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Organizational Conflict within the Department of Homeland Security

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A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the University of Denver

University of Denver

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In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Masters of Arts in Conflict Resolution

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by

M. Katherine Manderson

November 2008

Advisor: Karen Feste

Author: M. Katherine Manderson  
Title: Organizational Conflict within the DHS  
Advisor: Karen Feste  
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**Abstract**

This thesis seeks to explain why the Department of Homeland Security had difficulty fulfilling its roles when it was formed, specifically its role as grant administrator. Role theory surmises that conflict arises from unclear expectations, conflicting expectations, and too many roles. This study utilized various public testimonies, legislation, and other government documents to examine how the missions of the twenty-two agencies that were merged together to make up DHS changed. Even though DHS has changed continually over the five years since its existence most employees seem to be clear on the mission of the organization in which they work. However, there is still a considerable amount of conflict resulting from the agencies being forced together in such a frankensteinian way.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

ACIR	U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services
AQI	Agricultural Quarantine Inspection
ARS	Agriculture Research Services
CBP	Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CCP	Citizen Corps Program
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAO	Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
CRS	Congressional Research Services
DEST	Domestic Energy Support Team
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOT	Department of Transportation
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
EML	Environmental Measurements Laboratory
EMPG	Emergency Management Program Grants
EO	Executive Order
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
ESA	Energy Security and Assurance Program
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FedCIRC	Federal Computer Incident Response Center
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHCS	Federal Human Capital Survey
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
FPS	Federal Protective Services
FY	Fiscal Year
G&T	Office of Grants and Training
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GSA	General Services Administration
HHS	Health and Human Services
HSARPA	Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
HSO	Homeland Security Organization
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HSSTAC	Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
IAIP	Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
ICE	Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IG	Inspector General
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Services

LETPP	Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevent Program
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
MMRS	Metropolitan Medical Response Services
MSPB	Merit Systems Promotion Board
MTSA	Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
NBACC	National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
NCS	National Communications System
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NDPO	National Domestic Preparedness Office
NHSA	National Homeland Security Agency
NIPC	National Infrastructure Protection Center
NIPC	National Infrastructure Protection Center
NIRT	Nuclear Incident Response Team
NISAC	National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NYPD	New York Police Department
ODP	Office of Domestic Programs
OHS	Office of Homeland Security
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ONP	Office of National Preparedness
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PL	Public Law
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
SHSP	State Homeland Security Program
SLGCP	State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
SNS	Strategic National Stockpile
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
UASI	Urban Areas Security Initiative
US-CERT	U.S Computer Emergency Readiness Team
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

August 29, 2005 hurricane Katrina, a category 3 hurricane, struck the gulf coast. The hurricane itself brought significant damage to the region, but also breached the levees of New Orleans causing catastrophic damage the area. Many people believed that this was the first test of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that had been created only two years previously. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) became a part of DHS during the largest government restructuring to take place since President Truman. DHS took twenty-two independent government agencies with over 180,000 employees and merged them into one cabinet level department. Merging with DHS relegated FEMA from an independent agency to part of the much larger DHS, but gave access to a wider range of resources (PBS, 2005). The merger also altered the focus of FEMA from all-hazards to terrorism. According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO), nearly three out of every four FEMA grant dollars in 2005 went to programs solely concerned with terrorism-related disasters (GAO, 2005). Not only did the majority of grant funding go to terrorism-related disasters, but training was also focused on terrorism incidents. The GAO found that thirty-one of thirty-nine first responder departments agreed that training was adequate for terrorist attacks, but not natural disasters (PBS, 2005). The alteration of mission from an all-hazards focus to one of terrorism led to an unclear role for FEMA and conflict.

The purpose of this study is to examine how role theory explains the conflict within the various agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and how that conflict affected its ability to accomplish its role within the government. By ascertaining which agencies assumed new roles after becoming a part of DHS, this study will observe

the ways in which they were structurally incapable of reconciling these post-restructuring new roles with their pre-restructuring duties and were thus unable to fulfill DHS' stated mission of providing guidance to the states on homeland security funding issues. This study examines the missions of the twenty-two agencies that were combined to create DHS, looking towards the various laws that created DHS and other Congressional testimony by principal employees of DHS and others. First, this study will highlight how DHS was created and how the current grant process operates. Then, this study will examine the sources of conflict between DHS and the various audiences that held expectations for DHS. Then, this study will examine role theory literature highlighting how role theory helps to explain this conflict. Finally, this study will examine lessons learned and how to rectify any role conflict that is present.

### ***Methodology***

Understanding the basic tenets of role theory, this study hypothesizes that as the mission of the twenty-two agencies changed from independent government entities to components of a larger DHS, role conflict increased and there was less satisfaction with DHS as a whole, both from employees and the audiences (the states, Congress, other agencies) who had high expectations for the new department. As duties were added to an agency, prioritizing those duties added strain to the role that the agency performed before becoming a part of the DHS and it in turn experienced role conflict. In addition, the more that agencies were called on to coordinate with each other without a clarification of roles, the more conflict resulted.

To understand the effect that mission change had on each agency that merged to form DHS, this study examines all twenty-two agencies before the creation of DHS, in

2002 and after. This study utilized the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296) to obtain the mission Congress intended each agency to have after it was incorporated into DHS. This study examined Congressional testimony, speeches by leaders within DHS, and legislation concerning DHS to see how the DHS leadership identified the roles of the agencies within DHS. This study examined the Federal Capital Human survey from 2004 and 2006 and the Merit Systems Promotion Board survey from 2005 to see how the employees of DHS felt about their performance and mission accomplishment. While other functions transferred into DHS, as well this paper will only focus on the main twenty-two agencies that were transferred into the new department.

### ***The Creation of a Department***

The creation of DHS was not the only option available to the President after September 11<sup>th</sup>. It was not, in fact, the first option enacted. The first federal organizational response was to create an Executive Order coordinator position, which President Bush did on October 8, 2001 with Executive Order (EO) 13228. This established an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) within the White House. Governor Tom Ridge was appointed to head the office as the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The Office of Homeland Security was tasked with “coordinating the executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States” (EO No. 13228, 2001). According to the Executive Order, the main mission of the office was to “develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the U.S. from terrorist threats or attacks” (EO No. 13228, 2001).

The executive order emphasized that every federal agency had a degree of responsibility for homeland security. The advantage of having an OHS is that “the director is positioned to rise above the particular interests of any one particular agency, and he is located close to the president to resolve cross-agency disagreements. The OHS also provides flexibility by relying on the broad executive power of the president” (Wise, 2002). This office was envisioned as functioning similarly to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, a coordinating body that would coalesce all executive branch parties, which concern or relate to homeland security. There were a number of disadvantages to only have an OHS primarily, no accountability to Congress. “It is difficult to believe Congress would permit the development of a national strategy for countering terrorism to exist for very long without establishing political accountability to the legislative branch. Another disadvantage is that without a legislative framework providing budgetary authority and staff, the power of the office is uncertain and subject to the vagaries of the president or future presidents’ attention to homeland security, which can wax and wane over the years ahead” (Wise, 2002). These disadvantages ultimately led to the downfall of the OHS.

In 1998 Defense Secretary, William H. Cohen, chartered a bi-partisan commission to provide a comprehensive review of national security for the emerging era. The Hart-Rudman Commission, named for its co-chairs, issued a final report recommending “the creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security” (U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001). The commission further recommended that the new agency be built

“upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the three organizations currently on the front line of border security—the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol—transferred to it. The National Homeland Security Agency would not only protect American lives, but also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure including information technology. The National Homeland Security Agency Director would have Cabinet status and would be a statutory advisor to the National Security Council” (U.S Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, 2001). The Commission also recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) restructure, the National Guard be tasked with homeland security as its primary mission, and finally that Congress restructure itself so as “to accommodate this Executive Branch realignment, and that it also form a special select committee for homeland security to provide Congressional support and oversight in this critical area” (U.S Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, 2001). At the time, the responsibility for national security was diffused across a number of Congressional committees. According to Perrow (2006) there were “eleven Senate committees and fourteen House committees, as well as a large number of subcommittees, eighty-eight in all overseeing homeland security efforts.”

Shortly after September 11<sup>th</sup>, Senator Lieberman (I-CT), then Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, called “for the establishment of a permanent, homeland security agency with broad responsibilities to protect against threats to the American people, including terrorist attacks” (U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Press Statement, 2001). On October 11, 2001 Senator Lieberman and Senator Specter (R-PA) introduced S. 1534, a bill to establish the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS). This bill transferred FEMA, the U.S Customs Service from the Department of Treasury, the Border Patrol from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Coast Guard, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and the Institute of Information Infrastructure Protection from the Department of Commerce, and the National Infrastructure Protection Center and that National Domestic Preparedness Office from the DOJ into the new cabinet-level agency (Act to Establish a Department of Homeland Security, 2001). These agencies were to be organized into three directorates: the directorate of prevention, the directorate of critical infrastructure, and the directorate of emergency preparedness and response. Under this bill, Congress would not restructure, committees would maintain the same oversight they had previously.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 passed both the Senate and the House and was signed into law on November 25, 2002. This bill created a much larger department than that proposed by Senator Lieberman (I-CT) and Senator Specter (R-PA). The White House proposed more agencies transferred into DHS and transferred them into four directorates. Again Congress did not restructure, committees maintained the same oversight as they had previously.

After the bill was signed into law, “President Bush set a four-month deadline for DHS to open its doors to the twenty-two agencies that had to move” (Perrow, 2006). However, this move was in name only as there was limited space in which the DHS headquarters was set-up and the majority of agencies would not move physical locations. The fact that no agencies moved physical locations contributed to the initial confusion and conflict within the Department. The Department formally came into being on March 1, 2003 although a skeleton version had been in existence since January 24<sup>th</sup> (The

American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2003). Officials stated that more than 180,000 employees were transferred into DHS from twenty-two agencies. However, a number of the departments, that were losing agencies, decimated those agencies slated to transfer prior to them being subsumed into DHS. John Rollins, who became Chief of Staff for the new DHS intelligence section, recalls absolute chaos in the early months of the new Department. In particular within his office “there was no Under Secretary, no Assistant Secretary and just ten aides out of the three hundred the office was supposed to hire. Many of the new DHS offices had been picked apart by the Departments from which they came; Rollins had moved with the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, one of three of the center’s one-hundred and fifty staffers to make the switch” (Glasser & Grunwald, 2005). According to reports from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) by September 30, 2003 the DHS permanent workforce was 109,655 employees.<sup>1</sup> However, the Partnership for Public Service reports that DHS had 126,276 employees in fiscal year (FY) 2004, which began October 1, 2003. Both of these numbers indicate that DHS lost thousands of federal employees who were to have transferred from their previous Departments.

Not only were the twenty-two agencies transferred into the new Department, there were also several human resource systems, over nineteen accounting offices, 8,500 buildings, \$44.6 billion in assets, and \$36.7 billion in liabilities. Each agency transferred brought its previous appropriations levels with it. Congress passed a consolidated supplemental appropriations bill in February of 2003, however DHS was not created until

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<sup>1</sup> This is only a report of permanent full-time employees and doesn’t account for contractors and part-time employees.

March of that year, so the supplemental only provided marginal increases in funding for a number of programs within the new Department.

Private sector mergers and acquisitions typically take between five and seven years to function effectively, and that sector has more advantages than the public sector (Perrow, 2006). Public sector mergers have to deal with more stakeholders and power centers, less management flexibility, and greater transparency than in the private sector (Walker, 2002). The sheer magnitude of the merger was simply overwhelming for all the involved parties. Department leaders “worked almost full time on the merger, too busy to do much more than manage their inboxes, referee internal turf wars, and wage losing battles with departments that commanded more clout at the White House” (Glasser & Grunwald, 2005). Congress also required the Department to report to it regularly, within its first year of creation, Congress called on the leaders of DHS to testify one hundred and sixty times, about every day and a half (Perrow, 2006). All of this detracted from the agency’s ability to fulfill its mission and to cope with the high expectations leveled upon the new department.

### ***Areas of Conflict***

According to Steven Stehr (2005), there are two coordination problems within homeland security. The first is that large-scale organizations often struggle to coordinate the efforts of their sub-units. This problem is exacerbated when a number of agencies with pre-existing missions and organizational cultures are merged, as in the case of DHS (Stehr, 2005). The second problem occurs when multiple organizations in a given policy area have overlapping responsibilities and must work within inter-organizational networks to address public problems. Homeland security includes not only DHS, but

local and state governments and public health officials. Depending on the type of emergency, the list of relevant actors could be staggering.

A number of government agencies survey full time staff to understand how governmental organizations are operating. The Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) is a survey of full-time permanent employees that measures their perceptions of whether and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their agencies. The survey was first administered in 2002 and has continued to be reissued every two years since. The DHS was not established until 2003, so the first measure of the department came in 2004. In 2006 the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which administers the survey, sent the survey to 390,657 employees from the major agencies on the President's Management Council and the small/independent agencies. The Office of Personnel management received 221,479 responses for a response rate of 57 percent across the government (OPM, Message to Federal Employees, 2006). The DHS is a part of the President's Management Council and had 10,367 employees respond in 2006, which is a 56 percent response rate (OPM, FHCS, 2006). This number is similar to the number of respondents for 2004. The OPM then weighted the responses to average them across the responding agencies, 10,367 represents the sample of the DHS population. All of the questions were on the standard Likert scale. Employees rated statements on whether they strongly agreed, agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed, strongly disagreed, or didn't know. Overall the DHS did not score well on the survey. However, there were a few high points.

A number of the questions asked the employee to rate the mission, goals and priorities of the agency; 76.4 percent of the respondents stated that they knew how their

work related to the agency's goals and priorities, and 48.6 percent believed that managers communicated the goals and priorities of the organization (OPM, FHCS, 2006). As is evident by these responses, the majority of DHS employees indicated that they understood the mission of the overall mission of DHS; however, they may not have understood how their organization fits within DHS as a whole and therefore may experience role conflict. Addressing the FHCS results before Congress, DHS Under Secretary for Management, Paul Schneider (2007) stated, "although the general results of the survey were disappointing we are encouraged by the fact that DHS employees have passion for our mission. 89 percent of employees report that they believe the work they do is important, and 80 percent like the work that they do. This is a strong foundation to build upon for improvement."

The U.S Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) is an independent, quasi-judicial agency in the Executive branch that serves as the guardian of Federal merit systems (MSPB, About MSPB, 2008). Since 1983, the MSPB has surveyed the Federal workforce every two years to measure the "health" of federal merit systems principles (Merit Principles Survey, Welcome, 2007). In 2005, the MSPB sent 74,000 employees the survey and received 36,926 responses, a response rate of approximately 50 percent. The MSPB only surveyed 24 agencies, one of which was the DHS. The first series of questions asked about the understanding of the agency mission, and within the DHS, 90 percent of respondents replied that they understood their agency's mission (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005). Again this indicated understanding of the overall mission of DHS and not of the individual agencies within the organization. The only agency that did worse than DHS on this question was the Department of Transportation (DOT), which had 89

percent of respondents agreeing that they understood their agency's mission. The MSPB reported that the lower understanding might be due to a reorganization of the agencies that became a part of the DHS. "A recently restructured organization is still defining its mission and communicating the nature of that mission to its employees. Even employees who do not change jobs in such reorganization can be expected to be somewhat unsure that their mission remains the same. A comparison of the degree to which agency mission is understood in recently restructured organizations (92 percent) versus relatively stable organizations (98 percent) provides some support for this assertion" (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005). Only 37 percent of respondents stated that their organization had remained stable over the past two years preceding the survey (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005). DHS has continually changed since it was created, this may correlate with its low numbers, however this was a snapshot in time during the early years of the department.

One byproduct of the myriad of changes that DHS has gone through is the effect on services and products. Only 51 percent of DHS employees believe that their agency produces high quality products and services (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005). DHS was the lowest ranked agency out of 24 agencies on the MSPB survey. 43.3 percent of employees also do not feel as if they are rewarded for providing high quality products and services to customers (OPM, FHCS, 2006). Due to the fact that employees do not feel rewarded for providing high quality products, this may directly relate to why only 51 percent of employees believe that the DHS produces high quality products and services.

Another area where the DHS ranked the lowest of the 24 agencies participating was job satisfaction; only 58 percent of employees were satisfied with their job (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005). Similarly, only 56.6 percent of employees of DHS stated that they

were satisfied with their job considering everything (OPM, FHCS, 2006). On the FHCS survey 79.7 percent of respondents agreed that they liked the kind of work that they did. Employees may like what they do, but not be satisfied with their job due to lack of clarity of expectations for their role within the agency. 35 percent of the DHS respondents stated that they were likely to leave their agency within the next 12 months as well (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005). This could also be attributed to retirement eligibility. The OPM anticipates as many as 60 percent of the workforce will qualify for retirement over the next 10 years (OPM, FHCS, 2006).

The agencies that make up the DHS have gone through a myriad of rapid change and have had to transform into a unified cabinet-level department with new roles to accompany that change and new processes to accomplish their goals. The agencies had to learn to work together and function as one team, when in a number of situations the employees may have felt a bit more competition with their new colleagues. In creating a new department, several obstacles were present including establishing a new organizational identity without moving the agencies' physical location or altering the reliance of employees on the old organization for administrative support, answers to questions, and even clarification of their role and how to balance coordination between the two organizations.

Uncertainty and ambiguity are continually present when undertaking a restructuring of any kind; it is even more so in a large restructuring where the employees remain in the same location. Trying to find a headquarters for DHS has been a controversial and time-consuming task. After five years, DHS is still spread out over 40 locations and 70 buildings throughout the Washington, DC area. Not only did the agencies that make up

DHS not have one location to report to, they also had to find new employees to fill a number of positions in which the employees did not make the transition to the new department, but chose to remain with their old department. For some agencies, this meant that they began their work in DHS with a significant loss of institutional knowledge and a burden to hire a number of new employees quickly. This loss of institutional knowledge also affects organizational identity. One-way in which organizations establish a culture is through the emphasis of 'this is how we do things around here.' Without the established routine, organizations can have difficulty creating new cultures within the DHS. However, they may also lose an efficient way of performing their roles.

Another source of conflict in establishing an organizational culture and trying to relieve conflict for employees was the placement of the agencies within DHS. Some agencies were placed in directorates that did not match the goals and mission of the pre-restructured mission and goals of the agency. Some agencies were separated into a number of new agencies and placed into different directorates, however the agencies physical location never changed. The placement of an agency in a directorate can contribute to conflict because the expectations that the DHS has forth for a specific directorate may not be the same as the expectations for the agencies that were placed within it. Therefore the agency will experience role conflict because their mission does not contribute to the overall mission of the directorate. Not only will the employees experience conflict because of this, but also they may not then understand where their agency fits within the DHS.

Employees not only had to understand their role within a directorate, but also the other agencies that were placed in that directorate with them. In a number of cases, if two agencies work on similar areas and there is mission overlap the agencies may experience a turf-war. The leaders of the DHS had to motivate employees to work towards a common goal and communicate that employees are on the same team within the department. However, due to identity and role confusion these turf-wars did not just dissipate because the employees were told that they now composed a common team.

Employees did not just have to work with other employees with whom they may have a conflict with, but they also had to deal with the addition of new roles, which were different from their original mission. Employees did not just acquire new roles, but new roles were emphasized over the old roles, one example is FEMA employees; terrorism was emphasized over all-hazards. Employees not only needed to switch fluidly between these new and old roles, in some cases the new roles appear to be incompatible with the old roles.

Some offices within the DHS were new. They not only had to deal with the role conflict and identity issues that accompany any merger, they also had to deal with being a start-up organization. Each organization within the DHS was expected to immediately perform exceptionally. All agencies within the DHS were given a large magnitude of work as well. However, large bureaucracies with unclear roles often have problems performing efficiently or quickly. The DHS also had numerous audiences and each with different expectations for the organization.

State and local governments expected assistance for preparing for another terrorist attack, while Congress expected grants to be allocated quickly and all roles to be fulfilled.

Employees expected DHS to be responsive to their needs and give guidance to how they should perform their jobs. The President and public expected DHS to fulfill all roles assigned to it both pre-merger and post-merger. While these expectations may be congruous, the varied expectations from different audiences contributed to role overload, role conflict, and role ambiguity. It also led to a lack of trust; “the trust necessary to make homeland security intergovernmental partnerships work is lacking among many city and state officials, as well as some DHS employees due to the lack of role clarity” (Stehr, 2005).

### ***In Sum***

DHS was created specifically to be a unifier of the agencies that monitor and enforce laws at the border, and provide state and local municipalities a centralized location to ask questions and apply for grants, and enhance information sharing to the states. Mergers and acquisitions take years, the President gave DHS four months to combine twenty-two agencies, approximately 180,000 employees, billions of dollars in assets and liabilities, and numerous HR and accounting systems, into four functioning directorates. Such a massive reorganization takes time even when employees change physical locations. The employees that merged together to form the DHS not only had to deal with remaining in the same physical location, but they also had to learn to work together on the same team, learn new roles, and meet high expectations from a number of audiences. DHS still does not have a central location and employees do not understand how to balance their various roles. The frankensteinian way, i.e. a monstrous creation that ruins its creator, that the Department was developed inhibited its ability to fulfill all the roles of the various audiences looking to it for assistance.

## **Chapter 2 The Theory of Roles**

Conflicts occur every day resulting from many causes. One cause is the lack of understanding of a designated role within a social system. Every day people and organizations fulfill a number of roles. To understand an organization's role, one can examine their mission statement. According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,

the primary mission of the DHS is to: (A) prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism; (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the U.S.; (D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the DHS including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning; (E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the DHS that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress; (F) ensure that the overall economic security of the U.S. is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and (G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking (P.L. 107-296).

As noted in this mission the twenty-two agencies that combined to form the DHS already had established roles within the government. No one government agency merged into the DHS had as its primary mission to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S. That was one of the reasons that Congress created the DHS. However by combining these various agencies into a new environment the role that those agencies were filling was altered, as a result of this conflict arose within these agencies. According to Banton (1965), a "role" can be defined as a set of norms or expectations applied to the incumbent of a particular position. However, how roles are defined depends upon the audience defining the expectations for a position and how much consensus there is between those defining the role. Roles also depend upon the social system within which they are defined. Conflict results from unclear expectations for the role, too many expectations for a role occupant,

and contradictory expectations for a role. This chapter will provide an overview of role theory, the basic concepts of role theory, the expectations of the DHS, and how mission statements outline expectations of an organization.

### ***Overview***

Biddle and Thomas (1966) state that the “role analyst is concerned with describing and understanding many of the same complex aspects of human behavior about which dramatists, novelists, journalists, and historians write.” Role theorists have examined individuals in various social systems to try and gain a better understanding about why people act as they do. Role theory is not one grand theory (Biddle and Thomas, 1966; Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966), however, it cannot be rejected outright because the problems of role theory are inexplicably bound to the general problems of sociology and social psychology (Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966). To truly understand role theory, one must first dissect what a role is.

The literature does not reach a consensus as to the definition of role theory. Holsti (1977) outlines the fact that there is no one overarching definition because “scholars tend to define the term to suit their research needs. Since the concept of role is used at so many different levels of analysis – from exploration of a group of children learning to conform to the expectations of their elders, to theories of society – it is little wonder that a universal meaning of the term has not yet been developed.” Most role theorists believe that a role is the manifestation of a persons behavior influenced by the expectations of others in specific contexts (Gross, Mason, & McEachern, 1966; Biddle & Thomas, 1966; Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Seo & Hill, 2005). The expectations that people assume for various roles are learned through experience,

culture, and the social systems within which people interact. Therefore, people come to understand how to enact specific roles by observation, learning, and interaction with others in social systems. They must learn the culture of an organization e.g. ‘this is how we do things around here’ and the other unspoken nuances of how a given organization operates. However, according to Nicholson (1984), role development varies according to the constraints and opportunities of the needs and expectations of the person fulfilling that role. Each role will be altered slightly by the person who is assuming it, and the same roles will not be identical because each role involves a different person thus making it unique.

The other component of this definition is the fact that these roles are fulfilled within a social system. The type of social system is a matter of debate in and of itself and often depends on which sub-field of role theory one consults. Over time five main perspectives of role theory have emerged; organizational, functional, symbolic interactionist, structural, and cognitive. One of the most prevalent and researched perspectives is organizational. Organizational role theorists have built “a version of role theory focused on social systems that are preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical” (Biddle, 1986). “Organizational role theory proposes that individuals in organizations occupy positions or roles which involve a set of activities, including interactions with others, that are required or expected as part of the job” (Karakowsky and McBey, 1999). In this area of role theory, roles are influenced by the organization, the individuals within that organization, and informal groups that permeate the organization.

Functional role theory focuses on the characteristic behaviors of persons who occupy social positions within a stable social system (Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999). In

this sub-field roles arise from normative expectations about a function in society and individuals are socialized into a role (Guirguis and Chewning, 2005). However, there are a number of criticisms surrounding this concept of roles especially because not all roles are identified with social positions. Furthermore, social systems are hardly stable, and all roles contained therein are not necessarily associated with function (Biddle, 1986).

Symbolic interactionist role theory stresses the roles of individual actors, the evolution of roles through social interaction, and various cognitive concepts through which social actors understand and interpret their own conduct (Sarbin & Allen, 1954; Zurcher, 1983; Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999). In this school of thought little attention is given to the expectations that people have for the person occupying said role.

Researchers in this field focus on the individual and how the role and individual interact. The effects that each has upon the other as well as how diverse individuals in different roles interact with other people in their roles.

Structural role theory “represents a systems approach to a group-task situation and proceeds from the assumption that an account of the structure of the system must precede an effective study of its processes or dynamics” (Kabanoff, 1988). Like symbolic interactionist, structural role theory pays little attention to expectations, here the emphasis is on the social environment with less concerns about the individual within that environment (Campbell, 1999). This branch of role theory utilizes mathematical symbols to explain social structures, which are a stable organization of individuals (Guirguis and Chewning, 2005). Structural role theory does not enjoy a large following as its assumptions are limiting and many social scientists are not willing to accept arguments expressed in mathematical symbols (Biddle, 1986).

Cognitive role theory focuses on the relationships between role expectations and behavior (Biddle, 1986). Researchers studying cognitive role theory have examined the ways in which a person perceives the expectations of others and the effects of those perceptions on behavior (Campbell, 1999). Empirical research in this expansive perspective has studied role-playing, norms, anticipatory role expectations, and the effects of role taking on behavior. Criticisms of this theory are that it tends to focus on the individual, fails to account for the impact of environment, and tends to ignore the evolution of roles (Guirguis and Chewing, 2005). The five branches of role theory overlap and each has utilized some basic concepts to understand the problems associated with role theory and the obstacles people face in the roles that they occupy.

### ***Basic Concepts***

Consensus is an important basic concept to role theory. Consensus is the degree to which agreement of the expectations for a role exists by those defining the role. According to Gross, et al (1958), the degree of consensus among role definers is an important variable in how roles are filled. Just as there is never a complete absence of consensus, there can never be a complete presence of consensus since roles are defined by multiple groups and it is rare that multiple groups of people will agree (Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966; Gross et al, 1958; Biddle, Rosencranz, Tomich, and Twyman, 1966). However, consensus can be affected by a number of factors, one being the size of the organization. The smaller the organization the more likely consensus will exist (Thomas, 1966). The number of role definers also has a bearing on consensus. The less role definers there are the more likely there will be consensus among them regarding how a

person should perform in a particular role. In the majority of situations, roles are defined upon a continuum.

Role conflict occurs when people are charged with a role for which there is no consensus. Role conflict is any situation in which the incumbent of a focal position perceives that there are incompatible expectations (Gross et al, 1958; Sarbin and Allen, 1954; Kahn et al, 1964; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000). Some researchers studying role conflict have examined the various types of role conflict, and whether the conflict exists within the role itself or rests instead in the person that is holding two roles simultaneously. Most researchers examine role conflict and the ramifications it has on social systems from the context of people who assume a given role. Jackson and Schuler (1985) found role conflict to be negatively associated with six different aspects of job satisfaction and positively associated with tension, anxiety, propensity to leave the organization, and individual productivity. Floyd and Lane (2000) point out that when individuals interact within well-defined roles, their interactions become more predictable, which in turn increases ones level of trust in an organization. Therefore, roles, which are not clear and explicit, create interactions that are less predictable and the trust needed to facilitate exchanges within the group is more difficult to develop. There is a debate about whether role conflict is the result of contradictory expectations. According to Preiss and Ehrlich “contradictory expectations cannot be fulfilled, but all of the expectations can be ignored” (1966). Gross et al (1958) had similar findings in their research begging the question; if the occupant of the role does not believe the expectations of said role to be incompatible, then does the conflict truly exist?

Of course not all situations have contradictory expectations; sometimes there is a lack of information regarding expectations for a role. This is known as role ambiguity. A number of factors cause role ambiguity including: organizational complexity, rapid organizational change, and current managerial philosophies (Kahn et al, 1964). Role ambiguity can also be seen as employees' perceptions of uncertainty concerning various aspects of their job (Breugh and Colihan, 1994). Kahn et al, outlined that the ambiguity was caused when not only expectations were unclear, but also priorities, behaviors and performance levels as well. Role ambiguity interferes with goal accomplishment by employees, which in turn affects mission accomplishment by the organization.

Another concept examined within role theory is that of role overload. Role overload occurs when a person is faced with too many expectations (Biddle, 1986). Not only too many expectations, but also too many roles. Finding a balance between roles and the expectations of overlapping roles can be quite stressful. Being unable to perform a role due to lack of skill or because the occupant's personal values differ with other expectations for a certain role may have a similar effect as role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload. All of these issues may occur for a role occupant, and most are seen to have negative effects on the role occupant. However, this is not always the case.

With role overload, as one obtains more roles they also obtain more rights. While some of these roles may cause conflict with each other, some actually complement the existing roles that a given person holds. This is known as role accumulation. For example, a person may join a professional organization in order to gain networking opportunities. After being a member for a period of time they may decide that their career would be better served if they were in a position on the board. This new role is

acquired to further a role that the person already occupies. Sieber (1974) outlines four positive outcomes from role accumulation, such as the aforementioned example. The first outcome of role accumulation is role privileges. “Privileges are part and parcel of almost every social role, if those privileges are not endorsed, then the person occupying that role may renounce his responsibilities and even displace the person occupying that role by force. Thus, while revolutionaries might protest the inadequacy of past rewards for services rendered, their most stirring appeal to revolt is ordinarily couched in terms of rights rather than in terms of rewards for past performance” (Sieber, 1974).

The second outcome of role accumulation is overall status security, which is typically created by buffer roles. “The accumulation of buffers might be especially critical for individuals who engage in ventures of some risk. They are also of value to stationary individuals who fear or anticipate ego stress as a consequence of unpredictable or uncontrollable changes in a given role relationship” (Sieber, 1974). The third outcome of role accumulation is resources for status enhancement and role performance. Role accumulation is a common avenue for enhancing one’s power base in society (Sieber, 1974). The fourth outcome is personality enrichment and ego gratification. “It is possible to imagine situations in which role overload and conflict produce a good deal of ego-gratification, namely, the sense of being appreciated or needed by diverse role partners” (Sieber, 1974). Albeit, the accumulation of additional roles and expectations will not always be positive, but conversely this process does not always lead to conflict either. If a role occupant is in conflict however, there are ways to decrease or remove said conflict.

### ***Resolving Role Conflict***

Walker and Simon (1987) discovered four ways to resolve role conflict: merger, altercast, interpenetration of roles, and alternation. A role occupant can choose to merge two roles together. To altercast, a person responds to role expectations with a behavior that reorients the target's role expectations. To interpenetrate roles one takes the expectations for a specific role and diffuses them throughout the other roles, which they currently occupy. The last resolution is to alternate between the roles. All of these solutions are prevalent in American society today where people are constantly multi-tasking everyday and typically trying to fulfill a number of role expectations simultaneously.

If these solutions do not work however, there are three factors that one should examine when attempting to discern the allocation of time and energy among roles: the individual norm commitment, the established reward or punishment by role parties, and the reactions of the third party or audience (Sarbin and Allen, 1954). These are not so much ways to resolve role conflict, but ways to help the person in conflict decide which role to activate. Some roles may need to be changed to fit the conflicting expectations. Zurcher (1983) believes this may be appropriate "when the social systems that support the role occupants usual roles are rendered inoperative, individuals autonomously can find ways to make new roles. Those creations not only help the innovators maintain their self-concepts and sense of competence, but facilitate the rebuilding of the social status quo ante."

Another solution to role conflict is to seek clarification from the source of the conflict (Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966). However, this cannot be accomplished in every

situation. When a person cannot confront their audience another solution might be to develop scenarios for how actions within that role might be perceived by the audience for that role. With most roles, individuals not only understand what is expected of us, but we also internalize assumptions regarding how others conduct themselves in similar social systems. From these assumptions it is typical to derive scenarios as to how events are likely to develop, then conform to these expectations or exercise the flexibilities in the role in order to best react to future conflicts.

Role scenarios are not only central to decision making, they also tend to manage how we frame our choices. Scenarios reflect the comprehension attached to any role of how a given system functions—its goals, procedures, cultural premises, capabilities, and historical patterns—both in general terms and with regard to specific issues (Rosenau, 1987). However, one problem with scenarios is that they can typically only be broken down into a few decisions, after which they become too complex to be comprehended. Rosenau (1987) argues that role scenarios for governments are more complex than everyday people enacting roles and help to explain why politicians are so readily the subject of criticism. “The problems associated with elaborating role scenarios also serve to explain why makers of foreign policy in democratic politics are so readily subject to criticism. If they are cautious and confine their scenarios to only a few segments, they may be charged with being unimaginative and victims of bureaucratic inertia. If they offer clear-cut scenarios that elaborate many segments across long stretches of time, they may be seen as ideologues with tunnel vision.”

### ***Expectations for DHS***

The RAND Corporation (2006) conducted a nationwide survey to gather in-depth data about the assessment of state and local response organizations' regarding federal preparedness programs for combating terrorism. The first survey was conducted just prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>. They performed follow-up surveys in 2002 and 2003. RAND discovered high expectations for DHS. The majority of organizations were expecting funding support from DHS. "In addition, state and local organizations wanted more information about the terrorist threat and expressed a number of views on how to improve DHS' Homeland Security Advisory System. State and local governments expected DHS to improve coordination between federal, state and local levels, streamline grant processes and requirements, consolidate training courses and equipment programs, and finally facilitate integration of the private sector" (Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006). States and local governments are not just looking for money, but assistance with coordination issues, as well as "a clearly articulated vision from the DHS for how money should be spent" (Khademian, 2004).

"Reports by the GAO and DHS' Office of Inspector General, as well as by the House Homeland Security Committee, have identified the need for clear national guidance in defining the appropriate level of preparedness and setting priorities to achieve it. The lack of such guidance has in the past been identified as hindering state and local efforts to prioritize their needs and plan how best to allocate their homeland security funding" (Jenkins, 2005). No clear definition of homeland security existed prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>, which proved problematic with regards to funding.

“In interviews with officials at more than a dozen federal agencies, we found that a broadly accepted definition of homeland security did not exist. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) believes a single definition of homeland security can be used to enforce budget discipline” (Yim, 2002). In July of 2002 the Executive branch released the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, in which they define homeland security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” This definition is problematic because many of the agencies that were merged into DHS did not have terrorism prevention as their core mission. No one agency did, thus there was confusion about the missions of the various agencies that were merged together to create DHS. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* is a good start, but

it is vague, lacks a clear, concise plan for implementation, fails to define specific missions for the agencies being absorbed, and does not clarify each agency’s relationship to DHS. For example, the DHS website contains links to agencies being absorbed; however, some of these agencies do not have a mission statement related to their roles in DHS, nor an acknowledgement of their subordination to DHS. Uncertainty exists not only regarding the roles of the individual agencies, but also that of the local and state governments. For the department to be effective, clarification of the roles and responsibilities within and among the different levels of government, as well as the private sector, needs to take place (Mitchell & Pate, 2003).

As previously stated, there were many agencies involved in doling out grants to the states for homeland security purposes. The FEMA, the Office of Domestic Programs as part of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) were the main players; however, they were not the only agencies to dispense grants to states or local governments. Some grants were made directly to cities.

When Colorado created an office of homeland security the administrator read a newspaper story about how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had a security grant that went directly to water treatment facilities, which he did not know before the article (Peckenpugh, 2002). A major expectation for DHS was to create a “one-stop shop” for grants, but states and Congress expected DHS to do more than fund training exercises and equipment. They were expected to set priorities for how to spend the money and provide guidance to municipalities regarding what should be protected. The other issue is how these expectations were relayed to DHS. The first guidance that DHS was given as to what was expected was through its mission.

### ***Mission Statements***

In mergers and acquisitions organizations have to create a new organizational identity. To create a new identity, organizations must first create a new vision, highlight common goals, and create organizational symbols (Seo and Hill, 2005). Similar to individuals, organizations can have multiple identities and perform multiple roles. Just like in individuals these identities and roles can have negative or positive effects, similar to role overload. Organizations can also experience role conflict similar to individuals. However, the response to manage this conflict is slightly different. Pratt and Foreman (2000) examined multiple organizational identities and found four ways to resolve the conflict among identities: compartmentalization, deletion, integration, and aggregation. Organizations may be able to manage their multiple identities, but employees may still identify with the original organization. In turbulent organizational environments, it is important to ask whether employees still identify with the original organization(s), what forms such identification assumes, and what factors drive identification (Rousseau,

1998). In mergers and acquisitions both organizations and individuals are prone to role conflict. One way to help alleviate role conflict is by developing a mission statement for the new organization, and working as quickly as possible to create the new organization's identity.

Mission statements outline an organization's purpose and goals. They are also intended to motivate and therefore control the behaviors of organizational members toward common organizational goals (Bart, Bontis, and Taggar, 2001). When creating a mission statement an organization should seek to include its purpose, competitive distinctiveness, product/service definition, and values (Bart and Baetz, 1998). A mission statement allows an organization to inform the public of what to expect from it.

Throughout the 1990s companies around the world espoused the need for a mission statement. The Government Performance and Results Act (PL 103-62) require federal departments and agencies to write mission statements (Weiss and Piderit, 1999). Each agency within each department has a separate mission statement that should reinforce the overarching mission statement of the department as a whole. Despite the discussion of the need for mission statements, little research has been done to investigate whether their existence correlates positively to performance.

The results of a few studies to determine whether missions have a positive correlation on organization performance are mixed, but mostly lean towards the positive and the fact that missions matter (Bart, Bontis, and Taggar, 2001; Bart and Baetz, 1998; Weiss and Piderit, 1999). Simply having a mission statement in and of itself will not lead to organizational success, but it can help. Mission statements can give an employee a sense of purpose and direction as well as define the ultimate aspiration of the

organization. The DHS was given the mission of leading a unified national effort to secure America through the prevention and deterrence of terrorist attacks all the while protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation. While simultaneously ensuring safe and secure borders, welcoming lawful immigrants and visitors, and promoting the free-flow of commerce (DHS, Strategic Plan, 2004). Given this significant mission statement, it becomes critical to examine if all of the agencies that were combined to create DHS help to fulfill this mission while balancing their pre-existing responsibilities before being absorbed by DHS.

### ***In Sum***

When expectations are not clear for individuals they experience role conflict. When there is a lack of information about expectations for a role the result is role ambiguity. There is a negative correlation between role conflict, role ambiguity and job satisfaction. There is a positive correlation between role conflict, role ambiguity and tension, anxiety, and a lack of individual productivity. Individuals who enact well-defined roles develop more trust in an organization because their actions become more predictable. Role ambiguity is caused by organizational complexity, rapid organizational change, and managerial philosophies. When organizations change rapidly employees can be faced with too many expectations. The result of this is role overload. Role overload has both negative and positive effects on the role holder.

If an organization that has gone through a merger or acquisition has multiple organizational identities employees may identify with the original identity and not the new one. Mission statements are one way that new organizations create a unified organizational identity, which outline the purpose and goal of the organization. Mission

statements also convey to the public what to expect from the organization. DHS was given a large mission to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks, work to prevent new attacks, all the while maintaining their previous missions, and responsibilities.

DHS had to take multiple organizational identities, numerous overlapping roles, and a myriad of expectations from a number of audiences and merge them into a cohesive and fully functioning organization within four months. Many of the agencies merged into DHS had mission overlap, assumed new roles, and had their mission changed.

Examining all the mission statements of the agencies merged into DHS one will see what new roles they were given, the expectations of the agency, and how they manage their new organizational identity.

### **Chapter 3 Mission of DHS Agencies and Directorates**

The mission of DHS as outlined in the FY 2008 strategic plan is to lead the unified national effort to secure America, to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. All the while securing our national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade (DHS Strategic Plan, 2008). When DHS was created the political climate was antagonistic between Congress and the President. There was a race between the two in who could act first after September 11<sup>th</sup> and Congress beat the President in proposing a new cabinet level Department. The President and his staff proposed an expansive department. When working to create DHS those who were developing the proposal looked at all agencies (Glasser & Grunwald, 2005). However, when the President proposed the new Department to this Cabinet, some began to lobby to ensure that they would not lose any agencies in the merger. According to Glasser and Grunwald;

Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson launched a behind-the-scenes campaign to keep a handful of offices that were supposed to go to DHS, including the National Disaster Medical System and the national drug stockpile. "Make sure this doesn't happen!" he instructed Jerome M. Hauer, one of his assistant secretaries. The plan had been put together with such speed and secrecy that after its release angry officials had to explain to the White House how their agencies really worked. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham was able to beat back the total transfer of Livermore after it became clear the Gang of Five (the aides who proposed which agencies to make the move) had little idea what the lab did. A similar battle unfolded over the Department of Energy's radiological detection teams, which were supposed to be folded in with FEMA. The White House had not realized that the teams consisted of employees with regular jobs who mobilized only during emergencies (2005).

Lobbyists for the industries in which some of these agencies operated were also on Capitol Hill trying to explain why the agency that they work closely with should not be

moved into this new department. Once it was finalized which would move and which would not, all parties desired the agencies to move quickly and perform their new roles as fast as possible and nearly perfect as well. It was decided that some agencies needed to be moved to eliminate some of the mission overlap between them. This was true in merging the many border agencies. Some agencies it appears to be random in why they were merged, because the expectations for the agencies did not appear to be compatible with DHS. A few agencies were created within the legislation that created the department.

This chapter will examine the twenty-two core agencies that were combined to create the DHS and the four directorates in which they were placed. First, this study will discuss the four different directorates, then examining the agencies placed within each directorate. It will examine whether the mission of the agency changed, if the agency assumed new roles or lost roles, and if there was balance between the missions. It will also explore if the expectations between the DHS and the agency were compatible before the merger and if the expectations of what the agency would be doing within DHS were clear. The last question this chapter will seek to answer is whether employees still identify with the previous organization and why they may still have that identification. Appendix A highlights the mission statements of each agency before it was merged into DHS and after. To see the overall organization of the DHS shortly after it was created, review appendix B an organizational chart.

### ***The Border and Transportation Security Directorate***

The Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate brought together seven agencies from four different departments: the U.S. Customs Service from Treasury, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from DOJ, the Federal Protective Service from the General Services Administration (GSA), the Transportation Security Administration from the DOT, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center from Department of Treasury, part of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from US Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Office for Domestic Preparedness from DOJ. The mission of this directorate is preventing the entry of terrorists and instruments of terrorism, securing the borders and all transportation systems, administering immigration functions and policy and priorities. Two main bureaus were created from the merger of these bureaus: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These two bureaus absorbed the Customs Service, the INS, and the portion of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service that was merged into DHS.

#### *Immigration and Naturalization Services*

The Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was moved from the DOJ. The Immigration and Naturalization Service's mission is to administer and enforce the immigration and naturalization laws of the U.S., including securing the nation's borders and apprehending illegal immigrants (Federal Service Impasses Panel, 2001). INS' mission is twofold; prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country while updating the status of legal non-US citizens and prevent the employment of individuals ineligible for admission (DOJ, OIG, 2001). Thus INS' mission is one part enforcement and one part service. Upon its transfer into DHS, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was abolished. The adjudication portion of INS' mission was transferred to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration while the statistical branch of the Office of Policy

and Programs was transferred to the Under Secretary for Management. The INS function, which dealt with unaccompanied children, was transferred to the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement of HHS (P.L 106-313, 2000). Immigration officers who specialized in inspection, examination, adjudication, legalization, investigation, patrol, and refugee and asylum issues were combined with the U.S. Customs Service into the U.S Customs and Border Protection. Legacy INS employees now work in one of three agencies: the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (P.L 106-313, 2000).

The mission of the INS was not changed out right, however it was altered. This agency did not assume any new roles or lose any; however they separated the employees who performed the two roles within this agency. The expectations for INS were clear because they were still performing their old roles, just in different departments. The expectations between DHS and INS were compatible. INS' role was to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country and the expectation of DHS was to keep terrorists from entering the country. There was balance between the roles because all of the roles were separated and the agency did not assume new roles.

Due to the fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Services was dissolved and moved, employees would have to learn to identify with their new organization that may or may not be within DHS. Some of these employees were moved to HHS. While employee's jobs did not change, learning a new organizational identity could lead to role ambiguity. Establishing an identity and establishing a new organization culture could also lead to conflict. Organizational complexity can lead to role ambiguity and learning a

new organizational culture and new ways to operate within the new organization would lead to role ambiguity. Employees not only had to learn a new organizational culture, but also to work with other agencies that they previously may have been competitive with.

#### *U.S. Customs Service*

When Customs was transferred into DHS it became one of the backbones of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. It was separated into two agencies; one part combined Customs agents with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents to form the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency, and the other piece of the agency combined Customs agents with the Border Patrol to form the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The mission of the Customs service did not change greatly when it was transferred; however the new bureaus missions were slightly different and could contribute to role conflict within the Customs employees. According, to Richard L Skinner, the Assistant IG, in testimony to Congress (2005) the new mission and focus of CBP is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S. while also facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel (6). This keeps the current Customs agents who are located at the border or other points of entry in similar positions.

The focus of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is on “enforcement activities related to criminal and administrative violations of the immigration and customs laws of the U.S., regardless of where the violation occurs” (Skinner, 2005). Immigration and Customs Enforcement being the investigative arm of the Border and Transportation directorate allows employees with a specialized focus a clearer mission that could actually alleviate role conflict. However, other issues result from splitting an

organization in two and accordingly conflict may result from combining all these of agencies together. Secretary Ridge highlighted this concern in a speech to INS employees in 2003. “One of our first goals for the department this year is to integrate old functions in a new way, to make us stronger and safer. We will take our border entities - Customs, INS, Border patrol, and our Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - and merge them into one unified, coordinated force at the border” (Ridge, 2003). Hoping to remove mission overlap between Customs with Immigration and Naturalization Services and the Border Patrol, Customs was split and then absorbed by new bureaus within the DHS in the hopes to give them greater focus.

This agency did have its mission changed for some employees. This agency gained and lost some roles that they were previously performing. Before merging with the DHS the expectations for Customs were compatible with the DHS and they were clear. The DHS and Customs shared common goals for facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and enforcing the Custom laws. Employees in this agency may still identify with the previous agency, however because they split the employees along functional lines that should lessen that aspect of conflict. There appears to be a balance to the new roles that the employees who remained working on Customs issues gained.

As stated previously, the Customs agency was one of the main agencies that the Border and Transportation Security Directorate was built around. It was separated into two new bureaus along with the Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization Services. While agencies would have worked together previously, each had their own culture and way of operating. The merger would require them to leave that behind and work together to develop a new organizational culture and identity. Employees would

need to create a new organizational identity, which could contribute to role conflict. This rapid organizational change would lead to role ambiguity. While, the clearer mission of the new bureau may help to alleviate role conflict and may lessen role ambiguity, the contributing factors to both of these are so strong it would take time for these effects to take place.

*Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service*

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI), was transferred into the Border and Transportation Security directorate from the USDA. The APHIS Agricultural Quarantine Inspection has a very specialized mission within the DHS. The AQI program examines cargo and passengers entering into the U.S to ensure that there are no agricultural health threats contained within. Although most Agricultural Quarantine Inspections staff were reassigned to the DHS, the USDA retained responsibility for promulgating regulations related to the entry of passengers and commodities into the U.S, according to Under Secretary William Hawks (3, 2003). The USDA also retained the responsibility of collecting the user fees associated with inspections, with the understanding that fee collection was to be gradually handed over to the DHS. The USDA and the DHS had to create a memorandum of agreement concerning the transfer of fees and how the two Departments would work together to ensure that Agricultural Quarantine Inspection did not forgo new regulations set in place by the USDA or training also conducted by the USDA. The fact that the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection had to essentially solicit information for how to perform its job from two departments is one cause for role conflict. Having to receive information on job performance from the USDA instead of the DHS chain of command

would be confusing. As a result of this, the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection employees are unsure where to turn when faced with problems or questions the USDA or the DHS.

The mission of this agency did not change fundamentally. They did not acquire new roles. The expectations for this agency were compatible with the DHS as they were expected to keep health threats from entering the U.S at the borders. The expectations when they joined the DHS were not clear however. It was unclear who would set their expectations: the DHS or the USDA. The majority of the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection staff was absorbed into the DHS, however the USDA retained the information that they needed to perform their jobs. Due to this, the AQI staff would experience role ambiguity and possibly role conflict. The expectations of their role at the border would come from the DHS, but expectations on how to perform their jobs would come from the USDA. It is likely that many of these employees still identified with their previous organization because they had to rely on the USDA for training and the regulations under which they operated. There was balance between roles, but not a balance between administrative roles and who was performing them the USDA or the DHS.

Another area of conflict is over the collection of fees. The USDA collects the fees and then pays them back to the DHS. This money is utilized by the DHS for AQI staff; however there is a conflict over the collection of the fees and transferring them to the DHS. This adds to the stress that staff already is experiencing from becoming employees of the DHS.

### *Office of Domestic Preparedness*

The DHS was created to streamline the grants process. The intent of Congress was to distribute money faster to the states by only dealing with one Department. However, not all programs that dealt with first responder grants were transferred into the DHS. The main programs from the Office of Domestic Preparedness and FEMA were transferred to the DHS. The Office of Domestic Preparedness was first given the authority to administer grants to local responders in FY 1998. At that time only forty-one counties and local jurisdictions received funding (DHS, Office of Grants & Training, 2008). The Office of Domestic Preparedness' mission was "to develop and implement a national program to enhance the capability of state and local agencies to respond to domestic terrorism" (DOJ Inspector General, 2002). While a part of the Department of Justice, the Office of Domestic Preparedness was broken into five functional areas. The divisions were set-up to work with the various municipalities and assist them in developing three-year statewide preparedness plans as well as administer equipment grants, training grants, and a training center. Through January 15, 2002, the Office of Domestic Preparedness awarded grants totaling about \$149 million — \$101.7 million to 257 grantees for equipment and \$47.1 million to 29 grantees for training (DOJ, OIG, 2002).

According to a DOJ, Inspector General's audit the Office of Domestic Preparedness was not fulfilling its mission. "As of January 15, 2002, over \$141 million of the \$243 million in funds appropriated for equipment from FY 1998 through FY 2001 had not been awarded. Furthermore, about \$65 million in grant funds awarded to grantees was unspent. Also, nearly \$1 million in equipment purchased by the grantees was

unavailable for use because grantees did not properly distribute the equipment, could not locate it, or had been inadequately trained on how to operate it” (DOJ, OIG, 2002). In some cases grants were disbursed as fast as seven months, in other cases it took as long as twenty-nine months. There were a number of reasons for the delays, some on the part of the grant recipients, but the main reason was that states did not fulfill a prerequisite set by Congress; a completed domestic preparedness plan. Some plans were not completed because the Office of Domestic Preparedness did not set a deadline for when the plans should be submitted (DOJ, OIG, 2002).

After the disaster of September 11<sup>th</sup> Congress appropriated more money to assist states in becoming more prepared. The FY 2002 State Domestic Preparedness Program focused on responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). To be eligible for these funds states must have submitted and had approved their needs assessment as well as their domestic preparedness strategy. States could utilize these funds for equipment, exercises, and a small amount for administrative purposes. Total funding amounted to \$315 million for the grant cycle.

In FY 2003 grants for first responders grew exponentially, so did the responsibilities of the Office of Domestic Preparedness. The Office of Domestic Preparedness was placed within the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. Its responsibilities grew from assisting states with developing and implementing their strategic preparedness plans, administering equipment and training grants, and providing training to: coordinating preparedness efforts at the Federal level and working with all level of governments to on all matters pertaining to combating terrorism; coordinating communications relating to homeland security at all levels of government; direct and

supervise preparedness grant programs of the Federal government; providing training for the DHS agents; serve as the lead executive branch agency for preparedness for acts of terrorism, cooperating closely with FEMA; assist in conducting risk analysts and risk management activities at all levels of government; and those elements of the Office of National Preparedness (ONP) of FEMA which relate to terrorism, which shall be consolidated within DHS in Office of Domestic Preparedness established under this section (P.L 107-296, 2002). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also required Office of Domestic Preparedness to retain its functions from DOJ under the same terms, conditions, policies, and authorities, with the required level of personnel, assets and budget from before September 11<sup>th</sup> for FY 2003 and FY 2004 (P.L 107-269, 2002).

Kenneth Burris Jr., Region IV Director of FEMA, testified to Congress that Office of National Preparedness' mission is "to provide leadership in the coordination and facilitation of all Federal efforts to assist State and local first responders (including fire, medical and law enforcement) and emergency management organizations with planning, training, equipment and exercises necessary to build and sustain capability to respond to any emergency or disaster, including a terrorist incident involving a weapon of mass destruction and other natural or manmade hazards" (2002). The Office of National Preparedness was divided into four divisions: the administration division; the program coordination division; the technological services division; and the assessment and exercise division (Burris, 2002). Only the program coordination division, which is related to terrorism, was transferred into the Office of Domestic Preparedness within DHS. The rest of Office of National Preparedness' responsibilities remained in FEMA.

Congress was trying to streamline this office because there was overlap between the Office of Domestic Preparedness and FEMA in many ways. The first overlap between FEMA and Office of Domestic Preparedness was grant management. When DHS was formed a new office was created to manage grants. This office was the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). The SLGCP consolidated staff from three offices; the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Office of National Preparedness, and FEMA's grant management office. The three offices that formed the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness were now the "federal government's lead agency responsible for preparing the nation against terrorism by assisting states, local and tribal jurisdictions, and regional authorities as they prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts by providing an array of assistance to America's first responders through funding, coordinated training, exercises, equipment acquisition, and technical assistance" (ODP Fact Sheet). This new office had to merge these three offices in name only. All three offices remained in their previous locations, because there was no main office location for DHS when it was created. A change of physical location is one way to help staff create a new organizational identity. Without helping to establish a new organizational identity employees will undergo role conflict because they are still physically located in the other organization and still feel the emotional ties and responsibility to fulfill the expectations that the previous organization set, not the expectations of the new organization.

The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness was faced with monumental expectations. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 set the task of establishing a national security goal, which was the first

expectation of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. This national security goal would enable states, local, and tribal governments to identify needs, establish priorities in regards to homeland security, and have a reference with which to compare their current capabilities (HSPD-8, 2003). Congress also expected the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness to get grants out quickly to the states, monitor how well they were spending the grant money, and be a resource for state and local governments by answering questions in regards to grant funding. As stated previously, the Office of Domestic Preparedness had difficulty performing those tasks when they were within the DOJ and they did not have to contend with a merger. DHS received numerous complaints in regards to its handling of the grant administration because none of the previous problems from the Office of Domestic Preparedness were cleared up. If anything they were made worse when Congress passed the Patriot Act of 2001, which required DHS to grant money to the states via a formula.

The USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 states “each State shall be allocated in each fiscal year under this section not less than 0.75 percent of the total amount appropriated in the fiscal year for grants pursuant to this section, except that the U.S. Virgin Islands, America Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands each shall be allocated 0.25 percent” (P.L. 107-56). The rest of the funds were to be disbursed and allocated at the Secretary’s discretion. Secretary Ridge decided to allocate the grants on the basis of population. This led to smaller states receiving more funding than larger states. Funding did not go out as quickly as Congress had hoped, and there was still confusion on what could be funded and what the need was. Most states wanted the money to pay their first responders salaries and other administrative costs, however the grants were not allowed

to be utilized for that purpose and again a lot of the money was not drawn down or utilized by the localities as intended. DHS also relied upon the DOJ Office of the Comptroller for grant fund distribution and assistance with financial management support (Inspector General Berman, 2005).

As laid out above, the main expectation of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness was to set a national security goal that was in sync with the expectation of managing the first responder grants efficiently. The expectation that leads to role conflict within this agency is the expectation that the grants would be distributed according to a formula. In Congressional testimony, Dr. Veronique de Rugy outlines the problem to be that forty percent of the total grants are divided up equally among all states (2005). In his haste to distribute the grants quickly Secretary Ridge determined that the other sixty percent be distributed based upon population because to distribute the grants on the basis of risk would require time to perform a risk assessment of all critical infrastructure within each of the states and US territories that were eligible for funding. The expectation to get grants out quickly and fairly to all states regardless of where they were located led to considerable conflict within the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which it is still working to resolve.

Another obstruction in Office of Domestic Preparedness' transformation into the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness was its placement into the Border and Transportation Security directorate. Other preparedness programs were placed within the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate. The Inspector General highlighted this issue in its Semiannual Report to the Congress on April 30,

2003; “this bifurcation will create additional challenges related to inter-departmental coordination, performance accountability, and fiscal accountability.”

The Office of Domestic Preparedness underwent a tremendous amount of changes while DHS was establishing itself. The mission of the office did not change, however they did acquire new roles. These roles were complementary with the roles that they were already fulfilling though. However, there was not balance between the roles as states wanted more assistance on the administrative tasks associated with grants and this office was focused more on trying to get the funds out. This office also had high expectations placed on it, when it was transferred from DOJ. These expectations were compatible with the DHS and the relationship was clear before the merger. The expectations to have funds quickly disbursed to the states to help them prepare for another terrorist attack came down to how well this office was organized and set-up. There were divergent expectations between audiences.

The states wanted money to pay their first responders and Congress wrote the legislation as such that that was not possible. All audiences agreed that they wanted their grants to be allocated and disbursed quickly. However, while at the DOJ the Office of Domestic Preparedness had problems fulfilling its mandate of getting money to the states quickly, it had an even more difficult time once it moved to DHS because of the additional complications associated with merging with another office; the program coordination division of FEMA. This consolidation did nothing to relieve the problems that the original offices were experiencing. If anything it made them worse because now the new office had to deal with both offices organizational problems and try to fulfill the mandate from Congress to disburse funds quickly.

This office underwent constant change since it has merged into DHS. Not only was it combined with the program coordination division on FEMA when it was first transferred into DHS, but it was also transferred into the Border and Transportation directorate. The placement in this directorate separate from FEMA, which was in the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate is awkward and can lead to role conflict because this office's mission is to assist states and local governments prepare for emergencies and their response to them not deal with the border or transportation security. In 2005 the Office of Domestic Programs was moved again, into the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate, merged with a number of other offices, renamed once again to the Office of Grants and Training and oversight was given to FEMA. All of this change, along with the reliance on the DOJ to disburse the needed funds in the beginning, and the high expectations would contribute to role conflict among the employees in this office. This office has been working diligently to get information out to the states to alleviate some of the pressure placed on it in the beginning.

#### *Federal Protective Services*

The Federal Protective Services (FPS) mission did not change fundamentally when it was transferred from the Government Services Agency (GSA) into the Border and Transportation Directorate, though it was expanded. Robert Peck, Commissioner of the Federal Protective Services relayed to the Senate that “the principal mission is building security, by which we mean protecting the affected facility, its tenants, visitors, and their property from harm” (2000). Within DHS the Federal Protective Services still provides security services for federally owned and leased facilities; however the organization has seen its responsibilities sizably grow since the merger. The Federal

Protective Services was tasked with assuming increased responsibilities alongside Immigration and Naturalization Service agents and other custom agents.

DHS issued a fact sheet in January 2003 highlighting the reorganization of the border security. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “will bring together the enforcement and investigative arms of the Customs Service, the investigative and enforcement functions of Immigration and Naturalization Services and the Federal Protective Services. The reorganization involves approximately 14,000 employees, including 5,500 criminal investigators, 4,000 employees for immigration and deportation services and 1,500 Federal Protective Services personnel that will focus on the mission of enforcing the full range of immigration and customs laws within the interior of the United States in addition to protecting specified federal buildings” (DHS, Border Reorg Fact Sheet, 2003). However, contract guards perform most security services for federal buildings. The Government Services Agency collects fees for providing these services to federal buildings, manages the contracts, and provides training to those within federally owned and leased buildings. A major complication for the changes with the Federal Protective Services was transferring the responsibilities of contract management. The new responsibilities of the Federal Protective Services are not laid out clearly. This may leave staff wondering how they exactly fit into the new organization, and can contribute to role conflict.

The mission of this agency did not change. It did however assume new roles. The expectations of this agency with DHS were not overtly compatible before its placement within DHS. They did share the common goal of protecting government buildings, however the goal of enforcing immigration and custom laws do not fit with

their previous goals. The relationship between the FPS and DHS was not clear before the merger.

Due to the fact that the Federal Protective Services had to rely on both the Government Services Agency and DHS to understand their expectations for their new roles, role ambiguity would be rife within the organization. The new responsibilities were not clear and how to balance the missions was not clear. How would people trained to protect government buildings now enforce immigration and customs laws? Role conflict would result from the new responsibilities that are incompatible with the previous expectations of building protection. FPS employees would have to learn all the customs and immigration laws while maintaining the protection of federal buildings. Part of the law that established DHS mandated that the Government Service Agency and DHS establish an memorandum of understanding about the transfer of contract management responsibilities as well as training responsibilities, therefore employees of the Federal Protective Services would also have to learn the complicated contract management tasks and other administrative tasks. The additions of the new roles would be contributors to role overload. These are complicated new tasks added to this organization.

#### *Transportation Security Agency*

The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) did not exist until the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 became law shortly after September 11<sup>th</sup>. Within the Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security Agency was responsible for “civil aviation security, and related research and development activities; security responsibilities over other modes of transportation that are exercised by the DOT; and day-to-day Federal security screening operations for passenger air transportation” (P.L

107-71, 2001). The Transportation Security Agency's mission did not change when it moved to DHS. It was still responsible for the "security of the nation's transportation systems" (TSA, 2007). When it was created, the Transportation Security Agency had the monumental task of hiring and training thousands of screeners. Many employees who worked as screeners prior to the creation of TSA were contract employees. The switch to becoming a federal employee from being a contract worker could conceivably contribute to role conflict. However, the management issues, which were present within the Transportation Security Agency, played a larger part in the conflict when it came to creating a unified Department.

The mission of TSA did not change when it became a part of DHS because it was created shortly after September 11<sup>th</sup>. Employees here did not take on new roles, however their role was altered slightly in that they became federal employees. The expectations for TSA employees did not change when they became a part of the DHS and were clearly laid out. The goals of TSA and the DHS were similar and the relationship between the two is clear as well. Due to the fact that many of the employees were new employees they most likely did not identify with DOT.

The alteration from contract employees to federal employees would contribute to role conflict because the employees would have to adapt to the new organization and bureaucracy that comes with being a federal employee. However, since some of the employees were already contract employees they would be familiar with federal bureaucracy. The employees would still have to learn their role within TSA. TSA as a whole would have to work to establish administrative procedures because they were brand new when they were merged into the DHS. They would have to establish these

quickly as they needed to hire a lot of employees to fill these new positions at the airports quickly. Having this rapid organizational change could lead to role ambiguity and having to hire employees quickly would also lead to role conflict because so many employees would have to be involved in hiring these employees quickly. The more people involved in the hiring process the more likely there are incompatible expectations for those involved.

#### *Federal Law Enforcement Training Center*

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) was a part of the Treasury before becoming a part of DHS. The mission of the center did not change when it was placed in DHS. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center “provides career-long law enforcement training to 81 federal partner organizations and numerous state, local, and international law enforcement agencies” (Skinner, (3) 2005). Their mission is to train those who protect the homeland. The goal of Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is to provide fast, flexible, and focused training to secure and protect America, as well as develop uniform standards for training programs, facilities and instructors to ensure high caliber training across agencies (The White House, 2008). There is very little role conflict within the training center because its mission has remained the same, as did its memorandum of understanding that was in place with various partner agencies to conduct training.

The mission of this agency did not change when it was merged into the DHS. It also did not acquire any new roles or lose any roles. The expectations for this agency were clear and compatible with the DHS. The goals of this agency were also clear, as they did not change. The relationship between the DHS and the agency are clear.

Employees in this agency most likely identified with the agency itself, not the Department from which it came, Treasury, as that does not appear to be the best fit. It also appears that the roles that they were filling were balanced. The only question may be why was this agency placed in this directorate, but this agency does train all Border Patrol and Customs Agents, so that may be one reason it was placed here.

### ***The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate***

The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate combined five agencies from four departments; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which was previously an independent agency, the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System from HHS, the Nuclear Incident Response Team from the Department of Energy, the Domestic Emergency Support Teams from DOJ, and the National Domestic Preparedness Office also from DOJ specifically Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The agencies within this directorate oversee domestic disaster preparedness training and coordinate government disaster response (DHS, History Fact Sheet, 2007). This directorate is different than all the others in that it contains a stockpile of medicine and two interagency response teams, both of which are only utilized in specific situations. The main component of this directorate is FEMA.

### ***The Federal Emergency Management Agency***

FEMA was the backbone of the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate. As stated previously, it was created in a similar fashion as DHS when in 1979 President Carter took a variety of other agencies and placed them within FEMA (FEMA, History Fact Sheet, 2007). The focus of FEMA at the time of creation was on natural and man-made disasters. With the transfer into DHS a new focus would be

placed upon FEMA: response, recovery, preparation for, and mitigation of terrorism. The mission of FEMA did not change from “lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from disasters” (FEMA, History Fact Sheet, 2007). However, when FEMA was transferred into DHS the preparedness functions were separated from the response and recovery responsibilities. There was great concern about this change. Richard Skinner, DHS’ Inspector General noted in his testimony to Congress in January 2005, “we do have reservations about segregating FEMA’s preparedness functions from its response and recovery responsibilities. Disaster preparedness, response, and recovery are intricately related, each relying on the other for success.” Again, many critics believed that moving FEMA into DHS caused the focus on all-hazards to be lost for the focus on terrorism. The mission may have remained the same, but the transfer into DHS created conflict because FEMA was an independent agency.

Another problem for FEMA was the bifurcation of grants some were moved into the Office of Domestic Preparedness, while a portion remained under FEMA’s purview. All the grants retained within FEMA were related to preparedness, and specific disasters and hazards. Those specific disaster and hazard grants were only available in disasters or to mitigate certain hazards, such as flood insurance. The split between the grants keeps expert knowledge within FEMA; however it does not fulfill the expectations for DHS to become a one-stop shop for all grants. Interagency conflict between Office of Domestic Preparedness and FEMA can result from keeping the old system, which has Office of Domestic Preparedness in charge of some grants and FEMA in charge of others. In 2005 the preparedness grants were moved from FEMA into Office of Domestic Preparedness, which was named the Office of Grants and Training.

In 2006 Congress passed the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, which altered FEMA again. According to Matt Jadacki (2007), the Deputy Inspector General for Disaster Assistance Oversight within DHS “these management reforms enhanced FEMA’s mission and role as the federal government’s disaster coordinator.” Again, the stated mission of FEMA did not change; “to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation” (P.L. 109-295). The legislation however transferred all preparedness functions within DHS to FEMA and helps to strengthen their standing in the Department by not allowing the transfer of funds, assets, and personnel from FEMA. FEMA is still recovering from the problems and conflicts that originated during the 2005 Hurricane season. While the FY 2007 appropriations legislation helps to refocus FEMA, it also contributes to conflicts by giving FEMA more responsibility to coordinate between agencies and the federal government’s response to disasters, natural or man-made.

This agency had its mission altered in that terrorism was added to the preparedness, response, and recovery functions. Many people pointed out that the addition of this new mission focus led to an imbalance of roles between a focus on natural disasters and man-made disasters. During the two years since its placement into DHS many believe the focus of FEMA was too focused on terrorism until the 2005 hurricane season when they turned their focus back to natural disasters. Before being merged into DHS the expectations of FEMA and DHS were not explicitly compatible. Upon being merged into DHS they did have clear expectations in that they were to help

the U.S. prepare for all types of disasters. The relationship between DHS and FEMA was clear when the mission was altered to include the terrorism focus. Due to the fact that this agency was independent before being merged into DHS, that identity would be stronger for employees in this organization, which was altered only slightly when merged into DHS.

The biggest source of conflict within FEMA is the fact that it was separated into two areas: preparedness and response and recovery. This bifurcation was done to help FEMA focus, however it could lead to role ambiguity. In 2006, Congress changed FEMA again back to the way it was by remerging the preparedness functions back into FEMA. However, it was not only the preparedness functions that they previously had, but all preparedness functions within DHS. All of this change can lead to role ambiguity. Role ambiguity could also occur because there was no main DHS office, so the two agencies remained in the same location, but employees had to rely on two agencies for role clarity and expectations.

#### *National Domestic Preparedness Office*

The National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) was previously part of the FBI. According to Barbara Y. Martinez, Deputy Director of the National Domestic Preparedness Office in 1999, the office “provides a forum for the coordination of all federal programs that offer WMD terrorism preparedness assistance for state and local officials. It is intended that the NDPO will serve as a much needed clearinghouse to provide information to local and state officials who must determine the preparedness strategy for their community.” This office included members from FEMA, the DOD, the National Guard Bureau, the DOE, the HHS, the EPA, the Office of Justice Programs, the

FBI, the Coast Guard, the VA, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The National Domestic Preparedness Office coordinates six areas: training, exercise, equipment research and development, information sharing, and public health and medical services (Martinez, 1999).

Prior to becoming a part of DHS the National Domestic Preparedness Office was transferred to FEMA by President Bush. In 2002 it was reported “the office has been defunct since last year and has no employees, but it never has been officially closed” (Peckenpaugh, 2002). When the National Domestic Preparedness Office was moved into DHS it became a part of Office of Domestic Preparedness, which was split into two. The part that was responsible for emergency response was under the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. In 2005, the National Domestic Preparedness Office was again transferred into the Office of Grants and Training (G&T), which combined the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the National Domestic Preparedness Office, and other grants into this office. The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 changed the National Domestic Preparedness Office once again when the Office of Grants and Training was integrated into FEMA. With all of these changes taking place in this office there were no major changes to its role and mission, however developing an organizational identity would be difficult with all of the changes, and this could contribute to conflict for employees.

This office’s mission did not change when it was merged into DHS. The office did not acquire or lose any roles. The expectations were compatible with DHS, but they were not clear because the office was reportedly defunct in 2001. This office and DHS did share common goals. However, due to the fact that there was no dedicated staff in

this office, it was dependent on a variety of Departments across the government. It is not clear what the relationship between this office and DHS would be. Due to the fact that there was no dedicated staff they would all identify with their departments because they did not merge with DHS. When integrated into DHS the National Domestic Preparedness Office was incorporated into the Office of Domestic Preparedness and then changed a number of times along with that office, if there were any employees in this office then they would have experienced role conflict and ambiguity as a part of the National Domestic Preparedness Office.

*Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System*

The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) were both transferred from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Strategic National Stockpile is a large quantity of medicine and medical supplies that are utilized in an emergency if local supplies are depleted (CDC, Strategic National Stockpile, 2008). The mission of the Strategic National Stockpile did not change and nor did the operation of the program. According to Eric Tolbert, the Director of the Response Division of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (2003), the only change within the Strategic National Stockpile is that the DHS is responsible for determining when and where the stockpile should be deployed. The OIG highlighted that the biggest challenge for the Strategic National Stockpile, is that “responsibility for the stockpile is bifurcated and unclear” (Inspector General Ervin, 2004). HHS through the Center of Disease Control (CDC) maintained the management of the content of the stockpile. In 2004, DHS recommended returning responsibility for the stockpile entirely to HHS (Inspector General Ervin, 2004).

The National Disaster Medical System is a system that provides support to local and state health agencies during natural disasters, evacuates patients throughout the US when the casualties cannot be managed locally, and supports the DOD and the Veterans Affairs (VA) medical systems during times of overseas conflict (Tolbert, 2003). The purpose of the system did not change when it was transferred to DHS. The employees of FEMA make up the National Disaster Medical System in an emergency. HHS is still the lead agency when the National Disaster Medical System is needed, DHS is the coordinating agency, and DOD and the Veterans Affairs are in charge of transportation and logistics. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how the system could easily get overloaded. The amount of patients moved by state, local, and private hospitals was enormous which resulted in some patients not being logged into the National Disaster Medical System and therefore were not accounted for by the Federal government (Franco, C., Toner, E., Waldhorn, R., Inglesby, T.V., & O'Toole, T., 2007). During Hurricane Katrina the need was spread across three states and the system could not deploy Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT's) fast enough to handle the medical needs of the states affected by the Hurricane.

The Disaster Medical Assistance Teams are self-contained emergency teams comprised of thirty-five individuals who are deployed in emergency situations to stay on top of health care needs (S. Rep. 109-322, 2006). These teams are organized by and under the authority of FEMA. During the crisis of Hurricane Katrina the need was massive and spread out there was confusion about the role of FEMA. Coordination broke down among the various agencies that were supposed to help the affected states.

The mission of the stockpile and the medical system did not change. They did not assume new roles or lose any roles. The expectations of stockpile were clear and they were compatible with DHS before being merged within it. However, the expectations of the medical system were not clear, but they appear to be compatible with DHS before the merger. The relationship between both organizations and DHS were not clear before the merger because responsibility for the contents of the stockpile still lay with HHS and HHS was still the lead department when the medical system needed to be activated.

DHS and HHS were not the only Departments involved in both the system and the stockpile, DOD and the VA played a role in the operation of the medical system and the CDC managed the stockpile. Having to respond to this many federal departments during a disaster could contribute to the role conflict experienced by employees because each department could have a different expectation of how these two systems should operate. It is likely that employees who worked on the stockpile would still have identified with HHS. The employees who administered the medical system were FEMA employees and as stated previously they most likely still identified with their previous organization.

#### *Interagency Teams*

The Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) and the Domestic Emergency support Teams (DEST) are interagency teams that are utilized in specific incidents. The Nuclear Incident Response Team is similar to the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, except the Nuclear Incident Response Team responds to nuclear incidents. The Nuclear Incident Response Team is comprised of “those entities of the Department of Energy (DOE) that perform nuclear or radiological emergency support functions, radiation exposure functions at the medical assistance facility known as the Radiation Emergency

Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), radiological assistance functions, and related functions, and those entities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that perform such support functions and related functions” (P.L. 107-296, 2002). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 highlights the fact that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the EPA still have the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and utilizing their respective entities within the Nuclear Incident Response Team. The DOE and EPA can also utilize the Nuclear Incident Response Team when they are not operating as part of DHS (P.L. 107-269, 2002). The Nuclear Incident Response Team may also be called to assist at other special security events. Each event is assessed on a case-by-case basis and because the team is so specialized it would only be utilized when there is a great fear of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack.

The other interagency team is the Domestic Emergency Support Team, which was previously a part of the DOJ run by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). It is an interagency team of experts that provide advice, guidance, and support in situations involving WMD or other significant domestic threats (Bea, K., Krouse, W., Morgan, D., Morrissey, W., & Redhead, C.S., 2003). Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), created the Domestic Emergency Support Team in 1995, which stressed that “the Domestic Emergency Support Team shall consist only of those agencies needed to respond to the specific requirements of the incident.” By the very nature of the Domestic Emergency Support Team there is no permanent staff at any federal agency. However, when they are needed, the Secretary of DHS can call these teams together to provide needed guidance and support. They have been used to respond to natural disasters in the past, as well as the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>. By the very nature of both these

teams, interagency coordination is important to their function and use. Although responsibility for these interagency teams has changed, they have been in operation for a number of years, so that should not affect their operation.

The mission of these two teams did not change. They did not assume new roles or lose any roles. Their expectations were compatible with DHS before the merger to respond to any nuclear incidents within the U.S. especially WMD attacks and the emergency support teams incorporate those needed for specific incidents. The expectations for what DHS would be doing with the teams were not clear, as the DOE and EPA were still responsible for the training, organizing, and equipping the DEST. Also, when these teams are not being utilized they are not a part of DHS. The only time that DHS would have them within their purview was when there was a nuclear disaster or a disaster where there is a fear that WMD are involved. This can lead to role conflict between the employees of these teams when there is a disaster and they have to respond to DHS due to the fact that expectations for these employees is coming from two separate agencies.

For the Domestic Emergency Support Teams, however it is slightly different in that there is no permanent staff at any federal agency for these teams. This team by nature is made up of individuals from a number of agencies needed in specific situations. The only cause of role conflict for employees of DHS would be understanding how to manage these teams and taking on the new role of overseeing these teams and ensuring that the right people are called up for the right situations. Concerning both of these teams they would have common goals with DHS before the merger, but their relationship is not

overtly clear. Due to the fact that these are interagency teams creating an organizational identity is not needed in that they will only be called up in specific situations.

### *The Science and Technology Directorate*

The Science and Technology (S&T) directorate combined a number of laboratories and programs from the DOE, Department of Defense (DOD), and USDA. This directorate is the primary research and development arm of DHS (DHS, Directorate for Science and Technology Fact Sheet, 2007). The main functions transferred into this directorate were programs from the DOE. Absorbed into this directorate of DHS were: the chemical and biological national security and supporting programs; various non-proliferation research and development programs; microbial pathogen programs; and the chemical and biological countermeasures program within the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (P.L 107-296, 2002). Apart from these programs three other laboratories were transferred into this directorate: the Environmental Measurements Laboratory, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, and the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also created a number of new offices within the S&T directorate: Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA); the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee; and the Homeland Security Institute. These various programs and laboratories focus on three main areas: intramural, industrial, and education (Under Secretary McQueary, 2003).

### *National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center*

The National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center was transferred to DHS from DOD. In section 1708 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Congress actually

created the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center within the DOD. “There is established in the Department of Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center, whose mission is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction” (P.L 107-296, 2002). However, in section 303 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Congress transferred the center and its functions to the DHS. The center was renamed to National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC). According to Dr. Albright, the Assistant Under Secretary for the S&T directorate, the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center is made up of two centers; the Biological Threat Characterization Center and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (2005).

These two centers carry out the mission of threat awareness and surveillance and detection. Specifically, Dr. Albright highlighted the mission of the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center is to “understand current and future biological threats, assess vulnerabilities, and determine potential impacts to guide the research, development, and acquisition of biodefense countermeasures such as detectors, drugs, vaccines and decontamination technologies; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from biocrimes and terrorism to attain a “biological fingerprint” to identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack” (2005). In FY 2004, the Department completed the planning and conceptual design of the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center facility and construction of the facility is planned for completion by the fourth quarter of FY 2008 (Albright, 2005). Due to the fact that the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center was created and transferred all within the same law and it was

formed within the DHS it most likely did not experience role conflict similar to the other agencies transferred into DHS. However, the employees of this new center may have experienced role conflict because it was a new organization. In an audit by the OIG in 2004 one senior executive characterized the S&T directorate as a whole as a “startup within a merger” (DHS, OIG-04-24, 2004). As stated previously, role conflict is a common problem in mergers.

The same law that merged it into DHS created the mission of this agency, therefore the mission did not change. All the roles for this agency would be new due to the fact that it was a new agency. The general turmoil of starting up a new organization can cause role ambiguity because employees are not quite sure of what their role is specifically in relation to others in the organization. The expectations for this agency were clearly laid out in the law and those expectations appear to be compatible with DHS. However, within new organizations role conflict is often prevalent because there can be incompatible expectations from those starting the organization and those at the head of the organization. Role overload may also be present because in many new organizations there are so many expectations for employees and the organization itself that employees may feel overwhelmed. Mergers are ripe with role conflict, as are start-ups within mergers.

#### *Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory*

The Homeland Security Organization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was transferred into DHS as part of the collaboration between the DHS and the DOE. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 states “in carrying out the missions of the Department, the Secretary may utilize the Department of Energy national

laboratories and sites through any one or more of the following methods, as the Secretary considers appropriate: (A) A joint sponsorship arrangement referred to in subsection (b). (B) A direct contract between the Department and the applicable Department of Energy laboratory or site, subject to subsection (c). (C) Any “work for others” basis made available by that laboratory or site. (D) Any other method provided by law” (P.L 107-296, 2002). The Homeland Security Organization is a work for others agreement at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Homeland Security Organization (HSO) is “responsible for those LLNL activities explicitly transferred from National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)” (DOE, Operations Overview, 2004). The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory works on a number of homeland security programs, but there were two main programs transferred under the Homeland Security Act of 2002; the chemical and biological countermeasures program and the nuclear and radiological countermeasures program. Both of these programs were placed into the Science and Technology directorate.

The mission of both of these programs did not change, they both “focus on addressing the national need for technologies to quickly detect, identify, and mitigate the use of chemical and biological threat agents against the U.S. civilian population, as well as counter the threat of terrorist use of nuclear or radiological device in or near a US population center” (DOE, Operations Overview, 2004). DHS became the funding center for these programs and set the goals and priorities for what research should be conducted.

The mission of this organization did not change and they did not acquire new roles or lose any roles. The expectations for this lab were compatible with DHS, however the expectations from DHS were not clear. The lab had to be responsive to two

separate entities and meet the expectations of the DOE and the DHS. This may cause role conflict to occur among those who work at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on the Homeland Security Organization. DOE and DHS were not the only ones to set the requirements for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the advisory committee also set requirements for the lab. Role ambiguity may also occur because expectations are coming from so many organizations and the expectations from each entity are different and may be incompatible. The relationship between DHS and LLNL were not clear. These two organizations did share common goals.

#### *Environmental Measurements Laboratory*

The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) was also transferred from DOE to DHS. The mission of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory did not change when it was transferred into DHS, the focus of the laboratory was and continues to be to “measure and evaluate radiation in the environment” (Carafano, 2002). Dr. Mitchell Erickson, Director of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory noted that there was a change in mission and administrative relationship with the transition to DHS (2006). According to Dr. Erickson “Environmental Measurements Laboratory rapidly and expertly built upon its core competencies to meet the new mission of advancing and applying the science and technology required for preventing, protecting against, and responding to radiological and nuclear events in the service of Homeland and National Security” (2006). The focus is subtle, but the shift in mission from not just detection, but prevention, protection, and response could lead to role conflict because scientists now have to focus on more than just detection. This subtle shift could also lead to role overload.

The mission of this agency changed with a subtle shift to include new roles. The expectations for this lab are clear and appear to be compatible with the previous expectation of just measuring and evaluating radiation in the environment. Employees are trying to maintain a balance between the new roles of prevention, protection, and response with their previous role of detection. It appears that there is balance between the roles, however employees may experience role overload from the addition of the new priorities. This role accumulation may have positive as well as negative effects on employees. The lab and DHS did not have common goals before the merger, to ensure that their goals were more on the same track the mission of the lab was altered. The relationship between the lab and DHS appear to be clear. Due to the fact that the changes were subtle and no employees altered where they worked, their organizational identity would surround the lab itself and not the department within which it operated, i.e. DHS.

#### *Plum Island*

Plum Island Animal Disease Center was transferred from the USDA. Scientists on the island conduct research on foreign animal diseases, which has continued. According to the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), which has been responsible for the research center since 1954, “in 2003 the DHS joined us on the island, taking responsibility for the safety and security of the facility” (USDA, USDA and DHS Working Together, 2005). Due to the fact that DHS only became responsible for the safety and security of the center, the goals and the mission of the center did not change and role conflict would not occur. However, adding the responsibility of the security of the center could contribute to role overload of the S&T employees.

The mission of the island did not change, however employees did take on new a role. The expectations of what Plum Island does is compatible with DHS, however DHS did not take over performing any research on the island or set any of the standards for what research should be conducted. The expectations for DHS in this area are clear in that they are maintaining security for the island; however who exactly within DHS is performing that role was unclear. Role overload may result for those employees who took over performing security on the island. Role overload for the employees is not all bad, there are positives attached to having increased responsibility, however having too many expectations on employees can lead to role conflict. The research performed on Plum Island is extremely sensitive and providing security could be very complicated. Security on the island has to be very precise to ensure that no diseases are transferred from the island to the U.S. The relationship between DHS and Plum Island is not clear. Due to the fact that no employees from Plum Island transferred to DHS there would not be a need to ensure that a new organizational identity was established.

*The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency*

In the intramural arena, the Science and Technology directorate “works closely with scientists and engineers at our national laboratories and other government agencies on technological innovations” (Under Secretary McQueary, 2003). The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency funds research related to homeland security through procurement contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements (Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency Fact Sheet, 2003). The goal of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency is to get prototypes to public or private entities, businesses, development centers, and universities (P.L 107-296, 2002).

Congress also required DHS to create University based centers “to establish a coordinated, university-based system to enhance the Nation’s homeland security” (P.L 107-296, 2002). DHS designated these as centers for excellence and also funded various fellow programs and scholarships. This is a brand new agency created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The goals of this agency were compatible with DHS in that they gave out funding for homeland security projects. The expectations of this agency were clear and the relationship with DHS was clear. Since this is a new agency employees would not associate with a previous organization. The problems that this agency might encounter revolve around establishing its programs, hiring employees, and other administrative tasks, and establishing an organizational identity.

***The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate***

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate “analyzes and integrates terrorist threat information, mapping those threats against both physical and cyber vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure and key assets, and implementing actions that protect the lives of Americans, ensures the delivery of essential government services, and protects infrastructure assets owned by US industry” (DHS, OIG-04-13, 2004). The main objective of this directorate is to consolidate and analyze intelligence information from a number of sources and share that information with local and state officials. The agencies transferred into this directorate are: the National Infrastructure Protection Center from the FBI, the National Communications System from the DOD, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office from the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Computer Incident Response Center from the General Services Administration.

### *The National Infrastructure Protection Center*

The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) was transferred to the Intelligence Analyze and Infrastructure Protection directorate from the FBI. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) deals with cyber threats on infrastructure within the U.S. The National Infrastructure Protection Center was established in 1999 to “deter, detect, analyze, investigate, and provide warnings of cyber threats and attacks on the critical infrastructures of the U.S., including illegal intrusions into government and private sector computer networks. The National Infrastructure Protection Center will also evaluate, acquire, and deploy computer equipment and cyber tools to support investigations and infrastructure protection efforts” (Reno, 1999). This center is a collaboration between many government agencies, the intelligence community, and the private sector. When transferred into the DHS the National Infrastructure Protection Center was separated into two different divisions. The responsibilities were separated between those that dealt with the physical infrastructure assessment and protection and those that dealt with the cyber infrastructure (Department of Homeland Security Contact Information).

The mission of the center was not changed when it was merged into DHS and they did not acquire new roles or lose any roles. The expectations for this center were clear and with the separation into two divisions that could clarify the expectations of each areas role further. However, that could also contribute to role conflict as well. The expectations of this center were compatible with the IAIP. The relationship between this center and DHS appear to be clear before the merger as well.

However, a bigger problem that the National Infrastructure Protection Center had to deal with is the personnel shortage. According to IG Ervin (2004) “when the National Infrastructure Protection Center transferred into IAIP, personnel who actually left the FBI and remained with the National Infrastructure Protection Center filled only 18 of the 307 full time employee positions targeted for transfer. The other 289 were vacant.” Due to the fact that only 18 employees made the transfer role overload would be the biggest concern and also creating the new organizational identity to ensure that those employees do not leave the center.

#### *National Communications System*

The National Communications System (NCS) was transferred from the DOD into the Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate. This system was created shortly after the Cuban Missile crisis to form a single unified communications system to serve the President, the DOD, the intelligence community, the diplomatic community, and civilian leaders (NCS, Background and History, 2007). The system was established by President Kennedy and included linking the assets of six Departments, improving, and extending the communications facilities and components of various Federal agencies, focusing on interconnectivity, and survivability (NCS, Background and History, 2007). President Regan broadened the National Communications System’s capabilities in 1983 and expanded the membership of Federal agencies from six to twenty-three (NCS, Background and History, 2007). President Bush expanded it again in 2007 by adding the Director of National Intelligence to the membership.

The mission of the National Communications System is “to assist the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Director of the Office

of Science and Technology Policy and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the exercise of the telecommunications functions and responsibilities set forth in Section 2 of this Order” which includes wartime functions, emergency communication functions, policy guidance for Federal telecommunication assets, and more (E.O. 12472, 2003). The mission of the National Communications System also includes, “the coordination of the planning for and provision of national security and emergency preparedness communications for the Federal government under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstitution” (E.O. 12472, 2003). Each Department that is a member agency has specific responsibilities under the Executive Order.

DHS is designated as the Executive Agent of the National Communications System. As such they designate the manager of the National Communications System, ensure that it is operating properly and is prepared to meet the needs of the Federal government in case of an emergency. They also advise and assist state and local governments to ensure that they have plans and procedures in place for identifying their telecommunications needs in case of an emergency or national security situation, and ensure to the maximum extent practicable that state and local government planning is mutually supportive and consistent with the Federal government (E.O. 12472, 2003).

The mission of this system did not change and the center did not take on any new roles. The expectations for this system were compatible with DHS before the merger and are clear. The agency and DHS have common goals as well. This is another interagency system where each department has a specific role to fulfill. The role of DHS is to ensure that the system continues to run smoothly as well as assist state and local governments

have plans in place for identifying their telecommunications needs should an emergency arise. Due to the fact that the goals and responsibilities of each department are clearly laid out in the Executive Order this would relieve role conflict that the employees may experience within the merger. Employees in this organization would identify with the NCS.

#### *Federal Computer Incident Response Center*

The Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC) was transferred from the GSA, manages computer security throughout the government. According to the Acting Administrator in 2001 the Federal Computer Incident Response Center “is a collaborative partnership drawing on the skills and resources within Government, academia, and the private sector to address computer security related incidents” (Davis, 2001). The main mission of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center while in the GSA was “to be the Federal civilian government's trusted focal point for computer security incident reporting, sharing information on common vulnerabilities, and to provide assistance with incident prevention and response” (Acting Commissioner McDonald, 2002). Acting Commissioner McDonald (2002) noted that the Federal Computer Incident Response Center performs four major activities for the federal government. The first being it provides timely technical assistance to operators of agency information systems regarding security incidents, including guidance on detecting and handling information security incidents. The second major activity is compiling and analyzing information about incidents that threaten information security. The third major activity of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center is to inform operators of agency information systems about current and potential information security threats and

vulnerabilities and the last major activity of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center is to consult with agencies or offices operating or exercising control of national security systems. When transferred to DHS the major activities and mission of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center didn't change, however the Federal Computer Incident Response Center itself changed.

DHS created the U.S Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) in 2003 with the Federal Computer Incident Response Center as the initial nucleus (DHS, Privacy Impact Assessment, 2007). The fact that the mission and activities of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center did not change would help alleviate some role conflict. However, role conflict may still occur because of the change of culture and the addition of tools to improve cyber-security and a new 24x7 Incident Handling Response Center. Role conflict can also result from maintaining the partnerships with other federal agencies, the private sector, and public institutions "that have homeland security responsibilities for infrastructure sectors not covered by DHS" (DHS, OIG-04-13, 2004).

The mission of the FedCIRC did not change when it was transferred into DHS however it did acquire the new role of being the nucleus for the U.S Computer Emergency Readiness Team. The expectations of this agency were clear within DHS and appear to be clear within this directorate, as this agency's main focus was on mapping cyber vulnerabilities and protecting that infrastructure. Employees in this directorate may still identify with their previous organization. This agency also had to respond to a number of audiences in that it is a collaborative partnership with academia and the private sector. That could lead to role conflict among employees of this agency.

### *Energy Security and Assurance Program*

The Energy Security and Assurance Program (ESA) was transferred from the DOE into the DHS. This program was designed to protect the Nation from severe energy disruptions (H.R. Rep. No. 107-681, 2002). The Energy Security and Assurance program is a single program with six main activities: energy disruptions and preparedness, coordination with the private sector, state, and local government support, policy and analysis support, criticality of energy assets, technology development and application, and program direction (DOE, CFO, Budget Analysis, 2004). The program works with the private sector, state and local governments, and the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) to provide technical support during an emergency (S. Rep No. 107-220, 2002). Due to the fact that this program works so closely with the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, Congress also transferred that center to DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center “conducts advanced modeling and simulation activities that examine the potential consequences from terrorist attacks and natural disasters that impact critical infrastructure and key resources” (DHS, Office of Infrastructure Protection Goals, 2007). When transferred into the DHS the Energy Security and Assurance program’s mission did not change. Since both programs were moved to the new department together Congress hoped that would ensure a smoother transfer. “Keeping the Energy Security and Assurance program and National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center programs together will maintain program coherence, since the Energy Security and Assurance program provides analysis and

support for National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center” (House Committee on Science and Technology, Republican Caucus, 2008).

The mission of these two agencies did not change when they were merged into DHS. They also did not acquire new roles or lose any roles. The expectations for the ESA program were compatible with DHS before being merged into it. The expectations for the program did not change when it was merged within DHS. The relationship is clear as well and due to the fact that the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center was merged into DHS as well, that will help employees identify with the new organization quicker.

### ***The Coast Guard***

The Coast Guard experienced the most conflict of the agencies transferred into DHS. The Coast Guard’s mission was greatly expanded under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Coast Guard is a military organization, but was a part of the Department of Treasury before being transferred into DHS. When merged with DHS the Coast Guard was transferred in such a way that it reported directly to the Secretary. The Coast Guard originally had six missions; marine safety, search and rescue, aids to navigation, living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement), marine environmental protection, and ice operations. Congress in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 has deemed these as the Coast Guard’s ‘non-homeland security missions’. Congress added five additional missions within the Homeland Security Act of 2002. These are deemed the homeland security missions and consist of; ports, waterways and coastal security, drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, defense readiness, and other law enforcement. Both sets of missions were a part of the Coast Guard’s overall mission before the transfer

into DHS; however Congress delineated them within the creation of DHS. Due to the variety of missions and the amount of roles, both role overload and role conflict is a concern. Congress has been extremely concerned about mission performance and has addressed this question to the Commandant of the Coast Guard in a number of hearings. Some in Congress have even attempted to pass legislation to ensure that the non-homeland security missions do not take a back seat to the homeland security missions.

Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI) introduced legislation on April 11, 2003 “to guarantee the fulfillment of non-homeland security functions of the Coast Guard that Americans rely on daily.” The legislation was titled the Non-Homeland Security Mission Performance Act of 2003. The legislation did not focus solely on the Coast Guard, however when introducing the legislation, Senator Akaka (D-HI) focused his attention on the Coast Guard and the importance of the non-homeland security missions to Hawaii.

Senator Akaka stated that

“the establishment of the DHS created additional management challenges and has fueled growing concerns that the performance of core, non-homeland security functions will slip through the cracks. Just last week, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) testified before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that the Coast Guard has experienced a substantial decline in the amount of time spent on core missions. Moreover, the GAO found that the Coast Guard lacks the resources to reverse this trend. Coast Guard Commandant Thomas H. Collins is quoted as saying that his agency has more business than it has resources and is challenged like never before to do all that America wants it to do” (2003).

The legislation would require that each agency that performs non-homeland security missions submit a report on the agency with particular emphasis on the non-homeland security missions (S.910, 2003). The reports should “provide an inventory of the non-homeland security functions and identify the capabilities with respect to those

functions; contain information relating to the roles, responsibilities, organizational structure, capabilities, personnel assets, and annual budgets, specifically with respect to the capabilities to accomplish non-homeland security functions without any diminishment; contain information relating to whether any changes are required to the roles, responsibilities, functions, organizational structure, projects, activities, and annual fiscal resources to accomplish non-homeland security functions without diminishment; and contain the strategy the Department will use for the performance of non-homeland security functions and homeland security functions” (S.910, 2003). The legislation did not make it out of committee; however the concern for the balance of missions within the Coast Guard did not die.

In a 2004 report on the major management challenges within the DHS the OIG found three major barriers to performing its non-homeland security missions. The first barrier was the lack of a comprehensive and fully defined performance management system (DHS, OIG-05-06, 2004). Without a proper performance management system the Coast Guard is not able to adequately gauge the balance of its missions and how it is performing the various missions. The second barrier facing the Coast Guard is the continuing increase of workload demands as the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) is implemented (DHS, OIG-05-06, 2004). The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 added another duty to the Coast Guard of conducting vulnerability assessments of fifty identified seaports (Senate Report 107-64, 2001). This added responsibility will continue to stretch the personnel of the Coast Guard, which is the third barrier identified by the IG. The Coast Guard’s staff has declined in recent years, and its infrastructure has been taxed to the point where there are questions about the aging fleet

being able to meet all the new challenges of its mission. In 2005 Commandant Admiral Thomas Collins testified before the House Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity regarding these barriers and other questions about the Homeland Security missions of the post-9/11 Coast Guard.

This subcommittee wanted to ensure that the Coast Guard had the resources needed to balance the missions of homeland security and all the other missions that they were responsible for before joining DHS. During the hearing Admiral Collins (2005) noted that 45 to 46 percent of the total Coast Guard budget base is going towards homeland security missions as described within the Homeland Security Act of 2002. However, he did not believe that the other missions were being neglected. In fact he highlighted throughout the hearing that the Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, maritime service. That is not to say that Admiral Collins believed that the additional missions had not added strain to the Coast Guard. “These and other critical roles have imparted a tremendous challenge on Coast Guard men and women” (The Homeland Security Missions of Post 9/11 Coast Guard, 2005). Examining the statement it appears that Admiral Collins does not believe that the additional missions have lead to role conflict among the employees of the Coast Guard because even prior to the addition of the homeland security missions the Coast Guard was a multi-mission service. “The competencies necessary to do a variety of missions are built into that platform in the amount of people --. Not everyone knows every mission. We have multi-mission ships and multi-mission planes. A ship could be doing a search and rescue mission in the morning and could be interdicting drugs in the afternoon, which is frequently the case, by the way. And I would submit if you look at mission area by mission area by mission

area, our mission performance has been extraordinary and it hasn't taken a back seat anywhere" (The Homeland Security Missions of Post 9/11 Coast Guard, 2005).

However, the question of resources and balance of missions still lingers.

In 2006 while preparing the FY 2007 budget the Congressional Research Service, which provides policy and legal analysis to committees and members of both the House and Senate, submitted an analysis of the budget request for the Coast Guard which highlighted that 54 percent of the requested budget was for homeland security missions (O'Rourke, 2006). The Coast Guard will always have many missions and it appears they

The mission of the Coast Guard changed dramatically with the merger into DHS and they acquired a number of new roles. The biggest concern within Congress for the Coast Guard is how they will be able to balance all the missions that they have. Role overload could be present amongst employees. Due to the fact that they are a multi-mission organization and every employee does not have knowledge of every mission could help to alleviate some of the negative consequences of role overload. The Coast Guard has worked to ensure that employees do not experience too much role overload by making units mission specific. Expectations are clearly laid out for the Coast Guard and appear to be compatible with the DHS before they were merged. The relationship with the DHS before the merger is not clear until Congress identified the new roles for the Coast Guard. The organizational identity of being a member of the Coast Guard would overrule the identity of being a member of DHS.

### ***The Secret Service***

The Secret Service began in the late 1860's to investigate the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Over the years their mission was expanded to include protection of the

President, Vice-President, and other important political figures, cyber and telecommunications fraud, and other crimes that involve fraud and financial institutions (Secret Service, 2008). The Secret Service handles security at events that are deemed as National Special Security Events by the President or the Secretary of DHS. They also have a threat assessment center, which provides Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies with training, research, and consultation on complex threat assessment (P.L. 106-544, 2000). When the Secret Service was transferred into DHS it was transferred as a distinct entity that reports directly to the Secretary of DHS (P.L. 107-296, 2002).

Due to the fact that the Secret Service was transferred as a whole and reports directly to the Secretary and the mission of the organization did not change, therefore role conflict is lessened. The Secret Service did acquire new roles in that it was now designated to assist at National Special Security Events. Before merging into DHS it is not clear how the Secret Service is compatible with DHS. The expectations for the service are clear in that they did not change. Due to the fact that the service was transferred as a whole, most employees would identify with the service and not with the Treasury Department. However, role conflict may result from the many varied priorities within the Secret Service. However, since they have managed these various missions for a number of years, it seems that is not having a negative effect on the organization.

### ***Conflict within the Directorates***

The agencies are not the only organizations within the DHS that experienced conflict from the merger. The directorates also had a number of conflicts. Many of the sources of conflicts within the directorates are similar to the conflicts within the agencies.

In some cases, the conflicts within the directorates had a direct effect on the conflict within the agencies.

The agencies transferred into the Border and Transportation Security directorate were placed there because management believed there was mission overlap between protecting the U.S by enforcing immigration and customs laws, as well as overseeing the border. “The men and women of these various agencies carry out their responsibilities diligently, but they operate under a fragmented system. For example, both INS and Customs Service conduct criminal investigations. The result is that too frequently, investigators from both agencies are pursuing similar cases or even the exact same ones” (DHS, Border Reorganization Speech, 2003). To enhance efficiency and create a more seamless unit at the border, DHS created two bureaus that would focus on the border in different ways.

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection would focus on border protection and inspections. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement would focus on investigation and law enforcement. According to DHS, “these two new bureaus will break down barriers to communication and provide a direct line of authority to the Department's headquarters and give homeland security employees a clear mission. It will join the investigators with the investigators and the inspectors with the inspectors to capitalize on expertise and resources” (DHS Press Release, 2003). However, this change ended up splitting many of the agencies that were merged into this directorate thus, role conflict may have actually been created by altering the respective missions of the agencies involved. Congressman Rogers (R-AL) chaired a Congressional hearing

concerning these bureaus in 2005 and questioned whether the means of reorganization accomplished its stated goal.

The reorganization charged Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents with carrying out the duties and functions formerly carried out by three separate agencies and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents with the enforcement of both the laws of immigration and customs. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was rearranged to contain the Office of Detention and Removal, the Office of Intelligence, the Federal Protection Service, and the Federal Air Marshals (CBP and ICE Hearing, 2005). Congressman Rogers (2005) noted during the hearing concerning Customs and Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, that “we have heard of concerns that inspectors are not receiving investigative support as readily as before the reorganization and that reorganization may have created bureaucratic walls that impede effective and efficient communication and information sharing” (CBP and ICE Hearing, 2005).

This directorate has to respond to many different audiences with different needs and expectations for how to accomplish their jobs, which is the largest contributor to role conflict. This directorate also must rely on other agencies to fulfill a number of expectations and this can also contribute to role conflict because each agency has an opinion on how the job should be accomplished. However, because the goals of the directorate did not change, but were clarified this could help alleviate role conflict.

During Secretary Ridge’s swearing in before Congress he stated “under the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate in the new Department, we will strengthen our relationship with first responders and partner with the states, cities, and counties that manage and fund them. We will work with Congress to provide them with

the resources they need, beginning with the President's First Responder Initiative, which offered a thousand-percent increase in funding to equip, train, and drill first responders to meet a conventional attack or one involving a weapon of mass destruction” (Ridge, 2003). However, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, which is the main office for many grant programs, was placed within the Border and Transportation Security directorate. The Emergency Preparedness Response directorate modified the focus of the various agencies and programs that were transferred into it from a singular focus to an all-hazards focus. These changes led to conflict within the directorate as well as between the programs, which had to rely on their old agencies for assistance and direction.

The biggest source of conflict within this directorate is the reliance on other Departments. This directorate contains two interagency teams in which DHS only manages the teams when there is an emergency. When the teams are not needed they work within their home departments. A separate source of conflict within this directorate is the fact that FEMA is the backbone, however grants for preparedness and response were placed into the Border and Transportation directorate. This conflict was rectified after a few years, but this separation of roles into two directorates would affect how employees perform their duties.

The main focus of this directorate is collaborating with other government agencies to ensure that research and development pertinent to homeland security occurs at a rapid pace. In 2005 management of this directorate reported to the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) that “S&T continues to emphasize the Directorate’s role in interacting with other federal departments and agencies. Over the last year, S&T has worked with the Office of Science and Technology

Policy, the Homeland Security Council, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Office of the Vice President to begin a government-wide effort to coordinate homeland security R&D efforts, as Congress directed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002” (HSSTAC Minutes, 2005). The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee was created as an advisory committee to the S&T directorate through the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

The committee was made up of twenty members with differing backgrounds from emergency responders to representatives of citizen groups (P.L 107-296, 2002). The group was created with the mission to serve as a source of independent, scientific, and technical planning advice for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology (DHS, Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, 2004). The group was also given a time limit for its mission, three years. The committee took time to get set-up and didn't have their first meeting until February 2004. Their termination date was January 2005; however they did continue to meet until the end of 2005. The committee has not met since that time, during the meetings the S&T directorate continued to emphasize their work collaborating with other government agencies.

The biggest contributors to conflict within the S&T directorate are the administrative and logistical issues of managing the goals and priorities of the multiple audiences that they have to interact with; internal, external, and educational. In 2004 the OIG highlighted that many of the administrative and logistical issues are the result of the dependence of the S&T directorate on other federal agencies for services (DHS, OIG-04-24, 2004). In 2006 Jay Cohen, Under Secretary of the S&T directorate realigned the directorate. The directorate was separated into six divisions that are focused on specific

areas of research (DHS, Science and Technology Organization, 2007, with each division serving a number of customers within the Department.

The borders and maritime security division develops and transitions tools and technologies that improve the security of our Nation's borders and waterways, without impeding the flow of commerce and travelers. The chemical and biological division works to increase the Nation's preparedness against chemical and biological threats through improved threat awareness, advanced surveillance and detection, and protective countermeasures. The command, control, and interoperability division develops interoperable communication standards and protocols for emergency responders, cyber security tools for protecting the integrity of the Internet, and automated capabilities to recognize and analyze potential threats. The explosives division develops the technical capabilities to detect, interdict, and lessen the impacts of non-nuclear explosives used in terrorist attacks against mass transit, civil aviation, and critical infrastructure. The human factors division applies the social and behavioral sciences to improve detection, analysis, and understanding and response to homeland security threats. The infrastructure and geophysical division focuses on identifying and mitigating the vulnerabilities of the seventeen critical infrastructure and key assets that keep our society and economy functioning. This is the second realignment in four years. According to testimony from Under Secretary Cohen (2006) the goals of the directorate did not change, but were clarified.

The mission of the directorate did not change, however the amount of change in such a short period of time can contribute to role ambiguity. Also, this directorate has to respond to many different audiences with different needs and expectations for how to

accomplish their jobs, which is the largest contributor to role conflict. Many of the agencies within this directorate did not take on new roles; however with the change to being responsive to so many varied audiences they may have too many projects to manage. This directorate also must rely on other agencies to fulfill a number of expectations this can also contribute to role conflict because each agency has an opinion on how the job should be accomplished. However, because the goals of the directorate did not change, but were clarified this could help alleviate role conflict. Also, the realignment could help the agencies balance the various roles that they are filling because now they understand who they can ask for role clarity if need be.

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate does not collect any intelligence it only analyzes what information it is given. The National Strategy for Homeland Security that was published in July 2002 stated that, “the CIA is specifically responsible for gathering and analyzing all information regarding potential terrorist threats abroad. The proposed IAIP Division within the DHS would be able not only to access and analyze homeland security information, but also to translate it into warning and protective action.”

Due to the fact that the IAIP was not collecting any intelligence just analyzing it, role conflict can result from the dependence on other agencies and centers, programs that overlap the role of the IAIP. Early in 2003 President Bush directed the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the Secretaries of DHS and the DOD to create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (White House, 2003). The head of this new center would report to the Director of Central Intelligence. According to Inspector General Skinner (2005), “with the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center

under the Director of Central Intelligence and the Terrorist Screening Center under the Director of the FBI, the role and responsibilities of IAIP for intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination has been abated. Creation of the new Director of National Intelligence position makes the DHS intelligence coordination role even more uncertain, calling for prompt clarification of federal lines of authority in this area.” While the role conflict may not affect each individual agency that was transferred into this directorate, the lack of a clear role for the directorate would filter down to the individual agencies. The IAIP also had a lot of turnover of key management positions and also had to deal with space problems along with the rest of DHS (DHS, OIG-04-13, 2004). Both of these problems can lead to role conflict among the agencies that were transferred into the IAIP.

Similar to the other directorates, the agencies that were transferred into the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate had to collaborate with all the other agencies that were collecting the intelligence as well as the public. Role conflict can result from this collaboration because the expectations between the agencies that collect the intelligence and the public’s thirst for information may be incompatible. This directorate had some new programs created within it, which could contribute to role conflict because employees must learn the new program and manage the expectations of all those utilizing the program. Agencies within this directorate also had to deal with a personnel shortage. This would contribute to the role overload of the employees who work within these agencies. Role overload is the biggest problem within this directorate. Without the responsibility of collection, people may experience the positive

effects of role overload as well as the negative, but this can be bad for the overall organization as people may leave because they feel overburdened and now they have even more skills to market themselves with.

**Table 1: Sources of Role Conflict within the Agencies**

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Sources of Conflict</i>							<i>Previous Dept.</i>	<i>Reporting Line</i>
	<i>Stated Mission Change</i>	<i>Reliance on other agencies for Admin</i>	<i>Identify with</i>	<i>Number of Audiences</i>	<i>Role Ambiguity</i>	<i>Role Conflict</i>	<i>Role Overload</i>		
<i>Federal Protective Service</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>FPS</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Government Service Agency</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Directorate</i>
<i>Coast Guard</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Coast Guard</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>DOT</i>	<i>Secretary of DHS</i>
<i>Immigration and Naturalization Services</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>INS</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>Possibly</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Justice</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Directorate</i>
<i>U.S. Customs Service</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Customs</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Treasury</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Directorate</i>

<i>FEMA</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>FEMA</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Independent Agency</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate</i>
<i>Environmental Measures Laboratory</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>EML</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Department of Energy</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Science and Technology Directorate</i>
<i>Agricultural Quarantine Inspection</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>AQI</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>USDA</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Directorate</i>
<i>Office of Domestic Preparedness</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>ODP</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Justice</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Directorate</i>
<i>Strategic National Stockpile</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>HHS</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Health and Human Services</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate</i>
<i>Interagency Teams</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Organizations in which they work</i>	<i>Varied - dependent on the type of emergency</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Department of Energy and Justice</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate</i>
<i>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>LLNL</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Department of Energy</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Science and Technology</i>

									<i>Directorate</i>
<i>Plum Island</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Plum Island</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>USDA</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Science and Technology Directorate</i>
<i>National Domestic Preparedness Office</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Organizations in which they work</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>FBI (Justice)</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate</i>
<i>TSA</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>DHS</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>DOT</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Directorate</i>
<i>National Disaster Medical System</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Organizations in which they work</i>	<i>Varied - dependent on the type of emergency</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Health and Human Services</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate</i>
<i>National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>DHS</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>DOD</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Science and Technology Directorate</i>
<i>National Infrastructure Protection Center</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>NIPC</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>FBI (Justice)</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Science and Technology Directorate</i>

<i>National Communication Systems</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Organizations in which they work</i>	<i>Many</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>DOD</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection</i>
<i>Federal Computer Incident Response Center</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>FedCIRC</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Government Service Agency</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection</i>
<i>Energy Security Assurance Program</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>DOE</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Department of Energy</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection</i>
<i>Federal Law Enforcement Training Center</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>FLETC</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Treasury</i>	<i>Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Directorate</i>
<i>Secret Service</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Secret Service</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Treasury</i>	<i>Secretary of DHS</i>

\*Reliance on other agencies for admin, denotes that these agencies rely on their previous department for administrative support.

\*The identify with column denotes which agency or department the employees of the agency that merged into DHS would identify with.

\*Audiences for all agencies are Congress, the President, the American public, and the DHS administration; therefore each agency began with four audiences.

\* Reporting line denotes who within DHS the head of an agency reports to.

In Table 1, I have collapsed information about the conflict within the DHS agencies to indicate how role ambiguity, conflict, and overload are related to mission change and reporting lines. Examining the data only the border agencies, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Coast Guard, Environmental Measures Laboratory, and FEMA had their missions changed. Most of these agencies only had a slight change in their mission with terrorism added as another area of focus. Therefore, if the mission of the organization outlines its purpose and goals it is safe to say that the majority of the agencies merged into DHS did not experience role conflict because the expectation of their agency did not change. If it had changed the mission would have been altered.

Having a mission altered is not the only reason that agencies may have experienced role conflict. Seven agencies appear to be at risk or are at risk to experience role conflict. The main reason that these agencies are more vulnerable to role conflict is due to the fact that their organizational culture and identity remain with their old organization or the organizations in which the employees work. This is especially evident in the interagency teams, which are only managed by DHS in specific emergency situations. In these situations specifically however the teams are used to working with a variety of agencies, as that is the nature of these teams. Another contributing factor in role conflict is whether or not the agencies were compatible with DHS before merging. This is the case with the Federal Protective Services, the compatibility between these agencies were not obvious because of the job that FPS was performing before merging into DHS. Its mission was altered when it was added into DHS and this made it more compatible, however it also leads to over conflict.

Only three agencies had roles added to their current roles. The Coast Guard had the most roles added to its already full mission. This resulted in them having eleven roles total. The Environmental Measures laboratory added three new roles to their mission to total five roles for the employees of the lab. Both of these agencies added complementary roles. However, even complementary roles can result in role overload. Employees in these two agencies may have experienced some of the benefits of role overload such as privileges, status enhancement, and personal enhancement. Plum Island also added another role; however not knowing who exactly within DHS is performing the security at Plum Island it is difficult to determine who exactly may experience role overload. However, role overload may result from more than just an addition of a role for the organization. Employees may have taken on new roles even though the mission of the organization did not change because it was needed to help fulfill their original mission. In these situations it is more likely that the roles would be compatible and employees would experience the positive effects of role overload.

According to the data, seven agencies are susceptible to experience role ambiguity. This is the case for many of the directorates as well. Some of the causes of role ambiguity are rapid organizational change and organizational complexity. All of the agencies within DHS experienced these two factors. In particular the Immigration and Naturalization Service that was separated into two different agencies within DHS, but not all of the pieces of INS made the merger into DHS and other pieces went to other Departments. FEMA was in a similar situation as INS in that the agency was separated into a number of pieces. The Agricultural Inspection Service had to rely on USDA to set some of the expectations for their job performance, while DHS was actually managing

their performance. The Lawrence Livermore laboratory was in a similar situation as AQI in that DHS only had oversight of the Homeland Security Organization, but the Department of Energy also set expectations for the lab overall which would affect those employees who work within the Homeland Security Organization. The National Domestic Preparedness Office had to respond to the most audiences, the reason being that eleven offices were members of this office. This office did not have any dedicated staff when it was merged into DHS, however it was placed within the Office of Domestic Preparedness, which experienced a lot of organizational change over the last five years. The Transportation Security Agency was set up quickly after September 11<sup>th</sup> and this rapid organizational change combined with having to hire so many employees so quickly would lead to role ambiguity within this agency.

Looking at the agencies that experienced role ambiguity a number of them still identified with their old organization. The INS most likely identified with their previous organization, as did many of the border agencies because agencies in uniform tend to have a stronger identification within that unit. One could believe that it is because they have to protect each other while on duty and not just perform their jobs. This is one reason that the Coast Guard and the Secret Service would most likely identify more with the agency as a whole and not DHS. Establishing that new organizational identity in which employees see themselves as employees of DHS is a big feat for DHS due to the fact that they are not all in the same building and creating that organizational culture takes time without a shared space.

Some of the smaller agencies within DHS may have benefited from their size. This is due to the fact that consensus among audiences is more likely within smaller

agencies. However, one of the largest agencies, the Secret Service, may not have experienced role conflict, but that was most likely because their role was not altered when they were merged within DHS. The Federal Law Enforcement Center is another agency that appears to not have experienced any conflict related to its role and that is most likely because their role did not change and was not altered.

Most of the agencies within DHS did not experience conflict related to their roles or have roles added to their mission. However, the conflict that they were experiencing related to the merger in general would have put a strain on fulfilling their roles. Mergers are stressful to go through and employees had to learn how to operate in a new environment resulting from the merger even though their workspace did not change. Undergoing so much change in such a short period of time with such high expectations placed upon an organization, there is no wonder why so many of the agencies merged into DHS experienced conflict and did not perform their jobs one hundred percent out of the gate.

There is no easy way to resolve role conflict, however there are some ways in which employees can try to lessen the affects of it. One of the first ways to resolve role conflict is to interpenetrate the new role throughout the other roles that the agency is currently occupying. This would be easier for agencies like the Environmental Measurements Lab in which their new role only altered their current role slightly. The Coast Guard appears to utilize compartmentalization to resolve their role conflict. There are multi-mission ships that fill particular roles. When an employee is on that ship, the mission is clear and the employee can fulfill a given role to help the mission succeed. Congress with the passage of the Hurricane Katrina Relief Act helped FEMA merge

missions together, so that they would in turn focus again on all hazards and not just one area. This act also put all of the roles back within FEMA when originally they were separated out. This would also help to alleviate the role conflict within the Office of Domestic Preparedness, because it was placed within FEMA after becoming the Office of Grants and Training in 2005. Within the Border agencies the easiest way for them to relieve their role conflict would be to alternate between the given roles. Focus on the one area in which they have been placed and try to forget the other roles that they were fulfilling before the merger. The only other option for the agencies within DHS to resolve their role conflict is to altercast the roles, and try to reorient the audiences role expectations. This seems to be difficult with the number of audiences that some agencies within DHS had to deal with, however it is not impossible.

### ***In Sum***

Agencies merged into DHS had a heavy mission to fulfill. They had to work to prevent another terrorist attack. Reduce America's vulnerability to another terrorist attack and deter another terrorist attack. Protect the American public against another terrorist attack and respond to threats and all hazards, be they man-made or natural. Ensure that the borders are safe, welcoming lawful immigrants and visitors, while promoting the free flow of commerce. All the while carrying out their previous mission, without diminishment. The majority of agencies merged into DHS did not have their stated mission altered. However, many agencies experienced conflict over the expectations that they had been given before becoming a part of DHS and the expectations that they were given after. Agencies also needed the expectations to be compatible with DHS and for it to make sense of where they were placed within the new

department. The agencies combined together to form DHS had to work quickly to create new organizational identities and ensure that employees identified with the particular agency and not the old department that they were a part of.

## **Chapter 4 Conclusion**

Since its inception the DHS has continually changed. Due to all those changes, employees may not understand their role in the larger organization. This chapter recaps the problems that DHS has encountered since it was formed, how role theory explains some of the problems that it has encountered, limitations of this study, and areas for further study. To begin, this chapter will examine more changes that the DHS experienced with a change in upper management.

In 2005 DHS underwent another significant change; Secretary Michael Chertoff replaced Secretary Tom Ridge. Shortly upon his arrival Secretary Chertoff undertook a Second-Stage Review to systematically evaluate the Department's operations, policies and structures (Chertoff, 2005). The review was concluded in the summer of 2005 and Secretary Chertoff announced his new six point agenda to employees and Congress. The second stage review brought together 18 action teams with over 250 DHS employees. The action teams were asked to evaluate specific operation and policy issues. Opinions were also sought from DHS partners of local, State, and tribal governments. One of the goals of the second stage review was to "set a clear national strategy and design an architecture in which separate roles and responsibilities for security are fully integrated among public and private stakeholders" (Chertoff, 2005).

The six-point agenda "is structured to guide the department in the near term and result in changes that will: 1) increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events; 2) create better transportation security systems to move people and cargo more securely and efficiently; 3) strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform immigration processes; 4) enhance information sharing with our partners; 5)

improve DHS financial management, human resource development, procurement and information technology; and 6) realign the DHS organization to maximize mission performance” (DHS, Department Six-Point Agenda, 2008). Chertoff (2005) recognized that “modest, but essential course corrections regarding the organization will yield big dividends.” Even a modest change of the mission can lead to role conflict as people may not understand how their role fulfills the mission and how they contribute to the professed vision of the Department.

### ***Role Ambiguity***

Role ambiguity is the result of a lack of information regarding expectations for a role. As stated previously role ambiguity can be created by organizational complexity, rapid organizational change, and managerial philosophies. DHS has experienced all of these over the past five years. Examining each agencies expectations before merging with DHS and then after to see if it appears to be compatible with DHS, it seems that most of the expectations were clear. It also appears that expectations for the majority of agency’s merged into DHS were compatible. The number one lack of clarity for expectations is to whom employees should direct questions. Many of these agencies were still relying on their previous department for administrative tasks it was not clear who was setting the expectations and whose expectations employees should be fulfilling. The agencies that had to rely on their former Departments the most were, the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection, the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System, and the Federal Protective Services.

Employees may also have contradictory expectations for the department. They may expect certain tasks to be accomplished in a specific way and they are not being

fulfilled that way anymore because the new Department has taken over that responsibility. It appears that role ambiguity is the biggest problem within DHS since many of the missions of the agencies merged into DHS did not change and it appears that role conflict is not as present as role ambiguity. The ramifications of role ambiguity are interference with mission accomplishment and performance. This can also lead to employee turnover, which DHS cannot afford.

### ***Role Overload***

Role overload occurs when an organization or individual takes on too many roles. Role overload has negative and positive effects. It appears that the majority of agencies merged into DHS had balance among the new roles that they assumed. However, the Coast Guard should be very mindful of role overload, as should the National Infrastructure Protection Center. Only a limited number of agencies took on new roles and it seems that many have built upon their previous roles to try to alleviate role overload for their employees. To help alleviate both role conflict and role overload employees should try to merge any of these roles together. If that is not possible they may be able to alternate between the two roles. However, employees cannot sustain that for a long period of time as it can lead to many other conflicts. One last resolution for role conflict or role overload is to ask for clarification of the roles by those who created it. This is not always possible, but it is an excellent way to alleviate role conflict and overload.

Due to the fact that DHS has had difficulty setting up a national headquarters and the majority of the agencies have remained in their previous locations, DHS needs to work to create an organizational identity. One way to do that is to try to take over the

administrative tasks that the other departments are currently doing. Secretary Ridge began to take the human resources and accounting systems and merge them together to create one system for all employees. This is a daunting task, but this will greatly contribute to creating a DHS organizational identity. Secretary Chertoff has also helped to create the new identity with his second stage alignment. When he became Secretary he tried to ensure that the alignment would help employees reduce some of the bureaucracy that they had encountered when DHS was first created.

One of the biggest sources of conflict was the manner in which the Department was created. All of the agencies heard rumor and speculation surrounding the creation of the new Department, which most likely contributed to employees not wanting to make the transition. Another problem that still has not been addressed was the realignment of Congress. DHS still has to respond to an exorbitant amount of Congressional committees. According to Veronique De Rugy (2006) “Even after the combination of more than two dozen agencies, committee chairs have been unwilling to relinquish much of their jurisdiction over the 22 agencies and activities transferred to DHS. As a result, last year alone the leaders of DHS had to appear before 88 congressional committees and subcommittees.” This takes up significant time when trying to get a Department up and running. Another source of conflict is the territorial issues that occur within Congress and those agencies that became a part of DHS. DHS felt this most acutely when employees did not make the transition with their agency.

The turf wars are still ongoing with regards to homeland security funding. One of the main reasons for creating DHS was to make a one-stop shop for states and local governments to get grant funding. “Conversely, much homeland security spending takes

place outside of the department. The total amount directed to homeland security activities in fiscal year 2006 is roughly \$50 billion. But departments other than DHS will spend \$23 billion of that. Not surprisingly, a large portion--\$9.5 billion--goes to the Department of Defense. But other funding decisions are more curious. Why, for instance, are the Environmental Protection Agency, the Commerce Department, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration receiving homeland security funds (De Ruyg, 2006)?”

Some of these agencies had never worked together before merging to create this new Department. They had to establish programs and processes for working together. They needed to establish their organizational culture for working on new projects and expectations for the projects. They had to establish ‘this is the way we do things around here’ which is time consuming and can have an effect of how someone performs their role within the organization.

Another source of conflict is that some roles were emphasized over others. As many stated before 2005 FEMA focused on terrorism and forgot about natural disasters, that when the hurricanes struck in 2005 people were not prepared to deal with it. Another example is TSA. Many have stated that air transportation has been emphasized over all other transportation that other forms of transportation are not as secure. Another agency where this may be apparent is the Coast Guard, as evidenced by the testimony before Congress.

Another area of conflict is the amount of audiences that DHS had to report to. Many of the agencies had to answer to DHS, Congress, the President, the American people, and their previous Department. With more stakeholders there is less flexibility in

how the agencies perform their roles. There is also less ability to make small changes and adjustments to their roles. Also, there are more opportunities for expectations to be conflicted or not clear, which leads to role conflict and ambiguity. This appears to be a big problem for the administration of grants. The states and local governments want funds to pay for responders, but Congress does not allow this in the legislation. Congress and the states want the grants distributed quickly, however there are a number of checks in place to ensure that the money is distributed correctly. Parts of the country want the grants distributed on the basis of risk, however Congress wants to ensure that all parts of the country feel safe and get an allocation of money, so they added formulas to the grants. There are also a number of coordination issues and how to get the money distributed quickly and fairly as well as ensure that the states and local governments get answers to their questions and understand more about what they should be utilizing the funds for. A lack of consensus among the audiences can be very daunting because employees may not understand the expectations of all the audiences.

### ***Lessons Learned***

This is not the first agency that was created in this frankensteinian way. One that was very similar in size to DHS was the Department of Defense. FEMA was also created in a similar fashion. The DOD merger is considered successful now, however it took a number of years for the agencies combined to learn to function together as a team. Even after a number of years DOD employees still encounter some problems working together, however their roles are clearly laid out and most employees understand their role within the organization. The DHS should create a way to explain each agencies role within the larger organization and how employees fit within that organization chart. Employees

need to understand how their role works to fulfill the mission of the agency and how that agency works to fulfill the mission of the larger department.

One lesson for future mergers of this size with this amount of bureaucracy is to have meeting with the employees who will be merged together before the merger to ensure that they understand the expectations for their organization within the new organization. This will help employees to clarify any role conflict or ambiguity. A dialogue between all employees that will be merged together would also be good for employees to air their concerns and address any organizational conflicts before they occur. A dialogue would also be a good place for management to address any rumors that may be circulating and ensure that employees have factual information about what to expect with the merger.

Another lesson for future mergers is to clarify the roles of each agency to be merged within the organization by writing clear mission statements. Many of the agencies within the DHS did not have their stated mission altered, however almost all of their missions changed. The majority of agencies had to change their focus to include terrorism as well as their previous focus. Each agency needs to understand how to achieve balance between the previous focus and the additional focus of terrorism.

Another lesson learned from this merger is the consolidation of Congressional committees. This was recommended when by the U.S Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century in early 2001 when they recommended the creation of a department focused on homeland security. DHS will hopefully work as well as DOD does currently, but it took a number of years for DOD to obtain a level of cohesion. DHS is still learning its way and getting used to working together. Mergers and acquisitions take between five

and seven years in the private sector, DHS has been in existence for five years already and is performing progressively better.

### ***Limitations of the study***

There are a number of limitations to this study. The first being that there was no first hand data sought by employees of DHS. Further study should be performed in this area. There are a number of tools that measure role conflict, which could be given to actual DHS employees to examine how much role conflict, ambiguity, and overload they are experiencing. One should determine if employees still identify with their old department or DHS.

The second limitation to this study is the problems and lack of consensus among role theorists over the theory itself. Biddle states (1986), “confusion and malintegration persist in role theory. Authors continue to differ over definitions for the role concept, over assumptions they make about roles, and over explanations for the role phenomena. And formal derivations for role propositions have been hard to find.” Role theory has a number of limitations in that there is no grand theory present here. Many theorists argue over the basic concepts including what expectations are, what a role is, and who is the role occupant.

Another area that should be studied further from this topic is whether the conflict for the role lies within the person or the role itself. If a person that is occupying the role has different expectations for the role, how does that affect role conflict. Applying this to DHS would be especially interesting in that the Department was new and some people would look at that as an opportunity to create their role, while others may not. That could

have an effect on not just the employee occupying a particular role, but the agency in which that person works.

Another limitation to this study was only utilizing the mission statements to garner the expectations that Congress and the President have for the agencies. This would require another area of further study to see where agencies get their expectations if not from the mission statement. This study also utilized legislation, however there are questions there because the legislation to set-up that outlines the mission and duties of the agency may not be as up to date as the role they are fulfilling. While this is not necessarily an issue within DHS, as time goes on it does become more of one.

The complaints regarding grant funding have not changed since DHS began giving out grants in 2001 immediately following September 11th. Every year DHS has changed the grant process and that is part of the conflict between the states and DHS. Many states believe that DHS was created to fix the problem related to grant funding however, because DHS has been in constant flux for the past five years the grant process has been in flux for the past five years. Now that another election year and Administration change is upon us DHS will change again. From the outside it appears that DHS agencies have their missions in order, and that will contribute to the employees understanding their role. However, management should always be conscious to convey each employee's role within the offices, bureaus, agencies, and the Department as a whole.

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**Appendix A – Outline of Agency Missions**

<p><i>Department of Homeland Security</i></p>	<p>The mission of DHS: (A) prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism; (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the U.S.; (D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the DHS including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning; (E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the DHS that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress; (F) ensure that the overall economic security of the U.S. is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and (G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking (Homeland Security Act of 2002)</p>	
<p align="center"><b>Organization</b></p>	<p align="center"><b>Agency Mission in 2000</b></p>	<p align="center"><b>Mission in DHS</b></p>
<p>1. <a href="#"><u>The U.S. Customs Service (Treasury)</u></a></p>	<p>We are the guardians of our Nation's borders - America's frontline. We serve and protect the American public with integrity, innovation, and pride. We enforce the laws of the United States, safeguard the revenue, and foster lawful international trade and travel.</p>	<p>Became part of the CBP, whose mission is: As the single unified border agency of the United States, the CBP mission is vitally important to the protection of America and the American people. <a href="http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/">http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/mission/</a></p>
<p>2. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (part) (Justice)</p>	<p>The mission of INS is to administer and enforce the immigration and naturalization laws of the United States, including securing the Nation's borders and apprehending illegal immigrants.</p> <p>GAO highlights the fact that the mission is twofold: one is enforcement that prevents illegal immigrants from entering the country and removing those that do; the other is a service function that provides</p>	<p>INS was disbanded by the Homeland security act of 2002. The agency was separated into Customs and Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Policy and Programs in Under Secretary for Management, and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service. Employees went to one of the above new bureaus within DHS.</p>

	services and benefits to facilitate entry, residence, employment, and the naturalization of legal immigrants. (This was highlighted in a report in 1999 and 2000.)	
3. The Federal Protective Service	<p>According to Commission Peck, 2000: First, here's what our changes in FPS are all about. We started by defining the FPS mission and objective; they had not been clear before. The objective is for FPS to become the best facilities security organization in the world. The principal mission is building security, by which we mean protecting the affected facility, its tenants, visitors and their property from harm. As Assistant Commissioner Edwards, a veteran police officer and our top FPS official, says: FPS is not a police organization; it is a facility security organization with law enforcement authority.</p> <p><a href="http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?pageTypeId=8169&amp;channelId=-18801&amp;P=XAE&amp;contentId=11765&amp;contentType=GSA_BASIC">http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?pageTypeId=8169&amp;channelId=-18801&amp;P=XAE&amp;contentId=11765&amp;contentType=GSA_BASIC</a> accessed on March 17, 2007</p>	<p>The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) provides law enforcement and security services to over one million tenants and daily visitors to federally owned and leased facilities nationwide. FPS' protection services focus directly on the interior security of the nation, and require close coordination and intelligence sharing with the investigative functions within DHS. FPS is a full service agency with a comprehensive HAZMAT, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Canine, and emergency response program as well as state-of-the-art communication and dispatch Mega centers.</p> <p><a href="http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channelView.do?pageTypeId=8195&amp;channelPage=/ep/channel/gsaOverview.jsp&amp;channelId=-12951">http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channelView.do?pageTypeId=8195&amp;channelPage=/ep/channel/gsaOverview.jsp&amp;channelId=-12951</a></p>
4. <a href="#">The Transportation Security Administration (Transportation)</a>	TSA was federalized in 2001	<p>We are the Transportation Security Administration, formed immediately following the tragedies of Sept. 11. Our agency is a component of the Department of Homeland Security and is responsible for security of the nation's</p>

		transportation systems.
5. <a href="#">Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Treasury)</a>	The mission didn't change from before; the authority just went to DHS.	<p>We train those who protect our homeland. Vision: We must provide fast, flexible, and focused training to secure and protect America. From their website accessed on March 16, 2007</p> <p>FLETC's mission statement and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) signed by over 80 Partner Organizations clearly outline the Center's role and responsibilities. FLETC is the primary provider of career-long federal law enforcement training and prepares law enforcement professionals to fulfill their responsibilities safely and proficiently. The purpose of the program is to provide Federal, state, local, and international agents and officers who graduate FLETC the skills and knowledge needed to perform their law enforcement functions effectively and professionally. The program develops uniform standards for training programs, facilities and instructors to ensure high caliber training across agencies.</p> <p><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10000014.2005.html">http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10000014.2005.html</a></p>
6. <a href="#">Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (part)(Agriculture)</a>	APHIS provides leadership in ensuring the health and care of animals and plants, improving agricultural productivity and competitiveness, and contributing to the	Within the APHIS structure, animal quarantine inspection activities at ports of entry were transferred from the Veterinary Services (VS) division to the

	<p>national economy and the public health.  <a href="http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3025/mission.html">http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3025/mission.html</a></p> <p>The APHIS mission satisfies five strategic goals. They include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) safeguarding plant and animal resources from foreign pests and diseases;</li> <li>(2) minimizing production losses and export market disruptions by quickly detecting and responding to outbreaks of agricultural pests and diseases;</li> <li>(3) minimizing risks to agricultural production, natural resources, and human health and safety by effectively managing pests and diseases and wildlife damages;</li> <li>(4) ensuring the humane care and treatment of animals; and,</li> <li>(5) developing safe and effective scientific pest and disease control methods.</li> </ol> <p><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/MRP-Hawks-3.12.03.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/MRP-Hawks-3.12.03.pdf</a></p>	<p>Plant Protection division in 1974. As a result, the Plant Protection Division became Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ). In 2002 the majority of port inspection activities were transferred to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection.  <a href="http://www.aphis.usda.gov/about_aphis/history.shtml">http://www.aphis.usda.gov/about_aphis/history.shtml</a></p> <p>Homeland Security and Agricultural Border Protection. Traditionally, APHIS' Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program has had responsibility for excluding agricultural health threats. Annually, thousands of inspectors have inspected hundreds of thousands of cargo shipments and tens of millions of passengers' baggage arriving in the United States. They have intercepted tons of materials whose entry could jeopardize the agricultural sector. They have successfully excluded such threats as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which could have devastated not only the agricultural sector, but other sectors of the economy as well. That responsibility is now shared with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While most AQI staff are</p>
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		<p>reassigned to the new Department, USDA retains the responsibility for promulgating regulations related to entry of passengers and commodities into the United States. We intend to work closely with our counterparts in DHS. USDA retains the direct role of ensuring that passengers and cargoes traveling from Hawaii and Puerto Rico comply with specified regulations to protect the health of the agricultural sector on the Mainland, including necessary quarantines. We retain responsibility for collecting the user fees and will be periodically reimbursing DHS for their inspection services.</p> <p><a href="http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/MRP-Hawks-3.12.03.pdf">http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/download/MRP-Hawks-3.12.03.pdf</a></p>
<p>7. <a href="#">Office for Domestic Preparedness (Justice)</a></p>	<p>ODP was part of the Office for Justice Programs within the DOJ. The mission in 2000 was: To provide leadership in developing the nation's capacity to prevent and control crime, administer justice, and assist crime victims.</p> <p><a href="http://www.ojp.gov/annualreport/fy00pdf.pdf">http://www.ojp.gov/annualreport/fy00pdf.pdf</a></p> <p>The Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness was the office transferred. Their mission specifically was: To develop and implement a national program to enhance the capacity of State</p>	<p>DHS <b>office</b> responsible for enhancing the capacity of state and local jurisdictions to respond to, and mitigate the consequences of, incidents of <b>domestic terrorism</b>. <b>Now the office of grants and training, switch was made in 2005.</b></p> <p>The mission of G&amp;T is to prepare America for acts of domestic terrorism by developing and implementing a national program to enhance the capacity of state and local agencies to respond to incidents of terrorism, particularly those</p>

	<p>and local agencies to respond to WMD terrorist incidents through coordinated training, equipment acquisition, technical assistance, and support state and local exercise training.</p> <p><a href="http://www.mipt.org/pdf/puttingcttoworkaappendixp.pdf">http://www.mipt.org/pdf/puttingcttoworkaappendixp.pdf</a></p> <p>We have proposed the establishment of the Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) within OJP to provide funds for equipment, training and technical assistance to state and local authorities and emergency responders. OSLDPS is proposed as one mechanism through which we will implement the mandate given to the Justice Department by this Committee to enhance the capabilities of state and local jurisdictions to better respond to incidents of domestic terrorism. Statement of Janet Reno from 1999 to Congress</p> <p><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/1999/agappro020499.htm">http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/1999/agappro020499.htm</a></p>	<p>involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) incidents, through coordinated training, equipment acquisition, technical assistance, and support for Federal, state, and local exercises.</p> <p>G&amp;T fulfills this mission through a series of program efforts responsive to the specific requirements of state and local agencies. G&amp;T works directly with emergency responders and conducts assessments of state and local needs and capabilities to guide the development and execution of these programs. Assistance provided by G&amp;T is directed at a broad spectrum of state and local emergency responders, including firefighters, emergency medical services, emergency management agencies, law enforcement, and public officials.</p> <p><a href="http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/mision.htm">http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/mision.htm</a></p> <p>In 2005, SLGCP was incorporated under the Preparedness Directorate as the Office of Grants and Training (G&amp;T).</p> <p><a href="http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/overview.htm">http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/overview.htm</a></p>
<p>8. <a href="#">The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)</a></p>	<p>The mission of FEMA is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect our institutions from all hazards by leading</p>	<p>Lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from disasters.</p>

	and supporting the Nation in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.	
9. <a href="#">Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System (HHS)</a>	<p>The original mission of the National Disaster Medical System was to support state and local health agencies during natural disasters and to provide back-up support to DOD and Veterans Administration medical systems during times of overseas conflict.  <a href="http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20051209095733-01279.pdf">http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/20051209095733-01279.pdf</a></p> <p>CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) has large quantities of medicine and medical supplies to protect the American public if there is a public health emergency (terrorist attack, flu outbreak, earthquake) severe enough to cause local supplies to run out. Once Federal and local authorities agree that the SNS is needed, medicines will be delivered to any state in the U.S. within 12 hours. Each state has plans to receive and distribute SNS medicine and medical supplies to local communities as quickly as possible.  <a href="http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/">http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/</a></p>	<p>The mission of the NDMS has not changed. Eric Tolbert's testimony in 2003 to the House highlighted what the NDMS does and the response teams.  <a href="http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/schedule108/apr03/4-10-03o/etolbert.pdf">http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/schedule108/apr03/4-10-03o/etolbert.pdf</a></p> <p>DHS is now responsible for determining when and where the stockpile should be deployed, but HHS continues to manage the stockpile with assistance by the VA.  <a href="http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/schedule108/apr03/4-10-03o/etolbert.pdf">http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/schedule108/apr03/4-10-03o/etolbert.pdf</a></p>
10. Nuclear Incident Response Team (Energy)	If the US gets nuked by terrorists, the Nuclear Incident Response Team is ready to help. The organization offers experts and equipment to handle nuclear	The NIRT will operate at the direction of the Secretary in connection with an actual or threatened terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency

	<p>terrorism, emergencies, and accidents. The team's personnel provide expertise in areas such as device assessment and disablement, intelligence analysis, credibility assessment, intelligence analysis, and health physics. The organization works with other emergency response groups and engages in drills to prepare for emergency situations. The Nuclear Incident Response Team is part of the Department of Homeland Security.</p> <p><a href="http://www.answers.com/topic/nuclear-incident-response-team?cat=biz-fin">http://www.answers.com/topic/nuclear-incident-response-team?cat=biz-fin</a></p> <p><a href="http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rs22023_11jan05.pdf">http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rs22023_11jan05.pdf</a> Includes a bit about what NIRT is.</p>	<p>within the US. When there is no need the EPA and Secretary of DOE will still be responsible for the NIRT. Section 504 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002</p> <p><a href="http://f11.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf">http://f11.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf</a></p> <p>The Secretary of Energy shall retain primary responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping the NIRT's.</p> <p><a href="http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/billsandreports/107thcongress/hr5005mgsamendsummary.pdf">http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/billsandreports/107thcongress/hr5005mgsamendsummary.pdf</a></p>
<p>11. Domestic Emergency Support Teams (Justice)</p>	<p>The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) is a stand-by interagency team of experts that can be quickly assembled in accordance with pre-event scenarios and led by the FBI to provide an on-scene commander (Special Agent in Charge) with advice and guidance in situations involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), or other significant domestic threat. Such DEST guidance could range from information management and communications support to instructions on how to best respond to the detonation of a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon,</p>	<p>Domestic Emergency Support Teams previously under the Department of Justice that expeditiously provide expert advice, guidance and support to the Federal On-Scene Commander during an incident involving weapons of mass destruction or a credible threat.</p> <p><a href="http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pres_s_release_0100.shtm">http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pres_s_release_0100.shtm</a></p>

	<p>or a radiological dispersal device. As specialized predesignated teams, DEST has no permanent staff at the FBI or at any other federal agency.</p> <p><a href="http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf">http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf</a></p> <p>Response to terrorism: After an incident has occurred, a rapidly deployable interagency Emergency Support Team (EST) will provide required capabilities on scene: a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) for foreign incidents, and a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST membership will be limited to those agencies required to respond to the specific incident. Both teams will include elements for specific types of incidents such as nuclear, chemical, and biological threats. Presidential Directive 39 1995</p> <p><a href="http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/pdd39.htm">http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/pdd39.htm</a></p>	
<p>12. <a href="#">National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI)</a></p>	<p>The National Domestic Preparedness Office coordinates all federal efforts, including those of the Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency, to assist state and local first responders with planning, training, equipment, and exercise necessary to respond to a</p>	<p>Became the Office of Grants and Training:</p> <p>The mission of G&amp;T is to prepare America for acts of domestic terrorism by developing and implementing a national program to enhance the capacity of state and local agencies to respond to incidents of terrorism, particularly those involving chemical, biological,</p>

	<p>conventional or non-conventional weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident.  <a href="http://www.chaosacrossamerica.com/OHS/Departments/NDPO.htm">http://www.chaosacrossamerica.com/OHS/Departments/NDPO.htm</a></p> <p>Through the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) led the earliest efforts to coordinate federal assistance to first responders in the area of domestic terrorism preparedness. NDPO was established in the FBI by order of the Attorney General in August 1998 to serve as a single point of contact—a “one-stop shop”—through which state and local authorities could seek interagency assistance in the areas of planning, training, equipment, and exercises to better prepare for domestic terrorist incidents—particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). NDPO’s role was not operational, and the Office was not responsible for producing intelligence, preempting terrorist attacks, directly responding to terrorists attacks, or conducting investigations. Prior to the homeland security debate, the functions of NDPO were transferred from the FBI to FEMA as part of a wider and earlier effort by the Bush Administration to consolidate all federal domestic preparedness programs in a single agency. One</p>	<p>radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) incidents, through coordinate training, equipment acquisition, technical assistance, and support for Federal, state and local exercises.</p> <p><a href="http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/mission.htm">www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/mission.htm</a></p>
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	<p>2002news report stated that “the office has been defunct since last year and has no employees, but it never has been officially closed.”</p> <p><a href="http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf">http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf</a></p>	
<p>13. CBRN Countermeasures Programs (Energy)</p>	<p>The mission and focus of these programs did not change when merged into DHS.</p>	<p>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 2004</p> <p><b>2.3.5.1 Chemical and Biological Countermeasures Program</b></p> <p>This program focuses on addressing the national needs for technologies to quickly detect, identify, and mitigate the use of chemical and biological threat agents against the U.S. civilian population. The principal program is the Chemical and Biological National Security Program, within which are several notable projects, including the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System Project, Autonomous Pathogen Detection System, Advanced Biodetection Technology, Biological Signatures, the Forensic Science Center, in situ Chemical Sensors, and Remote Chemical Sensing.</p> <p><b>2.3.5.2 Nuclear and Radiological Countermeasures Program</b></p> <p>The Nuclear and Radiological Countermeasures Program develops technical capabilities aimed at</p>

		<p>countering the threat of terrorist use of a nuclear or radiological device in or near a U.S. population center, or from detecting and tracking nuclear material to forensic attribution in the event of a nuclear incident. Projects include nuclear emergency response, cargo container security, radiation detection, and detection and tracking systems.</p> <p><a href="http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/docs/deis/eis0348/volume_1/VolumeI-chap2.pdf">http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/docs/deis/eis0348/volume_1/VolumeI-chap2.pdf</a></p>
<p>14. Environmental Measurements Laboratory (Energy)</p>	<p>The laboratory is part of DoE. It measures and evaluates radiation in the environment.</p> <p><a href="http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the.php">http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the.php</a></p> <p>The Environmental Measurements Laboratory conducts scientific and technical investigations related to environmental surveillance and monitoring, site and facility characterization and decontamination and decommissioning. The Environmental Measurements Laboratory provides the Department of Energy and other Federal agencies with a responsive and objective technical capability to: assure sampling, measurement and analysis quality and assess risk of human exposure to radioactivity and other energy-related</p>	<p>The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML), a government-owned, government-operated laboratory, is part of the Science and Technology (S&amp;T) Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Laboratory advances and applies the science and technology required for preventing, protecting against, and responding to radiological and nuclear events in the service of Homeland and National Security.</p> <p>EML's current programs focus on issues associated with environmental radiation and radioactivity. Specifically, EML provides DHS with environmental radiation and radioactivity measurements in the laboratory or field, technology development and evaluation, personnel training, instrument calibration,</p>

	<p>pollutants. The Environmental Measurements Laboratory provides the Department and other Federal agencies with an inhouse, high quality scientific capability to address important issues related to national security.</p> <p><a href="http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/01budget/defem/prgdir.pdf">http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/01budget/defem/prgdir.pdf</a></p>	<p>performance testing, data management, and data quality assurance.</p> <p><a href="http://www.research.umd.umich.edu/fileadmin/template/researchsponsored/files/DOE_Labs.doc">http://www.research.umd.umich.edu/fileadmin/template/researchsponsored/files/DOE_Labs.doc</a></p> <p><a href="http://sphweb02.umd.edu/sphweb/files/bio/cv/Erickson_Apr-20-2006_CV.doc">http://sphweb02.umd.edu/sphweb/files/bio/cv/Erickson_Apr-20-2006_CV.doc</a></p> <p>States: “In formation of the Department of Homeland Security, Congress directed that EML transfer from the Department of Energy into the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS. This transition entailed change of both mission and administrative relationships. EML rapidly and expertly built upon its core competencies to meet the new mission of advancing and applying the science and technology required for preventing, protecting against, and responding to radiological and nuclear events in the service of Homeland and National Security.”</p>
<p>15. National BW Defense Analysis Center (Defense)</p>	<p>This center is a DoD research facility chartered to develop countermeasures for terrorist attacks.</p> <p><a href="http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the.php">http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the.php</a></p> <p>Mission is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using</p>	<p>The \$420 million included in the president's fiscal 2003 Defense Department's budget for the military chemical and biological defense program would be transferred to the Homeland Security Department. It would be used to establish the National Bioweapons Defense Analysis Center, which would have the mission of coordinating</p>

	<p>weapons of mass destruction.  <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2002_hr/80431.pdf">http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2002_hr/80431.pdf</a></p> <p>SEC. 907. NATIONAL BIO-WEAPONS DEFENSE ANALYSIS CENTER.  There is established in the Department of Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center, whose mission is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using weapons of massdestruction.  <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/title9.html#907">http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/title9.html#907</a></p>	<p>countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction.  <a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43669">http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43669</a></p> <p>Mission and Objectives:  HSPD-10 outlines four essential pillars of the nation’s biodefense program and provides specific directives to further strengthen the significant gains made in the past three years.  The four pillars of the program are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Threat Awareness, which includes biological weapons-related intelligence, vulnerability assessments, and anticipation of future threats. New initiatives will improve our ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on biological weapons and their potential users.</li> <li>• Prevention and Protection, which includes interdiction and critical infrastructure protection. New initiatives will improve our ability to detect, interdict, and seize weapons technologies and materials to disrupt the proliferation trade, and to pursue proliferators through strengthened law enforcement cooperation.</li> <li>• Surveillance and Detection, which</li> </ul>
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		<p>includes attack warning and attribution. New initiatives will further strengthen the biosurveillance capabilities being put in place in fiscal year 2005.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Response and Recovery, which includes response planning, mass casualty care, risk communication, medical countermeasures, and decontamination. New initiatives will strengthen our ability to provide mass casualty care and to decontaminate the site of an attack.</li> </ul> <p>The Department of Homeland Security has a role and responsibility in each of these four pillars of the national biodefense program. The S&amp;T Directorate has the responsibility to lead the Department's RDT&amp;E activities to support the national biodefense objectives and the Department's mission.</p> <p>* Renamed the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center</p> <p>The NBACC's mission will support two pillars of this blueprint – threat awareness and surveillance and detection. The NBACC is made up of two centers, the Biological Threat Characterization Center and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center to carry out these missions.</p> <p>Specifically, NBACC's mission is to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Understand current and future</li> </ul>
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		<p>biological threats, assess vulnerabilities, and determine potential impacts to guide the research, development, and acquisition of biodefense countermeasures such as detectors, drugs, vaccines and decontamination technologies; and</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from biocrimes and terrorism to attain a “biological fingerprint” In FY 2004, the Department completed the planning and conceptual design of the NBACC facility.</li> </ul> <p><a href="http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_02_08/albright.pdf">http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_02_08/albright.pdf</a></p>
<p>16. <a href="#">Plum Island Animal Disease Center (Agriculture)</a></p>	<p>Scientists at Plum Island conduct research and diagnostics on animal diseases that are not present in the U.S., but could pose a major economic threat to agriculture here. ARS owns and operates the island, and conducts research on foot-and-mouth disease, African swine fever, hog cholera, and vesicular stomatitis. The APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory has diagnostic and training responsibilities for these and other foreign diseases. As PIADC director, Huxsoll will coordinate the activities of both.</p> <p><a href="http://ars.usda.gov/is/pr/2000/000602.2.htm">http://ars.usda.gov/is/pr/2000/000602.2.htm</a> June 2, 2000</p> <p>Plum Island Animal Disease Center is a</p>	<p>At the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has an important job.</p> <p>We work to protect farm animals, farmers and ranchers, the nation's farm economy and export markets... and your food supply.</p> <p>Plum Island is located off the northeastern tip of New York's Long Island. USDA activities at Plum Island are carried out by scientists and veterinarians with the department's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).</p>

	<p>US Department of Agriculture (USDA) facility devoted to diagnosing and researching foreign diseases of animals. Named for the beach plums that grow along its shores, Plum Island's ownership was transferred to the USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) in 1954 to establish a laboratory to study foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and other exotic animal diseases. The diagnostic activities at Plum Island were transferred from ARS to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) in 1983. Since then, under the administration of ARS, APHIS has maintained a foreign animal disease diagnostic laboratory (FADDL) on the island.</p> <p><a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/plum_island.htm">http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/plum_island.htm</a></p>	<p>We're proud of our role as America's first line of defense against foreign animal diseases.</p> <p>We're equally proud of our safety record. Not once in our nearly 50 years of operation has an animal pathogen escaped from the island.</p> <p>In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) joined us on the island, taking responsibility for the safety and security of the facility.</p> <p><a href="http://www.ars.usda.gov/main/site_main.htm?modecode=19400000">http://www.ars.usda.gov/main/site_main.htm?modecode=19400000</a></p>
<p>17. Federal Computer Incident Response Center (GSA)</p>	<p>FedCIRC, in order to further secure our government technology systems and services.</p> <p>FedCIRC is a collaborative partnership drawing on the skills and resources within Government, academia, and the private sector to address computer security related incidents. Federal civilian agencies turn to FedCIRC for assistance in identifying, containing and recovering from adverse events that impact on the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information</p>	<p>It appears as if the FedCIRC is now the US-CERT.</p> <p>The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is a partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and the public and private sectors. Established in 2003 to protect the nation's Internet infrastructure, US-CERT coordinates defense against and responses to cyber attacks across the nation. The Federal Computer Incident Response Center</p>

	<p>traversing the critical information infrastructure.</p> <p><a href="http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?noc=T&amp;contentType=GSA_BASIC&amp;contentId=11775">http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?noc=T&amp;contentType=GSA_BASIC&amp;contentId=11775</a></p> <p>Federal Computer Incident Response Center. The center assists agencies with incident prevention and response.</p> <p><a href="http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/13679.pdf">http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/13679.pdf</a></p> <p>Developed FedCIRC in 1996 as a pilot program. It became operational in 1998 and was moved to GSA's Federal Technology Service. The overarching mission of the FedCIRC is to be the Federal Civilian Government's trusted focal point for computer security incident reporting, sharing information on common vulnerabilities, and to provide assistance with incident prevention and response.</p> <p><a href="http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentId=11782&amp;contentType=GSA_BASIC">http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentId=11782&amp;contentType=GSA_BASIC</a></p> <p>Four activities performed by the FedCIRC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide timely technical assistance to operators of agency information systems regarding security incidents, including guidance on detecting and handling information security incidents</li> </ul>	<p>(FedCIRC), established in Oct 1996 by the National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST) as a pilot program and taken over by the General Services Administration (GSA) in October 1998 as an operational entity, formed the initial nucleus of the US-CERT when DHS was established in March 2003.</p> <p><a href="http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_nppd_24x7.pdf">http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_nppd_24x7.pdf</a></p> <p><a href="http://www.us-cert.gov/press_room/us-cert-announced.html">http://www.us-cert.gov/press_room/us-cert-announced.html</a></p> <p>The US-CERT will complement current security capabilities, including the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC), which coordinates incident warning and response information across Federal Civilian Government agencies.</p>
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	<p>*Compile and analyze information about incidents that threaten information security .</p> <p>*Inform operators of agency information systems about current and potential information security threats and vulnerabilities.</p> <p>*Consult with agencies or offices operating or exercising control of national security systems.</p>	
<p>18. <a href="#">National Communications System (Defense)</a></p>	<p>The National Communications System, an interagency body of 22 federal departments and agencies, would transfer from the Defense Department to the Homeland Security Department.</p> <p><a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43669">http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43669</a></p> <p><a href="http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/execordr/eo12472.htm">http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/execordr/eo12472.htm</a> EO 12472 by Regan in 84 outlined new mission, amended in 2003</p>	<p>On November 15, 2005, the NCS became part of the Department's Directorate for Preparedness after nearly two years under the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate.</p> <p>Created by Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis: The NCS mandate included linking, improving, and extending the communications facilities and components of various Federal agencies, focusing on interconnectivity and survivability. With the addition of the Office of the Director, National Intelligence in September 2007, the NCS membership currently stands at 24 members.</p> <p><a href="http://www.ncs.gov/about.html">http://www.ncs.gov/about.html</a></p> <p><a href="http://www.ncs.gov/org_chart.html">http://www.ncs.gov/org_chart.html</a> Org chart outlines what exactly NCS is</p>

		<p>responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing the expertise for the planning, implementing, administering, and maintenance of approved national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications programs and NCS baseline activities.</li> <li>• Conducting technical studies, analyses, and assessments pertaining to the effectiveness of NS/EP communications programs and the effects of these programs on the Nation's critical infrastructures.</li> <li>• Consulting with the Committee of Principals (COP), the NCS Council of Representatives (COR), and the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) on issues pertaining to NS/EP telecommunications.</li> <li>• Participating on Federal councils and boards, such as the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), that develop telecommunications policies, standards, national initiatives, and</li> </ul>
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		<p>performing research on emerging technologies.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring international emergency telecommunications planning activities and offering assistance to international emergency planning groups.</li> <li>• Developing, planning, and implementing National Communications System (NCS) strategic goals and objectives.</li> <li>• Assisting individual NCS member organizations in developing efficient cost- effective solutions to complex communication/information requirements and resolutions to organizational communication/information issues</li> </ul>
<p>19. National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI)</p>	<p>Within the last year the NIPC was established to deter, detect, analyze, investigate and provide warnings of cyber threats and attacks on the critical infrastructures of the United States, including illegal intrusions into government and private sector computer networks. The NIPC will also evaluate, acquire, and deploy computer equipment and cyber tools to support investigations and infrastructure protection efforts.</p>	<p>On May 22, 1998, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), which called for the creation of a national plan to protect the services on which we depend daily. NIPC has moved from the FBI into the Department of Homeland Security under the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate.  <a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/critinfr.html">http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/critinfr.html</a></p>

	<p>Statement by Janet Reno 1999  <a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/1999/agappro020499.htm">http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/1999/agappro020499.htm</a></p> <p>The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the FBI which will fuse representatives from FBI, DOD, USSS, Energy, Transportation, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector in an unprecedented attempt at information sharing among agencies in collaboration with the private sector. The NIPC will also provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the Federal Government's response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats and monitoring reconstitution efforts;  <a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/factsh.htm">http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/factsh.htm</a></p> <p>The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), created by Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh in February 1998, addresses the growing threat of illicit computer activity, particularly as it affects critical national infrastructures. The mission of NIPC is to assess, warn of, respond to, and investigate illegal acts involving computer and information technologies, and unlawful acts that threaten or target our critical infrastructures.</p>	<p><a href="http://www.esisac.com/publicdocs/NICC%20Watch%20Office%20Info.doc">http://www.esisac.com/publicdocs/NICC%20Watch%20Office%20Info.doc</a></p> <p>Recently, the former National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) was fully integrated into the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As such, the responsibilities of fulfilling the mission of physical and cyber critical infrastructure assessment and protection of the former NIPC are now being addressed by two new divisions.</p>
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	<a href="http://www.calea.org/Online/newsletter/No75/The%20National%20Infrastructure%20Protection%20Center.htm">http://www.calea.org/Online/newsletter/No75/The%20National%20Infrastructure%20Protection%20Center.htm</a>	
20. <a href="#">Energy Security and Assurance Program (Energy)</a>	Mission did not change when merged into DHS	<a href="http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/otherdef/ea.pdf">http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/otherdef/ea.pdf</a> The Energy Security and Assurance Program leads the Federal government's effort to ensure a robust, secure, and reliable energy infrastructure in the new threat environment that includes malevolent threats and increasing complexity due to interdependencies. EA works with States, local governments, and the private sector to coordinate protection activities and cultivate collaborative partnerships to assure public safety, public confidence, and service in the energy sector.
21. The Secret Service	Mission did not change with merger	The United States Secret Service is mandated by statute and executive order to carry out two significant missions: protection and criminal investigations. The Secret Service protects the president and vice president, their families, heads of state, and other designated individuals; investigates threats against these protectees; protects the White House, vice president's residence, foreign missions, and other buildings within Washington, D.C.; and plans and implements security designs for designated National Special Security

		<p>Events. The Secret Service also investigates violations of laws relating to counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United States; financial crimes that include, but are not limited to, access device fraud, financial institution fraud, identity theft, computer fraud; and computer-based attacks on our nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure.  <a href="http://www.secretservice.gov/mission.shtml">http://www.secretservice.gov/mission.shtml</a></p> <p>With the growing threat of <b>TERRORISM</b>, the mission of the Secret Service has expanded. In 2000 Congress enacted the Presidential Threat Protection Act. This law authorized the Secret Service to participate in the planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at special events of national significance ("National Special Security Event"), as determined by the president.  <a href="http://law.jrank.org/pages/10077/Secret-Service.html">http://law.jrank.org/pages/10077/Secret-Service.html</a></p>
22. The Coast Guard	The six non-homeland security missions highlighted in the Homeland Security Act of 2002: marine safety, search and rescue, aids to navigation, living marine resources, marine environmental protections, and ice operations.	Its core roles are to protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic and security interests in any maritime region in which those interests may be at risk, including international waters and America's coasts, ports, and inland

	<p>The five homeland security missions added to the Coast Guard: ports, waterways, and coastal security, drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, defense readiness, and other law enforcement.</p> <p><a href="http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf">http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf</a></p>	<p>waterways. To serve the public, the Coast Guard has five fundamental roles: <b>Maritime Safety; Maritime Security; Maritime Mobility; National Defense; and Protection of Natural Resources.</b></p> <p><a href="http://uscg.mil/top/missions/">http://uscg.mil/top/missions/</a></p>
Sources:	<p>Customs info From this website <a href="http://www.traveloasis.com/uscustravin.html">http://www.traveloasis.com/uscustravin.html</a> accessed on March 16, 2007</p>	<p>INS info from <a href="http://www.flra.gov/fsip/finalact/01fs_210.html">http://www.flra.gov/fsip/finalact/01fs_210.html</a> on March 17, 2007</p>
	<p>FPS info from</p>	<p>TSA info <a href="http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/what_is_tsa.shtm">http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/what_is_tsa.shtm</a> accessed on March 17, 2007</p>

**Appendix B – DHS Organizational Chart**

# Department of Homeland Security

