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Rethinking Rosato: Understanding the Genesis of European Integration

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RETHINKING ROSATO:
UNDERSTANDING THE GENESIS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

A Thesis

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the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

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June 2012

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ABSTRACT

A balance-of-power argument that completely discounts the role played by the United States has been employed in a recent attempt to explain both the origins of European integration and the Continent's recent difficulties. This thesis sets out to rebut these notions through an examination of the historical record. Such an examination makes it clear that France and West Germany's reasons for pursuing the integration of Western Europe were grounded in these states' relationships with one another within the postwar context, not in their fear of Soviet aggression. France, after all, was seeking to rebuild itself and hold down the Germans after the war, while West Germany was seeking to regain its sovereignty. Further, it is clear from the historical record that the role played by the United States in the earliest iterations of postwar European integration was critical and should not be discounted.

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One

Introduction

While regional integration has become a very important part of the modern world since the end of World War II, recent financial difficulties in Europe have called the persistence of regional integration into question. Indeed, the European debt crisis has caused such uncertainty within the eurozone that some observers question whether the European Union will continue to enjoy the support of the states that created it. Gaining a proper understanding of the conditions that made early European integrative efforts successful is therefore important, as it is this understanding which will make a more accurate prediction regarding the future of regional integration on the Continent possible. Such an understanding may also assist in the creation of a general theory of regional integration, as European integration is often considered to be the most advanced and, therefore, perhaps the most instructive example of this phenomenon.

In order to effectively pursue such an understanding, one must go all the way back to the critical early years of European integration and examine the reasons why the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – the institution which would prove to be the earliest forerunner of the modern-day European Union – was created. The historical record indicates that this is a complicated story. The reasons behind the pursuit of integration in the years following World War II reflect the varying interests of the states involved, making it clear that there was not one simple, overarching rationale that made

integration in Europe appealing to all. Additionally, the historical record demonstrates that the efforts of the United States were critical to the formation of the ECSC, and that without its assistance to the Continent and encouragement of the ECSC concept, regional integration likely would not have enjoyed the success that it did. The role played by the U.S. was so crucial, in fact, that European integration may never have occurred at all apart from American efforts.

This complex, multi-causal explanation of European integration in the postwar era flies in the face of recent scholarship. Sebastian Rosato, in “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project,”¹ presents an altogether different narrative regarding the formation of the earliest iteration of the modern-day European Union. Rosato asserts that the Europeans’ desire to seek regional integration was the result of a simple balance-of-power calculation based on their fear of the Soviet Union.² Indeed, he argues that the decisions made by France and West Germany to pursue economic integration via the ECSC were driven by “balance of power thinking,”³ and that the overwhelming comparative strength of the Soviet Union in the early years of the Cold War was the sole reason why these and four other states decided to pursue the unification of Western Europe.⁴ He posits further that, based on this understanding of the origins of European integration, it makes sense that the states of Europe currently “have no

¹ Sebastian Rosato, “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), 45-86.

² *ibid.*, 48.

³ *ibid.*, 60.

⁴ *ibid.*, 53-54.

compelling reason to preserve their economic community.”⁵ The need to balance the powerful Soviet Union disappeared with that state’s demise in 1991, so the impetus to pursue and sustain integrative efforts in Europe has also disappeared. In Rosato’s view, then, it should come as no surprise that the economic downturn of recent years has put stress on the institutions of Europe and caused some states to pursue self-serving policies that may not be beneficial for Europe as a whole.⁶ Europe, according to Rosato, is “fraying.”⁷

The historical record, however, tells a different story. In order to truly grasp the genesis of European integration, one must begin with World War II. The wholesale destruction of Western Europe that resulted from this terrible war ultimately provided much of the impetus for the pursuit of regional integration in Europe, with a number of goals held by European policy elites stemming directly from this conflict. The French, for their part, placed a great deal of emphasis on rebuilding their country in the immediate postwar period, an effort that required access to a very large amount of natural resources. The Ruhr – a region which, as defined by the French in October 1945, included the entirety of the coalfield east of the Rhine – was seen as an important supplier of these resources. As a result, French policy elites sought to internationalize this portion of Germany, an action which would allow them unfettered access to the enormously valuable coke and coal that were mined there.⁸ This desire to pursue internationalization

⁵ *ibid.*, 48.

⁶ *ibid.*, 72-77.

⁷ *ibid.*, 72.

eventually led to a French realization of the necessity and desirability of placing all of the coal and steel resources of Western Europe under supranational control,⁹ thereby laying the foundation for the creation of the ECSC. The fear of a resurgent Germany, however, also entered very prominently into the calculations of French policy elites as they considered the creation of an integrated Western Europe. By folding the tremendous coal and steel resources of West Germany into a larger European supranational framework, the French believed that they might be able to prevent a reindustrialized Germany from initiating yet another destructive war.¹⁰ The French also believed that tying West Germany into Western supranational institutions would prevent the Germans from turning their backs on the West and allying themselves with the Soviet Union.¹¹ In sum, the French were attempting to gain some degree of control over the Germans through the creation of the ECSC. While there is a place for the USSR in this narrative, it is, in fact,

⁸ Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984), 127-128.

Craig Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 39, 45.
Irwin Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 65.

F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), 15.

Ernst Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership* (New York: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1966), 30.

⁹ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace* (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999), 76.

John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 169-170.

Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 165-166.

Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 51, 63.

¹⁰ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 74-76

Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 44.

Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 157.

John Gillingham, *European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22.

¹¹ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 74-76.

after the French had already decided upon and proposed the Schuman Plan, as it was after the Communist incursion into South Korea that the potential threat posed by the USSR became solidified in the minds of the French. This means, of course, that a fear of the Soviet Union had much more to do with the ECSC's eventual success than its initiation.

West German policy elites, on the other hand, sought above all else to end the occupation of their defeated country by the victorious Allies and return to some level of normalcy. Their ultimate goal, of course, was for West Germany to be seen as and treated like an equal in the international community, something that was impossible as long as the country was being run by foreign powers. The first step toward the realization of this goal was the accession of West Germany to the Council of Europe. This would only be possible, however, if a favorable outcome could be had vis-à-vis the Saar, which had essentially been handed over to France by the Allies in the wake of World War II.¹² West Germany was still concerned about its own economic recovery after the war, after all, meaning it desired to maintain access to Western Europe's critical natural resources. The supranational ECSC provided a solution to this problem. The ECSC also became the method by which the Ruhr question would be answered in a manner that satisfied the Germans,¹³ as it provided a means for them to gain something from the internationalization of the Ruhr¹⁴ while simultaneously assuaging the fears of their neighbors. The ECSC also provided a way for the German government to eradicate the excessive nationalism that was reestablishing itself in West Germany in the late 1940s as

¹² Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 140.

¹³ Gillingham, *European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?*, 24-26.

¹⁴ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 76.

a result of the Saar and Ruhr conflicts. The French and the Germans, then, had what seem to be very different motivations for pursuing the integration of their continent, meaning the reasons why the Europeans decided to pursue integration after World War II are clearly much more complicated than Rosato indicates.

Rosato also presents an alternative account with regard to the role played by the United States during the early years of European integration. In it, he completely discounts the part played by the Western superpower, claiming that “U.S. encouragement was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for [European] integration.”¹⁵ Again, the historical record paints a different picture. The critical importance of the American contribution to the success of early European integrative efforts also began with World War II. After playing a vital part in the Allied victory over the Axis powers, the United States was undeniably the most powerful Western country in the world. As a result, it was able to exert a great deal of influence over the affairs of Western Europe. This influence largely stemmed from three sources: the United States’ control over occupied Germany, the United States’ ability to contribute financially to the reconstruction of the countries devastated by World War II, and the United States’ ability to provide security for the Continent. American policy elites believed that the revitalization of Germany was indeed necessary,¹⁶ and that it had to occur within a European framework.¹⁷ When combined with a fear of Soviet encroachment upon Western Europe, these beliefs led to

¹⁵Rosato, 78.

¹⁶ Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 39, 73.

¹⁷ Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 33-34.
Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 73.

the creation of the Marshall Plan.¹⁸ Through this plan, the Americans hoped in some way to convince the French, whose acceptance of the Marshall Plan was seen as critical to the plan's success,¹⁹ to accept the reconstruction of Germany,²⁰ a vital precondition for the creation of a unified Western Europe. The United States also hoped that the Marshall Plan would, through the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, lay a practical foundation for the integration of Western Europe,²¹ something which had, again, come to be seen as necessary for a continent that had completely torn itself apart over the course of the previous half century.

French uneasiness about a reindustrialized Germany presented itself as an obstacle to the Americans' chosen policy of European integration, however.²² The horrors of World War II were still vivid in French minds, meaning that fear of Germany was still a common sentiment in France.²³ As a result, a security guarantee from the United States against future German aggression became necessary for the French to embrace the total reindustrialization of Germany, and this was achieved through the

¹⁸ Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 34-36.
Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 73.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, 74.
Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 142.
Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 138.

²⁰ Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 74.

²¹ Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 99-105.
Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 75.
Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 133.

²² Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 39.

²³ Timothy Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), 158.
Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 501.
Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967*, 58, 60.

creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.²⁴ The French simply did not want to be left alone on the Continent with Germany, and NATO saw to it that they would not be, even once the Americans decided to stop occupying the defeated German state. With France on board with German reindustrialization and inclusion in a Western European framework, the integration of the Continent became possible, meaning American involvement as Europe's peacekeeper was critical.²⁵

Additionally, while there were musings about the concept of European integration during the interwar period,²⁶ it was the Truman administration that actually put forward the concrete idea for the integration of Western Europe's coal and steel industries.²⁷ The American acceptance of the potential benefits that came along with the aforementioned French preoccupation with the internationalization of the Ruhr²⁸ led the Truman administration to suggest that the creation of a supranational coal and steel community might be a good way to maintain wider European access to the resources of the Ruhr without alienating West Germany and forcing it into the open arms of the Soviet Union. This basic idea was presented two years later as the Schuman Plan,²⁹ the proposal to integrate the coal and steel industries of France and West Germany that ultimately led to the creation of the ECSC.

²⁴ Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 159.

²⁵ *ibid.*, 178-179.

²⁶ Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 43.

²⁷ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 76.
Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe*, 169-170.

²⁸ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951*, 140.

²⁹ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 76.
Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945- 1955*, 169-170.

Finally, the Eisenhower administration, picking up the mantle of support for European integration from its predecessor, provided critical assistance to the ECSC that allowed it to achieve success in the early days of its operation. One of the most important manifestations of this assistance came in the form of a large loan from the United States government to the embryonic ECSC. This loan was seen as critical by Jean Monnet, as it helped the ECSC fund its modernization efforts³⁰ while conspicuously reaffirming American support for the process of European integration.³¹ Additionally, Monnet suggested, and Adenauer supported, the appointment of an official American ambassador to the new ECSC. They believed that such a move by the Eisenhower administration would further underscore the importance that the United States placed on furthering the process of integration in Europe, an important consideration in light of the fact that these key European elites saw American support for their integrative efforts as critical to their success.³² Not only was American support for the unification of Europe an indispensable part of getting this process off the ground, but it was also a crucial part of seeing to it that it ultimately succeeded.

Rosato's narrative in "Europe's Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project" is simply not supported by the historical record. This calls into question the entire balance of power-based theory of institutions that he presents, making his predictions regarding the future of integration in Europe suspect as a result. Since a proper understanding of the history of Europe is an integral part of the creation of any

³⁰ *ibid.*, 341-342.

³¹ Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 45-46.

³² *ibid.*, 38-40.

prediction regarding the future of Europe, this paper, using the current literature on the topic of European integration as well as the historical record, will explain the real reasons why “the Six” – France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – signed the 1951 Treaty of Paris and thereby took the first step toward the creation of the modern-day EU. France and West Germany will be the focal points of this study, as it was these two states that initiated the process of European integration in the first place. This paper will also shed light on precisely how important American encouragement of and involvement in early European integrationist efforts actually were. The aforementioned Truman and Eisenhower administrations, which were critical to both the creation and the subsequent success of the fragile early iterations of European integration, will be examined as this paper seeks to understand the role played by the Americans in early Continental integrationist efforts.

What will become clear throughout is that the motivations held by the Europeans went far beyond a simple wish to balance the Soviet Union, reflecting instead each individual state’s respective desires. These desires reflected their relationships with each other within the postwar context far more than they reflected their relationships with the USSR, and that is perhaps the key to gaining an accurate understanding of the reasons why the Europeans decided to seek integration. Additionally, the crucial role played by the United States will be made plain. Put simply, the United States’ financial and military might put it in the position to encourage the Europeans to pursue integration by putting pressure on them to do so while providing the environment within which integration became possible. This encouragement was essential, and European integration simply

would not have happened the way it did without it. The Truman administration did, after all, also provide the Europeans with a concrete way to begin the process of integration, something which had been lacking when Europeans had pondered integration before. Without World War II, then, it seems that European integration may never have happened, as it very clearly set the stage for the United States to facilitate an experiment in Continental supranationality.

Two

European Motivations

When one seeks to understand and explain the earliest years of Continental integration, one must look first and foremost to World War II. In the wake of the horrifying destruction that occurred in Western Europe during that war, the statesmen of both France and, after its creation, West Germany had many national goals that they wished to accomplish. For the French, the reconstruction of their country was paramount, while the West Germans sought above all else to regain the sovereignty that they had lost as a result of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and the occupation of their state. While these aims clearly grew out of the situations that these states found themselves in as a result of the war, other critical goals stemmed from these states' relationships with one another, as the French still greatly feared the possibility of future German aggression and wanted to see Germany held down as a result. France and Germany's respective decisions to embrace integration can be directly explained by these and other national aims. They cannot, however, be satisfactorily explained purely by a desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union, as Rosato claims.³³ As will become clear in the coming pages, to attempt to make the case that the Europeans' efforts reflected a

³³ Rosato, 48.

one-dimensional desire such as this simply does not do justice to the historical record, which plainly lays out a multi-causal, state-centric narrative for the genesis of European integration.

At the end of World War II, the first thing that needed to be taken care of was the rebuilding of a ravaged Western Europe. In France, this effort to achieve reconstruction took the form of Jean Monnet's *Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipement* (also known as the Monnet Plan), which was adopted in March 1946. This plan sought to not only achieve prewar levels of industrial output but also, and perhaps just as importantly, modernize certain key industries and, by extension, the country as a whole. The six critical sectors that needed attention according to the Monnet Plan were coal mining, electricity, steel, cement, agricultural machinery, and transport. The target for these sectors was to match France's peak interwar output – which was achieved in 1929 – by 1948 and to exceed it by 25% by 1950.³⁴

For Monnet, the pursuit of such an ambitious plan was important largely because France had fallen behind the other great European powers during the interwar period. There had been, in his eyes, a “technological revolution” that France had missed out on, and he desired to see his nation catch up. As he put it, “Modernization and reconstruction must go hand in hand.”³⁵ The simultaneous pursuit of these two goals, to Monnet, required the creation of a central plan that would guide the entire nation in its efforts. Such a plan was necessary because “a peacetime economy would no longer tolerate the wide safety margins which had been accepted for war production.” With the

³⁴ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 50.

³⁵ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1978), 237.

implementation of the Monnet Plan, improvements in critical areas such as productivity, economic growth, and the living standards of the French people became permanent national priorities. Complicated economic theories were eschewed for practical advances in production: bigger and better factories were the goal, and the rest was left to take care of itself.³⁶ The rebuilding of war-torn France was essentially left completely in the hands of Jean Monnet and his disciples at the *Commissariat Général du Plan*, meaning the success of the plan became paramount for France's future. In order for the Monnet Plan to be successful, however, France needed to have consistent access to the necessary natural resources. To be more specific, since the plan sought to make France more internationally competitive – particularly with respect to and at the expense of Germany – it was clear that its success was dependent upon an increase in the levels of German coal and coke being put into the French economy, as this was the only way the Monnet Plan's lofty targets could possibly be reached.³⁷ Only with massive imports from Germany could France become the new center of the European steel industry.³⁸

France had, after all, been dependent upon German coal and coke imports for decades. This dependence began in 1890 with the creation of a large basic steel industry in Lorraine that was based on the locally-available minette ores. After World War I, France's dependence on German resources increased as the French steel industry grew. Smelting in particular created a heavy French need for German resources, as the French minette ores being used required a very large amount of metallurgical coke for their

³⁶ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 138.

³⁷ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 129.

³⁸ Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 39.

smelting process. This came in the form of either German coke made from Ruhr coal or French coke that was created with Ruhr coking coals, meaning the French were dependent upon Ruhr resources either way. The amount of coking coal that was domestically available in France was simply too small to provide for the level of industry that France sought during the interwar period.³⁹ Additionally, the inferior quality of French coking coal, when compared to that which was available in the Ruhr, forced France to look to German resources in order to create and maintain a robust domestic steel industry.⁴⁰ When World War II finally ended and the French government turned to the Monnet Plan for its reconstruction and modernization blueprint, Ruhr resources became necessary again. The Lorraine blast furnaces were, after all, still geared towards the use of German coke, and France's theoretical alternative supplier, the United Kingdom, was experiencing a decline in coal output in the immediate aftermath of the war. Britain, therefore, lacked an exportable surplus of the resources needed by France, meaning that French dependence on German coke and coal was just as acute as it had ever been.⁴¹

The Ruhr – or more accurately the maintenance of French access to Ruhr resources – therefore became a focal point of French postwar policy. This became obvious at the seminal London Conference on Germany, which started on February 26, 1948. The day after the conference began, the French presented their proposal to create

³⁹ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 130-131.

⁴⁰ Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-67*, 89.

⁴¹ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 130-131.
Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 95.

an international authority for the Ruhr.⁴² The Ruhr had fallen within the zone of occupied Germany that was under the control of the British Military Government, meaning the formerly privately-held mines and steel mills that existed within the Ruhr had passed to British government control after the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. Seeing this, France desired – and believed it possible – to not only internationalize the resources of the Ruhr, but the management of the firms that existed within the Ruhr as well. This would give them the ability to influence how Ruhr coal and coke were allocated both in Germany and beyond its borders. Crucially, that would include exports to France, meaning that, with the creation of a fully internationalized Ruhr, France would be able to control at least to some degree how much German coal and coke were being sent to aid their reconstruction and modernization efforts.⁴³

By 1947, the United States was prepared to accept this French desire to internationalize the Ruhr and its resources. During that year, Secretary of State George Marshall assured the French Ambassador to the United States, Henri Bonnet, that the U.S. was in favor of the idea that the resources of the Ruhr should be made available for the recovery of the entirety of Europe rather than only that of Germany. While the method by which this was to be accomplished was unclear at the time,⁴⁴ these assurances foreshadowed the agreement regarding the Ruhr that would be made at the London Conference. On May 27, 1948, the U.S., France, and Britain agreed to the French

⁴² *ibid.*, 161.

⁴³ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 149.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 140.

proposal of February, albeit with some significant modifications.⁴⁵ This agreement set up the new International Authority for the Ruhr, a body which was created with the intention of ensuring “that the resources of the Ruhr shall not in the future be used for the purpose of aggression but shall be used in the interests of peace” and

that access to the coal, coke and steel of the Ruhr, which was previously subject to the exclusive control of Germany, be in the future guaranteed without discrimination to the countries of Europe cooperating in the common economic good.⁴⁶

In the interest of accomplishing these goals, the three powers gave the International Authority the power to, among other things,

make the division of coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr as between German consumption and export, in order to ensure adequate access to supplies of these products, taking into account the essential needs of Germany.⁴⁷

The powers of the International Authority were to be exercised jointly, with the United States, Britain, France, and Germany all having three votes in the International Authority’s representative body, while the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were each given one vote.⁴⁸ While this agreement committed Ruhr resources to wider European recovery and gave France the opportunity to exercise a certain amount of control over the amount of Ruhr coal and coke that was earmarked for export, the

⁴⁵ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 163.

⁴⁶ “Paper Agreed Upon by the London Conference on Germany,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 285.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, 286.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, 285.

agreement did not provide for international control at the firm level,⁴⁹ something which France had desperately desired in the hope that such a provision would have worked to prevent German evasion of the decisions handed down by the International Authority.⁵⁰

The International Authority for the Ruhr was not to last long, however. In addition to the internationalization of the Ruhr, the London Conference produced a recommendation to look into the internationalization of the wider European coal and steel industries. This recommendation, which came directly from Marshall and reflected the official policy of President Harry Truman, seems to have had a significant impact on Jean Monnet,⁵¹ who, on May 4, 1950, sent a memorandum to French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and French Prime Minister Georges Bidault to suggest the creation of a supranational institution that would later be realized in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This notion would be presented to France and the world by Schuman on May 9, 1950, causing the plan to place the coal and steel resources of Europe under supranational control to forever bear his name. Monnet's memorandum stated that a primary reason behind his suggestion to create what would later be called the ECSC was related to France's continued recovery. According to Monnet, France was in danger in 1950 of failing to achieve its goal of becoming the new industrial heart of Europe:

⁴⁹ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 161.
Gillingham, *European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?*, 24.

⁵⁰ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 150.

⁵¹ For more on the Truman administration's recommendation to pool the coal and steel industries of Western Europe and the impact that this recommendation had on the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, see chapter 3.

The continuation of France's recovery will be halted if the question of German industrial production and its competitive capacity is not rapidly solved. The basis of the superiority which French industrialists traditionally recognize in Germany is her ability to produce steel at a price that France cannot match. From this they conclude that the whole of French production is thereby handicapped. Already Germany is asking to increase her production from 11 to 14 million tons. We shall refuse, but the Americans will insist. Finally, we shall state our reservations but we shall give in. At the same time, French production is leveling off or even falling... With the solution proposed there is no more question of domination by German industry... This solution, on the contrary, creates for industry – German, French, and European – the conditions for joint expansion, in competition but without domination. From the French point of view, such a solution gives French industry the same start as German industry; it eliminates the dumping on export markets which would otherwise be practised by the German steel industry; and it enables the French steel industry to participate in European expansion, without fear of dumping and without the temptation to form a cartel... The biggest obstacle to the continuation of French industrial progress will have been removed.⁵²

Monnet sensed that the ability of the International Authority for the Ruhr to protect French resource needs was in danger of faltering, largely due to an American desire to see increased industrial production in Germany as well as the German wish to be viewed as equal in the international community. Indeed, Germany resisted the arrangements that had been agreed upon at the London Conference, refusing to be represented within the International Authority until December 1949, the month after the Petersberg Agreement had begun giving West Germany some level of international recognition. Seeing that the French need for German coal and coke was not enough to eternally justify the subservient position that Germany had been placed in after the war, Monnet desired to carve out another method for securing these resources. He knew that “the removal of controls over the German economy would have meant renewed uncertainty about our vital supplies of coal, and especially of coke, and would thereby

⁵² Jean Monnet, “Memorandum sent by Jean Monnet to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault, 4 May 1950,” *Postwar Integration in Europe*, Richard Vaughn, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 53-54.

have made our steel industry very much weaker than its powerful German rival.” If Germany wanted to increase its industrial production and begin using more and more of the Ruhr resources that France needed and sought to control, the International Authority for the Ruhr had to be replaced by a larger Western European coal and steel pool that would allow France to continue having unfettered access to Ruhr resources. The success of the *Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipement* depended upon it.⁵³

The French, therefore, decided to propose the integration of Western Europe’s coal and steel industries partially because such a development would allow France to continue rebuilding and modernizing itself in the wake of World War II. Because of the way that the French steel industry had evolved in the years since its establishment in the nineteenth century, reliable and consistent access to Ruhr coke and coal was an integral part of the successful implementation of the Monnet Plan, meaning France needed to take action in the immediate postwar period to secure reliable French access to these German resources. When it appeared that France’s initial effort – the creation of the International Authority for the Ruhr – may begin faltering in this regard, the supranational control over Western Europe’s coal and steel industry that was embodied in the Schuman Plan was seen by Monnet as a viable alternative. The French therefore viewed the integration of Western Europe as tremendously desirable because it meant that their recovery could continue and France could become a modern industrial power. The destruction of the Continent – and particularly France – that occurred during World War II, then, led directly to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community.

⁵³ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 283-284.

The French attempt to gain and maintain some degree of control over German natural resources was not solely borne out of a desire to keep their nation's reconstruction and modernization efforts going, however. German war-making potential entered into France's calculations as well. After experiencing the dreadfulness of war with Germany three times since 1870, the French desired an arrangement that would prevent any further outbreaks of conflict between the two historic rivals. The two World Wars in particular had simply been too destructive and too horrific to allow for a third. This postwar fear of a resurgent and hostile Germany⁵⁴ was very clearly displayed in the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk that France concluded with the United Kingdom, as this treaty had as its explicit purpose the goal of "ensuring that Germany shall not again become a menace to the peace."⁵⁵ France obviously still deeply feared German aggression. As a result, the French wanted to see German reindustrialization handicapped in the first few years after the war in order to ensure their security against the Germans.⁵⁶ As Bidault put it, "A lot of Frenchmen...had the vague feeling that France would not be safe if...Germany became a powerful industrial nation once again."⁵⁷ French efforts to prevent Germany from realizing its full industrial potential included the virtual annexation of the coal-rich Saar by France, the internationalization of the Ruhr, and the seizure of German factories as

⁵⁴ Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 158. Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 152. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 501. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 85.

⁵⁵ *Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and France (Dunkirk, 4 March 1947)*, CVCE, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/1fb9f4b5-64e2-4337-bc78-db7e1978de09/en;jsessionid=2BC2F8AA0BF71C23AF1866D8611E8901> (accessed April 13, 2012).

⁵⁶ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 148-152.

⁵⁷ Georges Bidault, *Resistance* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), 159-160.

reparations. A French desire to see Germany permanently occupied by the Allies was included in French plans as well.⁵⁸ After the United States convinced France that such a policy was neither desirable nor possible but that, instead, there were other means of preventing future military aggression from a reindustrialized Germany,⁵⁹ the French turned their focus primarily to the internationalization of the Ruhr as the means by which they might be able to bolster their own national security.⁶⁰ Indeed, French – as well as wider European – security concerns appear in the very agreement to create the International Authority for the Ruhr.⁶¹

When the agreed-upon International Authority for the Ruhr was in danger of failing to provide France with the materials it needed to continue reconstruction and modernization, Monnet believed that a wider supranational pooling of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe could take its place and keep the Monnet Plan going. Furthermore, such a pool would have the additional benefit of ensuring that France continued to experience the security against German attack that it desired. France, after all, was loathe to allow Germany to be free from any sort of control over its coal and steel industries,⁶² meaning the French believed that an alternative to the International Authority had to be agreed upon before it had a chance to fail because of increased

⁵⁸ Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 39.

⁵⁹ For more on the importance of the United States in convincing the French to support total German reindustrialization, see chapter 3.

⁶⁰ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 153.

⁶¹ “Paper Agreed Upon by the London Conference on Germany,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 285.

⁶² Monnet, *Memoirs*, 292.

German steel production.⁶³ French security goals were reflected in the May 9, 1950, announcement that Schuman made to introduce what would become known as the Schuman Plan. In this announcement – known as the Schuman Declaration despite the fact that it had been written by Monnet and two of his disciples – he stated that a peaceful Europe would have to be based upon “the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany,” and that “any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.” Further, he proposed

that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.⁶⁴

The French had very good reason to believe that the pooling of French and German coal and steel resources would help provide security for their nation. These resources, which had been made tremendously valuable with the arrival of the Industrial Revolution, were spread over a triangular area that lay primarily in Germany but was nevertheless intersected by the two countries’ national boundaries. According to Monnet,

Neither country...felt secure unless it commanded all the resources – i.e., all the area....Coal and steel were at once the key to economic power and the raw materials for forging weapons of war. This double role gave them immense

⁶³ Jean Monnet, “Memorandum sent by Jean Monnet to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault, 4 May 1950,” *Postwar Integration in Europe*, 53-54.

⁶⁴ Robert Schuman, *The Schuman Declaration*, May 9, 1950, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm (accessed November 29, 2011).

symbolic significance....To pool them across frontiers would reduce their malign prestige and turn them instead into a guarantee of peace.⁶⁵

While their status as the most important resources for the waging of war was perhaps waning with the dawn of the nuclear era, coal and steel nevertheless remained the most critical pieces to any nation's military buildup in 1950. They had played a decisive role in World War I and particularly World War II, meaning control over them had been viewed with envy by both France and Germany for generations.

By pooling the coal and steel resources of the two nations under the authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, the French sought to make it impossible for Germany to rearm and initiate another destructive war between them.⁶⁶ If the coal and steel resources that would be necessary for such an effort were controlled by a supranational authority, after all, it would reduce the propensity of either nation to use force to control the aforementioned triangular area of critical industrial resources. Just as importantly, though, it would also make it possible for France to monitor what the Germans were doing, immediately detect an attempt to rearm, and prevent them from taking aggressive action against France.⁶⁷ The French were not afraid to make this important motivation behind the Schuman Declaration known to the Germans, as Schuman himself told West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on the day of the Schuman Declaration that since "rearmament always showed first in an increased production of coal, iron, and steel," the ECSC would allow both France and Germany to

⁶⁵ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 293.

⁶⁶ Harold Callender, "France Proposes a Coal-Steel Pool with Germans in it," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1950, 1.

⁶⁷ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 303.

“detect the first signs of rearmament, and would have an extraordinarily calming effect in France.”⁶⁸ Monnet hinted at such ideas in the Schuman Declaration itself. For him, the purpose of the ECSC was to a large degree the protection of peace on the Continent, and, as a result, the essence of what France was trying to accomplish with the creation of the ECSC could be summed up in one sentence that appeared, underlined, in the copy of the Schuman Declaration that Monnet gave to Schuman:

By the pooling of basic production and the establishment of a new High Authority whose decisions will be binding on France, Germany, and the countries that join them, this proposal will lay the first concrete foundations of the European Federation which is indispensable to the maintenance of peace.

According to Monnet, “the last word was the most important: peace.”⁶⁹

The latent military power of West Germany therefore also played a large role in convincing Monnet, Schuman, and other French politicians that the integration of Western Europe would be a beneficial undertaking. They, along with many others on the Continent, had suffered a great deal during the first half of the twentieth century as a result of German aggression, meaning that a certain level of fear pervaded their thinking. Understanding that the German coal and steel industries would be the most critical elements of any German effort to rearm, the French believed that the best way to prevent such an occurrence was to simply place these industries under a supranational authority such as the European Coal and Steel Community. In so doing, they believed that it would be possible for German activities with respect to these crucial industries to be closely monitored, meaning any German attempts to rearm would be detected during their initial

⁶⁸ Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), 257.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 298.

stages and stopped. France's past experiences with Germany, then, were clearly an integral part of that nation's desire to pursue the integration of Western Europe in the postwar period. To put it simply, the French still feared the Germans in 1950, and the integration embodied in the ECSC was one way in which they could make substantial progress toward assuaging that fear.

The Soviet Union was also on French minds as they sought to create a Western European coal and steel pool. Specifically, the French wanted to ensure that Germany was tied irrevocably to the West. France recognized that a total European postwar recovery depended upon the inclusion of West German resources, and that, if they and the rest of the Allies continued to treat Germany as a second-class nation, it might be tempted to turn toward the Soviet Union for support.⁷⁰ The answer, therefore, was to treat West Germany as more of an equal, but even this was not guaranteed to prevent growing nationalism in Germany from manifesting itself as a desire to seek reunification and turn towards the East. This reality led to American statements of caution with regard to French demands for the internationalization of the Ruhr in 1948⁷¹ and ultimately seems to have led the French to pursue supranational control over the wider West European coal and steel industry. If West Germany could be tied economically to France and other Western European countries and its coal and steel resources placed under supranational control, after all, it would have a much more difficult time turning its back on Western

⁷⁰ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 75.

⁷¹ For more on the Truman administration's recommendation to pool the coal and steel industries of Western Europe and the impact that this recommendation had on the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, see chapter 3.

Europe and making its precious resources available to the Soviets instead of to the French and other Western Europeans. In the words of Monnet in September 1950,

[I]f the Germans get what the Schuman Plan offers them [i.e., reindustrialization, greater equality, and, eventually perhaps even rearmament], but without the Plan itself, we shall run the risk of their turning their backs on us.⁷²

To him, Germany simply had to be secured within the framework provided by the ECSC.

The Soviet threat to Western Europe also played a role in the early success of the European Coal and Steel Community, but, contrary to Rosato's arguments, only after it had already been proposed by the French and the drive toward an integrated Europe had begun. According to former Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak,

[A] number of Western statesmen have been dubbed either 'fathers of European unity' or 'fathers of the Atlantic Alliance'. Not one of them deserves this title: it belongs to [Soviet Premier Josef] Stalin. Without Stalin and his aggressive policies, without the threat with which he confronted the free world...the movement for European unity, embracing Germany as an integral part, would never have had the astonishing success which it has enjoyed.⁷³

The Communist menace to Western Europe, which had been a concern to the West since the end of World War II, seems to have been solidified in the minds of the French after the advent of the Korean War. Monnet recognized that the climate of fear that the June 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops instilled throughout the Continent assisted in the creation of a unified Europe.⁷⁴ This climate of fear seems to have been warranted, at least to a certain degree, as it was correctly assumed at the time that Stalin had personally approved the North Korean invasion beforehand. Such an assumption

⁷² Monnet, *Memoirs*, 341.

⁷³ Paul-Henri Spaak, *The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, 1936-1966*, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), 141.

⁷⁴ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 316.

naturally caused Western officials to begin comparing the divided Korea to the divided Germany, both of which had one side allied with the Communist world and one side allied with the Western world. If Stalin was willing to sanction a Communist invasion in Korea, it seemed logical that he might also be willing to sanction a Communist invasion in Germany.⁷⁵ Certainly Adenauer saw his newly-formed Federal Republic of Germany as being under threat, stating that he was “firmly convinced that Stalin was planning the same procedure for Western Germany as had been used in Korea.”⁷⁶ These assessments proved to be logical, as the East Germans were indeed building up their forces and actively training for a future conflict with West Germany.⁷⁷ The security of the Western world was widely perceived to be under threat, and the integration and strengthening of the Western European war-making industries – particularly, of course, its coal and steel industries – seemed to be a logical response to the Western Europeans.⁷⁸

Western fears about Soviet aggression also seem to have nearly had the opposite effect on Western European integration, however. The North Korean invasion occurred the month after the Schuman Declaration and only a few days after the beginning of the Schuman Plan conference that was convened to work out the details of the new community amongst the states that desired to join it. Upon hearing of the conflict, Monnet immediately recognized the potential disaster that it might inflict upon the still-embryonic plan for the creation of a coal and steel pool in Western Europe. He believed

⁷⁵ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 99.

⁷⁶ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 273.

⁷⁷ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 99.

⁷⁸ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 328.

that the United States would not allow the Communists to get away with what they had done, and that the Americans would seek to prepare for further Communist action in central Europe.⁷⁹ This was an accurate perception, as the fear of Soviet aggression against West Germany caused American officials to pursue the rearmament of West Germany, albeit with great trepidation.⁸⁰ Secretary of State Dean Acheson had said only the previous month that the U.S. “should not contemplate building up German military forces,”⁸¹ after all. The French were shocked by this American about-face. Schuman had said the previous year that “Germany is unarmed and will remain unarmed,” and Monnet believed that “the mere mention of a German army was enough to horrify Europeans.”⁸² No one in France wanted to see anyone return “to the former aggressor the weapons he had seemed glad to lay down.”⁸³

The U.S. nevertheless wanted to push ahead with rearming Germany, as Germany would inevitably be the scene of the battle in the event of Soviet aggression and it only made sense to American officials that the Germans should contribute to their own defense.⁸⁴ Despite the French government’s official line that “there can be no question of rearming Germany at all,”⁸⁵ Acheson told Schuman at the 1950 Foreign Ministers

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 336.

⁸⁰ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 251.

⁸¹ “The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, Vol. III, 1015.

⁸² Monnet, *Memoirs*, 337.

⁸³ *ibid.*, 304.

⁸⁴ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 101-102.

⁸⁵ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 341.

meeting in New York that the U.S. would only send military reinforcements to Western Europe if the Europeans themselves created a multinational army made up of sixty divisions – “ten of which might be German.” Acheson wanted these European forces to be assigned to the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization and put under the command of an American general, “probably [Dwight] Eisenhower.” To Schuman, this demand was unacceptable, but it nevertheless forced France’s hand. Monnet believed that there were three options at the time for his country: to do nothing, to treat Germany on a national basis and thereby unravel the budding drive towards European integration that was occurring on the Continent, or to create a sort of broader Schuman Plan that would allow the necessary actions to be taken within a European framework.⁸⁶ The French chose the third option, and the European Defense Community (EDC) proposal was the result.⁸⁷

The EDC was, however, an idea that came before its intended time. The French government had hoped that the proposal and successful implementation of the European Coal and Steel Community would “accustom people to the idea of a European Community before the delicate question of joint defence had to be broached.”⁸⁸ Schuman, Monnet, and others realized that the creation of a joint military structure for Western Europe – and particularly one which might include German units – would be a difficult sell. Military officers disliked the proposal because they disagreed that the political advantages of integrating their units outweighed the organizational nightmares that came with it, and almost none could appreciate the economic benefits that would have come

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, 342-343.

⁸⁷ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 263.

⁸⁸ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 347.

along with common budgeting, centralized procurement of equipment, and the standardized manufacture of armaments.⁸⁹ Many civilians disliked the EDC plan as well, particularly in France, where fear of German rearmament was widespread and palpable. Indeed, the greatest obstacles that the EDC had to overcome in order to win acceptance lay within the very country that proposed it: France.⁹⁰

The EDC was therefore doomed to fail, and mostly because it was not a truly European idea. It came largely as a response to the American desire to create a West Germany that could help provide for its own defense.⁹¹ Indeed, the EDC was widely perceived at the time as something which the United States was forcing upon France.⁹² However, its failure to become a reality did have real, positive benefits for the ECSC. It took American eyes off of the ECSC for a time, allowing the Europeans to work through the difficulties associated with its launch and establish it in the way that they saw fit. It also gave French politicians the time they needed to work through their anti-German sentiments and become accustomed to an integrated Europe built upon and centered around West Germany's tremendous economic potential.⁹³

The historical record, then, clearly does not support Rosato's claims with regard to why the French sought to integrate Western Europe via the Schuman Plan. The presence of the Soviet Union does seem to have instilled within the French a greater

⁸⁹ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 263-264.

⁹⁰ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 349.

⁹¹ Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 81-82.

⁹² Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 265.

⁹³ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 351-352.

desire to see to it that Germany's natural resources were tied permanently to Western Europe, as it would have been disastrous if the Germans had turned toward the East and added their incredible economic potential to the Soviet side. However, the historical record also makes it clear that the French aspiration to rebuild and modernize their nation as well as France's troubled relationship with Germany played by far the most important roles in convincing French leaders of the desirability of integration. The impetus for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community therefore cannot be accurately characterized as being driven by balance-of-power politics, as it was World War II – and not the Cold War – which played the decisive role in leading France to propose Western European integration. After all, the danger posed by the Soviet Union appears to have been solidified in the minds of Monnet and others by the Communist invasion of South Korea, which occurred after the Schuman Declaration had been already made. Contrary to the claims of Rosato, it is simply not the case that Monnet viewed the ECSC's principle virtue as being its ability to create a bloc that could effectively balance the Soviet Union, and that this is what caused the French to endorse the Schuman Plan.⁹⁴ It seems that the Soviet Union may have indeed had a role to play in fostering the success of early European integrative efforts in that it perhaps solidified French support for the Schuman Declaration once it had been made, but it certainly does not seem to have been critical to shaping French postwar plans for the future of the Continent.

The reasons why the West Germans enthusiastically accepted the Schuman Plan when it was proposed in May 1950 are just as varied as those which are to be found on the French side of the story. After it had been defeated by the Allied powers and offered

⁹⁴ Rosato, 60.

its unconditional surrender in 1945, Germany was split into four zones: one controlled by the United States, one by the United Kingdom, one by France, and the fourth by the USSR. In addition, German industry was subject to severe output limits, reparations were to be extracted from the country, and the German standard of living was capped. The hope was that all of these requirements would make German resources available to the rest of Europe for its reconstruction,⁹⁵ with the expectation being that the four victorious Allied powers would be able to work together to administer occupied Germany. Even before the 1945 Potsdam Conference that had decreed these methods for dealing with occupied Germany, however, Stalin had come to the conclusion that there would in fact be “two Germanies.” This seemed only natural considering the fact that the Soviets wished to impose a very different system on their portion of Germany from the one that the Western powers sought to put in place in theirs.⁹⁶ The Western powers accepted this division of Germany as inevitable,⁹⁷ and Secretary of State James Byrnes based his negotiations as well as his understanding of the outcome of the conference on this idea.⁹⁸

Other American officials either disagreed with or misunderstood Byrnes’ reasoning, however, and eventually American policy shifted toward the administration of Germany as a single unit.⁹⁹ Soviet unwillingness to run German foreign trade on an all-German basis, however, meant that administering Germany in this manner was simply

⁹⁵ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 127.

⁹⁶ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 30.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 34.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 41.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 41-45.

unfeasible, and the United States turned its attention toward the creation of a divided Germany made up of the Communist East and the democratic West. This was, after all, the obvious alternative to the failed policy of a reunified Germany. Britain quickly joined its zone with that of the United States, but France would not commit itself to such an overtly anti-Soviet policy for some time.¹⁰⁰ Eventually, in 1948, after realizing that the French zone might become isolated as the Anglo-American “Bizonie” pursued its own robust economic policies – some of which were detrimental to continued French recovery and modernization – France agreed to discuss the possibility of trizonal fusion.¹⁰¹

Germany, then, was divided and being ruled over by foreign military governments. As a result, getting out from under occupation by the Allies and being seen as an equal within the international community were very important to the Germans. Much of this desire stemmed from the living conditions that were present in occupied Germany, as they were all but intolerable. Germany had been ravaged by an Allied bombing policy that targeted houses and apartments in an effort to paralyze the German economy and force a Nazi surrender. By the end of the war, over 50% – and in some cities, as much as 80% – of prewar dwellings had been completely destroyed, with many more being severely damaged. Hunger, homelessness, and cold took hold as the central German authorities were no longer allowed to function in the wake of the Nazi surrender.¹⁰² The lack of food for the population – each person was rationed about 1,000 calories per day – led to constant malnutrition. This malnutrition, in turn, reduced

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 45-48.

¹⁰¹ Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-67*, 19-20.

¹⁰² Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 25.

Germans' ability to engage in meaningful work and contributed to an alarmingly rapid spread of serious disease.¹⁰³ In 1946, for example, there were an estimated 260,000 cases of tuberculosis in the British zone alone.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, the Allied Control Council in Berlin was not functioning properly, and, as a result, "all the efforts made in municipalities and even in entire occupation zones were bound to be fruitless." Such conditions not only caused unbearable living conditions for the German people but also retarded economic recovery. This was perhaps felt most acutely in the British zone, which contained the all-important Ruhr. The British occupation forces were, at least according to one very prominent observer, "treating the population badly,"¹⁰⁵ and the British Military Government was having trouble mastering its work¹⁰⁶ and administering its zone properly.

As a result, the West German desire to regain a position of equality and take control of German affairs should not be surprising. It should also not be surprising that such considerations did a great deal to color West German policy after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.¹⁰⁷ Adenauer, the first Chancellor of West Germany, viewed each arrangement that was made either by the Occupation government or the newly-created West German government through the lens of the restoration of

¹⁰³ "German Epidemic Feared," *The New York Times*, March 2, 1947, 12.

¹⁰⁴ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 58-59.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, 25.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, 56.

¹⁰⁷ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 86.

German equality and the furtherance of German development.¹⁰⁸ His ultimate goal was to have the numerous restrictions which had been placed on his country by the Potsdam Declaration and Occupation Statute removed. These restrictions were numerous and far-reaching, and included the areas of defense, foreign affairs, occupation costs, matters relating to the federal and *Land* constitutions, reparations, foreign trade, exchange controls, international borrowing, decartelization, and control over the Ruhr.¹⁰⁹ In lifting these restrictions, he desired to see his country become a valued member of the international community that had regained the trust and support of its Western neighbors and partners and was, as a result, no longer being occupied by foreign powers. To Adenauer, the Council of Europe seemed to be a way in which West Germany might be able to take a step toward this equality and “produce appreciable alleviations in the whole field of the occupation regime.” He was convinced that, if West Germany joined the Council of Europe, “the revision of the Occupation Statute... would be much more generous,”¹¹⁰ and conditions might then improve for himself and his countrymen. This goal of raising the standard of living not only in West Germany but across the war-torn Continent was eventually included in the treaty establishing the ECSC itself:

¹⁰⁸ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 193.

¹⁰⁹ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 389.

¹¹⁰ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 259.

The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute...to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States.¹¹¹

Convincing the newly-formed West German Bundestag to join the Council of Europe and take the first step toward this goal would not be easy, however.

The Council of Europe, which was meant to be the political parallel to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation that the U.S. had required for the administration of Marshall Plan aid, was proposed by France out of a desire to see an assembly set up for Europe. France believed that such an arrangement might give them an opportunity to exercise some level of control over Germany¹¹² while capturing the German “political imagination” by presenting the country with an opportunity to have a place and play a role in postwar Europe. It was also intended to gain the French some cachet with the American government,¹¹³ which had been pushing for some level of European integration since the end of the war.¹¹⁴ At the same time, however, France was hoping that the Saar would be given independent membership in the Council of Europe.¹¹⁵ France had, of course, essentially annexed the Saar with the Allies’ blessing¹¹⁶ after a favorable vote by the population of the Saar *Landtag* in 1947. This fusion of

¹¹¹ “Treaty Establishing the ECSC, 18 April 1951,” *Postwar Integration in Europe*, Richard Vaughn, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), 61.

¹¹² Harold Callender, “France Proposes a Coal-Steel Pool with Germans in it,” *The New York Times*, May 10, 1950, 1.

¹¹³ Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 48-49.

¹¹⁴ Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 99-105.
Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 75.

¹¹⁵ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 211.

¹¹⁶ Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 39

France and the Saar was enshrined in November of that year by the establishment of a constitution for the Saar that instituted a monetary and customs union for the two areas. While technically independent, the Saar clearly had a special relationship with France that allowed France to have free access to the vast resources that were contained within it, including coal. When the Federal Republic of Germany was created in 1949, however, the population of the Saar became increasingly displeased with its decision to pursue union with France, causing fear among the French that they may not be able to retain their access to the Saar's important resources. As a result, the French negotiated a new convention which allowed them to maintain financial and customs authority in the Saar. This convention also granted a long-term lease of the Saar mines to France, an action that allowed the French to continue having access to the Saar resources¹¹⁷ that they, of course, wanted for their *Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipement*.

The Germans were predictably angry about these developments. Adenauer called the new convention "a decision against Europe,"¹¹⁸ and the West German government decided to delay its entry into the Council of Europe as a result of the new convention, with the powerful *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) stating that it would only vote in favor of German accession to the Council if the Saar did not join as well.¹¹⁹ The SPD was not the only party that threatened to keep West Germany out of the Council of Europe as a result of France's actions regarding the Saar, meaning that the Bundestag simply would not vote to allow West Germany to join the Council of Europe if the Saar

¹¹⁷ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 390.

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 211.

was given full membership, too,¹²⁰ as this would acknowledge that the Saar fell outside of the Federal Republic of Germany.¹²¹ German protests about the detachment of the Saar from their country were rooted not only in the economic significance of that resource-rich region, but also in the fact that the newly-agreed Saar conventions broke previous Allied promises. The Allies had “maintained the position that a change in the frontiers of Germany could only be made by the peace treaty,” which had not yet been signed at the time. The Allied governments had, in fact, “repeatedly underlined this promise,” according to Adenauer. The French takeover of the Saar and its valuable resources therefore created a situation in which general German displeasure with the Allied powers might increase and cause nationalist sentiments in Germany to flare up. Adenauer saw that “the Saar question could become a dangerous explosive, a focus of agitation for nationalist circles.”¹²² Many within the French government, however, seem to have ignored this possibility, as they stated at the time that they would only agree to allow West German membership in the Council of Europe if the Saar was permitted as a member at the same time.¹²³ France’s conduct over the Saar caused widespread doubts

¹²⁰ *ibid.*, 249.

Drew Middleton, “Bonn Faces Crisis on Europe Council,” *The New York Times*, March 31, 1950, 15.

¹²¹ Lansing Warren, “Bonn and Saar Asked to Join Council of Europe as Equals,” *The New York Times*, March 31, 1950, 1.

¹²² Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 241.

Jack Raymond, “Adenauer Asserts Saar Deal Shakes His Faith in West,” *The New York Times*, March 5, 1950, 1.

¹²³ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 211-212.

within Germany as to whether France seriously wanted to improve its relationship with its old nemesis and allow Germany to regain its status as an equal and thereby assist in the reconstruction of Western Europe.¹²⁴

As a result, something had to be done about the Saar before European integration could begin in earnest. The Schuman Plan was the answer. This plan provided the possibility of solving the Saar issue by simply placing all of the coal and steel industries of France, West Germany, and any other Western European country that wished to join under supranational control. Such an arrangement would, of course, include the Saar, meaning it would safeguard not only French, but also German access to the resources of this vital region. The Saar question, then, would more or less “solve itself.” The Schuman Plan also reinforced in the minds of many Germans – including Adenauer – that France genuinely did want to pursue an understanding with its old enemy, and that it was not opposed to cooperation with Germany. After all, the Germans viewed the ECSC proposal itself as being “based on the principle of equality”¹²⁵ among the nations of Western Europe.

Once the Saar had been taken care of, West Germany was able to turn its attention to joining the Council of Europe, a move which, again, the Germans hoped would afford them a less burdensome Occupation Statute. To Adenauer, either “the passage of time or some unforeseen event” would need to take place in order for the Bundestag to accept the Council of Europe’s invitation to join. The Schuman Declaration provided this

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, 244.

¹²⁵ *ibid.*, 260.

unforeseen event,¹²⁶ and solved the problem of control over the Saar. “An essential element of estrangement” between France and Germany had been removed, Adenauer said,¹²⁷ allowing West Germany to agree to join the Council of Europe no matter what the status of the Saar was. Simply put, the Saar did not hold the significance that it did before the Schuman Declaration. The German Bundestag, as a result, voted to accept the Council of Europe’s invitation to join on June 15, 1950, by a vote of 220 to 152.¹²⁸

The Schuman Declaration, therefore, seems to have come at the perfect time for the West Germans. At a time when they desperately wanted to regain their independence and get out from under the misery of the Allied Occupation, joining the Council of Europe seemed to them to be the first meaningful step that they could take toward the realization of these goals. The Saar, however, created a conflict between France and Germany that was making West German accession to the Council impossible. The Schuman Declaration effectively solved this problem for the Germans by safeguarding their access to the Saar’s critical resources no matter what the status of the Saar would end up being. The integration of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe was seen as desirable by the West Germans largely because it would allow them to settle their dispute with France over the Saar and take the first step on the long road to the recovery of their sovereignty. Far from being “obsessed” with the power of the Soviet Union as Rosato claims,¹²⁹ it is clear that Adenauer’s decision to endorse the creation of the ECSC

¹²⁶ “Another Bold New Plan,” *The New York Times*, May 11, 1950, 28.

¹²⁷ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 264.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, 266.

¹²⁹ Rosato, 56.

was driven instead by a desire to regain independence for West Germany. Here again, the critical role that World War II played in the integration of Western Europe through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community becomes clear, as it was this war which had stripped Germany of its sovereignty in the first place. Without World War II, then, West Germany may not have been willing to embrace supranationalism in the manner in which it did in 1950.

Despite the occupation of Germany by the Allies after the war, France and other European countries still harbored concerns about the possibility of future German aggression. As demonstrated above, this was an important reason why the French decided to propose the coal and steel pool outlined in the Schuman Plan. These concerns were not totally misplaced, as nationalism had not completely gone away after the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany.¹³⁰ This became clear as the 1940s came to a close, with far-right political parties showing up in West Germany in late 1948 and early 1949. Some of these groups believed that they could restore Germany's former glory by reinstating the "good" parts of National Socialism.¹³¹ The reasons for this resurgence of extreme nationalism were many and varied. As time went by and the country began to recover economically, Germans began to lose their desire to "forget...that they were Germans" because of the horrors of the war and the total collapse of Nazi Germany. Indeed, the gradual recovery of West Germany instilled within many Germans a pride in their nation's technical skill and incredible economic potential, and, as living conditions

¹³⁰ "Meeting of United States Ambassadors at Paris, October 21-22, to Discuss Major Developments Relating to Europe," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, Vol. IV, 470.

¹³¹ Drew Middleton, "Extreme Rightists Gain in Germany," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1948, 2.

slowly improved, people had more time to think about their perceived mistreatment at the hand of the Allied Occupation regime.¹³² Part of this mistreatment included perhaps unsurprisingly the creation of the International Authority for the Ruhr, a development which stripped Germany of its control over its most important industrial resource and thereby increased nationalist feeling. The Soviets played a role in the increase in German nationalism as well, though, in that the 1948 Berlin blockade was seen as an attack on all of Germany, not just Berlin.¹³³ The presence of such a seemingly obvious danger served to bring Germans together and increase their nationalist sentiments. The splitting of Germany into East and West also bolstered German nationalism, as it represented the division of their great nation and provided them with another national grievance. No matter what the source of their nationalism, though, all nationalist Germans seemed to share a few things in common: pride in the powerful *Wehrmacht* of World War II, scorn for the occupying powers, some degree of anti-Semitism, and a “strong belief that Germany [could] again grow great as the leader of Europe.”¹³⁴ By the summer of 1949, the Allies – particularly the British and the Americans in Bavaria – believed that they were “losing control” of the populations in their zones as they became less cooperative with and increasingly antagonistic toward the Occupation governments.¹³⁵

¹³² Drew Middleton, “Germans Reviving Nationalist Ideas,” *The New York Times*, February 15, 1949, 10. Drew Middleton, “Extreme Rightists Gain in Germany,” *The New York Times*, November 17, 1948, 2.

¹³³ Drew Middleton, “Germans Reviving Nationalist Ideas,” *The New York Times*, February 15, 1949, 10. Drew Middleton, “Extreme Rightists Gain in Germany,” *The New York Times*, November 17, 1948, 2.

¹³⁴ Drew Middleton, “Germans Reviving Nationalist Ideas,” *The New York Times*, February 15, 1949, 10.

¹³⁵ Drew Middleton, “Britain’s Prestige in Germany Found Dangerously Low,” *The New York Times*, August 8, 1949, 1.

The fledgling West German government understood, however, that a key part of ending the occupation of their country and regaining independence and equality was the alleviation of French and wider European security concerns¹³⁶ driven by a fear of a new manifestation of militant German nationalism. They recognized that, in order for West Germany to regain its place in the community of nations, it would have to convince its neighbors that it would not act aggressively toward them in the future. Adenauer, accepting that the French viewed “German steel production as war potential,”¹³⁷ believed in early March 1950 that some sort of economic merger between the two nations would go a long way toward assuaging French security concerns vis-à-vis Germany. He stated that the creation of a customs union between France and West Germany would “cause the rivalry of the two countries to disappear.”¹³⁸ Further, he believed that such an arrangement would

be a big step forward if Frenchmen and Germans sat in one house and at one table in order to work together and to carry joint responsibility. The psychological consequences would be inestimable. French security demands could be satisfied...[and] the understanding that would grow between Germany and France on this basis would be even more significant than all the economic advantages that would undoubtedly accrue.¹³⁹

As indicated above, the French recognized the security benefits of such an arrangement as well, so when the Schuman Declaration was made in May 1950, Adenauer quickly confirmed his interest in the proposal. The Schuman Plan did, after all, give both France and West Germany a concrete way to enact the type of union that

¹³⁶ “German Peace Plans,” *The New York Times*, January 18, 1949, 22.

¹³⁷ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 202.

¹³⁸ *ibid.*, 245.

¹³⁹ *ibid.*, 247.

Adenauer had envisioned, and in a manner that was pleasing to the French. Like Schuman, Adenauer thought that a coal and steel pool specifically would be particularly beneficial for easing French fears:

There was good reason for projecting such a scheme for iron, steel and coal if the goal was to do away with the differences that had for centuries existed between the French people and the German people. There was no better way of dispelling French doubts about the German people's love of peace than to bring together the two countries' production of coal, iron and steel, which were always the mainstay of rearmament, so that each partner in this pact would know everything that was happening in this important sphere. I declared my conviction that the whole German people desired for the future a removal of all psychological inhibitions between France and Germany so that at long last peace should prevail in Europe.¹⁴⁰

The ECSC, therefore, provided a way in which French nerves could be calmed and German equality could be brought nearer, as it gave the French a way to constantly keep an eye on what the Germans were up to, no matter how out of control their nationalism seemed to be getting.

The new West German government shared this desire to prevent German nationalism from continuing to develop. Indeed, the men who made up this government were just as capable as any other European of remembering the horrors of Nazi Germany and World War II. They had seen the consequences of unbridled German nationalism firsthand, and were aware of the fact that they simply could not let nationalism go unchecked in the Federal Republic of Germany as the 1940s ended and a new decade began. As an occupied state that was striving to regain its equality, the Germans had to worry about how they were perceived by other countries, and Adenauer recognized that bouts of out-of-control nationalism would not do anything to gain the trust of Nazi

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 265.

Germany's victims, even if it was thought that the most violent possible manifestations of this nationalism could be kept in check by the European Coal and Steel Community. He also feared the detrimental impact that resurgent nationalism would have on the stability of the young West German state. Extra-parliamentary nationalist groups led by popular demagogues appeared particularly dangerous to Adenauer in this regard.¹⁴¹ The Soviet Union entered Adenauer's calculations as well, as the possibility that German nationalists might end up turning towards the USSR for support because of how the Allies were treating West Germany seemed to him to be a very real danger.¹⁴² This fear of a Soviet-dominated Germany was shared by many in the West, though, who thought that a West Germany that came under the control of far-right nationalists might pursue unification with East Germany and form some level of union with the Soviets.¹⁴³ The Allied decision to allow France to essentially annex the Saar seemed particularly salient in this regard, as it led to a great deal of anger and annoyance with the Allies and the West among Germans¹⁴⁴ for the reasons outlined above. Indeed, two of the ministers in Adenauer's own government were making public speeches that seemed to support German

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*, 178.

¹⁴² *ibid.*, 245.

¹⁴³ Drew Middleton, "German Nationalism Rising to a New Climax," *The New York Times*, January 29, 1950, 113.

¹⁴⁴ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 245.

Drew Middleton, "German Nationalism Rising to a New Climax," *The New York Times*, January 29, 1950, 113.

nationalism with regard to the Saar in early 1950, meaning action needed to be taken quickly by the Adenauer government to prevent German nationalism from peaking within the country.¹⁴⁵

As was the case with regard to French security concerns, some type of Franco-German economic merger seemed to be the answer to Adenauer in March 1950. He thought that such a development would allow German nationalism to be brought under control and prevented from getting out of hand¹⁴⁶ because it would go a long way toward resolving the aforementioned issues that were driving Germans to embrace excessive nationalism. It would also allow Germany to take the first steps towards equality and independence, a condition which Adenauer believed would cause “radical tendencies in Germany...to collapse and become an insignificant fraction of public opinion” as Germany was brought “back to an honourable place in the family of free peoples.” Such a development would also give Germany access to the resources that it needed to pursue economic growth and the alleviation of very difficult postwar living conditions. Such a development, according to Adenauer, would help eradicate the nationalism that was taking hold in his country because “radicalism was to a large extent the bitter fruit of post-war distress.”¹⁴⁷ When the Schuman Declaration came along, then, he was quick to embrace it, as it provided a concrete method for solving the German nationalism issue.

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 247.

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.*, 390-391.

This was critical if the Adenauer government wanted to see an internally-stable West Germany that was able to assuage the fears of its neighbors while resisting the pull of unification at the expense of falling into the Soviet sphere of influence.

As with the French side of the story, then, it is clear that Rosato's balance-of-power argument simply is not supported by the historical record. Instead, the West German reasons for accepting the French suggestion to create a supranational coal and steel pool in Western Europe were multidimensional and did not simply reflect an overwhelming desire to balance the Soviet Union. They were also much different from the reasons why the French decided to put forth the Schuman Plan. In addition to recognizing that it would solve the problem of the Saar and allow them to join the Council of Europe, the West Germans believed that the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community would help to assuage French fears of future German aggression. It was also seen as a way to prevent German nationalism from getting out of control, as this would be disastrous not only for West Germany but for all of Western Europe, particularly if it caused Germany to reunify and fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. The obvious overarching goal that drove all of these motivations was the West German desire to regain the sovereignty that it had lost when Nazi Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allies in 1945. Here again, then, the critical importance of World War II to the European integration narrative becomes clear. While the threat of Soviet influence in Germany certainly seems to have been on the minds of West German statesmen, the conditions created in West Germany in the aftermath of the war were

much more important, meaning the Germans' desire to pursue the integration of Western Europe simply cannot be attributed solely – or even predominantly – to a desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union.

Not every policy elite in France and West Germany supported the idea of placing the coal and steel resources and industries of Western Europe under the supranational control of the European Coal and Steel Community, however. In France, while “people imagine retrospectively that the government and Parliament enthusiastically welcomed the idea of an Iron and Steel Pool,” Bidault states that “this is far from true, although some of the men who opposed it then later became supporters of the plan.” For proof that the Schuman Plan ran into trouble, he cites the fact that the Schuman Declaration took place on May 9, 1950, but that it was not until December 13, 1951, that the French Chamber of Deputies actually ratified the Schuman Plan.¹⁴⁸ According to him, there were many reasons why French members of parliament opposed the Schuman Plan:

Some were concerned about their personal interests, others disapproved of the European Community in principle, and there were some who just found any change suspect. They made many speeches against the Plan, some of which were very clever, others merely emotional.¹⁴⁹

Indeed, the idea to place the coal and steel resources of Western Europe under supranational authority had to overcome significant obstacles in France.

The opposition to the Schuman Plan in the French government came from the Communists and the Gaullists, on the far Left and the far Right, respectively. The former stated that the ECSC was a “vast plan to deport workers, who are looked on as cattle or

¹⁴⁸ Bidault, *Resistance*, 178.

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 179.

mere merchandise to be sold abroad,” and the latter prophesied that a plan like the ECSC meant that, “All customs barriers will fall, and the whole French market, from Strasbourg to Brazzaville in the Congo, will be inundated by the dynamism of German industry.”¹⁵⁰ Sovereignty concerns were also important to the Gaullists, who on December 6, 1951, formally declared their opposition to the Schuman Plan on the basis that it placed the management of French coal and steel in the hands of “an uncontrolled authority without democratic responsibility.”¹⁵¹ Retaining the advantages that France had gained with the Allied victory in World War II seems to have been important to the Gaullists as well. According to General Charles de Gaulle, after his government left power in France in 1945,

Everything I had accomplished by dint of arduous efforts, as regards the independence, the status and the interests of France, was immediately jeopardized. Lacking the drive and energy thanks to which we were on our feet, the regime was to all intents and purposes concerned with pleasing others. Naturally enough, it found the required ideologies to camouflage this self-effacement: the one, in the name of European unity, liquidating all the advantages which victory had gained us...¹⁵²

While the opposition of these groups never made up a parliamentary majority in France and the Treaty of Paris ended up being ratified by the Chamber of Deputies¹⁵³ and the Senate by large majorities, Monnet nevertheless believed that “there could be no

¹⁵⁰ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 365.

¹⁵¹ “Gaullist Committee Hits Schuman Plan,” *The New York Times*, December 6, 1951, 21.

¹⁵² Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 10.

¹⁵³ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 364-365.

doubt...that the concerted nationalism of Left and Right would form a constant barrier to Europe's progress."¹⁵⁴ The European project would go ahead in France, but not without facing the opposition of some French policy elites.

West Germany faced much the same issue when it came to the ratification of the Schuman Plan. There, Kurt Schumacher's SPD pledged to oppose the creation of the ECSC.¹⁵⁵ Calling Adenauer the "Chancellor of the Allies," Schumacher opposed any effort to integrate West Germany into the West. This included the ECSC, which he derided as a scheme to keep Germany weak, divided, and under capitalist domination. Instead of recognizing as Adenauer did that the Schuman Plan would help West Germany achieve equality within the international community, he believed instead that it would, in fact, deny West Germany the equality and sovereignty that it desired.¹⁵⁶ He also believed that Adenauer's policies were generally meant to place West Germany under the control of "a reactionary international coalition...between the Roman Catholic Church and Western industrialists." He thought that such an arrangement "not only threatened the establishment of a truly democratic (i.e. socialist) Germany, but would revive strong authoritarian, anti-capitalist, and radical nationalist sentiments." The ECSC, to Schumacher, belonged among the group of Adenauer policies which would lead to this destabilizing outcome.¹⁵⁷ Finally, Schumacher claimed that each new agreement that West Germany entered into made it more difficult for the two halves of Germany to be

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*, 368.

¹⁵⁵ Lewis Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965), 131.

¹⁵⁶ *ibid.*, 171.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 227-228.

reunited,¹⁵⁸ a notion which was probably true, and which flew in the face of Schumacher's preferred policy of reuniting Germany even at the risk of offending the Western powers. As he and many of his deputies were natives of either East Germany or Berlin, such a goal is perhaps not surprising.¹⁵⁹ The probability of reuniting Germany under conditions which favored the West – a prerequisite as long as the Western Allies occupied West Germany – was likely a pipe dream by the time of the Schuman Declaration, however. In the end, the SPD's opposition to the Schuman Plan simply was not enough to block the ratification of the Treaty of Paris,¹⁶⁰ largely because Schumacher had lost the support of Germany's biggest labor union, which supported and actively negotiated for the acceptance of the Schuman Plan in the Bundestag.¹⁶¹

It was not only within the ranks of the French and German parliaments that opposition to the creation of the ECSC surfaced. The industrialists of not only France and West Germany but the other four initial member states of the ECSC – Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – expressed opposition to the Schuman Plan as well. In February 1951, the industrialists of the Six mounted a concerted effort to oppose the Schuman Plan's supranational elements, which they asserted constituted “a framework for a super-managed economy depriving the responsible owners of all initiative and making them a mere ‘conveying belt’ for super-government control.” Further, they

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 171.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 228-229.

¹⁶⁰ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 363.

¹⁶¹ Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior*, 255.

believed it was ultimately a move “toward enforced nationalization.”¹⁶² In all six nations, the industrialists wanted to retain their ability to decide on prices and production, something which was supposed to pass to the ECSC’s executive High Authority.¹⁶³ Additionally, they sought to retain some degree of control over the management and futures of their enterprises and wanted the treaty establishing the ECSC to include mechanisms which would allow for its modification in the future.¹⁶⁴ Eventually, the industrialists in the all-important Ruhr agreed, at the urging of Monnet, Adenauer, and U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy,¹⁶⁵ to support the Schuman Plan, albeit with some reservations. With the assent of these exceptionally powerful so-called “Ruhr Barons,” it became possible for West Germany and the rest of the Six to sign the Treaty of Paris on April 18, 1951.¹⁶⁶

In sum, it is clear from the historical record that one simply cannot point to a desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union in order to accurately explain why the Europeans pursued the integration of the Continent in the aftermath of World War II. Instead, it was this horrific war that created the conditions in Western Europe that led to the French proposal and German acceptance of the Schuman Plan. The reconstruction and modernization of France, the assuagement of French security concerns, the end of the Allied Occupation regime and the restoration of West German sovereignty, and the

¹⁶² Lansing Warren, “Schuman Plan Runs into Most Serious Snag,” *The New York Times*, February 11, 1951, 138.

¹⁶³ Harold Callender, “Pool’s Fate Hinges on Ruhr Cartels,” *The New York Times*, February 5, 1951, 4.

¹⁶⁴ “Plant Owners Ask to Guide Pool Plan,” *The New York Times*, February 21, 1951, 7.

¹⁶⁵ “Schuman Plan Progress,” *The New York Times*, March 17, 1951, 11.

¹⁶⁶ Jack Raymond, “Ruhr Chiefs Cool to Schuman Plan,” *The New York Times*, March 25, 1951, 19.

prevention of another bout of out-of-control German nationalism were the goals which were seen as being served by the pooling of Western Europe's coal and steel industries. The reasons why France and West Germany pursued the creation of the ECSC were, therefore, many and varied, meaning the narrative provided by the historical record is much more complicated than the one provided by Rosato. The Soviet Union certainly had a role to play in the eventual success of the ECSC, but it is, in fact, the relationship between France and Germany in the aftermath of World War II that takes center stage in this story, as the drive toward the creation of a unified Europe had already begun when the French fully recognized the potential threat that the USSR posed to Western Europe in 1950.

The significance of this understanding of the genesis of European integration is clear. While the Soviet Union has indeed ceased to exist and is no longer a threat to Western Europe, this does not mean that the unraveling of European integration is inevitable. Instead, since the reasons why France and Germany pursued integration were predominantly related to the outcome of World War II and, critically, their relationship with each other, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has very little to do with an accurate understanding of or prediction regarding European unity. In France, the overriding concerns in the postwar era were French recovery and German aggression, and it was these goals that led French policy elites to embrace Western European integration. French control over German resources and the ability to hold the Germans down and ensure they would not initiate another war were critical parts of addressing these issues. The Soviet Union does seem to have had a role to play in the success of the proposed Schuman Plan,

but after it had been agreed upon, meaning that a desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union did not play into the initial French decision to propose integration. The Germans, on the other hand, desired the return of independence and normalcy to their state, meaning their actions were not driven by the presence or power of the Soviets, either. They knew that it would take a great deal of time and effort for them to reestablish German sovereignty, and the creation of the ECSC was seen as the first step toward the realization of this goal.

France and West Germany saw their respective national interests as being served by the creation of the ECSC, then, and, as long as these states' modern-day incarnations believe that their interests are still being served by their continued participation in an integrated Europe, they are highly likely to keep supporting it. Indeed, even though the goals being pursued by these states when they set up the ECSC were generally accomplished long ago, that does not mean that integration cannot continue to be beneficial to them. States' interests are apt to evolve over time, but that does not necessarily prompt them to radically alter their entrenched institutional associations. The most powerful Continental leaders seem to understand this and also seem to believe that retaining their EU membership is currently in their respective states' best interests, as former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently proposed a deeper fiscal integration of the eurozone countries in a bid to find a permanent solution to the European debt crisis. This proposal included greater restrictions on taxation and spending, with automatic penalties for states that break the rules.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ "Euro Crisis: Eurozone Deal Reached Without UK," *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-16104089> (accessed January 20, 2012).

European leaders have also agreed upon the creation of a €700 billion firewall for the Continent that will provide financial stability going into the future,¹⁶⁸ and European finance ministers have agreed to allow the European Union to scrutinize eurozone members' budgets before they are approved by their respective national parliaments.¹⁶⁹ Merkel has also presented a vision of Europe that has a much more federal structure, with the EU making strides toward becoming the Continent's central government.¹⁷⁰ These developments obviously fly in the face of Rosato's notion that the dissolution or weakening of the union ought to be expected in the post-Cold War security environment.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, as these proposals to deepen European integration have come about as a result of the economic problems that Europe is currently experiencing, Rosato's belief that economic problems should cause Europe's "fraying" to accelerate¹⁷² appears to be incorrect.

¹⁶⁸ Ian Traynor, "Eurozone Ministers Agree €500bn in New Bailout Funds," *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/30/eurozone-ministers-500bn-bailout> (accessed April 7, 2012).

¹⁶⁹ Stanley Pignal, "EU Beefs Up Powers over State Budgets," *Financial Times*, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/07034eda-5ca6-11e1-8f1f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1muTlwMGp> (accessed April 11, 2012).

¹⁷⁰ "Merkel Resolved to Bring Europe out of Crisis, Though Cool to Big Boost for Bailout Fund," *The Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/markets/davos-business-leaders-say-western-capitalism-has-widened-income-gap-wonder-if-it-can-survive/2012/01/25/gIQA1sD2PQ_story.html (accessed January 25, 2012).

"Merkel Deflects Calls for Bigger Euro Zone Firewall," *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/us-davos-merkel-idUSTRE8001TW20120125> (accessed January 25, 2012).

¹⁷¹ Rosato, 48.

¹⁷² *ibid.*, 83.

Ultimately, Rosato's ideas are built upon an incorrect reading of history. The historical record makes it clear that the original goals of the European politicians who pursued the union of their Continent were largely state centric, with each state focused predominantly on its own individual economic and political interests. The French desired the integration of the Continent mostly because it would give them unfettered access to German resources, allowing them to continue their postwar reconstruction efforts while holding down and closely monitoring West Germany. The Germans, on the other hand, agreed to the French proposal for integration principally because they believed it would serve their overarching goal of regaining sovereignty, equality, and their place in Europe. These states were clearly pursuing Continental unification primarily because they believed that that was what was best for their respective countries as they moved forward in the wake of World War II. Rather than taking the fact that EU member states flout European laws and norms as a sign that the integration of Western Europe was driven by the Cold War, as Rosato has done,¹⁷³ such malfeasance should simply be viewed as a continuation of the state-centric, national interest-driven policies of France and West Germany that were so prominently displayed in the earliest days of European unification. Advanced European political and military unions meant to move completely beyond intergovernmentalism and shape the Continent into some type of super-state were never inevitabilities, as these were not the original purposes of European integration. The French and the West Germans were indeed willing to surrender some of their sovereignty to the supranational European Coal and Steel Community, but only because they believed they would be reaping very valuable benefits for their individual states as a result.

¹⁷³ *ibid.*, 73.

Rosato, however, has misunderstood the interests that the Europeans believed were being served by the genesis of European integration. He asserts that a group of minor powers that is attempting to balance a great power will pursue an integrated military establishment as well as a central authority,¹⁷⁴ causing him to mistakenly believe that the fact that full-blown political and military unions have not been forthcoming on the Continent in the post-Cold War era is due to the Soviet Union's collapse. This is not the case. As Rosato himself argues, advanced political and military unions were eschewed both during the Cold War¹⁷⁵ as well as after it.¹⁷⁶ This indicates that the presence or absence of the Soviet threat has had little bearing on whether or not Europe has pursued these types of deeper integration. Simply put, if the European Union decides to break up or, more likely, pursue further integration in the future, it will be because the most important EU member states see such a course of action as being in their respective states' best interests and not simply because the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991.

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 51.

¹⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 53-68.

¹⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 68-77.

Three

American Contributions

The historical record makes it very plain that the United States played a critical role in the successful establishment of an integrated Western Europe. The U.S. emerged from World War II as the most powerful country in the world, with enough might and capital to approach the Continent in essentially whatever manner it chose. Europe, on the other hand, had experienced unprecedented destruction during the war, placing the U.S. in the position to have a tremendous amount of influence over the affairs of Western Europe in the postwar period. After some initial debate within the U.S. regarding how to deal with the vanquished Germany, it became clear to the Truman administration that this nation held a position of central importance to the future of Europe, as its great natural resources and industrial potential were seen as critical to the reconstruction of the Continent. As a result, the encouragement of European integration became official American policy. With its power and influence brought to bear on the situation, the U.S. was able to not only do a great deal to encourage the Europeans to pursue integration, but, just as importantly, it was able to create the type of security situation that was necessary to assuage French concerns about a reindustrialized and no longer occupied Germany. Further, after the Dwight Eisenhower administration took office, a great deal

was done to ensure that the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community would be able to successfully get off the ground. As a result, the contribution of the United States to the genesis of European integration was essential. Further, as the following pages will make clear, the notion expressed by Rosato that U.S. encouragement was neither sufficient nor necessary for the successful implementation of European integration¹⁷⁷ is simply not supported by the historical record.

The struggle over how to approach the defeated Nazi Germany began in the United States even before the war had come to an end. As the country which was to escape from the war with the least destruction and most power, it fell very naturally to the U.S. to take the lead in deciding the postwar order. In 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created a Cabinet-level committee, made up of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, to consider precisely how Germany ought to be dealt with.¹⁷⁸ Morgenthau, for his part, believed that Germany would have to be treated extremely harshly in order to prevent it from initiating another conflict with its neighbors.¹⁷⁹

In a memorandum which was given to Roosevelt and brought to the 1944 United States-United Kingdom conference in Quebec, Morgenthau suggested that Germany should be totally stripped of its armaments, its armament industry, and any other industry that might be used for the creation of military strength. To do this, he thought that the Saar should be annexed by France while the Ruhr was “not only stripped of all presently

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 78.

¹⁷⁸ James Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), 182.

¹⁷⁹ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 101.

existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area.” Additionally, Morgenthau said,

Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed.¹⁸⁰

Finally, the Morgenthau Plan would have sent the entire German labor force to work on farms, a program which would have offered “security to [the U.S.] as well as food for Germany and her neighbors.” He recognized that his plan would “involve hardship and hard work for several years” and that there would “be considerable unemployment in the difficult transition period.”¹⁸¹ This did not seem to bother him, though, as he told his chief assistant, “I don’t care what happens to the population [of Germany].”¹⁸²

In September 1944, Roosevelt accepted the Morgenthau Plan for Germany,¹⁸³ and forced British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to sign onto it at the aforementioned Quebec conference.¹⁸⁴ Fortunately, though, no firm arrangement was ever put in place to implement the destructive and shortsighted Morgenthau Plan,¹⁸⁵ and Roosevelt eventually let it drop in order to prevent his Cabinet from becoming irreconcilably divided.¹⁸⁶ Hull

¹⁸⁰ Henry Morgenthau, “Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III,” *Germany is Our Problem* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1945), 1.

¹⁸¹ Morgenthau, *Germany is Our Problem*, 48.

¹⁸² Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 16.

¹⁸³ Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1951*, 39.

Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 16.

Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 100.

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 101.

¹⁸⁵ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 16.

and Stimson did, after all, strongly disagree with Morgenthau's ideas, causing American and therefore wider Allied work on how to deal with postwar Germany to stall. Unlike Morgenthau, the Secretaries of State and War recognized that Germany occupied a key place in Europe's economy, as it provided not only a great deal of manufacturing potential but also a significant market for the goods of its neighbors.¹⁸⁷ Stimson argued further that Germany's incredible industrial potential should be kept intact and made available for use by Europe as a whole as it sought to rebuild itself after the war. The internationalization of the Ruhr, he thought, might be a way in which this could be accomplished.¹⁸⁸ In the end, Roosevelt changed his mind on the Morgenthau Plan and placed American planning for postwar Germany in the hands of Hull and Stimson alone, removing Morgenthau from his Cabinet committee all together.¹⁸⁹ Germany's vast industrial potential was simply too important to the Continent for it to be destroyed. On April 12, 1945, however, Roosevelt passed away, leaving Vice President Harry Truman to ultimately decide along with the Allies how best to deal with postwar Germany.

Despite the Roosevelt administration's eventual recognition that Germany was important to the recovery of Europe, the Truman administration did not initially fully grasp how dependent the recovery of Europe truly was on the recovery of Germany.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Reconstruction of Europe, 1945-1955*, 102.

¹⁸⁷ "Morgenthau Plan on Germany Splits Cabinet Committee," *The New York Times*, September 24, 1944, 1.

¹⁸⁸ Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, 182.

¹⁸⁹ "Morgenthau Plan Shelved," *The New York Times*, September 28, 1944, 12.

¹⁹⁰ Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 31.

This was made clear, though, after the brutal European winter of 1946-1947, the worst in a century. Rail and barge traffic was brought to a halt and industrial production was interrupted for weeks at a time by the unusually harsh weather.¹⁹¹ Worse yet, the bitter winter combined with subsequent floods and droughts “which cut Western Europe’s grain crop to the lowest figure in generations.”¹⁹² Hunger and disease spread quickly throughout the Continent, and there were rising concerns that the distress being felt in Western European countries would cause the populations there to turn toward Communism for relief.¹⁹³ The war had, quite simply, done more damage than the Americans realized,¹⁹⁴ and the recovery process was extremely fragile.¹⁹⁵ In early 1947, many prominent individuals within the American government realized that something had to be done to help Europe get back on its feet. There was no specific plan in place when Secretary of State George Marshall announced the United States’ intention to assist the European recovery on June 5, 1947,¹⁹⁶ however, as it had not been until the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in the spring of 1947 that Marshall had decided to announce what would later become known as the Marshall Plan.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹¹ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 116.

¹⁹² “Special Message to Congress on the Marshall Plan,” December 19, 1947, *Public Papers of the Presidents: 1947*, No. 238, 520.

¹⁹³ C.L. Sultzberger, “Vast New Areas of Hunger Appear in Europe,” *The New York Times*, February 23, 1947, E3.

¹⁹⁴ “The European Crisis,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, Vol. III, 230-232. Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 35.

¹⁹⁵ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 116.

¹⁹⁶ John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976), 8-17.

In his private talks with Stalin during the Moscow Council, Marshall realized that the Soviets understood the impact that the conditions in Europe were having and sensed that they wanted to intentionally delay the recovery of the Continent. This was because Stalin knew, like many in the West, that the Communists in Western Europe would benefit politically from chaos and rapidly deteriorating living conditions.¹⁹⁸ Truman asserted further that

the communists have announced determined opposition to any effort to help Europe get back on its feet. There will unquestionably be further incitements to strike, not for the purpose of redressing the legitimate grievances of particular groups, but for the purpose of bringing chaos in the hope that it will pave the way for totalitarian control.¹⁹⁹

The Soviets were simply not negotiating in good faith, and Marshall realized that either the United States would have to give up on Europe or work toward completing the recovery of the Continent on its own.²⁰⁰ The Truman administration chose the latter, and the Marshall Plan was the result. The American focus remained on Germany, though, where the U.S. was an occupying power with “major responsibilities”²⁰¹ and the industrial heart of Europe lay. As former President Herbert Hoover put it after going to Germany on an official government mission in February 1947, “We can keep Germany in

¹⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 15-17.

Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 62.

¹⁹⁸ Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*, 8.

Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 35.

¹⁹⁹ “Special Message to Congress on the Marshall Plan,” December 19, 1947, *Public Papers of the Presidents: 1947*, No. 238, 520.

²⁰⁰ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), 229.

Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*, 16.

²⁰¹ *ibid.*

these economic chains but it will also keep Europe in rags.”²⁰² Simply put, if the U.S. wanted to prevent the Soviets from making headway in Western Europe, the reconstruction of the continent was a necessity, and if this were to happen, Germany would have to be revitalized.²⁰³

Balance-of-power politics, then, may have determined the manner in which the Truman administration approached the Continent. The Americans clearly recognized that the Communists in Western Europe were able to benefit from the economic malaise that had gripped that part of Europe since the end of World War II, and that, in order to prevent them from gaining a foothold in that region, reconstruction would have to be quick and complete. While Rosato may attempt to argue that, as a result, the entirety of the drive to integrate Western Europe through the creation of the ECSC can be boiled down to balance-of-power thinking, such sentiments would be misplaced. Rosato argues, for one thing, that the Americans’ contribution to the integration of Western Europe was largely immaterial, meaning that, by extension, the motivations held by the United States would also have to be immaterial. However, despite the critical role that the American contribution to the creation of the ECSC played in reality, this contribution facilitated rather than motivated the Europeans’ actions, meaning the Americans’ reasons for supporting the Europeans as they sought a unified Continent do not, by necessity, have any bearing on the Europeans’ motivations for doing so. While the Americans’ motivations for assisting the Continent are, indeed, perhaps best described as being

²⁰² Schwartz, *America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, 31.

²⁰³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, 229.
Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 63.
Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 73.

driven by balance-of-power considerations, this is fundamentally different from claiming that the Europeans sought to integrate Western Europe because they were attempting to balance against the Soviet Union. One cannot take the motivations of the United States government and impose them upon the European policy elites that were involved simply because both groups sought the same outcome.

The Truman administration believed that in order for the reconstruction of Europe to be successful, it would have to involve more than American assistance to the Continent. Instead, the administration envisioned the creation of a unified Europe with the industrial resources of Germany at its center. John Foster Dulles, who accompanied Marshall on his trip to the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers as a special advisor, made statements along these lines in a speech that he gave on January 17, 1947. In it, he stated that the tremendous industrial potential of Western Germany should be integrated into Western Europe, as such an arrangement would provide a check against future German aggression while creating a more stable and prosperous Western Europe. The wisdom of these ideas was accepted by the Americans after the unsuccessful Moscow Council, which had solidified in their minds the fact that the German problem was really at the heart of the European problem and that it simply could not be settled outside of a European framework of some kind.²⁰⁴ As Truman put it,

European recovery is essentially a problem for the nations of Europe. It was therefore apparent that it could not be solved, even with outside aid, unless the European nations themselves would find a joint solution and accept joint responsibility for its execution. Such a cooperative plan would release the full productive resources of Europe and provide a proper basis for measuring the need

²⁰⁴ Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 33-34.

and effectiveness of further aid from outside Europe, and in particular from the United States.²⁰⁵

Ultimately, Truman believed that “Europe had to be rehabilitated by the people who destroyed it.”²⁰⁶ The United States could not do it on its own, and it could not do it while dealing with a fragmented Continent.

In 1947, others in the American government echoed the idea that Europe would have to become unified if it were to recover properly. On March 21 of that year, both the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Relations passed a resolution which stated that, “Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) that the Congress favors the creation of a United States of Europe.” The day before his June 5 speech at Harvard announcing the Marshall Plan, Marshall himself responded to this Congressional resolution. In a letter to Arthur Vandenberg, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Marshall asserted that there was a fundamental difference between what the Truman administration was trying to accomplish and what the Congress was trying to accomplish. While he was “deeply sympathetic toward the general objective of the [Congressional] resolution,” he asserted that the initiative for the unification of Europe had to come from Europe. It could not be forced upon them by the United States, as Marshall believed the Congress wished to do.²⁰⁷ This was an important point, and one which both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations held to during their years in office. Both of these presidents, while

²⁰⁵ “Special Message to Congress on the Marshall Plan,” December 19, 1947, *Public Papers of the Presidents: 1947*, No. 238, 517.

²⁰⁶ Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1974), 80.

²⁰⁷ Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 103-104.

desiring to see the integration of Europe and believing that the United States had a critical role to play in this process, understood that the impetus for such a development had to come from the Europeans themselves, particularly the French.²⁰⁸ Regardless of these differences between the White House and Congress, however, the overall objective – the integration of Europe – was the same, and the Foreign Assistance Act, which put the ideas behind the Marshall Plan into law, reflected this goal:

Mindful of the advantages which the U.S. has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of the people of the U.S. to encourage these countries through a joint organization to exert sustained common efforts...which will speedily achieve that economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity.²⁰⁹

The Marshall Plan was therefore clearly meant to lay the foundation for a unified Europe²¹⁰ that would be less prone to initiate another devastating war or fall into the orbit of the Soviet Union and more capable of increasing its industrial production and pulling itself out of the postwar quagmire that it had found itself in.

In order for the Marshall Plan to accomplish these goals, the Truman administration believed that France had to be on board with it. Indeed, the administration saw France as the very “lynchpin” of the plan.²¹¹ The French, on the other hand, were extremely wary of the war-making potential of a reindustrialized Germany, particularly

²⁰⁸ “Meeting of United States Ambassadors at Paris, October 21-22, to Discuss Major Developments Relating to Europe,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, Vol. IV, 470.

²⁰⁹ Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership* 118.

²¹⁰ “Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas),” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 467.
Van Der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership*, 99-105.
Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 75.

²¹¹ *ibid.*, 74.

one that was no longer being occupied by the Allies.²¹² In the immediate aftermath of the war, the French wished to see the creation of a largely dismembered Germany, although not to the almost unfathomable extent that Morgenthau had envisioned in 1944. Crucially, they wanted to see a decentralized and permanently occupied Germany²¹³ with the Ruhr and the Saar – the most important industrial areas of Germany – internationalized²¹⁴ and taken over by France, respectively.²¹⁵ The United States, then, needed to convince France to accept the full-scale reindustrialization of Germany in order for the Marshall Plan to be effective and Western Europe to recover. The aid that the Marshall Plan promised to France in 1947 went some way toward accomplishing this for the Americans, as the French themselves saw the Marshall Plan as a way to purchase their assent to German reconstruction.²¹⁶ Indeed, Marshall Plan aid probably did a great deal to help convince the French over the next few years to accept American policy positions with regard to Germany, as France became heavily dependent upon it for the continuation of the *Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipement*. By 1949, 90 percent of the Monnet Plan's resources came from Marshall Plan aid,²¹⁷ meaning France relied at that

²¹² For more on French security concerns vis-à-vis a reindustrialized Germany, see chapter 2.

²¹³ Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 39.

²¹⁴ For more on the French desire to internationalize the Ruhr after the war, see chapter 2.

²¹⁵ For more on the French desire to gain control over the Saar after the war, see chapter 2.

²¹⁶ Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*, 74.

²¹⁷ Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, 100.

point almost completely on American assistance as it attempted to reconstruct and modernize its most important industries. This assistance, as a result, simply had to keep flowing into France.

While the Marshall Plan helped bring the French a step closer to accepting the full reindustrialization of Germany, they nevertheless held onto other demands that they believed would further their security against the Germans. One of these demands was, of course, the internationalization of the Ruhr that was proposed at the 1948 London Conference on Germany.²¹⁸ Just over a week before the London Conference began, French Ambassador to the United States Henri Bonnet called Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett in order to “reiterate the importance which his Government attached to reaching agreement at London on...international control of Ruhr production.”²¹⁹ The United States had been willing to accept international control of Ruhr resources since at least 1947,²²⁰ as the Truman administration understood how critical these resources were to wider Western European recovery after the war.²²¹ It was concerned, however, about how such a move would be received in Germany, where nationalism was on the rise as the 1940s came to a close.²²² As a result, Marshall, less than a week before the London Conference began, sent a telegram to Lewis Douglas, the American Ambassador to the

²¹⁸ For more on France’s suggestion to internationalize the Ruhr at the 1948 London Conference on Germany, see chapter 2.

²¹⁹ “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Loevett),” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 70.

²²⁰ Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*, 140.

²²¹ “Paper Agreed Upon by the London Conference on Germany,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 285.
For more on the London Conference agreement to internationalize the Ruhr, see chapter 2.

²²² For more on nationalism in postwar Germany, see chapter 2.

United Kingdom, giving him some “general background and guidance” for the upcoming conference. In it, Marshall stated,

The necessary restrictions on German control of [the] Ruhr which may result from an international agreement with respect to [the] control of Ruhr resources would be much more acceptable to [the] Germans if it embodies a contribution on their part to a larger Western European Union, to [the] realization of which other Western European countries will also be making substantial contributions of one kind or another.

The German solution, then, according to Marshall,

had a two-fold aspect: (a) economic and political reorientation of Germans, fostered by [the] common policies of Western occupation powers; and (b) integration of Western Germany into [the] Western European community.²²³

Douglas brought these guidelines to the London Conference when it began on February 26. Two days later, after the French had formally proposed the internationalization of the Ruhr, Douglas

stressed US sympathy with [the] principle [that] access to Ruhr products should not be exclusively controlled by Germany and readiness [to] consider proposals for long-term control [of the] Ruhr in [the] post-occupation period.

He also said that he

would hope, however, [that] such control would be of such [a] nature that Western Germany and Western Europe would be effectively integrated and [that it] would not be punitive so as to create conditions in Germany which we all desire to avoid and which would increase [the] bargaining power of [the] Soviet [Union] in Germany. While realizing [that] international control would have to set at rest [the] fear of Germany’s western neighbors, [it is] also important that it have [the] effect of making [the] German people feel part of Western Europe instead of turning them to [the] east. [The] US [has] attached very great importance to economic integration [in] Western Europe. Therefore very tentatively and very informally, he wanted to suggest that [an] international

²²³ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 71-73.

regime might look toward inclusion [of] not only [the] Ruhr but also similar industrial regions of Western Europe.²²⁴

While affirming the Truman administration's desire to see the Ruhr resources made available to the entirety of Western Europe, Douglas' comments stressed that France and the rest of the Allies ought to be wary of the potential unintended consequences if such a move were made in an exceptionally punitive manner. Indeed, the administration thought it would be wiser to create some sort of larger framework that all of Western Europe could be a part of than to simply take the Ruhr and its tremendous resources away from Germany without giving them anything in return. Further, it believed that an international regime that would include both German and wider Western European resources would assuage the security concerns of Germany's neighbors, prevent Germany from becoming extraordinarily nationalist or Eastern-leaning, and help foster the integration of Western Europe, something which had become very important to the Truman administration.²²⁵ It would accomplish these things by making the German people feel as though their nation was truly part of the Western community of nations, and not as though they were to be the perpetually trod-upon losers of World War II.

While Douglas believed at the time that his remarks at the London Conference "might be too ambitious and might look too far into the future,"²²⁶ what he said actually ended up having a tremendous impact on the future of Europe. Shortly after the

²²⁴ "The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 99.

²²⁵ "Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 467.

²²⁶ "The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, Vol. II, 99.

conclusion of the London Conference, the chief of the French Foreign Ministry's European desk wrote a background paper that acknowledged the wisdom of Douglas' comments. In it, the Frenchman criticized the French government for not seriously taking up the suggestion made by the United States that more than just the Ruhr should be placed under some type of international control and asserted that the other industrial regions of Western Europe should indeed be included as well. The author went on to insist that Germany was integral to the unification of Western Europe. Without it, European integration was nothing more than a "myth."²²⁷ Douglas' comments and this background paper seem to have had, in turn, an impact on Jean Monnet, as, in 1950, the Schuman Plan – which was remarkably similar to what Douglas had suggested and the French background paper had echoed – was announced. It appears, then, that a connection can be drawn between Truman administration policy and the Schuman Declaration via the 1948 London Conference. While the impetus to create a supranational authority for the coal and steel resources of France, West Germany, and other countries in Western Europe came from Europe – as Truman believed it must – the idea behind it was, in fact, originally American.²²⁸ To be sure, it can never be known with absolute certainty whether Monnet would have come up with such an idea in the absence of American influence. However, it can be said that, as it happened, his idea to take the "functional approach" to European unity²²⁹ likely stemmed at least to some degree from the comments that Douglas made in London in 1948, as these comments provided

²²⁷ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 169-170.

²²⁸ *ibid.*
Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, p. 76.

²²⁹ Spaak, *The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, 1936-1966*, 214.

concrete ideas for Monnet to work with as he pondered the value of Western European integration for France. American encouragement of the integration of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan and the Truman administration's recognition that the industrial resources of the Ruhr, Saar, and other parts of Western Europe would be needed for the revitalization of the entire Continent lead very naturally to the ideas at the heart of the Schuman Declaration.

American involvement, therefore, seems to have played a critical role in shaping the Schuman Plan. Not only did Truman work to foster European integration through the Marshall Plan and its Organization for European Economic Cooperation, but the wariness that he had about alienating Germany by stripping it of its ability to control the Ruhr also led to his administration's urging of the French to pursue a wider coal and steel pool of some sort. His actions make it clear that he understood the importance of German industry to postwar Western Europe, meaning that he simultaneously wanted to allow the rest of that part of the Continent to have access to German resources while not losing West Germany to the Soviets. France, which held a critical role in this entire effort, seems to have been heavily influenced by the Truman administration's ideas, as Monnet's plan for the pooling of all of Western Europe's coal and steel resources closely paralleled the suggestions that Douglas made at the 1948 London Conference. French acquiescence to German reconstruction was also realized partially through the tremendous amount of aid that the Marshall Plan had been able to contribute to the Monnet Plan. The critical role of World War II, which vaulted the United States to its

position of preeminence and gave it its extraordinary ability to exercise influence over German and French postwar policies, can therefore again be seen remarkably clearly in the story of European integration.

France, however, required more than Marshall Plan aid and the internationalization of the Ruhr in order to feel sufficiently comfortable with the total reindustrialization of Germany. Even though the internationalization of the Ruhr allowed France to exercise some control over the distribution of its vast resources and helped assuage French security concerns,²³⁰ it was still not enough to fully convince the French that the reconstruction of Germany would not place them in danger. The French were, in fact, so concerned about the danger posed by Germany in the immediate postwar period that they concluded a mutual defense treaty with the United Kingdom that was specifically aimed at Germany²³¹ and wanted to see Germany remain occupied by the Allies indefinitely.²³² By 1949, though, Secretary of State Dean Acheson saw the “diminution of direct allied control over Germany and the progressive reduction of occupation troops” as “inevitable.” He and his Executive Committee on Foreign Economic Policy had asserted five years before, after all, that, “An indefinitely continued coercion of more than sixty million technically advanced people... would at best be an expensive undertaking and would afford the world little sense of real security.”²³³ On the

²³⁰ For more on French postwar security concerns, see chapter 2.

²³¹ *Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and France (Dunkirk, 4 March 1947)*, CVCE, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/1fb9f4b5-64e2-4337-bc78-db7e1978de09/en;jsessionid=2BC2F8AA0BF71C23AF1866D8611E8901> (accessed April 13, 2012).

²³² Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, 39.

other hand, he recognized that without some sort of security pact between the United States and the French, it was doubtful that they would ever accept such a minimally-supervised Germany,²³⁴ let alone a completely reindustrialized one that might be capable of rearming itself as it had done in the interwar period. David Bruce, the U.S.

Ambassador to France, shared these sentiments, stating in October 1949,

All of the nations that were defeated by Germany in the last war, and in previous wars, are conscious of her latent power and are haunted by the fear that a reconstructed Germany will choose Russia rather than the West in the event of another war. This underlying reality cannot be disregarded or expected to disappear overnight. It must be accepted as a basic factor and compensated for as such. That is why the [State] Department's telegram appears to be unrealistic in urging that France alone can take the lead in bringing about the reintegration of Germany into Western Europe. France, and indeed no continental power, can take that lead without assurances of the full backing of the US...accompanied by precise and binding security commitments looking far into the future.²³⁵

The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that it created provided the answer to this problem of French insecurity vis-à-vis a reconstructed Germany. France greatly feared being left alone on the Continent with Germany, and the Truman administration believed that NATO was the way in which it could prove to the French that they were not going to be abandoned by the United States, even after it eventually stopped occupying West Germany.²³⁶ In addition to its obvious purpose of securing an American commitment to defend the Continent in the event of a

²³³ "Germany: General Objectives of United States Policy with Regard to Germany," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1944, Vol. I, 279.

²³⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, Vol. IV, 109.

²³⁵ "Meeting of United States Ambassadors at Paris, October 21-22, to Discuss Major Developments Relating to Europe," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, Vol. IV, 492.

²³⁶ *ibid.*, 490.

Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 166.

Soviet attack, then, NATO was created in part in order to provide security for France and the other NATO member states against renewed German aggression, thereby paving the way for West Germany to be fully reindustrialized and integrated into the Western European community.²³⁷ The French, for their part, recognized that one of the major purposes of NATO was to assuage their fears of a revitalized Germany. Indeed, by the time the North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the French Assembly in July 1949, many French politicians recognized that a unified Europe would have to include Germany, and that it simply could not function successfully as an economic unit without it. NATO made it possible for them to embrace this reality, as it guaranteed that the United States would come to their rescue if the Germans ever decided to initiate a conflict with them again.²³⁸

The United States, therefore, clearly provided the security environment which made the creation of the ECSC a possibility. While Rosato is right in stating that the American security guarantee was not the motivation behind the Europeans' desire to pursue European integration,²³⁹ it certainly did a great deal to alleviate French security concerns about a reindustrialized Germany, even one that was no longer occupied by the Allies. Without the inclusion of a fully reindustrialized Germany that was capable of contributing its tremendous economic potential to the coal and steel pool that the Schuman Plan envisioned, the ECSC likely would not have become a reality. The United States – and, to be more specific, the Truman administration – made the creation of the

²³⁷ *ibid.*, 159.

“France and the Pact,” *The New York Times*, July 28, 1949, 22.

²³⁸ *ibid.*

²³⁹ Rosato, 77.

European Coal and Steel Community possible by providing the security umbrella which made the French comfortable with the industrial situation in Germany that was necessary for proposing and, ultimately, implementing it.²⁴⁰ Completely discounting the “U.S. pacifier” argument, as Rosato has done,²⁴¹ is incorrect as a result. Rather than looking at the guaranteed American military assistance that NATO provided as the reason why the French and the West Germans sought to pursue the unification of the Continent, one ought to recognize that it was this American security guarantee that made it possible for them to do so. In a word, it facilitated rather than motivated the implementation of the Schuman Plan.

The United States’ policy of actively encouraging the creation of an integrated Europe did not change when Dwight Eisenhower became president in January 1953. As was the case with Truman, much of Eisenhower’s motivation for supporting the Europeans’ drive toward unification stemmed from the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. As excessive German nationalism was still an issue when he took office,²⁴² the Eisenhower administration was concerned about this nationalism getting out of control. In the words of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany Walter Donnelly,

Unless Ger[man] dynamism is able to express itself constructively by participation in close European cooperation and in achieving an important place

²⁴⁰ Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 178-179.

²⁴¹ Rosato, 77.

²⁴² Drew Middleton, “Rise in Neo-Nazism is Shown by Survey in West Germany,” *The New York Times*, January 18, 1953, 1.
For more on postwar German nationalism, see chapter 2.

in world affairs, the more constructive pro-European German leaders will be discredited, and more extreme men will take their places.²⁴³

The greatest danger that came along with German nationalism was the possibility that German nationalists might seek to exploit East-West tensions and pursue the reunification of their country in a manner that could lead to an Eastern-oriented Germany. This was a disaster scenario for the Eisenhower administration, which knew like its predecessor that the industrial resources of West Germany were critical to Western European reconstruction and feared further that adding such resources to the Soviet side could upset the balance of the postwar bipolar world order in their favor.²⁴⁴ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that if nationalism was allowed to take over in West Germany, the desire to reunify with the eastern half of the country would

become so strong in Germany as to give rise to [the] temptation to discard the associations with the West in an effort to advance reunification on terms which would at best result in a neutral Germany and at worst result in an Eastern-oriented Germany.²⁴⁵

If this were to happen, the administration feared that nationalist movements in other Western European states might subsequently be kindled,²⁴⁶ causing the entire effort to integrate Western Europe to be put at significant risk. Eisenhower, therefore, believed

²⁴³ “The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1952-1954, Vol. VII, 391.

²⁴⁴ Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe*, 79.

²⁴⁵ “Letter from Secretary Dulles to Foreign Secretary Macmillan,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 363.

²⁴⁶ “Memorandum Prepared in the Office of European Regional Affairs,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 355.

that tying West Germany irrevocably into Western Europe was the only way to prevent these things from happening, meaning that the successful establishment of the ECSC was critical.

Eisenhower also believed that the United States stood to benefit substantially from the integration of Western Europe. He envisioned a united Europe becoming the world's "third great power bloc," a development which he thought would be able to "solve the peace in the world."²⁴⁷ Specifically, he held that "a united Europe consisting of 250 million-odd people, of whom at least 23 million were skilled workers, would create an industrial complex comparable to the United States," and that "such a 'third force' working with the rest of the free world would change the whole complexion of present circumstances and insure peace."²⁴⁸ Like many in Europe,²⁴⁹ then, Eisenhower thought that an integrated Continent would be able to present itself as something of a third superpower, able to place its weight on the scales and tip them in favor of peace. The assumption among Americans was and had been for many years, of course, that the side that most favored peace was the United States, and that Western Europe would naturally gravitate toward it instead of toward the Soviet Union.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ Editorial Note, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. IV, 348.

²⁴⁸ "Memorandum of a Conversation Between President Eisenhower, President Mayer, et al.," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. IV, 408.

²⁴⁹ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 258-259, 349-350.
Drew Middleton, "Adenauer in Favor of a United Europe as a 'Third Power,'" *The New York Times*, May 22, 1950, 1.
"Europe as a 'Third Power,'" *The New York Times*, May 23, 1950, 27.

²⁵⁰ Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe*, 15.

While this would certainly be beneficial to the Europeans as they sought to prevent Soviet aggression against them, it would also assist the Americans by taking some of the pressure of defending Western Europe off their shoulders. Eisenhower recognized that the creation of a “third force” in Europe would allow the United States to “sit back and relax somewhat,”²⁵¹ as it would make the Western Europeans capable of taking more responsibility for their own defense.²⁵² Further, Eisenhower believed that a unified and prosperous Western Europe would be capable of attracting all of the Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellite states to it. This would cause the Soviet sphere of influence to contract dramatically, allowing the West to gain a considerable power advantage and making the threat to peace “disappear.”²⁵³ Such developments would be of great benefit to the U.S., as Eisenhower was concerned about the large amount of money that the U.S. was spending each year to keep troops stationed in Europe²⁵⁴ and hoped that the American military could eventually permanently return to North America.²⁵⁵ The successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and the subsequent strengthening of Western Europe were, therefore, high priorities for the Eisenhower administration, as they represented the first steps toward the accomplishment of this goal.

²⁵¹ Editorial Note, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. IV, 348.

²⁵² Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 147.

²⁵³ Editorial Note, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. IV, 348.

²⁵⁴ “Minutes of the 212th Meeting of the Council of the OEEC,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 304.

²⁵⁵ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 148.

Like Truman, Eisenhower also realized that the impetus for European integration had to come from the Europeans themselves. It simply could not be forced upon them. He nevertheless thought that the United States had a significant role to play in assisting their efforts. In his first State of the Union address, delivered on February 3, 1953, he stated,

The needed unity of Western Europe manifestly cannot be manufactured from without; it can only be created from within. But it is right and necessary that we encourage Europe's leaders by informing them of the high value we place upon the earnestness of their efforts toward this goal. Real progress will be conclusive evidence to the American people that our material sacrifices in the cause of collective security are matched by essential political, economic, and military accomplishments in Western Europe.²⁵⁶

Eisenhower was not alone in his belief that American assistance to the Continent was essential. Monnet, for his part, also recognized how important it was to the establishment of the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community that American support for it continued beyond the end of the Truman administration. Indeed, he believed that American support would be critical if the ECSC were to become a successful initial manifestation of integration on the Continent.²⁵⁷ Adenauer echoed these sentiments, stating that as the Truman administration vacated the White House,

The decisive question for us was whether the Eisenhower administration would continue the European policy of the Democratic Party and President Truman. All were agreed in Europe that without the support of the United States the decline of Europe would be irreversible.

He was relieved, therefore, when, in 1953, "the American interest in the integration of

²⁵⁶ "State of the Union Address," *Public Papers of the Presidents: 1953*, No. 6, 14.

²⁵⁷ Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe*, 43.

Europe ... was expressed even more strongly than in the second half of 1952.”²⁵⁸ Policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic, then, clearly viewed American support for the Europeans’ drive toward integration as essential to its ultimate success.

The first manifestation of this support came very early in the operation of the ECSC. On February 18, 1953, just eight days after the common market for coal opened, Eisenhower appointed David Bruce to be the U.S. Representative to the Coal and Steel Community at Luxembourg, giving him the rank of ambassador. The State Department explained,

By broadening his assignment in this way we will derive the maximum psychological impact in Europe from this important new step.... In addition, the designation of Mr. Bruce to the CSC would be looked upon by Mr. Monnet and his associates as perhaps the clearest indication we could give of our close support for and belief in their experiment in six-country unification.²⁵⁹

By appointing a U.S. ambassador to the ECSC so early in its operation, the Eisenhower administration publicly demonstrated its interest and faith in what was being accomplished in Western Europe. Monnet recognized the gravity of this development, asserting that the dispatch of an official American representative to the ECSC established the community’s sovereignty and its place as a recognized entity under international law.²⁶⁰ Giving Bruce the rank of ambassador put the United States’ relationship with the ECSC on par with its relationships with other states, after all. Gaining an established diplomatic connection to the most powerful Western country in the world also likely

²⁵⁸ Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-1953*, 428-429.

²⁵⁹ “Memorandum for the Secretary of State,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 276.

²⁶⁰ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 279-280.

cemented the legitimacy of the ECSC in the minds of potential member states and trading partners, increasing the probability that it would be able to survive the first few months and years of its operation and become successfully established within Western Europe.

In addition to international recognition, the fledgling ECSC needed the proper funding in order to be set up successfully. Despite the fact that it had inherited a less-than-ideal fiscal situation from the Truman administration,²⁶¹ a June 1953 visit from Monnet – a close personal friend of Dulles²⁶² – convinced the Eisenhower administration that the timing was right for the United States to step in and provide this funding.²⁶³ As a result, on June 15, Eisenhower sent a letter to Senator Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Representative Robert B. Chipfield, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which strongly encouraged them to support the extension of an American loan to the ECSC.²⁶⁴ These letters were well-received by both Wiley and Chipfield,²⁶⁵ but no action was immediately taken to make the loan a reality. Eisenhower refused to let the idea die, though, and, as 1953 came to a close, he released a statement stating that he

was encouraged that the Coal and Steel Community is now in effective operation, and reaffirm[ed] his hope that ways might be found to enable the United States to assist, on a loan basis, in modernizing and developing...this Community.²⁶⁶

²⁶¹ “State of the Union Address,” *Public Papers of the Presidents: 1953*, No. 6, 20-21.

²⁶² Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 341.

²⁶³ Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe*, 44-45.

²⁶⁴ “Eisenhower Urges Steel Pool Plans,” *The New York Times*, June 18, 1953, 12.

“The United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Bruce) to the Department of State,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 313.

²⁶⁵ “Eisenhower Urges Steel Pool Plans,” *The New York Times*, June 18, 1953, 12.

As expected, the ECSC's High Authority – the executive branch of the ECSC, headed by Monnet himself – responded favorably to Eisenhower's suggestions. It drafted a resolution for the Common Assembly of the ECSC which stated that the assembly welcomed "warmly the declaration of the President of the United States" that the unification of Europe is a "necessity for the peace and prosperity of Europeans and of the world." In addition, the Common Assembly approved the idea of establishing a partnership between the United States and the ECSC on the basis of cooperation instead of on the basis of aid.²⁶⁷ The Europeans recognized that, since the Eisenhower administration was proposing a loan instead of a grant to the ECSC, the United States trusted them and had faith in their ability to create a successful, united European community that would be capable of administering itself properly and paying back loans in a timely manner. Monnet also worried that an indefinite donor and receiver relationship between the U.S. and the ECSC would eventually harm the vital connection that existed between the two entities.²⁶⁸ He and the Common Assembly desired to get away from this model, which had formed the basis of the Marshall Plan,²⁶⁹ and pursue a place of greater equality within the international community.

²⁶⁶ "Presidential News Conference," *Public Papers of the Presidents: 1953*, No. 265, 843.

²⁶⁷ "The United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Bruce) to the Department of State," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 314.

²⁶⁸ "Monnet Hails U.S. For Pool Aid Plan," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1953, 18.

²⁶⁹ "Telegram from Deputy Representative Tomlinson to the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 357.

While Monnet pressured the Eisenhower administration to make the ECSC loan at least \$400 million in order to ensure that it would properly “capture European imagination,”²⁷⁰ Harold Stassen, the American Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, believed that such a loan would be excessive. Instead, he suggested that the U.S. provide a \$100 million loan to the ECSC to be used

for the improvement of coal mines, power plants and coke plants, all of which will strengthen the base of the Western European economy, improve its capability to finance its own defense, and...encourage the essential move toward European integration, which is highly desirable as a part of...basic policy.²⁷¹

While Monnet initially balked at this figure,²⁷² he eventually accepted it after a meeting with Dulles in March 1954.²⁷³ The next month, the Eisenhower administration and the High Authority of the ECSC agreed to the terms of a \$100 million loan with an interest rate of 3.7 percent.²⁷⁴ To Monnet, this loan was critical. He believed that, at the time that the loan was conferred upon the ECSC, no state could have obtained such favorable terms from the United States government, and that this gesture from the Eisenhower administration firmly established the ECSC’s credit worldwide. As a result, despite only being in its first year of full operation, the ECSC could “already think of borrowing on

²⁷⁰ “Letter from Secretary Dulles to Director Stassen,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 351.

²⁷¹ “Memorandum from Director Stassen to President Eisenhower,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 350.

²⁷² “Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Acting Secretary of State,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 359.

²⁷³ Editorial Note, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. VI, 368.

²⁷⁴ Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955*, 341.
Monnet, *Memoirs*, 390.

the private capital market.”²⁷⁵ The American loan to the ECSC, while not as large as Monnet and others would have liked, nevertheless gave the ECSC the funds it desired while opening the door to immediate borrowing from other sources. In its earliest days, the United States clearly helped the ECSC get off on the right foot and establish itself within Western Europe and the wider international community when it might not have otherwise been able to do so.

In early 1955, however, Joseph Dodge, chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, sent a memorandum to the State Department that accused the ECSC of allowing “cartel developments” within its member states and raised the question of whether, as a result, “U.S. policy concerning the Community should be subject to further consideration.” In response to these concerns, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Samuel Waugh conceded that “it is apparent that various restrictive arrangements, including the steel export cartel, exist among the industries of the CSC,” but nevertheless recommended “that the United States should continue its strong support for the High Authority and the Community especially in view of the far-reaching significance of the CSC as a major step toward European unity.” He went on to state further

that the facts currently available to the Department concerning the points raised by Mr. Dodge...do not warrant a reconsideration at this time of U.S. policy towards the Coal and Steel Community.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ *ibid.*

²⁷⁶ “Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Waugh to Under Secretary Hoover,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 261.*

One month later, Dulles himself addressed Dodge's concerns. He, like Waugh, agreed that restrictive practices detrimental to American industry were in place in the ECSC. He was aware that the steel producers of the ECSC had indeed established a cartel to fix minimum prices for the community's exports and that it had also designated two or three American scrap dealers as "exclusive agents for scrap purchases in the United States." While this naturally led the administration to question "the compatibility of the exclusive scrap purchasing arrangement with CSC objectives of establishing and maintaining competitive conditions in the Community," Dulles believed that it was not enough to warrant the termination of the Eisenhower administration's emphatic support for the ECSC, including the \$100 million loan that had been agreed upon the year before.²⁷⁷ Indeed, Dulles, who was willing to allow short-term European needs to take priority over American interests while the ECSC worked to establish itself,²⁷⁸ assured Dodge in his official response to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy that the restrictive arrangements would not last forever and stressed that the United States needed to continue looking at the bigger picture. He said,

Some steps have already been taken by the High Authority against restrictive arrangements and we have been assured that further measures are now in preparation. We consider that there are reasonably good prospects for further progress by the Community in combating such arrangements. The developments cited by Mr. Dodge should, moreover, be considered in the broad perspective of the Community's potential contribution to U.S. interests in Europe....The European Coal and Steel Community represents a dramatic movement in the direction of European unity, the promotion of which has been established by Congress and the Executive Branch as a basic objective of U.S. policy....[T]he Community serves as a rallying point for those upholding the idea of a united

²⁷⁷ "Report from the Department of State to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. IV, 266.

²⁷⁸ Gillingham, *European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?*, 28.

Europe. United States support for the CSC is widely recognized as a symbol of U.S. interest in encouraging progress towards this goal...The provisions of the CSC Treaty directed against monopolies and restrictive business practices...are completely unprecedented in Europe. While the Community's progress in combating restrictive practices has been slow, it has been substantially more active in this sphere than most individual European governments or other international bodies...Much remains to be done, however, and we should continue to give all possible encouragement to these governments, as well as to the High Authority, toward further development of programs for the elimination of restrictive business practices.²⁷⁹

In conclusion, Dulles stated,

The facts currently available to the Department concerning reported cartel developments in the CSC, in conjunction with the steps which the High Authority has taken and is anticipating in implementing the anti-cartel provisions in the CSC Treaty, do not warrant a reconsideration at this time of U.S. policy towards the Coal and Steel Community.²⁸⁰

The Eisenhower administration essentially argued that the ECSC simply needed more time, patience, and encouragement from the United States to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which included anti-cartel and trade liberalization provisions. The successful establishment of the ECSC was so important to the Eisenhower administration that it was willing to tolerate short-term restrictive European practices that had a negative impact on American economic interests in the hope that this would help integration become permanently established on the Continent.²⁸¹ It understood how difficult it was to set up a new supranational community like the ECSC – particularly since it was also attempting to implement policies that had never before been seen in Europe – and decided as a result to give it essentially as much time as it needed. The integration of

²⁷⁹ “Report from the Department of State to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy,” *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1955-1957, Vol. IV, 266.

²⁸⁰ *ibid.*

²⁸¹ Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe*, 66-67.

Western Europe was simply too important to be interrupted by the short-term interests of U.S. industry. The Eisenhower administration also clearly recognized that, eventually, the existence of the ECSC would likely prove to be very beneficial for U.S. economic interests and that, in reality, it was doing a better job of combating restrictive practices than many European governments. After some short-term pain, the administration believed that American industry would experience long-term benefits. Monnet and the High Authority just needed a bit of time to get their feet on the ground.

All told, then, Rosato's claim that American encouragement was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for European integration to take place²⁸² is clearly misguided, as it is simply not supported by the historical record. If his notion that the Western Europeans desired to integrate the Continent simply to balance the power of the Soviet Union were correct, such a claim may be logical. The previous chapter demonstrated that this was not the case, however. Rather than focusing on the power of the Soviet Union and trying to unite the Continent to balance it, the French and the West Germans were primarily interested in their own national interests, which included postwar recovery, the alleviation of French security concerns with regard to West Germany, and the renewal of West German sovereignty. Again, it was World War II and its aftermath – not the Cold War – that caused the Europeans to desire integration. The Americans, who had been put in a position of incredible power by the war, created the environment within which the Europeans could pursue their goals. Indeed, the American policy of ardently encouraging and supporting European unity in the postwar era, which spanned both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, played a critical role in

²⁸² Rosato, 78.

making it possible for the ECSC to succeed. While these administrations had different roles to play, both of their contributions to the earliest years of European integration were vital to the successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community.

The Truman administration had the tremendous responsibility of deciding with the Allies how postwar Europe should be addressed. In their minds, it was critical that the region immediately rebuild itself without falling into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union or starting yet another global conflagration. Tying West Germany and its resources irrevocably to the West through Continental integration was seen as the key to accomplishing these goals, and, despite its recognition that the impetus for European integration had to come from the Continent itself, the administration did whatever it could to ensure that the majority of French and West German politicians were supportive of this idea. Not only did it use the Marshall Plan's Organization for European Economic Cooperation to lay the foundations for a unified Europe, but it also used Marshall Plan aid to help convince the French to accept U.S. policy vis-à-vis West Germany. The Truman administration also worked to prevent the French from becoming so focused on retaining their access to German resources that they would alienate the West Germans and cause their increasing nationalism to get out of control. The American suggestion that the internationalization of the Ruhr be folded into a wider Western European coal and steel pool – the basic idea behind the Schuman Plan – was the way in which this was accomplished. Perhaps most critically, though, the Truman administration used NATO to

create the type of security environment that would allow the French to embrace the reindustrialization of West Germany as well as its inclusion in the Western European community, even after the Allied occupation eventually ended.

Upon taking office, the Eisenhower administration decided to continue the Truman administration's policy of encouraging European integration, although perhaps for slightly different reasons. It had, however, come to office after the European Coal and Steel Community had already been agreed upon. This gave it the opportunity to ensure that the still-embryonic ECSC would be successfully established. From international legal recognition through the dispatch of an American ambassador to the establishment of the ECSC's credit through the granting of a substantial loan to allowing American economic interests to temporarily be placed on the back burner while the Europeans worked to properly establish their new community, the actions that were taken by the Eisenhower administration were critical. Without the actions of these two administrations, it seems likely that the unification of the Continent never would have occurred and, even if it had, it would not have experienced the success that it did. Indeed, even Monnet and Adenauer recognized the incredible importance of American support and encouragement for what they were trying to accomplish, and were anxious to see these things continue to come from the White House when the Eisenhower administration took office in 1953. As the most powerful state in the world with a great deal of influence over the affairs of France and West Germany, the United States played a crucial role in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in a manner that no other country could have.

Four

Conclusion

The preceding pages have, through an examination of the historical record, made it plain that France and West Germany were driven to pursue the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community for state-centric reasons that came about largely as a result of their relationships with one another within the postwar context. World War II is, again, critical to gaining an accurate understanding of the genesis of European integration. Additionally, it should be apparent that the United States did indeed play a decisive role in not only the creation of the ECSC, but also its successful establishment in the 1950s. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations saw the unification of Western Europe as a critical foreign policy goal, and they can both be pointed to as effective facilitators of the Europeans' desire to pursue the integration of the Continent. The creation of a counterfactual may be a useful way to explore these points further and demonstrate quite clearly that both Rosato's balance-of-power argument²⁸³ and his claim that American involvement in early European integrationist efforts was neither sufficient nor necessary for Continental unification to take place²⁸⁴ are indeed incorrect. This will

²⁸³ *ibid.*, 53-54, 60.

²⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 78.

be accomplished, of course, by constructing an alternate world in which Rosato's claims are correct, and will allow the reader to clearly understand what one would and would not expect to find in the historical record of such a world.

The motives that drove France and West Germany to pursue the unification of the Continent through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community will be addressed first. If Rosato's argument were correct, and the Europeans sought to integrate solely in order to balance the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, this would be reflected in a number of differences in the historical record. First, one would see a clear indication that the Soviet Union was seen in postwar France as a much bigger threat than Germany, despite the fact that Germany had invaded France twice in the last half century and the Soviet Union had not. This would have manifest itself partially through a French decision to eschew the creation of new treaties like the Treaty of Dunkirk that explicitly named Germany as a security threat and would require, of course, that the recent history of terrible warfare that France had experienced with Germany be eclipsed in the minds of the French essentially immediately after the end of World War II by the prospect of going to war with the USSR.

The replacement of Germany by the Soviet Union as France's greatest security threat would have brought along with it a number of practical implications as well, including a substantially weakened desire in France to see Germany held down. Indeed, if the Soviet Union was France's focus in the postwar period, then the French would have embraced not only the end of the Allied Occupation regime, but also, and just as importantly, the complete reindustrialization and rearmament of West Germany. These

things would, in fact, likely have been a priority for France. In addition, if the French were simply trying to balance the power of the Soviet Union and were less interested in the reconstruction of their own country, then unfettered French access to the industrial resources of the Ruhr and the Saar would not have been one of France's highest priorities. Instead, the French would have wanted to see German industrial production expand, even at the expense of French access to these resources, as this would have transformed West Germany into a much more powerful and useful ally against the Soviets that stood geographically between France and the USSR. The French desires to internationalize the Ruhr and maintain control over the Saar through a customs union and the admittance of the Saar as an independent member of the Council of Europe would not have had much salience in such a situation, and the French would not have pushed hard for them and allowed them to become the sources of tension with and nationalism in West Germany that they ended up being.

The timeline of European integration also would have been drastically altered if the French had been principally concerned with balancing the Soviet Union. If the USSR was France's principle security threat and it was more interested in being allied to a strong West Germany that could help it balance the USSR than in seeing its long-time nemesis held down in the wake of the most destructive war in world history, then the French would have pursued the integration of Western Europe earlier than 1950, when the Schuman Declaration was made. This is because the security guarantee against Germany that was given to France by the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would not have been necessary, meaning France would not have had any

reason to wait until after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty to propose the creation of the ECSC. Instead, France would have proposed the integration of the Continent at the first sign of trouble for Western Europe from the USSR – presumably the 1948 Berlin Blockade – as the threat posed by the USSR would have had to have been solidified in the minds of the French long before the outbreak of the Korean War, which occurred after the Schuman Declaration.

Additionally, France would have proposed a much different-looking form of European integration if the Soviet Union was the target of such action. While it would, perhaps, still have made sense to build up Western Europe's war making ability via the integration and strengthening of France and West Germany's coal and steel industries, it would have been a priority for France to create an integrated military command for the Western European nations that were integrating. This is because, as Rosato points out, when a group of minor powers is attempting to balance a great power, they will create an integrated military establishment and central authority,²⁸⁵ as this is the most efficient and effective way to balance the threat that is posed by such a power. As a result, France would have proposed this form of integration either at the same time that it was proposing the ECSC or, more likely, in place of the ECSC, as this would have allowed Western Europe to have its best shot at balancing Soviet power.

Things also would have been much different in West Germany if the French and the Germans had been pursuing Western European integration purely to balance the Soviet Union. First of all, any vestiges of conflict between France and West Germany would have been effectively put on the back burner as they paled in comparison to the

²⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 51.

perceived Soviet threat. As stated above, France would have, instead, been concerned primarily with seeing to it that West Germany became a powerful ally against the Soviets, meaning Germany would not have had to deal with the Allied Occupation regime in the manner in which it did. This, in turn, would have led to a decreased desire by the West German government to secure independence and the restoration of German sovereignty in the wake of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, meaning West German accession to the Council of Europe would not have held the significance that it did. Indeed, France may have been able to convince the United States and United Kingdom to end the occupation not too long after the war, as it no longer feared German aggression above all else and would have prioritized the creation of a strong West Germany that stood between it and the Soviets. West German sovereignty would have subsequently been restored and the West German government would not have seen the restoration of the equality of their country as their overriding goal. If this would not have been possible, however, the West Germans nevertheless would have viewed balancing the Soviet Union as a more important goal than the restoration of German sovereignty and the end of the occupation, meaning the presence of British and American troops would have been welcomed, not loathed, as these troops would have been on hand – and would have dragged these two states into war on the side of West Germany – in the event of a Soviet invasion. In addition, since France would have feared Soviet aggression instead of German aggression, the West Germans would not have had to worry about assuaging French security concerns as part of their attempt to regain their sovereignty. In fact, this would have been a non-issue, as the French would have been far more worried

about the Soviets than they were about the Germans, who they would have viewed as their partners in defending Western Europe from the Communists rather than their historical enemies who could rise up against them again at a moment's notice.

On the American side of the story, if the efforts of the United States to encourage and support European integration were unnecessary and the Europeans would have pursued Continental integration in order to balance the threat posed by the Soviet Union regardless of what the Americans were doing, the historical record would, again, reflect these differences. For one thing, while the United States likely would have nevertheless viewed the encouragement of the integration of Western Europe as a foreign policy priority, the concrete ideas about how this should be executed that it shared with France would not have had the impact that they did. As stated above, it seems logical that France may have proposed something similar to the ECSC in an effort to balance the USSR, but it is more likely that it would have proposed an integrated military structure for Western Europe. If the United States' efforts were insignificant, therefore, the French would have followed a different course of action from the one that had been suggested to them by the United States at the 1948 London Conference on Germany. The U.S. would not have had to make these suggestions in the first place, though, as the internationalization of the Ruhr at West Germany's expense would not have been a high priority for France and the Americans would not have been worried about the alienation of the Germans.

This alternate course would also include, as indicated above, the announcement of the Schuman Plan before the creation of NATO, as the security guarantee provided by American forces against the Germans would have been unnecessary and irrelevant if the

French saw the USSR as their primary security threat. The Truman administration would not have viewed Marshall Plan aid as a way of purchasing French assent to German reconstruction, either, as France would have embraced this reconstruction wholeheartedly, as made plain above. Additionally, the European leaders who were primarily responsible for the creation of an integrated Europe would not have made it clear through their words and their deeds that the U.S. had an integral role to play in the successful establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. Monnet, for his part, would not have approached the Eisenhower administration for a loan in the manner that he did, and he would not have pointed to the United States as the nation that established the ECSC's credit worldwide and gave it its tremendously important ability to borrow from private lenders through the conferral of this loan. Monnet also would not have stated that the United States' decision to dispatch an ambassador to the ECSC was what gave the community its legal standing in the international system, and neither he nor Adenauer would have explicitly said that American support for and encouragement of European integration were essential.

Finally, if the Europeans had been solely motivated by a desire to balance the Soviet Union, then the European Union surely would have become obsolete the moment the USSR collapsed and no longer posed any sort of threat to the Continent. If the states involved in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the subsequent, more complicated iterations of Continental integration that followed were simply trying to balance the power of the Soviet Union, after all, then European integration would have completely lost its purpose as soon as the Soviet Union ceased to exist, meaning Rosato's

notions regarding the inevitable “fraying” of the European Union²⁸⁶ would be correct.

One must keep in mind, however, that the historical record indicates very clearly that the Europeans were not simply attempting to balance the power of the Soviet Union as they unified the Continent. It also makes it plain that the efforts of the United States to facilitate the Western Europeans’ pursuit of integration were critical, and that European integration likely would not have happened apart from them. Indeed, the entirety of the foregoing counterfactual is, quite obviously, not historically accurate in the least, meaning Rosato’s claims cannot be accurate either, as, if they were, the counterfactual presented above would not be a counterfactual at all. Instead, it would simply be a description of the historical record.

What the historical record does show very clearly, however, is that, far from being an effort to balance the Soviet Union, the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community was an attempt by France and West Germany to pursue separate sets of state-centric goals that each country’s government believed would be beneficial for its respective state. In France, these goals stemmed primarily from two sources: France’s need to maintain access to German natural resources in order to keep its *Plan de Modernisation et Ré-équipement* operating smoothly, and its fear of future German aggression in light of its experiences since 1870. Monnet believed that the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community would be the most effective way to maintain French access to important West German natural resources while allowing the French to keep a close eye on the Germans and ensure that they were not using their coal and steel

²⁸⁶ *ibid.*, 72.

industries to rearm themselves as they had done in the interwar period. In essence, France wanted to regain its strength while Germany was held down, and this was the underlying factor that ultimately drove the actions of the French.

The West Germans, on the other hand, were focused on the restoration of their sovereignty, independence, and equality within the international community after the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. Adenauer believed that joining the Council of Europe would be an effective first step on the road toward this goal, but the status of the Saar had to be satisfactorily worked out before this could happen. West Germany's accession to the ECSC was able to solve this problem while simultaneously helping to assuage French security concerns and stem the tide of growing German nationalism. Rather than being "obsessed" with the power of the Soviet Union, as Rosato claims,²⁸⁷ Adenauer, along with Monnet, Schuman, and the other pioneers of European integration, was focused on the national goals that could be accomplished through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. The beginning of the Cold War and a desire to balance the power of the Soviet Union simply did not cause the Western Europeans to pursue the integration of the Continent in the years following World War II, as it was the conditions that existed following this war that actually led to the integration of Europe.

The historical record also clearly demonstrates that the United States played an invaluable role in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. In addition to laying the foundation for European integration through the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Americans provided the French Foreign Ministry with the concepts that ended up defining the Schuman Plan and the ECSC.

²⁸⁷ *ibid.*, 56.

Further, it is clear that the French were very worried about the possibility of future German aggression in the years after World War II, meaning they would not be able to embrace the creation of a fully reindustrialized West Germany that was no longer occupied by the Allied powers without being able to count on the United States for assistance if the Germans should attempt to initiate a conflict with them again. Robust German coal and steel industries were necessary for the successful implementation of the Schuman Plan, however, meaning the fact that the Truman administration was willing to entangle itself in Continental security via the creation of NATO was a critical facilitating factor for the ECSC. While Rosato is correct in stating that the security guarantee against future German aggression that the Americans gave the French through the creation of NATO did not motivate European integration,²⁸⁸ it was integral in paving the way for the French to propose the unification of the Continent. Without American encouragement of and support for European integration in the postwar world, then, the unification of Western Europe probably never would have happened. Finally, the actions of the Eisenhower administration, including the dispatch of an American ambassador to the ECSC, the conferral of a sizeable loan to the ECSC, and the placement of short-term European interests over the interests of the United States, played an essential part in seeing to it that the European Coal and Steel Community was able to successfully establish itself and become a permanent part of the European landscape.

In sum, since the historical record does not support Rosato's arguments regarding either the origins of the European Coal and Steel Community or the role played by the United States in the creation of that community, it follows logically that it also does not

²⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 77.

support his predictions regarding the future of Europe. Indeed, contrary to what Rosato believes, the end of the Soviet Union has not created a situation in which the Europeans “have no compelling reason to preserve their economic community.”²⁸⁹ Instead, since the existence of the USSR was clearly not the driving factor in the Europeans’ decision to pursue integration, the current nonexistence of the USSR ought to have little effect on whether the European Union is sustained, deepened, or allowed to fall by the wayside. Since France and West Germany were seeking to achieve largely state-centric goals through the creation of the ECSC, it should not be assumed that, if these or other states decide to take actions that they perceive to be in their best interests but not necessarily in the best interest of the EU as a whole, they are doing so simply because the Soviet threat is gone and they feel no need to sustain the European Union.²⁹⁰

Rather, such behavior ought to be viewed as nothing more than a continuation of the state-centric, national interests-driven mindsets that were held by France and West Germany when they set up the ECSC. If EU member states’ malfeasance is seen in this light, it becomes clear that the future of the European Union will be decided by whether or not the various members of the EU believe that continued participation in the EU will allow them to achieve their respective states’ current goals. These states’ relationships with one another are also likely to continue to play an important part in determining the future of European unification, as the relationship between France and West Germany in the postwar world had a substantial impact on those states’ desires to pursue the integration of the Continent in the first place. A remarkable degree of continuity can,

²⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 48.

²⁹⁰ *ibid.*, 73.

therefore, be readily identified between the earliest years of Continental integration and the current situation in Europe, with states seeking their own national interest and the relationship between France and Germany – the most critical states in Western Europe both then and now – taking center stage.

Such ideas find support even among other realists, with Stanley Hoffmann serving as an example. In his seminal article on Western European integration, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” he puts forth the ideas that, in the postwar era, “Germany accepted dependence on the U.S. not merely as a comfort, but as a necessity as vital as breathing,” and that the “recovery of equality was...[a] vital goal [for the Germans].”²⁹¹ Further, Hoffmann contends that the French still deeply feared Germany as the drive toward integration got started,²⁹² and that the earliest forms of Continental integration worked because each state wanted to maximize its wealth.²⁹³ While he may put too much emphasis on the Soviet threat as a motivation for West Germany to pursue integration, Hoffmann nonetheless recognizes the importance of each state’s “different pulls and different pasts.”²⁹⁴ Each state had its own reasons for pursuing the integration of Western Europe, and each wanted to integrate with the other member states of the ECSC on terms that it found to be pleasing and appropriate²⁹⁵ and which would afford it the maximum benefit.

²⁹¹ Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 95, No. 3 (Summer 1966), 874-875.

²⁹² *ibid.*, 875.

²⁹³ *ibid.*, 886.

²⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 908.

Hoffmann also holds that, despite integration, the state remains the highest possessor of power, and that the power of institutions such as those created in Europe is “limited, conditional, dependent, and reversible.”²⁹⁶ Ultimately, the direction of an integrated Europe is decided by the individual states involved in its creation.²⁹⁷ Therefore, it should not be assumed, as Rosato has done, that a lack of total political and military integration on the Continent in the wake of the Cold War indicates that the Europeans sought to integrate in order to counter the Soviet threat and that the removal of this threat is the reason why these types of integration have not been forthcoming.²⁹⁸ Instead, in the words of Hoffmann,

the common organs set up by the national governments, when they try to act as a European executive and parliament, they are both condemned to operate in the fog maintained around them by the governments...Europe cannot be what some of nations have been: a people that creates its state; nor can it be what some of the oldest states are and many of the new ones aspire to be: a people created by the state. It has to wait until the separate states decide that their peoples are close enough to justify the setting up of a European state whose task will be the welding of the many into one.²⁹⁹

Clearly, realists such as Hoffmann believe that the state has been and will continue to be the most important actor in Europe despite the Continent’s integration. This is a trend that has continued uninterrupted since the genesis of the ECSC. Both the respective

²⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 887.

²⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 909.

²⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 908-910.

²⁹⁸ Rosato, 73.

²⁹⁹ Hoffmann, 910.

motivations and perceptions of national interest that are held by each state matter a great deal, and external factors such as the presence or absence of the Soviet Union do play a determining role in whether deeper integration is embraced or eschewed.

While the European debt crisis has been a remarkably trying time for the European Union and its member states, the drive toward further integration that it appears to have sparked provides further support for the notion that the dissolution of the Soviet Union has not determined the future course of European unification. This movement toward further integration includes not only binding new rules on taxation and spending, but also automatic penalties for states that overspend.³⁰⁰ In addition, European Union finance ministers have agreed to give the EU the power to scrutinize the eurozone members' budgets before they have been approved by national parliaments, giving the EU a chance to make recommendations about national tax and spending policies.³⁰¹ A €700 billion firewall has also recently been agreed upon, with €500 billion being set aside for the new European Stability Mechanism and the rest coming from the existing European Financial Stability Facility.³⁰² Finally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has expressed a vision of a Europe that features a much more federal structure, with the EU's European Commission coming to function more like the Continent's central

³⁰⁰ "Euro Crisis: Eurozone Deal Reached Without UK," *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-16104089> (accessed January 20, 2012).

³⁰¹ Stanley Pignal, "EU Beefs Up Powers over State Budgets," *Financial Times*, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/07034eda-5ca6-11e1-8f1f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1muTlwMGp> (accessed April 11, 2012).

³⁰² Ian Traynor, "Eurozone Ministers Agree €500bn in New Bailout Funds," *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/30/eurozone-ministers-500bn-bailout> (accessed April 7, 2012).

government.³⁰³ These developments are clear evidence of a drive toward further European integration, making it plain that the financial crisis has led to deeper integration of the Continent rather than the undoing of the great strides that have been made since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, as Rosato predicts. Again, rather than the existence or non-existence of the Soviet Union, the critical determining factor for the future of the European Union will be whether or not the individual member states of the EU continue to believe that membership in this organization serves the national interests of their respective states. If they continue to see EU membership as beneficial, then the world will likely be given the opportunity to witness the strengthening of Europe's most important – and the world's most advanced – regional institution, an institution that grew directly out of the rubble of World War II. If, however, the Europeans do decide at some point to put an end to their experiment in Continental unification, it will be because the most important EU member states – including, critically, modern-day France and Germany – see such a course of action as being in their respective states' best interests, and not because the Soviet Union has ceased to exist.

³⁰³ “Merkel Deflects Calls for Bigger Euro Zone Firewall,” *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/us-davos-merkel-idUSTRE8001TW20120125> (accessed January 25, 2012).

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