China's Lost Face and the Two Koreas: The Effects of Culture and Identity on Chinese Foreign Policy

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China’s Lost Face and the Two Koreas:
The Effects of Culture and Identity on Chinese Foreign Policy

A Dissertation
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the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
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by
Kang Kyu Lee
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Advisor: Dr. Suisheng Zhao
Abstract

This dissertation explores the question of why China responded particularly harshly to pro-U.S. military actions taken by South Korea, when this nation was identified as a friend to China, while responding less harshly to similar pro-U.S. military actions taken by Japan, who was not identified as a friend. My argument is that these divergent responses were caused by China’s different expectations, according to whether different nations had a perceived identity as a friend or a rival. China’s behaviors are essentially based on its own proclaimed identity and on the perceived identities of others. China has advanced the proclaimed identity of a “responsible great power” since the 1990s. Also, China has had the perceived identity of being friends to both North Korea from the beginning of its establishment, and South Korea through the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1992, whereas it has not perceived Japan as being a friend. The identity of friends can be measured by social bonds, social contacts, and expression of intimacy by words and behaviors. In responding to the actions of states identified as friends, Chinese face culture influenced the Chinese political elite to experience frustration and humiliation by the actions unexpectedly taken by its South Korean friend, leading them to adopt harsh responses and excessive retaliation. Relatedly, Chinese face culture shapes China’s reactions to others through three dynamics of seeking, saving, and losing face. In particular, China becomes furious and retaliates when it is humiliated and frustrated by losing face by the actions of its friends.
These arguments are tested through three case studies of Sino-North Korean relations, Sino-South Korean relations, and Sino-Japanese relations. These cases are, respectively: North Korea’s Taepodong-2 missile launch and first nuclear test in 2006, South Korea’s decision to allow the United States to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) around 2016, and Japan’s decision to deploy two U.S. X-band radars in 2005 and 2014. Multiple sources are relied on in these case studies, including several memoirs by diplomats and reporters. Two main resources are used throughout the case studies: official remarks by spokespersons from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China at their regular press conferences (2001-2018), and the database of the People’s Daily (1946-2019) (the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China). My findings from these three cases support the argument that identity and Chinese face culture shape state actions, while rejecting the possible counterargument that national interests primarily shape state actions.
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Chapter One

Introduction

As China has been rising to a great power, many states have become more interested in understanding how China thinks and how it behaves in the international arena. In particular, South Korea, who is the closest neighbor to China, has been very concerned about China’s policy toward North Korea and South Korea because it is one of the most important variables influencing security on the Korean Peninsula. ¹ However, South Korean leaders have failed to develop a clear understanding of China’s behaviors, despite almost thirty years of relations with China after diplomatic normalization in 1992, because the People’s Republic of China has sometimes behaved unexpectedly in its relations with neighboring countries. For example, no one could expect that China would cut off oil supply to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in response to North Korean provocations with the launch of the Taepodong-2 missile and its first nuclear test in 2006. China took an extremely harsh measure of cutting off oil to its long and close friend. More recently, in 2016, China launched unexpected and harsh economic attacks against the Republic of Korea in retaliation for its decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in its territory.

¹ Hereafter, the People’s Republic of China is referred to as PRC or China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is referred to as DPRK or North Korea, and the Republic of Korea is referred to as ROK or South Korea.
In contrast to these harsh responses, China did nothing but express discontent against Japan when it introduced an additional radar of THAAD in 2014. Why did China respond particularly harshly to the actions taken by the countries who were identified as friends to China, while offering a less harsh response to the similar action taken by a country who was not identified as a friend? This study firstly aims to explain these inconsistent behaviors of China. In so doing, the study ultimately seeks to provide new insight for understanding Sino-South Korean relations, and Sino-North Korean relations, both of which are significant to understand in order for South Korea to establish a strategy for security and peace on the Korean Peninsula. My argument is that China’s diverging behaviors are caused by the identities of other nations as perceived by China and that these behaviors are strongly influenced by Chinese face culture. In other words, unexpected action by a state that China believes to be a friend leads to humiliation and fury from losing face, and causes excessive retaliation.

**China’s Puzzling Behaviors**

When former South Korea President Park Geun-hye took in office in 2013, she began to pursue pro-Chinese policy compared with her predecessor, President Lee Myung-bak, who was well-known for his strong pro-American policy. China welcomed the shift in policy and eulogized the relationship between two states as the best period in history. The peak of this “best relationship” was President Park’s participation in China’s military parade on September 3, 2015, which was held to celebrate the 70th anniversary of

---

2 Japan had deployed its first THAAD radar in 2006.

3 The surnames have been written first for all Chinese, Korean, and Japanese individuals mentioned in this dissertation.
the victory over imperial Japan. In this event, President Park’s position on the platform was very close to Chinese President Xi Jinping, as well as during the photo session. China clearly perceived South Korea as a close friend. However, this intimacy did not last long. One year later, China began to retaliate strongly against South Korea, economically and politically, in response to South Korean’s decision to deploy the THAAD system. China argued that the THAAD system, especially its X-band radar, gravely infringes on Chinese core national interests by posing a threat to its security.

When Japan introduced the same radars in 2006 and 2014, however, China did not launch any retaliation against Japan. China only expressed its grave concerns one time over Japan’s second THAAD radar in 2014. The reason China gave for its more fierce retaliation against South Korea’s THAAD deployment was that the South Korean radar could monitor and detect China’s territory, including sensitive missile facilities. The radars in Japan have a longer detection range that those in South Korea, however. Thus, Japan’s THAAD system could be a more serious threat to China. Furthermore, China had no reason to be afraid of any aftermath for retaliation against Japan. In 2010, for example, China had retaliated against Japan without negative repercussions for a territorial conflict by banning export of rare earth metals to Japan that were indispensable for making high-tech products.

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4 When attending a South Korean conference, Yang Wenchang, retired Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, and Yan Xuetong, one of the most influential scholars in Chinese foreign policy, asserted that Sino-South Korean relations were much more important than Sino-North Korean relations because the former was a strategic cooperative partnership whereas the latter were only normal inter-state relationships (Han 2009, 2).
China often attacks other states on the ground of protecting its core interests.\(^5\) When French President Sarkozy met with the 14th Dalai Lama in 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao removed France from the countries visiting during his “journey of confidence” in 2009 and China canceled the contract to purchase 150 Airbus planes from France. Similarly, China canceled many investment plans in the U.K. when the U.K. treated the Dalai Lama as an honored guest in 2012.\(^6\) For Norway, China imposed a ban on the import of Norwegian salmon when Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010. Given these precedents, China’s lack of retaliatory action against Japan for the THAAD radars was unexpected.

**Table 1.1 Puzzling at a Glance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>The South Korean Case</th>
<th>The Japanese Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to China</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Rival (or potential enemy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>The deployment of the THAAD system (esp. X-band radar)</td>
<td>The deployment of the X-band radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Excessive retaliation by China</td>
<td>No retaliation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^5\) There is a controversy over the definition of Chinese core interests among scholars, politicians, and policymakers. According to Dai Bingguo, the Chinese state councilor in 2009 who is responsible for Chinese foreign policy, Chinese core interests include three components: “1) preserving China’s basic state system and national security; 2) national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and 3) the continued stable development of China’s economy and society” (Swaine 2011, 4). For details of the controversy, see Zeng, Xiao & Breslin (2015).

\(^6\) Chinese leaders think that meetings between foreign leaders and the Dalai Lama and support for dissidents who are against the Chinese Communist Party infringe on China’s core interests (Swaine 2011, 2).
China’s puzzling behavior leads to the question that this dissertation explores: what factor produced these mixed results which stemmed from similar security concerns regarding the THAAD system? My answer to this question is identity, especially the perceived identity of friend or non-friend, and culture, especially Chinese face culture. My argument is as follows: because China believed South Korea was its close friend, it expected that South Korea would respect China and would listen to its demand not to deploy the THAAD system. When the outcome was contrary to China’s expectations, Chinese leaders felt that the country had lost face because its friend did not demonstrate respect. This feeling of humiliation and then fury led to harsh retaliations against South Korea.

Any Insight from Existing Studies?

In addition to testing my argument regarding China’s behavior based on identity and culture, this research has another goal. This dissertation seeks to provide a new perspective in understanding China’s behaviors in the relationship between China and South Korea, which has been a subject of relative neglect in the academic community. Given these two goals of this dissertation, three groups of research studies are worthy of review: studies on Chinese policy toward South Korea, studies on Chinese identity and foreign policy, and studies on Chinese face culture and foreign policy.

Studies on Chinese Policy toward South Korea

Contrary to the numerous studies on relations between China and North Korea, the relationship between China and South Korea has not been a favorite topic among scholars. In particular, there are very few studies on this matter in the Western
International Relations community. The topic is mainly examined by some Korean scholars and Chinese scholars.

There are three streams of studies on Chinese policy toward South Korea. The first stream is to examine relations between China and South Korea from the historical approach (Chung 2007; Lee 2010; Jin & Jun 2012; Ye 2017). These studies focus on the reasons why relations between China and South Korea face difficulties in upgrading to a much closer relationship. Even though they take note of the remarkable development in warming relations, especially economic relations, between the two countries since the normalization of diplomatic relation in 1992, they diagnose that Sino-Korea relations face continuing and serious obstacles. According to many of these studies, North Korean issues and the South Korea-U.S. alliance are the main challenges to warming relations between China and South Korea, from the Chinese perspective (Lee 2010; Jin & Jun 2012).

The second stream of studies is to view the Korean Peninsula as a whole without dividing it into North Korea and South Korea. Studies in this stream mainly emphasize the significance of the Korean Peninsula to China in terms of national security (Nathan & Scobell 2012; Yu, Ren & Wang 2016). For example, the Korean Peninsula is often regarded as “a dagger aimed at the heart” of both China and Japan because the Peninsula can be used as a channel for an attack on either of them by the other power, or by a third power such as the U.S. (Nathan & Scobell 2012, 126). In this vein, the Korean Peninsula is seen as a cordon sanitaire to prevent Japanese expansionism into the continent (Kim 2006, 7). Furthermore, China’s Korean Peninsula policy as a whole can be a good example through which to explore continuity and changes in Chinese foreign policy.
because the peninsula is very important throughout China’s history, and continues to shape China’s global strategy (Yu, Ren, and Wang 2016: 17-18).

The third stream of studies is to understand China’s policy toward South Korea in regards to the U.S. factor (Zhao 2004c; Chung 2007; Snyder 2009; Friedberg 2012; Harding 2013). For example, Snyder (2009) argues that China’s attempts to utilize economic instruments as political leverage to induce specific outcomes in its relations with South Korea have generally not been successful because South Korea does not want to forgo the security benefits of the alliance with the U.S. This stream of research assumes that Sino-South Korean relations are a dependent variable shaped largely by the relationship between the U.S. and China, and the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea.

Existing studies on the Chinese policy toward South Korea have limitations. First, research on Sino-South Korean relations lacks adequate theoretical foundations, because it is heavily focused on the history and specific developments in the relationship between the two countries, and not on developing a theoretical framework to better understand this relationship. Second, studies of the Korean Peninsula put more emphasis on North Korea rather than on South Korea because their subjects often involve North Korean provocations, the reunification of the two Koreas, and the effect of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. Last, the research focusing on the impact of the U.S. presence makes study of China’s policy toward South Korea to be futile. If the U.S. factor determines China’s behavior towards South Korea, Chinese perceptions of South Korea itself cannot be a significant variable in shaping Chinese policy.
Studieds on Chinese Identity and Foreign Policy

As many scholars pay attention to the matter of identity in International Relations and foreign policy study, research that explores identity as a factor shaping China’s behavior has also been recently emerging. According to Shambaugh, studies on China’s identity can be categorized into Nativists, Realism, Major Powers, Asia First, Global South, Selective Multilateralism, and Globalism (Shambaugh 2013, 26-44). For example, Nativists believe that China has a uniqueness in forming its identity in terms of ideological, temporal, sectoral, vertical, horizontal, and intensity dimensions (Rozman 2012). On the other hand, Boon (2018)’s recent study of China’s global identity is related to the major powers approach.

South Korean China watchers have paid more attention to the relations between China’s identity and North Korean nuclear crises. For example, Kim (2004) analyzes China’s different attitudes toward the first and second North Korean nuclear tests in terms of China’s changed identity. Even though she has an accurate observation that China showed different attitudes without fundamental changes in its national interests, she only deals with China’s changed identity from the perspective of a revisionist state acting against the existing international order that did not allow China as a “responsible great power” to play an active role in mediating the North Korean crisis within international society (Kim 2004). Lee (2013) also takes note of China’s identity. Similar to Kim (2004), he explores the different reactions of China during the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis. He argues that China engaged in passive and ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy in the first crisis while choosing more proactive and ‘stage-managing’
diplomacy in the second crisis. He concludes that this difference was caused not by external interest calculus but by internal changes within China’s identity (Lee 2013).

This stream of studies focuses on how China’s identity is formed or changed, and thus on how China’s identity influences its behavior. In this respect, they can help to find an answer to questions investigated by this dissertation. However, they are not sufficient to explain China’s puzzling behaviors investigated by this dissertation. Most studies employing an identity framework only examine how China’s own proclaimed identity should be understood, rather than on how China perceives other states’ identities. State identity and national interests are socially constructed (Wendt 1999). If this is the case, other states’ identities, as perceived and understood by China, can be changed by social construction and can influence Chinese foreign policy.

**Studies on Chinese Face Culture and Foreign Policy**

Scholars who want to explain Chinese foreign policy by its culture often rely on a view of Chinese exceptionalism, Chinese nationalism, Chinese traditional values, or such ideologies as Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism (Lai 2012, 191). Similarly, although there are not many works taking note of Chinese face culture in foreign policy, some scholars do argue along these lines. For example, Huang & Bedford (2009), Nathan & Scobell (2012), and Ho (2016) all believe that Chinese face is uniquely influential in Chinese society, and important in explaining Chinese behaviors with other nations. In addition, Gries (2004) explains Chinese nationalism, and its influence on foreign policy, with reference to face culture. He believes face culture is a significant component of contemporary Chinese nationalism in that face culture helps to explain the interplay of reason and passion that is essential to nationalism and the way in which Chinese national
identity is reshaped by international pressure (Gries 2004, 23-25). Other researchers also understand Chinese face culture as shaping Chinese pursuit of prestige in relations with other states. For instance, China has made efforts to be treated as a global power in the international community (Cheng & Ngok 2004; Hooghe 2005; Brady 2015). Although it does not always result in any practical gains, China often takes actions to save face in the international community (Amako 2014).

Many works on Chinese face culture and on foreign policy are useful in providing insights and theoretical groundwork for the research question of this study. Nevertheless, they are insufficient to explain the puzzle of the dissertation. First, most of them focus on how Chinese culture is extraordinary rather than on how this culture works to shape foreign policy. Second, these studies often seem to confuse the goal of Chinese behavior and the cause of it when they use face to explain Chinese behaviors.

**A New Approach to Identity and Culture**

According to Jeffrey W. Knof (2006), a literature review has three purposes: “A literature review can be an end in and of itself; it can be a preliminary stage in larger research project; and it can be a component of a finished research report” (127). When it comes to the first purpose, researchers often simply want to ascertain the current “state of the art” on a particular subject or problem. On the other hand, researchers also want to make sure that their proposed research questions have not already been answered by others. This goal is related to the second purpose of a literature review. Finally, researchers might want to show how their final conclusions relate to prior knowledge regarding the subject (Knof 2006, 127-128).
Given those purposes of a literature review, reviewing the literature on China’s policy toward South Korea, on identity and Chinese foreign policy, and on Chinese face culture and foreign policy, leads to the conclusion that no existing research can clearly explain the reason why China responded aggressively to its friend, South Korea, whereas no aggressive response was offered to its non-friend, Japan, when China responded to the same issue of deployment of a THAAD system in these two countries. In common sense, it is more reasonable for someone to treat a friend less aggressively, and treat a non-friend more coercively, when he is furious at their actions. However, China showed the exact opposite behaviors.

To address this puzzle, additional attention must be paid to the concept of identity and how it shapes foreign relations. It may be that China behaved differently towards the two nations because South Korea a friend and Japan was not a friend, from the Chinese perspective. In other words, China perceived South Korea as a friend and therefore believed South Korea also perceived China as a friend, and would treat China as such. On the contrary, China perceived Japan as a non-friend and believed Japan also perceived China as a non-friend and would treat China as such. If this is the case, China could surmise that Japan’s deployment of the THAAD radar against China’s wish was understandable, because Japan was not a friend to China, while China could not understand South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD against China’s demand, because South Korea was perceived to be a friend to China. Thus, China’s divergent responses towards South Korea and Japan, in which greater anger was shown towards South Korea, could understandably flow from these understandings of national identity, from the Chinese perspective.
Identity matters in various relations. For example, when a sushi chef is holding a sashimi knife, a customer is expected to have delicious foods served up, but when a gangster is holding a sashimi knife, the customer probably feels threatened. These differing understandings of identity influence the customer in deciding how to respond. When faced with a knife, he asks the chef what sashimi is the best of the day, or he runs away from the gangster as fast as he can. But what if the sushi chef and the gangster are the same person who is working at the sushi bar during the day and for the gang at night? The customer might have a different response according to the perceived identity of the sushi chef/gangster, based on the place where the customer meets him--at the sushi bar or on the dark street.

The same dynamic is true of inter-state relations. Constructivist Alexander Wendt gives examples of different countries’ varying understanding of United States military power, and differing understandings of the meaning of nuclear weapons possession by the United Kingdom versus the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Even though Canada and Cuba are located next to the U.S., U.S. military power had a very different meaning for Canada than for Cuba (Wendt 1992, 397; 1999, 25). Moreover, 500 nuclear weapons in the possession of the U.K versus five weapons in North Korea have a very different significance to the U.S. (Wendt 1995, 73).

Furthermore, changes in state identity affect not only a state’s foreign policy but also the policy of other states toward it. For instance, in 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to unleash “fire and fury” against North Korea if it endangered the U.S., in the midst of a discussion regarding the horror of nuclear bombs (Baker and Choe 2017). Just one year later, however, President Trump said that he fell in love with North
Korean leader Kim Jong-un because of Kim’s beautiful letters (Rodrigo 2018). All of a sudden, fury changed into love, and the U.S. military-threatening policy toward North Korea changed into negotiating policy through talks.7

Given these examples of state identity and how it shapes foreign relations, two questions should be examined: (1) Did China have the identity of “friend” in its understanding of South Korea and the identity of “non-friend” in its approach to Japan? (2) Did China perceive a changed identity of South Korea from friend to non-friend when China retaliated against South Korea? If China did not have those differing perceived identities in their approach to South Korea and Japan, my argument should be rejected from the beginning. Moreover, if South Korea’s or Japan’s identity vis-a-vis China had changed from friend to non-friend or vice versa following the THAAD deployment, the distinction between friend or non-friend would be meaningless.

Regarding the first question, to explain the matter of identity in shaping relations between China and South Korea, and between China and Japan, I propose two types of identities: proclaimed identity, which is an identity asserted by a state itself, and perceived identity, which is how a state’s identity is understood by others. Proclaimed identity is very important to understanding the influence of Chinese face culture. Perceived identity, in this dissertation, is mostly the phenomenon of whether a nation perceives another nation as a friend or non-friend. To explore the extent to which one

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7 Of course, this changed dynamic alone might not be the evidence of North Korea’s changed identity to the U.S., because many Americans still saw North Korea differently according to the survey by YouGov, which showed that almost half of respondents considered North Korea as the enemy (Frankovic 2018). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the rate of perceiving North Korea as an enemy was diminished from previous years and there was evidence of increased support for Trump’s handling of North Korea as a possible ally or even friend.
nation perceives another with the identity of friend, three measurements will be used: social bonds, social exchanges, and expressions of intimacy.

Regarding the second question—Did China perceive a changed identity of South Korea from friend to a non-friend when China retaliated against South Korea?—the answer may more likely be that China became furious when it faced the situation where its friend did something against its expectation. When someone feels betrayed by a close friend, he might be angry or disappointed. Similarly, when China felt betrayed by its friend, South Korea, it may have felt anger and outrage. Therefore, China launched massive and excessive retaliation with its fury. The retaliation was so excessive that it seemed like an attack on an enemy. If China was simply disappointed in their South Korean friend, it might not have retaliated against South Korea in such strong fashion. What caused China’s fury and retaliation, rather than simply being disappointed? My argument for this second point is that Chinese face culture promotes fury rather than soft expressions of disappointment, when Chinese leaders feel disrespected by a close friend, and eventually this fury translates into harsh actions.

Three dynamics of Chinese face culture are developed in the dissertation to explain the mechanism that converts fury into retaliation. They are seeking face, saving face, and losing face. These three dynamics are closely intertwined one another. The dynamic of seeking face is to actively make its own image in relations with others. It is related to the proclaimed identity of the Chinese state as a great state that should not be disrespected by its friends. The dynamic of saving face is a defensive mechanism to avoid losing face. When seeking face confronts a negative situation, the dynamic changes into saving face. When saving face fails, it leads to losing face. When one’s face is lost,
an actor may attempt to restore face in two ways: seeking another face and/or retaliation to overcome frustration and humiliation.

**Figure 1.1 Variables of the Study**

As seen in Figure 1.1, the independent variable in this study is identity and culture. Culture here does not refer to a specific aspect of culture, such as Chinese face culture. Rather, this dissertation refers to culture as a whole, in the context of how it shapes and constructs overall national identity and perceptions of other nations’ identities. The dependent variable is Chinese foreign policy, especially China’s policy toward South Korea, North Korea, and Japan. Separate from these variables, Chinese face culture is a moderating variable that affects the way the independent variable of identity shapes foreign policy.

Three control variables in this study are the effect of the U.S. presence, inter-Korean relations, and North Korea-Japan relations. They are controlled in the case studies to facilitate focused examination of the operation of identity and Chinese face culture, because the THAAD issue is so closely intertwined with the U.S. and with inter-Korean and North Korea-Japan relations. The arguments of this dissertation will be tested by three case studies: the South Korean THAAD case, the Japanese radar case, and the
2006 North Korean provocative case. The North Korean case will be examined to test the argument by comparing it to the South Korean case.\textsuperscript{8}

**Plan of the Dissertation**

In the following chapters, I explore the mechanism that may explain China’s conflicting behaviors in response to issues that have taken place in the Sino-North Korean, Sino-South Korean, and Sino-Japanese relationship over the past years. Chapter two examines the methodology of the dissertation. First, it discusses the method of case studies as a qualitative approach in social science and political science. Some techniques for case studies are introduced, including process-tracing, historical analysis, and content analysis. These are the main methods employed in the dissertation. In the end, this chapter briefly introduces the cases to be examined in chapters five, six, and seven, and describes a mixed system methodological approach that will include most similar and most different systems design. Lastly, this chapter describes the resources available for completion of these case studies.

Chapter three explores the theoretical foundations for exploring the effects of identity on foreign policy. In particular, the chapter examines two types of identities, proclaimed and perceived ones, and explains how these identities might shape Chinese foreign policy toward the two Koreas and Japan. Furthermore, it suggests three measurements to verify the identity of friend, which are social bonds, social contacts, and friendly expressions. Based on these theoretical foundations, this chapter explores the

\textsuperscript{8} For the case selection including the reason to add the North Korean case, it will be explained in the Chapter 2 in terms of methodology.
brief history of Sino-North Korean relations, Sino-South Korean relations, and Sino-Japanese relations, and develops the propositions that will be tested with the case studies in later chapters. Chapter three also discusses the mainstream realist approach, including an overview of its limitations in developing understanding of some state behaviors. The realist approach serves as the counterargument to my argument regarding the influence of culture and identity on foreign policy, and this realist approach will be tested as a null hypothesis.

Chapter four delves into the effect of culture on foreign policy by focusing on Chinese political culture, especially its culture of saving face. By tracing the long tradition of Chinese culture, this chapter explores the psychological underpinnings of China’s behavior. The main theme of this chapter is how the culture of face shapes Chinese people and society, and influences decision-making at the state level. This chapter examines three dynamics of Chinese face culture: seeking face, saving face, and losing face. Drawing from observations regarding the 2000 Garlic War between China and South Korea, and the second nuclear crisis prompted by North Korean nuclear weapons development in the early 2000s, this chapter elaborates a hypothesis regarding the effect of Chinese face culture on its foreign policy.

Chapters five, six, and seven are the case studies. Three cases studies of Sino-North Korean relations, Sino-South Korean relations, and Sino-Japanese relations are covered, respectively, in these chapters. Utilizing the mixed system approach, the pair

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9 Considering the purpose to address the puzzle from the South Korean case and the Japanese case, it might be better to explore the Japanese case first in chapter 5. Although the inter-Korean relations and North Korea-Japan relations are controlled, however, the 2006 North Korean case had the effect on the
of the South Korean case and the North Korean case serve as a most different design, while the pair of the South Korean case and the Japanese case serves as the most similar design. The focus of these case studies is to test the hypotheses produced by the theoretical discussions in chapters three and four. For data, these chapters draw largely upon remarks by Chinese foreign ministry spokespersons at their regular press conferences, and articles from the *People's Daily*, which is China’s largest newspaper and the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.

Chapter five deals with China’s changed position towards North Korea following North Korea’s Taeopodong-2 missile launch and first nuclear test in 2006. Contrary to its reaction during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China played a proactive role in tackling the issues raised by these North Korean actions. A process-tracing method, supplemented by historical and content analysis, shows how China’s proclaimed identity of a responsible great power operated to shape its actions, and shows how dynamics of Chinese face culture led to China’s retaliation against its longtime friend.

Chapter six covers China’s fury against South Korea in response to South Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD system in 2016. By using process-tracing and content analysis, this chapter examines the remarkable change in the relationship between China and South Korea, with South Korean moving from close friend to nearly non-friend status in just one year. Chapter seven briefly touches on Japan’s introduction of radars that are deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea and Japan, directly or indirectly. Thus, I will examine the North Korean case before other two cases.
integral to the THAAD system. It describes China’s relatively lukewarm response to this decision and subsequent radar installation.

Chapters five, six and seven have a similar structure that consists of recounting the historical background and developments of the events, together with analysis regarding the effect of China’s losing face as these events unfolded. The analysis section of each chapter includes verification of the identity hypothesis (including the influence of Chinese face culture), as well as analysis of the null hypotheses, which is the mainstream realist hypothesis and its focus on Chinese national core interests.

Chapter eight is the conclusion. Based on findings from the previous chapters, it summarizes the results of the analysis. Also, this chapter summarizes the contribution of the dissertation in terms of theory, empirical insights, and policy recommendations. Lastly, it points out some limitations of the dissertation and provides suggestions for future study.
Chapter Two

Methodology

Because the dissertation delves into the possible identity-based and cultural roots of China’s arguably capricious behaviors—which are unexpectedly harsh towards nations perceived as friends to China, and less harsh towards nations perceived as unfriendly to China—a qualitative approach, particularly a case study research method, is adopted.

Case study research is one of the most frequently used and preferred research methods in social science (George & Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; Levy 2008; Yin 2014). Though various research methodologies exist to deepen scholarly understanding of meanings and causal relationships (Box-Steppensmeier, Brady & Collier 2008, 29), the case study method is thriving among many scholars today. The movement towards the the detailed case study approach is driven by dissatisfaction with alternative “cross-case” methods of exploring many variables across multiple cases that may in the end only be loosely related and cannot accurately contextualized or explained through regression analysis, or other such cross-case “scientific” approaches.

The case-study approach is also increasingly popular due to the development of a

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10 Even though some people seem to use terms ‘methodology’ and ‘method’ without a strict distinction (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004; Levy 2008), some argue that those two terms should be distinguished. For example, Kenneth N. Waltz emphasizes that “[m]ost students of international politics have not observed ‘due process of inquiry’…They have been much concerned with methods and little concerned with the logic of their use. This reverses the proper priority of concern, for once a methodology is adopted, the choice of methods becomes merely a tactical matter” (Waltz 1979, 13).
A series of rigorous methodological alternatives to cross-case analysis, such as the qualitative comparative approach, comparative historical analysis, and the marriage of rational choice tools with case study analysis (Gerring 2009, 90-92). Though case-study researchers can deepen their understanding of complicated causal dynamics that produce particular results, either in a single case or in a set of closely related cases. From this perspective, Beach and Pedersen (2016, 5) argue that case-studies shed light on causality because they serve as “an instance of a causal process playing out, linking a cause (or set of causes) with an outcome” (Beach & Pedersen 2016, 5).

Political science and International Relations scholars have certainly embraced the case-study approach (Bennett & Elman 2007; Gerring 2009; Maliniak et al. 2011). For example, “[c]ase study methods have dominated the IPE (international political economy) subfield over the past three decades” (Odell 2004, 56). Even though some scholars do not accept that case studies are an inherently qualitative methodology (in that case studies can employ various quantitative techniques including statistical analysis) (Gerring 2007; Levy 2008), case studies are usually distinguished from the quantitative approaches, large-N studies, and variable-oriented studies.12

11 Similarly, George and Bennett (2005, 33-34) point out that advances in case studies are caused by such factors as: interest in theory-oriented case studies has increased, developments in the philosophy of science have provided a firmer foundation for case studies, interest across the social and physical science in modeling and assessing complex causal relations are growing, and the publication of Designing Social Inquiry by King, Keohane, and Verba. Note: the page number of George and Bennett (2005) hereafter is based on the electronic version of the book instead of the original one.

12 Manoney and Goertz (2006) understand quantitative and qualitative research as belonging to two different cultures that have their own values, beliefs, and norms. In contrast, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) argue that qualitative research can also be scientific because qualitative and quantitative research share the same "logic of inference." However, their basic argument seems to assume that quantitative researchers have the best tools for making scientific inferences, and hence qualitative researchers should
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology employed in this dissertation: what a case study is, what cases the dissertation will examine, and how best to do a case study. The chapters have four parts. The first part briefly examines the definition of “case” and “case studies,” and presents features associated with these concepts. Though it is clear that “case study” means to conduct research by analyzing a specific case or cases, there is scholarly disagreement regarding the precise definition of case and case study. The second part of this chapter discusses various types of case studies. Though the case study method can be distinguished from other methods, case studies themselves are not homogenous and can be divided into different types according to differing functions or goals, or due to differences in the kinds of cases selected. The third part of the chapter examines varying case study strategies, including case selection, historical analysis, process tracing, and qualitative content analysis, which are employed in this research. Lastly, the cases selected, resources, and methods employed in the dissertation are introduced.

What Is a Case and what are Case Studies?

This dissertation will conduct case studies to test arguments. However, there is no agreement on the definition of case and case studies among scholars (Levy 2008, 2; Raigin & Becker 2009). For example, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) reject the term “case” because of too many different uses of the term, and instead they suggest “observations” as the substitute for “cases”(52). According to Bennett (2004, 20), who is attempt to emulate these tools to the degree possible. For the debate over King, Keohane, and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry, see Brady and Collier (2004).
drawing on Eckstein (1975), one of the widely used definitions of “case” is a “phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable”. However, Bennett criticizes this definition because it can lead to a misunderstanding that each case produces only one observation or measurement of the dependent variable, though in reality there are many independent variables and many possible observations regarding the dependent variable. He calls this the problem of indeterminacy (Bennett 2004, 20). Thus, Bennet (2004, 20-21) defines a case not as an instance for which we report only a single measure, but as “an instance of a class of events of interest to the investigator”. The term “class of events” means:

“a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of governmental regime, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or ‘generic knowledge’) regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of that class of events” (George & Bennett 2005, 38).

Similar to Bennett, Gerring (2007) also argues that each case may provide either a single observation or multiple observations. He believes that “[c]ase connotes a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time. It comprises the type of phenomenon that an inference attempts to explain” (Gerring 2007, 19). In this vein, for political scientists, a case could be the nation-state. Yin (2014) similarly explains that a case may be an individual phenomenon or unit, as is traditionally understood in a case study approach, but it could also be a set of events or entities, such as a case study of a community, a set of decisions, or a process (Yin 2014, 67-68). Therefore, he suggests that how to define a case relates to the research question
itself, because the selection of the appropriate unit of analysis will be initiated when the researcher specifies his research question (Yin 2014, 68).

Another complication in the matter of defining a “case” is summarized in the conceptual map in Table 2.1, as sketched by Raigin and Becker (2009). According to them, there are four starting points, with two dichotomies, to answer the question “what is a case?” They argued that cases can be understood as empirical units or theoretical constructs and that cases can therefore be specific or general, and can be found objects in the real world (an empirical unit) or can be “made” conventions of the researcher’s intellectual framework (a theoretical construct).

Table 2.1 What is a Case?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding of cases</th>
<th>Case conceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As empirical units</td>
<td>Cases are found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As theoretical constructs</td>
<td>Cases are made</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Similar to the challenge of how to define a case, defining “case studies” and “case study methodology” is also a complicated matter. The case study method is generally regarded as a type of non-experimental method (Lijphart 1971; Moses & Knutsen 2012). Bennett (2004) regards a case study as “a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical happening itself” (21). In addition, he uses the term “case study method” to refer to “both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons among a small number of cases, as most case studies involve both kinds of analysis due to the limits of either method used alone” (Bennett 2004, 21). In other work with Alexander George, Bennet he suggests a clearer definition
of the case study approach, calling it a “the detailed examination of an aspect of a
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to
other events” (George & Bennett 2005, 30).

Gerring (2007) discerns the notion of a single “case study” from “case study
research” by referring to the number of cases involved. According to Gerring,

“[a] case study may be understood as the intensive study of a
single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to
shed light on a larger class of cases (a population). Case study
research may incorporate several cases, that is, multiple case studies”
(Gerring 2007, 20).

However, some researchers use case study and case study research
interchangeably without a strict distinction (Yin 2014, Creswell 2007). For example, a
case study can be defined as an empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2014, 48).

Given those various definitions, a question might be raised as to whether a
distinction between case study and case study method (or research/approach) is of any
practical meaning. Most authors seem to use the different terms interchangeably, except
Gerring. Whatever perspective we take, case studies can be understood in terms of
George and Bennett’s definition, above, which clarifies that a case study approach
scrutinizes a historical event or phenomenon to develop or test generalizable
explanations. In this dissertation, I use the term “case studies” in this sense, meaning to
examine multiple but closely related cases, so as to test general hypotheses.
Various Types of Case Studies

Case studies have various types, according to their function or goal. For example, Creswell (2007) categorizes case studies into the single instrumental, the collective or multiple, and the intrinsic case study. Researchers decide which kind of case study to use according of the intent of the case analysis (74). Yin (2014) divides case studies into single-case (holistic) designs, single-case (embedded) designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs, and multiple-case (embedded) designs, which all vary by the number of cases or units in the research design (29-105).

In political science, it seems that most typologies of case studies are based on Lijphart’s and Eckstein’s categorizations. Lijphart divides case studies into atheoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-generating, deviant, or theory-confirming case studies, while Eckstein classifies them into configurative-ideographic, disciplined-configurative, heuristic, and the most-likely-least-likely test case study (Bennett 2004, 21-22; Levy 2008, 3). George and Bennett (2004) respond to these influential theories when they categorize case studies, and simply add “Building Block” studies of particular types or subtypes of a phenomenon to Eckstein’s previous categorizations (88-89). Also, responding to Lijphart and Eckstein’s categories, Levy (2008) suggests a simpler typology of case studies. His typology focuses on the theoretical purposes or research objectives of a case study.

Table 2.2 Types of Case Studies

|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
According to Levy, the idiographic case study aims to describe, explain, interpret, and/or understand a single case as an end in itself, rather than as a vehicle for developing broader theoretical generalization (Levy 2008, 4). Idiographic case studies have two subtypes of inductive and theory-guided case studies. The two subtypes differ according to the degree to which the case study is guided by an explicit theoretical framework (Levy 2008, 4).

Inductive case studies are similar to Eckstein’s configurative-idiographic case studies and Lijphart’s atheoretical case studies. Levy believes that they are highly descriptive and without a theoretical framework. An example of such a case study is the “total history” framework that assumes that everything is connected to everything else and which consequently aims to explain all aspects of a case and their interconnections (Levy 2008, 4). On the contrary, theory-guided case studies are based on a theoretical framework. Even though theory-guided case studies focusing on explanation and/or interpretation of a single historical episode, like inductive case studies, the theory-guided case studies are explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that lays emphasis on theoretically specified aspects of a historical episode (Levy 2008, 4). At a glance, the idiographic case studies blur the boundary between history and political science.
The second type of case studies, in Levy’s analysis, are hypothesis-generating case studies. This kind of study is similar to Eckstein’s heuristic case study. On the contrary to the idiographic case studies, the hypothesis-generating type is closely related to generalization. Unlike cross-case studies that can also develop a theoretical hypothesis, hypothesis-generating case studies contribute to the process of theory construction rather than to theory itself (Levy 2008, 5). Moreover, such case studies have advantages in the heuristic identification of new variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases, especially when a researcher does field work such as interviews with participants (George & Bennett 2005, 42). A researcher can find a new variable that he or she did not consider during initial analysis, or can develop a more sophisticated hypotheses, drawing on insights from deviant cases. In addition, the process of hypothesis generation can be helpful in specifying a causal mechanism.

Levy’s third type of case studies are the hypothesis testing case studies. For hypothesis testing, it might be true that cross-case studies, which means large-N research, have more advantages than a single case study (Gerring 2007, 42). However, it does not mean that case studies cannot function to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. For example, crucial case studies can contribute to testing hypothesis based on most-likely and least-likely case designs (Eckstein 1975).

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13 The conventional wisdom regarding deviant cases is that they are useful for finding omitted variables. However, Seawright (2016) insists that deviant cases are less useful in finding omitted variables than one might wish because the most important omitted variables are often closely related to the included variables.

14 Regardless of qualitative and quantitative research, Mearsheimer and Walt (2013) criticize the glut of simplistic hypothesis testing research because it hinders the development of theory and thus idens the gap between the academy and the real world.
The last type of case studies are plausibility probes. Such a case study is similar to a pilot study before engaging in a costly and time-consuming large-scale research (Levy 2007, 6). As Levy (2008, 6) argues, plausibility probes are more useful when they are combined with formal modeling or statistical analyses. Nevertheless, plausibility probes can also be used in case studies. For example, even thin description of a case can serve as a concrete example of the possibilities and limitations associated with theoretical arguments. Illustrative case studies, which are often used in IR, fall under the category of plausibility probes (Levy 2008, 6).

In short, there are multiple types of case studies that can each serve very different purposes. The cases that are discussed in the dissertation basically serve as both observations, which lead to puzzles to explore, and cases to test propositions. Therefore, cases studies in the dissertation fall under the category of hypothesis-testing (or theory-confirming) case studies.

**How to Do Case Studies**

This section of the chapter will examine the proper way to do case studies as well as critical issues to consider in doing case studies. In practice, case studies require several steps to be completed. For example, King, Keohane and Verba (1994) suggest that case studies have three stages: development of theory/hypothesis, selection of observations (the case), and analysis of observations (case study). Yin (2014) presents a case-study model in five stages: 1) research design with identification of case(s), 2) preliminary work to collect evidence, 3) collection of evidence, 4) analysis of evidence, and 5) reporting of results. George and Bennett (2005) suggest three phases of a cast study: designing case study research, carrying out the case study, and drawing the implications.
Regardless of the different nuances in breaking down the process, case studies consist of similar steps in the end: developing theory, identifying cases and collecting observations, and analyzing the cases so as to test theory. This dissertation follows these steps.

**Case Selection and Selection Bias**

In the process of doing case studies, researchers must consider some critical issues. To begin with, case selection is very important in case studies because how and what cases a researcher choose can determine the results of the research (Geddes 2003). Thus, case selection produces many questions to be addressed in case studies. For example, should scholars engage in systematic case selection? Should they choose cases randomly, strategically, or should they simply pick cases in an unstructured way? Moreover, should cases be selected one at a time or in coordinated pairs or groups? (Seawright 2016)

In large-N research, the potential adverse effect of case selection can be resolved by randomization (Fearon & Laitin 2008). However, in small-N case study research, using only a single or few cases, it is not appropriate to employ random sampling (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 124-128, Gerring 2008, 645), because it is highly likely that a small number of cases picked at random would not be representative of the broader population of cases (Seawright & Gerring 2008).

Given this ineffectiveness of randomization in small-N case studies, such studies seem to be vulnerable to selection bias (Geddes 2003). Selection bias is commonly understood as taking place when certain forms of the selection process, in either the design of the study or in selection of the real-world phenomena under investigation, result in inferences that suffer from systematic error (Collier & Mahoney 1996, 59). Scholars
usually choose cases with which they are familiar and this familiarity can serve as bias. Furthermore, researchers are exposed to the temptation to select cases deceptively in order to support their arguments. When cases are selected on the basis of a particular value of the dependent variable, we cannot learn about the causes of the dependent variable without taking into account other cases when the dependent variable takes on other values (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 129). For example, it is hard to find causal effects in cases with extreme values of the dependent variable.

On the other hand, Seawright (2016) directly challenges this argument. He argues that extreme cases in terms of the independent variable, or deviant cases, are much more useful in dramatizing and uncovering causal relationships than are typical cases. When it comes to extreme cases, he believes that extreme cases of variance in the independent variable are good for inquiring into sources of measurement error of the treatment variable and for discovering the most important and powerful confounding variables (Seawright 2016, 13).

In order to achieve good (i.e. unbiased) results from research, researchers have tried to develop scientific techniques or strategies of case selection according to the types of cases (Gerring 2007; Seawright & Gerring 2008; Seawright 2016). For example, Gerring (2007, 86-150 and 2008) suggests nine techniques to pick cases, according to the type of cases being sought, ranging from typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar to most-different case. His techniques can be applied to

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15 Contrary to selection bias concerning the dependent variable, selection bias is not a problem when choosing the independent variable because we can control for it (King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 137).
both qualitative and quantitative research. These techniques were elaborated upon in Seawright and Gerring (2008). Later, Seawright (2016) excludes influential, crucial, pathway, and most-different cases while adding random cases and dividing extreme cases into extreme on X and extreme on Y cases.

If we categorized all these various types of case studies by simply focusing on cases’ usefulness in generating or testing hypotheses, we could make the typology seen in Table 2.3.

**Table 2.3 How to Choose Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis generating</th>
<th>Hypothesis testing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Typical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviant</td>
<td>Diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most-similar</td>
<td>Influential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most-different</td>
<td>Crucial</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pathway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most-similar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most-different</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Gerring 2007, 89-90; Seawright & Gerring 2008, 297-298; Seawright 2016, 15)

In sum, case selection is a very significant but complicated task in case study research because it can critically affect the result and validity of research. Along with avoiding selection bias, it is important to choose the right case(s) for the goal of the research.

The cases in this dissertation can be categorized into most-similar and the most-different cases. The comparison of the North Korean case and the South Korean case is a most-different case study because, roughly speaking, they have the different actors, different regimes, and a different level of economic development, although they tentatively share similarities in terms of being influenced by Chinese culture. On the contrary, the comparison of the South Korean case and the Japanese case is a most-
similar case because these two nations have the same political regime of democracy, similarly close relations with China in terms of trade, similar levels of economic development, and the same security issues addressed by THAAD, although these countries face different outcomes in terms of China’s reaction to the THAAD/radar deployment.

**Historical Analysis**

Historical analysis is primarily a qualitative approach that relies largely upon “the use of primary historical documents or historian’s interpretations thereof in service of theory development and testing” (Thies 2002, 352). While process tracing (to be described later) is a good tool to discover causality behind how or why an event happens, historical analysis is useful to explain what happened in the past because it is a method of discovery based upon historical records of some past event or combination of events (Wyche, Sengers & Grinter 2006, 37). Thus, this method is used throughout this dissertation to understand the historical developments of Sino-North Korean relations, Sino-South Korean relations, and Sino-Japanese relations.

**Process Tracing**

Process tracing has recently received substantial attention from social scientists (George & Bennett 2005, 199; Bennett & Checkel 2015, 4; Beach & Pedersen 2016, 302). Even though it is difficult to establish scholarly agreement about what we are tracing and how we trace it, process tracing is usually regarded as one of the three main methods of within-case analysis (Bennett 2004, 22). The core of process tracing is to

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16 Other two methods are congruence testing and counterfactual analysis (Bennett 2004, 22).
trace the causal mechanism (Beach & Pedersen 2016, 304). For example, Wendt (1999) recognizes that the core tool in establishing descriptions of causal mechanisms is “process-tracing,” which “in social science ultimately requires case studies and historical scholarship” (82).

Disagreement on the precise definition of process tracing stems from the matter of how and whether to identify an intervening variable in the process of uncovering the causal mechanism. Some researchers take the term “process tracing” to describe a form of descriptive narrative that traces empirical events between the occurrence of a cause and an outcome (Abell 2004; Evangelista 2014). On the other hand, other scholars maintain that process tracing is to identify the intervening causal process between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable (King, Keohane & Verba 1994; George & Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007). Given the purpose of tracing that is to identify causal mechanism between the independent variable and the dependent variable, whether or not to consider intervening variables is not that crucial to determining causality itself in process tracing. Thus, Bennett changed his definition of process tracing and removed the necessity of defining intervening variables from the definition in his recent book. Bennett and Checkel (2015) define process tracing as “the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case” (7).

When it comes to establishing causation in process tracing, Bennett (2010) developed four tests for causation that determine whether evidence found in process tracing is sufficient or necessary to establish causation. His tests are mainly based on Van
Evera’s (1997, 31-32) strategies for confirming and eliminating potential explanations. Collier (2011) elaborated on Bennett’s work and provided the material in Table 2.4 as a tabular view of process tracing tests.

**Table 2.4 Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary for Affirming Causal Inference</th>
<th>Sufficient for Affirming Causal Inference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.</td>
<td>Passing: Confirms hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is slightly weakened.</td>
<td>Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is somewhat weakened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing slightly weakens them. Failing slightly strengthens them.</td>
<td>Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing substantially weakens them. Failing somewhat strengthens them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hoop</td>
<td>4. Doubly Decisive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.</td>
<td>Passing: Confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing: Eliminates hypothesis</td>
<td>Failing: Eliminates hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing somewhat weakens them. Failing somewhat strengthens them.</td>
<td>Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing eliminates them. Failing substantially strengthens them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Collier 2011, 825)

As seen in the Table 5, evidence affirms the relevance of hypothesis when it passes “straw-in-the-wind” but it is neither sufficient or necessary for affirming causal inference. On the contrary, it confirms a hypothesis and eliminates others when passing “doubly decisive” tests and is both sufficient and necessary for affirming causal inference. For “smoking gun” and “hoop,” evidence can be either sufficient or necessary for affirming causal inference.
For example, let us assume that my precious tiramisu cake in the refrigerator was gone, and I suspect a local girl as the culprit. If a girl was recorded by a security camera when she had it in her possession, I am sure that she is the culprit (doubly decisive). If she testified she saw a boy had taken the cake, I could be convinced that the boy is the culprit, but that does not mean I could conclude that he is innocent in the absence of her testimony (smoking gun). If the girl went out all day, it could convince me that she is innocent. However, the fact that she was at home all day does not guarantee that she is the culprit (hoop). Finally, if the local boy always likes to have tiramisu, it affirms the relevance of a my suspicion that he might have taken it, but does not confirm that hypothesis (straw-in-the-wind).

In this dissertation, process tracing is employed because it has several advantages: first, it is useful to analyze decision-making at the individual level; second, it can be combined well with other methods such as large-N case studies and formal modeling; third, it is useful to uncover complex causation (Levy 2008, 11-12). To be specific, the cases chosen in the dissertation are expected to allow a “Smoking-Gun” test to confirm my hypotheses (though without fully repudiating rival hypotheses). This approach will combine well with qualitative content analysis, as described below.

**Qualitative Content Analysis**

Content analysis is a widely used method in qualitative research. It is generally defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) as to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff 2004, 18). There
are three main types of content analysis: basic, interpretive, and qualitative. Basic content analysis is a research technique using word counts and other quantitative methods to analyze data, whereas interpretive content analysis is a research technique using interpretations of text, generated by the researcher (Drisco and Maschi 2016, 3-4).

Qualitative content analysis, which shares many characteristics with interpretive analysis, can be divided into three approaches once again: conventional, directed, and summative (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Even though those three approaches are used to interpret meaning from the content of the text, they are different in terms of coding schemes, origins of codes, and threats to reliability. For example, coding categories are derived directly from the text data in the conventional approach, while theory or relevant research findings become guidance for initial coding in the directed approach, and keyword counting and comparisons are followed by interpreting the underlying context in the summative approach (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1285-1286).

The process of content analysis can be broken down into phases, such as: 1) unitizing, sampling, recording/coding, reducing, abductively inferring, and narrating (Krippendorff 2004); 2) preparing, organizing, and reporting according to induction or deduction (Elo & Kyngäs 2008); or 3) formulating research questions, sampling, coding, and analyzing (White & Marsh 2006, 34-39). Even though content analysis is described as having different phases according to differing researchers, the common thread is that content analysis involves an effort to code and interpret the content of key text.

17 Some researchers, such as Krippendorff, are skeptical to the distinction between quantitative and qualitative content analysis because all reading of texts is eventually qualitative (Krippendorff 2004, 16).
In this dissertation, qualitative content analysis is used to find the nature of the relationship between identity, culture, and state behavior. Because identity and culture are intangible conceptions that are difficult to clearly define through textual analysis, I will adopt dual strategies of both counting words based on context relevance and interpreting the context, in order to complete the content analysis.

Collecting Sources

Yin (2014) selects six sources that are most commonly used in case studies: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. Among these sources, this section of the chapter explores how documentation, archival records, and interviews can be effective research tools, as they are relied upon in this dissertation. The first source is documentation, which includes various forms of documents, ranging from personal documents, government announcements, minutes of meetings, and existing studies (Yin 2014, 126-127).

Obtaining and evaluating these various sources of documentation can be difficult. For instance, researchers often have no idea of what materials a government has, it can be hard to find where these materials are, and government documents may not be accessible at all to a researcher, despite their existence. Moreover, rare documents make it hard to cross-check the facts, which is necessary because documents are likely to be written or produced from a subjective point of view.

A second source relied upon in this dissertation is archival records. Even though Yin distinguishes archival records from documentation by claiming that such records focus on statistical data or surveys (Yin 2014, 129), in fact archival records and documentation are not fundamentally different. One possibly valid difference is that
archival records are archived by authority. For example, Wedeman (2012) tries to tackle the puzzle of rapid economic growth and rising corruption in China by using archival records, including diverse yearbooks of central governments and municipal governments, together with national surveys.

Instead of distinguishing documentation from archival records, we can use the classification often used by historians: primary, secondary, and tertiary materials. For instance, if we search materials on the U.S. decision to engage in the Korean War, primary materials can be documents produced by government agencies of the U.S., South Korea and Japan, individual documents such as MacArthur’s notes, and other government documents in National Archives. Secondary materials are would be timely reports upon primary documents or immediate events, such as newspaper articles. Tertiary materials would be dissertations, academic papers, and biographies produced after the fact, in an effort to interpret the meaning of events.

A third case-study source is the interview. The interview is a powerful method for in-depth analysis of a case. It is useful for developing detailed description, integrating multiple perspectives, describing the process, learning how events are interpreted, and bridging inter-subjectivities (Weiss 1994, 16-19). Despite their advantages, however, interviews have not been often used in political science because interviewing often conflicts with methodological tendencies in political science, which are based on behaviorism and rationalism, and political scientists are skeptical of the practicability and rigorous of an interview methodology (Rathbun 2008, 685-686). To avoid the methodological muddle of an interview process that some scholars fear, interview researchers must pay attention to two key tasks during interviews: 1) follow a clear and
pre-defined line of inquiry to maintain consistency for the research objective, and 2) ask actual (conversational) questions in an unbiased manner that serves the needs of the line of inquiry (Yin 2014, 130).

When we do case studies, we are not restricted to employing only one source. For example, Weiss (2014) explores the nationalist protests in China to find their influence on China’s foreign policy. During her field research in China, she traced links between perceptions, motivations, actions, and reactions based on documentation and archival records. She gathered memoirs of high-ranking officials and senior leaders, party histories, yearbooks, diplomatic records, policy reports published by government-run think tanks, and material from online bulletin boards and forums. Along with using documentation and archival records, she interviewed more than 170 national activists, students, protesters, journalists, and diplomats.

Though a variety of tools like this could be utilized, this dissertation mainly relies upon documented materials rather than on interviews. In foreign policy analysis, especially in exploring decision-making processes or decision-makers’ perceptions, the interview is a very good tool to develop understanding of motivations, understandings, and actions of key players. However, contacting and arranging appropriate interviews with relevant interviewees can be very time consuming and costly. In addition to these practical problems, interviews are unlikely to achieve the desired results for purposes of the dissertation because interviewees would likely not offer candid responses, given the sensitive nature of topics of identity and culture. Due to these limitations, this study does not utilize the interview format.
Many documents and abundant written materials can provide findings sufficient
to supplement the lack of interview sources. In foreign policy analysis, memoirs,
biographies or autobiographies of political leaders, announcements by government
spokespersons, and minutes from meetings and events are good evidentiary sources to
inform a meaningful case study.

Methods of the Dissertation

Case studies are important and useful, especially for answering ‘how’ and ‘why’
questions, and for developing more sophisticated theoretical understandings. Case studies
contribute to theoretical generalization and cases themselves can be better understood
within a well-developed theoretical framework (Sprinz & Wolinsky 2002, 10). Moreover,
case studies can play a role in understanding complex causality behind a phenomenon
that has multiple and conjectural causalities. 18

Cases Selection: Mixed Systems Approach

The dissertation employs the qualitative approach with case studies as its
methodology to test hypotheses. Three cases are selected: one case from Sino-North
Korean relations, one case from Sino-South Korean relations, and one case from Sino-
Japanese relations. To be specific, the first case is North Korea’s first nuclear test
following the Taepodong-2 missile launch in 2006, and its effect on Sino-North Korean
relations. The second case is South Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD system in

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18 Cases studies have become more sophisticated by introducing new approaches such as Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Bayesian logic. QCA, especially Fs/QCA that is a type of QCA using
Fuzzy-set, is a kind of intermediate-N research that draws strengths from both case-oriented and variable-
oriented methods. For the details of the recent development in QCA, see Rihoux and Ragin (2009) and
Rihoux and Marx (2013).
2016, and its effect on Sino-South Korean relations. The third case is Japan’s deployment of the THAAD radars in 2006 and 2014, and its effect on Sino-Japanese relations. Those three cases are analyzed by a mixed system approach that combines the most-similar cases with the most-different cases to allow the researcher to draw causal inferences from the selected cases. Thus, this design uses both the method of agreement and the method of difference (Frendreis 1983; Hage & Meeker 1988). In addition to these three cases to test hypotheses, two observations of the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the Garlic War are explored to produce additional theoretical hypotheses.

North Korea’s second nuclear crisis was triggered by a North Korean official’s confirmation when the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific James Kelley, during his visit to Pyongyang in 2002, asked North Korean counterparts about the rumor that Pyongyang was covertly developing nuclear weapons by using enriched uranium (Sanger 2002). Furthermore, North Korea announced that it would restart three nuclear reactors with plutonium reprocessing, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze of nuclear programs at the end of 2002, and eventually announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January of 2003 (Nikitin, Chanlett-Avery, Manyin 2017, 7; Fu 2017, 8). To tackle this crisis, China played an active role in establishing the Six-Party Talks regime, which is composed of the six participating states of China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. When North Korea was reluctant to participate in multilateral negotiations to discuss the issue, China stopped its supply of oil to North Korea for several days (Shin 2005, 37).
China’s suspension of oil exports to North Korea occurred again in 2006 when North Korea launched the Taepodong 2 missile and conducted its first nuclear test. In particular, China harshly denounced North Korea for the nuclear test by using the term *hanran* (悍然), which means “flagrant” or “brazen.” This dramatic term is seldom used in diplomatic and official statements. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said “the DPRK flagrantly conducted a nuclear test. The Chinese government is strongly opposed to this act” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2006).

The Garlic War was a trade dispute between China and South Korea which lasted from 2000 to 2003. It began when the South Korean government took a safeguard action by increasing tariffs on Chinese garlic imports from 30% to 315% to protect Korean farmers because South Korean farmers blamed cheap Chinese imports for a 30% drop in garlic prices in the South Korean market. In response, a week later, China imposed a ban on imports of South Korean mobile telephones and polyethylene, used to make a wide range of plastics (Kirk 2000). After two months of negotiations, South Korea and China agreed that South Korea would increase imports of Chinese garlic and China lifted the ban on imports of Korean mobile phones and polyethylene. However, China’s retaliation was unreasonably excessive because Chinese garlic exports to South Korea amounted to only about $9 million, whereas exports of South Korean mobile phones and polyethylene were worth approximately $510 million altogether.

The Garlic War involved economic issues, while the conflict over South Korea’s THAAD deployment involved military security issues. On February 7, 2016, South Korea and the U.S. announced that they had agreed to begin talks aimed at “the earliest possible” deployment of THAAD, which is “a system designed to shoot down short-,
medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles using interceptor missiles, launchers, a radar, and a fire-control unit” (Swaine 2017, 1). After months of subsequent discussion, on July 8, Ryu Jae-seung (the South Korean Deputy Minister for National Defense Policy) and Thomas Vandal, (the commander of the U.S. 8th Army in South Korea) formally announced that the THAAD system would be deployed in South Korea (Choe 2016). In retaliation for the decision by the South Korean government to deploy THAAD, China immediately suspended all government-level exchanges with South Korea (Swaine 2017, 2). Along with an expression of outrage in the political sector, China also embarked on economic sanctions in private sector. In addition to the pullback of Chinese tourists to South Korea, the South Korean company Lotte’s business in China has taken a hit since the THAAD deployment, while sales of Korean restaurants in the Beijing area have plunged by a third year-after-year and sales of Korean automakers Hyundai and Kia Motors have fallen by half (Tselichtchev 2017). Even though Chinese State Council Yang Jiechi, who was the top official responsible for the Chinese foreign policy, repeatedly assured that China would withdraw major retaliatory measures from South Korea in 2017 and 2018, there still have been no substantive actions taken by China to reduce the economic pressure (Jo 2018).

Contrary to the above cases, Japan’s deployment of the THAAD radars have not led to any retaliation by China. In recent years, Japan has deployed two X-band radars, which are known as the AN/TPY-2 (Army/Navy Transportation Radar Surveillance), in Shariki and Kyogamisaki. These radar systems have similar purpose and power as the THAAD system deployment in Korea. The radar in Shariki started operations in 2006 and the one in Kyogamisaki was installed in 2014. However, there was no attack by
China when Japan announced its deployment of the Shariki radar in 2005 and activated it in 2006. When it came to the radar installation in Kyogamisaki, China simply expressed its concern by saying “neighboring countries pushing forward the deployment of anti-missile systems in the Asia-Pacific and seeking unilateral security is not beneficial to strategic stability and mutual trust in the region” (CFMSA 2014).

**Table 2.5 Three Cases in the Dissertation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sino-North Korean relations</th>
<th>Sino-South Korean relations</th>
<th>Sino-Japanese relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Missile launch and 1st nuclear test in 2006</td>
<td>THAAD deployment</td>
<td>THAAD deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Retaliation by China</td>
<td>Retaliation by China</td>
<td>No Retaliation by China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, substantial variation in the dependent variable is recommended in order to discern a stronger explanation for the causation (King, Keohane & Verba 1994). As seen in Table 2.5, the South Korean case and the Japanese case are ideal in this sense because they are “most similar cases,” and yet they have different outcomes in terms of the response of China to military installations in each country. Furthermore, the North Korean case is expected to provide either strong support or rejection of the argument to be tested, because it a different outcome than the Japan case, but the same outcome as the South Korean case (i.e., harsh response by China to an undesired action), even though the cases are most-different comparisons.

**Resources**

The main resource relied upon in the dissertation are primary textual sources. For example, I use remarks and statements by the Chinese spokespersons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gathered from 2001 to 2018. To find the context and meaning as
correctly as possible, the archive of these remarks and statements are composed of original Chinese materials. The problem is that the webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC only posts recent press conferences of spokespersons. As of the end of 2018, English transcripts from the regular press conference are accessible for conferences occurring after 2016, whereas Chinese transcripts from the regular press conference are available from 2015. Thus, I searched and found other webpages that were not accessible any longer by using search engines including Google and Baidu. As a result, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokespersons Archive (CFMSA) gathered by me has the transcripts of 4,907,826 Chinese characters from 4,371 regular press conferences, from 2001 to 2018.\textsuperscript{19}

Additionally, news articles and editorials in Chinese are also used, mainly from the \textit{People’s Daily} (\textit{Renminribao}, 人民日报) and sometimes from \textit{Global Times} (\textit{Huanqiu Shibao}, 环球时报). Since the official documents such as remarks and statements from spokesperson are mostly expressed in refined language, it is hard to find any cultural stance embedded in them. Thus, I complementally use the \textit{People’s Daily} to find relatively unrefined language expressed by officials and leaders in public statements, and drew from editorials in \textit{Global Times} to deduce the real meaning or context of Chinese officials in their remarks about events and issues. Other than these sources, many newspapers from South Korea, the U.S., Taiwan, and Hong Kong are also used to supplement process-tracing of the cases. They are mainly used for understanding of

\textsuperscript{19} I discovered that the world edition of \textit{People’s Daily} had all materials from regular press conference and irregular statements by spokespersons at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC only after this research was completed. It has transcripts from 1998 to present. However, unauthorized users, including users with foreign IP addresses, cannot access these resources.
details of the cases, while sometimes being used for cross-checking of the fact. For the articles of the People’s Daily, the database of People’s Daily (1946-2019) is primarily used in preference to the People’s Daily accessed through the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). In addition to these Chinese newspaper databases, two Korean newspaper databases are used to crosscheck trends or find historical records. For old articles, the Naver News Library Database is used, which provides articles from 1920 to 1999. For more recent Korean news articles and analysis on them, BIGKINDS (Korean Integrated News Database System), operated by the Korea Press Foundation, is used.

Five memoirs are used for the North Korean case: The Peninsula Question (English translation) by Funabashi Yoichi (2007), Failed Diplomacy by Charles L. Pritchard (2007), Outpost by Christopher R. Hill (2014), and Lee Soo-hyuk’s Transforming Events (in Korean, 2008) and North Korea is Reality (in Korean, 2011). Hill was the U.S. ambassador to South Korea (2004-2005), Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (2005-2009), and head of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks. Pritchard was the deputy negotiator for the U.S.-North Korea peace talks (1997) and special assistant to the U.S. President and senior director for Asian Affairs (2000). Lee was a professional diplomat and head of South Korean delegation to the Six-Party Talks. Funabashi is a Japanese journalist and his book includes 158 interviews with former and incumbent government officials from the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea.

Research Methods

Based on resources earlier mentioned, process-tracing, historical analysis, and qualitative content analysis are employed for the case studies, with a mixed systems
approach in order to find the effect of identity and Chinese face culture on China’s behaviors. First, this dissertation uses historical analysis to examine the background of the cases. Second, based on the background, the dissertation argues that China took unexpected actions, *i.e.* retaliation, against its friends. This argument is elaborated through a process-tracing method, drawing on news articles and memoirs. In that process, a causal mechanism is discovered that drives China’s unexpected foreign policy actions--namely identity and culture. Third, by using qualitative content analysis (including word counts and contextual interpretation of the meaning of words), the dissertation establishes the proclaimed identity of China as a responsible great power, as well as establishes China’s perceived identities of the two Koreas as friend, and Japan as non-friend. These differing identities prove critical as a casual mechanism driving China’s foreign policy responses in the three case studies.
Chapter Three

Identity and Chinese Foreign Policy

Identity can be used by political scientists to understand a variety of actors, ranging from individual, to nation, corporation, government, and state.20 Identities are the understanding and expectations about one’s self that are acquired by interacting with or defining the self in relation to an “other” in the context of social relationships, shared meanings, rules, norms, and practices (Viotti & Kauppi 2012, 287). Furthermore, identity of an Other can be perceived by one as the Other’s identity, regardless of the Other’s real identity. Despite the probability of misperception, a state must develop its understanding of the identity of other states because each state must try to predict how other states will act, and how other states will be affected by one’s own state actions in determining how to behave (Jervis 1968, 454). Therefore, my argument is that proclaimed identity—(which is identity that is perceived or pursued by one’s self) should be distinguished from perceived identity identity (which is how one’s identity is perceived by others). This chapter discusses the influence of these two identities on a state’s behavior and the applicability of this identity theory to understanding Chinese foreign policy.

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20 In this dissertation, “identity” mainly indicates state identity because one of the goals of the study is to find the relationship between identity and a state’s foreign policy in inter-state relations. Of course, it is not just state identity that is closely related to foreign policy. For instance, national identity can affect a state’s foreign policy, especially at the domestic level. For details regarding national identity and foreign policy, see Prizel (1998).
Identity and Foreign Policy

Identity in Foreign Policy Analysis

When it comes to how identity influences state behavior, a prominent challenge has been made by constructivism to neo-/structural realism in International Relations (IR) theory. The key to the constructivist social theory is that “people act toward objects on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them” (Wendt 1992, 396-397). In this sense, states are not as alike as the structural realist Waltz (1979) posits. He believes that the international system is a kind of self-help system because it is anarchic in the absence of a world government, and thus states are alike in that they all seek the same goal of survival (Waltz 1979). According to constructivism, however, states can have different identities and national interests of their own. Wendt gives the examples of how U.S. military power is perceived by different nations, and of the U.S.’ differing reactions to nuclear weapons in the U.K versus North Korea. Even though Canada and Cuba are located next to the U.S., U.S. military power has a different meaning for Canada than for Cuba (Wendt 1992, 397; 1999, 25). Moreover, 500 nuclear weapons in the U.K and five nuclear weapons in North Korea have very different significance to the U.S. (Wendt 1995, 73). Thus, differing perceived identities of other nations can explain differing U.S. policy toward the U.K. and North Korea regarding their nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it can also explain the recently dramatically-changed situation regarding the North Korean nuclear issue in that the traditional hostility between Washington and Pyongyang has changed to an atmosphere of dialogue due to changing identities of the U.S. and North Korea towards each other.
Despite the usefulness of this approach, the effects of identity on foreign policy were overlooked by scholars during the Cold War and have only come to figure prominently in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) since the 1990s, after the Cold War was over (Vucetic 2017; Hudson 2014; Grove 2010; Kaarbo 2003). Identity in FPA requires researchers to ask how people within a nation-state answer the questions, “who are we?”, “what do we do?”, “who are they?” (Hudson 2014, 118) and sometimes “what does who they are mean for what we do?” (Grove 2010, 765). Based on these questions, FPA on identity has evolved with several trends (Grove 2010, 766-769). First, some works focus on a specific region or country (Shaffer 2006; Campbell 1992; Pye 1985). Second, other studies, especially comparative politics (CP) studies, take a more systematic approach to measurement including attempts to measure the supra-culture of the elite and the subculture of mass (Ebel et al. 1991). Third, other studies look into the demographic makeup of a state and pay attention to the various ethnic groups in the state by focusing on how multiple cultures and identities of these ethnic groups affect foreign policy (Hill 2007; Wilson 2004). Fourth, still other studies investigate the uses of culture and identity by politicians to manipulate particular groups to support their foreign policies, such as through the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect (Baum 2002).

Even though many researchers utilize identity theory, and try to define identity, there is no satisfactory single definition of identity in the social sciences or in the humanities (Fearon 1999) The concept of identity is too fragmentary, contingent, and malleable (Vucetic 2017). IR constructivist Wendt (1999) suggests four kinds of identities: personal or “corporate” identity, which is constituted by the “self-organizing and homeostatic structures” that distinguish Self from the Other; “type” identity that is
placed within the “site” of personal/corporate identity and refers to a “social category”; “role” identity that depends upon culture and shared expectations and as such exists “only in relation to Others” and cannot be enacted solely by the Self on its own; and “collective identity” that leads to the “identification” of Self with Other through blurring the distinction between them (221–230). Similar concepts of identity are also found in other FPAs (Jepperson et al. 1996).

**Proclaimed and Perceived Identity**

To explain state behaviors in terms of state identity, I collapse Wendt’s four kinds of identities, particularly role identity and collective identity, into two more simple and intuitive kinds of state identity: proclaimed identity and perceived identity.21 Let’s go back to the example of a sushi chef and gangster, as presented in Chapter 1. When a person comes across the sushi chef holding a sushi knife preferred by Korean and Japanese gangs on the dark street, he or she might feel threatened by the chef. You may be relieved if he identifies himself as the sushi chef at the restaurant where you are a regular. On the other hand, you may still feel fear if you do not believe his self-identification. Your ‘imagined’ security depends on whether you believe your perceived

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21 The two identities here are not entirely new. Many scholars use a similar concept of identities. For example, even though Hoo (2018) uses a concept of global identity like Shambaugh (2013), he also used exactly the same term “proclaimed identity” in his dissertation that served as a springboard to his later book. In other work, Lee (2018)’s “imagined identity” and “self-identity” are very similar to proclaimed and perceived identities. However, the term “imagined” seems to have an implicit unreality because of the word “imagined.” Furthermore, his notion of self-identity does not rely on the necessity of subjective proclamation by a state actor, and is based more on a concept of objective reality. Thus, my use of the terms “proclaimed” and “perceived” state identities is similar to, but still different from, these other scholars’ terms.
identity of him or his proclaimed identity. That is to say, is the matter of identity that drives your reaction.

Proclaimed state identity means the identity proclaimed and pursued by a state itself. This proclaimed state identity can be a clear signal of state policy and behavior because it is usually declared through an official channel, including by qualified individuals. However, a proclaimed identity is not always solid because this identity is not always accepted by others. For example, North Korea declared itself a “nuclear state” in its constitution. In the “Kim Il-sung–Kim Jong-il Constitution,” which was the new constitution revised in 2012, North Korea stipulated that it was “an undefeated country with strong political ideology, a nuclear power state, and invincible military power” (Kwon 2012). However, this proclaimed identity of a nuclear state, or an invincible military power, has not been welcomed or accepted by other states. South Korea promptly disapproved it on the grounds that North Korea could not be a nuclear state because it was not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that admitted only five nuclear powers of the U.S., the U.K, France, Russia, and China (UPI 2012). Similarly, despite arguments from experts that the U.S. should admit North Korea’s nuclear status (McKeon & Thalheimer 2017; Narang & Panda 2018), Washington’s position has not been changed (Kim 2017).

Mitzen (2006) named this kind of psychological security as ontological security, contrasting with physical security.

Maybe it was a mistake, but the U.S. government once recognized North Korea as a nuclear state in 2008. A report by the U.S. military claimed that the Asia continent had five nuclear powers: China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and North Korea (US Joint Armed Forces Command 2008, 32).
A proclaimed identity can be formulated not just for describing the present status but also for announcing future goal. For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proclaimed Japan’s identity to be in the future as a “normal state” (futsu no kuni, 普通の国) by relentlessly attempting to revise its constitution with longing for becoming a military power (Yellen 2014). Although there is no official definition of what “normal” exactly means, “normal state” means a state that has the basic authority and capability to exercise autonomy in the management of its economic and security affairs (Inoguchi 2005, 135). In other words, the core of this identification of Japan is to allow Japan to fully remilitarize. The advocates for “normal” Japan think that Japan is abnormal because it has not responded adequately to structural factors, including the need to develop Japan’s own security in the international system (Tadokoro 2011, 45; Hagström 2015, 138), while the opponents argue that Japan has been and should be a “peace state” (heiwa kokka, 平和国家) under the pacifist constitution forced by the U.S. after the Second World War (BBC 2015; Lind 2016, 2-3). The varying proclamations and controversies over these matters are all a matter of Japan’s changing identity (Akimoto 2013; Hagström 2015).

Last, some leaders of states want to formulate their own identity to achieve a perceived identity from other states that is desirable for them, internationally, and to achieve political goals such as regime legitimacy, domestically. Proclaiming an identity

24 According to Ichiro Ozawa, who was the former Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and used this term first, “normal state” means a state that is willing to shoulder the responsibilities given by the international community and cooperates fully with other states in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people (Katahara 2007, 110). This definition is too ideal, however, given Japan’s moves to be militarized as part of pursuit of “normal state” status.
assumes there is an audience who listen to the proclamation. As seen from the examples of North Korea and Japan earlier mentioned, an announcement of state identity aims at double effects. One is an extroversive effect on other states. For North Korea, the proclaimed state identity of nuclear power can contribute to securing the survival of North Korea as well as Kim’s regime, which is of greatest concern to North Korean elites. Given the presence of nuclear weapon as a game changer in the international security structure, the identity of nuclear state can guarantee the survival and preservation of the poor and hermit Kingdom, and of Kim’s dynasty to a considerable extent.25 Similarly, Japan’s proclamation of normal state identity arouses attention from other states, including its neighbor countries, concerning more assertive behaviors of Japan. But it also may help Japan to more effectively handle conflict with China over territorial issue.

The other effect of state identity is introversive. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un needs a prominent achievement to consolidate his power domestically. Even though he is the only successor of Kim’s regime who has the “Mount Baekdu bloodline,”26 this charismatic source of origin for legitimacy is not sufficient to ensure the young leader’s power. Leaders in authoritarian regimes are usually faced with the lack of powerful authority (Svolik 2012). Kim Jong Un is no exception. This is the reason he ordered the

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25 North Korea recently often uses the term “strategic state” instead of referring to itself as a “nuclear state,” but the conceptual meaning has no difference.

26 The so-called notion of “Mount Baekdu bloodline” has been used by the Kim family to legitimize its iron-fist rule in North Korea for the past seven decades. Mount Baekdu is the highest mountain on the Korean Peninsula, which people have considered as a sacred place from ancient times. It is also where North Korean founding leader Kim Il Sung was said to fight against Japanese occupation forces, and where his son Kim Jong Il was said to be born (Choon 2017).
proclamation of North Korea’s achievement of nuclear power to his people. One recent guideline from the authorities requires all types of the press to propagate Kim Jong Un’s greatness, and related claims that North Korea could only become a dignified nuclear power thanks to the dedication of Chairperson Kim who made achievements in the parallel development of economic might and nuclear weapons (Cho 2018).

Similarly, Japanese Prime Minister Abe has enjoyed his second Prime Ministership by politicizing the concept of “normal state” in elections (Nagy 2014, 8; Dobson 2016; Hornung & McElwain 2017). When he won the election for his third consecutive three-year term as the head of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in 2018, which took him closer to becoming Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister, Prime Minister Abe said that “I feel I received a strong push to exert strong leadership for another three years, based on the results of my economic, diplomatic and national security policies so far” (Reynolds & Nobuhiro 2018).

Contrary to proclaimed identity, the perceived identity of a state is the identity perceived by other state(s), regardless of the state’s will. In this sense, perceived identity has similarities with reputation discourse in international relations. Many students in IR think reputation can influence cooperation and conflict among states (Schelling 1960; Mercer 1996; Copeland 1997; Sartori 2005; Tomz 2007; Crescenzi 2018). For example, the reputation of a state improves or aggravates the commitment problem and lack of information that are critical to cooperation and conflict. Moreover, the reputation of a

27 The concept of reputation is also somewhat similar to Chinese face culture, which is later discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
state is related to signaling a state’s competence, and thus a state’s reputation for competence can increase the likelihood of cooperation while a reputation for incompetence can raise the possibility of war (Crescenzi 2018, 80). Furthermore, reputations influence a state’s behavior. States do not want to have a bad reputation by violating international rules because they are afraid to be excluded by other states from future opportunities that can be beneficial to them (Brewster, 2009).

Furthermore, the perceived identity of a state can be relative, and thus can vary according to how other states perceive the identity of a given state. In other words, one state may have several different perceived identities by other states. For example, when the U.S. counted North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” along with Iran and Iraq, South Korea viewed North Korea as the partner in cooperating for peace on the Korean Peninsula, based on its engagement policy toward North Korea. So, North Korea had conflicting identities to the U.S. and to South Korea at the same time. In the same manner, Japan’s quest for normal state status might be viewed as a creating a more reliable ally to check the rise of China from the U.S. perspective, while it reminds South Korea and China of the resurrection of militarist Japan due to their memory of the past (Moon & Suh 2018).

Although the formation of proclaimed identity and perceived identity is not the primary concern of this dissertation, it is a topic worthy of brief analysis.\(^{28}\) First, the process of forming identity is similar to the process of making foreign policy in that identity is made rather than given and both proclaimed and perceived identities can

\(^{28}\) For the details about the formation of state identity, see Wendt (1994), Larson (2011), and Cho (2012).
change. Changes in identity include formation of identity, because change is the replacement of an old identity with a new one newly formed. Even though Wendt thinks that identity is relatively stable (Wendt 1992, 397), it does not necessarily mean that identity is unchangeable.29 Because identity is socially constructed (Wendt 1999), the process of change in identity occurs naturally through social interaction involving values, norms, beliefs, role conceptions, attitudes, stereotypes, and other cognitive phenomena (Chafez, Spirtaz & Frankel 1998, 10). This social interaction leads to the breakdown of the old identity, a critical reexamination of old ideas and practices, and construction of a new identity (Larson 2011, 60). After all, there are no permanent friends or enemies in international relations.

Second, individuals, especially national leaders and policy-elites, are the most influential in the process of change. Of course, national leaders and policy-elites are not the only factors to make or change foreign policy or identity, because institutions are not just a neutral channel through which leaders project their unmitigated influence on state behaviors. For example, states try to conform to international law on many issues, irrespective of a leader’s personality (Mitzen 2006, 352-353). Nevertheless, leaders are very influential in forming state identity and shaping foreign policy based on this state identity. In the history of U.S. foreign policy, presidential power and policy-elite preferences have played a significant role in swinging its foreign policy between peaceful engagement and containment (Viotti 2010). For example, it is the influence of U.S.

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29 Identity is relatively stable because it has some physical elements such as size or territory that are hard to change (Chafez, Spirtaz & Frankel 1998, 11-12).
President Trump leading the U.S. to push ahead with an engagement policy with North Korea, despite oppositions and skepticism from his staff and many in the international community (Sullivan 2019).

Third, both proclaimed and perceived identities are foundational to the foreign policy-making of a state. However, the roles of the two identities are somewhat different. Proclaimed identity has more influence on the proclaiming state’s behaviors and consequently affects other state’s perceived identity of the state, while perceived identity has a more influence on one state’s reaction to another state’s behavior, whose identity is perceived by the state.

A good example of the importance of proclaimed identity and perceived identity in shaping a state’s foreign policy is the case of South Korea. South Korea has shown a remarkable swinging between hard-line and soft-line policy against North Korea, according to the nature of the government in power. In other words, “[v]ariation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states” (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996, 52).

Before democratization in 1987, authoritarian governments of President Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan had regarded North Korea as the principal enemy. All these governments placed great importance on anti-communism for their legitimacy. There had been some exchanges and dialogue with North Korea intermittently, but it did not mean those governments changed their view on the identity of North Korea. Even though the Roh Tae-woo government is not taken as fully democratic, Roh’s regime did take a different foreign policy stance towards communist countries, including North Korea, shifting from the previous authoritarian governments’
hard-line stances in pursuit of detente after the Cold War.\textsuperscript{30} The Roh government established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union (then Russia) and China. It also pushed ahead with dialogue with Pyongyang (Cotton 1993; Kang 2012; Kim 2014). In subsequent civilian governments, conflicting North Korean policies emerged and have been controversial in South Korea. President Kim Young-sam was criticized for inconsistent policy toward North Korea by rapidly changing from a policy of economic cooperation (separating economic cooperation from political differences) to a policy of coercion in which both political and economic conflicts were heightened (Lee 1997; Park 1998; Paik 2012).

President Kim Dae-jung, Nobel Peace Prize laureate for his “sunshine policy,” firstly pursued engagement policy, assuming that North Korea would be a counterpart to cooperate and have dialogue (Bae & Moon 2014; Lee 2015). Thanks to the policy, Kim had the inter-Korean summit with hosted North Korean leader Kim Jung-il in 2000 for the first time in history. The Kim government pursued this engagement of “sunshine policy” despite the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the skirmish in the West Sea.\textsuperscript{31} Following Kim’s “sunshine policy,” his successor President Roh Moo-hyun held similar view on North Korea. He also hosted the second inter-Korean summit in 2007.

Two conservative Presidents, Lee and Park, followed two liberal Presidents (Kim and Roh) and had a different view on North Korea from their predecessors. They

\textsuperscript{30} Although President Roh was elected by direct presidential election after democratization movements in 1987, it is hard to describe his government as democratic because he was a military leader-turned politician and participated in an earlier military coup with his predecessor Chun.

\textsuperscript{31} For criticism on “sunshine policy,” see Kim (2018).
basically thought that the engagement policy toward North Korea for the past ten years allowed North Korea to develop nuclear programs (Park 2008; Suh 2009; Kim 2014; Kim 2017, 254-256). Thus, President Lee Myung-bak and President Park Geun-hye regarded North Korea as a security threat rather than as a cooperative partner. In particular, in addition to nuclear tests, there were two significant military provocations by North Korea during the Lee government. Even though the Park government’s North Korea policy could not become concrete because of her impeachment, it was not much different from that of the previous conservative government, given hardline measures including the shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex jointly operated with North Korea.

Liberal President Moon Jae-in brought the engagement policy back in inter-Korean relations, similar to his liberal predecessors. He asserted that he and his government would inherit President Kim Dae-Jung and President Roh Moo-Hyun’s efforts for reconciliation and cooperation between the North and the South (Chung Wa Dae 2017). Furthermore, he made clear that South Korea did not have a hostile policy toward North Korea (Chung Wa Dae 2017). Based on the perceived identity of North Korea as possible partner with South Korea, the Moon government pushed for a dialogue with North Korea patiently, despite missile launches and a nuclear test by North Korea.

**Table 3.1 The Identity of North Korea (NK) to the South Korean Governments**

|-------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|

32 Other than the presidents in Table 3.1, there were two other presidents who had no real power and several acting presidents in South Korea. All governments have a unification policy that is different from the NK policy. Only the four governments of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye named their NK policy.
As shown in Table 3.1, the South Korean governments have carried out their policy toward North Korea according to their perception of the identity of North Korea. Liberal presidents have employed engagement policy toward North Korea while conservative presidents have taken a hardline policy, particularly since democratization (Kim 2017). These changing identities of North Korea can be found in defense white papers of South Korea which reflect the changing identity of North Korea according to differing South Korean perceptions. For example, the *Defense White Paper 1995* stipulated North Korea as a major enemy but this notion was removed in the *Defense White Paper 2004* (Ministry of National Defense of Republic of Korea 1995; 2006).³³

The perception of North Korea as enemy reappeared in the *Defense White Paper 2010* with the expression that “the North Korean regime and its military (armed forces) will remain (as our) enemy.” This phrase remained in the recent *Defense White Paper 2016*

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³³ The Kim Dae-jung government that saw North Korea as the cooperative partner did not publish defense white papers from 2001 to 2003 to avoid the controversy over using the term of the enemy to North Korea.
(Ministry of National Defense of Republic of Korea 2017, 41). As expected, however, this expression was crossed out from the Defense White Paper 2018, which is the first defense white paper under the Moon government (Ministry of National Defense of Republic of Korea 2018).

In sum, state identity can be divided into the two identities of proclaimed identity by the state own self and perceived identity, which is how a state is perceived by other states. Both identities can play a role in making and conducting foreign policy: active foreign policy emerges largely from proclaimed identity and reactive foreign policy stems largely from perceived identity. The identities are influential, *inter alia*, to individuals, including national leaders. Chinese foreign policy should not be an exception to this theory of identities. Therefore, a hypothesis can be produced:

H1: *China’s foreign policy is influenced by its proclaimed identity and by perceived identities of others by China.*

**Chinese Proclaimed Identity: Great Power (Daguo, 大国)**

*The Notion of Great Power in Chinese Tradition*

China’s proclaimed identity is closely related to its positioning in world politics (Shambaugh 2013, 13; Pu 2017; Hoo 2018, xvii). A great power’s identity focuses on “the country’s past, present, and future in international relations, concentrating its capacity to project power in comparison to other countries with their own ambitions” (Rozman 1999, 384). Since China has extremely unbalanced development levels in many areas, it sometimes wants to be treated as a developing country, especially on the stage of
the world economy, while also wishing to be treated as a powerful state at other times in the political arena (Wu 2004, 58-59; The Editorial Board of the New York Times 2018). Despite its preference to be treated as a developing country (with favorable treatment in terms of international trade rules), China also wants to be seen as a great power nation that is different from other common developing countries. The conception of great power (Daguo, 大国) underlies these contradictory goals and is one of the longest lasting and most influential notions in China.

The notions of great power status, and the dichotomy of big and small states, have had a long history in Chinese thought. For example, when he was asked if he had a formula for diplomacy with neighboring states, Mencius answered that “[o]nly a man of humanity is able properly to put his large state at the service of a smaller one…Only the wise man is able properly to put his small state in the service of a larger one” (Mencius 2016, 27). The notion of big and small countries is also found in other ancient Chinese great thinkers, Confucius and Lao-Tzu. In the Analects, Confucius’ student Zilu used the term “great states” by saying “[l]et there be a state of a thousand war chariots, wedged between great neighboring states” (Confucius 2015, 56). It is more obvious in Daodejing by Lao-Tzu, where he explained that “when the large state takes the lower position it controls the small state. When a small state takes the lower position, it places itself under the control of the large state” (Lao-Tzu 2010, 28-29). The discourse of great power and the obligations of a small state towards that power has been reflected throughout Chinese

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34 Larry Kudlow, economic adviser to the U.S. President Trump, said “China is a first-world economy, behaving like a third-world economy” (Lester and Zhu 2018).
history. For example, in his letter to King Injo of Chosun dynasty, Hong Taiji, founder of the Qing Dynasty, said, “How dare you, small state, disobey great power of mine!” (Jangseogak Royal Archives). Furthermore, his successor, the emperor Qianlong, called his empire the Celestial Empire (天朝大国), whose original Chinese included daguo (大国), when he sent a letter to Lord Macartney from Britain's East India Company in 1793 (Peyrefitte 2013, 288-292).

As Confucius divided the grade of states by the number of war chariots, the notion of great power originated from conceptions of national power rather than the size of a state. As time passed, the word daguo (great power) became associated with assumptions of state virtues like generosity and responsibility, especially by Confucian political elites. For example, in most contexts dare (大人) and its opposite xiaoren (小人) do not respectively mean a tall and big person, nor a small and little one. Instead, dare indicates a gentleman who is respectable, whereas xiaoren refers to a person who is narrow-minded and petty. Similarly, a great power should act like a gentleman under Confucian tradition. Consequently, it is reasonable that the Chinese concept daguo(大国) is often translated as “great power” rather than “big country,” because the term implies greatness in non-material aspects, rather than greatness in territory and population. This notion of great power had has developed in Chinese thought into Sinocentrism that pursues influence through the education and transformation (jiaohua, 敎化) of other states, rather than through conquest and subjugation with armed forces (Zhang 2015; Hoo 2018, 2-3).
The notion of “great power” has a long history, tracing back to ancient times. Furthermore, it has been deep-rooted in Chinese society. Thus, the traits are easily found in contemporary Chinese politics. In fact, China’s proclaimed identity of great power had been severely damaged by the “Century of Humiliation” in modern China, which began with China’s defeat in the First Opium War and the loss of Hong Kong to Britain in 1842, and was followed by Japanese invasion (Gries 2005, 45-47). The discourse of great power revived with the end of the “Century of Humiliation” that was accompanied by China’s participation in the victory of the Allied Forces over imperial Japan in 1945, followed by the establishment of new China in 1949 (Gries 2005, 56-57; Kissinger 2011, 58). It is not surprising that Mao Zedong, who was the founding father of PRC and had a profound understanding of Chinese traditional thoughts, also expressed the notion of great power (Shen & Xia 2015, 101). In his *On Protracted War*, he reiterated this notion.

“We shall not be able to convince them merely by stating that Japan, though strong; is small, while China, though weak, is large….There is the additional factor that while Japan is a small country with a small territory, few resources, a small population and a limited number of soldiers, China is a big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plenty of soldiers, so that, besides the contrast between strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a small country, retrogression and meagre support, and a big country, progress and abundant support. This is the reason why China will never be subjugated.” (Mao 1938).

Mao had the ambition to re-position China in the world as a great power. This goal is well reflected in his renowned speech, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up,” in which he was very confident that China “shall be able to win speedy victory on the

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35 The discourse of the “Century of Humiliation” has been often used to promote Chinese nationalism with the notion of revival of Great China (Callahan 2010).
economic front” and “shall emerge in the world as a nation with an advanced culture” because “[t]he Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation” in addition to having the very favorable conditions of large population and territory (Mao 1949).

The current Chinese, President Xi Jinping, oft-mentioned as reminiscent of Mao (Zhao 2016), also has the notion of great power. He came up with a “new type of great power relations (xinxingdaguoguanxi, 新型大国关系)” and has been trying to construct relations with the U.S. based on this notion. This concept of China having “great power relations” among major states has gradually developed since the late 1990s (Zeng 2016), but it was Xi who made the idea attract attention during his visit to the U.S. in 2012 when he was still the Vice President of China. It is based on the framework of his predecessor Jiang Zemin that “the major powers are the key, surrounding areas are the first priority, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateral forums are the important state” (Shambaugh 2013, 14). Furthermore, President Xi declared his new foreign policy by focusing on “major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics (Zhongguotesedaguowaijiao, 中国特色大国外交).” Although China stresses that its diplomacy advocates equality between all countries regardless of their size (Wang 2013),

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36 The translation is quoted from Shambaugh(2013). For this phrase and framework of a new type of great power relations, see the news article from People’s Daily by Chang, Kang & Chen (2016).

37 In an address at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in Beijing on June 2-23 in 2018, President Xi has called for efforts to break new ground in major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, with the guidance of the thought on the diplomacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era. He suggested ten points for foreign policy and the second was to “advance major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics to fulfill the mission of realizing national rejuvenation” (Yan 2018).
this statement does not mean that Chinese leaders do not maintain a notion of “great powers” which have unique power and responsibilities in the world. When President Xi visited Brunei, he contributed to a Brunei newspaper. Even though his writing had the phrase “countries of different sizes” in English, the Chinese version of it was “big and small countries” (Xi 2018a). This notion of great power based on the differentiation between a country with substantial power, and a small and weak country, is well summarized by the remark by Shen Dingli, a Chinese professor at Fudan University: “China is a Big Power; we can handle any country one-on-one. No one should try to lead us; no one should tell us what to do” (Shambaugh 2013, 15).

The notion of great power has moved through Chinese thought from ancient times to the present. The continuing influence of the concept is supported by qualitative content analysis of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Archive (CFMSA). The term daguo—referring to great power—was found 554 times in the CFMSA and most of them were used to address China itself. According to the usage of these terms in the CFMSA, China is a great power in terms of economics, production, consumption, population, development model, and military power.38 As seen in the Figure 3.1, the use of term daguo has been increasing over time. Moreover, it has sharply risen since the inauguration of President Xi. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that China uses the term daguo in Chinese, but not all uses of daguo are translated into “great power” in English. For example, China addressed Brazil as a great power in the developing world, and Mexico

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38 Other than China, the result show that China often uses the term to the U.S., Russia, and India while seldom uses it to describe other major powers such as Japan, France, or Germany.
as a great power in Latin America, but in the English translation Brazil was called a “major developing country” and Mexico was named as a “major country.”

Figure 3.1 Frequency of “Great Power” in Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Archive. Source: CFMSA.

Figure 3.2 Word Cloud of Chinese Proclaimed Identities. Source: CFMSA.
The more specific identity proclaimed by China can be captured by various expressions to modify descriptions of China by Chinese foreign ministry spokespersons. Since these expressions are used by spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they are official. Among these descriptions, “responsible great power” has been used the most, as seen in the Figure 3.2.39 This term was used 78 times in the CFMSA database I consulted. The term was followed by usage of the phrase “great power of developing” which appeared in several English translations of Chinese statements. The “great power of developing” phrase is used 40 times. On the contrary, China rarely addresses itself as a “global great power” (four times), a “nuclear great power” (one time), or a “globally influential great power” (one time).

The Rise of Responsible Great Power

China is a great power. It might have only been one of the large-sized countries in the world, despite its international status of being a nuclear power and its membership in the U.N. Security Council, but in fact China has become a great power on the world stage. In spite of its low GDP per capita, China is expanding the influence over other states in economic, military, and cultural realms and is become a great power. What kind of great power will China be? This question has been a very hot issue in China. Evidence of the overheated debate is provided by the high popularity of a series of TV documentaries, such as the Rise of the Great Powers (Daguojueqi, 大国崛起) and the Road to Revival (Fuxingzhilu, 复兴之路) (Mueller 2013).

39 Of the phrases containing daguo, the term “a new type of great power relations” is the most used in the press conference of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, which recorded one hundred uses of that term.
As briefly discussed in an earlier part of this dissertation the answer to the question of what kind of great power China would become is most typically “Responsible Great Power” (fuzerendaguo, 責任大国), in official proclamations. Even though the concept of the responsible great power of China has attracted great attention in recent years, the discussion can first be traced back to the 1990s when the rise of China came into the spotlight. For example, Deng Xiaoping, known as the architect of Chinese reform and opening up, stated in his speech “Seize the Opportunity to Develop the Economy” that “we cannot simply do nothing in international affairs. We have to make our contribution. In what respect? I think we should help promote the establishment of a new international political and economic order” (Deng 1990).

Following Deng, Jiang Zemin put emphasis on the notion of responsible great power during his term. In April 1997, President Jiang used the term officially in his speech before the State Duma of Russia. He stated that both China and Russia, as great powers and permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, had an important responsibility to safeguard world peace and stability (Larson 2015, 337). In accordance with such claims, the notion of responsible great power became an important goal of Chinese foreign policy in the 1990s (Xiao 2003, 47).

As evidence of its commitment to behaving as a responsible great power, China did not devalue its currency during the Asian financial crisis in 1997 despite the risk of its

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40 It is believed that Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou originated use of the term in China in his article of “Chinese Diplomacy Oriented Toward the 21st Century” in 1999 (Shirk 2007, 107).

41 Deng opposes the notion that President Jiang is responsible for the origin of the responsible great power term. He argues that no national leaders contributed to the origin of the term (Deng 2015, 118).
own economic loss due to decreased exports (Chan 2001, 55). The result was double positive effects on China’s image: China demonstrated economic robustness in bearing the loss of trade and was seen as a responsible great power, preventing another round of crisis by sacrificing itself (Kim 2003, 63). Accordingly, Tang Jiaxuan, then foreign minister, ranked this case as one of the examples of China fulfilling its great power responsibility in foreign policy during Jiang’s era (Tang 2002). Even though in the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang’s successor, China seemed to be more reluctant to take on active and broad international responsibilities (Zhao 2012), the notion of responsible great power continued to shape China’s foreign policy goals (Cho & Jeong 2008, 469). For example, Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi put stress on acting as “a responsible big country” (big in terms of power), despite his emphasis on holding onto a low-profile foreign policy at the same time (Zhao 2013, 119).

President Xi brought the notion of responsible great power back into the core of Chinese foreign policy, which had been relatively neglected during Hu’s era. President Xi repeatedly emphasized China’s role as a responsible great power. For example, in his speech at Boao Forum for Asia in 2015, he asserted that “Being a big country means shouldering greater responsibilities for regional and world peace and development, as opposed to seeking a greater monopoly over regional and world affairs” (Xi 2015). His emphasis on the notion of responsible great power status is also found in his foreign policy of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. China is a great power, he claims, so it should have great power’s “way of thinking (心态), sense of responsibility (担当) and manner (气度)” (Hu 2019, 2). Furthermore, in the dimension of diplomacy, China, as a great power, believes that a great power is responsible for
providing public goods (Su 2018). Furthermore, in an article that explains the meaning of such diplomacy, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that “as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a developing country, China needs to consider and contribute to global wellbeing, shoulder its due international responsibilities and play its role as a great power in promoting common development.” In addition, he added that China will “continue to act as a responsible great power to contribute to world peace, promote global development, and uphold the international order” (Wang 2018 translated by Li).

Given such emphasis by Chinese national leaders, the notion of responsible great power is one of the most significant identities proclaimed by China. The attention to this concept can be identified by the number of news articles in the People’s Daily. As seen in Figure 3.3, the number of articles containing the term “responsible great power” (fuzerendaguo, 负责任大国) in the body has constantly increasing over the past two decades. According to the Database of the People’s Daily (人民日报图文数据库), which provides articles from 1946, articles that had the term “great power” in its body or the title only appeared for the first time in 1998 and 2008, respectively. The article in 1998 celebrated the 20th anniversary of China’s reform and opening up policy, and the article in 2008 applauded the Chinese navy for successfully completing a mission to protect ships in the Gulf of Aden (Database of the People’s Daily). Moreover, the number of articles with “responsible great power” in the title or body has dramatically increased since 2008. Interestingly, these two years of 1998 and 2008 were the beginning of two financial crises: the Asian crisis from 1997 to 1999 and the global economic crisis from 2007 to 2008. Thus, it can be assumed that the role of China as a great power was more
vigorously discussed in the times of financial crises. On the other hand, the number of articles with the responsible great power in the title alone shows no significant change.

Figure 3.3 Number of Articles using the term "Responsible Great Power" in the People's Daily. Source: Database of the People’s Daily (人民日报图文数据库)

The trend of an increasing number of People’s Daily articles referencing responsible great power can also be found in Korean newspapers. By using BIGKINDS (Korean Integrated News Database System) provided by the Korea Press Foundation, a keyword search was run with the key word combination of 中国 (China) & 책임 (responsibility) or 中国 (China) & 대국 (Big country), in Korean 55,530,070 newspapers articles from the 1980s to the present. The very similar tendency of a rapid increase in articles mentioning Chinese great power is seen in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 Number of Articles using the term "Responsible China" or "China Great Power." Source: Korean Integrated News Database System (KINDS)

The proclaimed identity of responsible great power emerged due to a nexus between China’s own needs and other states’ request for greater Chinese responsibility in the world, especially requests from the U.S. In terms of meeting China’s own needs, the discourse of responsible great power began to be actively discussed when the rise of China in the 1990s began to be seen as a threat in the West (Broomfield 2003). It was not good for China to be seen as a threat to West, since China wanted to enjoy its robust development period for a longer time so as to achieve its goal to realize xiaokang (小康) society in China, which means a moderately prosperous society where all Chinese people are well off, without worries about the necessaries of life. So, China needed to address its perceived threat to the Wests by playing a “responsible great power” role in international affairs in order to reassure Western nations, and thereby not upend diplomatic and trade relations which might slow down Chinese growth. At the same time, international society came to expect China’s increasing role in international affairs in terms of burden-sharing.
and responsibly engaging the international system. For example, in his remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in 2005, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick responded to an article titled “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status” in *Foreign Affairs* by Zheng Bijian, who was an influential theorist to China’s leaders. Zoellick proposed that “[w]e need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success” (Zoellick 2005).

Due to these double driving forces of domestic needs and international expectations, the proclaimed identity of responsible great power has increasingly been the center of Chinese foreign policy. Even as China has embraced a proclaimed identity as a responsible great power, the country has disappointed the international community in some issues, including perceived inadequate action to address climate change. In fact, China artfully employs its contradictory identities, i.e., it claims status as a developing country regarding the issue of climate change, so as to avoid the great power’s responsibility to lead the way in adopting environmentally responsible growth practices. Even though there might be controversy over the actual extent of Chinese responsibilities, China has demonstrated a commitment to responsible great power status through its behaviors during the Asian financial crisis and by joining important treaties for the world peace such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. In the same way, China’s proclaimed identity as responsible great power is likely to affect

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42 Deng(2015) and Mao(2017) think Zoellick’s remarks as the origin of the debate on the responsible great power.
its policy toward North and South Korea, which leads to the following hypotheses of this dissertation.

H1a: *China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward North Korea.*

H1b: *China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward South Korea.*

H1c: *China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward Japan.*

**Perceived Identities of Three Neighbors by China**

Perceived state identity is literally how a state’s identity is perceived by other states. It may be the same as a proclaimed identity or different from it. For example, socialist China wants to have an image of responsible great power that promotes democracy in international relations (Wang 2014), but other national does not necessarily accept this image as it proclaimed. In addition, the U.S. designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism despite North Korea’s repeated claim of its objection to terrorism. South Korea also has very confused proclaimed and perceived identities. For example, South Korea often proclaims that it adopts “middle power diplomacy” in its foreign policy, and South Korea elites often present their country as a middle power (Kim 2016; Robertson 2018). According to a survey by the *US News & World Report*, however, South Korea is ranked at 10th place in the most powerful countries of the world and 22nd place in the overall best countries respectively in 2019 (US News & World Report 2019). These examples of China, North and South Korea show the reality of how perceived identity can vary among nations, and conflict with a nation’s proclaimed identity.
How have the identities of North Korean, South Korea, and Japan been perceived by China? One possible example is that China imagines South Korea as “a former tributary periphery, a US ally, a democratic market economy, and a rising but ambivalent regional power” (Lee 2018, 35). Although this view might be plausible in explaining the fact-based identity of South Korea, it lacks depth in explaining the psychological perception of South Korea that might exert influence on foreign policy, especially at level of influencing individual leaders.

For perceived identity, it is often not important what others really are, but how they are perceived. The identities of the two Koreas and of Japan to China can be simply split into ‘friend’ or ‘non-friend.’ Even though there might be conflicts between ‘friends’ in state relations, there should be no war in their relations. Put simply, China ought to and is willing to treat North Korea, South Korea, or Japan as a friend when it feels they are friends, and would reasonably treat these countries as a non-friend when it feels they are non-friends. The perceived identity of a nation as a friend or a non-friend will reasonably shape foreign policy towards a nation. This insight gives rise to the hypotheses below.

H1d: China behaves according to its perceived identity of North Korea in Sino-North Korean relations

H1e: China behaves according to its perceived identity of South Korea in Sino-South Korean relations.

H1f: China behaves according to its perceived identity of Japan in Sino-Japanese relations.

To identify the level of friendship in Sino-North Korean, Sino-South Korean, and Sino-Japanese relations, three measurements are used in the case studies. They are social
bonds, social contacts, and expression of intimacy. The notion of national friendship has relatively recently introduced to IR and foreign policy (Hoef & Oelsner 2018). Despite the increasing interest in relations between friendship and foreign policy, most studies only focus on the types of friendship at the international level or the possibility of peace through friendship (Gartzke & Weisiger 2012).

Measurements of friendship have usually been developed in psychology. Nevertheless, studies in psychology mostly put emphasis on developing various scales to measure friendship by using survey methods, completely relying on individual respondents (Parker & Asher 1993; Sharabany 1994). However, this type of measurement is not feasible for states because states cannot be surveyed, and in any case the degree of friendship as measured on a psychology scale is not of interest to this study. In fact, for this study, the three measurements mentioned earlier (social bonds, social contacts, and expressions of intimacy) are simple but sufficient to determine whether two states are friends or not.

First, the measure of social bonds will indicate any binding or alliance between states. Alliance is a strong evidence of these social bonds (Gartzke & Weisinger 2012). However, examining only evidence of formal alliance is too strict a threshold for China, in that China has not officially pursued alliances with other nations. So, evidence of diplomatic ties are also considered to demonstrate social bonds at a minimum level in this study. Second, social contacts are measured through evidence of meetings and exchanges of leaders and political elites between two states. In general, if two states are not friends, they do not have summits or top-level meetings between leaders because a summit is generally accompanied by a high political burden. Last, expressions of intimacy means
words or behaviors that reflect friendship. One state’s positive expression of relations with the other state and one’s actions that benefit the other are regarded as expressions of intimacy.

**North Korea: From “Blood Alliance” to Strategic Asset and Liability**

*The Building of “Blood Alliance”*

China has never used this term “blood alliance” officially. However, it has long been used to describe Sino-North Korean relations because it has been the symbolic wording for the very close relationship between the two countries. China uses “traditional friendship” to describe relations with North Korea. On the contrary, North Korea often describes its relations with China as “forged in blood.” For example, the North Korean party newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*, recalled Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s gift of a flower to North Korean leader Kim Il-sung as the symbol of the alliance forged in blood (Shim 2018). Similarly, South Korea and the U.S. also use this expression of “forged in blood” to describe their alliance (U.S. Army 2017). Thus, whether the term is

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43 Searching the phrase “blood alliance (xuemeng, 血盟)” on the Database of People’s Daily, China National Knowledge Infrastructure, and the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC returns no results.

44 When Chinese President Xi Jinping first met with Korean President Moon Jae-in on the eve of G20 Summit in Berlin in 2017, the South Korean presidential office, Chungwadae (Blue House), released to the press that Chinese President Xi mentioned “blood alliance” in talking about North Korean issue. The truth was found that President Xi described the Sino-North Korean relations as “forged in blood” (xianxueningcheng, 鲜血凝成) in the past.

45 There are misunderstandings in South Korean media that the term “traditional friendship” emerged only after the normalization of China and South Korea relations in 1992. One alleged source for this misunderstanding is an article from the *People’s Daily* in 1992 which used the expression. However, there are many articles from the *People’s Daily* Database that used the term “traditional friendship” before 1992, tracing back to 1958.
officially used by China is not critical at all. Whatever it is called, the relations of China and North Korea have been very close, like a “blood alliance.”

This close relationship can be traced back to the 1910s when Chinese and Korean forces engaged together in armed struggles against imperial Japan. In particular, Korean communists and Chinese communists in Northeast China helped each other with anti-Japanese activities, set up their communist organizations together, and carried out communist revolution against the Kuomintang (KMT) by providing personnel, weapons, and other war materials (Lee 2016). For instance, at least three competent combat units of the Chinese army were mostly composed of ethnic Koreans (Chen 2003, 4; Jin 2015, 110; Shen & Xia 2018, 28). So, they had very close relations at all levels of individuals, communist parties, and states (Shen & Xia 2018, 15-17). Kim Il-Sung, who later became the North Korean leader, formed personal relationships with Chinese leaders and political elites through this process (Chen 2003, 4). Based on these relationships, China established diplomatic ties with North Korea in October 6, 1949 by mutual state recognition (Wertz, Oh & Kim 2016).

This close relationship was consolidated by brotherhood through the Korean War. With a goal to “Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,” China decided to

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46 There is also the opposite argument that the Sino-North Korean relations were not solid because they had different interests. For details of this argument, see Shen & Xia (2015; 2018).

47 Though the close relationship was deepened during the Korean war, there were some conflicts during the war between China and North Korea. Notable conflicts emerged over: 1) Kim Il-Sung’s insistence on advancing the PLA further to the South, 2) Kim’s insistence on launching a counteroffensive against the U.S. troops, 3) Kim’s endeavor to secure control over the railway system, 4) Kim’s opposition to attacking the South before reaching an armistice (Shen 2003, 5; Shen & Xia 2018, 44-76).
participate in the Korean War. Mao Zedong had the conception that North Korea was as close as lips to teeth, as if the lips were gone, the teeth would be cold.

The completion of building the “blood alliance” was signaled by signing the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty in 1961. The Treaty has two significant features. First, it has a tripwire clause. According to Article II,

“[t]he Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal” (Peking Review 1961, 5).

Second, it has no expiration. Article VII includes a provision that “[t]he present Treaty will remain in force until the Contracting Parties agree on its amendment or termination” (Peking Review 1961, 5).48

In sum, China had built a perceived identity of North Korea as a close friend, like blood brothers, from the very establishment of North Korea. It has treated North Korea as the close friend according to this perceived identity. One example of their intimacy are songs sung together by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Military Anthem of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) during the Korean War. The songs were the military anthems of PLA and NKPA, composed by Chung Yul-song (Zheng Lucheng in Chinese). He was Korea-born Chinese who had worked in China for the anti-Japanese movement and for Korea’s independence during the 1930s and 1940s (Kim

48 It was surprisingly released by Chinese state media in 2011 that the treaty actually has an expiration every 20 years and was already renewed in 1981 and 2001 (Jeon 2018). So, the next renewal is due in 2021.
Given the core status of the military in China and North Korea, the fact that their military anthems were composed by the same person indicates their very close relationship.

*Oscillating but Still Friendly*

In the 1960s, China and North Korea experienced deterioration in their relations because of different views on Brezhnev’s Soviet Union, on Soviet assistance to Vietnam, and on the Cultural Revolution. China had a troubled relationship with the Soviet Union while North Korea was gaining substantial material support from it. Moreover, China was opposed to participating in “united action” in the Vietnam War whereas North Korea supported it openly. During the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards in China targeted Kim Il-Sung by criticizing that North Korea had degenerated into “revisionist country” (Chen 2003, 7; Cheng 2015, 129-130). However, the tense relations thawed following the Pueblo Incident in 1968 when North Korea seized a U.S. ship and its crew that was gathering intelligence. China announced that it firmly supported “the legitimate position of the North Korean government” (Cheng 2015, 131). Following this support, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai paid an official visit to North Korea. In his speech at an official dinner, he stressed that “China and North Korea are neighbors connected by mountains and rivers, Chinese and North Korean have traditional friendship and very close relationship as if lips and teeth are mutually dependent” (Tianshanwang 2014).

In the 1970s, China changed its foreign policy to achieve rapprochement with the U.S. and opened its economic policy to limited market reforms. North Korea was unsatisfied with China’s new policy orientation towards the Western world. Despite North Korea’s dissatisfaction, however, China wanted to maintain friendly relations with
Pyongyang - even if they were not as close as they used to be - because it did not want to be isolated from the communist bloc (Shen & Xia 2018, 227-228). Overall, relations without serious problems were continuous until the 1980s because China had to concentrate on its economic growth and North Korea had to prepare for the succession of power to Kim Jung-Il. The most threatening crisis in Sino-North Korean relations popped up in the 1990s when China decided to normalize diplomatic relations with South Korea.

Nevertheless, these tensions did not affect the Chinese view of North Korea. From the North Korean perspective, this action was seen as a betrayal, but China still thought of North Korea as a friend. On August 25, 1992, the next day after normalization, an official stated that “China will continue to develop its relations of neighbor, friendship, and cooperation with North Korea. Any treaties between China and North Korea will never change” (Hiraiwa 2013, 321). Also, an editorial from the People’s Daily on September 9, 1992, asserted that “the friendship between China and North Korea has been built on a solid foundation by revolutionists such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Kim Il-Sung” (Hiraiwa 2013, 329).

In short, from the 1970s to the 1990s, Sino-North Korean relations have experienced some fluctuations, but have continued to be friendly, as perceived by China at least. Given the fact that there had been no mutual visit by top leaders of the two countries for almost seven years, North Korea likely felt some betrayal. Moreover, trade between the two countries had continuously decreased to less than half its peak levels (Chen 2003, 9). So, it is true that the relationship between the two countries is not what it used to be.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that China’s perception of North Korea as a friend changed. Even though there had been no meeting between top leaders of the two countries, China tried to continue the exchanges between them. For example, in 1993, Hu Jintao, then a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China, and who later became China’s President following Jiang Zemin, visited Pyongyang with his delegation to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the end of the Korean War (Lim & Cha 2017).

Furthermore, China remained the largest outside supplier for food and oil to North Korea during this period (Chen 2003, 9). Therefore, China’s perceived identity of North Korea in the 1970s to the 1990s changed from best friend to just friend. This identity is well expressed by President Jiang Zemin’s remark. When he met with the Japanese delegation led by Ishida Koshiro, Chairman of Komeito, (公明党) on October 8, 1991, President Jiang said that “North Korea was a comrade in a past war. We maintain close ties, but it is not an ally” (Hiraiwa 2013, 312-313; Park & Kim 2014).

**Strategic Asset and Liability**

Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese perceived identity of North Korea has been gradually changing once again. As the position of North Korea moved from the best friend to a friend, China began to think of this friend’s meaning to her, which was shaped by notions of the roles or functions of North Korea to China. This movement was fueled by Pyongyang’s obsession with developing nuclear weapons. According to Korean China expert Kim Heungkyu, three schools of thought emerged in China the mid-1990s with differing idea for how to approach North Korea’s nuclear goals: the Traditional Geopolitics School, the Developing Country School, and the Rising Great Power
Diplomacy School (Kim 2010). The Traditional Geopolitics School, which is composed of a traditional geopolitics group and the socialist group, views North Korea as a special friend who can function as a buffer zone for China. The Developing Country Diplomacy School, which pursues China’s continued economic growth, and the Rising Great Power Diplomacy School, which urges China to take more action in engaging international affairs, both regard North Korea as a burdensome friend (International Crisis Group 2009).

Those two views disintegrated into several positions in the era of President Xi Jinping: unconditional support for North Korea, abandonment of North Korea, maintenance of status quo, imposition of limited sanctions, imposition of strict sanctions, political realism, passive management, or indifference (Kim 2017, 4). Nevertheless, these various positions can be largely converged into three arguments: abandoning, protecting, or persuading a friend. The extreme option to abandon North Korea is not realistic at this moment because it is so dramatic and unattractive to China. In fact, China held a conference to discuss this option at a session titled “Friendship with Foreign Countries” in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 2013 (Wang 2014, 6). But this conference was more of a gesture to warn North Korea for its third nuclear test rather than serious policy debate over possible abandonment of the relationship, because then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi confirmed that there was no fundamental change in the Chinese policy toward North Korea after the conference. Thus, Chinese policy toward North Korea moves between those two conflicting perceived identities of North Korea as either a useful friend or a troublemaker friend—but a friend in the end.
China’s ambivalent attitudes toward North Korean nuclear issues are explained by how China sways between those two perceived identities of its friend. When the first North Korean nuclear crisis occurred in 1993, triggered by Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), China abstained in the vote for the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 825 that urged North Korea to reconsider its announcement to withdraw from the NPT and abide by its international obligations (UNSC 1993; UNBISNET Voting Record Search). This was the only abstinence made by a member of UNSC on a total of 21 resolutions concerning North Korean nuclear and missile issues until 2018.\textsuperscript{49} Previously, China has voted for all UNSC negative resolutions concerning North Korean nuclear and missile tests since 1993, in spite of these tests being coordinated in advance between China and North Korea.

In addition, contrary to its attitude in the first crisis, China took a more active role in addressing the second North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 2000s. When it comes to nuclear tests by North Korea, China’s behavior has gradually changed since the first test in 2006. Even though China repeatedly expressed its resolute opposition to North Korean nuclear tests, it was reluctant to agree to impose economic sanctions against North Korea. However, following the fourth test, China has changed its position to vote for economic sanctions, along with practically implementing them.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{49} Along with China, Pakistan abstained from Resolution 825.

\textsuperscript{50} In fact, China agreed to impose sanctions against North Korea before 2016, but was very passive in implementing sanctions. For example, when the U.S. wanted to blacklist more than forth North Korean companies, China agreed to list only three of them (Glaser & Billingsley 2012, 9-11).
China is in a relationship with North Korea where Beijing can change its face with discontent or fury to Pyongyang but it cannot completely turn its back (bianlianbufanlian, 變臉不翻臉) (Park 2014, 82). In other words, China has a mixed perceived identity of North Korea. On the one hand, North Korea is a strategic asset for China by serving as a physical and psychological buffer zone from the possible conflict with the U.S. At the same time, North Korean actions create a strategic burden for China, in that China must shoulder pressure from the international community, including the U.S., due to North Korea’s wrongdoings. The perception of a troubled friendship with North Korea was reinforced by the Japanese Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 2011. The nuclear accident fundamentally changed Chinese awareness of North Korea's nuclear program from trouble to danger. Many Chinese scholars and government officials began to pay more attention to the reliability of North Korean nuclear technologies (Lee & Lee 2012). China realized that even if North Korean nuclear missiles would not aim at China, China could not be free from the effects of a possible nuclear accident because North Korean nuclear facilities are located near the border area with China and nuclear tests can affect volcanic activities of Mt. Paektu (Cao & Yang 2016).

In short, China still perceives North Korea as a friend, useful but troublesome, and treats it as a friend in a broad meaning. Diplomatic ties and the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty demonstrate that China and North Korea have strong social bonds to each other. Meetings, including summits between top leaders and political elites from the two countries, show that China and North Korea have frequent and close social contacts. They have also various expressions of intimacy to each other. For instance, North Korea is a state that has the most similar voting patterns
to that of China, with 92.16% in agreement from 1971 to 2017 at the UN General Assembly (Fu 2018). Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC generally takes charge of high-level meetings between states. In additional, the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee (Zhonggongzhongyangduiwailianluobu, 中共中央对外联络部) organizes exchanges with North Korea, including every summit, because both China and North Korea are the party-states governed by communist parties. As a result, China and North Korea are friends.

**South Korea: From Enemy to Friend**

**A Friend’s Enemy**

The PRC and the DPRK were born to be friends while the PRC and the ROK were born to be enemies. When the communist PRC established in mainland China in 1949, there was already the anti-communist ROK in South Korea. Even though some South Koreans had personal relations with Sun Yat Sen, held in high respect by both the PRC in the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, it was of no use for establishing relations between the PRC and South Korea in that the two countries had different ideologies for their foundation of the state. There was no consideration of seeking common grounds while accepting differences (qiucuntongyi, 求存同異), which was the Chinese favored rhetoric for advancing practical interests. For example, when the *People’s Daily* reported the establishment of the Korean government and the inauguration of President Rhee Syngman on August 12, 1948, it used unrefined words such as “imperialist,” “treacherous guy,” and “puppet” (*People’s Daily*, 1948). So, it was a corollary that the two countries had no diplomatic ties. China recognized North Korea
as the only legitimate regime on the Korean Peninsula and South Korea recognized Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China. This antagonistic relationship between China and South Korea was deepened by the Korean War. They became real enemies who fiercely fought each other on the battlefield. Additionally, undermining the potential of good relations, Mao Zedong’s eldest son, Mao Anying was killed in the Korea War by U.S. bombing (Roblin 2017).

These hostile relations between the two countries continued until the early 1970s. There had been encounters occasionally in the 1960s. For example, sports teams from the two countries, such as ping pong and volleyball teams, had games at an international match (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1965; 1969). In addition to the civilian-level encounters, there were accidental contacts at the government level. For instance, people from the two countries had armistice meetings at the Panmunjom demilitarized area and two Chinese pilots defected to South Korea by flying their aircrafts there in 1961 (Chung 2007, 30). China was invited to a non-nuclear states conference held at the UN where South Korea attended (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1968). But these contacts were not between friends, and China’s perceived identity of South Korea from the 1940s to the 1960s, *i.e.* in Mao’s era, was nothing more than an enemy.

**Probable Good Neighbor**

As detente spread over the world, China’s view on South Korea changed gradually, albeit very slowly. For example, Chinese newspapers began to use different

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51 Although there were very few direct exchanges between China and South Korea, it does not mean that they had no interest in each other. Media search results from the *People’s Daily* and the Naver News Library show that newspapers in each country reported on each other almost every day.
language for South Korea. The *People’s Daily* changed to call South Korean leaders as “Park Chung Hee authorities (*Piao Zheng Xi dangju*, 朴正熙当局)” in the 1970s instead of describing leaders as a “Park Chung Hee puppet regime (*Piao Zheng Xi kuileidangu*, 朴正熙傀儡当局)” in the 1960s (*People’s Daily Database*). However, it was South Korea that was most active in seeking improved relations. In 1971, South Korean foreign minister Kim Yong Sik said that the Korean government was examining expanding trade with the PRC in a feasible direction (*Kyunghyang Shinmun* 1971). In 1973, South Korea radically changed its foreign policy especially toward the communist bloc by abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine that originated from West Germany’s foreign policy that it would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized East Germany. Moreover, Seoul suggested directly to Beijing that the two countries should have the negotiations for delineating the boundaries of the continental shelf between two countries and, the following year, lifted the ban on postal exchanges with communist countries including China (Chung 2007, 31).

On the other hand, China seemed to control the speed of exchanges with South Korea. China felt that since it already had the normalization with the U.S. and Japan in 1979 and 1972 respectively, there was no reason to speed up normalization with South Korea. Furthermore, it could not help but pay careful attention to its friend North Korea. So, when he met with a Japanese press delegation in March 1980, Deng Xiaoping

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52 Although he did not explicitly explain it, Chung (2007) stated that the *People’s Daily* on January 27, 1979 was the first time the term “Park Chung Hee authorities” was used in the newspaper. This is not the case because there were many articles that referred to the South Korean government as “Park Chung Hee authorities” before 1979.
stressed, “it would not be in China’s best interest to develop relations with South Korea” (Lee 1996, 106). Although some believe that Deng’s words were the only a diplomatic tactic to reassure North Korea (Chung 2007, 57), it was too early to judge whether Chinese perceived identity of South Korea had dramatically altered from enemy to potential partner. The Sino-South Korean relations during the period of the 1970s and the early 1980s can be summarized with then Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua’s words that the “gate remained closed but not locked” (Chung 2007, 33; Ye 2017, 15).

The Chinese unlocked gate increasingly opened to South Korea since the 1980s. A historical incident occurred on May 5, 1983. A Chinese civilian aircraft headed from Shenyang to Shanghai, which had 92 passengers and 5 crew members, was hijacked by six Chinese armed people and landed at a US army base in Chunchon, South Korea (Haberman 1983). Before this incident, there were two Chinese airplane defections to South Korea by Chinese air force pilots in 1982 and 1983 (Yu 1999, 205). China had no response to the incidents (Cho 2015). But this time was quite different. China immediately sent a telegram to Seoul that they would dispatch a delegation to resolve the matter (Chung 2007, 33). The incident was settled well, to the satisfaction of both countries. All passengers and crews with the aircraft returned to China and the hijackers were sent to Taiwan as they wanted after temporary imprisonment (Chung 2007, 33).

The most significant result of this resolution was that it laid the groundwork for a normalization process between China and South Korea. First, this incident and the visit of the Chinese delegation to South Korea was the first official contact between two countries since the end of the Korean War. Second, both used formal country names in communicating with or about each other. Before this incidente, South Korea referred to
China as Junggong (중공) which meant a Chinese communist country instead of the People’s Republic of China. In South Korea at that time, the term “China” was used only to indicate the Republic of China (Taiwan). Similarly, China called South Korea as nanchaoxian (南朝鲜) which indicated South of Chosun instead of the Republic of Korea (Dae Han Min Guk), because it called North Korea as just Chosun. But in its telegram regarding the hijacking incident, China for the first time used the formal name of the Republic of Korea (Chung 2007, 33).

Furthermore, representatives from the two countries signed a memorandum for the matter by using their formal national names. Despite some conflict over using the official names on the document, they agreed to sign by removing the expression of “on behalf of the government” (Lee 2009, 400; Fenghuangwang 2010). The process of negotiation served as momentum that helped China change the perceived identity of South Korea from an enemy (or friend’s enemy) to a good neighbor— and China subsequently incrementally expanded unofficial contacts with South Korea (Liu 1991, 53; Li 2009, 401-404). Gong Ro-myung, then the head of the Korean representative and later foreign minister, believed that China understood South Korea’s sincere intention that it did not have hostility anymore and wanted to establish a constructive relationship with China (Roh & Jung 2011).

Following these events, open trade between China and South Korea initiated in 1979 (Liu 1991, 53). Although some trade occurred and was an open secret before that
time\textsuperscript{53}, the trade was clandestine and indirect, via Singapore and Hong Kong, because both countries did not want to provoke their friends, North Korea and Taiwan (Chung 2007, 34-35). Nonetheless, the trade volume between the two countries dramatically increasing by more than ten times during the 1980s (Chung 2007, 35-41; Snyder 2009, 40-42). The prediction of Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, that normalization with South Korea would take some time was overturned by the sharp increase in trade and a closer economic relationship thanks to it (Snyder 2009, 42). China was therefore ready to make friends with South Korea by the late 1980s.

\textit{Win-Win Friend}

South Korea became a friend to China with the normalization of their diplomatic relations on August 24, 1992. Furthermore, their relations have been closer politically and economically since the normalization. According to the joint communique describing the normalization, the two countries had agreed to “develop durable good-neighborly relations of cooperation” (UPI 1992). The good-neighborly relations were confirmed when Chinese President Jiang Zemin first paid a state visit to Seoul. Having conversations about mutual concerns, the two leaders concluded that China and South Korea could be good neighbors against the bad neighbor of Japan because of their common historical tragedy of Japanese colonial rule (Snyder 2009, 88).

The good-neighborly relations were upgraded to a “cooperative partnership for the twenty-first century” in November 1998 when Korean President Kim Dae-jung

\textsuperscript{53} For instance, the old Soviet Union during this time accused China that it was increasing trade with South Korea and showing evidence of goodwill to South Korea (Kyunghyang Shinmun 1981).
visited Beijing (Lee 2010, 287). The cooperative partnership can be understood as a relationship between states that have no fundamental conflict of national interests and have mutual interests (Kim 2009, 294). Only two years later, the relationship between the two countries was elevated once again to “all round” cooperative partnership when Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited Seoul in October 2000. Given the word “all round,” China might have the intention to expand the area of cooperation into the political sector (Snyder 2009, 90). In fact, Defense ministers of two countries began to visit each other reciprocally around the time of Premier Zhu’s visit. South Korean Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae went to China in 1999 for the first time after normalization and Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin visited Beijing in 2001, while Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian went to Seoul in 2000 (Lee 2012, 4; Jung 2015, 43).

Sino-South Korean relations continued to develop into closer strategic relations. In August 2003, the two Presidents of China and South Korea, Hu Jintao and Roh Moo-hyun, had a summit in Beijing and agreed to upgrade relations to a “comprehensive cooperative partnership” (Snyder 2009, 92; Lee 2010, 288). “All round” and “comprehensive” have no stark difference, but the latter involves more practical cooperation and the highest level of partnership, rather than a more limited strategic partnership (Kim 2009, 302; Lee 2010, 127). For example, the two countries agreed to set up a hotline for military communication, according to the purpose of a comprehensive cooperative partnership, which was a step further than simply exchanges of top military personnel in joint meetings (Kim 2009, 302; Jung 2015, 46).

President Hu’s address before the South Korean National Assembly on November 2005 describe the implications of Chinese changing perceived identity of South Korea.
He asserted that relations between two countries had entered “the best stage in history,” argued that they should politically “become a model of peaceful coexistence between countries that have different social systems,” and celebrated that the two countries should culturally be “friends that can learn from and complement each other” (Du 2005). After South Korean President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2008, China and South Korea finally moved into a strategic level of relationship when President Lee visited China in May 2008. At the summit, President Hu defined China as “a close neighbor of the peninsula and a friend of the south and north of the Korean Peninsula” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2008). Furthermore, Hu answered in the affirmative when President Lee asked in a joke, “I met President Hu Jintao for the first time today, and during the talks, I felt like a friend I had known for a long time. I’m not sure if President Hu thought so” (Song 2008).

Despite improvements in political relations from good neighbor to strategic cooperative partner, these improvements arguably were overshadowed by the even more rapidly warming development of economic relations between two countries. For example, Sino-South Korean trade increasing remarkably since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1992, as seen in Figure 3.5. As of 2018, South Korea is the third largest trading partner to China, following the U.S. and Japan, excepting Hong Kong (Workman 2019). In addition to trade, as seen in Figure 3.6, the number of Chinese visitors to South Korea has also surged.54

54 The number of visitors plummeted in 2017. This sharp decline is discussed in Chapter 6.
Figure 3.5 Trade Volume between China and South Korea 1979 to 2018 (USD millions). Source: K-Start (http://stat.kita.net)

Figure 3.6 Chinese Visitors to South Korea 1984-2017. Source: Korea Tourism Statistics (kto.visitkorea.or.kr).
Evidence like this shows that the Chinese perceived identity of South Korea changed from enemy to friend. One evident example of being perceived as an enemy was the Korean War. China viewed South Korea as an enemy and treated it as an enemy by entering the war on the North Korean side. However, China has since developed a perceived identity of South Korea as friend, and the result was the normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea. Although there were conflicts between the two countries, such as over the Northeast Project,\(^{55}\) China generally behaves like a friend to South Korea since that country’s perceived identity has changed to friend. For instance, when it comes to Japan’s claim over the Dokdo Island (which Korea has long claimed sovereignty over), Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying unprecedentedly said,

> “China hopes that the ROK and Japan can appropriately settle relevant issues through dialogue and consultation. I must point out that territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors all stem from Japanese militarism’s wartime aggression and colonial rule. The Japanese side should deeply reflect on history and take real actions to win trust from its Asian neighbors” (Foreign Ministry of China 2014).

Moreover, China signed a currency swap agreement with South Korea in 2009 which was renewed in 2014 and 2017. The agreement contributed to maintaining the financial stability of South Korea in the face of the global financial crisis in 2008.

In short, China and South Korea are friends because they have diplomatic ties as evidence of social bonds, they have frequent meetings including summits which demonstrate social contacts, and they have given many expressions of intimacy in their

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\(^{55}\) China’s Northeast Project involves a historical territorial dispute between South Korea and China over a region that has historically belonged to both China and Korea, and that continues to be the source of diplomatic conflict.
behaviors and official statements. Therefore, China’s perceived identity of South Korea is the identity of friend.

**Japan: From Enemy to Rival**

*Unforgettable History*

In history, China had been sometimes invaded and/or conquered by other nations. In the process of ruling China, however, all nations who conquered China in the pre-modern era had eventually been assimilated with Chinese culture and political traditions over time, except imperial Japan. It was an unforgettable humiliation for China to be partially occupied by the brutal Japan from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s (which followed China’s previous humiliating defeat by Japan in 1894-1895 in a conflict over supremacy on the Korean Peninsula). It was particularly humiliating for China, since Japan had long been placed at the bottom of the Asian hierarchy created by China during its own period of ascendancy in earlier eras. This humiliating experience of Japanese colonialism underlies China’s continued long-term animosity toward Japan (He 2013, 223).

The animosity had not been mitigated at all after Japan’s surrender in 1945 and the establishment of the PRC in 1949 because China and Japan were locked into opposing camps of countries by the beginning of the Cold War. Based on the opposing positions of China in the communist bloc and Japan in the free world, then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru came up with a plan of “counter infiltration” which aimed to overthrow the communist regime in China by sending Japanese people into China through trade activities and encouraging anti-communist movements in China (Inoue 2009). China also strengthened its hostility toward Japan. For example, the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1950, clearly stated that “[t]wo Contracting Parties undertake to carry out jointly all necessary measures within their power to prevent a repetition of aggression and breach of the peace by Japan or any other State which might directly or indirectly join with Japan in acts of aggression”\(^{56}\)

**Partner for Economic Growth**

Despite the lasting animosity, there were some sprouts of efforts to exchange and cooperate between the two countries in the economic sector. In 1960, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai announced the concept of “friendship trade,” which allowed certain Japanese companies that China recognized as “friendly” to trade with China. In addition to “friendship trade,” he came up with the concept of “memorandum trade” in 1962, which aimed to increase the trade between China and Japan to US$ 100 million annually (Burns 2000, 39). However, these attempts failed to improve the relationship between two countries which continued to be hostile in accordance with China’s negative view of Japan which was exacerbated by the anti-China stance of Sato Eisaku, a newly elected Japanese Prime Minister, and by the Cultural Revolution in China (Burns 2000, 39; Dryer 2016, 115; Rose & Sýkora 2017, 108). During the era of Cultural Revolution, it was argued by Chinese elite that if Japanese representatives wanted to negotiate for better trade with China, they should be required “to praise the Cultural Revolution, to study the

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56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. “Conclusion of the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance"”

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little red book of Chairman Mao’s quotations, and to listen to prolonged political lectures delivered by their Chinese counterparts” (Lee 1984, 7).

Still, there were episodes of warming relations between the two countries. Spurred by the détente between the U.S. and China in the early 1970s, along with the end of the Cultural Revolution and the resignation of Japan’s anti-Chinese Prime Minister Sato, China and Japan agreed to normalize their relations in 1972. The two countries finally signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1978. Japan positively provided a loan to China when China started the policy of economic reform and opening-up, and did not stop economic exchanges even when Western states cut off such exchanges due to the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 (Kim 2016, 35-36).

However, these warming relations does not mean that China changed its perception of Japan fundamentally, as it did with the relationship of South Korea. Apart from economic exchanges, there serious conflicts continued between two countries over the territorial issue and the historical issue. In April 1978, dozens of Chinese fishing boats appeared around the waters of the Senkaku Islands/Daoyudao and some of them carried placards claiming China’s sovereignty over the Islands (Cheng 1984/85, 105). Furthermore, Chinese Vice-Premier Gu Mu stated unambiguously that the Islands belonged to China when he visited Japan to seek financial aid from Japan in August 1978 (Dreyer 2016, 168). Moreover, the political tensions between two countries mounted over conflict over historical issues, such as conflict over the distortion of Japan’s imperialist history in Japanese high school textbooks in 1982 and Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro’s official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, where Class A Japanese war criminals are enshrined among the 2.5 million soldiers (Rose & Sýkora 2017, 111).

Although there had been many mutual visits by top leaders from China and Japan in the 1990s, it could not change China’s view on Japan. Most recently, China has glanced suspiciously at Japan for its move to send its peacekeeping troops overseas, to cooperate with the U.S. on the missile defense, and to increase its military spending (Burns 2000, 53).

Rival, Close to Enemy

In the 2000s, especially during the Koizumi administration from 2001 to 2006, relations between Japan and China became worse because of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine (Tsunekawa 2009, 104-106; Chung 2012). Also, as China increasingly rose in the region, not only economically but also militarily, Japan began to see China as the potential threat. A drastic change was made by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo who had his first term from 2006 to 2007, and was elected to a second through fourth term, starting in 2012. In his first term, Prime Minister Abe upgraded the relations between Japan and China, seeking to build a strategic relationship of mutual benefit (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2006; Jiang 2007). When his second term started in 2012, however, Prime Minister Abe and his administration regarded China as the direct security threat to Japan because of two cases of territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands in 2010 and 2012 (Sakaki 2015; Lind 2016; Hughes 2016). In 2010, Japan detained the Chinese captain of a fishing boat on the charge of intruding in the waters off the Senkaku Islands, and China suddenly stopped its export of rare earth materials to Japan in retaliation for this detention. In 2012, the governor of Tokyo,
Ishihara Shintaro, ordered the Tokyo municipal government to nationalize three islets in the Senkaku Islands by purchasing them from a private Japanese owner and later, the central government decided to nationalize them instead of relying on the local government. In response, China sent more than 1,000 fishing boat to the waters around the islets claiming territorial sovereignty over them.

Having experienced these conflicts, the Abe administration eventually defined China as Japan’s main national security threat in its defense white papers. For example, in the most recent defense white paper of 2018, Japanese Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori states:

“China’s recent activities, including its rapid military modernization and enhancement of operational capabilities, its unilateral escalation of actions in areas around Japan, and with the lack of transparency in the military build-up, present a strong security concern for the region including Japan and the international community” (Ministry of Defense of Japan 2018, i).

China similarly regards Japan as a rival that is very close to an enemy. China has refused to recognize Japan’s post-war identity of a peaceful normal state (Gustafsson 2015, 129). Further, it is believed that China regards Japan as a security threat as well. For instance, the China Central Television (CCTV) broadcast the military drill of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force that assumed Japan as a hypothetical enemy in 2014.57 Moreover, according to a document written by strategists with the Chinese PLA, China posited Japan as number three among five potential threats

57 “kongjunshoubaoiguangjiaxiangdiri F-2 (空軍首曝光假想敵日 F-2)” MingPao. Retrieved from https://news.mingpao.com/pns/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B/article/20141209/s00013/1418061741675/%E7%A9%BA%E8%BB%BD%E9%A6%96%E6%9B%9D%E5%85%89%E5%81%87%E6%83%B3%E6%95%B5%E6%97%A5f-2
including the U.S., North Korea, the South China Sea dispute, and India.\textsuperscript{58} Lastly, Chinese President Xi Jinping had been reluctant to have a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for several years. In October 2018, these leaders had a summit in Beijing for the first time since 2012, which was their first time meeting in person except a short meeting at the APEC summit in 2014.

In sum, contrary to North Korea and South Korea, it is hard to say that China perceives the identity of Japan as friend. Given China’s proclaimed identity of great power, it is inevitable for Sino-Japanese relations to experience heightened tension, because both China and Japan seek supremacy in the region. China and Japan sometimes tried to improve their relations after the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1978 and there have actually been achievements in economic trade. Nevertheless, economic interdependence has not led to political intimacy. China has refused to hold meetings between top leaders from the two countries despite Japan’s repeated requests for several years. Furthermore, China has repeatedly denounced Japan for territorial and historical issues. Given China’s words and behaviors toward Japan, it is hard to find social exchanges and expression of intimacy enough to consider the two countries as perceived friends. In short, China does not think of Japan as a friend.

\textbf{Can the Realist Approach Strike Back?}

My argument is that Chinese foreign policy is shaped largely by its own proclaimed identity, and that China’s policies toward North Korea, South Korea, and

Japan depend on their perceived identities by China. This argument accords with a key principle of constructivist social theory that “people act toward objects on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them” (Wendt 1992, 396-397). In this sense, states are not alike because they can have different identities, differing perceived national interests, and differing meaning attached to events. However, some might not agree with this explanation. Perhaps, the refutation of the realist school of the thought is the most important to consider. Both structural realists and neoclassical realists have the conception in common that states have similar objective interests with an anarchical international system. In that system the actual balance of power among states is very important in explaining unitary states’ behavior to seek survival. A difference between these two realist schools of thought is that neoclassical realists take into serious consideration domestic factors that are neglected by structural realists (Viotti & Kauppi 2012, 43).

**Structural Realism**

In the structural realists’ view, especially the Waltzian view, the ordering principle of the international system is anarchy. Waltz argues that political structures can be defined by the organizing or ordering principle, the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and the distribution of capabilities (Waltz 1979). In regards to the ordering principle, international political systems are different from domestic political systems because domestic systems are centralized and hierarchical, whereas international systems are decentralized and anarchic (Waltz 1979, 88). In the arena of international politics, all states are equal because they each have their own sovereignty. Moreover, in international relations, there is no entity that is able to
monopolize the legitimate use of force as a government does. Of course, violence between sovereign states can be punished, like the use of armed sanctions by the international community against Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait in 1990. However, these armed punishments are uncommon. For example, even though then the UN secretary general Kofi Annan explicitly declared that the US-led war on Iraq was illegal, no states were punished (Tyler 2004).

Because the international system is an anarchy, the absence of a world government leads states to the world of self-help (Waltz 1979, 104, 111). In addition, self-help in the international political system is “individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended” (Waltz 1979, 91). States act to ensure their security for themselves, and thus survival becomes their primary goal (Waltz 1979, 91-92, 105, 111). In the same vein, their preferences are also fixed (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 12). Therefore, their functions are not differentiated, and they are all implied to have sameness as a unitary actor seeking survival, because states remain the same independent units as long as anarchy persists (Waltz 1979, 93, 104).

Second, anarchy is the permissive cause of war. Anarchy does not necessarily mean chaos, disorder or conflict per se (Mearsheimer 1994, 10; 2001, 38). However, Waltz believes that anarchy is the cause of conflicts (Waltz 1954; 1979). Waltz divides the causes of war into three images: human nature (the first image), domestic system (the second image), and international anarchy (the third image) (Waltz 1954). For him, the third image is the most important. He admits that the combination of the three images may enhance accurate understanding of international relations because any one of the images is not sufficient (Waltz 1954, 14, 223). However, he thinks that the immediate
causes of war, which are contained in the first and second images, are insignificant in many ways and cannot explain the recurrence of war (Waltz 1954, 232-235). He believes that this recurrence of war can be explained only by the third image that he wants to name a permissive or underlying cause of war (Waltz 1954, 232). After all, anarchy is a feature of the international system that makes states act uniformly to pursue self-help to survive. This self-help system prevents states from cooperating because of unequal distribution of gains, and due to fear of being subordinated to others (Waltz 1979, 105-107). Even though states can “form” the structure of international political systems by their interaction (Waltz 1979, 95), they cannot change key properties of the structure such as self-help. Therefore, this anarchy is likely to be violence-permissive and conflictual (Grieco 1997, 165).

**Neoclassical Realism**

Neoclassical realism is worthy of considering in foreign policy studies because scholars in this tradition look inside a state to explain its behavior. Even though Waltz (1979) strongly criticizes efforts to look into a state’s domestic dynamics to explain its behavior as reductionism, many scholars, including neo-classical realists, pay attention to domestic politics for understanding world politics.

Neoclassical realism, which is named by Gideon Rose (1998), has the same view as structural realism in seeing the state is the most important actor in international relations and describing state behavior as determined by anarchy and relative distribution of power. However, it is different from structural realism because it can provide the groundwork for a “general theory of foreign policy” by bridging the gap between structural realism and liberalism (Rose 1998, 145-148). It emphasizes “how systemic
pressures are translated thorough unit-level intervening variables” (Rose 1998, 152).

Neoclassical realists try to find these intervening variables by considering domestic politics, state power and processes, leaders’ perceptions, and the impact of ideas, to explain how states react to the international environment (Kitchen 2010, 118). For example, when it comes to explaining U.S. foreign policy, neo-classical realist Zakaria (1998) emphasizes how the power balance between the executive and the Congress shapes foreign policy, while Christensen (1996) pays attention to the role of public opinion.

Because domestic factors are an intervening variable, they have a limit in terms of their causal role. They do not determine state motives but “narrow down the range of acceptable policy options” (Dueck 2006, 25). This is well reflected in the discussion of Chinese nationalism and foreign policy. For example, the international behavior of contemporary China is far less puzzling when one considers China’s search for positive collective self-esteem and its desire for great-power status, which can be managed domestically by political elites (Larson and Shevchenko 2014). Moreover, Chinese international behavior corresponds to relatively specific patterns of action inherited from exemplary episodes in that nation’s history. The reenactment of such patterns allows Chinese foreign policy to be meaningful to the Chinese themselves (Shih 1993; Katzenstein 1997).

In addition to elite motivations, the masses who share the cultural understanding to which elites might appeal are influential (Grove 2010, 774). Some argue that Chinese nationalism would not make Chinese foreign policy assertive and offensive (Duan 2017; Zhao 2004; Zheng 1999; Downs & Saunders 1998/1999), whereas others insist that
Chinese nationalism can escalate to cause conflicts by being intertwined with China’s grievances against the existing international order and its confidence due to its own growing economy (McCormick 2000). Meanwhile, the nature of Chinese nationalism can influence the overall character of its foreign policy, shaping it to be either offensive or defensive, and Chinese nationalism can also influence specific decisions in foreign policy by providing leverage to decision-makers in terms of their consideration of domestic audience cost (Weiss 2014).

**Unrealistic Realism**

Both structural realism and neoclassical realism are not persuasive in explaining China’s inconsistent behaviors in the cases studied here. First of all, they are flawed in the theory itself. Waltz’s explanation of anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system seems very simple, and overly parsimonious. It is true that anarchy is important to understand international systems as well as causes of war. Nevertheless, the reality of international politics undermines his argument about how anarchy works. For example, Waltz repeatedly predicted the rise of a balance of powers against the U.S. after the end of the Cold War, because there was only the change in ordering of national powers after the Cold War, not change of the anarchical system itself, which endured and would endure (Waltz 1993, 2000). So far, however, we have not witnessed the balancing of powers against the U.S. On the contrary, we have witnessed a burgeoning of global cooperation in many areas, from anti-terrorism to information communications and technology sharing.

Furthermore, the question of why some states such as Vietnam and Indonesia have less interest in strengthening their military capabilities, even under anarchy, cannot
be answered by the realist approach. Furthermore, in this uncooperative and conflictual jungle, how can the world have seen more creation of states than deaths of them in recent years? Of course, these dynamics might occur not because of changing constructivist identity but because of the changing threats or distribution of power in the international system, as realists would argue. Or, they might be caused by changes in both identity and power, given the fact that explanations based on power and explanations based on identity are not mutually exclusive (Hudson 2014, 135).

However, this logic cannot be applied to explaining South Korean policy toward North Korea, as briefly discussed in Chapter 1. Despite no significant change in power and threat, South Korea has changed its North Korean policy according to its perceived identity of North Korea swinging from a rival nation to defeat to being a potential friend and partner. Thus, it might be more plausible to posit that the changing perceived identity of other states can lead to the changing foreign policy of the state, more than changing nature of the international distribution of power.

Neoclassical realism is ideal to supplement the weaknesses of structural realism, due to its focus on how domestic politics shape foreign policy and the international system. Domestic politics in this approach become an independent variable (or sometimes intervening variable) and foreign policy is the dependent variable. But this theorized consideration of how domestic politics interacts with realist assessments of the international balance of power in an anarchical system is too ideal. The approach often reduces the influence of domestic politics in any given case, in order not to abandon the conception of international pressure. But at the same time, international pressure such as the level of threat is hard to grasp and vague to define in terms of its influence on state
behavior (Narizny 2017, 169). On the other hand, domestic factors are often more influential than neoclassical realists assume. For example, South Korea canceled its plan to establish the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan in 2012. The South Korean government tried to sign the Agreement with Japan in order to effectively counter security threats from North Korea, but it withdrew the plan only because of South Korean’s strong domestic opposition based on a nationalist domestic uprising, with strong anti-Japanese sentiment.

For these reasons, foreign policy studies on culture and identity can provide useful explanations that are often neglected by other approaches, particularly neorealism. For example, it is impossible to understand the reason why South Korea is unwilling to participate in the trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to deter the North Korean threat without considering South Korean’s strong anti-Japanese sentiment. From the realist view, South Korea should cooperate with Japan because the two countries have the same security goal to address the North Korean problem. Nevertheless, anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea, which functions as a domestic factor, has not allowed South Korean leaders to cooperate with Japan. According to annual national surveys in South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Abe has been always the most unpopular figure in South Korea among five leaders of Northeast Asian countries, including North Korean Leader Kim Jung-un. Moreover, it is a joke but in fact true that the South Korean national soccer team can be defeated by any other national teams, except the Japanese team, a point of unique cultural importance to the South Korean domestic public.
In addition to these flaws, structural realism and neoclassical realism are not appropriate to explain the China case. It is unrealistic that China should care about its survival today. Of course, it might be argued that China must worry about its survival because it was conquered and occupied by others in history, including Japan. However, is it possible for present China to perish? It is too big to die, considering its large territory, huge population, strong military, and solid economy. Furthermore, as China always asserts, it puts emphasis on prosperity rather than survival. In addition, China expressed different attitudes towards some interstate affairs covered in the dissertation that cannot be explained by an appeal to realist state pursuit of self-interest and survival, which raised the initial research questions of this dissertation. For example, because the realist approach cannot well explain China’s puzzling responses to similar actions by South Korea and Japan (i.e., the installation of military radar systems), this chapter proposes that identity plays the role of the independent variable in Chinese foreign policy, rather than being an intervening variable.

Neoclassical realism takes into account domestic factors as an intervening variable which influences the pressure from the international system in shaping foreign policy. However, this dissertation use culture as a moderating variable that influences Chinese foreign policy. In addition, the direction is also different. In neoclassical realism, the international system shapes the manner by which domestic factors (the second image) influence foreign policy, while this dissertation takes the approach of focusing on domestic factors as independent and moderating variables, shaping foreign policy independently of the existing international system.
Nevertheless, two propositions from the realist view still need to be considered. One is that it might be true that international factors, including the U.S.-China relationship, affect the seemingly capricious attitudes of China. The other is that national interests, or China’s core interests, are more significant than any other factors in shaping China’s relationship to the states investigated in this dissertation. However, the first proposition is not examined in the dissertation because the U.S. factor is considered the control variable in the study of the effects of culture and identity on Sino-North Korean, Sino-South Korean, Sino-Japanese relations. If my arguments were to be rejected by the case studies, then the first proposition (the U.S.-China relationship shapes China’s responses to the case-studies investigated here) should be considered. Thus, only the second proposition is used as null hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation.

H2: Chinese foreign policy is influenced by Chinese core national interests.

H2a: Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding North Korea are influenced by Chinese core interests.

H2b: Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding South Korea are influenced by Chinese core interests.

H2c: Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding Japan are influenced by Chinese core interests.

Conclusion

Chinese foreign policy has been long influenced by its proclaimed identity of great power and has recently been dependent on the proclaimed identity of responsible great power. In practice, China has tried to behave as a responsible great power in Sino-North Korean relations and Sino-South Korean relations. It actively moderated the Six-
Party Talks to tackle the North Korean nuclear issues with the self-consciousness of a responsible great power and sought to promote this image in international relations.

Furthermore, China’s behaviors regarding the Sino-North Korean relationship, the Sino-South Korean relationship, and the Sino-Japanese relationship are based on its perceived identity of the two Koreas and Japan. It treated a friend as a friend and an enemy as an enemy. Though these arguments need to be elaborated by testing possible counterarguments by realists in following chapters, both Chinese behaviors as well as statements found in the CFMSA and the Database of People’s Daily sufficiently support them. For instance, China referred to South Korea 2529 times and North Korea 5527 times in the CFMSA database by using the word “friendly,” whereas it mentioned Japan 5916 times mainly using the less committal word of “neighbor.” In short, China and North Korea, and China and South Korea have social bonds as friends, social contacts as friends, and expressions of intimacy by words and actions as friends. On the other hand, despite social bonds of normalization between China and Japan, the two countries had few social exchanges when they had conflicts and only rare expressions of intimacy by words and behaviors in their relations. Thus, North Korea and South Korea’s identities are perceived by China are friends but Japan’s perceived identity by China is not a friend.
Chapter Four

Chinese Face Culture and Foreign Policy

Culture and identity are not identical, but they are inseparable because they are formed and influenced by each other. For example, identity, particularly collective identity, depends on cultural difference or culturally-sanctioned/promoted thinking and behavior. Culture has a great impact on human action and also on state behavior through the following factors, or any combination of them: 1) when it takes the form of worldviews, 2) when it provides criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust, and 3) when it explains cause-effect based on shared belief in authority derived from experience and the consensus of recognized elites (Goldstein & Keohane 1993, 8-10).

China is no exception. Rather, it is one of the most prominent examples of states that have a culture-influenced foreign policy. This chapter explores Chinese traditional culture and its influence on foreign policy. Among many features of Chinese culture, this dissertation specifically delves into the Chinese culture of saving face (mianzi, 面子) because it is expected to be able to explain Chinese conflicting behaviors regarding the perceived friends of North and South Korea and the perceived potential adversary of Japan.
Culture and Foreign Policy

Culture in Foreign Policy Analysis

The discussion of culture in social science can be traced back to the founding fathers of social science - Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim - and even to the ancient Greek philosophers of Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates (Wiarda 2014). In the modern development of political science, it was Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture* (1963) which heralded studies on political culture. It had a very sophisticated theoretical statement about democracy and how it is created and sustained according to various types of political culture: parochial, subject, and civic. Pye (1965) argued that political culture provides structure and meaning in the political sphere in the same manner that culture, in general, gives coherence and integration to social life. Despite its relative decline in the 1970s, mainly due to criticism by structuralism and institutionalism, political culture began to make a comeback in the late 1980s to early 1990s (Wiarda 2014, 105-106; Munck 2007; Inglehart 1988; Chilcote 1981). Nationalism has been one of the most preferred topics of a cultural approach, but it has also been used to explain many other phenomena, such as modernization, inter-ethnic violence, and authoritarianism (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991; Varshney 2007; Greenfeld & Eastwood 2007).

The attention to culture, similar to identity, among IR scholars has notably increased since the collapse of the Soviet Union, because mainstream IR theories failed to foreshadow or properly interpret the aftermath of this event (Katzenstein 1996, 2-4). Following the fall of the Soviet Union, states seemed less likely to ask each other “whose side are you on?” but rather began to ask “who are you?” because the world was no
longer dominated by the two superpowers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Huntington 1993).

Especially in the post Cold War era, national identity and nationalism have been examined as a source for international conflicts. Some argue that war can result from surges of nationalism following revolutions (Mansfield and Snyder 1995) and that charismatic leaders who can manipulate national sentiments make conflict more likely (Byman and Pollack 2001), while others maintain that nationalism itself is not a sufficient factor to cause conflict (Posen 1993; Laitin 2007). In these kinds of scholarly debates, culture, i.e. political culture, is essential to the study of politics, including foreign policy analysis, because it provides a framework for organizing people’s daily worlds by locating the self and making sense of the actions and interpreting the motives of others. It also offers a framework for grounding an analysis of interests, for linking identities to political action, and for predisposing states toward some actions and away from others (Ross 2009, 134).

**Influence of Culture on Foreign Policy**

Similar to identity, culture is hard to define. Given various aspects of culture in the study of social science, Hudson suggests one conception that “political culture is all the discourses, values, and implicit rules that express and shape political action and intentions, determine the claims groups may and may not make upon one another, and ultimately provide a logic of political action” (Hudson 2014, 126). One of the significant features of culture, particularly political culture, is that culture influences behavior and
interpretations of behavior (Helen Spencer-Oatey 2012, 4). So, culture can be a useful concept for FPA.  

There are some critics of the claim that culture affects foreign policy (Welch 2003; Sharp 2004; Breuning 2007). However, culture does matter. Culture frames the context in which politics occur, links individual and collective identities, and provides a framework for interpreting the actions and motives of others (Ross 2009, 139-140). In so doing, culture influences the structures and processes of decision-making by shaping perception, cognition, and reasoning (Grove 2010; Vlahos 1991; Hudson 1997). The perception, cognition, and reasoning of national leaders are shaped by internal and external forces. For example, the culture of liberal democracy explains the democratic peace thesis that there is no war between democracies because of their cultural preference for negotiation and dialogue to solve a conflict. Also, the sociocultural similarity between democracies at the international level can play a role in preventing conflicts between them (Geva and Hanson 1999).

Another example is the debate over Chinese strategic culture between Johnston (1995) and Feng (2007). Although strategic culture is related to military strategy rather than foreign policy, cultural influence on foreign policy can be sufficiently inferred from this debate because the military strategy is heavily dependent on a state’s foreign policy.

59 Hudson suggests the goals for a research agenda of FPA as determining 1) the extent to which cultural factors affect any given foreign policy; 2) how cultural differences lead to predictable patterns of interaction and under what conditions we expect culture to be more important in foreign policy; and 3) how we recognize and evaluate change in culture. For these goal, she asserts that FPA should include comparative analysis (uncovering the differences in culture); subnational analysis (looking at power nodes within the society which link to culture); discourse analysis (tracing the discourse between power nodes); horizon analysis (what becomes possible and not possible from each competing story?); and interaction analysis (when two countries have different stories/definitions of the situation that are ascendant, how do they interact?) (Hudson 2014, 136-137).
direction. According to Johnston (1995), the Chinese strategic culture that is found in its long history explains Chinese assertive behaviors in foreign policy crises during 1949-1985. Relying on his research into Chinese history in *Seven Military Classics*, he argues that China’s strategic culture has been offensive despite its weak material capability. His finding refutes the conventional notion of Chinese strategic culture as a product of a Confucian-Mencian paradigm and that thereby understands Chinese strategic culture as peaceful and harmonious.

On the contrary, Feng (2007) notes that Johnston’s approach to China’s “offensive realism” misses the fact that leaders’ beliefs may shift with context. By using a research design that ranks strategic preferences only for “self” and not providing for interactions with the “other,” or for changes in the strategic environment, Johnston misses the dynamic relationship between culture and decision making (Feng 2007). By using the Verb in Context System (VICS) to analyze the relationship between leaders’ beliefs as influenced by strategic culture, Feng introduces more rigorous methodological tools to bring the measurement of cultural variables closer to the individuals making the decisions. For example, Feng investigates Mao Zedong’s public speeches during the Korean, Sino-Indian, and Sino-Vietnam wars to see if Mao’s belief system better reflects an offensive or defensive strategic culture.

In sum, the effect of culture on foreign policy is 1) to influence the perception of individuals and groups and thus, to influence the behaviors of state, 2) to shape diplomatic activities through social interaction and language that reflect culture, and 3) to gain domestic support for foreign policy (Zhang 2017, 43-49). Culture provides a tool to understand others and guide behavior because it is the crystallization of the long
accumulation of experience and interaction. Furthermore, culture often functions as a diplomatic skill. For example, when they meet, leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea usually use quotes from Old Classics such as Confucian books, Buddhist books, or poems because they are familiar with them as representative of Asian culture.

**Chinese Face Culture**

Face culture means the cultural predisposition to protect one’s prestige, honor or reputation. This face culture is not unique to China but is universal because people are human (Hu 1944; Goffman 1967; Agassi & Jarvie 1969). Although the existence of face culture is universal, the degree to which people take it seriously and the level of its influence on society is not universal. For example, the Japanese are very sensitive to losing face (Pharr 1990), even more than Americans (Kirchner et al. 2017). Furthermore, the Chinese are more concerned about face than Americans at the international level, despite no significant difference at the individual level (Gries 2010; Gries et al. 2011). In China, almost everyone experiences face-related issues in his daily life (Li & Su 2006, 239). So, it is not surprising that 83.2% of the respondents of an online survey in 1998 said that face is very important, whereas only 2.7% responded that it was not important (Chan 2006).

Though China, Japan, and South Korea are all known as sharing similar cultural features and relatively emphasizing face in their culture, these countries have different attitudes toward face. Concerning the three factors of self-, other-, and mutual-face, Chinese people place the greatest value on self-face while South Korean and Japanese
persons value the most importance on mutual face (Lee 2015). This pattern suggests that the Chinese might show aggressive response when they lose their face because self-esteem and humiliation are related to aggression, anger, and violence (Websdale 2010; Walker & Knauer 2011).

**How to Define Face in Chinese Culture**

Defining an invisible but definitely existing thing is extremely difficult. Although the face is a part of the body, face in cultural meaning is not tangible at all. At the universal level, across cultures, face can be defined as “the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact” and thus, “an image of self-delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (Goffman 1955, 213). More simply, it can be defined as “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself,” consisting of the negative face and the positive face (Brown & Levinson 1987, 61). Another definition, in a universal sense, is to define face as “the public image which a person claims for himself/herself and is also recognized by others” (Zhang 2017, 88). Although it has universal character to some degree, face in Chinese culture is very peculiar in that it has practical power in Chinese society. For example, in his book, *My Country And My People*, the distinguished Chinese modern thinker, Lin Yutang, wrote that there were not political leaders but rather “three Muses ruling over China” whose names were “Face, Fate and Favour” (Lin 1936, 186). This notion of face is not physiological but psychological, which can be “granted, and lost and fought for and presented as a gift” (Lin 1936, 190). In addition, Chinese novelist Lu Xun

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60 The three factors of self-, other-, and mutual-face are developed by Ting-Toomey & Oetzel (2001).
picked *mianzi* ("face") as “the most complex and potent key to understanding Chinese national character and national spirit” (Hinze 2012, 16). He wrote in an essay:

“Tradition has it that in the Qing Dynasty some foreigner[s] went to the Zhongli Yamen [the Foreign Ministry of imperial China] to make certain demands, and so frightened the mandarins by his threats that they agreed to everything; but when he left he was shown out through a side door. Denial to the main gate meant that he had lost face. If he lost face that meant that China gained face and came off the victor” (Foster 2006, 157).

Face, as a translation of *mianzi* (面子) or *lian* (脸), is a very significant concept in Chinese society that dominates Chinese social interactions through which Chinese establish and maintain social relations (Jiang 2009). It was Hu Hsien Chin who first introduced Chinese face culture into the academic arena. In her seminal work, “The Chinese Concept of “Face,”” she defined *mianzi* as “a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation,” and distinguished it from another notion of face, *lian*, which was “the respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation” (Hu 1944, 45). In other words, *mianzi* involves the social prestige and reputation of a person while *lian* indicates a person’s moral character and honor (Ju 2016, 280).

In this same vein, a survey analysis showed that citizens of Wuhan city responded by classifying *mianzi* as applicable to social situations with others and *lian* as applicable to moral situations by answering that ‘adultery revealed’ fell under *lian* and ‘sending a gift declined by receiver’ came under *mianzi* (Zuo 1997).\(^6^1\)

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\(^{61}\) To interpret the data for cluster analysis, he came up with four clusters of behavior that are not in accord with proper morality: incompetent behavior, bad habits, and private matters being disclosed (Zuo 1997, 36).
However, the distinction between *mianzi* and *lian* is opposed by the argument that not every Chinese person speaks Mandarin, since a variety of dialects are spoken in China, depending on their regions. Since China is a very big country with many mountains that make it difficult to travel to other regions, people in some regions do not use Mandarin that has both *mianzi* and *lian* in the vocabulary, but speak their own dialects that only have *mianzi* (King & Myers 1977). Nevertheless, according to an empirical study of face, there are correlations between ‘which places’ and the notion of social face, and between ‘with whom’ and the notion of moral face (Ju 2016).

Definition of the universal meaning of face is not very useful for understanding Chinese face culture because there are some essential differences between universally-defined face and face with Chinese characteristics. For example, having been greatly influenced by Confucianism, Chinese face culture is strongly intertwined with hierarchical and close relations and the principle of reciprocity (Ho 1976). Of course, it is undesirable to maintain that Chinese face should be distinguished from universal one in that it can be unsatisfying to argue that “[t]he Chinese act that way because that is the Chinese way” (Pye 1988, 6). Given the difference that surely exists between Chinese face and universal face, however, it is more appropriate to use the definition of Chinese face culture, rather than universal face culture, to explain Chinese actions. On the other hand, the distinction between *mianzi* and *lian* has no practical advantage when we discuss Chinese face culture. In fact, Korean and Japanese use the same word with Chinese

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62 On the contrary, Gries (2005) examines Chinese nationalism by using the word *face* as a cultural universal that can be applied to all humans because he believes humans cannot exist by themselves without any relations with others (Gries 2005, 23). But this approach fades out the unique characteristic of Chinese face.
characters to express the meaning of face. It is 体面 that literally means body and face and is pronounced as chemyeon in Korean and taimen in Japanese. This term includes both social prestige and moral reputation in a single word, similar to how non-mandarin speakers in China use mianzi to express two slightly different meanings. In this context, face in English can cover both attributes of Chinese face culture, which are the moral-oriented face and the social-oriented face. So, I use the singular term face or Chinese face rather than mianzi or lian in this dissertation, except for situations where clear distinction is needed or the original Chinese wording itself is necessary to be used. For those reasons, the face of Chinese culture in this dissertation is simply defined as a psychologically valuable notion that should not be lost, but saved, and is based on the expected protocol of mutual respect and deference between people, regardless of whether people are Chinese or not. This concept of Chinese face culture also applies to the behavior of states.

The Dynamics of Chinese Face Culture

Seeking Face

The culture of Chinese face works in three ways: seeking face as an active meaning, saving face as a passive meaning, and losing face as a negative meaning.

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63 Face sometimes can also be the translation of mianmao (面貌). For example, at the roundtable to honor the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birthday in 2013, President Xi said, “Mao is a great figure who changed the face of the nation and led the Chinese people to a new destiny [emphasis added]” (Zhao 2016, 86). The use of face in his remarks was a translation of mianmao, not mianzi or lian.

64 Brown & Levinson divided face into two related aspects of negative and positive face. The former describes “the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction” and the latter describes “the positive consistent self-image or personality claimed by interactants” (Brown & Levinson 1987, 61). This conception can be also applied to Chinese face culture. But it is insufficient to achieve the purpose of this dissertation because it does not explain how this face culture works to shape foreign policy.
Seeking face is very similar to offering a proclaimed identity discussed in Chapter 3, in that one tries to make his own image as he wants. Seeking face is “a dynamic and continual life-long process rather than a one-time occurrence” (Zhang 2017, 89). Seeking face is done by a person who wants to establish a face without other person making the first move. A person who has a face means that he has good social status, and thanks to this face, he can enjoy many requests to have a good relationship (guanxi, 关系) with him, an indispensable notion in Chinese society (Tsang 2016). One request of someone with face is to be a mediator because he is expected to understand and respect the faces of people from two sides (Solomon 1971, 127-128). In so doing, establishing more relationships makes his face ‘bigger.’ It is a virtuous cycle to upgrade his social status.

In this context, it is reasonable for Chinese people to seek face actively.

For example, “[w]hen a Chinese is arrested, perhaps wrongly, the natural tendency of his relatives is not to seek legal protection and fight it out in a law court, but to find someone who knows the magistrate personally and intercede for his favour. With the high regard for personal relationships and the importance attached to face in China, the man who intercedes is always successful if his face is big enough [emphasis added]” (Lin 1936, 187).

Seeking face is closely related to seeking self-esteem, self-satisfaction, and showing-off. Although Chinese face itself has features of self-esteem and self-satisfaction, seeking face is to ensure these characteristics, while saving face and losing face involve maintaining and protecting them. A series of studies on the consumption of luxury goods in China show well this aspect of seeking face. For example, despite their relatively low level of income, Chinese people prefer to purchase expensive luxury goods because they want to improve their face by not lagging behind others who have luxury goods and who may feel superior to those who do not have ones (Li & Su 2007; Lee
Consumers who seek face are more willing to pay a premium price (Siu et al. 2016).

One good example of seeking face is the tributary trade in Chinese history. The tribute system in Chinese history was a twofold ritual: the exchanges of diplomatic delegation and the trading of goods. In terms of trade, the tribute system was not profitable at all to China because it usually gave a large amount of largesse in return for gifts from a tribute state. It was China that shouldered the financial burden in the tribute trade with Chosun dynasty in Korea (Pratt 2006; Hamashita 2008, 99). For Ryukyu, now Okinawa in Japan, the tribute trade was so profitable that it was be a matter of survival to maintain it (Smits 1999, 34). Matteo Ricci, an Italian Jesuit, worked for the Ming court, derided this situation by writing that “the Chinese themselves (who are by no means ignorant of the deception) delude their king, fawning with devotion as if truly the whole world paid taxes to the Chinese kingdom, whereas on the contrary tribute is more truly paid to those kingdoms by China” (Quoted from Fletcher 1968, 208).

Other than financial loss, another burden to China in the tribute trade system was to assure the security of tribute states in exchange for their tributary compliance (Wang 2013, 213). Ming could not but engage in the war to assist Chosun when Japan invaded Chosun in 1592 because it had the responsibility to protect the tribute Chosun. The Ming rapidly declined because of this military support and were eventually conquered by Qing. Despite these burdens, Chinese emperors were satisfied with the system because they and their country could gain prestige from the tribute trade system (Fairbank 1942, 135). When the delegation from a tribute state met the emperor, they had to show their respect to him. Furthermore, the fact that they came to the capital of China and had an audience
with the emperor indicated that the tribute state from which they came recognized the ruler of China had the mandate of Heaven to rule all mankind and its countries. Chinese emperors and China as a whole therefore sought face by using the tribute system that could give China a superior position in relations with its neighbors (Zhou 2011).

However, the seeking of face entails a risk of losing face when it fails. Thus, seeking face should be conducted cautiously and it should not be attempted when it is likely to be declined by others. This is the reason why Qing did not force the Western countries to conform to the tribute trade system.

*Saving Face*

While seeking face shows the active dimension of the dynamics of Chinese face culture, saving face is a relatively passive dimension of it. If there were no face to be saved because a nation or person were in the process of seeking face, saving face would not be necessary. Moreover, if one already lost his face, it could be too late to try to save it. Thus, saving face is typically, albeit not always, located between seeking face and losing face. Because the threat of losing face usually takes place in negative social situations rather than positive ones, the dynamic of saving face also works in negative situations (Han 2016).

The dynamic of saving face operates in three different ways: saving one’s face, saving another’s face, or both.65 Given the protocol of reciprocity in Chinese face culture,

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65 The dynamics of Chinese face work not only at the individual level but also at the collective level. So, “[the] uniqueness of Chinese face is that an individual would take actions not only for the face of oneself but also for the face of the greater self” (Wu 2013, 156).
a good way to save one’s own face is to save another person’s face first, or at the same time. The better is to make others gain face and at least help others not to lose face.

Another good way to save one’s face is to lower oneself and be humble. In this context, some researchers argue that saving face is a driving force behind politeness and conformity in Chinese society (Brown & Stevinson 1987; Pye 1988, 31; Tao 2017). Lowering oneself entails a sacrifice of a part of one’s face, but in the end helps one to save his or her whole face. Additionally, keeping a low profile helps one prevent losing face when events or matters go in a different way than one had hoped (Ho 015, 13). Lowering oneself may not always be good in terms of utilitarian, practical benefits, because it often requires a person to relinquish or concede something in return for saving face. An extreme example is Xiang Yu, who was a competent rebel leader between the Qin and Han dynasties. He was defeated by his competitor Liu Bang and left with only a few soldiers. He could have returned to his stronghold and prepare to strike back, but instead he decided to kill himself because he was humiliated and could not save face if he appeared before his people in the stronghold (Loewenberg 2011, 692).

One episode in Qing dynasty also reflected a creative way of saving face. When any delegation had an audience with the Chinese emperor, they had to kneel three times and knock their head on the floor nine times as a ritual to express respect to the emperor. However, the Tongzhi Emperor of late Qing had no confidence that he could make the Western delegations do it when they met him. If he had did receive the ritual, it would seriously lose his and China’s face. So, a clever courtier, Wu Kedu, advised the Emperor to avoid the negative situation and save face by abandoning the normal kneeling ritual and instead treat the Westerners as animals. The Emperor ordered the Western delegation
to be exempted from the ritual because they were under-educated and did not understand correct ethical behavior. So, it was not worthwhile to expect that these sheep and pigs would dance to music in an orderly manner (Topping 2013, 62-63).

The third way to save face is to neglect the negative situation. Even though it may be a nonsensical strategy of self-comfort, one can make an excuse that he has not lost his face by running away from and denying the negative situation. An episode regarding the Guangxu Emperor in late Qing, the successor of Tongzhi Emperor, showed this pattern of saving face. In 1900, the Boxer Rebellion took place. Although it was peasant uprising, the Rebellion was based on fury against the Westerners and aimed at driving all foreigners from China. So, the Guangxu Emperor and Cixi, the ruling empress dowager, continued to implicitly encourage them. In response, an international force was organized by the Western powers. Beijing fell to the international force in the summer of 1900 (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2019). The loss of Beijing meant losing face by the Guangxu Emperor, Cixi, and China as a whole. So, they made a plot to save their face by avoiding the negative situation. They went westward to Xi’an for wildlife hunting on the ground that Xi’an had suffered from severe damage by increased wildlife (Guangxu Emperor 1901). They believed that they could save their face because they did not flee the Western occupation, but had only went hunting to protect people’s security.

66 In Chinese history, there are many examples of face-saving excuses. One example is the Ming’s withdrawal from Vietnam after their victory over the Ming–Hồ War. Despite its victory, the Ming court realized that ruling Vietnam was a very stressful thing, so they wanted to withdraw. But they could not find any justification until a Vietnamese rebel leader gave an excuse to save Ming’s face (Wang 2011, 154-156).
Losing Face

The worst face dynamic a Chinese person can experience is losing one’s face. Richard Wilhelm, German missionary and Sinologist, observed Chinese society in late Qing and described “the strict injunction to avoid causing the feeling of shame to another and that one should not “lose one’s face” oneself” (Wilhelm 1928, 360). Two points are important to understand in terms of losing face: one is what causes a person to lose his face, and the other is how one responds when he loses face. First, the cause that makes an individual feel a loss of face can be internal and/or external. Internally, one might lose face when an embarrassing or shameful feeling arises from “unintentional and undesired social predicaments or transgressions” (Schlenker & Leary 1982) or due to disappointment by failing to meet his social expectations (Modigliani 1971). To be specific, this feeling emerges when there is a public violation of widely accepted social norms, and someone else witnessed the violation, even if the norms were violated unintentionally, (Edelmann 1985). Externally, people feel humiliated when they are rejected or treated disgracefully by others (Ho 1976; Scheff 1988), or when they fail to meet others’ expectations (Ho 1976).

Second, one can resolve the feeling of humiliation internally or externally. Internally, people who lose their face may try to restore face by rebuilding a good face with favorable self-image (Kim & Nam 1998, 523-524). Externally, those who lose face may wish to retaliate to regain their face. Some studies argue that retaliation and aggression are not typically not considered, even after losing face, because they are not helpful to keep face after face has been lost, since such strategies are unhelpful as a cooperative effort to recreate a good image (Ho 1976; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey 2003).
However, more research points out that there are strong correlations between retaliation and losing face (McKee 2008; Hui & Bond 2009; Chen 2015; McCauley 2017). When someone loses their face, they are less generous and more aggressive to others. According to studies on humiliation, which can be translated into losing face here, humiliation can cause a variety of violent responses in terms of retaliation, including violent crime, terrorism, war, mass-killing and genocide (McCauley 2017, 255-256 & 260).

In *Collective Biographies of the Records of the Grand Historian of China* (*Shijiliezhuan*, 史记列传), there are many episodes regarding losing face and its remedies. Among a total of 70 biographies, 31 are related to the dynamics of face, and 22 of those 31 have a story of losing face and of overcoming the situation. More interestingly, only two biographies deal with recovery of one’s losing face through internal strategies, while people from seven stories overcame their lost face by retaliation against others (Lim 2012, 298-299). For example, General Li Guang fought well against the Northern barbarian Xiongnu, but was expelled from the military by an unreasonable accusation and retired to a rural area. One day, he lost his face to a drunk local official because he was stopped by the official with insulting words during his return from hunting. So, when he was reinstated in the military, he asked the emperor to arrange for the local official to be placed under his power and then killed him (Lim 2012, 311-312).

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67 The remaining 13 stories tell of solutions for both regaining face and exacting revenge.
Figure 4.1 Relationship of Dynamics of Chinese Face Culture

In sum, although it has some similarities to universal face culture, Chinese face culture is uniquely influential in Chinese society and strongly governs Chinese behaviors. Chinese face culture has three dynamics of seeking, saving, and losing face. These three dynamics are closely intertwined with one another. Saving face is often located between seeking face and losing face, which often occur in chronological order. To save face, one can lower himself or can escape from the negative situation. Once face is lost, one tries to regain face again or to retaliate to overcome the feeling of shame and humiliation. Even though those dynamics work at the individual level, they can be applied to the collective face of the state or other collective entities, because face has social context and is formed in social relations and interactions (Qi 2017). Collective face is particularly important in China because Chinese people equate themselves with the group or the state to which they belong (Zhu 2016). Losing face can affect the family’s face, the group’s face, and the state’s face.
Face’s Effect on Chinese Foreign Policy

What Effect Does It Have?

The culture of Chinese face influences Chinese foreign policy. First, if culture has an effect on foreign policy as we discussed in the earlier section of this chapter, Chinese face culture could also have an effect, because it is also a part of culture. Second, as a state has a reputation, China has face that is mostly taken as identical to the Chinese leader’s face. An individual’s face is closely related to a group’s face to which he belongs.

Arguments for cultural influences on Chinese foreign policy are nothing new. Other than research on Chinese strategic culture, many studies find Confucian features are useful in understanding in Chinese foreign policy. For example, Qin (2011) argues that four key elements of contextuality, correlativity, complementarity, and changeability have played a significant role in China’s foreign policy-making. Zhao (2018) believes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has employed Confucianism to promote nationalist sentiments among the Chinese people and, thus, Confucianism has been served as the underlying ideology to secure the CCP’s political legitimacy and to enhance a more assertive foreign policy. Zhang (2015) asserts that Confucianism lays the groundwork for China’s grand strategy of inclusive relationalism due to its inclusive humanism.

Evidence of cultural effects on Chinese foreign policy is found in the language of Chinese leaders and elites. Although it might be only rhetoric, Chinese leaders and political elites often invoke meaningful words and phrases from Chinese classics to convey their will or thinking in a more elegant manner. For example, President Xi
Jinping always likes to use words from Chinese classics. In Xi’s recent speech at the 18th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization on June 10, 2018, he started his speech by quoting Confucius’ second sentence of *Analects* “What a joy to have friends coming from afar!” He also quoted Mencius’s remarks to explain international issues of hegemony and power politics, traditional and non-traditional threats, trade protectionism, and the clash of civilizations (Xi 2018b).

The relations between culture and foreign policy is also clearly explained by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. When he described China’s new foreign policy of Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics, he elaborated as follows:

“The unique features of China's diplomacy originate from the rich and profound Chinese civilization. In its five thousand-year history, the Chinese nation has developed the human-oriented concept of loving all creatures as if they are your kind and all people as if they are your brothers, the political philosophy of valuing virtue and balance, the peaceful approach of love, non-offense and good-neighborliness, the idea of peace being of paramount importance and harmony without uniformity as well as the personal conduct of treating others in a way that you would like to be treated and helping others succeed if you want to succeed yourself. These traditional values with a unique oriental touch provide an endless source of invaluable cultural asset for China's diplomacy...Over 2,000 years ago, China's great philosopher Confucius said, "the virtue of the sage will last long and the cause of the sage will thrive". To promote peace and development of mankind is just such a lofty and everlasting cause. We will actively explore major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, make joint efforts with people of other countries and work for the establishment of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” (Wang 2013).

In line with influence of culture on Chinese foreign policy, Chinese face culture has played a role in foreign policy. However, the levels of their effects are different.

Chinese traditional culture such as Confucianism has influenced overall Chinese foreign
policy at the macro level, while China’s face culture has more influence on specific incidents at the micro level. In this context, the working of face culture is similar to the discourse of reputation in IR theory. Reputation in IR theory came out of research on deterrence in terms of the problem of credibility. In that sense, it is a “belief based on an actor’s past behavior that informs predictions about his or her future behavior” (Renshon et al. 2018, 327). Reputation is formed when an observer explains an actor’s behavior as dispositional rather than situational and uses the past to predict similar behavior in the future (Mercer 1996, 7). For example, the U.S. should always respond vigorously to any Soviet Union move to test the waters, so as to keep a reputation of resolve (Shelling 1966).

Chinese face culture and the discourse of reputation are also similar in that influential leaders are very important in presenting face and forming reputation (Renshon et al. 2018). In Chinese history, China’s face was the emperor’s face because he was the most powerful person in his country, even when he had no real power because the fate of the court was shared by the emperor. Furthermore, both face and reputation occasionally are not accurate representations of the truth. For example, even though there were air battles between the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Korean War, they were covert and caused no damage to the reputation of either side (Carson 2015). In so avoiding reputational harm by publicizing the results of air battles, both states could prevent the unintended escalation of conflict to total war between them. In the same manner, China named its troops as the People’s Volunteer Army. By putting “Volunteer” on the name, China prepared just in case of the negative situation of losing face should this army lose important battles. Lastly, Chinese face culture and reputation are in common that both put
more emphasis on face and reputation than on actual gains and losses. For instance, the U.S. and the U.N. arguably participated in the Korean War with the sacrifice of numerous casualties not to save South Korea for South Koreans but to save their face in the international arena (Shelling 1966, 124-125).

On the other hand, Chinese face culture and reputation are not the same. First, all leaders of China have been bound by face culture because they are Chinese, and Chinese culture is strongly influenced by it. But not all leaders, even in the same country, highly value reputation. For example, some leaders are more willing to use military force to defend their reputation than others, if they are more sensitive to self-monitoring their foreign policy behaviors (Keren 2018). Second, face dynamics are not so much about whether a person has a good face or not (in fact, the very notion of face implies only good and honorable behavior), but on whether leader or state saves or loses face. On the contrary, reputation can be good or bad. In other words, a leader or state can develop a good reputation or bad reputation but they cannot have bad faces. So, reputation is usually combined with a value judgment as to whether an actor is good or bad, while the concept of face in Chinese culture is not as concerned with valuation.

Third, related to the previous point, a leader or state might have multiple reputations depending on which issue is at hand, whereas face does not vary as easily. For example, Singapore has a good reputation for its political stability and transparency but a simultaneously bad reputation regarding human rights and political freedom. It has been always in the top ten of the most transparent countries among 180 countries and territories in the world by executing strong anti-corruption measures including high salaries and harsh punishment for corruption (Quah 2007; Transparency International 2018).
2018). At the same time, Singapore is well-known for the poor political rights of citizens and atrophied civil liberties (Reyes 2015).

In addition to being similar (though still different) to notions of reputation, Chinese face culture also has similarities to the dynamics of naming and shaming, as introduced in studies on international human rights. Naming and shaming are one of the most preferred strategies in the human rights field to force states to comply with international norms, including human rights norms (Hafner-Burton 2008, 689). Naming and shaming involves public pressure and condemnation of states that violate international rules and norms by calling out the names and behaviors of these states officially (Friman 2015, 3-5; Koliev & Lebovic 2018, 439). One interesting example of naming and shaming is efforts by the U.S. to shame the Soviet Union by renaming a street. In 1984, the U.S. Congress changed the name of the part of 16th street in front of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. to “No.1 Andrei Sakharov Plaza,” in honor of Andrei Sakharov who was an oppressed dissident and Nobel Peace laureate in 1975 and who was exiled four years before this street renaming. After renaming the street, the Soviets could not help but mention and see his name when they had to use the address of their embassy. Two years later, Sakharov was allowed to go back to his home (Pizano 2014; Abrams 2016). More interestingly, China also had a world-renowned dissident, Lui Xiaobo, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, while in prison. History repeats itself. U.S. Senator Ted Cruz and Representative Mark Meadows repeatedly introduced a bill to rename the street on which the Chinese Embassy is situated after Liu Xiaobo, beginning in 2014 (Newman 2017).
However, the difference between naming and shaming, and Chinese face culture, is that the dynamic of naming and shaming by external actors is not as influential as the organic force of Chinese face in Chinese culture. Even though people in the state are is named and shamed by the international community are negatively affected by naming and shaming (Ausderan 2013), it does not mean much to the governments that are named and shamed, given their unchanged attitudes (Hafner-Burton 2008).

**How Does It Work?**

Chinese face culture influences state behavior through the dynamics of seeking, saving, and losing face. First, seeking face is deeply reflected in the current Chinese foreign policy of President Xi Jinping, who is pursuing his “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguomeng, 中国梦), which is to construct a New Type of Great Power Relations and Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics. As discussed in Chapter three, Chinese moves to become a responsible great power clearly correspond with Chinese efforts to seek face in the world. One striking example is the nature of China’s public diplomacy. Although Chinese public diplomacy has recently received more attention under President Xi, the CCP had long ago launched a kind of public diplomacy as a part of its communist propaganda. For example, it encouraged Chinese organizations in the U.S. to publish newspapers promoting the CCP’s position and imperial Japan’s cruelty. *Vanguard Weekly* (Xianfeng Zhoukan, 先锋周刊) and *Chinese Vanguard* were published by the Zhongguo Gong-Nong Gemin Datongmeng (Grand Revolutionary Alliance of Chinese Workers and Peasants) at the end of 1927 and April 1928,
respectively (Lai 2010, 71-72). Furthermore, the CCP published the *Voice of China* magazine in the 1930s in Shanghai and *China Digest* in the late 1940s in Hong Kong for the same purpose of propaganda (Aoyama 2007a, 159). These CCP’s efforts were followed by *People’s China* (English version) in 1950 and *Beijing Review* in 1958 (Aoyama 2007b, 3). The public diplomacy in this era was conducted through “regular publications, leaking the favorable information to the chosen foreign journalists, and foreign language broadcasting” (Aoyama 2007b, 4), and it aimed to seek face with clearly defined characteristics: peace-loving, victimized by foreign invasion, anti-hegemonic, communist, and a developing country (Wang 2003).

After reform and opening up in 1978, and the end of the Cold War, Chinese propaganda gradually transformed into public diplomacy, which means transformation from a simple tool of promotion to a strategy in advancing foreign policy. As China became more intertwined in international affairs in 1980, it became more sensitive to national image abroad and publicity to the outside world became more important in foreign policy (Shambaugh 2007, 47). Against this backdrop, the CCP renamed the Department of Propaganda to the Department of Publicity in the late 1990s, despite no change in the Chinese title (Hartig 2016, 85). Under President Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao from the 1990s to the 2010s, public diplomacy accelerated to improve China’s global image by focusing on Chinese economic development in the era of Jiang and on China’s

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68 *Xianfeng* magazine is translated as *The Pioneer* in some documents instead of *Vanguard*.

69 *The Voice of China* is different from the *Voice of Free China* that was run by the Republic of China from 1949 to 1988.
peaceful rise in the era of Hu (Cho & Jeong 2008, 459; Brady 2015, 54-55). In particular, President Hu was the first Chinese leader who announced that public diplomacy was one of the essential goals for Chinese foreign policy, by advocating for “an objective and friendly publicity environment” in the speech at the 10th Conference of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Stationed Abroad on August 30, 2004 (Wang 2008, 263-264). A prominent action plan was to establish the Confucius Institute (Kongzi Xueyuan), which now has 548 institutes around the world.

Chinese public diplomacy mainly based on advancing China’s cultural heritage has continued and been strengthened by President Xi Jinping. In his speech at a conference on how to enhance China’s cultural soft power on December 30, 2013, he asserted:

“To strengthen China’s soft power, the country needs to build its capacity in international communication, construct a communication system, better use the new media and increase the creativity, appeal and credibility of China’s publicity…The stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread, and characteristics of China well explained” (Xi 2014).

President Xi’s public diplomacy is not just words, as he pushes ahead with the conception of the Belt and Road Initiative of One Belt, One Road (Yidai Yilu, 一带一路), which aims to improve China’s image in the process of integrating the economy and transportation network of approximately fifty countries, while also spreading Chinese culture to them (Li 2018; Sterling 2018).

While the preceding dynamics speak to China’s efforts to seek face, saving face was pervasive in Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy. Deng’s guiding
principle in Chinese foreign policy can be summarized as twenty-eight Chinese characters:

“Lengjingguancha, Wenzhuzhenjiao, Chenzhuoyingfu, Taoguangyanghui, Shanyushouzhuo, Juebudangtu, Yousuozuowei (冷静观察, 稳住阵脚, 沉着应付, 韬光养晦, 善于守拙, 决不当头, 有所作为)” (People’s Daily 2012).

These can be translated into “be calm and observe the situation; hold our ground; hide our strengths and bide our time; be good at keeping a low profile; don’t take the lead; do what you can” (Brady 2017, xvi-xvii). Although he did not use the exact twenty-eight characters, Deng first mentioned the first three phrases of these guiding principles in 1989 when China faced domestic difficulties and international pressure due to the Tiananmen incident in 1989 (Chen & Wang 2011, 197; Vogel 2011, 657-659). He told his colleagues, “When it comes to the international situation, three sentences can summarize it. First, we should observe calmly. Second, we should secure our position. Third, we should cope with affairs calmly. We need to be calm, calm, and calm; we should focus on our own job and do it well” (Deng 1994). Regarding the most-famous term of Taoguangyanghui, it is known that he used the term only once in 1992, when he was discussing the problems of development in China. He claimed that “We will only become a big political power if we keep a low profile [Taoguangyanghui] and work hard for some years; and we will then have more weight in international affairs” (Chen & Wang 2011, 197).

Following Deng’s emphasis on those principles, they have served as the overarching strategy of China’s foreign policy. President Jiang Zemin repeatedly asserted that those principles were China’s foreign policy principles and the same was true of
Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao (Chen & Wang 2011). Some viewed his foreign policy as more focused on “do what you can or get some things done (yousuozhuowei),” which is rather assertive, rather than focused on “hide your strength and bide your time (Taoguangyanghui),” (Cabestan 2010; Johnston 2013; Amako 2014, 15-16; Doshi 2019). While the principle of “hide strength and bide time” seemed to apply during the peaceful rise proposed by President Hu, controversy emerged over an increased focus on “do what you can or get some things done (yousuozhuowei),” when President Xi Jinping suggested a more resolute direction of foreign policy.

In fact, the exact meaning of these terms and their status are controversial. For example, Taoguangyanghui, the key term, can be understood with various meanings: “1. suffer a lot and wait for revenge; 2. hide somebody’s capabilities and avoid leadership; 3. keep a low profile and bide one’s time” (Mierzejewski 2012, 80 endnote31). Furthermore, it is ambiguous whether these 28 characters are Chinese grand strategy or simply represent tactics (Chen & Wang 2011, 196-197). Nevertheless, the important point is that they are firmly related to Chinese saving-face culture. In particular, hiding strength and keeping a low profile is exactly the same dynamic of saving face by being humble and, if necessary, sacrificing what one has. Furthermore, unwillingness to take on leadership is related to another way to save face by avoiding the negative situation, because taking the leadership would entail China shouldering more burdens in engaging international issues that have potential to go poorly, thus undermining China’s efforts to save face.

Last, dynamics of losing face are more related to Chinese action rather than to its words. As explored in Chapter three, Chinese command-in-chief Mao Zedong declared
that the Chinese people had stood up through their revolutionary efforts. Mao was describing Chinese state-building in this way as a grand effort of seeking face following the loss of face during the Century of Humiliation. Mao’s comments describe a way to recover from lost face by gaining a new face. All efforts from Mao to the present President Xi have been involved in this recovery from China’s lost face. For instance, President Xi repeatedly proclaimed and promised the realization of the Chinese Dream of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” as well as promised to restore China’s status as a rightful great power in the world (Doshi 2017).

One action of China to restore its lost face was the long quest for permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council. Although the CCP kicked the Kuomintang out of mainland China, it was the Republic of China (ROC) by the Kuomintang that had been a member at the U.N. and a permanent member at the Security Council because it was a charter member. Even though the Kuomintang’s ROC had been expelled from power, the U.N. Security Council seat was not transferred to the newly empowered People’s Republic of China because the U.S. did not want to expel the ROC from the seat, despite many debates over the representation of China at the U.N. General Assembly throughout the 1950s and the 1960s (Cheung 2015). As many countries including the U.K. and France recognized the PRC and voted for restoring its seat, however, the PRC finally joined the U.N. and took permanent membership by replacing the ROC in 1971 (Cheung 2015).

The UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (UNGAR 2758), which had the title of “Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations,” recognized that “the representatives of the Government of the People’s
Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People’s Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council” (UNGAR 2578). The joint effort by the U.S and Japan to achieve dual representation for Taiwan failed. Following this episode, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China celebrated what they called “a major victory won on this issue through protracted struggle by China and many justices upholding third world countries and other countries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC).  

China does not try restoring its face only by gaining face where it had previously lost face. The other way to restore face following national humiliation is to retaliate on the perpetrator. An excellent example of this method is China’s military attack on Vietnam in 1979. As any war has varied, complicated causes, there are many arguments regarding the cause of the Sino-Vietnam war, such as Deng Xiaoping’s significant role based on his negative perception of Vietnam (Zhang 2010), Chinese political elites’ negative perception of Vietnam (Vogel 2011), and discouraging Vietnam’s trust in the Soviet Union as a reliable ally (Ross 1988). From the perspective losing face within Chinese fact culture, however, China’s decision to go to war with Vietnam was a retaliation on Vietnam for causing China to lose face. In the Sino-Soviet conflict, Vietnam went for the Soviet ally, not China (Ross 1988) and it even signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978, which expressed full support for each other (Soon 1980, 56-57).

70 The title of the commentary statement is “Struggle to restore China's lawful seat in the United Nations.”
Given the friendly relationship between China and Vietnam in the early 1970s, China felt Vietnam’s dramatic leaning toward the Soviets was a loss of face. This is the reason why China pointed out Vietnam’s intimacy to the Soviets as one reason to attack it, and used the term “punishment” in a statement in People’ Daily on December 25, 1978 (Zhang 2010, 3). Although it did not actually win a victory (Joffe 1987; O’Dowd 2007), China unexpectedly declared withdrawal from Vietnam on the ground that the “lesson” to teach Vietnam was fully completed (Quang 2017). After all, China launched the Sino-Vietnamese war because they wanted to “punish” Vietnam (Amako 2014, 6) and to restore its “psychological equation” (Kissinger 2011, 133). China intended to restore lost face by revenging itself on Vietnam.

Table 4.1 Examples of Chinese Face Culture in Chinese Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Dynamics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seeking Face</td>
<td>Chinese Dream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving Face</td>
<td>Principle of hide the strength and bide the time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing Face</td>
<td>Restoring the position in the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sino-Vietnam War (Retaliation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Simply put, Chinese face culture has been reflected in Chinese foreign policy as summarized in Table eight. In particular, words and behaviors in Chinese foreign policy are explained well by three dynamics of Chinese face culture: seeking face, saving face, and losing face. At the same time, no use of mianzi or mian to describe the meaning of the Chinese face is found in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Archive (CFMSA). This absence might be a matter of course because mianzi is not an appropriate word in a diplomatic and official language. When a spokesperson refers to mianzi, it
might entail losing face itself, given features of Chinese face culture. Let us assume that a person asks someone else to do something for him. If this person accepts the request, he gives face to the requestor, who therefore saves his face. If someone else declines the request, however, the requestor loses his face. If someone else reads the person’s mind before a person asks him, and does a favor in advance, that person gains a big face.

On the other hand, lian is found four times on CFMSA. The first one is found in the regular conference on February 3, 2016, which regards North Korea’s ballistic missile launching. The spokesperson Lu Kang said,

“During the stalemate of the Six-Party Talks, in response to relevant countries’ constant outcry for pressure and sanctions, the DPRK started a nuclear test and conducted it over and over again. In this sense, the DPRK did slap the relevant country across the face. As for whose face did the DPRK slap, the country itself knows well [emphasis added]” (CFMSA 2016).

The second usage of lian offered a similar expression as the first one. At the regular press conference on August 24, 2017, when asked a question about the report from the Indian press for road construction plans in a disputed area of the China-India boundary, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying answered, “[the] report makes me feel that India is slapping its own face” (CFMSA 2017). The third usage of the term was on May 30, 2018, regarding the U.S. tariff on Chinese goods. Spokeswoman Hua Chunying said that, “I believe that we all share the same feeling that when it comes to international relations, each and every flip-flop [bianlian, 变脸] will only lead to further depletion and squandering of a country’s credibility and reputation [emphasis added]” (CFMSA 2018).
The last incident of the U.S. tariff also provoked the same expression of slapping a face on December 17, 2018. Answering a question about US National Security Adviser John Bolton’s argument against China’s plan to take over Zambia’s national power and utility company, Hua said, “You may share the same feeling with me that this is not the first time for US officials to be *slapped in the face* on such kind of issues” (CFMSA 2018). Although the meaning of *lian* in those usages is not exactly the same as Chinese face culture, these usages clearly evoke the Chinese concept of losing face. Face in all three examples is used to criticize the other party, charging that the other party could be losing face due to inappropriate words or behaviors. Although the Chinese spokespersons use the expression of slapping one’s face, it is only used to describe what happens to others and never uses it to describe itself.

**Table 4.2 Uses of Mianzi/Lian on CFMSA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 3, 2016</td>
<td>slap the face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 24, 2017</td>
<td>slap the face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30, 2018</td>
<td>flip-flop / squandering of credibility and reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 17, 2018</td>
<td>slap the face</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To sum up, Chinese face culture exists and is an active force that shapes Chinese foreign policy. Given *Taoguanyanghui*, Chinese face culture itself might be seen as a primary force driving foreign policy at the level of national strategy. However, there are controversies regarding how much guiding principles such as *Taoguanyanghui* actually direct foreign policy. Considering the many examples mentioned earlier, it may be most
true that Chinese face culture most actively functions only when events that directly
catalyze face culture occur. Therefore, as described in hypothesis 3, face culture might be
likely to moderate Chinese foreign policy rather than directly make it.

H3: China’s foreign policy is moderated by Chinese face culture.

Observations Regarding the Relations between China and the Two Koreas

In Chapter three, it was found that China behaves in Sino-North and Sino-South
Korean relations according to two types of identities: the proclaimed identity of one’s
own self and the perceived identity of others. China treats a friend as a friend and an
enemy as an enemy. It is undeniable that every relationship may have ups and downs.
The Sino-North Korea and the Sino-South Korea relationship are no exception. That
being said, fluctuations within an understandable range are not the subject of discussion
in this dissertation.⁷¹ The dissertation focuses on some abnormal cases in which China
did not treat a friend as a friend but as a non-friend. They are beyond normal fluctuation
in relationships because they oscillate too far from the boundary line of “friend” and
move to close to the boundary line of “enemy.” In these cases, China treated a friend as
non-friend and vice versa, which runs counter to the argument that China acts by virtue of
identity. Is the argument flawed from the very beginning? Or is there any other factor to
consider that influences Chinese behavior? Two observations from the Sino-North
Korean relationship and the Sino-South Korean relationship address these questions. At
the same time, they are helpful in providing a clue to understanding China’s puzzling

⁷¹ Chung (2009) and Ye (2017) following him describe these kinds of conflicts over “low politics” between
China and South Korea as “soft” clashes.
behaviors that are the subject of this dissertation. These two observations are the Garlic War between China and South Korea and North Korea’s second nuclear crisis. In these incidents, China took different and unexpected attitudes toward North and South Korea, departing from their usual attitudes. 72

The Garlic War

Background

The Garlic War, a trade dispute between China and South Korea over Chinese garlic from 1999 to 2000, was the first official conflict between the two countries after normalization in 1992. It originated following the price crash of garlic in South Korea in the late 1990s. South Korea was the largest garlic consumer per capita in the world in 2018 (Baek 2018) and was a top five global garlic producer in 2016 (Ham 2018). In 2018, garlic consumption per capita was 6.7 kg, while it was 9.2kg in 2000 when the Garlic War occurred (Choi et al. 2019, 707). After normalization, South Korea’s garlic imports from China had been on the increase. For example, garlic imports tripled in the three years from 1996 to 1999, before the Garlic War erupted (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea 2000). In addition, domestic production of garlic had also been increasing over the similar period from 1997 to 1999 (Chung 2003/4, 556).

72 Another observation is the so-called 2010 Senkaku Boat Collision Incident between China and Japan, which led to China’s unexpected retaliation of banning the export of rare earth metals to Japan. However, this case is not discussed in this chapter. This incident will be briefly discussed in the Japanese case study in Chapter 7.


*Developments*

Against this backdrop, the garlic price in South Korea suddenly and sharply decreased in 1999. For example, the farm sale price of garlic nosedived by 44 percent from 2,719 Korean Won per kilogram in 1998 to 1,520 in 1999, and the wholesale price dropped from 3,097 Korean Won per kilogram to 1,859 in the same period (Chung 2003/4, 555). As the garlic price rapidly decreased and concerns over the increasing import of Chinese garlic among Korean garlic farmers were growing, the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (NACF or *Nonghyup* in Korean), which is the biggest farmers association in South Korea, filed a request with the Korea Trade Commission (KTC) on September 30, 1999 to investigate damages caused by Chinese garlic to Korean farmers (National Archives of Korea 2006). On October 27, the KTC recommended a provisional safeguard measure to the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the MOFE imposed a provisional tariff on Chinese garlic for 200 days, increasing the tariff from 30 percent to 315 percent during the period (Yonhap News Agency 2000). Following this measure, the KTC adopted a positive judgment on imposing tariffs on the import of Chinese garlic on February 2 and MOFE determined to officialize the imposition on March 17, 2000 (Yonhap News Agency 2000). Having had two working-level negotiations before the deadline of adopting the provisional safeguard, the South Korean government decided to take the safeguard measure by applying a 315 percent tariff on frozen and pickled garlic and a 436 percent tariff on peeled garlic from China for the next three years, effective beginning June 1, 2000 (Choi 2000, 86-87; Chung 2003/4, 553).
China’s retaliation began immediately. On June 7, 2000, China’s Ministry of Commerce decided to impose a ban on the imports of South Korean cell phones and polyethylene (Snyder 2009, 66; Ye 2017, 94 note 2), which was already hinted at in mid-March (Chung 2003/4, 554). But China’s revenge was excessive given the comparative trade volume of Chinese garlic and South Korean cell phones and polyethylene. In 1999, South Korea’s import of Chinese garlic amounted to $8.98 million while China’s imports of cell phones and polyethylene from South Korea were valued at $41.40 million and $470.13 million respectively (Kim 2001, 83).

Surprised by China’s strong countermeasure, the South Korean government had a third negotiation with China in Beijing on June 29, 2000, and the two countries reached an agreement on July 31, 2000 (Choi 2000, 88; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea 2000). As a result, South Korea decided to lower tariffs and ensure an import quota of Chinese garlic instead of imposing a dramatic tariff or outright abolition on Chinese garlic. In return, China lifted the ban on the imports of Korean mobile phones and polyethylene, effective on August 2, 2000 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea 2000).

However, it was not the end of the war. In April of 2001, China alluded to resuming its ban on Korean goods on the grounds that South Korea did not import the agreed quota of Chinese garlic (National Archive of Korea 2006). So, South Korea satisfied China’s demand by expanding its garlic imports from China. In 2002, the conflict was about to reoccur when the NACF asked the South Korean government to extend the safeguards against Chinese garlic with four more years of restrictions, lasting until 2006. But this proposal did not escalate into a conflict between South Korea and
China because the South Korean government promised financial support to their garlic farmers, rather than seeking to restrict Chinese imports (National Archive of Korea 2006).

*A Clue from China’s Strange Behavior*

As seen from the South Korean government’s surprise, China’s severe retaliation was beyond the expectations of South Korea. Because the two countries had enjoyed a good relationship as friends after normalization, China’s response is hard to understand in many ways. First, China had several opportunities to resolve the dispute before imposing a total ban on Korean goods. Second, it declined the suggestion from South Korea that South Korea would increase the imports of other Chinese goods such as corn and sesame (National Archive of Korea 2006). Third, the retaliation was disproportionate. China’s ban on South Korean mobile phones and polyethylene restricted 52 times more trading value than the amount of Chinese garlic effected by South Korea’s safeguard. Last, China outright banned South Korean imports instead of stepping up measures such as imposing tariffs or quotas.

One explanation might be possible. That is China that felt it lost face due to the actions of a friend. Given the complicated causes of the garlic price crash in South Korea, and South Korea’s large trade surplus to China at that time, China might believe that South Korea provoked it without any good reason.73 This presumption is substantiated by Chung (2003/4)’s interview where he said that the “China side regarded South Korea’s

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73 In fact, some argue that the reduction in garlic prices was attributed more to domestic production than to the import of Chinese garlic (Chung 2003/4).
safeguard measures as ungrounded and discriminatory, which undermined its ‘face’ in the eyes of the international community” (Chung 2003/4, 557-558).

The Second Nuclear Crisis of North Korea

Background

The first North Korean nuclear crisis occurred in 1993, provoked by North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT, and ended with the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1994 (Cotton 2003, 262; National Archive of Korea 2017). Almost ten years later, the second nuclear crisis of North Korea took place in 2002 when North Korea allegedly admitted a nuclear program with highly enriched uranium to James Kelley, who was the former Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Kwak & Joo 2007, 1). Then Fist Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok ju defended their nuclear program to Kelley during his visit to Pyongyang on October 3-5, claiming that North Korea had no choice but to develop the program, due to threats from the U.S. that included North Korea in the ‘axis of evil’ (Cotton 2003, 271; Funabashi 2007, 125; Pritchard 2007, 37). Despite its ambiguous answer to Kelly’s question about its nuclear program, North Korea’s nuclear program was clearly in violation of the 1994 Agreement that required North Korea to freeze its development of nuclear weapons.

Developments

The U.S. took action quickly. On November 14, in response to North Korea’s cheating, the Bush administration announced that the U.S. was no longer bound by the 1994 Agreement and suspended oil supply to North Korea that the U.S. had been providing according to the 1994 Agreement (Harrison 2005). On December 27, North
Korea announced that they had decided to unfreeze its nuclear program, which had stopped according to the 1994 Agreement, and to expel International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze of the program. This was followed by North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the NPT on January 10, 2003, along with restarting the Yongbyon nuclear facilities (Pritchard 2007, 43).

As tensions between North Korea and the U.S. grew, North Korea constantly asked for bilateral dialogue between them, which the U.S. would not accept it (Pritchard 2007, 57). Washington was strongly opposed to bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang because it was concerned with the difficulty of taking the initiative in the bargaining process (Funabashi 2007, 158). To break this stalemate, China was willing to take the role of an honest broker (Khan 2003). It was unexpected because China was reluctant to engage in the first North Korean nuclear crisis, when China remained a bystander (Lee & Kim 2017, 30).

To persuade North Korea into sitting at the table, China raised the stakes to shut down the oil pipeline to North Korea for three days in early March 2003, on the pretext of maintenance (Funabashi 2007, 323-324; Shirk 2007, 124-125). The action seemed to have been very effective. Consequently, three-party talks were held among Beijing, Pyongyang, and Washington on April 23-25, 2003 and this was followed by the Six-Party

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74 When it walked out of the NPT, Pyongyang declared that the withdrawal was effective immediately (Cotton 2003, 274).”Although Article X of the NPT requires that a country give three months’ notice in advance of withdrawing, North Korea argues that it has satisfied that requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw March 12, 1993, and suspended the decision one day before it was to become legally binding” (Arms Control Association 2019).
A Clue from China’s Strange Behavior

China’s strange behavior during the second North Korean nuclear crisis was not its changed attitude from a bystander to the leader of the talks. My curiosity is regarding China’s behavior to cut off oil supply to North Korea. Given the importance of oil to North Korea, especially under the condition of suspended oil supply by the U.S., China’s decision to close the oil pipeline is not easy to understand. If they were friends, it would be more normal to persuade North Korea with words, not with punishment. One assumption is that China felt it lost its face due to actions by North Korea. It tried to mediate between North Korea and the U.S. by seating them at the negotiation table by using its “big face,” but this effort was declined by North Korea.

On the other hand, regarding the pipeline closure, there was opposition, according to one memoir. South Korean diplomat Lee Soo-Hyuk, who was the South Korean representative for the Six-Party Talks, wrote in his memoir that “I asked Chinese representative Wang Yi for this matter. He said China as a big state did not treat a small neighbor, North Korea, like that” (Lee 2011). Wang Yi’s denial can be explained by Chinese face culture. Once he admitted the strong punishment, it could involve losing face for China because, as he mentioned himself, exacting this kind of punishment rather than engaging in dialogue was not like a great power.

The clues to the operation of Chinese face culture in these two episodes are worthy to be tested in the case studies of this dissertation. What if China lost its face in the case of the Sino-North Korean relations and Sino-South Korean relations studied in
this dissertation, but did not lose face in the case of Sino-Japanese relations? I hypothesize that just these dynamics of Chinese face culture explain China’s alternatively assertive and non-assertive foreign policy responses to the actions of North Korea, South Korea, and Japan.

H3a: **Chinese face culture leads to assertive Chinese foreign policy when China loses its face.**

**Conclusion**

Culture is essential to understanding China. When it comes to Confucian culture, we might think it is a very influential but ambiguous norm. It is a thin but widely penetrated influence on all aspects of Chinese life. Compared to this widespread cultural influence, face culture in China is more precise and direct cultural force that regulates people’s behavior. It does not mean that culture is everything. Rather, culture should be a significant consideration in foreign policy analysis despite its difficulty to be measured. The unseen does not mean the unimportant. Culture, especially Chinese face culture, is blended into Chinese foreign policy. More precisely, it influences Chinese foreign policy through the three dynamics of seeking face, saving face, and losing face. Sometimes these dynamics shape diplomatic strategies, while they can also shape guiding principles that underlie overall Chinese foreign policy, such as national security strategies.

Two observations from Sino-North Korean relations and Sino-South Korea relations are interesting regarding Chinese face culture. In Chapter three, I argued that China’s foreign policy is heavily dependent on two types of identities: proclaimed and perceived. According to this argument, China should treat a friend as a friend and treat an adversary as an adversary. However, China’s behaviors in the two observations of the
Garlic War and the second North Korean nuclear crisis are not explained by that argument. There are always ups and downs in the Sino-North Korean relationship and the Sino-South Korean relationship. For example, there have been periods of no exchanges of leaders between China and North Korea. Furthermore, there have been conflicts over Kimchi, over the historical memory of events, and over the so-called Northeast Project, between China and South Korea. The fluctuation in relations over such conflicts is common in any relationship. But China’s behaviors in the two observations covered here are beyond these normal fluctuations to the degree that China behaved as though North and South Koreas were not friends, because China employed very harsh punishment during those events. The discrepancy between identity and behavior in these cases might stem from a situation where China felt more humiliation when losing face due to the action of a friend.

This logic can be applied to the puzzle of this dissertation. Did China respond vigorously to undesirable actions of North and South Korea because of the exceptional loss of face caused by the action of perceived friends? And was the lack of retaliation against Japan for its undesired action driven by the fact that China did not lose any face in Sino-Japanese relations because Japan was already seen as an enemy? Therefore, the hypothesis H3a, produced by observations regarding the Garlic War and the second nuclear crisis, needs to be tested in the following case studies.
Chapter Five

Case Study: North Korea’s Taepodong-2 Launch
and the First Nuclear Test

North Korea’s provocations against the international community have long been a big headache, specifically North Korea’s development of a nuclear program and a missile program as a possible vehicle for a nuclear bomb. Despite twenty United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to prevent North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the international community has failed to tackle this issue, and Pyongyang has increasingly developed their nuclear and missile capabilities for the past several decades. Finally, North Korea declared that it had nuclear weapons on February 10, 2005, and stipulated its status as a nuclear power in the national constitution of April 2012.

Many states, especially the United States, have ascribed the failure to prevent North Korea’s nuclear development to China’s lack of action (and will) on the issue. Thus, the U.S. has pushed China to exert its influence on North Korea, so that North Korea would refrain from any further provocations and comply with the UNSC resolutions regarding the North Korean issue. But China has been reluctant to accept the U.S. request and has not exerted vigorous pressure on North Korea. Rather, it has supported North Korea, albeit implicitly, and still treated its neighbor as a friend.
However, this has not always been the case. As seen in the observation in Chapter four, China treated North Korea as a non-friend by closing the oil pipeline to North Korea in 2003, in an action more dramatic than a simple quarrel between friends.\textsuperscript{75} In addition to this closing, there was one more shutdown of the pipeline in 2006. Did this shutdown mean that China began to change its perceived identity of North Korea? Were there any other factors to consider, such as the matter of national interests, as realists would advocate? Or, does this case of the second pipeline shutdown support the hypothesis of identity-driven foreign policy, derived from the above-mentioned observation? This chapter delves into North Korea’s provocations in 2006 by focusing on the Taepodong-2 missile test and North Korea’s first nuclear test to find an answer to those questions.

**Background**

*Origin of the Six-Party Talks*

North Korea’s missile launch of Taepodong-2 and the first nuclear test occurred in the midst of the Six-Party Talks (SPT), which were a multilateral dialogue framework involving China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the U.S., and were designated to tackle North Korean issues. To address the second North Korean nuclear crisis, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Washington agreed to hold the Three-Party Talks in

\textsuperscript{75} From the North Korean perspective, however, China’s identity is sometimes not a good friend. This can be a good example to understand the discrepancy between state identity and national identity. Anti-Chinese sentiment among North Koreans is very strong and deep-rooted. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un allegedly argued that “Japan has been the deadly enemy for hundreds of years, but China has been the old enemy for thousands of years” (Denyer 2017). Similarly, there is an episode where the U.S. representative to the Six-Party Talks, Christopher R. Hill, said to Chinese chairman Wu Dawei, “I know why they hate us. I know why they hate the Japanese. What I cannot understand is why they hate you” (Hill 2014, 231).
Beijing on April 23-25, 2003.\textsuperscript{76} The Talks were mediated by China, which was a middle-ground strategy between the North Korea goal of a direct bilateral dialogue with the U.S., while the U.S. firmly insisted on a multilateral approach to the issue, with preference for exerting collective pressure (Moon & Bae 2003, 15-16).

China’s proactive moves during this time were entirely different than what it did during the first nuclear crisis.\textsuperscript{77} On the eve of the Talks, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement:

“China has always advocated the peaceful settlement of the Korean nuclear issue through dialogue. This is also the consensus of related parties and the international community. Based on such a consensus, China has invited the DPRK and the United States to send delegations to hold talks in China” (Requoted from Fu 2017, 8).

Nevertheless, the Talks could not produce any result. North Korea suggested a “new and bold” comprehensive approach by which the United States would offer diplomatic recognition and provide security assurances and economic assistance in return for North Korea's pledge to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, whereas the U.S. reiterated its position that it could start negotiation regarding demands by North Korea only if it abandoned the nuclear program through a “verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” method, which was the precursor of later demands for “Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)” (Chinoy 2008, 171-172).

\textsuperscript{76} The Three-Party Talks were practically held for only two days, wrapping up one day earlier than the original schedule. However, China succeeded in making it a three-day talk, albeit formally, by holding the delegations on the same spot for additional minutes to have a farewell courtesy (Funabashi 2007, 334; Pritchard 2007, 65).

\textsuperscript{77} In general, three worst-case scenarios are known to be the causes of China’s different approaches: “1) North Korean nuclear blackmail directed at China; 2) Japan’s ambition to be a nuclear power; and 3) a U.S.-DPRK War” (Kim 2003b, 15).
The Beginning of the Six-Party Talks

Right after the failure of the Three-Party Talks, China began to prepare another round of three-party talks (Pritchard 2007, 101). But both North Korea and the U.S. were reluctant to have a second round of three-party talks. The U.S. preferred five-party talks involving the U.S., China, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan (Chinoy 2008, 166). North Korea still wanted to have a bilateral dialogue with the U.S. and insisted on the participation of Russia as the next best option. On the other hand, it strongly opposed the participation of Japan in the talks. China preferred to only invite South Korea to the next talks (Shin 2005, 39-40). It was hoped that the Six Party Talks (SPT) would meet all parties’ satisfaction, and the first round of the SPT was held in Beijing on August 27-29, 2003. Due to a sharp gap in positions between the U.S. and North Korea, however, the participants could not reach agreement on a joint statement. Instead, the SPT chairman, Wang Yi, delivered an oral summary of the common understanding of the participants (Funabashi 2007, 345).78

Three points are noteworthy from the first round of the SPT in terms of the purpose of this case study. One is that China was satisfied with the issuance of the chairman’s statement despite the failure to draw up a joint statement. It seems that China was proud of holding the SPT as a host because it showed its diplomatic capabilities and its peace-loving image to the world (Lee 2005, 94-95). The other is that China became the permanent host country after many complications in agreeing on a location for the

78 Pritchard (2007, 104) regarded the summary as a chairman’s statement but it was different from a typical chairman’s statement because it was not a written document.
talks, and also because China had grown satisfied with its prestige from the role of host (Funabashi 2007, 340). The last point is that China employed the carrot rather than the stick, which was used for the Three-Party Talks, to bring North Korea back to multilateral talks. It is said that China promised to provide ten thousand tons of diesel oil to North Korea for free when Dai Bingguo, Chief Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, paid a visit to Pyongyang on July 12, 2003 (Shin 2005, 41-42).

The second round of the SPT was held on February 25-28, 2004. Because North Korea repeatedly maintained that participation in the SPT was meaningless and, thus, it was no longer interested in taking part in the SPT, China tried to coax Pyongyang into coming back to the table by suggesting the construction of a glass factory in North Korea without cost to Pyongyang (Funabashi 2007, 347). At the second round of the SPT, delayed from the original schedule on December 25-27, 2003, North Korea proposed a so-called “comprehensive approach” that North Korea temporarily freeze its nuclear program overall, albeit without complete dismantlement, in return for the U.S. security assurance to North Korea. However, the U.S. reiterated its requirement of “Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)” of all of its nuclear program (Funabashi 2007, 349).

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79 At first, some countries thought the host could be rotated and China itself complained about organizing the talks because of the financial burden and uncooperative attitudes of participants (Funabashi 2007, 340).

80 South Korea proposed a compromise with a 3-stage process: the first stage is a nuclear dismantlement proclamation of North Korea and oral commitment of security assurance by the U.S.; the second stage is a freeze of nuclear programs by North Korea and corresponding measures by the other five participants; and the third stage would be the complete dismantlement of nuclear programs by North Korea and implementation of the corresponding measures (Lee 2008). For the details of the South Korean position at the SPT in the beginning, see Lee (2008) and Moon (2008).
The second SPT made progress compared to the first one in that it released a chairman’s statement that was a little more formal than a host’s oral summary which followed the first round. Furthermore, participants agreed to establish a working group to support future SPT (Funabashi 2007, 352-353). On the other hand, China revealed its intention to develop the SPT into a regional security regime (Shin 2005, 46).

To encourage North Korea to participate in the next round of SPT, China suggested a carrot again to North Korea. At the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and Chinese President Hu Jintao on April 19-20, 2004, China promised to provide heavy oil, amounting to 0.3 billion Chinese renminbi, to North Korea free of charge (Shin 2005, 48). Thanks to this offer, the third round SPT was held on June 23-26, 2004. Contrary to the previous SPTs that were more focused on dialogue to figure out the difference in positions between participants, the third round SPT made progress in beginning negotiations among the participants (Kwak 2004, 42-47). In this situation, Chairman Wang Yi had to use the phrase “for the first time” several times because North Korea and the U.S. seemed to be ready to negotiate “for the first time” (Funabashi 2008, 360).

After the third round of SPT, there was a hiatus for about thirteen months. North Korea refused to resume the fourth round SPT on the ground of the U.S. calling it ‘an outpost of tyranny’ and North Korea officially declared that it had nuclear weapons on February 10, 2005 (Snyder 207, 163). North Korean official said that the only way for the U.S. to make North Korea return to the SPT was to formally retract the naming of North Korea as an outpost of tyranny (Funabashi 2007, 376). Although there was no official retraction, North Korea decided to return to the SPT without providing a justification.
(Hill 2014, 210-211). South Korea gave an ostensible reason for North Korea to return by providing the country with 500,000 metric tons of food, while China put constant pressure on North Korea as well (Pritchard 2007, 108-109).

The first session of the fourth round of the SPT was held on July 26-August 7, 2005 and the second session was on September 13-19, 2005. The issue of the fourth round of the SPT was a light water reactor. North Korea strongly demanded the provision of the light water reactor, arguing for the right to peaceful use of nuclear power whereas the U.S. had concerns with nuclear proliferation (Kwak 2007, 16-17; Pritchard 2007, 120-123). The compromise was to insert the phrase ‘at an appropriate time’ in the joint statement. However, the definition of ‘appropriate time’ was ambiguous. For example, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “It requires further consultation among the six parties to define when will be the appropriate time” (Pritchard 2007, 125). For the U.S., however, the appropriate time was to be determined by “North Korean action in fulfilling its denuclearization obligations” (Hill 2014, 240).

Meanwhile, it was true that the fourth round of the SPT made an achievement by producing the Joint Statement for the first time since the SPT began in 2003. To implement the Joint Statement of the fourth round of the SPT, the first session of the fifth round of the SPT was held on November 9-11, 2005. However, the Talks ended in a stalemate due to two issues raised by North Korea. One was the demand to provide a light water reactor first and the other was the request for the U.S. to lift financial sanctions against them, which were imposed in response to a money-laundering suspicion involving Banco Delta Asia Bank in Macau (Kwak 2007, 21-22; Funabashi 2007, 401-415; Pritchard 2007, 127-129).
Developments

Launch of Taepodong-2

China’s assertive response to its friend North Korea took place against these backdrops. Amid a tug-of-war between the U.S. and North Korea over the financial sanctions, when he visited Tokyo to attend the meeting of Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue on April 13, 2006, Kim Gye-gwan, Deputy Foreign Minister of North Korea and representative for the SPT, said,

“We don’t care about the delay of the SPT. We can have more deterrence [while delaying the talks]. As soon as the money [in the Banco Delta Asia Bank] comes into my hands, I will go to the meeting. No concession for this matter. If the U.S. wants to pressure us, we will take a stronger measure” (Jung 2006).

A week later, Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a visit to the U.S. and had a meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush to discuss the SPT. President Bush asked President Hu to tell Kim Jong-II that the U.S. was willing to work for a peace treaty if North Korea was willing to do it (Funabashi 2007, 422). So, on April 27-28, 2006, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei secretly visited North Korea. But there was no positive response from Kim Jong-Il.\footnote{There are several different stories regarding Tang’s visit to Pyongyang. One is that Kim Jong-II was outraged due to China’s coercive tactics (Pritchard 2007, 160). Another is that Tang was told that the return to the SPT was only possible when the U.S. unfroze $24 million at Macao bank (Lee 2006), and the other is that Kim seemed not to believe China’s real intention (Funabashi 2007, 423).}

From March to June, the Japanese news agency, Kyodo News, continually reported that a launch of the Taepodong-2 missile seemed to be pending. In response to these moves from North Korea, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned on June 19, 2006, that North Korea’s missile launch would be regarded as a provocative act
and a violation of moratorium responsibility under the Joint Statement of the fourth round of the SPT (Cooper & Onishi 2006). In response, on the next day, Ri Pyong Dok, a researcher from North Korea's foreign ministry, asserted that Pyongyang did not have to keep any promises regarding missile tests, nor was it bound by any statement, because this issue concerned their autonomy (Cooper & Gordon 2006). On June 22, 2006, Han Song Ryol, deputy chief of North Korea's mission to the United Nations, aligned himself with Ri by saying “North Korea as a sovereign state has the right to develop, deploy, test fire and export a missile.” On the other hand, he also noted that "We are aware of the U.S. concerns about our missile test-launch. So, our position is that we should resolve the issue through negotiations" (Herman 2006).

On the same day, former defense secretary, William J. Perry, and assistant secretary of defense, Ashton B. Carter, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post urging President Bush to launch a pre-emptive strike against North Korea's long-range ballistic missile (Carter & Perry 2006). On the other hand, the international community, including the other SPT members, exhorted North Korea to stop the moves to launch a missile. For instance, the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Anan urged Pyongyang to halt test preparations by saying, “I hope that the leaders of North Korea will listen to and hear what the world is saying. We are all worried” (Quoted from Pritchard 2007, 147).

China’s attitude was noteworthy. On June 27, 2006, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing had a meeting with South Korea Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon. After the meeting, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said,

“Both sides believe that under the current situation relevant parties should stick to the direction of solving this issue through dialogue and peaceful means, avoid intensifying antagonism and
tension, and to press ahead with the resumption of the six-party talks at an early date so as to maintain peace and stability in the Korean peninsula" (Voice of America 2006).


“We are paying close attention to the information showing there might be a possible missile-testing launch by North Korea. We hope that the various parties will proceed for the greater interest of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and refrain from taking measures that will worsen the situation” [emphasis added] (Quoted from Chinoy 2008, 280).

Despite the international community’s unanimous demand that North Korea should stop its provocative missile test, North Korea eventually launched Taepodong-2 on July 5 (July 4, in U.S. time), along with five Scud and Nodong missiles (Pritchard 2007, 145). North Korea said that the launching of missiles was a part of “routine military exercises to increase the nation’s military capacity for self-defense” (Kwak 2007, 27). Although the Taepodong-2 launching seemed to fail technically because it fell into the East Sea right after firing, it still was seen as a serious threat due to its longest range of North Korean missiles, which was presumed to be more than 10,000 km and that could reach the West Coast of the U.S. (Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea 2017, 33).

On July 7, deputy chief to the U.N. Han Song Ryol said that North Korea was willing to return to the SPT if the U.S. lifted sanctions against Macao bank, which could be good proof of the U.S. will to tackle this issue with dialogue (Kwak 2007, 28).

However, on July 15, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1695, which meant that China voted for the resolution, though China had abstained from the
previous resolution in 1993 that urged Pyongyang to reconsider its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT. Resolution 1695 condemned North Korea's launch of ballistic missiles and imposed sanctions by demanding that North Korea should stop producing and testing missiles, halt future launches, and unconditionally return to six-party negotiations (UNSC 2006a; Hill 2014, 247).

In the process of making a draft for the resolution, China opposed invoking the provisions of Article 42 under chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which allowed UN member states to employ military measures (Pritchard 2007, 147). In September 2006, however, Beijing autonomously punished Pyongyang by reducing its oil exports to North Korea, which were previously restored after North Korea’s promise to return to the SPT (Twomey 2008, 417; Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart 2013, 10).

**The First Nuclear Test**

The international community’s condemnation of North Korea missile provocation continued. For example, the Asean Regional Forum (ARF), which is the only regional regime to promote constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues in the region, issued a chairman’s statement on August 1, 2006, saying,

“Most Ministers expressed concern over the test-firing of missiles by the DPRK on 5 July 2006 and believed that such tests could have adverse repercussions on peace, stability and security in the region....The Ministers urged the DPRK in this regard to re-establish its moratorium on missile testing” (ASEAN 2006).

Amid the constant criticism and concerns by the international community, the U.S. broadcasting company *ABC News* reported on August 17 that there was evidence that North Korea seemed to be preparing for an underground test of a nuclear bomb (Karl 2006). In fact, North Korea announced its plan for a nuclear test on October 3, 2006, in
a Foreign Ministry statement that “[t]he field of scientific research of the DPRK will in the future conduct a nuclear test under the condition where safety is firmly guaranteed” (Yonhap News Agency 2006). Three days later, the U.N. Security Council issued a president’s statement that “underlines that such a test would bring universal condemnation by the international community and would not help the DPRK to address the stated concerns particularly with regard to strengthening its security” (UNSC 2006b).

Following the release of their plan, Pyongyang finally conducted an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), which is the largest news media run by the North Korean state, released a statement:

“The field of scientific research in the DPRK [North Korea] successfully conducted an underground nuclear test under secure conditions on October 9, Juche 95 (2006), at a stirring time when all the people of the country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great, prosperous, powerful socialist nation. It has been confirmed that there was no such danger as radioactive emission in the course of the nuclear test as it was carried out under scientific consideration and careful calculation” (Quoted by Zhang 2007, 1).

The international community immediately responded. The UNSC had an emergency meeting the next morning and discussed whether it should impose sanctions against North Korea. Moreover, U.S. President Bush said that the North Korean nuclear test was “a threat to international peace and security” and denounced it as a “provocative act” (Hoge & Stolberg 2006). China reacted furiously by saying that North Korea had ignored the widespread opposition of the international community and conducted a nuclear test brazenly, so “the Chinese government is firmly opposed to this” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2006). President Hu Jintao ordered Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to covertly meet North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju on 12 October,
and Foreign Minister Li delivered China’s strong displeasure to his counterpart (Shin 2006a; Chinoy 2008, 295). The UNSC passed Resolution 1718 unanimously that required UN members to prevent any provision of nuclear technology, large-scale weapons, or luxury goods to North Korea and permitted inspection of cargo to ensure compliance (UNSC 2006c).

On October 19, Tang Jiaxuan visited Pyongyang and met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. Kim expressed regret to Tang for North Korea’s nuclear test and also said that North Korea would return to the SPT if it could have some bilateral meetings with the U.S. (Kim 2006; Pritchard 2007, 156). However, China denied that Kim made an apology to the Chinese delegation. When it comes to the report by a Korean newspaper about Kim’s apology, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao said, “These reports are certainly not accurate. We have not heard any information that Kim Jong Il apologized for the test” (Jeffries 2010, 168). On October 31, 2006, North Korea agreed to return to the SPT and the second session of the fifth round of the SPT was held on December 18-22, 2006 (Prichard 2007, 155; Hill 2014, 252).

Analysis

North Korea’s Identity to China

To explain China’s reduction in oil supply and its vote for the U.N. sanctions, it requires close examination as to whether North Korea’s identity to China as a friend had changed. It is surely not impossible that identity can change dramatically in a moment, especially for a proclaimed identity that is announced by oneself. However, rapid change in identity is practically implausible considering the fact that identity is socially constructed. In particular, it is less feasible for perceived identity to change quickly, since
such an identity needs more time to form because others there must be sufficient social contacts over time to confirm a perceived identity. One outlier in terms of puzzling behavior towards a perceived friend, such as China’s caprice towards North Korea in this case, should be considered as exceptional rather than as evidence of China suddenly perceiving North Korea as non-friend.

In this context, China’s perceived identity of North Korea had not changed at all, speculating from their statements and behaviors. For example, when the U.S. suggested on April 26, 2005 that China should shut down its oil pipeline to North Korea, China was reluctant to do so (Pritchard 2007, 111). Furthermore, China opposed invoking Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that stipulates “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” despite its vote for UNSC resolutions condemning North Korea (Pritchard 2007, 92). Also, China and North Korea had constant exchanges between high-ranking officials, including national leaders, regardless of Pyongyang’s provocations in 2006.

Table 5.1 High-level Visits between China and North Korea (2000-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year / Bound for</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Premier-/Vice-Premier Level</th>
<th>Ministerial Level</th>
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As seen in Table 5.1, there have been constant exchanges of high-level officials between China and North Korea, despite its lowest number of six exchanges in 2007, the year after the 2006 nuclear test. Although it was the lowest year of mutual visits, the number was not too significant given only nine visits occurred in 2002 and 2003, and eight occurred in 2000, long before the nuclear test. The lower number of visits in 2007 may be interpreted as friction between the two countries. Nevertheless, if we concluded that China saw North Korea as a non-friend based on this number, it would be inadequate proof. In fact, China’s behaviors in supporting continued high-level visits between the two countries (including 10 visits in 2008, 19 in 2009, and 17 in 2010), substantiate that China did not change the perceived identity of North Korea as friend.

In addition to these behaviors, China’s statements also show that it still regarded North Korea as friend. As seen in Table 5.2, spokespersons of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of PRC always described the relationship between China and North Korea as a relationship between good friends and neighbors. Even after the launching of the Taepodong-2 missile and the nuclear test, they used this description. Furthermore, there surprisingly had been only twelve articles in People’s Daily regarding the nuclear test from October 9 to November 8, which mainly covered responses from the international community (People’s Daily Database). As a result, there was no change of the perceived identity of North Korea as friend to China, even following North Korean provocations in 2006, judging from China’s words and behaviors.

Table 5.2 China’s Wording on North Korea as a Friend (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (2006)</th>
<th>Wording by Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| January 19   | - Although Sino-North Korean relations are in transformation in the 21st century, traditional friendship of parties and peoples between two countries has never changed.  
- As good friends and neighbors, China and North Korea have the responsibility for common development.  
- China and North Korea further strengthened the profound traditional friendship and cooperation between two parties and two peoples. |
| February 14  | China and North Korea are good friends and neighbors. Economic and personnel exchanges between the two countries are normal. |
| April 4      | China and North Korea have normal and friendly relations of states.                                                     |
| April 18     | China and North Korea have the traditional relationship of friends and cooperation. Two countries hold good cooperation and exchange in all areas. |
| July 6       | China and North Korea are good friends and neighbors. China has always pursued a good-neighbor policy.               |
| October 10   | - North Korea’s nuclear test has a negative impact on China-DPRK relationship. China and North Korea are good friends and neighbors. This policy is unwavering and has never changed.  
- I do not agree with what you just said that China is in alliance with North Korea. China pursues the non-alignment policy and is not aligned with any other country. The relationship between China and the DPRK is a normal state-to-state relations based on the norms of international relations. |
October 12

China is committed to developing friendly and cooperative relations between China and the DPRK. The friendship between the Chinese and Korean people is profound.

Source: CFMSA

The perceived identity of North Korea by China, as a friend, was not altered despite North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006. First, the social bond of the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty was not revised. Also, their diplomatic ties established in 1949 did not change. Second, social contacts of exchanges between the two states were not suspended. Third, the wording of official statements still reflected social expressions of intimacy.

**China’s Lost Face**

Since I conclude that there was no change in the perceived identity of North Korea as friend to China, China’s unexpected behavior of cutting off the oil supply and voting for the sanctions needs closer examination. Can these behaviors be explained by the logic of losing face? My answer is in the affirmative. Forced to deal with two North Korean provocations was sufficient to cause China to feel that it lost face because of North Korea. There are two ways to confirm whether China lost its face. One is to determine whether this situation was a negative situation where China was unlikely to save its face. The other is to investigate whether mechanisms of restoring lost face can be observed—which can be divided into two remedies of seeking another face or retaliating with fury, as discussed in Chapter four.
Failed to Save Face

As discussed in Chapter four, China’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by its culture. This observation also applies to the Sino-North Korean relationship. In this context, “China’s expectations of deference (zunzhong, 尊重) remain integral to Chinese policy toward North Korea because North Korea ‘owes’ China special respect” (Easley & Park 2016, 659). Deference means saving another’s face. The pathway to China’s losing face in 2006 included the fact that China had previously been seeking face by playing a significant role in establishing the Six-Party Talks (SPT). China had taken the position of chairman since the first round of talks, and China’s proactive moves for the SPT are closely intertwined with the national goal of seeking face as a responsible great power.82

As the international community had turned its focus to the SPT because of North Korea’s nuclear program, China as a host of the talks felt proud of the image that it made great efforts for peace in the region as well as in the world. In fact, it seemed that China was ambivalent towards holding the position of the host in the beginning. On the one hand, China found it burdensom to convene representatives and mediate their position through these talks. For instance, after the failure of the Three-Party Talks, one Chinese diplomat confessed as follows:

“We wish no more trilateral meetings. China will be bashed from both sides no matter what. We have an old saying in China, we are always expected to give them [North Korea] things with haokan haochi [with both good looks and good taste]. North Korea would be unhappy if both the appearance and the substance were not satisfactory. We have

82 In fact, the role of China was intentionally administered by the U.S. because the U.S. wanted to put more pressure on China to play an active role in tackling the North Korean issue. For example, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick believed that China, as a responsible stakeholder, should prove that it was pursuing a peaceful rise not only in language but also in action (Funabashi 2007, 316).
had enough. One cause of the failure might be that we had forcefully pulled a reluctant North Korea to the meeting” (Funabashi 2007, 336).

Moreover, China had to shoulder the substantial financial and logistical burden to host the talks. So, Wang Yi proposed another member country in the SPT should host the following SPT (Funabashi 2007, 340).

On the other hand, China enjoyed the image of being a responsible great power. When the first Joint Statement was issued following the second round of the SPT, it was “a diplomatic victory for China as host and mediator” (Kwak 2007, 18). In fact, China’s complaint about hosting the SPT might have derived from its face culture. It is widely known that a Chinese person generally declines an offered gift two or three times before they will receive it. Similarly, China may have wanted to play the role of host continuously, but leaders would not mention that desire at the outset, in order to save face. For example, one Japanese government official made a comment regarding China’s mindset as follows:

“Once during Japan-China bilateral consultations, the Chinese declared that they would stop hosting the six-party talks after two more rounds [that is, after the first round]. But they said nothing this time [the second round]. In its heart of hearts, China probably wants to remain the host. But it wants to be asked by other members to remain the host” (Funabashi 2007, 326).

Accordingly, it was a great honor to China to have a sentence in the chairman’s statements following the second and third rounds of SPT reading as follows: “[t]he delegations of the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the USA have expressed their appreciation to the Chinese side for the efforts aimed at the successful staging of the two [three] rounds of the Six-Party Talks” [emphasis added] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Appreciating this kind of honor may be a reason why China always asks to resume the SPT to address the North Korean issues.

However, China’s prideful satisfaction did not last long because North Korea did not save China’s face. The launch of Taepodong-2 on July 5, 2006 made China lose face. First, this launch poured cold water on China’s plan to hold another round of the SPT. In fact, before the launch, China had proposed an unofficial meeting to member states of the SPT to discuss the next round on June 28. Chinese vice foreign minister Wu Dawei called the ambassadors of the six member nations of the SPT and suggested an unofficial round of talks in mid-July (Hankyoreh 2006). A week after China’s proposal, however, North Korea launched several missiles, including the Taepodong-2, that could reach other nations if their development were completed successfully.

Second, China lost face because North Korea did not pay deference to her, but instead ignored China’s call for restraint from any provocation. In particular, the request was made by one of the top Chinese leaders, Premier Wen Jiabao. He announced that “China expects North Korea to refrain from taking measures that would worsen the situation” (Funabashi 2007, 465). North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan said, “What I hear is, Big Brother is telling Little Brother, 'Don't do that.' But we are not boys. We are a nuclear power” (Chinoy 2008, 280).

Third, North Korea not only ignored China’s admonition but also did not notify China of the impending missile test. Though North Korea notified Wu Dawei, China’s Vice Foreign Minister who had explained China’s position to the North Korean ambassador to China three times, this notification occurred only one hour before the official announcement (Funabashi 2007, 465). When he met with Dennis Wilder, senior
director for Asia at the National Security Council, after the missile launch, one Chinese
general did not conceal his fury. “After all we've done for them, they couldn't give us
any warning they were going to do this. How dare they?” (Chinoy 2007, 284). What
was worse for China’s face, on the same day as the missile launch (July 4), the Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu had announced the Chinese delegation’s visit to
North Korea from July 10 to 15 to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the Sino-North
Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty signed in 1961 (CFMSA).

The situation was more serious following the first nuclear test conducted by North
Korea on October 9, 2006. Although the pattern of losing Chinese face was similar to the
case of the missile test, the level of Chinese humiliation and wrath was not comparable. It
is true that North Korea’s missile launching caused China to lose face. But the missile
test of Taepodong-2 failed because it dropped into the sea, no less than one minute after
launch. Furthermore, by firing other missiles along with Taepodong-2, North Korea
argued that the test was just a part of normal military drills. In particular, the date of July
5 was July 4 in the U.S. local time, which is Independence Day and one of the most
significant national holidays for the U.S. The missile launch was therefore obviously
aimed at the U.S. Thus, China could save face to some extent because this launch did not
devastate the foundations of the SPT.

83 North Korea often challenges China in this way. When North Korea declared that it had nuclear
weapons, it did not give prior notice of its announcement to China, which, as a result, lost face in the world
(Funabashi 2007, 323)

84 The delegation went to Pyongyang as scheduled despite the nuclear test. But the head of the delegation,
Vice Premier Hui Liangyu, was not received by Kim Jong-Il, which was regarded by China as losing face
(Cheow 2006, 34-35).
However, the nuclear test completely violated international norms, and provoked a totally different response from China. First, the nuclear test frustrated China’s effort to ignite the SPT. Due to North Korea’s provocative nuclear test, participant states in the SPT had to discuss severe punishment rather than friendly dialogue. The SPT was out of the limelight, and the U.N. Security Council drew more attention, which meant losing face for China, the host of the SPT. Second, when it comes to the matter of prior notification, China was ignored again by Pyongyang. North Korea actually notified China of the underground nuclear test briefly in advance of the test. China might have saved a small bit of face by notifying the U.S. through the U.S. embassy in Beijing as soon as it was informed (Funabashi 2007, 463). But the notification from North Korea to China was made only twenty minutes before the test (Huntley 2010).

China did not think a twenty-minute warning was sufficient to save its face at all. China felt North Korea had crossed a red line and violated a fundamental understanding of their relationship, which was that North Korea was expected to avoid a nuclear test without prior consultation with China (Chinoy 2008, 295). Third, North Korea intentionally flew in the face of China. In late February 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao sent Wan Jiarui, head of the international liaison bureau of the CCP, to Kim Jong-Il with his personal message that “it was in both China’s and North Korea’s vital interests to resolve the issue reasonably through negotiation.” Kim responded that North Korea was still interested in the SPT (Kim 2011, 149). In turn, North Korean Premier Park Bong-Ju visited Beijing on March 23, 2006, to have a meeting with President Hu (Kim 2011, 149). Furthermore, the date of the nuclear test humiliated China because it was the second day of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP,
which was scheduled from October 8 to 11 in 2006 (Paltiel 2008, 96). The Plenary Session was very important to Chinese leaders because President Hu used this event to try to consolidate his power through action plans for his goal of building a “harmonious society” and eliminating his opponents. North Korea’s nuclear test overshadowed this critical event.

Restoring Lost Face

According to the dynamics of the Chinese face culture, Chinese actors pursue two kinds of remedy to recover their lost face. One is seeking another face to gain face again and the other is retaliating on others who damaged one’s face. China employed exactly these two methods to restore its lost face in response to North Korean missile and nuclear tests. First, China made a considerable effort to be recognized as a responsible great power. In so doing, Beijing endeavored to resume the SPT. Right after the missile and nuclear tests, China dispatched high-level officials to persuade North Korea to refrain from further provocation and to return to the SPT. For example, Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei visited North Korea after the missile launch in July. He delivered China’s grave concern to Kim Gye Gwan and urged Pyongyang to return to the SPT (Funabashi 2007, 467). State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan also went to Pyongyang after the nuclear test. He had a meeting with Kim Jong-Il and discussed North Korea’s return to the SPT in October (Pritchard 2007, 156). These efforts came to fruition in the second session of the fifth round of the SPT held on December 18–22, 2006.

In addition to efforts to resume the SPT, China behaved like a responsible great power in the U.N. China voted for U.N. Security Council resolutions 1695 and 1718, which were adopted in response to North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test,
respectively. China adhered to the notion that the role of a responsible great power in the international community should be played out in the U.N. (Funabashi 2007, 317). Against the backdrop of unanimous condemnation on North Korea’s provocations, China was committed to acting as a responsible great power. Thus, China agreed to the adoption of resolutions of condemnation, in contrast to its previous abstention against resolutions that were unfavorable to North Korea. For example, China had abstained from the vote on the IAEA resolution that was designated to report North Korea’s nuclear program to the UNSC in 1994. It also abstained from the UNSC resolution that asked North Korea to reconsider its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT in 1993. But the responsible great power of China in 2006 did not oppose nor abstain, but vote in favor of resolutions condemning North Korean actions.

As the second method to restore its lost face, China employed coercive measures of hostile words and actions against North Korea, in revenge for its humiliation. Fury was a corollary of losing face. First, China expressed its rage publicly. According to Chinese face culture, it is common that conflict is resolved behind the scenes because revealing conflict causes a loss of face to all parties. One typical example is the conversation between Wu Dawei and Kim Gye Gwan during Wu’s secret visit to Pyongyang after the missile launch:

“Wu: This kind of conduct goes against the long friendship between North Korea and China.
Kim: We base every action on the principle of our being a sovereign state. As a sovereign state, we are allowed to develop and test missiles. Friendship has nothing to do with that principle.
Wu: Friendship is a very basic principle. It is an important principle agreed upon by Chairman Mao Zedong and Chairman Kim Il Sung. You have no right to change this principle unilaterally.
Kim: China should go its own way. We will go our own way. Still, we will survive.” (Funabashi 2007, 467).

Contrary to this concealed friction, President Hu Jintao exceptionally made a public statement that “North Korea should face severe criticism from international society” (Easley & Park 2016, 661). This resentful response was exceptional in that 1) it is uncommon for Chinese leaders to express their opinion publicly and 2) he did not conceal his outraged feeling under the water, which is contradictory to Chinese face culture. When it came to responding to the nuclear test by North Korea, the level of fury became even higher. The prominent evidence of Chinese anger was use of the word hanran (悍然), in a Chinese official statement:

“On 9 October, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea flagrantly conducted a nuclear test in disregard of the common opposition of the international community. The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to this act [emphasis added]. To bring about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and oppose nuclear proliferation is the firm and consistent stand of the Chinese Government. China strongly urges the DPRK to honor its commitment to denuclearization, stop all moves that may further worsen the situation and return to the Six-Party Talks. To safeguard peace and stability in Northeast Asia serves the interests of all parties involved. The Chinese Government calls on all parties concerned to be cool-headed in response and persist in seeking a peaceful solution through consultation and dialogue. China will continue to make every effort towards this goal.” (CFMSA)\(^85\)

The Chinese word hanran, which is usually translated into ‘brazenly’ or ‘flagrantly’ in English, is a very rare word to find in official documents and remarks.\(^86\) It

\(^{85}\) The English translation is by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC retrieved from [http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t275508.htm](http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t275508.htm)

\(^{86}\) The Chinese Foreign Ministry translated it into ‘flagrantly’ while Chinese press such as *China Daily* and *Xinhua News Agency* translated it into ‘brazenly’ and ‘brazen’ respectively.
is mostly reserved for describing putative adversaries or non-socialist states (Swaine 2009, 4; Moore 2014, 88). As seen in Table 5.3, it is hard to find the use of *hanran* in Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s remarks before it was used to describe North Korean actions in 2006. Other than describing the North Korean nuclear test in 2006, the word *hanran* appeared four times in CFMSA, in describing Japan, the Philippines, and India. All of them are used in the cases related to perceived challenges to China’s territorial sovereignty. Given these usages, Chinese fury over the North Korean nuclear test in 2006 can be assumed by use of the word *hanran* by Pyongyang in the official statement.

**Table 5.3 Uses of Hanran (悍然) in Regular Press Conferences (2001-2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 30, 2012</td>
<td>The Japanese government has <em>brazenly</em> made the wrong decision to “purchase” the Diaoyu Islands. This is gravely infringing on China’s territorial sovereignty. It sparks the strong indignation of the entire Chinese people and also seriously damages Sino-Japanese relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29, 2015</td>
<td>It is the expansion policy employed by the Philippines that <em>brazenly</em> infringes on China’s sovereignty and rights and interests, causing disputes over the South China Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6, 2017</td>
<td>The purpose of the Indian side to provoke the incident is clear. On the pretext of so-called “security concerns” and the so-called “protection of Bhutan, it <em>brazenly</em> crossed the boundary of Sikkim delineated by the Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, which was recognized by both China and India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 3, 2017</td>
<td>On June 18, more than 270 Indian border guards carrying weapons and two bulldozers <em>brazenly</em> crossed the boundary of the Sikkim section more than 100 meters in the Doka La pass and entered Chinese territory to obstruct the Chinese activities for constructing roads.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CFMSA

In addition to expressing its fury with words, China also took actions to exact revenge for its loss of face. As earlier mentioned, China voted for two UNSC resolutions
of condemnation against North Korea. Although China did not approve much stricter sanctions, including inspection of cargo to and from North Korea, it was meaningful that China voted for the sanctions against North Korea, which included an embargo on arms sales and luxury goods, as well as a freeze on North Korean assets. Although these votes can be seen as an expression of China’s desire to play a role as a responsible great power in the international community, they could also be seen as an action to punish North Korea at the same time. The Chinese permanent representative to the U.N., Wang Guangya, stated that

“On 9 October, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had flagrantly conducted a nuclear test in disregard of the common opposition of the international community. China’s Foreign Ministry had issued a statement on the same day, expressing firm opposition to that act. Proceeding from the overall interests of bringing about denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and maintaining peace and stability there and in North-East Asia, China supported the Council in making a firm and appropriate response.” (UNSC 2006d).

Other than participation in the sanctions imposed by the UNSC, China avenged itself by controlling the supply to North Korea. Oil supply is very sensitive to North Korea. Despite the arguments regarding the level of North Korea’s oil dependence on China due to inaccurate data, it is indisputable that China’s suspension of oil supply to North Korea was detrimental to its economy and further survival.\(^7\) As we discussed in Chapter 4, China had earlier employed the means of closing the oil pipeline to Pyongyang to pressure North Korea to agree to sitting at the table for the Three Party Talks. Once again, China pulled out this card. In September 2006, China sharply reduced

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\(^7\) The expected dependence varies from 50% to 100% depending on the energy expert consulted.
oil supply to the degree where any further reduction could lead to a structural problem that the oil feed pipe would become unusable (Twomey 2008, 417). Instead, all of China’s oil exported in September were sent to the U.S. (Moore 2014, 88). Another stick China used was to stop all financial transactions of the four largest banks with North Korea after the nuclear test, which were Bank of China, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, China Construction Bank, and CITIC Bank (Fairclough & King Jr. 2006; Moore 2014, 88-89).

**Chinese Core National Interest**

Although my argument seems to be substantiated by analysis of China’s words and behaviors during North Korea’s provocations in 2006, a possible counterargument has to be examined to make my argument more solid. One possible counterargument discussed in Chapter three is that China’s assertive attitude toward its friend of North Korea stemmed from North Korea’s infringement on China’s core interests. In fact, China has frequently defended its core interests through acts of retaliation. As briefly mentioned in Chapter one, Japan, Norway, France, Taiwan, and the Philippines all suffered from economic retaliation by China, when China argued these nations were undermining China’s core interests.

China has repeatedly declared its willingness to use armed force when its core interests are infringed. Despite controversy over the exact definition of Chinese core interests, they are generally understood as what Dai Bingguo suggested in 2009, which are “1) preserving China’s basic state system and national security; 2) national

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88 For this reason, Cheow (2006, 36) used the word “delayed” instead of “cutting off.”
sovereignty and territorial integrity; and 3) the continued development of China’s economy and society” (Swaine 2011, 4). Applying these initial core interests to explaining China’s retaliation against Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines shows that each of these retaliatory acts were related to “national sovereignty and territorial integrity” issues, because China’s retaliation was caused by territorial disputes with these countries. Similarly, while Norway and France were seen as challenging China’s commitment to “preserving China’s basic system” because they supported Chinese dissidents.

Does this same analysis apply to the North Korean case? At a glance, North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test are not directly related to those core interests. Because China’s expression of a commitment to core interests officially appeared around 2003 for the first time, however, we can explore China’s own definition of core interests in 2006, when North Korea conducted its missile and nuclear tests. The first official use of the term ‘core interests’ was found in the report of a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on January 19, 2003 (Swaine 2011, 3). In this meeting, Tang said that “the Taiwan question is one of China’s core interests and that handling the issue in a careful and appropriate way is critical to the stable development of Sino-US relations” (China Daily 2003). According to a study of Chinese core national interests, they have been expanding over time, increasing from one core interests in 2004 (the Taiwan question) to nineteen in 2016, which were defined through content analysis of the People’s Daily from January 1, 2000, to October 27, 2016 (Lee 2017a).

There have been no Chinese core national interests directly, or even indirectly, related to North Korea’s provocations in 2006, because the Korean Peninsula is included
as a Chinese core interest only in 2016. As seen in Table 5.4, only Taiwan, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and history are mentioned as Chinese core national interests in the *People’s Daily* around 2006 (Lee 2017a, 49-52). This result is in accordance with the outcome of content analysis using CFMSA as seen in Table 5.5. The term “core interests” firstly appeared on CFMSA only in 2004. Before 2004, the term “fundamental interests” was generally used. All reference to “core interests” are made regarding Taiwan. ‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Territorial Integrity’ are mostly used along with references to Taiwan, rather than used separately, such as in the following typical sentence, “The matter of Taiwan is related to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and core interests.”

**Table 5.4 Chinese Core National Interests in the *People’s Daily* (2004 -2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese Core National Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Taiwan, Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Taiwan, Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lee (2017a, 51)

**Table 5.5 Chinese Core National Interests in CFMSA (2004-2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Chinese Core National Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Taiwan (Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, sovereignty and national integration also appeared in the *People’s Daily* in 2004 according to the Database of *People’s Daily*. This difference stems from the database used because Lee (2017) used the Chinese national knowledge infrastructure database (CNKI).
In short, there is no ground for claiming that China’s retaliation against North Korea was caused by North Korea’s infringement on China’s core national interests. The missile launch and nuclear test in 2006 by North Korea are not related to any Chinese core national interests such as Taiwan, Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and History, which are all extracted from articles in the People’s Daily around the period of 2006 when North Korea’s provocations were made.

**Conclusion**

Findings from the case study on North Korea’s first nuclear test support Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 3a, which are, respectively, “*China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward North Korea*” and “*Chinese face culture leads to assertive Chinese foreign policy when China loses its face.*” These findings whereas they reject Hypothesis 2a that “*Chinese inconsistent behaviors on North Korea are influenced by Chinese core national interests.*” Chinese coercive behaviors in the course of North Korean missile launch and first nuclear test in 2006 were caused by its lost face. Due to losing face, it treated the friend as a nearly non-friend, despite no change in the perceived identity of the friend. No change of North Korea’s friendly identity to China is substantiated by China’s words and behaviors. Social bonds of friendship between China and North Korea were not broken because there was no revision of the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty and no change in their diplomatic ties. Although they were less vigorous than

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Taiwan (Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Taiwan (Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CFMSA
before, social exchanges through mutual visits by high-level officials from the two countries were not discontinued. Moreover, friendship was officially expressed by official statements. China’s punitive economic retaliation was targeted at the friend, not at a non-friend. Thus, the North Korean case supports Hypothesis 1c that “China behaves according to its perceived identity of North Korea in Sino-North Korean relations.”

The dynamics of Chinese face culture were in operation after the North Korean missile and nuclear tests. China felt it lost face because of North Korean provocations while it was seeking the face of a responsible great power. China made an effort to restore its face by forcing North Korea to return to the SPT on the one hand, while it tried to recover from the humiliation of lost face by expressing its rage through unrefined words such as “brazenly” and taking the action of halting the oil supply and financial transactions with North Korea. China’s frustration and humiliation by losing face were in evidence through its fury. Therefore, China’s inconsistent behavior to its friend North Korea is explained by its losing face. Chinese face culture moderated China’s North Korean policy which stemmed from North Korea’s own proclaimed identity as a responsible great power, and its perceived identity of North Korea as a friend to China.
Chapter Six

Case Study: South Korea’s THAAD System Deployment

Since the normalization of Sino-South Korean relations in 1992, relations between the two countries have remarkably developed. The Sino-South Korean relationship has dramatically upgraded from being described as good-neighborly relations, to descriptions as a cooperative partnership for the twenty-first century, comprehensive cooperative partnership, and to a strategic cooperative partnership. It took only sixteen years, from 1992 to 2008, for the two countries to develop the highest level of relationship.

On the other hand, there had been some frictions such as the dispute over Kimchi trade, the historical issue of the Northeast Project, and illegal fishing in the West Sea by Chinese fishermen. But these are usual and acceptable conflicts between friends to some extent, except for the Garlic War briefly discussed in chapter four. Even the Garlic War might have been understandable as a quarrel between friends who had yet to become very close and were in the course of gradually coming to know each other, because the War occurred only eight years after their normalization of diplomatic ties. Furthermore, it was resolved in a relatively short period of time without escalation to a highly-unraveled political issue.
However, the recent conflict caused by the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea could not be blamed on an immature friendship, because it took place between friends in a strategic cooperative relationship, who had developed relations of friendship for more than two decades after normalization. When South Korean President Park Geun-hye attended the China Victory Day parade in September 2015, which was held to celebrate the 70th anniversary of victory over Japan in the Second World War, she took a seat to the left of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan. Ms. Peng sat to the left of President Xi, so President Park sat very closely next to President Xi. Russian President Vladimir Putin was seated on President Xi’s immediate right. In contrast, when newly-elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his wife visited Beijing in December 2017, Chinese leaders gave the couple the cold-shoulder by inviting them to only one banquet and one luncheon over four days. The only reason for this dramatic change of China’s attitude in two years is South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD system. In addition to the cold-shoulder diplomacy, Beijing launched considerable economic retaliation against Seoul, which was an immoderate action against a friend.

Why did Korea’s deployment of THAAD make China so angry? Does China believe that South Korea should not be a friend anymore? Is it really because the deployment of the THAAD system is a substantial challenge to Chinese national interests? Or, does this case support the hypothesis of China responding due to a loss of face, as observed in Chapter four? To find answers to these questions, this chapter examines detailed developments regarding the case of the South Korean THAAD
In fact, the THAAD issue is very complicated because it is intertwined with many critical problems that can be mainly divided into three axes: domestic politics of South Korea, U.S. grand strategy, and nuclear and missile capabilities of North Korea.

Background

The Best Relationship in History

It seemed that the Sino-South Korean relationship had no break in their positive development until the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea took place. Although the Sino-South Korean relationship has been greatly influenced by North Korean issues and the United States’ position, bilateral exchanges between the two countries became increasingly vigorous since normalization. As briefly discussed in Chapter three, trade volume and mutual visitors between the two countries have remarkably increased, by more than a hundred or thousand times. The Sino-South Korean relationship developed into a strategic cooperative partnership in May 2008 when South Korean President Lee Myung-bak paid a visit to Beijing in the first year of his term. Despite his five visits to China and eleven summits with Chinese President Hu Jintao, however, there was no further development in positive relations between the two

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90 Because the THAAD case is a relatively recent event, there are no documents to reveal the inside story of it, when compared to the North Korean case examined in Chapter five. So, the analysis here is heavily dependent on news articles in constructing developments based on the facts that are revealed there.

91 Since China has been a good friend of North Korea and South Korea has been a good friend of the U.S., the Sino-South Korean relationship is unlikely to be completely independent of the U.S.-China relationship and the inter-Korean relationship. However, the U.S. and inter-Korean relations are controlled to simplify the discussion, as suggested in Chapter one.
countries because the conservative Lee government had strong pro-American proclivity. The Lee government believed that the U.S.-South Korean relationship was the most important and that this very important relationship was gravely undermined during the period of the predecessor President, Roh Moo-hyun (Kim 2008; Konish & Manyin 2009; Ma 2011). Moreover, North Korea’s provocation of the Cheonan sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 also contributed to the Sino-South Korean relationship lacking additional progress.

As both countries coincidentally experienced leadership changes in March 2013, however, expectations for the development of improved bilateral relations between South Korea and China increased. Korean President Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping met these expectations in the beginning. When she was just president-elect, President Park selected China as the destination of her first special envoy, that usually has a mission to promote a new president and explain his/her foreign policy (Kim 2013). Chinese expert Ruan Zongze, Vice President of China Institute of International Studies, said that it was a sign that president-elect Park would have a more balanced foreign policy towards neighboring countries, especially China (Liu & Zhang 2013). It had been customary for South Korean presidents to visit the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia, in that order, after they were inaugurated. By breaking these practices, President Park paid a state visit to China on June 27, 2013, after a visit to the U.S. in May 2013. At the summit,

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92 In fact, President Lee had the same number of eleven summits with the U.S. and Chinese counterparts respectively during his term from 2008 to 2013. When meetings with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao were included, President Lee had a total of sixteen summits with Chinese leaders.
President Park and President Xi adopted the Korea-China Joint Statement on Future Vision, in which the two leaders agreed to:

“[M]ake concerted efforts to further enrich the 'strategic cooperative partnership' in all related areas, including detailed implementation strategies such as strengthening strategic communications in political and security affairs, expanding cooperation in economic and social spheres, and expediting diverse channels of people-to-people exchange” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea 2014, 85).93

Improved relations between South Korea and China became more prominent when President Xi visited Seoul on July 3-4, 2014. It was the only time a new Chinese President paid a visit to South Korea first, before visiting North Korea (Byun 2017, 99-100). The Chinese side began to acclaim Sino-South Korean relations as the best period in history, with President Xi’s visit to Seoul.94 Similarly, at the reception by the Chinese embassy in Seoul in May 2004, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that Sino-South Korean relations were facing the best period in history thanks to all efforts made by people from the two countries (Wang 2014b). Moreover, the Chinese ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, contributed to the People’s Daily on July 3 by writing, “At present, China-ROK relations have never been better” (Qiu 2014). On July 4, the second

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93 To be specific, Seoul and Beijing agreed to promote close communications between the two leaders, as well as set up four channels of strategic dialogues: “dialogue between the Korean Director of National Security Office and the Chinese State Councilor; foreign policy and security dialogue; policy dialogue among parties; and a joint strategic dialogue between national research institutes. The two countries also agreed to hold the Vice Foreign Ministerial Strategic Dialogue twice a year” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROK 2014, 85).

94 There was an unfortunate incident regarding dissemination of the expression “best period in history,” later in 2015 when President Park visited Beijing. The Presidential Office, Blue House, released a press release in which President Xi was quoted as saying, “The Sino-South Korea relationship developed into the best period in history because of cooperation by President Park and me.” But they canceled this release because it was mistranslated by an intern.
day of his visit to Seoul, President Xi himself delivered a speech at Seoul National University, which has been the cradle of South Korean elite, saying that “Now the two nations clearly have a strategic cooperative partnership and the relationship is better than ever before” (Xi 2014b).

The peak of the “best period” relationship between two countries was President Park’s participation in China’s military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the victory over Japan in World War II on September 3, 2015. President Park’s position very close to President Xi on the platform and at the photo session demonstrated the close relations between China and South Korea. She was the only national leader from among countries allied with the U.S. to attend this event. Many experts explained Seoul’s tilt to China, despite being unpleasant to the U.S., as based on strategic thinking that a close relationship with China could be helpful for reunification and, at least, for checking North Korea (Draught 2015; Wang 2015).

This “best relationship” period continued until the end of 2015. The relationship was improved with progress on two issues, which had long been challenging for Sino-South Korean relations. On December 20, 2015, the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) finally came into effect. Discussions regarding the Korea-China FTA first kicked off in September 2004 when South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to start joint research on it. However, there had been slow progress for the FTA because of concerns about practical benefits in South Korea,  

95 President Park’s personal preference for China might be more important than strategic considerations in guiding her actions, judging from her unconventional way of ruling, revealed through her impeachment trial. She was the most popular Korean politician in China because the Chinese had a very good feeling for her due to her allegedly fluency in Chinese and her understanding of Chinese culture.
contrary to China’s proactive interests in moving the FTA forward. It gained momentum, however, after the Park government took office. Finally, the FTA was officially signed by two governments on June 1, 2015, after fourteen rounds of negotiation at the working level. President Xi highly appreciated the FTA as a “monumental event” that would “realize a new leap and bring more tangible benefits to the peoples of the two countries” (Tiezzi 2015; China FTA Network 2015).

In addition to the enactment of the Korea-China FTA, defense ministries of the two countries opened a hotline on the eve of 2016. On December 31, China’s defense ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said in a press conference that General Chang Wanquan, State Councilor and Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, reported that:

“The Chinese side was happy to see that China-ROK relations in various fields had witnessed comprehensive development in recent years, and bilateral cooperation had continued to deepen. The Chinese side will continue to implement the consensus reached between President Xi Jinping and President Park Geun-hye, strengthen the military-to-military exchange and cooperation, push forward sustained development of the mil-to-mil relationship, and jointly maintain regional peace, stability and prosperity.” (Ministry of National Defense of PRC 2015).

**Back to Normal**

The “best period” soon came to an end. A potential source of conflict had been growing under the water. It was the THAAD system that returned Sino-South Korean relations back to normal, and later made them even worse. The THAAD deployment became the focus of attention after June 3, 2014, when General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of United States Forces Korea (USFK) and head of the UN Command, made remarks about the deployment of the THAAD system at a breakfast meeting of the
National Defense Forum, organized by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) which is the only security think tank under the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea. General Scaparrotti said, “I recommended the deployment of the THAAD missiles to South Korea,” and added, “Unlike recent media reports claiming that a preliminary study is currently underway, it would be more accurate to say that an initial review is being conducted” (Park 2014b).

Although it was the first time that the US military had publicly announced that it was considering deploying the THAAD system in South Korea, the issue was raised a few years in nomination hearings of the two predecessors of General Scaparrotti. In 2008, at his nomination hearing, USFK Commander nominee General Walter L. Sharp suggested that the development of THAAD could be crucial “to provide the layered, systematic missile defense capability required to protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea” (Sankaran & Fearey 2017, 325). Following General Sharp, General James D. Thurman at his nomination hearings in 2011 as USFK Commander testified that “A THAAD system could be used to provide layered defense and also improve early warning for the Korean Peninsula as well as enhance Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) early warning in the region” (Sankaran & Fearey 2017, 325).

However, THAAD had not been seriously discussed until the Park government took power, because South Korea had been building its own missile defense system, known as Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD). But the THAAD issue returned to

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96 On March 9, 2016, quoting the interview report by the Voice of America (VOA) Korea, the Korean news agency Yonhap News Agency reported that former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said that he discussed the THAAD system with South Korea during the Lee Myong-bak presidency. However, his
the surface due to North Korea’s missile provocations. As North Korea advanced its missile and nuclear capabilities, concerns began to grow that KAMD could not effectively defend South Korea. For example, on June 20, 2014, South Korean defense ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok said in a press briefing that “the current Patriot missile defense system (PAC-3) in Korea is incapable of intercepting the improved version of North Korea’s Rodong missile, which flew at an altitude of about 160 km in a recent drill” (Hwang 2014).

**Developments**

**Strong Opposition from China**

China has long opposed the expansion of the U.S. anti-missile system to other regions, especially Asia, since the late 1980s (Teng 2015). Beijing has long felt besieged by the U.S. missile defense system. For instance, On August 12, 2009, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi asserted at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that “the missile defense program by some countries in the Asia-Pacific region would do no good to regional peace and stability” (Teng 2015). Moreover, Luo Zhaohui, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs with the Foreign Ministry, said in April 2012 that, "Building a missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region will have negative effects on global and regional strategic stability, and go against the security needs of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region" (Weitz 2012a).

remarks cannot be found in the VOA interview report on March 3, 2016, either in the English version or the Korean version.
Negative remarks regarding THAAD began to emerge from China in 2014. Although he did not directly mention THAAD because no decision was yet to be made on its deployment, Chinese President Xi was said to express his concerns to President Park during a South Korea-China summit in July 2014. Xi noted that the missile defense system by the U.S. would not be helpful to Chinese security interests and asked for South Korea’s consideration (Seong 2014). On September 30, 2014, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work admitted that the U.S. and South Korea were working towards the deployment of THAAD.

“[W]e are considering sending a THAAD to South Korea,” he noted. “We are considering very carefully whether or not to put a THAAD in South Korea. We’re doing site surveys. We’re working with the government of South Korea now to determine if that is the right thing to do. We’ve emphasized to both China and to Russia that these are not strategic anti-ballistic missiles” (Work 2014).

China was not pleased with these developments. On October 23, 2014, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying answered a question about US delivery of the X-band Radar system to Kyogamisaki Sub-Base in Kyoto, Japan:

“The anti-missile deployment in the Asia-Pacific by a certain country in the pursuit of unilateral security goes against regional strategic stability and mutual trust, as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Such an action is particularly concerning when the situation in the region is complex and sensitive” (CFMSA 2014).

From late 2014, China began to raise the tone of its opposition. For example, on November 27, 2014, the Chinese ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, warned that if South Korea allowed the U.S. military to deploy the THAAD system in its territory, it would hurt Sino-South Korean relations (Yonhap News Agency 2015). Chinese high-ranking officials also joined in voicing their opposition to THAAD. On February 4, 2015,
Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan conveyed China’s concerns about THAAD to his counterpart, Korean Defense Minister Han Min-gu, when he visited Seoul. Following defense minister Chang’s remarks, Chinese Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Liu Jianchao came to South Korea on March 16 and reiterated China’s concern regarding the possible deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea. “We would appreciate it if South Korea could consider China's interest and concerns as important,” he noted. “We hope that the U.S. and South Korea make a reasonable decision on the THAAD issue” (Yu 2015). Three months later, on May 31, 2015, Sun Jianguo, the Admiral of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Deputy Chief of Staff for the PLA General Staff Department, met with Korean Defense Minister Han and expressed China’s concern about THAAD at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2015 (Lee 2015a).

It was in January 2016 that the controversy that had subsided for a while came back with force. In response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, South Korean President Park Geun-hye left open the possibility of the THAAD system deployment by saying that the government would consider such action in accord with South Korea’s national security and national interest, during an official statement and subsequent press conference on January 13, 2016 (Park 2016). Park’s remarks led to a series of oppositional statements from the China side. On the same day as Park’s remarks, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei said at the regular press conference:

“China holds a consistent and clear position on anti-missile issues. It is our belief that every country should keep in mind other countries’ security interests and regional peace and stability while pursuing its own security interests. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is highly sensitive. It is hoped that relevant countries can bear in mind the larger picture of regional peace and stability and cautiously
and properly deal with the relevant issue” [emphasis added] (CFMSA 2016).

Moreover, on January 27, *Global Times* (Huanqiu Shibao, 环球时报), the sister newspaper of the *People’s Daily* that is the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, carried an editorial arguing:

“South Korea should avoid using the THAAD missile system as leverage against China. The system will pose a threat to China’s security. If Seoul does so, it will severely hurt mutual trust between China and South Korea. [It should be prepared to pay the penalty for this decision]” (Global Times 2016).  

Chinese opposition was unabated in the next month. On February 7, Yoo Je-ho-Seung, the South Korean deputy defense minister for policy, formalized discussion of THAAD by saying, “It has been decided to formally start talks on the possibility of deploying the THAAD system to South Korea as part of steps to bolster the missile defense of the Korea-U.S. alliance” (VOA 2016). On February 12, 2016, during his interview with Reuters, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that the detection range of the X-band radar, a component of THAAD, would go beyond the Korean Peninsula and into China’s territory, causing direct harm to Chinese strategic security.  

He described the situation by quoting two Chinese ancient episodes: “When Xiang Yu’s nephew Xiang Zhuang dances the dance of swords, what he really means to do is to kill Liu Bang” (xiangzhuangwujian yizaipeigong 項莊舞劒 意在沛公) and “Everyone knows

97 In the English version, the sentence of “paying the penalty” was removed. It is found in the Chinese version. On the other hand, the identity of *Global Times* is very controversial, as it is may be speaking the real mind of the CCP, or simply be a form of yellow journalism.

98 Wang Yi’s argument was repeated as such on February 15 by foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei.
what Sima Zhao’s ambitions are” (*simazhaozhixin lurenjiezhi* 司馬昭之心 路人皆知) (Seong 2016). On February 22, Chinese ambassador Qiu Guohong said,

“China vehemently opposes the THAAD deployment...Much effort has been made to develop bilateral ties to today’s level, but these efforts could be destroyed in an instant with a single problem. [Once destroyed, it] could take a long time to recover” (Tiezzi 2016; Yonhap News Agency 2016).

In March, many Chinese diplomats, including Minister Wang Yi, Vice-Minister Wu Dawei, and China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Liu Jei-yi, continuously expressed China’s opposition to THAAD in South Korea. Finally, Chinese President Xi Jinping himself came out against THAAD deployment. According to Zheng Zeguang, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, during the U.S.-China summit held on March 31 President Xi told US President Barack Obama that China was “firmly opposed” to U.S. plans to deploy the THAAD system in South Korea (Brunnstrom & Wroughton 2016). Furthermore, President Xi, jointly with Russian President Putin, announced two joint statements in three days at the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 23-24 and at the summit between China and Russia in Beijing on June 25, both of which expressed opposition to THAAD (Ye 2016). Once again, President Xi expressed his opposition to THAAD when he met with South Korean Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn on June 29, 2016. President Xi demanded that South Korea should pay attention to “China's reasonable security concern, and prudently and properly deal with the possible deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in South Korea by the U.S.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2016).
**China’s Retaliation**

Despite China’s strong opposition, the South Korean government decided to deploy the THAAD battery. On July 8, 2016, South Korean deputy defense minister for policy Yoo Jeh-Seung announced that South Korea and the U.S. agreed to deploy THAAD to better protect South Korea and the U.S. military in the region from North Korea’s growing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities (Choe 2016). On the same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said, “China has expressed strong dissatisfaction with and firm opposition to the decision, and has summoned the ambassadors of the US and the ROK to lodge our representations” (CFMSA).

When it comes to China’s anger over the decision, one noteworthy response was a four-part series of articles in *People’s Daily* from July 29 to August 4, which were written by Zhong Sheng (Swaine 2017, 6). Zhong Sheng is a pseudonymous writer whose name literally means the sound of a bell, but is translated into *China Voice* in the English version because Zhong is the same sound as the first letter of China in Chinese. Although this four-part series of articles was very exceptional, it can be understood as a way of expressing China’s attack on a country, in the same way that China had used this strategy to criticize Soviet party leaders from September 6, 1963, to July 14, 1964, by carrying a series of nine open letters in the *People’s Daily* to he (Li 1995, 92).

When it comes to China’s retaliation, the South Korean government had dismissed the possibility of retaliation from the beginning, despite Korean China-watchers’ warning. For example, Yoo Il-ho, deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, said that China was a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and it was unreasonable for China to engage in economic retaliation for a political issue. Prime
Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn said that Korea did not have to worry about China’s economic retaliation because of high interdependence between South Korea and China (Chun 2017).

However, although Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei avoided an answer to the question of countermeasures by China on July 8, 2016, spokesman Lu Kang confirmed that China would take corresponding measures to safeguard its interests (CFMSA). In line with this Foreign Ministry statement, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Senior Colonel Yang Yujun said, “We will pay close attention to relevant actions of the U.S. and the ROK and will take necessary measures to maintain national strategic security as well as regional strategic equilibrium” (Ministry of National Defense of PRC 2016).

China’s retaliation began ambiguously, compared to China’s previously direct retaliations, such as the explicit ban on imports or exports during the Garlic War. These ambiguous retaliations may be based on characteristics of Asian culture. One example is *sontaku* in Japanese, which is the culture that requires people to surmise or conjecture a senior’s feeling or will in advance and not to be against it. Although it is unofficial and has no legal binding, *sontaku* regulates people’s behaviors. The mechanism is similar to the administrative guidance in administrative law, which is a non-binding recommendation but has practical force in China, South Korea, and Japan. The Chinese version of *sontaku* is *Chuaimoshangyi* (揣摩上意), which describes the expectation that lower level actors should read the mind of leaders beforehand and take appropriate measures.
China’s initial retaliation against South Korea seems to be based on this type of administrative guidance, which is an oral directive that is hard to be officially identified in most cases (Yoo 2017).\footnote{In this context, the South Korean government was unwilling to file a lawsuit with the WTO against China, where the two countries are members.} For example, Qian Hongshan, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the although negative consequences were not intended by China, the THAAD issue negatively affected the exchanges in many areas between China and South Korea, which was a natural response from ordinary Chinese people (Zhao 2016). Furthermore, when it came to questions about growing restrictions against South Korean pop stars in China, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said,

“First and foremost, I have never heard about any restriction on the ROK. Second, the Chinese side is always positive to people-to-people and cultural exchanges with the ROK. However, I believe you can all understand that such kind of exchanges should be based on public support. Third, the Chinese side's steadfast opposition to the deployment of the THAAD system by the US in the ROK is well known to all. The Chinese public has voiced their dissatisfaction as well. Relevant parties must have taken note of that” (CFMSA).

Under this covert retaliation, South Korea experienced substantial damages and harassment by China in many sectors. According to Bank of Korea, one year of retaliation was expected to reduce South Korea’s economic growth by 0.4 percent while many economic experts estimated that economic damage by Chinese retaliation could be almost one percent of GDP in 2017 (Park 2017b; Lee 2017a). Chinese retaliation against South Korea’s THAAD deployment is composed of economic retaliation and non-economic retaliation, both of which have not been explicitly revealed. Economic retaliation was all-round and persisted for a considerable period of time. First, normal
administrative processes including visa issuance and customs clearance by China were delayed. For example, the China embassy in South Korea suspended issuance of a business visa for multiple-entry. Despite denial by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, South Korean businesspeople felt that it was in fact suspended due to the extreme strengthening of the requisites and screening process (Yoo 2016). Custom clearance also took more time to be completed than before. If one typo was found on a document, Chinese customs requested the Korea Customs Service to verify the document was not a forgery (Son, Kim & Kim 2016).

Second, a regulation that bans Korean culture in China, so-called Xianhanling (限韩令), became operative. No Korean stars could get approved for their entertainment activities by Chinese authorities and some events featuring Korean music and TV stars were canceled (Qin & Choe 2016; Meick & Salidjanova 2017, 7; Park 2017). South Korean trade surplus related to culture and entertainment was recorded at USD $66.6 million in June 2016, but it decreased to just USD $2.2 million in October 2017 due to China’s restrictions on Korean cultural activities (Lee 2018c). Third, restrictions on group tours to South Korea were imposed. On March 3, 2017, the China National Tourism Administration ordered travel agencies in China to stop selling either group or individual tour packages for Chinese citizens wishing to travel to South Korea (Kim 2017g; Meick & Salidjanova 2017, 7). Due to this order, Chinese tourists to South Korea decreased by 63.6% in April 2017, compared to the same period in the previous year (Choi 2017). As seen in Figure 6.1, Chinese tourists to South Korea had sharply increased in so-called “the best period in history” from 2013 to 2016. However, tourism nosedived in 2017 in response to the decision to deploy the THAAD system in mid-2016.
Fourth, South Korean companies suffered from a variety of disadvantages. Investment by Chinese companies in South Korean companies was canceled. A Korean company, Lotte, had an unexpected tax investigation by Chinese authorities in 2016. Moreover, electric cars and trucks that installed Korean batteries were excluded from Chinese government subsidies. Korean cosmetics were not approved for import into China by the Chinese government (Meick & Salidjanova 2017, 7; Park 2017).

Other than economic retaliation, China also took military and political retaliatory measures, with low intensity. In February 2016, a Chinese expert on missile defense, Wu Riqiang, warned that “if a limited war were to occur between the U.S. and South Korea, the THAAD system in South Korea should be naturally the primary target of the People's Liberation Army” (Cho 2016). The Chinese military did not conceal its will to retaliate.
against the deployment of THAAD. Senior Colonel Wu Qian, the spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, said at a regular press conference on March 31, 2017, that “the Chinese military’s opposition to the deployment of the THAAD system will definitely not stay on words only” (Panda 2017). For instance, Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly entered South Korea’s air defense identification zone (KADIZ) without advance notification since the THAAD deployment, and the number of trespassing cases has increased over the past several years (Noh 2018). However, Chinese defense ministry spokesman Ren Quoqiang said, “The exercise in question is part of an annual training of the Chinese air force, and conforms to international laws and customs. We hope the South Korean side will not be startled by such an insignificant event” (Shim 2018).

One method of political retaliation by China was that China gave South Korean politicians the cold-shoulder when they visited Beijing. Two special envoys to China from Korean President Moon Jae-in, Lee Hae-Chan and Chung Eui-yong, visited China on May 19, 2017, and March 12, 2018, respectively. When they met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, President Xi sat alone at a center head table, while the Korean envoys were seated below him at a different table in both meetings. In the past, the South Korean special envoys of President Lee Myung-bak and President Park Geun-hye, were equally seated side-by-side at one table with the Chinese president (Lee 2017d). Although China explained it was a new diplomatic practice of China, they did not apply this new practice to other countries (Lee 2018b).

No exception from this Chinese diplomatic discourtesy was granted even to South Korea’s President Moon. When he paid a state visit to Beijing, he experienced a cold
shoulder from China. When he arrived at the Beijing airport, he was greeted by Kong Xuanyou, the deputy foreign minister, despite this being a formal state visit. In contrast, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was greeted by Foreign Minister Wang Yi and U.S. President Donald Trump was greeted by State Councilor Yang Jiechi, at the airport (Oh & Park 2017; Volodzko 2018). Furthermore, President Moon only had one official lunch and dinner with Chinese leaders during his stay for four days, which is obviously intentional mistreatment given the Chinese culture of “Fanju(饭局)” that puts emphasis on having meals together with others (You 2017). Meanwhile, there was an incident in which two Korean reporters were severely beaten by a number of Chinese guards while trying to cover an event involving their president in Beijing and the Chinese government declined their request to make an apology (Gao 2017).

Analysis

South Korea’s Identity to China

Although identity can change, it takes a certain amount of time for identity—especially perceived identity—to change, because it is socially constructed by interactions with others over time, and changes must be perceived and confirmed by repeated interactions. Words and behaviors are a litmus test to investigate whether there is a change in the perceived identity of South Korea to China or not. When it comes to wording from China, it is hard to find any fundamental change in how China refers to South Korea. As reviewed earlier, China referred to Sino-South Korean relations as “best period in history” in 2014 and 2015. Although the term was not used anymore after the THAAD issue, China did not blame South Korea overtly. Instead, strong language was reserved for criticizing the deployment of the THAAD system itself, rather than
criticizing South Korea. As seen in Table 6.1, there has been no change of China’s perceived South Korean identity as a friend. Although the two friends experienced conflict over THAAD, and thus their relationship was not as good as it was in the past few years, the relationship can be still regarded as friendly, even while the THAAD issue kept going.

Table 6.1 China’s Wording on South Korea as a Friend (2016-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Wording by Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>February 29</td>
<td>(China and South Korea) jointly try to preserve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and commit to developing the China-ROK strategic partnership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 23</td>
<td>South Korea is our important neighbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November 21</td>
<td>China has always held a positive attitude toward the cultural exchanges between China and South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>January 3</td>
<td>China has always held a positive attitude toward economic and cultural exchanges between China and South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 10</td>
<td>China and South Korea are important neighbors to each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 31</td>
<td>The Chinese government attaches importance to economic and trade cooperation between China and South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 17</td>
<td>In fact, before the South Korean government made this decision [to deploy THAAD system], China-South Korean relations have reached the highest level in history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 11</td>
<td>China and South Korea are close neighbors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 20</td>
<td>China and South Korea are important neighbors to each other. China has always attached importance to developing China-South Korean relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November 23</td>
<td>China and South Korea are neighbors who cannot move away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 12</td>
<td>China and South Korea are close neighbors and important partners to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100 There were some criticisms of President Park after the THAAD issue in Chinese media but these criticisms used quotations from South Korean’s own media that criticized President Park, rather than offering Chinese independent criticism. This is typical of China’s tactics when it wants to criticize somebody. One uncommon case is Chinese Korea specialist Li Dunqiu (2017)’s criticism of President Park’s incapacity. *Global Times* carried his contribution, under the article title “President Park completely put South Korea into chaos” in the first newspaper of 2017.
In addition to this friendly wording, Chinese behaviors could be interpreted as behaviors towards a friend, except for the excessive retaliation against the specific issue of THAAD. Of course, Chinese behaviors are not as intimate as behaviors in their best period, such as the two leaders breaking the traditional rules of diplomatic protocol and visiting the other country first, China’s invitation of President Park to attend a military parade and sit near President XI, establishing a military hotline between the two defense ministries, and concluding the ROK-China FTA. But even since the THAAD issue, national leadership exchanges between the two countries have never stopped.

One example of continued positive exchanges at the national leader’s level are birthday greeting letters between President Xi Jinping and President Park Geun-hye. On February 1, 2016, Chinese President Xi sent his birthday greetings with his handwritten autograph to President Park, celebrating her 64th birthday on February 2, even after she left open the possibility of the deployment of the THAAD system in January (Wang 2016). Another example is the gift that South Korean President Moon Jae-in received from President Xi during his visit to Beijing. Although President Moon experienced some diplomatic discourtesy, the gift of a go board and go stones both made of jade, was meaningful because jade was the gift from former President Park to President Xi when she had her first visit to China in 2013.

In another example of continued positive relations, annual fishery negotiations between South Korea and China have produced favorable results for South Korea, even
after the THAAD issue took place in 2016. Illegal fishing by Chinese fishermen in the West Sea located between South Korea and China has been a thorny issue between the two countries because armed conflicts between the South Korean coast guard and Chinese fishermen often occur when Korean military officials cracking down on the fishermen (Kim 2019). Against this backdrop, the two countries have agreed to reduce the amount of fishing by Chinese fishermen in the restricted waters for three consecutive years since 2016 (Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of ROK 2018).

**Table 6.2 High-Level Meetings between China and South Korea (2008-2017)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Ministerial/Vice-Ministerial Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Diplomatic White Papers of ROK (2009-2018)

The Lee Myung-bak government (2008.2-2013.2), which was known for pro-American propensity, had more meetings with China than were held during the first half of Park Geun-hye’s presidency (20013.2-2017.3), as seen in Table 6.2. More interestingly, the year of 2015 when is often praised as the best year in Sino-South Korean relations recorded the lowest number of meetings between two countries. Given
this discrepancy, the number of meetings is insignificant to understanding the nature of the two countries’ relationship. However, the continuation of exchanges, especially through summits, is important rather than the raw number, because it can be the evidence of an unbroken relationship regardless of intimacy. Furthermore, the number of meetings after the THAAD deployment, including summits, shows no remarkable difference from the 2011, 2013 and 2014 period. In this sense, the perceived identity of South Korea to China has not essentially changed.

In sum, the perceived identity of South Korea as friend to China has not fundamentally changed, despite the conflict over the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea. As seen in Table 6.2, social contacts between the two countries have continued, and the number of summits has been stable. Furthermore, a CFMSA search shows that statements used to to describe South Korea and Sino-South Korean relations have continue to adhere to the identity of South Korea as friend. Most importantly, the symbol of the social bond between the two states, joint communiques to establish diplomatic relations, has never been abrogated. Thus, China and South Korea are still friends.

China’s Losing Face

Since South Korea continued to be perceived by China as a friend even after the THAAD deployment, attention should be paid to Chinese face culture to explain China’s extreme rage against its friend. China’s angry reaction can certainly be considered excessive because it has lasted for more than two years. Given the case of China’s ban on exports of rare earth metals to Japan in 2010, which had previously been the most powerful retaliation measures taken by China, the retaliation for a considerable period of
time against South Korea seems to cross the line between treating South Korea as friend versus non-friend. Similar to the North Korean case discussed in Chapter five, there is a good explanation for this behavior. China failed to save its face after South Korean deployment of THAAD, and retaliated when it lost face.

Failure to Save Face

At a glance, China did not seem to seek face during the THAAD issue, because China did not play any proactive role directly during the process of resolving the THAAD issue. The deployment of THAAD is basically the matter resolved between the U.S. that has the system and sought to deploy it, and South Korea that has to approve the deployment and provide the site. So, it may seem that saving face was the dynamic of Chinese face culture that was applicable in the course of the THAAD issue, rather than seeking face. However, this is not the case. In fact, just as North Korea’s previous missile launch and nuclear test had frustrated China’s effort to seek face as a responsible great power, so did South Korea’s agreement to deploy the THAAD system have an adverse effect on China’s seeking the face of a responsible great power. The main reason for the THAAD system deployment was to enhance South Korea’s security against North Korea’s advanced missile and nuclear capabilities (Klingner 2015). South Korea’s changed views in accepting THAAD were directly caused by North Korea’s provocations, given the fact that President Park mentioned the possibility of the deployment of a THAAD system right after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test. These provocations by North Korea should have been tackled in the framework of the Six-Party Talks, to which China was devoted as a responsible great power. In this context, the U.S. maintained that China should turn its anger away from South Korea and towards North
Korea, whose actions provided the impetus for the THAAD system deployment (Kim 2017f). China should have prevented the deployment of the THAAD system to save its face without creating a negative situation. Therefore, South Korea’s decision to deploy it was a failure of saving face from the Chinese perspective.

In addition to losing face due to the failure of the SPT to restrain North Korean provocations (thus leading to the THAAD deployment), it is apparent that China lost face because it was ignored by South Korea. Similar to the North Korean case, South Korea did what China repeatedly asked the country not to do, despite China’s requests for mutual deference. Chinese President Xi Jinping personally had asked South Korea to consider, or respect, China’s interests at least three times over several years when he met with South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn. Whenever he asked, South Korea gave the same answer with the so-called “three no’s principle” regarding THAAD: “no request had been made by Washington, no discussions had taken place, and no decision had been made” (Park & Choi 2016).

The critical event was President Xi’s meeting with Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn on June 29, 2016. Before the meeting with President Xi, Prime Minister Hwang met with Premier Li Keqiang on June 28. Even though Prime Minister Hwang met both the Chinese number one and two leaders for two days, he did not notify either of them about the THAAD deployment. However, only a week later, the South Korean government announced its decision to deploy the THAAD system, on July 8. China might reasonably feel that it was completely ignored in this decision by South Korea. In fact, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told this story to the Korean special envoy of President Moon
Jae-in after one year. He explained how Chinese diplomats felt embarrassed due to this incident by saying:

“When Hwang traveled to China in late June, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed having discussions through various channels on the THAAD issue in a way that wouldn’t harm either side’s interests. Shortly after that, [South Korea and the US] announced the THAAD deployment without any explanation to China ahead of time” (Kim 2017e).

Beyond being disrespected due to South Korea not informing China of upcoming actions, China believed that South Korea was disloyal to China as a friend. When President Xi Jinping delivered a speech before college students at Seoul National University on July 4, 2014, during his visit to Seoul, he put emphasis on loyalty while speaking about the future of Sino-Korean relations. He noted that Chinese people historically have argued that loyalty and righteousness are the nature of a gentleman (Xi 2014c). Furthermore, President Xi quoted the Chinese traditional idiom Yin Shui Si Yuan (饮水思源) when he met with President Park on September 5, 2016, after President Park decided to deploy the THAAD system. The idiom can be literally translated into “when you have water, don’t forget where it comes from,” which means, “don’t forget who made you who you are.” President Xi mentioned this idiom in relationship to Korea’s anti-Japan movements. Thus, President Xi seemed to remind President Park of China’s support in the past and asked Korea not to betray China today (Jo 2016). But the THAAD system was deployed after all and as a result, China felt it was betrayed by South Korea and lost its face.
*Restoring lost face*

When it came to restoring its humiliated face, China used the option of seeking retaliation. As examined earlier in the section covering developments regarding the THAAD issue, China’s retaliation has been twofold: economic retaliation and non-economic retaliation. China employed the two methods together, which reflects that China’s fury against South Korea stemmed from losing face because China was very pleased to humiliate South Korean leaders in multiple ways. Although the two countries agreed to recover bilateral relations on October 31, 2017 (Glaser & Collins 2017), no tangible sign of thawing the Chinese cold mind had been shown to date. In an attempt to thaw that chill and rebuild the Sino-South Korean relationship, the South Korean government officially came out with strategies to appease the implacable fury of China in November 2017. It is a new “three no’s principle,” which means “no further anti-ballistic missile systems in Korea, no joining of a region-wide US missile defense system and no military alliance involving Korea, the US and Japan” (Volodzko 2018b).

In short, China lost its face due to the developments regarding the THAAD issue. First, its failure to seek the face of responsible great power provided an excuse to South Korea to deploy THAAD. If China had succeeded in tackling the North Korean missile and nuclear issue as a responsible great power, South Korea would not have considered deploying the THAAD system at the risk of ruining a good relationship with China and provoking domestic political confrontation. Second, no prior notification and consultation from South Korea made China lose face. Furthermore, South Korea announced its decision for the deployment of the THAAD system only a week after the Korean Prime Minister had a meeting with Chinese president.
This pattern is very similar to the North Korean case. In both cases, top-level figures met the Chinese president just before humiliation from China’s view (namely, Park Bong-joo, the premier of North Korea, and Hwang Kyo-ahn, the Prime Minister of South Korea). These leaders did not notify the Chinese leader at all regarding about future events, though the Chinese president reasonably expected to hear something from them. And then the critical events happened not long after top level North and South Koreans returned to their home country. To restore its lost face regarding the THAAD issue, China took retaliatory measures both economically and non-economically. In particular, economic retaliation was so destructive that it reduced South Korea’s GDP by almost one percent. This is an substantial level of retaliation. Therefore, even if China does not treat a friend as an enemy, China also did not treat a friend as a friend when it had lost face due to his actions.

**Chinese Core National Interests**

In explaining China’s hostile reaction to the deployment of the THAAD system, It might be more plausible that China treated a friend almost as a non-friend because it was a matter of protecting China’s core national interests given the inseparable relationship between missile defense and the national security of a state. In this vein, some researchers believe that China’s retaliation against the deployment of THAAD system is identical to other cases of China’s economic retaliation for reasons for national interests, including the Norwegian case and the French case briefly touched in previous chapters (Meick & Salidjanova 2017, 8). However, I believe the South Korean case is different from these cases because the pathway to retaliation was greatly influenced by Chinese face culture. Nevertheless, the argument for national interests being a driving factor in China’s
response deserves a close examination because China itself argued that the THAAD system would cause major damage to Chinese national interests.

**Table 6.3 Chinese Core National Interests in the *People’s Daily* (2008-2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese Core National Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Taiwan, State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Taiwan, State Sovereignty, Territorial Integration, Tibet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Taiwan, State Sovereignty, Territorial Integration, Tibet, National Unification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>State Sovereignty, Territorial Integration, National Unification, Diaoyu Islands, National Security, Development Profit, Macao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Taiwan, State Sovereignty, Territorial Integration, National Unification, Diaoyu Islands, National Security, Development Profit, Overall Stability of Political System and Society, Maritime Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Taiwan, State Sovereignty, Territorial Integration, Tibet, Core Values, National Security, Development Profit, National Dignity, Xinjiang, Maritime Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Taiwan, State Sovereignty, National Security, Tibet, Macao, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Taiwan, State Sovereignty, Territorial Integration, Tibet, National Unification, National Security, Development Profit, National Dignity, Maritime Interests, Macao, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Independence, People’s Welfare, South China Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Taiwan, State Sovereignty, Territorial Integration, Tibet, National Security, Development Profit, Maritime Interests, Xinjiang, Independence, South China Sea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As seen in Table 6.3, a variety of core national interests have been mentioned in articles of the People’s Daily from 2008 to 2018. They can be largely divided into three categories of protecting state unity, national security, and development interests of China. The State unity category includes core interests that are necessary for maintaining the entity of China, which include the issues of Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the Diaoyu Islands, sovereignty, national unification, ethnic unity, and so on. The category of national security includes maritime interests and security, airspace security, border areas, the South China Sea, and so on. The Development category includes issues related to supporting China’s continuous growth, including people’s welfare, science and technology innovation, and securing developmental profits. The Korean Peninsula falls under the category of national security. China’s concern is related to insuring stability on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, Chinese scholars have emphasized stability and development on the Korean Peninsula, and include the North Korean issue when they refer to the Korean Peninsula as relating to China’s core national interests (Zeng, Xiao & Breslin 2015, 261).

The THAAD issue clearly could relate to the interest of national security. In fact, China officially argues that the deployment of THAAD infringes on China’s security interest. For example, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that “[o]bviously it will undermine the strategic security interests of China” [emphasis added]. He more specifically explained,
“The coverage of the THAAD missile defense system, especially the monitoring scope of its X-Band radar, goes far beyond the defense need of the Korean Peninsula. It will reach deep into the hinterland of Asia, which will not only directly damage China’s strategic security interests, but also do harm to the security interests of other countries in this region” [emphasis added] (Swaine 2017, 3).

Wang’s conception of the THAAD system as affecting Chinese security interests is also found in remarks by Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokespersons at regular press conference. As seen in Table 6.4, THAAD has been mentioned in terms of Chinese strategic security interests and security interests multiple times from 2015 to 2018. The word THAAD(萨德) first appeared on February 5, 2015, and was mentioned a total of 347 times at subsequent press conferences (CFMSA). But it is noteworthy that the term THAAD suddenly disappeared from regular press conferences in 2018.

**Table 6.4 Types of Chinese National Interests Relating to THAAD (2015-2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Security Interests</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Interests</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Interests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CFMSA; Lee (2017e)

Judging From statements by China, it might be plausible to argue that China’s coercive retaliation against South Korea for the THAAD system deployment was caused by China’s concern about that THAAD threatened to undermine China’s strategic security interest and core national interests. When it comes to defending its core national interests of issues like THAAD, China has asserted that “China has not given in, is not giving in, and will never give in” (Galbraith 2019). The controversy over the technical capacity of the THAAD system, and whether it can monitor China’s intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) and thus emasculate China’s deterrence, is a matter of technical truth and beyond the scope of this dissertation. The point is that China believes and argues that this is the case. Due to that concern, China retaliated against its friend for deploying THAAD.

Nevertheless, there are still some questions. First, if China really were concerned regarding its national security interests, China should retaliate on the U.S. rather than South Korea due to deployment of THAAD. Although South Korea agreed to provide the site for the THAAD battery, the THAAD system is operated by and belongs to the U.S. military. China has strongly opposed THAAD because the U.S. has a means to directly monitor China’s missiles. For such reasons, President Xi Jinping expressed Chinese concerns about the THAAD to the U.S. President Obama at the summit. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that one who has insight could rightly determine the intention of the U.S. in deploying the THAAD system in South Korea. But if these intentions were clear, and if they were a threat to China’s core national interests, then China should express its fury against the U.S. and should demand the U.S. to directly remove the threat to Chinese core national. Second, if reactions are driven by national security interests, China should have retaliated on Japan for deploying a radar similar to the THAAD system earlier than South Korea did. China expressed its grave concerns for Japan’s THAAD radar system, which can also reach Chinese territory, only two times at a regular press conference by Foreign Ministry spokesperson, compared to more than 300 times for the South Korean THAAD issue.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ This will be explored in the Japanese case in the Chapter seven.
Third, if national security interests were paramount, Russia should retaliate on South Korea because it is also affected by the THAAD system. When it comes to the THAAD issue, Russia closely cooperated with China including issuing joint statements to oppose the deployment (Rinna 2018). But Russia has not employed any retaliatory measures against South Korea. Is it just because the THAAD system poses a threat to China while only causing low-level anxiety to Russia? (Shinha 2018). Lastly, why has China’s retaliation become lukewarm after South Korea helped it to regain face? Although there is no clear evidence for full recovery of Sino-South Korean relations in 2018, there were declaratory remarks suggesting the end of retaliation, and THAAD was not been mentioned any longer in Chinese Foreign Ministry press conferences in 2018. These results came after South Korea’s efforts to give face to China. South Korean President Moon was willing to put up with China’s humiliation against him. Furthermore, South Korea made concessions including the promise of the three no’s principle.

In short, it is hard to jump to the conclusion that China’s severe retaliation against South Korea is caused by a threat to Chinese core national interests. By taking the above questions into consideration, China’s argument for strategic security interests looks like an excuse to retaliate against South Korea’s misbehavior which caused China to lose face.

Conclusion

The Sino-South Korean relationship has continuously improved since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1992. Despite some ups and downs in their relations, the relationship had reached the level that two countries called their best period in history in 2014 and 2015. However, things completely changed only one year later. As
the South Korean government announced the possibility of deploying the U.S. THAAD system and later formalized the deployment on its territory, China severely resented South Korea’s “betrayal.” China’s resentment was caused by losing face due to the developments of THAAD. Furthermore, this resentment against the actions of a friend led to excessive retaliation against Seoul.

This case supports the hypothesis that China behaves according to its perceived identity of South Korea in Sino-South Korean relations. Even having gone through the THAAD conflict between two countries, China had not changed the perceived identity of South Korea as friend, as can be seen by examining China’s words and behaviors. The case also strongly supports the hypothesis that Chinese face culture leads to assertive Chinese foreign policy when China loses its face. China lost its face in the process of opposing the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea. To recover from humiliation due to the actions of a friend, China chose to take economic retaliatory measures first and also to take some non-economic measures. On the other hand, China’s argument for its strategic security interests slightly support the hypothesis that Chinese inconsistent behaviors on South Korea are influenced by Chinese core national interests. However, there is also good evidence that China only uses its argument for core interests as an excuse for retaliation due to losing face. Thus, findings from this case do not weaken the hypothesis regarding the effect of Chinese face culture. Meanwhile, China’s wordings or behaviors as a responsible great power are hardly found in the South Korean case. As a result, the South Korean THAAD case strongly supports Hypotheses H1d and H3a, while offering only slight support for H2b. For H1b, the effect of the proclaimed identity of the responsible great power is unknown.
Chapter Seven
Case Study: Japan’s THAAD Radar Deployment

South Korea is not the only neighbor of China that has the THAAD radar, which can pose a serious threat to China’s security according to China. Japan has two AN/TPY-2 radars (Army Navy/ Transportable Radar Surveillance) that are an integral part of the THAAD system. Furthermore, and contrary to South Korea, who declined to join the missile defense (MD) system created by the U.S., Japan has actively cooperated with the U.S. to develop the system. Thus, for Japan, the installation of AN/TPY-2 radars was a matter of course in the context of the construction of a broader MD system. It introduced one radar at Shariki base in 2006 and the other at Kyogamisaki in 2014.

Surprisingly, China did not take any harsh action against these installations, unlike its aggressive attitude toward South Korea. Although Japan normalized its diplomatic relations with China twenty years earlier than with South Korea, this does not mean that Japan is a much closer friend of China than in South Korea. Instead, as briefly discussed in Chapter three, China and Japan are more like rivals who are close to enemies or potential adversaries than friends. Why does China keep silent to Japan regarding the matter of the radar? Does China actually think of Japan as a valuable friend, and this was not bothered when Japan introduced the radars? Doe China believe The THAAD radars
in Japan do no harm to Chinese national interests? Or, was China not angry because it knew that there was nothing better to expect from Japan, since Japan was not a friend to China? This chapter explores the background and developments of the Japanese case of the deployment of THAAD radars to find a good answer to those questions. Similar to the South Korean case, this Japanese case has a knotted skein that is hard to unravel, such as North Korea’s missile capabilities, U.S. grand strategy, and Japan’s domestic politics. For the purpose of this dissertation, however, this chapter focuses on the AN/TPY-2 as closely as possible to test hypotheses.

**Background**

Along with the U.S. which intended to build the missile defense system, Japan had joined the development of the system from the beginning. Two years after the U.S., during the Reagan Administration revealed the conception of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1985, the Japanese government signed an Agreement Concerning Japanese Participation in Research for the Strategic Defense Initiative (Kaneda et al. 2007, 51). However, Japan’s participation was not necessarily driven by a sense of the practical usefulness of the system for military use, but was a tool to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance for political uses (Kaneda et al. 2007, 53-54; Jimbo 2002, 57). Thus, there was been no significant progress for the MD in Japan, even after the U.S.-Japan SDI initiative was signed in 1985.

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102 The missile defense (MD) system includes the previous Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD), both of which fell under the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The TMD systems aim to defend against short-range and theater-range ballistic missiles usually up to 3,500 km by being deployed in a military theater of operations, while the NMD systems were intended to defend the territory of the U.S. against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) (Cronin 2002, 3).
In the 1990s, however, Japan changed this view and began to see the MD system as having a possible security purpose, because of Chinese military exercises in March 1996 with a bunch of short-range ballistic missiles and also due to North Korea’s missile test of Taepodong-1 in August 1998 (Jimbo 2002, 56; Swaine, Swanger & Kawakami 2001, 11-17). In particular, North Korea’s Taepodong -1 missile, which had flown over Japan’s territory, greatly influenced Japan’s reassessment of threats by missiles because North Korean missiles allegedly had a long enough range to reach Japan (Kaneda et al. 2007, 55; Takahashi 2012, 10). For example, Japan mentioned the threat from North Korean long-range missiles such as the Taepodong-1 in its annual defense white paper of 1999 for the first time (Nam & Lee 2010, 71).

**Table 7.1 Japan's Description of North Korean Missile Threat in the Defense White Papers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>North Korea’s Action</th>
<th>Japan’s Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Launch of a Nodong-1 Missile to East Sea</td>
<td>North Korea’s Nodong missile is described for the first time as a threat to Japan’s security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1997</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs pose a threat to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Launch of Taepodong-1 Missile in 1998</td>
<td>Japan expressed its concerns for North Korea’s long-range missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Japan expressed its concerns for North Korea’s missiles and actual deployment of missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Japan expressed its concerns for North Korea’s development and deployment of missiles that could reach all of Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Japan expressed concerned about North Korea’s missiles mounted with biochemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nam & Lee 2010, 70-71
Developments

*The First Radar at Shariki*

In December 2003, Japan’s Cabinet and Security Council decided to deploy the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 and the Standard Missile (SM)-3 (Block I-A) to counter ballistic missile threats. Japan issued a document titled “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and other measures”, which covered the lower-tier BMD with a surface-to-air system and the upper-tier with a sea-based system, respectively (Toki 2009; Takahashi 2012, 10). To implement the plan, the Japanese government revised its Self-Defense Forces Law to legalize possible interceptions of ballistic missiles.

Against this backdrop, in July 2005, the Japanese and the U.S. government began considering the possibility of deploying a X-band radar in Japan, which was America’s newest type of surveillance system, in order to strengthen the joint response capability of the MD system by linking the radar to Japan’s established radar net (Mulgan 2005, 65 footnote 15). This consideration was officialized in a document describing the U.S.-Japan Alliance--Transformation and Realignment for the Future-- signed on October 29, 2005, by the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and their counterparts, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura Nobutaka and Minister of State for Defense Ohno Yoshinori. When it comes to the missile defense described in the document, it stated:

“[t]he optimum site for deployment in Japan of a new U.S. X-Band radar system will be examined. Through timely information sharing, this radar will support capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil defense and consequence management. In addition, as appropriate, the U.S. will
deploy active defenses, such as Patriot PAC-3 and Standard Missile (SM-3) to support U.S. treaty commitments” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2005).

In November 2005, the U.S. and Japan agreed to deploy a mobile X-band radar system to more effectively detect cruise and ballistic missiles with advanced targeting discrimination technology (Pekkanen & Paul 2010, 183).

In 2006, the discussion over the deployment of an X-band radar accelerated. On February 6, in the press briefing about the fiscal 2007 defense budget, a senior U.S. Missile Defense Agency said that the U.S. hoped to have the deployment of the X band radar in Japan within the next six months (Igarashi 2006). On May 1, the U.S. government and the Japanese government agreed to the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. In the agreement, which had the title of “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” the X-band radar was described as ready to deploy at the Air Self-Defense Force Shariki Base in the summer. According to the related articles,

“The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as Air SDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG [the U.S. government], will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006. The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ [government of Japan]” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2006b).

Despite the two governments’ argument that the radar system was directed at North Korea’s missile threat, it implicitly had an intention to monitor China’s missile sites, given common concerns about China’s military build-up. For example, Japanese Defense Minister Nugata outrightly said at the news conference to announce the above agreement, that “China's military spending is increasing in line with its economic
development, and China needs to make it transparent for its neighboring nations to feel at ease” (Tang 2006)

The X-band radar system, which was the Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2), was temporarily moved to Misawa Air Base and then set up at Shariki base in June 2006 (Svan 2006). The AN/TPY-2 has two types of surveillance: forward-based mode and terminal mode. The forward-based mode can monitor up to 1,800~2,000 km, with boost-phase surveillance, while the terminal mode can monitor up to 600~900 km with terminal phase surveillance. The radar at Shariki operates in the forward-based mode (Park 2015).

**The Second Radar at Kyogamisaki**

Right after the deployment of the first X-band radar in Japan, the U.S. considered deploying another radar system in the western Pacific region, somewhere among the four candidates of Guam, South Korea, and Kyushu or Okinawa in Japan (Park 2006). In December 2006, the U.S. asked Japan to allow it to deploy its second radar in the south of Japan for the reason of monitoring North Korea’s Taepodong-2 launch site (Shin 2006b).

In 2012 the plan to deploy the radar, which had been dormant for a while, came back again. In August 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense discussed the additional deployment of the radar in southern Japan to supplement the X-band radar positioned in northern Japan. Compared to the first deployment that put emphasis on North Korea’s missile threat, the U.S. revealed that its real target was China. For example, a US missile-defense expert said, “The focus of our rhetoric is North Korea. [But] the reality is that we’re also looking longer term at the elephant in the room, which is China” (Entous & Barnes 2012).
On September 17, 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that Japan agreed to deploy another AN/TPY-2 to defend against ballistic missiles, during his visit to Tokyo. Panetta noted that the radars did not aim at China but were solely designed to counter North Korea (Barnes 2012). On February 22, 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo confirmed in their meeting in Washington that there were agreed to deploy another early-warning radar system. The Kyogamisaki base in Kyotango, located on the East Sea near Kyoto, was selected as the place to host the second radar (Kyodo News 2012). On April 29, 2013, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said that he and his Japanese counterpart, Onodera Itsunori, made progress on plans to deploy another X-band radar system in Japan (Azuma 2013).

On June 11, 2014, having had several repeated confirmations of the deployment by defense ministers from the U.S. and Japan for almost two years, the U.S. Department of Defense finally said that it expected to complete the deployment of the second AN/TPY-2 radar in Kyogamisaki in southern Japan by the end of 2014 (Syring 2014). On December 26, the U.S. Department of Defense and Japanese Ministry of Defense jointly announced the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar at Kyogamisaki in Japan to enhance sensor coverage for ballistic missile defense and augment an existing radar at Shariki (U.S. Department of Defense 2014). Just like the radar at Shariki, the AN/TPY-2 at Kyogamisaki is run in the forward-based mode that has a longer range than the terminal mode.

**China's Response**

It was evident that two X-band radars in Japan were not limited to detecting missile threats by North Korea. Their ultimate target was indisputably China. This claim
was substantiated by remarks from both American and Japanese officials who expressed their concerns about China. For example, as earlier mentioned, Japanese Defense Minister Nugata and U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld expressed similar views on China’s increased military spending during their talks in May 2006 (Tang 2006).

Nevertheless, China’s response to the Japanese two THAAD radars was relatively lukewarm, compared to its harsh reaction against South Korea later. China has, of course, consistently opposed the conception of missile defense by the U.S., mainly for two reasons: 1) the U.S. missile defense will lead to a vicious cycle of an arms race; 2) the U.S. missile defense will neutralize China's efforts to maintain a viable strategic deterrent and ultimately pose a threat to the survival of China (Romberg & McDevitt 2003; Yuan 2003; Roberts 2004).

In line with this position, China has not concealed its discontent over the deployment of radars in Japan. For instance, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons explained China’s view on Japan’s X-band radars twice at regular press conferences. On September 23, 2013 when Japan decided to deploy the second X-band radar around Kyoto, Chinese spokesman Hong Lei said:

“We have noted relevant reports and are concerned about that. China believes that some individual country or bloc of countries' unilateral deployment of anti-missile system or engagement in bloc cooperation under the pretext of guarding against the nuclear and missile "threat" from the DPRK [North Korea] will make no contribution to regional non-proliferation, nor will it be conducive to peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific, rather, it may produce a severe and negative impact on global strategic stability. We maintain that political and diplomatic means should be adopted in dealing with the issue of missile proliferation, so as to fully accommodate different
countries' legitimate concerns over the anti-missile issue and safeguard global strategic stability [emphasis added].” (CFMSA 2013).

Although he asserted China’s position to oppose the deployment of a radar in Japan, the Chinese spokesperson did not explicitly express that the radar could pose a threat to China’s security. Instead, he indirectly expressed it by mentioning the global stability to which China surely belonged. By using the word “pretext” for the justification of the radar deployment, he indicated that China believed that the radar was ultimately targeted at China. For instance, Li Qinggong, deputy secretary of the China Council for National Security Policy Studies, said “It will be like killing a fly with a bazooka if it is used to contain Pyongyang. I believe it is mainly aimed at detecting China’s missiles” (Weitz 2012b, 13).

The X-band radar was mentioned again on October 23, 2014 when the second radar in Japan was almost completely installed. Chinese spokeswoman Hua Chunying answered a question regarding the radar as follows:

“The anti-missile deployment in the Asia-Pacific by a certain country in the pursuit of unilateral security goes against regional strategic stability and mutual trust, as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Such an action is particularly concerning when the situation in the region is complex and sensitive. The Chinese side believes that the relevant country should proceed from regional peace and stability, stay committed to maintaining regional security through political and diplomatic means, and shall not infringe upon other countries' security interests under the pretext of aforementioned action [emphasis added].” (CFMSA 2014).

This expression of opposition was slightly changed from the expression a year previously. The goal of global strategic stability was reduced to a regional goal, and then to a more local Northeast Asian goal. Furthermore, she asserted security interests directly despite the fact that the subjects of these security interests were ‘other countries,’ not
China directly. However, it was unambiguous that her remarks admitted China’s view on the radar system as a security threat.

Other than spokespersons’ remarks, there were other some timid complaints from the Chinese side. For instance, when Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie met his U.S. counterpart Panetta, who came to China right after visiting Japan to announce the deployment of the second X-band radar on September 19, 2012, Liang asked to Panetta, “Isn’t the base in Aomori prefecture...enough?” (Weitz 2012b, 11).

However, China did not go further. It is noteworthy that additional opposing remarks by Chinese top leaders are hard to find. No harsh response can be found regarding the first X-band radar in Japan. No exceptionally harsh expression in diplomatic rhetoric is found. Furthermore, no action was taken by China against Japan’s two decisions to deploy the X-band radars.

**Analysis**

*Japan’s Identity to China*

As discussed in Chapter three, Japan’s identity to China has not been as a friend in the least, despite the close relationship in trade between China and Japan. Although China perceives Japan as one of its most important economic partners, it sees Japan as a potential adversary at the same time, due partly to continuing conflict over territorial issues and to the history of Japan’s atrocities to China during the WWII era, without any Japanese repentance even to this day.

Around the times when Japan deployed radars in 2006 and 2014, Sino-Japanese relations were at their lowest level. Sino-Japanese relations had been getting worse for several years when the deployment of the first X-band radar began to be discussed by
Japan and the U.S. These poor relations were caused not by the radar but by other historical issues. One historical issue during this period was Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine that honors about 2.5 million Japanese war dead. The problem is that this shrine includes fourteen Japanese class-A war criminals from the second World War. Thus, the Prime Minister’s prayer visit to the Shrine signaled to China that Japan does not regret its wrongdoings during the War.

This shrine visit has been a very sensitive issue for China, and it was mentioned 429 times in Chinese regular press conference for the past 18 years--always with strong opposition to a visit by Japanese leaders (CFMSA). For example, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue said on July 6, 2004, when Prime Minister Koizumi vowed an annual homage to the Shrine:

“China is firmly opposed to homage paid by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine. We express our dissatisfaction and regret about the provocative remarks continuously made by Japanese leaders in defiance of the just appeal of the victimized peoples” [emphasis added] (CFMSA 2004).

Another historical issue, related to the first issue, related to a Japanese history textbook. It was not the first time that a Japanese history textbook gave rise to controversy among many Asian countries that shared the experience of Japanese colonial rule. However, the history textbook made by Fusosha Publishing, which seemed to justify Japan’s atrocities during the Pacific War, precipitated unprecedented mass protests in China and South Korea when the Japanese Ministry of Education approved it for a junior high school history textbook (Inuzuka 2013). The protests in China continued for weeks, condemning Japan for distorting history and boycotting Japanese products (Zhao & Hoge 2006, 424). China’s Foreign Ministry summoned Japan’s ambassador to China to voice
disapproval and released a statement that “[t]he Chinese government expresses indignation toward the Japanese government for approving the revised textbook in spite of China’s strong representations on many occasions” (Hu & Song 2005).

The relationship between China and Japan had been even more aggravated around the period when Japan was considering deploying the second AN-TPY-2 system. The main reason for the worsening relations between the two countries was the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyudao. On September 7, 2010, there was a collision between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard’s patrol boats, which occurred in the process of chasing and fleeing. On September 8, Japan arrested and detained a Chinese captain of the fishing boat on charges of intruding and illegally fishing in the waters of the Senkaku Islands. China demanded the release of the captain immediately, but Japan declined the demand. In response to Japan’s refusal, China suddenly stopped its export of earth rare materials to Japan in retaliation for the detention, which were indispensable to Japan’s high-tech industry (Green et al. 2017, 66-94).

This was not the end of story. In 2012, the governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, ordered the Tokyo municipal government to nationalize three islets in the Senkaku Islands by purchasing them from a private Japanese owner. To prevent this nationalist governor from purchasing them and, in turn, doing harm to relations with China, the Japanese central government decided to intervene in the matter and to nationalize them instead of allowing a purchase by local government. Contrary to Japan’s expectation that its action would calm tensions, China sent more than 1,000 fishing boat to the waters
around the islets claiming the territorial sovereignty over them (Green et al. 2017, 128-145). In addition to this action, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a statement:

“[t]he Chinese government solemnly states that the Japanese government's so-called ‘purchase’ of the Diaoyu Island is totally illegal and invalid. It does not change, not even in the slightest way, the historical fact of Japan's occupation of Chinese territory, nor will it alter China's territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 2012).

Furthermore, the Chinese State Council published a white paper on Diaoyu Dao, claiming it as inherent territory of China.

Although the treaty for diplomatic ties between China and Japan has remained valid during these periods, exchanges between two countries stopped. Due to the aftermath of these worsened relations during the period of mid-2000s to mid-2010s, there had been no visit by Japanese Prime Minister to China for seven years (2011-2018), no visit by Chinese Foreign Minister to Japan for eight years (2010-2018), no high-ranking economy dialogue for eight years (2011-2019), and no exchange of military people for six years (2012-2018). Furthermore, there were no expressions of intimacy. For example, on September 30, 2012, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, “[t]he Japanese government has brazenly made the wrong decision to “purchase” the Diaoyu Islands [emphasis added]” (CFMSA 2012). The word brazenly is the translation of Chinese Hanran, which was very inappropriate word in diplomatic rhetoric given its meaning. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that Japan’s perceived identity by China was not a friend during the period.

103 For the context of using Hanran, see the Chapter 5.
China’s Losing Face?

There was no evidence to demonstrate that any dynamics of Chinese face culture worked in the process of Japan’s deployment of two X-band radars. On the contrary to the South Korean case in which Chinese top leaders strongly argued for withdrawal from the decision to deploy the THAAD system, they were silent for the Japan’s THAAD radars. Although China expressed its opposition to the deployment, it did not strongly demand the withdrawal beyond the opposition. In other words, from the start, China did not expect mutual deference that was essential in the relations where Chinese face culture was working. Therefore, it might be true that China did not retaliate against Japan for its deployment of the THAAD radars because it never lost its face. It does not mean that China did not lose its face not because Japan saved its face, but because the dynamics of Chinese face culture themselves had no chance to work. 104

Chinese Core National Interests

As reviewed above, China did not explicitly assert that the deployment of X-band radars in Japan should be the matter of Chinese core national interests. In the South Korean case, it reiterated the assertion that South Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD system should be a grave infringement on Chinese core national interests of security due to its radar that enabled South Korea, practically the U.S. to monitor China’s core missile facilities. According to the remark by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, China

104 For other issues such as visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, Chinese leaders demanded not to visit, and Japanese leaders temporarily stopped to visit for years. In this context, China saved its face.
believed that X-band radars in Japan were the potential threat to its national interests of security of it and stability in the region.

Is there any difference between the THAAD radars in South Korea and that of Japan? If this is the case, it might be understandable for China’s no retaliation against Japan. However, they are the same model of AN/TPY-2 that are technically identical. The only difference is that radar in South Korea will be run by the terminal mode and radars in Japan are operating with the forward-based mode. Thus, radars in Japan have the longer range of 2,000 km. It means that China’s argument is not adequate at all because Japanese THAAD radars are already monitoring the range overlapped with South Korea’s radar as long as the South Korean radar changes its mode to the forward-based one. In short, if China had the infringement on its core national interests due to the THAAD radar in South Korea, it should have had a damage on its core national interests by radars in Japan. If China’s retaliation against South Korea purely due to threat to its core national interest, it should retaliate Japan on the same reason.

**Conclusion**

It is undeniable that there is the time gap in the processes between Japan’s X-band radars and South Korea’s radar for their discussions to deploy and the completion of the deployment. However, the timing of South Korean THAAD issue, which started in earnest from 2014, was overlapped with the discussion of the second radar in Japan, which was installed in 2014, to some extent. Therefore, it is hard to say that there had been any certain fundamental change only in a few years.

The Japanese case is essentially similar to the South Korean case in that both are related to the deployment of the U.S. THAAD system including its integral part of the X-
band radar with the justification to counter North Korea’s serious missile threat. Furthermore, two countries are significant economic partners to China. Nevertheless, two cases have different outcome because Japan had not experienced any retaliation from China.

It is unclear that China’s proclaimed identity of responsible great power played a role in Sino-Japanese relations for the Japanese deployment of radars. It might be working in the general Sino-Japanese relations including the territorial issue and the historical issue, but any specific link between proclaimed identity of China and China’s behaviors toward Japan in the matter of X-band radars is not found. On the other hand, China perceived Japan as a quasi-adversary and behaved according to this perceived identity. Since there was no retaliation by China against Japan regarding its deployment of radars, China’s behaviors were not influenced by its core national interests. Even if no retaliation can be assumed as inconsistent behavior given Japan’s perceived identity of enemy, Chinese core national interests cannot explain the reason why China did not retaliate. Thus, it strongly rejects the hypothesis of national interests. Lastly, it is hard to test the Chinese face culture as a moderating factor. Although there was no losing face because there was no working of Chinese face culture, it does not necessarily mean that no retaliation can be explained by no losing face. It is the fallacy of denying the antecedent. However, it cannot reject the hypothesis, either.

In short, the Japanese case support the hypothesis of perceived identity whereas it strongly rejects the hypothesis of national interests. For other hypotheses, the case cannot determine the results.
Chapter Eight

Conclusions

When Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a 2014 speech at Seoul National University in South Korea, he mentioned eight historical persons: four were Chinese and four were Korean, dating from B.C. 219 to the 1900s. They all left significant marks on the history of Sino-Korean relations. Although China and Korea had sometimes gone to war with each other, President Xi’s speech was a reminder that China and Korea have had a long and close relationship, dating from ancient times.\textsuperscript{105} This historically close relationship between Korea and China has continued to shape relations between China and both North Korea and South Korea until today.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have been friends forged in blood since the establishment of their governing parties and modern states. When their states were founded, they immediately recognized and established diplomatic ties with each other. Also, China signed a treaty of alliance with North Korea in 1961. In terms of its relationship with South Korea, the PRC and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have officially been friends since their normalization of diplomatic relations in 1992.

\textsuperscript{105} China and Korea also fought many times against a common enemy in WWII, which has frequently been Japan, as irony would have it.
Based on these traditional relations, in his Seoul address, President Xi addressed North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un as “comrade” and South Korean President Park Geun-hye as “an old friend.” Furthermore, he described the Sino-South Korea relationship as follows: “Historically, whenever the two nations have been in a perilous situation, they helped each other out and overcame the difficulties. Now the two nations clearly have a strategic cooperative partnership and the relationship is *better than ever before*” [emphasis added] (Xi 2014b; Han & Lim 2014). Regarding Sino-North Korean relations, he said:

“[North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to China] fully showed his fixed will to attach great importance to the strengthened strategic communication between the two parties of China and the DPRK and to develop the traditional friendship of the two countries and demonstrated to the whole world the *invincibility of the relations* between the two parties and two countries” [emphasis added] (North Korea Leadership Watch 2018).

Despite this proclaimed identity of the PRC and both North and South Korea as best friends, there have been some grave conflicts beyond simple friction and quarrels between friends, both in Sino-North Korean and Sino-South Korean relations. China’s excessive attacks on her friends are difficult to understand. For example, South Korea (which has pursued differing policies toward North Korea according to the government in power), has often treated North Korean as a friendly partner worthy of dialogue and cooperation, even despite two naval skirmishes during the Kim Dae-jung government after he had pursued the so-called Sunshine Policy of engagement. Why does South Korea sometimes behave according to the perceived identity of friendship between nations, even when facing problematic challenges by its North Korean neighbor, and
China sometimes does not? Is China’s foreign policy not influenced by identity? Or is there another factor influencing China’s foreign policy, in addition to the significant role of identity in shaping Chinese policy?

China’s unexpected behaviors vis-a-vis its friends are more puzzling when considering its behavior to Japan in response to Japan’s deployment of the THAAD radars. Although there was no remarkable difference between the South Korean THAAD deployment case and the Japanese radar deployment case, China unexpectedly did nothing against Japan, and responded only with grumbling. Because China perceived Japan as a rival, who is close to being an enemy, China should logically treat Japan as an enemy by employing more severe retaliatory measures to punish the country. Why did China not take any measures against Japan? Is it because China thinks of Japan as a friend more than as an enemy? This dissertation is motivated by these questions. Now I will suggest the answers with my arguments, based on the findings presented in the case studies of previous chapters.

Key Findings

From the theories and observations presented in previous chapters, three major hypotheses and ten sub-hypotheses can be drawn, as seen in Table 8.1. The alternative hypotheses are used to test, and eventually support, my arguments for identity and Chinese face culture. The null hypotheses have a role to serve as counterargument for national interest.
Table 8.1 Hypotheses of the Dissertation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Major Hypotheses</th>
<th>Sub-Hypotheses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>H1: China’s foreign policy is influenced by its proclaimed identity and the perceived identities of others.</td>
<td>H1a: China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward North Korea. H1b: China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward South Korea. H1c: China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward Japan. H1d: China behaves according to its perceived identity of North Korea in Sino-North Korean relations. H1e: China behaves according to its perceived identity of South Korea in Sino-South Korean relations. H1f: China behaves according to its perceived identity of Japan in Sino-Japanese relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Hypotheses</td>
<td>H3: China’s foreign policy is moderated by Chinese face culture.</td>
<td>H3a: Chinese face culture leads to assertive Chinese foreign policy when China loses its face.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H2: Chinese foreign policy is influenced by Chinese core national interests.</td>
<td>H2a: Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding North Korea are influenced by Chinese core national interests. H2b: Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding South Korea are influenced by Chinese core national interests. H2c: Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding Japan are influenced by Chinese core national interests.</td>
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To test hypotheses using the mixed systems research design, three cases were selected: North Korea’s Taepodong-2 missile launch and first nuclear test in 2006 and resultant Sino-North Korean relations, South Korea’s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and resultant Sino-South Korean relations, and Japan’s deployment of the X-band radars from 2005 to 2014 and resultant Sino-Japanese relations. Three measurements are used for identifying friendship between states in these
case studies: social bonds, social contacts, and expressions of intimacy. Regardless of the degree of intimacy, the relationship is regarded as friendly when these three measurements are fulfilled to some extent. Additionally, public statements and behaviors are used as evidence to support or reject the hypotheses throughout the case studies. When statements and behaviors of China are consistent, it provides strong evidence to support or reject the hypotheses.

**The Effect of Identity on Chinese Foreign Policy**

From observations and theory, it needs to be tested whether China’s foreign policy-making is influenced by identity—proclaimed identity or perceived identity, or both. The North Korean case strongly supports H1a (*China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward North Korea*) and H1d (*China behaves according to its perceived identity of North Korea in Sino-North Korean relations*), as seen in Table 8.1. When the first North Korean nuclear crisis occurred in 1993, China acted as a bystander. The tensions between North Korea and South Korea and the U.S. had been increasing to the degree to which Pyongyang threatened a “sea of fire” on Seoul, resulting in scared Seoulites rushing to buy and store instant noodles, water, and other necessities (Williams 2013). The U.S. and South Korea asked China to exert influence on North Korea to relieve the tension and tackle the problem. Nevertheless, China adhered to the position of a third party and did not ratchet up pressure on North Korea (Snyder 2009, 117-118). In contrast, China was willing to take on a mediator’s role in the second nuclear crisis by accepting the U.S. request to play a proactive role. In taking this action, China was encouraged by its own proclaimed identity of responsible great power. By this time, China had a proclaimed identity as a
great power, able to exert its influence on North Korea as well as on other countries. Moreover, China was reacting based on a proclaimed identity as a responsible nation, which was obliged to actively address international concerns.

Still, China’s pressure on North Korea did not mean that China did not think of North Korea as a friend. Rather, it tried to cover for North Korea against other countries, and spoke on behalf of North Korea. No change of North Korea’s identity as perceived friend to China occurred, even during the second nuclear crisis. This conclusion is substantiated by China’s official words and behaviors during this time. The social bond of friendship between China and North Korea is symbolized by the enduring Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. The treaty has never been revised or abrogated, even after North Korea’s arguably treacherous behaviors. Furthermore, social exchanges, as represented by mutual inter-state visits of leaders and high-ranking officials, were never halted. Despite the decrease in the overall number, mutual visits of political elites between China and North Korea has continued. Moreover, official Chinese statements never described Sino-North Korean relations in unfriendly terms. Thus, China’s punitive economic retaliation was targeted at a friend, not at a non-friend.

The South Korean case produces similar, but still different, results. First, this case supports hypothesis H1e in Table 8.1 (China behaves according to its perceived identity of South Korea in Sino-South Korean relations). That perceived identity is that South Korea is a friend to China. In accordance with that perceived identity, the Sino-South Korean relationship has been continuously upgraded since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1992. The relationship had improved steadily over the years and
has evolved through good-neighborly relations, cooperative partnerships for the twenty-first century, a claim of comprehensive cooperative partnership, and the development even of a strategic cooperative partnership in the last fifteen years. Of course, there have been ups and downs in their relations, but the two nations had reached the level of a so-called “best period in history” in 2014 and 2015, according to Chinese President Xi Jinping himself. China invited the South Korean president to its military parade to celebrate joint victory in the Second World War. The two nations have concluded a Korea-China Free Trade Agreement. Furthermore, they have established a military hotline between the two countries. All these behaviors and proclamations show that China’s foreign policy has been influenced by China’s perceived identity of South Korea as friend.

Although China expressed fury against South Korea because of the deployment of the THAAD system, China did not change its perceived identity of South Korea as a friend. This unchanged identity is confirmed by China’s words and behaviors in response to the THAAD issue. Despite the rapidly chilling relationship between the two countries, social contacts through exchanges of high-level officials continued. Furthermore, statements describing South Korea and Sino-South Korean relations did not shown deep hostility during the THAAD issue. Most importantly, an important symbol of social bonds between the two states—joint communiques establishing and continuing diplomatic relations—were never revised or abrogated.

When it comes to hypothesis H1b (*China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward South Korea*), however, this dissertation failed to find any support from the South Korean case. There was no
prominent wording or behaviors relating to China’s proclaimed identity as a responsible great power before or after the South Korean THAAD issue. However, this does not necessarily mean that the South Korean case provides evidence to reject H1b, because the lack of claims of responsible great power status does not necessarily mean that China’s behaviors stem from the absence of such claims. In sum, the hypotheses of H1d and H1e are strongly supported by both the North Korean case and the South Korean case. On the other hand, the hypothesis H1a is strongly supported by the North Korean case while H1b is unable to be decided.

The Japanese case strongly supports H1f (China behaves according to its perceived identity of Japan in Sino-Japanese relations). China has perceived two ambivalent identities of Japan over recent years: a partner identity in economic relations and a rival identity, which is very close to a potential adversary, in political relations. The partner identity is often overwhelmed by the rival identity. Regarding H1c (China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward Japan) direct evidence is not found. Although the identity of Japan as a rival might be likely to have formed partly due to Chinese proclaimed identity of great power status for itself, no specific evidence of this Chinese proclaimed great power identity can be found in the context of the Japanese radar case.

The Effect of Chinese Face Culture on Chinese Foreign Policy

Remarks by national leaders and political elites provide substantial evidence of the influence of Chinese culture on foreign policy. If we can infer the effect of culture on Chinese foreign policy, it is a corollary that Chinese face culture also influences Chinese foreign policy because face culture is an important component of broader Chinese
culture. The North Korean case well demonstrates the importance of seeking face within Chinese face culture, as seen in China’s dedication to a proclaimed identity of responsible great power. However, even more direct and important effects of Chinese face culture can be seen in regards to the dynamic of losing face. For example, in response to North Korean missile and nuclear tests, China felt that it had failed to save face and eventually lost face because of North Korean provocations, even while it was seeking to gain face as a responsible great power. North Korea poured cold water on China’s efforts and pride in organizing the Six-Party Talks (SPT) by carrying out missile and nuclear tests. In response, China retaliated against North Korea in reaction to the experience of losing face due to the actions of a perceived friend.

China’s retaliation was executed in two ways. Economically, China suspended its oil supply to North Korea, which was very deadly to North Korea’s economy and even national survival chances. Politically, China voted for the United Nations Security Council resolutions that severely condemned North Korea’s provocations and imposed sanctions against it. On the other hand, in addition to restoring its humiliated pride by retaliating, China made efforts to gain face by returning North Korea to the SPT. Chinese face culture moderated China’s North Korean policy, which generally reflected a perceived identify of North Korea as friend, but which also reflected the consequences of a loss of Chinese face due to actions by the supposedly friendly North Korea. China’s proclaimed identity as a great power, together with its loss of face in the international community due to North Korean nuclear provocations, helps explain China’s strongly negative response to North Korean actions. Therefore, the hypothesis H3a (Chinese face
culture leads to assertive Chinese foreign policy when China loses its face) is strongly supported by the North Korean case.

The South Korean case also strongly supports hypothesis H3a. The decision of THAAD system deployment by South Korea caused China to lose face in two ways. First, the grounds for the deployment was that South Korea needed it to defend its security against North Korea’s advanced missile and nuclear capabilities. In fact, North Korea’s capabilities should have been tackled in the SPT. So, the host of the SPT, China, failed to save its face since the SPT talks were proven to be ineffective. Second, South Korea finally decided to allow the U.S. to introduce the THAAD system in its territory in spite of China’s repeated opposition and request for consideration of China’s position. So, China lost its face by South Korea’s decline (or betrayal). To recover from humiliation by the friend, China chose to take both economic and political retaliatory measures. In this way, the dynamics of Chinese face culture are seen to be at work in the course of the THAAD issue.

Consequently, both the North Korean case and the South Korean case strongly support H3a (Chinese face culture leads to assertive Chinese foreign policy when China loses its face). However, the effect of Chinese face culture on foreign policy is limited, compared to the effect of identity. As seen in Figures 10 and 11, below, Chinese face culture only influences certain moments in the history of Sino-North Korean relations and Sino-South Korean relations. It does not create or sustain a long-term foreign policy trend. In this context, the role of face culture in foreign policy-making is to moderate the foreign policy that is more fundamentally shaped by identity. Therefore, the two cases also strongly support H3 (China’s foreign policy is moderated by Chinese face culture).
On the other hand, no dynamics of Chinese face culture are found to influence Chinese response to the Japanese deployment of X-band radars. However, this does not mean that the Japanese case undermines claims of the importance of Chinese face culture. In fact, in the Japanese case there was no start to the dynamics of face culture at all. It seems that China did not expect any deference from Japan, and thus China did not risk a loss of face due to Japanese disrespectful actions, since from the beginning Japan and China were not perceived as friends. Thus, the Japanese case confirms the possibility that the lack of fury and retaliation against provocative actions like radar deployment may largely be because China did not experience a loss of face vis-à-vis non-friendly Japan.

**Figure 8.1 Fluctuations in Sino-South Korean Relations**
In considering the mainstream realist counterargument that the Chinese core national interests account for foreign policy decisions, the two cases produce mixed results. The North Korean case rejects H2a (*Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding North Korea are influenced by Chinese core interests*). In terms of Chinese reactions during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, it can be argued that core national interests were quite undeveloped at the time, and had not yet been well established. It was arguably too early in its period of national development for China to apply the logic of core national interests to its retaliation against North Korea’s misbehaviors. Moreover, North Korean defense and North Korea’s development of a nuclear program had never been discussed by Chinese officials in terms of their relationship to Chinese core national interests. Nevertheless, from a broader sense, it could be possible that China saw the protection of national security as a core national interest, in response to the North Korean
nuclear crisis. If North Korea’s nuclear missiles were targeted at Beijing or if North Korea’s nuclear program led to more active and deep U.S. engagement on the Korean Peninsula, it could pose a potential threat to China’s security. However, national security as a core national interest were not much discussed by Chinese spokespersons until after 2006. Thus, the argument that China’s coercive measures were employed because of national interests is not supported by strong evidence in the North Korean case.

However, the South Korean case shows a different result. It slightly supports H2b (Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding South Korea are influenced by Chinese core interests). First, China itself has argued that the deployment of the THAAD system would undermine Chinese strategic security interests which are part of Chinese core national interests. Second, China had earlier suggested that protection of national security was a core national interest even before the THAAD controversy began in earnest. However, these facts are insufficient to fully support H2b. In fact, in this case, China seemed to use the argument of protecting core national interests as an excuse to justify retaliation. If China felt it necessary to respond to the THAAD issue in terms of protecting national interests, then China should also have retaliated against the U.S., which owns and operates the THAAD system. If China wanted to remove the threat to its security, it should have employed military measures or other effective measures against South Korean and the U.S., rather than simply pursuing economic and political retaliation against South Korea.

In fact, China’s excessive retaliation against South Korea can be explained better by the dynamics of Chinese face culture. After all, findings from the case study do not weaken the hypothesis regarding the effect of Chinese face culture and do not strongly
support H2b (*Chinese behaviors towards South Korea are influenced by core national interests*). As a result, the South Korean case only “slightly” support H2b. Put simply, support for H2 is mixed in the two cases. At the same time, the North Korean case strongly rejects H2a (*Chinese behaviors towards North Korea are influenced by core national interests*) while the South Korean case only slightly support H2b (*Chinese behaviors towards South Korea are influenced by core national interests*).

On the other hand, the Japanese case strongly rejects H2c (*Chinese inconsistent behaviors regarding Japan are influenced by Chinese core interests*), although for different reasons than the North Korean case. It is true that the X-band radars in Japan could be seen as challenging Chinese national interests in terms of undermining national security and stability. So, it is a natural corollary that China would take extremely harsh actions against Japan because Japan was not a friend and because radar installation infringed on China’s national interests. However, China did not launch any meaningful retaliation at all, suggesting that a defense of Chinese core interests cannot explain Chinese reactions to Japan.

**Summary of Findings**

My argument is that China harshly retaliated against South Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD system because it lost face by its friend of South Korea contrary to its expectations that the friend would respect China by listening to the request. As seen in Table 8.2, both the North Korean and South Korean cases strongly support H1 (*China’s foreign policy is influenced by her proclaimed identity and the perceived identities of others*) and H3 (*China’s foreign policy is moderated by Chinese face culture*), while the Japanese case supports H1. The Japanese case possibly supports H3 in that no retaliation
was made against Japan, possibly because there was no loss of face by China since Japan was never considered a friend to begin with. Moreover, both the North Korean and the Japanese case strongly reject H2 (*Chinese foreign policy is influenced by Chinese core national interests*) whereas the South Korean case slightly supports H2. Though a defense of Chinese national interests cannot well explain China’s inconsistent foreign policy responses, Chinese assertive attitudes toward its friends and less assertive actions towards non-friends can be well explained by Chinese face culture. When China has a proclaimed identity of itself and a perceived identity of others as being friendly, it is furious and retaliates against friends when it loses face due to their actions. But when China does not proclaim itself, nor perceive another country, as being friends, then China does not experience much loss of face due to the actions of an already unfriendly country. Therefore, China did not respond vigorously against Japan’s radar installation, though that installation could be seen as a grave infringement on Chinese core national interests.

**Table 8.2 Test Results of the Hypotheses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>N. Korean Case</th>
<th>S. Korean Case</th>
<th>Japanese Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>H1: China’s foreign policy is influenced by its proclaimed identity and the perceived identities of others.</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses</td>
<td>H1a/b/c: China’s proclaimed identity of great power or responsible great power influences its policy toward North Korea / South Korea / Japan.</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H1d/e/f: China behaves according to its perceived identities of North Korea in Sino-North Korean relations / South Korea in Sino-South Korean relations / Japan in Sino-Japanese relations.</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Hypotheses</td>
<td>H3: China’s foreign policy is moderated by Chinese face culture.</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>Unknown (possibly support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H3a: Chinese face culture leads to assertive Chinese foreign policy when China loses its face.</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>Strongly Support</td>
<td>Unknown (possibly support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H2: Chinese foreign policy is influenced by Chinese core national interests.</td>
<td>Strongly Reject</td>
<td>Slightly Support</td>
<td>Strongly Reject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H2a/b/c: Chinese inconsistent behaviors on North Korea / South Korea / Japan are influenced by Chinese core national interests.</td>
<td>Strongly Reject</td>
<td>Slightly Support</td>
<td>Strongly Reject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the comparable case study method, the North Korean case and the South Korean case should be considered as most-different cases. North and South Korea have many differences in regime types, economic systems, alliance with either China or the U.S., and their perceived impact on Chinese core national interests. On the other hand, both countries are friends with China, and both experienced vigorous retaliation by China in response to a Chinese loss of face, provoked by their own actions.

On the contrary, the South Korean case and the Japanese case might be considered as most-similar cases. Although South Korea and Japan have different perceived identities by China—as friend or rival—they share many things in common—such as democratic political systems, liberal market economies, close trade relations with China, and the same identity of friends with the U.S. Therefore, these three cases are

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106 China, Japan, and South Korea have highly close economic relations, especially in trade. For example, China was the number one, and Japan was a top three, trading partner with South Korea as of 2016. Japan and South Korea, respectively, are the top two and three trading partners with China as of 2016 (Korea International Trade Association 2016). On the other hand, they have political/security conflicts at the same time. China and Japan have a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyudao. Japan claims the Dokdo Island and China claims the Ieodo rock, while South Korea also claims sovereignty over both islands. Furthermore, there are conflicts over history textbook issues between China and South Korea, and...
good candidates for mixed systems research, based on methods of analyzing reasons for convergent and divergent results between most-different and most-similar cases. The comparison of the three cases are summarized in Table 8.3.

Table 8.3 Features of the Three Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Identity to China</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Rival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Retaliation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy System</td>
<td>Socialist Closed Economy</td>
<td>Capitalist Open Market Economy</td>
<td>Capitalist Open Market Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance with China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with the U.S.</td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>Friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Relations with China</td>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td>Bordering Country</td>
<td>Neighboring Country</td>
<td>Neighboring Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Core National Interests</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Face</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern to Lose Face</td>
<td>Increased tension → Premier’s Visit to China → Meeting with Chinese President → No Prior Consultation/Notification → Return to Pyongyang → Action against China’s Wish</td>
<td>Increased tension → Prime Minister’s Visit to China → Meeting with Chinese President → No Prior Consultation/Notification → Return to Seoul → Action against China’s Wish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

between China, South Korea, and Japan over the colonial past, such as conflicts over how to accurately present the history of sex slaves during Japanese occupation.
Contributions of the Study

Theoretical Contribution

Discussions and findings from this dissertation can contribute to existing theories of international relations and foreign policy analysis, as well as to area studies on China and relations between China and the two Koreas. First, this dissertation suggests the worthiness of a culture- and identity-based approach to Chinese foreign policy. In particular, it provides new insight to understanding the Sino-North Korea relationship and the Sino-South Korea relationship, by exploring how Chinese culture and identity shapes Chinese policy toward these two countries, and contrasting these relationships to the Sino-Japanese relationship, which is also shaped by Chinese culture and identity. Much attention has traditionally been paid to Sino-North Korean relations on the Korean Peninsula. However, Sino-South Korean relations have long been neglected in studies of Northeast Asian security. By examining Sino-North Korean relations and Sino-South Korean relations in a balanced manner, my research foregrounds the impact of Chinese motivations and interests across the entire peninsula.

Second, the dissertation provides a multi-dimensional approach to the study of the effect of identity on foreign policy. In studies of identity and foreign policy, many works have emphasized a state’s own proclaimed identity. My research offers the possibility to understand identity from various angles by suggesting two types of state identity: proclaimed and perceived identity. How the state thinks it is and how it should be is important in shaping the state’s active behavior, but it is also true that how a state perceives the identity of others is significant in shaping that state’s proactive and reactive behavior. To understand a state’s foreign policy, both proclaimed and perceived identities
are important. Additionally, the dissertation suggests three criteria to measure the perceived identity of friendship between nations: social bonds, social contacts, and expressions of intimacy.

Third, the dissertation proposes three vital dynamics of Chinese face culture at the state level. In previous studies of Chinese fact culture, there has been no clear distinction between the dynamics of saving face and losing face. By more clearly distinguishing these two dynamics and adding the dynamic of seeking face, I offer a more robust understanding of Chinese face culture and suggest tools for exploring the operation of Chinese face culture through the mechanisms of seeking face, saving face, and losing face. Moreover, I show how feeling or cognition is realized as behavior. These dynamics can be seen in operation through mechanisms of reputation or naming and shaming in international relations.

Lastly, although this dissertation focuses on Chinese behaviors regarding the Sino-North Korea relationship, the Sino-South Korea relationship, and Sino-Japanese relationship, findings from this dissertation can be generalized to other cases. For example, it is commonly assumed that China’s retaliation against other countries is due to China’s damaged core national interests such as danger to national integration or territorial security. However, with a much closer look, it might be found that the dynamics of Chinese face culture are operating behind the scene.

**Empirical Contributions**

First of all, the dissertation suggests the usefulness and importance of remarks from Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons at regular press conference. Although these spokespersons typically use well-refined, very diplomatic, routine wordings, their
remarks are very important because they are official and are well-planned, and careful study shows them to reveal nuanced changes in Chinese state policy, depending on the circumstances. Two Chinese researchers have recently developed a Policy Change Index that is based on analysis by artificial intelligence (AI) that studies all articles of the *People’s Daily*. They argue that AI has succeeded in predicting critical past policy change in China by scrutinizing articles on the *People’s Daily* (Zhong & Chan 2018).

Similarly, archives of remarks by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons over the decades can be used to determine previously hidden reasons for Chinese foreign policy developments in various cases. Given these advantages, archiving statements of Foreign Ministry spokespersons is a necessary and a very useful tool for further research.

Second, the dissertation uncovers important data from the relatively neglected cases of the North Korean Taepodong-2 missile test and Japanese X-band radar installation. The North Korean missile test of Taepodong-2 has not drawn much attention. Despite its possibility in suggesting North Korean interest in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), the missile test quickly disappeared from public concern because the test failed and North Korea’s more provocative first nuclear test followed soon thereafter. However, studying reaction to the Taepodong-2 missile test is a meaningful case to understanding China’s face culture and how it shapes foreign policy. This case study presents all the elements discussed in this dissertation, such as proclaimed and perceived identity, as well as mechanisms of seeking, saving, and losing face. The Japanese X-band radars are also entirely neglected in academic studies. Interestingly, the North Korean case and the Japanese case are linked because Japan’s decision to deploy X-band radars was greatly influenced by North Korea’s launch of Taepodong missiles.
Furthermore, this dissertation selects the South Korean THAAD issue that is yet to be touched on in the academic field. As far as I know, there is no dissertation or book-length treatment that explores the case of the THAAD, even in South Korea. The South Korean THAAD issue is very complex. It involves matters of international security, and often tense politics between states - Seoul and Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington, Seoul and Beijing, and Washington and Beijing. In addition, the THAAD case involves high profile domestic political dynamics in Korea, and related domestic social conflicts. Although this dissertation only deals with limited aspects of the THAAD issue, it contributes to understanding of the development of this issue over time, based on methods of process-tracing.

Third, the dissertation finds that a more sophisticated approach is required when researchers on China use the People’s Daily, especially in the case of quantitative studies. Most researchers use the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) when searching for articles in the People’s Daily. However, articles discovered on the People’s Daily at CNKI versus those extracted from People’s Daily Database (人民日报图文数据库) are often different. In general, the latter has more articles. When the overall number of discovered articles is very large, the difference between the two sources can be minimal, and likely does not affect the result of a study. But sometimes the differences between discovered articles in the two databases can be significant, especially when articles for a specific topic or keyword are few and small difference can change the whole conclusion.

This matter is related to a feature of the Chinese language. Because the Chinese language is not composed of separated syntactic words, many programs widely used for
content analysis, such as NetMiner and R, are not appropriate to analyze it, since they are optimized for English texts that consist of separated syntactic words. For this reason, researchers have developed content analysis programs based on a specific language. For example, the KrKwic (Korean Keyword in Context) program is widely used for content analysis of texts in the Korean language. Similarly, ROST CM6.0 has recently been used for content analysis of texts in Chinese, as it was developed by Dr. Shen Yang and his Rost Virtual Learning Team at Wuhan University for just this purpose. But it is still doubted that ROST CM6.0 can analyze meaningful keywords by distinguishing them from other meaningless keywords.

Lastly, by scrutinizing remarks of Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons, this dissertation finds that the original Chinese version of these remarks and the translated English version often differ, not only in the nuanced meaning of words but also in the frequent elimination or replacement of some very sensitive expressions. Although such errors might sometimes be indispensable for a smoother translation, especially when translating unique Chinese idioms that originate in historical events, resulting translations sometimes contain significant inaccuracies, and sometimes even suggest passages were removed from the transcript intentionally. So, when doing research on China, it is highly desirable to use Chinese texts as raw data. Furthermore, it is also important to have the original Chinese version rather than the revised Chinese version, in order to find the original context. For example, a translated editorial on Huanqiu Shibao revised the title of an article that harshly criticized South Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD system, resulting in a title that inaccurately reflected the harsh content of the article itself.
Policy Recommendation

Other than theoretical and empirical contributions, the dissertation provides useful insight to policy-makers who are responsible for China issues. One tip is that they should not make a minor issue into a major one by humiliating China unconsciously due to ignorance of Chinese face culture. Many issues with China can be solved just by paying proper attention to Chinese face culture. What if the South Korean Prime Minister sincerely had sought understanding of the perspective of Chinese leaders before the decision to install THAAD? Moreover, it is necessary not to misunderstand China’s real mind in efforts to understand the actual cause of their discontent. In a practical sense, China’s behavior and responses might not be understood from a traditionally “realist” perspective. But there can be something cultural that might explain motivations behind immediate behaviors. For instance, it is common knowledge in business guidebooks that a person who wants to give a gift to a Chinese person has to give it at least three times, despite a receiver’s repeated decline of the gift. If a gift-giver misunderstands the decline as real, and think the receiver does not like to receive a gift, he cannot survive in the Chinese business community. This same insight leads to a conclusion that understanding the culture of a country is significant for foreign policy-makers seeking productive international relationships.

The other tip is that it is wise to tackle an issue before it becomes a matter of Chinese face culture. For instance, Chinese top leaders, especially presidents, always have been involved in saving face, in each of the cases in this dissertation. When they mention an issue, it should be understood that this issue now involves not only the matter of saving the leader’s face, but also saving China’s national face in the international
arena. Avoiding this situation does not mean that a state should be humble all the time in relations with China. Rather, policy makers should simply be aware of practically useful methods to work with China, in regards to the importance of face culture. For example, it may sometimes be wise for a state to keep its strong attitudes underwater. Furthermore, state actors should be aware that they often have time to address an issue practically as long as Chinese top leaders have not staked out positions, because Chinese face culture has yet to be seriously engaged as long as top leadership has not weighed in.

**Limitations of the Study**

Despite the many contributions earlier suggested, the dissertation also has some limitations. These limitations are found both in theory and in the research methods. The dissertation could be improved if the limitations below had been better considered.

**Theoretical Limits**

First, I use identity as the key independent variable for understanding Chinese foreign policy. However, the matter of how to define identity is not well elaborated. To be specific, I do not consider a variety of sources of identity and I equate state identity with the national leader’s expression of identity. In line with this approach, I implicitly assume that national leaders and political elites are the most important actors in foreign policy-making and its implementation. This assumption is based on Chinese characteristics of an authoritarian regime. But it might be insufficient. Many studies have pointed out that more and more actors, including researchers at think-tanks and scholars at universities, have participated in the process of foreign policy-making in China. Moreover, there have been many works that explain Chinese foreign policy with reference to populist Chinese nationalism. To tackle this problem, we have to begin with
the recognition that cultural identity is “layered and situationally defined” (Ross 2009, 153). Thus, what level of cultural identity is the most prominent at any moment depends on the context of where someone is, and what someone is doing with whom. For such reasons, it might have been better to discuss China’s national identity with reference to a broader range of actors.

Second, culture is mainly discussed as a moderating variable in the dissertation in terms of Chinese face culture. However, as briefly mentioned in Chapters three and four, identity and culture are inseparable, because identity is formed through cultural interactions and practices and culture is itself delineated by identity. Still, I do not elaborate on the role of culture as an independent variable in Chinese foreign policy-making. In addition, similar to my limitations in defining Chinese national identity, there are many limitations in defining Chinese culture. Even Northeast Asians who share cultural similarities are convinced that each and every country (and even regions within countries) have unique cultures. So, it is very challenging to advance a “scientific” definition of any nation’s culture, including China’s.

Third, three tools are used to measure friendship in relations between states. They are social bonds, social contacts, and expressions of intimacy. Although I believe they are very useful and persuasive criteria to measure friendship, they could be discussed in more detail, especially drawing from insights from psychology. There have been some efforts to bridge insights between psychology and foreign policy analysis, including the matter of identity. For instance, Kaarbo (2003) argues that research on identity in foreign policy analysis should rely more on psychology. In fact, collective self-esteem (CSE) measures developed by psychologists to study gender, ethnic, and other social identities could be
adapted to study Chinese patriotism (Gries 2010). But this dissertation does not fully explore the nexus between psychology at the individual level and foreign policy studies at various levels. Furthermore, the dissertation simply distinguishes friend from non-friend. The dissertation does not take into account the degree of intimacy, though it may be that the degree of intimacy is related to changing identity not from friend to non-friend, but from friend to close friend, and vice versa.

Lastly, the dissertation does not distinguish foreign policy from diplomacy. In general, foreign policy can be understood as policy directives announced at a macro level, while diplomacy can be defined as skills or techniques employed by professional diplomats in negotiating individual situations. This distinction might be correct, or may be problematic, but the difference is not critical for the purpose of the dissertation. Furthermore, if the distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy is needed, then more careful definitions of national strategy, security strategy, and foreign policy may also need to be distinguished. Though such an approach might allow for more definitional precision, it would make things unnecessarily complicated in terms of addressing the core themes of this dissertation.

**Methodological Limits.**

First, the dissertation mainly uses remarks by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons which are gathered into the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons Archive (CFMSA) from 2001 to 2018, which covers 4371 press conferences. In the beginning, I thought this source was sufficient because the two cases covered in this study occurred in 2006 and 2016. However, more resources could provide more solid evidence. In addition to the regular press conference, the spokespersons sometimes
release a statement on a specific matter and have irregular meetings with the press.
Although most of them are fortunately provided by the world edition of the People’s
Daily, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly deletes its transcripts of press
conferences. As far as I know, there is no database where these press conference
transcripts can be accessed once deleted. Thus, it is recommended to archive as many
materials as possible at the moment they are posted on the website, so as to be able to
consult them for future research.

Second, similar to other research on culture and identity in foreign policy, this
dissertation has the problem of measurement. The issues of measurement and
generalization can undermine claims to academic precision or rigor. Contrary to other
units of analysis in political science, such as voter behavior, state actions, and measurable
wars, culture is difficult to identify with clear and precise statements. This problem of
the unit of analysis is related to difficulties in defining what constitutes the core of a
culture and how to identify its edges. Culture and identity as variables are not easy to
define and measure because they are inclusive, intangible, and vague, thus complicating
efforts to draw boundaries between one culture and another. For these reasons, studies
on political culture often faced criticisms of cultural relativism, embedded racism, and
ethno-centrism (Wiarda 2014, 85-103).

To help address these problems and to better measure culture and identity,
scholars often depend on surveys, content analysis, discourse analysis, and ethnography
(Abdelal et al. 2009). In most cases, scholars use multiple methods rather than one.
Reliance on multiple methods might be helpful in making cultural analysis more
sophisticated. But this dissertation mainly uses limited methods of content and discourse
analysis, with some historical analysis. Because identity and Chinese face culture are a matter of perception by individuals, in depth interviews and ethnography might be good methods to elaborate on the argument. However, such approaches have many practical problems. One of them is that it is extremely difficult to conduct interviews with individuals, including presidents, who had involved in the top-level policy-making decisions covered by these case studies.

Third, the dissertation might have had a better result if it had employed quantitative content analysis by using advanced software. As technologies are rapidly developing, analysis with big data, such as voluminous statements by spokespersons, becomes more feasible. Based on new software systems, quantitative content analysis is being upgraded from simple keyword frequency analysis to abilities to conduct qualitative analysis such as social network analysis, sentiment analysis, and association rule mining. Use of these new software developments might have offered an additional level of sophistication to the analysis here.
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of-reform-and-opening-to-the-outside-world-china-can-have-great-hopes-for-the-
future/


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### Appendix A

**Types and Frequency of the Term Great Power at the regular press conferences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2001-2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Great Power</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Type of Great Power Relations</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Great Power</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Developing</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging Great Power</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Large Population</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Production (Energy)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of the Internet</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Economy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Consumption (Energy)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (-Pacific) Great Power</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Trade</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Great Power</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceanic Great Power</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Toys</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of New Renewable Energy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Intellectual Property Rights</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power involved in the Arctic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offshore Great Power</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Friendly to North Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of least-exporting weapons</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Game Industry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Forestry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power unwilling to Challenge</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power of Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

324
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Source: CFMSA
**Appendix B**

**Frequency of South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula at the regular press conferences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2001-2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>North Korea</th>
<th>China-North Korea</th>
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Source: CFMSA


**Appendix C**

Number of Articles with word “responsible great power” in the People’s Daily (1998-2018)

<table>
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Source: Database of the People’s Daily
Appendix D

Keyword Analysis on Chinese Face from Korean Newspapers

Source: BIGKINDS

The Number of Articles Relating to Chinese Face in Korean Newspapers

Source: BIGKINDS