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## Human Rights and Post-War Reconstruction: Democratization in Afghanistan

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## Democratization in Afghanistan

by Chris Rowe

What determines whether a specific country embarks on the road to democracy, if it completes that voyage successfully, and finally consolidates democratic values, practices, and institutions? Analysts have debated these issues for decades and have identified a number of historical, structural, and cultural variables that help account for the establishment of successful democracies in some countries and its absence in others. Frequently cited prerequisites for democracy include social and economic modernization; a large and vibrant middle class; and cultural norms and values relating to politics.

Yet whatever its determinants, operational democracies normally include contested elections, a free press, and the separation of powers. Although these characteristics have been identified as vital features of a democracy, emerging democracies also need to address serious social and economic injustices that threaten democratic consolidation. Afghanistan is a case in point in this regard. As a burgeoning democracy directly influenced by U.S.-led nation-building efforts, Afghanistan presents a unique and challenging case for democratization.

Afghanistan has been ruled by warlords since the era of Taliban rule, and to an extent still is. Informal rule combined with the heroin trade and severe gender inequalities have created a frail foundation on which to promote democratic reforms. Although international human rights, judicial and national assembly commissions have presented significant mandates for change, all have met with problematic results.

In order for democracy to take hold in Afghanistan, the fruits of warlord economy—opium production, smuggling, and illicit taxation of trade—must be wrested away from regional power brokers and replaced with socially stable economic incentives. Additionally, the centralized government in Kabul must gain the trust and loyalty of the regional tribal commanders. The future of Afghanistan lies in the ability of its people to forge a united political community that resolves disputes in the manner of a democratic nation.

### Challenges to Democracy

As a nation struggling to establish a centralized and legitimate democratic government, Afghanistan faces myriad developmental barriers to democratic consolidation. This section highlights the following specific problems: overcoming well-established political and cultural norms; addressing a government infrastructure ill-equipped to accommodate elements of democracy; human rights and gender issues as basic features of democracy; warlordism across the region; and the illicit drug economy.

Khabir Ahmad. 2001. "U.N. pleads for support for aid workers in Afghanistan after Taliban collapse." *Lancet*. 358(9295): 1792.

*Abstract: States that the United Nations (U.N.) High Commission for Refugees is concerned about the lawlessness in northern Afghanistan, which is hampering aid efforts and endangering aid workers. Suspension of*

*convoys after two drivers were killed; Request from the U.N. to the Northern Alliance and the Taliban for aid agencies to have safe access to displaced persons and other vulnerable Afghans; Efforts of Amnesty International to prevent human rights abuse.*

Samina Ahmed. 2004. "Warlords, Drugs, Democracy." *World Today*. 60(5): 15.

*Abstract: Delves into the political situation in Afghanistan. Replacement of the country's existing government; Discussion of the realities behind the reconstruction of a country's government; Problem of warlordism.*

Sultan Barakat. 2002. "Setting the scene for Afghanistan's reconstruction: the challenges and critical dilemmas." *Third World Quarterly*. 23(5): 801.

*Abstract: The current round of fighting in Afghanistan is only the latest twist in a protracted conflict in which the focus of the international community has tended to fluctuate, depending on prevailing geopolitical agendas. Now in its third decade, the war has resulted in massive population displacement, both internal and external, casualty figures in excess of one million, and a serious deterioration in conditions for the civilian population. This paper takes as its starting point the events of 11 September 2001, which led to the recent dramatic changes in Afghanistan, including the Emergency Loya Jirga and other constitutional developments envisaged in the Bonn Agreement. By way of essential background, the paper then offers a brief introduction to the country; it describes the way in which conflict began and traces the various different phases of the war from the late 1970s to the present day. In so doing, it seeks to outline the global and historical context of the current crisis in Afghanistan. It considers the challenges that need to be addressed in order to achieve effective post-conflict reconstruction and development. Finally, it offers a brief overview of current U.N. plans for Afghanistan's reconstruction and outlines a number of critical dilemmas facing those involved in their implementation.*

Thomas J. Barfield. 2004. "Problems in establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan." *Iranian Studies*. 37(2): 263.

*Abstract: Afghanistan has been called a "highway of conquest," the pivot of Central Asia that led armies to India and Iran, to the rich lands of the Transoxiana and the borders of China. Since the beginning of recorded history, its territory has fallen victim to waves of conquerors and been part of much larger empires. Indeed, while each ethnic group in the country can claim some periods of glorious history, none can make an absolute indigenous claim to the region: their histories all begin with the displacement or incorporation of some preceding group already occupying the land. Yet in more recent times Afghanistan has become famous as the graveyard of imperial ambitions, having rebuffed the British twice in the nineteenth century and forced the Soviet Union to withdraw in defeat in the twentieth. How is it that a territory that was historically overrun by every major power in pre-modern times became so indigestible in the last 150 years? And why has the United States, in at least its initial foray into Afghanistan, not provoked the high level of opposition that is habitually assumed to await the arrival of any foreign troops there? The answer lies in the changing relationship between war and political legitimacy, a change that grew out of reformulation of the conception of society and government itself. It is this change in the conception of legitimacy that has made the restoration of internal national order in Afghanistan so difficult.*

Daniel Consolatore. 2002. "What Next for the Women of Afghanistan?" *Humanist*. 62(3): 10.

*Abstract: Interviews Tahmeena Faryal, U.S. envoy of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), a political and social service organization in Afghanistan with a mission to work for peace, freedom, democracy and women's rights. Ambivalence toward the arrival of the Northern Alliance; Opinion*

*on whether the Afghan population is distrustful of U.S. motives in its involvement in the war in Afghanistan; Views on fundamentalism and human rights.*

William J. Crotty. 2005. *Democratic development & political terrorism: the global perspective.* Northeastern University Press.

September 11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised difficult questions about the challenges and far-reaching consequences of international responses to terrorism. In this timely collection, experts delve into such critical topics as the root causes of terrorist acts; the relationship between authoritarian repression and terrorist movements; the most effective foreign policies for containing worldwide political violence; the role of military force; and problems with democratizing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Antonio Donini. 2004. "An Elusive Quest: Integration in the Response to the Afghan Crisis." *Ethics & International Affairs*. 18(2): 21.

*Abstract: Looks at the humanitarian and assistance activities of the United Nations during the periods of crisis concerning peace in Afghanistan. Highlights of the use of humanitarian assistance during the 1980s; Information on the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan in 1998; Changes that occurred regarding the overall humanitarian and human rights efforts in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York.*

Christopher P. Freeman. 2002. "Dissonant Discourse: Forging Islamist States through Secular Models: The Case of Afghanistan." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 15(3): 533.

*Abstract: Presents an alternative perspective on the U.S. war against terrorism and the intervention in Afghanistan in 2003. Manner by which Western nations regard political Islam or Islamism; Values and processes attached to liberal democracy which is not suited to the developmental stage of Afghanistan; Pervasiveness and power of Islam.*

Kathy Gannon. 2004. "Afghanistan Unbound." *Foreign Affairs*. 83(3): 35.

*Abstract: The article deals with the decision of the U.S. to reinstate several warlords in Afghanistan in an effort to promote democracy and stability in the country in 2004. Warlords who have returned to power are Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Muhammad Fahim, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Burhanuddin Rabbani. All these men share responsibility for the ferocious killing of civilians in the mid-1990s. They still maintain private armies and private jails and are reaping vast amounts of money from the illegal opium trade in Afghanistan. Lakhdar Brahimi, the special envoy of the United Nations to Afghanistan, warned that the situation is reminiscent of what was witnessed after the establishment of the mujahideen government in 1992, which eventually led to the rise of the Taliban a few years later. If the U.S. really wants to develop democracy and stability in Afghanistan, it must abandon its policy of working with the warlords and factional leaders of the Northern Alliance. Sayyaf, Fahim, and their men have nothing to offer that would help Afghanistan move forward. Instead, the U.S. should concentrate on training a police force, which, along with the national army the U.S. and France are helping to build, could provide security at a local level.*

Jonathan Goodhand. 2005. "Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan." *Journal of Agrarian Change*. 5(2): 191.

*Abstract: This paper describes the evolution of the opium economy in Afghanistan and examines the factors behind its resurgence since the fall of the Taliban regime. The historical roots of poppy cultivation are analysed with particular reference to the role of borderlands and processes of state formation and collapse. This is followed by an examination of the contemporary dynamics of the opium economy. It is argued that micro-level opium production lies at the intersection of three economies of production, namely the "combat," "shadow" and "coping" economies.*

Anthony Hyman. 2002. "Nationalism in Afghanistan." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 34(2): 299.

*Abstract: Argues that the neo-colonial domination of Afghanistan by Great Britain and the USSR went in tandem with a form of internal colonialism by a Pashtun ruling class over the country's many ethnic minorities. Weakness of national or patriotic idea in the modern Afghanistan; Language issues; Origins of the state.*

Angelo Rasanayagam. 2003. *Afghanistan: a modern history: monarchy, despotism or democracy? The problems of governance in the Muslim tradition.* London; New York: I.B. Tauris.

Afghanistan has been the focal point of East-West relations since the 19th and early 20th centuries when its mountain ranges provided the arena for the world's greatest powers to contest each other's influence. Squeezed between four empires--Russia, China, India, and Persia--Afghanistan's tortured history provides an extraordinary glimpse into the patterns of world movements. This serious, yet accessible history of modern Afghanistan is of vital importance for understanding the country's current crisis and is essential reading for historians, policy makers, and all those interested in the state of the world today.

Carol J. Riphenburg. 2005. "Ethnicity and Civil Society in Contemporary Afghanistan." *Middle East Journal*. 59(1): 31.

*Abstract: This article focuses on the critical question of ethnicity and politics in Afghanistan. It examines current conceptual models of ethnicity and their application to present day political affairs in the country. Research shows that it is not the presence of ethnic groups per se that leads to violence or instability but the absence of civil society and democratic governance and norms. Lessons may be drawn from Afghanistan's neighbors to the north. These Central Asian nations present cases of emerging civil societies, which are fragile, fragmented, and strongly influenced by the international donor community. After 23 years of war in Afghanistan, repression and neglect have had a devastating effect on civil society.*

James D. Ross. 2002. "Promoting Human Rights." *Ethics & International Affairs*. 16(2): 27.

*Abstract: Discusses the need to promote human rights in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Actions taken by Human Rights Watch during the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan; Position of the U.S. government on individuals apprehended in connection with the war on terrorism; Important role for the human rights community.*

Barnett R. Rubin. 2002. "Putting an End to Warlord Government." *New York Times*. 151(51999):

*Abstract: Focuses on the choices facing the U.S. and other donor nations in deciding how to help rebuild Afghanistan. Factors leading the U.S. to arm anti-Taliban warlords before the Bonn accords; Purpose of the accords; Situations to be dealt with by the renewed Afghan government.*

Barnett R. Rubin. 2003. "Transitional justice and human rights in Afghanistan." *International Affairs*. 79(3): 567.

Like other societies emerging from protracted conflict, Afghanistan confronts a legacy of past crimes and violence. Communist rulers, Soviet occupiers, rural resistance fighters, Islamist parties, the Taliban movement, Pakistani volunteers, al-Qaeda members, power-seeking warlords, and the anti-Taliban coalition all contributed more or less to the litany of abuses since 1978. Almost no one in the society has been untouched, and almost no one with any power has clean hands. For these very reasons, caution and care are necessary. Demobilizing and reintegrating tens of thousands of irregular militia, as well as creating new security forces are the necessary conditions for the rest of the peace-building agenda, and, as shown by the author's first-hand experience in the Bonn negotiations over the post-Taliban succession, raising the issue of past crimes prematurely may lead fighters to revert to previous modes of behaviour. He argues for a careful start that emphasizes documenting the scale of the abuses with an emphasis on the suffering of the victims rather than the guilt of the perpetrators, in order gradually to support an Afghan debate on how to reconcile the society with its history.

Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong. 2003. "Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan." *World Policy Journal*. 20(1): 31.

Abstract: *Discusses several regional issues in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Consequence of the proliferation of armed groups in the region; Resumption of drug trafficking; Views on the need for regional cooperation.*

Conrad Schetter. 2005. "Ethnoscapes, National Territorialisation, and the Afghan War." *Geopolitics*. 10(1): 50.

Abstract: *This article pursues the question of how the territorialisation of power in the establishment of the Afghan nation-state has affected the spatial perceptions of political actors and the population at large. This question is particularly topical as spatial references are at present the driving force behind an ethnicisation of politics in Afghanistan. These perceived ethnic spaces, so-called ethnoscapes, not only compete with one another, but also contradict Afghanistan itself as a national territory. Thus since the outbreak of the Afghan war 1979 various political actors have been attempting to mobilise their constituencies over ethnic issues in order to use references to the spatial origins and expansion of their ethnic category to legitimise political claims. The principal argument of this article is that the population's strong identification with the national territory of Afghanistan has to date prevented an ethnicisation of the masses in the Afghan conflict. Furthermore the article argues that the irreconcilability of the various perceived ethnic territories is an obstacle to the currently much-discussed establishment of ethno-federalism.*

Nazif M. Shahrani. 2002. "War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan." *American Anthropologist*. 104(3): 715.

Abstract: *Since September 11, 2001, the explanations offered to account for the rise of a foreign-led terrorist network on Afghan soil have variously focused on the political vacuum opened up by the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, interference by foreign powers in Afghanistan's internal affairs, the failure of Afghanistan to produce a "strong state" because of ethnic factionalism, and an internal moral incoherence inherent to Afghan culture. I argue that none of these explanations is entirely satisfactory in itself. To understand the situation in Afghanistan, we must recognize that its political and military chaos is not an isolated or unique*

*phenomenon, and at the same time acknowledge the particular social and political dynamics of Afghanistan's history that have set the parameters for current events. I show that communal conflicts in Afghanistan are part of a much wider affliction common to many postcolonial states and multinational societies, and that Afghanistan's current situation can only be understood by focusing on its failed attempts at nation-state building within the broader geopolitical circumstance of foreign manipulation and proxy wars that have given rise to particular forms of ethnic division.*

Alexander Thier and Jarat Chopra. 2002. "The road ahead: political and institutional reconstruction in Afghanistan." *Third World Quarterly*. 23(5): 893.

*Abstract: After 23 years of war, Afghanistan's political reconstruction faces a daunting number of hurdles. Institutions must be developed at the national, regional and local levels, and a means for interface among these institutions, and between them and an array of international actors, must be created. As each institution defines and develops its role, it will rely on and/or conflict with other institutions at different levels. Establishing a healthy political and societal environment, critical to the success of Afghanistan's new institutions, will require development of organisational infrastructure and power sharing at all levels. Long-term integration needs to be taken into account along with short-term needs. Instability also allows fluidity, and institutions supported by resources now will become embedded in a new political culture. This article seeks to answer the question of what shape these institutions should take, what key considerations will determine their success, and how they can best be supported.*

Guglielmo Verdirame. 2001. "Testing the Effectiveness of International Norms: U.N. Humanitarian Assistance and Sexual Apartheid in Afghanistan." *Human Rights Quarterly*. 23(3): 733.

*Abstract: This article focuses on the effectiveness of the international law on prohibiting discrimination against women in the context of sexual apartheid in Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, the United Nation's (U.N.) institutional practice, consisting of mission reports and policy statements, played a central role in determining the final terms on which the U.N. continued its engagement in Afghanistan. The regulatory failure of the Security Council and of the General Assembly has various causes. First, there is no clear independent monitoring machinery to ensure adherence to principles, as well as decisions and policies laid down by these two organs. Second, even if the General Assembly decided to take a more proactive role and to monitor the operational practice of the organization, it would still find it difficult within the current structure to enforce its findings efficaciously and swiftly. Third, both the General Assembly and the Security Council rely on the Secretary General for information on developments on the ground, even though the Secretariat is at the heart of the bureaucratic structure and is unlikely to report on the U.N. own failures.*

Human Rights Watch. 2004. *The Rule of the Gun Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in the Run-up to Afghanistan's Presidential Election*.

Describes how the general behavior and continuing power of various armed factions have created an environment of fear in which many of Afghanistan's voters, party organizers, journalists, women's activists, and government officials are afraid to speak openly.

Brigitte Weiffen. 2004. "The Cultural-Economic Syndrome: Impediments to Democracy in the Middle East." *Comparative Sociology*. 3(3/4): 353.

*Abstract: Compared to other world regions, the Middle East is exceptional in its resistance to democratization. Whereas a cultural explanation for this democracy gap refers to historical legacies, especially to the dominant role*

*of Islam, an economic explanation emphasizes oil wealth as the main barrier to democracy. According to various quantitative studies, both claims seem to be valid. Nevertheless, none of the explanations is uncontested, as there are always examples that demonstrate the opposite. This paper argues that it is exactly the combination of culture and economic structure that makes democracy in the Middle East unlikely. Both factors mutually reinforce each other on the macro, meso and micro level and thus constitute a cultural-economic syndrome with a strong negative impact on democratic performance. Regression analyses demonstrate the significance of this interaction effect: If the cultural-economic syndrome of Islam and oil wealth is present in a country, its negative impact on democratic performance becomes even stronger than the sum of the additive effects of Islam and oil wealth.*

## Democratic Consolidation

The push for democracy in Afghanistan, although often problematic, has experienced some degrees of success. Successful elections, one hallmark of democracy, produced a new Afghan president and cabinet. After the meeting of the Loya Jirga, a nation-wide grand council, the new Afghan Constitution was ratified. Following The Bonn Agreement, the drive for a newly elected government, a ratified Constitution, and the establishment of the rule of law has formed the basis for the development of Afghan democracy. These efforts have been the focal point of Afghan rebuilding efforts in the hopes of founding a democratic Afghan state. This section addresses the steps that have been taken in this process and examines the future of Afghan democratic development.

Anthony Borden and John West. 2002. "Stirrings in Kabul." *Nation*. 275(7): 5.

*Abstract: Comments on politics and government in Kabul, Afghanistan. Influence of the loya jirga national council on the running of the country; Topic of the political leadership of President Hamid Karzai; Problems of poverty, sickness, and unemployment in the country.*

Larry Goodson. 2003. "Afghanistan's Long Road to Reconstruction." *Journal of Democracy*. 14(1): 82.

*Abstract: Urges the United States and the world to make a deeper commitment to peacekeeping and decentralized government to forestall a worst-case scenario in Afghanistan. Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.; Establishment of a workable government; Election of the Loya Jirga, the country's legislative body.*

Nigel J. R. Allan. 2003. "Rethinking Governance in Afghanistan." *Journal of International Affairs*. 56(2): 193.

*Abstract: Argues that the creation of a central government in Afghanistan can be accomplished by devolving centralized nation-state power out of Kabul. History of political instability; Ethnic identity in Afghanistan; Regionalization of foreign aid.*

Paul Jackson. 2003. "Warlords as alternative Forms of Governance." *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. 14(2): 131.

*Abstract: Warlord is a label that currently besets us on all fronts. The 2001-2002 military action in Afghanistan is illustrative of the West's ambivalent view of armed factions in the developing world in general. The*



*demonisation of the Taliban and the elevation of the former 'warlords' of the opposition to the rather more grandiose sounding 'Northern Alliance', at once formalising the hitherto informal nature of the warlord system, implies that the term 'warlord' is synonymous with anarchy, violence and a breakdown in civilised values. 'Warlord' has become an ugly, detrimental expression, evoking brutality, racketeering and terrorism. Analysts referring to violence across developing countries routinely refer to 'new wars' and 'post-modern' conflict, and yet the language used to describe these phenomena is usually pre-modern (medievalism, baronial rule, new feudalism). This article outlines some examples of historical warlords and draws out the common issues. In particular it emphasises the fact that warlords have been present for centuries and have periodically emerged whenever centralised political-military control has broken down. All that has changed through history is the technology available to each generation and the relative economic base. The article concludes with a series of implications for policy-makers currently considering intervention in warlord-based economies.*

John Jennings. 2004. "Afghanistan: The Gulf between Report and Reality." *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*. 6(1): 1.

*Abstract: This article focuses on the political conditions of Afghanistan. Earlier this month, Afghanistan's 502-delegate loya jirga approved the draft of a new constitution that concentrates power in the hands of a directly-elected president, with no prime minister as an alternate source of executive authority and only limited legislative oversight. Such portrayals merit special scrutiny because they mirror official statements by one of the country's main political factions. Meanwhile, Taliban apologists pilloried the United Front, a coalition of mujahideen who continued to resist the Taliban after the fall of Kabul, and its leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud.*

Hamid Karzai. 2004. "The Future of Afghanistan." *Vital speeches of the day*. 71(5): 130.

*Abstract: Presents a speech by Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, delivered to the world leaders and televised to the people of Afghanistan in Kabul on December 7, 2004. Information on how the people participated in the elections; Details of the manifesto presented by Karzai for the future to the people of Afghanistan; View on the fight against terrorism.*

Steven S. Lapham. 2002. "Forging a New Afghanistan." *Social Education*. 66(1): 26.

*Abstract: Reports on the formation of an interim government led by Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. Meeting of the loya jirga; Objective of the interim government; Representations by ethnic groups in the interim government.*

Gordon Peake. 2003. "From Warlords to Peacelords?" *Journal of International Affairs*. 56(2): 181.

*Abstract: Presents information on leadership and political change in Afghanistan as of 2003. Discussion on warlord politics; History of the political prominence of leaders; Information on the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing U.S.-led war against the Taliban.*

## **Democratic Intervention**

This section addresses the international influences on democratization in Afghanistan. The intervention attitude and approach utilized by the United States and general theory and practice of democratic advocacy in failed/failing nations are discussed in detail.

Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. 2002. "The Responsibility to Protect." *Foreign Affairs*. 81(6): 99.

*Abstract: Since September 11, 2001, international policy attention has been captured by the response to global terrorism and case for preemption against countries believed to be irresponsibly acquiring weapons of mass destruction. These issues, however, are conceptually and practically distinct. What is involved in the debates about intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere is the scope and limits of countries' rights to act in self-defense. If the international community is to respond to this challenge, the issue must be reframed, not as an argument about the right to intervene but about the responsibility to protect. At the heart of this conceptual approach is a shift in thinking about the essence of sovereignty, from control to responsibility. Of the precautionary principles needed to justify intervention, the first is 'right intention.' The second is 'last resort.' The third is 'proportional means.' Finally, there is the principle of 'reasonable prospects.' The most difficult and controversial principle to apply is that of 'right authority.' It is the responsibility of the whole international community to ensure that the mistakes of the 1990s will not be repeated. A good place to start would be agreement by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council to systematically apply the principles set out here to any such case.*

Francis Fukuyama. 2004. "The Imperative of State-Building." *Journal of Democracy*. 15(2): 17.

*Abstract: Argues that state-building must become a priority for the world community. Weak or failed states as root of serious global problems, including AIDS, drug trafficking and terrorism; Failure of democratic government; Major responsibility for nation- and state-building assumed by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq.*

Francis Fukuyama. 2004. "U.S. Must Balance Hard Power With Soft Power." *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly*. 21(3): 29.

*Abstract: After 9/11 attacks, everyone understands that out of failed states like Afghanistan come terrorists like Al Qaeda. The issue goes beyond terrorism arising from failed states to the broader problem of why the rest of the Third World outside of East Asia, from Latin America to Africa to the Middle East has been unable to develop. People are less willing to tolerate an authoritarian government. Not to have a democracy then becomes destabilizing because democracy is the basis of legitimacy in modern societies. We see this in Hong Kong today, where the per capita income is far beyond the cutoff point at about \$25,000.*

Eric J. Hobsbawm. 2004. "SPREADING DEMOCRACY. (Cover story)." *Foreign Policy*. (144): 40.

*Abstract: The article discusses the faults of democratization. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are but one part of a supposedly universal effort to create world order by "spreading democracy." The rhetoric surrounding this crusade implies that the system is applicable in a standardized (Western) form, that it can succeed everywhere, that it can remedy today's transnational dilemmas, and that it can bring peace, rather than sow disorder. Besides democracy's popularity, several other factors explain the dangerous and illusory belief that its propagation by foreign armies might actually be feasible. Globalization suggests that human affairs are evolving toward a universal pattern. This view underrates the world's complexity. One should always be suspicious when military powers claim to be doing favors for their victims and the world by defeating and occupying weaker states. "Spreading democracy" aggravated ethnic conflict and produced the disintegration of states in multinational and multicomunal regions after both 1918 and 1989, a bleak prospect. The effort to spread democracy is also dangerous in a more indirect way: It conveys to those who do not enjoy this form of government the illusion that it actually governs those who do. We now know something about how the actual decisions to go to war in Iraq were taken in at least two states of unquestionable democratic bona fides: the United States and the United Kingdom.*

*Other than creating complex problems of deceit and concealment, electoral democracy and representative assemblies had little to do with that process. Decisions were taken among small groups of people in private, not very different from the way they would have been taken in nondemocratic countries.*

Ahmed Rashid. 2001. "Afghanistan: Ending the Policy Quagmire." *Journal of International Affairs*. 54(2): 395.

*Abstract: Examines the sanctions, rogue status and foreign policy imposed by the United States on Afghanistan. History of the emergence of Taliban movement, a group of madrassa students, in Afghanistan; Details on the Taliban support for Islamic militancy; Prevalance of criminal activity in the country; Sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations Security Council on the Taliban in 1999.*

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 2004. Afghanistan: in pursuit of security and democracy: hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, October 16, 2003. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108%5Fsenate%5Fhearings&docid=f:91915.pdf>

This hearing discusses the future of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) as well as addressing the gambit of Afghan reconstruction issues on a regional and global scale. Democratization is discussed in the wider framework of regional stability and territorial security.

Jennifer L. Windsor. 2003. "Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism." *Washington Quarterly*. 26(3): 43.

*Abstract: Focuses on democratization of countries which has gained credence in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Logic behind the reduction in terrorist activities by democratization of nations; Launch of several initiatives by the U.S. to promote democratization in the Middle East; Political condition in Middle East.*

## Democracy and Islam

There has been worldwide debate about the prospects for Democracy in Islamic societies. Specifically, in the unique social and cultural structure of Middle Eastern Islamic states, democracy has taken on severely altered forms. Western-style democratic structures have been the model for many democratic Middle Eastern nations. However, states such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Jordan do not represent fully democratically consolidated systems. The following section includes references that address this historically problematic issue and examine the relative success of democracy and democratic advocacy in the Islamic context.

Ehteshami Anoushiravan. 2004. "Islam, Muslim Polities and Democracy." *Democratization*. 90.

*Abstract: Since 11 September 2001 (9/11) the international spotlight has been more firmly than ever on the Muslim world, and its Middle East heartland in particular. All aspects of life in Muslim societies -- history, educational system, attitudes towards the West, gender relations, cultural underpinnings, political and economic*

*systems, demography, foreign relations -- have been pored over by policy commentators and analysts in attempts to unearth the root causes of Islamist militancy against the West. Using the tools of political economy and social movement theories this analysis will debate the complex set of issues underlining many aspects of the 'Islam and democracy' debate, which today is very much about the relationship between Islam and governance. Indeed, as the debate itself since '9/11' has been increasingly shaped by priorities of western actors, whose traditional interests in the Muslim Middle East are now being driven by concerns about international stability, Muslims have tended to adopt an even more skeptical posture. Whether forced democratization can be effectively administered adds a new and interesting twist to the debates surrounding Islam and democracy, adding new dimensions to the already tangible impact of geopolitical factors on Muslim polities.*

Cheryl Benard. 2004. The Five Pillars of Democracy: how the west can promote an Islamic reformation. RAND.

<http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2004/pillars.html>.

This article discusses some interpretations of Islam (fundamentalism, secularism, traditionalism, and modernism) and how a five-tiered approach may aid in the reception and development of democratic policies in Muslim countries. Each Islamic follower is treated separately and subjected to the treatment put forth by the five-tiered approach. The design is aimed to minimize discontent among the more easily radicalized portions while maximizing communication between all groups especially democratic mediators.

Gary C. Gambill. 2004. "Democratization, the Peace Process, and Islamic Extremism." *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*. 6(6/7): 16.

*Abstract: The article presents information that the most common objection among Arab and Western critics alike is the claim that a concerted American campaign to promote democracy in the Middle East will be either ineffective or counterproductive in the absence of significant progress toward a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. Although Arab governments do typically justify repressive policies on this basis, outside of Lebanon and Syria (and, to a lesser extent, Jordan), the conflict with Israel does not directly affect, or even have the potential to directly affect, the livelihoods of Arab citizens. In light of deep popular antipathy to Israel in the Arab world, more representative and accountable Arab governments may have less flexibility in making peace, but they will certainly also have less flexibility in waging war.*

Robert W. Hefner. 2002. "Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics." *American Anthropologist*. 104(3): 754.

*Abstract: The attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States and the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan provoked fierce threats of violence in Indonesia, the world's largest majority-Muslim country. Western journalists portrayed these reactions as among the most destabilizing in the Muslim world. Less widely reported, however, was the intensification of a struggle between Muslim proponents of democracy and neofundamentalist conservatives, sparked by the same incidents. This article explores the varied reactions of Muslims to the violence of September 11 and its aftermath in light of this contest between rival Muslim groupings. It examines their competing visions of Islam and nation, as well as their supporting alliances in state and society. The example highlights the pluralism of Muslim politics and the special challenges of democratic transitions. Emphasizing the plurality and permeability of civilizations, the example also suggests that there is no "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West but, rather, a more open process of globalization, localization, and exchange.*

International Institute for Electoral Assistance And Democracy. 2005. The Arab World.  
[http://www.idea.int/publications/dem\\_arab\\_world/index.cfm](http://www.idea.int/publications/dem_arab_world/index.cfm)

Adrian Karatnycky. 2002. "Muslim Countries and the Democracy Gap." *Journal of Democracy*. 13(1): 99.

*Abstract: Focuses on the impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the democracy in Afghanistan. Tranquility of the advanced democracies; Decline of governments and market systems; Occurrence of gaps in the state of freedom.*

Vickie Langohr. 2004. "Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics." *Comparative Politics*. 36(2): 181.

*Abstract: Advocacy nongovernmental organizations have led major antiauthoritarian campaigns in many liberalizing Arab regimes because of the weakness of opposition parties. Their actions bode poorly for democratization because they are structurally incapable of sustaining successful campaigns against determined authoritarian regimes. To explain the weakness of opposition to Arab authoritarianism, it is necessary to examine the conditions that promote the expression of opposition through nongovernmental organizations rather than parties. These conditions include both severe limitations on party mobilization, the financial poverty of most opposition parties, and the dramatic increase in donor funds for advocacy nongovernmental organizations.*

Sadiki Larbi. 2000. "Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 32(102): 71.

*Abstract: Proposes that domestic political conflict presents opportunities for positive change with long-term effects despite the inherent plausibility of its harmfulness. Arab bread riots in the context of Arab democratizations; Discussion on Islamists, bread riots and the Arab social compact; Collapse of Dimuqratiyyat al-ḵhubz; Peculiarities of Arab democratic transitions.*

Anna Caroline Muller. 2004. "Legal issues arising from the armed conflict in Afghanistan." *Non-State Actors & International Law*. 4(3): 239.

*Abstract: The article is an attempt to shed some light on the legal issues arising from the armed conflict that took place in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks as concerns non-state actors. The first two parts consider the right of self-defence as a possible justification of the U.S. bombings. Can attacks by non-state actors qualify as "armed attacks" under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter? Secondly the legal limits of the exercise of the right of self-defence are considered, with focus on the possible adversaries of the actions of the defending state. In the third part, the imprisonment of the captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters is considered. The legal status of the detainees, the possible legal bases of the detention and the relationship of the legal bases with the treatment of prisoners are discussed.*

Andrew Reynolds. 2005. "Constitutional Medicine." *Journal of Democracy*. 16(101): 54.

*Abstract: Discusses the rediscovery of the discipline of constitutional design in nations struggling to move toward democratization. Efforts to bring peace and free self-government to countries such as South Africa, Bosnia, Fiji, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and Iraq; Experimentation with electoral systems and autonomy deals for outlying regions; Consideration of the involvement of communal minorities in government.*

Larbi Sadiki. 2000. "Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 32(1): 71.

*Abstract: Proposes that domestic political conflict presents opportunities for positive change with long-term effects despite the inherent plausibility of its harmfulness. Arab bread riots in the context of Arab democratizations; Discussion on Islamists, bread riots and the Arab social compact; Collapse of Dimuqratiyyat al-kubuz; Peculiarities of Arab democratic transitions.*

Amin Saikal. 2003. *Islam and the West: conflict or cooperation?* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mustapha Tlili. 2001. "Arab Democracy: A Possible Dream?" *World Policy Journal*. 18(3): 47.

*Abstract: Comments on democratic institutions in the Middle East. Functions of democratic institutions in the Arab world; Implications of the democratization of the Middle East for the world.*

## Elections

This section addresses the Afghan elections held in 2004. While issues of security, tribal discontent, and political maneuvering plagued the run-up to the election, the system proved relatively successful. As an integral feature of a democratic system, the Afghan elections served as the first step in a long road of reconstruction and democratization.

Thomas J. Barfield. 2005. "First Steps: The Afghan Elections." *Current History*. 104(680): 125.

*Abstract: Focuses on the efforts of the Afghan government to produce a successful election in a country that still lacked security. Historical background on the rise and fall of the Taliban; Selection of Hamid Karzai to form the interim government of post-Taliban Afghanistan; Concerns on the holding of a parliamentary elections in country with no firm foundation on party politics; Highlights of the election campaign and its outcome; Political initiatives of Karzai as the legitimacy of his government assured by the electoral victory.*

Robert H. Foglesong. 2005. "Successful elections in Afghanistan." *Armed Forces Journal International*. 143(6): 41.

*Abstract: The article comments on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and coalition forces deployed to Afghanistan. Since NATO took command of ISAF in August, these forces have been securing and maintaining a safe environment leading to the country's free elections. In the months leading up to the elections, NATO forces conducted patrols throughout Kabul, operated the city's international airport and coordinated civil-military cooperation for reconstruction and infrastructure projects--all to ensure a safe election.*

Larry P. Goodson. 2005. "AFGHANISTAN IN 2004: Electoral Progress and an Opium Boom." *Asian Survey*. 45(1): 88.

*Abstract: Afghanistan began and ended 2004 on high notes, with a moderate Constitution passed on January 4 and successful presidential elections held in October that created a new cabinet dominated by technocrats in late December. In between, slow progress on reconstruction and state-building was threatened by continuing insecurity and the presence of a booming opium crop.*

John Heller. 2003. Afghan Elections Jeopardized by Lack of Security. globalsecurity.org. Report #: 21.

Almost one year before the first free elections in Afghanistan are to be held in June 2004, foreign experts and Afghan political groups have warned for the first time that the failure to disarm the warlords could not only jeopardize the voting process but also the whole peace process.

Jim Ingalls and Sonali Kolhatkar. 2004. Afghan Elections: U.S. Solution to a U.S. Problem. Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies.  
[http://www.fpif.org/papers/0410afghanelect\\_body.html](http://www.fpif.org/papers/0410afghanelect_body.html)

Group International Crisis. 2004. Elections and security in Afghanistan. International Crisis Group.

Addresses the elections in Afghanistan and the security situation surrounding them. Emphasizes the disarmament and reintegration process of militant groups as a way of ensuring successful elections, guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of electoral institutions, and ensuring the representation of nonmilitarized political parties and independent candidates participating in the process.

Missy Ryan. 2004. "Afghanistan's Bumpy Road to Elections." *National journal*. 36(29): 2255.

*Abstract: Provides information on Afghanistan's first presidential election scheduled in October 2004. Reason for the postponement of the election in June; Countries that donated funds for the election; Views of some Afghans on the election's outcome.*

Mark Sedra. 2004. Afghanistan: democracy before peace. Foreign Policy In Focus.

Covers the issues of election fraud, security, post-election scenarios, and degrees of international support for the Afghan elections.