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The Changing Face of *El Moudjahid* During the Algerian War of Independence

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**Abstract**

The 1956 Soummam conference is considered a turning point for Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN), due to a platform that asserted the supremacy of political over military objectives and the corollary importance of diplomacy and public relations. For domestic outreach, the FLN turned to a small publication that had debuted months previously - *El Moudjahid* - giving it a heightened profile and a new importance.

From its founding in June 1956 to the Evian Accords in March 1962, *El Moudjahid’s* layout evolved dramatically – an evolution most evident on its cover page. The simple style and pamphlet-like shape of the early issues initially shifted to a text-dense “broadsheet” layout, and ultimately by a single photograph. Yet even after the layout stabilized, the page’s various elements continued to evolve. This article argues that these changes illustrate Hayden White’s argument about the “content of the form”: that the physical organization of a page is not inert, but rather influences how readers understand its content. Taking this seriously means turning the analysis from *El Moudjahid’s* content to its physical structure: its cover page elements and their relationship with the text.

Focusing on *El Moudjahid’s* French edition, this study addresses ten elements: the language used, the presence, size, and placement of the title, authorship, the presence, size, and
placement of the crescent and star emblem, the subtitle “Organe Central du Front de Libération Nationale”, inset articles and notices, the presence and location of the place of publication, the amount and currency of the price, the slogan “Révolution Par le Peuple et Pour le Peuple”, and the presence of the Algerian flag. It concludes by examining two time elements: the publication date and the issue number. Complicating Benedict Anderson’s arguments about the linear nature of “national time”, El Moudjahid presented Algeria’s national time as both horizontal and vertical – linear and sacral. Its publication date and issue number anchored the reader in horizontal calendar time. However, as an “organ” El Moudjahid differed from Anderson’s national newspaper. It added verticality by emphasizing the sacrality of anniversaries, like that of November 1, 1954.

While scholars have used El Moudjahid as a primary-source archive, they have put little analytic pressure on the cover and other constituent parts. Doing so enables a more substantive understanding of the journal, its operations, and its impact, in ways that can only enrich its archival uses in the future.

Text
The first six months of 1956 were a dark time for the FLN. Little more than one year after the All Saints’ Day attack with which the fledgling front launched its offensive against the colonial French government, its organization seemed dissolute and chaotic; its operations were at a standstill. Several members of the original leadership had been killed during guerrilla skirmishes or French counter-attacks. Meanwhile, several recruits had emerged as de facto leaders despite their lack of clearly defined positions within the FLN command. Personality and ideological clashes, as well as disagreements over whose voice should represent the FLN, added tension to this confusion of absent and new faces. Moreover, the dispersion of FLN leadership throughout
Algeria as well as outside cities (primarily Cairo) hindered effective communication and led to divergences in strategic and tactical objectives. Domestically, the communication difficulties had led to the increasing autonomy of the FLN’s six military zones: they developed differing strategic approaches that enjoyed widely varying degrees of success. Overall, military successes were haphazard and seemed insufficient to either mobilize Algerians to rally behind the FLN or provoke the French into abandoning the country.

Despite their differences, FLN leaders recognized the danger that these factors posed to the revolution’s eventual success. The deleterious effects that internal disagreements and an indeterminate hierarchy of command were having on the FLN’s military campaign were evident. Additionally, some of the leadership had become convinced that it would be the FLN’s political campaign – and not its guerrilla exploits – on which the chance of victory depended. The development of such a campaign had until this point been effectively sidelined by the predominance of military concerns. Now, the FLN needed to establish a clear organizational hierarchy, a concrete political focus, and an organized system for diplomatic initiatives abroad and propaganda at home. Interior leaders, guided by Abane Ramdane, proposed a major conference involving current leadership as well as representatives from each of the wilaya commands.

Having convinced the remaining FLN leadership of the need for such a conference, determining its location became a critical issue. Holding the conference inside Algeria entailed a higher risk for the FLN as a whole: were the French to learn of the conference, they would enjoy an unparalleled opportunity to effectively decapitate the FLN. Yet successfully staging the conference in Algeria would represent a substantial public relations coup. It would suggest to the Algerian people, as much as to the outside world, that French control of the territory was more
tentative than had been assumed. This symbolic value – coupled with lukewarm support from the Egyptian government in Cairo, seen as the most logical exterior option – led to the decision to hold the conference at Soummam.

**Soummam and the focus on the political**

To safeguard participants, Soummam’s zonal chief organized raids outside the town, diverting French attention from Soummam itself while allaying the suspicions that a period of quiet might otherwise arouse. Meanwhile, Ahmad Ben Bella and other representatives of the exterior leadership travelled to Marseilles to await an “all-clear” signal before attempting to smuggle themselves into Algeria. They waited in vain: the Soummam Conference convened August 20 without them, its proceedings guided by Ramdane; whether this represented a deliberate policy of exclusion or the unfortunate unfolding of circumstances has been debated. What is less debated is that Ramdane and his supporters capitalized upon the exterior leadership’s absence to work for the efficient ratification of the platform that he supported.ii

Both FLN leaders and outside observers soon described the platform established at Soummam as a turning point, introducing a new stage for the FLN’s development as an organization. One of its most noted components included an assertion of the supremacy of political over military objectives. This reflected the political leadership’s concerns that ALN officers were arrogating too much authority and prioritizing military operations over diplomatic efforts. Two new institutions – an executive committee and a governing authority empowered to negotiate and making binding commitments for the FLN – were created, in which the military leadership was given a subordinate role. (Over time, this supremacy was challenged by the greater sophistication of ALN institutions relative to those of the FLN, as well as former military leader Belkacem Krim’s domination of the political leadership.iii)
In keeping with Soummam’s focus on the political, another plank emphasized the importance of diplomatic efforts and domestic propaganda. Ramdane believed that the FLN could only win by mobilizing international public opinion. Consequently, the FLN put renewed stress on “internationalizing” the conflict via diplomatic efforts to engage the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity. Ramdane similarly believed that success depended on the FLN becoming a national movement enjoying the active support of the Algerian people. The FLN’s previous public relations efforts had been largely limited to distributing leaflets and bulletins. After Soummam, propagandizing became a top priority. The FLN’s primary vehicle for this was a small publication that had debuted two months earlier: *El Moudjahid*.

*El Moudjahid* post-Soummam

Soummam’s emphasis on the need for domestic propaganda brought *El Moudjahid* under the direct control of FLN leadership, giving it a heightened profile and the means to continue as a regular publication. Published in both Arabic and French, the first seven issues were distributed as monthlies, running from June 1956 until January 1957. They were printed secretly in Algiers, at first on a primitive mimeograph-style machine known as a roneograph, but subsequently on a printing press. However, the press was destroyed during the Battle of Algiers – a bloody and bitter defeat for the FLN –, and various editorial staff were tortured or killed by French paramilitary troops; the seventh issue was never published. Several months passed before the surviving staff began publishing *El Moudjahid* again, distributing three issues from Tetouan in August and September 1957. A second, shorter publishing hiatus followed before the paper resumed publication from Tunis in November. This move was decisive and lasting: *El
*Moudjahid* would continue to be printed in Tunis until the end of the war, with copies smuggled into Algeria and shipped abroad.

The changes in *El Moudjahid*’s physical location were more than matched by shifts in its appearance. From 1956 to 1962, the *El Moudjahid*’s layout evolved dramatically in structure and design – an evolution most evident on its cover page, which went through several iterations before settling on a fairly stable layout foundation by late 1958. The simple, graphic style and pamphlet-like shape of the first five issues was initially replaced by a text-dense “broadsheet” layout in which the cover page appeared more like the front page of a newspaper, which lasted through Issue 15. From Issue 16 through Issue 31, this layout gradually evolved into one that combined large photographs with a bold headline. Photos almost entirely dominated the cover page from Issue 32 (11/20/58) through Issue 91 (3/19/62) and the end of the war. Yet even when the overall layout stabilized, the various information elements continued to evolve. What can be gleaned from these elements and their evolution?

These changes could be attributed to the exigencies of publishing during wartime: The material conditions of production were frequently uncertain and less than ideal. Moreover, few FLN leaders had previous experience in producing propaganda: Shifts in layout could be ascribed to the inconsistency and experimentation of a changing group of amateurs. Yet if taken seriously, these shifts illustrate what Hayden White (1987) terms the important “content of the form” of written works. White argues that the form – the physical organization of newspaper columns or a book’s page – is not inert, but rather influences what the reader takes from the content. Taking this seriously means turning the analysis back from the content and rhetoric of *El Moudjahid*’s articles and towards their physical structure, giving the cover page and its layout greater significance. Examining cover page elements as well as the shifting relationship between
the page and its text offers deeper analytic insights about *El Moudjahid* as a propaganda project, both with respect to its primary Algerian audience and a broader international one.

**El Moudjahid’s changing face**

The issues analyzed here are those of the war years and the French-language edition – numbers 1-91. They cover the period from *El Moudjahid*’s founding in June 1956 until March 19, 1962, when the Evian Accords were signed. Examining these wartime issues reveals a number of cover page elements, some of which remained constant, but many of which evolved or appeared and disappeared over time. This study focuses on nine key elements:

1) Language (Arabic/French)  
2) Title - “El Moudjahid” (presence/size/placement)  
3) Authorship (individual/collective/significance)  
4) Emblem - crescent and star (presence/size/placement)  
5) Subtitle - “Organe Central du Front de Libération Nationale” (presence/size/placement)  
6) Insets – articles and notices presented in boxes  
7) Place of publication (presence/location)  
8) Price (presence/amount/currency)  
9) Slogan - “Révolution Par le Peuple et Pour le Peuple” and flag (presence/significance)

It concludes with an examination of two elements that work in tandem with the headlines to indicate the war’s progress over time: the presence of a publication date and the calendar used for this, and the presence of an issue number. Together, these indicated the FLN’s commitment to independence and the paper’s commitment to a narrative of inevitable, if long-fought, victory.

The copies used for this research are taken from three bound volumes printed in Belgrade shortly after independence. These volumes include facsimiles of each issue’s cover page followed by its full text, retyped in column form. Working from their office in Tunis, *El Moudjahid*’s editors themselves oversaw publication of these volumes, which were published in June, July, and August 1962. Yugoslavia, which supported the FLN throughout the war, helped underwrite the costs of production: in the preface to the first volume, the editors thanked
Yugoslavia’s “Secretariat of Information” for providing financial and technical support. □ (These volumes include only the French-language issues; there appears to have been no similar republication of the Arabic-language issues.)

**Analyzing *El Moudjahid***

1) **Language**

As noted above, *El Moudjahid* appeared from its inception in two editions – Arabic and French, with both printed on the same roneograph machine. The decision to publish in these two languages reflected several inter-related issues: the complex linguistic situation in Algeria after more than 125 years of French colonization, earlier decisions made regarding the FLN’s working language, and the multiple targets of FLN propaganda efforts (*El Moudjahid* 1962, Vol. I, p. 3).

French and Arabic might be described as charged languages, putting pressure on speaker (or writer) and audience alike thanks to the differing positions they occupied in the colonial hierarchy.

Benedict Anderson has described the position of colonial languages – like French in colonial Algeria – as “imperial languages” that intervene in the imagining of the national community. Whether the post-colonial state accepts them or rejects, them, imperial languages collaborate in constructing the national community even if merely by establishing a contrast with the local language(s). For Anderson, imperial languages highlight the active role that languages play in producing – rather than merely reflecting – the nation. He argues that

> [i]t is always a mistake to treat languages in the way that certain nationalist ideologues treat them – as *emblems* of nation-ness, like flags, costumes, folk-dances, and the rest. Much the most important thing about language is its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities. After all, imperial languages are still *vernaculars* (1991, p. 133-4).
French might have become an Algerian vernacular, but one altered by the socio-political context. Algerians could not claim French as their “personal property” (Anderson, p. 84) in the same manner as French citizens (regardless of their regional mother tongue). Nor could it bind the national community in the same way – not least because access to French had served as a means to divide Algerians.

In contrast to Benedict Anderson’s assertion in his now-classic work on nationalism that language is “fundamentally inclusive, limited only by the fatality of Babel: no one lives long enough to learn all languages” (1991, p. 134), controlling language access was an essential weapon in the French colonial arsenal. The repercussions of this indirectly affected not only the choice to publish *El Moudjahid* in French, but also the FLN’s decision to use French as its primary working language. Many FLN leaders were ethnically Berber (Imazighen); historically, French policy had prevented them from enrolling in Arabic-language schools. This policy developed from a nineteenth-century French belief that Berbers were the inheritors of a Western Roman tradition, who had suffered from the forcible imposition of Arab culture and language (as well as Islam). As a result, colonial administrators assumed that Berbers would be more easily assimilated into French culture and citizenship, and possibly more amenable to Christian evangelizing. Although these beliefs eroded over time – particularly those related to conversion – the colonial state continued to treat Arab and Berber as discrete communities, privileging the latter and channelling them educationally away from Arabic and toward French.

Even French-educated Berber Algerians still spoke their mother tongues at home, however – meaning that there were several contenders for an Algerian national language. From the FLN’s perspective, French offered the practical advantage of being understood by all FLN leaders, and the ideological advantage of presenting no viable threat to the claims of Arabic or
the Berber languages. As a result, French became the organization’s lingua franca. As Jacques Duchemin noted: “All orders and all administrative materials were written in French or bilingually”. He described French as the language most commonly spoken throughout the ALN, with Arabic and the Berber languages employed like regional vernaculars in France. “Arabic and Kabyle were spoken somewhat, but not more than Breton, Alsatian or Provencal in French barracks” (1962, p. 129-30).

If the use of French as a publishing language reflected both the overall linguistic picture of Algeria and the specific administrative decisions of the FLN, it also permitted *El Moudjahid* to reach a broader audience internationally. Publishing in French allowed the FLN to make its case to the French public and others beyond the Arab world. Perhaps most importantly, French was an official United Nations language, and internationalizing the Algerian cause through appeals to the United Nations became a crucial aspect of FLN strategy. Although *El Moudjahid*’s articles and editorials were almost always addressed to Algerians, publishing in French broadened the FLN’s potential audience base to include key international constituencies. Perhaps reflecting this broadening, each edition had its own writing and editorial staff, although housed in the same building. In other words, while there was some overlap between the editions, neither the French nor the Arabic existed merely as a translation of the other.

2) Title

*El Moudjahid* was a bold title. The word is Arabic; the transcription is French. Coming from the same root as the word “jihad” (as well as “ijtihad”), it likely resonated with French officials as well as Algerians. The concept of jihad as religiously inflected resistance to colonial authorities had been invoked since the French invasion in 1830, perhaps most notably with Abd al-Qadir in the 1830s and 1840s and various mahdist movements in subsequent decades. The
FLN’s use of “el moudjahid” must be seen against the array of other possible choices, including more neutral Arabic terms such as “the soldier”, “the revolutionary” or “the volunteer”, as well as any array of equivalent French terms. Titling both editions by the same Arabic term unified them; titling them “El Moudjahid” lent them a particularly Islamic character, while also linking the paper and the FLN to earlier manifestations of Algerian resistance.

The same resonance that made “el moudjahid” a powerful term also made it potentially difficult to control. The paper’s efforts to control the term included defining and contextualizing it - starting with the editorial that accompanied the first issue in June 1956. The editorial acknowledged “el moudjahid’s” religious overtones by translating it into French as “fighter for the faith”. But it separated the Algerian struggle for independence, however religiously inflected, from Western stereotyping of Islam as the “religion of the sword”, arguing that

The word “jihad” (holy war), from which “el moudjahid” (fighter for the faith) derives, has always been, due to an anti-Islamic prejudice dating from the Crusades, taken in the Christian West in a narrow and restrictive sense. It appears as a symbol of religious aggressivity.

Yet, the editorial argued, this view is false:

This interpretation is already rendered absurd by the very fact that Islam is tolerant; and that respect for religions, and in particular Christianity and Judaism, is one of its fundamental prescriptions, and one put in practice for centuries.

Instead, “jihad” was “simply an energetic demonstration [manifestation dynamique] of self-defence”, one aimed at protecting or restoring “a patrimony of higher values indispensable to the individual and the community.” Rather than a call to violence, jihad was a call to self-improvement: it embraced “the desire to perfect oneself [se parfaire] continually in all areas.”

Since religious resistance had been the idiom of Algerian resistance to French occupation since 1830, it was the most appropriate to the struggle for independence. “Islam in Algeria was the final refuge of values [that had been] hunted down and profaned by an extreme colonialism,” the
editorial stated. “Is it surprising that, in the moment of recovering a national conscience, [Islam] arrives to contribute to the triumph of a just cause?” (*El Moudjahid* 1962, V. I, p. 8-9)

Despite the religious invocations of this first editorial, elements on several issues’ cover pages balanced the religious connotations of “el moudjahid” with less religious ones. The first three issues included “Le Combattant” as a subtitle, translating “El Moudjahid” for French speakers with a term that made no reference to religion or faith. Nor did outside observers see the term as intrinsically Islamic. For example, the *New York Times*, which began citing *El Moudjahid* as a source in July 1958, translated the title for its American audience as “The Fighter” and made no reference to the term’s religious heritage. Even the editorial itself might be said to hedge slightly, arguing later that the FLN merely adopted a term already in popular use: “In calling itself *El Moudjahid*, this paper does nothing but consecrate the glorious name that our people’s good sense has, since November 1, 1954, attributed to the patriots who have taken arms for a free Algeria.” (*El Moudjahid* 1962, V. I, p. 9)

Regardless of intent, the religious identity invoked through even a secular use of “el moudjahid” was one that excluded as much as it included Algerians as participants in the national struggle. If Islam were the idiom through which Algerians historically resisted French colonialism, and through which they would now seek independence, then what role could non-Muslims - Jewish Algerians, colons, and the small group of “évolués” - play? Although the FLN’s embrace of Islam and a Muslim political identity waxed and waned during the war years, its institutionalization after independence left little space for these groups to claim their own Algerian identity.

3) *Authorship*
The corporate approach to authorship suggested by the unsigned editorial analyzed above was characteristic of *El Moudjahid*. Named authors played little role on the cover page or in the paper as a whole: *El Moudjahid*’s articles and editorials were almost always published without attribution, and nor were editorial staff identified by name. In place of individual authors, many editorials were signed “El Moudjahid” or “la direction d’El Moudjahid” – reaffirming the collective approach while highlighting the paper’s title.

The absence of identified authors and editors limited readers’ ability to link particular articles with an individual’s political position or writing style. This authorial anonymity fit with the FLN’s principle of “collective leadership”; it also limited French authorities’ capacity to use *El Moudjahid* articles against any FLN member taken into French custody. However, the lack of attribution also raises the question of how closely top FLN leadership were involved in the journal, and to what extent the paper’s views mirrored, deviated from, or pushed those of the GPRA.

During the FLN’s initial turn toward propaganda, top leadership seems to have been directly involved in the paper. Issue Three, published in September 1956 – one month after Soummam –, was the only one to name the author of every article. Many were central FLN figures: Ramdane wrote the editorial and Belkacem Krim and Mohammed Larbi Ben M’Hidi each contributed articles. As Mameri (1988) suggests, the FLN leadership seems clearly to have at this point been directly involved in boosting *El Moudjahid*’s profile, giving credence to its claim to be the “central organ of the FLN”.xv While no other issue included so many authored pieces, the paper did attach names to certain kinds of articles, including letters of support sent by heads of various national governments, appeals from GPRA President Ferhat Abbas, and conference reports from Frantz Fanon. Authored articles also included numerous “day in the life”
pieces by ALN soldiers and officers, including “Notre armée et sa stratégie”, written by a Colonel Saadek of Wilaya IV. (*El Moudjahid* 1962, V. I, p. 100) Similarly, reprints of letters sent from soldiers to family and friends included the senders’ first names.

4) Emblem

Several graphic and textual elements contributed to the title’s appearance on *El Moudjahid*’s cover page – reinforcing its connection to Islam and the FLN. The Islamic crescent and star emblem appears as a prominent graphic element on all but one of the first thirty issues, with its size and placement varying considerably on the first nine. In the first issue, the hand-sketched emblem emerged from under the hand-drawn title, which cut an upward diagonal swath across the page. Issues 2 and 3 showed the emblem and title superimposed upon the Algerian national flag (discussed below). Perhaps the most striking cover was that of Issue 9 (8/20/57), which superimposed text over a hand-drawn crescent and star that covered over two-thirds of the page. Two much smaller crescent and star emblems flanked what might be described as the paper’s subtitle - “Organe Central du Front de Libération Nationale Algérienne” - , an element introduced in Issue Eight (8/5/57). The subtitle and small emblems were enclosed in a rectangular box directly under *El Moudjahid*’s title, and appeared in this format for the next twenty-two issues.

FLN correspondence of this period also employed the crescent and star emblem. For example, a FLN “tract” from 1957 incorporated a hand-drawn crescent and star into the document’s header - like a logo on corporate letterhead (Duchemin 1962). Yet after Issue 31 (11/1/58), the crescent and star emblem disappeared from *El Moudjahid*’s cover page. This disappearance seems curious since the FLN’s commitment to Islamic socialism is generally seen to have solidified during this period – one of military ascendancy following secularist Abane
Ramdane’s assassination. With _El Moudjahid_’s Arabic title and embrace of Islam as the historic idiom of Algerian resistance, retaining the crescent and star emblem would have made sense. However, Issue 31 also marked the war’s four-year anniversary - its headline read: “la revolution à quatre ans”. Several elements changed in Issue 32 or shortly thereafter. Removing the graphic element that visually signalled an Islamic identity could have been a sign of the FLN’s maturing political program, its preparation for outreach to a broader, not-necessarily Muslim audience, and/or a general re-evaluation of the paper’s cover page.

5) Subtitle

While the crescent and star disappeared from the cover page in November 1958, the phrase “Organe Central du Front de Libération National” remained. Announcing _El Moudjahid_’s connection with the FLN, it appeared on the cover page of every issue published during the war. Like several cover elements, it shifted positions considerably during the first seven issues before settling into a “subtitle” position with Issue Eight (8/5/57). After Issue 30, it moved into the top right-hand corner; the issue date, number, and price appeared directly beneath it. The changes in position seem less crucial than the fact of its consistent presence, which reaffirmed _El Moudjahid_’s claim to legitimacy as the sole voice of the FLN, authorized to publicly broadcast its views and to proselytize on its behalf. Although visually a subtitle, this phrase might be more aptly considered part of the journal’s branding.

6) Insets

As argued above, Issue Eight, which resurrected the journal after seven months of silence, marked a key moment in _El Moudjahid_’s development. It was not only the first issue published after the Battle of Algiers, but also the first issue published outside Algeria. Perhaps reflecting the capabilities of a new printing press, the layout changed. _El Moudjahid_ adopted a
newspaper-like front page, with articles arranged in columns and covering much of the page, and the title and subtitle reduced to a “header” at the page’s top right edge. This layout, retained through Issue 15, often included a small photo associated with one of the articles. Perhaps most noticeably, editorials and special notices were now from ordinary text by a rectangular outline inset, highlighting their importance.

These inset pieces often featured FLN memoranda and communiqués, including ones referring specifically to *El Moudjahid*. The first inset piece, which also appeared in Issue Eight might have been the most crucial: it featured a statement issued by the CCE that confirmed *El Moudjahid*’s “official” status, stating that its purpose was to advance the struggle by reporting on and explaining events to the Algerian population. By supporting the FLN’s “political, social, and cultural program” in its articles, *El Moudjahid* was to strengthen the nation’s unity and resolve (*El Moudjahid* 1962, V. I, p. 84). This communiqué reaffirmed the claim to legitimacy advanced by the “Organe central” subtitle discussed above. But the timing is curious: if an official statement were necessary, why was it not done for the first issue? The answer seems rooted in the immediate context: As the first issue published in exile and the first issue published after the demoralizing loss of Algiers, Issue Eight confronted the need to stake a more tenacious claim for *El Moudjahid* at a paradoxically more vulnerable time. It reasserted its right to speak for an organization whose survival seemed suddenly in jeopardy, even if doing so from abroad.

At times, the close relationship between *El Moudjahid* and the FLN drew even closer – perhaps most noticeably when the paper served as the publisher for FLN statements. By publishing FLN declarations, *El Moudjahid* shifted from a journalistic approach that quoted previously published documents to serving as the Front’s mouthpiece. One of the clearest examples comes in Issue 66 (6/20/60), whose headline, printed in a font size larger than the
journal’s title, read: “Appel à la nation”. Underneath was the text of a letter from Ferhat Abbas to the Algerian people. It was “signed” with his name and title, along with the location - Tunis - and date – June 20, 1960. The date and location aligned with that of Issue 66 itself, suggesting the immediacy of El Moudjahid’s relation to the GPRA (El Moudjahid 1962, V. III, p. 121-3). At moment like this, it could claim not only to speak for the FLN but also to speak as the FLN. Yet the relationship is asymmetrical: El Moudjahid might have been the official organ of the FLN, but the FLN did not speak solely through El Moudjahid. Hence in this particular case, the journal published Abbas’ letter and appended its own editorial, adding its voice to the FLN’s.

7) Place of Publication

The decision to include Abbas’ location reflected the broader set of choices that the FLN leadership had made regarding where to establish their headquarters, whether to disclose this publicly, and – if so – how to frame their choice of location. After the Battle of Algiers, the Algeria-based FLN leadership – the CCC – retreated into exile to regroup and reorganize. They were not the only FLN body in exile: what was termed the “exterior leadership” had been headquartered in Cairo since the beginning of the war. However, by 1957 the Cairo operations had become politically ineffective. Talks between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in March 1956 had resulted in a détente that reduced Nasser’s already lukewarm support of the FLN. According to Harbi (1980, p. 174), Nasser assured Pineau that arms deliveries to the ALN had been halted, while the Voice of Cairo broadcasts that to the Algerian population ceased. However, the revolution continued regardless of Nasser, whose ability to provide assistance was in any case severely curtailed after Egypt’s defeat in the 1956 war.
Cairo may have seemed a less welcoming place by mid-1957, but it was also no longer the sole location available to the fleeing members of the CCE. The FLN had for some time been conducting military operations from Tunisia, taking advantage of its porous eastern border to transport men and arms into Algeria. Like Morocco, Tunisia had been granted independence from France in 1956. Although politically autonomous, their sovereignty in foreign policy concerns was not yet firmly established and was actively discouraged by France. Yet both had provided tacit support since the early days of the war, partly in response to the FLN’s argument about Maghreb solidarity. Relocating the CCE leadership – the GPRA – to Tunis, which remained its headquarters for the duration of the war, made this support public.

As noted above, *El Moudjahid* also moved to Tunisia, although its new location was not immediately advertised. This was not surprising: the first issues of *El Moudjahid* had made no reference to the paper’s physical location, and the Tunis issues continued this practice. However, in June 1959 Issue 43 (6/8/59) introduced a new element to the front page: the address of *El Moudjahid*’s headquarters. The paper’s mailing address and telephone number in Tunis appeared in the upper right corner, along with the issue number, date, and price. The address and telephone number of a “Rabat office” were also listed. By making this information public, the paper relinquished one of the primary advantages of secrecy: greater freedom from French military retaliation. It also limited the Tunisian and Moroccan governments’ capacity to claim plausible deniability – that their aid to the FLN was limited to humanitarian support and refugee asylum, for example.

Including contact information for *El Moudjahid* might be considered the result of a calculated risk taking, one elucidated by the tone of Issue 43’s headline: “Généreux parce que forts”. By mid-1959, the FLN’s sense of strength likely derived from several factors. These
included its success in bringing Algeria to the attention of the United Nations; growing evidence that the Algerian population supported independence; the increasingly public support of other governments, including Yugoslavia and several African states; and, perhaps most fundamentally, the ALN’s ability to remain an active fighting force, even as the French government continued increasing the number of soldiers stationed in Algeria - reaching 450,000 and beyond. The FLN’s position in world opinion was migrating from dismissal as a small, possibly fringe rebel group towards recognition as a national movement. By publishing the location of its offices, El Moudjahid claimed the status of an ordinary paper or party journal, which would have no need to hide its location. For the FLN and its push toward independence, strength, international recognition, and institutional normalcy went hand in hand.

Yet El Moudjahid’s offices were not located in Algeria: normalcy was a goal, rather than a description of the status quo. Placing the Tunis and Rabat offices on El Moudjahid’s front page could also be seen as a statement about the extent of the Moroccan and Tunisian commitment to Algerian independence. That the GPRA had relocated to Tunis, with El Moudjahid and other supporting institutions in tow, was probably at most an open secret. Publicly “announcing” this reality via El Moudjahid and other means suggested that Tunisia and Morocco had established full sovereignty, meaning that they could assure no repeat of France’s 1958 bombing of the Tunisian town of Sakiet, which France had justified by pointing out the town’s FLN presence. It also presented Tunis and Rabat as willing to risk their relationship with France to publicly support the FLN, whether due to a vision of Maghreb solidarity or the desire to play a leadership role in the region, as well as a commitment to the Algerian cause. Plausible deniability was no longer necessary or appealing.

8) Price
El Moudjahid’s addresses remained on the front page for two years. In June 1961, Issue 82 (6/25/61) replaced them with a revised pricing system. Price was one of the journal’s most consistent front-page elements: it appeared – in various locations - on almost one of the ninety wartime issues. The insistence on assigning a price to every issue of El Moudjahid is in itself significant, for it links the journal to market relationships of supply and demand. By putting the journal on the market rather than distributing it gratis, the FLN could claim that an audience willing and eager to buy each issue existed – turning the market into a source of consumer “testimony” for popular support of the FLN. The price would likely not have deterred would-be readers: the amount charged was not prohibitive and varied little. From Issue 9 (8/20/57) through Issue 30 (10/10/58) the price remained a constant 30 francs, excluding only the unnumbered special issue of 9/19/58, which was priced at 20 francs. From Issue 31 (11/1/58) through Issue 91 (3/19/62), the price remained a constant 40 francs (or 0.4 new francs), excluding only the double issue 53/54 (11/1/59) and the issue that followed (11/16/59), both of which were priced at 50 francs.

While the constant pricing might suggest the stability of El Moudjahid’s ‘market demand’, the evolution in the national currency used suggests something more complex. It raises first and foremost the question of why an anti-French, revolutionary newspaper would choose to price itself in French currency at all. The answer – that no national Algerian currency yet existed – pointed both to the fact of continuing French dominance and the institutional immaturity of the GPRA. Although claiming the rights of a government in exile, El Moudjahid’s pricing highlighted the GPRA’s inability to take up most governmental functions, including the establishment of and control over a national currency. The GPRA’s vulnerability is highlighted by another instance of pricing instability: Issues 32 (11/20/58), 33 (12/8/58), and 39 (4/10/59)
listed the price in Tunisian millimes rather than (French) francs. While Issues 30-40 generally showed the price as “francs/millimes”, these three issues abandoned Algeria’s pricing altogether, suggesting perhaps that France’s ongoing efforts to prevent *El Moudjahid’s* distribution in Algeria had been successful, and that the paper was only available for sale in Tunisia.

For the next two years, from spring 1959 through early summer 1961 - Issue 40 (4/24/59) through Issue 81 (6/4/61) - *El Moudjahid’s* price was given solely in francs. In late June 1961, the editors introduced a new pricing system with Issue 82 (6/25/61) – one that made a very different claim about *El Moudjahid* as a publication with a paying readership. The price was now given in the currencies of the three Maghreb countries: “Algeria – 0.40 new francs, Tunisia – 40 millimes, Morocco – 0.40 dirham”. The new pricing list might be understood as part of a broader move to “normalize” *El Moudjahid* into one among many national newspapers with an international audience that might be sold at a newsstand, like *Die Spiegel, Le Monde*, or *Al-Hayat*. It might also be seen as suggesting that the ‘market demand’ for the paper extended around the region, like support for the Algerian cause itself. Yet the denominations, if not the national currencies used, arguably highlight the GPRA’s continued provisionality, as well as the vulnerability of the nascent Moroccan and Tunisian states. All prices were iterations of “40” – indicating that independence brought a change in currency name, not in valuation. (Morocco appears to have even re-valued its dirham in keeping with France’s introduction of the “new” franc.) Furthermore, while the inclusion of countries beyond Algeria in this price list suggests *El Moudjahid’s* interest in a readership that extended beyond national boundaries, this interest appears limited to French North African territories. Although *El Moudjahid* throughout the war published headlines and articles invoking solidarities with Africa and the Middle East, the price list did not: it did not include France, most notably, but nor did it include Francophone...
Africa, non-Francophone North African countries like Libya and Egypt, or any lands further East.xxvii

9) Slogan and flag

In contrast to the subtle argument about Maghreb solidarity made through the publication of *El Moudjahid*’s offices and price list, the slogan that appeared on the cover of most issues made an unambiguous claim of domestic support: “Révolution Par le Peuple et Pour le Peuple”. ‘By the people and for the people’ was not a newly minted phrase - its most obvious connection was with Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address of 1863, which famously defined democratic governance as characterized by these elements. The global resonance of this phrase helped position the FLN as the embodiment of the nation’s popular will, fighting by popular demand and with popular support, while situating *El Moudjahid* as both witness and participant in this revolution. (The slogan did disappear for a time from the cover. Absent from the 9/19/58 special issue, it reappeared in Issue 30 (10/10/58) but disappeared from Issues 31 (11/1/58) through 47 (8/3/59).) After independence, it would be incorporated into the national constitution as the state motto.xxviii

Images of the Algerian national flag made a similar if more visual declaration that the FLN and *El Moudjahid* represented the Algerian nation. The cover pages of *El Moudjahid*’s first three issues included hand-drawn illustrations of the flag, which consists of two panels – one green, one white – that bisect the flag vertically. A crescent and star, both red, sit in the centre of the flag, bridging the green and white panels. Claiming a national flag for Algeria was itself a revolutionary act: it visually articulated a national identity for Algeria and Algerians. The concept of an Algerian national identity – to outsiders, at least – was not self-evident: in French eyes, the “Algeria” invaded in 1830 was not a sovereign national state but a discrete jumble of
tribes, caravan routes, and empty territory. Hence one of the foremost arguments for independence hinged upon the articulation of a pre-colonial Algerian identity that was violated by each assertion that the Algerian identity could only be French. As a result, it could be argued that the revolutionary struggle for independence was legitimated by the degree to which it aimed for the restoration, rather than establishment, of national sovereignty. El Moudjahid’s task was thus to write this sovereign Algeria back into history, after so many years of French efforts to write it out.

As a recognizable sign of national sovereignty, the national flag countered the French claim that Algeria was an integral part of France and that “Algerians” was - like “Bretons” - at most a regional identity, and one reserved for those with French citizenship rather than those of “indigène” status. Nor was the flag presented as a new creation. Although the precise history of the Algerian national flag is contested, it is often said to invoke the standard that Emir Abdelkader had used during his fight against the French army in the 1840s, or to reference the flag used by the Ottoman regency in Algiers. In both cases, the flags claimed as antecedents pre-dated the French presence. They reinforced Algeria’s claim to be a nation by establishing the flag as a national symbol with a long-standing – and thus legitimizing –, pre-colonial history of its own.

For the FLN, the inclusion of this flag in FLN-affiliated materials, like an August 1957 tract that incorporated two hand-drawn flags into the ALN/FLN’s “signature” (Duchemin 1962, frontispiece), helped reinforce its claim to be the legitimate representative of the (legitimately existing) Algerian nation. El Moudjahid’s depiction of the flag worked in a similar manner. During the course of the war, its cover-page incorporations of the national flag evolved from sketches to photographs and headlines - barometers of the degree to which Algerian sovereignty
establishing national time

the nine cover page elements outlined above contributed substantively to the overall narrative that El Moudjahid presented readers (both supportive and hostile). But they should not be isolated entirely from their broader context: these visual elements interlaced with the content of the page’s text. For those who read the paper or even glanced at the cover, the headline and article text (and accompanying photographs), which recounted or commented upon the latest developments, were likely its most striking feature. Together, these elements dramatized the struggle for independence in a series of discrete, punctuated moments that communicated a sense of urgency. What helped knit each issue into a larger whole was the inclusion of an issue number and publication date, which suggested a larger narrative about the coherence of the struggle and
the inevitability of the war’s progress. In doing so, *El Moudjahid* contributed to a broader project: the creation of a uni-directional national time.

*El Moudjahid*’s editors fore-grounded the passage of time in several ways that reinforced its centrality as a rhetorical trope and also as a marker of the flow of events. Articles and editorials demonstrated an acute sensitivity to Algeria’s appearance on the world stage, and displayed a historicized consideration of each event’s long-term import. This was most evident in the journal’s concerns that world opinion should recognize the importance of the Algerian issue and the role of the FLN and the Algerian people in changing history. It was also sensitive to the passage of time since the start of the war, to measuring the duration of the struggle, and (particularly in the early years) to highlighting the imminence of independence. In all cases, the concern with time included articles and editorials as well as the cover.

In the paper’s early issues, the impact of time’s passage was often communicated through the use of book imagery. The metaphor of opening “un nouveau chapitre” was employed several times, including consecutive appearances in Issue 3 (9.56), where it served as the title of Ramdane’s editorial, and in Issue 4 (11.56), where it appeared in the introduction. In the editorial, the “chapter” was positioned as part of the “story” of the Algerian revolution; in the introduction, it referenced history more broadly. Yet while time captured in book-length might seem both epic and distant, *El Moudjahid*’s covers stressed that it was also an urgent, immediate matter. The immediacy of the future was repeatedly professed: the final hour of liberation appeared not only inevitable but also imminent. This stance was supported by the number of cover headlines that employed time markers, like “à l’heure” and “à l’ère”, and directional terms, of which “vers” was the most common. Verbs played a lesser role in this process: although
some headlines included present or future tense verbs, most headlines consisted solely of noun-adjective phrases.

With or without verbs, the book metaphors and time markers made clear that the passage of time was linear and uni-directional: launching the independence struggle initiated a trajectory of inevitable progress. The editorial of Issue 12 linked the book metaphor to a broader idea of national history, arguing that

On November 1, 1954 the Algerian people made the irrevocable decision to change their destiny, to turn the most sombre and the most tragic page of their history and to embark upon the path of a new world, freed from oppression and obscurantism. This date does not mark merely a transition, a simple passage from one phase of history to another. It is the point of departure of a new life, a new History, a History of Algeria shaken from top to bottom and rebuilt on entirely new foundations.

The editorial presented this choice to “turn the page” as irrevocable: once turned, the page could not be turned back (El Moudjahid 1962, V. I, p. 162). Moreover, this passage identified the struggle as not only marking a major moment in Algerian history, but also rather creating a new history – a History. The editorial presented the Toussaint attacks as the product of a national decision made by the entire Algerian community, rather than the risky gamble of a few men. Time here played a role not only as the measurement of the FLN’s progress toward independence, but more fundamentally as something changed by the independence struggle. Just as history was re-envisioned as History, time was re-imagined as national time, in which individuals interacted as Algerians engaged in a collective project of national liberation and nation building.

This national time – that of the “new History of Algeria” – was populated with anniversaries, like those of the Soummam conference and the formation of the GPRA. The most important anniversary, of course, was that of the Toussaint attacks, which El Moudjahid’s headlines proclaimed each year: “La révolution à [deux, trois, quatre] ans”. In 1959, the journal
marked the five-year anniversary with a special double issue. Issue 53-54 (11/1/59) cost 50 francs and included a small “Numéro Spécial 20 pages” violator in the bottom corner of its cover page. The cover featured a photograph of a copy of the FLN appeal issued to the Algerian people on November 1, 1954, marking the anniversary by highlighting FLN-popular relations rather than the attacks themselves. *El Moudjahid* employed the symbolic power of this date on other occasions as well, using November 1, 1954 rhetorically in numerous articles as an invocation of this national time. National time was the bridge that connected Algeria’s pre-colonial past to her post-colonial future, without denying the radical ruptures of the colonial present. As Duchemin (1962) also found, reclaiming Algeria’s past through the figures of men like Jugurtha and Abdelkader reframed it in the context of colonial resistance – a resistance that was finding its fullest realization in the current struggle. Consequently, November 1, 1954 became the foundational point from which Algeria’s progress as a nation could be measured, hence to which it must refer.

Complicating Benedict Anderson’s arguments about time’s role in the national community, *El Moudjahid* presented Algeria’s national time as both horizontal and vertical – both temporal and sacral. Its emphasis on the revolution’s progress illustrated Anderson’s understanding of national time as the inert – though uni-directional – temporality through which a national community passes as it develops (Anderson 1991, p. 26). Hence, as noted above, *El Moudjahid’s* articles and headlines highlighted recent achievements - military victories, political developments - as measures of Algerian progress over time. Cover elements like issue number and date more subtly reinforced the sense of linear time. Each issue was numbered, and the issue number appeared in the upper corner of the cover. The publication date, which was given according to the Gregorian calendar, appeared next to it. Issue numbers and dates provided
linked *El Moudjahid* to standard serial publishing practices; but they also communicated an idea of open-ended linear temporality. The orderly sequence of numbers established a connection between issues, giving them a structural coherence, and further suggested that this coherence had value. Numbering reminded readers that each issue was part of a larger whole – the broader whole of *El Moudjahid*.

It also reminded readers that time flowed in one direction. While there was a first issue, there was no suggestion of a final issue. Instead, *El Moudjahid*’s publication date anchored the reader in calendar time, reinforcing a sense of time as linear. Dating the issues reinforced their currency, but also highlighted their limited shelf lives. For the reader, *El Moudjahid*’s value was ephemeral: its information was meaningful only so long as it remained current. Although not a newspaper in the strict sense, it resembled Anderson’s national newspaper to the extent that it presented a development-oriented depiction of events unfolding in the “homogenous, empty time” in which the “secular, historically clocked, imagined community” imagines the nation (1991, p. 33-6).

However, as an “organ” *El Moudjahid*’s mandate differed from that of Anderson’s national newspaper. Its pages highlighted developments related to the FLN and the struggle for independence, ignoring or giving less attention to stories a general-interest paper might consider newsworthy. The result was that newspaper linearity was balanced by verticality, which activated a kind of sacral time. The commemoration of anniversaries and the frequent references to November 1, 1954 described above also suggested a sacralization of the annual calendar. *El Moudjahid* published “date counts” in the upper corner of its cover page starting with Issue 8 (8/5/57), the first issue published “in exile”. Its special issue of 9/19/58, which marked both the 1,416th day of the revolution and the first day of the republic, reemphasized these originary
moments. The front-page date counts ceased six weeks later with the publication of Issue 31 on the Toussaint attacks’ four-year anniversary, leaving the project of re-sacralizing the nation to the articles and editorials inside.

**Assessing *El Moudjahid***

This article has focused on *El Moudjahid’s* structure, asking: what do we learn from looking at the elements on its cover or front page, and analyzing their evolution over time? This analysis has produced five key insights. First, that the challenges of war-time publishing were sizeable and did meaningfully impact *El Moudjahid*, whether regarding the printing technology used or the politically sensitive decision to publish a physical address on the cover page. Second, that the efforts expended to keep *El Moudjahid* publishing despite the challenges signal the importance placed upon it and on communication in general during the struggle for independence – communication that included foreign observers and neighbour states as well as the Algerian people, the French government, and the French public. Third, that the specific elements on *El Moudjahid’s* cover / front page produced a coherent, relatively consistent message over time. Fourth, that this message engaged broadly with accepted international conventions through cover elements, including the paper’s use of a Western, Christian-origin calendar and numbered issues. Fifth, that these elements were deployed to support the crucial project of creating a national community, particularly the horizontal and vertical marking of time, the crescent and star emblem, the Algerian flag, and the “Révolution Par le Peuple et Pour le Peuple” slogan.

Anderson’s work on nationalism helped unpack issues of language and time in print media’s role in constructing national communities, helping situate the arguments made in the
insights above. However, it was White’s concept of the ‘content of the form’ that provided the broad theoretical foundation for taking *El Moudjahid* seriously as an embodied physical object as well as a collection of articles and editorials. While scholars have quoted extensively from latter, using it as a primary-source archive when searching for evidence of Frantz Fanon’s contributions to *El Moudjahid*, or signs of FLN thinking at particular points in the struggle, they have put little analytic pressure on the cover and its constituent parts. Yet doing so opens up a deeper and more substantive understanding of the journal, its operations, and its impact, in ways that can only enrich its more archival uses in future scholarship.

References


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i Email: andrea.l.stanton@gmail.com.


iv *El Moudjahid*, volumes I (nos. 1-29), II (nos. 30-59), III (60-91) (Belgrade, 1962). Issues Five through Seven are missing from the Belgrade edition. Issue Seven was in process during the Battle of Algiers; the destruction of the presses there prevented its publication and distribution. Yugoslavia was one of the first countries to recognize the GPRA (Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne) as Algeria’s legitimate government. After the revolution, the new government would use the Yugoslavian system as a model from which to build its own socialist platform. See Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (London: Macmillan London Ltd., 1977), p. 406.

v In this period, the Berber languages were primarily oral, curtailing the possibilities for Berber-language instruction.
To cite one example: Captain Édouard de Neveu’s 1845 study on the religious brotherhoods of Algeria describes France’s task there as rescuing “beautiful and brilliant” Roman Africa before it was entirely ravaged by “Muslim hordes”. It fell to “Christians and civilized men” to “rendre à une terre dévastée cette splendeur que l’invasion barbare d’une horde de musulmans lui avait ravie depuis tant d’années”. See Édouard de Neveu, *Les Khouan: ordres religieux chez les musulmans de l’Algérie* (Alger: Adolphe Jourdan, 1845).

French scholars – particularly in the nineteenth century – described Arabic as itself a ‘colonial’ language, implicated in the Arab-Islamic subjugation of the Berbers.

Duchemin conducted extensive interviews with FLN and ALN figures at various levels.

The FLN began operating among the Algerian migrant community in France in 1955, although its effectiveness was initially limited. It focused on mobilizing financial support from Algerians working in France and opposing the Messalists active there – which sometimes resulted in violence. Because the victims were primarily other Algerians, French media at first dismissed such incidents as tribal “settling of scores”, fallout from racketeering deals gone wrong, or religious over-excitement. They began to connect these incidents to the war in Algeria in 1957. See Neil MacMaster, *Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900-1962* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1997) and Raymond Muelle, *La Guerre d’Algérie en France, 1954-1962* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1994).


The first two issues of *El Moudjahid* depicted the title in both its French transliteration and in Arabic script; subsequent cover pages showed the title only in French transliteration.

Eqbal Ahmad argues that the term was frequently applied to anti-colonialist activities in Muslim-majority colonies, including the primarily secular liberation struggles of the mid-twentieth century. Although these movements were not principally religious in character, “jihad, noun, to struggle, from the Arabic root verb J.H.D., to strive, was nevertheless a favoured word among Muslims in their struggle of liberation from colonial rule.” See his “The Roots of Violence in Pakistani Society,” in Zia Mian and Iftikar Ahmad, editors, *Making Enemies, Creating Conflict; Pakistan’s Crisis of State and Society* (Lahore: Mashal, 1997).


Whether this unmediated access to the CCE continued is difficult to determine. Ramdane’s biographer suggests that the close association between him and *El Moudjahid* made the journal a casualty of his deteriorating relations with Krim. Ramdane was increasingly excluded from critical decisions in the months prior to his assassination in December 1957; Mameri suggests that *El Moudjahid* may have been subject to the same quarantining. See Mameri, 288.

The exception is Issue 4 (11/56), a special issue that commemorated two years of the revolution and included the platform established at Soummam in August. The layout resembled a book cover: the typeface in which “El Moudjahid” was printed was dramatically different and “Éditions: Résistance Algérienne” was printed on the page in the area where the name of the publishing house would appear.

The addresses of *El Moudjahid*’s offices in Tunis and Rabat also appeared under the price after addresses were introduced in Issue 43 (6/8/59).
Numerous other examples exist, as *El Moudjahid* published the declarations and communiqués of various FLN leadership groups (CRUA, CCE, CNRA, and GPRA) throughout the war years.

Harbi had been a member of the MTLD before joining the FLN. For a more recent analysis, see Connelly, 102-104.

Several scholars, including David Gordon, have argued that the French government distrusted Nasser’s assurances and continued to see Cairo as the “head” of the FLN. Irwin Wall has similarly linked France’s interception of the *Athos*, a Yugoslav ship carrying arms to the ALN apparently brokered with Egyptian assistance, to Pineau’s belief that Nasser had “taken him for a fool”. Although records indicate that after 1956 Egypt provided the FLN less aid than either Yugoslavia or Tunisia, the French appear to have continued to consider Nasser the primary supporter if not the mastermind of the FLN. See David C. Gordon, *The Passing of French Algeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 55-6, and Irwin Wall, *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 36-7. Wall covers the war from an international relations perspective, focusing on the shifting relations between France, the United States, and Britain vis-à-vis Algeria and the Cold War.

France was particularly incensed by the decisions of the United States and Britain to deal with Tunisia and Morocco directly rather than through a French intermediary.

The FLN had been linking the fate of Algeria with that of Tunisia and Morocco since its first broadcast on the Voice of Cairo to announce the Toussaint attacks, in which the front demanded recognition of the “natural” Arab-Muslim unity of North Africa. The Soummam platform similarly argued that the independence of Tunisia and Morocco would be a sham unless Algeria was liberated as well. The FLN cited the Sakiet bombing as confirmation that France continued to regard Tunisia and Morocco as colonial dependencies. See “Vers la libération totale de l’Afrique du Nord”, Issue 18 (2/15/58) (*El Moudjahid* 1962, V. I, p. 315-17).

The headline was accompanied by two photographs, each showing the ALN transferring a captured French soldier to the care of the Red Cross / Red Crescent.

No price is listed for issues 2-8.

The French franc was re-valued in early 1960, with one “new” franc” equal to 100 “old” francs.

See, for example, headlines like “Bagdad, Koweit, Beyrouth: Solidarité renforcée avec le people Algérien” (5/10/59); “… Un défi aux peoples Africains”, Issue 50 (9/14/59); or “Algérie, Angola, Cuba: un meme combat”, Issue 80 (5/12/61).

The frequent appeals to North African solidarity in the journal largely encouraged Morocco and Tunisia to view Algeria’s plight as the limiting factor curtailing their independence: If the “yoke” of colonialism remained on one nation, it remained on all. This solidarity should not be confused with a political pan-Maghrebianism that would fuse the people of all three countries into one nation-state.


*Kassamen*, the Algerian national anthem, was the other national symbol that *El Moudjahid* mobilized to actualize this national identity; like the flag, it represented one of the “must-have” components of modern nationhood. Although the national anthem did not appear on the cover, *El Moudjahid*’s references to the emotional experience of hearing or singing the national anthem...
began with the first issue. Issue 1 featured a report of a recent battle, which described the “moving moment when our fighters [broke] into the national hymn, that which all Algerians – men, women, children and prisoners of colonialist jails and concentration camps – sing” (El Moudjahid 1962, V. 1, p. 12).

xxx See for example “L’ONU à l’heure de la médiation maghrèbine”, Issue 13 (12/1/57) and “Vers la liberation totale de l’Afrique du Nord”, Issue 18 (2/15/58),

xxxi Placement of the issue number on the first four (undated) issues varies. The September 1958 special issue (9/19/58) announcing the formation of the GPRA was not numbered.