Missed Appropriations: Uncovering Heidegger's Debt to Kierkegaard in Being and Time

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MISSED APPROPRIATIONS:
UNCOVERING HEIDEGGER’S DEBT TO KIERKEGAARD
IN BEING AND TIME

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the University of Denver and the
Iliff School of Theology Joint PhD Program
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of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
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Abstract

It is widely held that Martin Heidegger appropriated several existential concepts from Søren Kierkegaard in his 1927 work, *Being and Time*. Most scholars agree that Heidegger did not sufficiently credit Kierkegaard. What was the extent of the appropriation, and why did Heidegger not duly cite Kierkegaard? This work will focus on the concept of anxiety which appears throughout *Being and Time* and which was influenced by the concept of the same name presented in Kierkegaard’s 1844 work *The Concept of Anxiety*. It will also be seen how the structure of *Being and Time* closely resembles that of *Concept of Anxiety* given that the first halves of both works focus on aspects of physical existence while the second halves concern temporal existence. Anxiety will serve as a starting point that will also connect Heidegger to Kierkegaard on related concepts such as Heidegger’s concept of “fallenness” to Kierkegaard’s “objective sin,” and the concepts of “repetition” and “the moment” that appear in both works. Historical background concerning Heidegger’s early academic career will also be given in order to gain insight on how Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard’s thought and why Heidegger was reluctant to disclose this influence. It will be shown that while the background contexts of *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety* differ greatly, the concept of anxiety is functionally similar between the two works.
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Introduction

It is generally accepted that Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was influenced by Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) in his magnum opus *Being and Time* (1927). Scholars and commentators range widely on how much influence took place. Some believe that even though the influence is identifiable, it is slight and Kierkegaard’s ideas only served as seeds for ideas that Heidegger developed in a different context. Others claim that Kierkegaard’s ideas appear practically verbatim in *Being and Time* without due acknowledgment, and that this amounts to plagiarism. The latter view is supported by the fact that Heidegger only minimally acknowledged Kierkegaard in *Being and Time*, and never stated explicitly that the latter had any influence on his thought. Why was this the case? It is thought that Heidegger was attempting to distance himself from the thought of Kierkegaard, who happened to be in vogue at the time Heidegger was teaching at Freiburg and Marburg. Another reason might have stemmed from Heidegger’s larger project of separating theology and metaphysics from philosophy. Since Kierkegaard was viewed as a theologian, Heidegger did not want to appear to be influenced by him. Regardless, the problem remains: how much influence did Kierkegaard’s writings have upon Heidegger in *Being and Time*? Is it valid to assume that Heidegger simply appropriated several of Kierkegaard’s concepts without credit to the latter? I will side with those that
believe Heidegger did indeed appropriate several Kierkegaardian themes in Being and Time without enough acknowledgment. I will be focusing on the concept of anxiety and related themes that Kierkegaard laid out in his 1844 pseudonymous work, The Concept of Anxiety. I will show that these themes are present and recognizable and often have a similar function in Being and Time. I will not however, claim that there is an exact identity between how the themes are presented in Concept of Anxiety and Being and Time. The former is a work of psychology (according to the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis), and the latter concerns “the question of the meaning of Being.” The fields that these works propound to belong dictate the roles that the ideas within them play. Sometimes anxiety and related themes function in a similar way between the two works, but there are times when they do not. I will point out these similarities and differences. From the textual evidence I will point out, it will become apparent that Being and Time was significantly influenced by Concept of Anxiety. In addition, from the historical context provided on Heidegger’s early academic career in Chapter 1, it will be clearer why Heidegger appropriated themes from Kierkegaard without due acknowledgement.

Why Anxiety?

Anxiety is commonly seen as the primary locus of the the Kierkegaard/Heidegger connection. This is due to the oft-cited feature in the Kierkegaard and Heidegger definitions that anxiety is the “fear of nothing.” This shared characteristic of anxiety is played up in commentaries as the central
essential attribute of anxiety common between the concepts of the two men. I will show that there are several other attributes of anxiety that are equally if not more important than the “fear of nothing” attribute, and in these areas there is sometimes a considerable difference between the concepts. The differences have to do mainly with how Heidegger emphasizes “Being-in-the-world” in the first half of *Being and Time*, versus Kierkegaard emphasizing physical embodiment in the first half of *Concept of Anxiety*; as well as how Heidegger operates within finite temporality in the second half of *Being and Time* while Kierkegaard is focused on the eternal in the second half of *Concept of Anxiety*. I will show that this parallel structure of the development of the concept of anxiety is the most prominent “missed appropriation” in the literature concerning the Heidegger/Kierkegaard connection to date.

An example of another attribute of anxiety common to both is that it is associated with the Fall of Adam. In Kierkegaard’s *Concept of Anxiety*, anxiety is directly connected with “hereditary sin.” In *Being and Time*, Heidegger precedes his discussion of anxiety with a description of his concept of “falling.” He claims that falling has nothing to do with the Judeo-Christian idea of the fall or original sin. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how this point has also caused some commentators to posit a strong connection between Kierkegaard and Heidegger with regards to anxiety. It will become apparent that even though certain attributes of anxiety are shared, these attributes appear in different contexts and may have different ends. This work will trace the appearances and contexts of anxiety and related themes in *Being and Time* and compare those to Kierkegaard’s articulation
of anxiety as put forth primarily in *Concept of Anxiety*. Any of Heidegger’s or Kierkegaard’s themes which are essential or prior to an understanding of their concepts of anxiety will be examined as well.

In this work I will be following Dan Magurshak’s view\(^1\) that the theme of anxiety bears the most fruit in the putative Heidegger/Kierkegaard connection in *Being and Time*, and that *Concept of Anxiety* is the best place to look at the shared concept. Anxiety will serve as a starting point that will further connect Heidegger and Kierkegaard on several related themes such as authenticity, guilt, and temporality. While I concur with Magurshak’s assessment that *Concept of Anxiety* is the “…cornerstone of the relationship between the two thinkers,”\(^2\) I disagree with Vincent McCarthy’s more extreme statement that “…in *Being and Time*, Heidegger followed Kierkegaard nearly step-by-step in the exposition and exploration of anxiety.”\(^3\) The vagueness of “nearly” is at question here. I agree there is a parallel structure between the development of anxiety in *Concept of Anxiety* and *Being and Time*, but to say the latter follows the former step-by-step is an overstatement.

The other chief reason for focusing on anxiety and specifically looking at Kierkegaard’s *Concept of Anxiety* has to do with the three footnotes in *Being


\(^2\) Ibid., 191.

and Time in which Heidegger acknowledges Kierkegaard, albeit in a somewhat backhanded way. In the first two footnotes Concept of Anxiety is directly mentioned. In the third footnote, Kierkegaard’s temporal concept of “the instant” is referred to, and although this concept appears in a few of Kierkegaard’s works, it is in Concept of Anxiety where the concept is is laid out in full, and not surprisingly, it is intimately related to anxiety.

The Approach of the Current Work

This work will follow the appearance, development, and the major themes connected to anxiety in the texts of Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety. While this may not seem like the most exciting way to proceed, and indeed at times may verge on being ponderous, I believe it is the only way to thoroughly elucidate Heidegger’s putative appropriation of anxiety and related themes from Kierkegaard, and it is work that has not been done thoroughly in the literature to this point. For the most part I will proceed seriatim through the primary texts. This is necessary not only to follow the argument in each work, but also to show the parallel structure of the development of anxiety between the two works. I will rely very little on secondary texts and commentaries. The exception to this will be in Chapter 1, where I focus on Heidegger’s encounter with Kierkegaard’s texts early in his teaching career before 1927 when Being and Time was published. Here I will be working primarily out of historical monographs on Heidegger by Van Buren, Kisiel, and Sheehan. I will also refer to several articles on the Kierkegaard/Heidegger connection, first and
foremost Dan Magurshak’s 1985 article on the importance of *Concept of Anxiety* in this connection. I dedicate two chapters to *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety* respectively because I have found a mirrored structure between the development of anxiety between Divisions One and Two of *Being and Time* with Chapters I-II and III-V of *Concept of Anxiety* respectively. I believe this finding to be novel, as I have not seen evidence of recognition of this common structure in the literature.

It is my hope that by focusing very closely on small areas of the primary texts, in some cases just a phrase or even a particular word, that the connection between Heidegger and Kierkegaard will be clarified in a way that has not yet been seen. This exegetical approach may seem labored at times, but it is my impression that too many commentaries have parroted previous opinions and inundated this particular subject with “glosses of glosses.” Some commentaries are colored by the particular author’s judgment of Heidegger’s later political activities and seem to be looking for more evidence of his flawed character. This work will steer clear of passing judgment on Heidegger’s personal or political scruples.

A difficulty arises when examining a particular theme such as anxiety common to both thinkers: it becomes readily apparent how the theme in question is connected to other themes, and before long the issue of having to explain the greater part of *Being and Time* or of *Concept of Anxiety* becomes an issue. As much as either man (especially Kierkegaard) might balk at having their work viewed as a “system,” none of the themes explored here can be considered “standalone.” They are intertwined in a web that connects to other themes which may or may not be
common to the other thinker. This is perhaps more true of Heidegger, since he is
the more systematic of the two. Because of this we are aided by the fact that for
the most part he defines his terms, although these definitions rely on other terms
that must then be defined, etc. This is less the case with Kierkegaard, as will be
discussed in Chapter 1. He rarely provides a single clear definition, which may be a
purposeful part of his style.

With anxiety in particular it is impossible to merely skip around in the
primary texts where anxiety appears without also expositing related themes such
as spirit, sin, temporality, death, and care. The need to unravel these related
and dependent themes is necessary, and the danger of having to explain a large
portion of each man’s work becomes a reality. While it is beyond the scope of
this dissertation to be a short course on Kierkegaard or Heidegger, some in-depth
analysis of disparate areas of their work will at times be necessary. This perceived
“danger” may prove to be a useful way of proceeding however, since it will serve
to uncover fundamental similarities or differences on how a concept is used by
providing context that in turn may differ or bear similarity to the background in
which it is set by the other thinker. If the context differs greatly, then the concept in
question can also be considered to differ. Because the present work cannot explain
everything about Concept of Anxiety and Being and Time, especially the latter, it
will have to be assumed that the reader has a basic level of familiarity with the
two works. Since Being and Time is a much larger work in length and scope this
assumption will apply more on that side.
This work will utilize Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s texts directly as much as possible. For Heidegger, the 1962 Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time* will be used, and on the Kierkegaard side the latest 2014 Alastair Hannay translation of *Concept of Anxiety* will be used. Also, in Chapter 5 the 1983 Hong translation of *Repetition* will be referenced. Unless otherwise noted, in quotations any text emphasis, capitalizations, or spellings will be as they appear in the translations of the works cited. In the original texts in German and Danish, both authors, especially Heidegger, made liberal use of the « » symbols to denote emphasis. Word capitalization is more of issue in *Being and Time*. An important example of this is how Macquarrie and Robinson (and many Heidegger commentators) capitalize Being when referring to the ontological concept (*Sein*) and use lowercase being when referring to particular (ontical) entities or beings (*Seiendes*). In Chapter 1, some of Heidegger’s lectures and letters pre-dating *Being and Time* will be examined, to show how he was aware of Kierkegaard’s works and of their influence at Freiburg and Marburg and where he was teaching at the time. At times a German or Danish translation of a word or short phrase will be given. It will be assumed that the reader has some familiarity with German and less or none with Danish. Since the two languages share many cognates, the Danish term will be given so that the German reader may benefit by seeing the resemblance.
Where to Place this Work

There are a plethora of general commentaries on *Being and Time*, and relatively few on *Concept of Anxiety*. It is not my hope for this work to be counted among these. My goal is to focus on the similarities and differences in anxiety and the dependent themes in these two works and not to stray into unrelated territory. However, since *Concept of Anxiety* centers on anxiety, my Chapters IV and V may come close to resembling a more general commentary on that work.

Since Heidegger is a controversial figure in twentieth century Western philosophy, it is worth considering where the current work might fit in the conservative-liberal spectrum of Heidegger scholarship. Thomas Sheehan delineates four gradations along this spectrum: the ultra-orthodox, the orthodox, the liberal assimilationists, and the rejectionists. The ultra-orthodox is the most conservative and unapologetic school, represented by the journal *Heidegger Studies* and the *Heidegger-Gesellschaft*. The orthodox position is “dedicated to getting Heidegger right” and emphasizes the historical/exegetical approach exemplified in the work of Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren. The liberal-assimilationists engage Heidegger with other contemporary philosophers, e.g. Derrida, Levinas, and Hubert Dreyfus. The rejectionist school are the “Heideggerian’s against Heidegger,” and are motivated by his National Socialist party membership and John D. Caputo’s

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1993 book *Demythologizing Heidegger*. The current work, with its emphasis on close textual analysis could presume to be placed in the orthodox school, but since it also acknowledges contemporary works and is in dialogue with another—although historical rather than contemporary—philosopher, i.e. Kierkegaard, it could be seen as assimilationist. While I deplore the idea of Heidegger’s Nazi involvements, I do not see this as cause to reject his work wholesale, especially *Being and Time*, which was completed well before January 30, 1933.

Western philosophy has a rich tradition of men appropriating from their predecessors. Starting with Plato appropriating from Pythagoras. This was particularly common in in German Idealism, e.g., Fichte from Kant, and Schelling from Hegel. Why then is the Heidegger’s appropriation of Kierkegaardian concepts deemed as being controversial? Some commentators point to Heidegger’s alleged appropriation of Kierkegaardian themes to serve as yet another example of Heidegger’s flawed character. There was certainly a kind of appropriation that occurred, but it must be remembered that the concepts in question did not originate with Kierkegaard nor terminate with Heidegger. There was certainly much appropriation of both Heidegger and Kierkegaard in Sartre’s 1943 work *Being and Nothingness*, although Sartre was far better than Heidegger about acknowledging his influences. Anxiety in particular, especially in the Christian context, was described by Augustine in his *Confessions* and is essential to Luther’s idea of *Anfechtungen* in his works. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger were obviously influenced by their predecessors in the long history of western philosophy and theology, so to say that
Heidegger’s appropriation of anxiety was *only* from Kierkegaard is presumptive. Nevertheless, as we will see there is a considerable amount of resemblance between the concepts of anxiety and related themes between *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety*. Anxiety will be seen to generally function in a similar way in the two works, although the contexts, mainly in terms of embodiment and temporality, differ.

Before we continue it is worth considering the first two words of the title of this work: “Missed Appropriations.” I intentionally did not use “missappropriations” since that would indicate that Heidegger was wrong or incorrect in the way he used Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety and related themes in *Being and Time*. My aim in using “missed appropriations” is to see it in two senses: the first and more obvious sense is that there are things which Heidegger appropriated from Kierkegaard that have been missed by scholars to this point; the second sense is that Heidegger himself “missed” certain aspects of Kierkegaard’s version of anxiety and thus his version of anxiety and related themes is lacking when compared to that of Kierkegaard. If that is the case, can Kierkegaard’s version of anxiety be thought of as being more complete and Heidegger’s version as merely a derivative? As indicated by the remainder of the title, the bulk of this work will be dedicated to elucidating the first sense of missed appropriations, the aspects and themes related to anxiety that have been missing in the literature to this point. By the end of this work we will have accrued enough textual evidence to see that the second sense of missed appropriations also bears out. By looking at both senses we will target two issues: 1) The degree to which Heidegger appropriated from Kierkegaard, i.e., was it
tantamount to plagiarism on Heidegger’s part or was it merely a case of him being loosely influenced by Kierkegaard? 2) Can Kierkegaard finally be “freed” from the designation sometimes given to him as the philosopher that influenced Heidegger in *Being and Time*?
Chapter I: Propaedeutics

There are several general preliminary topics that should be examined before we look more specifically at the concept of anxiety. The bulk of this chapter will be dedicated to a historical background of Heidegger’s early career emphasizing how he encountered Kierkegaard while teaching at Freiburg and Marburg. We will also look at how Heidegger categorized theology as a science, since this will be a point of relation to Kierkegaard. We will then look at the issue of commensurability between Heidegger’s ontology and Kierkegaard’s theology. We will then shift to Concept of Anxiety, and the difficulties presented in its interpretation. Finally, before we delve into Division One of Being and Time, we will look briefly at current common notions of anxiety.

Heidegger Preliminaries

A brief biographical sketch of Heidegger prior to 1927 is necessary here to accentuate his religious upbringing and penchant for theological studies. Heidegger was born in Messkirch, a small town in the Black Forest region of southern Germany in 1889. His father was the sexton of a local Catholic church. Young Martin attended a Catholic boarding school and was on track for clerical studies.
Heidegger’s interest in philosophy begins at age seventeen he is given a copy of Franz Brentano’s *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (“On the Manifold Meaning of Being According to Aristotle”) by a mentor at Berthold-Gymnasium in Freiburg. He was deeply affected by this book, which he read over the summer break of 1906. He entered the noviate with the Jesuits in 1909, but was discharged in October of that year with heart problems. From the end of 1909–1911 he studied theology at Freiburg. His Catholic training ended at that point and he began studies in philosophy, humanities, and natural sciences at Freiburg. According to Van Buren, his first encounter with Kierkegaard’s works is in 1911, although which works he read is not known. In 1913 he received his doctorate, with a thesis titled “The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism.” In 1915 he received his habilitation and title of *Dozent* with his dissertation “Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Categories and Meaning.” From 1915–1918 he was in the army, but never saw combat in World War I. His duties while in the army included postal censorship and meteorology. He married Elfride Petri (a Protestant) in 1917. Their first son, Jörg is born in 1919, and their second, Hermann in 1920. In 1919 Heidegger breaks with Catholicism. From 1918–1923 he is a *Privatdozent* and assistant to Edmund Husserl. His friendship with Karl Jaspers begins in 1920. In 1923 he is appointed to Marburg. This is also the year that he is known to have read some of Kierkegaard’s edifying writings, “The Anxieties of the Heathen” and “The Lilies of the Field and

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the Birds of the Air". In 1927, *Being and Time* is published, and in 1928 Heidegger succeeds Husserl at Freiburg.

Heidegger’s status as a Christian has been a subject of speculation, however it is clear that he was “thrown” into a conservative Catholic family and community. It is also clear that in his youth he intended to become a Catholic cleric. Even though that plan did not pan out, he pursued education as a theologian before turning to philosophy and phenomenology. How much did his youth and early academic career affect his thought and writings? I would contend that his religious upbringing was in some ways underlying his thought, and was still influencing him even as a man of thirty-eight years when *Being and Time* was published.

**Heidegger and Jaspers**

As far as his exposure to Kierkegaard is concerned, this is believed to have occurred mainly in the period of his friendship and correspondence with Karl Jaspers (1883–1969). They were academic colleagues during the 1920s and mutually influenced one another’s philosophical positions and both highly critical of one another’s work. Heidegger and Jaspers were working amidst the dominance of neo-Kantianism in the philosophy departments at German universities during that time. They were both reacting against it, Heidegger perhaps more so than Jaspers. Both men had a shared appreciation of Kierkegaard, but it took them in different

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3 “Thrownness” will be covered in depth in Chapter 2.
directions. “‘We also shared a passion for Kierkegaard,’ wrote Jaspers about his visits with Heidegger from 1920 onward.”

From 1919–21, Heidegger was working on a review essay titled *Anmerkungen zu Karl Jasper’s Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (Comments on Karl Jaspers’ Psychology of Worldviews), which Van Buren believes he used as an occasion to reflect on rethinking ontology via Jasper’s reading of Kierkegaard. In this review, Heidegger acknowledges Kierkegaard’s methodological rigor:

Concerning Kierkegaard, we should point out that such a heightened consciousness of methodological rigor as his has rarely been achieved in philosophy or theology... One loses sight of nothing less than the most important aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought when one overlooks this consciousness of method, or when one’s treatment of it takes it to be of secondary importance.

This is high praise indeed for Kierkegaard. It is a markedly different tone than Heidegger takes toward Kierkegaard in the footnotes of *Being and Time*. Although it is a little odd: Kierkegaard is not particularly well known for his methodological rigor, if that means being rigorously systematic. Perhaps Heidegger is simply admiring the novelty of Kierkegaard’s methods and his tenacity for sticking to his methods. We could assume these methods include those of indirect communication and the use of pseudonyms. Van Buren contends that Kierkegaard’s influence on Heidegger was filtered through Jaspers’ interpretations:


5 Ibid., 155.

Heidegger’s initial reception of Kierkegaard came through his 1919–21 review-essay of Jasper’s book and in the following years he continued to rely heavily on Jasper’s detailed expositions here of such Kierkegaardian concepts as *Existenz*...‘the individual,’ ‘subjective truth,’ ‘passion,’ ‘anxiety,’ ‘death,’ ‘dispersion,’ ‘curiosity,’ ‘being closed off,’ ‘conscience,’ ‘guilt,’ ‘becoming manifest,’ ‘indirect communication,’ ‘time,’ and the moment (*Augenblick*).\(^7\)

Of this list of concepts, in the current work we will be focusing of course on anxiety, but will also be examining concepts of the individual, death, conscience, guilt, and the moment.

**Quoting Kierkegaard**

As an example of Kierkegaard’s influence in Heidegger’s early teaching career at Freiburg, an instance of Heidegger quoting Kierkegaard’s works can be given. Heidegger quotes Kierkegaard directly in the notes to his first Aristotle lecture course at Freiburg, Winter Semester 1921. On a page with the heading “Motto and Grateful Indication of Sources” there are two Kierkegaard citations.\(^8\) The first is from Kierkegaard’s *Training in Christianity*, published in 1850 under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus—the same pseudonym responsible for 1849 work, *The Sickness Unto Death*—it reads,

...philosophy floats in the indefiniteness of the metaphysical. Instead of admitting this and so directing (individual human beings) to the ethical, the religious, the existential, philosophy has created the illusion that human

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\(^7\) Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King*, 170.

\(^8\) Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 61: Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, Einführung in die phanomenologische Forschung (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994), 182.
beings could, as one prosaically says, speculate themselves out of their own good skin and into pure light.  

The second quote is from Kierkegaard’s 1843 work Either/Or (as the pseudonym Victor Eremita): “But what philosophy and the philosopher find difficult is stopping...(Stopping at the genuine beginning!)” These two quotes highlight Heidegger’s agreement with Kierkegaard’s opinion of how philosophy is frivolous and misguided. The first quote indicates that Heidegger concurs with Kierkegaard that the ethical, religious, and existential are superior categories to philosophy. With Kierkegaard’s use of the word “speculate” we can assume that he is referring for the most part to Hegel. In the second quote Kierkegaard is ridiculing the garrulous nature of philosophers. Heidegger also agrees that philosophy fails to start at the beginning. Part of his ethos as a philosopher is to return to the these primordial beginnings.

Theologian or Philosopher?

In order to again emphasize the theological side of Heidegger, and thus his possible sympathy towards Kierkegaard, we will explore how he viewed himself in terms of being a theologian or a philosopher. Heidegger may have viewed his project as akin to that of Luther. Where Luther was trying to free Christianity from the grips of scholasticism, Heidegger was trying to free philosophy from the grips of

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Aristotelian metaphysics and Neo-Kantianism. Kierkegaard also wrote in this spirit, trying to free philosophy from Hegelianism and theology from dogmatism. As Kisiel notes,

...the young Heidegger saw himself... as a kind of philosophical Luther of Western metaphysics... Heidegger modeled his project on Kierkegaard and especially on Luther’s destruction, from which he derived his odd philosophical term ‘destruction.’

In his 1919/1920 lecture course entitled “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology” Heidegger outlines his views concerning how scholasticism corrupted Christianity. Here he points to certain points in history when certain figures allowed the “Christian achievement” to reassert itself:

...the ancient Christian achievement was distorted and buried through the infiltration of classical science into Christianity. From time to time it reasserted itself in violent eruptions (as in Augustine, in Luther, in Kierkegaard).

Here he classes Kierkegaard amongst the greatest theologians as one of those who was able to restore the original “Christian achievement.”

In Freiburg in the early 1920s while Heidegger was working as Husserl’s senior assistant it is clear that he viewed himself more as theologian than as philosopher or even as a phenomenologist. Heidegger taught two religion courses in the 1921 at Freiburg: “Introduction to Phenomenology of Religion” in the winter semester, and “Augustine and Neoplatonism” in the spring semester. These two courses exemplify

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Heidegger’s attempts towards a phenomenology of religion. After he taught the spring semester course in a letter to his student and friend Karl Löwith, Heidegger reveals his orientation toward theology, where he states that it is fact of his life:

I work concretely factically out of my ‘I am,’ out of my intellectual and wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and whatever is available to me from these as a vital experience in which I live...To this facticity of mine belongs what I would in brief call the fact that I am a ‘Christian theologian.’

It may come as a surprise that Heidegger actually writes to his friends in a style similar to that in Being and Time. The above is his obtuse way of telling Löwith that he views himself as a Christian theologian. In the original letter, Heidegger emphasized -logian. By doing this, Kisiel believes that Heidegger was pointing to the philosophical foundations of theology, specifically the phenomenology of religious life. Kisiel further notes that Heidegger believed that philosophy and theology had been deeply intertwined in a history “…in which philosophy (Greek, scholastic, modern) had contributed to a degeneration of the original Christian experience while at the same time nourishing itself from that experience.” Heidegger also thought that Christianity needed repeated renewal, which occurred through figures such as Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard. We see this theme again in a transcription of a theological discussion that Heidegger participated in in 1923: “...it is the true task of theology, which must be discovered again, to find the world that is able

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14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., 101.
to call one to faith and to preserve one in faith.”\textsuperscript{16} Here Heidegger emphasizes the idea that theology is something that has been corrupted, and that there is a “world” of true theology that must be rediscovered, freed from the ossifications of Aristotelean/Thomistic interpretations. In his Summer 1925 course, again along these lines he says, “Theology is seeking a more original interpretation of the being of the human being toward God, prescribed from the meaning of faith and remaining within it.”\textsuperscript{17} We see from the above that Heidegger believed vehemently in the fact that Christianity had lost sight of its original meaning. His thrust is that there must be a restoration of the primordial Christian experience. He also believed that Kierkegaard was engaged in a similar task.

Heidegger also admires Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the fact that modern Christianity is “too easy.” This view is expounded by Kierkegaard particularly in \textit{Fear and Trembling} (1843) and \textit{Concluding Unscientific Postscript} (1846). Caputo writes,

Home fresh from the war, the young philosopher was very much taken with Kierkegaard’s sense that Christianity has not been brought into the world in order to comfort us in our old age and allow us to sleep at night. Christianity had to do with the terror of Abraham and the battle of the night of faith.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} Van Buren, \textit{The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King}, 154.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

Kisiel confirms this view: “Heidegger loved the rhetoric of vigor and robustness, of the ‘difficulty of life.’” This sentiment is not particularly apparent in *Being and Time*, indeed the only time the theme of “passion” arises is in the context of his concept of Being-towards-death. However, we will see Kierkegaard’s version of “terror” in *Concept of Anxiety*.

Even though Heidegger viewed himself as a “theologian” in the early 1920s, there is also evidence that indicates he was at times frustrated with being labelled as such. In another letter to Löwith, Heidegger indicates dissatisfaction with being assigned to the position of philosopher of religion by Husserl. He viewed this assignment “…with great reluctance, and even antipathy.” He expresses his annoyance to Löwith, “I myself am no longer even regarded as a ‘philosopher’, I am ‘still really a theologian’.” Here it is apparent that Heidegger believed “philosopher” had a higher status than theologian. He seems to have wanted to be both philosopher and theologian, which does not seem like too much of a stretch, but apparently in the German university structure this was difficult. Nevertheless, apparently he attempted as much in his courses, whether or not they were philosophy courses or religion courses:

> The phenomenologist of religion was also an ontologist, the ontologist also a theologian. In his philosophy courses he talked about theology, and his religion courses he talked about philosophy. There was a particular back-and-forth, cross-fertilizing movement in his youthful thought between

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religion and ontology, such that each was supposed to make the other possible.\textsuperscript{21}

Van Buren continues describing Heidegger’s desire to have it both ways:

Heidegger thought that he could simultaneously be both an ontological and theological thinker... since the conceptual basis of theology had after all been provided originally by Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, theological reform presupposed philosophical reform.\textsuperscript{22}

Here again is the thesis that Heidegger viewed himself as Luther’s analogue, trying to reform theology by stripping it of flawed metaphysical thinking.

Part of his frustration at being labeled a theologian or at best, a philosopher of religion may have been due to the new found popularity of Kierkegaard at the time in Freiburg. Heidegger apparently bore some animosity towards students who wanted to study Kierkegaard with him, mainly because these students were typically not well prepared and unable to keep up, as Kisiel notes, “He complains about the poor theological grounding of his seminar students, who nevertheless want to study Kierkegaard or Descartes with him.”\textsuperscript{23} For Heidegger, Kierkegaard was a theologian, or at least could only be talked about in theological terms, as he states in correspondence with Löwith: “Kierkegaard can be truly exposed only theologically.”\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} Van Buren, \textit{The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King}, 150–151.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 153.

\textsuperscript{23} Kisiel, \textit{The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time}, 150.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
Heidegger found that the students who were interested in Kierkegaard rarely brought anything of substance to seminar discussions. This frustrates Heidegger to the point of causing him to cancel a planned seminar in the phenomenology of religion. He writes about this in letter to Löwith. He first complains about being identified with Kierkegaard. He claims that his thought has been mistakenly taken as Kierkegaardian:

What is of importance in Kierkegaard must be appropriated anew, but in a strict critique that grows out of our own situation. Blind appropriation is the greatest seduction... Not everyone who talks of ‘existence’ has to be a Kierkegaardian. My approaches have already been misinterpreted in this way. But I at least want something else... namely, what I vitally experience as ‘necessary’ in today’s factic situation...  

Here is evidence of a key point of my thesis, that Martin Heidegger did actively and knowingly appropriate the thought of Søren Kierkegaard. I qualify this however: this letter was dated September 1920, long before the publication of Being and Time in 1927, and was in the context of his teaching career. He himself qualifies the appropriation, saying that it must not be a “blind appropriation.” Appropriating Kierkegaard’s thought is only valid as it applies to the situation in 1920s Germany. He acknowledges that the circumstances of his place and time are different than those of Kierkegaard, and that simply appropriating Kierkegaard’s thought at face value would contradict his belief that philosophy and theology are only useful as they apply to the current, concrete, spatiotemporal situation.

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He then turns to the frustrations of his unfulfilling experience in teaching phenomenology of religion: "...I myself want to learn something in my seminars, by way of objections and difficulties, which are posed with the necessary acuity only when the participants are equal to the matter at hand..."\(^{26}\) The students he has been getting in these seminars—those wanting to study Kierkegaard—have not been up to the task of providing enough of a challenge to Heidegger. He decides to cancel the upcoming seminar because, "...all that would come of it is the kind of babble in the philosophy of religion that I want to eliminate from philosophy, this talk about the religious that is familiar to us from reference works."\(^{27}\) Here it appears that he is associating Kierkegaard’s thought with the “babble” in the philosophy of religion. So at one point in this letter to Löwith, Heidegger is recognizing the value in appropriating Kierkegaard’s thought for his own time, but then just a few sentences later laments how the students wanting to study Kierkegaard are only superficially interested in his thought, what could easily be gained from “reference works” and are not up to the challenge of applying Kierkegaard’s thought to the situation of their own time.

At some point, anyone engaged in pedagogy has experienced a degree of Heidegger’s frustration with ill-prepared students. Heidegger takes it to the point of not bringing up Kierkegaard or using terminology that might evoke Kierkegaardian themes in his classes. Kisiel notes how this avoidance began in the summer of 1923

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\(^{26}\) Kisiel and Sheehan, *Becoming Heidegger on the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910 - 1927*, 98.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.
and lasted through 1927: “He thus establishes a pattern, which lasts until the very last draft of *Being and Time*, of diligently avoiding existentialist terminology in public... he is apparently still wary of the modishness of ‘Kierkegaardism’ at this time.”

The modishness of Kierkegaard was also present in Marburg when Heidegger arrived there in 1923:

Why this diligent evasion of the vocabulary Heidegger began to develop in his early Freiburg period and which will eventually inundate *Being and Time* itself? The reasons are obscure, but one reason can be gleaned from Heidegger’s correspondence at this time is a strong aversion, which he apparently developed upon first arriving in Lutheran Marburg, to the ‘Kierkegaardism’ then en vogue in theological circles.

Apparently Heidegger could not escape Kierkegaardism even with his move to Marburg, so he continues to be a “non-Kierkegaardist,” at least publicly. Although, as Kisiel notes, the existentialist and Kierkegaardian vocabulary again appears full force in *Being and Time*.

**Theology as a Science**

We will change focus slightly to look at how Heidegger classifies theology in the realm of academic and scientific categories. This will be important later when we look at Kierkegaard’s discussion of the sciences of psychology, ethics, and dogmatics. It will also shed more light on Heidegger’s views on theology and specifically the relationship between philosophy and theology that he had at the

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29 Ibid., 316.
time of the writing of *Being and Time*. He wrote the following in his 1927 lecture entitled “Phenomenology and Theology,” comparing the philosophy and theology:

Philosophy is that interpretation of the world and of life that is removed from revelation and free from faith. Theology, on the other hand, is the expression of the creedal understanding of the world and of life—in our case a Christian understanding.\(^\text{30}\)

There is nothing too controversial here, he is simply stating that philosophy is a secular way of describing our world and our role in it. This contrasts with theology, which may also describe our world and our place, but through the lens of Christian belief. He sees relationship between philosophy and theology as “a question about the relationship of two sciences.”\(^\text{31}\) Because he classifies philosophy and theology as sciences, it is necessary to understand what he believes a science to be. He presents this definition of science in his 1927 lecture:

We offer only as a guide the following formal definition of science: science is the founding disclosure, for the sheer sake of disclosure, of a self-contained region of beings, or of being. Every region of objects, according to its subject matter and the mode of being its objects, has its own mode of possible disclosure, evidence, founding, and its own conceptual formation of the knowledge thus arising.\(^\text{32}\)

This is essentially the same definition of science that he gives in *Being and Time*. Without delving into Heidegger’s idea of “disclosure” at this point, some further explanation of his definition of science is needed. He envisions each science as self-contained sphere of knowledge or disclosure, with well defined boundaries. Each


\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.
science has its particular subject realm and each science has its own methodologies for managing and incorporating new disclosures or discoveries. He then delineates the two types of sciences: “...there are two basic possibilities of science: sciences of beings, of whatever is, or ontic sciences; and the science of being, the ontological science, philosophy.”

The former type are what we would typically call the sciences, e.g., physics, biology, medicine, etc. These are focused on entities in the world. He uses the word “ontic” here to describe these sciences. This term will appear many times in Chapters 2 and 3 of this work, so this will serve as its definition. The latter type of science is ontology, the science of capital B Being itself, and what Heidegger is engaged with in *Being and Time*. He presumptively calls this science “philosophy,” even though there are many fields or “regions” within philosophy as we know it. Here he is making a return to Aristotle’s definition of metaphysics as πρώτη φιλοσοφία, “first philosophy” or the study of being qua being: “Hence to investigate all the species of being qua being is the work of a science which is generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of the specific parts of the science.”

Heidegger’s definition differs from that of Aristotle in that Aristotle divides the one science into parts which would correspond to Heidegger’s ontic sciences.

Heidegger will go on to classify theology as an ontic “positive science.” A positive science is that which posits: “We call the sciences of beings as given—of a

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positum-positive sciences.” Any positive science has a relative difference with any other positive science. Philosophy—the science of being itself—is not a positive science, and does have a relative position to those sciences, so the difference between it and any positive science is absolute. Since theology is a positive science, the difference between it and philosophy is thus absolute: “Our thesis, then, is that theology is a positive science, and as such is absolutely different from philosophy.” He goes as far to say that “…theology, as a positive science, is in principle closer to chemistry and mathematics than to philosophy.”

The Commensurability Issue

As a segue from Heidegger to Kierkegaard and to further elucidate the problem of Heidegger’s edict that ontology stands above all other sciences as absolutely separate, we will look at the idea of commensurability, particularly between that of Heidegger and Kierkegaard’s thought. To do this We will look at Dan Magurshak’s 1958 article, “The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger Relationship.”

Magurshak begins by summarizing the status of the view of many in 1985 regarding the Kierkegaard/Heidegger relationship: “In the opinion of many, the relationship between the thought of Søren Kierkegaard and that of Martin Heidegger

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36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.
hardly needs further investigation.”\textsuperscript{38} These scholars believe that in the three footnotes in \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger “generously acknowledges that debt.”\textsuperscript{39} They also agree with Heidegger’s characterization of Kierkegaard as a merely ontical thinker mired in the structure of Western metaphysics. Magurshak sees matters differently, claiming that a close study of Kierkegaard’s works will lead to the conclusion that the \textit{Being and Time} footnotes do not adequately acknowledge Heidegger’s debt; that Heidegger’s existential analysis is at times \textit{less} fundamental that Kierkegaard’s religious reflections; and finally that “any complete study of the relationship between the thinkers must acknowledge the multi-leveled complexity of that relationship.”\textsuperscript{40} What then, are these multiple levels of complexity? Magurshak is suggesting that the issue goes beyond the binary ontical/ontological distinction.

In addressing the multiple levels of complexity Magurshak raises the issue of whether the ideas of Heidegger and Kierkegaard are “commensurable” and/or if one of their approaches is “subordinate” to the other:

...are existential phenomenological investigations based upon a concern for being Christian commensurable with those arising from a quest for being? Can they be compared to and contrasted with one another on an equal footing or must the findings of one approach inevitably be subsumed as a subordinate, less profound portion of the other?\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} Magurshak, “The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger Relationship,” 167.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 168.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
The point regarding commensurability shall be dwelt upon here because it is a useful heuristic in understanding the Heidegger/Kierkegaard relationship. One thinker cannot be precisely mapped on to the other because of the issue of commensurability.

The first and still widely recognized definition of commensurability is from Euclid’s *Elements*, Book X, Definition 1: “Those magnitudes are said to be commensurable which are measured by the same measure, and those incommensurable which cannot have any common measure.”\textsuperscript{42,43} Commensurability should not be understood as “equality,” but rather more as “compatibility.” It is expressed simplistically in the cliché, “It’s like comparing apples and oranges.” One quantity cannot be divided evenly by another, e.g., the circumference of a circle cannot be divided by its radius. The irrational number $\pi$ is incommensurable with the set of rational numbers.

Something like commensurability has been used in the context of the science vs. religion debate, manifesting in extreme form as Stephen Jay Gould’s Non-Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA),\textsuperscript{44} where science and religion are taken to have dominion over completely separate domains. Here, however, it is posited that Kierkegaard and Heidegger operate in similar domains, yet that these domains may


\textsuperscript{43} The Greek for ‘commensurable’ (σύμμετρα) and ‘incommensurable’ (ἀσύμμετρα) have the English cognates ‘symmetrical’ and ‘asymmetrical’ respectively.

in the end be incommensurable. There is no implication that one of the domains is superior or inferior to the other.

It isn’t clear that Magurshak differentiates between commensurability and subordination. His wording suggests that he understands commensurability to be “equal to” and incommensurability to be “not equal to,” which is a misunderstanding of the concept. He clearly views the domains of Heidegger and Kierkegaard as being quite different, however:

When one explores the relationship between Kierkegaard’s thought and Heidegger’s existential analysis one must face squarely the radical difference between their projects. Kierkegaard reflects upon the existing individual as capable of genuine and complete existential integrity or wholeness only through a God-relationship based upon the belief in a divine redeemer. Heidegger, on the other hand, thinks about human being in its distinctive relation to the truth of being itself.\footnote{Magurshak, “The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger Relationship,” 171.}

Here, Magurshak does not posit one project as superior or inferior to the other, but he does indicate a “radical difference,” not unlike Gould’s NOMA. Whether or not this is the case will be explored later in the present work.

**Kierkegaard Preliminaries**

**The Difficulty of *Concept of Anxiety***

*Concept of Anxiety* is regarded as one of Kierkegaard’s most difficult works to understand. Gordon Marino of the St. Olaf Kierkegaard Library comments,
“The Concept of Anxiety is a maddeningly difficult book.” He continues, “In one of the central images... anxiety is likened to dizziness. One reader of Kierkegaard has commented that the book attempts to evoke the very dizziness that it describes.”

That reader, Roger Poole, elaborates at length on the impenetrability of Concept of Anxiety. He suggests that Kierkegaard deliberately takes an obstructive stance towards his reader:

...there is something quite unusually forbidding in the style of The Concept of Anxiety, as if the author is doing all in his power to outwit the reader, or to make his job actually harder than it needs to be. The text generates this sense of being against the reader rather than for him. The text labors, it would seem, to refuse even the elements of courtesy or elementary helpfulness to a reader who is, after all, tackling a new book on a difficult subject. In fact, it is not very long before the reader suspects that he is being manipulated by Vigilius Haufniensis, that he is being humiliated, forced into a reading position where he is helpless.

This criticism could certainly be leveled at particular writers and works of philosophy since Kierkegaard’s time, the “later” post-Kehre Heidegger is prime example of obscurantist style. Poole continues, emphasizing that at times Concept of Anxiety approaches sheer nonsense:

The text pullulates with ambiguities, paradoxes, oxymorons, apparent selfcontradictions, varieties of time and of history, types and subtypes of explanations and clarification, and yet the effect on the reader is one of evergrowing incomprehension. None of these terms seems to follow naturally after the other...the terms are given multiple redefinition, so that each time a

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key term recurs, it is put in a new context in which it cannot help but mean a new thing.48

Many of Kierkegaard’s works are quite difficult for the reader, but *Concept of Anxiety* in particular is rife with *non sequiturs* and contradictions. At times it reads like a rough first draft or of stream of conscious journal entries strung together. Part of this, is due to Kierkegaard’s attempt to ridicule and trivialize the Hegelian dialectic, i.e., thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Kierkegaard strives to show how this mode of thinking is insufficient to address the issues facing the existing individual. In mimicking Hegel’s dialectical method, he frequently juxtaposes pairs of seemingly unrelated concepts as theses-antitheses then will reconcile them until a third idea which does not appear to be related to the first two. Unfortunately, with Kierkegaard’s simultaneous use and parody of Hegelian dialectic, the reader can begin to feel like the victim of a joke.

Marino’s comment on the book jacket of Hannay’s 2014 translation of *Concept of Anxiety* reads, “A book at once so profound and byzantine that it seems to aim at evoking the very feeling it dissects.” One of the issues with reading any of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works is his pervasive use of irony, making it difficult for any reader, including even prominent Kierkegaard scholars, to know for sure if Kierkegaard is being serious or sarcastic. The use of irony is especially prevalent in *Concept of Anxiety*. Marino readily admits, “In all honesty, I must confess that there are many passages in *The Concept of Anxiety* the meaning of which completely

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48 Poole, *Kierkegaard*, 100.
escapes me. Worse yet, Kierkegaard scholars are silent on most of these passages.”

In his translator’s introduction of Concept of Anxiety, Alastair Hannay cites an early review of the work: “This book is interesting to the psychiatrist mainly because it inadvertently presents strong evidence that the writer is a psychiatric case.”

The other issue that must be taken into account in interpreting Kierkegaard is his use of pseudonyms for the majority of his oeuvre. There is much scholarship devoted to this problem, and I will not dwell on it much here. It is generally accepted that Kierkegaard used pseudonyms as a means of implementing his tenet of “indirect communication.” It is his tenet that truth cannot be effectively communicated definitively and directly, but is better communicated “poetically” in the form of parables, narratives, or by distancing the author from the audience by using pseudonyms. Kierkegaard used ten different pseudonyms across his twelve pseudonymous works, with two related pseudonyms being used twice: Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus. In some of his works, e.g. Either/Or or Stages on Life’s Way, the pseudonym will relate a narrative told by another person, and that narrative will contain even further narrators and/or parables. In some cases the reader is four or five steps removed from Kierkegaard. Trying to keep track of who is saying what and what position Kierkegaard himself is taking on a particular issue also contributes to the “dizzying” experience for the reader.


The pseudonym used in *Concept of Anxiety* is Vigilius Haufniensis, which translates as “the watchful Copenhagener.” This pseudonym is only used once in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, and holds a special position in relation to the other pseudonyms. This is from the appendix “A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature” in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*: “*The Concept of Anxiety* differs essentially from the other pseudonymous works in that its form is direct and even somewhat didactic... Perhaps the author thought that at this point a communication of knowledge might be necessary...” Hannay believes that “*Anxiety’s* ‘Vigilius Haufniensis’... comes closest to describing Kierkegaard as he saw himself, as a rather special kind of writer...” Apparently Kierkegaard very nearly signed the completed work as himself. The original draft of *Concept of Anxiety* has “S. Kierkegaard” as the author. It is reasonable to assume that Vigilius Haufniensis is unique among Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms: he represents a more direct communication of Kierkegaard’s views than any of the other pseudonyms. We have


54 Ibid.

the arduous task of opposing the meandering style of *Concept of Anxiety* to its “antithesis:” Heidegger’s Kantian architectonic style in *Being and Time.*

The point of going on at length here about just how difficult it is to glean anything definite from *Concept of Anxiety* is not to frighten the reader of this current work, nor to make excuses about my own interpretation of it, it is rather to emphasize that even a thinker like Heidegger probably did not have a crystal clear understanding of the work himself. Karl Jaspers, Heidegger’s chief interlocutor on the work would have faced similar difficulties.

**A Primer on Anxiety**

Kierkegaard and Heidegger both have specific meanings for anxiety that do not necessarily correspond to our current definition of the concept. In order to prepare to delve into their respective concepts, it will be helpful to look at some of our current common notions regarding anxiety. We will also look at specific current definitions of anxiety, as well as the etymology of the word and the translation of the German and Danish words *Angst* and *Angest* as anxiety.

We currently think of anxiety either in its relatively mild everyday form, as in being anxious about an upcoming event such as a public speaking engagement, or we think of it in its more extreme form as a psychological disorder, i.e., one “suffers from anxiety.” In western culture there is currently a great industry in pharmaceuticals and self-help books centering around alleviating anxiety. In severe
cases, anxiety can be associated with panic attacks, which present to the sufferer as an intense and very real feeling that death or disaster is imminent.

When one is said to be “feeling anxious,” the feeling is usually directed at a particular thing that is perceived as negative or unpleasant, e.g., “I am feeling anxious about having the surgery.” In this sense, feeling anxious is synonymous with worry. In most contexts, anxiety is seen as negative, however, being anxious can also be about anticipating a positive event, e.g. “I am anxious to begin my vacation.” The first meaning for anxiety in the OED is, “The quality or state of being anxious; uneasiness or trouble of mind about some uncertain event; solicitude, concern.” The fourth meaning, in the psychiatric context: “A morbid state of mind characterized by unjustified or excessive anxiety, which may be generalized or attached to particular situations.” The etymology is Latin anxietatem, noun of quality from anxius, “troubled in mind.” This is further traced to angere, “to choke, distress,” and finally to the Greek root ἄγχω (ankhō): “to compress, press tight, esp. the throat, to strangle, throttle, choke.” The angere and ἄγχω roots are also those of ‘anguish,’ ‘anger,’ the German Angst, and Danish angst. However, ἄγχω is not connected with the word commonly translated as anxiety in ancient Greek: μελέδημα (meledema), which is usually seen in context of “the cares of the gods.” Anxiety as a concept of being generally troubled about an uncertain event is rarely seen in ancient Greek literature of Homer, the plays of Euripides and Sophocles, or in the philosophical works of Plato and Aristotle.
In *Being and Time*, Macquarrie and Robinson have obviously translated *Angst* as anxiety, even though our word “angst” is the direct English cognate. They probably chose not to leave it untranslated as the term angst is usually associated with rebelliousness in teens coming of age, which has little to do with Heidegger’s concept. The translation of the Danish *Angest* is not so straightforward. In his highly respected 1944 translation of *Concept of Anxiety* (*Begrebet Angest*), Walter Lowrie translated *Angest* as “dread.” While this is a correct translation, I believe it has negative connotations of foreboding and doom that color the concept too darkly and may mislead the reader. Although, as we will see, Kierkegaard’s version of anxiety does at times seem more like dread. Nevertheless, I will always use the more neutral term anxiety, because it is the related English cognate, and is the more common translation.

Now that we have covered these preliminaries, namely the historical background concerning Heidegger’s early academic career, the issue of commensurability, the issues surrounding the difficulty in interpreting *Concept of Anxiety*, and a discussion on what we consider the current definition of anxiety, we are prepared to begin our look at anxiety and related concepts in Division One of *Being and Time*. 
Chapter II: Anxiety in Division One

In order to get at Heidegger’s notion of anxiety, we will examine where anxiety appears in Division One of *Being and Time* and how it is defined. As noted earlier, anxiety is inseparably connected to several other major concepts, so those concepts will need to be examined as well. As preparation, it will also be helpful to define a few central concepts, namely ontology, Dasein, and Being-in-the-world. Then, before getting to anxiety itself, we will need to understand key concepts that are intimately related to anxiety, which are: state-of-mind, mood, thrownness, fear, understanding, discourse, and falling. This may seem a circuitous course, but it is necessary to show what role anxiety plays in Heidegger’s system as well as to distinguish his version of anxiety from that of Kierkegaard.

Anxiety is introduced at a critical juncture in the work: in the last chapter of Division One, the “Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein.” This is half way through *Being and Time*, in Chapter VI entitled “Care as the Being of Dasein.” In Chapters I—V Heidegger laid out the broad concept headings of Being-in-the-world, the worldhood of the world, Being-with, Being-one’s-Self, Being-there, the ‘they,’ and Being-in. At this point in Chapter IV Heidegger is summarizing and preparing to transition into Division Two, “Dasein and Temporality.” To some degree we will
have to familiarize ourselves with the ideas of the previous chapters as well, but as our starting point we shall look at where anxiety first appears in *Being and Time*.

The discussion of anxiety begins to take shape in ¶40 Anxiety as a Distinctive Way in which Dasein is Disclosed. Just prior to this section is the first occurrence of the word “anxiety” (*Angst*) in *Being and Time*. Heidegger states, “...we shall take the phenomenon of falling as our point of departure, and distinguish anxiety from the kindred phenomenon of fear.”¹ Thus in order to prepare for our exploration of anxiety, we will first need a description of falling and fear. Since Heidegger then first discusses fear we shall also look at fear first. However, before we can even begin to look at fear, we must understand that Heidegger defines fear as a “state-of-mind.” Another reason to fully understand what Heidegger means by state-of-mind is that anxiety is also defined as a state-of-mind, in fact it is the most “primordial” state of mind. Therefore we will need to back up even further to look at Heidegger’s concept of state-of-mind. Finally, since Heidegger says that state-of-mind is “equiprimordial” (equally fundamental) to both understanding and discourse, and since these two concepts are also tied to anxiety, we will need to have a look at his concepts of understanding and discourse as well. Before we can tackle any of that however, we must get a handle on the difference between ontical and ontological and then define Heidegger’s ubiquitous concept of Dasein.

Ontical (ontisch) is taken in contrast to ontological (ontologisch):

“Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences.”². The ontic positive sciences are the “sciences of beings” as opposed to ontology—what Heidegger is doing in *Being and Time*—as the “science of Being.” Macquarrie and Robinson note that Heidegger never explicitly defines ontical or ontological, but that the former “is concerned primarily with entities and the facts about them” and the latter with Being itself.³ Ontical typically has to do with “everyday” attributes of a thing, e.g., the size, weight, and color of a hammer. Some commentators have used “thing-ish” or “thingly” in exchange for ontical.

### Dasein

Dasein is one of Heidegger’s more well-known concepts, and any encounter with *Being and Time* requires an understanding of it. The first use of Dasein in a philosophical context was in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*.⁴ The German is literally “there-being,” *Da-Sein*, and is now commonly taken to mean “existence.” Heidegger of course, has a more specific meaning in mind, and fortunately for the reader provides a fairly succinct and clear definition of Dasein:


³ Ibid.

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.5

What is Dasein? For all practical purposes, Dasein is a generalized term for human being, with the emphasis on being, i.e., being in the universal capital B sense.

Heidegger avoids using human being as this term would imply that the project of Being and Time is merely an ontic investigation, defining human existence in the “thingly” ways that other sciences do. Dasein is an ontological term which describes the way in which persons are rather than what they are. At the center of the concept of Dasein is how Dasein exists. Heidegger calls this existence “Being-in-the-world,” and since this also an essential concept it should be explained here.

**Being-in-the-world**

What is “Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein)? A large portion of Division One of Being and Time centers on this concept and only a cursory treatment of it can be given here. Put succinctly, Being-in-the-world is the way Dasein exists alongside and is involved with other entities as an entity that is aware of and concerned with its own being. Being-in-the-world is an existentiale (essential existential attribute)

5 Heidegger, Being and Time, 32.
of Dasein. It is an *a priori* condition\(^6\) of Dasein’s existence. It is a “unitary phenomenon,” as opposed to the traditional subject-object/observer-observed duality of modern metaphysics. Dasein is fundamentally embedded in and affected by its world. The two cannot be taken as separate.

In his analysis of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger splits off the Being-in (*In-Sein*) aspect for special examination. It denotes how Dasein resides or *dwells* in the world unlike the way other entities are merely “in” the world.\(^7\) Being-in is not Dasein’s spatio-temporal location. Dasein is not in the world the way water is in a glass. Generally speaking, “Being-in is not to be explained ontologically by some ontical characterization”\(^8\) rather, Dasein’s Being-in is *involved*. Dasein’s involvement is characterized by

...having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining. . . . All these ways of Being-in have *concern* as their kind of being.\(^9\)

Heidegger makes much of the concept of concern (*Besorgen*) and the related concept of care (*Sorgen*). We will return to these two concepts later when we look at Division Two. For now, we will take concern as Dasein’s “being directed toward something.”

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\(^6\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 78.

\(^7\) Ibid., 80.

\(^8\) Ibid., 82.

\(^9\) Ibid.
State-of-Mind

We are now better prepared to return to the idea that anxiety is the primordial state-of-mind. This is how Heidegger introduces his phenomenon of anxiety: “As a state-of-mind which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for our analysis.” The methodological requirements that this state-of-mind must fulfill are that it be “...one of the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure,” and that it allows Dasein to be “...accessible as simplified in a certain manner.” It is important to dwell here on why Heidegger categorizes anxiety as a state-of-mind and how states of mind provide “possibilities of disclosure” since this will be a significant point of difference between his definition of anxiety and that of Kierkegaard.

What does it mean that anxiety is a state-of-mind? In non-Heideggerian terms, this seems fairly straightforward, i.e., anxiety is a particular psychical state. This would be an oversimplification however, since Heidegger’s definition is of course more specific and nuanced. State-of-mind is introduced earlier in Chapter V of Being and Time: “What we indicate ontologically by the term ‘state-of-mind’ is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned.” Macquarrie and Robinson translate Befindlichkeit as the idiom state-of-mind,

10 Heidegger, Being and Time, 227.

11 Ibid., 172.
whereas Stambaugh translates it as “attunement.”¹² Some commentators translate it as disposedness or disposition. Befindlichkeit is literally “how one finds oneself to be.” It has the general meaning of sensitivity, feeling, or affectivity. The German for mood is Stimmung, but Macquarrie and Robinson note that is also has the meaning of “tuning,” as in tuning a musical instrument.

As noted in Chapter 1 of this work, Heidegger usually classifies concepts as as either ontic or ontological. Initially it looks that he may be doing that here, with state-of-mind as the ontological underpinning of the ontic mood, however not too much farther along in the text he seems to be using the terms interchangeably which confuses the issue. It would seem that if Heidegger were adhering to his stricture of using language etymologically he would be more careful with his use of these two terms to preserve the distinction between Befindlichkeit and Stimmung. The former has the flavor of being a passive undirected state, while the latter is active, directed and focused. For now we will take state-of-mind as referring to the general background ontological state, and moods as particular instantiations of states-of-mind in Dasein’s everyday world.

Moods are how Dasein is attuned to Being and “Dasein always has some mood.”¹³ There is never an absence of mood. Even plain apathy or boredom are moods. Moods bring Being to the fore: “A mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and


¹³ Heidegger, Being and Time, 173.
how one is faring’. In this ‘how one is’, having a mood brings Being to its ‘there’.

A state-of-mind is a kind of hook by which Dasein can find itself, not in terms of self perception, but as something that is in a particular mood: “In a state-of-mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has.” This is an interesting reformulation of Descartes’ cogito: for Heidegger it is “I am in a mood, therefore I am.”

Three Essential Attributes of States-of-Mind

Heidegger claims that a state-of-mind or mood is an existentiale that has three components: 1) it discloses Dasein in its thrownness 2) it discloses Being-in-the-world as a whole, and 3) it allows what Dasein encounters in the world to ‘matter’ to it. According to the first attribute, states of mind “…disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and …in the manner of an evasive turning-away.” i.e., moods reveal the particular circumstances of a person’s lived situation in a mode of avoidance.

What does Heidegger mean by “disclose” here? This is the translation of erschliessen or Erschlossenheit as “disclosedness”. Although the term is prominent in Being and Time, a clear definition is not provided. We commonly use disclose

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14 Heidegger, Being and Time, 173.
15 Ibid., 174.
16 Or perhaps more correctly: “Dasein is in a mood, therefore Dasein is.”
17 Heidegger, Being and Time, 175.
or disclosure to mean making public something that is intentionally held private or secret. Heidegger uses it in the sense of “to lay open”\textsuperscript{18} or lay bare. There is not the sense in \textit{Being and Time} that what is disclosed is of a private or secret nature but there is the sense of its having been covered, hidden, or forgotten. Laying open or laying bare is not an epistemological function that leads to knowledge of an entities’s ontic attributes: “‘To be disclosed’ does not mean ‘to be known as this sort of thing.’”\textsuperscript{19} Heidegger designates that kind of knowing as “discovery” (\textit{Entdeckheit}).

Dasein is able to discover entities because “Dasein is its disclosedness,”\textsuperscript{20} This attribute of Dasein is perhaps more confusing than clarifying. The best way to understand this and relate it to the first essential attribute of states-of-mind is that Dasein is both that which discloses entities, and, through its moods, is that which is itself disclosed.

\section*{Thrownness}

States-of-mind disclose Dasein in its thrownness. Essentially, thrownness is Heidegger’s term for describing how Dasein is placed into a set of circumstances over which it has no control. He defines it in the context of state-of-mind as,

\begin{quote}
This characteristic of Dasein’s Being—this ‘that it is’—is veiled in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither’, yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{18} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 105.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 173.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 171.
it the ‘thrownness’ of this entity into its ‘there’... The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.\textsuperscript{21}

From this awkward passage we can take that thrownness can be “veiled” by the “from where and to where” of Dasein’s existence if whence and whither are seen as mere spatio-temporal data. If the whence and whither are taken as integral to Dasein’s existence in its “there,” then Dasein’s thrownness is disclosed. The there is the Da of Da-sein.

What does it mean that thrownness is the facticity (Factizität) of being delivered over (Überantwortung)? Facticity is a key component of Heidegger’s description of Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein. It is more than just “the fact of” something. It is defined early in \textit{Being and Time}:

Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain ‘factual Being-present-at-hand’. And yet the ‘factuality’ of the fact of one’s own Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein’s ‘facticity.’\textsuperscript{22}

Dasein is not like a stone. Dasein is aware of the fact of its existence. Facticity is, simply put, “the fact of the fact of Dasein” or, the fact that the fact of Dasein’s existence matters to it. Heidegger continues, “The concept of ‘facticity’ implies that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.”\textsuperscript{23} Facticity is not only the factuality of Dasein,

\textsuperscript{21} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 174.  
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 82.  
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
but the fact that Dasein is intimately involved with other beings. We shall return to the concept of destiny when we look at Division Two of *Being and Time*.

A point should be addressed here: what does Heidegger mean by “Being-present-at-hand?” The concept of present-at-hand (vorhanden) and the related concept, ready-to-hand (zuhanden), will appear again later in our exploration of anxiety. These two concepts are central to Heidegger’s concept of the worldhood-of-the-world, i.e. the world as it presents itself to Dasein as an environment. For now we will understand present-at-hand as “...a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein’s character.” It is the kind of being which is appropriate to entities that are not aware of their being, and constitute a background environment for Dasein, e.g., stones and trees. It is differentiated from entities that are ready-to-hand: the latter are entities that Dasein deals with directly as “useful” or as “equipment.”

Thrownness is introduced in the context of the given condition of Dasein having to be amongst the “they.” This concept is tied closely with what he terms “falling” (Verfallen):

...Dasein is its ‘there’—the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. As definite existential characteristics, these are not present-at-hand in Dasein, but help to make up its Being. In these, and in the way they are interconnected in their Being, there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the ‘falling’ of Dasein.25


25 Ibid., 219.
Heidegger is careful not to disparage falling, as we will see later, but rather points out that it is simply a condition of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, alongside other entities. Although, he does point out that it “…has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’” and is associated with inauthenticity. The “they” are the masses, similar to Nietzsche’s “herd,” but in a less pejorative sense. He calls their influence on Dasein a “real dictatorship” whose power Dasein can fall under by default: “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking.”26 The “they” encourages averageness where no one stands out from the crowd. We will see later similarities between this and Kierkegaard’s “spiritlessness.”

How is thrownness the “facticity of being delivered over?” The “delivery” is of Dasein into its “there.” If we take facticity as the “fact of the fact” then we have thrownness as the “fact of the fact of being delivered over,” i.e., it isn’t simply the delivery of a person into particular spatiotemporal circumstances, it is rather the fact that Dasein has to exist in these circumstances, in its “there.”

Thrownness is more than the sum of the spatio-temporal and biological facts that a person is born with. It is an essential attribute of Dasein’s Being. As Heidegger notes later in Division Two:

To Dasein’s state of Being belongs thrownness; indeed it is constitutive for Dasein’s disclosedness. In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as

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26 Heidegger, Being and Time, 164.
my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a
definite range of definite entities within-the-world.\textsuperscript{27}

Throwness personifies and individualizes each and every Dasein. It is to a certain extent, inescapable. Dasein finds itself as thrown into having to take responsibility for itself, yet not being responsible for being in that position. One can endeavor to extract themselves from their initial thrown circumstances, however even if one succeeds to the extent possible, new thrown circumstances will have been created from which one will eventually attempt to flee. Thrownness is thus not something that exists only in the past or is ever finally “over and done with” (except upon death). Thrownness persists. Dasein is always “in the throw.”\textsuperscript{28} The fact that Dasein tends to avoid facing up to its thrownness is the “evasive turning away” (\textit{ausweichenden Abkehr}) that Heidegger described earlier. It is avoidance of the here and now and avoidance of what should or must be done in Dasein’s given circumstances. It is the reluctance to face up to Dasein’s Being: “Dasein for the most part evades the Being which is disclosed in the mood.”\textsuperscript{29} It isn’t hard to understand the turning away in the case of bad moods, but how is turning away present in \textit{good} moods? Good moods merely alleviate the burden of being\textsuperscript{30} so are also a a kind of turning away. The second essential attribute of a mood is that a “...\textit{mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a

\textsuperscript{27} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 264.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 223.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 174.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 173.
whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something.”\textsuperscript{31} The third essential attribute of mood or state-of-mind is closely related to the second attribute, and is that “...a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us.”\textsuperscript{32} Heidegger’s use of “submission” (\textit{Angewiesenheit}—also dependence or reliance) here is interesting, what does he mean? Is he inferring that Dasein is at odds with or oppressed by the world?\textsuperscript{33} Regardless, this disclosive submission allows the experience of something “mattering” to Dasein. It isn’t clear how this differs from the second attribute wherein state-of-mind allows Dasein to direct itself toward something. Perhaps it is simply that the “directing” of the second attribute is prior to the “mattering” of the third attribute.

With the three essential attributes of states-of-mind, it is worth noting what is being disclosed/disclosive. In the first attribute Dasein is disclosed; in the second, Being-in-the-world is disclosed; and in the third we have Dasein’s disclosive submission to the world. With these three attributes, Heidegger has effectively (although circuitously) shown how states-of-mind or moods are a central feature to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and provide the “most primordial possibilities of disclosure.”

\textsuperscript{31} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 176.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 177.

\textsuperscript{33} Hubert Dreyfus emphasizes the theme of Dasein’s “coping” in his commentary \textit{Being-in-the-World} (1991).
Fear

We are now ready to return to our starting point and look at anxiety’s kindred phenomenon of fear (Furcht). Heidegger’s first concrete example of a state-of-mind is fear. There are three aspects of fear: 1) that in the face of which we fear or the “fearsome,” 2) fearing as such, and 3) that which fear fears about.34

The first aspect of fear is what he calls “the fearsome.” It is an entity that is characterized as threatening or detrimental to Dasein. Heidegger points out that it is not something that is within “striking distance,” but is something that is drawing close or looming. The second aspect, fearing as such is what makes the fearsome clear, or what discloses the fearsome. Heidegger calls this aspect of fear “…a slumbering possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind...”35 The third aspect of fear, “that which fear fears about” is simply Dasein itself. “Fearing discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself.”36 Heidegger notes that one can fear about others, but primarily the third aspect of fear is directed and discloses Dasein and it’s Being-in-the-world.

There are various subspecies of fear. When the fearsome thing is “altogether unfamiliar” the fear becomes dread.37 When dread is combined with “...the

34 Heidegger, Being and Time, 179–181.


36 Ibid.

37 The German for dread is Grauen, it is distinctively different than Angst. This is mentioned because as noted in the Introduction the Danish cognate Angest has been translated as dread.
suddenness of the alarming” then dread becomes terror.\textsuperscript{38} There are also milder forms of fear such as, “...timidity, shyness, misgiving, becoming startled.”\textsuperscript{39} All these forms of fear, Heidegger believes, show that Dasein is fearful. Fearfulness is “...an existential possibility of the essential state of mind of Dasein in general...”\textsuperscript{40}

Fear is thus an effective example of state-of-mind. The aspects of fear make clear how states-of-mind disclose entities in the world (the fearsome) as well as Dasein’s involvement with entities in the world, and how Dasein can direct itself towards entities, and how entities can matter to Dasein. As we will see in contrast to anxiety later, the main point of difference between the state-of-mind of fear and the kindred phenomenon of anxiety is that the latter lacks a counterpart to the first aspect of fear, i.e. the fearsome.

In the sections following his discussion on fear, Heidegger describes two other existentiale conditions that are equiprimordial with state-of-mind: understanding (\textit{Verstehen}) and discourse (\textit{Rede}). First let us get a better handle on what is meant by equiprimordial. Heidegger believes that it has been a mistake in the field of ontology to search for a single, primordial condition or organizing principal. He believes that several conditions can be equally fundamental:

“...the fact that something primordial is underivable does not rule out the possibility that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then existentially they are equiprimordial.

\textsuperscript{38} n.b. The themes of “the sudden” and the terrifying are attributes of Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety

\textsuperscript{39} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 182.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple ‘primal ground’.”

In this case, state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse are equiprimordial. Since anxiety is also a component of the latter two conditions, understanding and discourse are worth briefly outlining here.

**Understanding**

Heidegger states the reciprocal relationship between state-of-mind and understanding as follows: “A state-of-mind always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood.” Understanding involves the for-the-sake-of-which: “In the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called ‘understanding’.” In the general sense, for Heidegger, the for-the-sake-of-which is not unlike the Aristotelian τέλος (telos) or purpose of a particular entity. Of course, Heidegger must put his own obfuscating twist on it: “The ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ signifies an ‘in-order-to’; this in turn, a ‘towards-this’; the latter, an ‘in-which’ of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the ‘with-which’ of an involvement.”

Suffice it to say, for-the-sake-of-which has to do with a thing’s purpose in a

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42 Ibid., 182.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 120.
network of involvements with other things, e.g., the for-the-sake-of-which of a hammer is to pound nails, the for-the-sake-of-which of nails is to fasten boards together, the for-the-sake-of-which of the boards is as structure for a house, and the for-the-sake-of-which of the house is to provide protection. Understanding then, is the comprehension of the purpose of a thing and the relationship of that purpose as it is involved with the purposes of other things.

Dasein’s self-understanding has more to do with its comprehending its own potentiality or possibilities: “In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a ‘what’, but Being as existing. The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding.”45 Dasein’s self-understanding is its competence in knowing what it is capable of and what it is incapable of: “As such understanding it ‘knows’ what it is capable of—that is, what its potentiality-for-Being is capable of.”46 and “Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of.”47

Heidegger asks, why understanding always looks forward into possibilities? “It is because the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call ‘projection’.”48 Recall, that thrownness has the character of projection: “...as


46 Ibid., 184.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 184–185.
thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call ‘projecting’.”49 This projection into its possibilities is a characteristic of Dasein and of how it understands itself: “…any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities.”50 The aspect of projecting into possibilities ties understanding to anxiety, since the later is also focused on Dasein’s possibilities. We see that Heidegger’s concept of understanding is interrelated with state-of-mind in that the both are attributes of one another. Understanding is the forward looking aspect of state-of-mind that projects Dasein into its possibilities.

Discourse

The final fundamental existentiale that is equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding is discourse. As one would expect, discourse has to do with language and communication: “The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk.”51 Heidegger defines discourse thus: “Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility.”52 It is tied to state-of-mind and is the expression of the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world: “The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world—an intelligibility

49 Heidegger, Being and Time, 185.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., 203.

52 Ibid., 203–204.
which goes with a state-of-mind—*expresses itself as discourse.*" Discourse does not always refer to the actual act of talking, it can also involve hearing and silence: “*Hearing and keeping silent* are possibilities belonging to discursive speech.” Hearing and silence will be important features of the ‘call of conscience’ in Division Two.

Discourse usually communicates through what is said: “In any talk or discourse, there is something said-in-the-talk as such—something said as such whenever one wishes, asks, or expresses oneself about something. In this ‘something said,’ discourse communicates.” However, there is more to discourse than merely what is said. There are in fact, four features of discourse: “The items constitutive for discourse are: what the discourse is about (what is talked about); what is said-in-the-talk, as such; the communication; and the making-known.” Heidegger does not explicitly delineate difference between these attributes. The first two attributes are not difficult to understand. We can take the what is talked about as the subject of the conversation. The what is said is the description of that subject. The communication is the transference of what is said to what is heard. The making-known is not explained, however we could posit that it has to do with the hearer understanding the assertions made in the what is said.

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53 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., 205.
56 Ibid., 206.
As we have noted, a key component of discourse is hearing: “We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself—hearing... Hearing is constitutive for discourse.”\textsuperscript{57} All ‘hearing’ involves our Being-in-the-world.

Everything we hear is already imbued with meaning:

What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon [sic], the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’\textsuperscript{58}.

This is a rare occasion where Heidegger provides real, easily understood, everyday examples in plain language. Indeed, one hardly hears something that is not already laden with a context of meaning. This becomes apparent when an unfamiliar sound is heard: one immediately attempts to fit it into the realm of likely sounds that would be heard in the current environment. Unfamiliar sounds, e.g., the bump in the night, arouse fear or at least curiosity.

A final yet important attribute of discourse which is related to the phenomenon of sound is the absence of sound or talk:\textsuperscript{59}

*Keeping silent* is another essential possibility of discourse... In talking with one another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that is, he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than the person who is never short of words.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 206.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 207.

\textsuperscript{59} This will be a component of Heidegger’s definition of resoluteness

\textsuperscript{60} Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 208.
The person who remains silent can at times communicate more effectively than someone who constantly seeks to fill the silence with words. Being silent does not mean that Dasein doesn’t have something to say. Indeed, in Heidegger’s version of keeping silent Dasein must have something to say. “To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say—that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself.”61 This type of silence indicates Dasein’s authenticity. Heidegger calls such silence reticence (Verschwiegenheit): “In that case one’s reticence makes something manifest, and does away with ‘idle talk’!”62 Space does not permit an exploration of idle talk here, but we can understand it at face value, it is mere chatter or talk about trivialities used to pass the time, e.g., gossip, the weather. Reticence allows true listening: “…reticence Articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a Potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent.”63 Reticence is the primordial communicative silence that allows Dasein to “hear” in an authentic way. Discourse and particularly the concept of reticence appear again in Division Two where they are related to anxiety by the role they play in the “call of conscience” and Heidegger’s definition of resoluteness.

61 Heidegger, Being and Time, 208.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.
Falling

We now turn to the key concept of falling. Heidegger describes falling as an essential existential characteristic of Dasein, and something that belongs to Dasein’s everydayness. He’s careful to note that falling is not to be evaluated negatively. It primarily signifies that “…Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the world of its concern.” He calls it an “absorption in” and says that it has “…the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’.” He claims it has nothing to do with anything like the fall of Adam or original sin: “So neither must we take the fallenness of Dasein as a ‘fall’ from a purer and higher ‘primal status’. Not only do we lack any experience of this ontically, but ontologically we lack any possibilities or clues for Interpreting it.” He makes a stronger statement about this in his summary on falling at the end of the chapter:

“…our existential-ontological Interpretation makes no ontical assertion about the ‘corruption of human Nature’… Ontically, we have not decided whether man is ‘drunk with sin’ and in the status corruptionis, whether he walks in the status integritatis, or whether he finds himself in an intermediate stage, the status gratiae. But in so far as any faith or ‘world view’, makes any such assertions, and if it asserts anything about Dasein as Being-in-the-world, it must come back to the existential structures which we have set forth,

64 Heidegger, Being and Time, 219.

65 Ibid., 220.

66 Ibid.

67 C.f. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety. There is much discussion of the link between anxiety and what Kierkegaard refers to as “hereditary sin”.

68 Heidegger, Being and Time, 220.
provided that its assertions are to make a claim to conceptual understanding.\textsuperscript{69}

Here Heidegger is essentially bracketing out the issue of the Fall of Adam and any sort of theological anthropology. He claims there is no ontical experience of the corruption of human Nature, and that any claim of this must adhere to his existential structures. Falling always involves the temptation of the “they.”\textsuperscript{70} This temptation is towards the security promised by the they. Dasein is lured into a sense of tranquility,\textsuperscript{71} but this tranquility is in fact alienating. It leads Dasein to becoming entangled in itself,\textsuperscript{72} which he calls the “downward plunge” into itself and out of itself. The movement of falling is always “turbulent.” It is interesting that he attributes actual physical attributes to falling, when we do not ontically experience these physical events.\textsuperscript{73} Falling is essentially the means by which one avoids anxiety by returning to the comfort and familiar world of the they.

\section*{Anxiety and Fleeing}

Now that we have completed the propaedeutic and have at least working definitions of the concepts integrally related to anxiety, we are finally prepared to

\textsuperscript{69} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 224.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 221.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 222.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 223.

\textsuperscript{73} c.f. \textit{Concept of Anxiety}, the dizziness of freedom and the metaphor of falling into the abyss.
turn to ¶40 where Heidegger begins to speak directly about anxiety. Recall that anxiety is a state-of-mind that discloses Dasein, or brings Dasein before itself, but how does anxiety accomplish this, or, how does Dasein’s bringing itself before itself occur? Heidegger proceeds by showing how it occurs in a negative way, i.e., in Dasein’s fleeing (Flucht\textsuperscript{74}) in the face of itself:

Dasein’s absorption in the “they” and its absorption in the ‘world’ of its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself—of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self... to bring itself face to face with itself, is precisely what Dasein does not do when it thus flees. It turns away from itself in accordance with its ownmost inertia of falling.\textsuperscript{75}

A problem arises due to the fact that this fleeing is actually “the privation of a disclosedness,” since Heidegger is trying to get at disclosing Dasein in its Being. Heidegger solves this problem by making the following move: “Only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itself in an ontologically essential manner through whatever disclosedness belongs to it, can it flee in the face of that in the face of which it flees.”\textsuperscript{76} In other words, the act of fleeing discloses the thing that it is fleeing from. This is a kind of via negativa approach to disclosing Dasein, i.e., a negation is used to elucidate existing attributes. It is also dangerously close to a Cartesian duality where there is the observer and the observed in Dasein, in this case there is the part of Dasein that flees and there is a part that is fled from. Which part of Dasein is disclosed in fleeing, the part that flees or the part that is fled

\textsuperscript{74} Literally, “flight.”

\textsuperscript{75} Heidegger, Being and Time, 229.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
from? Heidegger seems to be suggesting that both aspects of Dasein are disclosed. Even though a duality is suggested, it is de-emphasized and the focus is placed on the activity that holds together that which flees together with that which is fled from. Heidegger concludes that even though Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself is ontical, it disloses Dasein ontologically: “This existentiell-ontical turning-away, by reason of its character as a disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees...”77 For now we will accept Heidegger’s formulation that Dasein has not just been bifurcated into a traditional Western subject (that which flees) and an object (that which is fled from).

**Distinction Between Anxiety and Fear**

Heidegger then turns to the distinction between anxiety and fear. He claims that in common usage there’s not been a distinction between the two.78 He says that fear involves a “shrinking back” from something threatening, i.e., the fearsome. This shrinking back has the character of fleeing, but in the case of anxiety and falling, Dasein is fleeing in the face of itself, not from any external threatening entity: “That in the face of which it [Dasein] thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the

77 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 229.

78 Ibid., 230.
one that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself.” Thus a key distinction between fear and anxiety centers on the fact that the fleeing involved in falling/anxiety is not a fleeing or shrinking back from external fearsome or threatening entities in the world (as with fear), but rather is Dasein’s shrinking back or turning away from itself. Both fear and anxiety have the characteristic of being threatening. On the relationship between falling, anxiety, and fear he further says that “The turning-away of falling is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible.” Thus anxiety is prior to or is the grounds for the possibility of falling and fear. This will be an important point of comparison between Heidegger’s concept of anxiety and that of Kierkegaard.

Anxiety and Indefiniteness/Nothing

Heidegger then gives an essential attribute of anxiety: “That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such.” Recall that Being-in-the-world is not being in general, rather it is Dasein’s way of existing alongside other entities as an entity aware of and concerned about its own being. So here, the very way that Dasein exists in the world is the object of anxiety. Because the object of anxiety is not an entity, Dasein cannot have any definite involvement with it: “That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. Thus it is essentially

79 Heidegger, Being and Time, 230.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
incapable of having an involvement...That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite.”82 One could take Heidegger to task here, since he has just said on the previous page that the fleeing involved in anxiety is Dasein fleeing in the face of itself. Is Dasein then something that is “completely indefinite?” We will leave this issue for now, but note that it may leave a hole showing that Heidegger is not fully prepared to deal with the implications that anxiety is about the completely indefinite.

In an important move he then claims that the indefiniteness causes all entities to lose their relevance: “Not only does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within-the-world are not ‘relevant’ at all.”83 This anticipates the central and oft-cited putative Kierkegaardian appropriation, that anxiety is about nothing (Nichts): “Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.”84 With this Heidegger further embellishes his idea that the indefiniteness or nothingness of anxiety causes the world to implode into insignificance: “Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely

82 Heidegger, Being and Time, 231.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.
lacking significance.\textsuperscript{85} One could raise the issue that if all entities lose significance, then all entities become indefinite and thus the totality of insignificant entities contribute to further anxiety.

Anxiety does not recognize any kind of spatial characteristics of “here” or “yonder” of that which is threatening, yet “…it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one’s breath, and yet it is nowhere.”\textsuperscript{86} This “nothing and nowhere” of anxiety has the character of “obstinacy” (\textit{Aufsässigkeit}): “The obstinacy of the ‘nothing and nowhere within-the-world’ means as a phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety.”\textsuperscript{87} Heidegger does not use \textit{Aufsässigkeit} accidentally. He has a specific meaning in mind. Obstinacy refers back to the section near the beginning of \textit{Being and Time} on the “worldhood of the world” where he discusses the phenomenon of when ready-to-hand entities are unusable, missing, or when something stands in the way of that which concerns us.\textsuperscript{88} As noted earlier, ready-to-hand entities are those entities which are “handy” for Dasein as useful equipment: “The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests itself in its own right—we call this ‘readiness-to-hand’.”\textsuperscript{89} Ready-to-hand entities serve a purpose for Dasein, as opposed to present-at-hand entities which merely fill

\textsuperscript{85} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 231.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 102–104.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 98.
out the background environment. There are three conditions in which something ready-to-hand can become un-ready-to-hand, i.e. viewed as non-functional: these are conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy. The first two are quite easy to understanding: conspicuousness occurs when the entity is broken and in need or repair before it can be used; obtrusiveness is the situation in which the ready-to-hand entity which we require is missing or unavailable. Obstinacy is a bit more difficult to grasp because the obstinate entity is more ambiguous. Obstinacy is manifest when an entity or entities are standing in the way or blocking access to the ready-to-hand entity or entities of concern. An obstinate entity is

“...something un-ready-to-hand which is not missing at all and not unusable, but which ‘stands in the way’ of our concern. That to which our concern refuses to turn, that for which it has ‘no time’, is something un-ready-to-hand in the manner of what does not belong here, of what has not as yet been attended to. Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else.”

Obstinacy occurs when things are a mess, when ready-to-hand entities are in a state of disorder and being able to access the object of our concern is blocked by this mess. The whole world of our concerns seems to rebel and we can’t proceed any further until the mess is cleaned up or sorted out. How is it that anxiety exhibits the character of obstinacy? Can it be possible for something that is “nothing and nowhere” to block or deny access to our concerns? In anxiety “the world as such,” or the world as a whole has a recalcitrant nature.


91 Ibid., 103.
Heidegger then shifts emphasis from actuality to possibility: “What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself.”\textsuperscript{92} It is not readily apparent how the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general constitutes the world itself, but if we consider “world” here as Dasein’s environment, then it makes some sense that the ever-present possibility of the disorder of ready-to-hand entities causes anxiety.

He then returns to the relationship between nothing and anxiety. Now, however it is nothing ready-to-hand:

That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is nothing ready-to-hand within-the-world. But this ‘nothing ready-to-hand,’ ...is not totally nothing. The ‘nothing’ of readiness-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial ‘something’—in the world.\textsuperscript{93}

Recall that anxiety has caused all ready-to-hand entities to become insignificant, so that “nothing” remains ready-to-hand. This is different from nothingness in general. There is still something that remains when all readiness-to-hand is removed. That remaining something is the world-as-such, i.e., the world that is behind the world that is Dasein’s ready-to-hand environment. Heidegger then draws the conclusion that this nothing is what causes Dasein to have anxiety about its Being-in-the-world:

“So if the ‘nothing’—that is, the world as such—exhibits itself as that in the face of

\textsuperscript{92} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 231.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 231–232.
which one has anxiety, this means that *Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.*”

He restates the fact that “Being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world.” and reminds us that anxiety is a state-of-mind: “…the *world as world* is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a mode of state-of-mind.” Then he reasons that anxiety as a state-of-mind must be about something: “Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of something, but, as a state-of-mind, it is also anxiety about something.” It is not clear why this is the case, and the suggestion that anxiety must be about something or have an object makes it sound like anxiety is just a species of fear. As if anticipating this objection, Heidegger reminds us that anxiety is not about anything definite:

That which anxiety is profoundly anxious about is not a *definite* kind of Being for Dasein or a *definite* possibility for it. Indeed the threat itself is indefinite, and therefore cannot penetrate threateningly to this or that factically concrete potentiality-for-Being.

What can we conclude about anxiety having an indefinite object? It is critical to note that even though many commentators point to Heidegger’s concept of anxiety as being about nothing, it is a specific type of nothing. Since in anxiety the whole of Dasein’s ready-to-hand environment is obstinate, one could say that anxiety is about everything instead of nothing.

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
Heidegger then returns to the role of possibility in anxiety, and now claims that this individualizes Dasein:

Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about—its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities... anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible...  

Anxiety faces up to possibilities and allows Dasein to embrace them, thus making that Dasein an authentic individual. This aspect of anxiety also brings to light that Dasein has for choosing itself: “Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself.”

**Uncanniness**

Heidegger then introduces one of his most notable attributes of anxiety, that it makes one feel uncanny: “…a state-of-mind makes manifest ‘how one is’. In anxiety one feels ‘uncanny’.” The translators note that uncanny is the translation of unheimlich, which literally means ‘unhomelike’. This un-homely feeling stems

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99 Ibid.

100 This shift, at least the theme of being free for the freedom of choosing, is seen as one of the points that Heidegger appropriates from Kierkegaard.

from how anxiety pulls Dasein back from its comfortable, familiar, and tranquilized everyday Being-at-home amongst the “they.” With anxiety,

...as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the world. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the ‘not-at-home’.102

Here we have two contributing factors to the uncanny feeling. The first is the collapse of the familiar ready-to-hand environment into obstinacy. The second is the individualization of Dasein through its choices.

Anxiety is the opposing force to Dasein’s falling into the “they.” Falling or fleeing is Dasein’s run for the comforting and familiar environment of the “they.” In falling or fleeing Dasein “…does not flee in the face of entities within-the-world; these are precisely what it flees towards—as entities alongside which our concern, lost in the ‘they’, can dwell in tranquillized familiarity.”103 Falling/fleeing is a running toward the they and a running away from the not-at-home of individuality: “When in falling we flee into the ‘at-home’ of publicness, we flee in the face of the ‘not-at-home’; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein—in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world.”104 Anxiety is always lurking in the background and “…can arise in the most innocuous Situations.”105 Falling/fleeing can never completely alleviate anxiety, but it can ameliorate its effects: “When Dasein


103 Ibid., 233–234.

104 Ibid., 234.

105 Ibid.
‘understands’ uncanniness in the everyday manner, it does so by turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the ‘not-at-home’ gets ‘dimmed down.’”\(^{106}\)

Heidegger returns briefly to the subject of fear and contrasts it with authentic anxiety: “...only because anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world, can such Being-in-the-world... ever be afraid. Fear is anxiety, fallen into the ‘world’, inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself.”\(^{107}\). Anxiety is always present in the background, and this the possible grounds for Dasein to be afraid or be in a state of fear. Fear is the fallen state of anxiety in the world of the the “they.” This reconciles somewhat with the definition of fear given earlier, i.e., that it always involves being threatened by some entity in the world. Here it is the context of being fallen into the “they” world. Authentic anxiety is hidden from itself in the “they” world, i.e., one can never experience true anxiety in the “they” world. Fear can appear to be anxiety, but in the end is directed at objects in the “they” world, so therefore remains inauthentic. Real anxiety is not possible, or at best, rare in the the “they” world: “…under the ascendancy of falling and publicness, ‘real’ anxiety is rare.”\(^{108}\)

Because falleness so sucessfully “dims down” anxiety it is rarely seen. Instead, ontic fears pass as anxiety but are not the actual anxiety.

In a rare occurrence in *Being and Time*, Heidegger briefly acknowledges Dasein’s physical embodiment: “Anxiety is often conditioned by ‘physiological’

\(^{106}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 234.

\(^{107}\) Ibid.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.
factors... Only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically.”

He does not describe how anxiety is exhibited physiologically or provide any examples. We are familiar with the symptoms of everyday inauthentic anxiety: sweaty palms, dry mouth, elevated blood pressure, stomach butterflies, etc. Are these also the symptoms of ‘real’ anxiety, or are those symptoms more deep seated and long term like psychosomatic disorders? Since Heidegger does not develop this thought further, or ever mention Dasein’s embodiment, again we cannot know.

The First Footnote

We have come nearly to the end of Heidegger’s initial analysis in ¶40 and to the first point in Being and Time where he acknowledges Kierkegaard in a footnote. At this point Heidegger is continuing to play with the idea of the rarity of authentic anxiety. He believes that an existential analysis of anxiety has been neglected: “Even rarer than the existentiell Fact of ‘real’ anxiety are attempts to Interpret this phenomenon according to the principles of its existential-ontological Constitution and function.” Here he is suggesting that he is the first to do such an analysis. What distinguishes his analysis from previous analyses of anxiety?

109 Heidegger, Being and Time, 234.

110 This is a key point of difference between Heidegger’s and Kierkegaard’s respective concepts of anxiety. Kierkegaard readily acknowledges the individuals embodiment, particularly the sexual aspect and its role in anxiety.

111 Heidegger, Being and Time, 234–235.
The key factor according to Heidegger is that no one has yet identified anxiety as a state-of-mind: “The reasons for this lie partly in the general neglect of the existential analytic of Dasein, but more particularly in a failure to recognize the phenomenon of state-of-mind [Kierkegaard footnoted here].”\(^{112}\) We will return to the failure to recognize anxiety as a state-of-mind and how that relates to Kierkegaard in a moment, but first let us see where Heidegger is going with regards to the issue of the rarity of authentic anxiety: “Yet the factical rarity of anxiety as a phenomenon cannot deprive it of its fitness to take over a methodological function in principle for the existential analytic.”\(^{113}\) Heidegger is addressing the possible objection that since real anxiety is such a rare phenomenon it cannot be used as the pivotal point of the existential analytic. He addresses this issue in the following way:

On the contrary, the rarity of the phenomenon is an index that Dasein, which for the most part remains concealed from itself in its authenticity because of the way in which things have been publicly interpreted by the ‘they’, becomes disclosable in a primordial sense in this basic state-of-mind.\(^{114}\)

The primordial state-of-mind of anxiety can serve as an index because authentic Dasein is for the most part concealed, i.e., the disclosure of authentic Dasein is itself a rarity. Therefore, the rarity of real anxiety serves as an appropriate sign of the disclosure of authentic Dasein.

Returning now to the Kierkegaard footnote: it is a lengthy footnote that begins with Heidegger further affirming his belief that anxiety and fear have never

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\(^{112}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 235.

\(^{113}\) Ibid.

\(^{114}\) Ibid.
been properly analyzed, and previous analyses, though faulted and incomplete have only appeared in a theological context:

> It is no accident that the phenomena anxiety and fear, which have never been distinguished in a thoroughgoing manner, have come within the purview of Christian theology ontically and even (though within very narrow limits) ontologically.\(^{115}\)

As shown in Chapter 1 of this work, Heidegger firmly believed that theology was an ontic science. The footnote continues: “This has happened whenever the anthropological problem of man’s Being towards God has won priority and when questions have been formulated under the guidance of phenomena like faith, sin, love, and repentance.”\(^{116}\) Here he is contrasting the ontical context of Being towards God, faith, sin, love, and repentance with his positioning of anxiety as an ontological state-of-mind. After mentioning Augustine’s and Luther’s analyses as examples of theological analyses of anxiety he acknowledges Kierkegaard: “The man who has gone farthest in analysing the phenomenon of anxiety—and again in the theological context of a ‘psychological’ exposition of the problem of original sin—is Søren Kierkegaard.”\(^{117}\) He references the 1844 Diederichs German translation of *Concept of Anxiety*. Again Heidegger points out that Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety is within the realm of the ontic sciences of theology and psychology. Kierkegaard would likely object to the characterization of *Concept of Anxiety* as theological, but the subtitle of the work is “A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in

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\(^{115}\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 492, fn. iv.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.

\(^{117}\) Ibid.
View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin. Since Kierkegaard himself clearly
places his “deliberation” in the psychological context, Heidegger was also correct in
this description. Whether or not “dogmatic” can be conflated with “theological”
in Kierkegaard’s writings is debatable. Nevertheless, because Kierkegaard was
working in an ontic science Heidegger believes he never would have arrived at the
classification of anxiety as a state-of-mind. We will see later that while there are
many aspects of anxiety for Kierkegaard, being a mood or state-of-mind is not
among them.

Heidegger then concludes ¶40 with a restatement of the function of anxiety
in the existential analytic:

...in anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive;
for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from its
falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are
possibilities of its Being.\footnote{118}

Again, anxiety’s primary function is that it serves to individualize Dasein. The
individualization brings Dasein out of its everyday absorption in the “they” and
exhibits to Dasein the choice of authenticity or inauthenticity.

**Care**

Before looking at how anxiety appears in Division Two, we will need to
prepare by taking a brief side excursion into Heidegger’s concept of “care” (*Sorge*)
since anxiety plays a fundamental role in care. As noted earlier, the section of

\footnote{118}{Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 235.}
Being and Time we have just been examining is from Chapter VI entitled “Care as the Being of Dasein.” Heidegger introduces care in ¶41 immediately after the section on anxiety. As a segue from anxiety into care he says, “...the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen.” Heidegger is looking for a unity that holds existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen together, a totality of the structural whole:

These existential characteristics are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which might sometimes be missing; but there is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up that totality of the structural whole which we are seeking. The members of this triad are all always present and interdependent, no one of them can go missing. The totality of existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen will be his concept of care.

The totality itself has two components. The first component, which is founded in anxiety, is “Being-ahead-of-itself.” Heidegger recalls that “Being-free for one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness, in anxiety.” This potentiality/possibility is future oriented, and is where Dasein gets ahead of itself: “…Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being means

119 Heidegger, Being and Time, 235.
120 Ibid., 235–236.
121 Ibid., 236.
that in each case Dasein is already *ahead of itself*...”¹²² Dasein gets ahead of itself by being in a state of anticipation or expectation about future possibilities. We have already seen how possibility is related to anxiety. Heidegger further refines “Being-ahead-of-itself” by adding on the aspect of Dasein’s thrownness and reminds us that this too is founded in anxiety: “To Being-in-the-world, however, belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself—that it has in each case already been thrown into a world. The abandonment of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial concreteness in anxiety.”¹²³

The second component of the totality of care is “Being-alongside” which involves Dasein’s absorption in the world of the “they,” falling, and fleeing—which also involves anxiety. Dasein is

...always also absorbed in the world of its concern. In this falling Being-alongside..., [sic] fleeing in the face of uncanniness (which for the most part remains concealed with latent anxiety, since the publicness of the ‘they’ suppresses everything unfamiliar), announces itself...¹²⁴

Being-alongside is the attempt to flee uncanniness by being together with others in the comforting world of the “they.” He then brings the two components of care together: “Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-a-world essentially includes one’s falling and one’s Being alongside those things ready-to-hand within-the-world with which

¹²² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 236.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 237.
one concerns oneself.”\textsuperscript{125} With this he believes he has established the structural unity of care that holds together existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen:

The formally existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification of the term ‘\textit{care},’ which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner.\textsuperscript{126}

This is all well and good, but what does this actually mean? Why is he using the term “care” here, or why at least have the translators translated \textit{Sorge} as care? This word can also mean worry or concern. Care is perhaps not the best translation, since it has the primary meaning of love for a person or persons and of attending to their welfare, especially when they are ill. Here care should be taken in the sense of “having cares” in the world, or of having things to maintain in working order.

Heidegger does in fact delineate care further into concern (\textit{Besorgen}) and solicitude (\textit{Fürsorge}): “…Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous analyses as concern, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as solicitude.”\textsuperscript{127} So, care as maintenance of the ready-to-hand is concern whereas care as attending to another’s welfare is solicitude.

We thus end our look at the role played by anxiety in Division One of \textit{Being and Time}. We initially saw it classified as a state-of-mind or how Dasein is “attuned” to the world. We explored the relationship between anxiety and

\textsuperscript{125} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 237.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
Heidegger’s concepts of thrownness, understanding, discourse, and falling into the world of the “they.” We also looked at the distinction between fear and anxiety, i.e., how fear directed at something definite, while anxiety is directed at the indefinite or nothing in particular. Related to this, we explored how Dasein’s being in anxiety reduces ready-to-hand entities in the world to a state of insignificance. We looked at Heidegger’s emphasis on uncanniness, and finally we saw the role that anxiety plays in the concept of care. We will now look at the role played by anxiety in Division Two, in issues related to Dasein’s temporality.
Chapter III: Anxiety in Division Two

The Second Footnote

Before getting into Division Two, we will need to look at the second place in *Being and Time* where Kierkegaard is acknowledged in a footnote. This at the very end of ¶45, the short introductory section to Division Two, where Heidegger lists the titles of the six chapters in this second half of the book. Here, he inexplicably cites Kierkegaard with the following footnote:

In the nineteenth century, Søren Kierkegaard explicitly seized upon the problem of existence as an existentiell problem, and thought it through in a penetrating fashion. But the existential problematic was so alien to him that, as regards his ontology, he remained completely dominated by Hegel and by ancient philosophy as Hegel saw it. Thus, there is more to be learned philosophically from his ‘edifying’ writings than from his theoretical ones—with the exception of his treatise on the concept of anxiety.¹

What is odd about this citation is that it has nothing to do with the sentence or the paragraph to which it is attached, nor to the content of ¶45. Why then did he include it here? Regardless of his reasons, there are a few points to cover in this footnote.

Heidegger claims that Kierkegaard’s analysis of the problem is existence was as an existentiell problem, meaning it was about existence as an ontic, rather

¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 494, fn. vi.
than ontological issue. This hearkens back to Heidegger’s edict that ontology is the absolute science which stands above all others, and Kierkegaard was not an ontologist.\(^2\) Although he credits Kierkegaard for a “penetrating” analysis, he believes that Kierkegaard was hopelessly mired in Hegelian metaphysics an that a true grasp of existential problems was completely alien to him. It is not clear why Heidegger thought that this meant Kierkegaard’s edifying writings were of more value than his pseudonymous works. The former are entirely theological, which, according to Heidegger is an ontic science. He notably makes the exception of *Concept of Anxiety*, however, even though it contains only an existentiell analysis of anxiety.

Since we are in ¶45, it will be helpful to briefly look at what Heidegger is laying out as the purpose of Division Two. He believes that the existential analysis of Division One has fallen short: “One thing has become unmistakable: our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay claim to primordiality.”\(^3\) The purpose of Division Two is to introduce temporality into the analysis, because he believes that “…the primordial ontological basis for Dasein’s existentiality is *temporality*.\(^4\) The concept of care that ended Division One, must now incorporate time: “If temporality makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein’s Being, and if moreover this entity is one for which, in its Being, *this very Being* is an *issue*, then

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\(^2\) It appears that Heidegger thought of himself as the only true ontologist, at least since the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers.

\(^3\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 276.

\(^4\) Ibid., 277.
care must use ‘time’ and therefore must reckon with ‘time’. Thus, Heidegger now turns to describing the essentially temporal aspect of Dasein’s Being.

**Being-towards-death**

The first chapter in Division Two concerns “Being-towards-death” and it is in this context that anxiety reappears. Here, Heidegger suggests that Being-towards-death is revealed in anxiety: “Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that state-of-mind which we have called ‘anxiety’.” Part of Dasein’s thrownness is the fact that Dasein will eventually cease to exist. Heidegger seems to be positing a species of authentic anxiety that is directed towards death: “Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety ‘in the face of’ that potentiality-for-Being which is one’s ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped.” This anxiety about death has a specific “in the face of” which makes it seem like fear. However, as with the anxiety of Division One, this “in the face of” is a nothing, and perhaps more truly “nothing” than the anxiety of Division One, i.e, it is the possibility of Dasein’s non-existence. It is also indefinite, since one can never know for certain when one will die. However, it is also very definite that everyone knows with utmost certainty that they will die. These three

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5 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 278.

6 Ibid., 295.

7 Ibid.
factors taken together make the anxiety involved in Being-towards-death particularly powerful and Heidegger goes to great lengths to emphasize this.

The phrase “potentiality-for-Being which is one’s ownmost, non-relational, and not to be outstripped” is Heidegger’s rather cumbersome way of defining death in ontological-existential terms. It is one’s ownmost because every Dasein’s death belongs only to oneself. No other Dasein partakes directly in another’s death. Because of this it is non-relational. It is not to be outstripped in that it is inevitable, unavoidable, and inescapable. There is no getting around it, Dasein must necessarily experience it. Heidegger continues in this context, distinguishing anxiety about death from the mere fear of death:

Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused with fear in the face of one’s demise. This anxiety is not an accidental or random mood of ‘weakness’ in some individual; but, as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, it amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end.8

Here, authentic anxiety about death is contrasted with the inauthentic fear of death. The latter is something that can randomly occur or may occur when one’s life is immediately threatened. Authentic anxiety towards death, like the generalized anxiety of Division One, is a primordial, persistent, and essential background state that signals the fact that Dasein must come to an end.

Several sections later, Heidegger continues describing the mistaken perception that anxiety towards death is often taken as fear and a weakness. This view is

purported by the “they” regarding how one behaves in facing death. The accepted behavior robs Dasein of the courage to authentically face death:

The “they” does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death... The “they” concerns itself with transforming this anxiety into fear in the face of an oncoming event. In addition, the anxiety which has been made ambiguous as fear, is passed off as a weakness with which no self-assured Dasein may have any acquaintance.\textsuperscript{9}

Authentic anxiety about death is simplified by the “they” into fear about the definite threatening event of death. This fear is downplayed and viewed as undesirable or as a sign of cowardliness; one does not dwell on death. It better not to think about death, but to flee from these thoughts is also a seen as a weakness.

Heidegger ends the chapter on Being-towards-death with a restatement of the role of anxiety: “...the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety.”\textsuperscript{10}

Again, the key here is the persistent nature of anxiety, it is not a temporary or random fear. The “utter” or ultimate threat is death which may not seem immediate, but it nevertheless persistent. He continues in this thread,

In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious about the potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined, and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility.\textsuperscript{11}

Here again he reinforces the attributes of anxiety as a state-of-mind directed toward the “nothing,” which is seen as an impossibility. Indeed, in death all possibility

\textsuperscript{9} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 298.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 310.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
ceases. Death is given as a potentiality or possibility because Dasein never actually experiences it, or at best it is only actualized in an instant, since at the moment it is actualized Dasein’s ceases to be. In his next sentence, in what might seem to be a misprint, Heidegger substitutes “anticipation” in place of anxiety: “Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being.”¹² Recall in ¶40 of Division One he spoke of anxiety as that which individualizes. Why has he switched now to anticipation? Not surprisingly, Heidegger has a specific meaning for anticipation, which we must now examine. This exploration will also be important later in this work when we explore Heidegger’s concept of “anticipatory resoluteness,” which echoes Kierkegaardian themes.

**Anticipation and Expectation**

Heidegger contrasts anticipating with expecting. Anticipation is being open to any possible outcome in a given uncertain situation, while expecting is being focused on a specific, preconceived, outcome. With death, the common way of relating to it is in the form of expectation. We might expect that we will live into our eighties, or if we’re lucky into our nineties, and will likely die of a cause similar to one of our parents’ deaths. Expectation concerning death can also be a brooding over it: “Indeed, it always gets brooded over as something that is coming; but in

such brooding we weaken it by calculating how we are to have it at our disposal.”

In this brooding we try to “have” death by calculating when it will occur. We try to claim it or to know specifically how it will transpire. This kind of expectation amounts to waiting for it:

To expect something possible is always to understand it and to ‘have’ it with regard to whether and when and how it will be actually present-at-hand. Expecting is not just an occasional looking-away from the possible to its possible actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that actualization.

Expecting something is waiting for a particular actualization, it tries to annul the possibility—and the anxiety associated with the possibility—that the outcome may be different. On the other hand, Anticipation is the openness to any possibility, i.e., the openness to the indefinite as the possibility of possibility. Heidegger introduces anticipation in the context of our Being towards death:

...Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport ourselves towards death that in this Being, and for it, death reveals itself as a possibility. Our terminology for such Being towards this possibility is ‘anticipation’ of this possibility.

Anticipation is an asymptotic “coming-close” but never a final actualization. Instead of diminishing the outcome, the coming-close of anticipation makes the thing, in this case death, greater rather than weakening it the way expecting does: “In this kind of coming close, however, one does not tend towards concernfully making available something actual; but as one comes closer understandingly, the possibility

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14 Ibid., 306.

15 Ibid.
of the possible just becomes ‘greater’.”¹⁶ In anticipation there is no intent to realize something definite and thus annul the possibility: “In accordance with its essence, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, ‘picturing’ to oneself the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility.”¹⁷ Anticipation does not imagine a particular outcome, it is an opening up to possibility instead of the closing down of expectation which focuses on an imagined outcome.

Then, mirroring how he spoke about anxiety in Division One ¶40, Heidegger claims that an anticipatory stance is necessary for authentic existence:

In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility…Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.¹⁸

Further, anticipation, like anxiety, is the individualizing factor: “Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being.”¹⁹ Is he justified in substituting anticipation for anxiety? Anticipation cannot be exactly the same as anxiety.

Anticipation appears to be anxiety in the context of Being-towards-death. Both are directed at nothing: anxiety was directed at the nothing of the insignificance of the ready-to-hand world; anticipation is directed at the nothing of Dasein’s own non-existence.

¹⁶ Heidegger, Being and Time, 306.

¹⁷ Ibid., 307.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 310.
Heidegger makes this flat claim regarding the relationship between Being-towards-death and anxiety: “Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety.”

How are we to take this? At least as “all Being-towards-death is anxiety.” However, is the reverse true? “All anxiety is Being-towards-death.” This surely cannot be the case, since there are other varieties of authentic anxiety which are not directed toward’s Dasein’s end. Being-towards-death is a type of anxiety, but anxiety is not a type of Being-towards-death. Anxiety is the larger category which contains Being-towards-death. Anticipation is the analogue of anxiety in the context of Being-towards-death.

Heidegger wraps up the relationship between anticipation, death, and anxiety in one of his most emphatic statements in *Being and Time*:

...anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself... in an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the ‘they’, and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.

Here again we see the substitution of anticipation in one of the key roles of anxiety, of being lost in they-self. Now also anticipation takes the role of anxiety in facing death. Here, Heidegger presents it as “an impassioned freedom towards death”. This is one of the few locations where Heidegger employs the extreme state of passion.

Until now anxiety has been seen as a mild to moderate yet persistent state-of-mind. Here he is portraying it as almost a violent emotion. Is Being-towards-death the

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21 All text emphases from the Macquarrie and Robinson translation are preserved here.

exemplar of anxiety? Can one ever have an impassioned freedom towards death? Perhaps he is stretching the point a bit far here, we will take from his discussion about being-towards-death that it is a complete openness towards the possibility of death coming at any moment and letting go of expecting or imagining to die at a particular time and place.

The Call of Conscience

The next appearance of anxiety in Being and Time is in the context of “the call of conscience”. First we will need to generally understand what Heidegger means by conscience (Gewissen), then what he means by the call of conscience. Then we will need to understand what role conscience plays in this chapter of Division Two entitled “Dasein’s Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-for-Being, and Resoluteness.” First he frames conscience in terms of authenticity: “...an authentic potentiality-for-Being is attested by the conscience... Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-Being in that it wants to have a conscience.”

Conscience, or the want of a conscience is something we can readily identify, and is a sign of its cause, the authentic potentiality-for-Being. Conscience attests to the authentic potentiality-for-Being: “...this potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein’s everyday interpretation of itself, is familiar to us as the ‘voice of conscience’.”

23 Heidegger, Being and Time, 277.

24 Ibid., 313.
Heidegger wants to make it absolutely clear that his analysis is conscience is ontological: “The ontological analysis of conscience on which we are thus embarking, is prior to any description and classification of Experiences of conscience, and likewise lies outside of any biological ‘explanation’ of this phenomenon...”

His version of conscience belongs in no way to any ontic science. In the same way, it does belong in the realm of theology: “...it is no less distant from a theological exegesis of conscience or any employment of this phenomenon for proofs of God or for establishing an ‘immediate’ consciousness of God.”

Conscience, like anxiety, discloses Dasein: “Conscience gives us ‘something’ to understand; it discloses. By characterizing this phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the disclosedness of Dasein.”

It is interesting to note here that conscience provides us “something” to understand. Soon Heidegger will claim that the content of the call of conscience is “nothing.”

It is no accident that Heidegger elicits the idea of the “voice” of conscience. Conscience is a “call” which brings Dasein back to its authenticity:

If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call... The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty.

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26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 314.

28 Ibid.
We shall return the concept of Being-guilty later, as this is a key point relating to Kierkegaard. An important component of the mechanism of the calling is that the call is heard: “To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing.”\textsuperscript{29} The call can be made, but it may not necessarily be not heard. The call can be drowned out by the noise made by the ‘they’ and the they-self: “Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the ‘they’, it \textit{fails to hear} its own Self in listening to the they-self.”\textsuperscript{30} In other words, Dasein can get so occupied and absorbed in the chatter of the “they” that the call is silenced. How then, can Dasein ever hear the call? First, Dasein must find itself: “If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find itself—to find itself as something which has failed to hear itself...”\textsuperscript{31} Here Heidegger has made the odd move similar to what he did with fleeing. Dasein is disclosed or found because it is the entity that, in the case of fleeing was being fled from, and here is the entity that has failed to hear itself. Next, listening to the ‘they’ must be interrupted so that Dasein can hear the call: “This listening-away must get broken off; in other words, the possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein itself...”\textsuperscript{32} Dasein must be open to hearing the call, i.e., Dasein must be listening-toward it. The listening-toward

\textsuperscript{29} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 314.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 315.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 315–316.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 316.
is opposed to the listening-away, and thus is able to break the listening-away:
“...this listening-away gets broken by the call if that call... arouses another kind of
hearing, which, in relationship to the hearing that is lost, has a character in every
way opposite.” 33 The call arouses the listening-toward, so that hearing the call
takes place. When all these things happen, we have the call of conscience: “That
which, by calling in this manner... is the conscience.” 34 So, the call of conscience is
not merely the call from the conscience, but is also the breaking off of listening to
they-self, and the act of hearing the call. Calling is a mode of discourse: “We take
calling as a mode of discourse.” 35 Recall that Heidegger placed special emphasis on
silence as an essential part of authentic discourse. As with discourse, in the case of
calling, a physical voice is not required: “Vocal utterance, however, is not essential
for discourse, and therefore not for the call either...” 36 Even though there may not
be an utterance, the character of the call is of a sudden nature: “In the tendency
to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the momentum of a push—of an abrupt
arousal.” 38,39

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 This will be relevant in our exploration of ‘the moment’ later.
39 c.f. The “sudden” character of anxiety about the good in *Concept of Anxiety*. 
Heidegger is careful to point out that he has avoided attributing the common “psychical” attributes to conscience or construing it as a mental faculty:

...we have from the beginning avoided the first route which offers itself for an Interpretation of conscience—that of tracing it back to some psychical faculty such as understanding, will, or feeling, or of explaining it as some sort of mixture of these.  

The call is ontological-existential, not an ontic phenomenon of psychological science. Heidegger then launches into an in-depth phenomenological analysis of the discourse behind the call of conscience. The questions he explores are, “What is the content of the call?” and “Who or what does the calling?”

In answer to the question, “What is the content of the call?” Heidegger points out that similar to anxiety, conscience is about nothing:

What does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell...‘Nothing’ gets called to this Self, but it has been summoned to itself—that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.

Does this not seem problematic, especially since Heidegger said earlier that conscience gives us “something” to understand? How can we be given something with nothing as its content? Surely there must be some positive content in the call of conscience. In the common everyday notion of conscience as the regulative inner moral voice there is, e.g. “You shouldn’t do that!”, or as Heidegger would describe the call, “You shouldn’t listen to the ‘they’, you ought to be more true to yourself!”

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41 Ibid., 318.
However, this should/ought language attaches ontic ethical attributes to conscience, which Heidegger is trying to avoid.

The question, “Who or what does the calling?” is addressed next. The call originates from some part of Dasein and is directed towards another part of Dasein: “In conscience Dasein calls itself.”42 The act of the caller is not ‘willed’ by any part of Dasein: “Indeed the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ calls, against our expectations and even against our will.”43 The “it” is the caller. Heidegger refers to “it” several times in the context of this discussion. Macquarrie and Robinson note the indefinite nature of the German Es ruft instead of Der ruft, which would refer to the call itself. The call is involuntary, and sometimes counter to our wishes at the time of the call.

Heidegger then reminds us of Dasein’s thrownness and of the primordial state-of-mind that discloses Dasein, i.e., anxiety, and of the uncanniness produced by this state-of-mind:

Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety; and, as the most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed, it puts Dasein’s Being-in-the-world face to face with the “nothing” of the world; in the face of this “nothing”, Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.44


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 321.
Note the emphasis on ‘nothing’ which connects anxiety with the content of the call of conscience. Heidegger then finally asks the question that he has been leading up to all along: “What if this Dasein, which finds itself in the very depths of its uncanniness, should be the caller of the call of conscience?” It is ‘uncanny Dasein’ that is the caller of conscience. Heidegger further describes this ‘nothing’ caller:

“In its ‘who’, the caller is definable in a ‘worldly’ way by nothing at all. The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the ‘not-at-home’—the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world.” Here we have Heidegger describing the caller in very similar language to that which he used in describing anxiety. Heidegger further describes this calling voice as alien to everyday inauthentic Dasein: “The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice.” He then finally offers a helpful description of the ‘nothing’ that is the content of the call of conscience, here again, the “it”: “‘It’ calls, even though it gives the concernfully curious ear nothing to hear which might be passed along in further retelling and talked about in public. But what is Dasein even to report from the uncanniness of its thrown Being? What else remains for it than its own potentiality-for-Being as revealed in anxiety?” The ‘nothing’ of the call of conscience and of anxiety is not nothing per se, but nothing in that it is not

45 Heidegger, Being and Time, 321.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 322.
communicable in a public way. It is nothing in the ontic sense, there is no ‘material’ or ‘form’ that is communicated, but ‘something’ is communicated in the ontological sense: the summoning of Dasein back to its authenticity. Heidegger’s gives his final statement on the role of anxiety in the call of conscience: “The call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”49 The potentiality-for-Being recalls what was said about anxiety and anticipation of Being-towards-death earlier.

**Resoluteness**

The next point in *Being and Time* where anxiety appears is in the context of resoluteness. As may be expected, resoluteness is closely tied to conscience. Resoluteness melds anxiety, conscience, and guilt. So first, as promised earlier, we must take a detour into guilt.

Recall that Heidegger’s initial definition of the call of conscience involved summoning Dasein “to its ownmost Being-guilty.” Heidegger further elaborates on that aspect of conscience: “All experiences and interpretations of the conscience are at one in that they make the ‘voice’ of conscience speak somehow of ‘guilt’.”50 What is the nature of guilt for Heidegger? He runs through the common notion that guilt involves indebtedness, or owing something to others. Heidegger gives this as

49 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 322.

50 Ibid., 325.
“Being-the-basis for a lack of something in the Dasein of an Other...This kind of lacking is a failure to satisfy some requirement which applies to one’s existent Being with Others.” Heidegger terms this kind of lacking as moral guilt, and he thinks little of it: “If one takes ‘laden with moral guilt’ as a quality of Dasein, one has said very little.” Heidegger wants to move toward the existential definition of guilt. First though, the ordinary sense of morality must be removed: “…the idea of ‘Guilty!’ must be sufficiently formalized so that those ordinary phenomena of ‘guilt’ which are related to our concernful Being with Others, will drop out.”

Heidegger transforms the ontic, moral lack to an ontological “not” or nullity:

Nevertheless, in the idea of ‘Guilty!’ there lies the character of the “not”...Hence we define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as “Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a ‘not’”—that is to say, as “Being-the-basis of a nullity”.

His purpose is to disentangle guilt from the ontic sense of morality: “‘Being-guilty’ cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself.” Being-guilty is a primordial and essential aspect of Dasein’s existence: “That this primordial Being-guilty remains proximally and for the most part undisclosed, that it is kept closed off by Dasein’s falling Being, reveals only the aforesaid nullity.

51 Heidegger, Being and Time, 328.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 329.
55 Ibid., 332.
Being-guilty is more primordial than any knowledge about it.”\textsuperscript{56} Being-guilty is often hidden by Dasein’s falling but nevertheless is an \textit{a priori} state of Dasein’s existence.\textsuperscript{57}

Heidegger then connects guilt with the call of conscience. Dasein needs to be in a state of readiness before it is able to hear the call of conscience or be “free” for the call: “When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes its becoming free for the call—its readiness for the potentiality of getting appealed to.”\textsuperscript{58} Dasein cannot choose to have a conscience, but it can choose to \textit{want} to have a conscience which is the connection with owning up to being guilty:

Understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is having-a-conscience as Being-free for one’s ownmost Being-guilty. ‘Understanding the appeal’ means ‘wanting to have a conscience’.\textsuperscript{59}

Owning up to guilt and wanting to have a conscience is related to anxiety:

The uncanniness... becomes genuinely disclosed by the state-of-mind of anxiety... The fact of the \textit{anxiety of conscience}, gives us phenomenal confirmation that in understanding the call Dasein is brought face to face with its own uncanniness. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety.\textsuperscript{60}

Here Heidegger has equated wanting-to-have-a-conscience with readiness for anxiety. It would seem then that wanting-to-have-conscience must occur

\textsuperscript{56} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 332.

\textsuperscript{57} c.f. Kierkegaard’s concept of objective sin.

\textsuperscript{58} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 334.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 342.
prior to Dasein having any real experience of anxiety. That would make wanting-to-have-a-conscience a more primordial state than the state-of-mind of anxiety. This is problematic given that anxiety was supposed to be the most primordial state-of-mind. This inconsistency will arise again in the context of anticipatory resoluteness.

Readiness for anxiety will be what Heidegger will call resoluteness. He moves toward the definition of resoluteness by re-introducing understanding as projection, and reticence: “The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence.”61 What role does reticence play in resoluteness? Recall that reticence is the primordial authentic silence of discourse. In reticence, the call of conscience is heard and authentic Dasein is disclosed. Heidegger connects conscience, reticence, Being-guilty, and readiness for anxiety to define resoluteness: “This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety—we call ‘resoluteness’.”62 Resoluteness is the state of disclosedness that results from the silent acknowledgement of one’s guilt. It is the state of readiness for anxiety.

61 Heidegger, Being and Time, 343.
62 Ibid.
Anticipatory Resoluteness

The next significant appearance of anxiety in *Being and Time* is in the context of anticipatory resoluteness. This concept is the joining of anticipation, the authentic Being-towards-death, with resoluteness:

As Being-towards-the-end which understands—that is to say, as anticipation of death—resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resoluteness does not just ‘have’ a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbours in itself authentic Being-towards-death...

In this context, Heidegger recalls the definition of resoluteness given earlier, but rearranges the constituents and gives this slightly altered definition of resoluteness:

“We have characterized resoluteness as a way of reticently projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and exacting anxiety of oneself.” Earlier, anxiety was the necessary background state-of-mind for resoluteness, but here Heidegger has shifted the emphasis to position anxiety as something that resoluteness *demands*.

It isn’t clear why Heidegger makes this move. It is inconsistent with his previous definitions of anxiety as an *a priori* state behind the disclosure of authentic Dasein. Here it is given as something one demands of oneself, almost as something produced by owning up to Being-guilty.

Perhaps this demand is not for anxiety as a product, but is a demand to not run away or flee from anxiety but to face up to it. In the next mention of anxiety


64 Ibid.
Heidegger remains with the theme of death, but here anxiety is the agent that
exacts resoluteness:

The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety. But this
primordial anxiety strives to exact resoluteness of itself. It moves out of the
way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein has been abandoned to
itself. The “nothing” with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the
nullity by which Dasein, in its very basis, is defined; and this basis itself is as
thrownness into death.\textsuperscript{65}

Here, anxiety serves to clear the way for Dasein to face its nullity, and in so doing
exacts resoluteness of itself. Anxiety \textit{demands} resoluteness. This is more in line
with Heidegger’s previous descriptions of the role of anxiety as the prior state. Yet
in a later passage he switches again to anxiety as being demanded by resoluteness:

“Dasein is \textit{authentically itself} in the primordial individualization of the reticent
resoluteness which exacts anxiety of itself.”\textsuperscript{66} The point of comparing these quotes
is to show that Heidegger switches the role of anxiety in relation to resoluteness:
sometimes anxiety is prior and exacts resoluteness, and at other times resoluteness
is the prior state that exacts anxiety. If Heidegger were being consistent with how
anxiety is defined in Division One as the most primordial state-of-mind, it should
always be the case that anxiety exacts resoluteness.

In the next mention of anxiety, for the first time Heidegger mentions one of
its positive side effects: “Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face
with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this

\textsuperscript{65} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 356.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 369.
possibility.”  What is this joy? He gives a hint, but then quickly shuts down any possible exploration of it:

In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining ‘incidentals’ with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself—primarily from the events of the world. But the analysis of these basic moods would transgress the limits which we have drawn for the present Interpretation by aiming towards fundamental ontology.  

Apparently the joy of being freed from worry about the trivialities of world of the “they” is not relevant to fundamental ontology.

**The Temporality of Anxiety**

Heidegger then turns to describing the temporal nature of Dasein in its everyday world. Anxiety plays a key role in this. He first goes through the temporality of disclosededness and understanding, and then begins his description of the temporality of state-of-mind. As we would expect, his explanation of the temporality of anxiety appears in the section on state-of-mind. He uses fear and anxiety as the prime examples of state-of-mind: “Our temporal Interpretation will restrict itself to the phenomena of fear and anxiety, which we have already analysed in a preparatory manner.” He will contrast the temporality of anxiety with that of fear, so we shall first explore his description of the temporality of fear.

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68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., 391.
Heidegger recalls that fear is an inauthentic state-of-mind and that fearing is always in the face of some definite thing. In temporal terms, fear is oriented towards something threatening coming towards oneself, so in this sense is futural: “Has not ‘fear’ been rightly defined as ‘the expectation of some oncoming evil’ (‘malum futurum’)? Is not the primary meaning of fear the future, and least of all, one’s having been?”\(^70\) This is a characterization of the everyday or ontical sense of fear as fear was described in Division One. Here Heidegger is considering the “existential temporality” of fear. It is strange that he is doing this, since fear was downplayed as merely reaction to the everyday world in Division One, he called it an “inauthentic state-of-mind.” Why should he be considering it in existential terms here? It is because fear is a mood, and even if moods are “…ontically well known to us, they are not recognized in their primordial existential function.”\(^71\) He goes on to say that such moods are “fleeting Experiences” and “Anything which is observed to have the character of turning up and disappearing in a fleeting manner, belongs to the primordial constancy of existence.”\(^72\) Because of this he claims that the task is “…to exhibit the ontological structure of having-a-mood in its existential-temporal Constitution.”\(^73\) The key to this existential-temporal Constitution is the idea of “having-been,” i.e. of returning from an inauthentic ecstasis to an original authentic

\(^70\) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 391.

\(^71\) Ibid.

\(^72\) Ibid.

\(^73\) Ibid.
state: “The thesis that ‘one’s state-of-mind is grounded primarily in having been’ means that the existentially basic character of moods lies in bringing one back to something.”74 While Heidegger is not explicitly admitting it, he is suggesting that it is nearly impossible for Dasein to remain authentic all of the time. After all, “falling” is an existentiale of Dasein. Authentic Dasein cannot help but to occasionally fall back into the “they” world, but it recognizes this falling and strives to return to authenticity.

The existential temporality of fear is forgetting oneself. Here Heidegger emphasizes the importance of bewilderment (Verwirrung):

> When one’s Being-in-the-world has been threatened and it concerns itself with the ready-to-hand, it does so as a factical potentiality-for-Being of its own. In the face of this potentiality one backs away in bewilderment, and this kind of forgetting oneself is what constitutes the existential-temporal meaning of fear.75

The bewilderment or confusion that takes place in the fearful state blocks out possibilities, much like the obstinate nature of anxiety as described in Division One. The forgetting of oneself thwarts Dasein in its attempt to grasp any particular possibility: “When concern is afraid, it leaps from next to next, because it forgets itself and therefore does not take hold of any definite possibility.”76 Heidegger finally defines the temporality of fear succinctly as follows: “The temporality of fear is a


75 Ibid., 392.

76 Ibid.
forgetting which awaits and makes present.” It is interesting that he returns to using the term “awaits” which is associated with “expecting” and inauthenticity.

Heidegger then begins his examination of the existential temporality of anxiety by asking, “How is the temporality of anxiety related to that of fear?” He recalls the various attributes of anxiety, such as how anxiety is not about facing something definite, how anxiety makes Dasein’s immediate environment become insignificant, how anxiety is anxious in the face of nothing and in the face of Being-in-the-world. Being anxious “in the face of” has a temporal aspect:

To be anxious in-the-face-of...[sic] does not have the character of an expecting or of any kind of awaiting. That in-the-face-of which one has anxiety is indeed already ‘there’—namely, Dasein itself. In that case, does not anxiety get constituted by a future? Certainly; but not by the inauthentic future of awaiting.

Like fear then, anxiety has a futural character, but it is constituted by authentic anticipation of possibility instead of expecting a particular event or entity that one stands in-the-face-of in the case of fear.

Another important characteristic of the temporality of anxiety relates to how anxiety causes things in the world to lose significance. Heidegger reintroduces this theme from Division One:

Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself—or, in other words, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for-Being

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77 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 392.

78 Ibid., 393.

79 Ibid.
which belongs to existence and which is founded primarily upon one’s objects of concern.  

In what Heidegger is attempting to pitch as a kind of revelation, anxiety reveals in a radical way the impossibility of basing one’s existence solely on things in the world, however this impossibility opens the door to the possibility of authenticity: “The revealing of this impossibility, however, signifies that one is letting the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being be lit up.” Here Heidegger reuses the motif of something being ‘lit up’ or disclosed. It first appears in the context of the worldhood-of-the-world in the case of a ready-to-hand thing becoming unready-to-hand when it is broken. This brokenness causes the whole network of dependencies in the workshop to be “lit up” or disclosed. Here, in the case of anxiety, which causes the whole world to appear in a state of brokenness, the possibility of authenticity is lit up. Heidegger then considers the temporal nature of this revelation: “What is the temporal meaning of this revealing?” He ties the “bringing back” associated with anxiety to a new temporal concept, repeating or repetition:

Anxiety... brings one back to the pure ‘that-it-is’ of one’s ownmost individualized thrownness. This bringing-back has neither the character of an evasive forgetting nor that of a remembering... On the contrary, anxiety brings one back to one’s thrownness as something possible which can be repeated.  

80 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 393.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., 394.
Unlike the temporality of fear, Heidegger claims anxiety is not a forgetting. With how he describes repetition however, it does seem to be something akin to remembering.\textsuperscript{84}

Heidegger gave a definition of repetition a few pages earlier. It is important to understand this concept, as it is another point of relation to Kierkegaard. Repetition has its basis in the coming-back to oneself associated with anticipatory resoluteness:

The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back to one’s ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization... In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it ‘repetition’.\textsuperscript{85}

Repetition is Dasein’s returning from being in world of the “they.” It recognizes itself in its individualization and again takes over itself. Repetition has characteristics of past time as the coming back to the having-been, but it also has futural characteristics in that it brings forth Dasein into its potentiality.

Anxiety allows Dasein to stand authentically in the face of its thrownness, not just once, but any number of times. Heidegger elaborates further on the futural character potentiality-for-Being revealed by anxiety: “…it also reveals the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being—a potentiality which must, in repeating, come back to its thrown ‘there’, but come back as something futural which comes towards.”\textsuperscript{86} This is not easy to understand: it appears that the futural aspect of

\textsuperscript{84} c.f. The relationship between recollection and repetition for Kierkegaard.

\textsuperscript{85} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 388.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 394.
anxiety is that which comes back. It is not clear what makes potentiality-for-Being futural. In the simplest sense, potentiality always implies the future, i.e., the actualizing of a potentiality will occur at a future time. However, in the next sentence Heidegger emphatically writes, “The character of having been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability is the specific ecstatical mode of this character.”

He has switched from speaking of the futural nature of the potentiality-for-Being to the “having been” or “in the past” nature of anxiety. The difficulty of this passage stems from the temporality of repetition being of both past and future, which seems contradictory.

Heidegger then elucidates another important difference between the temporality of fear and anxiety which centers on the temporality of the present moment and what he calls the “moment of vision” (*Augenblick*) Fear lets Dasein “...drift back and forth between ‘worldly’ possibilities which it has not seized upon.” However, unlike fear anxiety *does* seize the present: “In contrast to this making-present which is not held on to, the Present of anxiety is *held on to* when one brings oneself back to one’s ownmost thrownness.”

The present moment seized by anxiety signals a readiness for a moment of vision:

...even though the Present of anxiety is *held on to*, it does not as yet have the character of the moment of vision, which temporalizes itself in a resolution. Anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a *possible* resolution. The

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87 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 394.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
Present of anxiety holds the moment of vision at the ready; as such a moment it itself, and only itself, is possible.\textsuperscript{90}

As in the case of the call of conscience, where anxiety is a prerequisite which holds Dasein open for receiving the call, here anxiety holds Dasein open for the possibility of the moment of vision. Again, as with repetition, the moment of vision is a key point of relation to Kierkegaard, so it must be explored more in depth here.

As with repetition, the moment of vision is an authentic form of temporality with both past and future temporal elements. However, in addition to past and future the moment of vision also encompasses the present moment:

To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a Present… In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one’s closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That Present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the ‘moment of vision’.\textsuperscript{91}

Again, as with repetition we have the motifs of “being brought back” and of “having been.” This is the revelatory moment spoken of earlier wherein anxiety reveals the impossibility of existence based solely on things of the world and the possibility of authentic existence based on owning up to oneself and one’s death: “It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness.”\textsuperscript{92} The aspect of the present moment in the moment of vision is not temporal in the traditional sense: “In the moment

\textsuperscript{90} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 394.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 387.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
of vision' nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us to encounter for the first time as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand."⁹³ This is indeed a “momentous” statement. It sounds like Heidegger is saying that a moment of vision is necessary before anything can be experienced in time at all.

The Third Footnote

This is the final point in Being and Time at which Heidegger acknowledges Kierkegaard in a footnote:

S. Kierkegaard is probably the one who has seen the existentiell phenomenon of the moment of vision with the most penetration; but this does not signify that he has been correspondingly successful in Interpreting it existentially. He clings to the ordinary conception of time, and defines the ‘moment of vision’ with the help of ‘now’ and ‘eternity’. When Kierkegaard speaks of ‘temporality’, what he has in mind is man’s ‘Being-in-time’⁹⁴

Saying that Kierkegaard has provided the “most penetration” is the highest praise that Heidegger will give him in Being and Time. It is very quickly cut short by criticism that Kierkegaard is not operating in the ontological realm, and therefore his analysis of the present moment is not up to par. Later we shall see if Heidegger is justified in his criticism.

Returning to the point of how anxiety prepares Dasein for the moment of vision we again see anxiety as a prerequisite state, here it holds Dasein open for a

⁹³ Heidegger, Being and Time, 388.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 497, fn. iii.
moment of vision. In a rare moment Heidegger acknowledges the strangeness of these ideas:

The temporality of anxiety is peculiar; for anxiety is grounded primordially in having been, and only out of this do the future and the Present temporalize themselves; in this peculiar temporality is demonstrated the possibility of that power which is distinctive for the mood of anxiety.\textsuperscript{95}

The peculiarity of the temporality of anxiety is that it is constituted of past, present, and future. To further explain this peculiarity, we are reminded that, “Fear is occasioned by entities with which we concern ourselves environmentally. Anxiety, however, springs from Dasein itself.”\textsuperscript{96} This internal spring of anxiety is a mounting of anxiety, which, “When understood temporally, this ‘mounting’ of anxiety out of Dasein, means that the future and the Present of anxiety temporalize themselves out of a primordial Being-as-having-been in the sense of bringing us back to repeatability.”\textsuperscript{97} Again, the “having been” is emphasized as the most fundamental characteristic of the temporality of anxiety. The authentic “having been” is necessary before the coming back of repetition can take place. In a summary of this section Heidegger clarifies the difference between the temporality of anxiety and fear:

Although both fear and anxiety, as modes of state-of-mind, are grounded primarily in having been, they each have different sources with regard to their own temporalization... Anxiety springs from the future of resoluteness, while fear springs from the lost Present...\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{95} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 394.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 395.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
The only futural aspect of fear is that the threatening entity is approaching. Fear has no future “hope” that resolution provides.

There is only one more time that anxiety is mentioned in *Being and Time*, and that is in the section on historicality, specifically in Heidegger’s description of the concept of fate (*Schicksals*). No new aspects of anxiety introduced here, but it bears brief mention because fate is also something that appears as a theme in Kierkegaard’s *Concept of Anxiety*: “Fate is that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for adversities—the power of projecting oneself upon one’s own Being-guilty, and of doing so reticently, with readiness for anxiety.” 99 This sounds very much like his definition of resoluteness. The difference here is that fate involves heritage, and Dasien’s “handing down” of itself to itself: “This is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen.” 100 Heritage and handing down have to do with Dasein being historical, that is, having existed over time. It is a completion of the concept of repetition in the context of Dasein’s being historical. At this point, late in *Being and Time*, there is so much “repetition” that the language is stacking up so much as to become cumbersome. Heritage and handing down add slight nuances to resoluteness, and thrownness:


100 Ibid., 435.
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one’s coming back resolutely to one’s thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one…

The idea of handing down serves to flesh out the temporality of “having been” that was introduced with the concept of repetition. It takes into account Dasein’s actual existence over time and how Dasein learns from its previous experiences.

In Division Two we have seen the role that anxiety plays in Dasein’s temporality. This occurred in three contexts. The first was Being-towards-death, where anxiety is not to be confused with fear of death. We saw how anxiety was involved in Dasein’s authentic anticipation of death or freedom towards death. The second context in which anxiety appeared was that of conscience. This involved the call of conscience, guilt and resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness then combined authentic anticipation of death with resoluteness. The third context in which anxiety appeared was temporality. The temporality of fear was differentiated from anxiety. The latter involved the concepts of repetition and the instant. We have now completed our journey through anxiety in Being and Time. We will now turn to the concept as Kierkegaard presents it in Concept of Anxiety.

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101 Heidegger, Being and Time, 435.
Chapter IV: Concept of Anxiety: the First Synthesis

As mentioned in the Introduction to this work, we will be looking mainly at Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety. This was Kierkegaard’s fifth major pseudonymous work and was completed in the second year of authorship, in June of 1844. It was published in the same month as Philosophical Fragments and the signed\(^1\) work Three Upbuilding Discourses. The full title of the work is The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, or in Danish: Begrebet Angest: En simpel psychologisk-paapegende Overveielse i Retning af det dogmatiske Problem om Arvesynden.

The title provides a starting point for delving into the work. Let us pause for a moment to look at the first word in the title. Looking at the Danish, Begrebet, the German reader, and especially a reader of Hegel, will see a close resemblance between Begrebet and the German der Begriff. This is even more apparent if the -et suffix, which in Danish denotes the definite article, is removed. While it is beyond the scope of this work to go into Hegel’s use and development of der Begriff, which is also commonly translated as “notion,” it is worth noting that Kierkegaard

\(^1\) Signed by Kierkegaard as the author.
chose *Begrebet* instead of *Konceptet*. The remainder of the title is dealt with in the *Concept of Anxiety*’s Introduction, and will be examined below.

As with in our analysis of anxiety in *Being and Time*, we will proceed through *Concept of Anxiety* seriatim for the most part, specifically examining sections where anxiety is dealt with at length. Since Kierkegaard does not write in a linear fashion, at times it will be necessary to skip forwards or backwards in the text in order to clarify a point. Also, as with *Being and Time*, we will find that anxiety is closely associated with and dependent upon various other concepts in the schema of the work and those will need to be explained as well. Hopefully this can be done without entangling the reader in the general confusion of *Concept of Anxiety*. Unlike working with the fairly systematic Heidegger in *Being and Time*, at times it will be quite challenging to nail down even a “working definition” of a concept as it appears in *Concept of Anxiety*. For the most part I will use the convention of referring to the pseudonym Haufniensis as the author rather than Kierkegaard himself.

It is important to understand how Haufniensis categorizes anxiety, since he is very careful to make sure the reader understands what “sciences” he is considering in his analysis. He puts forth the project of *Concept of Anxiety* as follows: “The present work has set itself the task of treating ‘anxiety’ psychologically in such a way as to have in mind and view the dogma of hereditary sin.”

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it also extends into the religious realm, to include the “dogma of hereditary sin.” He will soon refer to dogmatics as a science. This project was stated explicitly in the subtitle of the work: *The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin.* Setting it out as “simple” is perhaps an example of Kierkegaard’s wry sense of humor. The project is also iterated in the preamble to the Introduction: “In what sense the subject of this deliberation is a matter of psychological interest, and in what sense having interested psychology it points precisely in the direction of dogmatics.”

From the three forms of his statement of the project, it would seem the psychology is the primary context and that dogmatics is secondary. As we will see however, at times the dogmatic context dominates, especially with regard to hereditary sin.

There are two main points to examine in his project statement. First, what does Haufniensis mean by “treat psychologically”? This will involve a look at the state of the science of psychology in Kierkegaard’s time as well as his exposure to it. Secondly, what is the “dogma of hereditary sin?” This will entail a brief discussion of Kierkegaard’s view of dogma and dogmatics. Then, since the bulk of *Concept of Anxiety* is dedicated to explicating hereditary sin *(arvesynd)*, much of this chapter will hover around that concept.

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4 Indeed, it may have been more appropriate to title the work *The Concept of Hereditary Sin.*
Treating Anxiety Psychologically

What is meant by treating anxiety psychologically? At first this sounds quite reasonable to our modern ears, as psychology or “the psychological” is typically the context in which we encounter the term anxiety. However, it is not a stretch to say that the science of psychology in the pre-Freudian days of Kierkegaard differed considerably from our contemporary science of psychology. Hannay agrees: “Kierkegaard’s psychology is unlike any scientific discipline that goes by that name today.”\(^5\) He believes that Kierkegaard’s psychology is “...essentially Hegelian in its structure and aims,” but it is “anti-Hegelian in its stress on the individual subject.”\(^6\)

While it is not possible to give even a cursory treatment of Hegel’s psychology here, suffice it to say that his version of psychology was in support of the progress of “spirit” through history. Hegel’s concept of spirit will be further explained below.

What was the state of the “science” of psychology like in mid-nineteenth century Europe? Freud’s works did not appear until the end of the century.

Kierkegaard assumes that the reader understands what psychology is. It is known that he took coursework in philosophy at University of Copenhagen from Frederick Christian Sibbern,\(^7\) who he respected greatly. Sibbern published psychological works


\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid., 47.
such as *Psychological Pathology* (1828)\(^8\) Some thinkers historically proximal to Kierkegaard regarded Kierkegaard himself to be a psychologist, Watkin notes, “...in a letter to Friedrich Nietzsche in 1881, writer and critic Georg Brandes (1842–1927) wrote that he regarded Kierkegaard as one of the most profound psychologists who ever lived...”. She continues by stating that it is “...probably true to say that had Kierkegaard’s language been French, German, or English, he would have taken the place in the history of psychology occupied by Sigmund Freud.”\(^9\)

Whether or not it is true to say that Kierkegaard can be regarded as a psychologist or proto-psychologist is beside the point, and it is beyond the scope of the present work to investigate the state of the psychology in Kierkegaard’s time. It is not particularly salient to the purpose of comparing Kierkegaard and Heidegger either. It is my opinion that Kierkegaard was at least to some degree using irony in classifying *Concept of Anxiety* as psychological. It is important to note that Kierkegaard regarded psychology to be a science with set boundaries, and in this, he is in agreement with Hegel’s and Heidegger’s definition of a science.

By setting anxiety in the context of what Heidegger would classify as an ontic science, i.e. psychology, it would seem that at first glance that Heidegger’s assessment of Kierkegaard’s analysis in the footnote in *Being and Time* is correct. Kierkegaard would agree with Heidegger that psychology is a science devoted to a

\(^8\) Julia Watkin, *The A to Z of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 233.

\(^9\) Ibid., 49.
particular topic. In fact, the first (long) sentence of the Introduction of *Concept of Anxiety* opens by describing the “place” of a problem within a science:

That every scientific problem within the wide embrace of science has its appointed place, its aim and limit, and for just that reason its harmonious fusion within the whole, its justified consonance in what the whole tells us, this consideration is not merely a *pium desiderium* [pious wish] that ennobles the man of science with its inspiring or wistful fervor, not merely a sacred duty that binds him in service to the whole and bids him forsake anarchy and the adventurer’s urge to lose sight of the land; it is also in the interest of every more specialized deliberation, because by forgetting where it belongs it also, as language with its well-aimed ambiguity is wont to put it, forgets itself, becomes something else, attains a suspect perfectibility in being able to become whatever it likes.\(^\text{10}\)

In the above quote, Kierkegaard describes the necessity of assigning a particular problem to a particular science and in so doing keeping the problem within the boundaries of that science. Much of *Concept of Anxiety*’s Introduction is devoted to justifying how Kierkegaard places his analysis within the borders of the sciences of psychology and dogmatics.

### The Dogma of Hereditary Sin

Let us return to the second component of his project, of having “...in mind and view the dogma of hereditary sin.” First however, it is worth noting the language that Kierkegaard uses to connect the psychological treatment to the dogma of hereditary sin. This is his frequently employed motif of having or keeping something “in mind.” The original text, as it usually with this motif, is the Latin

in mente. He uses Latin here to emphasize that this is not trivial, or to elevate it above the everyday concept. He is endeavoring to express that having something in mind is more than merely “keeping it in a certain context,” or “having it serve as the backdrop.” It is more an effort to merge background and foreground, in this case to show how anxiety is intimately connected or “embedded” in the dogma of hereditary sin. In the German Idealism tradition, hereditary sin can be thought of as the “ground for the possibility of” anxiety.

We will need to clarify the terms “dogma” as well as “dogmatics”. It is close to the standard concept, but Haufniensis applies a few nuances and emphases that are worth examining. A couple of pages before the quote above, still in his discussion of science, he points out that “...two sciences, ethics and dogmatics, are fundamentally confused...”\(^{11}\) This hearkens back to Kierkegaard’s signature concept of the “spheres of existence” that figures prominently in three of his previous works: *Either/Or* (1843), *Repetition* (1843), *Fear and Trembling* (1843). The idea of the spheres are developed further in works after *Concept of Anxiety*, especially *Stages on Life’s Way* (1845) and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846). Haufiensis refers to spheres in a long footnote in *Concept of Anxiety*\(^ {12}\) where he portrays it as being quite well-known to the general public and thus not necessary to explain. He refers occasionally to “the religious” or “the ethical” throughout the rest of *Concept of Anxiety*, those being two of the three spheres of existence.


\(^{12}\) Ibid., 22–23.
The Spheres

In short, there are three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The works prior to *Concept of Anxiety* feature narratives of characters that personify a particular sphere of existence. The aesthetic sphere is characterized by a person living strictly according to his passions and appetites, without concern for the moral consequences of his actions. The ethical sphere has to do with one’s duty to society, church, marriage, and to act according to the moral imperative. The religious sphere transcends the dictates of ethics and societal duty, it epitomizes the ideal of the individual standing alone before God. Kierkegaard does not explicitly state a hierarchy of the spheres, although he indicates that the aesthetic sphere is the least desirable, and the religious the most. However, there are aspects of the aesthetic that are admirable, and aspects of the ethical that are points of ridicule. He also doesn’t prescribe that there is a “progression” or mechanism by which an individual moves from one sphere to the next, although movement into the religious sphere is accomplished via his famous “leap of faith.” While the spheres are not expounded upon directly by Haufniensis, in this section about the boundaries of science it is clear that he is reemphasizing Kierkegaard’s claim that religion is not ethics, and that the two are not to be conflated. This must be kept in mind as we proceed.

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13 In the Kantian sense.
Hereditary Sin

The next point of concern is what is meant by the dogma of hereditary sin? Since this question constitutes a large portion of Concept of Anxiety, we will not define it completely here, but we will at least consider a few attributes that Haufniensis’ points out initially in his Introduction. He wants to find the science that is appropriate to the study of sin. Unlike anxiety, its proper place is not psychology: “Sin, however, is no matter for psychological concern…”14 Then in a typical de-centering Kierkegaardian move he says, “Sin has its definite place, or rather it has none at all, but that is its characteristic.”15 So, at this point, the definite place of sin is no place at all, that is, there is no science proper to it. If it is treated in the wrong place it’s concept is “corrupted.”

He places much emphasis on the “mood” that a particular science produces. The Danish word that is translated as mood is Stemning, which can also be translated as “atmosphere.” In a footnote Haufniensis notes that science in general assumes a mood: “…science too, as much as poetry and art, assumes a mood on the parts of both producer and recipient…” This mood or “modulation” (Modulationen) must be the proper one since, “…an error in modulation is just as disturbing as an error in the exposition of thought…”16 It is important to note here that the use of


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.
Stemning is quite different than Heidegger’s use of Stimmung as state-of-mind in reference to anxiety. Here, mood refers to the “mode” of the science in question. Although the mood of the recipient is mentioned, it is the mood that is the frame of mind in which a concept is received. I am making much of how mood is used by Haufniensis because this is one of the few places where mood appears in Concept of Anxiety. It is clear that Heidegger was not appropriating his Stimmung from Kierkegaard’s Stemning.

Haufniensis defends his point that sin has no proper science by listing the “moods” produced by various sciences. He quickly dismisses aesthetics and metaphysics as improper. If sin is studied under aesthetics, the mood would be “frivolous or melancholic”,17 if under metaphysics, “…the mood becomes that of a dialectical parity and disinterest which weighs up sin as something that cannot stand up to thought.”18 He gives more treatment to psychology, “…the mood becomes that of the persistent observer, of the dauntless spy, not the victorious flight of earnest out of it.”19 Psychology has the mood of the observer being detached and not intimately connected with the trials and tribulations of the individual. Psychology is not involved enough: “The mood of psychology would be an antipathetic curiosity, but the right mood is earnest’s stout-hearted resistance.”20 Haufniensis is heading

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18 Ibid., 20.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
toward “earnestness” as being the most appropriate mood for the study of sin. The Danish for earnestness, *Alvorens*, can also be translated as seriousness. We shall return to earnestness later when Haufniensis develops it more fully.

He reiterates, “Properly speaking, sin belongs in no science.” He then continues, sounding very much like the later pseudonym Johannes Climacus in *Concluding Unscientific Postcript* (1846):

> It [sin] is a theme for the sermon, where the individual talks as an individual to the individual. In our own age, scientific self-importance has fooled the priests into becoming a kind of professorial deacon who also serves science and thinks preaching beneath his dignity.

This gives a hint at what is meant by earnestness, i.e., it is an individual talking to an individual. He then makes explicit “To the concept of sin corresponds the mood of earnest.” He then backtracks and entertains the possibility that sin might belong to ethics, but that cannot be so because ethics is an “ideal” science, “...it wants to bring ideality into actuality.” He believes that it is also difficult to place ethics in a science, that “...it is impossible for anyone to write an ethics without having entirely different categories up his sleeve.” There is also the difficulty that since sin is an “actuality” and ethics is an ideal science, then “If ethics is to include

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 22.
sin, its ideality is at an end.”\textsuperscript{26} Luckily, Haufniensis is not analyzing sin in general, but rather hereditary sin, and thus dogmatics can come to the rescue: “Hereditary sin... removes the difficulty, not however with the help of ethics but with that of dogmatics.”\textsuperscript{27}

**Dogmatics vs. Ethics**

Haufniensis is keen to delineate dogmatics (\textit{Dogmatiken}) from ethics (\textit{Ethiken}), and he attempts to do so in a systematic way. He spends so much time here because these are the “sciences” where sin, especially hereditary sin, have been traditionally been placed. His goal is his invention of a new ethics that blends aspects of dogmatics and traditional ethics. He will call this new ethics the “second ethics.”\textsuperscript{28}

Why look at dogmatics and ethics at all, since it should be obvious that the study of sin belongs to one or both of these sciences? Haufniensis initially suggests (at least momentarily) that ethics is the science which studies sin (\textit{synd}): “The science in which sin might most plausibly find a place would surely be ethics.”\textsuperscript{29}

There is a difficulty in placing sin within ethics however, because as noted earlier


\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 25.

\textsuperscript{28} Rather, it is translated this way. The Danish is either \textit{anden Ethiken}, literally, the other ethics, or \textit{nye Ethiken}, the new ethics.

ethics is an “ideal science,” and sin is far from ideal. Ethics attempts to bring “ideality into actuality.” The ideal and the actual are either Platonic or Hegelian categories. The ideal being that of the universal, necessary, and incorruptible forms, while the actual belongs to the contingent, particular, corruptible, everyday world. For Haufniensis ethics as a science is concerned with the former, while sin is very much in the realm of the latter. The approach of ethics is wrong because “...its movement is not that of raising up actuality into ideality. Ethics points to ideality as a task and assumes that a person is in possession of the required conditions.”

The “top down” directionality of ethics is problematic and makes it an inappropriate science in which to study sin since “If ethics is to include sin, its ideality is at an end.” The directionality issue is solved in the science dogmatics, since it employs a bottom up approach: “With dogmatics begins the science which, in contrast to that ideal science strictly so called, begins with actuality.” Instead of applying ideality to actuality, dogmatics “...begins with the actual in order to raise it up into ideality.” Here, hereditary sin (arvesynen) enters the picture, since dogmatics “...does not deny the presence of sin; on the contrary it assumes it and explains it

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31 Ibid., 22.

32 Ibid., 25.

33 Ibid.

34 In Danish, literally “inherited-sin.” In modern Danish, arvsynen is usually translated as original sin, but Hannay and other translators of Concept of Anxiety use hereditary sin to emphasize the more literal aspect of inheritance.
by presupposing hereditary sin.”35 For the science of dogmatics, hereditary sin is an unquestioned *a priori* condition, as Haufniensis emphasizes: “Hereditary sin is therefore not to be explained by dogmatics; the explanation is that it is something presupposed...”36

Now, in a move similar to a Hegelian *Aufhebung* Haufniensis merges ethics and dogmatics to arrive at his new science, what he will call the second ethics:

Here ethics finds its place again as the science that has the dogmatic consciousness of actuality as a task for actuality. This ethics does not ignore sin, and its ideality consists not in making demands ideally but in a penetrating consciousness of actuality, of the actuality of sin...37

Thus, his second ethics, like dogmatics, begins in the realm of actuality. The second ethics retains ideality as a task from the first ethics and adopts the presupposition of hereditary sin and the bottom-up directionality of dogmatics:

The new ethics presupposes dogmatics and along with it, hereditary sin, and now, with that, explains the sin of the individual while at the same time presenting ideality as a task, not however by a movement downward from above, but upward from below.38

Why not simply stay with dogmatics instead of creating a new science, the second ethics? It is because dogmatics takes into account sin as condition for the human race as a whole, whereas the second ethics addresses the “sin of the individual.”


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 26.

38 Ibid., 27.
Haufniensis then points to a weakness with the second ethics regarding how sin comes to be: “…the second ethics can deal with its manifestation, though not with its coming to be.” 39 Granted, the distinction between sin’s “manifestation” and its “coming to be” is slight, but his point is that while the second ethics is capable of dealing with the existence of sin, it is not able to articulate the mechanism by which sin comes into existence. For the latter aspect, he turns to the science of psychology:

…the abiding state out of which sin constantly comes into being, not by necessity… but by freedom… sin’s real possibility, this is an object of interest for psychology. What can occupy psychology, and what it can occupy itself with, is how sin can come to be, not that it comes to be. 40

It isn’t made clear why the science of psychology can address the issue of sin’s coming to be, but a key point here is the introduction of “freedom” and “sin’s real possibility” Freedom will later be shown to be an essential characteristic of anxiety, and is according to Haufniensis, a subject of study for psychology. He reiterates: “With respect to sin, however, the whole content of actuality is properly denied to it; what belongs to it is only its possibility.” 41 Psychology revels in the possibility of sin: “Psychology, on the other hand, loves it; it sits sketching the contours and calculating the angles of possibility…” 42 Here, psychology is portrayed


40 Ibid., 28.

41 Ibid., 29.

42 Ibid.
in a mathematical or Cartesian fashion, attempting to arrive at a formula for the possibility of sin.

While psychology may be able to address the possibility of sin in terms of actuality, it cannot complete the study of sin. For that, Haufniensis returns to the need for dogmatics: “While psychology fathoms the real possibility of sin, dogmatics explains hereditary sin, that is, the ideal possibility of sin.”43 Where, then does the second ethics fit? “The second ethics has... nothing to do with sin’s possibility or with hereditary sin... the second ethics has the actuality of sin within its scope.”44

Let us summarize how the triad of dogmatics, the second ethics, and psychology work in conjunction to analyze sin. Traditional ethics, or “the first ethics,” the seemingly obviously place to study sin is tossed out because it is too focused on ideality. Because of this “The first ethics ran aground on the sinfulness of the individual.”45 He introduces dogmatics as a possible solution. Dogmatics addresses the problem of the actuality of sin for the human race by assuming hereditary sin as a precondition. However, dogmatics is not geared to address the problem of an individual’s sin. The second ethics is capable of handling the existence of individual sin in terms of actuality but fails to explain how sin comes to be. Psychology is able to explain how sin comes into existence, the “real possibility

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
of sin,” in terms of actuality and individual freedom. All three sciences are thus required to complete the analysis of sin.

In the final sentences of the Introduction, in his own summary and charting the way forward, Haufniensis directly refers to the Hegelian concepts of subjective and absolute spirit:

Psychology has been called the doctrine of the subjective spirit. If we pursue this science a little more closely we will see how, when it comes to the problem of sin, it must first switch over to the doctrine of Absolute Spirit. There lies dogmatics.⁴⁶

This is a prime example of how Kierkegaard operates within Hegel’s System, even though he frequently criticizes it. It is far beyond the scope of the present work to outline Hegel’s concepts of subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. An attempt will be made to at least give the reader a cursory understanding of these concepts, however.

In the Philosophy of Mind section of Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, Hegel divides spirit (Geist) into three parts: subjective, objective, and absolute. The study of subjective spirit is further divided into three parts: anthropology (the soul), phenomenology (consciousness), and spirit or mind (psychology). Haufniensis will be operating primarily within psychology, but will also touch on phenomenology. Hegel’s psychology is more akin to epistemology than today’s science of psychology.⁴⁷ It deals with mental faculties such as attention, memory, imagination, and judgment.


Subjective spirit describes the subject’s progression towards overcoming or annulling the otherness of the object, to make it its own. Objective spirit is more concerned with ethical behavior and adhering to societal norms. Absolute spirit has religion and art within its realm. It does not appear to be a coincidence that Hegel’s three levels of spirit map fairly closely on to Kierkegaard’s spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.

### Anxiety and Hereditary Sin

Let us now move out of the Introduction and into the main body of Concept of Anxiety and look closely at where anxiety is first described. The first chapter is entitled “Anxiety as Hereditary Sin’s Presupposition and as Clarifying Hereditary Sin Retrogressively in Terms of its Origin.” Anxiety makes its appearance in “§5 The Concept of Anxiety.” This comes after Haufniensis has gone through sections on “Historical Hints Regarding the Concept of Hereditary Sin,” “The Concept of the First Sin,” “The Concept of Innocence,” and “The Concept of the Fall.” Haufniensis is setting up anxiety in its relation to the account of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden as given in Genesis Chapters 2–3. His chief aim will be to show anxiety in its dialectical relationship to innocence. We will spend what may seem to be an inordinate amount of time picking apart a few sentences where anxiety is first introduced, but this will be important for identifying attributes that will distinguish Kierkegaard’s anxiety from that of Heidegger.
Anxiety as Innocence and Anxiety in Dreaming Spirit

Haufniensis begins defining anxiety as innocence: “This is the profound secret of innocence, that at the same time it is anxiety.” How does he get from innocence to anxiety? This is an example of Kierkegaard’s tendency to tease the reader with a provocative statement that prima facie may not make complete sense. This is not to be understood as “innocence is anxiety” in the logical form of A=B. It would have been clearer (but perhaps less “poetic”) if he had said, “innocence and anxiety occur simultaneously.” Haufniensis is pointing out that anxiety accompanies the state of innocence. He never explicitly states that innocence produces or causes anxiety, but as we will see, he suggests that innocence is prior to anxiety and that anxiety is an attribute of the state of innocence.

In his previous section on the state of innocence in Adam before that fall he has concluded that “Innocence is ignorance.” This has more the flavor of an A=B premise than the innocence=anxiety premise above, i.e., innocence is the equivalent of ignorance. Innocence is ignorance of good and evil or rather even the possibility of good and evil, i.e., good and evil have not yet been posited. Ignorance does not have negative connotations here, rather it is merely a primitive epistemological state due to lack of experience.


49 Ibid., 45.

50 Haufniensis make much use of the verb “to posit”
He connects innocence to anxiety via “nothing:”

In this state there is peace and repose, but at the same time there is something else, something that is not dissension and strife, for there is nothing against which to strive. What, then, is it? Nothing. But what effect does nothing have? It begets anxiety.\textsuperscript{51}

Even though in the state of innocence there is idyllic peacefulness there is also the looming “nothing.” It will be helpful here to understand “nothing” as nothingness, or as the nothing of Parmenides that was impossible to articulate.\textsuperscript{52} To borrow a term from Heidegger, it is the “primordial” nothing. It should not be thought of as merely “nothing in particular.”

Apparently innocence isn’t complete ignorance, since there is awareness of nothing. Haufniensis’s innocence/ignorance is only in regards to good and evil. Nevertheless, we have arrived at the causal factor of anxiety, i.e., the awareness of nothing. Haufniensis appears to be veering in an ontological direction, however this kind of ontology differs from that of say, Heidegger, because it is not concerned with Being vs. non-Being in general, but is rather focused on the self vs. nothing.

The next characteristic of anxiety is its relation to “dreaming spirit”:

“Anxiety is an attribute of the dreaming spirit and belongs as such to psychology.”\textsuperscript{53}

What is spirit and dreaming spirit in particular? Haufniensis will have much to


say about spirit later, here he does not define it specifically, but he does give several of spirit’s properties. The opening lines of §5 are: “Innocence is ignorance. In innocence the human being is not characterized as spirit but is psychically characterized in immediate unity with its natural condition. Spirit is dreaming in the human being.”54 Here we see that in the state of innocence, spirit is not yet present but is “dreaming.” The self is not fully defined as human being. There is no mediation between the entity and its environment, which is not to say that the entity is an animal or even plant. The entity is not yet human but is potentially human in the Aristotelean sense. Spirit is what will imbue the entity with its full nature as a human being by giving it awareness of self and other, subject and object.

Dreaming spirit takes in the nothing: “Dreaming, spirit projects its own actuality, yet this actuality is nothing, but innocence always sees this nothing outside itself.”55 Haufniensis does not define specifically what he means by dreaming spirit, but it appears to correspond to Hegel’s concept of spirit “in itself,” i.e., spirit has a vague self awareness, but does not yet fully realize itself in relation to an other. He further elaborates on the psychological aspects of the waking vs. sleeping, and dreaming person: “Awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited;56

55 Ibid.
56 Both Hannay and Thomte translate the Danish word sat as “posited.” Sat simply means “set.” Posited suggests that something is being hypothesized, which is confusing. Sat should be thought of in the sense of “set in place,” “set forth,” or “given.”
sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is a nothing hinted at.”

Here is one of the few occasions were Kierkegaard helpfully shifts away from universal abstraction and gives the concrete example of “myself” (*mig Selv*) In waking, the difference between myself and my other (*mit Andet*) can be distinguished. The difference is between an extant particular “thing” that is myself and “a nothing” that is “my other.” In non-dreaming sleep the difference dissolves. He does not indicate whether in this state the sense of myself remains or if it too disappears. He then shifts back to using the universal “spirit” in place of the particular myself/my other: “Spirit’s actuality appears constantly as a form that tempts its possibility but disappears as soon as it reaches out for it, and is a nothing that can only bring unease.”

He is still speaking about dreaming sleep here. The unease (*ængste*) is anxiety.

**Fear of Nothing / Antipathetic Sympathy**

He reaches the distinction between anxiety and fear that is often cited as being appropriated by Heidegger:

The concept of anxiety is hardly ever seen treated in psychology, so I must point out that it differs altogether from fear and similar concepts that refer to something definite; whereas anxiety is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.59


58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.
As Heidegger points out, fear has a definite object or is a result of a particular threat. Anxiety does not have such an object, but is the result of the full realization of the vast nothingness of freedom. Later Haufniensis will use the image of looking into an abyss of freedom and the resulting dizziness as anxiety. As we will also see, Haufniensis often refers to the ambiguity (Tvetydighed) of anxiety. At first glance this appears to be similar to Heidegger’s characterization of anxiety as fear of nothing in particular, but for Haufniensis the ambiguity of anxiety has the character of confusion, even a terrifying confusion as will be described below in the case of Adam.

We then arrive at Kierkegaard’s most quoted epigram regarding anxiety:

“Anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy.”

60 This is Kierkegaard as his best (or worst): providing a definition in seemingly paradoxical terms. The interpretation of this statement has been along the lines of one being involuntarily attracted to that which is dangerous. 61 Usually the analogy of looking into an abyss is employed in this interpretation: there is a simultaneous attraction/repulsion of wanting to get close to the edge and look down into the gaping maw and be terrified of falling in, but at the same time be fascinated by the possibility of jumping. Haufniensis helpfully provides an example of sympathetic antipathy as childlike curiosity:


61 It is important to note that Heidegger does not appropriate this paradoxical definition of anxiety.
When we observe children, we find the anxiety more definitely intimated as a seeking after the adventurous, the prodigious, and the mysterious...This anxiety belongs so essentially to the child that the child will not do without it; although it alarms, in its sweet anxiousness it also captivates.\footnote{Kierkegaard, \textit{The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin}, 51–52.}

In this example, anxiety and curiosity are intertwined, or perhaps, anxiety drives curiosity in a child. In any case, anxiety is essential and normal: “Only a prosaic stupidity will think of it as a disorder.”\footnote{Ibid., 52.} Modern psychology and psychiatry treat anxiety as a disorder, Haufniensis’s version of psychology does not.

He then briefly considers how anxiety is related to guilt, as a continuation of the theme of his previous section of the current chapter on hereditary sin:

...the person who becomes guilty through anxiety is indeed innocent, for it was not himself but anxiety, an alien power, that seized him, a power he did not love but about which he was anxious. And yet he is indeed guilty, for he sank down in anxiety, which he loved nevertheless in fearing it.\footnote{Ibid.}

It is important to note the idea that anxiety is portrayed here as an irresistible external force. The sympathetic antipathy of anxiety is exhibited here. Anxiety is not responsible for guilt unless the person sinks down into anxiety and is not able to control it. Guilt will be considered more closely later.

He then returns to the role played by anxiety in the “synthesis” between soul and body that constitutes an individual: “Everything depends on anxiety coming into view. The human being is a synthesis of the psychical and the physical, but a
synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is spirit.”\textsuperscript{65} It is perhaps becoming clearer about what he means by spirit, i.e., it plays a role in realizing the synthesis of the Cartesian duality of body and soul. Haufniensis is speaking here about spirit’s role in the primordial state of innocence, “In innocence, the human being is not merely animal, for if at any moment in his life he were merely animal, he would never become a human being. So spirit is present but as immediate, as dreaming.”\textsuperscript{66} Even in the initial state of innocence a human is more than just an animal because of the presence of dreaming spirit. Spirit here is an “ambiguous power” (\textit{tvetydige Magt}) because it is at once both hostile and friendly:

So far as it is now present, it is in a sense a hostile power, for it constantly upsets the relation between soul and body, a relation that does have subsistence but then doesn’t have it, because it receives it first through spirit. It is, on the other hand, a friendly power that wishes precisely to constitute the relation.\textsuperscript{67}

The hostile aspect of spirit disrupts the soul/body relationship even though the friendly aspect defines that relationship. He then asks the question, “What then is the human being’s relation to this ambiguous power; how does spirit relate to itself and to that which conditions it?”\textsuperscript{68} His answer: “It relates as anxiety.”\textsuperscript{69} The relation of spirit to body/soul as anxiety has to do with the very nature of spirit


\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
and its simultaneous inability to escape itself or to grasp itself: “To do away with itself, that spirit cannot do; seize itself, so long as it has itself outside itself, it cannot do that either. Nor can the human being sink down into the vegetative, for he is characterized as spirit.” 70 Thus spirit is an ever-present ambiguous power in the human, even if it is only dreaming. Haufniensis reemphasizes the sympathetic antipathy of anxiety: “Flee from anxiety he cannot, for he loves it; really love it he cannot, for he flees from it.” 71 The human in the state of innocence is in a predicament, in the perpetual condition of wishing to escape that which it loves. In pure innocence, the vast nothingness of ignorance is revealed:

Innocence has now reached its peak. It is ignorance, not an animal brutishness but an ignorance characterized by spirit, and it is as such precisely anxiety, because its ignorance is about nothing. Here there is no knowledge of good and evil, etc., but the whole actuality of knowledge projects itself in anxiety as the enormous nothing of ignorance. 72

The zenith of innocence corresponds to the same with anxiety. We should be convinced by now that Haufniensis does not believe much in the “peace and repose” of the state of innocence. Indeed he makes this state sound almost torturous.

Haufniensis then shifts back to the scenario of Adam and God’s prohibition that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge. The prohibition itself causes Adam to experience anxiety: “The prohibition makes him anxious, because it awakens in him freedom’s possibility. What innocence let slip as the nothing of anxiety now


71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.
enters him, and here again it is a nothing—the anxious possibility of being able.”

Prohibition, which is a restriction of freedom causes Adam to be aware of his own infinite freedom. God’s judgment and the ultimate punishment, death: “Following the word of prohibition comes the word of judgment: ‘Then you shall surely die.’”

Death is an unfamiliar concept to Adam, a condition that would severely limit his freedom. This leads to a maximizing of anxiety as terror: “Adam of course has no grasp at all of what it means to die, while on the other hand nothing prevents him, supposing that it was said to him, from acquiring a notion of the terrifying.” It is the ambiguity of anxiety that causes this terror: “The terror here is simply anxiety, since Adam has not understood what was said, and so here again there is only the ambiguity of anxiety.” Anxiety has become terror for Adam, even before he takes of the tree of knowledge.

Haufniensis ends this introductory section on the concept of anxiety by turning back towards the ethical and the role that anxiety plays in the context of hereditary sin: “Innocence is brought in this way to its extremity. In anxiety, it is related to the forbidden and to the punishment. It is not guilty, and yet there is an anxiety as though innocence were lost.” At this extremity of innocence, Adam has


74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.
not yet eaten of the tree and therefore not yet sinned, but still the prohibition has caused him so much anxiety that the spectre of guilt is on the horizon.

Objective and Subjective Anxiety

The next chapter of *Concept of Anxiety* turns full force into the relationship between anxiety and hereditary sin. Haufniensis states, “The outcome of hereditary sin, or hereditary sin’s presence in the individual, is anxiety, which differs only quantitatively from that of Adam.”78 The quantitative difference is due to anxiety increasing in each subsequent generation: “Anxiety in the later individual will, on the other hand, be better able to reflect itself than in Adam, because in the later individual the quantitative accumulation that the race puts behind it now takes effect.”79 This is key to understanding what Haufniensis means by hereditary sin (*Arvesynden*). Although he makes much of the relationship between sin and “sensuousness,” hereditary sin is more than simply original sin—the doctrine propounded by Augustine which dictates that Adam’s sin is transmitted to each subsequent generation by concupiscence. Augustine’s sin does not increase in each generation, whereas *Arvesynden* does. “Sinfulness has in this way acquired a greater power, and hereditary sin is growing.”80 Along with hereditary sin, anxiety


79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.
is growing: “The anxiety that sin brings in with it is really only present when the individual itself posits sin, and yet this anxiety is obscurely present as a more or a less in the quantitative history of the race.”

In order to get a better understanding of what Haufniensis means by “quantitative,” we will need to look at it in relationship to “qualitative.” In general, quantitative can be thought of as continuous, whereas qualitative is discreet. Quantitative denotes change in small amounts, whereas qualitative is characterized by large jumps or leaps between stages that may not even be qualitatively the same or commensurable. With the quantitative, there is a “more or less,” and increase or decrease is made without hindrance. However with the qualitative, once a leap has been made there may be no returning to the previous state. An analogue of the qualitative leap can be seen in subatomic physics, i.e., the quantum leap of an electron from one energy state to the next. However, quantum denotes quantity, which is not present in a qualitative leap.

The exemplar of a qualitative leap—The Qualitative Leap—for Haufniensis is the fall of Adam: “...the Fall is the qualitative leap.” Before the fall, Adam and all of existence was in a state of innocence. After the fall, i.e., after sin entered the world and a qualitative difference has been introduced, this universal state of

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82 Perhaps the “unit” of a qualitative leap could be called a “qualtum.”

innocence is forever removed. As we will see, each individual also has their own fall from a personal state of innocence into that of sin and guilt.

Other examples of lesser qualitative leaps (not mentioned in Concept of Anxiety) in an individual’s life include birth, salvation, marriage, and death. Birth and death can mark qualitative leaps not only for the individual experiencing the event, but also for family members and loved ones. Those lives are qualitatively changed by these events as well so that there can never be a return to the previous state. Anxiety in relation to sin has both qualitative and quantitative attributes:

Anxiety, then, means two things: the anxiety in which the individual posits sin through the qualitative leap, and the anxiety that comes in and enters with sin, and in that respect also enters quantitatively into the world every time an individual posits sin.84

Because of the qualitative leap of Adam’s fall, there is always a base condition of sin, but because every individual is capable of further sins, the state of anxiety and guilt is quantitatively augmented with each sin of the individual. Anxiety is connected to both forms of sin and increases as they increase.

The qualitative and quantitative aspects of anxiety are distinguishing factors in what Haufniensis calls objective and subjective anxiety:

Anxiety, as it appeared in Adam, will never return, since it was through him that sinfulness entered the world. For that reason there are now two analogues to Adam’s anxiety: the objective anxiety in nature and the subjective anxiety in the individual...85


85 Ibid., 70.
Objective anxiety was brought into the world through the qualitative leap of the Fall, whereas subjective anxiety is due to the quantitative increasing of sin in each individual.

**Objective Anxiety**

Objective anxiety is the “...generational sinfulness of the entire world.”\(^{86}\) Of course, sinfulness originated in Adam’s sin: “...through Adam’s sin, sinfulness entered the world”\(^{87}\) and this had a irreversible effect on the whole of creation:

“Sin’s entering the world had significance for the whole of creation. The effect of this sin on the nonhuman aspect of life I have called objective anxiety.”\(^{88}\)

This form of universal anxiety is a primordial longing: “What this means can be indicated by calling attention to the scriptural expression ἀποκαραδοκία τῆς κτίσεως [the eager longing of creation] (Rom. 8:19).”\(^{89}\) Because of this longing, “...it goes without saying that creation is in a state of imperfection.”\(^{90}\) This state of imperfection implies the previous state of perfection, and this is the state which is longed for:

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87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., 71.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.
One often fails to see with expressions and definitions such as longing, eager longing, expectation, etc., that these involve an antecedent state, and that this state is therefore present and simultaneously makes itself felt as that in which the longing unfolds.\textsuperscript{91}

It is interesting to note his tenet that the antecedent state is present and makes itself felt. This concept will become clearer when we come to Haufniensis’s explanation of “the instant” later.

The familiar background state of objective anxiety is that into which a person comes into the world, and because humans are a part of the world, they also produce anxiety in themselves and thus in turn contribute to this overall state:

This state of expectancy is not one that the person has fallen into by accident, etc., thus finding himself a total stranger in it; he is producing it himself at the same time. The expression for such a longing is anxiety; for it is in anxiety that the state out of which he longs to be proclaims itself.\textsuperscript{92}

This sounds not unlike Heidegger’s concepts of inauthentic expecting and fallenness.

Haufniensis then connects objective anxiety to sensuousness:

This anxiety in creation can indeed properly be called objective anxiety. It is not brought forth by creation but by the fact that Adam’s sin placed it in an entirely different light, and insofar as sin continues to enter the world, sensuousness is constantly degraded to mean sinfulness.\textsuperscript{93}

He laid out the relationship between sensuousness and sin in an earlier section, where it also involved the sexual and has to do with human being as a synthesis:

\textsuperscript{“If man were not a synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit, the sexual could


\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 72.
never have entered with sinfulness.” The reasoning behind this is not made clear, however if we keep in mind that the synthesis is composed of body and soul, and the former by necessity has a sensuous aspect, and further, that “...the extremity of the sensuous is precisely the sexual,” then perhaps the meaning is clearer.

Sensuousness in its simplest form is not sinful, however, because of Adam’s sin, in its extreme form as sexuality it became sinful, even though sexuality is required to further the human race: “Sinfulness is then not sensuousness, not at all; but without sin, no sexuality and without sexuality, no history.” Objective anxiety then, in addition to the “eager longing” also has to do with the fact that sexuality is forever degraded to being sinful.

**Subjective Anxiety**

In the section on subjective anxiety we come to one of the more well-known Kierkegaardian metaphors. It is a physical example of what anxiety feels like in terms of the leap. Haufniensis likens anxiety to the feeling of dizziness:

Anxiety can be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy... It is in this way that anxiety is


95 Ibid.

96 This is a corrected translation of the word *Sexualitet*. Hannay confusingly translates it as sensuousness, which would be the Danish word *Sandseligheden*. The entire sentence in Danish is, “Syndigheden er da ikke Sandseligheden, ingenlunde, men uden Synden ingen Sexualitet og uden Sexualitet ingen Historie.” The Thomte (1980) translation is correct here.

Just as one encounters dizziness when looking over the edge of a cliff one also feels anxiety when confronted with the infinity of freedom. The anxiety of looking into the abyss of freedom reaches a point where the individual becomes overwhelmed and is compelled to find something finite on which to grab hold. Haufniensis then ties this retreat from the infinite to guilt: “In that very instant everything is changed, and in raising itself up again freedom sees that it is guilty. Between these two moments lies the leap, which no science has explained and which no science can explain.” At the moment where finiteness is sought, the personal leap is made and guilt enters the picture. Like anxiety, this guilt is not directed at a particular object, but is ambiguous: “The person who becomes guilty in anxiety becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is possible to become.” The personal fall occurs when the person is in a weakened or compromised state: “Psychologically speaking, the fall into sin always occurs in a state of enervation.”

In the next section Haufniensis returns to the theme of how anxiety is connected with sensuousness, and that “...the proportion of sensuousness corresponds

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99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.
to that of anxiety.” 102 Here he focuses on the bodily component of the synthesis of body and soul. He begins by attempting to show that anxiety was more pronounced in Eve than in Adam: “…anxiety is more reflected in Eve than in Adam. This is because the woman is more sensuous than the man” 103 Woman apparently has more anxiety than the man because there is an imbalance in the synthesis. In woman, the body dominates the synthesis:

…it is not a matter of an empirical state, or of an average number, but of the dissimilarity in the synthesis. If in one part of the synthesis there is a ‘more,’ a result will be that when spirit posits itself, the cleft becomes deeper and in freedom’s possibility anxiety will find greater scope. 104

He names two other causes of anxiety that are related to the body. The first is modesty: “There is an anxiety in modesty because spirit is defined at the extremity of the difference of the synthesis in a way that identifies spirit not merely as body but as body with the sexual difference.” 105 Modesty is the first post-Fall form of anxiety mentioned in Genesis. Before the fall, there was no such anxiety: “And the man and his wife were both naked, and were not ashamed.” 106 However, the very first action after Eve and Adam ate the fruit of the tree was to exercise sexual modesty:

103 Ibid., 78.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., 84.
106 Genesis 2:25 (NRSV)
...she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate. Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made loincloths for themselves.\textsuperscript{107}

The first words of Adam to God reflect this anxiety: “He said, ‘I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself.’”\textsuperscript{108}

For Haufniensis the anxiety of modesty has to do with spirit facing up to the sexual difference: “The real significance of modesty is that spirit cannot, so to speak, own up to the extremity of the synthesis. That is why the anxiety found in modesty is enormously ambiguous.”\textsuperscript{109}

The next form of anxiety having to do with the sexed body is the erotic:

“Just as anxiety is posited in modesty, so is it present in all erotic enjoyment…”\textsuperscript{110}

For the same reason as in modesty there is anxiety in the erotic, but there is an additional aspect to anxiety in the erotic: “But why this anxiety? It is because spirit cannot take part in the culmination of the erotic.”\textsuperscript{111} We shall assume that by culmination he means sexual climax. At that moment, spirit is pushed into the background and the bodily aspect of the synthesis dominates:

Spirit is indeed present, because it is spirit that establishes the synthesis, but it cannot express itself in the erotic; it feels alien. It is as though it said to

\textsuperscript{107} Genesis 3:6-7

\textsuperscript{108} Genesis 3:10


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 87.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 88.
the erotic: ‘My dear! Here I cannot be a third party, so I shall go into hiding for the time being.’

The spirit retreats during the height of erotic enjoyment, but anxiety is present because of extreme imbalance of the synthesis. The anxiety associated with the erotic is not necessarily a bad thing: “But when the erotic is pure, innocent, and beautiful, then this anxiety is friendly and mild, and the poets are therefore right when they speak of a sweet anxiousness.” Haufniensis also gives a similar model of anxiety present in conception and birth, noting again that spirit is farthest away so anxiety is at an extreme. This type of anxiety is an indication of the ‘perfection’ of human nature: “Anxiety...is an expression of the perfection of human nature...”

We again see the refrain of the proportional relationship between anxiety and sensuousness: “But the more anxiety, the more sensuousness.” Haufniensis now suggests that this increase in what is the objective anxiety of the entire race is due to the increase in sensuousness in each generation: “The procreated individual is more sensuous than the original, and this ‘more’ is the common ‘more’ of the generation for every later individual with regard to Adam.” Haufniensis has been explicating subjective anxiety, which varies in each individual, so in addition to the

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113 Ibid.

114 Ibid., 89.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.
increasing objective anxiety of each generation, there is ‘more and less’ of subjective anxiety for an individual: “But this ‘more’ of anxiety and sensuousness for every later individual in relation to Adam may of course signify a more and less in the particular individual.”\textsuperscript{117}

The increase in sensuousness in each generation leads to greater anxiety in each generation, and can lead to the “maximum” of anxiety about sin: “Just because sensuousness here is defined as a ‘more,’ spirit’s anxiety in assuming responsibility for it becomes a greater anxiety. The maximum here is the dreadful fact that anxiety about sin produces sin.”\textsuperscript{118} The individual does not even have to have actually sinned. It is enough that the individual merely be worried about appearing to have sinned: “At this point a maximum may appear... that the individual in anxiety about sin produces sin, in this case: the individual, in anxiety not about becoming guilty but about being seen as guilty, becomes guilty.”\textsuperscript{119} This is a key point about anxiety that will be developed in greater detail later. Haufniensis will call this manifestation of anxiety “anxiety about the evil.”

In the first half of \textit{Concept of Anxiety} we have examined how the analysis of anxiety belongs to the science of psychology, although the sciences of the “second ethics” and dogmatics are also involved. The first two chapters were dedicated to anxiety’s role in the first synthesis, that is the synthesis of body and soul. Here we

\textsuperscript{117} Kierkegaard, \textit{The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin}, 89.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 91.
saw anxiety in the primal state and its relationship to innocence and dreaming spirit. We looked at Haufniensis’s concept of hereditary sin and how it is responsible for objective anxiety in all creation. We also saw that in addition to objective anxiety, subjective anxiety is present in each individual. Subjective anxiety largely involved sensuousness, i.e. the anxiety of existing in a sexed body. We are now ready to look at the role that anxiety plays in the second synthesis that is exposited in the next chapter.
Chapter V: *Concept of Anxiety*: the Second Synthesis

Anxiety of Lacking Awareness of Sin

The next category of anxiety Haufniensis discusses is the kind that is due to the individual or even a society being unaware that they are in the state of sin. What he calls the sin of “sin-consciousness’s non-appearance.” There are three components of this category: the anxiety of spiritlessness, the anxiety of fate, and the anxiety of guilt. This category has to do with the “second synthesis.” The first synthesis was that of soul and body bound together by spirit. The second synthesis is that of the temporal and eternal: “The human being was, then, a synthesis of soul and body, but also is a *synthesis of the temporal and the eternal*.”¹ Haufniensis notes there is a difference between these two syntheses. The first synthesis had three definite components, whereas in the second, the third “binding” component appears to be missing:

As for this latter synthesis, what immediately strikes one is that it is formed otherwise than the first. The two factors there were soul and body, and then spirit the third, although in a way that one could properly speak of a

synthesis only when spirit is posited. The latter synthesis has only two factors, the temporal and the eternal. Where here is the third?²

There is a third component of the temporal-eternal synthesis, though it is not completely analogous to spirit in the soul-body synthesis. The third component is “the instant” (Øieblicket)³ The category of anxiety related to the second synthesis has to do with the failure to realize the eternal nature of the instant.

The Instant/Temporality

In order to have a better understanding of this category of anxiety, we will need to become familiar with temporality as Haufniensis explains it. He wants to reject the traditional view of time as merely past, present in future. The concepts of past and future aren’t particularly problematic, but the traditional concept of the present moment as the dividing point or discremen between past and future that Haufniensis finds unacceptable. Sounding very much like Heidegger, he says, “Thinking that this division can be upheld is due to an instant’s being spatialized, but this brings the infinite succession to a halt; it is through introducing representation, by allowing time to be represented instead of being thought.”⁴

It is the Cartesian “spatial” or mathematical representation of the instant that Haufniensis rejects. He believes the instant should be thought of as “…eternity’s


³ This is a key point of the Heidegger/Kierkegaard relationship.

reflection in time,” in effect, “The present is the eternal, or rather, the eternal is the present and the present is fullness.” The instant is where “...time and eternity touch each other.” Haufniensis realizes the difficulty in speaking of the instant in these terms, and he like Heidegger after him, considers the literal meaning of Øieblikket: “‘The instant’ is a metaphor and in that regard not so good to deal with. But it is a beautiful word to take heed of. Nothing is as swift as a twinkling of the eye, and yet it is commensurable with the content of the eternal.” The twinkling or glance of the eye is a reference to I Corinthians 15:51–52, where Paul says, “Listen, I will tell you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed.” For Paul, the twinkling of an eye represents a qualitative leap from death to eternal life.

The instant is also involved in the first synthesis: “The synthesis of the temporal and the eternal is not another synthesis but the expression for that first synthesis according to which man is a synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit. Once spirit is posited, the instant is there.” The instant occurs when spirit comes

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6 Ibid., 106.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 108.
on the scene to form the soul-body synthesis. The two syntheses are united when
the spirit is realized as eternal:

The synthesis of the psychic and the somatic is to be posited by spirit, but
spirit is eternal and the synthesis is accordingly only when spirit posits the
first synthesis as, additionally, the second synthesis of the temporal and the
eternal. As long as the eternal is not posited, the instant is not, or is only a
discrimen.\textsuperscript{11}

In the second synthesis, Haufniensis equates temporality with the bodily or sensous
component of the first synthesis: “As with sensuousness, so with temporality.”\textsuperscript{12}
Like sensuousness, temporality becomes sinfulness once sin is posited: “The instant
that sin is posited, temporality is sinfulness. We do not say that temporality is
sinfulness, any more than that sensuousness is sinfulness; but with the positing of
sin, temporality signifies sinfulness.”\textsuperscript{13} The idea that temporality is associated with
sinfulness is seen in the following section on spiritlessness.

\textbf{Death}

Before examining spiritlessness, we must pause to look at the footnote that
accompanies the quote above (temporality is sinfulness) that briefly addresses
Haufniensis’s thoughts on the role of anxiety and death. Since this is a point of
connection with Heidegger’s Being-towards-death, it is worth a quick look at this
footnote. He begins by stating, “From the definition of temporality as sinfulness

\textsuperscript{11} Kierkegaard, \textit{The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 108.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 112–113.
it follows that death is in turn punishment.”¹⁴ This follows from God’s judgment upon Adam’s punishment mentioned here in Chapter 3: “Then you shall surely die.” As with anxiety, the more “perfect” the organism, the greater the effect of death: “...death announces itself the more terribly the greater the perfection of the organism.”¹⁵ This is not only true of the human species versus animals, but also true for individual humans: “…it is indeed true that the more highly the human being is rated, the more frightful is death.”¹⁶ There is the effect of death that corresponds to objective sin, i.e., it is common to the human race, but there is also the added terrible effect that takes place in the greater individual, similar to subjective sin.

Haufniensis relates the terrible anxiety of death to the anxiety of birth, generally when the body-soul synthesis is at an extreme:

“Death’s anxiety therefore corresponds to the anxiety of birth... In the moment of death the human being finds itself at the extreme point of the synthesis; it is as though spirit cannot be present for it cannot die, and yet it must wait because the body has to die.”¹⁷

Here again, as in the sexual act, spirit can have no part and must “wait” for the body. This emphasizes the eternal nature of spirit versus the finite nature of body. Let us leave this topic for now, we will return to a discussion of the anxiety


¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., fn. 112–113.
associated with death and Heidegger’s Being-towards-death in the conclusion of this work.

**Anxiety & Spiritlessness**

In the next section, Haufniensis discusses anxiety, or rather the absence of anxiety in what he terms paganism and spiritlessness. His definition of paganism is not simply non-Christian or non-Jew. A pagan is one who lives in temporality, i.e., one who does not realize the eternal. This living in time in the quantifiable sense is the sin of paganism: “Paganism as it were stretches out time with quantifying attributes, never arriving at sin in the most profound sense, but this precisely is sin.”\(^{18}\) Paganism exists within any religion, including Christianity: “The life of Christian paganism is neither guilty nor not guilty; it recognizes no real distinction between present, past, future, the eternal.”\(^{19}\)

Closely related to paganism is Haufniensis’s idea of spiritlessness. Spiritlessness is less desirable than paganism because at least the latter is making an attempt at realizing spirit, even if incorrectly. Spiritlessness is the complete ignorance or avoidance of any kind of spiritual existence. Because neither condition realizes spirit, there is no true anxiety:

In spiritlessness there is no anxiety. It is too happy for that, too content, and too spiritless. But this is a very pitiable reason, and paganism differs from

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.
spiritlessness in the former being definable as directed toward spirit and the latter as directed from spirit. Paganism is, if you will, the absence of spirit and thus differs far from spiritlessness. Paganism is in this respect much to be preferred.\textsuperscript{20}

The ignorance of spirit can give the spiritless person a false sense of security: “The perdition of spiritlessness, as well as its security, consists exactly in its understanding nothing in a spiritual way...”\textsuperscript{21} Haufniensis reneges a bit on his claim that anxiety is completely absent in spiritlessness, even though the person is ignorant of it, it is lurking in the background: “Even if there is no anxiety in spiritlessness, because it is excluded just as is spirit, anxiety is still present except that it is waiting.”\textsuperscript{22}

**Anxiety & Fate**

In the next section, Haufniensis develops the role played by anxiety in paganism. Unlike the condition of spiritlessness, there is a type of anxiety present in paganism: “It is commonly said of paganism that it rests in sin; it might be more correct to say that it rests in anxiety.”\textsuperscript{23} The sin of paganism is of resting in finite temporality and in sensuousness. However, there is a superficial relationship to spirit: “Paganism is generally speaking sensuousness but a sensuousness that has a relation to spirit, although without spirit being in the most profound sense posited


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 117.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
as spirit. But this possibility is precisely anxiety.”24 Even though the relationship to spirit is not in the most profound sense, it is in the possibility of the relationship to spirit where anxiety arises. Haufniensis reminds the reader of his original tenet that anxiety is directed at nothing. There is a nothing specific to paganism: “…what is it then, more particularly, that the nothing of anxiety signifies in paganism? It is fate.”25 The nothing of paganism is fate.

Unlike the true inward relation to spirit, the pagan relates to spirit as something external: “Fate is a relation to spirit as external to it; it is a relation between spirit and something other that is not spirit...”26 The pagan relates to spirit as something finite, temporal, and inconsistent. An example of this kind of relationship given by Haufniensis is that of the ancient Greeks’ relationship to the Oracle at Delphi. The Greeks had a necessary relationship to the Oracle because of their belief, yet this relationship was to something as completely external.

Fate “…is a unity of necessity and contingency.”27 Because of the relation to something eternal, anxiety appears: “The pagan cannot come into a relation to fate, because the very instant that it is the necessary, in the next it is the accidental. And still he is in relation to it, and this relation is the anxiety.”28 This kind of relationship

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25 Ibid., 118.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 119.
is possible within Christianity: “Within Christianity, one finds paganism’s anxiety with regard to fate wherever spirit, although present, is not essentially posited as spirit.” So even within Christianity, the relationship to spirit can be to something as external and finite.

The extreme case of a person caught up in fate is “the genius.” Haufniensis does not define what he means by genius, but it later becomes apparent that here he is focused on “immediate genius.” This is an attribute of someone who possesses the height of talent, but bound to exist only temporally and outwardly. Immediate geniuses are those with pronounced aesthetic or political/military talents, e.g., Napoleon. Although Haufniensis does not take it as far, this genius can be thought of as analogous to Aristotle’s great-souled man or Nietzsche’s Übermensch. The life of the genius is dictated by destiny and fate, which is realized in proportion to the level of genius: “…the genius continually discovers fate, and the more profound the genius, the more profound the discovery.” The genius believes their life to be directed by a definite plan toward a particular end. This belief can lead to greatness, but also to downfall: “…through its discovery of fate that genius shows its primordial power, but then also in turn its impotence.” The immediate genius does


30 Watkin, *The A to Z of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy*, 94.


32 Ibid.
not transcend temporality, and because of this fact will never experience “deeper” anxiety:

To itself genius does not become significant in the most profound sense; its compass can extend no further than that of fate in relation to fortune, misfortune, esteem, honor, power, immortal fame, all of which are temporal terms. Every deeper dialectical characterization of anxiety is excluded.\(^{33}\)

Later Haufniensis will speak of “religious genius” which will differ from immediate genius by its relation to spirit as internal and eternal.

### Anxiety & Guilt

The next section is concerned with anxiety and its relation to guilt. Haufniensis focuses on Judaism (and in passing, Catholicism). His first sweeping generalization is, “Judaism rests in anxiety.”\(^{34}\) The anxiety of Judaism is not about fate like that of the pagan or genius, it is rather directed at guilt: “The anxiety found in Judaism is anxiety about guilt.”\(^{35}\) It later becomes clear that this anxiety is not about actually being guilty, but rather is about merely being thought to be guilty. This was described earlier as the “maximum” of being in anxiety about sin or anxiety about appearing to be in sin, c.f. anxiety about evil below.

As with paganism Judaism has an external object. The analogue of the pagans’ oracle in Judaism is the sacrifice: “To the oracle in paganism there

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\(^{34}\) Ibid., 125.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 126.
corresponds in Judaism the sacrifice.”\textsuperscript{36} The sacrifice as the external object is preferable to the oracle because it offers some solace, however it is still only alleviates the anxiety of being thought guilty: “The Jew has recourse to the sacrifice but it does not help him, for what would really help is the canceling of the relation of anxiety to guilt and the positing of a relation that is actual.”\textsuperscript{37} There is no “actual relation” because the sacrifice is a finite external action.

Haufniensis contrasts the anxiety of Judaism with that of the “religious genius.” Unlike the immediate genius who is focused outwardly, the religious genius is turned inwardly. The analogue of the immediate genius’ fate is guilt, but unlike in Judaism it is \textit{actual} guilt: “The first thing he does is to turn toward himself. Just as the immediate genius has fate as the figure that follows him, so this one has guilt.”\textsuperscript{38} Like fate, for the immediate genius the guilt is proportional to the level of religious genius: “In turning toward himself, he discovers guilt. The greater the genius, the more profoundly is guilt discovered.”\textsuperscript{39} The inward turn also discovers freedom, not an external freedom, but an inner freedom. This negates any fear of fate:

In turning inward he discovers freedom. Fate he does not fear, for he takes up no outward task and for him freedom is his bliss; not freedom to do this


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 130.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 131.
or that in the world, to become king and emperor… but freedom to know within himself that he is freedom.40

By turning inward and realizing the eternal, the religious genius experiences an infinite freedom that it not tied to glories or rewards in the external world. However, anxiety is not absent. In place of the fear of fate that the immediate genius had, the religious genius fears actual guilt: “It is, as fate was, the only thing he fears, and yet his fear is not what was its maximum in the former case, namely, fear of being thought guilty, but fear of being guilty.”41 The fear of guilt is there because it can deny the religious genius its freedom: “The more he discovers freedom, the more sin’s anxiety is upon him in the state of possibility. Only guilt frightens him, for guilt alone can deprive him of freedom.”42

**Anxiety as the Result of the Individual’s Sin**

In his next chapter Haufniensis examines the anxiety that is the result of sin in the single individual. Unlike other types of ambiguous anxiety or anxiety directed at nothing, this anxiety has a very definite object: “…the object of anxiety is something definite, its nothing an actual something, because the distinction between good and evil is posited *in concreto*, and the anxiety has therefore lost its

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41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 131–132.
dialectical ambiguity.”⁴³ There are two forms of this anxiety that correspond to the two parts of the distinction: anxiety about the evil, and anxiety about the good.

**Anxiety about the Evil**

The first form of this anxiety that is a consequence of the actuality of an individual’s sin is anxiety about the evil. Here, “The individual is in sin, and his anxiety is about the evil. This formation, when seen from a higher standpoint, is in the good, for that is why it is anxiety about the evil... The bondage of sin is an unfree relation to the evil...”⁴⁴ This is the subjective anxiety that was earlier given as the “maximum” anxiety about being guilty or appearing to be guilty. Here the person is sinning further by worrying about sin. In the anxiety about the evil “…the anxiety is about the actuality of sin” and “…about the further possibility of sin.”⁴⁵ To add to the problem, in this anxiety the person does not want their individual sin to be completely be removed, however they do strive to have sin quantitatively diminished: “Anxiety wants the actuality of sin removed, not entirely but to a certain degree, or more exactly it wants to a certain degree to have the actuality of sin continue but, be it noted, only to a certain degree.”⁴⁶ While the person wants


⁴⁴ Ibid., 144.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 139.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 138.
to have their sin lessened, they do not wish it to be entirely alleviated because that
would remove the need to worry about sin.

The striving to lessen individual sin is attempted through repentance, but
according to Haufniensis, the power of repentance is deficient in that it cannot do
away with the sin, “...repentance cannot cancel sin, it can only sorrow over it.”

Nevertheless, “Anxiety throws itself despairingly into the arms of repentance.”

Repentance thus provides some kind of solace for the person in anxiety about the
evil in that it offers to quantitatively and temporarily lessen sin, but is still provides
this person with the condition of being able to worry about sin and the mounting
of future sin. How can one finally overcome the deficiency of repentance? Even
though this is something that the person in anxiety about evil would never consider,
Haufniensis claims that this deficiency is accomplished through faith: “All that can
truly disarm the sophism of repentance is faith...” This is because “...only in faith
is the synthesis eternally and in every instant possible.”

Recall that the synthesis
spoken of here is that of spirit in eternity through the instant.

47 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 139.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., 141.

50 Ibid.


Anxiety about the Good

The second form of anxiety that is a result of the individual’s sin is anxiety about the good, which Haufniensis inexplicably calls “the demonic” (det Dæmoniske). Even though he called anxiety about evil a “maximum,” he goes on at great length and many pages about the demonic, suggesting that this is in fact the greatest (or worst) form of anxiety.

Here, the situation is the reverse of anxiety the evil: “The individual is in the evil and is anxious about the good… the demonic is an unfree relation to the good.”\textsuperscript{51} Haufniensis gives a brief definition of what he means by the good: “The good, of course, signifies the restoration of freedom, redemption, salvation, or whatever one wants to call it.”\textsuperscript{52} Even though he did not include it, we would assume faith, as the complete absolution of individual sin is included in the good. For Haufniensis the demonic is more insidious and widespread than anxiety about the evil. He begins by listing three approaches to viewing this form of anxiety: the aesthetic-metaphysical point of view, in ethical condemnatory terms, and in terms of medical treatment.

With the aesthetic-metaphysical point of view, the demonic is seen as fate or misfortune and is approached sympathetically. This is a self-protection mechanism on the part of the demoniac: “Far from standing the sufferer in good stead, sympathy is sooner just a way of protecting one’s own egotism. Not daring in

\textsuperscript{51} Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 144.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
a deeper sense to think about such things, one saves oneself through sympathy."53

Here the demoniac makes excuses about avoiding the good in order to protect their own ego. These excuses are rationalizations about the good being an unachievable goal, so there is little point striving for it. The person does not believe they are worthy of such a task and that it is simply easier to remain in the demonic state. When the demonic is viewed in ethical condemnatory terms, physical punishment is involved. Haufniensis cites the “frightful severity” of the punishment historically inflicted on the demoniac. The medical view takes the demonic as having a malady in the physical body that is to be treated, what we now would call a psychiatric condition. From the three viewpoints listed, it becomes apparent that the demonic “...belongs in a way to all spheres: the somatic, the psychic, and the spiritual.”54 The aesthetic-metaphysical takes in the physic and spiritual; the ethical condemnatory view is primarily corporeal; and the medical is psychosomatic, involving physic and bodily elements. Haufniensis reminds us of how the three components of body, soul, and spirit are interdependent and that a disturbance in one affects all three: “...the human being is a synthesis of psyche and soma sustained by spirit, and a disorder in one therefore manifests itself in the others.”55

The demonic condition is widespread, and to some degree, everyone experiences it: “...there are traces of it in every person as surely as every person is

54 Ibid., 147.
55 Ibid.
a sinner.” The demoniac sets up the good as that which is to be rejected because it is a threat to freedom: “Freedom is posited as unfreedom, because freedom is lost.” The goodness of redemption and salvation are seen by the demonic person as “unfreedom.” This unfreedom wants to hide away: “The demonic is unfreedom that wants to close itself off.” Haufniensis characterizes at length closed-off or “reserved” nature of the demoniac i.e., as withdrawn and unwilling to communicate. “Freedom is always in communication... unfreedom withdraws ever more in its reserve and will not communicate.” He gives a biblical example of a demoniac:

...a demoniac in the New Testament says to Christ, when he approaches: τί ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί [What have I to do with you], and goes on to suggest that Christ has come to destroy him (anxiety about the good). Or a demoniac implores Christ to go another way.

This example shows how the demoniac is always resentful at never appearing to be “good enough” and thus withdraws into a reserved state.

Haufniensis gives two other aspects of the the demonic that are related to its reserve: the demonic is the sudden; and the demonic is the contentless, the tedious. What does he mean by these seemingly arbitrary characteristics of anxiety about the good? The sudden (det Pludselige) has to do with the break in the continuity

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57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 149.

59 Ibid., 148.

60 Ibid., 150.
of communication: “Reserve shuts itself off ever more from communication. But communication is in turn the expression of continuity, and the negation of continuity is the sudden.”\(^61,62\) This becomes clearer when Haufniensis describes the demonic as reserve that is discontinuous, i.e., it is not ever-present: “In one instant it is there, in the next it is gone, and no sooner is it gone than it is there again, whole and complete.”\(^63\) *Pludselige* can also be translated as “abrupt,” which suggests that one can fall in and out of the reserved demonic state unexpectedly and without warning. How reserve is the contentless and the tedious is not well explained. Haufniensis offers this tautology as an explanation:

> In now bringing in the contentless and the boring as an additional term, this reflects upon the essence and the reserved on the form corresponding to the essence. This completes the whole conceptual definition, since the form of contentlessness is precisely reserve.\(^64\)

I will offer this interpretation: the reserved state as a closing off and rejection of the good lacks any “true” or substantial content, i.e., any content worthy of interest. It becomes a nothing. Because of this lack of content the demoniac faces boredom and tedium in the reserved state.

Returning to the idea that unfreedom is freedom lost, Haufniensis proposes two ways in which the freedom lost manifests itself in the demoniac:


\(^62\) Note the similarity here of “communication” and Heidegger’s call of conscience.


\(^64\) Ibid., 161.
psychosomatically and spiritually. In the first, less common way, the manifestation of unfreedom presents itself in the body: “…the body is the soul’s organ, and thus in turn that of spirit. Once this ministering relationship ceases, once the body revolts, and once freedom conspires with the body against itself, unfreedom is present as the demonic.”\textsuperscript{65} This is a manifestation of the “medical viewpoint” propounded earlier. Haufniensis provides examples of the symptoms: “A hypersensibility and a hyperirritability, neurasthenia, hysteria, hypochondria, etc., all of these are or could be nuances of it.”\textsuperscript{66} The spiritual manifestation of the demoniac’s unfreedom is the more common than its bodily manifestation: “This form of the demonic is very widespread and we meet here the most diverse phenomena.”\textsuperscript{67} In its more minor forms,

...the demonic can express itself as a laziness that postpones thinking, as curiosity that never becomes more than that, as dishonest self-deception, as effeminate weakness that constantly turns to others, or as superior negligence, as mindless busyness, etc.\textsuperscript{68}

The demoniac will resort to these faulted behaviors in order to avoid facing up to the good. Note that this list of characteristics is very similar to those of Heidegger’s inauthentic Dasein, who has fallen into the world of the “they.”


\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 165.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 166.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
Another sign of the spiritual manifestation of the demonic can be seen in the lack of two positive attributes: certitude (Visheden) and inwardness (Inderligheden).

These two attributes are actions:

Certitude and inwardness, which can only be reached by and exist in action, decide whether or not the individual is demonic... arbitrariness, unbelief, mockery of religion, etc., do not, as is commonly believed, lack content but lack certitude, in exactly the same sense as superstition, servility, and sanctimoniousness. The negative phenomena lack certitude precisely because they are in anxiety about the content.69

What are certitude and inwardness? Haufniensis rarely mentions the former without the latter, although the latter appears many times without the former. Certitude is an attribute of inwardness, but not vice versa. He will soon define them together as “earnestness.” With regards to inwardness: it should not be confused with the demoniac’s reserve. The latter is a negative withdrawal as an avoidance of the good, whereas the former is positive form of introspection and self-reflection. Haufniensis adds this as an attribute of inwardness: “Inwardness is an understanding, but in concreto it is a matter of how to understand this understanding.”70 This “understanding of understanding” has a similar construction to Heidegger’s facticity, that is, “the fact of the fact” of something’s existence.

Haufniensis provides an example: “...to understand what you yourself are saying is

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70 Ibid., 171.
one thing, understanding yourself in the saying is another.”\textsuperscript{71} Inwardness can be taken as a double self-reflection: as self-understanding-understanding.

Haufniensis gives a “schema” for the absence of inwardness which entails that every form of the absence is “…either activity-passivity or passivity-activity”\textsuperscript{72} He gives three dyads as examples that exhibit the activity/passivity poles: unbelief-superstition, hypocrisy-offense, and pride-cowardice.\textsuperscript{73} The first member of each dyad corresponds to the second component with the first being the active component and the second, the passive. These three dyads characterize lack of inwardness. The activity/passivity aspect is not worth dwelling on here, it is worth noting how these three examples indicate a lack of the double self-reflection. These three examples are all directed toward the outward, finite world.

He then introduces the concept of earnestness (\textit{Alvor}), referring back to certitude and inwardness: “What are certitude and inwardness? Giving a definition of inwardness is no doubt hard. But for the time being I shall say that it is earnestness.”\textsuperscript{74} Redefining inwardness as earnestness doesn’t seem to help much however, since “…there is no single definition of earnestness.”\textsuperscript{75} Haufniensis doesn’t seem to be too concerned about this because “…with regard to existential concepts


\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 174–176.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 176.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 177.
it always betrays better discretion to abstain from definitions...”76 He does however classify earnestness as a type of disposition77 (Gemyt), and provides the definition of disposition as given by Karl Rosencrantz: “…that the feeling unfolds itself to self-consciousness, and vice versa, that the content of the self-consciousness is felt by the subject as his own. It is only this unity that can be called disposition.”78 This is not far from Haufniensis’s previous characterization of inwardness as understanding of self-understanding. He believes earnestness to be the highest form of the unity that is a disposition: “Earnestness and disposition correspond to each other in such a way that earnestness is a higher and the deepest expression of what it is to be a disposition.”79 How is earnestness the highest form of a disposition? It has to do with the primitivity (Oprindelighed80) of earnestness: “The disposition is an immediate property, while earnestness is on the contrary the disposition’s acquired primitivity, its preserved primitivity in the responsibility of freedom...”81 The primitivity of earnestness is a sign of the eternal, and because of the presence of the eternal, earnestness can never become mere habit, as Haufniensis states,


77 c.f. Befindlichkeit in *Being and Time* as state-of-mind, disposedness, or disposition


79 Ibid.

80 This can also be translated as originality, c.f. Heidegger’s “primordiality.”

“The primitivity of disposition... indicates precisely the eternal in earnestness, for which reason earnestness can never become habit.”

Habit involves repeating the same action or attitude again and again. Habit is always in the context of finite temporality. The corresponding “again and again” in the context of the eternal is repetition:

...habit arises as soon as the eternal drops out of the repetition. When the primitivity in earnestness is acquired and kept, there is succession and repetition, but as soon as primitivity is lacking in the repetition, there is habit. The earnest man is earnest precisely through the primitivity with which he returns in repetition.

The concept of repetition is a central feature of Kierkegaard’s “system” and is present in several other works, mainly *Repetition* (1843) and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846). Haufniensis does mention repetition in a very long footnote in the Introduction to *Concept of Anxiety*, but refers the reader to “Repetition, a work by Constantin Constantius (Copenhagen 1843).” This is Kierkegaard’s playful way of citing his other pseudonymous work. Because repetition is so important, and because it is also a point of connection to Heidegger, we will briefly leave *Concept of Anxiety* to examine the salient points of this concept as it is presented in Kierkegaard’s work, *Repetition*.

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83 Ibid., 180.

84 Ibid., 23.
Repetition

In Part One of *Repetition* Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantin Constantius introduces repetition in relation to Plato’s idea of recollection: “...for repetition is a crucial expression for what ‘recollection’ was to the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowing is a recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition.” For Plato, recollection is an essential aspect of the soul’s immortality. It is how we are able to reacquire knowledge from our past lives. Recollection is described primarily in the *Meno* and *Phaedo* dialogues. In the *Meno*, recollection is given as the reason why the slave boy is able to solve the geometrical problem that Socrates presents to him. The boy was never taught geometry, but is able to arrive at the solution to the problem because he already had the knowledge through recollection, which is possible because the soul is immortal: “As the soul is immortal, has been born often and has seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is in no way surprising that it can recollect the thing it knew before...” In the *Phaedo*, the fact of recollection is given as one of the proofs of the immortality of the soul: “...for us learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time have learned what we now recollect. This is possible only if our soul existed somewhere before it

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87 Ibid., 880.
took on this human shape.” Both dialogues emphasize recollection as being tied to the eternal nature of the soul.

With repetition, Constantius recognizes the eternal component of recollection, but he takes the orientation of recollection towards remembering the past and turns it towards the future: “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward.” Constantius is exploring the consequences of actually realizing the fact of eternal recollection. One consequence of turning it towards the future is that one realizes that one’s current existence will be eternally recollected in the future in the same way that one’s past existence is recollected in the present. This opening to the eternal nature of repetition removes temporality and the effects it has in the endless repeating patterns of everyday life. For instance, the concepts of new and old fall away: “One never grows weary of the old, and when one has that, one is happy. He alone is truly happy who is not deluded into thinking that the repetition should be something new, for then one grows weary of it.” Repetition entails openness to possibility, much like Heidegger’s idea of anticipation. One does not expect novelty in repetition because novelty is tied to finite temporality and is thus superficial. Constantius considers the case of life without repetition:


90 Ibid., 132.
Indeed, what would life be if there were no repetition? Who could want to be a tablet on which time writes something new every instant or to be a memorial volume of the past? Who could want to be susceptible to every fleeting thing, the novel, which always enervatingly diverts the soul anew?91

Constantius is claiming that life lived without realizing eternal future-oriented repetition is merely a tabulation of past events. Life without repetition is also much more susceptible to trivialities of novelty and the whims of contingency.

Repetition is necessary for full self-realization: “...he who wills repetition is a man, and the more emphatically he is able to realize it, the more profound a human being he is.”92,93 The person who does not realize repetition never escapes the finite and is subject to the ultimate effect of temporality, namely death: “...he who does not grasp that life is a repetition and that this is the beauty of life has pronounced his own verdict and deserves nothing better than what will happen to him anyway—he will perish.”94 Here Constantius points out that the person that doesn’t realize repetition “deserves” to perish, introducing a moral imperative: one must realize repetition.

Constantius does not provide a method for realizing repetition, other than to say that it entails circumnavigating existence: “When existence has been circumnavigated, it will be manifest whether one has the courage to understand

91 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, 132–133.
92 Ibid., 132.
93 c.f. “Anxiety as Saving Through Faith” below where anxiety is the analogue of repetition given here.
94 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, 132.
that life is a repetition...”\textsuperscript{95} Again, he does not explain what is meant by this circumnavigation, we will assume that it involves viewing life sub specie aeternitatis and seeing one’s whole life and its place in eternity. Although he is not explicit, it would seem that because of repetition itself, this circumnavigation is not a one-time event that is ever “completed.” The circumnavigation is continuous. This is apparent in the fact that one can circumnavigate and still not realize repetition: “The person who has not circumnavigated life before beginning to live will never live; the person who circumnavigated it but became satiated had a poor constitution; the person who chose repetition—he lives.”\textsuperscript{96} A person can circumnavigate once and then fall into smug satisfaction at the “completion,” not realizing the eternal repetition of the circumnavigation. This is opposed to true life through embracing repetition.

According to Constantius, God instantiated repetition, which was essential for the world to come into existence and for it to maintain its existence: “If God himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into existence... the world continues, and it continues because it is a repetition.”\textsuperscript{97} Repetition is thus a metaphysical necessity for Constantius, is it what holds the world together. He posits repetition as metaphysical earnestness: “Repetition—that is actuality and the

\textsuperscript{95} Kierkegaard, \textit{Fear and Trembling / Repetition}, 132.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 133.
earnestness of existence.”98 A person that realizes repetition in their own existence has come to maturity: “The person who wills repetition is mature in earnestness.”99

We will end our look at *Repetition* at this point. Constantius has arrived at earnestness, which is where we left *Concept of Anxiety*. Haufniensis was explaining the difference between habit and repetition in relation to earnestness. Habit takes place in finite temporality whereas repetition is always in the context of the eternal and is realized through the primitivity of earnestness.

Haufniensis then further emphasizes the eternal in earnestness by defining it in terms of inwardness: “But earnestness is something I can also express in another way. As soon as inwardness is lacking, the spirit is finitized. Inwardness is therefore eternity or the constituent of the eternal in the human being.”100,101 The understanding, or rather the lack of understanding of the eternal is key to understanding the demonic: “To study the demonic properly one need only observe how the eternal is construed in the individuality and one will be immediately informed.”102 The demonic occurs in individuals that lack a true understanding of the eternal. They lack inwardness and earnestness: “...anyone who has not understood

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98 Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling / Repetition*, 133.

99 Ibid.


101 This last sentence is perhaps Kierkegaard’s most succinct statement of the importance of inwardness in his theology that appears across his entire oeuvre.

the eternal correctly, understood it altogether concretely, lacks inwardness and
earnestness.”

Haufniensis describes how misunderstanding of the eternal involves at least four points: that one denies the eternal in man, that the eternal is construed altogether abstractly, that eternity is bent into time for the imagination, and that eternity is construed metaphysically. The first point has to do with the fear of eternity, which leads to the demonic: “If the eternal is posited, the present becomes something other than what one wants. This prompts fear and one is then in anxiety about the good.” Haufniensis believes this kind of fear to be pervasive in his time. Construing the eternal abstractly posits the eternal as the boundary of the temporal, which finitizes it. Bending eternity into time also finitizes it and merely “…produces an enchanting effect.” The metaphysical construal of eternity causes the temporal to become “comically preserved” in it. In any case, Haufniensis is pointing out that people rarely consider eternity in earnest. Haufniensis ends the chapter by stating, “…eternity is not what people think earnestly about; they are anxious about it, and anxiety can hit on a hundred evasions. Yet this is precisely


104 Ibid., 183–184.

105 Ibid., 183.

106 Ibid., 184.

107 Ibid., 185.
the demonic.” People would prefer to construe any number of rationalizations, evasions, and excuses in avoidance of eternity rather than to earnestly face up to it.

**Anxiety as Saving through Faith**

The final chapter of *Concept of Anxiety* is entitled “Anxiety as Saving through Faith.” Recall that in the context of anxiety about evil Haufniensis proposed faith as being the only way to overcome the weakness of repentance. The deficiency of repentance is that it cannot do away with sin, only “sorrow over it.” In the final chapter Haufniensis presents faith as the solution to the problem of anxiety. He reminds the reader of the essential role that anxiety plays in the adventure that is human existence:

…it is an adventure that every human being has to live through, learning to be anxious so as not to be ruined either by never having been in anxiety or by sinking into it. Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate.\(^{109}\)

Here Haufniensis warns against the pitfalls of 1) not ever being in anxiety (being spiritless) or, 2) becoming mired in anxiety (anxiety about evil or the good). One can learn the “right way” to be in anxiety, and this is the desired goal.

While one should avoid “sinking” in to anxiety, the more one appreciates the depths and profundity of anxiety, the better: “Through being a synthesis the human being can be made anxious, and the more profoundly, the greater the

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\(^{109}\) Ibid., 187.
human being.”\textsuperscript{110} He suggested this idea earlier, in the context of subjective anxiety: “Anxiety... is an expression of the perfection of human nature...”\textsuperscript{111} He is careful to note that “being made anxious” is not to be taken “in the usual sense in which anxiety is about something external, about something outside a person, but in the sense that it is the person himself who produces the anxiety.”\textsuperscript{112} The distinction here is that in the first case, which is sinking into anxiety, is anxiety about particular external things, whereas in the second case anxiety is generated by inwardness on the part of the individual.

He then connects the second type of anxiety with faith: “…this anxiety alone is, through faith, absolutely formative, since it consumes all finite ends, discovers all their deceptions.”\textsuperscript{113} Even though transcending finite trivialities is an ultimate goal, anxiety through faith is itself by no means to be considered pleasant or easy:

And no Grand Inquisitor has such frightful torments in readiness as has anxiety, and no secret agent knows as cunningly how to attack the suspect in his weakest moment, or to make so seductive the trap in which he will be snared; and no discerning judge understands how to examine, yes, exanimate, the accused as does anxiety, which never lets him go, not in diversion, not in noise, not at work, not by day, not by night.\textsuperscript{114}


\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 188.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
This is consistent with Kierkegaard’s view propounded in other pseudonymous works, e.g., *Fear and Trembling* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, that faith and religion are the most difficult tasks that an individual can undertake. Here Haufniensis has set up anxiety through faith as tantamount to a form of relentless torture. Because this anxiety is connected with the eternal through faith, it never lets up on the individual.

He then shifts to the aspect of this form of anxiety that is related to possibility: “Anyone formed by anxiety is shaped by possibility, and only the person shaped by possibility is cultivated according to his infinitude.”¹¹⁵ With the idea of a person being cultivated by possibility he furthers his idea that an individual grows into maturity in faith. We are reminded that this anxiety is always directed inwardly at the eternal,

...one should certainly not be in anxiety about persons, about finitudes; only someone who passes through the anxiety of the possible is cultivated to have no anxiety, not because this person can escape the terrible things of life, but because these always become weak by comparison with those of possibility.¹¹⁶

This is a somewhat confusing statement: earlier he said that the individual is being cultivated to have the right kind of anxiety, the anxiety of possibility or anxiety through faith, but here he is saying that someone who passes through anxiety can grow to have no anxiety. This could be read as saying that the anxiety of possibility will eventually alleviate all anxiety including the anxiety of possibility itself, which

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¹¹⁶ Ibid., 190.
would be nonsensical. I read this as saying that the anxiety of possibility will ameliorate the lesser, finite anxieties which in no way compare to the anxiety of possibility. We are reminded that some may claim to not be in anxiety or to never have been in anxiety. In one sense, they are correct in making this claim: “If... the speaker maintains that the great thing about him is that he has never been in anxiety, I will gladly provide him with my explanation: that it comes from his being very spiritless.”

The spiritless “speaker” here does not realize the necessity of passing through the anxiety of possibility to be able to truly make the claim that they are no longer in anxiety about finite trivialities.

Haufniensis changes tack with the warning that at the moment of the qualitative leap or the instant of formation there is the possibility that the person will be led away from faith: “If, on the point of being formed, he misunderstands the anxiety, so that it leads him not to faith but away from it, then he is lost.” This is because the anxiety of possibility is emphatically not altruistic. It is deceptive and capable of leading the individual in the wrong direction, but the individual who is already formed is not taken in by this deception. Instead anxiety, even though terrifying, leads the individual in the right direction:

On the other hand, someone who is already formed remains with anxiety; he does not allow himself to be deceived by its countless falsifications... The


118 Ibid., 192.
attacks of anxiety, even though terrifying, will then not be such that he flees from them. Anxiety becomes for him a ministering spirit that leads him...

Instead of fleeing from anxiety, the individual welcomes anxiety and allows it to expunge all trivial anxieties:

Then, when it announces itself, when it disingenuously makes it look as though it has invented an altogether new instrument of torture, far more terrible than anything before, he does not draw back, and still less does he try to ward it off with noise and confusion, but bids it welcome, greets it solemnly... Then anxiety enters into his soul and searches out everything, and frightens the finite and petty out of him.

There is a slight problem here. It is unclear how someone is “already formed” so that they would be able to welcome anxiety. There is an initial point of being formed, so at that point any person could be led toward or away from faith. Once that person is formed in faith, then they are able to handle further anxiety. Haufniensis has either overlooked this issue, or is perhaps suggesting that some people, e.g., the spiritless or the pagans are less likely to be formed in faith at the point of formation.

Haufniensis then reconsiders the issues of fate (in the pagan or immediate genius) and guilt (in the religious genius). When the individual is formed to faith anxiety does away with all petty finite anxieties, however then the individual will come to the stage of trusting in fate, but the anxiety of possibility is also capable of eradicating this shortcoming: “So when the individual, through anxiety, is formed to faith, anxiety will then eradicate what it itself produces. Anxiety discovers fate, but when the individual would entrust itself to fate, anxiety switches around


120 Ibid.
and takes fate away...”\textsuperscript{121} After fate is removed, anxiety finds all guilt related to finitude: “With faith’s help, anxiety educates the individuality to rest in providence. So too in respect of guilt, which is the second thing anxiety discovers.”\textsuperscript{122} Guilt due to dealings with the finite world are eradicated, but not the objective guilt of hereditary sin. The finite world cannot educate the individual on anxiety:

From finitude one can learn much, but not how to be anxious, except in a very mediocre and corrupting sense. Anyone who has truly learned how to be anxious, on the other hand, will tread as if in a dance when the anxieties of finitude strike up...\textsuperscript{123}

Haufniensis thus ends \textit{Concept of Anxiety}, believing he has written a psychological treatise, and that psychology cannot take the subject of anxiety any further: “Here this deliberation ends where it began. Once psychology has finished with anxiety, is to be handed over to dogmatics.”\textsuperscript{124}

In this chapter we have seen how anxiety is involved in the second synthesis of the self, i.e, of the temporal and the eternal. We first examined anxiety in the context lacking awareness of sin. This included Haufniensis’s concept of the instant, which incorporates both temporality and eternity. We saw what absence of anxiety is like as spiritlessness, and anxiety when there is fixation on finitude and fate.

We also explored the relationship between anxiety and guilt, which also involves


\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 195.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
finitude. The second context in which anxiety was analyzed was anxiety in terms of the individual’s sin. This included anxiety about evil, where one is in the good but anxious about evil, and anxiety about the good or what Haufniensis calls the demonic, where one is in evil and is anxious about the good. This involved the exposition of certitude, inwardness, and earnestness. Haufniensis’s final chapter discussed anxiety’s relationship to faith and how even though true anxiety about the infinite can be terrifying, it wipes out anxieties about finite things and finally absolves anxiety about sin.

We have completed our long sojourn through the texts of *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety*. It has hopefully raised questions about the certainty of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety in *Being and Time*, and that the putative appropriation is not so straightforward. In the final chapter of this work I will examine specific points of similarity and difference between Heidegger’s concept of anxiety and that of Kierkegaard.
Chapter VI: Similarities and Differences

How does the concept of Anxiety compare between Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety? Are they similar enough to say that Heidegger directly appropriated the concept from Kierkegaard in Being and Time? Would we agree with McCarthy’s statement that Heidegger followed Kierkegaard “step-by-step” in the development of anxiety, or would we just say that there is a striking resemblance between anxiety in the two works but that they differ enough so as to not warrant the theory that Heidegger’s concept relies solely on that of Kierkegaard? Or, have we uncovered enough evidence to show that the background contexts and “sciences” differ so much that the concept of anxiety in the two works could be called incommensurable? Is Heidegger’s dismissal of Kierkegaard’s work as merely that of an “ontic science” justified, or even relevant?

In this concluding chapter I will compare specific points about anxiety and dependent themes between Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety. As noted in the Introduction, there is a mirrored structure between Division One of Being and Time and the first two chapters of Concept of Anxiety and between Division Two and Chapters III–V of Concept of Anxiety.1 Because of this I will make my

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1 It is also noteworthy that there is similarity between the Introductions of Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety. In their Introductions, both Heidegger and Haufniensis write at length about the “science” in which their respective works should be placed.
comparisons between anxiety and related themes as they appear in Division One of *Being and Time* with Chapters I and II of *Concept of Anxiety*, and then Division Two and Chapters III–V.

The mirroring of structure between *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety* appears to be an undocumented appropriation on Heidegger’s part. I claim there is a similar structure because Division One of *Being and Time* has to do with Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and the worldhood-of-the-world. These are the more physical aspects of Dasein’s existence. This corresponds to Chapters I–III of *Concept of Anxiety* which describe the first synthesis, that is, the synthesis of body and soul through spirit. This is the more physical of the two syntheses. Division Two of *Being and Time* has to do with Dasein’s temporality, which corresponds to the second synthesis of temporal and eternal described in Chapters III–V of *Concept of Anxiety*.

**Division One and the First Synthesis**

Division One of *Being and Time* has to do with Dasein’s physical presence in and with the world of other entities including other people, equipment, and entities belonging to the background environment. The first two chapters of *Concept of Anxiety* have to do with a person’s embodiment, literally, as the soul synthesized with a physical body. This is accomplished via the “positing” of spirit.² Anxiety

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² In the first chapter of *Being and Time* Heidegger acknowledges the formulation of the “whole man” as “…customarily taken as a unity of body, soul, and spirit.” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 73–74)
occurs in both of these contexts, however there are several important differences in the concepts of anxiety in these first halves of *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety*.

Heidegger begins his study of anxiety by saying that it is a fundamental state-of-mind or mood. This is an essential attribute of anxiety. If this attribute were removed, it would not be anxiety. Does Haufniensis ever refer to anxiety as a mood? In fact, he does not. The only time mood is mentioned in *Concept of Anxiety* is in terms of the “mood” of a science, e.g. ethics, psychology, that might be the proper place for anxiety to be studied. Does Haufniensis ever portray anxiety as something like an ever-present background state? Recall that in *Being and Time* mood is how one finds oneself, or how Dasein is “attuned” to the world. For Haufniensis, anxiety is indeed always present as objective and subjective anxiety, but this is a given condition of human existence rather than a mood. Haufniensis introduces anxiety in the context of innocence and dreaming spirit. Anxiety comes on the scene when spirit is posited and the first synthesis of body-soul takes place. This seems nothing like mood or state-of-mind. For Haufniensis anxiety is initially a kind of tension that occurs when the person is beginning to become self-aware rather than a mental state that dictates how a person is attuned to the world.

Heidegger’s introduction to anxiety as a state-of-mind emphasizes Dasein’s thrownness into its world of circumstances. Haufniensis’s initial description of anxiety does not emphasize this attribute, except perhaps in the case of Adam’s being thrown into the world and facing his situation and the ambiguity of freedom.
It is interesting to consider Haufniensis’s version of Adam as “first Dasein,” i.e., as the first universal representation of self-realization. The issue with entertaining this notion is that for Haufniensis this self-realization and the anxiety connected with it is in the primordial situation of the individual’s self-realization in the face of God, literally, naked before God. Heidegger’s Dasein is never in this extreme situation as “naked” before itself or the world. Heidegger emphasizes anxiety as Dasein fleeing in the face of itself and fleeing in the face of the world. For Haufniensis the only example of fleeing we see is Adam’s naked flight and hiding from God.

So, at least at the outset, the descriptions of anxiety in *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety* are somewhat different. Heidegger’s version is a state-of-mind. Haufniensis’s version is a consequence of the synthesis of body and soul. Heidegger is focused on the phenomenon of anxiety and its effects while Haufniensis is concerned with the provenance of anxiety.

We now get to the central point that is usually cited as proof that Heidegger appropriated the concept of anxiety from Kierkegaard, i.e, that anxiety is the fear of nothing. Yes, both Heidegger and Haufniensis make this claim, however it could be contested that there are two different kinds of “nothing” here. Both Heidegger and Haufniensis distinguish anxiety from fear, with fear having a definite something as a threatening object. However, for Heidegger nothing is “nothing in particular” or indefinite, whereas for Haufniensis it is the nothing, i.e., the metaphysical nothing, the void, or the abyss of eternity.³ Both concepts of anxiety are associated with

³ This is point is emphasized more in the context of the second synthesis.
ambiguity, but we saw that the ambiguity also has different meanings\(^4\) between the two works. For Heidegger the ambiguity involved the vagueness of the “object” of anxiety, which is nothing in particular, for Haufniensis anxiety is caused by ambiguity itself. The ambiguity is the abyss of freedom which is a terrifying confusion, as it was in the case with Adam.

Another characteristic of anxiety emphasized by Haufniensis is the “sympathetic antipathy” of being simultaneously attracted and repulsed by the nothing. This attribute of anxiety is largely absent in *Being and Time*. There is a similar construction with Dasein’s attraction/repulsion to the “they,” and the repulsion exemplified in fleeing from oneself and the world, but these are not the same as sympathetic antipathy directed at the nothing. Haufniensis also emphasizes the idea of the qualitative leap, whereby one realizes the eternal and releases their grasp on the finite. While there is no “leap” for Heidegger *per se*, something resembling it occurs in Division Two in the context of Being-towards-death and the moment of vision. We will look at that similarity further below.

Heidegger emphasizes anxiety as it is related to Dasein’s being-in-the-world with other entities. Anxiety in this context has an “obstinate” character and causes entities to lose significance. Heidegger also emphasizes anxiety as uncanniness, or the feeling of not being at home in the world. These are much milder versions of similar characteristics of Haufniensis’s anxiety. For Haufniensis, the effects of anxiety are presented in a more violent form, e.g., the terror of Adam. This is

\(^4\) No pun intended.
another difference between the two versions of anxiety, at least in the first halves of these works: the degree of its intensity. For Heidegger there does not seem to be much “at stake,” to cause great anxiety. It is just a matter of Dasein’s authenticity. Dasein could go on living in the world of the “they” quite happily, it seems. Anxiety is presented as a tepid mood involving how Dasein is attuned to the world, of how the world it presented and how Dasein reacts to it. For Haufniensis, on the other hand, it is the individual’s immortal soul that is at stake! Anxiety is a torturous ordeal of the individual wrestling (in the first synthesis) with being trapped in a finite, sexual, body that causes the individual to sin and feel guilt.

Obviously one of the central differences in the two versions of anxiety is its association with sin and guilt for Haufniensis and the absence of these characteristics for Heidegger. Although, for the latter in Division Two of *Being and Time* there is again, a milder form of guilt associated with the call of conscience. For Haufniensis there is the background objective anxiety of the human race and all of creation that is the result of hereditary sin, as well as the additional subjective anxiety that arises from sin in the individual. Heidegger makes no mention of sin since he is steering clear of theological issues, but he does place great emphasis on fallenness as an existentiale, or essential existential attribute of Dasein. Even though he claims that fallenness has nothing to do with the “primal status” of Adam before the fall, Heidegger’s pervasive state of fallenness and Haufniensis’s objective sin bear more than a passing resemblance. Haufniensis introduces objective anxiety as “the eager longing of creation,” a longing for the primal status that Heidegger
denies. The longing is for the original state of perfection. There no longing like this in *Being and Time* except for Dasein’s longing to fall into the “they” world. Haufniensis’s introduction to subjective anxiety includes his famous motif of anxiety as the dizziness of freedom. This is described as the extreme vertigo of looking down into a gaping abyss. While Heidegger does talk about anxiety in terms of freedom, it is Dasein’s freedom to choose itself, is is not the freedom of leaping into the eternal. The concept of the leap in *Concept of Anxiety* does not occur explicitly in *Being and Time*, but we will leave that until we address the idea of the instant and moment of vision below. Much of Haufniensis’s description of subjective anxiety involved the anxiety of existing in a sexed body, of how anxiety is proportional to sensuousness, and his perception of the difference in this anxiety between men and women. Heidegger steers far clear of any mention of sexuality in *Being and Time*. In fact, there is very little discussion of the embodiment of Dasein at all. To reiterate, his form of anxiety in Division One of *Being and Time* has to do largely with Dasein having to cope with entities in the world and with Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself.

In the first halves of *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety* we have seen concepts of anxiety that differ in several ways. Heidegger’s concept has to do with Dasein’s existence and awareness of itself in a physical world of things and other people. Haufniensis’s concept has to do with the first moments of an individual’s formation, of existing in a sinful state in the face of God, and the sinfulfulness that is due to being a sexual creature. We have seen similarity in the common idea that
anxiety is the fear of nothing, but it is not the same “nothing” between the two. Even though anxiety differs in certain respects between the two works, functionally it is quite similar: it arises when Dasein or Kierkegaard’s individual encounters something unknown or unfamiliar. Admittedly, this unknown is much more vast and extreme for Haufniensis than it is for Heidegger, which is why the former’s version of anxiety is more violent.

The other concept related to anxiety that bears considerable resemblance between the two works is Heidegger’s fallenness and Haufniensis’s objective sin. While Heidegger denies any relationship between fallenness and the Fall, both fallenness and objective sin are given as an a priori attribute of human existence. Regardless of the “source” of the fallen state, both Heidegger and Haufniensis agree that it is a universal condition involving a “longing” for return, although the return is in opposite directions: for Heidegger it is the misplaced longing to return to the world of the “they,” while for Haufniensis it is the admirable longing to return to the primal state of perfection. Let us now see how the resemblance between the two concepts of anxiety bears out in Division Two of *Being and Time* and Chapters III-V of *Concept of Anxiety*.

**Division Two and the Second Synthesis**

Division Two of *Being and Time* has to do with Dasein’s temporality as a finite being that is aware of its own demise. The central feature of Division Two is Being-towards-death. Chapters III-V of *Concept of Anxiety* are concerned with the
second synthesis of the individual as being temporal and eternal. The main theme of these chapters is the difference between realizing the eternal or living in the finite.

Heidegger begins Division Two by introducing Dasein’s Being-toward-death and the anxiety associated with dying. His related concepts here are resoluteness, and authentic anticipation of the possibility of death. He unites the two in anticipatory resoluteness. Haufniensis does not emphasize death. As we saw, it is only mentioned as a footnote to his tenet that “temporality is sin.” For Heidegger death plays a more important role because he does not “posit” eternal spirit. Dasein’s existence is decidedly finite. For Haufniensis, the body is the finite aspect, but once spirit is realized as eternal, death takes on less significance.

An area of Dasein’s temporality emphasized by Heidegger in the context of Being-towards-death is the call of conscience and guilt. Haufniensis also talks at great length about anxiety in terms of guilt. How do the concepts of guilt and the anxiety associated with it compare between the two? Heidegger specifically separates guilt from morality. For him, guilt is an a priori condition of Dasein’s existence—not unlike Haufniensis’s objective sin. It is the “Being-the-basis of a nullity,” signaling an ontological lacking in Dasein’s existence. The call of conscience is what causes Dasein to realize guilt. Haufniensis on the other hand, has no qualms about connecting guilt to morality, for him guilt is the result of sin. Guilt is also connected with temporality. The pagan, who has no conception of the eternal, also has no true guilt. It is confusing that Haufniensis’s main discussion of guilt is in the context of one’s lacking awareness of sin. This is because the “maximum” of guilt is
not simply being guilty of sin, but is guilt about appearing to be guilty. This guilt is directed at finite appearances rather than the true guilt that is directed at the eternal. Genuine guilt occurs when one turns inward and makes the connection with the eternal.

The final area regarding anxiety in the context of temporality in *Being and Time* is the idea of repetition and the instant, and is at a point where Heidegger cites Kierkegaard. For Heidegger repetition is Dasein’s authentic repeated return to itself from its fallen state in the world of “the they.” For Haufniensis, repetition is connected to earnestness. It is the individual’s repeated return to the eternal. In Kierkegaard’s *Repetition*, he contrasts repetition with Plato’s concept of recollection. Both recollection and repetition are directed at the eternal: recollection towards the past, repetition towards the future. Repetition must be embraced in order for the individual to achieve true earnestness. Again here, we see that repetition has essentially the same function between *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety*, except that for Heidegger it is repetition in the finite temporality of one’s lifespan, whereas for Kierkegaard this limitation is removed.

Heidegger and Kierkegaard share the concept of the instant or moment of vision. Since this is a point where Heidegger does cite Kierkegaard, it is reasonable to assume from the outset their respective concepts are similar. For Heidegger the instance (*Augenblick*) is the “moment of vision,” the revelatory moment when anxiety lights up the impossibility of existence based on living with things of the world and the possibility of authentic existence based on owning up to oneself and
one’s death. For Haufniensis, the instant (Øieblicket) is also a moment of revelation on the part of the individual. In addition it is a component of the second synthesis. Just as in the first synthesis where body and soul are united through spirit, in the second synthesis the temporal and the eternal are united through the instant. It occurs in the moment of the leap when the eternal is posited or realized. Heidegger’s instant has to do with the resolute moment when Dasein realizes the possibility of owning up to itself and coming to terms with death while living in the “thingly” world. Haufniensis’s instant is the realization of eternity in the present. Both concepts have to do with an “earth moving” moment of revelation: Heidegger’s moment of vision with Dasein’s authenticity and resoluteness, Haufniensis’s instant with orienting oneself towards eternity. Both are moments of individualization.

There is one case where Heidegger and Haufniensis differ markedly with regards to anxiety and temporality. This occurs with the theme of fate. For Heidegger fate is connected to repetition and is an authentic feature in Dasein’s handing down itself from the past to itself in the present—and again to itself in the future. That is, Dasein recalls it’s authentic past and takes it up again in the present. Fate for Heidegger is a positive attribute of authentic Dasein. Fate for Haufniensis is decidedly negative: it is an attribute of the pagan, a misdirected focus on finite glories and rewards rather than on the eternal.

Another point of interest in the concepts of anxiety in the respective second halves of Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety is seen in Haufniensis’s distinction between anxiety about evil and anxiety about the good. Recall that anxiety about
evil is being in the good but worrying about evil. Anxiety about the good is the reverse, i.e., being evil (dwelling in the finite) and worrying about the good. Haufniensis spends most of his time developing the latter, anxiety about the good, what he calls the demonic. While Heidegger does not explicitly make the distinction between anxiety about evil versus anxiety about the good, his version of anxiety in Division One as fleeing is quite similar to Haufniensis’s anxiety about the good. There are also other attributes of this form of anxiety that appear in Being and Time. Chief among these is the characteristic of the “reserve” of the demoniac. This has to do with “suddenness” or abruptness of broken communication. Heidegger’s analogue is in reverse, i.e., the “sudden” call of conscience that discloses Dasein and pulls it out of fallenness. If there were a direct analogue to the call of conscience in Concept of Anxiety, it would call the demoniac out of his reserved state. This is essentially the function of the true form of anxiety that occurs in faith.

Haufniensis’s final chapter on faith focuses on the “right” way to be in anxiety. It offers the solution of the eternal that alleviates the finite anxieties he presented in Chapters III and IV. The solution of faith shares attributes with Heidegger’s concept of anticipatory resoluteness especially with the common attribute of great joy associated with anticipatory resoluteness and with faith. Again, faith involves the eternal, while anticipatory resoluteness is a kind of finite “faith” in the possibility of authentically and resolutely facing one’s death.

As we saw in the first halves of their works, in Division Two of Being and Time and Chapters III-V of Concept of Anxiety we again see that anxiety is
functionally similar, but differs on several points. Again the similarity stems from facing a great unknown. For Heidegger it is a more “definite” and final unknown, i.e., Dasein facing up to its death. For Haufniensis it is again a more vast unknown: the individual facing up to the eternal. The main difference here in the two concepts thus involves temporality. Heidegger’s anxiety concerns the finite temporality of Dasein existence which inevitably ends in death. Kierkegaard’s discusses this kind of anxiety but dismisses it as as pagan because it does not realize the eternal. Again, as in the first halves of their respective works there are related themes that share similarities such as the very close resemblance of repetition between the two works as well as the nearly identical instant or moment of vision. There is also similarity seen between anticipatory resoluteness in *Being and Time* and faith in *Concept of Anxiety*.

## Conclusion

Now that we have reached the end of our exploration of anxiety and related concepts in *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety*, we return to the question raised in the Introduction to this work: did Heidegger appropriate Kierkegaard’s ideas, especially anxiety and related concepts in *Being and Time* without due acknowledgement? After all our considerations, the answer is a qualified “Yes.” It is clear that Heidegger not only appropriated certain functional elements of anxiety from Kierkegaard, but he also mirrored the general structure of its development in...
Concept of Anxiety in *Being and Time*. This similarity in structure between the two works is what I claim to be the most apparent “missed appropriation.”

Why do I qualify my answer concerning the appropriation of anxiety and related concepts? The qualification has to do with the larger contexts in which anxiety is presented in the two works. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger is endeavoring to get at the nature of Being in general by examining the phenomenon of finite human existence in a world of finite things and other finite human beings. He brackets out any consideration of the theological and the eternal. He does this because these are not things we can experience ontically. On the other hand, Kierkegaard as the pseudonym Haufniensis describes human existence without questioning Christian dogmatics. Haufniensis is concerned with existence in terms of the temporality, or rather the non-temporality, of the eternal. His description of existence relies heavily on two categories that are absent in *Being and Time*, namely spirit and eternity. These are components of the two syntheses: spirit is “posited” in the “traditional” synthesis of body and soul, while eternity is the predominate member of the temporal-eternal synthesis. Both syntheses involve “non-ontic” elements, namely soul (and spirit) in the first synthesis and eternity in the second.

Anxiety has been suggested as the key point of connection between Heidegger and Kierkegaard by commentators such as Magurshak and McCarthy. Magurshak suggests that anxiety is a starting point for exploring the Heidegger/Kierkegaard connection since it is behind nearly every major theme in *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety*. McCarthy is much more forceful in claiming that Heidegger
followed Kierkegaard “nearly every step-of-the way” in the development of the concept of anxiety. I agree with the former but not the latter, since there is evidence supporting the fact the some aspects of anxiety differ between *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety*. As we have seen, for Heidegger anxiety is a state-of-mind that affects how one interacts with the world and other beings as well as how one faces self-awareness and death. For Kierkegaard anxiety stems from the sexual nature of the body as well as the individual’s facing the freedom of the eternal. Heidegger’s version of anxiety is quite mild relative to Kierkegaard’s which can be terrifying and torturous. Both Heidegger and Kierkegaard agree that there is a “right” way to be in anxiety. This proper form of anxiety for Heidegger leads Dasein to resolutely own up to itself and face death. The true form of anxiety for Kierkegaard is the anxiety of facing eternity which will lead to saving through faith and release the individual from all finite concerns.

Is one version of this kind of true anxiety “better” than the other? What about the commensurability issue? Can the two concepts be compared if Heidegger’s version never escapes the realm of the finite while Kierkegaard’s is focused on the eternal? Heidegger discredits Kierkegaard for operating in the metaphysical realm that cannot be ontically verified. Kierkegaard’s purpose is to show the importance of realizing the eternal and let all anxiety stem from that source. For him the finite world and finite body can indeed cause anxiety, but it is not the true anxiety of the eternal. Kierkegaard would almost certainly classify Heidegger’s approach as pagan, since it has no conception of the eternal. Perhaps the question of whether
one version of anxiety is better than the other should be formulated as whether one of these forms is actually possible and/or sustainable? It seems nearly impossible in either case to keep up the vigilance required to live a life of complete authenticity or to always be focused on the eternal. Both Heidegger and Kierkegaard allow that the individual will fall back into either the “they” world or into the wrong kind of finite anxieties. Both have the concept of repetition whereby the individual returns to reclaim authenticity or the eternal. The true form of anxiety for both Heidegger and Kierkegaard has a similar function: it holds the person to what they “ought” to do in terms of facing up to either their finitude in the case of Heidegger or facing the eternal in the case of Kierkegaard. Heidegger’s form of true anxiety could be construed as a secularized form of Kierkegaard’s, however it may be more accurate to say that Heidegger’s form is a finitized form of Kierkegaard’s anxiety.

Is Heidegger’s criticism of Kierkegaard’s work as being merely that of an ontic science justified? Yes, according to both of their definitions of science in their respective Introductions. I do not think Kierkegaard would object to this criticism. However, in my opinion Kierkegaard crosses the boundary of the science he calls psychology when he posits the eternal in the second synthesis. At that point his analysis is no longer merely a “psychological deliberation.” Because he analyses anxiety in terms of the eternal, his analysis “transcends” that of Heidegger. Apparently Kierkegaard takes for granted that human beings do have an “ontic” experience of the eternal whereas Heidegger does not. This is apparent in his statement, “Every human life is religiously arranged. Wanting to deny this confuses
everything and cancels the concepts of individuality, race, and immortality.”\footnote{Kierkegaard, \textit{The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin}, 127.} While we cannot go into an explanation of this statement at this point, we will equate “religiously arranged” with realization of the eternal. Kierkegaard sees this as an \textit{a priori} condition of existence, but Heidegger denies it because he believes it is not ontically verifiable. Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety takes the extra step of examining it in terms of the eternal, whereas Heidegger’s analysis “ends” with Dasein’s death.

Why did Heidegger appropriate anxiety and related themes without due credit to Kierkegaard? As we saw in Chapter 1 of this work, it is clear that Heidegger was conflicted regarding his identity as a theologian or as a philosopher. He preferred to be identified as a philosopher, but he felt he was being perceived as a theologian. Heidegger was exposed to Kierkegaard early on in his teaching career and was greatly interested in the latter’s ideas, however when Kierkegaard’s thought became faddish at Freiburg and Marburg and Heidegger was inundated with lackluster students who wanted to study Kierkegaard with him, he tried to disassociate himself from Kierkegaard. It is not terribly surprising that he would “accidentally” omit references to Kierkegaard in \textit{Being and Time}. Even though he duly references Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, and Nietzsche, among others, his lack of adequate references to Kierkegaard can be attributed to the situation described above. He was trying to distance himself from Kierkegaard
in order to avoid being labelled a theologian, and also to avoid association with what he thought to be an inferior area of scholarship. It is not controversial to say that Heidegger’s character was flawed. Apparently he could not live up to his own standard of authenticity. His omission of suitable credit to Kierkegaard is perhaps another sign of this failing, indeed it can be seen as Heidegger’s “falling” into the world of the “they.”

Before ending this work it is worth reconsidering the first two words of its title, “Missed Appropriations.” In the Introduction I suggested that there are two senses to this phrase, the first being that there were appropriations made by Heidegger from Kierkegaard that have been missed by the Heidegger/Kierkegaard scholarship, and the second that Heidegger “missed” certain key aspects of Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety that leave the former’s version lacking in some way. We have certainly seen enough evidence to support the first sense, especially with regards to the strikingly similar structure by which anxiety is developed in the two halves of Concept of Anxiety and Being and Time respectively. This significant appropriation is something that has been “missed” in the Heidegger/Kierkegaard scholarship to date. In support of the second sense of missed appropriations, we have also seen ample evidence that there are additional aspects of Kierkegaard’s version of anxiety that Heidegger overlooked, either intentionally or accidentally. Kierkegaard’s version goes farther in analyzing anxiety in terms of human embodiment and human existence in the face of the eternal. His version fully embraces the “terror” of anxiety whereas Heidegger’s version plays down or even fails to mention this
extreme. Hopefully we have seen enough in the close examination of the texts of *Being and Time* and *Concept of Anxiety* to quiet those who say that Heidegger’s concept of anxiety and related themes are practically identical. We have also seen enough evidence to show those who claim that there was only a passing resemblance in anxiety between the two works to be incorrect. As far as "freeing" Kierkegaard from Heidegger, it has been shown that Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety is the more complete of the two and has several significant aspects that go further and are outside of Heidegger’s analysis. This should aid in seeing the strength of Kierkegaard’s analysis as standing on its own. Regardless, under any consideration, it would have been better for Heidegger and for subsequent Heidegger and Kierkegaard scholarship if Heidegger had been more forthcoming in his acknowledgement of Kierkegaard’s influence in *Being and Time*. 
Bibliography


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