Military Masculinities and Honorary Men: A Comparative Analysis of United States and United Kingdom Approaches to Iraq Security Sector Reform

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The 2003 Iraq War marked the first time in wartime that the United States and United Kingdom deployed female-specific units in support of combat operations. As manifestations of changing gendered norms within defense institutions, these Team Lioness units became symbolic of military transitions to a more diverse fighting force. Following the Iraq War, the US and UK were authorized as governing entities over the post-conflict Security Sector Reform process. Despite growing internal awareness on the importance of gender-inclusive policies, US-UK Coalition Forces instead focused reconstruction efforts on addressing immediate security needs of Iraq. While prior feminist literature has criticized the lack of formalized gender-inclusive policies in the US and UK defense apparatuses, these debates largely ignore the broader consideration of how donor state gender norms impact post-conflict reconstruction. In other terms, there remains the question of how United States and United Kingdom defense institutions perform gender and to what extent such normative cultures impacted Security Sector Reform efforts in post-conflict Iraq. Thus, this research investigates the militarized masculinities of US and UK fighting forces embodied within defense behaviors and policies, arguing the normative ‘laddish’ cultures inherent to military structures force women to become honorary men. As a result, these domestic norms help explain why American and British approaches to post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq were devoid of gendered considerations.

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Military Masculinities and Honorary Men: A Comparative Analysis of United States and United Kingdom Approaches to Iraq Security Sector Reform

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Undergraduate Thesis for Departmental Distinction in International Studies
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Abstract

The 2003 Iraq War marked the first time in wartime that the United States and United Kingdom deployed female-specific units in support of combat operations. As manifestations of changing gendered norms within defense institutions, these Team Lioness units became symbolic of military transitions to a more diverse fighting force. Following the Iraq War, the US and UK were authorized as governing entities over the post-conflict Security Sector Reform process. Despite growing internal awareness on the importance of gender-inclusive policies, US-UK Coalition Forces instead focused reconstruction efforts on addressing immediate security needs of Iraq. While prior feminist literature has criticized the lack of formalized gender-inclusive policies in the US and UK defense apparatuses, these debates largely ignore the broader consideration of how donor state gender norms impact post-conflict reconstruction. In other terms, there remains the question of how United States and United Kingdom defense institutions perform gender and to what extent such normative cultures impacted Security Sector Reform efforts in post-conflict Iraq. Thus, this research investigates the militarized masculinities of US and UK fighting forces embodied within defense behaviors and policies, arguing the normative ‘laddish’ cultures inherent to military structures force women to become honorary men. As a result, these domestic norms help explain why American and British approaches to post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq were devoid of gendered considerations.

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Introduction

“I’ve learned to dance that delicate dance, and along the way I’ve learned the rules. Don’t be too friendly, don’t be too mean. Don’t look too good, make sure you always do what’s right, never put yourself in a compromising situation. Don’t cry. Perception is reality. Do your job and do it well. Above all, complete your mission. Oh yeah, and try not to get killed.”

Captain Rebecca Murga, Member of United States Female Engagement Team in Afghanistan


In 2005, the United States Army and Marine Corps formed their first Team Lioness units for the war in Iraq. Five years later, drawing from their American counterparts, the United Kingdom deployed their first Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan. Composed solely of female soldiers trained in Entry Point Control (ECP), also known as security checkpoint searches, these units were tasked with building local female-to-female relationships (Lewis 2019, 134). While limited in aim, the perceived successes of Team Lioness units in Iraq and Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan represented a growing realization in Western defense sectors of the necessity for women’s participation in combat theatres. In particular, these teams were formed on the emerging awareness that men could not access the same populations as women in specific contexts, thus these all-female teams added value to conflict environments. As a result, Lioness and Female Engagement Teams became the starting point for Women Peace and Security (WPS) domestic agendas in the US and UK, underwriting gender-aware integration goals within military policies. Thus, as physical manifestations of changing gendered defense norms, Team Lioness and FETs arguably embodied the ways in which US and UK security sectors ‘do gender’ during and after war.
To this end, gender is understood as the socially constructed roles, attitudes, behaviors, and relative power associated with men and women (Mobekk 2010; Wilen 2020; Bastick and Valasek 2008). Applying this definition to a defense niche, militaries are understood as “masculinized institutions” that are defined by “braveness, power, aggression, and authority” which are socially conflated with masculine traits (Wilen 2020, 90-1; Wadham 2017, 248). These military masculinities explain the normative expectations of servicemembers across security institutions including the manner to which soldiers are expected to act, speak, and behave, as well as what personalities or characteristics they are expected to assume.

The formation of Lioness and Female Engagement Teams both represent and challenge militarized masculinities associated with US and UK defense norms. Deployment of these teams, from a surface-level interpretation, indicates warfighting states are more willing to integrate women into combat operations on the basis of operational support. To this end, such perspectives imply women servicemembers in the Lioness and Female Engagement Teams are able to dispel the internalized masculinities inherent to traditional warfighting tactics. As shown by Captain Murga’s comment in The New York Times, however, women’s participation in security institutions holds a double standard; Team Lioness units and Female Engagement Teams provided space and recognition for women in security sectors, but often forced them to “dance that delicate dance” by embodying just enough masculinized behaviors to be taken seriously but, contrastingly, not too much to compromise themselves or the mission. Recent feminist literature expands upon Murga’s experiences, arguing these teams only exacerbate military masculinities because they equate physical inclusion of women to broader gender-aware frameworks without actually undertaking transformative measures (Lewis 2019, 136). Contemporary feminist literature contends military masculinities are forced upon female servicemembers, requiring
them to become honorary men, rather than attempting to transform security institutions (Lewis 2019).

These debates regarding gendered behaviors, security institutions, and conflict raise critical questions on how militaries act in gendered ways before, during, and after war. Particularly considering the contentious yet contributory nature of Team Lioness and Female Engagement Team units, paired with the rising interest in Women Peace and Security agenda following United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000, there remains a need to examine how the United States and United Kingdom specifically ‘do gender’ and how such gendered practices impacted their respective missions in Iraq.

The formation of Lioness Teams transpired five years after the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Adopted in October 2000, UNSCR1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) recognized the critical role of women in defense efforts by reconciling security sector development with gender equality (UN Security Council 2000; Wilen 2014). These agendas are traditionally associated with post-conflict states in a process known as Gendered Security Sector Reform (GSSR); for some states, such as the US and UK, adherence to WPS entailed adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs). In such contexts, the goal is to reconstruct the gender-defense nexus by dismantling military masculinities and regendering military practices. These objectives are often achieved through the design, implementation, and evaluation of gender-inclusive policies (Bastick and Valasek 2008, 2-12).

In practice, for the United States and United Kingdom, the Lioness and Female Engagement Teams were critical starting points for enacting the WPS agenda internally and externally. Yet, as the US and UK faced calls to push beyond tokenistic inclusion of female-only units in forward-facing military operations, they concurrently were responsible for the
overwhelming task of post-conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Iraq after 2003. Prior feminist literature has criticized the lack of formalized gender-inclusive policies in both US-UK internal defense sectors and post-conflict policies. Such literature, however, remains limited in evaluating the rationales for US-UK Coalition policies in post-conflict Iraq. More specifically, there remains little understanding of how gender norms internal to supporting donor states manifest within post-conflict reconstruction efforts led by said external donor states. This raises the particular question of how the US and UK ‘performed gender’ in their defense sectors during the Iraq War and whether this impacted their post-conflict SSR missions.

Thus, this paper will contribute to feminist scholarship by attempting to understand how the US and UK militaries ‘do gender’ via WPS and NAPs, and whether such gender performance impacted their Security Sector Reform policies in Iraq following 2003. This research does not seek to judge the effectiveness of gender integration within militaries given the extensive work of other feminist researchers in this area. Rather, this paper will attempt to understand whether there is a relationship between domestic WPS reforms and the foreign policies of Western militaries. The research questions I will attempt to answer are:

*How do the United States and United Kingdom security sectors ‘do gender’? To what extent can this explain post-conflict SSR policies in Iraq between 2003-2021?*

This paper argues the US and UK have varied in their formalized adoption of WPS agendas yet have similar experiences of informal norms and behaviors regarding military masculinities. In particular, the United States and United Kingdom militaries reflect tokenistic practices of women’s integration which conflates gender to women as a result of limited military leadership buy-in to the concept of gender. Such similarities reflect parallel normative behaviors, attitudes,
and rhetoric representative of militarized masculinities which often force women
servicemembers to become honorary men. While similar in such informal normative
experiences, however, the United States has embodied military masculinity norms within their
Women, Peace, and Security national frameworks via operational effectiveness rhetoric.
Reflective of their Team Lioness unit experiences, the United States defense apparatus view
women as “force multipliers” wherein their physical presence serves a mission purpose (Pham
2021). The United Kingdom, however, has externalized their military masculinities rather than
confronting such behaviors internally. To this end, the United Kingdom gender-defense nexus is
perceived as a humanitarian or women’s empowerment issue rather than an opportunity to
reconsider “laddish cultures” inherent to the military (United Kingdom House of Commons
Defence Committee 2021, 17). As a result, these informal and formal gender-integration
scenarios have impacted not just how the US and UK ‘do gender’ but also in how they
conceptualize post-conflict reconstruction objectives. In particular, the prominence and
prevalence of such military masculinities in the US and UK defense sectors manifested in post-
conflict Iraq Security Sector Reform as an intensive national security effort rather than a whole-
of-country gender-inclusive reconstruction opportunity. Focused on ethnic-sectarian violence,
instability, and rising insurgent activities, the US and UK partnered with Iraq to reconstruct a
traditional defense apparatus. To this end, gender was put in the backburner and was not
understood nor realized as an essential factor in Security Sector Reform approaches. Therefore,
this research concludes masculinized gender norms internal to US and UK security sectors
inhibited a gender-aware Security Sector Reform approach to post-conflict Iraq.
Background and Literature Review

Security Sector Reform and the 2003 Iraq War

The Iraq War and resulting US-UK reconstruction efforts serve as a foundational example of 21st century Security Sector Reform practices, both successful and unsuccessful. Following the two-month Operation Iraqi Freedom “shock and awe” bombing campaign and ground-troop surge, the US-led coalition of American, British, Australian, and Polish troops declared an end to the Hussein regime on April 13, 2003 (Iraq War 2019, xiv). Subsequently, the US and UK Coalition, later known as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), were recognized by UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511 as occupational authorities, and tasked with establishing effective Iraqi security sector institutions (Iraq War 2019; Bellamy 2003; Hashim 2003; Halchin 2005). Authorized by the United Nations Security Council, the CPA was specifically charged with a three-part mission to restore state security and stability; create conditions which Iraqi populations can freely determine their political futures; and rebuild effective security sector institutions (Halchin 2005, 6; Rathmell 2005, 20).

To this end, the US and UK undertook Security Sector Reform (SSR) which attempts to reestablish effective and efficient state security structures for the protection of civilian populations (Albrecht and Jackson 2014; UN General Assembly 2008, A/62/659-S/2008/39). While recognizing the symbiotic relationship between security institutions, civil society, and political institutions, SSR in contemporary post-conflict contexts such as Iraq focused on defense reform. To this end, the “Security Sector” is defined as (Sedra 2007):

1. Groups with the authority and instruments to use force such as militaries, police, paramilitaries, intelligence services.
2. Institutions that monitor and manage the sector including government ministries, parliament, civil society.

3. Structures responsible for maintaining the rule of law related to the judiciary, the ministry of justice, prisons, human rights commissions, etc.

The purpose of Iraqi SSR was to establish accountable, legitimate, and effective institutions by undertaking immediate technical security provision as well as normative transformations to combat corruption and politicization (Bastick 2017; Bellamy 2003; Brzoska 2006; Mobekk 2010; Bellamy 2003; Naraghi Anderlini and Conaway n.d., 32). Whereas technical programs reflect more train-and-equip efforts, normative transformation entails a restructuring of defense hierarchies or policies to promote more just and representative power sharing. In order to achieve both technical and normative objectives, Security Sector Reform has five necessary preconditions regarding the nature of the state (Sedra 2007, Bellamy 2003). These essential conditions include: a stable security environment; political consensus among domestic actors; minimum human and institutional capacities; reform reconciliation with cultural and historical frameworks; and local engagement (Sedra 2007, 9-10; Demir 2021, 82; Naraghi Anderlini and Conaway n.d., 34).

While difficult to evaluate the transformative nature of Iraqi SSR given the long-term timeline associated with such practices, Iraq is largely considered a failure due to overemphasis on politicized and technocratic practices (Rathmell et. al, 3-7; Jackson 2018; Sedra 2007; Al-Marashi 2021). These criticisms challenge traditional Weberian Realism interpretations of SSR, arguing the process was “sound in theory, but problematic in practice” as it failed to “account for the politics, in terms of local power relations, underlying state structures” (Brozka 2006; Jackson 2018, 2; Jackson 2018; Brozka 2006; Demir 2021; Gordon 2014; Gordon et al. 2015; Bellamy
In essence, these liberal critiques contend that international donors focused on liberal governance norms that did not necessarily align with cultural or historical norms and power relations of a post-conflict nation like Iraq, leading to unsustainable policies and an “empty-shell” government (Ebo 2007; Ansorg and Gordon 2019; Jackson 2011, 1816; Albrecht and Jackson, 2014; Jackson 2018). To this end, Iraq is considered a technocratic SSR example given its limited consideration for power dynamics embodied via gender, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and political ideology. Instead, Iraq security reforms were framed around the need to reassert state monopolies over use of violence regardless of how such newfound power would be enacted against or inclusive of marginalized minority groups (Brozka 2006, 5; Demir 2021; Ebo 2007, 28-32).

Largely absent from these liberal critiques, however, is a gendered understanding of what happened in Iraq. Recognizing previous feminist literature which has examined both Iraqi SSR failures and tokenization of gender inclusion in defense sectors, there remains a need to apply a gendered approach to American and British rationale for Coalition policies. Specifically, prior research has alluded to the broad failures of Security Sector Reform in integrating feminist perspectives, namely the continued essentialization of women with an “add-and-stir” approach (Ansorg and Haastrup 2018; Bastick 2017; Bastick and Duncanson 2018; Bastick and Valasek 2008; DeGroot 2001; Dharmapuri 2011; Duncanson and Woodward 2016; Egnell 2016; Gordon 2014; Gordon 2019; Gordon, Welch and Roos 2015; Gordon, McHugh and Townsley 2021; Hudson 2012; Huber and Karim 2018; Kunz 2014; Lewis 2019; Mobbek 2010; Pham 2021; Wilke 2006; Wilen 2020). Thus, this research draws from both prior liberalism and feminism approaches to Iraqi Security Sector Reform by integrating a gendered critique on the impact of
external donor state conceptualization of gender onto post-conflict policies. Moreover, undertaking a feminist evaluation of US and UK Security Sector Reform policy inclusion of gender, or lack thereof, will enable a comprehensive understanding of the successes and failures of donor-driven SSR missions to enhance feminist post-conflict visions.

One such approach to understanding the Iraq War is through a Gendered Security Sector Reform (GSSR) framework which attempts to combat the “dominant warrior discourses” or military masculinities embodied within both security sectors and evaluations of said defense institutions (Bastick 2017; Duncanson and Woodward 2016; Mobekk 2010; UN Secretary General 2008). As a specific policy approach to post-conflict settings, Gendered Security Sector Reform stems from a feminist perspective of Security Sector Reform efforts by diving further into how SSR includes or lacks a gender-aware perspective. From this feminist perspective, military institutions embody a hyper-masculinized “warrior mindset” which values soldiers, policies, and tactics that embody “aggression, emotionless character, and toughness” which are societally coded as masculine traits (Pham 2021; Duncanson and Woodward 2016; Bastick and Duncanson, 2018; Egnell 2016; Cohn 2000; Gordon 2019). For example, whereas masculine strategies are perceived as “assertive” and “offensive,” feminized military policies are equated to humanitarian security and women’s empowerment strategies through civil society programming (Stachowitsch 2012, 311). These hypermasculine “warrior frameworks,” consequently, force non-male defense participants to act as “honorary men” by masculinizing their actions, thoughts, and ways of being (Pham 2021, 15; Kanter 1977; King 2016). Thus, as explained by the United Nations Secretary General, GSSR not only confronts these dominant warrior mentalities, but also attempt to integrate new perspectives and power relations into security institutions for more inclusive, representative, and localized practices:
Gender sensitive security sector reform is key to developing security sector institutions that are non-discriminatory, representative of the population and capable of effectively responding to the specific security needs of diverse groups. (UN Secretary General 2008)

Therefore, this paper attempts to understand whether the US and UK framed their Security Sector Reform efforts in Iraq as a Gendered SSR policy versus general Security Sector Reform. Framing SSR policies as gender-aware versus national security-focused indicates a relationship between US and UK internal military masculinities and the effects of such on external military policies. Therefore, Gendered SSR addresses the traditional elements of Security Sector Reform project cycles with an added gendered evaluation of WPS National Action Plans, federal legislation, defense policies, and military branch-specific action plans (Gordon, McHugh, and Townsley 2021, 10; Kunz 2014, 609). As argued by True and Parisi, these defense policies all reflect a specific mentality on gender, such as whether these policies and their practitioners view gender as a threat, an opportunity, a necessity, or a normative requirement (True and Parisi 2013, 38). These efforts can be categorized into five approaches (True and Parisi 2013, 38-40):

- **Gender Integrationist Model**: Gender concerns are addressed in reference to existing frameworks with no attempt to alter existing norms; known as “add women and stir.”
- **Gender-as-difference Model**: Relies on tolerance for existing masculine power structures by developing “women-only” programming as recognition for diverse voices.
- **Gender-as-intersectionality Model**: Defense institutions are restructured using “gender mainstreaming” policies to address specific post-conflict needs and restructure local norms based on external donor norms.
• **Alternative Gender Mainstreaming Model**: Formation of new defense policies, practices, and organization around a “new conception of gender.”

• **Resistance to Rejection Model**: Defense institutions view gender integration as a threat, and as a result, gendered policies are insincere.

The goal of GSSR is to “gender differently” by restructuring norms and hierarchies within defense sectors away from hyper-masculinized warrior frameworks or military masculinities towards a more gender-aware balance (Kunz 2014, 604-5; Gordon, McHugh, and Townsley 2021; True and Parisi 2013). Thus, the above GSSR practices either prescribe “gender mainstreaming” or “gender balancing” practices to institutional reforms. As seen with the Gender-as-difference and Gender Integrationist models, gender balancing approaches rely on the tokenization of women (Egnell 2016, 83; Mobekk 2010, 279; Bastick 2017). These balancing approaches prescribe recruitment and representation policies to increase the number of women in service positions. Such approaches are often perceived by feminist scholars as performative and ineffective because they neglect power structures which reaffirm masculine violence (Wilen 2014; Wilen 2020, 87). Moreover, women are often portrayed as “mediators” who are the only ones capable of ensuring peacebuilding due to their superior listening skills, compassionate nature, and “feminine purity” (Kunz 2014, 612; Mobekk 2010). When women are integrated into security sectors based on this model, they are “essentialized as the cure to violent masculinity” (Kunz 2014, 612).

Approaches that move beyond this essentialization of women in security sectors prescribes a gender mainstreaming approach. Such frameworks understand men and women do not engage with nor experience conflict and violence in the same manner; thus, this approach focuses on “regendering” defense institutions where gender is not just perceived as a women’s issue but is a
reconsideration of masculinity norms (Kunz 2014; True and Parisi 2013; Bastick 2017, 390). This framework operationalizes such ideas via comprehensive gender-based violence trainings, laws, and penal codes to challenge masculinized military systems (Egnell 2016; Duncanson and Woodward 2016; Gordon 2019). It is important to recognize, however, that without increasing the number of women in security sectors, defense institutions will “remain by and for men” (Wilen 2020, 91). Yet, simply integrating women into a military setting will not guarantee gender-inclusive policies; assuming women are “gender aware” or promoters of feminist ideologies is just as damaging as assuming all men in military units embody hypermasculine characteristics (Egnell 2016; DeGroot 2001, 29). To this end, successful yet realistic policies created to promote gender perspectives within security institutions are just as dependent on gender-aware men as they are on physical representation of women (Egnell 2016).

United States and United Kingdom: Gender Perspectives in Action

Looking at how the United States and United Kingdom ‘do gender’, their historic “special relationship” and alliance throughout the Iraq War indicates a high likelihood of similarities in how gender is experienced within military structures. Such likelihoods are highlighted by the fact both states increased the number of women participating in combat operations with the deployment of Team Lioness, Gender Field Advisors (GFS), and Cultural Support Teams (CST) in Iraq and Afghanistan while later adopting National Action Plans and Gender Focal Points (GFP) to remove gender-based restrictions for security roles (Huber and Karim 2018, 264-273; Egnell 2016, 74). While gender mainstreaming perspectives would argue such gender-specific teams are tokenistic, Coalition military advisors contend such units were introduced not as “a politically correct nicety […] but as a direct result of operational
necessities” thus reflecting US and UK similarities in the symbiotic gender balancing-mainstreaming relationship (Egnell 2016, 74).

The similarities between the United States and United Kingdom defense sectors are also reflected in their respective timelines of gender integration for combat units and policy objectives of Women, Peace, and Security frameworks. Approximately 65 years after the Women’s Armed Service Act enabled permanent membership for women in the military outside times of war, United States Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta lifted the ban on women in active combat roles in 2013 (Egnell 2016). The decision challenged decades of legislation which prohibited women’s participation in combat including the 1988 “risk rule” and 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (Pham 2021, 1). The decision came in response to the 2011 Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) report which called for all armed forces to “review and validate their occupational standards to ensure they were appropriate for the requirements of the position and were gender-neutral” (Pham 2021, 2). By 2015, all combat positions were open to women.

As the last major NATO power to do so, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense opened all combat positions to women in 2018 after significant criticism and internal review on the detrimental retention impacts of militarized masculinities across service branches. The decision was based off the Women in Close Combat Review paper, publicly published in 2016 but released in 2014, which recommended an end to the ban on women in front-line positions (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 2016). While women had previously served via the Women’s Auxiliary Corps, later known as the Women’s Royal Army Corps, the Ministry of Defense decision formalized women’s contributions to British war efforts. Moreover, the decision also challenged prior Parliamentary legislation including Section 85 of the Sex

In spite of such integration similarities, however, there are likely differences between how the United States and United Kingdom ‘do gender’. While reflecting similar normative behaviors and attitudes of military masculinities, as evidenced by their respective histories of gender exclusion, the methods to which gender inclusionary policies were enacted are likely to be different based on domestic agendas. In particular, the United States is likely to contextualize gender integration within an operational effectiveness lens given their trial of Team Lioness units during the Iraq War. While the United Kingdom did create their own Female Engagement Teams for Afghanistan by 2010, these units participated later in the conflict, likely indicating the role of domestic agendas in limiting women’s active participation in combat-adjacent roles. In contrast to the US, the United Kingdom is likely to exhibit more tokenistic externalized perspectives on gender integration, deflecting responsibility onto humanitarian or women’s empowerment programming rather than within security policies. Again, this focus on humanitarian programming is likely reflective of domestic agendas as evidenced by UK Foreign Office focus on post-conflict women’s empowerment in civil society. In particular, such differences could be representative of how US and UK militaries perceive their own military masculinities, whether such norms are understood as a legitimate issue for operational effectiveness or unit cohesion, and to what ends American and British security institutions conceptualize the connection between gender and combat operations.

The unique nature of US and UK gendered units in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars prior to subsequent National Action Plan efforts prescribed by UNSCR 1325 presents a fascinating case study as to the cause-and-effect impacts of Women, Peace, and Security agendas on defense
policies. Best explained by Egnell, the Iraq War showcases how women’s integration into the respective US and UK militaries was a “direct result of operational necessities” (Egnell 2016, 74). There remains a necessity, however, to consider the post-conflict element of US and UK involvement in Iraq from a feminist perspective including whether or how external donor efforts were shaped by gender. To this end, there is a need to consider how the United States and United Kingdom ‘did gender’ within their militaries and whether or how such gendered lenses impacted subsequent post-conflict policies.

**Methodology**

Theoretical Debates: A Move Towards Feminist Institutionalism

To better understand whether and how the US and UK integrated gendered considerations into their post-2003 Security Sector Reforms, this paper will employ a Feminist Institutionalism lens. As an emerging theoretical lens, Feminist Institutionalism (FI) investigates the way in which policies, such as SSR, construct and reconstruct gender power relations (Gordon, McHugh, and Townsley 2021; Ansorg and Haastrup 2018; Chappell and Waylen 2013; Pham 2021; Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell 2010; Gordon 2019). Specifically, FI examines how informal norms, such as traditions and behaviors, undermine formal rules, such as codified laws and policies, demanding gender inclusion in the security sector, thereby reaffirming masculinized gender power relations in spite of codified policies stating otherwise (Gordon, McHugh, and Townsley 2021, 6; Ansorg and Haastrup 2018, 1129; Chappell and Waylen 2013, 599-605; Pham 2021; Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell 2010; Gordon 2019, 76).

A Feminist Institutionalism lens is of particular use when examining US and UK gender operationalization in Security Sector Reform considering FI’s emphasis on normative rhetoric. In other words, Feminist Institutionalism focuses on how norms are enacted via rhetoric and policy
terminology. Therefore, this “feminist vision of security” argues gender equality is perceived as a “force multiplier” within defense planning, education, and policy rhetoric wherein gender inclusivity is often justified as a means to bolster operational effectiveness via enhanced information access, credibility, and protection (Bastick and Duncanson 2018, 560; Dharmapuri 2011, 56; Egnell 2016; Kunz 2014).

While utilizing an FI approach, this research also recognizes the importance of post-colonialist contributions which argue GSSR interventions are hegemonic manifestations of the liberal peace thesis wherein Global South women are portrayed as inferior and passive victims (Hudson 2012, 443-447). Moreover, Feminist Institutionalism challenges anti-militarist feminist perspectives which argue the WPS agenda is more concerned with “making war safe for women rather than demilitarization strategies” (Shepard 2016, 325-6; Enloe 2007; Cockburn 2013). While recognizing both theoretical perspectives, neither holistically address the impact of gendered processes on institutional change in post-conflict settings, as evidenced in policy rhetoric.

**Investigating Iraq: US-UK Military Doctrines, GSSR Policies, and Feminist Institutionalism**

Combining feminist institutionalism with Security Sector Reform practices and gender-defense policy debates, this research builds upon prior work investigating Gendered SSR. The efficacy and efficiency of Security Sector Reform has long been questioned by academic literature from a variety of theoretical lenses with post-conflict case studies from Afghanistan to Burundi to Sierra Leone (Albrecht and Jackson 2014; Bastick 2017; Demir 2021; Dharmapuri 2011; Gordon 2019; Huber and Karim 2019; Jackson 2011; Jackson 2018; Jackson and Barkania 2018; Lewis 2019; Sedra 2007). While recognizing this prior research, missing from such
debates is an understanding of whether and how varied gender norms in external donor states drive policy decisions to enact G/SSR programming. In particular, there remains the need to understand how domestic norms, as evidenced across internal policies and institutional cultures, influence external-facing military operations from a feminist perspective.

Iraq presents a compelling example of external donor-driven Security Sector Reform programming. Started by the United States and Coalition forces in 2003 and carried on by the United Kingdom since the early 2010s, Iraq has had mixed results on the efficacy and success of security sector reform. Dissolution of Baathist party officials from government institutions, coupled with growing insurgency concerns and tribal-based power conflicts, greatly influenced the viability of US-UK Security Sector Reform goals. Concerns of such traditional national security elements, however, alludes to a limited consideration of Gendered Security Sector Reform elements including recruitment and retention programming and reexamination of policy statutes that perpetuate gendered hierarchies.

As the two external authorities for Iraqi-based Security Sector Reform, the US and UK present compelling opportunities to examine the similarities and differences in their defense norms, hierarchies, and values from a gender perspective. Despite their similarities in policy approaches to Iraqi SSR, given CPA collaborations, and timing of gender-integration efforts as well as their “special relationship,” there remains the question of whether similarities or differences exist in the manner to which these states ‘do gender’ via informal norms and formal WPS initiatives. These differences, in particular, can be expected based on domestic agendas and cultural norms regarding gender, conceptualization of what role militaries serve post-conflict, and uptake of WPS agendas. Investigating these similarities and differences from a Feminist Institutionalism perspective raises the question of whether institutional gender norms and
policies in the United States and United Kingdom defense sectors explain their approaches to Iraqi SSR policies from 2003-2021. Moreover, a Feminist Institutionalism perspective can also illuminate whether there are variations in US-Coalition and UK Security Sector Reform policies in Iraq, and to what extent such differences can be explained or correlated to institutionalized gendered norms.

Within a qualitative case study, I completed semi-structured interviews, followed by a limited descriptive analysis of comparable US and UK defense policies between 2003-2021. In doing so, this research investigated both the formalized and informalized norms associated with gender integration to whether and how Gendered Security Sector Reform was enacted by the United States and United Kingdom in post-conflict Iraq. To this end, the prescribed research methodologies first examined gendered power hierarchies and norms experienced by former servicemembers and policy advisors in the external donor militaries. Subsequently, this research then assessed how these gendered power distributions impacted codified SSR defense policies in a post-conflict setting.

It is necessary to recognize this research does not undertake a whole-of-government approach to understanding the manners in which United States and United Kingdom defense sectors 'do gender.' Such methodological decisions are justified on the basis that Security Sector Reform was primarily directed by American and British defense sectors in collaboration with foreign-focused institutions such as USAID or the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO). Separately, while understanding that United States and United Kingdom Women Peace and Security initiatives have taken whole-of-government approaches, the overwhelming emphasis of such National Action Plans on the defense sector indicates an
initial predisposition towards examining just the defense area but highlights a potential for a more holistic methodology in future research.

**Semi-Structured Interviews: Informal Practices of ‘Gender’ in ‘Defense’**

Semi-structured interviews with academic experts and military gender practitioners help contextualize the informal norms associated with gender-security policies in the United States and United Kingdom. The purpose of semi-structured interviews is two-fold. First, to understand the lived experiences of current and former servicemembers, gender advisors, and policymakers. Second, to understand how defense gender integration efforts in the US and UK were accepted or rejected by servicemembers across rank, gender, age, background.

Utilizing publicly accessible information and snowball sampling, interviewees were selected by military and academic experience related to the Iraq War, WPS initiatives, and United States and/or United Kingdom military doctrines. Given the sensitive nature of this research topic, all identifiers for participants were removed following the transcribing process. The identifiers for each consenting participant were randomized and coded with a decipher key. As a result, each participant and their testimony have been anonymized.¹

**Descriptive Analysis: Understanding Formal Gender Integration Norms**

A subsequent descriptive analysis examines the formal rhetoric conceptualized under gender-security intentions, with particular emphasis on understanding how institutionalized norms construct power hierarchies, leadership decision-making, and military policies. This analysis starts first by examining US and UK National Action Plans then moves into national

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¹ University of Denver Institutional Review Board. Research #1942592-1.
WPS legislation and governmental Iraq SSR progress reports since 2003. Recognizing the plethora of Coalition Provisional Authority regulations and orders on Iraq SSR, specific reports were selected on the basis of their relevance to the Iraqi defense sector including military, police, and civilian defense corps.

While a broad range of US and UK Defense documents exist in evaluation of their respective participation in Iraq, this analysis only examines comparable document sets between the two nations. Such documents include National Action Plans, Women Peace and Security Initiatives, Department and Ministry of Defense gender integration strategies, and Iraq War Security Sector Reform evaluation reports. This research compares executive summaries, objectives, measurement strategies, and evaluation summaries within the above specified documents (see Appendix A.1).

By focusing on these sections, this analysis examines how the US and UK separately define their WPS objectives and Iraqi Security Sector Reform progress. This approach allows for understandings of broader US and UK intentions towards gender inclusion within their own militaries, and whether such gender-integration framed Iraqi SSR.

‘Doing Gender’ in Defense Policies

The lack of academic literature applying feminist institutionalism to a Gendered Security Sector Reform case study, complemented by limited examination of the relationship between US and UK gender-defense integration opportunities and foreign defense policies, presents a challenging yet necessary opportunity to examine the unique case study of Iraqi SSR post-2003. As such, the research questions I attempt to answer are:
How do the United States and United Kingdom security sectors ‘do gender’? To what extent can this explain post-conflict G/SSR policies in Iraq between 2003-2021?

To preview my findings, this research concludes the United States and United Kingdom ‘do gender’ as evidenced by the presence, prominence, and intensity of militarized masculinities and limitations of gender integration strategies in defense institutions. To this end, their respective way of performing gender impacts their foreign policy framings whereby gender-aware frameworks are exclusive and tokenize female servicemembers.

For the United States, their explicit display of militarized masculinities is enacted within normative behaviors and codified legislation. The US embodies hypermasculine military cultures within defense institutions which is reinforced by military leadership and forces women to become honorary men. Any considerations of gender are equated with women, as underscored by gender exclusionary practices in direct combat units until 2016, which consequently tokenizes female servicemembers. The presence and prevalence of Team Lioness units, however, indicates a shift in US Defense Department doctrine to supporting gender integration as reflected in “force multiplier” or “operational effectiveness” rhetoric in their respective Women, Peace, and Security documents.

Similarly for the United Kingdom, their military institutions explicitly embody gender exclusionary practices as evidenced by the inability for women to join ground combat units until 2018. Reflective of US military masculinities, the United Kingdom also conflates gender with women, thereby tokenizing female servicemembers while enforcing a “warrior framework” and enshrining militarized masculinities. To this end, the United Kingdom’s Women, Peace, and Security codified policies reflect internalized military masculinities. In contrast to the United
States, however, such NAP documents are more external-focused rather than invested in transforming internal British policies or behaviors.

Both the United States and United Kingdom have limited considerations of gender within Iraq Security Sector Reform. As both countries were unable to challenge their own institutionalized military masculinities prior to Iraqi SSR efforts, Gendered Security Sector Reform became a moot point. US and UK domestic agendas indicate limited, if any, consideration of gender-aware policies while reinforcing warrior cultures that tokenize women. As such, Iraqi SSR policies were constructed towards national security objectives of the US, UK, and Iraq. More specifically, these national security objectives were framed around concerns for rising ethno-sectarian conflict, post-Saddam corruption, and rising insurgent behaviors. When women or gender, more broadly, were considered in any Security Sector Reform documentation, it was largely reflective of a tokenistic approach suited to the needs of national security concerns rather than a gender-aware framework as would be expected in Gendered Security Sector Reform.

To this end, the United States and United Kingdom ‘do gender’ in normatively similar manners on the basis of military masculinities and tokenistic practices. In contrast, the manner to which they ‘do gender’ in policy realms is varied as the United States operationalizes gender according to mission needs whereas the United Kingdom externalizes gender for its foreign policy objectives. As such, the manner to which the US and UK ‘do gender’ from a domestic agenda influenced their approach to post-conflict Iraq Security Sector Reform which reflects limited, if any, consideration of a gender-aware framework.
Analysis

Based on interviews with five former military servicemembers and current gender advisors to the US and UK Departments of Defense, parallel to an analysis of relevant WPS legislation and Security Sector Reform policies, this research postulates there is a correlation between gender performance within military settings and Iraq SSR policies for the United States and United Kingdom.

While reflecting normative similarities regarding military masculinities, conflation of gender and womanhood, and necessity for leadership buy-in, the US and UK vary in how they have framed gender-integration in defense settings. Whereas the US frames their respective WPS policies around its own operational effectiveness, the United Kingdom instead externalizes WPS gender reform efforts as something to be done abroad. As a result, these gender-defense performances manifest in Iraq as an overwhelming lack of holistic gendered considerations for post-conflict Security Sector Reform between 2003 to 2021. While immediate Coalition Provisional Authority and US-informed policies forwent any gender considerations, more recent UK SSR renditions have only tokenized female participation.

US-UK Similarities: Military Masculinities

From a Feminist Institutionalism lens, military masculinities are deeply engrained and reaffirmed norms embodied within defense institutions. Based the socially constructed association of masculinity with strength, militaries are seen as the physical manifestation of these normative expectations. For both the United States and United Kingdom, gender performance or the way in which their respective militaries ‘do gender’ is similarly based on these military masculinities.
Military masculinities are first experienced in military culture as the ways in which servicemembers are expected to behave. For the United Kingdom, the House of Commons released an analysis of gender-military integration in 2021, titled “Protecting those who protect us: Women in the Armed Forces from Recruitment to Civilian Life.” The report argued 62% of female-identifying service personnel have faced harassment and bullying (United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee 2021, 17). These behaviors were attributed to the pervasive “laddish culture” where women servicemembers are expected to become “honorary men” (United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee 2021, 17). In one cited testimony within the report, retired Lieutenant-Colonel Diane Allen explained how masculine norms lead to discriminatory behavior against non-masculine servicemembers including an increased likeliness to be more harshly critiqued then male colleagues; increased likelihood to be passed over for officer promotions; and increased likelihood to face bias or harassment within their units (United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee 2021, 41-2).

As identified in the report, British defense institutions perpetuate a military masculinity “laddish culture” wherein traits associated with “manhood” are expected and normalized. The report does not provide detailed examples of so-called “laddish” behaviors. However, from a Feminist Institutionalism lens, the report’s rhetoric indicates harassment and bullying exhibited in the UK military are a physical embodiment of the warrior framework based a need to exhibit violence, aggression, or hypermasculinity. Thus, ‘doing gender’ in the UK military is ‘doing masculinity’ via performance of strength, violence, power, and aggression. For those who may not outwardly display such masculine traits or simply are not perceived as masculine-enough, there is an expectation to conform. Conformity is enforced through harassment, bullying, and
discriminatory practices which act as a litmus test wherein an individual is forced to prove they can both embody and display masculine traits.

In the United States, military masculinities similarly impact servicemember experiences and battlefield decisions, illustrating gender performance in American defense institutions is also a performance of masculinity. Interviewee C, a former Marine pilot during the Iraq War, explained how during their deployment to Iraq, there was an explicit ignorance to consider gender-aware or non-masculine ways of thinking:

> Our tactics at the time were to fly as low and as fast as possible to get from point A to point B. I win by killing the bad guys, saving the good guys [...] Our forward operating base was about 3 kilometers outside the city [...] in between there were some Bedouin camps. One of the things that we were noticing was that when supplies would have to get brought into [redacted], we'd have trucks that would come all day and they would just get like IED’d and ambushed to shit and everyone's like 'what's going on, why is this happening?' One day, I rose, I was like, 'you know, I'm pretty sure that everyone's just sick of their kids getting woken up in the middle of the night. Because we're flying helicopters over their tents at like 20 feet and they're pissed.' And so, when you know Al-Qaeda, or just whoever wants to make trouble comes in and like, can we use your camp to stage to ambush the Americans? They're like, 'yes, do that because I'm sick of my kids waking up.' One of the guys that I was flying with was like, 'that's a really like girly thing to think about.' So, I became a leader later on, I was like we're gonna try it my way and we're not gonna fly over these camps anymore, you don't get to say like 'shut up little girl, sit in the corner,' right? And so, in doing that and
going through this, all of a sudden we started to see like ambushes go way down,

IEDs go right way down. (Interviewee C)

Clearly described by Interviewee C, a non-masculine interpretation of a battlefield scenario was immediately deemed unworthy of consideration. The individual who considered the interpretation “girly” likely did so because it integrated the perspectives of kids and families which is conflated to gender; in a military context, gender is seen as a women’s issue. Thus, this refusal to consider an alternate perspective reinforced the legitimacy of masculine norms, communicating how effective battlefield strategies are ones based on strength, aggression, and violence rather than a “girly” approach. Moreover, the explanation that Interviewee C had to wait until they were in a position of power to act upon their interpretation indicates a widespread acceptance of militarized masculinities. Without the backing of higher leadership, Interviewee C had to wait until they themselves were the higher leadership to consider the alternative interpretation of the given scenario. While only one situation, this event alludes to the broader expectation of military masculinities and conformity to associated manly norms in the American military. Similar to the United Kingdom, the United States also ‘does gender’ by ‘doing masculinity’. Normative practices embody societal associations between masculinity and strength, deeming anything other than as “girly” or inappropriate for the context. Those who may not necessarily display these masculine traits initially are expected to conform by partaking in “laddish culture” and becoming “honorary men.” Only when these individuals reach military leadership are they able to act upon their “girly” perspectives, alluding to an internalized hypermasculine warrior culture from enlisted through the ranks to command leadership.
These expectations of conformity are further reinforced via military identity. In both the United States and United Kingdom, the idea of a “warfighter” identity is foundational to defense institutions as it builds and reinforces unit cohesion, loyalty, and commitment to the mission. As explained by Interviewee A, a former gender advisor in Iraq, the “warfighter” identity is experienced as the antithesis to gender-aware norms, by interpretation, because of associations between gender, women, and peace.

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the concept of the “warfighter” is perceived as the antithesis to gender wherein the idea of gender is not a necessary nor appropriate consideration for a defense institution. For example, as explained by Interviewee E, a former British servicemember and current gender military advisor, ‘gender’ terminology is not universally accepted within UK military institutions because of its association to peace and humanitarian agendas. Interviewee E explained, “the word ‘gender advisor’ didn't resonate very well and so [the British military] were more at ease calling [their position] a protection of civilian lead” and had to introduce gender propositions under “human security” framings. Interviewee E explained military officials were more comfortable accepting propositions under the “human security” agenda, alluding to a broader military culture of lacking comfortability when considering policies coded as gendered.

Thus, the idea of “doing gender” is a “nonstarter,” according to Interviewee A, because the military “warfighter” identity is so firmly engrained within the US and UK military culture of masculinity, strength, security, and aggression. This is particularly evident when outsiders such as academics or political officials “drone on” about gender reform. Explained by Interviewee C, “people's eyes glaze over and it's like ‘you don't know what you're talking about. You're not a warfighter.’” Similarly, for Interviewee E, the deeply engrained warfighter identity makes it an
uphill battle to argue in favor of a defense reconceptualization of military masculinity warfighter culture. Explained by Interviewee E, UK military servicemembers are taught to view themselves as “the boots on the ground, the steely eyed killers, the dealers of death, the people that are in the infantry.” To this end, foundational warfighter military masculinities enforced through normative expectations pertaining to aggressive behavior and displays of strength make it so only conformity to masculine norms is the accepted way of being.

For Interviewee B, a retired US Naval servicemember, this conformity makes it so non-masculine servicemembers are only legitimized as a member of the warfighting community when they can prove themselves as “reliable and having done part of the main effort” in military operations. Similarly, for Interviewee C, they are quick to highlight their experience as a pilot, stating, “had I been a supply officer or an administrative officer, I never would have had the same ability to interact with key people to make them understand why change is important.” To this extent, the US and UK defense institutions ‘do gender’ via explicit performance of masculine norms, behaviors, and attitudes. These military masculinities are conceptualized within “laddish culture” wherein non-masculine servicemembers are required to become honorary men by enduring aggressive harassment and adopting a warfighter identity. Even when partaking in combat or combat-adjacent operations, conformity to a warrior mentality is still required. Only when in positions of leadership are individuals able to express traditionally non-masculine behaviors or attitudes, alluding to a broader trend across both United States and United Kingdom defense sectors wherein military leadership perpetuate masculine performance just as much as the enlisted. Moreover, the need for access illustrates the current limitations for change even in tokenistic situations. Women or gender-aware servicemembers must be in positions of power or have access to changemakers, such as military leadership, in order to
discuss gendered issues. Being in positions of power, however, tokenizes these servicemembers and further enforces the military culture norm that combat experience, of which women have historically been excluded from, is the only way to become a legitimate decisionmaker or military actor.

**US-UK Similarities: Women-Gender Conflation and Tokenization**

The expectation of warfighter identities and conformity to military masculinities reinforces an ill-informed association between women and gender in both the United States and United Kingdom. Explained by Interviewee D, a gender advisor with the US Department of Defense, military leadership are more likely to equate gender with women because both are perceived as different to the expected military cultural experience of hypermasculinity. Interviewee C reinforced this argument, stating most military servicemembers associate gender with women and women with gender. To this end, gender is not understood holistically as both an examination of masculinity and femininity, but rather is thought of as “‘oh we did our gender perspective today. We brought a woman to the table and like so click, we’re done right?’” Thus, according to Interviewee D, “the US Department of Defense has the hangover of a ‘this is a women's participation program’ […] because it's the most accessible way that they understand women, peace, and security.” This association of gender with women is reflective of the warfighter identity as a display of aggression and strength, and the antithesis to such includes women and peace. Rather than understanding gender as the socially constructed behaviors associated with masculinity and femininity, it is instead conflated to just the latter. This connotation reinforces gender performance as a simplistic display of masculine aggression and
feminine peacefulness, thereby preserving military masculinities and warfighter identities expected of US and UK defense servicemembers.

This association of gender and women also creates tokenistic approaches to ‘doing gender’ which reinforce military masculinities. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 2016 Ministry of Defense “Women in Ground Close Combat (GCC) Findings Paper” recommended an end to the GCC exclusion policy to “maximize talent available to Defence” (United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 2016, 1). Evidenced by theatre deployment over the prior 16 years, the Ministry of Defence justifies their argument by explaining how field operations benefit from team diversity and “that commanders want more women in their teams especially when operating ‘amongst the people’” (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 2016, 1-2). While on the surface, this report appears to support a more gender-aware defense approach via recruitment and retention of female-identifying servicemembers, it actually reinforces military masculinities and tokenizes gender diversity. The report frames its argument around the idea that an increase in women will increase talent and ability to operate within local communities. Such associations not only reinforce the stereotype that women are inherently more peaceful and therefore able to collaborate or form relationships with locals, but that men are unable to do so because they are aggressive or meant only for security operations. Similar to the argument regarding local operations, it limits women’s participation in combat spheres to only non-combat or “humanitarian” relationship-building scenarios thus reaffirming the social construction legitimized and codified in national legislation. Thus, these recommendations tokenize women by making the UK military appear more inclusive, but in reality, merely conflate gender to women for humanitarian-based or peace-oriented operations.
Similarly, in the United States, gender-inclusive frameworks reinforce a militarized understanding of gender which tokenizes women. Explained by Interviewee D, military leadership often “just want to see more women in leadership” as that is how they understand the gender agenda. Yet, the mere presence of women does not mean a more gender-aware military setting as seen in prior feminist literature arguments. Rather, it reinforces military masculinities because it does not directly unpack conformity expectations to masculine behaviors in defense institutions. Instead, it equates women’s presence to ‘doing gender’ which reinforces the expectation that women not only understand gender but are also able and willing to ‘do gender’ for the defense sector. To this end, as explained by Interviewee A, it perpetuates “great misunderstanding about gender [with] the assumption that women naturally understand [gender]. They don't. Why would they?” Such perspectives mitigate or ignore the important role of men in deconstructing military masculinities while also perpetuating the idea that all men embody the warrior mentality required of defense actor across ranks. Thus, even when the US and UK militaries attempt to appear more gender-aware, their conflation of gender and women not only tokenizes female-presenting servicemembers but reinforces the very stereotypes which are instrumental in forming military masculinities. Consequently, gender becomes a matter of essentialism wherein all women are perceived as gender-aware, thereby tokenizing female servicemembers. Yet, as highlighted earlier by Interviewee C, these tokenized servicemembers are only legitimately considered or perceived as changemakers when they have had military operational experience. Thus, the US and UK similarly ‘do gender’ by associating gender to women which tokenizes female servicemembers and reinforces masculine conformity.
US-UK Similarities: Importance and Lack of Leadership Buy-in

The continued embodiment of military masculinities stems directly from leadership understandings of gender performance in both the US and UK militaries. Explained by Interviewees A and C, United States military leadership including O-6 classifications, general and flag officers are primarily responsible for producing or blocking cultural “buy-in.” Particularly in an active post-conflict Security Sector Reform context, buy-in from these leaders, in addition to G3s and service chiefs, is critical because they are the operating generals in charge with the explicit capacity to make change. In a UK military setting, these leaders would be classified as Majors and Lieutenant Colonels who, as Interviewee E explains, are responsible for integrating “gender into the military DNA.” Such interpretations of gender, however, are up to the specific leaders themselves with some guidance from defense policies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>United States Military (Army &amp; Marines)</th>
<th>United Kingdom Military (Army)</th>
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<td>General of the Army</td>
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<td>O-10</td>
<td>Army Chief of Staff / Commandant of the Marine Corps / General</td>
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<td>O-9</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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Information Provided by: United States Department of Defense Veteran’s Affairs and United Kingdom Army. N.d.

From a Feminist Institutionalism lens, those in power are charged with framing acceptable normative behaviors, traditions, and attitudes. Due to leadership reputation and
power, lower ranks will accept or refuse to outwardly challenge these norms and instead embody and reinforce them into everyday behaviors. To this end, military masculinities are legitimized by senior leaders in both the US and UK militaries which tells lower ranks that hypermasculine norms are acceptable. Thus, how the US and UK ‘do gender’ is dependent on how senior ranks understand the relationship between gender and defense, and how such relations are legitimized through military norms, attitudes, and behaviors.

**Gender Differences: US Emphasis on Operational Effectiveness**

While similar in their embodiment and experiences of military masculinities, the United States differs from the United Kingdom in its application of gender performance to its Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) legislation and guidance framings. By adopting an operational effectiveness approach, the United States frames gender-aware policies around national security and combat mission necessities. Based on the 2011 Executive Order “Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security,” the first US National Action Plan adopted its initial gender policy outcomes around the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (United States Executive Branch 2011, 1). To this end, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services is specifically tasked with recruitment, retention, and integration methods to better mainstream women into military settings (United States Executive Branch 2011, 4). The Department of Defense then tasks Combatant Commands with theatre-specific gender integration considerations, which for the Middle East, recognized the critical work of Marine Corps’ Female Engagement Teams and the Army’s Cultural Support Teams as foundational to promoting future gender integration initiatives (United States Executive Branch 2011, 4).
This first WPS framework clearly conveys the US’s operational effectiveness approach to gender policies in the military. By framing WPS around national security objectives outlined in both the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Review, the United States adopted a paradoxically holistic yet tokenistic approach to gender-aware defense policies. While holistic in that it challenges the sole acceptance or reliance on masculine norms, it concurrently tokenizes women as the only ones who can provide this gender-aware approach. It specifically does so by insisting the recruitment, retention, and integration of women can create a more operationally effective yet gender-aware force for the complex battlespaces of today. By conflating women to gender, however, it fails to dismantle military masculinities inherent to defense culture and alludes to an inherent understanding that integrated women will take up the characteristics of aggression, strength, and violence to support defense achievement of national security goals. Moreover, it reaffirms the expectation that women will be inherently more aware of gender issues.

As a result of this first WPS iteration, the United States Department of Defense first committed to reevaluating combat exclusions in its 2012 “Report to Congress on the Review of the Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting the Service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed Forces.” Presented to Congress, the report recommends removal of all barriers that “would prevent Service members from rising to the highest level of responsibility that their talents and capabilities warrant” (United States Department of Defense Office 2012, i). The report opposes the 1994 “Risk Rule” which explicitly excludes women from combat operations if the risk of exposure to hostile fire it equal or greater than the combat units they supported (United States Department of Defense Office 2012, 3). Thus, the report proposes eliminating all combat exclusions for women across most occupational specialties based off experiences in Iraq.
and Afghanistan which showed no delineation between “risk” and “non-risk” military environments (United States Department of Defense Office 2012, 3, 15). To this end, the report recognizes the modern battlefield is “non-linear” and devoid of a “clearly defined front line and safer rear area” (United States Department of Defense Office 2012, 3). In relation to operational effectiveness, this recognition of changing battlefield conditions legitimizes women’s participation in combat operations on the basis that they will be at risk regardless. Thus, from an operational effectiveness lens, women are perceived as necessary for contemporary military operations which combats prior viewpoints that women near combat operations had to be protected.

Similar to the 2011 WPS Executive Order, the 2012 Department of Defense report indicates an increasing awareness to adopt gender-integration policies. While removing barriers to women’s full participation in defense operations, the report indicates continued understandings of gender as a woman’s issue rather than as an opportunity to reevaluate military masculinities. Specifically, the report argues “there is no compelling reason for continuing the portion of the policy that precludes female Service members from being assigned to units or positions that are doctrinally required to physically co-locate and remain with direct ground combat units” (United States Department of Defense Office 2012, 3). In simpler terms, women are perceived as a necessity in the modern “non-linear” battlespace, therefore limitations on their combat participation are now unjustified. Yet, such arguments represent tokenistic rhetoric which conflate women’s presence to gender sensitivity rather than viewing gender as an analytical tool to understand the battlespace of today. To this end, the operational effectiveness lens characterizes women who are capable of upholding defense values, such as warrior mentalities, as able and willing to participate in the non-linear battlefield. It is critical, however,
to recognize how this advancement of women in combat positions challenges decades of policy which barred any participation of women in combat operations. The US Department of Defense recognizes the necessity for equal participation of both groups within a defense sphere and encourages the reconsideration of power hierarchies within the US defense sphere. Moreover, the report recognizes the need to increase female leadership representation across service branches. While indicating a tokenistic perspective, such recognitions are nevertheless impactful and transformative. Without providing spaces for women to rise through the ranks and establish themselves as capable leaders, then the US military understands they will continue to have limited or nondiverse perspectives supporting operational missions in the future.

This 2012 DoD report ultimately influenced the United States Congress ratification of the first and only existing US-WPS legislation in 2017, titled Public Law 115-68 “The Women Peace and Security Act of 2017.” Mandating that relevant public entities immediately develop their own strategic implementation plans regarding gender-aware policies, the Law recognized women as instrumental defense operatives in conflict zones (United States 115th Congress 2017, Section 2). As required by Public Law 115-68, the Department of Defense developed its “Women, Peace and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan” in 2020 which is framed around the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS). The Department of Defense Plan specifically views women’s integration as an operational necessity wherein women’s participation in military decision-making is essential to US posturing as a key ally (United States Department of Defense 2020, 12). As such, the WPS plan argues a diverse fighting force is “more lethal” and successful which, in turn, strengthens global alliances by demonstrating US commitment to “women’s empowerment” (United States Department of Defense 2020, 10). To this end, the Department of Defense views women’s empowerment as
“increasing inter-operability and better preparing forces to face the complex challenges of the modern battlefield” (United States Department of Defense 2020, 11).

As with its previous iterations of WPS frameworks, both the 2012 Public Law and 2020 Department of Defense WPS Plan continue to frame women as an operational necessity for security sector operations on the grounds of efficiency, rather than equality. Mention of US National Security Strategies, paired with recognition of the complex modern battlefield, again showcases the holistic yet tokenistic understandings of women’s participation in defense fields. Similar to the 2011 Women Peace and Security framework, the reports both highlight women as “force multipliers” who will provide new and necessary alternative perspectives on the situations inherent to an increasingly complex world. Reflecting the comments made by several interviewees, this operational effectiveness lens is the most accessible manner for defense officials to understand gender integration. While a starting point, such mentalities or frameworks fail to holistically recognize the inherent military masculinity culture deeply engrained in US defense sectors. Nevertheless, it does encourage greater reception towards gender inclusiveness in operational missions from an understandable foundation.

These codified legislation examples are reflective of informal normative experiences of an operational effectiveness lens towards ‘doing gender’ in the US military. Explained by Interviewee A, defense officials and gender advisors nearly always position “gender analysis as an analytical tool […] which is very highly valued […] to say: when you go down range, do you want to be better at this and that, mitigating risk to enhance operational effectiveness?” To this end, tokenizing women as “force multipliers” in the name of operational effectiveness may not reflect a gender mainstreaming framework but does begin the work of addressing gender integration elements from a defense-accessible perspective. In codified public laws and federal
legislation, the push-dull dynamic between gender tokenism and inclusion is evident. As argued by Interviewee D, these policies “don't necessarily guarantee they get [gender inclusion] done the way you want them done, and they don't necessarily have the impact or outcome that they say all the right things on paper.” Yet, as evidenced by Interviewee C’s service experiences, such operational effectiveness lenses are often the only way to start overcoming a military masculinity culture which views women or gender as a threat.

Explained by Interviewee C, field officers in Iraq were more receptive to female-engagement teams when they could contextualize such units within the broader understanding of operational effectiveness. Without understanding the “power dynamics, social psychology, and the structural institutional dynamics,” these officers understood the Lioness Teams had a higher survivability rate and greater chance to engage with local populations for counterinsurgency purposes than non-gender integrated units. Similar to the UK in equating women’s combat participation to local engagement missions, this perspective highlights the “force multiplier” argument defense officials rely on to justify gender, or women’s, integration into combat spheres.

For troops on the ground, however, some perspectives regarding gender integration, women’s combat participation, and operational effectiveness move beyond the force multiplier lens. Providing a specific example of a Marine Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) in Iraq, Interviewee C explained how some officers in combat operation scenarios consistently requested more women for field operations. Rather than justifying such asks on the basis of “women are more culturally-sensitive” – which the Marine LTC coined “the lazy person’s explanation” – he instead explained:
Women's Spidey senses are different. They saw different threats. They were aware that things were going wrong in different ways. Their radar towards danger was different. And when you are doing house to house operations in an urban environment, you need a whole lot of different Spidey senses to keep everybody alive. (Interviewee C)

As evidenced by both federal WPS legislation and the lived experiences of servicemembers, the United States military ‘does gender’ through an operational effectiveness lens. Formed on the basis of military masculinities and tokenization of women, United States WPS legislation frames gender-integration efforts as one of necessity for the modern battlefield. While such language reflects and reinforces internalized military masculinities, it nevertheless positions women as an equal defense operative required for military missions. As defense actors who have different “Spidey senses,” women are seen as force multipliers capable of contributing to various elements of combat operations. To this end, how United States ‘does gender’ can be understood through its tokenization of female service actors and internalized hypermasculine behaviors. While such approaches are reinforced by military leadership, they also indicate a growing awareness of gender or women as an operational necessity.

Gender Differences: UK Policy Externalization

While similar to the United States in its embodiment of military masculinities, tokenization of gender, and necessity for leadership buy-in, the United Kingdom defense sector ‘does gender’ differently by externalizing its gender-integration strategies to foreign states rather than articulating the WPS agenda as a domestic reform program.
Reflective of this external-focused WPS agenda, the first UK National Action Plan in 2006 solely focused on supporting United Nations stakeholder programming by leading official UNSCR 1325 trainings and “raising awareness on the importance of gender considerations in conflict” (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2006, 1). To this end, the NAP calls for “HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] to continue to deploy female personnel on operations […] and to pay attention to gender representation” in support of such external programming (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2006, 2). The 2012 iteration of the UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security follows a similar focus on external support to foreign partners. Defining the UK-WPS mission as an opportunity to “focus on where [the UK] has the most influence,” the NAP identifies Female Engagement Officers as critical actors in working to mainstream gender considerations into operational settings (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2012, 4, 11).

These first two UK gender-integration strategies reflect British limited understandings of internalized military masculinity culture inherent to defense institutions. While tokenizing its own female personnel in a manner similar to the US, the UK military instead externalizes the problem to foreign conflict settings whereas the US tokenizes women for its own operational effectiveness. Depicting the Female Engagement Officers as “critical actors” paints them as those solely responsible for any gender mainstreaming initiatives the United Kingdom and its foreign partners undertake. In essence, the 2006 and 2012 National Action Plans appear to argue the issue of gender integration is a problem in other countries rather than its own. Moreover, it conflates women to gender perspectives, arguing increased gender representation will help support women’s empowerment abroad. Rather than arguing Women, Peace and Security is an element of its own work to restructure internal military masculinities, these National Action
Plans clearly convey Women, Peace and Security work is that which external powers, in partnership with the United Kingdom, must complete. To this end, the United Kingdom ‘does gender’ by seeing women’s participation in humanitarian-security operations abroad.

Reflecting more gender-aware rhetoric in both its 2014 and 2018 National Action Plans, the United Kingdom took additional steps to recognize how “women’s participation is often tokenistic” and that “conflict shapes and is shaped by gender norms” (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2014, 5; United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2019, 3). To this end, both the 2014 and 2018 NAPs contend gender-aware policies must involve the empowerment of men and boys to “change social attitudes from the grassroots level up” (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2014, 5). For the 2014 NAP, this new approach results in the United Kingdom specifying it will no longer allocate specific resources to “Women, Peace and Security work [which] only discourages attempts to integrate gender into everything [they] do” (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2014, 10). Instead, WPS funds were to be directed into a holistic Foreign & Commonwealth Office operations fund. As identified by the UK in its 2018 National Action Plan, these funds will support operations across nine different countries focused on developing meaningful women’s representation initiatives and encouraging accountability mechanisms within security institutions (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2019, 6).

As highlighted in such policies and further explained by Interviewee E, the change to more gender-aware rhetoric yet continued external focus of NAP policies is reflective of UK foreign policy priorities. According to Interviewee E, “whenever the UK military goes overseas, it just doesn’t just go on its own in a military capacity, the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office will insist somewhere in the paperwork that there is some instruction
relating to women peace and security.” To this end, the United Kingdom ‘does gender’ via its WPS policies by focusing on initiatives which support gender-aware security operations. While recognizing the role of both men and women in gender integration strategies, the UK does not operationalize this within their own military structures, thereby ignoring internalized military masculinities. Notably, the United Kingdom also takes steps to dismantle the specified Women, Peace, and Security foreign funding structure, instead placing WPS allocations across generalized foreign policy work. While noteworthy in that the UK government recognizes the need to establish WPS initiatives across all efforts rather than designating it separate to foreign policy programs, this element is still derived from the belief that Women, Peace, and Security is a foreign-facing priority rather than an opportunity to reconstruct internal structures.

As an additional element to such National Action Plans, Interviewee E discussed how there are internal British military trainings offered at Sandhurst Military Academy regarding WPS agendas. Yet, in reference to these opportunities, as explained by Interviewee E, the trainings are positioned so that when officers “get sent to do a security sector reform and tasking […] they should already be thinking right, Women, Peace, and Security. It's my responsibility to teach this to [foreign] troops.” Thus, even in the rare instance of integrating WPS into its own military, the UK still ‘does gender’ on the framework of external operations rather than evaluating their own military masculinities and tokenization norms.

Manifestations in Iraq: Silence as Data

The similarities and differences in how the United States and United Kingdom ‘do gender’ helps us understand the overwhelming lack of gendered considerations in Iraq post-conflict Security Sector Reform between 2003 to 2021. Immediate Coalition Provisional
Authority actions, informed by US and UK officials, failed to consider Gendered SSR mechanisms.

Tasked with providing for the effective administration of Iraq immediately after the war, Coalition Provisional Authority actions largely encompassed security and stability measures (Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority 2003, Regulation 1). The first two CPA orders eliminated all Ba’ath party structures and removed Iraqi leadership from governing positions in defense-adjacent entities (see Appendix A.2) on the basis that a future Iraqi Security Corps would be “professional, non-political, militarily effective, and representative of all Iraqis” (Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority 2003, Order Number 1; Order Number 2). The New Iraqi Army was later defined in Order Number 22 as responsible for protecting national territory (Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority 2003, Order Number 22). In both cases, Iraqi servicemembers were required to meet age, scholastic, and political affiliation requirements yet no mention of gender was made (Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority 2003, Order Number 22).

Order Number 28 similarly outlined the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps which was tasked with routine patrolling and checkpoint security (Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority 2003, Order Number 28). Within the qualifications section, similar requirements relative to the Iraqi Defense Corps exist with an additional mention of anti-discrimination on the basis of gender, race, color, religion, or regional origin (Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority 2003, Order Number 28). CPA Order Number 67 also establishes a new Iraqi Ministry of Defense on the basis of 11 principles including representativeness which entails the inclusion of all candidates regardless of race, color, gender, religion, sect, tribal or regional origin to best reflect broader Iraqi society (Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority 2004, Order Number 67).
As evidenced in these relevant Security Sector Reform policies, the Coalition Provisional Authority fails to mention gender except on the basis of anti-discrimination. Only once, in CPA Order Number 67, is gender actually considered appropriate in enlistment qualification measures. Thus, in post-conflict Iraq, silence is data. The failure of Coalition Provisional Authority forces to consider gender is representative of the internalized conceptions or understandings of gender within the defense institutions of contributing forces. For the United States and United Kingdom, the internalized and inherent military masculinity culture enforces a policy orientation devoid of gender considerations given gender within their own normative structures is conflated with peace. As highlighted earlier, gender and peace are considered non-starters with the US and UK militaries because these concepts are perceived as the antithesis to a warfighter mentality. Recognizing that warfighting and post-conflict reconstruction are two different activities, the Iraq War mentality focus on national security objectives did not shift between the time of the actual conflict and post-conflict contexts. The lack of this ‘national security’ mentality shift is justified on the fact that both the US and UK militaries were overwhelmingly invested in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts to prevent insurgency and instability. Responsible for training defense actors, such as police and army forces, the US and UK still carried a warfighter mentality into their Security Sector Reform efforts because it was their militaries which influenced the post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Militaries are meant to embody masculine traits of strength and control, according to the United States and United Kingdom normative cultures, therefore peace is not part of the accepted behavior. Based on understandings of how the US and UK ‘do gender’, any issue related to gender is automatically associated with humanitarian or civilian missions, as evidenced by Interviewees A, C and E in their respective experiences of post-conflict Iraq. To this end, the
CPA and immediate US-UK led Security Sector Reform was exclusively cultivated around military masculinity norms of defense, protection, and rebuilding the strength of Iraqi military institutions.

Moreover, when gender is included, such as within qualification standards for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Defense Corps, it is only added in on the basis of anti-discrimination. The inclusion of such standards is likely a reflection of non-military institutional contributions, such as USAID or the UK Foreign Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), rather than a tried-and-true reflection of United States and United Kingdom reconsideration of gender-inclusive language. For example, Interviewee A explained how in their Iraqi USAID work, the relationship between conflict, gender, and post-conflict reconstruction was either “not on people’s radar” or “became as a lightning rod nonstarter.” One senior-level USAID official “considered the programs as something that was decided upon to please the people in DC.” Similarly, Interviewee A recalled how the Ministry of Women’s Affairs received no US Security Sector Reform funding despite being the newest ministry created in the immediate post-conflict setting. Interviewee A characterized this failure to integrate gender into Security Sector Reform in Iraq as case-and-point of Coalition Provisional Authority obliviousness to the gender perspective, stating “they didn't understand the value of the issue.” In this sense, gender was perceived as a politicized issue and not a legitimized defense concern, thus not worthy nor relevant to Security Sector Reform efforts.

Later evaluations of Coalition Provision Authority, United States, and United Kingdom Security Sector Reform policies highlight this continued ignorance towards gender perspectives as a reflection of internalized military masculinities. For the United States, quarterly “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” reports from 2008-2010 detailed ongoing SSR efforts in-country.
These reports, however, only recognize the limitations of CPA efforts to support national reconciliation. In particular, these reports highlight the role of increasing ethno-sectarian tensions and insurgency concerns as determining factors for Security Sector Reform efforts both in the past and for the future, indicating traditional military concerns form the focal point of defense-related policy initiatives (United States Department of Defense March 2009, iv).

Similarly, the United Kingdom Parliament Select Committee on Defence report published in 2005 specifically addressed the status of UK participation in Iraqi Security Sector Reform (United Kingdom Parliament Select Committee on Defence 2005). The Parliament Report characterizes Coalition Provisional Authority approaches as “bottom-up, numerically-focused [which] meant that the Iraqi military, security, and police did not develop in a well-coordinated manner” (United Kingdom Parliament Select Committee on Defence 2005). While alluding to the importance of moving beyond traditional train-and-equip programming, the report fails to consider a gender perspective, particularly from the perspective of power dynamics and hierarchies. Instead, the report attributes failures to encompass more holistic programming as an issue of limited “emphasis on leadership, mentoring and battle and operational inoculation which are fundamental […] for the prosecution of a complex counter-insurgency” (United Kingdom Parliament Select Committee on Defence 2005).

Even in less immediate evaluations of Security Sector Reform in Iraq, the United States and United Kingdom militaries continue to reflect a masculinized approach to post-conflict settings. The focus on counterinsurgency, leadership, and ethno-sectarian tensions are viewed through a masculinity lens for strength, security, and aggression towards the enemy. While recognizing the need to move beyond such traditional programming, the United Kingdom evaluation fails to highlight the role of gender or power dynamics, alluding to a sustained and
internalized technical viewpoint of Security Sector Reform. Similar to immediate post-conflict SSR policies, these evaluations are silent on a gender perspective which is reflection of how the US and UK also ignore gender within their own military structures.

Manifestations in Iraq: Contemporary Tokenization of Women

Only in limited contexts did the United States and United Kingdom evaluate Iraqi Security Sector Reform policies from a gendered perspective, yet these were also reflective of the military masculinity cultures inherent to their internal defense structures.

The United States quarterly “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” reports occasionally integrated gender perspectives into evaluations of counterinsurgency policies. In particular, these reports highlighted growing female suicide bomber trends in 2008, indicating that “community leaders began calling for women to join the Daughters of Iraq (DoI), a female unit within the community policing program largely credited with reducing violence in Iraq” (United States Department of Defense March 2009, 21). The report characterizes this female-unit as “non-standard” yet credits the program as a necessity to “fill the security gap that currently allows women to avoid scrutiny at checkpoints” (United States Department of Defense March 2009, 21).

Similar to conflation of gender and women in their own militaries, this United States evaluation of counterinsurgency operations reflects gendered understandings on the basis of women’s participation. Such reports indicate when gender was considered in post-conflict Iraq Security Sector Reform, it was evaluated on the basis of quantifiable women’s participation efforts rather than using gender as an analytical tool to holistically understand the post-conflict space. Similarly, the characterization of the all-female unit as “non-standard” indicates United
States military conceptions of traditional counterinsurgency within a masculinity lens. This rhetoric illustrates the masculine orientation of US counterinsurgency policies which are based on the concepts of strength, aggression, violence, and desire to eliminate the enemy. Thus, the recognition of all-female units is a surprise as their existence is associated with peaceful, humanitarian approaches. Moreover, this evaluation is reflective of the operational effectiveness lens adopted by the US Department of Defense. The report specifically indicates the Daughters of Iraq are a “necessity” to “fill the security gap” which threatens checkpoint operations and the safety of coalition troops. Thus, gender is understood as women’s participation as mirrored in US Defense military masculinities generally.

The quarterly reports also discuss the integration of women into non-commissioned police units (United States Department of Defense March 2009, 39; September 2009, 35; December 2009, 51; June 2010, 52). In 2009, the report discusses the establishment of a Female Institute in the Baghdad Police College (BPC) to “increase the number of female officers participating in the commissioned officer program, and to lay the foundation for total integration of women into the commissioned officer program” (United States Department of Defense June 2010, 53). The report highlights the first female officer class had 50 graduates as of November 2009 and 83 were enrolled for the March 2010 class (United States Department of Defense September 2009, 35; December 2009, 51).

Similar to the Daughters of Iraq evaluation, this examination of the female police college reflects an operational effectiveness mentality instilled within a military masculinity culture. The report implies the participation of Iraqi women within policing security institutions is a necessary step for the basis of security needs rather than an actual desire to reconsider gendered security institutions. This is further reinforced by the quantification of female police officers who
participate in the program which tokenizes women rather than reevaluates gendered military masculinities.

United Kingdom evaluations of Iraqi Security Sector Reform also reflect the tokenization of women in post-conflict defense institutions. In their 2018 National Action Plan, the UK evaluates their integrated reconciliation programming meant to increase government-civilian accountability mechanisms. While not specific to the defense sector, the evaluation recognizes women’s participation as a necessary precondition for accountable governance and gender-sensitive community planning between federal and provincial authorities (United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2019, 17).

Reflective of their externalization of WPS agendas, this United Kingdom report conflates gender and women while failing to integrate gender considerations into defense reform. Specifically, the United Kingdom report fails to mention gender or even women’s empowerment in the context of defense reconstruction efforts. Moreover, the report only accepts gender as a precondition for stable governance rather than as a necessary good for defense reconceptualization. To this end, British modern evaluations of Security Sector Reform in Iraq almost entirely ignore the defense aspect of their initial SSR plan. The evaluative report also tokenizes women by essentializing both foreign and British women’s presence as a necessary condition for a successful external-led WPS program.

**Discussion & Conclusions**

How do the United States and United Kingdom security sectors ‘do gender’ and to what extent can this explain post-conflict G/SSR policies in Iraq between 2003-2021? Using a Feminist Institutionalism approach, this research found the United States and United Kingdom ‘do gender’ as evidenced by the presence, prominence, and intensity of militarized masculinity
norms and WPS legislation, thereby impacting their foreign policy framings. Thus, utilizing a feminist institutionalism lens indicates the importance of domestic gender agendas and normative patterns on foreign policy framings, specifically with post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Based on my research, my answer to my questions is: the United States and United Kingdom exhibit similar military masculinities enforced by defense leadership which tokenize women servicemembers and conflate gender to women. These military masculinities are derived from societal associations between masculinities and characteristics of strength, and violence, aggression. This “laddish culture” inherent to US and UK defense institutions force those who are not perceived as masculine or masculine-enough to become honorary men in order to fit the warfighter identity, oftentimes enforced via harassment and bullying. To this end, the association between masculinity and military culture generates an understanding that the antithesis to such is women and peace. Thus, any acceptance other than masculine normative behaviors, attitudes, and traditions is perceived as being for women or in the name of peace – a “nonstarter” for defense institutions.

In spite of such similarities and nature of the US-UK special relationship in modern defense spheres, the United States WPS framework actively attempts to understand gender within an operational effectiveness lens. Based on experiences in Iraq with Team Lioness units, United States efforts to adopt more gender-aware policies have, in actuality, been more inclusive of female-presenting servicemembers. To this end, women are seen as “force multipliers” which are determining factors in the increasingly complex battlespaces of the future as understood and justified by the contributions of Team Lioness units during the Iraq war. Women, Peace, and Security frameworks such as Public Law 115-68, Executive Order on Instituting a National
Action Plan, and Defense Department Review of the Combat Exclusionary Law all indicate the United States perceives gender integration as a necessary addition to support combat missions. In this sense, however, gender integration is understood as women’s integration and is achieved via recruitment and retention mechanisms. The lived experiences of former US servicemembers and gender advisors deployed in Iraq concurrently highlight this operational effectiveness lens, explaining defense-gender frameworks as an analytical tool. Given the deeply engrained military masculinity culture of US forces, operational effectiveness helps defense officials comprehend gender within a simplified lens on the basis of survivability and “Spidey senses” for close-combat missions.

In contrast, United Kingdom WPS strategies are externalized to partner nations. While one of the first nations to develop a National Action Plan, all four iterations of the UK NAP reflect rhetoric wherein foreign nations are the ones who require a reconstruction of security sectors to support women’s empowerment. Different to the United States, the United Kingdom National Action Plans from 2014 and 2018 contain gender-aware foundations which recognize gender cannot and should not be conflated to women’s participation and instead require gender-aware men’s participation as well. Despite such framework distancing from tokenistic practices, however, the external-focus of UK NAP strategies fails to meaningfully challenge the internalized military masculinities of its own defense sectors. Therefore, gender and the Women Peace and Security agenda is externalized as a foreign issue rather than an internal issue which reinforces the military masculinities inherent to UK defense structures.

To this end, the way in which the US and UK ‘do gender’ was impactful for Iraq Security Sector Reform from 2003-2021, but not in a transformative manner. Rather, SSR policies were either ignorant of gender-aware frameworks or simply tokenized women’s participation on the
basis of mission needs, reflecting the inherent military masculinities embodied by American and British defense sectors. As reflected in Security Sector Reform-relevant policies designed and implemented by Coalition Provisional Authorities between 2003-2010, the United States and United Kingdom were solely focused on traditional political-military threats. Policies were formed on the basis of counterinsurgency concerns and ethno-sectarian tensions, reflecting a traditional masculinized SSR approach which failed to understand and address the power dynamics inherent to security institutions. When gender or women were mentioned, this inclusion demonstrates a tokenistic approach wherein Daughters of Iraq and female police officer participation in security sectors were quantified and justified on the basis of counterinsurgency.

While these findings provide new perspectives on the Gendered Security Sector Reform field, there are limitations to be acknowledged within this research. Firstly, I was only able to complete one interview with a representative of the United Kingdom defense experience. As such, this singular perspective cannot and should not be considered holistic for all UK defense experiences from a gendered perspective. Moreover, the descriptive analysis of this research is subjective given it was a rhetorical interpretation of policy intentions. While this descriptive analysis approach is justifiable given the research subject, it is worth mentioning the presence of interpretation bias. Additionally, while this research only examines defense actors, I recognize the defense realm does not operate in a policy vacuum. As such, it is worth considering domestic policy environments of the US and UK regarding post-conflict Iraq and how such political debates influenced defense-gender framings. Finally, this research is limited in its inclusion of Iraqi perspectives on the Security Sector Reform process. While not considered part of the research question, it is worth examining how Iraqi actors conceptualized gender and whether or how this impacted US and UK approaches to Security Sector Reform.
Based on the findings of this paper, I recommend additional areas for future research. This thesis utilized a Feminist Institutionalism lens to best understand the normative behaviors, traditions, and attitudes of gender in defense sectors in a post-conflict sphere. Thus, a future area of study could be a comparative analysis of pre-conflict and post-conflict gender performance in the United States and United Kingdom militaries to understand whether and how conflict influences gendered norms. To this end, future research could also examine the implications of normative adoption timelines on gender frameworks in defense institutions. The UNSCR 1325 was adopted in 2000, meaning the relationship between gender and defense was likely only emerging in policy debates, let alone reflected in actual policies by 2003. Lastly, while this research proposes a cause-and-effect relationship between US and UK gender performance on the Iraq War post-conflict sphere, it is also worth considering whether and how the Iraq War impacted how the US and UK did gender. The prominence of Female Engagement Teams or Team Lioness units in policy debates on gender inclusion in combat operations is one hint as to how the gender-defense nexus was reconceptualized following the war.

In conclusion, the military masculinities embodied within United States and United Kingdom defense institutions limited transformative policy approaches to the Iraqi security sector post-2003. Militaries are physical manifestations of societal associations between masculinity and aggression, strength, and security. As such, the “warfighter” identity is encompassed around this characterization of masculinity and aversion to characteristics of gender, peace, and femininity. While this “laddish culture” is represented differently between United States and United Kingdom internal WPS frameworks, it nevertheless impacted how these Coalition partners approached Security Sector Reform in post-conflict Iraq. Silence is data, and the failure to include holistic measures of gender integration, paired with tokenistic inclusion
of women on the basis of counterinsurgency needs, was a result of the internalized military masculinility cultures of United States and United Kingdom defense actors. From this thesis, we can now better understand how internalized cultural norms of defense institutions impact foreign policy frameworks from a gendered perspective.
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### Appendix

**A.1: List of NAP, WPS, and Iraq War Reports**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
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|  | - Follows Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Public Law 115-68)  
- Four lines of effort: 1) seek and support the preparation and meaningful participation of women in decision-making; 2) promote the protection of women and girls’ human rights; (3) adjust U.S. international programs to improve outcomes in equality for women; (4) encourage partners to meaningful include women (7)  
- DoD Objective 1: The Department of Defense exemplifies a diverse organization that allows for women’s meaningful participation.  
- DoD Objective 2: Women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks.  
- DoD Objective 3: Partner nation security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and  
- Puts WPS within National Security Strategy (NSS) – “societies are more peaceful and prosperous when women and men enjoy the same rights, liberties, and access to resources.”  
- Puts WPS within National Defense Strategy (NDS) – “build a more lethal force […] diverse and innovative fighting force” (10)  
- Line of Effort 1: measured by number of engagements with key USG leaders focused on increasing women’s meaningful participation.  
- Line of Effort 2: number of USG leader engagements on women’s safety and prevention of GBV in conflict  
- Line of Effort 3: designation of one or more senior official to WPS initiatives per department  
- Line of Effort 4: number of engagements by key US leaders which lead to formal WPS partners. | - UK National Action Plan founded on an understanding that people experience violent conflict differently according to gender” (3)  
- “Conflict shapes and is shaped by gender norms” (3)  
- Quantified solutions: peace is 35% more likely to last for fifteen years; women in senior positions were found in 75% of UN led or co-led peace processes (3)  
- Nine focus countries where the UK leads / contributes to the outcomes.  
- Decision-making: increase in women’s meaningful and representative participation in decision-making processes  
- Peacekeeping: Gender perspective is consistently applied  
- Gender-based violence: increase in the number and scale of interventions.  
- Humanitarian response: Women’s and girl’s needs are more effectively met.  
- Security and justice: actors are increasingly accountable to women and girls needs.  
- Preventing and countering violent extremism: ensure the participation/leadership of women.  
- UK Capabilities: processes and leadership to deliver against WPS commitments. |
Views women in conflict-affected regions as having significantly achieved moderation of violent extremism.

“Peace negotiations are more likely to succeed and to result in durable peace agreements when women participate in the peace process” (Sec.2)

US as a global leader in promoting meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention.

Policy Statement: integrate perspectives and interests of affected women; encourage partner governments to support women’s voices in peace and security processes; promote the physical safety, economic security, and dignity of women.

Section 6: Requires Department of Defense to ensure relevant personnel training that specifically addresses the importance of meaningful participation by women.

Men and boys are a central part in promoting the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

Three foundational principles: Women’s participation to build peace; Women and girls suffer specific forms of violence in conflict; In emergencies and conflict situations, women and girls have specific needs.

Without women’s rightful participation, peace is unbalanced and unsustainable.

Women’s formal participation doesn’t guarantee gender equality → women’s participation is often tokenistic → inclusion must be meaningful.

Significant focus on GBV, how this disproportionally impacts women (6-9)

Use of FCO, DFID, MOD, Stabilization Unit to integrate gender centrally to conflict, stability, and security work.

Women, Peace, and Security should never be a “silo” issue.

Will not specify a dedicated allocation of resources to Women, Peace, and Security work – this only discourages attempts to integrate gender into everything.

Conflict prevention on the basis of equal participation from women

Dedicated staff to addressing gender considerations in keeping with DOD’s mission; policies to the recruitment, retention, treatment, and integration of women into U.S. Armed Forces

Experience from Marine Corps’ Female Engagement Teams and the Army’s Cultural Support Teams provide new avenues for women Marines and soldiers to support ongoing operations and engage women in local populations.

Objectives and Action Framework

National Integration and Institutionalization: interagency coordination, policy development, enhanced professional training to institutionalize a gender-responsive approach (12)

Participation in Peace Processes and Decision-making: improve the prospects for inclusive, just,
and sustainable peace by promoting and strengthening women’s rights (12)
- Protection from Violence: strengthen its efforts to prevent—and protect women and children (12)
- Conflict Prevention: promote women’s roles in conflict prevention (12)
- Access to Relief and Recovery: respond to the distinct needs of women and children in conflict-affected via humanitarian assistance.” (12)
- Outcome 1: National Integration
- Outcome 2: Participation in Peace Processes
- Outcome 3: Protection from Violence
- Outcome 4: Conflict Prevention
- Outcome 5: Access to relief and recovery

Forces, to allow them to undertake operations with due regard to local culture and customs, including gender considerations. Fully developed cultural training also remains an ongoing objective.” (11)
- Objectives & Measurement (15-25)

Middle East Considerations
- Identifies future plan potentials with Iraq (60)
- Increase participation of women in political and public life; women in transitional planning, peace building and the security and justice systems; facilitate cross-learning and sharing of experiences between women activists across the region and beyond.


- Focus on external partners and consideration of gender issues in project activities.
- EX: training on UNSCR1325
- UK Ministry of Defence Armed Forces audit of gender content of Pre-Deployment Training
- Continued deployment of female personnel

WPS Evaluation  xx

- General recognition that the MOD fails to support female servicemembers.
- Women face disproportionate levels of bullying, harassment and discrimination, particularly sexual assault.
- Relatively less overt hostility to female personnel BUT … Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Diane Allen ‘on paper’ all roles are now open to all, the culture and attitudes in some parts of the military can still mean women experience a ‘sense of not being welcomed in”’ (11)
- “Laddish culture” and “honorary men” (17)
- “Within the military culture of the Armed Forces and the MOD, it is still a man’s world. Although many servicewomen are able to cope with this, we do not think they should have to.” (18)
### Internal Reviews: Military Inclusion


- Positions opening to women are now recommended at battalion level of direct combat.
- Elimination of co-location
- No change recommended to allowing women into long range reconnaissance and special operations.
- No change recommended to physically demanding tasks qualifications.
- The dynamics of the modern-day battlefield are non-linear; no clearly defined front line and safer rear area where combat support operations are performed THUS no compelling reason for continuing the portion of the policy that precludes female Service members from being assigned to units or positions that are doctrinally required to physically co-locate → based on Iraq.
- Recommendations to expand career opportunities; provide greater number of qualified candidates; reduce operational tempo for male counterparts; improve assignment consistency.
- Army: 10 officer and 10 enlisted occupational specialties; 755 Army positions at the battalion level available for assignment to women
- Marine Corps: 371 positions within direct ground combat units at the battalion staff level in open


- Recommendation to lift exclusion from GCC roles to “maximize talent available to Defence and deliver equality of opportunity for all service personnel” (1)
- Women & higher risk with Musculoskeletal Injury (MSkI) – justification for incremental intro for gender integration
- UK commanders want more women in their teams especially when operating ‘amongst the people.’
- External Reputation: UK Armed Forces’ reputation to partner states as a modern employer and genuine meritocracy.
- International Reputation: Female personnel would see opening GCC roles as a positive
- Integration: Lessons from other indicate the impact of gender integration on the cohesion of traditionally male groups depends on the culture of the group → ensuring women are treated equitably with men.
occupational specialties for women; additional 60 positions for Navy officers and enlisted members to serve in support of the Marine Corps

- Air Force: 99 percent of positions open to women.
- Gender-neutral standards BUT thorough analysis required prior to changing qualification standards.


- Gender-neutral and merit-based qualifications
- Gender-integration is a methodological and evidence-based process which will take time to ensure welfare of entire armed forces.
- Quality not quantity of women
- Conduct and Culture: required cultural shift; primary factor in developing cohesion is the ability of all members of the team to perform assigned mission essential tasks effectively.
- Recruiting, retaining, and advancing talented women requires merit-based system.
- Responsibility not just on women, but across the entire force and the military and civilian leadership of the Department of Defense

**Iraq SSR**

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<th>ONGOING Report</th>
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- Mission focus on national reconciliation and accommodation; hinderance by ethno-sectarian agendas and disagreements
- ISF battalions taking the lead in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
- Increasing trend of female suicide bombers in Iraq in 2008, creation of DoI female counterpart Daughters of Iraq (DoI) largely credited with reducing violence in Iraq “non-standard role in Iraqi society has attracted much attention.”
- DoI program designed to fill the security gap that currently allows women to avoid scrutiny at checkpoints.
- DoI played a prominent role in the provincial elections, searching large numbers of female voters as they went to the polls.
- Shurta Basic Recruit Training (BRT) and shifting focus toward specialized training in English language training, criminal investigation techniques, ethics and human rights, forensics, community policing.

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselectlcmdfence/65/6508.htm.|

- SSR core security actors: Armed Forces, police and para-military forces, security and intelligence organizations, parliamentary committees
- UK as part of MNF-I devoted to the development of the Iraqi Security Forces; work closely with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to train, equip, mentor, and make operational the Iraqi security forces.
- Dr. Hutton on British involvement: “On the specifics of what the UK are doing to assist in the building of the Iraqi security forces, in the Iraqi police service you are aware we have a number of advisers, we have basic level training in Basra, Jordan, and we have deployed UK police officers to assist with that and supporting contractors. Perhaps most importantly from the MoD perspective is the assistance that we give to the Iraqi National Guard which you will also be aware is merging
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<td>• See March 2009 regarding female suicide bombers and training policewomen → longer period of assessment is required to definitively determine the full effects, but the number of security incidents decreased.</td>
<td>• Gender references on political representation, educational and literacy rates</td>
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<td>• Focus on development of the Iraqi justice and penal systems, control of border areas to reduce smuggling of lethal materials and foreign fighters, and development of improved ministerial processes to coordinate sovereignty and security matters.</td>
<td>• Shurta Basic Recruit Training and initiatives to improve professionalization and specific skill sets in English language training, criminal investigation techniques, ethics and human rights, forensics and crime scene management, community policing.</td>
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<td>• UK conclusion of Iraq mission commitments as part of the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) on July 31, 2009</td>
<td>• No mention of Gender &amp; SSR / Policing</td>
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<td>• US move away from combat and counterinsurgency (COIN) mission to focus on stability tasks centered on training, advising, and assisting the ISF; protecting U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities.</td>
<td>• MoD Human Rights (HR) Directorate work on women’s issues</td>
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<th>Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (March 2010)</th>
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<td>• Increasing focus on counterterrorism as a means to create a sovereign and just Iraqi governance system; Iraq framed as a long-term partner.</td>
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<td>• Women’s issues mentioned in literacy, education, political representation in Kurdish diasporas, policewoman training, MoD Human Rights</td>
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<td>• MODHR: Women’s Rights policy to set initial and future goals for percentage of women in MoD and for treatment of women in the work environment; current employment of 1,160 female personnel, 615 civilians, and 545 military.</td>
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<th>Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (June 2010)</th>
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<tr>
<td>• USAID Access to Justice Program provision of legal services to women and war widows</td>
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<td>• Police Basic Recruit Training shift to specialized training on human rights, justice, etc.</td>
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<td>• Baghdad Police College (BPC) established Female Institute to focus on increasing the</td>
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<td>• with the Iraqi Army. That is focused on the six ING battalions in MND(SE). Those units are paired with our units which mentor and monitor their progress. The main focus is on mentoring at division and brigade level.”</td>
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<td>• Olga Oliker: “We should not think that as long as enough people are deemed ‘trained’ and given a uniform that the Iraqis will be capable of providing for their own security. We must always be asking who is being trained, to do what, and how well.”</td>
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<td>• New emphasis needed on leadership, mentoring, and battle and operational inoculation.</td>
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<td>• SSR “should have” had a greater priority before and after the invasion / belated responses has forced an uncoordinated effort.</td>
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<td>• Significant focus on the command system and ensuring Iraq exerts control over its own security sector.</td>
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| **Regulation Number 1 (16 May 2003)** | - Outline of CPA regulations and administrative powers of governance including mission priorities for Iraqi government, security sector, and civil society.  
- Outline chain of command and area of responsibilities |
| **Order Number 1: De-Baathification of Iraqi Society (16 May 2003)** | - Elimination of Baath Party structures, leadership, and financial access. Dismisses Iraqi public officials if they were aligned with Baath party ideas or participated in their political activities. |
| **Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities (23 August 2003)** | - Dissolution of all Iraqi governmental entities prior to the 2003 Coalition invasion. Concurrently releases military members from their assigned service obligations.  
- DISSOLVED ENTITIES: Ministry of Defense, Information, State for Military Affairs; Iraqi Intelligence Service; National Security Bureau; Directorate of National Security; Special Security Organization; Murafaqin and Humaya al Khasa (Hussein Bodyguards); Army, Air Force, Navy, Air Defense Force; Republican Guard; Special Republican Guard; Directorate of Military Intelligence; Al Quds Force; Emergency Forces; Saddam Fedayeen (paramilitary); Baath Party Militia; Friends of Saddam (paramilitary); Ashbal Saddam (paramilitary); Presidential Diwan; Presidential Secretariat; Revolutionary Command Council; National Assembly; National Olympic Committee; Revolutionary, Special and National Security Courts; The Youth Organization (al-Futuwh) |
| **Order Number 67: Ministry of Defence (21 March 2004)** | - Establishes the new Iraqi Ministry of Defence, including the inclusion of previously establishes Iraqi Armed Forces as subdivisions. Provides mission statement and outlines chain of command structures, responsibilities, and service qualifications |