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Developing Effective Intervention: A Case Study of Genocidal Moments in Srebrenica and Kosovo

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Despite numerous treaties and international agreements aimed at stopping genocide, genocidal mass killings continue to take place within the current international system. In order to better understand how to best combat genocide, scholars have developed two main approaches: intervention and prevention. The interventionist approach argues genocide can be stopped in its tracks through use of military force and targeted diplomacy, while the preventionist approach argues pre-emptive action is needed to truly stop genocide. Both approaches, however, have relied too heavily on hypothetical analysis of how past genocides could have turned out differently given certain factors. This study instead aims to use case study analysis to compare two “genocidal moments”—one where genocide did take place, Srebrenica in 1995, and one where genocide did not take place, the Kosovo War in 1998 and 1999. To define this term, “genocidal moment,” this study uses Gregory Stanton’s “The 10 Stages of Genocide.” Ultimately, this study concludes that effective humanitarian interventions cannot remain neutral and, instead, must side with victims and against perpetrators.

Keywords

Genocide, Genocidal moment, Humanitarian intervention, Genocide prevention, Srebrenica genocide, Kosovo war

Publication Statement

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Abstract

Despite numerous treaties and international agreements aimed at stopping genocide, genocidal mass killings continue to take place within the current international system. In order to better understand how to best combat genocide, scholars have developed two main approaches: *intervention* and *prevention*. The interventionist approach argues genocide can be stopped in its tracks through use of military force and targeted diplomacy, while the preventionist approach argues pre-emptive action is needed to truly stop genocide. Both approaches, however, have relied too heavily on hypothetical analysis of how past genocides could have turned out differently given certain factors. This study instead aims to use case study analysis to compare two “genocidal moments”—one where genocide did take place, Srebrenica in 1995, and one where genocide did not take place, the Kosovo War in 1998 and 1999. To define this term, “genocidal moment,” this study uses Gregory Stanton’s “The 10 Stages of Genocide.” Ultimately, this study concludes that effective humanitarian interventions cannot remain neutral and, instead, must side with victims and against perpetrators.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Despite the efforts of many different NGOs, international organizations, and individual states since the end of World War II, genocide and similar mass killings have continued to take place. In particular, the United Nations has created numerous genocide-prevention institutions that the international community has failed to live up to^{1,2}. Given their longstanding use of rhetoric condemning genocide and the catastrophic consequences of inaction, it is necessary for international organizations like the UN to change their approach with regards to genocide in order to truly improve international norms. This research will use the term “genocidal moment”—which itself will be defined using Genocide Watch’s “The Ten Stages of Genocide”—in order to refer to both instances of completed genocide and instances of potential genocide that never progressed to Stanton’s “extermination” stage³. This research aims to compare two specific cases—the genocide in Srebrenica and the Kosovo War—to isolate what variables are most important to stopping “genocidal moments.” Indeed, what are the necessary conditions to stop genocidal moments from progressing to extermination? By examining genocidal moments in Srebrenica and Kosovo, this paper attempts to answer that question.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In the field of genocide studies, two main approaches to avoiding genocide predominate: *intervention* and *prevention*. The first approach supports the use of “humanitarian intervention”—a combination of targeted diplomacy and military force by the international community—to stop genocide in its tracks^{4,5,6}. The latter approach, on the other hand, doubts the effectiveness of this humanitarian intervention and instead supports the prevention of genocide before it can even begin, often by fostering appropriate conditions for reducing conflict in countries where warning signs of genocide exist^{7,8,2}. While both sides agree that it would be preferable if genocide never occurred at all, preventionists doubt the international community’s ability to effectively intervene while interventionists, more optimistic on that front, doubt the international community’s ability to first predict, and then prevent, genocide. Nevertheless, both interventionist and preventionist scholars have largely used hypothetical analyses to speculate on how past genocides might have been avoided in developing their policy recommendations. This is an obvious weakness in much of the genocide studies literature and my own research attempts to avoid this hypothetical analysis by examining the different outcomes of two actual genocidal moments: the Srebrenica Genocide and

the Kosovo War. But first, what solutions to genocide have previous scholars developed?

To start with, interventionist scholars, for the most part, have focused on how military force can be used to stop genocide. Interventionists all agree that military force can be an effective tool for stopping genocide, but debate among themselves on the appropriate ways military force should be used to be most effective^{4;5;6}. Scott Feil, for example, reported on a conference held by the Carnegie Corporation that aimed to determine what the ideal military response would have been to the Rwandan genocide to save the most lives⁴. The conference of mostly military experts, including General Romeo Dallaire, who led the UNAMIR peacekeeping force in Rwanda during the genocide, ultimately found that a force of about 5,000 appropriately armed, trained, and organized men could have significantly altered the outcome of the genocide if they deployed between April 7th and April 20th, 1994⁴.

Similarly, in an analysis of NATO intervention in Kosovo during the 1998-1999 Kosovo War, Peter Ronayne argued that military force could have been used in specific ways to significantly improve outcomes in Kosovo. While Ronayne still acknowledged that the NATO airstrikes played a significant role in avoiding a potential humanitarian disaster—mostly by breaking Serbian domestic support for war—he argued that the use of ground troops could have importantly hindered Serbian forces in a way that airstrikes did not⁶. Ronayne thus warned the lessons from Kosovo should be taken with caution as the air campaign only defeated Serbian forces politically, and not militarily⁶.

Another interventionist scholar, Arash Pashakhanlou, disagreed that NATO airstrikes were significant in ending the conflict in Kosovo, but similarly argued that the use of ground troops could have dramatically changed outcomes. Pashakhanlou argued that, not only were the airstrikes militarily ineffective, but that they actually “accelerated... human rights abuses” before Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic caved to diplomatic pressure. In particular, Pashakhanlou pointed out that atrocities were committed by Serbian forces during every day of the three-month NATO air campaign⁵. He compared airstrikes in Kosovo to a similar NATO air campaign in Libya where Libyan rebels acted as surrogate ground forces. According to Pashakhanlou, the air campaign in Libya was far more effective because of this added ground support as well as because of several other key factors like better “geography, diplomacy and technology”⁵. In any case, despite some disagreement, the research conducted by the Carnegie Corporation, Ronayne, and Pashakhanlou all similarly ventured to discover the specific uses of military force needed to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention by the international community.

Preventionist scholars, by contrast, have claimed that

there are fundamental flaws with this approach^{7;9;2}. For example, in an analysis of the Rwandan genocide, Alan Kuperman assessed a specific, hypothetical scenario where “The president of the United States, upon determining that a genocide was in progress in Rwanda, had unilaterally ordered the expeditious deployment of an U.S. intervention force”⁸. To ensure his hypothetical was “legitimate” and “contendable,” Kuperman limited his alterations to the past to that single counterfactual statement and, through an analysis of government reports and on-the-ground primary source accounts, found that military intervention would have failed to save most of the victims⁸. In particular, Kuperman argued that, while military preparedness could have been improved, the main reason why military intervention would have failed is because the international community would not have realized genocide was taking place and responded properly before at least three quarters of the Tutsi population was already killed, given the speed of the genocide⁸. Instead of military intervention, Kuperman argued international actors should emphasize de-escalating civil wars diplomatically since genocide often occurs after civil war⁸.

David Hamburg similarly called for a preventionist approach. According to Hamburg, early warning signs present themselves years before killing takes place in every genocide⁷. Furthermore, he argued that within well-crafted cooperative international institutions, “strong democracies and humane organizations could reach out *proactively* to nations in trouble”⁷. Specifically, he argued that this “proactive” aid should target certain “pillars of prevention,” which included preventive diplomacy, democratization, equitable socio-economic development, education, international justice, and restraints on weaponry⁷.

Finally, in their analysis of United Nations responses to genocide, Samuel Totten and Paul Barthrop were far less optimistic than Hamburg concerning the role cooperative international institutions could play in preventing genocide. Totten and Barthrop found that the United Nations rarely acted to prevent genocide throughout its history because of Cold War tensions and a still-present reluctance among member-states to violate the principle of state sovereignty². Totten and Barthrop also argued that when the UN did act to intervene in genocide, it was mostly ineffective (they cited the examples of Rwanda and Bosnia while acknowledging the exception of East Timor). Totten and Barthrop, therefore, doubted humanitarian intervention’s effectiveness primarily because they doubted that the human rights norms necessary for international action actually exist, despite the rhetoric used since the UN conventions on genocide in 1948. In this sense, Kuperman, Hamburg, and Totten and Barthrop all doubted the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention in their research.

In any case, as mentioned above, interventionist and preventionist scholars alike have relied far too heavily on hypothetical analysis for developing solutions to the problem of genocide. While this has not always been the case, such as Hamburg's discussion on actual genocide prevention in South Africa or Pashakhanlou's discussion on effective airstrikes in Libya, many scholars have opted to ask "what if" in determining how genocides can be stopped. This research instead aims to look at how key genocidal moments actually ended in the hopes that this may teach scholars and policymakers something about how to stop genocide. To learn if any generalizable findings exist around how genocidal moments have actually ended, this study compares the cases of the genocide in Srebrenica and the Kosovo War.

3 RESEARCH BODY

3.1 Method – Defining "Genocidal Moment" and Selecting Cases

In order to best compare the various factors that could possibly stop genocide, it is important that this study does not limit itself to only one set of outcomes. Therefore, this study will not only consider events in which genocide occurred, but also events where—while indicators of genocide existed—genocide did not occur. This research, therefore, builds on the premise some scholars have suggested that genocide is always preceded by observable indicators^{8,7}. Furthermore, to describe these indicators, this research will use Genocide Watch's "The 10 Stages of Genocide"³. This study argues that in "genocidal moments" many of these ten stages occur, but that the crucial stage, "extermination," does not necessarily take place. This concept of "genocidal moment" is used in order to determine the case selection of this study.

Somewhat unhelpfully, however, Genocide Watch's founder, Gregory Stanton, defers to legal definitions of genocide when describing extermination: "extermination begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called 'genocide.' It is 'extermination' to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human"³. Therefore, to supplement Stanton's stages, this research will also use the widely-cited legal definition of genocide used by the United Nations in Article III of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its

physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group¹⁰."

Given Stanton's description of extermination as the "mass killing legally called genocide," this study will use this UN definition to determine extermination in various genocidal moments.

This research compares the genocidal moments of the Srebrenica genocide and the Kosovo War. This study argues that both cases constitute genocidal moments because throughout both the Kosovo War and the Srebrenica genocide several key stages of genocide were reached—including the later stages of organization, polarization, preparation, and persecution³. The genocidal moment of the Kosovo War, however, was stopped before extermination occurred, whereas in Srebrenica extermination was allowed to take place.

This study follows a "most similar" selection strategy in comparing the Srebrenica genocide and the Kosovo War. In both cases, the perpetrators were the same, or close to the same, (Bosnian Serbs supported by Serbia/Yugoslavia in Srebrenica and Kosovo Serbs/Serbian/Yugoslavian forces in Kosovo) and because the context was similar (armed conflict following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in both cases). These similarities make it easier to determine important variables that contributed to the differing outcomes of these genocidal moments.

3.2 Case 1: Srebrenica

The genocide of Muslim men and boys that took place in Srebrenica in July of 1995 occurred within the broader context of Bosnia and Herzegovina's bloody civil war and the collapse of communist Yugoslavia. As communism ended within Yugoslavia, old nationalist and ethnic tensions began to rise between the various constituent republics; these resurgent ethnic/nationalist tensions were a necessary progression on the path to genocide in Srebrenica¹¹. Still, Stanton's first stage of genocide, classification—or the existence of "categories to distinguish people into 'us and them' by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality"—had long existed in Srebrenica and Yugoslavia broadly as people living in the region were often categorized by their nationality or ethnicity (Serb, Bosniak, Croat, Albanian etc.) and were further categorized by their religion (Muslim, Christian etc.)³. Moreover, for Muslim peoples living in Yugoslavia like Bosniaks or Kosovar Albanians, the second stage—symbolization—had also long existed since differences between Muslim and Christian dress often made it visually obvious who belonged to what group. Importantly, Stanton notes that "Classification and symbolization are universally human and do not necessarily

result in genocide unless they lead to dehumanization" so their long existence in Srebrenica and Yugoslavia is not surprising and does not necessarily constitute a "genocidal moment"³.

In any case, ethnic and nationalist tensions further escalated in post-communist Yugoslavia when the constituent republic, Serbia, opportunistically seized unilateral power over the federal government in the early 1990s¹¹. Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic supported Serbian minority movements demanding for the resignation of the governments in Montenegro and in the autonomous province, Vojvodina, and, following these resignations, "hand-picked Milosevic men" were put in power in both governments¹¹. Milosevic then, using military force, stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, giving Serbia its vote in the federal government¹¹. With the federal votes of Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo, Milosevic was able to effectively dominate the Yugoslavian federal government¹¹. Fearing a Serbian dominated Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia soon seceded in 1991 and following these secessions war soon broke out. Accepting his failure to dominate all of former Yugoslavia, Milosevic did little to resist the secession of areas with no significant Serbian population like Slovenia, and instead focused on creating a "Greater Serbia" where large parts of the other republics with Serbian minorities were brought under Serbian rule¹¹.

This included large parts of Croatia, resulting in the war which broke out between Croatia and Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1991, but more importantly, it included even larger portions of the ethnically diverse Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sharing Milosevic's vision of a "Greater Serbia," Serbian paramilitaries supplied by Yugoslavia seized large areas within Bosnia and Herzegovina and declared independence¹². Supported by Yugoslavia, this newly independent, Republika Srpska well outmatched Bosniak and Croat fighting forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and "seized control of about 60 percent of Bosnia"¹¹.

Within the territory they captured, Bosnian Serbs then began brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing in which other Bosnian minorities—especially Croats and the Muslim, Bosniaks—were forcibly removed from their homes by military forces^{11;12}. This ethnic cleansing campaign represented a rapid progression through the stages of genocide. Stage three, discrimination, occurred because Serbs used their political power to deny the property rights of Bosniaks and Croats. Stage four, dehumanization, occurred because Serbs used dehumanizing hate propaganda to justify the campaign. Stage five, organization, occurred because Serb paramilitaries were established to fight the war, carry out the ethnic cleansing, and "to provide deniability of state responsibility" for Yugoslavia/Serbia³. And finally, stage six, polarization, occurred because extremists drove "the groups apart" physically and rhetorically, isolating

moderates advocating for Serb, Croat, and Bosniak co-existence³. Moreover, to accomplish their ethnic cleansing campaign, Serb paramilitaries used "mass killings, forced displacement, torture and rape, and the destruction of private and public property, including religious objects"¹².

By April of 1992, this violence reached Srebrenica when Bosnian Serbs attacked the city—killing 27 people¹². Soon after, however, "the Bosnian Army recaptured the city" and Srebrenica became an enclave within Bosnian Serb territory "into which refugees streamed from throughout the Podrinje region"¹². By the end of 1992, the population of Srebrenica had risen to around 30,000 of mostly refugees¹².

In response to the atrocities being committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Nations—which had already declared a peacekeeping mission in the ongoing war in Croatia—extended the mandate of the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia to also include Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 1992^{13;14;15}; UNSC Resolution 770; Tardy 2015). Alongside the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, peace talks were also opened up between the Bosnian government and the Republika Srpska in September 1992¹¹. The approach of the United Nations, however, was guided by a view of "the conflict as a part of a long-term ethnic contest that had been underway for many centuries and whose real origins lay in a murky Balkan past. Since all sides were equally guilty the argument went, the only solution was to mediate and compromise over territorial issues"¹¹. This view directed the peacekeeping mission and negotiations; negotiations aimed at dividing up Bosnian and Herzegovina into different territories for different ethnicities while the peacekeeping mission focused on humanitarian aid and the "creation of so-called 'safe-areas'"¹⁵. These efforts did not properly target Bosnian Serbs as aggressors and, instead, aimed to separate belligerents. Of course, this peacekeeping mission represents a form of "humanitarian intervention" by the international community, although interventionist genocide scholars will be quick to point out this intervention was not meant to stop an ongoing genocide, but instead was meant to protect civilians during a civil war.

On April 16, 1993, the UN declared that "all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act" in a Security Council resolution¹⁶. About 7,600 UNPROFOR forces were deployed to maintain this and other "safe areas" ("Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Zepa, and Gorazdje") within Bosnia and Herzegovina and were authorized only to use force in self-defense^{12;15}. Despite the declaration of a "safe area," Bosniak forces in Srebrenica still "maintained its own defenses" which included some 1,500 lightly armed soldiers¹².

The following year, in March of 1994, a “Dutch battalion of 570 soldiers relieved” older UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica¹². These Dutch troops were the active force in the UNPROFOR mission in Srebrenica when the genocide took place in the summer of 1995. Upon arriving in Srebrenica, the Dutch battalion became frustrated with the refusal of Bosniak forces to demilitarize and with the “dismal conditions within the enclave;” some of the soldiers even seemed to treat the refugee population with contempt as one piece graffiti in their barracks demonstrated: “No teeth...?/A moustache...?/Smells like shit...?/Bosnian girl!”¹². Well before the 1995 attack, relations between the UN soldiers and the Bosniak refugees were “tense” and “often marked by mutual distrust”¹².

In June of 1995, Bosnian Serbs ignored UN Security Council Resolution 819 and attacked Srebrenica¹². The Bosnian Serbs quickly captured two Dutch observation posts with little resistance in early July¹². On July 6, upon receiving fire, UNPROFOR commander Tom Karremans surrendered more posts without putting up a fight¹². More UN positions fell, and by July 9 the Bosnian Serbs were attacking the city of Srebrenica itself¹². Hesitation among UN decision makers halted UNPROFOR requests of NATO air strikes¹². Bosniak forces too hesitated in responding to the Bosnian Serb aggression, worried that by fighting in the designated “safe area,” they might deprive themselves of UN and NATO support¹². Disastrously, this led to the complete victory of the Bosnian Serbs who, by July 11, had captured the city and began separating Bosniak men and boys from the women; following negotiations with UN forces, the women and young children were also forcibly deported from the city with assistance from the UN peacekeepers¹². By this point, Bosnian Serb paramilitaries were already planning the genocidal killings of the Bosniak men and boys; as such the situation progressed to Stanton’s seventh stage, preparation. Furthermore, by separating the men and boys and gathering them in a concentrated area, the Bosnian Serbs also committed stage eight, persecution, where “Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity”¹². In this case, gender identity was also a determining factor for separating victims.

Fearing the worst, however, many of the separated Bosniak men decided to try and escape and formed a column that ventured into the woods hoping to flee to Bosnian-government held territory¹². The column was shelled and ambushed by Bosnian Serbs who used machine guns and small arms on the Bosniaks while they ran through the forest. The vast majority of the men were killed¹². Men captured from the column and many of those who chose not to flee were also executed in mass and by July 17 an estimated 8,000 Bosniak men and boys had been killed¹². Stage nine, extermination,

had been reached. In the years following the genocide, Serbia also progressed to the final stage in Stanton’s model, denial¹².

3.3 Case 2: Kosovo War

The 1998-1999 Kosovo War was preceded by a long history of Serbian domination in the majority-Albanian region of Kosovo and, similar to the Bosnian War, the conflict was caused in part by communism’s collapse in Yugoslavia. Despite an overwhelming Albanian majority, Kosovo had long been a constituent region within Serbia, and later Yugoslavia, since the 1913 Balkans War⁶. Under communist rule, Kosovo had been allowed some autonomy as Tito’s regime “emphasized ‘Yugoslav’ identity,” but this changed as communism’s hold over the Balkans weakened in the late 1980s⁶. Succumbing to military pressure by Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, the Kosovo Parliament, “ringed with Yugoslav army tanks,” was forced to pass a constitutional amendment giving up regional autonomy in November of 1988. Civil rights abuses—including the removal of ethnic Albanians from government and the suppression of Albanian language newspapers—followed the dissolution of regional autonomy⁶. Like in Bosnia, stages one and two—classification and symbolization—had long existed in Kosovo. People were classified by their national identities—namely, Serb and Albanian—and differences in Muslim and Christian dress often visually demonstrated who belonged to what group. The civil rights abuses caused by Serbia’s takeover of power further progressed the situation to stage three, discrimination³.

For many Serbs, Kosovo’s importance to Serbian national identity stretched back much farther than Serbia’s 20th century rule over the region. It had been on Kosovar land that the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje—or “the Field of Black Birds”—had taken place. In this battle, Serbian Prince Lazar faced off against the invading Ottoman Empire in what became a semi-mythical battle of martyrdom for Christian Serbs^{11:6}. For many, this battle made Kosovo integral to Serbian national identity. Kosovo was seen as a part of Serbia’s ancestral homeland and many Serbs were greatly alarmed at the “growing Albanian birth rate, and Serbian emigration patterns” which led to Kosovar Albanians making up “some 90 percent of the population” by the late 1990s⁶. This concern over national heritage led many Serbs to feel culturally threatened by the very existence of Albanians in Kosovo and it significantly contributed to the popularity of hateful rhetoric against Albanians in Serbian media. As Albanians began to resist their discrimination, this hate escalated and soon stage four, dehumanization, was reached where “hate propaganda in print and on hate radios... [was] used to vilify the victim group [Albanians]”³.

At first, Albanian resistance to increasingly discriminatory Serb rule was peaceful; many non-violently followed the literary historian, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova⁶. By the mid-1990s, however, frustration with a lack of success led the movement for Kosovo independence and Albanian civil rights to turn violent⁶. A new organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK), began a campaign of terrorist attacks against Serbian authorities, first starting with attacks against policemen and bombing in Serb refugee camps in 1996¹⁷. By 1998, Serbia sent security forces to Kosovo in order to combat the KLA and fighting escalated¹⁷. Soon, Serbian forces began not only fighting the KLA, but used violence against the civilian population in their effort to quell the insurgents¹⁷. Notably, in March of 1998, Serbian security forces killed “fifty-three Kosovo Albanians (half of whom were women and children) in response to a KLA attack near Drenica”⁶. Massacres like this quickly escalated the threat of genocide. With Serb forces mobilized against civilians, stage five, organization, had been reached. Furthermore, by connecting ordinary civilian Albanians with the insurgent KLA, Serb media further pushed the situation into stage six, polarization, where moderates in the perpetrator group were drowned out by extremist messages driving Serbs and Albanians apart³.

The potentially genocidal violence against the Albanian population drew the attention of many international actors, including the UN, NATO, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), and the “Contact Group”—including France, Germany, Russia, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States⁶. In response to the March 1998 civilian killings, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Serbia⁶. Nevertheless, as the fighting continued, violence against the civilian population only became more widespread and “by mid-September 1998 some 250,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes and some 50,000 were still in the open as winter approached”⁶.

In February of 1999, negotiations were established in Rambouillet, France, between a Kosovo Albanian delegation and the Yugoslavian/Serbian government⁶. The talks aimed to protect the rights of all sides and give Kosovo autonomy, but not independence⁶. While the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed a draft of the agreement, the Serbs refused to commit to it and talks were suspended in March 1999 when an estimated “40,000 police and soldiers and 300 tanks” were positioned by Serbia around Kosovo⁶. By now, stage seven—preparation—seemed to be rapidly manifesting as the Serb forces surrounding Kosovo were likely preparing for more violence against civilians. The “extrajudicial killings” and “genocidal massacres” that occurred in 1998 were also key signs of stage eight, persecution, in Stanton’s model³.

Without UN approval, direct NATO action in the conflict began on March 24, 1999 in response to the failed negotiations¹⁷. Rather than continue third-party diplomacy, NATO became “a secondary warring party to the conflict” and launched an air campaign that attacked Yugoslavian military targets around Kosovo and within Serbia¹⁷. The military effectiveness of the campaign was questionable, however; planes were not flown from below 15,000 feet and the actual damage to Yugoslavian forces seems to be lower than what NATO reported⁵. According to a third-party, Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team (MEAT), the campaign only scored 18 APC (Armored Personnel Carrier) kills and 20 artillery piece kills—lower than what NATO estimated in its self-assessment¹⁸. Operating at 15,000-feet, NATO planes were also more likely to hit civilian targets by mistake⁵.

Nevertheless, the air campaign was effective because of its impact on the political situation in Yugoslavia. NATO bombings made Milosevic’s war in Kosovo unpopular. A series of contemporary newspaper articles written by New York Times journalist, Steven Erlanger, in 1999, demonstrates this impact. “NATO Attacks Darkens City and Areas of Serbia” (May 3, 1999) discussed the impact NATO bombings of a hydroelectric dam had on Belgrade’s population. “Bombs Pound Heart of Serbia’s Capital” (May 1, 1999) discussed the devastating effect NATO misses had on residential areas in Serbia. And “Pressure on Milosevic Grows: Key Opposition Leader Joins Rally Asking Milosevic to Resign”—while written shortly after Serbian capitulation—discusses a rally of 20,000 Serbs opposed to Milosevic that demonstrated Serb dissatisfaction with the Milosevic regime. In the rally, opposition leader, Vuk Draskovic “spoke of the need for Serbs ‘to discuss and accept the shame for what was done in Kosovo’”¹⁹.

On June 10, 1999, the Yugoslavian president finally capitulated. Serbian forces were withdrawn and “Nearly all of the Kosovar Albanians returned to the province”⁶. As part of the agreement, Kosovo remained a part of Serbia, but was governed by the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and continually protected by UN/NATO forces⁶. UN sanctions and negotiations sponsored by the international community had both failed; in the end, NATO bombs brought an end to the killing in Kosovo and Stanton’s key stage nine, extermination, was avoided.

4 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS

4.1 Discussion

The most important difference between the two genocidal moments of Srebrenica in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 was the approach the international community took in military intervention. Both cases had otherwise similar contexts as they both took place due to the Milosevic

Table 1 Comparison of Variables Important to the Ending of Each Genocidal Moment

Dependent Variable and Potential Explanatory Conditions	Srebrenica Genocide	Kosovo War
DV: Did extermination occur?	Yes , the Bosniak population was forced from Srebrenica and an estimated 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were killed	No , while civilians were killed, NATO action eventually put an end to the conflict and allowed for the return home of almost all Kosovar Albanian refugees
Were negotiations attempted?	Yes , peace talks opened up in September of 1992	Yes , talks were established in Rambouillet in April of 1999
Were negotiations effective?	No , the Bosnian Serbs did not accept the negotiations because they already held more territory than negotiators were offering them ¹¹	No , talks fell through in March 1999; a peace agreement was only reached after NATO intervention
Was there international pressure against perpetrators?	Yes , the UN enacted sanctions against Yugoslavia and UN peacekeepers were sent into Bosnia	Yes , UN sanctions were enacted and many diplomatic efforts were made by the Contact Group
Were victims completely unarmed?	No , Bosniak forces managed to repel the Bosnian Serbs for a time but eventually succumbed; most victims after the fall of the city were civilians	No , the KLA engaged in combat with Serbian forces throughout the war
Were the perpetrators defeated militarily?	No , in Srebrenica the killing only stopped when the entire city had been “cleansed” by the Bosnian Serbs	No , when Milosevic capitulated, Serbian forces still had the upper hand against the KLA
Were interventionist forces targeting perpetrators?	No , UNFORPOR did not attack the Bosnian Serbs; they treated Serbs and Bosniaks as mutually culpable belligerents to be separated from one another and even showed contempt for the Bosniak population in Srebrenica	Yes , NATO forces aided the KLA militarily by targeting Serbian forces

regime's quest for a "Greater Serbia." Moreover, there was little difference in the effectiveness of international diplomacy, which failed in both instances. The key difference that allowed for a better outcome in Kosovo was NATO's clear marking of Serbia as perpetrator and its subsequent use of military force against Serbia. While the air campaign was not necessarily a military success, it had a profound effect on Milosevic's political support and that brought an end to the conflict. By contrast, the UNPROFOR troops deployed to Srebrenica during the Bosnian War failed to designate the Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors and aimed to create a neutral "safe zone" in Srebrenica. This approach failed disastrously when UN forces quickly surrendered to attacking Bosnian Serbs in 1995 and extermination followed thereafter.

Nevertheless, while Kosovo was certainly a more successful intervention than the abject failure of UN peacekeeping in Srebrenica, it is important not to ignore its limitations. In both the case of Srebrenica and Kosovo, intervention forces were too worried about protecting their own personnel and material to effectively influence the military situation—UN forces surrendered without a fight and NATO refused to deploy ground troops or fly below 15,000 feet because they worried even light casualties would be too costly⁶. Used against a more politically stable regime, it is hard to say that the approach NATO intervention took in the Kosovo War would be effective.

This research, therefore, has limited generalizability. The Kosovo War turned out to be more complicated than a clear-cut NATO success story, even if extermination was avoided. Atrocities were allowed to continue against the Albanian population throughout NATO's intervention and Serbian civilians were mistakenly killed by missed bombings. Moreover, NATO intervention likely only succeeded because of the specific political instability of the Milosevic regime in 1999. Still, this research does find that intervention was at least somewhat successful in Kosovo and unsuccessful in Srebrenica. It reveals little about the effectiveness of preventionist approaches, however, as this was not substantially attempted in either case. Furthermore, it shows that when the international community intervenes in genocidal moments, it is important to distinguish between preparator and victim and not to treat both sides with mutual distrust.

Finally, this research shows that in Srebrenica the genocide only ended when the Bosniak population was almost totally removed from the region. This horrific end demonstrates that if there is no intervention in an ongoing genocidal moment, it will not likely otherwise stop until it has run an extremely destructive course. By contrast, much of the Albanian population in Kosovo was spared due to an early end to the conflict and almost all Kosovar refugees were allowed to return home. From this finding, it might be concluded that interven-

tionist strategies should be developed, even if only in conjunction with more proactive preventionist ones, because without them genocidal moments that have progressed past preventionist measures cannot be combated. A genocidal moment cut short is still better than one left alone, even if its most preferable that genocidal moments never occur at all.

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6 EDITOR'S NOTES

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