

January 1995

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Recommended Citation

Nuclear Proliferation: The Post-Cold-War Challenge, 24 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 245 (1995).

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Book Notes

BEE, RONALD J., *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE POST-COLD-WAR CHALLENGE*, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY (1995). (\$5.95); ISBN 0-87124-160-9; 72 pp. (pbk).

Each issue of the Foreign Policy Association's Headline Series aims at "every serious reader, specialized or not, who takes an interest in the subject." While the specialized reader may find Mr. Bee's resource book on Nuclear Proliferation rudimentary, as a whole, this volume reaches its target through a serious and thought-provoking discussion of an otherwise arcane subject. *Nuclear Proliferation* offers a topographical map delineating the issues arising from the nuclear threat, the institutions established to confront those issues, and the state of the debate in the post-Cold War era.

Mr. Bee finds three nuclear races at work since the detonation at Alamogordo: 1) the World War II race between United States and Germany; 2) the Cold War competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., with Britain, France and China playing a smaller, albeit no less significant, part; and 3) the efforts to place nuclear weapons and their proliferation under the auspices of some international regime, ignited by the Cold War controversy.

The first two sections of the book recount the early years of the nuclear era and the questions left for resolution in modern-day international relations. Of the factors driving the nuclear age, fear, says Bee, supplies the crucial psychological motive. This fear encourages countries to develop nuclear systems at both the international level and the state level.

Enter the Nonproliferation Regime, focusing on supply-side, "denial" policies. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) articulates the policy design for the lid on a nuclear pandorabox. The IAEA functions as the authority to effectuate that lid, facilitating the transfer of civilian nuclear technology and verifying compliance with NPT provisions. In keeping abreast of technological advances, the Zangger Committee maintains a list of materials and equipment designed for non-weapons use, but with military applications subject to IAEA safeguards. Agreements such as the Treaty of Rarotonga and the ABM Treaty stem horizontal (weapons denial beyond existing nuclear states) and vertical (weapons reduction within existing stockpiles) proliferation.

The fourth section describes areas of potential strain on nonprolifer-

ation. "Hot spots," such as the former Soviet Republics, the Middle Eastern countries, and South Asian nations such as India, pose a threat to the nonproliferation movement. Bee discusses U.S. attempts to implement a "dual containment" policy in the hopes of averting a spread of nuclear weapons to both Iran and Iraq. What sets Bee's discussion apart from simple reporting is his combination of personal viewpoints with those of other scholars, practitioners and policy makers. In this manner, the reader is left with a feel for the complexity of the issues and the boundaries of the debate.

What are the limits to stemming proliferation? As mentioned above, the book only obliquely examines the Regime's effectiveness. Thus far, the Regime's health has been bolstered by several successes, such as the resolution of Argentina's and Brazil's nuclear differences and their accession to the NPT. Yet Bee points out that despite the presence of the NPT, South Africa has developed a nuclear capacity, states such as Italy and Japan have developed the ability to produce weapons within a relatively short period of time, and the former Soviet Union may allow weapons-grade plutonium to travel across borders in exchange for sorely-needed hard currency.

The final section addresses these difficulties through a discussion of the Clinton Administration's nonproliferation policy goals. These include: a strengthening of existing nonproliferation norms and agreements; trouble-shooting; domestic-export control regulations tailored toward nonproliferation and commercial objectives; and, military objectives, including the doctrine of "counterproliferation" should the nonproliferation trend reverse. This section also offers problems with and criticisms of each of these goals.

This user-friendly resource includes a map charting the global spread of nuclear weapons to present day, a summary reference of the NPT, a glossary, and an annotated reading list. As worldwide events progress, the book's greatest strength will lie in its particular applicability to the post-Cold War nuclear proliferation concerns. These cover policy-polemics, such as nuclear testing and a test ban treaty, implications of the have/have-not problem, and security concerns from control of nuclear materials — all are issues likely to endure and perhaps outstrip the rapid pace of technology.

Marco Madriz

CUMINGS, BRUCE, *DIVIDED KOREA: UNITED FUTURE?*; Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY (Spring 1995); (\$5.95); ISBN 0-87124-164; 88 pp. (softcover).

Cumings believes that it is imperative for Americans to understand the past and present role of the United States in Korea and to learn about the history of the "two Koreas." In the absence of such knowledge,