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Conditions Affecting The Outcome Of Peace Operations In Post-Cold War Africa

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CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF PEACE OPERATIONS IN
POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by

Aaron K. Smith

June 2019

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Title: CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF PEACE OPERATIONS IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

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Abstract

What factors have led to successful outcomes in international peace operations conducted in Sub Saharan African countries? What factors explain mission failure? I proposed a basic theory of peace operations that linked conflict conditions to mandate design to the capability of an intervening force deployed for mission implementation developed from arguments and empirical results of previous research.

Data on 86 peace operations that occurred in 23 African states covering 33 separate conflict periods between 1990 and 2015 was analyzed. My main findings showed that mandates were derived from conflict assessments and determined the size of intervening force required. The results also indicated that neither the size of an intervening force, nor the lead-organization, nor mandate robustness (offensive deterrence capacity), nor sequencing of operations were predictors of mission success or failure. However, implementation forces that included parallel support operations and/or mission assistance from Western great powers had higher levels of successful outcomes.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Issue

Peace operations are designed as international interventions that seek to protect and enhance security within countries. They include a variety of missions: fact-finding/observation (peace monitoring), support of existing peace agreements (traditional peacekeeping), peace enforcement, and multi-dimensional peace building. These can generally be categorized as either facilitative missions seeking to contain conflict or transformational missions seeking to resolve a conflict (Sambanis, 2008). All peace operations aim to abate conflict and are legitimized through the United Nations Charter (Diehl & Druckman, 2015).

The idea of international peace operations is not new. The 1945 United Nations Charter provided guidelines that have been used to address threats to security: Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” Chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression,” and Chapter VIII outlines the role of regional arrangements and agencies in the ensuring international peace and security. However, the charter did not specifically mention peace observation and peacekeeping was not yet created. Peace operations evolved through ad hoc responses to international crises. Growth was slow throughout the Cold War. Deadlock in the Security Council limited opportunities for international intervention.

Peace operations began to proliferate after 1989 and in 1992 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was formed in the UN (Autesserre, 2019).

Since 1990, the number of peace operations and the number of participating country intervenors has increased dramatically. More peace operations occurred in the four-year period following the end of the Cold War, 1990-1994, than in the previous fifty years (Williams, 2016). However, support for peace operations declined drastically following the 1993 Battle for Mogadishu in Somalia. The 1994 Rwandan Genocide reawakened the world to the importance of engagement, but not before the loss of nearly a million lives. International support for peace operations accelerated after 2001 as great powers increased funding in an effort to limit global instabilities rising from intrastate conflict.

Today more than 50% of United Nations peace operations take place in Africa (Karlsruud, 2018). African peace operations have increased in complexity over time. In the 1990s, mission mandates were mainly to observe and monitor conflict conditions in unstable countries. A primary actor, the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), was generally not successful in efforts to make or keep peace (Williams, 2016). The African Union (AU) formed in 2002, emphasized the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of social and economic development. The AU's African Peace and Security Architecture design sought to unify the process for intervening in African states. Later, most missions became multidimensional, seeking to focus not only to prevent bloodshed, but also on building positive peace.

Peace operation missions have grown increasingly large, costly, and complex. Simultaneously, they have become more successful at building lasting peace (Fortna, 2004; 2008; Williams, 2016). However, success has not been ubiquitous and results are mixed. Some operations achieved measurable milestones while others did not. Why have peace operations in Namibia, Mozambique, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Comoros, and Cote d'Ivoire succeeded while those in Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and others, failed?

Support for UN missions in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was reduced based on limited performance achievements. The UN High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) convened 2014-2015 to undertake a thorough review of UN peace operations with the assistance of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), to resolve issues relating to the establishment of empirical data on peace operations' success and support. The outcome has been a call for researchers to develop a systematic data set to inform and support policy makers (de Coning & Drange, 2017).

A study on the interplay between the dimensions of a conflict; the mandate directing the operation; and characteristics and capabilities of the intervening force contributes to this call for action. Construction of peace operation forces for particular missions has been ad hoc and based on who is willing to serve rather than selecting the best and most appropriate units to perform and achieve mission objectives. This construction process has resulted in a major challenge: matching intervenor capacities to mission requirements. More than 80 peace operations were active in Sub-Saharan Africa

between 1990 and 2015. States, regional communities, non-African organizations, the African Union, the United Nations, and other groups have created and supported these interventions.

This thesis began with an observation that the ad hoc nature of peace operation construction in Africa is not random. Operational construction has followed patterns that evolve over time in response to factors as disparate as the domestic politics of great powers, the nature of conflicts themselves, and in response to internal shifts within international organizations. These operations have had disparate results. Some operations such as UNTAG in Namibia have performed exceptionally well bringing lasting peace to conflicted societies. Other operations such as OMIB in Burundi have performed their mandated tasks yet failed to produce peace. Some have produced a temporary peace (UNAMIR II in Rwanda), and others have failed to establish any peace, withdrawing in the face of increased violence (UNOSOM II in Somalia). Why do some peace operations succeed where others fail? What factors influence the ability of a peace operation to address the issues endemic in a conflict? Where are these factors found? Are they in the mandates that direct forces employed and attempt to address the issues endemic to the conflict, are they found in the capabilities of the forces that are employed to carry out the tasks directed by the mandate, or do both pieces impact the overall success or failure of a peace operation? This thesis explores these relationships and their effects on the outcome and impact of peace operations in post-Cold War Sub Saharan Africa.

Previous Research

Peace operations have generated positive results. Intervened conflicts are resolved at higher rates and have greater rates of peace resiliency than non-intervened conflicts (Fortna, 2008; Sambanis, 2008). However, scholarship addressing the question “what factors impact the success or failure of a peace operation?” points to a diverse range of answers. Some studies focus on intervenor composition or characteristics: who are the intervenors, where they come from, and how they are trained. Bellamy and Williams (2013) argue that finding capable forces is a challenge to peace operations success; the UN can often recruit the required numbers of soldiers but as a group they may not have the necessary capabilities. Jett (1999) finds that operation failure is often caused by poorly trained forces. He cites instances of failure in Angola and Mozambique caused by soldiers who were unable to drive the equipment provided to them and shared no common language with the region in which they were deployed. Daniel (2013) similarly finds that most UN peacekeepers come from nations in the bottom third of spending per soldier. In summary, these studies find that the success of peace operations is effected by their struggle to meet capability needs even in the face of an adequate number of troops.

Daniel (2013) and Martin-Brule (2012) examine the means to mitigate mission failure resulting from a lack of troop capabilities in UN “partnered missions,” that combine a traditional UN operation with the deployment of soldiers from a western or regional power to borrow advanced technical capabilities. Martin-Brule (2012) finds that the involvement of political or military representatives from one of the permanent

members of the UN Security Council is key forces without major power support lack credibility and are unable to gain cooperation from belligerent parties.

The numerical density of peacekeepers per geographic unit or per population is not a significant factor for success. Fortna (2008) ruled the numbers irrelevant; finding instead that the mission's very existence is key. According to Fortna, the mission will either be large enough to perform the task or will serve as a trip-wire to an organization that can. Sambanis (2008) comes to a similar conclusion, that the quantity of peacekeepers has an insignificant impact on mission success. But, the former head of UN Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno, argues that a mission can only succeed when troops are sufficient in numbers and capabilities in relation to mission needs (cited in Berdal, 2016). Similarly, Badmus (2015) finds that most failures of AU and UN missions in Africa have been due to insufficient funding, troop numbers, and support to troops in the field. Discussions on the correct "right-sizing" of mission personnel are ongoing.

The role of mandate and doctrine on the success or failure of peace operations is not clear. Some research finds the success of peace operations to be hamstrung by mandates not matched to conflict conditions. Other argues that success is dependent on robust empowering mandates. The argument that peace operations are destined to fail by ineffective or inappropriate mandates is focused on the selection of appropriate mandates. Holmqvist (2014) states that interventions designed by liberal regimes seek to produce clones of themselves. Therefore, peace operations are by nature ill-conceived ventures. Rhoads (2016) similarly finds fault in many mandates, arguing that robust mandates

exceed the logical limits of peacekeeping. Robust intervenors become an additional belligerent in the conflict. This status deprives intervenors of legitimacy and stands in the way of success (Nascimento, 2018). Fiedler (2000) concludes the consent of the parties is the most important element. He argues, more robust mandates are inappropriate as they violate the principle of consent.

Unclear or vague mandates may condemn peace operations to failure. de Coning, Aoi, and Karlsrud (2017) find that the UN is hamstrung by a lack of coherent vision and concrete direction in peace operations. Williams (2016) argues that intervening forces are often given vague orders, but also contradictory guidance. Missions deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan instructed peacekeepers to simultaneously help governments extend their authority and protect civilians with the full knowledge that the governments were among the greatest perpetrators of violence against civilians.

Some scholars hold the key to success lies in more robust multidimensional or peace enforcement mandates that emanate from chapter VII of the UN Charter and do not require host nation consent (United Nations, 2018). Sandler's (2017) research supports the conclusion that multidimensional missions have achieved a higher success rate due to their focus on issues foundational to the conflict. Sambanis' (2008) findings indicate a robust mandate is the key to success. Similarly, Thakur's (2014) reading of the Brahimi Report finds that credible force is the keystone. The over emphasis of neutrality in mandates has led to timidity in the face of human rights violations (Hultman, 2014). Therefore, timidity of troops in the field is an effect of poor mandates. This is echoed by

NATO doctrine that states that intervenors can experience feelings of impotence due to limited rules of engagement. The findings of this group argue that robust mandates and rules of engagement lead to credible peace interventions.

Other findings hold that conflict specific factors have the greatest effect on peace mission success or failure, where an understanding of the conflict environment is key to overall mission achievement. According to Dennys (2014) conflict dynamics can only be understood by local actors. Therefore, outside interventions are more likely to have negative than positive outcomes. Mobekk (2017) argues that the failure of multiple missions to Haiti was caused by a weak comprehension of local political factors. Essentially because local actors caused the conflict, they are responsible for conflict resolution. Whalan (2013) finds the intervenor's ability to obtain local compliance and cooperation as the key. Mission efficacy requires peacekeepers must have power to influence local actors and local actors must respect the legitimacy of peacekeepers for the mission. Peace operations fail when intervenors attempt to impose a standard response template onto a conflict. Howard (2007) also focuses on the interplay between intervenor and conflict parties, noting that mission success depends on the extent that the peacekeepers learn from local actors: rigid implementation of missions from above causes certain failure while integrating lessons and direction from below leads to success.

Fortna (2008) and Karlsrud (2018) argue that the success or failure of a peace operation is determined by the match of the mission to the conflict's political economy. Fortna's recommendations use conflict ripeness theory to move the belligerents towards peace (Zartman, 2003). She argues that peace is best achieved by increasing the cost of

violence and financially incentivizing peace. Karlsrud (2018) argues that failures are caused by the international community's preference to work with states over rebel groups. Communities in conflict may receive more services and support from rebel groups than from their own legitimate government. Therefore, to shift the power balance toward the government is to ignore the political economy that drives the conflict. Similarly, Westendorf (2015) finds that intervenors view peace as a technical problem and so overlook the underlying political and economic factors that have created the conflict. The focus becomes the views and interests of the elite that inadvertently causes the extension and entrenchment of the conflict (Tardy, 2017). These authors all agree that getting the local dynamics right is more likely to result in a successful peace operation mission.

Other scholars point to the primacy of regional factors in determining the success or failure of a peace operation. Regional states can serve as spoilers by allowing arms shipments into a conflict zone or facilitating a profitable illicit flow of raw materials out of the conflict zone (Jett, 1999). van der Lijn's (2010) study states that the failure is inevitable without the cooperation of regional actors. UN, NATO, and other institutional doctrine all emphasizes the importance of positive involvement of regional actors as intervenors (Garb, 2014).


Most studies agree on the utility of peace operations (Dorussen, 2014). Researchers find answers to the success or failure of a peace operation in analysis of the conflict environment, the operation's mandate, or intervenor composition and capacity. Surprisingly, intervening force troop numeric strength has been found to be irrelevant to

predicting mission success (Fortna, 2008). Additionally, there is no clear understanding of the interplay between the dimensions of a conflict; the mandate directing the purpose and objectives of a peace operation mission; and the characteristics of capability defining and constituting the intervening force. The disparity of findings has failed to produce usable data to policy makers in several key areas (de Coning & Drange, 2017). The proposed study is designed to address some of these issues.

The Argument

What is the relationship between the characteristics of a conflict, the peace operation mandate designed to reduce violence, and the intervenor characteristics in determining the outcome of such international engagements? This question is examined by analyzing post-Cold War peace operations (1990-2015) in Sub-Saharan African countries¹. My argument is that mandates are developed in direct response to the conflict environment and will be successful when carried out by a capable intervening force. Peace operations will have higher rates of success when mandates are properly constructed and staffed by sufficiently trained and equipped forces. The basic theory of peace operations is diagrammed in Figure 1.

¹ This study utilizes the United Kingdom Government's parameters for defining the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This definition includes all independent countries on the African continent excepting the northern states of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Also included are the island states of Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Comoros (DFID, 2006). Thus defined, the region comprises forty-six states in 2015.



My hypotheses are crafted to challenge the assumptions of this model. I assume that the nature of a conflict dictates the mandate that determines the required force capabilities. The chain leading to failure can therefore be the result of a mandate that does not address the conflict issues or a force capacity that cannot fulfill the mandate’s requirements. It follows that mission success requires the appropriate match of intervenor capabilities to mandate requirements to conflict situation. Nine hypotheses will be tested to evaluate different elements of this chain.

This study will analyze both the ability of the intervention force to accomplish its mandated tasks, this mission’s overall effects on the conflict, and its relation to other peace operations. The key questions are: did the intervention force produce peace, did it transition from or to another operation, and what was the overall success of the peace operation in addressing the conflict (specifically did the conflict end with no reoccurrence

within five years?). Cases with similar outcomes will be analyzed to identify common points of failure or success and focus on how the intervening forces played a role in peace operation outcomes.

Outline of Thesis

This thesis is composed of five chapters. The introduction first chapter provides a review of peace operation literature and presents the basis argument about peace operation success. The second chapter examines the history and evolution of conflicts and peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter two provides an overview of all post-World War II wars and all post-Cold War interventions into Sub-Saharan Africa. Conflict trends, international organization actions, mission trends, and great power actions are all discussed. Different models of operational change and support are examined in detail. Collectively, the first two chapters establish the background information that informed the design of my analysis.

Chapter three discusses the research design. The chapter details my conflict-mandate-intervenor conceptual model of peace operations. Next, data collection, variable selection, analysis method, are all explained. The chapter explains the manner that qualitative analysis will test hypotheses linking mandate selection to conflict characteristics and intervenor characteristics to mandate type.

Chapter four and five are devoted to empirical findings and conclusions draw from these findings. Chapter four tests links between conflict, mandate, and intervenor in the search for patterns that produce greater incidences of resilient peace. The chapter explains the raw outputs and highlights those variables found to be significant. Chapter

five summarizes my findings and analyzes how this research aligns with other scholarship or departs from previous research results.

CHAPTER TWO: AFRICAN CONFLICTS AND PEACE OPERATIONS: A DESCRIPTION

Conflict in Individual States

Post-World War II conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have been dominated by the question for independence followed by the struggle to maintain sovereignty once gained. Sub-Saharan Africa in 1950 had only three independent states; Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. Ghana and Guinea increased the total to five by the end of the 1950s. The 1960s and 70s saw a dramatic uptick in independence as France and other European powers moved away from colonization. Djibouti was the last country to gain independence from a European power; gaining its independence from France in 1977. Other Sub-Saharan nations have gained their independence from other African powers; Namibia became independent from South Africa in 1990; Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993; and most recently South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 (DFID, 2006).

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to provide an overview of violence and wars within sub-Saharan African countries in order to highlight the magnitude of conflict in this region; and second, to describe specific international peace operations in Africa that were organized to reduce conflict intensity and/or resolve conflict.

Self-determination conflicts have been ubiquitous in the post-World War II history of Sub-Saharan Africa. Eight of the 43 nations in Sub-Saharan Africa were engaged in self-determination conflicts at the time of independence, another 11 erupted

into conflict in the immediate aftermath of independence, and a further 9 experienced similar conflicts after the initial post-independence phase. Therefore, in total 28 of 43 nations in question experienced self-determination conflicts according to Department for International Development (DFID). These conflicts took place before, during, and after independence. The belligerents have struggled for independence from colonial powers and from governments that they felt did not represent their group or interests. The Correlates of War (COW) data defines “war” by the standard of 1,000 deaths per annum. By their criteria, the record shows that 70 wars have occurred in 27 Sub-Saharan African states between 1945 and 2015. A brief outline of conflicts (and fatalities) in these countries is presented drawing on data and narratives from the COW collection (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Descriptions of peace operations follow.

Angola

Conflicts. Several separate periods of violent conflict occurred in Angola. First, the war of independence (1961-1974) that concluded with an end to 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule. There were 25,000 Angolan and 4,000 Portuguese battle-related deaths. Second, The Angola Guerrilla War (1974-75) between three groups, the Marxist Popular Movement for the Rebellion of Angola (MPLA), the National front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). No reliable estimates for battle deaths exist for this conflict (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Third, the War Over Angola (1975-76) involving South African troops (supporting UNITA) and Cuban troops (supporting MPLA) that resulted in 2,700 battle deaths. Fourth, the Angolan Control War (1976-1991) between UNITA, FMLA, and

MPLA, that led to approximately 150,000 casualties. Fifth, the Angolan War of the Cities (1992-1994) caused an estimated 500,000 total deaths (Mullenbach, 2018). Finally, another war with 25,000 battle-related deaths occurred between 1998-2002 ending with MPLA government victory and a peace agreement that has been sustained.

Peace Operations. Four peace operations took place in Angola during the Angolan Control War, 1976-1991, and the Angolan War of the Cities, 1992-1994. The UN led all four operations. The 70-person United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) was a peace monitoring operation beginning in January of 1989 and ending in June of 1991. UNAVEM I was tasked with observing the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The mission transitioned to the 718-person peacekeeping UNAVEM II mission following the signing of a cease-fire. UNAVEM II operated from June of 1991 to February of 1995. The operation was tasked with ceasefire observance, police development, and election observation. UNAVEM II transitioned to the 4,220-person peacekeeping operation UNAVEM III in response to the February 1995 signing of the Lusaka protocol peace agreement. UNAVEM III monitored the military mobilization and observed the transition of UNITA from an armed movement into a political party. UNAVEM III then transitioned to the 2,773 peacekeeping UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) in June of 1997. MONUA was disbanded in March 1999 in response to conflict resurgence. Eventual peace in Angola was unrelated to the efforts of any of the four peace operations (Mullenbach, 2018).

Burundi

Conflicts. Three wars developed between the two dominant ethnic groups: Tutsis and Hutus in their quest for governmental control. The first conflict in 1972 lasted a few weeks and resulted in 2,000 battle related deaths. The second, (1993-1998) led to 50,000 civilian deaths, plus an unknown number of direct combatant casualties. The third war (2001-2003) left an estimated 300,000 people dead.

Peace Operations. Burundi played host to five peace operations covering the Second, 1991-1998, and Third, 2001-2003, Burundi Wars. The 47 personnel OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) monitored the Second Burundi War from December 1993 to July 1996. The mission withdrew in 1996 due to the financial burden of mission support. The Second Burundi War continued for nearly three years after OMIB's withdrawal (Pan African News Agency, 1997).

Three peace operations supported the peace process of the Third Burundi War. The 750-person peace enforcement South African Protection Service Detachment (SAPSD) supported the peace process by ensuring the security of Burundi leaders from October 2001 to August 2009. SAPSD began as a standalone mission, transitioned to a support mission to the peacekeeping African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), and returned to a standalone mission. The AU led 3,029-person AMIB was installed in support of a cease fire and tasked with preventing a resurgence of violence. AMIB conducted operations February 2003 to June 2004 before transitioning to the 6,352-person peacebuilding UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) following the peace agreement signing. ONUB provided security, assisted with disarmament, ensured election security, and

developed institutions from June 2004 to December 2006. SAPSD continued its duties following ONUB's withdrawal. It finally withdrew in August 2009 after ensuring continuing security for elected leaders through Burundi's post-war transition period (Nantulya, 2016). Burundi's peace remained resilient after the departure of all peace operations.

Central African Republic

Conflicts. The Central African Republic has been plagued by conflicts and struggles for control be they religious, ethnic, or otherwise since its independence from France in 1960. These conflicts resulted in incalculable deaths and several non-democratic changes of power. The Central African Republic War (2012 to 2013) is the only episode in which this violence reached the level of war. Multiple Muslim majority rebel groups combined to form the Séléka Coalition. They were opposed by Christian majority Anti-Balaka forces. The conflict resulted in the collapse of multiple governments and more than 6,300 battle related deaths (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2018). The conflict continues to the present at a less than war level (Mullenbach, 2018).

Peace Operations. The Central African Republic has hosted three separate series of peace operations. The first in a time of less than warfare violence, the second failed to prevent the onset of war, and the third series was deployed to allay violence of the Central African Republic War.

The first period of intervention began in February 1997 and extended until February 2000. The 800-person Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic (MISAB) conducted operations from February 1997 to April 1998. MISAB was a peace

enforcement operation to stabilize the Central African Republic that was composed of an adhoc coalition of African nations. The UN led UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) replaced MISAB in April 1998. MINURCA was a 1,612-person peace building mission designed to enhance Central African institutions and see the country through a democratic election process. MINURCA mission stood down in February of 2000 (United Nations, 2001). Peace lasted for one-year after the conclusion of the MINURCA operation (Mullenbach, 2018).

The second period of intervention extended from February 2002 to December 2013 and encapsulated three separate peace enforcement operations. Each operation was led by an African regional entity and was tasked with a nearly identical mission; support and defend the recognized government against rival militant groups. The first operation was deployed by the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). The CEN-SAD mission deployed 300 troops from February until December 2002. CEN-SAD was augmented by the 380-troop Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) in October 2002. FOMUC was a CEMAC peace enforcement operation that remained in place until transition to the larger ECCAS led Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) in June 2008. MICOPAX was a 2,800-person force that remained in place until December 2013. MICOPAX failed to stop the Séléka led fall of Bangui in 2011. The second period of intervention failed to prevent the onset of the Central African War as well as the subsequent defeat of the recognized government (Meyer, 2009).

The Central African Republic War ignited a global focus on the Central African Republic resulting in the deployment of four peace operations led by four different entities. French Operation Sangaris and the AU's African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) were launched in December 2013. MISCA's 6,030 personnel were tasked as a peacekeeping force responsible for stabilizing the country and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. The 1,600 French soldiers of Operation Sangaris were tasked with peace enforcement in support of MISCA. MISCA was unable to neither stop the violence nor effect the underlying conditions. As a result, it transitioned to UN Multidimensional Integrated Stability Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in September 2014 (United Nations, 2018). MINUSCA was an 14,110-person UN led peacebuilding operation tasked with stabilizing and supporting the transition of the republic to democracy. The EU Military Operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) was opened as a peacekeeping operation supporting MINUSCA via providing local security in Bangui. EUFOR RCA's 700 troops fulfilled this mission from September 2014 until March 2015 (European Union, 2018). Operation Sangaris was withdrawn in October 2016. The conflict continues at the less than war level and MINUSCA continues to support stability and the transition to democracy.

Comoros

Conflicts. The Comoros islands have experienced frequent low-level conflicts for central control. Both non-democratic transitions of power and election related violence have perpetuated instability. These incidents have all arisen from inter-island rivalry and

power competition. None of these events have risen to the level of war (Mullenbach, 2018).

Peace Operations. Comoros has hosted seven peace operations despite never reaching conflict at the level of war. Five of the seven operations were monitoring operations deployed during times of election or disarmament. All seven have been led by either the AU or its precursor organization, the OAU. The four Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC, OMIC 2, OMIC 3, and OMIC 4) missions and AMISEC were monitoring missions that occurred in isolation from one another. OMIC consisted of 20 observers, took place from November 1997 to May 1999, and was tasked with building confidence in the government of Comoros by way of observing actions. OMIC 2 had 14 observers, took place from November 2001 to February 2002, and was responsible for observing combatant disarmament. OMIC 3 had 34 observers, took place from March to May 2002, and was responsible for observing election related violence. OMIC 4 had 39 observers, took place from November 2001 to February 2002, and was responsible for observing election related violence. The March to June 2006 AU Mission to Support Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) had an observer mandate for its 522-personnel to carry out. The Electoral and Security Mission in the Comoros (MAES) and Operation Democracy in the Comoros were the only partnered missions in the Comoros. MAES's 482 personnel conducted peacekeeping operations from June 2007 to October 2008. Operation Democracy in the Comoros' 1,350 personnel executed a peace enforcement mandate in support of MAES from March 2008 to April 2008. The conclusion of MAES

mission has led to a resilient peace with no further peace operation deployments and no incidents of war (Mullenbach, 2018).

Chad

Conflicts. Chad has experienced six conflicts reaching the level of war. These conflicts have nearly all been wars for central control. Belligerent groups have been frequently supported by and served as proxies of France, Libya, and Sudan. The First Chadian Rebellion (1966-1971) was fought by the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) against French supported government of Chad. Combat deaths are estimated four-thousand in total (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The Second Chadian War (1980-1984) was fought between the Chadian government, Sudanese/French supported Armed Forces of the North (FAN), and Libyan supported FROLINAT. The war produced six-thousand battle related deaths and ended with the FAN consolidation of power. Next, the Azouzou Strip War (1986-1987) resulted from Libya's refusal to withdraw from and attempted annexation of northern Chad following the Second Chadian War. Chad won a decisive victory. Battle related deaths are estimated at 7,000 Libyans and 1,000 Chadians (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Then, the Déby Coup (1989-1990) pitted a rebel group led by Iriss Déby and supported by both Sudan and Libya against the Chadian government. The war ended with Déby in power and an estimated 4,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next, the Togoimi Revolt (1998-2000) was fought between the government of Chad and a coalition of northern rebel groups. The war ended with a negotiated settlement and resulted in 1,500 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Finally, the Chad-United Opposition War (2005-2008)

pitted the government of Chad against a Sudanese supported alliance of rebel groups from eastern Chad and Darfur. The war ended in a negotiated settlement and caused 3,500 battle related deaths.

Peace Operations. Chad has hosted one stand-alone and one series of two peace operations dispersed between two conflicts. The UN led monitoring operation, UN Azouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), monitored the Libyan withdrawal from Azouzou Strip between May and June 1994 (United Nations, 2018). The mission was limited to 15 personnel. Peace lasted four years ending with the outbreak of the Fourth Chad War (Togoimi Revolt) of 1998-2000.

The second group of operations deployed in response to the Chad-United Opposition War of 2005-2008. The UN led international intervention with the peacebuilding UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) from September 2007 to December 2010. MINURCAT consisted of 4,903 personnel tasked with supporting the rule of law and protection of civilians (United Nations, 2018). MINURCAT was supported from January 2008 to March 2009 by the EU Military Operation in Chad (EUFOR-Chad). The EUFOR-Chad peacekeeping operation consisted of 3,700-personnel tasked with securing the areas around and within refugee camps (European Union, 2018). MINURCAT/EUFOR-Chad produced a resilient peace in Chad's eastern border regions.

Côte d'Ivoire

Conflicts. Côte d'Ivoire experienced two wars post-independence. Both conflicts were caused by intergroup tensions between southern Christian and northern Muslim

groups. The Côte d'Ivoire Military War (2002-2005) pitted various military units against one another. The conflict ended in a negotiated settlement and caused around 3,000 total battle related deaths occurred (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The Second Côte d'Ivoire War (2011) stemmed from similar circumstances and caused an additional 3,000 battle related deaths.

Peace Operations. Côte d'Ivoire hosted four peace operations in one series confronting two wars and stretching from 2002 to 2017. The Côte d'Ivoire Military War's beginning was met with the quick deployment of the 5,000-soldier French Operation Licorne. Operation Licorne initially deployed as a peacekeeping operation, but occasionally adopted the offensive nature of peace enforcement (French Ministry of Defense, 2018). The 1,500-person peacekeeping Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) operation deployed in October 2002 to enforce a ceasefire. The UN deployed the 184-person UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) monitor mission in May 2003 to observe the conflict and assist ECOMICI. In April 2004, both ECOMICI and MINUCI transitioned into the 6,910-person UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) peacebuilding mission. Peace held in Côte d'Ivoire from 2005 to 2011 (United Nations, 2018).

ONUCI and Operation Licorne remained in place to support Ivoirian peace, but failed to hold off the Second Côte d'Ivoire War that resulted from president Gbagbo's 2011 stolen election. However, their presence did limit the war's duration to less than one year. The two missions held in place after the war with Operation Licorne

withdrawing in 2015 and ONUCI in 2017 (United Nations, 2018). Peace has been resilient since the withdrawal of ONUCI.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)

Conflicts. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Zaire has experienced nearly endemic conflict since independence from Belgium in 1960. The country has hosted six wars and innumerable incidents of organized violence at the less than war level. The First DRC (Zaire) War (1960–1963) took place in southeastern province of Katanga between the Zairian government supported by the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and local rebels. The war ended in government victory and 9,000 battle related deaths. The Jeunesse War (1963 to 1965) was a second war of succession. A Maoist group calling itself the Jeunesse warriors battled the government for an independent Kwilu province. The war ended in a government victory and resulted in 9,000 battle related deaths. The Simba Rebellion or Third DRC War overlapped in time with the Jeunesse War between 1964 and 1965. The Simbas supported by the Cuban, Algerian, and Egyptian Governments fought government forces aided by the Belgian military and the United States Air Force. The war ended in a government victory and caused over 4,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next came a resumption of the First DRC War. The Shaba War or Fourth DRC War (1978) resulted in approximately 1,000 battle related deaths; nearly all on the separatist's side. The Fifth DRC War (1996 to 1997) resulted in the overthrow of the Mobutu regime by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) aided by Rwanda and Uganda. The war resulted in at least 4,000 battle-related deaths and returned the name of

the country to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Lastly, Africa's World War (1998-2002) began as a struggle between the government and multiple rebel groups. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi supported the rebel groups. Zimbabwe, Chad, Sudan, Angola, and Namibia supported the government. The war ended in a negotiated power sharing agreement and caused an incalculable number of deaths; estimates range from one million to 7.6 million (Associated Press, 2010). Post conflict violence has been endemic in the DRC but has not reached the status of a further intra-state war (Mullenbach, 2018).

Peace Operations. The international reaction to Africa's World War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the most complex and robust series of peace operation interventions. The series began with the 43-person OAU Observer Mission that was sent to monitor an early cease fire from November 1999 to November 2000. The 4,278-person UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo-a (MONUC-a) peacekeeping mission was initiated 14 days after the OAU Observer Mission. MONUC-a served to separate combatants and to protect civilians. MONUC-a transitioned to the massive 22,016-person MONUC-b peacebuilding mission in January 2002. MONUC-b added disarmament, reintegration, rule of law development, and border protection to the mandate. MONUC-b was assisted by the 2,060-soldier Operation Artemis EU peace enforcement mission from June to September 2003. The EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC-Congo) fifty personnel peacebuilding operation also supported MONUC-b with security sector reform from January 2005 until

the present. MONUC-b was also supported by the 2,275-person peacebuilding EU Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EURFOR-RD) that performed election support from April to September 2006. MONUC-b transitioned to the 20,359 UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) peacebuilding mission. MONUSCO added robust peace enforcement tasks and capabilities to the mission. MONUSCO continues to the present supported by EUSEC-Congo.

Eritrea and Ethiopia

Conflicts. Eritrea's battle for independence encompassed four wars. The first war, the Eritrean Split (1972-1974) was fought between the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and a splinter group named the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (ELPF). The infighting ended as the groups turned their efforts against Ethiopia. The war resulted in 3,000 combat deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next, Ethiopian troops supported by Cuba defeated the ELF and ELPF in the Eritrean War (1975-1978). The war resulted in over 12,000 battle-related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Then, the Tigrean and Eritrean War (1982-1991) resulted in Eritrean and Tigrean rebel victory over the Ethiopian government. The Tigrean rebels became the national government of Ethiopia and the EPLF announced Eritrean independence. The war caused 75,000 battle-related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Finally, the Badme Border War (1988-2000) emanated from an unresolved border dispute. The war ended in an OAU mediated agreement and an estimated 120,000 battle related deaths occurred (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. The UN and AU deployed peacekeeping forces in response to the inter-state Badme Border War. Both the AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OMLEE) and UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) deployed from July 2000 to July 2008. UNMEE was a 4,627-person peacekeeping force that deployed to separate the warring parties in support of a cease fire agreement (United Nations, 2018). OMLEE was a 43-person monitoring mission deployed to monitor the conflict and provide AU assistance to the UN (Williams, 2016). Peace was resilient following the withdrawal of forces.

Guinea

Conflicts. The Guinean War (2000-2001) emanated from a failed coup and the spillover of regional instability. Government forces battled the Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea in country and crossed borders to fight Liberian national forces. The war ended in a peace agreement and resulted in slightly more than 1,000 combat deaths.

Peace Operations. The ECOWAS brokered peace agreement did include plans for the deployment of a peace keeping force, but funding was never secured and the deployment of ECOMOG (ECOWAS Military Observation Group) Guinea never occurred (Mullenbach, 2018).

Guinea Bissau

Conflicts. The Guinea-Bissau Military War (1998-1999) was an intra-state war played out between the government backed by Senegal and Guinea and rebel forces. The war ended with a rebel victory and resulted in over 2,000 combat related deaths.

Residual violence was quelled by the ECOWAS peacekeeping force, ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG-GB) peace operation.

Peace Operations. Guinea-Bissau has seen one peace operation deployed in response to the Guinea-Bissau Military War (1998-1999) and three deployed during times of less than war conflict. ECOMOG-GB deployed from December 1998 to June 1999 in response to the Guinea-Bissau Military War. ECOMOG-GB was a 712-person peacekeeping force sent to ensure the success of the peace agreement (Obi, 2009). ECOMOG-GB produced a resilient peace with no periods of war and no further peace operation deployments for nine years. The 24-person peacebuilding EU Security Sector Reform (EU-SSR) mission deployed February 2008 to enhance the rule of law via security sector reform. The mission withdrew in September 2010 in response to host government non-adherence to the rule of law (European Union, 2018). The 250-person Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG-GB) peacebuilding mission deployed from March 2011 to June of 2012 with a similar mandate to that of the EU-SSR. MISSANG-GB withdrew after a coup destabilized Guinea-Bissau (Mullenbach, 2018). The 700-person peacekeeping ECOMIB Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) operation deployed in May 2012 to provide security through a peace agreement mandated transition period. ECOMIB would remain in place until June 2017. Peace has been resilient since the mission closure.

Kenya

Conflicts. Post-World War II Kenya experienced one conflict rising to the level of war. The extra-state British-Mau Mau War (1952-1956) contested between the “Mau

Mau” guerilla force and the British military. The war resulted in more than 17,000 battle related deaths and ended in a British military victory.

Peace Operations. Kenya has not hosted any peace operations.

Liberia

Conflicts. Charles Taylor subjected Liberia to a near perpetual state of conflict between 1989 and 2003 reaching the level of war three times. The First Liberia War (1989-1990) began when National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), supported by Libya’s Qaddafi and incubated in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, invaded. ECOWAS deployed the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) as a peace-enforcement mission to fight the NPFL on behalf of the national government. The conflict ended in a stalemate and caused 10,000 battle field deaths. War resumed with the Second Liberia War (1992-1996). The war ended in national elections and an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 deaths. Finally, the Liberia-LURD War (2002-2003) broke between the Taylor led government and two Guinean supported rebel groups. The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel groups won the war. The signing of a peace treaty, the imprisonment of Charles Taylor, and the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the first African female head of state followed the war. An accurate death toll is unknown for this war.

Peace Operations. Liberia has hosted six peace operations in two series spanning three wars between 1990 and the 2018. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG-L) 12,040-person peace enforcement mission was deployed to support the government in ending the First Liberian war in August 1990 and would stay through the Second

Liberian War. The UN deployed a 642-person monitoring mission, UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), to observe ceasefire adherence and support ECOMOG-L from September 1993 to September 1997. ECOMOG-L officially ended in February 1998, but in practice remained in place continuing its mission until October 1999 (Obi, 2009). Peace was resilient for four years after the withdrawal of ECOMOG-L forces.

The second series of international peace operations in Liberia were launched to combat the Liberia – LURD War. ECOWAS deployed the 3,356-person ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) peacekeeping mission from August to September 2003. ECOMIL was supported by the 4,350-person US Joint Task Force (JTF) Liberia peace enforcement mission from August to September 2003. ECOMIL transitioned responsibilities to the newly established UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in October of 2003 (Mullenbach, 2018). The UNMIL peacebuilding mission remained in place until March 2018. It was comprised of 17,045-personnel and focused on maintaining the peace while developing the host nation security sector (United Nations, 2018). Peace has been resilient post UNMIL.

Madagascar

Conflicts. The Third Franco-Madagascan War was fought 1947-1948. Malagasy soldiers returning from WWII service in the French army fought the French military for control of the island. The French army brutally repressed the uprising. The war resulted in a French victory and 100,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. Madagascar has not hosted any peace operations.

Mali

Conflicts. Mali's Tuareg Independence War (2012-2013) was sparked by the return of Tuareg fighters who had been employed by Libyan president Gadhafi prior to his fall. The war was fought between Tuareg fighters in the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) supported by numerous militant Islamic groups and the Malian government supported by France, Chad, and Nigeria. The war officially ended in a government victory and resulted in over 1,000 combat deaths. However, violence continues at a less than war level.

Peace Operations. Mali's Tuareg Independence War has sparked a large international peace operation response. The first deployment was the 3,300-troop joint ECOWAS-AU African Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) peace enforcement operation deployed from December 2012 to April 2013. France deployed Operation Serval in January 2013 and remained in place until July 2014. Operation Serval was a 4,000-soldier peace enforcement operation in support of AFISMA and the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). AFISMA and Serval together sought to restore Malian government control of the north and prevent the spread of terrorist activities. AFISMA transitioned to MINUSMA in April 2013. MINUSMA is a 15,425-person peace building mission that seeks to stabilize the region and develop Malian institutions. MINUSMA is also supported by the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) that has performed security sector reform and development peacebuilding efforts since February 2013. Operation Serval was replaced by Operation Barkhane in August 2014. Operation Barkhane has an expanded mission to provide enforcement

capabilities against terror groups throughout the Sahel. Peace has not been established in Mali (World Peace Foundation, 2017).

Mozambique

Conflicts. Conflicts in Mozambique twice reached the level of war. The Mozambique-Portuguese War (1964-1975) was fought between the Marxist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) backed by the Soviet Union and China and the Portuguese government. The war ended when a Portuguese coup resulted in the withdrawal of all troops. The war resulted in Mozambican independence and 14,000 battle related deaths. The Mozambique War (1979-1992) soon followed. The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) supported by South Africa fought FRELIMO supported by Zimbabwe and Tanzania for central control. The war ended in a political settlement and caused over 20,000 battle related deaths.

Peace Operations. The Mozambique War saw a small peacekeeping mission transfer to a larger peacebuilding operation and the production of resilient peace. The 30-person Joint Verification Mission (JVC) was deployed from December 1990 to October 1992. The JVC maintained safe passage corridors, supported the cease-fire, and enabled time for the Rome Agreement to be negotiated. The JVC was an adhoc organization with Kenya, Portugal, US, Zambia, Congo, France, USSR, and UK all contributing troops (Hume, 1994). The JVC was replaced by the 6,576-pax UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in December 1992. ONUMOZ was tasked with implementing the Rome Agreement including election and governance support. ONUMOZ was closed in December 1994. Peace has been resilient since that time (United Nations, 2001).

Namibia

Conflicts. Namibia has experienced one war. The South African Border War (1975-1988) was fought by the South West Africans Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) supported by Angola against the South African government. The war ended in a peace agreement and Namibian independence. The war resulted in 20,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was the only peace operation to support the peace process of the South African Border War. UNTAG's 7,993 personnel oversaw elections and assisted in ending systematic discrimination. The UNTAG peacebuilding operation deployed from April 1989 to March 1990 and produced a resilient peace (United Nations, 2001).

Nigeria

Conflicts. Post-Independence Nigeria has been plagued by inter-ethnic conflict that has risen to the level of war on four occasions. The Biafra War (1967-1970) began when three Igbo majority states declared independence. The Nigerian military won a slow war of attrition resulting in 45,000 battle-related deaths and the starvation deaths of one-half million civilians (Mullenbach, 2018). Next, the Nigeria-Muslim War (1980–1981) was fought between the Nigerian government and Muslim fundamentalist in Kano province. A rapid Nigerian military victory resulted in slightly over 1,000 battle-related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next, the extra-state Jukun-Tiv War (1991–1992) was fought between two ethnic groups in eastern Nigeria. The deployment of national forces ended the fighting that had caused more than 1,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees

& Wayman, 2010). Finally, the Boko Haram War began with one-sided violence in 2009, progressed to the level of war in 2012, and is currently ongoing. The war is fought by the joint effort of the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad against the Boko Haram militant group. The total number of battle-related deaths is difficult to ascertain but believed to be well over 20,000 (Matfess, 2017).

Peace Operations. See the Regional Peace Interventions section below for a description of the counter-Boko Haram Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) peace enforcement mission.

Rwanda

Conflicts. Rwanda has reached the level of war five times. Each time has been the result of ethnic tensions between the elite Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority. The Rwandan Social Revolution (1959-1962) began pre-independence as a Hutu reaction to future Tutsi rule. The war ended with the Tutsi king being deposed and 20,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Next, the First Rwanda War (1963-1964) occurred when exiled Tutsi's attempted a return to power. The war ended with a Hutu military victory and 1,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The Second Rwanda War (1994) and the associated genocide was fought between the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu government. The war ended with an RPF military victory and an end to the genocide. However, more than a million people were killed in the conflict and related genocide (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Then the Third Rwanda War (1997-1998) and Fourth Rwandan War (2001) each began with a Hutu offensive launched from the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the intention

of regaining central control of Rwanda. In each war the attack was repulsed, and the government remained in control. The Third and Fourth Rwandan Wars combined produced approximately 5,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. Rwanda played host to seven peace operations in the time directly before and after the 1994 genocide. The first three missions were all OAU led observer mission employed to monitor cease fire agreements. The OAU Military Observer Team (OAU MOT) deployed 15 personnel from April to September 1991. The mission was replaced by the 40-person OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (OAU NMOG) that served from September 1991 to July 1992. OAU NMOG I sought to improve on the OAU MOT model by employing personnel from non-interested nations. OAU NMOG II replaced OAU NMOG I. It deployed from August 1992 until November 1993. OAU NMOG II increased the troop strength to 132 personnel in an attempt to better document the violence (Berman & Sams, 2000). The UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) deployed to southern Uganda in response to OAU NMOG II reporting of armed groups operating on the Uganda-Rwanda border in June 1993. UNOMUR's 81 personnel were tasked with monitoring the activities of armed groups on the border (United Nations, 2001).

The growing tension as reported by OAU NMOG II and UNOMUR led to the creation of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I) in October 1993. UNAMIR I was a 444-person peacekeeping mission that sought to ensure implementation of the peace agreement and protect civilians. It failed at both as the Rwanda genocide and the Second Rwanda War began under its mandate. In May 1994

UNAMIR I transitioned to UNAMIR II with an increase to 5,737 total personnel and a more robust mandate to protect civilians, support reconciliation, and train security forces (United Nations, 2001). UNOMUR was withdrawn in September 1994 as it was no longer relevant to monitor the border with Uganda. The French peace enforcing Operation Turquoise was deployed from June to July 1994 to provide a humanitarian safety zone in Rwanda's west (United Nations, 2001). Peace failed to be resilient as the Third Rwanda War began one year after UNAMIR II's withdrawal in March 1996.

Sierra Leone

Conflicts. The First and Second Sierra Leone Wars together compose a decade of intrastate conflict between 1991 and 2000 with a pause in the fighting from 1997-1999. The First Sierra Leone War (1991-1996) was fought between the Revolutionary United front (RUF) supported by Liberia and the government of Sierra Leone assisted by South African mercenaries. The war ended in a peace agreement and caused an estimated 25,000 conflict deaths occurred in the war (Mullenbach, 2018). Next, the Second Sierra Leone War (1998-2000) was started by an alliance of anti-RUF local security forces, ECOMOG forces, and the British Sandline mercenary group with the intention of wresting power from the RUF. The RUF received support from Burkina Faso and Liberia in their ensuing "Operation No Living Thing" scorched earth campaign. The war ended with another peace agreement. Total battle related deaths are unknown for this conflict, but estimates are over 100,000 for the 1991-2000 decade of fighting.

Peace Operations. Sierra Leone hosted five peace operations in response to the First and Second Sierra Leone Wars. The 9,000-person ECOWAS Military Observer

Group-Sierra Leone (ECOMOG-SL) peace enforcement mission deployed from June 1997 to May 2000. ECOMOG-SL was able to force an end to the First Sierra Leone War but failed to prevent the onset of the Second Sierra Leone War (Mullenbach, 2018). The 217-person UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) monitoring mission was deployed July 1998 to October 1999. UNOMSIL partnered with ECOMOG-SL providing assistance in monitoring a cease-fire agreement. UNOMSIL transitioned to the 18,329-person UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacebuilding mission in October 1999. UNAMSIL remained in place until December 2005. UNAMSIL was tasked with providing security, building institutions, and overseeing elections in to build a positive peace (United Nations, 2009). Two UK Missions assisted UNAMSIL. The 1,300-person peace enforcement mission, Operation Palliser, deployed May to June 2000 with a mandate to defeat the RUF. Operation Palliser transitioned to Operation Basilica and Silkman, a 250-personnel peacebuilding operation supporting security force development, in June 2000. Operation Basilica and Silkman and UNAMSIL both closed in 2005 leaving behind a resilient peace (Ucko, 2016).

Somalia and Ogaden

Conflicts. Somalia has experience five post-World War II wars. The first two wars, the First (1963-1964) and Second (1976-1980) Ogaden Wars began as inter-state conflict with Ethiopia. In the First Ogaden War the Somali government supported the Western Somali Liberation Front's (WSLF) successionist campaign against the Ethiopian government that was supported by Cuban and Soviet forces. The Ogaden wars ended with an Ethiopian battle field victory and estimated 60,000 battle field deaths (Sarkees &

Wayman, 2010). The First (1988-1991), Second (1991-1997), and Third (2006-2012) Somali Wars all emerged from the state collapse caused by the Somali defeat in the Ogaden wars. The Somali central government was defeated by a coalition of the Somali National Movement (SNM), Somali National Alliance (SNA), the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), and the United Somali Congress (USC) in the First Somalia War. The war resulted in 5,000 battle related deaths. The Second Somalia War grew from the disintegration of the coalition force that had won the First Somali War. The war ended with a peace agreement. Estimates of battlefield deaths vary from 32,000 to 100,000 (Mullenbach, 2018). Finally, the Third Somalia War was contested between the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and various Islamic groups led by Al Shabab and the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts. The TFG was supported by AU peace enforcement mission AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia); as well as the militaries of Kenya, Ethiopia, the United States, and France. The war ended with a TFG military victory. Total battle related deaths estimates vary between three and twelve thousand.

Peace Operations. Five Peace operations have been deployed in response to the Second (1991-1997) and Third (2006-2012) Somali Wars. The 947-person peacekeeping UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) deployed in April 1992 to monitor a cease fire agreement and permit the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The 37,000-person Unified Task Force (also known as Operation Restore Hope) peace enforcement operation was deployed to bolster UNOSOM I efforts in December 1992. The Unified Task Force was a US led coalition of 27 nations. UNOSOM I and the

Unified Task Force merged into the UN led UNOSOM II peace building operation in March 1993 (United Nations, 2001). UNOSOM II was a 30,800-person peacebuilding operation with responsibility to permit humanitarian assistance, provide security, and oversee demobilization efforts. UNOSOM II was closed in March 1995 due to international frustration at the pace of change and the continuation of the conflict (United Nations, 2003).

The Third Somali War erupted in 2006. The AU took the lead in response with the formation of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM is a 22,126-person peace enforcement mission tasked with establishing the peace and setting the conditions necessary for handover to Somali authorities. AMISOM has been deployed since January 2007 (African Union, 2018). The EU Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) is a 193-person peace building operation that leads security sector reform and training initiatives in support of AMISOM. The EUTM Somalia has been deployed since April 2010 (European Union, 2018). Both missions remain deployed and the conflict continues at a less than war level.

South Africa

Conflicts. South Africa's anti-apartheid violence began almost immediately following independence in 1961 and continued until the election of Nelson Mandela to president in 1994. However, only once did the violence reach the level of war. The Inkatha-ANC War (1987-1994) pitted the apartheid government supported Inkatha political group against the Soviet and Angolan supported African National Congress

(ANC). The war caused 20,000 battle related deaths and ended on the election of Nelson Mandela, an ANC leader, to president in 1994 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. One peace operation complimented with numerous civil assistance and monitoring missions was deployed to ease the end of apartheid minority rule in South Africa. The Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group South Africa (CPAG-SA) was a 33-person peace building operation that deployed from February to April 1994. CPAG-SA performed security sector reform in support of the formation of the newly integrated South African Defense Forces (Canadian Defense Forces, 2017). CPAG-SA was complimented by the UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), the European Community Observer Mission in South Africa (ECOMSA), and the OAU Observer Mission in South Africa (OAUOMSA) civil missions that observed the transition of power and conduct of elections from September 1992 to June 1994 (United Nations, 2007). South Africa has not returned to intra-state war following the redeployment of the operation.

South Sudan

Conflicts. South Sudan has been locked into near perpetual conflict over who should govern the region. The First (1963-1972) and Second (1983-2005) South Sudan Wars were wars of succession fought by the Christian south against the Muslim dominated government in Khartoum. The SPLA Division War (1991-1992) and the South Sudanese Civil War (2012-2015) were conflicts between southern leaders and ethnic groups. The First South Sudan War was between the southern Anya-Nya group supported by Israel and the northern government supported by Egypt, the Soviet Union,

and other Socialist powers. The war ended in a peace agreement and left an estimated one-half million dead. The Second South Sudan War was fought along similar lines. The southern Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebelled in response to the north's attempted imposition of Islamic Sharia law on the Christian south. The Sudanese government was aided by Libya, Iran, and Eritrea. The southern cause was aided by Tanzania, Uganda, and Israel. Ethiopia alternated between providing support to the government and the rebels. The Second South Sudan War ended in an agreement that led to South Sudanese independence and caused 100,000 battle-related deaths. The intracommunal SPLA Division War was fought between southern splinter groups. The war ended when splinter groups refocused their efforts against the north and caused 1,200 battle related deaths. Finally, the South Sudan Civil War fought between southern leaders who relied extensively on ethnic loyalties to drive their supporters to take up arms against one-another. The Ugandan military and the Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement militia intervened on behalf of the government. The war has been resilient through many agreements and continues at a less than war level. The war has resulted in 50,000 combat related deaths as of 2015 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. Four peace operations have deployed to South Sudan. The 25-person, UN led, Joint Military Commission and International Monitoring Unit (JMC and IMU) monitoring mission was deployed from April 2002 to June 2005 to monitor the SPLA withdrawal from the Nuba Mountains (Mullenbach, 2018). The 14,799-person peacebuilding UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) deployed in March 2005 following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (United Nations, 2011). UNMIS

was tasked with assisting in demobilization, leading security sector reform, providing rule of law support, and conducting elections assistance. UNMIS was replaced in the 18,013-person UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacebuilding operation in June 2011 following the declaration of South Sudanese independence. UNMISS added peace enforcement protection of civilians language to the previous mandate (United Nations, 2018). The 4,803-person UN Interim Security Force for Abyei Area (UNISFA) peacekeeping mission was also started in June 2011. UNISFA is responsible for preventing a return to conflict between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan in the disputed Abyei area (United Nations, 2018). Both UNMISS and UNISFA continue to the present and struggle to contain the high levels of violence that remain endemic to South Sudan.

Sudan (Darfur)

Conflicts. Pastoral agrarian and ethnic tensions have reached the level of war in Darfur one-time. The Darfur War (2003-2006) was fought between Black agrarian tribes and Arab nomadic herders. The black tribes were represented by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM); each of which sought Darfurian autonomy and received support from Chad. The Arab tribes were represented by pro-government Janjaweed militias supported by the Sudanese government. The conflict was reduced to a less than war level following the signing of a peace agreement. At least 2.5 million people were displaced and between 200,000 and 400,000 died (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. Four peace operations have deployed in response to Sudan's Darfur Rebellion. The 390-person AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS 1) monitoring operation deployed from April to October 2004 to observe and report on the conflict. AMIS 1 was replaced by the 7,641-person peacekeeping AMIS 2 operation in October 2004. AMIS 2's mandate included responsibility to prevent resumption of hostilities by providing a buffer between warring groups. The EU Support Mission to AMIS 2 was a 150-person peacekeeping mission deployed July 2005 to December 2007 to assist AMIS 2 in its peacekeeping responsibilities (European Union, 2018). AMIS 2 was replaced by a joint UN/AU mission in July 2007. The UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is a 23,448 person peacebuilding mission tasked with preventing a return to conflict, facilitating intercommunal dialogue, and the protection of civilians (United Nations, 2018). UNAMID remains in place to the present and the conflict remains at a less than war level.

Uganda

Conflicts. Four wars have contested the question of who should lead Uganda. The First Uganda War (1966) occurred when the Baganda tribe attempted to depose Prime Minister Obote. The war ended with a government victory and 1,000 battle related deaths. Next, the Ugandan-Tanzanian War (1978–1979) was fought between the Ugandan government supported by Libya and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) supported by Tanzania. The war ended in a rebel victory and resulted in 3,000 battle related deaths; civilian casualties were estimated at 500,000. Next, the Second Uganda War (1980-1986) was contested between the ruling UNLA and Yoweri

Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA). The war ended in a rebel victory. Total battle deaths are estimated at 46,000 and civilian deaths are estimated to be 800,000.

Finally, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) attempted to seize power in the Holy Spirit Movement War (1986-1987). The HSM was defeated in a pitched battle in 1987. The war caused 7,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. UNOMUR was the only peace operation based in Uganda. However, its mission was wholly focused on the conflict in Rwanda. UNOMUR's 81 personnel deployed to Uganda's southern border and monitored the activities of armed groups on the border from June 1993 to September 1994 (United Nations, 2001).

Western Sahara

Conflicts. Western Sahara has experienced one war. The Western Sahara War (1975-1983) was fought between the Polisario Front supported by Algeria against Morocco in one sector and against Mauritania in another. The war ended in a UN brokered ceasefire and resulted in 16,000 battle related deaths (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

Peace Operations. Two missions have been deployed in response to the Western Sahara War. The 90-person OAU Mission to Western Sahara monitoring mission deployed from January to April 1991 to conduct fact finding operations (Williams, 2016). The 10,177-person UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) peacekeeping mission replaced the OAU mission in April 1991. MINURSO added cease-fire observance to the mandate and remains in place to the present (United Nations, 2018). The conflict remains frozen without casualties, but without resolution.

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

Conflicts. The Rhodesia War (1972-1979) fought by various Black resistance movements against Rhodesian White minority rule was Zimbabwe's only war. The Soviet supported Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU) and Chinese supported Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) battled the South African and Mozambican backed government. The war took place over seven years of harsh guerrilla fighting. The war ended in a negotiated settlement followed by the former rebel Robert Mugabe's electoral victory. The war caused 11,000 battle-related deaths.

Peace Operations. Zimbabwe has not hosted any peace operations.

Regional Peace Interventions

Two recent peace enforcement operations take a regional approach. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a conglomeration of the efforts of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin to confront the Boko Haram terrorist group. The MNJTF is authorized by an AU mandate and seeks to coordinate efforts to restore peace in the region. It formed in October 2014 and has approximately 10,000 troops assigned to it (Assanvo, Ella, Abatan, & Sawadogo, 2016). The French Operation Barkhane is another a regional peace enforcement operation. Operation Barkhane's 3,000 troops began operations in August 2014. Barkhane supports MINUSMA in Mali and national governments throughout the Sahel with counter terror focused enforcement capabilities (French Ministry of Defense , 2018). Both these operations, and the conflicts they seek to ameliorate, continue to the present time.

Conflict Patterns Across African States

African conflicts have proven resilient and African peace fragile. Many countries have found themselves in the throes of four or five sequential wars all drawn from the same conflict conditions. Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Somalia, Uganda, and others have had four, five, or even six wars generated from the same basic conditions. Outside interventions have been both a positive and a negative force. On the negative side, some interventions have directly contributed to violence and others have been ineffectual at halting it. Regional actors joining Africa's World War grew the conflict creating the deadliest conflict since World War II. UNAMIR I's presence served mainly to observe and document an ongoing genocide. However, other interventions have halted violence and stabilized fractured societies. UNTAG is frequently credited with transforming Namibia from a conflict torn society into a stable middle-income country.

The reasons for conflict and war in African states changed little over time. Most conflicts related to identity issues (ethnic, religious, tribal affiliations) and the quest for power over who would be the dominant actor in these nascent national governments. These conflicts escalated due to the fragility of post-colonial institutions that were not adequately developed in the pre-independence period (Williams, 2016).

The pattern of outside interventions in African conflicts, has however, changed significantly. Before 1990, individual states seeking to pursue national interest engaged in Africa's wars. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and others engaged in proxy fights perceived to be the front lines between the communist and capitalist

worlds. The only notable peace operation during this time was ONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to stabilize Katanga province. Since 1990, peace operation interventions increased exponentially in Africa: over 80 operations were organized through 2015.

The end of the Cold War presented two changes: first, regimes that relied on superpower support destabilized as they no longer received military and financial assistance from the U.S. or the USSR, or their funding was significantly reduced; and second, the original purpose of the UN Security Council to keep peace in the world was restored as superpower rivalry exercised through the gridlock of veto power dissolved.

The deployment of police and/or military forces to support international peace and security grew exponentially in post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1989 and 1990 two operations per year were initiated. In 1991 the number was five and in 1992 seven new operations were initiated. The quantity of interventions has ebbed and flowed from that time to the present. However, the international community has remained constant in its support for the presence of interventions to support national and regional issues in Africa (Williams, 2016).

Peace operations deployed to 23 sub-Saharan African countries have been led by the UN, the Organization for African Unity/African Union, the European Union, regional economic communities, ad hoc coalitions and individual countries². Their tasks have

² Two recent peace enforcement operations take a regional approach. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a conglomeration of the efforts of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin to confront the Boko Haram terrorist group. The MNJTF is authorized by an AU mandate and seeks to coordinate efforts to restore peace in the region. It formed in October 2014 and has approximately 10,000 troops assigned to it (Assanvo, Ella, Abatan, & Sawadogo, 2016). The French Operation Barkhane is another a regional peace enforcement operation. Operation Barkhane's 3,000 troops began operations in August 2014. Barkhane supports MINUSMA in Mali and national governments throughout the Sahel with counter terror focused

been designed to assist in the prevention or cessation of armed conflict by serving to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; enforcement of ceasefires or peace agreements; or to build a stable peace (Williams, 2013).

enforcement capabilities (French Ministry of Defense , 2018). Both these operations, and the conflicts they seek to ameliorate, continue to the present time.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This study examined all sub-Saharan peace operations that occurred from 1990 through 2015. There were 86 missions spread across 23 African states. The main question addressed is: Did the intervention force achieve a desired peaceful outcome and was that peace, if established, resilient? These operations were led by a multitude of organizations covering a variety of mission objectives. It is assumed that the nature of a conflict dictates the design and mandate for any peace operation, that in turn, determines the required force capabilities deemed necessary for implementation. Mission success requires the appropriate match of intervenor capability to deal with the conflict situation. The chain leading to failure develops when a mandate does not address the conflict issues or the force capacity is inadequate to meet mandate requirements.

Hypotheses

To test the linkage between conflict characteristics, mandate features, and intervenor capacity, the following nine hypotheses were tested:

1. The conflict characteristics determine the peace operation mandate.
2. Peace operations mandate determines the force capacity.
3. The force capacity determines peace operations outcome.
4. The intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations outcomes.
5. Robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates.
6. Sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success rates.

7. Force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater peace operations success.
8. Force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead to greater peace operation success rates.
9. Force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission and a Western Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace operations success.

Key Variables

The independent variables fall in three broad categories; conflict characteristics, mandate features, and force composition/capacity. The variables that compose the three categories are detailed below along with their indicators and coding.

Conflict Characteristics. Peace operations must deal with the conditions of the conflict into which they are deployed. Some of these conditions or characteristics inhibit the success of peace operations. Other conditions may make success more likely or have no discernable effect. Studies by Fortna (2004, 2008); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fiedler (2000); Diehl and Balas (2014); and Walter (2010) have examined the effects of conflict characteristics. Each study has explored characteristics that make a conflict resilient to peace and reduce the likelihood of intervention success. Variables discussed below are categorized into belligerent characteristics, conflict issues, and level/duration of violence. The analysis of complexity allows the author to compensate for the fact that missions are not randomly assigned in analysis of the interrelationship between conflict and mandate (Sambanis, 2008).

The greater the number of belligerent groups the greater the number of potential spoilers to any peace deal (Diehl & Druckman, 2015). Multiple groups provide the opportunity for an equal number of objections to any peace agreement and create great difficulty in the complexity of interpositional separation and DDR operations. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) and Fortna (2004) each found a direct correlation between the number of belligerent groups and the likelihood of violence resurgence.

The presence of external support to both the government and the opposition by regional powers has been shown to have a corrosive impact on peace interventions. Arms, materiel, or direct troop intervention are considered to be direct support to a belligerent party. Support to the government produces a reluctance of the government to make peace prior to a full battlefield victory. Support to the opposition enables rebel forces to remain in the field extending conflicts that may have otherwise lessened or concluded. External support to either party was negative, but support to rebels had the greater effect on increasing the duration of conflict (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

Wealthy nations were found to recover better from and have lower rates of relapse from intra-state wars. Potential combatants in wealthy nations had better alternative opportunities for gain (Diehl & Balas, 2014). These opportunities created drivers away from conflict. Essentially, a lack of wealth increased the likelihood of recidivism (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).

Characteristics found in the conflict issues, those reasons why groups fight, also impact the challenge of intervention. Categories such as resource conflicts; ethnic or religious conflicts; separatist conflicts; and/or intra-state conflicts have all been found to

impact the challenge of intervention. Previous studies have found each of these categories to have a direct impact on the likelihood that intervention will produce resilient peace.

Resource conflicts are those that either the primary motivation or sustainment of a belligerent group was raw resources. The Liberia and Sierra Leone Civil Wars were seminal examples of resource conflicts. Each conflict centered on control of and was funded by diamonds. Conflicts fueled by lootable resources resist agreement and are more likely to experience recidivism (Walter, 2010). Both Fortna (2008) and Sambanis (2008) found this variable to have the greatest impact of any measured independent variable on the likelihood a return to violence.

Conflicts with an identity, ethnic or religious, element increase the difficulty of response. Forces divided along these identity lines find it easier to mobilize support and are more resilient once fighting has begun (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Ethnicity was the mobilization tool utilized in the Rwanda genocide. Similarly, identity has been employed as a mobilization tool by rebel groups in South Sudan who are unable to pay or use other means of coercion towards collective violence. Religious identities have been used to mobilize in a similar manner (Williams, 2016). Fortna (2008), Sambanis (2008), and Walter each found identity issues second only to resource issues regarding degree of impact on the resiliency of a post-civil war peace. Identity has been especially pernicious conflict characteristic due to its ability to mobilize on behalf of groups otherwise lacking means.

Intrastate conflicts are more likely to return to war than interstate conflicts (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). This is true for wars for central control, regional internal wars, and intercommunal wars. Wars for central control are civil wars in which two or more belligerents compete for sovereignty over the territory of a state. Belligerents may have the support of outside entities but remain primarily composed of those from that state such as in the 1992-1994 Angolan War of the Cities (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The second intrastate war sub-group is regional internal war. These wars are those in are contested between regional states, but in the geographic confines of one state. Africa's World War, 1998-2002, is one such conflict. All conflict took place within the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo despite there being over a dozen state and non-state actors participating in the conflict (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Intercommunal conflicts are the final type of intrastate war. These conflicts take place within one state and are contested by non-state actors. These have rarely received international intervention. The First (1991-1992) and Second (2004) Nigerian Christian-Muslim Wars are two such conflicts (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). These forms of intrastate wars create challenges to successful intervention due to the frequency that belligerent groups split and regroup as well as the durability of identity issues as a grievance.

Peace interventions into separatist conflicts have a greater likelihood of success than other types of intrastate-war. Separatist conflicts are those in which a rebel group holds the intention to form a new state as key to their platform. They are in effect a conflict over the right exercise sovereignty over a specific geographic section of an existing state and differ from other intrastate conflicts in which two or more groups

compete for the right to govern the existing territorial boundaries of a state in its entirety. Most post-independence African separatist conflicts have been at their heart conflicts to reform the state. Elites from marginalized groups have launched conflicts to gain access to patrimonial networks that have been denied to them (Williams, 2016). Elites in these conflicts are generally more prone to negotiate peace and that peace is more likely to hold than in other intra-state conflict types. Separatist are on whole slightly less likely to experience recidivism as compared to non-separatist conflicts (Fortna, 2008).

Inter-state wars present a simpler problem set to an intervenor. Inter-state wars generally present an agreed on boundary on which to interposition forces to prevent a resumption of violence. Inter-state wars also, generally are dyadic in nature and composed of groups able to make and keep commitments to treaties and agreements (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Intra-state wars are chaotic and multifaceted compared to inter-state. Inter-state wars make up only three of the conflicts in my study but have a 100% complete success rate compared with a rate near 50% for all relevant intra-state conflicts.

The duration and intensity of violence also impacts the likelihood of intervention success. Deaths per annum and duration of violence each correlate toward an increased likelihood for renewed violence and lower chances for peace operation success (Fortna, 2008). These “enduring rivalries” create heightened and hardened feelings of enmity between groups. This in turn produces climates in which compromise with former enemies is politically unpalatable (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

Phase of conflict at intervention has a statistical impact on the challenge of intervention (Diehl & Balas, 2014; Jett, 1999). Pre-violence conflict prevention is

theoretically well suited to intervention but currently lacks a significant number of examples for generalization. Active-violence is the most complex and ill-suited to traditional peace keeping operations. Active-violence requires troops to be well armed, well trained, and provided with a robust mandate to carry out the required action (Boulden, 2001). Post-agreement interventions present the best opportunity for success and face the fewest obstacles. Post-peace agreement is less complex than post-cease fire based on historical outcomes (Diehl P. F., 1994). The final category, post-agreement with residual violence, presents the issues of capacity endemic to the active violence phase, but with a greater likelihood of combat abatement. This increased probability of success is resultant from the belligerents demonstrated ability to make an agreement as well as the existence of a previous agreement to utilize as a starting point of future negotiations.

The consent of all belligerent forces for the intervention greatly enhance the probability of intervention success (Diehl & Balas, 2014; Fortna, 2008; Fiedler, 2000). Major studies to have been unanimous in agreeing that consent has a demonstrable positive impact on the likelihood of intervention success. The resistance of even one group can open the intervening force to sabotage and/or make them the target of attack. 1993's Black Hawk Down incident, that resulted in the withdrawal of UNITAF forces, was endemic of this effect. I captured consent by measuring the presence of a cease fire or peace agreement. Post-peace agreement peace operation deployments are predicated on the consent of the belligerents. The presence of post-agreement continued violence was indicative of the lack of a credible commitment to peace. The Second South Sudan

War, 1983-2005, and the South Sudanese Civil War, 2013-Present, are classic example of this phenomenon where the opposing sides use agreements as strategic moves rather than genuine efforts towards conflict resolution (Kalpakian, 2017).

Variables that have been found to have no discernable effect on the probability of success are not utilized in this study. Type of government and geographic size of mission responsibility have been omitted due to an agreement among previous studies on their lack of impact on outcomes. Walter (2010) and Sambanis (2008) each found type of government to have no statistical impact; while Fortuna (2004) and Sambanis (2008) found geographical size and features to have little or no effect on outcomes. Table 3.1 summarizes the set of conflict characteristics indicators, measurement and sources.

Conflict complexity was a qualitative assessment of the level of challenge a conflict presents to a theoretical peace operation. The measure was based on the summation of the independent variables discussed above. Those conflicts that have a preponderance of the complicating factors were said to be highly complex. Africa's World War is the archetype for a highly complex conflict. The war has a long duration of conflict, numerous belligerent groups, identity issues, external support to belligerents, readily exploitable resources, no agreed on peace plan, lacks the consent of the belligerents, has a low capacity for state building, and other numerous factors complicating any peace intervention. A medium complexity conflict has some, but not most or all of these factors. For example, the Angolan War of the Cities had complicating factors such as large numbers of organized armed individuals, highly exploitable resources, and a long pre-intervention duration of violence. However, the

war had some advantages such as a higher than average GDP, only two active belligerent groups, and limited external support to either group. A low complexity conflict may have some complicating factors, but does not have a majority of issues associated with resistance to intervention. For example, the War of the Azouzou Strip did have high casualty numbers and was a resource-based conflict. However, the conflict had a peace agreement in place, was interstate, and had been fought for a short duration. These three gradients of complexity are necessary to facilitate the comparison of various peace operations acknowledging that they are not deployed in a vacuum (Diehl & Balas, 2014). A summary of conflict characteristics including variables and indicators is displayed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Conflict Characteristics

Variable	Indicator Measures
Belligerents	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Government vs. 1 opposition? Yes/No• Number of opposing sides: (2, 3, or >3)• Size of forces of each side• External support to government? Yes/No Who? What?• External support to opposition? Yes/No Who? What?
Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Intrastate Conflict? Yes/No• Resource Distribution? Yes/No• Ethnic/Religious Discrimination? Yes/No• Separatist Movement? Yes/No
Violence Level	Annual deaths due to political violence
Elapsed time to intervention	Number of months from violence onset until intervention
Conflict Phase at Intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Pre-Violence• Active Violence (No Agreement)• Post-Cease Fire• Post-Peace Agreement
Local Capacity	Per-Capita GDP measured via Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)

Sources: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2018); Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International Peace Institute (2018); World Bank (2018).

Mandates. Mandates are instructions provided from the lead organization or country convening the peace operation. The mandate instructions or tasks dictate the mission's responsibilities and authorizations. Operations can be classified based on the contents of these instruction and fall into four basic categories; peace monitoring missions, traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacebuilding (Sandler, 2017). The 86 missions meeting the criteria of this study have each been categorized into one of these four categories based on a careful reading of their individual operational guidelines and deployed areas of effort.

Peace monitoring, sometimes also referred to as observation, missions are the least complex of all peace operations. Monitoring missions are small deployments of observers deployed to perform fact-finding observation of specific actions and report findings to the lead organization (Fortna, 2003). Monitoring missions may be deployed prior to violence (OMIC 3 and MIOC), during active conflict (OMIB), or post ceasefire/peace agreement (UNAVEM I). These missions may act as stand-alone operations or may be deployed to gather information to be used in the construction of a more robust operation to be deployed when the situation is viewed as appropriate (Balas, 2011).

Traditional peacekeeping, also referred to as interpositional missions and here referred to only as peacekeeping, deploy in support of a cease fire with the intent to promote an environment suitable for conflict resolution. Peacekeeping missions establish an interpositional buffer between combatants following a ceasefire. The presence of this buffer seeks to prevent conflict recidivism and enable the conditions necessary for a permanent peace agreement to be reached. Peacekeeping mission mandates are designed around the 'holy-trinity' of host-nation consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010). Peacekeeping missions are facilitative and as such do not directly engage in diplomatic initiatives (Diehl & Balas, 2014). These missions may work in concert with other missions or as standalone interventions.

Peace enforcements missions seek to end hostilities between warring sides with active military force. Enforcement missions require a larger military capacity than peace monitoring or peacekeeping mission types. Enforcement operations conduct offensive

military operations to force the conditions for peace through punishment of those responsible for hostilities. The missions may or may not have the consent of the host-nation and/or belligerents. Peace enforcement missions often work in parallel to or as a precursor to other missions that seek to build a positive peace (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

Peacebuilding operations are the most complex of peace operation mandates. Peacebuilding operations seek the creation of a new environment; not the mere cessation of hostilities. Peacebuilding operations are frequently tasked with disarming warring parties, destroying weapons, conducting security sector reform, facilitating elections, strengthening government institutions, and numerous other activities (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Peacebuilding missions may be standalone missions tasked with peacekeeping responsibilities in addition to their transformative tasks (ONUB), parallel missions that support an existing peacekeeping operation with specific tasks (Operation Basilica and Silkman), or be a multi-dimensional stabilization mission with a robust combination of peace enforcement and peace building responsibilities (MINUSMA, MONUSCO). Peacebuilding missions require the greatest international commitment in terms of troop numbers and financial investment (Sandler, 2017).

Robust peacekeeping or robust mandates are terms used to describe peace enforcement and peacebuilding operations that employ force to deter attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians, and/or assist in maintaining law and order. These mandates frequently include language authorizing the use of all necessary means to defend the mandate. The offensive use of force differentiates robust from traditional

operations (United Nations, 2018; Sandler, 2017). Traditional peacekeeping allowed for use of force only in defense of the peacekeeping force itself (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

Robust mandates were a necessary evolution of peace operations due to the conflict environments that forces were deployed post-Cold War. Cold War traditional peacekeeping operations operated under the holy trinity of host nation consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force. Cold War missions were deployed to relatively stable post ceasefire or peace agreement situations. In contrast, post-Cold War missions have been frequently deployed to fractured civil wars. In these situations, there is often no peace to keep. There may either be no cease-fire/peace agreement or there are spoiler parties not beholden agreement.

Robust mandates have added coercive force to more appropriately address these complex environments. The missions are considerably larger than traditional missions and employ more offensive capability. Robust operations are by design offensively capable with increased weaponry, forces frequently larger than 20,000 troops, and rules of engagement permitting offensive action (Williams, 2013).

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 detail mandate types and characteristics. Table 3.2 lists the four mandate categories with their definition. These definitions were the criteria used in categorization of individual operations in this study. Table 3.3 provides more detailed information on characteristics common to each type of mandate.

Table 3.2. Types of Peace Operations Mandates

Variable	Definition
Peace Monitoring	A fact-finding mission observing specific actions and reporting findings to an international organization.
Peacekeeping	Deployment of troops following a ceasefire agreement to serve as an interpositional buffer between belligerents; requires the consent of all parties to the conflict, impartiality, and the minimum use of force; goal is to prevent the resumption of hostilities by preventing accidental engagement of opposing forces, deliberate cheating on ceasefire terms, and to apply international pressure to deter a resumption of violence.
Peace Enforcement	Proactive missions designed to restore peace and redress aggression with the significant use of military coercion; does not require the consent of the host nation.
Peacebuilding	The creation of a new environment, not merely the cessation of hostilities, dedicated to decreasing the opportunity to resort to violence and creating mechanisms to manage conflicts peacefully.

Source: Sandler (2017).

Table 3.3. Mandate Tasks Variables

Variable	Monitoring	Incorporated into Peace-Keeping	Enforcement	Building
Observe and Report	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Physical Separation of Belligerents	No	Yes	Yes	No
Consent of the Belligerents	Yes	Yes	No	Sometimes
Demilitarization of Belligerents:				
Disarmament			Sometimes	Yes
Demobilization			Sometimes	Yes
Reintegration			Sometimes	Yes
Government Capacity Development:				
Organize Elections	No	No	Sometimes	Yes
Train Security Forces				
Required Size of Force	30-100	100-1000	1,000-10,000	>5,000
Intervenor Armament Capabilities:	(Sometimes)			
Small Arms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Armored Vehicles			Sometimes	Sometimes
Combat Aviation Support			Sometimes	Sometimes

Sources: Diehl and Balas (2014); Sandler (2017); Williams (2016).

Force Composition and Capacity. The organizing agency and troop contributors have a direct impact on the capacity of a mission to employ its mandated tasks. The agency and the troops assigned must implement the mission mandate. It is therefore essential for the agency to be able to manage the mission and for the troops to be capable to carry out the tasks assigned.

African peace operations are led by one of several common organizing agency models. The UN has led the largest number of missions with 33 missions in the study group. The AU/OAU is the next most common organizing agency with 21 missions. Non-African international organizations such as the EU and the Commonwealth of Nations have led 10 missions. African regional economic communities have led nine

missions. Individual sovereign countries have led nine missions. Ad hoc coalitions have led four missions.

UN operations are those authorized by the UN Security Council, implemented under the supervision of the UN Secretary General, and with senior leaders who function as UN civil service employees. These missions enjoy UN support structures such as DPKO institutional support including standardized doctrine, supply procurement, and field support. Since 2005 the UN Peacebuilding Commission has also aided missions by serving as an advisory body to UN missions (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

AU, OAU prior to 2002, operations are those authorized, constructed, and implemented under the auspices of either the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution or the AU Peace and Security Council. The OAU missions remained mostly small observation missions. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) included two bodies; the Military Staff Committee and the Commissioner in Charge of Peace and Security. These two bodies have increased the AU's capacity for supporting more robust operations. AU missions since 2003 have had the support of these bodies and have reported to the Chairperson of the PSC (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

Missions led by non-African international organizations have included the EU and the Commonwealth of Nations. Both groups have focused on smaller supporting missions with a narrow focus in support of a larger UN or AU mission. The Commonwealth of Nations missions have been authorized and managed by the Royal Commonwealth Society on an ad hoc basis (Royal Commonwealth Society, 2016). The EU missions relied on a more established support infrastructure supported by the EU

Peace and Security Committee that was responsible for mission support and management. Non-African international organizations led missions focused on niche support of larger missions.

Regional economic communities have been the intervenor of last resort. ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD, SADC, and others have intervened when others would not (Balas, 2011). Their focus has been on peace enforcement missions into active conflicts. Missions in Sierra Leone (ECOMOG-SL), Liberia (ECOMOG-L), and the Central African Republic (MICOPAX and FOMUC) have fallen into this pattern. The organizations lack established support structures and function on an ad hoc basis. They frequently have deployed peace enforcement operations due to the consensus-based (no requirement of unanimity) decision making of their organizations (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

Individual sovereign nations and ad hoc coalitions have led relevant peace operations on 14 occasions. In each instance these interventions have relied on the endemic capacities of the nations that acted. The majority of these have received UN security council authorization and have served to bolster either a UN, AU, or regional economic community mission in need. Their mandates have either been to enforce peace so that an established mission may focus on its peacekeeping or peacebuilding mandate or to fulfill a niche mission set in support of a larger mission. These niche peacebuilding activities enable nations to contribute to the success of a mission without placing their forces under the command of the said mission (Williams, 2016).

Troop capacity is the essential link between what the mission aspires to do, the mandate, and what the mission does, the output. Logic dictates that a mandate will fail if

the force charged with implementation has neither the requisite expertise nor tools at its disposal. The examples of this have been many in peace operation history. MINUSCA's undertrained and poorly equipped forces have been unable to achieve mandated protection of civilians task (Amnesty International, 2016). ONUMOZ struggled to deploy its forces to rural Mozambique not due to a lack of equipment, but due to a shortage of trained drivers (Jett, 1999).

Haass and Ansorg's study (2018) demonstrated the success of mandate execution was dependent on quality of forces not quantity. Specifically, they found that troop quality and capacity were directly linked to the successful protection of civilians and other tasks associated with more robust mandates. Their study explained the mismatch between larger forces that have failed and smaller forces that have succeeded. Haass and Ansorg found causation to be a combination of better training, more equipment, and higher levels of political support (2018).

I adopted Haass and Ansorg's measure of a troop contributing country's (TCC) military expenditure per number of armed personnel (spending per capita) to assess the capacity of peace operations soldiers. The troop spending per capita figures were created by dividing a nation's total military expenditure by total number of military personnel. The calculation was based upon on numbers from the year a mission was initiated and measured in constant 2016 USD. This formula provided a quantifiable proxy measure of assumed military capacity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database (2018) provided the military spending numbers. *The Military Balance* annual publication by the International Institute for Strategic

Studies (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990-2015) provided the number of armed service members for each country.

This proxy is an imperfect measure. Spending per capita is an input. A forces' ability to take actions in support of a mission is the true output. However, expenditures are widely accepted as a measure of military capability (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The formula is the best available measure as it encapsulates both the equipment a military possesses as well as the training of its military forces. Higher spending per soldier equates better equipment and training (Haass & Ansorg, 2018).

Post-Cold War frequently employed assistance programs to augment the training, equipping, and sustainment of peace operation forces. It was therefore necessary to examine the impact of these programs on the capability of forces to conduct mandated tasks in pursuit of a successful peace operation. The presence of African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program or African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) trained forces and African Peace Facility (APF) mission support were examined as additional independent variables. These programs affected the same capability factors Haass and Ansorg identified as affecting success. These programs support to training, equipping, and sustaining peace operations forces has been key to force development in support of African peace operations (Varhola & Varhola, 2011).

Table 3.4 below consolidated the factors that impact the peace operation force capacity. The variables have been categorized into those dealing with a mission's lead organization; the quantity and origin of its troops; and the capacity of those troops. These

variables were essential to test linkages between intervenor and mandate in my basic theory of peace operations.

Table 3.4. Peace Operation Force Composition and Capacity

Variable	Indicator Measures
Lead Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN • AU/OAU • Regional Economic Communities (RECs) • Individual Countries or Ad hoc Coalitions
Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intervenor force composition • Number of countries represented • Country representation and proportion of total force
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Troop contributing country military expenditure per armed force member • Training & equipment support from major power? yes/no. • Primary major power supporter (UK, US, France, etc)

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International Peace Institute (2018); World Bank (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015); Williams (2016).

Peace Operations Outcomes. Scholarly works of peace operations have too often delved into the reasons why an operation succeeded or failed without first defining how the assessment was reached (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Terms such as success or failure have little value unless specifically defined. I have defined success by means of a two-part question. First, was either peace established, or the mission transferred? Second, if established was peace resilient for five years? Resilient peace was defined as the absence of either war or another deployed peace operation during the five-year period. Potential outcomes were complete success, partial success, or failure. Complete success was defined as peace established and resilient in excess of five years. Partial success was defined as either peace established and lasted less than five years or mission transferred to another peace operation. Failure was defined as a mission withdrawing during a time

of war or transferring after a new war erupted. For example, UNAMIR I was coded as a failure despite it transferring to UNAMIR II which would be coded a partial success. UNAMIR I was a failure due to the Second Rwandan War beginning during its deployment. UNAMIR II deployed during the Second Rwandan War, and closed after the establishment of a peace that lasted less than five years. I utilized the decision template developed by Diehl and Druckman (2015) and elaborated by Peter (2016) to produce this definition. The section below explains selection criteria and defines specific terminology used in the research analysis.

The peace operation success decision template was designed to assist in the scoping of studies. Diehl and Druckman's template had three questions to be asked during study design. These questions were: who are the stakeholders, what is the time perspective, and what is the assessment standard. Peter added, what is the type of peace operation, to the template. My definition was created via this template. A discussion of the four questions below demonstrates the logic chain that produced my definition.

"Success for whom?" was the framework's first question. I chose success for the international community who supports the peace operation. All peace operations seek to ameliorate conflict conditions and ultimately to end the conflict (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Therefore, it is a logical position for a quantitative study of peace operations to analyze whether the investment, the operation, produced the desired outcome, the absence of war. This response may not be adequately concise for a detailed case study nor a comparative analysis that sought more causation and less correlation.

The selection of a short-term or long-term time frame is the second question. I assessed the resilience of peace at the five-year post intervention closure date. Peace was considered resilient there has been no further armed peace operations nor named conflicts per the Correlates of War standard at the five-year mark. The peace was considered not to be resilient if these standards were not met. For example, the ECOMICI peace keeping mission in Cote d'Ivoire was not coded as producing a resilient peace as both the peace keeping Operation Licorne and the peacebuilding ONUCI missions would be present for more than 10 years after the end of ECOMICI.

The selection of five-years was made to ensure sufficient time had lapsed to demonstrate the resilience of peace. A return to conflict post withdrawal demonstrates that the mission, while successful at halting violence, was unsuccessful in the superordinate goal. Timeframes for similar studies range from two to ten years (Diehl & Druckman, 2015). Selection on the lower end of the model is advantageous for policy makers who seek a rapid response and fidelity that the mission was responsible for the conditions at time of assessment. As time duration increases the conditions on the ground are influenced by an increasing number of factors that were not present at the time of mission completion. However, a longer duration reduces the impact of short-term trend and increases fidelity on the resilience of conditions created by the mission.

The framework's third point is definition of the baseline from which success is measured. My selection was to establish the baseline for success as no further armed peace interventions nor named conflicts per the Correlates of War project at the time of evaluation. This selection sought to avoid three traps associated with similar academic

studies. The postulating of counterfactual analysis requires the creation of an alternative reality in which no action is taken. The reality is that there are other options such as sanctions and diplomacy available to the international community. I have also sought to avoid the minimalist definition of any improvement. A well planned and resourced peace operation should be expected to produce something greater “one death fewer per annum”. The third trap is to compare the situation after the mission to the situation at the time of deployment. This creates a selection bias where missions appear to be more or less successful depending on if they deployed to an area during active conflict or during a ceasefire (Peter, 2016). My baseline was designed to provide feedback to my stakeholders, the international community, on the success or failure of their superordinate goal, the establishment of resilient peace.

The fourth question, what to include in the population of peace operations, is designed to maximize the comparison of like and like operations. Most studies have focused on either one category of operation or kept missions segregated into categories for comparative reasons. My study has fallen under the latter category. I have included all operations meeting the following definition: the deployment of police and/or military forces to assist in the prevention or cessation of armed conflict by serving to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; enforcement of ceasefires or peace agreements; or to build a stable peace (Williams, 2013). I segregated these missions based on mandates categories of monitor, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. These categories facilitated both the comparison of like with like missions and the evaluation of outcome trends by mission type.

My answers to the framework’s questions produced a definition of success that enabled comparison among and between the 86 missions identified in the study. The question of success identifies output and impact resulting in the three potential answers; complete success, partial success, or failure.

My definition of success was similar to many other studies that asked what was the output, peace or no peace, and the impact, resilient peace. These included the works of Fortna (2008) and Fiedler (2000). My output varied slight from the others in that I incorporated mission transfer into the structure. The three potential outputs identified whether the mission was successful and to what degree. See Table 3.5 below for the measurements of success, the dependent variable.

Table 3.5. Peace Operations Outcome Variables

Variable	Indicator Measure
Peace at mission end	yes or no
Mission transfer	yes or no
Outbreak of war during deployment	yes or no
Peace maintained 5 years	yes or no

The potential outputs based on this model are as follows:

- Complete Mission Success: Peace was established prior to mission departure, and peace was resilient for a period of five-years.
- Partial Mission Success: Peace was established prior to mission departure or mission responsibilities transferred to another operation. Any peace established was not resilient to the five-year

mark as indicated by the deployment of another peace operation or the outbreak of a named war.

- Mission Failure: Peace was not established and mission withdrew; or mission transferred after a new war began.

This measurement of success indicates if a mission resolved a conflict, produced some positive outcomes, or failed. Failure indicates the intervenor was unable to establish peace and withdrew. Missions which failed to prevent the onset of a new war and then transferred are also determined to be failures. Partial Success correlates a failure of the mandate to fully address the underlying root causes of conflict. Any peace established by a partially successful mission proved resilient for less than five years as indicated by the eruption of a named war or the deployment of a subsequent peace operation. A partially successful mission may have also produced some positive outcomes before transferring to another operation. Complete success indicated that the operation was capable of producing peace and that the mission addressed the conflict conditions sufficiently to make that peace resilient.

Mission Completion Terms: Transition and Close. These are not used in the same construct as utilized in the 2008 UN Capstone project. In the UN Capstone the term transition refers to the end of military involvement and the transition to a wholly civilian mission set under a new name and structure. This study is focused on interventions with a military aspect. As such, the terms are utilized in a manner germane to the study's purpose.

Transfer or transition refers to a mission whose responsibilities are transferred from one to another named mission. These missions may be led by different organizations; may or utilize the same personnel; and may add or subtract from the mandated responsibilities. Peace operations focused on the Darfur Rebellion are a seminal example of transition. The response to Darfur began with an AU led observation mission, transitioned to an AU led peacekeeping mission, and then transitioned to a hybrid AU/UN led mission. The transition from observation to peacekeeping maintained the same leadership but changed the mandate and the personnel. The second transition maintained the same personnel but changed leadership.

Close refers to a mission whose end does not coincide with a transfer of responsibility to another mission involving military personnel. Often times, these missions do not close all offices, but change into a solely civilian mission focused on providing assistance to local authorities and continuing the peace building actions of a mission. However, these civilian missions do not include a military element and conduct operations on a level below those specifically defined as peace operations.

Summary

This chapter examined the variables connected to conflict characteristics, mandate type, and intervenor capacity as well as their impacts on the chain of success or failure connecting these independent variables with the dependent variable. My study examined all peace operations in post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa. Information began with Williams' (2016) list of peace operations and was augmented by the conflict and intervention descriptions in Chapter 2. Variables that affected the success or failure of

peace operations were identified from previous studies discussed in Chapter 1 and elaborated on in this chapter. These variables were categorized into those that pertained to the conflict, the mandate, and the intervening force.

This chapter explained these variables and their impacts. Numerous conflict related variables were found to increase or decrease the likelihood of a successful intervention. Qualitative analysis of conflicts is concluded in Chapter 4 and categorizes conflicts based on the presence or absence of these variables. Also discussed were mandate variables that delineate operations as being either a peace monitoring, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacebuilding mission type. Finally, those variables that impact force capacity including the construction of a proxy figure were discussed. These variables have been shown to measure the ability of an implementing force to accomplish its mandated tasks. These independent variables all influence the

The following chapter tests my nine hypotheses to examine the peace operations discussed in Chapter 2 by means of the variables presented in this chapter. This hypothesis testing provides answers on the relationships between and outputs produced by various conflicts complexities, mandate types, and intervenor capacity.

CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

This chapter examines each of the hypotheses listed at the beginning of the Methodology chapter, in order to test the basic theory of peace operations outlined in Figure 1.1. in the Introductory chapter. The logic of this theory is that the conflict conditions existing in an African country will be addressed by the peace operations mandate to be carried out by military forces charged to achieve conflict settlement conditions that ameliorate violence and establish and enforce a sustaining peace agreement.

Peace Operations Data

The data descriptions in Chapter 2 provided the basic information on variables listed in the Methodology chapter, augmented by Williams' (2016) list of 83 African peace operations that occurred between 1990 and 2015 (including mission name, location, dates, and deployed size) plus three additional peace operations not included in Williams' list, for a total of 86 cases. I expanded Williams' data to incorporate these three additional cases to incorporate one recent mission and two that met my peace operation criteria, but did not appear on his list. The French operations Turquoise was included in my list as it received UN authorization and deployed into a Sub-Saharan country during the relevant timeframe. Williams' did not provide a reason for not including Operation Turquoise, but may have omitted the operations due to the debate as to if France's goal was in line with the UN mandate (Conroy, 2018). Operation Barkhane

was the successor mission to Operation Serval and was included to update Williams' list. I counted AMIS 1 and AMIS 2 as separate missions to accommodate for the change in mandate and force structure brought by the transition. Considering AMIS as two separate missions is also in line with the official position of the EU and others (Janos, 2009). Williams himself included the EU Support to AMIS 2 mission in his list but did not differentiate AMIS 2 as a separate mission from AMIS 1. Table 4.1 shows basic information about each mission, organized alphabetically by country of deployment, and the mission outcome using the measures described in the Methodology chapter.

Table 4.1. Sub Saharan African Peace Operations: 1990-2015

Country	Type	Lead Org	Name	Start Date	End Date	Outcome*
Angola	MON	UN	UNAVEM I	1/3/1989	6/6/1991	Partial Success
	PKO	UN	UNAVEM II	5/1/1991	2/1/1995	Failure
	PKO	UN	UNAVEM III	2/1/1995	6/1/1997	Partial Success
	PKO	UN	MONUA	6/1/1997	3/20/1999	Failure
Burundi	MON	OAU	OMIB	12/7/1993	7/31/1996	Failure
	PKO	AU	SAPSD****	10/27/2001	8/8/2009	Complete Success
	PKO	AU	AMIB	2/12/2003	5/20/2004	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN	ONUB	5/21/2004	12/31/2006	Complete Success
CAR	PEO	Inter-African Force	MISAB	2/1/1997	4/1/1998	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN	MINURCA	4/1/1998	2/1/2000	Partial Success
	PEO	CEN-SAD	CEN-SAD	2/1/2002	12/28/2002	Partial Success
	PEO	CEMAC	FOMUC	10/1/2002	7/1/2008	Partial Success
	PEO	ECCAS	MICOPAX	6/20/2008	12/19/2013	Failure
	PEO	France	Operation Sangaris**	12/5/2013	10/31/2016	Partial Success
	PKO	AU	MISCA	12/19/2013	9/15/2014	Partial Success
	PKO	EU	EUFOR RCA**	9/15/2014	3/15/2015	Partial Success
PBO+	UN	MINUSCA	9/15/2014	3/30/2019	Ongoing	

Chad	MON	UN	UNASOG	5/1/1994	6/1/1994	Complete Success
	PBO	UN	MINURCAT	9/25/2007	12/31/2010	Complete Success
	PKO	EU	EUFOR-Chad**	1/28/2008	3/15/2009	Complete Success
Comoros	MON	OAU	OMIC	11/25/1997	5/30/1999	Failure
	MON	AU	OMIC 2	11/27/2001	2/2/2002	Partial Success
	MON	AU	OMIC 3	3/15/2002	5/15/2002	Partial Success
	MON	AU	MIOC / OMIC4	3/9/2004	5/9/2004	Partial Success
	MON	AU	AMISEC	3/21/2006	6/9/2006	Partial Success
	PKO	AU	MAES	5/9/2007	10/30/2008	Complete Success
	PEO	AU	Democracy in the Comoros**	3/25/2008	4/30/2008	Complete Success
Cote d'Ivoire	PEO	France	Operation Licorne**	9/22/2002	1/21/2015	Partial Success***
	PKO	ECOWAS	ECOMICI	10/1/2002	4/4/2004	Partial Success
	MON	UN	MINUCI	5/13/2003	4/4/2004	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN	ONUCI	4/4/2004	6/30/2017	Partial Success***
DRC	MON	OAU	OAU Observer Mission	11/16/1999	11/30/2000	Partial Success
	PKO	UN	MONUC-a	11/30/1999	1/1/2002	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN	MONUC-b	1/1/2002	6/30/2010	Partial Success
	PEO	EU	Operation Artemis**	6/1/2003	9/1/2003	Partial Success
	PBO	EU	EUSEC-CONGO**	1/1/2005	3/30/2019	Ongoing
	PBO	EU	EUFOR-RD**	4/25/2006	9/1/2006	Partial Success
Ethiopia and Eritrea	PBO+	UN	MONUSCO	7/1/2010	3/30/2019	Ongoing
	MON	AU	OLMEE, AULMEE**	7/31/2000	7/31/2008	Complete Success
	PKO	UN	UNMEE	7/31/2000	7/31/2008	Complete Success
Guinea-Bissau	PKO	ECOWAS	ECOMOG-GB	12/26/1998	6/7/1999	Complete Success
	PBO	EU	EU SSR	2/12/2008	9/30/2010	Failure

	PBO	Anglola	MISSANG-GB	3/21/2011	6/9/2012	Failure
	PKO	ECOWAS	ECOMIB	5/16/2012	6/30/2017	Ongoing
Lake Chad Basin	PEO	MNJTF+Benin	MNJTF vs Boko Haram	10/7/2014	3/30/2019	Ongoing
Liberia	PEO	ECOWAS	ECOMOG-L	8/24/1990	2/2/1998	Partial Success
	MON	UN	UNOMIL**	9/1/1993	9/1/1997	Partial Success
	PKO	ECOWAS	ECOMIL	8/4/2003	9/30/2003	Partial Success
	PEO	US	JTF Liberia**	8/14/2003	9/30/2003	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN	UNMIL	10/1/2003	3/30/2018	Partial Success***
Mali	PEO	AU/ECOWAS	AFISMA	12/20/2012	4/1/2013	Partial Success
	PEO	France	Operation Serval**	1/11/2013	7/15/2014	Partial Success
	PBO	EU	EUTM Mali**	2/1/2013	3/30/2019	Ongoing
Mali and others	PBO+	UN	MINUSMA	4/25/2013	3/30/2019	Ongoing
	PEO	France	Operation Barkhane**	8/1/2014	3/30/2019	Ongoing
Mozambique	MON	Eight Allied Nations	JVC	12/1/1990	10/1/1992	Partial Success
	PBO	UN	ONUMOZ	12/1/1992	12/1/1994	Complete Success
Namibia	PBO	UN	UNTAG	4/1/1989	3/1/1990	Complete Success
Rwanda	MON	OAU	OAU MOT	4/1/1991	9/1/1991	Partial Success
	MON	OAU	OAU	9/1/1991	7/1/1992	Partial Success
	MON	OAU	NMOG I	8/1/1992	11/1/1993	Partial Success
	PKO	UN	UNAMIR I	10/1/1993	5/17/1994	Failure
	PBO+	UN	UNAMIR II	5/18/1994	3/1/1996	Partial Success
Rwanda/ Uganda	PEO	France	Operation Turquoise**	6/1/1994	7/1/1994	Failure
	MON	UN	UNOMUR	6/1/1993	9/1/1994	Failure
	PEO	ECOWAS	ECOMOG-SL	6/1/1997	5/2/2000	Failure
Sierra Leone	MON	UN	UNOMSIL	7/13/1998	10/21/1999	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN	UNAMSIL	10/22/1999	12/31/2005	Complete Success

	PEO	UK	Palliser**	5/1/2000	6/15/2000	Complete Success
	PBO+	UK	Basilica and Silkman**	6/16/2000	1/1/2005	Complete Success
Somalia	PKO	UN	UNOSOM I	4/1/1992	3/1/1993	Partial Success
	PEO	Coalition of 20 nations	UNITAF**	12/1/1992	3/1/1993	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN	UNOSOM II	3/1/1993	3/1/1995	Failure
	PEO	AU	AMISOM	1/19/2007	3/30/2019	Ongoing
	PBO	EU	EUTM Somalia**	4/10/2010	3/30/2019	Ongoing
South Africa	PBO	Commonwealth of Nations	CPAG-SA	2/1/1994	4/9/1994	Complete Success
South Sudan	PBO+	UN	UNMISS	6/9/2011	3/30/2019	Ongoing
Sudan	MON	UN	JMC and IMU	4/4/2002	6/20/2005	Partial Success
	MON	AU	AMIS 1	5/1/2004	10/1/2004	Partial Success
	PKO	AU	AMIS 2	10/1/2004	1/1/2008	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN	UNMIS	3/24/2005	7/9/2011	Partial Success
	PKO	EU	EU Support to AMIS 2**	7/18/2005	12/31/2007	Partial Success
	PBO+	UN/AU Joint	UNAMID	7/31/2007	3/30/2019	Ongoing
Western Sahara	PKO	UN	UNISFA	6/27/2011	3/30/2019	Ongoing
	MON	OAU	OAU Mission to W. Sahara	1/1/1991	4/1/1991	Partial Success
	PKO	UN	MINURSO	4/1/1991	3/30/2019	Ongoing

* Complete mission success: mandate tasks completed, peace established by mission departure, lasted at least 5 years; Partial mission success: mandate tasks completed, peace established but short-lived; Mission failure: mandate tasks not completed, peace not established. Unknown: mandate tasks completed, peace established, less than 5 years passed since mission closure.

** Parallel supporting mission. A mission deployed to complement another peace operation (e.g. EU Support to AMIS 2 provided planning, technical assistance, and troop training in support of AMIS 2).

*** Successful mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

**** SAPSD stand-alone, then parallel, then standalone mission.

+ Peacebuilding Operation with UN Chapter VII deterrence authorized in mandate.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); Williams (2016).

The following paragraphs present initial observations from the data in Table 4.1. My study identified 86 peace operations deployed to 23 countries or contiguous regions in response to 33 periods of conflict. These missions were dispersed between lead organizations with 33 UN led, 21 AU led, nine regional economic community led, and 23 “Other” missions that were atypically organized and led. These missions were spread between mandates with 21 peace monitoring, 20 peacekeeping, 19 peace enforcement, and 26 peacebuilding missions. Results were mixed with 16 mission completely successful, 44 missions partially successful, 12 failed missions, and 14 missions either ongoing or recently concluded.

Mission duration showed a slight correlation between longer missions and success. It also highlighted the trend towards longer missions. The average mission duration was 943 days (about 2.5 years). The shortest mission, Operation Turquoise, lasted a mere 30 days while the longest mission, UNMIL, lasted 5,294 days (about 14.5 years). Missions that were completely successful averaged 979 (about 2.7 years); those that were partial successful 696 days (about 1.9 years); and failed missions averaged 709 (almost 2 years). The most significant statistic was that those successfully completed in the past five years averaged 4,878 days (over 13 years) and those ongoing would have averaged 3,536 days (about 9.7 years) if they were simultaneously completed on April 20, 2019 (the cutoff date for this research). Longer duration missions were loosely associated with resilient peace outputs and more recent missions have been much longer than average.

UN led missions were the plurality composing 33 of the 86 missions analyzed. The UN led missions across the spectrum of mandates including seven peace monitoring, eight peacekeeping, three peace enforcement, and 15 peacebuilding missions. UN missions were successful 21 times; with seven completely successful and 14 partially successful. Five UN missions ended in complete failure and seven are ongoing. UN missions that have closed were on average deployed for 1,345 days (about 3.7 years); significantly longer than average.

The African Union (AU or OAU) led 21 missions. These missions included 13 peace monitoring, five peacekeeping, and three peace enforcing missions. Outcomes were generally positive with four complete successes, 14 partial successes, two failures, and one mission, AMISOM, ongoing. AU missions that have closed were on average deployed for 584 days (1.6 years); significantly shorter than average.

Regional economic communities have led nine peace operations in my study. These missions were split between four peacekeeping and five peace building missions. Outcomes were mixed with one complete success, five partial successes, two failures, and one ongoing. Regional Economic Community led missions that have closed were on average deployed for 1,124 days (just over three years); slightly longer than average.

23 peace operations were otherwise organized, i.e. they were not led by the four key players I identified. These operations were divided across the spectrum of missions with one peace monitoring mission, three peacekeeping missions, 11 peace enforcement missions, and eight peacebuilding missions. Outcomes were mixed with five complete successes, 10 partial successes, three failures, and five missions ongoing. These missions

that have closed were on average deployed for 681 days (about 1.8 years); significantly shorter than average.

Peace monitoring missions were relatively successful with 18 of 21 missions rated successful. However, there were only two instances, OLMEE and UNASOG, of a resilient peace being established after the closure of a monitoring mission. The 16 other occasions were rated as partially successful. On five occasions either a new conflict or the deployment of another peace operation occurred within five years of mission closure. In 11 occasions the mission transferred to peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission.

A majority, 13, of peace monitoring missions were led by the AU. The UN led seven and one, JVC Mozambique, was led by an ad hoc coalition. As previously stated 11 missions transferred to larger missions. Five of the 13 AU missions transitioned to UN missions. Many peace monitoring missions served as a trip-wire to larger internationalized responses to African conflicts.

Peacekeeping missions were completely successful five times, partially successful 10 times, twice resulted in failure, and three missions are ongoing. These positive outcomes are not surprising given most major studies have determined the two prerequisites for peacekeeping, an existing cease-fire and belligerent consent, are prerequisites for peace operations success in general (Fortna, 2008; Diehl, 1994; Heldt, 2001; Greig & Diehl, 2005; Fiedler, 2000).

Peacekeeping missions were led by a variety of intervening forces. UN forces led eight, the AU led five, regional economic communities led four and the EU led three. All non-UN led missions were either a partial or complete success with one currently

undetermined. The UN had a mixed outcome with two complete failures (UNAMIR I and MONUA), three partial successes (UNOSOM I, UNAVEM III, and MONUC-a), and two complete successes (UNMEE and ONUB).

The figures for peace enforcement confirm Fortna's assessment that enforcement missions were likely stop fighting but unlikely to produce resilient peace (2003). Peace enforcement operations produced a complete success only twice and then only when deployed as a parallel supporting mission. They were partially successful 11 times, a failure on three occasions, and three missions are ongoing. Regional economic communities led the majority of completed peace enforcement missions including the two of three failures, MICOPAX and ECOMOG-SL.

Peacebuilding operations were relatively successful with seven complete successes and seven partial successes. Additionally, two of the partial successes may yet prove resilient when the five-year post closure date is reached for ONUCI and UNMIL. Four peacebuilding missions failed and eight are ongoing. The UN led the majority of peacebuilding missions. They were partially successful in four of eleven missions and completely successful in five of eleven. Two of the non-UN missions in this data set were complete failures. EU SSR and MISSANG-GB were both small scale operations with limited objectives and even more limited means. They were withdrawn when failure appeared inevitable.

The information provided in Table 4.1 demonstrated the variety of operations by outcome, mandate, duration, and lead agency. The hypotheses testing elaborated on these cursory observations by examining the conflict itself, the mandates, the intervening force

capacity, and the relationships to other peace operations. The examination of these elements identified patterns that were more likely to produce desirable outcomes. These conclusions are listed by hypothesis in the following section with a summarization following the hypotheses.

Hypothesis Testing

My hypotheses focus on the relationships between various elements of a peace operation. The first hypothesis examines the relationship between the conflict characteristics and the peace operation mandate. The second hypothesis examines the relationship between the mandate and the force capability sent to implement that mandate. The third and fourth hypothesis examines the effect of intervening force capacity on mission outcome. The final five hypotheses look at specific issues that may impact the effectiveness of an operation.

The analysis for each section relied on 66 of the identified 86 peace operations. The outcomes of 20 parallel supporting operations were not included in the results. These missions were factored as an independent variable affecting the outcome of the missions they supported. Counting the outcome of these parallel operations would have double count their impact. 14 included missions were ongoing at the time of this study. A further seven had not passed the five-years post-mission closure point required for assessment of impact. Four of these missions (Operation Sangaris, EUFOR RCA, MISA, and Operation Serval) were partially successful, but did not produce a resilient peace. Three of these missions (ONUCI, UNMIL, and Operation Licorne) were counted as partially successful, but may transition to completely successful at a later date. In

summation, missions included in calculations were those deployed to directly address the conflict, not to augment an existing mission addressing the conflict, and include ongoing as well as recently closed operations.

Hypothesis 1: The Conflict Characteristics determine the peace operation mandate. The data in Table 4.2 displayed the level of conflict complexity, type of peace operation, and the mission outcome. The relationship between complex conflicts and robust peace operations was demonstrated by which mandate types have been deployed to specific conflicts. Conflicts were qualitatively assessed into each category based on the variables identified in Table 3.1 and categorized into categories of high, medium, or low complexity. The variables from Table 3.1 were those identified as having the greatest impact on making a conflict resilient to peace and reducing the likelihood of intervention success in previous studies by Fortna (2004, 2008), Doyal and Sabanis (2006), Fiedler (2000), Diehl and Balas (2014), and Walter (2010). The most significant of these variables were the presence of an intra-state war with external support to the rebels (Williams, 2016) and the absence of a cease-fire or peace agreement signed by all belligerent groups (Fortna, 2008).

Highly complex conflicts are those that exhibit all or most of the features found to increase the likelihood of conflict reoccurrence and minimize the likelihood of interventions success. Africa's World War was the most complex conflict analyzed. It had greater than three belligerent groups, more than 100,000 individuals under arms, external support to rebel forces, readily lootable resources to fund the conflict, high annual deaths due to violence, no cease-fire agreed to by all parties to the conflict, and a

low local capacity. All these factors add to the challenge of peace operation intervention and lessen the ease of successfully establishing a resilient peace. Unfortunately, these ingredients have been common to post-Cold War conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A medium complexity conflict presents serious challenges to a peace operation, but at a lesser level than a highly complex conflict. These conflicts possess some, but not all of the variables that diminish the likelihood of a successful peace operation outcome. They possess some mitigating factors such as a peace agreement, only two belligerent groups, or a highly developed economy. The Burundian conflicts were examples of medium complex conflicts. The conflicts were intrastate wars with moderate levels of violence and low local capacity. External support to rebels was limited, there were no readily lootable resources, and ceasefire agreements were in place prior to mission deployment.

Low complexity conflicts are those that do not present serious barriers to peace operation intervention. These conflicts were frequently interstate conflicts with a ceasefire or peace agreement in place. The South African Border war in Namibia was one such conflict. Namibia's long duration of conflict and intrastate fight with external support were mitigated by the presence of a peace agreement and low levels of violence. In another example, the Badme Border War was a long and bloody war but was an interstate conflict with an existent cease-fire at the time of intervention. Low complexity conflicts have features in place that better facilitate the unopposed introduction of a peace operation.

Table 4.2. Conflict Complexity and Peace Operation Mandate: Mission Outcome

Country	Conflict*	Mission Name	Mandate	Mission Outcome
<i>High Complexity (N = 8 Countries; N = 38 Peace Operations)</i>				
Angola	Angolan Control War	UNAVEM I	MON	Partial Success
CAR	Intrastate Conflict CAR War	CEN-SAD	PEO	Partial Success
		FOMUC	PEO	Partial Success
		MICOPAX	PEO	Failure
		Operation Sangaris**	PEO	Partial Success
		MISCA	PKO	Partial Success
		EUFOR RCA** MINUSCA	PKO PBO+	Partial Success Ongoing
DRC	Africa's World War	OAU Observer Msn	MON	Partial Success
		MONUC-a	PKO	Partial Success
		MONUC-b	PBO+	Partial Success
		Operation Artemis**	PEO	Partial Success
		EUSEC-CONGO**	PBO	Ongoing
		EUFOR-RD**	PBO	Partial Success
		MONUSCO	PBO+	Ongoing
Liberia	1 st and 2 nd Liberia Wars 2 nd Liberia War Liberia-LURD War	ECOMOG-L	PEO	Partial Success
		UNOMIL**	MON	Partial Success
		ECOMIL	PKO	Partial Success
		JTF Liberia**	PEO	Partial Success
		UNMIL	PBO+	Partial Success***
Sierra Leone	First Sierra Leone War Second Sierra Leone War	ECOMOG-SL	PEO	Failure
		UNOMSIL	MON	Partial Success
		UNAMSIL	PBO+	Complete Success
		Palliser** Basilica and Silkman**	PEO PBO+	Complete Success Complete Success
Somalia	2 nd Somali War	UNOSOM I	PKO	Partial Success
		UNITAF**	PEO	Partial Success

	3 rd Somali War	UNOSOM II AMISOM EUTM Somalia**	PBO+ PEO PBO	Failure Ongoing Ongoing
South Sudan	South Sudanese Civil War	UNMISS	PBO+	Ongoing
Sudan	Darfur Rebellion	JMC and IMU AMIS 1 AMIS 2 EU Support to AMIS 2**	MON MON PKO PKO	Partial Success Partial Success Partial Success Partial Success
	2 nd South Sudan War	UNAMID UNMIS UNISFA	PBO+ PBO+ PKO	Ongoing Partial Success Ongoing
<i>Medium Complexity (N = 9 Countries; N = 30 Peace Operations)</i>				
Angola	Angolan War of the Cities	UNAVEM II UNAVEM III MONUA	PKO PKO PKO	Failure Partial Success Failure
Burundi	Second Burundi War Third Burundi War	OMIB SAPSD**** AMIB ONUB	MON PKO PKO PBO+	Failure Complete Success Partial Success Complete Success
CAR	Intrastate Conflict	MISAB MINURCA	PEO PBO+	Partial Success Partial Success
Chad	Chad-United Opposition War	MINURCAT EUFOR-Chad**	PBO PKO	Complete Success Complete Success
Cote d'Ivoire	1 st Ivoirian Civil War	Operation Licorne** ECOMICI MINUCI ONUCI	PEO PKO MON PBO+	Partial Success*** Partial Success Partial Success Partial Success***
Lake Chad Basin	Boko Haram War	MNJTF	PEO	Ongoing
Mali		AFISMA	PEO	Partial Success

	Tuareg Independence War	Operation Serval**	PEO	Partial Success
		EUTM Mali**	PBO	Ongoing
		MINUSMA	PBO+	Ongoing
		Operation Barkhane**	PEO	Ongoing
Mozambique	Mozambique War	JVC	MON	Partial Success
		ONUMOZ	PBO	Complete Success
Rwanda	Intrastate Conflict	OAU MOT	MON	Partial Success
		OAU NMOG I	MON	Partial Success
		OAU NMOG II	MON	Partial Success
		UNOMUR	MON	Failure
		UNAMIR I	PKO	Failure
	2 nd Rwanda War	UNAMIR II	PBO+	Partial Success
		Operation Turquoise**	PEO	Failure

Low Complexity (N = 7 Countries; N = 18 Peace Operations)

Chad	Azouzou Strip War	UNASOG	MON	Complete Success
Comoros	Intrastate Conflict	OMIC	MON	Failure
		OMIC 2	MON	Partial Success
		OMIC 3	MON	Partial Success
		MIOC / OMIC4	MON	Partial Success
		AMISEC	MON	Partial Success
		MAES	PKO	Complete Success
		Democracy in the Comoros**	PEO	Complete Success
Ethiopia and Eritrea	Badmee Border War	OLMEE, AULMEE**	MON	Complete Success
		UNMEE	PKO	Complete Success
Guinea-Bissau	GB Military War	ECOMOG-GB	PKO	Complete Success
	Intrastate Conflict	EU SSR	PBO	Failure
		MISSANG-GB	PBO	Failure
		ECOMIB	PKO	Ongoing
Namibia	South African Border War	UNTAG	PBO	Complete Success
South Africa	Inkatha-ANC War	CPAG-SA	PBO	Complete Success

Western Sahara	Western Sahara War	OAU Mission to W. Sahara	MON	Partial Success
		MINURSO	PKO	Ongoing

* Conflict names and durations from Sakees and Wayman (2010), and Dixon and Sarkees (2016).

“Intrastate conflict” label denotes period of less than war violence.

** Parallel supporting mission. A mission deployed to complement another peace operation.

*** Successful mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

**** SAPSD stand-alone, then parallel, then standalone mission.

+ Peacebuilding Operation with UN Chapter VII deterrence authorized in mandate.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); Williams (2016).

The analysis indicated a strong correlation between mission type and conflict complexity. The more complex a conflict the more likely was the deployment of a peacebuilding mission. This correlation was especially drastic when looking at robust peacebuilding missions. Peace enforcement deployment displayed a similar array favoring more complex conflicts. Peace monitoring missions were deployed in an inverse pattern with a preponderance of low complexity conflicts receiving a peace monitoring deployment. Peacekeeping missions were the only type to not display a distinct pattern based on conflict complexity. The output demonstrated a strong link between deployed mission type, excepting peacekeeping, and conflict complexity. The data strongly supported hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2: Peace Operations mandate determines the force capacity. It was assumed that peace monitoring missions would deploy the smallest number of troops due to their limited mission scope. Traditional peacekeeping missions were assumed to have the next smallest force as their interpositional mission function requires sufficient numbers to deter an attack. Peace enforcement missions were assumed to be larger than peacekeeping due to the requirement that they contain sufficient numbers and capacities

to deter or defeat belligerents acting against the interests of the mandate. Finally, peacebuilding missions were assumed have the largest number of troops due to the varied and complex mission tasks they carry out; many that encompass either in part or in whole the mission tasks of other mission types. Table 4.3 was compiled to determine the mean and median size of missions and capacity of deployed personnel categorized by mandate type. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.

Table 4.3. Peace Operations Mission Force Capacity and Mandate Outcome

Mission Name	Lead Org	Number of Troops	Average Troop Investment*	Mandate Success
Peacebuilding. N = 20				
	Mission Size	Mean: 10,516	Median 8,873	
	Troop Capacity	Mean: \$33,382	Median: \$17,017	
UNOSOM II	UN	28,559	\$96,885	No
UNAMID	UN	23,448	\$11,161	Ongoing
MONUSCO	UN	21,222	\$15,963	Ongoing
MONUC-b	UN	20,796	\$11,965	Yes
UNAMSIL	UN	17,477	\$3,406	Yes
UNMIL	UN	15,250	\$4,370	Yes
UNMISS	UN	13,035	\$16,481	Ongoing
MINUSCA	UN	12,361	\$14,043	Yes
MINUSMA	UN	11,693	\$30,240	Ongoing
UNMIS	UN	9,817	\$17,552	Yes
UNAMIR II	UN	7,750	\$3,444	Yes
ONUMOZ	UN	6,576	\$19,132	Yes
ONUCI	UN	6,560	\$8,589	Yes

ONUB	UN	5,665	\$12,994	Yes
UNTAG	UN	4,493	\$27,084**	Yes
MINURCAT	UN	3,814	\$36,712	Yes
MINURCA	UN	1,505	\$26,579	Yes
MISSANG-GB	AU	250	\$31,106	No
CPAG-SA	OTHER	33	\$136,917	Yes
EU SSR	OTHER	8	\$143,010	No

Peace Enforcement. N = 9

Mission Size Mean: 6,715 Median 2,990
Troop Capacity Mean: \$7,287 Median: \$9,258

AMISOM	AU	22,126	\$9,258	Ongoing
ECOMOG-L	REC	12,040	\$2,949	Yes
MNJTF	OTHER	10,000	\$12,387	Ongoing
ECOMOG-SL	REC	9,000	\$3,719	No
AFISMA	AU	2,990	\$9,816	No
MICOPAX	AU	2,800	\$9,258	No
MISAB	AU	800	\$3,906	Yes
FOMUC	OTHER	380	\$3,577	Yes
CEN-SAD	REC	300	\$10,715	Yes

Peacekeeping. N = 18

Mission Size Mean: 2,702 Median 2,308
Troop Capacity Mean: \$14,205 Median: \$9,011

UNAVEM III	UN	7,294	\$9,824	Yes
AMIS 2	AU	6,295	\$8,197	Yes
MISCA	OTHER	5,142	\$10,205	No
UNISFA	UN	4,529	\$3,224	Ongoing

UNMEE	UN	4,209	\$39,841	Yes
ECOMIL	REC	3,556	\$4,256	Yes
MONUC-a	UN	3,395	\$10,050	Yes
AMIB	AU	2,989	\$4,958	Yes
MONUA	OTHER	2,484	\$7,559	No
UNAMIR I	UN	2,131	\$19,656	No
ECOMICI	REC	1,500	\$4,256	Yes
UNAVEM II	UN	1,327	\$7,892	No
UNOSOM I	UN	952	\$20,490	Yes
SAPSD	AU	750	\$56,865	Yes
ECOMOG-GB	REC	712	\$4,417	Yes
ECOMIB	REC	700	\$10,205	Yes
MAES	OTHER	430	\$8,197	Yes
MINURSO	UN	250	\$25,606	Ongoing

Peace Monitoring. N = 19

Mission Size Mean: 87 Median: 43
Troop Capacity Mean: \$16,874 Median: \$7,111

AMISEC	AU	432	\$7,111	Yes
AMIS 1	AU	390	\$4,958	Yes
UNOMSIL	UN	139	\$13,302	Yes
OAU NMOG II	AU	132	\$6,629	Yes
UNOMUR	UN	82	\$22,095	No
MINUCI	REC	75	\$5,040	Yes
OMIB	AU	67	\$7,865	Yes
UNAVEM I	UN	67	\$16,833	Yes

OAU Observer Mission	AU	43	\$3,906	Yes
OAU NMOG I	AU	40	\$8,641	No
MIOC / OMIC4	UN	39	\$4,958	Yes
JVC	OTHER	30	\$50,190	Yes
JMC and IMU	REC	25	\$135,113	Yes
OMIC 3	AU	25	\$3,577	Yes
OMIC	AU	20	\$3,719	No
OAU MOT	AU	15	\$9,302	No
OMIC 2	AU	14	\$3,577	Yes
UNASOG	UN	9	\$4,488**	Yes
OAU Mission to Western Sahara	UN	not available	\$9,302**	Yes

*Average troop investment is the average expense per troop in constant 2016 USD. The figure is produced by dividing the total nation military expenditure of a TCC by the total armed service members of that country. The numbers are then combined based on numbers of troops to produce the average investment into each troop in a mission. Calculations were based on top ten contributors to each mission.

**Numbers are an estimate based on known TCCs for these missions. Exact mission composition is unavailable.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International Peace Institute (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015); Williams (2016).

The analysis found that mandate type had a strong correlation with mission troop size and capacity. Peacebuilding missions averaged 10,516 troops, peace enforcement missions 6,715 troops, peacekeeping missions 2,702 troops, and peace monitoring missions 87 troops. These totals were in line with the hypotheses and demonstrate that the mission type had a strong influence over the mission size.

However, size is not the only determinant of force capacity. As previously discussed, there have been events in peacekeeping history when troops were unable to execute a task based not on sufficient troop numbers, but on a lack of training and skills (Jett, 1999; Daniel, 2013). Troop contributing country annual expenditure per soldier is the common measure of the capacity of individual soldiers. This figure captured both the training and equipping a soldier from a particular nation would receive on average. Table 4.3 also captured the average expenditure per troop for all relevant peace operation missions. This calculation encapsulated the organic troop training capability of the troop contributing countries. External support to bolster troop capability is assessed later under the hypotheses focusing on partnered and supported missions.

The analysis demonstrated disparate findings for average troop capacity for each mandate type. Peacebuilding operations had the highest average troop capacity based on a mean and a median analysis. These numbers are reflective of large UN peacebuilding missions that attract troop contributions from outside the Sub-Saharan region. Peace enforcement missions had the lowest mean capacity but the second highest median capacity. Peacekeeping operations were near the average capacity numbers. Peace monitoring was second highest on average but lowest on a median basis. The peacebuilding numbers demonstrated a correlation to better trained and equipped troops being deployed for the complex tasks associated with peacebuilding. The peace enforcing numbers display the prevalence of peace enforcement missions being conducted by regional economic community members that are on average less well funded than troops deployed from outside the Sub-Saharan Africa region. The

peacekeeping and monitoring numbers were mainly reflective of the lower per troop spending norms in earlier years when these missions were more prevalent.

Mandates did impact the size and capacity of troops deployed. Peace Monitoring missions were the smallest missions in terms of size and had capacities that ranged widely. Peacekeeping missions had the next largest size and a capacity near the mean for all operations. Peace enforcement missions had the second largest size but a limited capacity reflective of their being predominantly sourced from regional economic communities. Finally, peacebuilding missions were both the largest and had the highest capacity. These findings validated hypothesis two.

Hypothesis 3: The force capacity determines peace operations outcome. Does increased force capacity equate better peace operations outcome. Troop numbers and TCC spending per troop have been closely correlated with mission type. Therefore, it was necessary to examine these outputs by mandate category. Table 4.4 explains outcomes categorized by mission type and above or below the median level for number of troops and per troop capacity. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.

Table 4.4. Peace Operations Mission Force Capacity and Mandate: Mission Outcome

		Success		Failure	Ongoing
		Complete	Partial		
<i>Peace Monitoring</i>		N = 19			
Force Size (Number of troops)	Larger*	-	7	2	-
	Smaller	1	8	1	-
Troop Investment (\$ per solider)	Larger	-	7	2	-
	Smaller	1	8	1	-
<i>Peacekeeping</i>		N = 18			
Force Size (Number of troops)	Larger	1	6	1	1
	Smaller	3	2	2	2
Troop Investment (\$ per solider)	Larger	2	4	1	2
	Smaller	2	4	2	1
<i>Peace Enforcement</i>		N = 9			
Force Size (Number of troops)	Larger	-	1	1	2
	Smaller	-	4	1	-
Troop Investment (\$ per solider)	Larger	-	2	-	2
	Smaller	-	3	2	-
<i>Peacebuilding</i>		N = 20			
Force Size (Number of troops)	Larger	1	3**	1	5
	Smaller	5	3**	2	-
Troop Investment (\$ per solider)	Larger	4	2	3	1
	Smaller	2	4***	-	4

*Note: Larger = above median, Smaller = at or below median.

** Includes 1 case (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

*** Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); International Peace Institute (2018); World Bank (2018); SIPRI (2018); IISS (1990-2015) Williams (2016).

The comparison of missions that were larger and had more per troop capacity than the median for their category provided limited patterns from which to draw conclusions.

Peace monitoring missions were marginally more successful if they were smaller and had

less capacity. Peacekeeping missions were less likely to fail with a larger mission, but the data otherwise showed no clear pattern. Peace enforcement missions were less likely to fail if they were better equipped. Peacebuilding operations that had a smaller force size with more funding produced both the most complete successes and failures. In total, these results gave no clear guidance on the ideal combination of size and capacity.

Hypothesis 3 was not supported by the findings.

Hypothesis 4: The intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations outcomes. Different intervening organizations have different restrictions, levels of experience, and resources at their disposal. Balas (2011) found the UN to be more experienced and have greater resources. The AU and regional economic communities were found to be less capable and experienced. Commonly, the African intervenors initiated an intervention that then transferred to the UN once adequate political will had developed.

Table 4.5 provides the outcome of peace operations organized by intervenor group and mandate type. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.

Table 4.5. Intervener Group and Peace Operations Mandate: Mission Outcome

	Success		Failure	Ongoing	Totals
	Complete	Partial			
<i>United Nations. N = 32</i>					
Peace Monitoring	1	4	1	-	6
Peacekeeping	1	3	3	2	9
Peacebuilding	5	6*	1	5	17
Totals	7	13	5	7	32
<i>African Union. N = 19</i>					
Peace Monitoring	-	10	2	-	12
Peacekeeping	2	3	-	-	5
Peace Enforcement	-	1	-	1	2
Totals	2	14	2	1	19
<i>Regional Economic Communities. N = 9</i>					
Peacekeeping	1	2	-	1	4
Peace Enforcement	-	3	2	-	5
Totals	1	5	2	1	9
<i>Ad hoc / Other. N = 6</i>					
Peace Monitoring	-	1	-	-	1
Peace Enforcement	-	1	-	1	2
Peacebuilding	1	-	2	-	3
Totals	1	2	2	1	6
Totals	11	34	11	10	66

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations (2018); Williams (2016).

The data outlined in Table 4.5 does not validate the hypothesis. Different intervening organizations produced different rates of success in line with their demonstrated mission type preferences. The UN has played in leading a majority of large peacebuilding operations that have been generally either successful or are still ongoing.

The AU has played a leading role in peace monitoring missions that then transitioned to larger UN missions. As such the AU has produced high rates of partial success with few completely successful missions. Regional economic communities have conducted many peace enforcement missions as an intervenor of last resort. This was reflected in their high rate of failure. Any impact of intervening organization was more closely related to the mandate type than an impact from the organization. Hypothesis 4 was not supported by the data.

Hypothesis 5: Robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates.

Robust mandates describes peace enforcement missions and those peacebuilding operations mandated to employ deterrent force. These offensive capabilities are designed to deter attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians, and/or assist in maintaining law and order. These mandates frequently include language authorizing the use of all necessary means to defend the mandate or protect civilians. The offensive use of force differentiates robust from traditional operations (United Nations, 2018).

Robustness is contrasted by traditional peacekeeping that allowed for use of force only in self-defense of the peacekeeping force itself (Diehl & Balas, 2014).

Table 4.6 provides the outcome of robust and traditional defensive postured mandates. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.

Table 4.6. Robust Peace Operation Mandates and Mission Outcome

<i>Robust Mandate?</i>	Success				Total
	Complete	Partial	Failure	Ongoing	
Yes	2	10	3	6	21
Peace Enforcement	-	5	2	1	8
Peacebuilding (Robust)	2	5*	1	5	13
No	9	24	8	4	45
Total	11	34	11	10	66

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations (2018); Williams (2016).

Robust missions produced fewer complete or partial successes. Robust peacebuilding missions produced near average outputs and peace enforcement missions produced dismal results with no complete successes. These results validated the view that violence itself cannot address the underlying causes of the conflict; should be employed as only a part of a strategy; and that peace operations succeed most where there is peace to be kept (Fortna, 2008). Lower outputs of complete success could be expected due to the prevalence of deployment to complex conflicts such as the South Sudanese Civil War and Africa’s World War. However, robust mandates failed to keep pace with even modest expectations. The data did not support hypothesis 5.

Hypothesis 6: Sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success rates. The terms sequential, serialized, or transitioned operations all refer to the same construct. These are operations in which one mission performs duties in before or after the mission of a different named mission without a break in mandated responsibility for

the same temporal space (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Table 4.7 compared the outcome of operations based on whether or not they were part of a serial. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.

Table 4.7. Sequential Peace Operations and Mission Outcome

<i>Sequential Mission?</i>	Success		Failure	Ongoing	Total
	Complete	Partial			
Yes	4	29*	7	7	47
No	7	5	4	3	19
Total	11	34	11	10	66

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations (2018); Williams (2016).

The results demonstrated that sequential missions produced nearly the same rate of successful outcome as standalone missions. Sequential missions do stand out in terms of producing partially successful missions, but were much less likely to result in a complete success. Serials were nearly as likely as standalone missions to produce a resilient peace only if the chains of intervention were counted as a whole (i.e. only the impact from the final mission in the serial). The data did not support hypothesis 6.

The most common pattern was a serial commencing with either a regional economic community or an AU led mission that then transferred to a UN led mission. The initial missions were nearly always either peace monitoring or peace enforcement and deployed to an active conflict without an existent cease fire agreement. The follow-on missions were mainly peacekeeping operations after a cease-fire was established. These missions then transferred to a peacebuilding mission after the signing of a peace

agreement. These UN missions were given robust enforcement authorization in those conflicts in which violence continued (Derblom, Hagstrom Frisell, & Schmidt, 2008). While this was the dominant model, there were many other subgroups. In some operations a temporary enforcement mission was deployed alongside the primary mission to reduce the violence to a manageable level or to defeat a miscreant group that is preventing the peace process from progressing. Regardless of the exact pattern, multiple operations have become the norm (Balas, 2011). In more recent operations it has become rare for only one peace operation to be deployed to halt or prevent a descent into violence as evidenced by nine of 12 ongoing or recently closed missions being part of a serial.

Bridging and hand-overs are the two types of sequential operations. Bridging is when one mission deploys for a relatively short period of time with the express purpose of preparing for another organization to take over responsibilities (Balas, 2011). The EU led Operation Artemis was a bridging mission authorized by the UN Security Council to stabilize an area of the DRC in preparation for the deployment of MONUC. Artemis deployed for a limited duration with specific goals, and the intention of bridging to another mission (Diehl & Balas, 2014). Hand-overs differ in that they are a permanent change of responsibility. Hand-overs can be either from one organization to another. Such as were the cases of the ECOWAS missions ECOMOG and ECOMICI transferring responsibility over to the UN missions ECOMIL and ONUCI after the establishment of peace agreements in the Liberia – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy War and the First Ivoirian Civil War respectively. Handovers have also occurred within an organization in response to a changing conditions. This was the case in Rwanda when

the UN reflagged UNAMIR as UNAMIR II in 1994. UNAMIR II transformed the mandate from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and added several thousand troops to the authorized numbers (United Nations, 2001).

Sequential operations have composed a key component of the African peace operation landscape. The established patterns embolden regional actors to intervene to prevent an active intra-state conflict from becoming a regional issue. The regional actors have done so with a tacit understanding that the UN will assist once a cease-fire is in place (Balas, 2011). This norm has enabled the UN to avoid leading peace enforcement operations and local actors to utilize their limited resources to the greatest effect.

Hypothesis 7: Force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater peace operations success. Parallel peace operations are those that are deployed at the same time, in the same conflict, but under different lead organizations (Balas, 2011). The supported or primary operation is mandated to take action focused on the conflict. The supporting operation is mandated to aid and assist the primary mission. It is an auxiliary operation that seeks to assist the supported operation by doing what it is not mandated or not able to accomplish. Most often, the supported mission is a peacebuilding mandate under the auspices of the UN or AU, while the supporting mission is peace enforcement or training mission led by either a western power or a regional organization. Parallel peace operations allow organizations to focus on their strengths and rely on allied organizations or countries to complement their efforts. Table 4.8 compared the outcomes of missions that were or were not supported by a parallel supporting peace operation. Table 4.9 listed each supported mission organized by mandate type. These tables

excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.

Table 4.8. Parallel Supporting Peace Operations and Mission Outcomes

<i>Mission Supported by a Parallel Mission?</i>	Success		Failure	Ongoing	Total
	Complete	Partial			
Yes	5	14*	-	4	23
No	6	20	11	6	43
	11	34	11	10	66

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations (2018); Williams (2016).

Table 4.9. Peace Operation Parallel Support Relationships and Mandate Types: Mission Outcome

Supported Mission	Type	Lead Org	Supporting Mission	Mission Outcome
ONUB	PBO	UN	SAPSD	Complete Success
MINURCAT	PBO	UN	EUFOR-Chad	Complete Success
UNAMSIL	PBO	UN	Operation Palliser & Basilica-Silkman	Complete Success
UNMEE	PKO	UN	OLMEE, AULMEE	Complete Success
MAES	PKO	AU	Operation Democracy in the Comoros	Complete Success
MONUC-b	PBO	UN	Operation Artemis, EUSEC, and EUFOR-RD	Partial Success
UNAMIR II	PBO	UN	Operation Turquoise	Partial Success
ECOMOG-L	PEO	REC	UNOMIL	Partial Success
MISAB	PEO	OTHER	Unnamed French Operation	Partial Success
AFISMA	PEO	AU	Operation Serval / EUTM	Partial Success

UNOSOM I	PKO	UN	UNITAF	Partial Success
ECOMICI	PKO	REC	Operation Licorne	Partial Success
ECOMIL	PKO	REC	JTF Liberia	Partial Success
AMIB	PKO	AU	SAPSD	Partial Success
MISCA	PKO	AU	Operation Sangaris	Partial Success
AMIS 2	PKO	AU	EU Support to AMIS2	Partial Success
MINUCI	MON	UN	Operation Licorne	Partial Success
ONUCI	PBO	UN	Operation Licorne	Partial Success*
UNMIL	PBO	UN	JTF Liberia	Partial Success*
MINUSCA	PBO	UN	EUFOR RCA / Operation Sangaris	Ongoing
MINUSMA	PEO	UN	Operation Serval and Barkhane / EUTM	Ongoing
MNJTF	PEO	OTHER	Operation Barkhane	Ongoing
AMISOM	PEO	AU	EUTM Somalia	Ongoing

* Mission where elapsed time since mission end has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations (2018); Williams (2016).

Missions supported by a parallel operation were more likely to be a complete success, nearly equally likely to be a partial success, and have never failed. The support of a parallel mission contributed greatly to producing higher rates of success and lower rates of failure. Hypothesis seven was validated by the data.

There have been frequent examples of parallel supporting missions. Examples include the French Operation Barkhane's support of MINUSMA and the MNJTF; the U.S. JTF's support of ECOMIL in Liberia; and numerous EU training missions. The

practice maximizes the mutual benefit from the parallel efforts of the multiple organizations.

Nations or organizations may wish to deploy a parallel supporting mission rather than join an established mission for several reasons. The supporting mission gives increased control over the organization they support or may gain access to be able to support national interests. For example, Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire gave the French military a legal UN mandate to protect French citizens and property during the First Ivoirian Civil War (French Ministry of Defense, 2015).

The practice also benefits the supported organization. Partnered missions often open doors to much bilateral assistance that is provided by nations such as the US, France, Britain, and China (Williams, 2016). For example, in the Central African Republic War France was not only providing Operation Sangaris as a peace enforcement mission to stabilize the capital, but also providing training and equipping support to both MISCA and its successor mission MINUSCA (World Peace Foundation, 2018). It is a logical leap that a nation that supports a mission with the expense of a supporting mission will also be more vested in ensuring the mission personnel are capable of accomplishing their mandate. This support also correlates to mission support on the UN Security Council if the supporting state is a member.

The practice also enables parties to focus on their capability strengths and economize peace support. The division of effort between French and UN forces in Mali is one such example. French Operation Barkhane forces focus on the employment of close air support and direct-action special operations forces to remove terrorist leadership

and assets. MINUSMA peacekeepers focus on controlling territory with large numbers of troops. The MINUSMA troop contributing nations focus on their ability to field large numbers of troops necessary for securing large geographical sections and the French are focus on their capacity to provide limited numbers of highly skilled assets at key times (Charbonneau, 2017). Parallel support operations enable each intervenor to focus on their inherent strengths and cover the other's limitations for mutual benefit.

Hypothesis 8: Force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead to greater peace operation success rates. The impacts of two programs were analyzed to determine their effect on outcome. The first program group was the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program that grew into the present day African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program (Karis, 2009). The second program group was the French led program that has grown into the present-day EU African Peace Facility (APF). These programs each contribute to African peace operations via funding the training, equipping, and sustainment of troops (European Center for Development Policy Management, 2018). These programs have been the practical expression of the rhetoric of “African Solutions to African Problems” with an end goal that African nations provide the capable troops for African peace operations assisted as necessary with western funds (Williams, 2016). The impacts of a peace operation being supported by one or both of these programs was incorporated into Table 4.10. Table 4.11 listed all missions that received assistance for a US or European Assistance program sorted by outcome. These tables excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.

Table 4.10. Peace Operations Assistance Programs and Mission Outcome

	Success		Failure	Ongoing	Total
	Complete	Partial			
<i>Supported Mission?</i>					
Yes	6	16*	2	9	33
No	5	18	9	1	33
Total	11	34	11	10	66

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management (2018).

Table 4.11. Assistance Program Support and Mandate Type: Mission Outcome

Supported Mission	Type	Lead Org	Assistance Partner	Mission Outcome
MAES	PKO	AU	EU	Complete Success
ONUB	PBO	UN	US	Complete Success
UNMEE	PKO	UN	US	Complete Success
UNAMSIL	PBO	UN	US	Complete Success
MINURCAT	PBO	UN	US and EU	Complete Success
ECOMOG-GB	PKO	REC	US and EU	Complete Success
FOMUC	PEO	REC	EU	Partial Success
AMISEC	MON	AU	EU	Partial Success
AFISMA	PEO	AU	EU	Partial Success
MONUC-a	PKO	UN	US	Partial Success
MONUC-b	PBO	UN	US	Partial Success
ECOMIL	PKO	REC	US	Partial Success
UNOMSIL	MON	UN	US	Partial Success
UNMIS	PBO	UN	US	Partial Success

UNMIL	PBO	UN	US	Partial Success*
ONUCI	PBO	UN	US and EU	Partial Success*
MISAB	PEO	OTHER	US and EU	Partial Success
MINURCA	PBO	UN	US and EU	Partial Success
MISCA	PKO	AU	US and EU	Partial Success
ECOMICI	PKO	REC	US and EU	Partial Success
AMIS 1	MON	AU	US and EU	Partial Success
AMIS 2	PKO	AU	US and EU	Partial Success
OMIB	MON	AU	US	Failure
MICOPAX	PEO	REC	US and EU	Failure
MONUSCO	PBO	UN	US	Ongoing
UNMISS	PBO	UN	US	Ongoing
UNISFA	PKO	UN	US	Ongoing
UNAMID	PBO	UN	US	Ongoing
MINUSCA	PBO	UN	US and EU	Ongoing
ECOMIB	PKO	REC	US and EU	Ongoing
MNJTF	PEO	OTHER	US and EU	Ongoing
MINUSMA	PBO	UN	US and EU	Ongoing
AMISOM	PEO	AU	US and EU	Ongoing

* Mission where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management (2018).

Missions assisted by a mission support program were slightly more likely to be a complete success, equally likely to be a partial success, and significantly less likely to fail when compared to unassisted missions. MICOPAX and OMIB were the only two

instances of assisted missions failing. Mission assistance programs contributed greatly to ensuring operations did not fail. Hypothesis six was validated by the data.

Assistance programs supported African peace operations through two main methods; preparation of deployment and the sustainment of deployed forces. The U.S. has focused on preparatory train and equip programs. This trend began with the ACRI and then transitioned to the ACOTA program. These predeployment programs enhanced the capacity of African troops to conduct peace operations by providing training and equipment (usually non-lethal) to African forces that would deploy as part of an AU or UN led peace operation (Karis, 2009). The EU's African Peace Facility (APF) has focused on the sustainment and maintenance of African troops in the field (European Center for Development Policy Management, 2018). Together these programs have trained, deployed, and sustained African peace operations forces.

ACRI operated from 1997 to 2002 with the intent to support peace operations without U.S. troops intervening in African conflicts. ACRI trained 9,000 troops from eight partner nations. ACRI trained troops deployed in support of over 13 different peace operations (Karis, 2009).

ACRI became ACOTA in 2002. ACOTA trained whole units immediately prior to deployment. ACOTA also changed the curriculum focus from training on monitoring and observation tasks to a focus on offensive and defensive military operations more closely aligned with the needs of enforcement missions (Handy, 2010; Berman, 2002).

ACOTA trained 353,871 troops, composing 417 units, from 26 different nations as of 2017 (Rainey, 2018). Today it is a partnership led by the US, but with support and coordination across US, British, and French governments.

The African Peace Facility (APF) is a funding mechanism that draws funds from the EU development fund to support the African Peace Security Architecture (APSA). The APF was developed in response to African leaders' call for assistance in facilitating African responses to African conflicts at the 2003 Maputo Conference (African Union, 2018). It was formed in 2004 and began delivering funds in 2007. The APF's overall goal is to enhance the capacity and functioning of the APSA by funding peace operations; developing the capacity of AU and the regional economic communities; and funding conflict prevention and mediation efforts. The APF has expended 1.9 billion euros from its inception to 2006 (European Center for Development Policy Management, 2018).

Assistance programs have facilitated African troops performing African peace operations. Frequently the US led on training and equipping forces via the ACOTA program and the EU has been the primary funding source of sustainment. These programs have each assisted the deploying and maintaining African troops in the field.

Hypothesis 9: Force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission and a Western Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace operations success. My final hypothesis is the fusion of hypotheses six and seven; peace operations supported by both a parallel supporting mission and a peace operation assistance program will produce the highest rates of success. The results were compiled

into Table 4.12. This table excluded parallel supporting operations and counted only the 66 missions that had primary responsibility for a conflict response.

Table 4.12. Peace Operations Assisted by a Mission Support Program and a Parallel Peace Operation: Mission Outcome

	Success		Failure	Ongoing	Total
	Complete	Partial			
<i>Assisted and Partnered Mission?</i>					
Yes	4	10*	-	4	18
No	7	24	11	6	48
Total	11	34	11	10	66

* Includes 2 cases (of 3 total) where elapsed time since mission closure has not reached the five years of peace criterion for complete success owing to the temporal period selected in this research.

Sources: Karis (2009); Vic (2017); European Center for Development and Policy Management (2018); Sarkees and Wayman (2010); Dixon and Sarkees (2016); Mullenbach (2018); United Nations (2018); Williams (2016).

Missions that combined the impacts of partnering with a parallel mission and a mission support program produced resilient peace at a superior rate to those missions that do not. Additionally, these missions never failed. These figures demonstrated a pattern of success related to external support that bolsters the capacity of a peace operation.

Hypothesis eight was sustained by the data.

Summary of Results

My nine hypotheses were developed to test the linkages between conflict, mandate, intervenor capacity, and outcome. Hypothesis one tested the linkage between conflict and mandate. Hypothesis two tested the connection between mandate and intervening force capacity. Hypothesis three tested the relationship between intervenor force capacity and outcome. Hypotheses four and five examined links between mandate and outcome. Hypotheses six, seven, eight, and nine examined the impact of various factors augmenting intervenor force capacity.

Hypothesis 1, the conflict characteristics determine the peace operation mandate, was strongly supported. Peace enforcement and peacebuilding operations were more frequently deployed to medium or highly complex conflicts. Peace monitoring missions were predominantly deployed to low complexity conflicts and peacekeeping showed no definitive pattern. Every instance of a peace monitoring or peacekeeping operation deploying to a medium or highly complex conflict resulted in a transition to a more robust operation. The data indicated a strong confirmation of hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2, peace operations mandate determines the force capacity, was partially supported. Mandates determined the quantity but not the capacity of troops deployed. Peace Monitoring missions were the smallest missions in terms of size and had capacities that ranged widely. Peacekeeping missions had the next largest size and a capacity near the mean for all operations. Peace Enforcement missions had the second largest size but a limited capacity reflective of their being predominantly sourced from regional economic communities. Finally, peacebuilding missions were both the largest and had the highest capacity. These findings predominantly supported hypothesis two.

Hypothesis 3, the force capacity determines peace operations outcome, was not supported. The comparison of missions that were larger and had more per troop capacity than the median for their category provided limited patterns from which to draw conclusions. Peace monitoring missions were marginally more successful if they were smaller and had less capacity. Peacekeeping missions were less likely to fail with a larger mission, but the data otherwise showed no clear pattern. These results presented no clear indication of an ideal combination of size and capacity.

Hypothesis 4, the intervening organization is a predictor of peace operations outcomes was not supported by the data. No significant differentiation was found between organizations when mission type was accounted for. The UN has played in leading a majority of large peacebuilding operations that have been generally either successful or are still ongoing. The AU has played a leading role in peace monitoring missions that later transitioned to larger UN missions. As such the AU has produced high rates of partial success with few completely successful missions. Regional economic communities have conducted many peace enforcement missions as an intervenor of last resort. This was reflected in their high rate of failure.

Hypothesis 5, robust mandates produce higher peace operation success rates, was not supported. Robust missions rarely produced a resilient peace and performed no better at producing partial successes than non-robust operations. Peace enforcement mission performance was the most egregious having never produced a resilient peace without first transitioning to a peacebuilding mission. My fifth hypothesis was not supported by the data.

Hypothesis 6, sequential operations lead to greater peace operation success rates, was not supported by the data. Serialized conflicts failed as often as standalone conflicts and produced low rates of complete success. Serials were as likely as standalone missions to produce resilient peace only if considering only the final mission in a serial. Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported.

Hypothesis 7, force capacity with parallel support missions leads to greater peace operations success, was strongly supported. Missions supported by a parallel operation

were more likely to be a complete success, nearly equally likely to be a partial success, and have never failed. The support of a parallel mission contributed greatly to producing higher rates of success and lower rates of failure.

Hypothesis 8, force capacity with Western power assistance programs will lead to greater peace operation success rates, was strongly supported. Missions assisted by a mission support program were slightly more likely to be a complete success, equally likely to be a partial success, and significantly less likely to fail when compared to unassisted missions.

Hypothesis 9, force capacity that includes both a parallel supporting mission and a Western Power assistance program will produce the greatest rates of peace operations success, was strongly supported. Missions that combined the impacts of partnering with a parallel support mission and a mission assistance program produced resilient peace at a superior rate to those missions that did not and have never failed. These figures demonstrated a pattern of success related to external support that bolsters the capacity of a peace operation. Hypothesis nine was strongly supported by the data.

Combining insights gained from multiple hypotheses led to several conclusions. First, the conflict complexity study conducted to examine hypothesis 2 contextualized the results of all subsequent hypotheses. Serialized were on average deployed to much more challenging situations than standalone operations. Serialized operations on average produced similar outcomes in spite of this headwind. Similarly, robust missions' failure to establish peace at a superior rate to traditional missions is less surprising when the complexity of conflicts peace enforcement and peace building missions were deployed to

are considered. Robust missions were deployed at higher rates to high and medium complex conflicts than either peace monitoring or peacekeeping missions. One would therefore expect the failure of robust missions to be more dramatic than observed. Similarly, the assessment that more capacity and size do not equate greater success fails to acknowledge that larger and more complex missions were deployed to conflicts more likely destined for failure. Therefore, the lack of definitive pattern based on force size and capacity can be interpreted as capacity overcoming adverse conditions to achieve results on par with conflicts that exhibit more favorable conditions.

Differing conclusions on the importance of force capacity was a second overall conclusion. Augmented capacity (hypotheses 7, 8, and 9), but not greater endemic capacity (hypothesis 3), produced greater outcomes. The non-support of hypotheses 3 and 4 indicated robust mandates implemented by capable intervenors does not make a panacea for success. However, the strong support for hypotheses 6, 7, and 8 demonstrated that missions that received assistance and partnered support greatly improved outcomes. This may be due to the targeted nature of training and equipping under mission assistance programs. A TCCs per soldier capacity did not assess if a soldier's training and equipment was specifically targeted to mission requirements. However, assistance programs, notably ACOTA, tailored training and equipment to mission requirements (Karis, 2009).

Peace enforcement missions' utility was linked to specific circumstances. Great success was realized in the international responses to conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and others when peace enforcement missions were deployed as a parallel

supporting mission in support of a larger peace building mission. These supporting missions produced conditions conducive to peacebuilding where they did not previously exist. Even in the case of Somalia, UNITAF was able to temporarily create the conditions in which UNOSOM could have succeeded (United Nations, 2001). If there is no peace in place peace must be established but, force must be targeted to specific objectives in support of a larger strategy.

A final takeaway was that more recent missions were characterized as more complex conflicts being addressed with those types of interventions shown to produce the greatest rates of success. Half of current or recently closed missions had a parallel supporting operation and 11 of 12 benefited from an assistance program. Essentially, operations post-2015 have evolved towards those practices seen to better produce resilient peace. The hope is that these most complex of conflicts, such as Africa's World War, will end in similar fashion to the Liberia-LURD war that was nearly equitable in its violence at the highpoint of the war.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Introduction

What factors have led to successful outcomes in international peace operations conducted in Sub Saharan African countries? What factors explain mission failure? I proposed a basic theory of peace operations that linked conflict conditions to mandate design to the capability of an intervening force deployed for mission implementation developed from arguments and empirical results of previous research.

Data on 86 peace operations that occurred in 23 African states covering 33 separate conflict periods between 1990 and 2015 was analyzed. My main findings showed that mandates were derived from conflict assessments and determined the size of intervening force required. The results also indicated that neither the size of an intervening force, nor the lead-organization, nor mandate robustness (offensive deterrence capacity), nor sequencing of operations were predictors of mission success or failure. However, implementation forces that included parallel support operations and/or mission assistance from Western great powers had higher levels of successful outcomes.

Missions were distributed between host countries, conflict complexities, mandate types, intervening organizations, and produced varied outcomes. 38 peace operations were deployed to 14 high complexity conflicts in eight countries. 30 peace operations were deployed to 11 medium complexity conflicts in nine countries. 18 peace operations were deployed to eight low complexity conflicts in seven countries. Mission leadership

varied. The UN led 33 missions, the AU or OAU led 21 missions, regional economic communities led nine, and individual countries or ad hoc coalitions led 21 other operations. 14 missions were still ongoing on April 20, 2019 (the cutoff date for this research). Three successful missions could only be partially evaluated due to the temporal period selected for this study. 20 missions were parallel supporting missions; deployed to compliment the efforts of 23 supported peace operations. The outcome of parallel supporting missions was measured in the success or failure of the mission they supported. 47 of the 66 non-supporting missions were part of a sequential series while 19 were standalone missions. Outcome varied with 16 missions completely successful, 44 partially successful, 12 failed, and 14 missions either ongoing or recently closed. Completely and partially successful missions together composed 60 of 75 completed missions. 20% of missions failed.

Discussion

Peace operations were successful in some countries, but not in others. Some countries such as Namibia and South Africa seemed destined for success and succeeded. They both had a signed peace agreement, higher than regional average GDP per capita, and relatively low annual conflict related deaths prior to peace operation deployment. Other countries seemed destined for failure and failed. Angola twice returned to war during the presence of a peace operation and finally found peace in the absence of a peace operation. Angola suffered external support to rebel forces, the presence of readily lootable minerals, high levels of violence, and a moderate GDP per capita. However, some missions succeeded in the face of great challenges. Missions deployed to Liberia

and Sierra Leone faced open conflict with no peace agreement, the presence of readily lootable minerals, external support to rebel forces, relatively low GDPs per capita, and extreme rates of battlefield deaths. However, peace operations proved ultimately successful in both nations. These examples illustrate that success or failure could not be predicted on the conflict characteristics alone.

Mission outputs varied with mandate type. Peacebuilding missions, especially larger multidimensional missions, produced the greatest rates of establishing a resilient peace. Small peacebuilding missions with limited objectives such as EU-SSR and ECOMIG (both in Guinea Bissau) frequently failed. However, larger UN led missions such as ONUMOZ in Mozambique, ONUB in Burundi, and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone succeeded so long as international will to support was maintained. Even UNOSOM II in Somalia reduced the severity of the Second Somali War. However, the mission withdrew in failure after international supporters including the United States withdrew support. Overall peacebuilding missions produced seven complete successes, seven partial successes, four failures, and have eight ongoing missions.

Peacekeeping missions were the second most successful mission type. Peacekeeping missions led to resilient peace including SAPSD in Burundi, MAES in the Comoros Islands, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and ECOMOG-GB in Guinea Bissau. These missions all benefited from the presence of a peace agreement pre-deployment and limited objectives in line with a medium or low complexity conflict. MONUA in Angola and UNAMIR I in Rwanda were examples of peacekeeping failures. These missions each failed to prevent the outbreak of a new war. They were each limited due to the

absence of a credible deterrent threat. Overall peacekeeping missions produced five complete successes, ten partial successes, two failures, and three ongoing missions.

Peace monitoring missions produced the greatest rate of overall success, but only once produced a resilient peace without the transition to a larger mission. UNASOG in Chad was the one example of a complete success. UNASOG's mission was limited in scope and took place after the signing of a peace agreement in an intrastate conflict. Other missions generally either served as a tripwire to the deployment of a larger mission or saw a return to violence shortly following mission withdrawal. Overall peace monitoring missions produced two complete success, 16 partial successes, and three failures.

Peace enforcement missions only produced a completely successful mission when acting as a parallel supporting mission. Complete failures included MICOPAX in the Central African Republic and ECOMOG-SL in Sierra Leone. These missions were failed regional economic community attempts to bolster embattled governments. Partial successes included multiple missions in the Central African Republic and AFISMA in Mali. These missions were most notable in their transitions to larger UN missions which are ongoing. A majority of peace enforcement missions were deployed to high complexity conflicts. Overall peace enforcement missions produced two complete successes, 11 partial successes, three failures, and three missions are ongoing.

Outcome by mandate type yields multiple conclusions. Peacebuilding missions are the most likely to establish a resilient peace. Peacebuilding missions frequently succeed in their focus on the underlying conflict conditions. Peacekeeping missions

produce positive outcomes in those conflicts which have favorable conditions including an existing peace agreement. Peace monitoring and enforcement missions lack the ability to produce a resilient peace but can serve as a tripwire to a peacebuilding or peacekeeping mission.

Organic force composition and structure analysis did not yield resolute answers. Mandate type was a predictor of force composition, capacity, and lead organization. However, mission success correlated to neither mission size nor the military expenditures of troop contributing countries. Similarly, there was no clear correlation between lead intervening organization and mission outcome.

Western great power support was found to be extremely beneficial. The deployment of a parallel supporting mission or support from a mission assistance program each dramatically improved mission outcome rates. Parallel supporting missions are those deployed to complement another peace operation. 17 parallel supporting missions were led by Western powers. The missions they supported never failed. Similarly, the presence of a mission assistance program demonstrated a marked impact on mission outcome. The United States' ACRI/ACOTA and the EU's APF each improved outcomes. Assisted missions that have closed produced six complete successes, 16 partial successes, and twice failed. The greatest rates of success were found to be those missions that had both a parallel mission support and the assistance of a mission support program.

In an optimistic note, recent missions were characterized by those traits that led to greater rates of success. Half of ongoing or recently closed operations had a parallel

supporting operation and 11 of 12 were assisted via an assistance program. Operations post-2015 evolved towards those practices seen to better produce resilient peace. The hope will be that these most complex of conflicts, such as Africa's World War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Tuareg Rebellion in Mali, will be ended in similar fashion to the Liberia-LURD war that was nearly equitable in its violence at the highpoint of the war.

My findings indicate that conflict complexity alone is not a definitive predictor of success or failure. The positive examples of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire demonstrate the potential for a multifaceted, complex, enduring commitment from the international community to end complex conflicts. The example of UNOSOM II in Somalia demonstrates the failure brought about by the withdrawal of international commitment. The failure of the OMIC peace monitoring mission in the Comoros Islands demonstrates that an extremely limited response can fail in even the lowest complexity conflict. In summation, conflict complexity is a predictor of the required response but not the expected outcome of a peace operation.

The successful intervention into the Liberia-LURD War was an outlying case worthy of note. The conflict's primary determinant was credible deterrence provided by the overwhelming force of the 4,350 U.S. Marines of JTF Liberia (Sirleaf, as cited in Strasser, 2017). The overwhelming force provided adequate temporal and physical space for local and UN led peacebuilding efforts to take root. Intervention into the Liberia-LURD War was a unique case of a peace enforcement mission producing a resilient peace.

My study and its conclusions had many overlaps of agreements and disagreements with the existent literature. I agreed that peace operations generate positive results (Dorussen, 2014; Fortna, 2008; Sambanis, 2008). I found that a majority of intervened conflicts with known outcomes ended peacefully and had low rates of conflict recidivism.

My findings provided possible mitigation of issues raised by those who cite intervenor capability as the primary challenge to peace operation success. Numerous studies have argued that force capability is key to operations success (Bellamy & Williams, 2013; Jett, 1999; Daniel, 2013). Missions that employed capacity support mechanisms succeeded at a high rate regardless of the endemic capability found in the troop contributing countries. Other studies have similarly shown how missions that combine a traditional UN operation with the deployment of soldiers from a western or regional power augment capacity (Daniel, 2013; Martin-Brule, 2012). My findings indicate that capacity challenges can be overcome through the deployment of parallel supporting missions and the implementation of mission support programs.

I concur with Fortna's (2008) and Sambanis' (2008) conclusions that numbers are largely irrelevant. The mission will either be large enough to perform the task or will serve as a trip-wire to a more capable mission if the mission is prioritized. Failures of missions in Africa have occurred due to insufficient funding, troop numbers, and support to troops in the field (Badmus, 2015). However, if the conflict is seen as important interventions will receive additional support and capacity. For example, the early failures of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone transitioned to successful missions by the

United States and Great Brittan respectively. Missions will generally transition to larger more capable forces until the correct match of mandate and intervenor capabilities are realized.

My findings partially contradicted those studies that determined that robust mandates negatively affect the success or failure of peace operations (Holmqvist, 2014; Rhoads, 2016; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Nascimento, 2018). I agree that deterrence force does not guarantee success and negative outcomes have resulted from primary missions employing robust mandates. However, parallel supporting operations with robust mandates have been able to create the conditions for peace where they did not otherwise exist (Sandler, 2017; Sambanis, 2008; Thakur, 2014). The efforts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire were among the seminal examples of the use of force to create the conditions for peace. My findings indicated that the credible threat or use of force is a key element to conflict transformation, but only if nested in a peacebuilding effort.

Studies of peace operations have been dominated by case studies or comparisons of select similar cases. My study has contributed a breadth of analysis to the understanding of peace operations and the factors affecting their outcome. My study has taken an expansive 25-year view of peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. My review of 86 operations has yielded conclusions on the connections between conflict, mandate, and intervening force and empirically demonstrated the impact of parallel support missions and assistance programs. My findings were not revolutionary. They agreed with most existent literature. The findings contribute in that I add supporting data to

lessons originally drawn from limited case numbers. Policy makers and mission designers should recognize the demonstrated importance of support mechanisms which augments capacity organic to the mission itself.

Limitations of Study

My study took a macro approach to African peace operations. I examined all Sub-Saharan peace operations that occurred from 1990 through 2015. Commonalities of those interventions that did or did not achieve a peaceful outcome were identified. However, results were more correlation than causation. My data and results are useful for informing policy decisions, but they are aggregates that cannot provide a fail-safe model suitable to all conditions.

My study did not address the perspectives of the parties to the conflict. I focused upon intervening organizations, peace operations forces, and assistance partners. I did not address the role of those living with the conflict and their effect upon an intervention's success or failure. A bottom-up analysis would greatly compliment this study. It is after all, local actors who choose whether to return to war (Whalan, 2010).

My study was also limited in that I did not analyze the actions of missions once on the ground. Outcomes are inevitably influenced by what an actor does or does not do. My study evaluated the inputs and a measure of potential in place of actual actions. Potential additional variables to refine results could include violence directed toward the intervening force and/or characteristics of force leadership.

My variables relating to conflict complexity are based upon best available information, but present two issues. First, factors leading to conflict recidivism are a

proxy for factors challenging the success of a peace operation. They are not a direct measure. Additionally, to declare a conflict highly complex leads to the false impression the conflict can only end with proper intervention. This is demonstrably false as the end of the Second Somali War and the Angola War of the Cities each came after the withdrawal of international peace operations.

Additionally, my findings only examine two trends among many which augment mission capacity. Pre-deployment training standards have been under development for UN missions. There were elements of the African Peace Facility not examined including the development of peacekeeping training centers. An analysis of what proportion of troops received said training, equipping, and/or sustainment as well as an expanded list of programs may have better captured great power support to peace operations.

My data was limited to that available in published databases, organizational websites, and academic journals. UN operations have treasure troves of data stored on UN websites and available from the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database. This information includes mandate texts, troop numbers and composition by month, and others. However, non-UN missions lack a similar resource. I relied upon journal articles, information from the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management Project conflict narratives, and that published in Williams' (2016) *War and Conflict in Africa*. Information on non-UN led missions remained challenging, but was adequate for the compilation of peace operation data. The compilation of data from these sources enabled me to make comparisons between the interventions, but did not permit a full understanding of the conflict conditions and the causative factors at play.

Future Research

My study pointed to several areas for further research. Western great power assistance played a key role in improving outcomes. How and where should this support be directed, and to what level of magnitude, should be more thoroughly examined. Potential answers to “how” include whether the tangible support, political votes at the UN Security Council, or legitimacy conveyed by support causes the greatest impact in outcome. Additionally, what support produces the greatest impact? Future research should examine whether training, equipping, or financial support has the greatest impact.

Another direction for study is the change within operations. My study accounted for a mission’s overall mandate and the force at its largest point. This accounts for neither the month to month changes to troop levels nor mandate shifts. Future studies should examine specific missions on a month to month basis seeking to find relationships between the deployment of specific capabilities or troops who have completed a specific training set and the overall rates of violence in a conflict. These intra-conflict stats may demonstrate more precisely the impacts from various support programs.

Additionally, the support provided by private military contractors should be examined. Sierra Leone, Angola, and other conflicts in Africa have employed private military contractors. Some have argued that they have been a stabilizing force against rebel movements in a similar fashion to peace enforcing parallel supporting operations (Ucko, 2016). A study as to the impact of their employment in an intra-state conflict would be welcome.

International peace operations deployed to reduce conflict in African states have had a positive impact. Western great power assistance programs drastically improved outcomes. Overall missions with Western support eliminated failure and produced higher rates of stable peace outcomes. Complex conflicts were overcome in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and others via a combined effort involving the UN, the AU, regional economic communities, and incorporating great power support. Perhaps the key conclusion is that peace in Africa requires a partnership between regional players and the broader international community.

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APPENDIX: OPERATION AND ORGANIZATION NAMES AND ACRONYMS

Mission Acronym	Full Mission Name
AFISMA	African Led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS 1	AU Mission in Sudan
AMIS 2	AU Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
CEN-SAD	Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens
CPAG-SA	Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group – South Africa
ECOMIB	ECOWAS Mission in Bissau
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG-GB	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOMOG-L	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOMOG-SL	ECOWAS Military Observer Group
EU SSR	EU Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau
EU Support to AMIS 2	EU Support to AMIS
EUFOR RCA	EU Military Operation in the CAR
EUFOR-Chad	EU Military Operation in Chad

EUFOR-RD	EU Force in the DRC
EUSEC-CONGO	EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the DRC
EUTM Mali	EU Training Mission in Mali
EUTM Somalia	EU Training Mission in Somalia
FOMUC	Multinational Force in the Central African Republic
JMC and IMU	Joint Military Commission / International Monitoring Unit
JTF Liberia	Joint Task Force Liberia
JVC	Joint Verification Committee
MAES	Electoral and Security Mission to the Comoros
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Africa
MINUCI	UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire
MINURCA	UN Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MIOC / OMIC4	Observer Mission in the Comoros
MISAB	Inter-African Force in the Central African Republic
MISCA	Transitioned to MINUSCA
MISSANG-GB	Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau

MNJTF vs Boko Haram	Multinational Joint Task Force
MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC-a	UN Organization Mission in the DRC
MONUC-b	United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
OAU Mission to Western Sahara	OAU Mission to Western Sahara
OAU MOT	OAU Military Observer Team
OAU NMOG I	OAU Neutral Military Observer Group
OAU NMOG II	OAU Neutral Military Observer Group II
OAU Observer Mission	OAU Observer Mission
OLMEE, AULMEE	OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea/ AU Liaison Mission to Ethiopia-Eritrea
OMIB	Observer Mission in Burundi
OMIC	Observer Mission in Comoros
OMIC 2	Observer Mission in the Comoros
OMIC 3	Observer Mission in the Comoros
ONUB	UN Mission in Burundi
ONUCI	UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique
Operation Artemis / IEMF	International Emergency Multinational Force
Operation Barkhane	Operation Barkhane

Operation Basilica and Silkman	Operation Basilica and Silkman
Operation Democracy in the Comoros	Operation Democracy in the Comoros
Operation Licorne	Operation Licorne
Operation Palliser	Operation Palliser
Operation Sangaris	Operation Sangaris
Operation Serval	Operation Serval
Operation Turquoise	Operation Turquoise
SAPSD	South African Protection Service Detachment
UNAMID	UN/AU Mission in Darfur
UNAMIR I	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMIR II	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda II
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNASOG	UN Azouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAVEM I	UN Angola Verification Mission
UNAVEM II	UN Angola Verification Mission II
UNAVEM III	UN Angola Verification Mission III
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei Area
UNITAF	Unified Task Force (Operation Restore Hope)
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia

UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM I	UN Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia II
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group

Organization / Country Acronym	Organization / Country Name
ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training Assistance
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
APF	African Peace Facility
ASPA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MNJTF	Multi-National Joint Task Force
OAU	Organization for African Unity
REC	Regional Economic Community
SWAPO	South-West Africa Peoples' Organization
UN	United Nations