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Shoulder to Shoulder Yet Worlds Apart:  
Variations in Women's Integration in the Militaries of  
France, Norway and the United States

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A Dissertation  
Presented to  
the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies  
University of Denver

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In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy

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by  
Kyleanne Hunter  
August 2019  
Advisor: Deborah Avant

Author: Kyleanne Hunter  
Title: Shoulder to Shoulder Yet Worlds Apart: Variations in Women's Integration in the Militaries of France, Norway and the United States  
Advisor: Deborah Avant  
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## ABSTRACT

Women have become an essential part of Western militaries. Particularly concerning the experience of NATO militaries in Afghanistan, there has been much public attention on the role of women in the military. While Western militaries are often studied as a whole with regards to military operations, there is variation in both how women are employed in the military and the experience they have as service members. This dissertation seeks to understand the cause of this variation by examining three critical cases: France, Norway and the United States.

In this dissertation, I argue foundational beliefs about gender equality affect the institutional trajectory of military integration. Thus, variation in how gender equality is defined and operationalized across the Western world help explain the variation in women's integration into militaries. The differences inherent in these beliefs can best be understood and operationalized through tracing the way in which women's movements interacted with the government and society, and the differences in the claims made about women's participation in public life. As an institution of the government, the military rarely makes policies about women's service in a vacuum, but rather as a result of or response to broader equality law or shifts in attitudes about women's roles in public life.

While policies about women's service set the stage for women's integration, integration is a result of the interaction between claims about women's military

participation and broader military culture and history. When the claims made about women's service are compatible with the role and culture of the military, there is a high level of integration. When the claims about women's service and military culture are in conflict, there is a low level of integration. In France, the claims about women's participation and military culture have largely been in concert with one another, resulting in a high level of integration. In Norway, there have been periods in which they coincided, and periods in which they have been in tension, resulting in a moderate level of integration. In the United States, they have largely been in conflict with one another, resulting in a low level of integration.

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## CHAPTER 1

### **Shoulder to Shoulder yet Worlds Apart:**

#### **The difference in Women's Experiences in the Military**

While women in the military have been instrumental for centuries, modern experiences have put the role of women in the military at the forefront of public consciousness. Women have been key to the tactical successes seen in Afghanistan since September 11, 2001. In particular, women have been an essential component to counterinsurgency and village stability operations, engaging parts of the population that traditional male infantrymen have been unable to reach. While the United States was an initial leader in the combat operations, other nations quickly took on prominent roles. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was truly a joint mission that relied on integrated strategic and tactical aims of all countries involved. As North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg exclaimed in a speech to the troops on December 14, 2014, “for over a decade, the world’s largest coalition for peace and stability has stood *shoulder to shoulder* in Afghanistan.”<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the focus of the Secretary General’s remarks at the close of official combat operations in Afghanistan was

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<sup>1</sup> Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the last North Atlantic Council with past and current non-NATO ISAF Contributing Nations, December 14, 2014. Archived at NATO.int

on the joint nature of operations, how NATO and non-NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) militaries worked together as a nearly seamless unit to eradicate Taliban and terrorist safe havens and promote local stability and rule of law. Though the overall success of combat operations has been subject to scrutiny and debate, there have been tactical successes, no matter how limited in their nature (See, for example, Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009; Chaudhuri & Farrell, 2011; Barno, 2007). On the successes that were seen in Afghanistan, it was noted that “efforts at the tactical level would not be possible if gender roles and gender relations [were] not taken into account” (Lackenbauer & Langlais, 2013, p. 4). Indeed, the importance of women for both localized tactical successes and overall implementation of strategic aims, was nearly universally noted by all levels of commanders in Afghanistan. NATO Deputy Secretary Rose Gottemoeller noted, “the ability to apply gender as a perspective and an analytical tool has proven to be vital to our missions and to our advising and training efforts to local security forces [in] Afghanistan.”<sup>2</sup> Yet while ISAF’s actions in Afghanistan brought the universality of the need for a gendered focus in combat to light, it also highlighted some very important differences in women’s experiences in the military between participant countries.

### **The Observable Difference**

Given both the joint nature of ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan and the near universal recognition for the importance of women, it would be easy to assume that

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<sup>2</sup> Remarks at the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, April 28, 2017. Archived at NATO.int

women in Western militaries, particularly those that participated in ISAF, can be studied as a homogenous group. Throughout Afghanistan, units were organized into Regional Commands (RCs), often led by officers from different countries. This created a battlespace in which general officers were frequently tasked with employing foreign troops on combat missions. Such activity assumes a great deal of interoperability between international forces. Processes such as uniform rules of engagement and clear chains of command helped ensure that ISAF forces could work together to achieve a common mission (US Army, 2012). However, despite a convergence on most tactical aspects of military service in Afghanistan, there was no uniform policy on women in ISAF forces.

This experience in Afghanistan highlights a puzzle: despite convergence of organizational and tactical aspects of their militaries, Western Democracies remain divergent on the integration of women in the military. Each individual nation maintains its own policies and practices with regards to what women are allowed to do, where they were allowed to be stationed, and the particulars around legal aspects of women working with infantry, or other ground-combat units.

This dissertation examines the cases of the United States, France and Norway as critical to understanding how despite having spent over a decade fighting “shoulder to shoulder,” women experienced very different levels of integration in the military. Not only were the tactical outputs of their participation different, but their experiences with the military and their path to service has been very different. I argue that these differences in integration are a result of the interaction between claims made about women’s service in the country as a whole and military culture and tradition that unfolds over time. These

differences seen not only in combat operations in Afghanistan but also the domestic experiences of women. Understanding these differences cannot be done by looking at military conflicts alone. They are the consequences of a long and slow-moving process that has taken place against the backdrop of domestic fights for gender equality and military responses to a changing global order.

The United States, Norway, and France are critical cases to understand these variations in the process and outcomes of integration. All three countries have been active proponents of increasing women's presence and participation on the global stage, and have all been active in international military operations. Yet the paths to military participation women in each country took varied. While much attention has been paid to the outcomes of utilizing women in the most recent wars, there are few studies on how women came to be integrated into their various roles. In this dissertation I look at the process of integration and find that it is an historical process that it has been, in large part, dictated by varying national beliefs about gender equality and their ability to resonate with military culture.

### **Argument in Brief**

I argue foundational beliefs about gender equality affect the institutional trajectory of military integration. Integration is a process that is driven by beliefs about the way in which equality should be practiced, and the resulting level of influence government has in shaping conditions for equality. The differences inherent in these beliefs can best be understood and operationalized through tracing the way in which the

various women's movements interacted with the government and society, and the differences in the claims made about women's participation in public life. As an institution of the government, the military rarely makes policies about women's service in a vacuum, but rather as a result of or response to broader equality law or shifts in attitudes about women's roles in public life.

While policies about women's service set the stage for women's integration, integration is not set by policy alone. It is a result of the interaction between claims about women's military participation and broader military culture and history. The difference in claims is driven by differences in beliefs about equality. Military culture is driven by beliefs about the military's place in the geopolitical order, its history of warfare, and its responsiveness to changing global politics. This can be operationalized in the degree to which the conduct of violence is emphasized as a source of authority for service members. Though the military is the legitimate institution of political violence, it has functional roles that exceed killing or physical destruction. Indeed, achieving the political aims of military action often rests on restraint in using force. The centrality of combat to the military identity varies across the Western world and between the countries examined in this dissertation. Additionally, military culture is manifested in the degree to which citizenship claims hinge on military service. This can be seen in the degree to which militaries embody the "schoolhouse for the nation" idea professed by Ronald Krebs (2006) in which militaries serve to make citizens by uniting diverse individuals into a common identity. Changes to global politics have made certain aspects of military culture

more desirable and conducive to women's integration, and militaries have adopted to these changes in varying ways.

When the claims made about women's service are compatible with the role and culture of the military, there is a high level of integration. When the claims about women's service and military culture are in conflict, there is a low level of integration. In France, the claims about women's participation and military culture have largely been in concert with one another, resulting in a high level of integration. In Norway, there have been periods in which they coincided, and periods in which they have been in tension, resulting in a moderate level of integration. In the United States, they have largely been in conflict with one another, resulting in a low level of integration.



**Table 1: Relationship between claims about women’s service and military culture**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Claims about Women’s Service</b>	<b>Role &amp; Culture of the Military</b>	<b>Result</b>
France	Institutional Equality: High emphasis on difference between men and women, High level of government involvement to ensure equality despite difference	Adaptable and innovative; reflective of changes in global political relationships	High level of integration. Space for women to make the claim that they were needed “as women”
Norway	Citizenship Equality: Low emphasis on difference between men and women, High level of government involvement to ensure equality	Focused on making Norwegian citizens and differentiating themselves from Scandinavian neighbors	Moderate level of integration. Initial space for women to make great progress, but as geopolitical needs change progress stalled
United States	Individual Equality: Mixed emphasis on the difference between men and women, Low level of government involvement to ensure equality	Combat-centric and focused on conventional force projection	Low level of integration. Little space for claims about women’s value outside of combat operations.

In France, where there was a strong legacy of institutional equality, the women’s movement lobbied the state to ensure that provisions were made to account for and mitigate any differences between men and women that could potentially be detrimental to women’s advancements. The military was one of the first places for women to experience professional equality, as it was impacted by the public policies created to ensure structural equality between men and women. The beliefs about the role of government in

promoting equality, namely that formal public policy has a role in not only promoting, but shaping public values, meant that women were able to promote further change once in the military. The military's history of adaptability and response to changing global politics led to a military that valued restraints on the use of force and adoption of gendered policies in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. Such a culture is amenable to the claim's made about the benefits of the unique characteristics that women bring to the military. The high level of women's integration in France is a reflection of the fact that women, acting as women, have contributed not only to the adoption of new policies that better account for the differences women face, but have also had the ability to have an impact on both military tactics and strategies.

In Norway, the women's movement emerged from a society that was rooted in beliefs about citizenship equality, downplaying the differences between the genders and focusing instead on the important contributions made by all citizens. In the early 1970s, wide-sweeping policies were made to bring all citizens into the military. A combination of the de-gendered nature of the claims made by the women's movement, and focus on normalizing an inclusive citizenry resulted in policies and practices – from physical requirements to bunking accommodations – that view men and women as virtually identical. The military's focus on making citizens and preserving the values of "true Norwegianness" coincided greatly with the second wave feminist argument about citizenship equality for women. However, as the military needed to respond to changes in geopolitics that necessitated gendered engagement with other cultures, the gender-neutral claims about women's service began to conflict with military ideals, stalling further

progress on women's integration. The result is a moderate level of integration in the Norwegian military. While many of the cultural problems of "hyper masculinity" frequently associated with the military have not been present in Norway, some of the particular benefits from women's service haven't been quickly or easily realized either. While women in the Norwegian military were among the first to make strides in the infantry and senior leadership world-wide, the continued focus on de-gendered citizenship has meant that women have had moderate success in influencing military policies, tactics and strategy in a changing world.

In the United States the women's movement lacked a cohesive claim about women's participation in public life and instead sought to empower individual women to prove their value in society. The United States also has a history that relies much less on state-led policies to legislate equality. Women's participation in the military was either driven by tactical necessity or framed as individually empowering, a means by which women could prove their strength and grit. The combat focus of the United States military has left little space for claims about women's service beyond national security. Women that have joined the military typically conform to the dominant male ideology, focusing on achieving individual success rather than changing the institution. As a result, laws around women's participation in the military frequently had to play catch-up to what women were already doing. Little formal change – either in policy or culture – was made by women, resulting in a low level of integration in the United States Military.

Understanding the process by which women have been integrated into the military has both scholarly and practical benefits. From a scholarly perspective, it focuses on the

military as an institution of democracy and part of the makeup of a country's identity, rather than just a tool of violence. The exceptional nature of the violence that military is capable of frequently overshadows the other functional roles the military plays – such as promoting democratic norms and values, and preserving human rights. However, viewing the military as part of the larger set of democratic institutions, we see that women's integration into the military is not only a strategic or tactical innovation, but also a mechanism of social change. The military has a long history of being a tool of citizenship, both in giving previous out-groups claims to expanded sociopolitical rights and in indoctrinating new citizens into a political culture (Krebs, 2006). Indeed, institutions in democracies seek to be expansive and reflective of their population in order to build robustness and durability (Olsen, 2009). The military is often viewed as excepted from this due to its unique role in engaging in violence on behalf of its people (Goldstein, 2001). The need to do violence has often been used as an argument to keep people out. However, I argue that despite its exceptional capacity for violence, military is, in fact, an essential institution for expansion. Looking beyond the violent aspects of military functions is an important part in understanding this integration and the degree to which women have been able to leverage it.

While present in nearly every democracy, variation exists in both the degree to which the societal role of the military is emphasized and the way that militaries have evolved with regards to changes in global politics. Carl von Clausewitz noted nearly 200 years ago that war was the “continuation of politics by other means.” It is not violence for violence's sake, but the specific and disciplined use, or threat of use, of violence to

achieve a particular political objective. In the 200 years since Clausewitz noted this, global politics has changed. So, too, has the conduct of war, and by extension the composition and role of the military in society. Understanding integration requires a more nuanced look at the different ways that militaries have been used in response to the changes in global politics.

Viewing the military as a government institution, rather than just a tool of violence, allows better differentiation between *integration*, and *inclusion*. Much of the current focus on women's participation is on the way in which women have been included. However, to truly understand the difference in women's participation, we need to better understand integration. Integration is not merely bringing women into the military to fight, but a process of structural allowances, participation, and meaningful impact that allows women to leverage their unique contributions in order to better the military's policies, tactics and strategies. Integration thus allows women to influence the military in a way that is reflective of the unique benefits that women bring to the public arena. France, Norway, and the United States despite all having made strides in including women in their militaries, have different level of integration. Understanding why these differences exist will help explain the observable variations in women's experiences in the military, as well as their ability to affect tactical outcomes.

From a practical standpoint, understanding the differences in levels of integration is of great interest to military leaders. As shown by the recent ISAF mission in Afghanistan and beyond in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) coalition forces are becoming standard practice for Western militaries in today's national security arena.

Women are increasingly seen as necessary in these operations. It is thus very likely that military leaders will have female troops from other countries under their command. Understanding the differences in women's integration in various militaries will help commanders to best employ women.

Further, throughout the Western world, women in the military remain a topic of discussion and policy debate. From 2000-2016, nearly every NATO member state and member of the partnership for peace has said that they have “enacted new policies” or “engaged in studies” aimed at increasing the number of women in the military or increasing retention rates of women in the military.<sup>3</sup> A large majority of these studies include wide-sweeping reviews of other countries' experiences with women in the military as a baseline to set new policies (Berkshire Consultancy Ltd., 2009; Burrelli, 2012; Cawkill, Rogers, Knight, & Spear, 2009; Trucano, Myers, Corbo, Hare, & Gaddes, 2017). However, rarely, if ever, are the programs and policies of other countries put in an historical or cultural context. While there are commonalities between NATO allies, there are historical and cultural differences that must be taken into account when making policies aimed at encouraging more participation by or greater retention of women. By approaching integration as a process and situating it within its cultural and institutional historical context, I shed light on what parts of integration are generalizable and what parts are particular to a particular country's cultural view of gender equality and military institutional history.

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<sup>3</sup> NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives Annual Reports 2000-2016. While not every country enacted new policies or commissioned studies every year, each did at least once.

## **Plan of the Dissertation**

This dissertation consists of three parts. Part one (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) explains how the various beliefs about gender equality interact with military culture to explain variation in women's integration. It shows how this study differs from previous attempts to understand women's military participation by introducing a definition of integration that goes beyond the measures of inclusion typically used. In the remainder of this chapter I discuss my approach, case study selection, and briefly address alternative explanations for the puzzle of variation in gender integration. Chapter 2 introduces the various beliefs about gender equality and highlights how the women's movements in France, Norway and the United States contributed to the claims made about women's service. In particular I focus on the degree to which the claim had universal appeal and its strength in appealing to the various military culture. In Chapter 3 I differentiate between integration and inclusion by arguing that what is missing in the current studies of women's military participation is an outcome-driven study of integration. I argue that a cornerstone to understanding the observable differences in these cases is in looking at historical evolution of the process of integration, rather than its individual aspects or particular moments of inclusion. I conclude Chapter 3 by discussing how claims about women's participation and military roles and culture interact to drive the process of integration.

Part 2 (Chapters 4-6) consists of in-depth case studies of France, Norway, and the United States. A structured-focused comparison of each country first examines the role of the military in society, and then traces the way that the claims about women's service

coincide and conflict with it. I look at three particular time periods that are reflective of major changes in global politics. The first is the 1970s – early 1990s. This period represents the early legislative impact of second wave feminism to the end of the Cold War. The second is the early 1990s – 2001. This period represents the end of the Cold War through the attacks of September 11, 2001. The third is 2001 – present. This period represents the post-9/11 world. Through tracing the process of integration in each country, I show how the differences in initial policy conditions and claims about service ultimately resulted in the observed different levels of integration.

In Chapter 4 I discuss women's integration into the French military. In France, the women's movement focused on institutional equality, highlighting that there were differences between men and women and that formal government apparatuses should mitigate that difference. The work of the women's movement resulted in legislated equality for women in all public employment (to include the military) and focused on creating a formal support network to address those areas (primarily child care and parental issues) that disproportionately impact women's ability to engage in public life. The military's culture was conducive to women participating "as women," and formal mechanisms allowed women to impact and change the military to make it more accommodating for women coming after them. Further, military doctrine reflected the unique contribution of women in both tactics and strategy.

In Chapter 5 I discuss women's integration into the Norwegian military. The Norwegian women's movement largely aligned with ideals of citizenship equality. Norwegian women downplayed their gender differences, focusing on the role that all



Norwegians played in promoting a stable and prosperous society. As a result, policies were made that impacted “Norwegians” without differentiating gender. Political and social structures were largely de-gendered, to include military service. The military’s focus on making citizens, coupled with their emphasis on restraining the use of violence made them a pioneer in women’s integration. Since they began the process of integration, a modest, but steady, number of Norwegian women have consistently been in, and remained, in the military. Yet while an initial leader in women’s participation, the gender neutrality of the policies has resulted in women’s “stalled” participation when faced with a changing global political order. The experiences of the Norwegian military in Afghanistan has highlighted the need for increased women in the military, resulting in new policies being made to attract and train all-female special operations units and attempt to increase women’s integration.

In Chapter 6 I discuss women’s integration into the United States military. For the United States, I show how the absence of a unified claim about women’s service and an historical distrust of government intervention for social equality, led the women’s movement to largely focus outside the formal government apparatus and encourage women to prove that they deserve equality. The degree to which men and women are (or are not) different has been the subject of a great deal of tension in the American women’s movement. The military’s commitment to a combat-centric identity has further made it difficult for women to make strong claims about their participation broadly. Policies about women’s participation in the military have frequently been a response to what women were doing, or needed to do, in the conduct of war, and were often temporary.

Though the United States has a relatively high percentage of women in the military at any one point in time, due to a lack of supporting policies, very few women remain in the military to achieve enough seniority to effect change. This has, in turn, impacted the way in which women have been used to face the challenges of the current security arena. Because of policies and a dearth of senior female combat leadership, women have been specially trained to augment all-male units. While individual women have been very successful in military careers, they have largely done so by proving their own personal worth, and conformed to, rather than pushed to change, the military.

Part 3 (Chapter 7) explores the implications of the differences of integration and examines how these differences may be leveraged. As highlighted in the beginning of this chapter, these three countries, along with other NATO allies and coalition forces, rely on joint operations to meet today's global security challenges. Additionally, NATO countries frequently engage in joint training exercise and military educational exchange programs. However, despite increased exposure and the convergence of other tactical areas, the integration of women has remained culturally specific. Understanding how women have been integrated into different militaries is indeed helpful to joint operations, as it will help commanders to utilize the different strengths that have resulted from the various processes.

Additionally, understanding integration of women into the military as a process opens the door for many more research questions. When we move beyond inclusion to integration, we are more richly able to explore the impact that women have on the

institution. In part 3 I will introduce some of these potential questions and address their possibility to impact both scholarship and policy.

## **Historical, Process Driven Approach to Understanding the Differences in Critical Cases**

### ***Approach***

I argue that women's integration into the military is a cultural process, driven by the interaction between claims made about women's service and military identity and tradition. I take an historical-institutional approach to understand the different levels of integration seen in the France, Norway, and the United States.<sup>4</sup> Integration is a process that takes place over a prolonged period of time, and is thus illustrative of the type of variable that Paul Pierson calls "cumulative and continual" (Pierson, 2003, p. 179). Such variables unfold over a prolonged period of time, and build upon themselves. Most studies looking at women's participation in the military have focused on the impact of singular moments or policy decisions, treating the cumulative processes as fixed in a particular moment of time. While these studies tell us a great deal about those particular moments of inclusion, they do not capture the temporally dynamic process of integration.

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<sup>4</sup> While Israel is a case worth of study for understanding women's integration into the military it did not fit the most similar design of this dissertation for several reasons. First, Israel does not have the shared history with second wave feminist movements of the countries examined in this case. Second, Israel is involved in kinetic conflicts with its geographic neighbors, a reality that gives the military a different place in society than those countries who are primarily involved in operations abroad. However, while not included here, it is worth studying in the future to understand the role of culture in women's integration.

Indeed, there are particular moments and events that are critical to integration, but these moments are only one part of a longer process of institutional evolution.

Taking an historical institutionalist approach also allows for an examination of the constraints of institutional social change that are imbedded both within the institution itself and the society working to change it (Berry, Forthcoming). Using such an approach, I conceptualize integration as what James Mahoney terms a “self-reinforcing sequence,” in that it is “characterized by the formation and long-term reproduction of a given institutional pattern” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 510). Integration is a temporally dynamic process that produces differing outcomes when applied to different countries. The differences in beliefs about equality, and the resulting claims about women’s participation underpin the reproductive process. The process is constrained by beliefs about the role of the military and the military’s internal culture. Thus, even if seemingly identical laws and policies about women’s military service are passed in each country, the variation in culture and institutional evolution result in different levels of integration.

Using differing beliefs about gender equality as the underlying mechanism for understanding military integration is unique. Most studies of women’s inclusion in the military focus either on the gendered nature of the violence that the military is charged with conducting, and the paradox of women engaging in such violence, or the legal changes that allow for women’s participation in an historically male institution. They highlight how critical moments, such as total war or economic crisis, overcome this paradox, and allow society to better accept women participating in the typically male act of conducting war (See, for example: Carreiras, 2006; Goldstein, 2001; MacKenzie,

2015; Segal, 1995; Eulriet, 2012). However, these studies do not capture the iterative nature of women's service or the cumulative impact of social engagements that have led to variations in participation. They look at external shocks that see more women serving rather than internal learnings that shape the way that women service and the military as an institution interact with one another. Tracing the way in which that the claims made about women's participation either coincided or conflicted with the role of the military in society and historical military culture thus gives insight into the slow moving yet dynamic process of integration.

### ***Case Study Selection***

The United States, Norway, and France are critical cases in understanding this difference. They are similar in many ways, yet reflect differences in foundational beliefs about gender equality. They thus represent a most similar research design and provide critical insight into how the nature of the interactions women's groups had with political institutions and the kinds of claims they made about equality influenced the process of women's integration into their militaries. All three countries are all wealthy and established democracies with both a democratic citizen-soldier tradition and formal civilian control of their militaries. They are also all early members of NATO, active both in balancing the Soviet Union and in integrating former Soviet states. They were all instrumental – and had active leadership roles – in ISAF's mission in Afghanistan, with women winning numerous award for valor and conduct during combat. Culturally, they all had strong second-wave feminist movements in the 1960s-80s that actively lobbied for

expanded social, economic, and political rights for women. As of 2015, all three countries legally allow women to participate in all occupational specialties in the military.

However, the underlying belief about gender equality is the key variable in explaining the difference in military integration. Despite all being liberal democracies that promote “equality,” both domestically and internationally, they do not conceptualize equality in the same way. France represents institutional equality, with a focus on a high level of difference between men and women, and an emphasis on the government enacting laws and policies that ensure that this difference does not result in equality. Norway embodies citizenship equality, emphasizing the similarity between all citizens with an emphasis on citizens receiving much from the government in return for substantial service. In the United States there has historically been an emphasis on individual achievement and a lack of social or cultural cohesion. As a result, there was little consensus on the nature of role of men and women in society, resulting in an absence of a uniform claim about women’s equality. These differences led to cohesive claims about women’s military participation in France and Norway, and individualized efforts on the part of women in the United States.

The “women’s movement” of the United States and Western Europe frequently get lumped into a generic category, as they all focused on ensuring greater sociopolitical rights in established, liberal democracies (Rowbotham, 1996). A closer examination of the movements, though, shows that while all possessed a macro-focus on “women’s rights,” the types of claims, and the specific actions taken by women’s groups in various

countries were constrained by foundational beliefs about what equality looks like. In teasing out the differences in these views, I take Judith Butler's advice to not allow the "universal subject of women ... to override or reduce the distinct articulations of gender asymmetry in different cultural contexts" (Butler, 2011, p. 48). These differences are frequently overlooked when comparing women in the military. By taking them into account, I am able to tease out the critical difference in the path to and process of integration that have resulted in the observed variation in outcomes and experiences of women in the Norwegian, French and United States militaries.

There are also differences in beliefs about the military's role and culture. The militaries in each of the countries reflect different orientations with regards to their place in the world. These differences have resulted in variations in the sources of authority for leadership and legitimacy. The United States has long been seen as a "superpower," emphasizing military might and conventional combat. As a result, the infantry has been seen as the primary source of authority. France and Norway have both largely enjoyed the United States' security umbrella, and have thus placed their sources of authority in military aspects other than combat. Norway's historical subjugation to Denmark and Sweden has resulted in a military that is focused on the differential aspects of Norwegian culture that set it apart. The military is largely seen as the protector of Norwegian values and the maker of "true" Norwegian citizens. France's military culture is shaped by its colonial legacy and current relationship to its former colonies. It is largely adaptable to the changing international political arena and rewards innovation in both tactics and strategies.

Taken together over time, the interaction between the claims made about women's military participation and military culture, result in differences in the levels of women's integration into the military. From the way women are talked about by their peers and senior leaders, to policies on coed bunking facilities, to provisions for child care and parental leave, despite years of fighting side by side, women have very different experiences with military service. These differences are reflective of differences in the integration process as experienced by women in the United States, France, and Norway. There have been differences in the way in which women have been able to impact the military as an institution, both in terms of policies and strategy. Taken in total, these represent differences in levels of integration in the countries considered.

Table 1.2 highlights the key similarities and differences that influenced case selection.



**Table 1.2: Overview of Case Selection**

	<b>United States</b>	<b>Norway</b>	<b>France</b>
<b>Similarities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Liberal democracy</li> <li>- Civilian control of military</li> <li>- Early NATO member</li> <li>- Military strategy includes promoting democratic values</li> <li>- History of women's participation in the military</li> <li>- Participation in operations in Afghanistan</li> <li>- Active women's movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Liberal democracy</li> <li>- Civilian control of military</li> <li>- Early NATO member</li> <li>- Military strategy includes promoting democratic values</li> <li>- History of women's participation in the military</li> <li>- Participation in operations in Afghanistan</li> <li>- Active women's movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Liberal democracy</li> <li>- Civilian control of military</li> <li>- Early NATO member</li> <li>- Military strategy includes promoting democratic values</li> <li>- History of women's participation in the military</li> <li>- Participation in operations in Afghanistan</li> <li>- Active women's movement</li> </ul>
<b>Difference – Belief about Equality</b>	Individual Equality	Citizenship Equality	Institutional Equality
<b>Level of Integration</b>	Low	Moderate	High

### **Alternative Explanations**

There are currently three primary lines of arguments used to explain women's increased participation in the military: to support the war effort, competition for employment, and reflection of societal views about women. While these arguments have historical validity and are foundation for the study of women in the military, they fall short of explaining the current variation in women's integration, especially among ISAF countries.


### *Supporting the War Effort*

The need for women to support a national war effort is the most common and universally used explanation for women's increased role in the military. Indeed, it has been used both as justification by policy makers (the "Free a Man to Fight" logic) and as an explanatory tool by academics (Enloe, 1980; Eitelberg, 1988; Higonnet, 1987) to explain why it becomes both legally and socially acceptable for women to increasingly engage in military service. As Segal (1995) explains, as the threat to national security goes up and states need bigger militaries to confront this rising threat, women are seen as necessary in order to meet the needs of the growing size of the military. The exceptional nature of war-time means that states will take "seemingly exceptional" measures, including recruiting and expanding the role of women, in order to meet their security needs (Goldstein, 2001). This approach uses participation in war and the size of militaries as the primary independent variables.

This approach fails to explain the current variation in levels of integration. The United States, Norway and France have been engaging in most of the same international conflicts since the end of the Cold War, yet experience different levels of integration. Additionally, it cannot explain why all Western militaries are focusing on measures to increase the presence of women in their ranks, despite drawing down the size of their militaries. For this logic to hold, given the comparatively rapid rise of women in Western militaries, we would expect to see an increase in the number of wars being fought by


Western militaries and a growth in the size of militaries. However, neither of conditions are met in the post-Cold War era.

**Figure 1.1: States Experiencing Warfare**



Source: Center for Systemic Peace, [systemicpeace.org](http://systemicpeace.org)

**Figure 1.2: Total Force Numbers for Select NATO Forces 1990-2014**



Source: World Bank Data

As Figure 1.1 shows, war has been generally on the decline. NATO and Western militaries, in particular, have decreased their number of military interventions as well (Kisangani & Pickering, 2008). Additionally, as shown in Figure 1.2, the size of militaries has been trending downward or holding steady. Further, most NATO nations have participated in the same conflicts since the end of the Cold War,<sup>5</sup> making war an inadequate explanation for the variation in women's integration.

### ***Competition for Employment***


As militaries have professionalized, economics increasingly plays a role in the personnel composition of the armed forces. When men no longer have to serve in the military, they are more likely to choose jobs that are less dangerous, more stable, and offer better pay in the private sector. As a result, states must increasingly turn to women to fill the ranks of the military (Stanley & Segal, 1988; Segal, 1995). This logic is primarily related to the legal provisions of women's participation, offering evidence as to why states open positions to women that seemingly contradict social norms (Eulriet, 2012). If this approach were true, we would expect to see low male unemployment (as men have secure private sector jobs) when seeing an increase of women in professional militaries. As Mady Segal asserts "high [male] unemployment rates are associated with a ready supply of men for the armed forces, and relatively low opportunities for women" (Segal, 1995, p. 767). But when unemployment rose in the early 1980s, opportunities for

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<sup>5</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natohq/topics\\_52060.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natohq/topics_52060.htm)

women in the military contracted (Stanley & Segal, 1988). Therefore, given the stark rise in women's military participation since the end of the Cold War, we would expect to see very low male unemployment. Figure 1.3 shows the trend lines of male unemployment in select NATO countries. While unemployment was falling in the 1990s, it rises sharply beginning around 2000. It is in the early 2000s that most NATO countries saw their most dramatic increase in women in the military, making explanation via economics less likely.

**Figure 1.3: Male Unemployment Rates of Select NATO Countries**



Source: World Bank Data


### ***Reflection of Societal Views on Women***

A final argument explaining women's integration rests on the fact that professional militaries become more representative of the societies they protect. Therefore, as society's values and attitudes about social norms (whether race or gender) change, the military should reflect that change (Abrahamsson, 1972; Allen, 2000; Armor & Gilroy, 2009). As social attitudes change and the citizenry accept women in non-

traditional roles, it becomes more acceptable for women to engage in a profession of violence (Carreiras, 2006).

If this logic were to hold true in explaining the observable differences in Western militaries, we would expect to see states in which women were more present in the public workforce have more opportunities and higher levels of women's integration in the military.<sup>6</sup>

**Figure 1.4: Women's Workforce Participation**



Source: World Bank Data

Figure 1.4 shows the public workforce participation of women in select NATO countries. Used as an operationalization of attitudes and values about women's public participation, it is moderately useful in explaining the various levels of women's integration in militaries. In the case of the countries with the highest women's

<sup>6</sup> Operationalization from: Carreiras, Helena. *Gender and the military: Women in the armed forces of western democracies*. Routledge, 2006. And further explained in Alexander, Amy C., and Christian Welzel. "Empowering women: four theories tested on four different aspects of gender equality." *Annual meeting of Midwest Political Science Association*. Chicago: Palmer House Hotel. 2007.

participation (represented by Norway and Canada), it is a plausible explanation for their high degree of military integration. However, the other countries are more problematic. For example, despite their relatively high rates of workforce integration, the United States and United Kingdom have a relatively low level of overall military integration. Similarly, this approach cannot explain countries such as France and Belgium's relatively low workforce participation yet high level of military integration.

### **A Note about Women in the Military and Levels of Integration**

This dissertation focuses on the different levels of integration of women in the French, Norwegian, and United States' militaries as a way of understanding the observed differences of women's experiences in Western militaries. While I operationalize integration, and place a value of "low," "moderate," or "high" on the three countries, this is a comparative value, not a values judgement on who a country has engaged with gender integration. As highlighted on the NATO committee on Gender Perspectives' annual reports, women in the military remains a contentious and unsettled topic in nearly every country. Both government and military leaders continue to grapple with both policy provisions and culture issues around the topic. My intent in labeling the levels of integration is not to highlight a "right" or "wrong" way, but to create a viable means for comparison.

It is also important to note that individual women in all three militaries still believe that there is much work to be done to improve both the experience of women and the overall effectiveness of the military. This reality highlights the need to look at

integration rather than just inclusion. Indeed, in all three countries, women are legally allowed to participate in any occupational specialty, and their numbers are growing. The fact that despite this, women still feel as though their potential is not fully realized shows that there is still work to be done. My hope in highlighting the cultural and historic institutional constraints placed on the process of integration is that it will ultimately be able to help determine those spaces for opening more opportunities for women to be more fully integrated and utilized in their nations' militaries.



## CHAPTER 2

### Beliefs, Laws, and Action:

#### Views about equality and claims to women's public participation

Military participation is one way in which women participate in public life.

Though there is a commonality among women's movements *that* women should have a greater participation in public life there is not a unified reason as to *why*. These claims are largely rooted in foundational cultural beliefs about gender equality. The variations in these claims are one of the driving forces in understanding the variations in the process of integration. Further, the way that claims interact with role of the military in public life and military culture creates either permissive or restrictive condition for the process of integration. In order to better understand the differences in claims made about women's military service, I turn to the second wave feminist women's movements in France, Norway and the United States as a way to understand the foundational differences in beliefs about gender equality. Though women's movements were active on specific issues in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, particularly workers' and voting rights, the second wave feminist movement expanded the focus of women's issues to engage with the totality of women's position in society. Second wave feminism moved beyond specific legal demands (such as voting rights) to discussions of how to change large scale social, political and economic attitudes and opportunities for women ((Katzenstein &

Mueller, 1987). While the women's movement rarely engaged directly with the military, the language used concerning women's equality and the way in which women's movements interacted with the government laid the groundwork for the claims made about women's military service.

It is important to look beyond individual women's organizations and to view the women's movement in a given country as a "broad political force" that weaves throughout a country's many ideologies, identities, and moments of history (Katzenstein, 1987) in order to better understand how the women's movements impacted women's integration into the military. I thus focus on the underlying beliefs about equality and the role of women in public life that transcended specific groups and result in unified claims about women's service.

The impact of these underlying beliefs on women's military integration fall into two primary categories. First is the way that underlying beliefs about equality influenced the type of claims made about women's participation and roles in the military. Women in Norway, France, and the United States, as well as officials in the militaries in which they served, made claims about why women should (or shouldn't) serve in the military. These claims are largely influenced by the beliefs about women's equality espoused by the movements in the various countries. The language of the women's movement permeated into social dialogue about women's participation such that even groups not directly targeted by the movement adopted their language of equality.

The second area in which women's movements had an impact on military integration is in creating initial structural enabling conditions. Legal provisions for

military service not only include what women are allowed to do in the military, but also enabling provisions, such as child care and maternity leave, that ensure the familial and social expectations placed on an individual because of one's gender are not a limiting factor to service. In all three countries, women's movements were largely responsible for lobbying for, and often drafting, the legislation that led to such policies. The variations in parental leave and childcare policies seen in the three countries are reflective of the variations in the underlying beliefs held by the women's movements.

In this chapter, I discuss the three broad categories of belief about equality<sup>7</sup> that differentiate the women's movements in France, Norway, and the United States: institutional equality, citizenship equality, and individual equality. The differences in these categories will be traced through two factors: women's self-identification compared to men, and beliefs about the government's role in ensuring gender equality.

I begin this chapter by discussing some of the key differences in foundational beliefs about equality. I then go into more detail about how each country's women's movements defined and professed their self-identification in relation to men and their interaction with the government. Throughout the chapter I highlight how these differences resulted in different types of legislation concerning the key structural enabling conditions of child care and parental leave. I conclude this chapter highlighting

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<sup>7</sup> These are based on the work of Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller who focuses on the difference between institutional and citizenship ideas of equality. Combining their work with that of Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen Beckwith and Dieter Rucht I added the idea of individual equality to better capture those movements that primarily worked outside the state to promote gender equality in the private or social sectors.

how these differences resulted in differences in both the strength and type of claims that helped inform and constrain the process of women's integration into the military.

### **Beliefs About Equality**

Studies of feminism and women's movements have a prominent focus on second wave feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The era of second wave feminism was one of global change and idea diffusion (Klein, 1987). Additionally, feminist journals and magazines were published in many countries across the West during this era, allowing for both the sharing of ideas and access to primary source materials. While the diffusion of ideas did result in some commonalities between countries, a closer examination highlights that there were variations in the way in which women's movements talked about equality. National cultural and political history and traditions contribute to these variations that can be seen in the different self-identifications and beliefs about the role that government plays in ensuring gender equality. We can see these differences through outcomes in terms of both policy achievement and social claims about women's role in public life throughout the Western world (Katzenstein & Mueller, 1987; Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003).

While the Western world is frequently thought to be blanketly "liberal" with regards to social and political equality, there is quite a bit of variation in how that equality is understood, practiced, and manifested (Hindess, 1993). Equality is broadly talked about throughout the West, particularly as a foundation for democracy. However, it is not practiced or conceptualized in a uniform manner. Understanding that political

culture, institutions, and historical experience all contribute to shaping socio-cultural ideas of equality, the following three broad categories of gender equality help our understanding of variations in women's military integration.

**Table 2.1: Categories of Gender Equality in Western Democracies**

<b>Category of Gender Equality</b>	<b>Characterized by</b>	<b>Example Countries</b>
Institutional Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gendered focus on differences between men and women</li> <li>- Government seen as responsible to ensure that differences don't result in one gender being preferenced over the other</li> <li>- Women fill public roles that men can't</li> <li>- Unified claims around the benefits of gendered actions</li> </ul>	France, Belgium, Netherlands
Citizenship Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- De-gendered downplay of difference between men and women</li> <li>- Government provides large amount of equal social provisions for all citizens</li> <li>- Women viewed as citizens with the same obligations to the state as men</li> <li>- Unified claims around de-gendered responsibilities</li> </ul>	Norway, Denmark, Canada
Individual Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Individual ability, not gender, is the basis for equality</li> <li>- Government <i>may</i> be pressured to provide equality of opportunity, but no focus on equality of outcomes</li> <li>- Limited obligations of citizens of either gender to state</li> <li>- No universal claim about women's public participation</li> </ul>	United States, United Kingdom

Because the military is both beholden to public policy decisions and reliant on citizens to make up its ranks, the underlying beliefs about equality held by the women's movements and their interaction with the government shaped the way that women's integration took place. Further, because the militaries of the United States, France, and Norway all rely on women volunteering to serve, the claims made about women's role in public life influenced the choices that women made to join and remain in the military. Below, I briefly discuss the three different categories of beliefs about gender equality.

### ***Institutional Equality***

Institutional equality is characterized by a high level of difference in women's self-identification from men and a high level of government involvement to promote and ensure equality. Gender differences are not muted, but emphasized as necessary, and diverse characteristics that complement one another are highlighted. These differences are seen as necessary and it is incumbent on society to both protect and promote them. Institutional equality is frequently accompanied by a strong strain of intellectualism, focusing on the sources of inequality experienced by out-groups and the requirements to ensure social, political, and economic equality between them (Lovenduski, *Women and European Politics*, 1986). The focus of such intellectualism is often to guarantee that differences – whether innate or socially constructed – do not become “synonymous with oppression,” (Duchen, *French Connections*, 1987) but are properly leveraged to promote a diverse, yet equal, society. In this vein, the role of the government is to ensure that

differences do not put one group at a disadvantage to another in the formal or public sector. Public policy must provide the resources to mitigate any potentially adverse externalities resulting from differences and ensure a truly opportunity for equality.

Women's movements based on institutional equality tend to lobby the government for policies that make up for both the biological and socially constructed differences between the genders. Rather than downplaying femininity or attempting to dismantle gendered structures of power, the feminine is highlighted as a necessary complement to the masculine that has typically dominated society. Both must act together to ensure a well-functioning sociopolitical order. Formal institutions, from education to parliament to the military, are targeted in order to ensure that gender imbalances are not perpetuated and to ensure that public policy does not preference men. Universal child care, women's health care, and parental leave are examples of policies for which such women's groups lobby, as they help to mitigate some of the differences between men and women that have traditionally hindered women's ability to achieve full equality in public life. In return, women participate in the public *as women*, often engaging with formal institutions in such a way that they adopt more feminine characteristics or are made aware of more feminine approaches to their work.

France typifies institutional equality. French feminists highlighted the unique characteristics of women, and demanded institutional change to ensure that women would not be disadvantaged because of their differences. The government was lobbied to break the hold of the "institutions of the patriarchy"<sup>8</sup> (Duchen, 1987). The words of Simone

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<sup>8</sup> Term originally coined by Collette Guillaumin writing in *Questions Feministes* in 1979.

Veil, a French politician, exemplify this approach, noting that “a democratic system must ensure equal participation of all its citizens” (Quoted in Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003, p. 74). An example of this can be seen in how child care was framed as a necessary provision for women’s participation in society. French feminists attacked the “unbearable conditions imposed on mothers” (Gallimard, 1973) and thus insisted that public policies, such as crèche care, were necessary to ensure that motherhood did not inhibit women’s ability to engage in public life on equal footing with men. Childcare remained a “woman’s issue,” and the differences between men and women were not muted, but highlighted as an essential part of a diverse public citizenry.

### ***Citizenship Equality***

Citizenship equality centers around the idea that individuals – regardless of gender, race, religion, or ethnicity – are seen as citizens first, and any other particular identity groups second. From a gender perspective, citizenship equality is characterized by a low level of difference in women’s self-identification from men and a high level of government involvement to promote and ensure equality. Differences between individuals or identity groups are downplayed, and instead the similarities of both obligations and benefits of citizenship are emphasized. Often seen in social welfare states, citizenship equality is usually accompanied by generous benefit provision from state institutions given equally to all identity groups (Borchorst & Siim, 2008). Because of the high levels of benefit provision from the government, increased social, political and economic rights are often bargained for in return for service to the country or the



public good. Equality in benefit provision by the government to all groups can be seen as an instrument of social integration, as benefit provisions help ease the transition of a previous out-group into the social order (Banting, 1995). For example, immigrants who become citizens are given nearly the same benefits as those with birthright citizenship. Such universal provision works to create a more homogenous society and associated with “equality of the highest standards, rather than minimum need” (Epsing-Andersen, 1990, p. 27). To ensure equality for all citizens, governments frequently provide such benefits as education, employment, healthcare, and parental benefits at the same level for everyone, regardless of their belonging to any particular identity group or gender.

Norway is an example of a country rooted in citizenship equality. Even when lobbying for those issues or benefits traditionally seen as “women’s rights,” such as childcare, education, and parental leave, women’s movements did not frame them explicitly beneficial for women, but as a positive benefit for all of society. To combat the historical patriarchal nature of the state,<sup>9</sup> Norwegian women focused on sociopolitical homogeny. As women organized and lobbied for increased medical, social, economic, and political rights, they did so by stressing their *sameness* to their male counterparts as citizens, and willingly engaged in the same obligations, from increased taxes to universal military conscription. Women argued to be treated as citizens – and therefore afforded all the social welfare guarantees of their male counterparts – in order to expand the labor pool and defense market, something that would benefit all Norwegians, not only women (Hernes H. M., 1988). This is highlighted in the case of universal childcare. Rather than

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<sup>9</sup> For a discussion on the debate around the patriarchal nature of welfare states see O’Connor, 1993

being framed as necessary for women to have equal opportunity, Norwegian women argued that “working citizens” should be sociopolitical norm (Leira, 1992). State-provided childcare would thus free more citizens to work, resulting in net benefits for society. Childcare thus became de-gendered, and seen not as the responsibility of women, but of “parents.”

### ***Individual Equality***

Individual equality holds that it is each individual’s responsibility to overcome any perceived disadvantages or hardships and prove themselves based on merit. Individual equality is characterized by a lack of a unified belief about the difference in women’s self-identification from men and a low level of government involvement to promote and ensure equality. Government plays a minor role in ensuring equality, ensuring only that there are no formal structural restrictions on individuals achieving the same level of social, political, or economic success. The overarching focus of those rooted in individual equality is on empowerment of individuals and removing formal barriers to success without guaranteeing any particular outcome. Structural, institutional, or social mechanisms of inequality are greatly downplayed. With regards to gender, there is little consensus as to the differences between genders, whether those differences are biologically or socially constructed. As a result, rather than focus on group characteristics or differences, individual choice and ability is emphasized (Brenner, 1996). Unlike either institutional or citizenship equality, very little is expected from government, and, in return, there are lower expectations of public service for those groups that adhere to

individual inequality. Instead, it is up to the individual to choose the path that is best for them. Public policy is an “insufficient means of producing social change ... [as] it denies autonomy, and forces a one-size fits all solution to a complex problem” (Costain, 1992, pp. 8-10). Proponents of individual equality thus seek to use the experiences and abilities of individuals that have been successful as proof of equal opportunity, highlighting success without assistance from formal government policies or structures.

For women’s movements in individual equality, feminism, and the resulting identity vis a vis men, is seen as an individual choice. If there are perceived gendered differences that result in inequalities, it is up to the individual to compensate for them. The United States exemplifies individual equality. While women fought for increased recognition and rights, they appealed to individuals much more than the government. Harriot Stulman, a women’s activist and member of Students for Democratic Society, noted in 1967 that “women will always be invisible in [government] power ... so we bypass the government” (Quoted in Evans, 1979, p. 167). Indeed, the tactics of the women’s movements reflected the historic belief in the United States that the government should not interfere with personal matters, to include gender relations (Evans, 1979; Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003; Costain, 1992). The absence of a national child care system is an example of how individual equality plays out in practice. Though groups such as the National Organization of Women (NOW) lobbied for federally-funded child care centers, the political opposition was strong,<sup>10</sup> so groups did not devote resources to formal political lobbying (Mink, 1998). Rather, women’s groups encouraged individual

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<sup>10</sup> See, for example, President Nixon’s veto of the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971

women to form child-care co-ops to “encourage community involvement in empowering women and direct social change” (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003, p. 1). It was believed that seeing examples of success in individuals would better direct change than government-led programs.

As noted above, women’s self-identification in relationship to men, and beliefs about the government’s role in promoting and ensuring equality are prominent differences between the various beliefs about equality. Taken together they result in different claims about women’s roles in public life. Table 2.2 highlights the differences for the countries included in this dissertation.

**Table 2.2: Overview of Self-Identification, Government’s Role, and Claims**

	<b>Self-Identification</b>	<b>Government’s Role in Equality</b>	<b>Claims about women’s role</b>
<b>France – Institutional Equality</b>	Difference between women and men	Government must make up the difference to ensure equality	Women need to do what men can’t
<b>Norway – Citizenship Equality</b>	Little to No Difference between women and men	Government policies shape social attitudes	Women have an obligation to be active citizens
<b>USA – Individual Equality</b>	Individual characteristics	Minimal intervention	No unified claim about women’s service

Below I trace how this self-identification and beliefs about women’s equality combine in each country to result in claims about women’s’ role in public life. I then identify how the variation in these claims help us better understand the variation women’s military service.

## France: Different Can be Equal

### *Self-Identification: Strong emphasis on the difference*

French Feminism, and the women's movements that it spurred, strongly adheres to the belief that there is a difference between men and women. While there was disagreement among organizations during the second wave feminist era as to whether the difference is part of the inherent natural differences between men and women or a result of social and political experiences,<sup>11</sup> there was agreement that they were fundamentally different. Both the intellectual roots of the women's movements, and the experience of women during World War II were instrumental in emphasizing this difference and contributing to solidifying it in the French consciousness.

The intellectual roots of French feminism provide a strong body of work that focus on the difference between men and women. The source of that difference, as well as how it should be addressed, is the subject of a great deal of French feminist writing. The idea of the difference between men and women was so important to intellectual feminists that an entire issue of *Questions Feministes*<sup>12</sup> in 1979 was dedicated to debating both the source and nature of difference in an attempt to find unity among feminist movements. The hope was that by engaging in dialogue about the source of the difference, women's organizations could discover that they had more in common than

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<sup>11</sup> The two major French women's organizations, *Psyche et Po* and *Mouvement de Liberation des Femmes (MLF)*, highlight this divide. While *Psyche et Po* focused primarily on the natural origins of the difference between men and women, *MLF* emphasized sociopolitical and economic roots of the masculine/feminine divide. Disagreements about the roots of the difference resulted in a great deal of discord among the women's movements.

<sup>12</sup> A French feminist journal that ran from 1977-1980. It was originally founded by Simone de Beauvoir.

previously thought, and work together to advance a common cause. Collette Guillian, a prominent French feminist intellectual, asserts in the introduction to the volume “as [women] we must address the heterogenous nature of our difference. By heterogenous I mean that it covers both anatomical and physiological features and also social-psycho phenomen” (Guillaumin, 1979).

The focus on the heterogeneity of difference, like many of the intellectual roots of French feminism, can be traced to Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*. An example of the dual nature of difference can be seen in de Beauvoir grappling with the relationship between the act of sex and marriage:

...It is still a difficult problem for [women] to reconcile their conjugal life with sexual satisfaction. A marriage generally does not mean physical love, it would seem reasonable to clearly differentiate one from the other. A man can admittedly make an excellent husband and still be inconstant: his sexual caprices do not in fact keep him from carrying out the enterprise of a friendly communal life with his wife... One might allow that it could be the same for the wife; she often wishes to share in her husband’s existence, create a home with him for their children, and still experience another embrace... But for women, the love act is still considered a *service* a wife must perform, the possible result of which makes her shakedown to her husband. (De Beauvoir, 1949, pp. 596-597)

In this passage, we see de Beauvoir highlight how biological differences, namely the fact that women are the child bearers, are exploited through the socially constructed expectations in the institution of marriage. Throughout this seminal work, she highlights how both social institutions and formal laws take advantage of women’s biology and

therefore lessen their worth, chastising the French government for creating “a system based on women’s dependence” (De Beauvoir, 1949, p. 721).

Illuminating how laws and policies created an environment where women were considered second class citizens, often based on their biological differences, was a primary focus of the intellectual pursuits of French feminists. Indeed, they did not theorize for merely the sake of creating new ideas, but with a focus to change the policies that had allowed the government to continue to reproduce the patriarchy. The desire to work to change the system is characterized by the introduction to the first issue of *Questions Feministes*: “*Questions Feministes* is a theoretical discourse that attempts to explain the causes and mechanisms, the why and the how of women’s oppression in general, or of one of its specific aspects; it welcomes any discourse that tries to draw political conclusions, which suggest a strategy or tactics for the feminist movement.” The writings contained in *Questions Feministes* served to enlighten and embolden women in a way that would result in lasting change. Intellectual feminism existed to “analyze and demystify the patriarchy and to project a reconstruction of a society where relations of domination are eliminated” (Duchen, 1986, p. 83).

The focus on women’s difference was not only seen in intellectuals. Women in France became acutely aware of the differences between men and women during the Resistance to Nazi occupation during World War II. The women of the Resistance provided a practical model to highlight the benefits of leveraging the difference between men and women for the good of the country. With their role in liberating France, women of the Resistance and the Women’s Corps proved that national defense was not only a

man's job. The influence of the Resistance women on claims made about the benefit of the difference between men and women on future generations is seen in the trial of Marguerite Gonnet. Ms. Gonnet, a mother of 9, was a successful fighter in France's resistance. However, due to the formal restrictions that were still in place regarding women's participation in combat and possession of firearms, she was put on trial in 1942. Upon being asked why she broke the law and "picked up a gun," she responded, "quite simply, Colonel, because the men had abandoned their weapons" (Transcript of the trial in Douzou, 1995). Throughout the trial the message remained clear: women picked up arms because the men, charged with the defense of the country, had failed.

Throughout the Resistance, women were able to largely do what men were not. From bombing Nazi barracks to leading raids on Nazi strongholds, women proved essential to the liberation of France (Weitz, 1995; Diamond, 2005). It is worth noting that women, by in large, acted in line with social gender norms when carrying out combat actions. They adapted to cultural norms about women's role in society, often seducing officers to get information or access to intimate spaces. Rather than engaging in overt offensives, the women of the Resistance used their femininity to move through occupied France with little suspicion and launch covert attacks. The success of female members of the Resistance resulted in women experiencing both validation and a form of freedom previously unknown. As Jean Paul Sartre wrote in the *Atlantic*, "Never were we freer than under the German occupation ... for they forced us all to be Frenchmen in the ways in which we knew how" (Sartre, 1944, p. 43). This freedom, for women to live as equals to their male counterparts while maintaining their femininity, and have their differences



celebrated as necessary for victory, would serve as a foundation for the claims made about women's public service throughout the Fifth Republic.

Recalling their roles in particular combat operations, *partisans*<sup>13</sup> noted that their success was largely due to the fact that they were able to leverage their differences and move through occupied France in a way that their male counterparts were not. Reflecting on her assassination of a Vichy military officer, "Claude"<sup>14</sup> spoke of wearing her best dress and a hat with an ostrich feather to woo him at Maxime's, a fine dining establishment where German and Vichy military officers would dine. After a flirtatious evening, she escorted him out a rear door, leading the officer to believe that their evening was "off to a grandiose finish" (Interview in Schwartz, 1998). Outside, she led the officer into the backseat a cab driven by a member of the Resistance, and met his advances with a shot from a revolver to the head. She exited the cab, and walked through the streets, passing the Gestapo checkpoints without suspicion while her comrade disposed of the body. Similarly, Fanny Dutet and Betty Jegouzo<sup>15</sup> recall carrying weapons in shopping bags undetected into Nazi barracks and safe houses to conduct raids and assassinations.

Gender norms made women particularly adept at urban guerrilla warfare, as they were able to move through urban settings seemingly undetected and strike when Nazi or Vichy soldiers were unaware. Due to their tactical success, women were promoted into command positions in organized Resistance fighting units. Women in command were

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<sup>13</sup> Term female members of the Resistance used to self-identify

<sup>14</sup> Due to the sensitive nature of her work as an assassin, this particular woman has refused to be recorded in interviews or write an official memoir. However, her story is recounted exactly the same way in Schwartz, Diamond, Weitz, and reported in The Atlantic.

<sup>15</sup> All interviews transcribed in Schwartz 1998

primarily stationed in Lyon and Limoges, areas where urban guerrilla warfare was the most common tactic to defeat Nazi occupation (Baudoin, 1962). The groups commanded by women would frequently conduct raids of city halls where occupying forces were holding meetings or the living quarters of the Nazi soldiers. As a result, women found themselves frequently fighting house-to-house in urban combat. Urban units also played to the benefits of having mixed gender units. Male and female officers in the resistance would frequently live together, posing as a couple, in order to infiltrate affluent Nazi or Vichy neighborhoods.

Both the intellectual conceptualization about the differences between the genders and the practical experiences of women being successful “as women” during the Resistance are the foundation of many of the claims about women’s role in public life, to include their military service. Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> and into the 21<sup>st</sup> Centuries, women would continue to emphasize the importance of their difference to meet the changing nation security arena.

### ***Role of the Government: Take Responsibility and Provide for the Differences***

The French women’s movements emphasized the differences between men and women, and many French feminists focused on the government as one of the primary drivers of inequality that resulted from those differences. Indeed, the government was often seen as being responsible for creating the conditions that created or intensified women’s inequality. French feminists often referred to “structures of patriarchy” created by the government as the root of social, political, and economic inequality:

We believe that [inequality] is socially constructed, that it is one of the pillars of patriarchy, that it is not a ‘moral’ norm but a political strategy which makes it possible to keep a system going, to perpetuate it, hide its contradictions, mask the oppressors and above all *divide us*. (Icamiaba, 1981)

The women’s group *Psyche et Po* catalyzed around this idea by asserting in their charter, “We are not in the margins; we’re here to explode the structure that says we are marginal” (Pysche et Po, 1978). The focus of French women’s movement on trying to change formal structures through government actions is reflective of a history of previously marginalized groups lobbying the French government for policy changes to address inequality (Lovenduski, 1986; Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Hall, 1986). Despite different flavors of policy prescriptions held by the French right and left, government intervention in “labor market policy, social protection policy, and issues [related to] structural inconstancies” has remained constant (Levy, 2005, p. 107).

The women’s movement took great care to properly engage with government policy. Edith Lhuillier, a prominent voice in the feminist movement, asserted in a *Parti Socialiste* (PS) meeting that the “if [feminists] are going to play the institutional game, and are obligated to play it properly” (Transcript of the meeting in Duchen, 1986, p. 116). To this end, feminists partnered with politicians (particularly in PS), to pursue policy changes that helped revise the structures of inequality and ensure that women had truly the same access to political, social and economic opportunities as men, without having to compromise on the unique characteristics that made them women. In the words of political activists, the overarching theme of engagement with government was for a

woman's "right to be different biologically ... but to squash any resulting political difference" (Guillaumin, 1979). Among the most radical factions of French feminists there was a distrust of male politicians, and a move to only support female legislators. Such activists believed that "it was up to women to formulate women's politics" (Duchen, 1987).

It is important to note that French feminists did not see the government's role as changing societies' views about the gender norms, nor did they focus on convincing men to do traditional "women's work." Rather, they believed that the government was responsible for ensuring that the differences between the genders did not result in inequalities. When they used the clause in Constitution of 1946 that asserted that all French citizens were equal before the law to strengthen their claims to increased social, political, and economic access, they did not substitute equality with "sameness." In seeking liberation and equality, French feminists rejected the idea that they had to be "just like men," and instead focused on the important differences between the genders and the unique role for women in society (Jardine, 1979). In order to guarantee equality, they focused on public policies that made up for any differences could disadvantage women.

The focus on the government's role in mitigating any negative outcomes from gender differences cut across political ideology. For example, conservative politician Simone Veil stated, "I believe that men and women are rich in their differences and that they are complementary. It is, moreover, in the name of these differences and of all that

women can offer that it is necessary to demand equality in politics.”<sup>16</sup> The ability of the French women’s movement to appeal to both radicals and conservatives would help solidify it as a cross-cutting force throughout the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> and shape the claims that would be made about women’s role in public life.

Laws around child care highlight the beliefs in the government’s role in ensuring that women’s differences are not a disadvantage. The lobby for universal child care was rooted in The Constitution of the Fifth Republic’s legal guarantee for the “right to work” for all French citizens. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, women were committed to guaranteeing that they actually had equality in the workplace. Women quickly realized that guaranteeing work could not be done without overcoming many other structural hurdles women faced with regards to gender-based workplace discrimination (Mazus, 1995, p. 49). In order to ensure workplace equality, reforms and laws would have to be made that extended beyond employment. For example, child care, health care, and maternity leave were part of ensuring equal opportunity at work that would result in equal pay. Without them, women would not be competitive with their male colleagues.

The most wide-sweeping government response to women’s equality was the 1972 Law of Equal Pay between Men and Women.<sup>17</sup> While the law was foundational in ensuring gender equality, it is the interpretations and follow-ons to the law that are the

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<sup>16</sup> Speech to Parliament recorded in *Le Monde*, June 6-7 1993

<sup>17</sup> Loi No. 72-1143 du 22 Decembre 1972 relative a l’egalite de remuneration entre les hommes et les femmes

most illustrative of the government ensuring conditions are met for equality. In a 1972 report to the Conseil Economique et Social, Yves Chaigneau writes

It would be illusionary to think that a legislative text could by itself automatically solve completely the problem of salary equality within the firm... in terms of other contributing factors in disparities [between men and women workers], they will disappear only with the formulation of much broader and better adapted policies on women's equal right in all areas, especially in the employment, training and social promotion. The success of such policies depends on the modification of resources available and values around womanhood when it involves the professional future of young girls and women. (Chaigneau, 1972)

To that end, a series of structural reforms that further enhanced equal opportunities for women were passed. As a result of the work of the Comité d'Etudes et de Liaison des Problèmes du Travail Féminin (CETF) and the writings of several prominent feminist intellectuals the in early 1973 Prime Minister Pierre Messmer issued formal clarification on the 1972 Equal Pay Law. In a decree dated March 27, 1973, PM Messmer asserted that simply offering equal pay was not enough, and that “conditions for equality” must be set by all employers, public and private.<sup>18</sup>

The conditions to which PM Messmer alluded would be codified in a series of laws and edicts issued throughout 1975. For example, protections were codified for pregnant women that both forbade employers from using pregnancy as grounds for refusing to hire or terminating employment, and guarded women against having to reveal pregnancy to their employers. Employers were also banned from firing women during

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<sup>18</sup> Decret no. 73-360 27 Mars 1973

medically advised maternity leave periods, and mandated that employers either pay women during this period or face penalty fines.<sup>19</sup>

The importance of meeting women's unique needs was further emphasized in a series of decrees issued in March of 1984. While childcare and maternity leave were codified in response to interpretations of the 1972 Equality Law, the decrees of 1984 emphasized the importance of structural reforms to the principles of the Equality Law. The decree strengthened the child care system, requiring increased education for care providers and expanding access for rural women. It also affirmed the equal "importance of the roles of men and women in all stages of life ... [and] that a woman's life stage should not inhibit her from economic equality."<sup>20</sup> The recognition both that womanhood was valuable in society and that women may need support at various life stages would prove essential for claims about women's role in public life.

### ***Claim's About Public Life: Don't Send a Man to do a Woman's Job***

The claims about women's role in public life were a result of the focus on the differences between men and women coupled with an emphasis on women fulfilling a unique role in French public life. The focus on the contributions that only women can make are seen in several aspects of public participation. In elected office, women are often "othered," and subjected to discrimination based on their gender. French politics was no different, and when women first entered elected office they were often "teased

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<sup>19</sup> Loi 72-625 11 Juillet 1975

<sup>20</sup> Journal Officiel de la Republique Francais, 20 Mars 1984 Article 12-16

about being different” or forced to serve only on committees related to family and social services (Sineau, 1988). However, rather than downplaying their difference, or attempting to assimilate into the previously all-male Parliament, women “aspired to change the acceptable ways of doing politics” (Jenson & Sineau, 1994, p. 247). In particular, women claimed that they were essential to changing the language of politics and creating new norms and practices that would ensure equality for all citizens. As Simone Veil, a former Minister of Health, Member of Parliament, and President of the European Parliament stated, “I believe that men and women are rich in their differences and that they are complementary. It is, moreover, in the name of these differences and of all that women can offer that it is necessary to demand change in politics.”<sup>21</sup>

In the political arena, claims focused on the benefits brought about as a result of the difference between men and women were successful in both increasing the number of women in French politics and changing the character of the political process. Despite a slow start to representation, in the past two decades, the number of women in the National Assembly has increased from around 6% to nearly 40%.<sup>22</sup> More important than the increase in number of women has been the changes in the way women candidates present themselves publicly, and the impact that elected and appointed officials have had on the political process. In 2000 the *Parite* law was passed, requiring that parties run equal candidates of both gender in national election. Additionally, parties must address an equal number of “women’s issues” to those issues traditionally considered part of the

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<sup>21</sup> Speech to Parliament recorded in *Le Monde*, June 6-7 1993

<sup>22</sup> Source: World Bank Data



political arena (defense, infrastructure, etc) on their official party platforms. While individual women in politics still assert that cultural norms of sexism are present in the political office,<sup>23</sup> the reframing of women and women's issues as a central part of the political identity has invigorated and elevated the discourse around women's public life (Defossez, 2017). Such claims were ideologically independent and nearly universal. On both the right and the left, these claims have been used to successfully elevate both female candidates and women's issues.

Claims about women's economic participation are similarly rooted in beliefs about the benefits of the difference between men and women. Traditionally, the claims around the benefits of women's workforce participation were used to lobby for increased protections and benefits from employers. However, as the economy has shifted from manual labor to a more service-based workforce, women have been able to more effectively leverage their claims of difference to make inroads in the economy (Unit D2 "Gender Equality", 2013). The claims have resulted in a proliferation of women in the quickly-growing biotech and emerging technology market. France has one of the highest percentage of female managers in the service sector in Europe.<sup>24</sup> Under women's leadership, tech firms have led the way in economic growth, due in large part to innovative work environments that have adopted to differential family situations and retained employees in ways that the traditional economic sector has not (Feinstein, 2017).

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<sup>23</sup> In 2016, MPs and Ministers staged a protest outside the Parliament demanding that formal action be taken against the everyday practices of sexism that ranged from harassing language to groping. Several ministers were removed from office as a result.

<sup>24</sup> Source: OECD Data. The countries that have higher percentages (Ireland, Sweden) have laws mandating gender-equality of boards.

While the claims about French women's participation in politics and the economy resulted in increased participation by women, more notable is the impact that women were able to have. Women not only joined politics and the workforce, but changed the character and dialogue. Indeed, the focus of French women's claims is not so much that "we deserve to be included" as "we can make unique contributions." These claims were echoed by women in the French military, and top military leaders working to expand opportunities for women.

## **Norway: A Nation of Citizens**

### ***Self-Identification: De-gendering Norms for a Norwegian Identity***

The gender-neutral beliefs of Norway's second-wave women's movement have roots in the struggle for Norwegian independence, drawing on Norway's strong egalitarian history as a means of differentiating itself from Denmark and Sweden. This history can be seen in the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century, when Norwegian women appealed to their economic contributions as citizens, focusing on the fact that they were active and engaged citizens as a means of claiming more political rights. In the years leading up to the 1905 referendum for independence from Sweden, focused on their economic contributions to make the argument that that *they too* were citizens and deserved the same benefits as their male counterparts. The way in which women in Norway characterized their claims for enfranchisement were the foundation of de-gendered nature of the Norwegian feminists in the second wave.

Though women could not vote in the referendum for independence from Sweden, they were active public advocates for the vote. The degree of Norwegian advocacy was a result of the demographic difference between Norwegian and women in Western Europe. Compared to much of Western Europe, Norwegian women were more likely to remain unmarried or marry later in life, pursuing careers before domestic lives (Blom, 1980). Participation in the workplace gave them credibility for their interactions and advocacy in the public sphere. Additionally, compared to other women in Western Europe, they had more “leisure time” to devote to political advocacy, as they had less expectations of housework and childcare obligations (Hernes, 1987).

Women’s history of lobbying and interest-group organization made them successful political activists for equality throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. As the number of women in the workforce grew, they began to demand more political involvement to secure better working conditions, forming *Norsk Kvinnesaksforening* (Norwegian Feminist Society) to formally lobby the government for increased rights and protections. *Norsk Kvinnesaksforening* worked to create legislation to benefit all workers and ensure that equality prevailed throughout the workforce. Political equality was included in this quest for workplace equality. Given the gender-neutral nature of Norway’s constitution<sup>25</sup> women made a claim for enfranchisement on the basis of their economic contributions to the country.<sup>26</sup> They emphasized their sameness with men due to their public economic

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<sup>25</sup> The 1814 Constitution refers only to “Norwegian Citizens.” Unlike many European constitutions of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, there is was no reference to “man” or “mankind” that could have been interpreted as excluding women from citizenship.

<sup>26</sup> Nearly 45% of women in Norway worked outside the home by 1905 and their contribution to the country’s GDP increased yearly. (Source: van der Ros, 1994)

contributions in order to appeal for increased sociopolitical benefits and protections (Van der Ros, 1994). However, as long as Norway was legally under Swedish control, it would be unlikely that women would gain increased political rights. Women's suffrage advocates thus had to appeal to their male counterparts to gain independence from Sweden,<sup>27</sup> in order to secure their own rights.

The way in which women appealed to men to convince them to vote for independence and thus women's suffrage, was consistent with the Norwegian cultural history of egalitarianism. As an independent country during the Middle ages, "aristocracy or bourgeoisies in the European context was completely nonexistent" in Norway (Norwegian National Commission, 1989). Formal class divisions were first imposed when Norway was under Danish control in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century and then further entrenched during subjugation to Sweden in the 19<sup>th</sup>. An assertion of independence was thus also a call for a rejection of all things foreign, and a return to the foundational Norwegian principles of egalitarianism. Women capitalized on the historically Norwegian nature of egalitarianism to argue for independence. Regarding the importance of the referendum for Norwegian independence to women, Martha Thynas, standing in for her husband as a Labor party representative asserted:

Given the option to vote, no Norwegian women would answer "no" to the question which will be posed on the 13<sup>th</sup> [The date set for the referendum]. Yet alas, this is not a plebiscite of the whole people but only of Norwegian men. It undermines the value that women bring to Norwegian society, in culture, economics, and status. We women feel that we, too, belong to the people and wish to be regarded as part of Norway, and cannot be so until we are free from

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<sup>27</sup> For much of the time that Norway was under Swedish dominion Sweden was a monarchy. Suffrage only existed for Swedish citizens in local elections.

[Sweden's] influence. (As quoted in *Social-Demokraten*, 10 August 1905)

The referendum was successful, with less than 100 people voting against it. Norway now operated under gender-neutral Constitution of 1814, and women were grander suffrage.<sup>28</sup>

The appeal to the sameness between men and women continued after independence, and is echoed in the way in which women made claims for legislation on “women’s issues” during the second wave feminist movement. In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, women in the *Sorting* focused on offloading such things as child care and domestic work from individual women to public society through welfare state reform (Epsing-Andersen, 1990; Hernes, 1987). Concurrently, they sought to elevate the financial status of single or stay-at-home mothers by reframing mothering as “work” rather than a women’s burden, and providing stipends, health care, and pensions for mothers (Sainsbury, 1999). By 1915, policies on public childcare and motherhood salaries were in place. This framing of women’s issues as work was unique among social welfare states. Women being compensated for providing a public good moved social policies away from been interpreted as “protective” of women or “paternalistic,” and towards inclusive egalitarianism.

The women’s movements focus on men and women as identical was a vital part of the ideal Norwegian society. Writing in the *Journal of the Norwegian Women’s Movement*, Bjornstjerne Bjornson asserted, “a modern woman is a woman ... who

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<sup>28</sup> While women were given legal suffrage as part of the referendum on independence, the practice was phased in between 1905-1913. Initially only women that paid taxes (i.e. were working citizens) were allowed to vote. However by 1913, all citizens, regardless of income, were enfranchised.

understand that the fate of her children is mainly decided by society, and that her work is pointless, maybe even in vain, if that society sees her as different” (Transaltion in Blom I. , 2004, p. 125). Such an assertion downplays gender differences, even when related to parenthood. Raising children, something that for many women’s movements was seen as the crucial difference between men and women, was seen as being in vain if men and women were to be perceived differently from one another.

Because of the way in which child care, early childhood education, and healthcare opportunities, were framed, as well as the introduction of compensated parental leave, women were able to navigate the public arena more easily knowing that they could openly discuss issues of childcare and health without repercussion. Norway became a state that “[did] not force harder choices on women than on men ... women could continue to have children, yet there were also other roads to self-realization open to them ... women did not have to choose futures that demanded greater sacrifices from them than were expected of men” (Hernes, 1987, p. 15).

The similarity between men and women was codified with the Equal Status Act (ESA) of 1978. While policies to ensure workplace equality had begun to be implemented in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century women wanted to ensure that gender was not grounds for social discrimination either. The ESA ensure that men and women were not only treated the same but given the same amount of attention and exposure in society. For example, the ESA “mandates that books, audio and video tapes, and other materials used in educational institutions promote the ideas of gender equality” (Kelber, 1994, p. 75). In practice, this meant that everything from math

problems to the literature assigned in school represent an egalitarian society and actively promote the equal status of men and women.

Egalitarian gender neutrality, a framework initially used by Norwegian leaders to differentiate Norwegian culture from that of the Swedes and Danes, became an important identifier of the women's movement. Women were able to leverage the memories of the past to appeal for increased rights in the present. The result was a deliberate effort to de-gender typical "women's" issues and universalize citizenship.

***Role of the Government: Offload the private to make it part of public life***

As part of the historical commitment to egalitarianism, the Norwegian government was proactive in introducing legislation that muted the difference between the genders in the years following independence from Sweden. The gender-neutral language of the constitution, coupled with a cultural dedication to social equality, resulted in the welfare of all citizens being greatly improved after independence. Throughout the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the Norwegian government was actively engaged in creating a redistributive welfare state that preferenced worker's rights. Between 1905-1909, a series of labor laws were passed that limited work hours, regulated workers conditions, and supported the family life of workers. Childcare allowances were integrated into the national welfare scheme, as were social security payments for families that required one parent to leave the workforce for a period to care for a family member. These provisions were enacted to promote the "independence, value, and continued contribution of all Norwegian citizens" (Unidentified member of the *Sorting* quoted in

Flora 1986, 125). The Nordic Women's Rights association was at the forefront of revisions to labor policies, arguing that a universal eight-hour work day would ensure that *all* citizens could adequately contribute to the economic well-being of the country while also ensuring that essential domestic tasks did not go unfulfilled (Paletschek, 2005). Explicit in their argument was that women had a place in the public workforce, and men had a place in domestic roles. Such policies not only directly benefited workers, but shifted social norms. Not only did it become acceptable (and even encouraged) for women to be in the public workforce, but men were expected to be part of domestic life. Such government policies worked to change social attitudes about acceptable behavior and gender roles.

Women also benefitted from both a legislative and executive branch that was on the forefront of policies aimed at redistributive egalitarianism. As political scientist and Labor Party politician Helga Hernes (1988) describes, the government was committed to being an active participant in the quest for equity, not just equality, for all of its citizens. The commitment to economic parity resulted in less of a disparity in professional valuation than is seen in other Western countries. Whereas traditional "women's" work, such as nursing, elementary education, and child care, often have relatively low salaries, Norway has very little gendered gap in income disparity.<sup>29</sup>

Like other aspects of Norwegian legislation, the ESA focused on shaping attitudes more than on delivering actual provisions. It was largely a symbolic measure on the part

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<sup>29</sup> World Economic Forum has deemed Norway the second most equal country with regards to economic opportunity and access with more than 85% of all economic gender gaps closed. This compares to a 59% average for the United States and Europe.



of the *Sorting* to recognize the importance of egalitarianism among Norwegian citizens.

As Beatrice Halsaa, political scientist and member of the Equal Status Council, remarked,

On the one hand, the Act is intended to ensure substantial equality of treatment in all areas of life. On the other hand, the law is intended to influence attitudes about sex roles, committing the authorities to work actively for equal status through instruments that may not specifically be outlined in policy (Halsaa, 1989, p. 25).

The instruments that Dr. Halsaa was referring to were found in the community. Indeed, if equal status was actually to be achieved, it would be through changes in beliefs that and behavior so that equality was practiced in the way that the legislation intended.

Child care was similarly implemented to both provide a social necessity and shape attitudes and values towards gender neutral egalitarianism. Norway's policies encouraged a dual-earner socioeconomic model whereby both the mother and father were incentivized to work and be engaged in childrearing (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Korpi, 2000). In 1975, the federal government created a shared local-federally funded child care scheme that ensured that all working citizens would have access to childcare as they needed it to engage in Norway's economic public life (Havnes & Mogstad, 2009). In 1978 the *Sorting* introduced gender-neutral leave, with each parent getting 18 weeks of paid leave upon the birth of a child. Parental leave was extended to 12 months in 1993 and to 13 months in 2002. Further, as part of the 1993 act, a portion of leave was explicitly designated for fathers that was non-transferable to mothers (Duvander, Lappegård, & Andersson, 2010). The implications of the so-called "daddy quota" was that nearly 70% of Norwegian fathers take the full portion of parental leave after the birth of a first child and over 80% after the birth of a second (Lappegård, 2008).

Norway's childcare system was the result both of a social welfare state that valued a productive and egalitarian workforce and a women's movement that emphasized the importance of social equality. Indeed, the emphasis on the "daddy quota" is a "break" with traditional feminist policies. While historically women's movements had worked for policies that made women equal to men, the Norwegian women focused on simultaneously bringing men into equality with women (Brandth & Kvande, 2009). The shape of government policies echoed this, with egalitarian policies that helped to flatten society and shape social attitudes towards a rejection of traditional gender roles and a focus on the obligations of citizenship.

### ***Claims about Public Life: Recipients and Participants in the Welfare State***

Women's claims to public participation are based on citizenship rights and obligations. Rather than emphasize the unique role that women play in society, they emphasize that women are part of the broader society. Women have been careful to emphasize that they desire to improve equality in general rather than specifically improve women's historically subordinate position (Van der Ros, 1994). Women's claims to equality were reinforced by Norway's early experience with women's formal political representation (Blom I. , Women's politics and women in politics in Norway since the end of the nineteenth century, 1987). By 1983, over 37% of elected officials were women and in 1986 the Labour Party government was headed female Prime Minister who

appointed 40% female cabinet ministers.<sup>30</sup> Especially when compared to the rest of the developed Western democracies, women occupied a large place in public office.

While women continued to increase in prominence in public life, they rarely used their positions to attempt to change the process or structures of government. Women campaigned and were elected on their contributions to society (Skjeie & Forde, 1989). The tradition of “moral representation” in Norwegian politics, a focus on policies that emphasize the good of the collective over individual identity groups (Gilbert, 1995), helped women assimilate into political life and gain popularity for their gender-neutral practices.

In the economic sphere, women similarly claimed that equality was grounded in their role as citizens. Women’s increased labor force participation has largely been a result of wide-spread campaigns about social obligation coupled with a service-heavy economy. Due to Norway’s resource wealth, it boasts a disproportionality high level of service-sector jobs. Also, it transitioned quickly to a service economy while other countries were focused on manufacturing and agricultural labor (Johnsen, 2012). Physical ability has thus not been a prominent factor of economic participation, removing one of the traditional barriers for women entering the workforce. Because the primary economic drivers are not very gendered, women have been able to enjoy nearly equal footing to men in competition for employment, and by the 1970s had nearly identical workforce participation to men (76% vs 80%).<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Source: World Bank Data

<sup>31</sup> Source: OECD Data

Both the political system and the service-heavy economic foundation of the country have reinforced women's claims for equality based on their sameness. This undercurrent of equity is prominent on the right and the left. Even among groups and individuals that espoused more traditional gender norms, they did so in such a way that emphasized that motherhood and domestic work was *work*. Such groups also advocated for increased domestic participation by men. Women were unified around the belief that there was little difference between men and women. Further, the nearly gender-neutral social benefit provisions have created a dialogue around equal obligation for Norwegian women. As I will show in Chapter 5, both the history of gender-neutral political and economic participation and the benefit provision are leveraged to make claims about the need for women in the Norwegian Armed Services.

## **United States: Individuals and Empowerment**

### ***Self-Identification: The Same or Different?***

Compared to Norway and France, feminism in the United States has a much more recent history. While there was a consolidated and organized women's suffrage movement in the 1910s, after the passage of the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the United States Constitution (1920), the women became less organized, and as a group less politically active until the 1960s. When women did organize and emerge as a political group, they were not homogenous, but "diverse and dis-unified ... mirroring the complexity of American society" (Costain, 1992, p. 26). Much like the diversity of politics in the United States as a whole, the women's movement lacked a cohesive or unifying identity. Such

discord is common in contentious social policy issues in the United States, with issues rising to prominence only to be dropped when a new ideological identity comes into favor (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). One of the biggest sources of discord and disunity among women's groups in the United States was the identity of women compared to men. The roots of this disagreement are seen in the aftermath of the ratification of the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment, with disagreements as to whether women should have the same legal rights and responsibilities as men, or whether biological and/or social differences warranted laws specifically tailored to meet their needs (Lemons, 1973). A fissure developed among the women that had fought for the right to vote, between those that believed that true equality would only be achieved when women were seen as the same as men, and those that believed that women could be different and also equal.

Women on both side of the argument emphasized that their view would be the best for individual women. Proponents the belief that men and women should be subject to the same rights and responsibilities asserted that as long as men and women were treated differently, women would not be able to live up to their potential. Women adhering to this belief called upon women to recognize their identity and value beyond the socially mandated roles of wife and mother in order to find their humanity. Betty Friedan, writing in 1963's *Feminine Mystique*, asserts "In a sense that goes beyond any woman's life, I think this is a crisis of women growing up—a turning point from an immaturity that has been called femininity to full human identity" (Friedan, 2010, p. 136). Friedan's argument hinges on the belief that traditionally prescribed gender roles are constructed to keep women subservient and beholden to a "feminine mystique" that is

created by men to keep women out of the public arena. If women are to recognize their potential, they must focus their effort on ensuring that women are treated the same as men. Women that adhered to a belief in the sameness of men and women appealed to the growing discontent of housewives in the United States in the post-World War II era. After the war, women left factories and service jobs to reassume their domestic identity now that the male labor force had returned. In the decades that followed the War, there was a further emphasis on growing the American population. As one woman that left her job to raise a family asserted in response to why she supported formal equal rights:

It makes me mad – makes me feel like a child – when I have to ask my husband for money. My mother was always dependent on my father and so fearful of life. She is lost now without him. It frightens me, the thought of being dependent like my mother, even though I have a happy marriage. ... It improves your sense of self-worth when you don't depend on your husband for everything good in life, when you can get it for yourself. I don't want [my daughter] to have the fears that paralyzed my mother and that I've always had to fight. I want her to have real options. (Tong, 2013)

To overcome the fear and humiliation associated decreased social status of wives and mothers, women argued for equal treatment with regards to economic opportunities that would allow women to be untethered from their husbands.

The emphasis on the sameness between men and women most closely aligned with liberal feminist beliefs. The basic tenets of the liberal women's movement adhered to women's legal equality with a focus on personal liberty and individual rights (Banks, 1981; Ferree, 1987). Equality in access to education, political rights, economic rights and property ownership were framed as promises guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence's focus on each *individual* American's right to life, liberty and the pursuit

of happiness. Liberal feminists based their claims on the belief that women's capacity to freely compete and participate without prejudice or favor would benefit the most individual citizens (Brenner, 1996). There was little discussion about whether any accommodations were needed to ensure equality for women as the focus was more on equality in access and opportunity than in result.

Not all women activists in the United States' second wave movement argued that women should be treated the same as men. There was a strong faction of women that promoted differential treatment from men. Though arguing for different policies and social norms, these women appealed to the logic that it was in the best interest of individual women and their ability to live up to their potential. Though an ideological fissure existed, the appeal to individuality was the same.

Women that stressed the difference between men and women focused on the mother-child bond or the uniqueness of pregnancy as both a medical and psychological condition as the roots of this difference. They viewed these as differences to be celebrated, and advocated for a strong understanding of these differences in order to ensure women were prepared *if* they chose to enter public life (Chesler, 1988). They argued that men and women had different roles in society and that they had to approach public life differently. Further, they asserted that if the difference between men and women was not emphasized, that women be forced to adopt "male-defined abstract standards ... and attempt to assimilate into male norms" (Brenner, 1996, p. 46). If forced to do so, women would not be able to realize their potential in society.

The emphasis on the unique character of women came from both the left and right of the political spectrum. On the left, Zillah R. Eisenstein (1978) critiqued the assertion that men and women should be viewed as the same in society as privileged in that ignores the compounded impact that race and class have on women's inequality. She argues that womanhood is incompatible with a "mutually reinforcing dialectical relationship between capitalist class structure and hierarchical sexual structuring," and that a socialist model that incorporates and represents the differences was necessary if women were to experience equality in public life (Eisenstein, 1978).

A backlash to the idea that women were to be viewed as the same as men also emerged from conservatives. Phyllis Schlafly (1977) attacked the "women's liberation" movement as being focused on the sameness of men and women "at the expense of women, babies, and society itself." To be successful, she asserted, women must "understand the differences between men and women," and rather than fight for political economic equity, leverage their difference to "motivate, inspire, encourage, teach, restrain, and reward men" (Schlafly, 1977). While not exhaustive, Eisenstein and Schlafly's critiques of the liberal feminists' emphasis on sameness highlight the extent of the disunity experienced in the United States women's movement. Women were neither unified by political ideology nor belief about the role of women in society.

The lack of agreement around the self-identity of the women's movement in the United States was further heightened by the often-contentious relationship between the women's movement and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. On the one hand, injustices faced by the African American community and the lack of political and



economic opportunities for women shared a common enemy: the white patriarchy. Individual white women became active and instrumental in the Civil Rights movement, both by challenging the segregation of Southern churches and the prohibition against interracial matrimonial relationships. As Lilian Smith, a prominent white anti-segregation activist and author argued “southing was wrong with a world that tells you that love is good and people are important and then forces you to deny love and humiliate people” (Smith, 1994, p. 28). Much of the language of de-segregation was also used by feminists. Women attacked the system that viewed them as different. Whether they were formal prohibitions against women’s participation in economic systems, or informal expectations on women’s role in society, women had largely become second class citizens. Some women, such as Lilian Smith, saw civil rights as going hand in hand with women’s rights. The work in the civil rights movement gave some women both the credibility to speak on public issues and the tools to organize and lobby for social change.

However, women’s involvement in the Civil Rights movement also highlighted many of the problems brought about by the intersection of class, race and gender that was present in the United States. It became increasingly evident that “white women” feminism was not universal for all women in the United States. The case of white women’s involvement in student protests highlights some of the discontent among the women’s movement. Throughout the 1960s, young black women increasingly joined the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a student-led group that engaged in direct-action protests against segregation throughout the South. Though initially welcoming of white members, black women in the SNCC became increasingly suspicious

of white women. While members of the SNCC were being harassed, arrested, and often physically harmed by the police, white women were able to “return to a white refuge” that benefited and protected them (Belfrage, 1965, p. 80). Particularly under scrutiny from the SNCC and civil rights leaders were liberal feminists. The lack of intersectionality practiced by liberal feminists and the underlying assumptions that all people were equal was deemed the province of rich white women.

The contention over the identity of women further manifested in debates and beliefs about higher education. For those that emphasized men and women being the same, college was seen as an essential step in a women’s development because it was often the first time in a woman’s life that she was held to academic and intellectual standards that did not have any regard for sex or gender (Evans, *Personal Politics: The Roost of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left*, 1979). College campuses were seen as essential places for women to understand their humanity, not just the expectations that society has for them. Those that emphasized the differences between men and women, and focused on women’s unique role asserted that college was a time for women to better learn how to “inspire in her home a vision of the meaning of life and freedom ... help her husband find values that will give purpose to his specialized daily chores ... [and] teach her children the uniqueness of each individual human being” (Adlai Stevenson quoted in Friedan, 2010, p 53). This disunity in the role of higher education further hindered women from having a unified claim about their role in public lives. College and university campuses were essential places for activism and the homes

of many prominent women's rights groups. However, despite often being co-located with one another, women's groups did not always have unity of effort.

Even when high-level women seemingly came together in the 1960s to advance the causes of women's rights, there remained disagreement about women's self-identity. In the report provided to President Kennedy, the President's Commission on the Status of Women opened with saying that "one of the greatest freedoms ... is the freedom to choose among different life patterns" (President's Commission on the Status of Women, 1963). The emphasis on the ability to choose one's "life pattern" set the stage for a report that walked a fine line between advocating for women in the workforce and women in the home. The overarching theme of the report was that women should be free to pursue whatever course in life was best for them. It did not make a cohesive claim about *what* women should do in the public life, just that they should be free to pursue the options that best suited them. The report also fell short of making any specific policy recommendations with regards to the traditional women's issues such as child care or parental leave. Rather, it emphasized the need to support female individualism.

The lack of a cohesive understanding about the self-identification of women and their role in public life resulted in an unharmonious and contentious practice of feminism in the United States. Due to this, there was an emphasis on individual choice and responsibility. Often, both the structural and cultural roots of women's inequality were left unaddressed. The only agreement was that individual women should be successful within the system in the way they wanted.

### ***Role of Government: Limited Intervention to allow for Individual Responsibility***

The United States' political model is characterized by limited government intervention into the lives of its citizens. There is an historic belief in the ability of liberal markets to create a beneficial equilibrium and a distrust of government intervention to promote socioeconomic equality (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Efforts at adopting parts of a welfare-state model of equality assurance, especially with regards to employment, have failed because of the interferences of “status groups and echelons in private industry” (Epsing-Andersen, 1990, p. 97). The only government action or intervention that is celebrated is removing the barriers to competition. In the absence of government intervention, there has been a focus on individual empowerment to obtain the tools necessary to achieve equality.

Despite the historical hands-off approach of the United State government's involvement with social issues, there was a concerted effort to lobby for women's formalized legislative equality. By the early-1970s a group of politically astute and elite women coalesced with the goal of changing the political landscape in a way that would be favorable to women (Ferree & Hess, 1994). The growth of the National Organization of Women (NOW) into a formidable lobbying force emboldened feminists to pursue the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).<sup>32</sup> The ERA would prove to be a litmus test both for beliefs in the role of women in society and the role of government in intervening in matters of social and economic equality.

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<sup>32</sup> During the 1970s NOW's lobbying budget grew from \$160,000 to \$500,000. Source; *National NOW Times*, October 1982.

When the ERA was introduced in Congress in 1971, it enjoyed great bipartisan support and by 1972 easily passed both the House of Representatives (354 yeas, 24 nays, and 51 abstaining) and the Senate (84 yeas, 8 nays and 7 abstaining), thanks in large part to the lobbying efforts of NOW. The text of the ERA was simple and direct:

**Section 1.** Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

**Section 2.** The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

**Section 3.** This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification

Despite the legislative support, the ERA ultimately failed to be ratified by the states. Its failure illustrates both the disagreement that existed (and continues to exist) in the United States' women's movement and the wariness of Americans towards government intervention in social policy. As Senator Lloyd of Utah noted, most Americans supported equal rights for men and women, but not in a way that "gave the appearance that the government was changing social roles" (Berry, 1988, p. 100).

While NOW had influence with enough key politicians to garner support for the ERA in congress, divisions among women still resonated among the general population. In an effort to block its ratification after passage, the ERA was painted as government overreach attempting to erode values and social roles. The primary ideological challenge against the ERA was mounted by self-described "traditionalists" who argued that ratification of the ERA would result in a "substantive change in women's roles ... and a

government-mandated change to the social order” (Mansbridge, 2015, p. 20). Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum drew parallels to the government-mandated desegregation of public restrooms as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to argue that passage of the ERA would “impact the privacy and safety of women and girls by forcibly removing gender designations for bathrooms, locker rooms, jails and hospital rooms.”<sup>33</sup> Concerns over unisex bathrooms and forced mixing of the sexes were used to emphasize the extent to which the government would intervene into the everyday lives of Americans if the ERA were to be ratified.

Government overreach was used as a primary argument against the ERA because, even among traditionalists, there was general support for a women’s choice to enter the workforce and an overall positive attitude about women in politics and higher education (Donnelly, 2013). The contention came around the government’s role in promoting social change, or potentially forcing individuals to adopt a particular way of engaging in the public sphere.

Ultimately, the traditionalists were able to mount enough of a campaign against the ERA that in 1982 it failed to gain enough state approval for ratification. The failure was largely a result of the traditionalists’ ability to drum up fear about what the government possibly could do to dictate women’s roles, rather than the reality of women’s experiences (Ferree & Hess, 1994).<sup>34</sup> The United States is unique among

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<sup>33</sup> The Phyllis Schlafly Report Archives. Available at [www.eagleforum.org](http://www.eagleforum.org)

<sup>34</sup> President Nixon’s veto of the Comprehensive Childcare Act, after its passage through both houses of congress represents another example of legislative decisions based on fear (“the Sovietization of American children”).

developed democracies in that it does not have a national gender equity policy. In the absence of such, women's activists have reverted to a model of individual liberalism, stressing the importance of women making their own personal and professional decisions (Ferree, 1987; Brenner, 1996).

Women activists in the United States have done this through two primary strains of action. First is the backing of individual female political candidates. Facing defeat of the ERA and a conservative executive administration voted-in in 1980, progressive women's organizations reasoned that getting women elected to public office was the only way to keep women's equality in the public discourse (Costain, 1992). NOW initiated an "elect women" campaign both to substantively ensure women were in seats of power and to symbolically elevate the discourse on women's rights. Second is the targeting of private industry and celebrating the accomplishments of women's success in the private sector. Indeed, while the federal government failed to ratify the ERA, the private sector has emerged as a place of equality. Women in business mentorship programs, and women's conferences began to emerge.<sup>35</sup>

The strides made by female politicians and women in the private sector reflects the values of individual equality, and also the often problematic fissures in the United States' women's movement. While individual women have been successful in both politics and the private sector, they are overwhelmingly women from privileged backgrounds with access to privately-funded childcare and medical care (Gordon & Chase-Lansdale, 2001). Indeed, though the government does not restrict women's

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<sup>35</sup> For examples, see Women in the World, the Catalyst Conference, Forbes Women's Summit, and INC Women's Summit

participation in any aspect of social, political, or economic life, it does not enable it either. Legacies of oppression due to race, social class, or religion have gone unaddressed. And while there is an emphasis on the choice of individuals to participate, the responsibility to overcome structural inequalities is also left up to them.

***Claims about Public Life: Ask what you can do, and do it.***

In the United States, there is not a universal ideal claim about women's public participation. Rather, there is a focus on equal opportunity and equal status under the law. Both the de-centralization of political power of the federal government and the historical commitment to the primacy of the liberal markets has made the United States focused on the role and impact of individuals. The success of individual women has been held up as proof that women have equal rights and opportunities (Nelson & Carver, 1994).

However, the success of individual women has not translated into a more general improvement for women. While the United States has a high, and increasingly growing number of female CEOs and members of boards of directors, it simultaneously ranks below other developed democracies in terms of the average wage gap and other gender equality indices (World Economic Forum, 2016). The success of these individuals has not translated into an overall increase in the quality of life or opportunities for women.

Additionally, though women have increased in political representation, there has continued to be a failure of women's issues to be broadly advanced among the national legislatures. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, women that ran "as women," or campaigned on a platform centered on "women's issues" deviated from it once in office



(Plutzer & Zipp, 1996). Once in office, women tended to put the interests of their race or social class above that of their gender in making decisions as to how to vote or what bills to introduce (Vega & Firestone, 1995). In the absence of claims that were able to advance the condition of women broadly, women's movements turned their attention to the success and empowerment of individual women.

### **Claims and Integration**

In this chapter, I highlighted how different starting points in beliefs about equality informed claims about women's service in public life. These claims provide valuable insight into understanding the variation of women's integration into the military. Both the strength and universal appeal of the claims, as well as their ability to coincide with military culture help to better explain the environment in which integration was taking place. In most of the studies of gender integration, laws and policies about women's are the starting point. Introducing claims about women's role in public life starts the inquiry a step earlier.

Understanding how claims drive the integration process is especially important given recent scholarship on the important link between the security of women and the security of states. As evidenced through the work of Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett (2012), the way that women are treated in society is a key predictor to overall security, stability and prosperity. Including women in security forces has been a method used to safeguard against potential abuses of women (Simić, 2010). However, laws and policies for inclusion are not sufficient to capture the

full benefits from women's participation. The way in which these laws are implemented and the process by which women come to participate in public life matters for a successful capture of these benefits (Ruppel, 2008; Budgeon, 2001; Razavi, 2016). Indeed, the differences in the pathway matters.

In chapter 3 I highlight how these differing beliefs allow for a rich study of the variation in gender integration. In doing so, we are able to view military policies as a result of broader sociopolitical beliefs and examine the roots of their differences.

Additionally, the strength of the claim matters. In both France and Norway, women's claims about their role in public life had near universal appeal. They also worked to increase the status of women more broadly, through the implementation of national level policies aimed at gender equality. Conversely, in the United States, the lack of a universal claim meant that the success of some women did not necessarily translate into improved status or opportunity for all. In chapters 4-6 I will show how these claims interact with military culture to provide either conducive or restrictive environments for women's integration.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **From Inclusion to Integration:**

#### **Talking about the military and women in it**

The differences in beliefs about gender equality discussed in chapter 2 are exemplified by how women were used in the military. The United States had to contend with restrictive laws about what women were allowed to do in combat environments. In combat, women were used in temporary positions to meet mission needs. For example, Female Engagement Teams (FET) teams augmented infantry units engaged in village stability operations (VSO). These teams, attached to infantry units to engage with women in villages, followed very close legal guidance to ensure they were in alignment with the so-called “combat exclusion” policy that was in place when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 (Lemmon, 2015). Women received differential initial training from their male counterparts and were kept in separate quarters aside from the time spent conducting missions. While FET teams were essential for success that the United States military had in VSOs, the women that participated in them were never fully viewed as part of the infantry units to which they were attached.

Norway’s employment of women in is exemplified by the appointment of Colonel Ingrid Gjerde, a decorated infantry officer, as commander of all Norwegian forces in Afghanistan. While her gender was touted by the international community, the

Norwegian military greatly downplayed it, focusing instead on her proven leadership ability and combat proficiency (Matlary & Petersson, 2013). Her service is reflective of the sameness of service experienced by men and women in Norwegian society. simultaneous development and security, using purposely designed mixed-gendered infantry teams to gain the trust of the local population while engaging with the enemy.<sup>36</sup>

The French military employed tactics and strategies that were consistent with the belief that men and women were different, yet of equal value. Women were often specifically chosen to conduct certain missions, and identified as essential for the realization of long-term strategic plans. When the French were given control of the Tagab Valley, an area that the Soviets couldn't pacify in the 1980s and in which the British had suffered their greatest losses in the previous months, they developed a strategy of simultaneous development and security, using purposely designed mixed-gendered infantry teams to gain the trust of the local population while engaging with the enemy.<sup>37</sup> Such tactical innovation is indicative of the way in which the French have employed gender integration and the resulting high level of integration that they experience.

These differential ways in which women were employed resulted in differential outcomes in Afghanistan and has been the subject of much military study. The director of the military studies department at Army Command and General Staff College notes that the "women in Afghanistan, to include FET teams, and the work of our NATO allies

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<sup>36</sup> Unclassified after action report

<sup>37</sup> Unclassified after action report

is one of the most popular topics of study for our students.”<sup>38</sup> For example, Lieutenant Colonel Tyra Harding found that FET teams attached to United States’ infantry units were essential to successfully moving from the “hold” to the “build” phase of the clear-hold-build counterinsurgency triad.<sup>39</sup> However, getting “buy in” from infantry commanders was exceedingly difficult. Especially when compared to coalition allies, United States’ platoon and company level commanders frequently “left the women behind” on missions because they were “not part of standard infantry tactics or training” (Harding, 2012, p. 18). In her final paper for the Naval Postgraduate School, Stephanie Erwin compared Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, highlighting the differences of women’s roles in the militaries of the various countries that had control of the different RCs. In her analysis, she found that degree of women’s participation in the military impacted not only combat outcomes, but the ability of ISAF forces to engage with the local population and create indigenous governments (Erwin, 2012). She highlights Faryab Province, under Norwegian control, as being an effective example of women-led provincial rebuilding.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Several of the papers, both at Command and General Staff, as well as the War College and Post-Graduate schools rely on classified personnel or event data, and remain within the military’s system. Therefore, a full count of the number of papers is not available. Dr. Valentine, director of military history for DoD schools, estimates that “20-30%” of students engage with the effectiveness of women in the military to some extent (May 2017 interview).

<sup>39</sup> For an overview of the Counterinsurgency doctrine see Army manual MCWP 3-33.5 “Counterinsurgency” December 2006

<sup>40</sup> At the time of her publication, Faryab Province was considered a success story. However, in 2016 the Taliban returned and now control the province.

In addition to different use in and impact on combat operations, women have had different experiences in the domestic context of military service. This difference is highlighted through recent notable events. On March 4, 2017, Thomas Brennan, a former United States Marine and journalist, reported for *The War Horse* that a website, “Marines United,” with over 30,000 current and former members of the United States military as subscribers, had uploaded thousands of pictures of scantily clad or nude female service members. Some of the photos were taken unwillingly, while others were shared in a “revenge porn” manner, but all contained descriptions of rape, violence, and lewd sexual activities that visitors to the site wanted to engage in with those women. Members of the military, veterans, politicians, and citizens of the United States were outraged. Senator Gillibrand’s comments echoed the sentiments of many when she asked, “how can a country that sends *so many* women to war, women who are willing to die for this country, produce Marines and Soldiers who are willing to do this.”<sup>41</sup> Indeed, the United States has one of the highest percentages of women in their militaries, yet still has what service members have dubbed a “cultural problem” (Ackerman, 2015) that hinders women’s ability to both be seen as equals and influence change among the ranks.

In 2016, *Jegertroppen*, or Hunter Troop, an all-female elite special forces unit, completed training in Norway, as part of a pilot to test whether women had the ability to endure the country’s hardest military training and harshest environmental conditions without assistance from their male peers (Braw, 2016). The women-only makeup of the Troop was a departure for the Norwegian military, historically emphasizing gender

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<sup>41</sup> Senate Hearing Transcripts March 14, 2017.

neutrality. Three years earlier, universal conscription was passed, and gender-neutral bunking and berthing was adopted after a long-running study found that gender-neutral standards dramatically reduced (to less than 8 reports/year) instances of sexual harassment or assault (Fasting, 2011). Yet despite these advancements, officials in Norway continue to pursue measures as to how to *increase* both the number of women in the military and number of women who make a career out of service. As Frank Steder, special researcher on women in the services for the Norwegian Defense Research Institute stated, “Norway should continually be a pioneer for gender equality in all aspects, we’re not doing enough to engage women, to encourage them, to keep them as valuable members of our armed forces.”<sup>42</sup>

Newly elected French President Macron, in a March 2017 interview with *Reuters*<sup>43</sup> asserted that France was facing “turbulent times” with an increase in home-grown radicalization and the targeting of French Citizens abroad. To combat this, he called for the recruitment of 60,000 more French *women* into the military, citing women as “proven to fight radicalization in a way that men cannot.” His statement was met with over 80% approval rating from the French public, and French Defense ministers began to deliberate on how to appeal to female recruits to meet the needs of their country.<sup>44</sup>

Using both the impact that women have tactically and their experience in the military to understand women’s integration is unique in studying women in the military.

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<sup>42</sup> Interview conducted July 23, 2017.

<sup>43</sup> Reuters, March 17, 2017.

<sup>44</sup> Remarks at NATO High Profile Event at University of San Diego by French representative, April 2017

In this chapter I discuss the evolution of the study of women in the military and introduce my theory of how claims about women's participation in public life contributes to gender integration. I highlight how there have been great strides made in understanding the autonomy of women to choose to participate in the military despite the permeation of masculinity throughout Western military culture. However, I also point out the deficiencies in much of our understanding of women's military participation, noting that the focus tends to be on either the legal or numerical inclusion of women, and the military is still essentialized as solely focused on violence and killing. I then go on to discuss the importance of the military's other roles, and discuss how military culture and the response to changing global politics have influenced what roles are the most emphasized. I operationalize integration through the impact that women have on various aspects of the military, and introduce the components of integration. I explain how integration is a result of the interaction between legal provisions and functional participation, spurred and constrained by the interaction between claims about women's service and military culture. I end by briefly highlighting the differences in women's impact on the military observed in France, Norway and the United States and how they are reflective of high, moderate, and low levels of integration respectively.

### **The Evolution of the Study of Women in the Military**

Historically, the scholarship on women's inclusion in the military has treated it as a one-way process. Women join the military. The military changes women, or forces them to conform to their historical masculine culture. Most of the variation studied



centers on the differences in number of women in the military or laws about women's participation. There is little examination as to what impact women have on the military or the relationship between military service and broader public life. I argue that to understand integration, we must examine impact. While the current scholarship has been instrumental in elevating the importance of women in the study of war and the military, it falls short in explaining the more nuanced variations we see in women's integration into Western militaries. This failure stems largely from both the segmented operationalization – focusing either on number or laws – of women's participation and the essentialization of the military. An emphasis on laws over-simplifies many facets of military service, especially as militaries have professionalized. As a result, the emphasis has been on inclusion, bringing women into the military, rather than integration, incorporating women in such a way that they are able to have a beneficial impact on military tactics and strategies. The existing studies have set the stage in highlighting both that there is variation in women's participation and that this difference matters. Yet do not fully explain the current variation or how women have been able to impact the military.

Studies of women's participation in the military have grown out of the broader literature on women in war. A consequence of the growth of feminist discourse in political science and international relations in the late twentieth century has been a move to understand women "outside the homogenous bonds of motherhood and reproduction" (Ferguson, 1988). Understanding women's role in war, to include their participation in the military, is one such area that has expanded. Particularly in the women, peace, and security (WPS) arena, the literature has been moving beyond assuming that women are

essentially pacific in nature, and towards understanding the totality of women's participation during war and conflict.

The recent emphasis on the importance of gendering security studies in WPS scholarship represents an important evolution in the study of women in the military. Broadly, there has been an accelerated interest on the role that gender plays in security and stability. Gender equality and inclusion has been found to be directly related to a state's peace and stability (Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli, & Emmett, 2012). Further, gender equality generally in governance generally promotes more peaceful and lasting outcomes to potential inter- and intra-state conflicts (Caprioli, 2005; Castillejo, 2009). Through the work of scholars such as Valerie Hudson and Mary Caprioli, we have empirical evidence that the role of women in society matters. Their work has created a cornerstone for academic and political activists to work for more inclusive governments in order to promote security, stability, and prosperity. However, despite the increased attention on women's inclusion in formal politics, women's participation in the military has largely remained an outlier.

Early arguments about women as they related to the military were primarily focused on the importance how women were affected by war or military actions (Enloe 1980, 1983, 1990; Elshtain 1981; Cohn 1987). Historically, military studies have been both male-focused and dominated by male scholars. By asking a simple question, "where are the women?," (Enloe, 2014) a new movement in scholarship and public conscious was born. International relations and war studies were no longer solely the province of men. This early feminist scholarship was radical in that it asserted that women mattered,

and a women's perspective to conflict was as valid as the traditional male counterpart (Tickner, 1992). These works laid the groundwork for a focus by both policy makers and scholars on bringing women into policy conversations and studies, and considering diverse views of both conflict and security.

These pioneering studies of women in war recognized that women had *always* been present on the battlefield, and brought that presence into the security dialogue. Such studies challenged both which actors we attended to during war and conflict and which outcomes were of interest. By putting camp followers, comfort women, and mothers on the same plane as soldiers, military action became not just a man's world, but a social enterprise. However, while these studies emphasized the importance of women, they viewed women as largely passive. While the women's perspective is deemed important, war (and the military broadly) was operationalized something that happened to women. In the introduction to the *Women & War Reader*, Jennifer Turpin asserts "war has profound and unique *effects on* women" (Turpin, 1998, p. 3). This view places women outside the institution, unable to shape or change it. The choices women do have are only in reaction to or a byproduct of war's conduct.

The literature has evolved from viewing women as passive and reactive to war into viewing them as autonomous actors who make choices as to how they interact with war and institutions of violence. Studies now acknowledge that women may also have a roll in war's conduct (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007), and often focus on the number of women that participate in war or are included in the military. Those looking at the number of women in the military largely focus on understanding why women are allowed in an

institution that has been historically characterized as the providence of men (Goldstein, 2001; Cockburn & Zarkov, 2002; Higonnet, 1987; Hacker, 1981; Herbert M. S., 1998). They often emphasize the construction of masculinities and femininities, and how the conduct of war either reinforces or conflicts with social gender constructions. Though they recognize women's autonomy, they typically still treat women as objects of war or the military. They often are concerned with what the impact of fighting is on women, or how the feminine identity may be at odds with military service. As Melissa Herbert (1998) finds, though women have a choice to enter into the military, they do so knowing that they will become more masculine. The underlying assumption is that if women want to be included in the military, they must conform to the traditionally masculine norms and rules associated with it. As Sjoberg notes, even as militaries have included women and emphasized the importance of their participation, there has been a "preservation of the discursive structures of gender subordination" for women (Sjoberg L. , 2007, p. 84). Even when given autonomy over their participation, the relationship between the military and women has largely been viewed as one way, with the focus on how women are changed or subjugated by the military, rather than how they may impact it.

Some, however, also focus on the social implications of women's military participation, including attempts to understand why a society chooses to send women to fight. Goldstein (2001) emphasizes that war is an exceptional phenomenon, and societies must respond in exceptional ways. Such a logic helps to justify women's participation in an historically masculine enterprise, while maintaining generalized gendered beliefs about the roles of men and women in sociopolitical life. There are also more practical

approaches to understanding women's participation in war. Such approaches focus on needs of war fighting, emphasizing the manpower needs of the military to successfully defend a nation. As Segal (1995) explains, as the threat to national security goes up and states need bigger militaries to confront this rising threat. When men are unable to fill the ranks, women are seen as necessary in order to meet the needs of the growing size of the military. National security has traditionally held an exceptional place in the national consciousness (Goldstein, 2001), and as such provides the leverage for countering traditional gender roles by recruiting more women for the armed services.

Social expectations are also used to highlight unnecessary gendered constraints that have been placed on women. Often, the military's role in conducting violence is used as an excuse to keep women out of war, or at least certain military occupations. For example, in her exploration of the United States military, Megan MacKenzie (2015) focuses on the social (mis)conceptions of what violence is and who is capable of doing it. She shows how overly essentialized gender ideals created a legacy of exclusion for women in the United States military. She argues that women's history of proving themselves to be capable of the conduct of war is a necessary step in the military becoming more legally inclusive. Her work is useful in explaining how women are able to change social beliefs by their actions. It highlights how war as an enabling condition for women to do exceptional things that challenge the existing social order. However, as I will show in the case studies, some of the most prolific change for women came during peacetime and was led not by women in the military but by civilian women or government leaders.

In addition to the focus on how many women participate in the military, there is also a body of work that focuses almost primarily on the legal aspects of women's military service. These studies focus on what women are *allowed* to do in the military, and how women's roles have formally expanded over time. Mady Segal (1995), often considered the pioneer of women's military sociology, contributed greatly in conceptualizing Western militaries, NATO forces in particular, as differential and discrete units of analysis. Her work focuses primarily on the legal aspect of inclusion, arguing that what women are allowed to do in the military is a product of the military's prominence overcoming social norms about women's role in society and state institutions. She hinges her argument on the experiences and priorities of Western nations during the Cold War, focusing on how different priorities led to different opportunities for women among NATO countries. Her work contributed greatly to understanding that there is, in fact, variable experiences and outcomes between NATO countries. However, the effectiveness of her argument diminishes in the post-Cold War era as NATO members have increasingly converged on military priorities.

Segal also focuses on the legal ramifications of the professionalization of militaries. As militaries have professionalized, economics increasingly plays a role in the personnel composition of the armed forces. When men no longer have to serve in the military, they are more likely to choose jobs that are less dangerous, more stable, and offer better pay in the private sector. As a result, states must increasingly turn to women to fill the ranks of the military. Segal asserts "high [male] unemployment rates are associated with a ready supply of men for the armed forces, and relatively low

opportunities for women” (Segal, 1995, p. 767). Women’s inclusion in the military is thus typically associated with low male unemployment. Conversely, there is a surplus of male labor, women tend to lose military opportunities. Explicitly, it was found that when male unemployment rose in the early 1980s, opportunities for women in the military contracted (Stanley & Segal, 1988). However, while this pattern held for the first decade after most Western militaries professionalized, it has proved more problematic in recent years. In the 2000s, when Western military saw expansions in both the number of women participating in the military and in laws accommodating them, much of Europe and the United States was experiencing an economic recession and high male unemployment. Economics alone cannot explain women’s integration.

In more recent years, there have been efforts to expand on Segal’s work and account for changing global politics in the post-Cold War era. For example, Helena Carreiras (2006) emphasizes the changing nature of the conduct of violence, noting that both improvements in military technology and growth in the personnel requirements for combat support,<sup>45</sup> coupled with changes in geopolitics have played a substantial role in states’ willingness to formally include women in their militaries. As militaries are less reliant on combat foot soldiers, they are more likely to include women. Including women in support positions does not challenge gendered norms as much as including women in combat roles. Additionally, Carreiras provides evidence for the idea that as states professionalize their militaries, they will need to expand opportunities for women in order to have a large enough talent pool to fill the ranks, hinging her argument on women

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<sup>45</sup> Logistics, supply, intelligence, transport aviation and medical specialties

being more willing to participate in support roles than their male counterparts. While very applicable to the post-Cold War era, her argument hinges on *inclusion* rather than *integration*. Irene Eurilet (2012) furthers Carreiras' arguments about military inclusion by emphasizing the role of political culture. She argues that the stickiness of cultural norms create political systems that are either permissive or restrictive to increasing formal allowance for women's participation in the military. I draw much from both Eurilet and Carreiras' work to explain variations in demand and allowance for women's participation in the military. However, their work does not explain why women are able to have variable impact on the military and treat women as largely passive with regards to military service. They focus on women being allowed into the military, but not on how they can potentially impact military operations. The military is still the primary actor, with women being impacted and often changed by their service.

Beyond the scholarly literature, focusing on either the number of women or the laws about women's service has impacted the way that governments have approached understanding women in the military. There have been many studies undertaken by Western governments on women's military participation. Most of these focus primarily on the number of women in the military (Steder, 2014; National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, 2014; NATO, 2016). Much attention, especially since the adoption of UN Resolution 1325 has been on increasing the number or share of women in the military. Whether 10% or 50%<sup>46</sup> many governments have set a target percentage for


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<sup>46</sup> Targets set by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the wake of the Marines United Scandal and the Minister of Defense of Norway after the successful training of the Hunter Troop respectively.



“success” with regards to women’s inclusion in the military. However, focusing on the number of women results in little variation between Western democracies. Most NATO countries have between 9-11% female service members<sup>47</sup> (NATO, 2010-2016). Additionally, this percentage has been increasing since the end of the Cold War. According to the 2015 NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives report, women represent 11% of all operational<sup>48</sup> NATO forces, up from 3.7% in 1998 (NATO, 2016).

**Figure 3.1: Women in NATO Forces**



*Source: NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives<sup>49</sup>*

The focus on numbers as the operationalization for women’s service is an efficient way to compare militaries. However, it provides limited, and often misleading information as to the quality of women’s participation. Hungary, for example, has the highest percentage of women in the military of all NATO forces at 20.2%. Relying on

<sup>47</sup> Notable outliers are Italy that did not open any military positions to women until 2000 and Denmark, that has a unique hybrid civilian-service member military rank structure.

<sup>48</sup> NATO’s reporting requirements focus on troops that are deployable, which excludes some service specialties (such as medical) that are not regularly deployed.

<sup>49</sup> The decline from 1999-2001 is largely related to the assentation of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the alliance. These countries did not make policies permitting women into the military until 2001.

numbers alone, one would expect that the military is more egalitarian, and even attractive to women. However, there are no female senior officers or senior staff noncommissioned officers, and only 6% of Hungary's operational<sup>50</sup> forces are women. The vast majority of Hungary's service women are of junior rank and in non-deployable service roles that have little impact on either the military as an institution or its conduct of missions. Despite being most inclusive of women, Hungary is one only two countries<sup>51</sup> that do not consider gender as a factor when planning military operations (NATO, 2016). Though women are included in the military, they have not had the opportunity to make a meaningful impact, therefore are not well integrated. Indeed, numbers are a useful proxy, as they can neatly be discussed and measured as a way to operationalize women's presence or inclusion. However, they fall short in measuring the quality of women in the military or explaining variations in the outcomes resulting from women's service.

In addition to largely being constrained by a focus either on the numbers or legal allowance for women's participation, several studies also suffer from an oversimplification in the way they view the military. These studies largely assume that the military is a masculine institution that is focused almost exclusively on the violent conduct of war. The focus on the violent outputs of the military allows for a construction of women and femininity as the "other," a foil to military life (Goldstein, 2001, pp. 304-305). Such an emphasis has resulted in discord among feminist scholars. Because military service and the conduct of war is largely viewed as masculine by design, women are

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<sup>50</sup> Defined as forces that can be deployed in support of military operations

<sup>51</sup> Luxemburg is the only other country that does not formally consider gender in their operational planning

often emphasized in their roles opposing the conduct of war or militarism more broadly. As Cynthia Cockburn writes in the introduction to her book on anti-war activism, a feminist take on war is one that emphasizes that “women are less inclined to support war ... and need to tools to mobilize against it” (Cockburn, 2007, p. 1). Judith Hicks Steinem, conversely, argues that women should reject the gendered norms of war and join the military on the same terms as men in order to prove their equality (Stiehm, 1982). Where there has been debate about the form that women’s participation during war takes, the focus remains on the military’s output of violence, and sees the relationship between the military and women as one-way. Whether opposing it or participating in it, women are reactive to the military and changed by it.

However, as I will discuss in more detail below, women have had, and continue to have an impact on the military. Indeed, to understand women’s *integration*, and the resulting variations in tactical and strategic outcomes, I argue that we must look beyond the numbers of women participating in the military or the laws passed about their participation to the impact that women have had on the military. This includes both internal military policies and tactics and strategies of war. To do this, we much understand that the military-woman relationship is not only one-way, and examine the impact (or lack thereof) that women have had on the military.

The first step in creating the framework for understanding women’s impact on the military is to recognize that the military does more than just engage in state sanctioned violence. It plays a vital role in promoting a country’s social and political values both at home and abroad. The role of the military has shifted over time as well. As global politics

have shifted, so, too, has military conduct. Particularly in the past decade, militaries in Western countries have been less focused on killing and more focused on creating beneficial conditions for democracy. As Colonel (Retired) Mike Shup, commanding officer of Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 1 in the First Battle of Fallujah noted, “I could have recruited anyone to kill Iraqis, what I needed was Marines who upheld the moral values of equality ... to model to the Iraqi people that democracy was something worth fighting for ... and they needed to model it to the American people when they get home, too.”<sup>52</sup> On the ground, commanders recognize the need to look beyond the conduct of violence to understand military success and respond to global changes. In the next section, I discuss the functional roles of the military beyond conducting violence and how they have evolved, and highlight why they are important in understanding women’s integration.

### **The Military: Beyond Killing People and Breaking Things**

The idea that the military is an exceptional institution because of its capacity for violence is prevalent throughout both policy debates and scholarship on expansion of military service to women. “The military is not a social experiment,” is a common cry of politicians and activists striving to maintain a masculine status quo. This assertion is typically followed up with some derivation of the military’s purpose being “to kill people and break things,” emphasizing sanctioned acts of violence over the political role of the military both at home and abroad. The prominence of the military in public life can

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<sup>52</sup> Interview September 14, 2017

accentuate the traditional masculine character of the military. As Uta Klein asserts, the more active a military in society, more obvious the gendered “division of labor” is. Beyond any other function a military serves, violence “is essential in its formulation of the masculine identity” (Klein, 1998, p. 149). However, when we look beyond the outputs of violence, we are able to more fully understand the differences in military cultures and ultimately women’s integration into them. Indeed, while all militaries conduct violence, they all also serve other important functional roles. The degree to which militaries emphasize these various roles differs and has evolved with changes in global politics. This difference is part of understanding the differences in women’s integration.

Moving beyond a focus on the military as solely defined by the outputs of violence is more than recognizing that there are jobs in the military that may not directly involve killing or destruction. However, in understanding women’s inclusion in the military, the presence of non-combat jobs has been of particular interest. From intelligence, to communications, to cooking, to supply and logistics, to administrative roles, Western militaries have large support apparatus. Nearly 80% of military jobs are not part of the “ground combat”<sup>53</sup> specialties (Carreiras, 2006; NATO, 2016). A main thread of argument for keeping ground combat positions closed to women has been that there are so many other opportunities for service that don’t involve ground combat that women are not actually limited in making military service a career. Helena Carreiras (2006) and Mady Segal (1995) both highlight how the large support population of

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<sup>53</sup> Defined as infantry (both ground and mechanized), artillery, and tanks.

modern Western militaries have provided extensive opportunities for women, as they are able to participate without disrupting too many gendered ideals on acceptable professional behavior. However, while opening opportunities to women, this focus on non-infantry jobs perpetuates the primacy of violence and combat as the area of importance in the military, and continues the gendered essentialization of both women and the military. All support elements exist to enable the infantryman to conduct violence, and therefore success in a masculinized combat role remains the continued focus of military culture.

However, recent arguments suggest that the focus of the military is on more than just the infantry, and that military effectiveness includes actions that cannot be measured in body counts or physical destruction. Particularly as global politics has moved away from the bi-polar standoff of the Cold War towards economic and political globalization and interdependence of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, state politics has become less zero-sum and more focused on consensus building (Lipschutz, 2012). As Risa Brooks notes, military effectiveness is not just about the capacity to kill, but the ability to achieve specific and strategic policy outcomes while continuing to adapt to changes in both domestic priorities and the international security arena (Brooks, 2007, pp. 9-11). Even during the Cold War, countries had strategic aims that involved more than killing. Beginning in the post-World War II era, Western states have largely focused less on conquering and more on promoting and preserving democratic values and beneficial political arrangements. This can be clearly seen in the case of the United Kingdom. Once a military focused on physical conquest, the post-imperial military named as its top priority “promoting the

United Kingdom's wider security interests through maintenance of international peace and stability" (Dandeker, 2000, p. 33). In his assessment of this new priority, Charles Dandeker (2000) finds that the idea of the "soldier statesman" has become as important as the soldier-conqueror to ensure that the strategic purpose of the military is maintained. In a security context where national strategic interests are more than national physical survival or territorial expansion, soldiers must be more constrained in their use of force and ensure that any violence that is expressed serves political ends.

The emphasis on the ability of western militaries to be more than an instrument of brute force and violence has become central to their function in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Though western military power during the Cold War was measured largely in terms of physical capacity and ability to effectively balance against the Soviet threat, changes in the post-Cold War order have shifted the military's purpose. James Rosenau refers to the transition Western militaries underwent at the end of the Cold War as one in which armed force was no longer the assumed outcome of military action (Rosenau, 1998). Particularly for Western militaries, military power and effectiveness was measured in its capacity to *prevent* violence, rather than enact it. Since the end of the Cold War, nearly 88%<sup>54</sup> of NATO's missions where infantry troops have been sent were non-combatant in nature (peacekeeping, crisis response, natural disaster, training exercises, etc). General Rupert Smith (2007) similarly notes, "the reality of contemporary conflict, and the new paradigm, is that information – not firepower – is the currency on which war is conducted."

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<sup>54</sup> Data compiled from NATO.int

While militaries still have the capacity for overwhelming combat force, the focus on international peace and stability and democratic values has taken center stage as the purpose of military action. The security of Western democracies frequently rests on “building relationships on a global scale,” and, as Rosa Brooks notes, the “military is the only institution with the manpower to do it” (Brooks, 2016, p. 144). It is also in the best interests of political leaders in Western democracies to promote democratic values without bloodshed, as democratic selectorates preference systemic peace over increased expansionism (Bausch, 2015). Indeed, to serve in this role, the military must constrain force for much of its operational time. The concern with constraining force and modeling democratic norms among militaries from developed democracies is correlated with positive institutional outcomes in those developing democracies with whom they interact. Modeling a purpose beyond the use of violence has positioned the military as an essential tool of diplomacy in the post-Cold War era (Meernik, 1996). Even in terms of conventional military force, norms around the use of military force have converged towards restraint. While militaries have built large weapon stockpiles and invested heavily in technology that increases lethality, their purposes tend to be more strategic than practical, as a coercive tool of last resort (Farrell, 2007).

Modern peacekeeping operations highlight how the fundamental functions of the military go beyond just the conduct of violence. Stability throughout the world is in the political, economic, and security interest of West. However, many states, especially those emerging from conflict, lack the internal capability to provide for both the domestic and international security necessary to build robust and resilient political and economic



institutions. Foreign powers thus step in to fill the security void, freeing domestic forces to focus on internal capacity building. Foreign powers are faced with a two-pronged dilemma; to be strong enough to enforce peace, while maintaining a light enough footprint to not be seen as an occupying or imperial force (Edelstein, 2009). It is not just violence, but the ability to tie its use to concrete policy objectives that define modern effectiveness. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis emphasize this in their examination of “failures” of peacekeeping. They described failures as resulting from a “troubling divorce” between political strategy and operations in the field (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, p. 185).

If we look beyond the physical conduct of violence, we see that the military is engaged in a verity of tasks – from construction to intelligence gathering to education – that are not merely needed to enable violence, but central to the political mission of the armed forces. Top generals from every NATO country involved in the operations in Afghanistan have noted some derivation of the idea that we can’t kill our way out of the war. The conduct of violence is thus not the sole focus of military force, nor are non-violent activities merely enabling violence. To achieve strategic political aims, militaries must be equipped to engage in a range of activities. The more complex an international security dilemma, the less likely that violence, alone, will solve it. In a comprehensive review of 20<sup>th</sup> Century counterinsurgency campaigns, Kalev Sepp found that operations led by “military goals, rather than civil politics [were] overwhelming disasters” (Sepp, 2005, p. 11). Effective militaries are not just good at fighting, but beholden to political

control and reflective of the values of the society they represent and protect (Kestnbaum, 2012).

A historical institutionalist approach helps us understand that the functional role of the military can change. Understanding how military culture and their role in society changed in response to global political changes is essential for more completely understanding the process of integration. I trace the process of integration through three eras of global political change. First is the early 1970s – early 1990s. This era is the first in which women made large legal strides in public life. Additionally, it is a time of transition from “hot” proxy wars in the Cold War to an increased emphasis on peacekeeping and development in post-Colonial Africa and South Asia. The second is 1992 (end of the Cold War) – 2001. In the post-Cold War era, the lines between war and peace have been blurred, with no clear enemy or delineated battlefields. There was both an increase in peacekeeping as well as an increase in non-state violence. The third is 2001 – present. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, much of the Western world’s security sectors have been focused on the Global War on Terror. The nebulous nature of this conflict has resulted in a permeation of the role in the military throughout society (Brooks, 2016). Additionally, it has often furthered the military’s role in promoting values. Rather than “killing people and breaking things”, the military is now expected to constrain the use of violence to only those times that it is politically necessary. This is essential to winning on today’s battlefield. Hard-power and violence have become less useful for meeting the threats Western militaries faced in the post-Cold War (Nye Jr, 2008).

Not all societies have adopted the belief that the role of the military is greater than conducting violence to the same degree though. Beliefs about the military's role in society, and the emphasis placed on conventional military tactics varies between Western militaries, especially since the end of the Cold War. As Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (2002) find, the divergence in the changes – both in doctrine and prominence in society – to Western militaries in the post-Cold War global security arena is a result of a combination of cultural inputs and public policy constraints. Domestic experiences with war, the history of imperialism, the size and strength of the military budget, and beliefs about social welfare and values have influenced military doctrine and policies. Risa Brooks (2007) further emphasizes that sociopolitical and cultural beliefs influence both the definition of military effectiveness and the means by which militaries achieve it. For example, France's colonial legacy has resulted in a military that is very responsive to changing international politics, while Norway's history of subjugation to its Scandinavian neighbors has resulted in a military that is more entrenched in citizenship ideals. The size and strength of the United States military has resulted in an enduring focus on combat and conventional military strength, even in the face of changing political demands. Tracing these differences in experiences, beliefs, and policy constraints is important for fully understanding differences in integration. As I will show, the critical differences in cultural beliefs about equality have impacted the way in which militaries have adopted to new security challenges, and specifically affected attitudes toward women. This, in turn, has created permissive or restrictive environments for women's integration.

The way in which the military has responded to changes in global politics is an output of differences in military culture. A particular military may be more responsive to some political changes than to others. For example, in the years immediately following World War II, the United States' military was used as a means of making citizenship claims, with an emphasis placed on the military as a "schoolhouse for the nation" (Krebs, 2006). Military service was used to strengthen the Civil Rights' movements. However, by the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and the introduction of the all-volunteer force, the United States' military had returned its focus outwards, with an emphasis on conventional military tactics and force projection. The Norwegian military has historically been focused on making Norwegian citizens, and highlighting those aspects of culture that are distinctly Norwegian (Friis, 2000). The historical focus has been on appealing to the values of equality and egalitarianism, and socializing young people into the national sociopolitical culture. However, the demands of the international environment, especially in the wake of operations in Afghanistan, have resulted in a more externally focused military that must try to respond to the changing security landscape. In France, the military has had strong conventional foci in various periods of its history (Siegl, 2008), while also being dedicated to positive values engagement during military conflicts (Bore, 2006) that have translated into its responses to the current environment.

The way in which militaries respond to changes in global politics is a result of a larger military culture. Military culture can be best seen in the sources of authority<sup>55</sup> for

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<sup>55</sup> Sources of Authority is a term used by Dobbin, 1994 to help explain variation in industrial policies between the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. He argues that the variations in authority over economic policy (markets, firms, or central government) created differential outcomes despite similar available policy options. Variations of sources of authority were reflective of a deeper sociopolitical and

reward or promotion within a given military. Despite the changes in global politics and the resulting nature of warfare, the ways in which service members gained credibility and access to leadership positions has been relatively unchanging. These variations in sources of authority represent some of the more deeply rooted aspects of military culture.

To understand the sources of authority in the military I look to the background of and requirement for promotion to leadership ranks and the way that members of the military can earn accolades and awards. In the United States, the source of authority lies in the combat arms. Of the four-star generals that have been the most senior leaders of the Army and Marine Corps, only one has come from a non-ground combat occupational specialty. Combat service is seen as a requirement for military leadership. Additionally, over 90% of the valor-awards since Vietnam have been awarded to members of ground-combat specialties. In France, the source of authority lies with furthering political norms. There is a high concentration of intelligence officers in the general officer rank, highlighting the emphasis on a values-based constrained use of force, and the importance of information gathering and decimation. Norway places its source of authority in citizenship ideals. Leadership promotions are based off of upholding the tenets of “Norwegianness” and performance in skillsets based on classical Norwegian identity. These variations in sources of identity are reflective of the deeper military cultural identity that drives changes in orientation. Understanding the variations in these cultures and identity is important for understanding the variations in integration. Over time, the

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institutional culture. The source of authority guided both how the policy was enacted and the character of the resulting economic and industrial development. In much the same way, I argue that there are variations in the sources of authority in the military that are reflective of the deeper military culture.

cultures are more or less responsive to the claims that women make about their service, influencing women's ability to influence military policies, tactics and strategy. It is against the background of military culture that the process of integration takes place.

### **The Process of Integration: Women's Ability to Impact the Military**

Studies of women's participation in the military that focus on numbers or law, do not fully capture the variation seen in women's integration in the militaries of the France, Norway, and the United States. These approaches focus on women's inclusion, viewing the military as the primary actor and women as a subject to being allowed to participate. While they offer great insight into the drivers of legal change or moments of time that result in increased participation, they do not engage with the relationship between the women and the military or explain the observed variation seen in both tactical outcomes and the experiences of women in the military. To understand this, a more robust and comprehensive measure of *integration*, with a focus on the interactive effect between women and the military, specifically the impact that women are able to have on the military, is needed.

Women's participation in the military is not the only area where scholarship has revealed a tension between inclusion and integration. Work on women's participation in parliamentary politics has been met with similar challenges. Early work on women's elected representation focused heavily on the number of women in parliaments, often emphasizing quotas or electoral systems that best helped bring women into the elected body (Caul, 1999; Caul, 2001; Squires, 1996). However, while this work revealed the

importance of having women in parliaments, there was criticism and questions raised as to the character and quality of the women elected, and if women had any meaningful impact on politics or the political process. A common criticism to women's inclusion in politics was that women were essentially coopted by male party members, forced to toe party lines, negating any benefit of women's presence in government (Tinker, 2004). To address this criticism there was a subsequent move to assess the actual *impact* of women's participation in legislatures, measuring the policy outcomes and debates that women brought to the table by virtue of their unique social experiences (Ballington & Karam, 2005; Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli, & Emmett, 2012). The driving scholarly questions moved beyond "how many women" are in parliament to "what is the value added by women's participation in governance?" The study of women in the military is due for a similar shift in focus, away from how many, and towards what impact they have on policies, tactics and strategies.

To do this, I focus on the impact that women have on the military as the dependent variable. To measure impact, it is best to view integration as a complex set of legal, cultural, and practical factors (Vojdik, 2005) that interact to ultimately determine the degree to which women have been able to change military policies, tactics and strategy. More than numbers or laws, change in policy, tactics or strategies is indicative of integration taking place. As March and Olsen (1989) find, institutions in democracies change as they integrate individuals with different preferences. Christopher Anderson (2009) similarly discusses the change in institutions that result from participation by previous outgroups by emphasizing that institutional policies, practices and norms are

“changed – whether strengthened or weakened – by new [participants’] priorities or preferences” (Anderson, 2009, p. 317). We should therefore expect to see the military change as a result of women’s increased participation if integration has taken place. To understand how the change in the military occurs (or what inhibits its occurrence), it is best to conceptualize integration as a process that has unfolded overtime.

Understanding the integration of women into the military as a process rests on two important assumptions. First is the idea that institutions in democracies see change – especially change that expands their participatory base – as both beneficial and desirable. Democratic organizations must be both enduring enough to withstanding potentially whimsical changes in popular sentiment, and nimble enough to improve with changing sociopolitical beliefs (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1981). Identifying and responding to beneficial moments of change is essential for a well-functioning democratic institution (Olsen, 2009). Regarding the military there is evidence that militaries that are reflective of their citizenry population are more effective and efficient at both their overall military objectives and at acting as part of the total state political apparatus (Burk, 2002; Cottey, Edmunds, & Forster, 2002). It can therefore be argued to be in their best interest to continue to expand military participation to be more reflective of society. Additionally, there are strong arguments to be made linking military participation to social and civic rights and duties of previously excluded or newly enfranchised groups (Burk, 2001; Krebs, 2006). Indeed, if the military is conceptualized as an institution that can take on different roles and cultures (rather than solely a tool to commit violence for the state), we can see how expansion of opportunities to women – who comprise 50% of the population



and have an increasing state in the political, civic, and economic life of the state – can be beneficial.

The second major assumption is that the requirements for participation remain constant when the participatory based is expanded. Whether expanding voting rights (Dalton & Grey, 2003) or military participation (Cohn, 2000), opponents of an increased institutional reach frequently point to the possibility that the institution will have to weaken its core competencies in order to account for the newly included group. Because of the unique nature of the military in society, and the gendered nature of the conduct of violence (Goldstein, 2001), this line of argument is particularly loud with regards to women's integration in the military. However, there is no evidence that democratic institutions, including the military, have lessened or reduced standards or capabilities when expanding to include previous out-groups (MacKenzie, 2015). While the military, as an institution, may *change* requirements in order to meet changing security threats or changing global politics, they have not been lessened to accommodate newly integrated groups, including women.<sup>56</sup> Requirements for military service can be seen as a potential constraint on women's choice to participate. However, they are constraints that impact all potential recruits, and thus are operationalized as an inherent part of the institution.

By conceptualizing of integration as a relational process we are able to identify and measure individual components (such as legal provisions and numbers of participation), while also capturing the ways in which women have actually changed the military. It takes the often segmented measures present in most of the literature on

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<sup>56</sup> See NATO country reports 2000-2016 for a list of training requirements.

women in the military and interacts them. By taking an historical institutional approach to studying the process of integration, I will show that the interaction between military history and culture, and women's claims about service create unique dynamics that help to explain the variation in tactical outcomes we see in the cases of Norway, France and the United States. The foundational beliefs about equality discussed in Chapter 2 greatly influence women's decisions about both whether and how to join (and remain) in the military, and, in turn, their ability to influence military policies, process, and tactics. The degree to which these claims coincide or clash with military culture creates either a permissive or restrictive environment for the process of integration.

**Figure 3.2: The Process of Integration**




Figure 3.2 highlights the process of integration. Integration takes place bounded by the interaction between claims about women's service and military culture and tradition. Within these bounds legal provisions and functional participation interact to allow for women to have an impact on the military. This, in turn, creates new legal provisions and allows for new functional participation in military service. When claims about women's service and military culture are in agreement with one another, a permissive environment is created for integration and the interaction of legal structure and functional participation results in women having the ability to change military policies, tactics and strategies. When claims and military culture are in conflict women are less likely to affect change on the military. The interaction between claims about service and views on the military role and culture help explain variation in women's integration. Because of this variation, even when laws about women's service are the same, or there are the same number of women in the military, we see differences in levels of integration.

### ***Operationalizing & Measuring Women's Integration in Western Militaries***

To operationalize the process of integration it is important to operationalize its components. Referring back to Figure 3.2, we see that legal provisions and functional participation interact to result in changes to the military's policies, tactics and strategies. Legal or structural provisions are necessary open military service to women. They are the initial enabling conditions that allow women to be a part of the military structure. Functional participation addresses not only how many women are in the military, but

what women are doing in critical occupational specialties. It also addresses women's staying power in the military and focuses on women's access to influential senior positions. These components interact to ultimately result in women's ability to impact the military. I will next discuss the measures of each of these components.

### ***Legal***

Though not the sole factor, *de jure* provisions for women's inclusion in the military are an essential building block for integration. They formally open space in the military for women to participate. The legal component, however, extends beyond just what women are allowed to do, and also encompasses formal support structures that promote or enable equality and egalitarianism between the genders with regards to military service. In order to fully encompass the totality of the legal aspects of women's integration we must take into account three legal factors. The first is what women are (or are not) legally allowed to do in the military. While I argue that this is not the sole basis of integration, I do agree with Irene Eulriet that the law is the foundation of women's participation in Western militaries, especially in the post-Cold War era (Eulriet, 2012). Throughout the history of women's participation in Western militaries, there have been restrictions placed on their service, particularly with regards to participation in direct combat roles and service aboard ships with limited berthing spaces. The expansion of what women are legally permitted to do, therefore, does represent a first and necessary step in the process of integration.

Simply allowing women the possibility to serve in combat roles, though, does not account for integration. Even when there is legal equality in occupational specialties that are open, there are structural factors that hinder the *de facto* equality of women. The second and third legal factors are related to creating a structural environment that mitigates any differences resulting from one's gender that may disproportionately hinder one's possibility for operational success or promotion. Access to childcare and adequate female-specific medical care was cited as one of the top concerns of service members when asked what may hinder their career possibilities. In several instances, women were unable to find childcare outside traditional working hours, despite the fact that military operations take place 24 hours a day (DACOWITS 2016). Parenting is a condition that overwhelming affects women. Nearly 30% of all service women across NATO forces are single mothers (NATO 2016). For both biological and cultural reasons, motherhood is often used as a reason that women should not participate in the military (Goldstein, 2001; Van Creveld, 2001). Legally mitigating the differential in childcare requirements creates an environment where gender equality can be more fully practiced, and women actually able to integrate (rather than just be included) in the military. Access to childcare, or the lack thereof, is thus either an enabling or constraining force to women's service and composes the second legal factor of integration.

Similarly, parental leave and pregnancy policies impacts women's ability to integrate. The physical aspects of motherhood do impact women's ability to engage in many military activities. From not being able to be on ships or shoot firearms, to limited physical capability, pregnant women cannot participate in all aspects of military life.

Policies around assigning pregnant women to non-physical jobs, and allowing for adequate physical recovery time enable women to stay in the military and balance motherhood with their professional duties.

Sexual assault and/or harassment is another explanatory factor linked to women's propensity to serve in the military (Cawkill, Rogers, Knight & Spear, 2009).

Institutionalized sexism manifested through both harassment and assault has been found to be a structural barrier to women's participation in Western militaries from both a cultural perspective and lost training time (Fitzgerald, 1999; Morral, Gore & Schell, 2016; LeardMann, et al., 2013). As the traditional domain of men, introducing women into the military has the potential to bring out "toxic, even dangerous" aspects of traditional views on masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). While there is debate around the interplay between culture and laws, legal conditions and processes are measurable and offer a point of comparison between countries. To this end, incorporating laws around sexual harassment and assault, as well as the degree to which reports of such are investigated and prosecuted, provide necessary insight into structural conditions to create actual equality between men and women, and comprises the third legal factor of integration.

**Table 3.1: Legal Components of the Integration Index**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Description</b>
Barriers to Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Occupational fields closed to women</li><li>- Geographical restrictions on women's service</li><li>- Quotas/limitations on number of women able to serve in a given unit</li></ul>
Childcare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Provisions for childcare during all operational hours</li><li>- Provisions for childcare during deployment</li><li>- Equality in maternity / paternity leave</li></ul>
Sexual Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Laws on harassment / assault (military and national)</li><li>- Ratio of allegations to investigations</li><li>- Allegations / 10,000 military members</li><li>- Ratio female/male victims</li><li>- Ratio of trial / prosecutions</li></ul>

### ***Functional Participation***

In addition to considering the legal factors of integration, the nature of women's participation and the roles they hold in the military is necessary to understand integration. Beyond just looking at what women are allowed to do, it is important to measure what women are actually doing and their ability to access promotions and leadership roles. Legal expansion to include women in the military does not guarantee that they will choose to participate. As seen with the case of voter enfranchisement, we cannot assume that expanding access to rights will result in more participation (Alex-Assensoh, 2005). While laws may be more inclusive, and create conditions for participation, without the choice to participate, the previous outgroup will never actually integrate. Additionally, all participation is not equal. As Carole Pateman asserted, "participation," must be viewed as a "continuum of engagement" that encompasses various forms, qualities, and intensities

of involvement (Pateman, 1970, pp. 67-70). This variation is the functional quality of participation – how many women are doing what in the military.

Functional participation composed of three factors. First is the number of women in the military as a percentage of the total force. While not the complete picture, it gives a comparative baseline between countries. Understanding how many women participate is necessary for understanding the potential breakdown of labor. When there are relatively few women in the military (below 5%), women tend to be concentrated in a few occupational specialties that are reflective of traditional gender roles. While there is not a clear understanding as to why, the 5% threshold is correlated with women engaging in a verity of occupational specialties (Segal, 1995; Carreiras, 2006). Capturing the overall percentage of women is thus part of understanding what women may be doing.

The second component of functional participation is a breakdown of what occupational specialties and roles women are actually doing in the military. To evaluate this, I use the NATO standard of grouping military occupational specialties: administration/support, medical, support aviation, combat aviation, supply/logistics, ground combat, submarine, surface navy (shipborn), and intelligence. Breaking down participation into the actual occupational specialties is important for two primary reasons. First, it shows the degree to which women have permeated throughout the military. Indeed, there is evidence that numbers matter, and success in newly opened occupational specialties is dependent on women reaching a certain threshold of participation (Cawkill, Rogers, Knight & Spear, 2009). Second, it allows insight into the supply side of military participation. In Western militaries, military service is voluntary, to include a choice of



occupational specialties.<sup>57</sup> Women must therefore *choose* to participate in occupational specialties that have previously been closed to them. This is a critical piece of the iterative process of integration. If women are not choosing to participate, despite *de jure* provisions that allow their service, full integration will not take place.

The roles that women have in the military, particularly those that result in leadership and authority are also an important part of functional participation. For women to have an impact on the military in a meaningful way – both that makes it stronger and more conducive to future women’s participation – they must achieve a certain level of seniority and be in leadership positions. We must therefore look beyond the numbers of women who join, or what they are doing, and also examine the rate at which they stay in the organization and their access to leadership roles.

Looking at evidence from women’s participation in politics, gender-differentiated effects become more prominent when women reach a certain seniority of political office (Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Melander, 2005). It may logically follow that as women reach more seniority in the military, they may impact both strategy and tactics in a way their male counterparts do not. To capture seniority, I look at the percentage of women that hold the rank of non-commissioned officer or field grade officer. Though countries vary in their initial operational commitment, individuals cannot obtain these ranks during their initial enlistment term. Additionally, these are the ranks at which individuals exert leadership authority over others. For the NATO countries, these ranks are achieved

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<sup>57</sup> Though the needs of the military will ultimately win out, in the countries considered, recruits are able to express preference as to their desired occupation specialties. Currently, infantry occupations and special operations are still completely voluntary for women.

somewhere between 10-12 years of service.<sup>58</sup> Additionally, I consider the retention rate of women compared to men. A positive value means that that a greater percentage of women as compared to men stayed on to their next term of enlistment. A negative value means that a greater percentage of women than men who were eligible for separation due to the end of contract left the military.

In addition to seniority I also look at the number of operational commands and key positions that are held by women. Being in command gives one direct influence over more junior service members. This exposure to leadership is essential to make the military a more permissive environment and ultimately enact lasting structural change that will ease women's ability to join in the future. Further, receiving command demonstrates the most senior military leadership's confidence in women's tactical competency. Women receiving command billets also signals that they have been normalized (and therefore integrated) into what is often conceptualized as a gendered organization.

Finally, functional participation includes a measure of women involved in overseas operations. The military has twin purposes overseas – a functional enactment of violence as an extension of policy aims and a societal reflection and upholding of core values (Feaver, 1996; Nielsen, 2012). The number of women involved in overseas operations is a reflection of both the faith in women's ability to engage in functional combat operations and the centrality of gender equality to national priorities.

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<sup>58</sup> Organizational requirements of NATO countries available at:  
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/68147.htm#civilian>

**Table 3.2: Functional Participation Components of Integration Index**

Component	Definition
Level of Participation	- Women's Participation as percentage of total force
Types of Participation	- Women's Participation by occupational specialty - Women's Participation by rank - Women's Leadership positions - Retention Rate of women
Overseas Participation	- Women's Participation in overseas missions - Breakdown of combat vs peacekeeping vs training missions

***The Impact Women have on the Military as a Result of Integration: Changes in Policies, Tactics and Strategy***

Ultimately, the result of the process of integration is that women have an impact on the military. This impact varies in the cases of the France, Norway, and the United States. The variation can largely be seen in the degree to which the military recognizes the benefit of women *as women*, and has allowed space for them to impact and shape strategic policy outcomes while continuing to adapt to changes in both domestic priorities and the international politics (Brooks, 2007, pp. 9-11). If we look especially in the post-Cold War era, women have been essential in both leveraging the currency of information and achieving strategic policy outcomes for which the military was deemed the appropriate tool. Further, the militaries of the France, Norway, and the United States have all emphasized women's rights and gender relations as a strategic priority, particularly in their operations in Afghanistan. However, the degree to which strategic priorities beyond conventional force has been adopted varies.

Understanding the degree to which women have had an impact on the military as an institution can thus be seen in two ways. First is the policies that have made it easier

for women to join and remain in the military. Though men are capable of enacting women-friendly policies, as the Commandant of the Marine Corps remarked, “I had no idea that child care was even an issue we should be concerned with; however it turns out it makes us better warfighters. Maybe we need more female senior leaders to make us aware of these things.”<sup>59</sup> Women can be influential in easing the structural constraints that have limited their participation.

Second is in the adoption of strategies and tactics that play to women’s unique strengths that also enhance the capabilities of the organization as a whole. Women have proven beneficial in advancing national security priorities and policy objectives, especially in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency missions. Including women in the military does not necessarily result in them being used in any different way than service members have been used traditionally. Historically, women have felt the need to adopt masculine characteristics and adhere to the “male way of fighting” (Herbert M. S., 1998) to be included in the military. Integration, conversely, results in the institution of the military being changed by women. Therefore, in more integrated militaries we see the adoption of tactics and strategies that harness women’s unique abilities to better achieve their strategic goals.

**Table 3.3: Impact on the Military**

	<b>United States</b>	<b>Norway</b>	<b>France</b>
<b>Structural Provisions</b>	Left up to the individual	Applied to all citizens equally	Refinement to maternity policies and childcare
<b>Tactics/Strategies</b>	Conventional Force	After Afghanistan realize the value of women in COIN	Emphasis on women’s specific roles

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<sup>59</sup> Remarks to DACOWITS, June 2017

Table 3.3 highlights the differences in the impact that women have had on the militaries of the United States, Norway, and France.

Broadly speaking, women have had very little impact on the military in the United States, despite their relatively high level of participation. Laws around their participation have been slow to change, and enabling structures still are largely left up to the individual. The lack of structural support for child care and motherhood contributes to the negative retention rate. While the United States has a relatively high number of women at any given point in time, the majority of them are junior enlisted or junior officers who leave after their enlistment contract is up, citing family as the primary reason (DACOWITS, 2016). Further, those women who do stay in the military tend to remain single or not have children. As retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Fran Wilson stated, “being a woman in the [United States] military is all about survival. You don’t make waves, and you sure as hell don’t offer up any ideas that may you’re your male peers think that you want things ‘easier’ for other women.”<sup>60</sup> As evidenced by her remarks, despite the success of individual women, there was little space for meaningful change that would either ease or encourage women’s continued participation in the military.

Discussions around women’s participation in the United States military typically hinge on whether or not they will be able to meet the male standards. For example, most of the contention surrounding FET teams was on the ability of women to meet the same

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<sup>60</sup> Interview May 2017

physical standards as men, and engage in the “masculine” enterprise of close-quarters combat. Though FET teams were created specifically for gendered reasons, women were encouraged to adhere to male standards and patterns of behavior in order to “fit in” to the infantry units to which they were attached (Lemmon, 2015). Attempts to masculinize women in FET teams is at least partially responsible for the hurdles for fully implementing counterinsurgency strategies the United States faced in Afghanistan. After what was seen as a “failed experiment” by many of the current administration’s advisors,<sup>61</sup> the United States continues to focus on conventional warfare, as evidenced by President Trump’s recent assertion that the purpose of military action in Afghanistan is “killing terrorists, not nation building.”<sup>62</sup>

In Norway, the ability of women to change the organization has been limited, but is present. Concerning laws and enabling structures, Norway’s government has enacted wide-sweeping laws and policies on parental leave and childcare that pertain to all citizens. These policies minimize gender differences. For example, parental leave is equal between parents, and fathers are expected to be as present in children’s lives as mothers. Indeed, the so-called “daddy quota” mandates that fathers take the first 16 weeks of a child’s life away from work (Hernes, Scandinavian Citizenship, 1988; Borchorst & Siim, 2008). The need for more specific policies directly aimed at military women has been largely seen as unnecessary. Culturally, there is an expectation that

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<sup>61</sup> Discussion on Afghanistan with members of Trump’s national security team who wish to remain anonymous, May 2017

<sup>62</sup> Speech on Afghanistan, August 21, 2017

government and parents will work together to ensure a proper work-life balance for all its citizens.

The adoption of universal conscription further muted the differences between men and women. A 2011 report on the potential impacts of universal conscription highlighted how expanding to conscription to women would make women and men feel “more Norwegian” knowing that all fellow citizens were subject to the same benefits and responsibilities (Sand & Fasting, 2011). While historically men and women have been viewed as equal in all ways in the military,<sup>63</sup> experiences in Afghanistan resulted in the creation of the “Hunter Troop,” an all-female special operations unit. Its creation was a response to the lessons learned in Afghanistan as to the value of having women for specific tactical and strategic outcomes. The unit has not yet been tactically employed, yet its creation highlights the beginning of a women-led, meaningful change to military strategy.

The French military is experiencing the highest level of women’s integration. Since 1972, there have been more than a dozen policy changes aimed at revising the maternity and childcare policies in the military, to include a 1984 order that deemed childcare a national security priority. These laws have been aimed at both attracting women and retaining them in service. Valerie Andre, the first female general in the French military, writes in her memoir that it was her duty and responsibility to make it easier for the women who came after her, and ensure that they never had to make the

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<sup>63</sup> In an event sponsored by CSIS, Col Gjerde continued to emphasize the “sameness” of service in the military, downplaying any role that her gender had on her success. Transcript available at: <https://www.csis.org/events/women-combat-arms-conversation-colonel-ingrid-gjerde>

same choices concerning family or military that she did (André, 1954). Even early on, there was a recognition of responsibility to ensuring that the institution made up for any potential differences between the genders in order to create true equal opportunity.

Women have also been targeted for recruitment for the specific talents that they bring, and integrated into infantry units purposefully for peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations. The focus on female-specific military talents have their history in the role that French women played in the Resistance to Nazi-occupied France and the role of women in counterinsurgencies in Indochina and Algeria (Weitz, 1995; Hubin, 2012). Indeed, the role and success of women in these early wars has set the stage for women to have a powerful voice when it comes to military tactics and strategies.

In the following chapters I highlight the historical process that have shaped integration in France, Norway and the United States.



## **CHAPTER 4:**

### **France**

#### **Professional Feminization**

Women have, and continue to have, a measurable impact on military tactics and strategy. Claims rooted in institutional equality are compatible with a culture of responsiveness to changes in global politics and a focus on innovative and human-centered tactics. Today, France's military is at another pivotal moment of change, as it is working to address the emerging threat of domestic terrorism and radicalization. The current responses in calls for cultural training and engagement are in line with the historical process of integration that women experienced.

The impact that women have had on the French military can be seen in their operations in Afghanistan. The French military made technological and tactical changes to harness women's contributions to combat operations. Technologically, the French redesigned their body armor and combat gear to fit women. Though they had been working in peacekeeping operations, women had not been frequently engaged in offensive combat. Therefore, there was not combat-specific body armor tailored to women's proportions. Combat-specific vehicles were also not designed for women's smaller frames. In evaluating the reason for combat deaths in 2008, ill-fitting equipment was found at least partially to blame. Women were not able to maneuver easily, or

upload/offload from vehicles effectively. Properly fitting personal protection equipment and retrofitted vehicles allowed women to move more freely and effectively in combat situations. As a result, by 2009, the French COIN forces had eliminated over half the Taliban forces in the Kapisa Province (Le Nen 2010).

The success in Kapisa rested on a tactical doctrine that de-emphasized purely kinetic operations and incorporated community engagement and capacity building. When Colonel Chanson took control of the region, he emphasized that “spatial discrimination, rather than large scale attrition, leading to a careful control of a few selected areas through persistent presence in the villages,” would be the key to ensuring that the Taliban would not return to gain control of the region (as quoted in Taillat, 2010). Rather than focusing on capturing main supply routes by force, or conducting house to house raids aimed at killing Taliban operatives, they focused on key village influencers, and used persuasion and coercion to fortify against Taliban recitivism. France withdrew from Kapsia in 2012, turning it over to Afghan security forces. Kapsia and the Tagrib Valley is currently a contentious region, yet has not fallen to the Taliban.

While there has been debate about the overall effectiveness of ISAF operations in Afghanistan, the Kapsia Vally is a succes story, in large part due to the actions of the women in the French forces stationed in the Vally. The high level of intergration of women into the French military was largely responsible for the French military’s success. The process by which the French military came to be integrated in important to understanding their recent actions in Afghanistan.

## **France: High Level of Integration**

The claims rooted in institutional equality and the policies resultant from the women of the women's movement contribute to the high level of integration of women into the military in France. This can be seen both in the way in which policies concerning women's participation and the structural enabling conditions have been refined as well as the degree to which the unique talents of women have been used to strengthen military action. Laws have been continually refined to better accommodate women's needs, both easing their ability to join the military and increasing retention. Additionally, France has revised strategic and tactical practices that emphasize to adapt to changes in global politics that highlight the importance of gender and the values of equality. For example, the 2013 Defense White Paper put an emphasis on human intelligence as the foundation of defense policy, and the military's role in preserving and promoting values of equality and justice in both the near and far abroad (Ministry of Defense 2013). Evidenced by the work in Afghanistan, and the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, women were an essential part in both gathering actionable intelligence, but more importantly promoting values through their lived experiences. The focus of the strategy outlined in the White Paper is on the military's role in preventing conflict before it starts. This is seen in President Macron's call for female service members to fill roles in intelligence, peacekeeping and crises mitigation.

The laws related to equal pay and work discussed in Chapter 2 were foundational in setting the stage to begin the process of integration. While laws related to women's equality were necessary for France's high level of integration, alone they were not

sufficient. The permissive environment created by the positive interaction of claims about women's service and military culture has allowed women to influence the military through their participation and access to key positions of influence. This influence comes both in terms of military-specific policies, and tactical and strategic decisions. Table 4.1 shows the current measures of women's integration.

**Table 4.1: Current Measures of Women's Integration into the French Military**

<b>Measure</b>	<b>Value</b>
Legal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No Restrictions on Occupational Specialties open to Women</li> <li>- No Restrictions on services on ships or in combat zones</li> <li>- No quotas (either positive or negative)</li> <li>- Creche Care – national childcare program</li> <li>- Guaranteed provisions for child care for night work</li> <li>- Pre/Post partum leave (16 weeks)</li> <li>- 156 weeks shared leave for mother/father in cases of dual military families</li> <li>- Themis Cell created a “prevention kit” for sexual assault</li> <li>- Approximately 60 cases/year of sexual harassment reported</li> </ul>
Functional Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 15.5% of military force</li> <li>- 5.5% in ground combat force</li> <li>- 7% in international operational forces</li> <li>- + 6.3% retention rate</li> <li>- 2% of flag officers</li> <li>- 9% of senior officers</li> <li>- 51% of Noncommissioned Officers</li> </ul>
Institutional Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Spreading the values of equality and security worldwide is a national security priority</li> <li>- Counterinsurgency and nation building activities</li> <li>- Personnel policies refined to attract more women</li> </ul>

While the individual components each represent a relatively high level of women's inclusion in the military, it is the process of their interaction that helps to better understand the high level of integration experienced by the French Military. The legal

and functional components interact in a way that is supported by institutional equality's focus on the government's role in ensuring that differences are not detrimental. This can be seen in the legal provisions for women's service extending beyond allowance for women's participation to include targeted maternity and child care policies that make it easier for women to both enter and remain in the military. The refinements to benefit policies largely came from women having influence on decision makers. Additionally, while France has an objectively high percentage of women in its military (15.5% compared to a 2016 NATO average of 11%), what women do and their numbers in leadership positions is more important when determining their level of integration. Though still objectively low, at 5.5%, France has one of the highest percentage of women in ground combat units. The presence of women in the specialty considered the "main effort" of military operations, reinforces the unique role that women have in the military. Traditionally, in order to participate in combat operations women had to adopt male characteristics, and were treated more as a soldier than a woman (Herbert 1998). However, the historical experiences of the military, coupled with the strategic commitment to values transferal has resulted in women in the French military being able to retain some of their uniquely feminine characteristics even while serving in combat roles (Boulegue 1991).

Women's ability to be both women and soldiers is reflected in a positive retention rate (women are more than 6% more likely to stay in the military than their male counterparts), and is also seen in their presence in leadership roles. Notably, staff noncommissioned officers (SNCO) are majority female. SNCOs are primarily

responsible for personnel management and the day to day lives of soldiers. The continue refinement to policies that impact women are reflective of women being in leadership positions that emphasize the wellbeing of soldiers.

As noted in Chapter 3, integration is more than either just the laws that allow women to participate in the military or their degree of participation at any given point in time. Rather, it is a temporally dynamic process of institutional change and participation that interact to fundamentally change the institution. In this chapter I will show that France did not achieve a high level of integration due to one policy change. Rather, they engaged in multiple iterations of change that resulted from women being able to position themselves in leadership roles such that they could influence claims about women's service and the conditions under which they serve. Because of policy change that made military service more attractive, and a culture that valued women for their unique characteristics, women remained in the military and gained influential leadership positions. I begin this chapter by discussing the role of the French military and its culture. I focus on its culture of adaptation through self-examination and how its history has resulted in an emphasis on values and equality in response to changes in the international arena. I further show how the structural results of the work done by the women's movement set the stage for women's military integration, and the claims made about women's service in response to a changing international security situation echoed the claims made about women's equality. I then trace the process of women's integration through the three eras of global political change. In the first, the basis for integration is set through initial equality laws that allowed women into the regular armed forces. In the

second, military policy was refined to better account for the experiences that women were having in the military, and French military doctrine shifted from conventional combat to values based intervention and norm defusing. In the third, French forces professionalized and the military continued to refine its identity around values. In the fourth, I show how current proposed changes are reflective of the past process of integration.

### **French Military Culture**

The French military history of adaptation through self-examination (de Durand 2011, Hubin 2012). As Olivier Schmitt (2017) argues, the modern-day French military has looked to their own history of colonial warfare – both its successes and failure – to both strategically and tactically adapt to present circumstances. Historically, there has been a tension over the role of the military in everyday French life. On the right, there has been an historical argument for professional militaries as an essential function of reproducing citizenship norms. For example, in discussing the importance of the military to society, former Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle commented that military service was the “right by which proper young men were initiated into becoming French citizens” (Sorin, 2003). This assertion was predicated on this history of the warrior class that were the keepers of French society and had particular appeal to the upper class. Prior to World War II, military officers had primarily come from upper class families, and military service seen as part of their duty to countries. The notion of gentlemen officers rooted in the Napoleonic tradition was part of an officer’s ethos and education (Hughes, 2012). However, on the left, there was a great distrust of the professional military, for fear of

military power becoming concentrated in the hands of elite politicians (Kier, 1995). Indeed, many former military officers pursued politics after their time in the military was completed. It was worried that the military to politics pipeline would undermine the diversity of representation that should be part of a democracy. In particular there was fear that former officers would hold undo sway because of the allegiance to officers that conscripted troops felt (Kier, 1995). The left therefore argued for short-term conscription to keep the military decentralized and not powerful. They argued that if soldiers did not have as much time to build an allegiance to their officers, members of the officer class would not hold as much sway. The compromise on this tension was a reduction in conscription time from 3 years at the end of World War II, to 12 months by 1970, and to 10 months by 1990. Concurrently, the percentage of the military that was made up on conscripts was reduced to 29% by 1950. In adapting to these changes, the military was able to keep the citizen soldier ideal through the continuation of conscription, while also relying on the professional military to adapt to changes in global politics.

During and between the World Wars, and in the early years of the Cold War, France had a conventional focus (Siegl, 2008). Its primary focus was on maintaining control of its colonies and thwarting foreign invasion at home. French military personnel were stationed throughout the French empire, charged with both protecting the colonies and training indigenous forces in conventional military tactics (Chafer, 2002). However, in the post-World War II era, the military focus shifted. During World War II, French Africa had been an important part of the fight against Axis powers. However, in the aftermath of the War, it became apparent that France would not longer to hold on to its



colonial powers indefinitely and that conventional forces were not ideal for protecting French sovereignty on the European continent. Military defeats by the Nazi forces, and subsequent losses of colonies, resulted in a reevaluation and redefinition of the French military tactics and strategies.

In the aftermath of the wars in Algeria and Indochina, the French military took a critical look at itself, particularly around the way in which it viewed the use of force. Constantin Melnik, a French political scientist and Army Officer who participated in the war in Algeria from 1959 – 1962 noted that the extreme use of violence by the French “ultimately resulted in support for the FLN, and hurt the French cause” (Melnik, 1964, p. 143). Melnik’s report officially documented and elevated to the highest levels of French policy what many French officers noted in their reports during the war. The lessons from the decolonization wars shifted the French focus from conventional force to restraint in using force. For example, Captain Eyraud, a French officer stationed in the outskirts of Algiers at the beginning of the conflict, went so far as to argue that the FLN should be treated with dignity and respect, and that the French military should focus on constraining rather than using force, especially in the more rural areas (Eyraud, 1958).

While there were immediate structural changes to the military in the 1960s and 70s (including the reduction of troops that trained for foreign invasion, the prohibition of conscripts from engaging in foreign wars, and a tightening of the political control exercised during war), it was during the 1980s that the military’s identity shift – away from a focus on conventional warfare and towards constraint and the perpetuation of democratic values – took place. Though France did not altogether abandon conventional

tactics (it still maintained a conscripted ground force for the eventuality of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, and was one of the early adopters of nuclear weapons), its primary focus turned towards those military activities, such as peacekeeping, that were less focused on brutality and more focused on utilizing the diverse talent pool of French citizens. Retired French Colonel Henri Bore notes that the most effective use of French military personnel is to “engage with the community,” rather than enact violence (Bore, 2006).

The changing nature of the French military throughout the 1980s can be seen in two primary areas: its role in the Peacekeeping and the doctrinal evolution between its 1972 and 1994 Defense White Papers. In discussing their role in the UN Missions in Lebanon, a French officer noted that the most remarkable aspect of their mission was ensuring that “over 9000 Palestinians were able to withdraw and return with dignity and safety.”<sup>64</sup> A stark contrast to the actions in Algeria, French soldiers were rewarded for their restraint. Additionally, France was the lead nation in passing UN Resolution 13/141 (December 1988) that asserted that peacekeeping forces had an obligation to ensure corridors of safety to ensure that victims of the conflict were able to receive humanitarian assistance.

French military participation in peacekeeping operations in the 1990s greatly increased. Citing the reviews they had done of their practice and policies post-Algeria, a French military officer noted that the military was focusing on embracing the

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<sup>64</sup> News reel access available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cS1BpzkoFXs>

“ambiguity” and “human” aspects of military actions, and that peacekeeping fit well with their new identity (Sorin, 2004).

The focus on restraint on the use of force was echoed in the differences in France’s 1972 and 1994 White Papers. While the 1972 White Paper focused primarily on the physical defense of France and its interests abroad, the 1994 White Paper focused on a global need to promote democracy and curtail violence. The 1994 White Paper also highlights that France’s defense interests are inextricably linked with humanitarianism and human security (Balladur, 1994). The 2012 White paper further affirmed this, and noted that national security issues often begin far from France’s borders. Because of this, they concentrated their efforts on expeditionary human security, focusing on peace-promoting and goodwill training missions to prevent some of the causes of conflict. Under President Chirac, France began to commit itself to becoming experts at “Chapter VI-1/2 Missions,”<sup>65</sup> as they fit with both the value base of the country and the training and force structure abilities of the military.

A 50,000-person strong expeditionary unit was formed that could “sustain itself for at least 1 year” in overseas operations. The purpose of the unit was to be “on patrol” around the world for crises response and humanitarian intervention. President Chirac hoped that this force would help to establish France as a leader in promoting stability and security (Isnard, 1996). Throughout the post-Cold War era, France further offloaded immediate territorial defense issues to the European Defense Community to focus on their expeditionary forces. Though a Western nuclear power, France decided to downplay

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<sup>65</sup> Missions that straddle the UN Charter’s Chapter VI (Peace Keeping) and Chapter VII (Peace Enforcement) missions.

its conventional forces and focus on strengthening its role in peacekeeping and human security.

The focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian security also changed the way that leadership was viewed and rewarded. While military might was favored in the colonial wars, in the years that followed, political-military restraint surrounding the use of force became more and more valued. This can be seen in France's decision to differentiate themselves from the United States' response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Feeling that the United States was too eager to engage in kinetic operations, France agreed to align with the multi-national force only under the condition that it could maintain a distinct military presence to act as a "friend to all Lebanese factions" (Wood, 1998). Indeed, a positive emphasis on "soldier-diplomats" emerged by the 1990s (Coulon, 1998). Throughout the years following the end of the Cold War, officers' education was extended, and thoughtful response to crisis was preferenced over brute force.<sup>66</sup>

The emphasis of French military doctrine of an operational culture that "understands foreign cultural norms, beliefs and attitudes and is operationally relevant ...for general officers as well as infantry squad leaders to navigate complex human terrain" (Bore, 2009) has positively interacted with the claims rooted in institutional equality to provide a permissive environment for women's integration. Throughout each

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<sup>66</sup> In the 1990s, the requirements at *Ecole d'état-major* (the senior officers' academies) was expanded to include course in language, culture, negotiation, civilian protection, and natural resource management in addition to traditional tactics (Archived at [www.defense.gouv.fr](http://www.defense.gouv.fr))

of the three eras of global political change, this positive interaction supported women's integration into the military.

## **Era 1: The final years of the Cold War**

### **Workplace Equality and the Feminization of the Military (1970-1992)**

In the final two decades of the Cold War the French military underwent a process known as “feminization”. It begins with the formalization of women's military participation in the professional armed forces in the 1970s and the adoption of the Equality Law. This era was the first in which women were formal participants in the military. In the first 2 decades after women were formally allowed into the military they had substantial policy, tactical and strategic impact. In this first era of integration, claims about women's participation in broader public life coincided with the military's restructuring in the post-colonial era. This created a permissive environment for the process of integration to take place.

#### ***Legal and Structural Provisions***

The initial legal and structural provisions at the beginning of the first era of integration were a result of the wide sweeping changes to laws about women's participation in public life. Table 4.2 summarizes the legal and structural provisions at the beginning of this period of women's integration.

**Table 4.2: Summary of Structural Provisions during the first era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Barriers to Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Access to professional military via 1972 Equality Law and 1973 Statute</li> <li>- 1973-1975 integration of military schools and MOS'</li> <li>- Women not conscripted (men only)</li> <li>- Some caps on school attendance and billeting on ships</li> </ul>
Childcare / Parental Leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Maternity leave and provisions for motherhood stipulated in the 1975 laws (applied to all French citizens)</li> <li>- Creche Care strengthened under 1973 Statue &amp; 1985 Declaration</li> <li>- Expanded night care opportunities</li> </ul>
Sexual Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Outlawed under the Equality Law. All handled outside the military</li> </ul>

The 1972 Equal Pay act was instrumental in both women beginning to achieve structural equality in the public sector, and in highlighting the impact of women's movement in shaping public policy. An additional, and potentially unintended, consequence of the law was that it began the process of integration for French women in the military. In debating the 1972 law, a prominent feminist lawmaker asserted that men and women "serve the same Republic" and are therefore entitled to "equal pay, equal rank, and equal opportunity for promotion."<sup>67</sup> The idea of "serving the same Republic" would become seminal in opening the door for women's military service.

Women's integration was further helped by the military's restructuring to focus on retaining professional soldiers and relying less on conscripts. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, the military focused on retention, with preference given to volunteers who

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<sup>67</sup> 13 July 1972

would carry a continuity of service. Both the length of conscription and the degree to which the military relied on conscripted forces. Historically, military conscription had been a “socialization” process for French males into political society, resulting in a masculine character to the military. A criticism of the French military’s ability to successfully thwart the Nazi invasion is that the military was more a tool of masculine cultural indoctrination and less of a force focused on meeting global threats (Boulegue, 1991). The success of women in the Resistance (as well as later success in Indochina and Algeria) made it impossible to ignore the impact that women had on military success. To both attract and retain talented women, the military focused on the professional nature of service, and focused on its role as an employer, not just an army of conscripts.

As an employer, the military was thus subject to the provisions of the 1972 Equal Pay Law. In interpreting the law for the military, the minister of defense went beyond simply stating that everyone was to be paid equally, and stated that “all citizens wishing to make a career of the armed forces shall have an equal possibility to do so.”<sup>68</sup> Further clarification of the application of the 1972 Equal Pay Law to the military was contained in Statute passed on March 23, 1973.<sup>69</sup> Of note, this statute integrated the previously single-sex staff noncommissioned officer school and the advanced military officer schools. Much like the trade unions identifying women for skills training that would increase the likelihood of promotion, the 1973 Statute encourage commanders to identify women that would benefit from advanced training. The formal opening of advanced

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<sup>68</sup> Minister of Defense’s comments on Loi no 72-662.

<sup>69</sup> Statute on the “special status of women’s bodies in the armed services”

military schools and academies created an environment where military leaders could benefit from the diverse nature of all French citizens who chose to join (Reynaud, 1988; Alexis & Dubois, 2010). Both the exposure to women and the unique perspectives that they brought impacted the male students.

While women were allowed in the formal professional military, at the time that the 1972 Equality Law was put into effect for the military there were still restrictions on the roles that women could hold in the military. Women were prohibited from participating in infantry units and submarines because of the “unique” and “exceptional” nature of those jobs and their “unsuitability” for female participation (Sorin, 2003; Prévot, 2010). Using the cost of providing billeting spaces and berthing as primary rational, military officials placed caps on women’s participation in certain occupational specialties ranging from 3.5% for combat support to 7% for shipboard service. Further, no more than 20% of a given class at the St Cyr military academy could be female (Belmokhtar, 1980). Additionally, the Gendarmerie requested a formal exception to policy stating “qu'en raison des conditions de mise en oeuvre et d'intervention des formations de gendarmerie et des sujtions du service, les emplois des sous-officiers et des officiers de l'arme de la Gendarmerie ne sont ouverts qu'aux hommes.”<sup>70</sup> His initial request was granted due to what was perceived to be the exceptional nature of the work of the Gendarmerie.

In addition to the structural provisions for equality that the 1972 law and the 1973 statute provided, women in the military benefited from the 1975 law forbidding

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<sup>70</sup> Translation: Due to the conditions and requirements for employment, NCOs and Officers of the Gendarmerie’s armed units will only be men



pregnancy to be a consideration for employment. Prior to the 1975 law, the military could discharge or separate women who were pregnant, or deny mothers recruitment into the military. The 1975 law, however, applied to the military as well, and pregnancy and motherhood were no longer disqualifying factors. Further, the law required that employers make accommodations for pregnancy and motherhood. Creche Care protections were also further expanded under the 1975 law, ensuring that women had access to child care at all time they were expected to be at work.

The initial policies associated with the Equality Act in the early 1970s were essential for allowing women to gain a foothold in the military service. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s there were many changes in the policies surrounding women's participation. In 1982, Minister of Defense Charles Hernu established the Committee to Study the Perspective of Female Service Members (*La Commission d'Etude Prospective de la Femme Militaire*). This Committee consolidated many of the recommendations made by women service members throughout their initial years in service. The result was a series of revisions to the personnel code aimed at better integrating women into the French military between 1983-1984. Rooted in the language of the original 1970s' equality legislation revisions and improvements to policies on child care, maternity leave, and parental benefits highlighted the Committee's engagement with female members of the military. Examples of these policies were allowing service members to remain in the same geographic region throughout their career (barring operational necessity), and ensuring night childcare was available at every duty station for service members. All of the policies were based on women's suggestions, and with the hope of attracting women's

enlistment and retention (Reynaud, 1988). Additionally, between 1983 - 1987, overhauls to facilities and equipment (including ships) were undertaken in order to ensure that there would be no arbitrary constraints on women's service due to berthing, hygiene, or maternity facilities (Dufoulon, Saglio & Trompette, 1999).<sup>71</sup> Under Ministry of Defense directives, facilities had to be built or converted to accommodate as many women as may possibly volunteer and be qualified to serve in a given position. This did away with the caps that had been put on women's service, as access to (or the cost of converting) facilities could no longer be used as an excuse for limiting women's service.

The 1980s also saw the restrictions on women's service lifted. Decrees made on 9 May 1985 and 31 May 1985 gave women the ability to both serve in and rise to the highest noncommissioned and commissioned officer ranks in combat arms units. Further, the 31 May decree declared that not only *could* women attain these posts but that they *should*. This exemplifies the belief that women should not only have the same opportunities as men, but that there is benefit to be gained from women's leadership. The recognition by the government that women were beneficial for the military at large helped to solidify women's position in the French military, and codify the influence that women were able to have on it.

There were also legal changes made to the Gendarmerie. Though not part of the military *per se*, the Gendarmerie serves a military-like purpose. As noted above, the Gendarmerie claimed exception to integrating women under the Equality Act. Due to the exceptional nature of the Gendarmerie, this claim went largely unchallenged until 1983.

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<sup>71</sup> Submarines were not required to be retrofitted, however all future builds had to have berthing and hygiene facilities for women.

On 10 February 1983, Decree 83-94 mandated that the Gendarmerie come into line with the military services with regards to gender equality. When pressed on the rational for excluding women, the Director-General could only speak to the history of the Gendarmerie, and failed to produce any concrete evidence pointing to the need for excluding women. The 1983 Degree thus sent a message that tradition or perception were not adequate reasons for maintaining gender segregation.

### ***Functional Participation***

In addition to advances in the legal aspects of women's service, there were important advancements in the functional participation of women in the French military. Table 4.3 highlights the functional participation of women in this first era.

**Table 4.3: Summary of Functional Participation during the first era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Level of Participation	- Increase from 2.74% to 8.5% of the total force (over 20% of professional forces)
Type of Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Primary fields: Information Technology, Senior Administration</li> <li>- Sharp increase in participation in infantry and combat arms (including Gendarmerie)</li> <li>- Between 20-30% of school classes and increased participation as instructors</li> </ul>
Overseas Participation	- No numerical data, but antidotal information on women's participation in peacekeeping and in the Gulf War.

Before embarking on a discussion of women's functional participation during the 1970s and 1980s it is important to emphasize that conscription still existed for male

French citizens. The reliance on conscription means that the vast majority of junior enlisted service members were male. Conscripts were viewed as cheap, expendable, and temporary labor, and therefore given the jobs that required the least amount of training (Martin, 1981). Enlisted women, part of the professional force, were primarily in positions that required more schooling and specialty training, such as intelligence, aircraft maintenance, and medical services. As a result of the increased schooling timeline, women entered the operational forces at a later time than men (Ministère des Armées, 1984). The continued practice of male conscription, coupled with the training-intensive occupational specialties to which women were most often assigned, resulted in a figure on women's military participation that has been argued to be skewed in favor of men. Indeed, throughout the 1970s, women only averaged 2.75% of the total military forces, however 14% of the professional forces were women, as were between 10-25% of the staff NCOs (depending on service), 12% of senior administrative professionals, and over 50% of the information technology specialists<sup>72</sup> (Martin, 1982). In the 1980s, women's service continued to rise. By 1985, a quarter of new recruits and officer candidates in the Army and Air Force were women and ascension into the Navy and Marines more than doubled from the previous decade.

**Table 4.4: Percent of New Women Recruits/Officer Candidates by Service<sup>73</sup>**

	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marines
1975	15	15	5	3
1985	25	25	10	7

Source: Monrique 2004

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<sup>72</sup> Early computer operators and cryptologists

<sup>73</sup> Excludes Gendarmerie, since they did not admit women until 1983

Notably, women achieved this level of participation despite some of the caps put on aspects of their service.

Not only did women join the military, but they remained in it for a considerable period of time. While there is not data on retention rates kept in the 1970s and 1980s, the continued increased percentage of NCOs and Senior Officers indicate that women were both remaining in the military and advancing through the ranks.

**Table 4.5: Percentages of Officers and NCOs 1962<sup>74</sup> vs 1979**

	Army		Air Force		Navy	
	Sr. Officer	NCO	Sr. Officer	NCO	Sr. Officer	NCO
1962	0.5%	6.1%	0%	4.8%	0%	18.1%
1979	21.1%	36.9%	23.8%	24%	22.7%	18%

Source: Ducret-Schaeffer 1980

The percentages in Table 4.5 are the as a proportion of the professional force, that is they exclude conscripts from the total numbers. Throughout the 1980s, the percentage of officers rose by about 5% as well (NATO 2000). The sharp increase in women in leadership positions, coupled with the fact that the percentage of women in more senior ranks is higher than the overall percentage of women in the professional forces gives credence to the assertion that women in the French military were dedicated to staying in the military and make it a career. Not only were they included in the military through the allowance for them to participate, but they remained in and were competitive for promotion.

As women answered the call to military service, they proved themselves capable of meeting the challenges. Not only did they meet the physical and tactical standards

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<sup>74</sup> Data on 1962 is available as it is 10 years after women were first admitted into the military. While numbers of the late 1960s and early 1970s are not available, Ducret-Schaeffer (1980) indicates that these numbers are representative of the averages just before the passage of the 1972 law and 1973 Statute.

required of them for military service, they excelled in socializing their male peers to the benefits of women's inclusion in the military (Prévot, 2010). The relatively long time that women spent in school had the advantage of allowing them to succeed in a low-consequence environment and gain the trust of their male peers before having to engage in operational activities. The ability of women to perform according to standards coupled with the strategic benefit that they brought to units resulted in women being listened to and respected as fellow service members.

Not only did the percentage of women joining in the military overall increase, but the percentage of women in combat-related fields sharply increased. Women's participation in ground combat arms specialties rose by nearly 30% between 1975-1990, outpacing the traditionally gendered specialties such as healthcare (8% growth) (Monrique 2004). Additionally, by 1990, 25% of the women serving in the military (or military-like activities) were in the Gendarmerie (Jauneau, 2012).

During this period of growth in women's participation in the military, the military response to global politics was rather calm. Coming off of heavy casualties in Indochina and Algeria, the military used this time to embark on a period of regrouping, restructuring, and training. The first opportunities for women thus came in the form of domestic schooling and training. In 1977, women were admitted to the Ecole supérieure de guerre (War College). This gave officers access to the flag rank, as school attendance was mandatory for promotion to brigadier general. Additionally, the number of women NCOs attending the newly-integrated NCO academies resulted in women having leadership roles in the domestically based training exercises. Once senior level schools

were open for women, women comprised 20-30% of each class (Martin, 1982). From 1972-1979, the number of female NCOs in leadership roles rose from 6% to 30% (Ducret-Schaeffer, 1980).

The domestic strengthening of France's military was beneficial when global politics turned resulted in attention increasingly abroad. In the 1980s, France turned its attention to bolstering its presence in NATO. Though not part of the formal command structure, French troops took active roles in leading NATO exercises and in occupations in Germany. It is in such roles that women were able to tactically shine. As Katia Sorin (2000) notes, women's leadership in multi-national exercises began to re-shape the ideal type military leader. One result of the military defeats in its former colonies was a loss of faith in the traditional leadership styles of male service members. For many service members, the style of male leadership was seen to be detrimental; the reason that they lost colonies and suffered heavy casualties (Boulege 1991). Women stepped in with what Jean Boulege (1991) refers to as a "charismatic authority" that served as a foil to traditional masculinity. According to surveys done by Boulege, though there was some initial trepidation to women's ability to perform in the military, those that had served with a woman overwhelming saw their leadership style as positive and an asset to the overall mission of the military.

The focus on peacekeeping in the 1980s also opened space for women to serve internationally. In both Lebanon and Bosnia, there were women engaged positively in peacekeeping operations. Women peacekeepers helped to prevent local women from being used as human shields, and were instrumental in creating a permissive environment

for humanitarian actions (Murphy, 2007). Indeed, even amongst the controversies that have surrounded Western involvement in peacekeeping operations, the role of women has generally been found to be a positive contribution in minimizing violence, and achieving tactical and strategic objectives (DeGroot, 2001; Molloy, 2004).

The credibility brought about by women's service in peacekeeping missions resulted in their being instated as instructors and leaders in military academies and specialty training schools. Their positions in schools was critical for women to continue to influence policy and doctrine (Monrique, 2004). Not only did their roles as instructors solidify the idea that women's style of leadership was beneficial, but gave experienced women the ability to influence military curriculum (Sorin, 2004).

Memoirs and statements from women who were among the first to achieve senior ranks highlight that they both joined and remained in the service because they had the opportunity to participate in meaningful ways as women (Bertrand, 2013; Sorin, 2003). As one female Navy officer in the mid-1970s asserted,

for me it was always 'the Navy or Nothing!' when my friends were competing for college or the workplace, I pursued the Navy. ... I knew it would be challenging, but it also the place where there is a career, schooling, and responsibility. (Unidentified officer quoted in Bertrand 2013)

Women not only achieved rank in the military, but positions of influence. The arena where this happened the most was in schools. As noted above, the 1970s and 1980s were relatively peaceful for the French military. As a result, leadership in schools as among the most influential and prestigious that one could attain during this period. Women were active both in the teaching and administration of military schools. In



addition to active duty service members, many women that had been active in the Resistance and in France's military operations in Indochina took on tactics and strategy positions (Sorin, 2004; Prévot, 2010). Women were not just able to join the military, they did so and remained in, while having a meaningful impact.

### ***Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture***

The laws and statutes of the 1970s provided the conditions under which women were able to join the military, and the changing personnel policies throughout the 1980s are reflective of the claims that women made about participation in public life. These claims were strengthened by the visibility of women in leadership roles in Lebanon and Bosnia, their positions in military academies, and their enduring military service. The claims rooted in institutional equality interacted positively with French military culture to help create the permissive environment for women to join and advance in the military, ultimately resulting in their ability to make changes to policy and tactics. Because of the military's de-emphasis on violence and killing, military leaders were able to frame a career in the military as a means of serving the country *as a woman*, focusing on values and a restraint of force. Socially, as women were increasing overall in the workforce, and the role of the working mother being more accepted, military service was framed as a way to be "a role model to France, and a role model to your daughter" (Monrique, 2004, p. 21). The focus on the military as a career coupled with the values emphasis of the military led women to be more open about their identities as both *woman* and *soldier*.

Especially among more senior women, there was a growing comfort in identifying oneself as feminine and capable of being a military professional.<sup>75</sup>

Many of the claims made by women drew from the stories and experiences of women in the Resistance, Indochina, and Peacekeeping missions; and highlighted the strategic and tactical importance of the “feminization of coercive power” (Boulegue, 1991, p. 350) to French military success. Because of the limited opportunities for deployments during the 1970s and 1980s, women strengthened their claims through the experiences of women in previous operations to highlight their importance. Women such as Betty Albrecht, Georgette Gerar, and Madeline Riffaud,<sup>76</sup> key figures in the Resistance were employed to teach French counterinsurgency forces and codify lessons learned from the Resistance into French strategy (Trinquier, 2006). The focus on bringing women in to share their unique experiences and enhance overall military effectiveness is emblematic of what French historian Jean-Charles Jauffret (2013) describes as the “French touch” to military operations that is focused on the humanity and individualism in both its troops and the enemy. The emphasis on the tactical impact of the difference between men and women was well-received by the military culture. Unlike most Western militaries that carried an expectation that women would conform to masculine norms if they were to succeed in the military (Herbert, 1998), women in the French military were

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<sup>75</sup> The interview transcripts from Sorin 2004 (conducted between 1989-2000) reveal a shift ... by the mid 1990s, women frequently define themselves as both “woman” and “soldier” in the same interview, suggesting a shift in cultural, such that being openly a woman was not a detriment to being a soldier.

<sup>76</sup> For narratives of their actions see: Weitz, Margaret Collins (1995) *Sisters In the Resistance: How Women Fought to Free France 1940-1945*. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

expected to use their differences in ways that would benefit the overall strategic objectives.

However, the focus on the difference between men and women did not always result in increased participation by women in the armed services. Military leaders initially used the difference between men and women to constrain the number of women serving in particular units. Included in the equality laws of the 1970s were requirements to provide accommodations for pregnant women and new mothers so that their biological difference would not interfere with their competitiveness in the workplace. The military, as an historically all-male organization did not have the infrastructure to support many women-specific needs. Accommodating women would mean having to build new facilities or retrofit existing ones, a costly proposition. This resulted in restrictions being placed on women's initial entry into the military.

The restrictions drew backlash. From within the military, women asserted that the restrictions on the numbers of their service ran counter to the guarantees for equal opportunity and evaluation promised in the 1972 and 1975 laws. Citing the historical success of women in the Resistance and Indochina, women claimed that it was detrimental to France's well-being to artificially constrain the contribution of women. As Catherine Bertrand, a French Naval officer from 1974-2000 asserted in a statement on the condition of the military and personnel training for the French Army's *Historical Review*:

The Secretary of State, in 1973, remarked that equality between men and women is a Constitutional guarantee. And France very much recognizes the role of women in the military and the appeal that the military has to young girls. Why are they limiting us? Just as the feminist movement is giving space to women's rights at home, we need it to give

way to women's rights in Defense. France may fall again if we do not allow for full equality between men and women in the military (Bertrand 2013, 7-8).

Assertions such as those made by Bertrand resonated with both women and military leadership and resulted in changes to military policy that allowed women to more fully participate.

The impact of women's claims was further strengthened by the decrease in reliance on conscripts. As Cold War politics were more reliant on deterrence and containment and less focused on conventional warfare, the emphasis in recruiting shifted to professional forces, preferencing skills over recruiting more bodies. By the mid-1970s, less than ¼ of the force was comprised of conscripted soldiers (Belmokhtar 1980). Indeed, the focus on recruiting professional soldiers rather than relying on conscripts, coupled with the momentum from the women's movement in encouraging women to pursue employment opportunities resulted in a steady increase of women both joining and remaining in the military as a career (Monrique, 2004). The interaction of the claims made by women and the military culture resulted in a more robust supply of women who not only needed to join the military but wanted to, seeing that their unique contribution was valued and could impact the institution.

In many countries, women expressing discontent with "women's issues" has been used as a reason to discount their service, and used as rational for the claim that women do not belong in the military (Gutmann, 2000; Van Creveld, 2000). However, the emphasis on the specific aspects that women bring to the table was compatible with the French military culture that was focused on cultural evolution and values. France stands

out as exceptional in this case. This is not to say that the French military was exempt from sexism. Like most militaries, women in the French military expressed discontent with cultural issues around sexism and discrimination (Sorin, 2004). However, the fact that their grievances were addressed rather than used to try and push them out, is exemplary of both the acceptance of women's role in the military *as women*, as well as the beliefs rooted in institutional equality that the government has both the ability and obligation to formally address the conditions of inequality to allow women to equally participate and contribute. As the Cold War came to a close, women had not only proven that they were necessary in military actions, but that creating enabling structures that encouraged women's participation was beneficial to national security broadly.

### ***Outcome***

The results women's integration during this first period of global politics were largely seen in changes to military policy. As women joined the military in increased numbers, a process that became known as the "feminization" of the military began (Prévot, 2010; Observatoire de la féminisation, 2006). While important changes were made to military policy, the process was not always smooth for those involved.

Historically, conscription in the military was a cultural signal of the transition to manhood. While women had been participating in military operations since the French Revolution, they had largely done so outside of formal institutional channels. Despite women being essential to tactical and strategic successes, the *institution* of the military had long remained the domain of men, many of whom resisted the formal inclusion of

women into their institution (Ehrenreich, 1999). Indeed, in the early years of all military occupations being open to women, they were attempts to relegate women to gendered roles such as quartermaster, cook, and supply (Observatoire de la féminisation, 2006; Prévot, 2010; Monrique, 2004). However, as women continued to remain in the military and make claims about the benefit of their participation to military operations the “feminization” process took root.

The first outcome of the feminization process was changes to personnel policies. For example, while the 1970s equality legislation addressed child care, and Crèche Care had been established in the 1960s, child care still posed a problem for many women. Despite the legal provisions ensuring care, there was still a sense that women were not respected for their motherhood choices (Boulegue, 1991). As a response, the March 20, 1984 parliamentary record emphasized that “men and women’s equality is necessary for the security of France, and access to child care is part of that equality,” effectively reframing Crèche Care into a national security issue. The proclamation recognized that there is a difference between men and women with regards to their needs around pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare and emphasized that provisions such as “free medical and child care, as well as all necessary nutritional assistance ... [in order to ensure] equal access to all financial, cultural, social, and security aspects of French life”<sup>77</sup> was to be guaranteed.

The Committee to Study the Perspective of Female Service Members (La Commission d’Etude Prospective de la Femme Militaire) was another key outcome

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<sup>77</sup> Journal Officiel de la République Française, 20 Mars 1984, Article 12-16

women's integration during this first period. The Committee was established in 1982 by Minister of Defense Charles Hernu as a formal channel for the growing number of women in the services to voice their concerns and ensure that their needs were met. As noted above, the number of women in the military grew from in the single digits (between 2-4%) to around 10% very quickly (Monrique, 2004). Having a formal channel for communication to political leadership ensure that women were able to voice their concerns and impact structural change. The Committee's recommendations, including opening positions to women, dropping caps on service, and mandating that all facilities are in line with the equality law, are the root of the substantive legal changes that set the initial formal conditions for the second cycle of integration.

The provisions in the 1994 Defense White Paper further highlight the impact that women had on the military. The White Paper is the first written after the end of the Cold War and is primarily focused on how the military would evolve to meet the changing world. Throughout the White Paper, new threats are identified, and holistic strategies proposed to address them. Specifically, it mentions the increased threat of terrorism, religious extremism, instability in the former Soviet States, economic uncertainty in Africa, and propaganda from globalized information flows as the most pressing issues to French security. The White Paper identifies the best way to face these threats as ensuring that all military actions "emphasize the social dimension," and focus on a "preservation of life that is necessary to preserve French interests and the interests of the international order" (Balladur, 1994). Peacekeeping missions also draw particular attention. Drawing heavily from the lessons of Balkans on the importance of having both the capacity to

engage militarily but also the diversity of skills to effectively operate in culturally foreign environment, the White Paper emphasized the importance of effective culturally sensitive peacekeeping in preventing many of the contributors to extremism such as resource degradation, religious antagonism, and the trauma of violence. Peacekeeping forces had to be capable of militarily enforcing the peace when necessary, while also ensuring long-term conditions for peace were not disrupted (Lanxade, 1995). Drawing from the lessons learned in Lebanon and Bosnia, women were an essential component in ensuring that the cultural dimensions of peacekeeping were respected.

These lessons are echoed in the twin emphasis on military capability and cultural sensitivity. Particularly in France's role in establishing humanitarian corridors during the mission in Bosnia, the ability to transition seamlessly from traditional combat activities to social engagement was highlighted (Woodhouse & Ramsbotham, 2005). Women were an essential part of this. With combat roles now open, there were infantry-trained women that were able to both effectively engage militarily and serve as important liaisons in society.

The dedication to restraining the use of violence and the emphasis on the post-conflict environment was indicative of a permissive environment for women to continue to join the military in meaningful ways. This was not only the case in the peacekeeping environment, but also with regards to France's participation in more conventional wars. During the Gulf War, French generals credited the women in their units as a "positive force for restraining force," and making France a "model military" in living up to its stated values (Monrique, 2004, p. 19). The role of women in the French military was



impactful. Foreign observers remarked that France's emphasis on incorporating women into their tactical and strategic plans was their way of differentiating themselves from other Western militaries (Riding, 1991). Indeed, throughout the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s women's impact was not only noticed but incorporated into the conduct of military operations, furthering the feminization of the military.

## **Era 2: Post-Cold War**

### **Professional Feminization into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

As the Cold War came to an end, not only did the French military continue to refine its doctrine with regards to the promotion of values and restraint on violent action, but it made a move towards full professionalization. The decision to end conscription in 1996 and transition to an all-volunteer force was primarily made out of forces structure requirements. The length of conscription had decreased to only 10 months, resulting in conscripts being viewed primarily as unskilled labor used to perform menial tasks. Further, the military was primarily composed of professional service members rather than conscripts (over 87% professional), alleviating concerns about being able to fill the ranks with volunteers (Boene and Martin, 2000). Substantively, the move to professionalism was largely symbolic, as the reframing of the role of the military in the 1980s and 90s had made it an attractive career field for men and women alike (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2000). The professionalization of the military, while not intentionally aimed at women's integration, created space for women to further influence the military. In this section I

show how professionalization and France's response to the post-Cold War changes in global politics resulted in further integration of women into the French military.

### ***Legal and Structural Provisions***

By the end of the Cold War, there had been many improvements to the legal and structural provisions that made it more accommodating for women to join the military.

Table 4.6 highlights these.

**Table 4.6: Summary of Structural Provisions during the Second Era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Barriers to Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- No Barriers</li><li>- End of Conscription</li></ul>
Childcare / Parental Leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Expansion of Maternity Leave for Military</li><li>- Special provisions for dual military couples</li></ul>
Sexual Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Themis Cell "toolkit" on prevention</li></ul>

The most profound structural change was the end of conscription, resulting in the full professionalization of the military. The decision to end conscription was made in 1996, with the timeline to phase it out by 2001.<sup>78</sup> Though by 1996 the overwhelming majority of forces were professionals, the ending of conscription had an important cultural impact for both the military and the country as a whole. Despite women's increased participation in the military throughout the 1970s – 1990s, the continuation of the policy of male conscription allowed for a masculinized nationality to endure. Even

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<sup>78</sup> 2001 was the first year in which there were no conscripts in the military.

though conscripts were a very small minority of those serving, the gendered nature of conscription could be used to undermine women's contributions. Military was still often seen as the passage to manhood. Though there were mechanisms for women to address their grievances and the injustices that they faced, such as the Committee to Study the Perspective of Female Service Members, cultural discrimination still existed with regards to the role of men and women. The end of conscription was one of the final hurdles to effectively overcoming gendered discrimination (Sorin, 2003).

Concurrent with professionalization, the French military drastically reduced its size, cutting personnel by nearly 40%.<sup>79</sup> French officials wanted to send a message that the military was going to be focused on professionalism and recruiting the best qualified individuals, not just having a large standing army, in order to ensure that the transition away from conscription was a success (Boene & Martin, 2000).

There were also structural changes made that specifically impacted women. In 2000 maternity policies were overhauled. Mothers were given 16 weeks for their first child and 26 weeks subsequent children, and 156 weeks of "flexible" time in which they could take additional leave as necessary to fulfill maternal duties (NATO, 2016). Women in the military were afforded 3-4 weeks more leave than their civilian counterparts in order to address the physical and emotional aspects of motherhood more effectively.

The military also took direct measures to address sexual harassment and assault. Though still prosecuted under civilian law, the Themis Cell developed a sexual harassment "prevention kit" during the transition to the all-volunteer force. Part of the

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<sup>79</sup> In the 1990s, force strength was around 500,000. By 2012 it was 300,000. (Source: World Bank Data)

professionalization of the services was focused on troops not only being models of values of equality to the international community, but among their brothers and sisters in arms (NATO, 2013). Additionally, the Themis Cell worked to coordinate legal representation for service members that had been harassed or assaulted, and ensured that all the proper administrative work was done so that service members could continue to receive their pay and benefits while going through the legal process (NATO, 2014).

Policy and structural changes that France made in response to the passage of UN Resolution 1325 also influenced the military. As France set out to create its National Action Plan (NAP) it focused on the goal of becoming a leader in combatting the cross-cutting impact that conflict has on women.<sup>80</sup> Elevating women into combat leadership positions was seen as essential for ensuring France's credibility in their commitment to peace in post-conflict societies (NAP, 2010). Additionally, gender advisors were incorporated into the military specifically to ensure that operations were planned and executed with the multi-level considerations of gender taken into account. Not only were French Gender advisors used in support of French operations, but also deployed in support of NATO allies (NATO, 2016).

### ***Functional Participation***

In the years post-Cold War, women's participation in the military continued to expand. Women also continued to have longevity in the military, choosing to make it a career. Table 4.7 highlights the functional participation of women in the military.

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<sup>80</sup> When France had the presidency of the European Union this language was also used in the EU's security policy language.

Professionalization positively impacted the total percentage of women in the military, as conscripted forces no longer diluted the gender balance. Yet not only did the total proportion of women increase, but women also continued to increase their presence in operationally deployed forces and in leadership roles.

**Table 4.7: Summary of Functional Participation during the Second Era of Women’s Participation**

Component	Measure
Level of Participation	- 15% total force
Type of Participation	- 5.5% of combat arms - Concentrated in Naval and Expeditionary Forces
Overseas Participation	- 7-10% of deployed forces

At the end of the Cold War, France reasserted its focus on collective security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Conventional military operations and nuclear deterrence took a further back seat to actions designed to promote international peace and stability. The 1994 Defense White Paper focused on a need to promote democracy around the world. This was again affirmed in the 2012 White Paper which also noted that national security issues often begin far from France’s boarder. The role of women in the military was largely a result of the focus on expeditionary human security, peace-promoting and goodwill training missions that may prevent some of the causes of conflict. Coined by President Chirac, France committed itself to becoming experts at “Chapter VI-1/2 Missions,”<sup>81</sup> as they fit with both the value base of the country and the training and force structure abilities of the military.

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<sup>81</sup> Missions that straddle the UN Charter’s Chapter VI (Peace Keeping) and Chapter VI (Peace Enforcement) missions.

In response to both the military downsizing and the emphasis on values-based deployments, when the end of conscription was announced, a 50,000-person strong expeditionary unit was formed that could sustain itself for at least 1 year in overseas operations. The purpose of the unit was to be “on patrol” around the world for crises response and humanitarian intervention. President Chirac hoped that this force would help to establish France as a leader in promoting stability and security (Isnard, 1996). To compensate for downsizing the military while having a more expeditionary focus, France offloaded immediate territorial defense issues to the European Defense Community. Though a Western nuclear power, France decided to downplay its conventional forces and focus on strengthening its role in peacekeeping and human security.

During the transition from conscription to the AVF and the downsizing of the force, the military engaged in a process of direct recruitment for NCOs in order to fill leadership roles in technically-demanding fields. In order to fulfill the expeditionary mission the military needed not just bodies to fill ranks, but highly skilled and educated leaders. Notably, a significant portion of the French direct recruits were women. Table 4.8 highlights the number of women in such positions.

**Table 4.8: Percentage of Women NCO Direct Recruitment Candidates 1999**

	Army	Air Force	Navy	Gendarmerie
% Candidates	36	43	39	21

Source: (Sorin, Women in the French Forces: Integration versus Conflict 2004)

The relatively high proportion of women who were eligible for the “line jumping” into leadership as a result of the direct recruitment program is indicative of the belief that women played an essential and important role in military leadership. Because direct

recruits were not part of the military system at the time of their recruitment, they were not socialized into military culture. Indeed, the women brought in as NCOs were put in command of junior troops strengthened the beliefs begun in the previous decades that women had leadership value that was distinct from men. Women were not expected to conform to men's image, but to lead in ways that they saw as effective and efficient.

Not only did women join in leadership roles, and take on new operational responsibilities, but they remained in the military. While the direct-recruitment of NCOs skew the numbers of NCOs as a measure of the longevity of service, at nearly every point in the military career there was a positive retention rate of women when compared to men. From 1995-2015, there was an average retention rate of 6.15%, meaning that the military retained 6.15% more women than men (NATO, 2016). In response to the needs of post-Cold War global politics, women were stepping up to serve their country.

### ***Claims About Women's Service and Interaction with Military Culture***

Claims about women's service were strengthened by the focus on humanitarian security and peacekeeping throughout the post-Cold War era. This focus also changed the way that leadership was viewed and rewarded. While military might was favored in the colonial wars, in the years that followed, political-military restraint surrounding the use of force became increasingly valued. This can be seen in France's decision to differentiate themselves from the United States' response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Feeling that the United States was too eager to engage in kinetic operations, France agreed to align with the multi-national force only under the condition

that it could maintain a distinct military presence to act as a “friend to all Lebanese factions” (Wood, 1998). Indeed, a positive emphasis on “soldier-diplomats” emerged by the 1990s (Coulon, 1998). Throughout the years following the end of the Cold War, officers’ education was extended, and thoughtful response to crisis was preferred over brute force.<sup>82</sup>

The focus on education and restraint of violent force provided an opening for women to re-engage with claims about their service as a woman. Given the emphasis on the difference between men and women by the women’s movement, women were able to capitalize on qualities typically associated with the feminine. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the French feminist movement emphasized that society had largely been responsible for the difference between men and women. In addition to being used as leverage to lobby for policies that specifically addressed women’s issues, these differences were used to highlight the importance of women’s military service. In 1998, the first women were successful in completing commando training and serving in a previously all-male commando unit. Much like the women of The Resistance used their femininity to gather intelligence and conduct raids against Nazi and Vichy officers, female commandos used the perception of their femininity to move in spaces that were traditionally and typically closed to their male commando counterparts (Monrique 2004).

Women’s integration into previously all-male units coupled with the overall move towards professionalization continued the process of feminization of the French military.

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<sup>82</sup> In the 1990s, the requirements at *Ecole d’etat-major* ( the senior officers’ academies) was expanded to include course in language, culture, negotiation, civilian protection, and natural resource management in addition to traditional tactics (Archived at [www.defense.gouv.fr](http://www.defense.gouv.fr))



By 2000, France had instituted gender-training in all of its units (Sorin, 2004).

Additionally, gender became part of the focus of career management. As the force professionalized, there was a conscious effort to ensure that women's service continued to be valued. While there was an overall move to increase the number of women, it was coupled with ensuring that the women recruited would stay in service. Military schools specifically focused on targeting high-achieving women in order to ensure that there was a large talent pool of leaders to choose from. Incoming academy classes averaged between 17-20% female enrolment (NATO, 2016). In the 2000 report to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, a French official noted that "professional gender equality will increase feminization, and emphasize the importance of women's role in the armed forces" (NATO, 2000). The continued overall stability of the post-Cold War years allowed France to continue to emphasize their role in perpetuating values and norms. Indeed, a mission set that allowed women to participate as women ultimately also helped recruiting and retention efforts. Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, France scaled back its direct recruiting of women into NCO position. However, the number of women in both the military at large, and in leadership positions in particular, continued to grow (Schjølset, 2010). Rather than explicitly targeting women, recruitment was focused on mission set and mission type in such a way that it emphasized that the contributions of all French citizens were necessary to meet the challenges of the changing world. Appealing to differences (though not explicitly targeting women) is reflective of the claims rooted in institutional equality. Just as women's movements focused on the notion

that France was stronger when all citizens participated in cultural, economic, and political life, the military appealed to the value of difference.

### ***Outcome***

By the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the French military was a fully professional force that was experiencing a high level of integration. The discussions leading up to the adoption of the French National Action Plane highlight the role that women played in shaping French attitudes and high-level policy. French military women were included in the drafting process, and the result was a document that had both the role of women in managing and mitigating conflict and cultural sensitivity (especially to former French colonies) as priority areas in the plan (Miller, Pournik & Swaine, 2014). When the Plan was adopted, money was set aside for French military women to hold gender-based training in French-speaking countries and former colonies.

On a tactical level, women were directly engaged in responding to the new challenges of the post-Cold War global political environment. Ground combat units were intentionally loaded with more women than would be otherwise the case in order to meet the cultural challenges that arose in the post-Cold War world. For example, in Kosovo women were essential to ensuring protection of humanitarian evacuations and provisions. French infantry soldiers – trained to engage in the combat that they would see – were deployed to ensure the safe evacuation civilians. Their gender helped to calm the Kosovars and build a rapport that was important for creating a long-term relationship between France and Kosovo (Koeth, 2010).

Though the full extent of women's integration in the professional military remains to be seen, there is evidence, especially in the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> actions in Afghanistan, that French women are in essential component of the French military.

### **Era 3: Post-9/11 in Afghanistan**

#### **Putting Feminization to the Test**

The 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban would be the first real test of feminization in an offensive military operation. Throughout the 1990s, while the military had remained active, it had been in support of peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance. Combat engagements were thus primarily defensive in nature. Engaging in direct and deliberate offensive combat is something that had not been done since the feminization of the armed forces took place. Indeed, offensive combat could still be considered the province of men, or at least untested and unproved as women's work in any operational way.

The peacekeeping focus of the 1990s prepared France for parts of its role in Afghanistan, but left it woefully unprepared for others. Indeed, much France's initial contribution to the US-led operations in Afghanistan were intelligence-gathering foot patrols in and around Kabul. The nearly 4000 troops in country in the early years of the war conducted themselves similarly to how peacekeeping troops patrolled in Africa and Bosnia.<sup>83</sup> However, in 2008, when President Sarkozy agreed to increase France's contribution to the coalition forces, they learned quickly that peacekeeping skills were

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<sup>83</sup> France's initial contribution was limited to light infantry and air power.

not directly related to offensive combat. France was assigned to the Kapisa province in the Tagrib Valley. Unlike many European countries that ran support for American infantry groups, the French forces took operational control of the province with their infantry units as the main focus of effort. Their first efforts at offensively-focused infantry actions were met with disaster. On 19 August 2008, 10 French forces were killed and 21 wounded, the most significant casualties for French forces since the Drakkar building attack in Lebanon in 1983.

In response to the loss of life, the French revamped their fighting style both doctrinally and technologically.<sup>84</sup> Doctrinally they combined their intelligence (or “human terrain”) and combat forces, integrating the gendered nature of peacekeeping intelligence with traditional combat tactics. Because of the integration of women into commando forces that had taking place in the 1990s, the gendered assets necessary for intelligence gathering were organic to the units stationed there. Indeed, violence was often inevitable in the operations in Afghanistan. However, the integrated gendered-intelligence worked to mitigate casualties on both the French and Afghan side (Foust, 2012).

The best practices from Afghanistan – primarily the use of expeditionary forces and a gendered perspective to intelligence – were codified and implemented in 2013 missions in Mali and the Central African Republic. One of the most important lessons learned was in the importance of fully integrated combat and human terrain teams.

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<sup>84</sup> Interview transcript with Colonel Aragon, French commander in the Tagrib Valley, that describes these changes available at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afghanistan/actualites/12-03-09-afghanistan-6-mois-en-kapisa-interview-du-colonel-aragones>

Because of the gendered nature of COIN operations, women are essential parts of human terrain teams. As learned in Afghanistan, such teams were best composed of individuals who had been parts of commando units from their initial training, rather than attached at a later date (Shurkin, 2014). As Shurkin (2014) notes, without the success of integrated commando teams capable of simultaneous and seamless intelligence and combat operations, France would not have been able to develop the expeditionary doctrine practiced in later interventions.

France's role in Afghanistan, and their subsequent missions in Mali, highlighted that there is a role for women to be in modern militaries as women. Indeed, units integrated from day one, and intentionally composed of women in human terrain and intelligence teams, proved to be an asset for the French military. As noted in Chapter 1, the composition of these units were so successful that President Macron has called for specific recruitment of women to meet the challenges of ISIS and homegrown terrorist attacks.

Today, France's military is entering into another process of change. Though the military is considered at a high level of integration comparatively, there are still problems, especially with issues of sexual harassment and cultural isolation of its women soldiers. Though instances of workplace sexual harassment and assault have declined drastically in the French military, there historically have not been mechanisms for military commanders to address issues that occur outside working hours. This has hit women in the military especially hard, as they are often living with their male counterparts and the lines between work and social situations are frequently blurred.

Marlene Schiappa, the French Minister for Gender Equality, is working to eradicate sexual harassment through wide sweeping social reforms to the penal code.<sup>85</sup> She's working closely with the Themis Cell, and other the Ministry of Defense units that have developed innovative techniques at combatting workplace discrimination. Though the military is not the specific target of her actions, any measures passed will benefit the military and continue to make a permissive environment for women.

Women are also continuing to prove essential and innovative in the national security arena in France. In the years since France's initial entry into Afghanistan, they have introduced gender advisors to their ranks to ensure that a gendered perspective is taking into account when planning and executing missions on both the strategic and tactical level. 30,000 of France's slightly over 200,000 troops are currently deployed in support of international COIN operations. Nearly 7% of the forces deployed in these COIN operations are women, with the majority of them being concentrated in the officer ranks (NATO, 2014-2016). Notably, women are both proving strategically important in these operations, and those who participate are more likely to remain in the military beyond their initial obligation than those who do not deploy (Bigio, 2017). As a result, the women currently serving in operational leadership positions have the potential to further impact the future of French military operations.

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<sup>85</sup> Interview with Marlene Schiappa available at: <http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/08/26/545297078/frances-gender-equality-minister-wants-on-the-spot-fines-for-sexual-harassers>

**CHAPTER 5:**  
**Norway**  
**Making Soldiers and Citizens**

Norway was an early leader in gender integration, with claims rooted in citizenship equality being consistent with the internally focused values based identity of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Indeed, as long as women claimed their sameness to their male counterparts, a permissive environment for integration existed. Further, the types of missions that the Norwegian military tended to participate in reinforced the benefits of a gender neutral egalitarian force.

However, the benefits of gender-neutrality were put to the test with Norway's participation in ISAF operations in Afghanistan. Within ISAF Norway was seen as progressive due to Colonel Ingrid Gjerde's command of all Norwegian forces, as she was the first female infantry commander of that level. Indeed, by many countries, she was hailed as a model of success and evidence of gender-integration.<sup>86</sup> However, despite the overall commitment from ISAF to gender being an essential part of the mission in Afghanistan, Col Gjerde was chosen by the Norwegians for her success as an infantry officer, not her gender. Though Norway maintained a gender-neutral assignment policy

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<sup>86</sup> See footage at: <https://www.csis.org/events/women-combat-arms-conversation-colonel-ingrid-gjerde>

For their units, operations in Afghanistan were such that women became important not only for their skills as soldiers but for their gender. Even more so than in peacekeeping missions, women provided an essential function in counterinsurgency and village stability operations. From gathering intelligence to training security forces and politicians, Norwegian women were essential to mission effectiveness. Special operations, in particular realized the need for women's unique contributions. "In Afghanistan, one of our big challenges was that we would enter houses and not be able to speak to the women. In urban warfare, you have to be able to interact with women as well. Adding female soldiers was an operational need."<sup>87</sup>

The need for women to both perform their military duties and retain some of their gendered characteristics created a tension between claims about women's service and military culture. As a result, women's integration has stalled, with women having less of an impact on the military in the years since counterinsurgency operations have taken center stage in global politics. To address these challenges, the Norwegian military is restructuring and attempting to make space for the new roles that women are needed to serve.

### **Norway: Moderate Level of Integration**

The claims rooted in citizenship equality are largely responsible for the moderate level of women's integration in the Norwegian military. This is seen in both the nature of

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<sup>87</sup> Capt Ole Vidar Krogsaeter, Norwegian Special Operations Officer, Afghanistan



the laws and policies that have been implemented with regards to women's access to and participation in military, and the operational practices of the armed forces. Consistent with the beliefs about citizenship equality highlighted in Chapter 2, military policy and practice largely downplayed the difference between men and women. From universal conscription to gender-neutral berthing, the military has become more inclusive of the Norwegian citizenry, while remaining the institution for creating model citizens. Indeed, women's integration has been approached in a de-gendered manner, with both men and women expected to converge around the norms and practice of "Norwegianness" that has historically shaped the citizen-soldier. However, in recent years, the approach to gender integration has begun to shift, as gender differences are becoming more important in the changing international security landscape.

The result of Norway's de-gendered approach is a moderate level of integration. Norway was a pioneer in gender equality in the military. However, after initial successes in integration, the impact that women had on the military stalled. Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, women in the military were largely seen as symbolic of citizenship status rather than a substantive force. Women were seen as serving in the military to be Norwegians, rather than for a specific strategic purpose. However, experiences in Afghanistan have resulted in Norway pivoting away from gender neutrality in order to leverage women in counterinsurgency operations. The inward and value orientation of the military culture was in tension with these new claims, making it hard for women to have an impact quickly. However, there are indications that the military is becoming more receptive to gendered claims.

Table 5.1 highlights the current measures of the various components of integration in the Norwegian military.

**Table 5.1 Current Measures of Women's Integration into the Norwegian Military**

Measure	Value
Legal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No restrictions on women's functional or geographic service.</li> <li>- No preference given to women for infantry service</li> <li>- 6 weeks Maternity / 10 weeks paternity leave</li> <li>- 49 weeks of parental leave 100% paid; 59 weeks at 80% pay</li> <li>- National childcare and early education programs</li> <li>- Mixed-gender training as sexual harassment mitigation</li> </ul>
Functional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 9.5% of military force</li> <li>- 3.5% in ground combat force</li> <li>- 16% in international operational forces*</li> </ul>
Durability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2% retention rate</li> <li>- 2% of flag officers</li> <li>- 12% of senior officers</li> <li>- 36% of Noncommissioned Officer</li> </ul>
Institutional Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women's inclusion in conscription</li> <li>- Establishment of Hunter Troop</li> </ul>

\*Includes Northern border guard units that receive a hazardous duty designation

Norway's components of integration are themselves representative of a moderate level of integration. However, it is the way in which they interact that highlight that women have had a limited amount of change on the military that is the focus of this chapter. The foundational belief that men and women are the same as citizens has guided the process of integration of women into the Norwegian military. The laws and policies that begun the process of integration have shaped it as a gender neutral. From the military giving more time for paternity leave to mixed gender training and berthing in the border units, the Norwegian military has downplayed gender as an aspect of its tactical or

strategic initiatives. This has given women room to succeed on their merits and achievements, with little questioning of the suitability for women in the military in general or combat roles in particular.

In this chapter I show how the core tenants of citizenship equality, and the claims made by women's movements about women's role in public life influenced the process of integration, by engaging with the Norwegian defense culture of citizen-building before militarism. I begin by discussing the Norwegian military culture. Next, I highlight how the claims made about women's participation in the military have unfolded over the three eras of global political change noted in Chapter 1. In the first, the 1984 decision to include women into all aspects of the professional force was a defining feature. In the second, debates around universal conscription for all Norwegian citizens (including women) took center stage. In both of these eras, gender neutrality coincided with military culture to allow for women's continued gender integration. However, in the third, gender integration stalled, because of the change in the claims made about women's service. In the aftermath of actions in Afghanistan, gender-focused units, epitomized with the creation of the Hunter Troop, the all-women special operations unit, have been developed. While there has been success with the Hunter Troop, the claims about women's service continued to be in tension with military culture.

### **Norwegian Military Tradition: Citizen before Warrior**

Though a war fighting organization first and foremost, the Norwegian armed forces are highly regarded as "an important contributor to the formation of common

national values” (Friis, 2000, p. 119). In addition to fighting wars, the armed forces have been at the forefront of creating a uniquely Norwegian identity. Given Norway’s relatively late independence, the military was a way to accelerate and codify a new identity, giving the citizens of Norway a way to both craft a common identity, and an institution through which Norwegian values would be transmitted to young citizens. As Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute Historian Stale Ulriksen notes,

The Norwegian Defense Tradition is not the aggregation of the experiences had by the Norwegian armed forces in war. Rather, it is a result of a series of more or less conscious choices about the historical aspects of nationalism worth celebrating, and a gradual institutionalization of these choices. The Defense Tradition is in part a result of the historical experiences different actors have been concerned about, or have chosen to emphasize, coupled with the needs of identity in a new nation, and beliefs about how best to represent that identity.

It has been created for a purpose. Not necessarily by one person, or a particular group of persons, but through a national debate or general public discourse. It has been honed and adapted to national trends in times when important policy choices have been taken and when the central political ideas of what “Norway” would be were formulated. (Ulriksen, 2002, pp. 25-26)

While military victory certainly is an aim of the Norwegian armed forces, military victory is not its primary purpose in society. Rather, it is a socializing vessel, focused on promoting values to a domestic audience and creating a distinctly Norwegian cultural tradition shared by all citizens.

In order to differentiate themselves from their previous colonizers (Denmark and Sweden), a belief about “ideal Norwegian” was created. Coastal Norway was seen to be heavily influenced by its contact with other cultures and traditions. Therefore, the

Norwegian mountain farmer was seen as “exemplary, or at least ideal, because he was a *true* Norwegian” (Tordsson, 2003, p. 97). Survival skills in the harsh winters became synonymous with the ideal citizen, and exploration, especially of previously unexplored arctic or polar regions, became an essential function of the armed forces in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century (For histories of Norwegian soldier-explorers see: Christensen, 1993; Pedersen, 1997). Despite its long coastline, the naval tradition in Norway has been greatly downplayed. Rather, it was the soldier on skis, with his ability to cope with rough terrain and harsh climates, that personified the pride of Norway to its citizens (Rones, 2015).

In the early years of Norwegian independence, military conscription became a way for young male citizens to be socialized into the Norwegian ideal. The purpose of conscription in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century was character-building through introduction to the uncivilized and harsh wilderness that was seen to be the “true Norway” (Woodward & Duncanson, 2017). While other Western nations were engaged in identifying their militaries through weaponry and tactical innovation, Norway focused on those things that were the most Norwegian. Indeed, the military was more a tool of nation building and identity conformation than offensive, or even defensive, violence.

In the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> and into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Norway became a more prominent military power on the international stage. Officially neutral during World War I, and occupied by Nazi forces during World War II, Norway had been able to keep its military insular and focused on national identity rather than force projection for the first several decades of independence. However, at the onset of the Cold War, its membership in NATO and strategic geopolitical position with regards to Russia, made it a valuable

ally of the United States. Yet even with this growth of prominence, military policy was kept as soft as possible. While troops from NATO allies regularly trained in Norway, and the country was a physical defense against potential Russian advances, Norway was reluctant to engage in an arms race or physical force projection (Riste, 2001). Rather, Norway largely viewed its military as an activist institution, promoting its foundational beliefs about equality beyond Europe. The self-identification of the military's role is best captured by former Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godel: "The Norwegian society's deep respect for humanitarian values has made the promotion of Human Rights a cornerstone of all our policy. This is of special importance to our military policy, where it combines idealism and self-interest."<sup>88</sup>

In the post-Cold War years, the Norwegian military became more involved in using kinetic action, rather than rhetoric, to promote its values. In Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, human rights were promoted through military action. As Thune and Ulriksen (2002, p. 15) note, Norwegian officials justified their increased deployment of troops through a belief that "'hard security had moved into 'soft fields, and therefore 'hard' means were necessary to reach 'soft' goals." Participation and leadership in international military operation was seen as an extension of building a national identity. As discussed in Chapter 2 egalitarianism human rights were a cornerstone of national identity on which Norwegians focused to differentiate themselves from their Scandinavian neighbors. Military action specifically in support of such goals thus strengthened the unique

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<sup>88</sup> Speech to Parliament 1996

Norwegian commitment to egalitarianism and continued to promote a unique Norwegian identity.

Even as Norway has increased its military participation abroad, rather than counting military success as a matter of conquests, enemy body counts, or even thwarted foreign invasions, it is measured by the ability to spread values of egalitarianism and secure human rights (Thune & Ulriksen, 2002; Woodward & Duncanson, 2017). A modern example of this can be seen in a 2008 public media debate about the way that Norwegian snipers were greeted upon their return from Afghanistan. Criticisms from the American media that the Norwegian people did not greet the returning soldiers with a “heroes’ welcome,” were met from a response by the Minister of Defense that Norway did not have a warrior culture built on killing, and should not strive for one (Matlary, 2008).

The Norwegian military culture is one of citizen-building first, war-making second. Against this backdrop, women in Norway were able to make claims that put the Norwegian military on a trajectory of being one of the earliest adopters of codified gender equality. Indeed, the focus on citizenship rather than violence, provided women with an opening for the military, and lessened many of the typical military cultural barriers to entry driven by hegemonic masculinity. Within the Norwegian military tradition, women have been viewed as essentially equal to their male counterparts, as citizens first (Gustavsen, 2013). In the sections that follow, I show how this was to women’s advantage early on, but has come into tension with claims made as global politics increasingly required the military to engage in gendered activities.

## **Era 1: The final years of the Cold War: Citizen Claims for Full Inclusion in the Professional Armed Forces (1970-1992)**

The process of full integration of women into the Norwegian military began in the 1970s with the passage of the Equal Status Act (ESA). During the waning years of the Cold War, the professional forces were opened to women as a result of the ESA, though there were restrictions on service. In 1984, all restrictions were lifted on women's service. In the 1970s Norway was on the forefront of gender equality and military integration. As a result, women had a substantial impact on the military during the early years of integration. In the years following the laws dropping any restriction for women in the military, the percentage of women in the military jumped from 3.2% in 1980 to upwards of 8% by 1990. By 1986, over 6% of Norway's contribution to the UN Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were women, including the highest ranking officer in UN's dispersed peacekeeping operations (Karamé, 2001). The emphasis on peacekeeping and values promotion within NATO suited Norway's military culture, and a conducive environment for women's integration existed.

### ***Structural Provisions***

The Equal Status Act (1978) was the landmark legislation of women's equality in Norway. Beyond just guaranteeing equal economic and political rights, the law was centered around creating a more egalitarian society. The armed forces, however, were partially excluded from immediate full compliance with the act until 1984 when all



occupational specialties were open to women. Yet the areas of the act that did impact the military were important in initiating military integration.

**Table 5.2: Summary of Structural Provisions during the First Era of Women's Participation**

Component	Measure
Barriers to Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Access to professional military</li> <li>- Ground combat opened 1984</li> <li>- Not conscripted</li> </ul>
Childcare / Parental Leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Childcare under 1975 Law (all children up to age 6 regardless of parent's economic status)</li> <li>- Parental leave under Equal Status Act (42/52 weeks and access to job + expected benefits when return)</li> </ul>
Sexual Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Outlawed under Equal Status Law, but no specific NorAF policies</li> </ul>

Table 5.2 summarizes the structural provisions that contributed to women's integration in Norway's during this first period. The Equal Status Act allowed for the formal participation of women in the professional forces. The shape of global politics during the end of the Cold War resulted in a shift in emphasis from conscripted troops to professional soldiers that allowed for women to be elevated in status as a result of their military participation.

The Equal Status Act was instrumental in solidifying a strong professional military. After World War II, the military focused on creating a military comprised of "robust, conscripted, and dedicated citizen-soldiers" (The Norwegian Armed Forces Museum, 2015), save for a small professional officer corps. After the devastating occupation during World War II,<sup>89</sup> Norway realized that isolation and neutrality would

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<sup>89</sup> It is estimated that over 11,000 Norwegians lost their lives during the liberation alone.

not save them and sought out alliances with stronger countries. Norway's geostrategic position vis a vis Russia made it a valuable ally to the United States in the early years of the Cold War. While defense policy remained focused more on soft projections of power, the Norwegian military began to organize itself more like the United States, with an emphasis on infantry soldiers, in order to keep in its favor (Bitzinger, 1989). The heavy focus on conscription (to quickly build up a force) and infantry (a traditionally masculine military role) was seen as necessary to ensure favorable standing within NATO (Græger, 2005). This twin focus, while helping to solidify the position of the military also essentially excluded women, as they were still not part of conscription nor the infantry. While this focus was necessary to gain standing with the United States, the military still put a premium on the traditional Norwegian "cultural skills" such as skiing and winter survival. Though having to adjust some of its practices to conform to the stronger allies, the military retained its cultural focus on traditional aspects of Norwegianness.

The Equal Status Act led to a shift in the Norwegian military's personnel composition, with a pivot from conscripts to professional soldiers. In order to give women equal status, it was necessary to increase the professional ranks in both size and prominence.<sup>90</sup> As a government department, the Ministry of Defense was subject to the rules around gender parity in appointed government committees.<sup>91</sup> This meant that on the

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<sup>90</sup> While the Equal Status Act allowed for the NorAF to be partially exempt, as a government ministry it had to comply in ensuring women "equal pay and access to promotion" in the ministry. Therefore professional access to everything but infantry was opened.

<sup>91</sup> Per the Equal Status Act: Any government committee that has 2-3 members must have both genders represented; 4-6 members must have at least 2 people from each gender; 6-8 members must have at least 3 people from each gender; 9 members must have at least 4 people from each gender; 10 or more must have at least 40% from each gender.

civilian side, women were very active in the Ministry of Defense. Not only are women active in lower level committee positions, but since the passage of the Equal Status Act, six women have ascended to the position of Minister of Defense. Women in both lower level and leadership positions within the Ministry helped to ease the transition from a conscript army of men to a more professional force that practiced gender parity, as military leadership already had experience working with women. Indeed, their presence in matters of security and defense was not seen as out of place.

As a result of the Equal Status Act, the military began to emphasize professionalism in order to provide more opportunities for women to both participate in military activities and advance into leadership positions. However, the ESA also recognized that the functional role of the military was unique and made provisions for the “King [to] issue regulations providing that the service of women in the Norwegian Armed Forces shall fall partly outside the scope of this Act.”<sup>92</sup> In practice this meant that while women were ensured the professional benefits of military service in the same way as their male counterparts, there were restrictions to the roles that they could hold. At the passage of the act, the King prohibited women from serving in direct ground combat roles.

However, his decision did not go unchallenged. The decision to put restrictions on women’s service resulted in discontent and pressure from the *sorting* to drop the restrictions. The 1984 “Military Occupational Equality for Men and Women” act gave men and women the same opportunities in the volunteer professional Norwegian armed

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<sup>92</sup> Text of the Act Relating to Gender Equality and Equal Status Act accessible at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-act-relating-to-gender-equality-the-/id454568/>

forces. Legally, this decision brought the military into full compliance with the equal status act, and therefore in line with the rest of Norwegian society in both the private and public sphere. The dropping of gender-based restrictions on combat occupations and postings meant that citizenship-producing and reinforcing mechanisms were now open to both genders equally and that the military could, in theory at least, no longer be considered a masculine enterprise (Værnø & Sveri, 1990). From the time of the passage of the act there was an emphasis on purposefully growing the number of women in the military in order to practically realize the theoretical equality. In particular there was an effort to mirror the success of the civilian government to attract and retain women. The Norwegian government has historically been the largest employer of women in the country (Steder, 2014). This is indicative of the foundational beliefs about citizenship equality. Women benefited greatly from the Norwegian government, and in return, they often worked as public servants. As highlighted in Chapter 2, part of the argument used by the Norwegian women's movement to gain expanded economic and political benefits was that being engaged public citizens was an obligation as members of the welfare state.

Though women were allowed to serve in all roles in the professional military, there was a disparity in service obligation. Conscription was a requirement for men, but not for women. The Equal Status Act only extended to access to the *professional* armed forces, and excluded women from conscripted roles. While the Act resulted in a shift of focus from conscription to professionalization, roughly 10-20% of the military remained filled by conscripts.<sup>93</sup> Women's entry into the professional ranks, and their exclusion

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<sup>93</sup> Norway MOD records

from ground combat, meant that more and more conscripts were used to fill infantry ranks, and professional soldering focused on logistics, intelligence, and transport roles in order to show competitiveness between men and women.

Members of the military, as the rest of society, were able to take advantage of the Act's guarantees around parental leave. In addition to a generous leave allowance (52 weeks at 80% pay or 42 weeks at 100% pay) and mandated maternity and paternity leave periods, parents were assured not only a return to their position, but accommodation for any "improvements in their working conditions or time-based promotions they could have reasonably entitled to during their absence."<sup>94</sup> The provisions of the act thus removed a great deal of both social stigma and professional hardship that may be associated with parenthood.

### ***Functional Participation***

The initial entry of women into the military in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was not in large numbers. By 1980, only 3.2% of the Norwegian military was women. However, after all occupational specialties were open to women, their numbers increased, reaching 9% by the mid-1990ss. Despite their relatively small numbers, they proved an essential part to Norway's military operations.

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<sup>94</sup> Text of Acts available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-act-relating-to-gender-equality-the-/id454568/>

**Table 5.3: Summary of Functional Participation during the First Era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Level of Participation	- 3.2% - 9% of the total force
Type of Participation	- Primary fields: Medical and Logistics - When infantry opened to women, proportional representation to the medical and logistic fields
Overseas Participation	- 5-6% (nearly identical to domestic breakdown)

Table 5.3 highlights the components of functional participation during this period. While limited in number, they were not relegated to domestic and non-deployable jobs. Additionally, their active role in UNIFIL would prove to be important for their claims for dropping any restrictions on their service

Unlike many countries that kept women in domestic administrative roles (NATO, 2000-2016), Norway set women on international missions in their first years in the armed services. Indeed, of early contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, Norway was the only country that's deployed demographics reflected its overall gendered composition. Though the overall numbers were still low, the Norwegian Armed Services were cognizant to ensure that all international missions were reflective of the overall gender breakdown of the military.

The UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was one of the earliest examples of the functional impact of women in Norwegian Armed Forces. In the early years of UNIFIL, women were instrumental in helping to bolster Southern Lebanon's economy (Karamé, 2001). When, in 1980, the UN made it a policy for peacekeeping forces to move into the community (and out of tents), the peacekeeping troops were

responsible for buying provisions from the local community. The presence of women in the peacekeeping units helped to boost the economic status of many local women through shopping for the daily necessities. Given the gender roles in the Lebanese society, there was a dedicated “women’s section” or the commercial area. Even beyond buying the essentials, women from the Norwegian peacekeeping battalion would socialize in these areas, frequenting cafes and restaurants.<sup>95</sup> In such visits not only did they help to stabilize the economy through their patronage, but they learned valuable insights into Lebanese culture that would help them in their day to day operations.

When the 1984 act was passed, Norway was heavily invested in UNIFIL. By 1985,<sup>96</sup> the first Norwegian female infantry officers and soldiers arrived as part of the mission (Karamé, 2001). The addition of women in the infantry contributed to both the UNIFIL mandate and furthering the culture of the military in domestic life. Including women in the infantry served not only a functional purpose (women were capable soldiers) but also a cultural one. Women in the Norwegian military modeled behaviors of equity to the other countries engaged in peacekeeping operation, (Værnø & Sveri, 1990).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the majority of women in the Norwegian military were in the medical profession and logistic communities. Though there are not official records of the gender breakdown of each unit<sup>97</sup> antidotal accounts of military life

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<sup>95</sup> Interview with Captain Ingrid Gjerde in Oslo, 1999 as quoted in Karme, 2001.

<sup>96</sup> The “lag” was due to the time it took to train women into the infantry.

<sup>97</sup> The Norwegian Ministry of Defense did not start keeping gender-based demographic data by occupation specialty until 1999

paint a picture of life in the military during these years.<sup>98</sup> Because of the gender-neutral language in much of the legal provisions, women experienced life much as any other soldier would. Those that were deployed in support of operations in Lebanon or to the Northern Border Guard described their careers as “challenging,” and lamented long separations from their family, but at nearly the same rate as men (Steder, 2015).

While the overall percentage of women in the military was low, it is notable that the percentage of women deployed international mirrored the overall percentage of women in the military. Indeed, deploying a force that was reflective of the domestic breakdown of military forces was a testament to Norway’s belief that the military’s purpose was centered around value transmission. Additionally, the women who did join largely had service longevity. Some of the longevity was a result of male citizens still being subject to conscription. Because women were part of the professional (rather than conscripted) force, their terms of service were necessarily longer than their male counterparts. Also, because of the restrictions put on their service, they were generally in career fields that had a longer training pipeline and therefore greater service commitment. While exact numbers of women in leadership roles in the late 1970s and 1980s is not available, survey results put women’s average time in service as greater than ten years (Carreiras, 2002). Additionally, approximately 5% of the leadership contingent of Norway’s UNIFIL contribution was women.<sup>99</sup> Given that this percentage is larger than

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<sup>98</sup> The *Aftenposten*, A Norwegian daily newspaper conducted a series of interviews with the women who were among the first to join the Norwegian military as professionals. They overwhelmingly speak of medical and logistic services.

<sup>99</sup> UN Peacekeeping Contributor Country Profile



the overall percentage of women in the military, it shows that women are staying in and gaining the required skills for leadership promotion.

### ***Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture***

Early claims about women's military service must be looked at from both the supply (women choosing to join the military) and demand (the military wanting women) side. Since the passage of the Equal Status Act and the focus on professional forces, there has been an effort by the Norwegian government to increase the role of women in the military (Steder, 2014; Wooten, 2014). In line with the egalitarian arguments about women's role in society as citizens, once women were allowed into the professional forces, there was a push to bring them into the service in an equal way as their male counterparts. Because of the focus on *sameness* between men and women, the women who chose to enter the professional service strongly mirrored their male counterparts. Concurrently, debates about opening all military roles to women centered around duty and obligations to the country rather than physical attributes or warfighting experiences.

As noted above, one of the primary purposes of the Norwegian military was to create an "ideal" Norwegian citizen, someone that was rugged and adventurous. The first women that joined the military largely mirrored the ideal type. The overwhelming majority of women who chose to enlist in the 1970s and early 1980s came from the "Midt-Norge" (central) region of Norway. They were largely from families that had a strong tradition of hunting and adventure sports, and were said to value "ruggedness and strength" as central to their Norwegian identity (Fauske, 2015). Such women saw it as

part of their duty as Norwegians to help perpetuate and preserve the unique Norwegian culture. As Norway was increasingly being involved in international treaties and operations, the military worked as a means of maintaining and perpetuating Norwegian values (Korsvik, 2014). Women emphasized their part in maintaining “Norwegianness” as justification for military participation.

As women started to join the professional forces, the *Sorting* was engaging in debates as to whether or not to open all military roles to women. The justification to exclude women from combat roles was initially made by King Olav V, a career military officer before ascending to the throne in 1957.<sup>100</sup> King Olav V’s justification rested primarily on the fact that he had not served with any women during his tenure in the army (Skaine, 2011). However, many members of the *Sorting* did not believe that his inexperience with women alone was reason enough to exclude women in total from infantry units. Especially members of the more liberal Labor party saw it as their duty to “formalize gender balances” in all aspects of public life as part of their national dedication to equality (Siim & Skjeie, 2008, p. 325). The military was seen to be a necessary part of the formalized gender balance. Members of the *Sorting* drew on the fact that women in Norway had been leaders in receiving political and economic rights to argue that they should equally be a part of the military to fulfill their role as citizens (Sainsbury, 2001).

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<sup>100</sup> Olav attended military school in the UK and Sweden and rose through the ranks of the Norwegian military to become a general in the army. He was known as “the people’s king” because of the fact that he did not fulfill his military obligation in a symbolic way, but engaged in the same training and service as all Norwegian citizens.

From both the supply and demand side, claims about women's military participation focused on their role as citizens. Little distinction was made between male and female citizens, as witnessed by the focus on being an "ideal" Norwegian, rather than a female soldier. For the non-combat roles that women were able to join, there was one standard for all soldiers, further strengthening the de-gendered claims. If women were to be full citizens, then their participation in the military was necessary. Such claims were consistent with the military's culture focused on making citizens. Indeed, it was difficult to discount claims that women were equal citizens and therefore should be subject to the same military opportunities as men.

### ***Outcome***

Women's initial entry into the professional arm of the military had a quick and meaningful impact. The most notable change that occurred was that all restrictions to women's service were lifted in 1984. This decision was not made necessarily because the Norwegian military wanted women in combat arms positions but because it would better promote citizenship equality if men and women were subject to the same service requirements (Kristiansen & Steder, 2015). Debates in the *Sorting* focused more on what the obligations of women in Norway should be rather than on what women should not do.

The 1984 decision to open all occupations to women and hold men and women to the same training and operational standards was exceptional in the international environment. Not only was Norway on the leading edge of allowing women into all military occupations, but they were also proactive in ensuring that women were a part of

the totality of military operations in a meaningful way but setting objective standards and fully integrating all aspects of training (Steder, 2015). Indeed, as soon as women were allowed into combat roles they became active in the military apparatus. Women immediately joined the UNIFIL operation as infantry officers. While women were active in engaging with Lebanese women in the host society, during operations their actions were dictated by “their rank and uniform, not their gender” (Karamé, 2001, p. 89). Indeed, women’s success was largely due to their similarity to their male counterparts.

Norway’s early leadership with regards to women’s military integration was largely due to the fact that women’s claims about service, as well as the roles they performed matched closely with military culture and beliefs about the purpose of the military. The experience in Lebanon gave credence to their claims, and helped to ensure that women were included equally in all aspects of military life.

## **Era 2: Post-Cold War**

### **Universal Conscription for a Citizen Army**

During this era, the primary military issue women faced was around universal conscription. From a conceptual standpoint, women transitioned from being limited participants to being lawfully integrated into the military in the same way as their male counterparts. This gave women the ability to claim even more citizenship rights. It is notable that through Norway was on the leading edge of integrating women into the military, they did not achieve the numbers of many of the Western militaries that opened combat positions to women later did. Targets for service have ranged from 7-10%

depending on who is in power (NATO, 2000; Steder, 2015). Though smaller in number, the women that did join the military had career longevity and often rose to command positions. The small, but durable, force of Norwegian women helped to solidify egalitarian policies around citizenship and service. However, the egalitarian focus also came under criticism for stalling women's advancement in a changing global security environment.

### ***Structural Conditions***

The legal and structural conditions for women in the post-Cold War military were largely the same as those for men.

**Table 5.4: Summary of Structural Provisions during the Second Era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Barriers to Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Access to professional military</li> <li>- No restrictions to women's service</li> <li>- Air Defense Unit 50/50</li> </ul>
Childcare / Parental Leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Childcare under 1975 Law (all children up to age 6 regardless of parent's economic status)</li> <li>- Parental leave under Equal Status Act (42/52 weeks and access to job + expected benefits when return)</li> <li>- Life-phase oriented personnel policies</li> </ul>
Sexual Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Outlawed under Equal Status Law, but no specific NorAF policies</li> </ul>

Table 5.4 summarizes the structural provisions for women's military participation in the Norwegian military. Notably, the provisions were aimed at promoting citizenship equality, formally downplaying the difference between men and women.

The changes in policies that came after the 1984 Military Occupational Equality for Men and Women act were aimed at increasing the number of women in the armed forces. In the two decades following the formalization of military equality, there were 199 unique suggestions – from academic, politicians, and military leaders – aimed at increasing the share of women in the military (Værnø & Sveri, 1990; Sand & Fasting, 2012). Suggested measures include implementing gender-based evaluation measures, engaging in recruitment in elementary schools, more direct officer commissions, and increase diversity training for younger troops. The widespread and diverse focus of these suggestions highlights the weight that the Norwegian government put behind wanting to remain a pioneer in gender equity, especially among its Scandinavian neighbors. As egalitarianism was a central part of its national identity, having a military that was reflective of its values in practice and not just policy was important. However, most of the suggestions were ultimately rejected on the grounds that they disproportionately favored women and were therefore in violation with the Equal Status Act.<sup>101</sup>

The suggestions that were implemented and ended up having an impact on women's military service were those that fall under what is referred to as "life-phase oriented personnel policies" (Steder, 2014, p. 303). These policies recognize that an individual does not have the same life-family-professional balance needs throughout their career, and make efforts to address the variations in challenges that individuals meet at various life-stages. For example, an effort was made to give mid-level officers and enlisted soldiers a longer time in one geographic region. This was done in recognition of

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<sup>101</sup> Interview with Frank Steder – August 2017

the fact that at this time in one's life (generally in their early – mid 30s) that it is more critical for children to have geographic stability for both schooling consistency and the development of social skills. It is notable that these policies were seen as equally applicable and important for both genders. As highlighted by the impact that the “daddy quota” has had on norms about childcare and family roles in Chapter 2, parenthood has become increasingly de-gendered in Norwegian society. Life-phase oriented personnel policies were thus what was the most acceptable, as they were not seen as overtly or disproportionately favor women.

The military also used operational organization to attempt to increase the number of women. Though a minority of the overall force, some units were intentionally balanced at a near 50/50 ratio. In particular, the elite air defense units underwent a reorganization in the late 1990s/early 2000s to ensure gender parity in numbers, and in all living and operational conditions. The purpose of this reorganization was to highlight that female soldiers were “just soldiers” and that men don't set the tone in either military life or operational conduct (Braw, 2017). By manufacturing an environment where men and women were equal in all aspects – standards, living quarters, and number – the military showed that there was little to no difference between the genders in hopes of appealing to the beliefs about citizenship.

### ***Functional Participation***

In the post-Cold-War era, women's participation in the military was important to both international and domestic participation. Internationally, women's biggest impact

came in peacekeeping missions. As noted above, women were essential to the UNIFIL mission. Their success in UNIFIL was mirrored in UN missions around the globe.

**Table 5.5: Summary of Functional Participation during the Second Era of Women's Participation**

Component	Measure
Level of Participation	- Steady around 9% of total force
Type of Participation	- Nearly even spread among occupational specialties
Overseas Participation	- 6-9%

Table 5.5 highlights components of functional participation. While not high in number, women's proportion of the force did increase, and women represented an even spread across the occupational specialties. The work that women in the military did in the decades following women being allowed in all occupational specialties further degendered women in the service. As they took on newly opened roles, women served as citizens, emphasizing that it was their service, not their gender that made them successful.

Norwegian women's success in peacekeeping operations provided them with accolades and allowed them to ascend the ranks quickly. The global emphasis on women's increased participation in peacekeeping operations was in line with Norwegian views about the cultural role of the military. The military was an institution to share the values of equality and citizenship with the rest of the world. "We did not lobby to train women to kill," was a common refrain of the leaders in the UN peacekeeping circles (Skjelsbaek, 2016), emphasizing that women helped to temper the brutal nature of the military and enhanced its role in promoting values. Though there was an emphasis on training women in the skills required for infantry action, it was done so because it was



necessary to ensure the peace, not because there was inherent value in killing. Infantry officers in particular were rewarded in the Norwegian military because of their restraint in using violence during peacekeeping operations. Women were included in these promotions and took on important leadership roles in peacekeeping operations. In the 1990s, female officers were made commanders in the UN missions in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and were the leads in NATO-sponsored trainings for potential peacekeeping forces (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2016).

Major General Kristin Lund was named the first female force commander of a peacekeeping mission, highlighting the importance of Norwegian leadership around the world. Major General Lund emphasized the Norwegian view of gender equality when speaking about her role as a woman force commander. “There’s no difference in what men and women can do in the military,” she remarked in an official UN interview (Childs, 2017). Though the coverage of her leadership was framed as “exceptional” and “groundbreaking” by press in the United States and throughout Europe, she viewed herself as largely no different than her predecessors.

While internationally women were proving themselves as equals peacekeeping missions, domestically women were making strides in the border guard units. The border guards provided a valuable tool for the military in their role promoting the image of the ideal citizen. During the Cold War the border guard provided a valuable physical service in defense of the country. Yet rather than disband at the end of the Cold War, the border guard took on a symbolic role. In the years after the Cold War it became the unit where the ideal soldier could act. The area patrolled by the Norwegian border guard is among

the most rugged terrain in the country. The soldiers of the border guard epitomized the hearty ruggedness and adventuresome spirit that was part of the Norwegian identity. Women in these units, living and working alongside their male counterparts, became idealized by other Western nations in the process of integrating women into their militaries. When asked by an Australian reporter if the women in the unit became “one of the guys” when stationed on the border, a male soldier responded, “maybe you should ask her if I become ‘one of the girls.’ We all do the same things here. Patrol the same ground and survive in the same wilderness.”<sup>102</sup> Though not a 50/50 split as in the case of the air defense battalion, men and women in the border guards shared lived in mixed housing and engaged in fully gender integrated training and patrols. Their physically demanding work was split evenly between men and women, with no special conditions made for the female soldiers. Border patrol work was truly gender neutral and served more to be a model of Norwegian citizenship.

Though the number of women who chose to enter military did not reach the thresholds that leadership desired, the women who did join largely remained in at the same rate as their male counterparts. By 2009, 10% of all flag officers were women, as were 10% of all Lieutenants (Strand, 2015). The nearly consistent level of women throughout the rank structure is indicative of retention policies that neither overly favored nor harmed women. Indeed, they are consistent with other policies in Norwegian society that were applied evenly regardless of gender.

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<sup>102</sup> Norwegian Television Network. “Gender Mission: How the Norwegian military is breaking down gender divisions in the quest for a better force.” Air Date August 18, 2014

Women's retention may have in part been aided by the male conscription law. As noted above, despite all positions being open to women, women were not subject to conscription. Though the overall percentage of conscripts as part of the total force remained low, conscripts only served one year. The fact that some men left after a year due to the length of their conscription contract could artificially inflate women's retention rate. It is for this reason that it is important to look at the officer ranks.<sup>103</sup>

As women gained seniority, it is notable that they also gained authority. In addition to women moving up the rank structure in a similar fashion as men, they also gained positions of authority, command, and influence at the same rate. From peacekeeping missions to border guard units, women held command at a proportional rate to their male counterparts (Karamé, 2001; Strand, 2015).

Concerning retention efforts, there have been debates about whether or not to specifically target women. As the military has been unable to hit its target percentages, there has been discussion as to the merits of specifically using leadership to grow the overall percentage of women. For example, a 2007 Ministry of Defense White Paper emphasized the need for women in "management" and "leadership" roles in the military (Ministry of Defense, 2007). As a result, women were intentionally selected for leadership roles in schools and prominent positions in both domestic and international units. Between 2007-2011, the number of women in leadership positions in schools grew by 2 women per year (FFI 2015 data). By 2011 this resulted in women being overrepresented in command positions (approximately 16-18% of O-6 and above

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<sup>103</sup> While male conscripts have the option to go to officer candidate school after their initial conscription obligation is fulfilled, men are not conscripted into the officer corps.

command positions held by women). In 2011, however, the number plateaued, as artificially inflating the number of women leaders was not sustainable given the population of available officers. Since 2011, the number of senior officers has decreased (8% in 2015), and now more closely mirrors overall service numbers.

### ***Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture***

As women established themselves in all occupational specialties in the armed forces, both supply and demand side claims were shaped by women's experiences in the military. Citizenship equality remained a central tenant of the claims. In particular, the demand side of the argument focused on universal conscription being the last remaining difference between men and women's service. Given the success that women had adhering to "male" standards and berthing and bunking with their male counterparts, proponents for universal conscription argued that it was a natural progression. Laila Gustavsen, a long time Labour Party parliamentarian was one of the fiercest proponents of including women in military conscription. "Rights and duties should be the same for all," she asserted in an interview.<sup>104</sup> Indeed, military conscription was framed as the dutiful counterpart to the rights afforded to all Norwegians by the welfare state.

The arguments about conscription being a duty were strengthened by changes to military composition at the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Norway was an important geopolitical ally in NATO. To that end, they established a robust border guard

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<sup>104</sup> *Reuters* Newswire. "Norway become first NATO Country to Draft Women into the Military" June 14, 2013. Access at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-women-conscription/norway-becomes-first-nato-country-to-draft-women-into-military-idUSBRE95D0NB20130614>

force to defend the alliance from Moscow as well as a sizable Arctic maritime detachment. However, at the end of the Cold War, Norway substantially contracted the size of its military. Whereas the Cold War force structure relied heavily on conscripts to fill its ranks (60-80%), since 1993, conscripts have made up approximately 10% of the overall force. However, eligibility for conscription remained an important part of Norwegian citizenship. Between 2000-2013, each year there were approximately 60,000 males that qualified for the selection process for conscription. Of that group, less than 10,000 were needed to go to training and only 3,000-5,000 given operational roles (Steder, 2015). However, the shared experience of completing the conscription requirements created a bond between Norwegian men that reinforced citizenship and promoted a common understanding (Kristiansen & Steder, 2015). The arguments were therefore not made that women were necessary for fighting war, but that women should engage with the same citizenship duties as their male counterparts.

Norway's increased participation in peacekeeping operations further contributed to women's claims about military service. Indeed, in the early years after the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping became a major part of both the UN and NATO's agenda, with Norway taking a lead both operationally and in training (Karlsrud & Osland, 2016). As noted above, peacekeeping was in line with their beliefs about the role of the military as a transmitter of values. Further, peacekeeping operations were seen as a way to "build better citizens," as Norway took a leadership role among its NATO allies (Khanna & Sandler, 1997). The emphasis on building citizens continued coincide with Norwegian military culture and values, and allowed women to have influence in the military.

## ***Outcome***

Though it took nearly 30 years from the time that women were allowed to serve in all occupational specialties, universal conscription including women passed the *Sorting* in 2013, with legislation written into law in 2014. With the passage of the legislation, women were included in the Joint Selection Process for General Conscription (JSPGC) to determine their eligibility and suitability for various military positions. Universal conscription was touted as being both culturally and institutionally beneficial for the military. In an address to the OSCE, the military advisor to the permanent delegation asserted that conscription represented a watershed moment for Norway.

Universal conscription is important for two main reasons. Firstly, in all parts of society women and men have - and should have - equal rights, obligations and opportunities. Secondly, from a military perspective, the armed forces need to be able to recruit among the most capable candidates. Operational demands and high levels of specialization and technological sophistication dictate the need to recruit as widely as possible. We cannot afford to exclude half of the population in the recruitment process. In terms of human resources, the state sends a very clear message that competency is not down to gender, in this case the male gender. (Dalaaker, 2017)

The appeal to both sociopolitical equality and military effectiveness highlights the twin functions of the military. This appeal to equality continued the tradition of the military being a means of citizenship socialization. Including women in the process of conscription signified the completion of citizenship ideals. The appeal to the functional purpose of the military, namely the focus on operational demands, signaled that Norway was committed to its military obligations. Such a statement was essential to ease the

concerns of NATO allies that Norway was being political at the expense of its military effectiveness.

In the first year that women were included in the JSPGC (2015), they represented 25% of the eligible and willing conscripts.<sup>105</sup> To qualify, individuals have to be able to compete physically and mentally in any job that a conscript could have. In practice, this means that all conscripts must physically meet the infantry standards regardless of what job they ultimately have. Though only about 10% of the overall conscripts ultimately get called into service, the presence of women in the eligible pool will necessarily increase the number of women in the armed forces. However, more important than numbers, women's inclusion in the conscription pool signals the commitment to egalitarianism that has historically been one of the foundations of national identity. The neutrality with which conscription was applied to men and women is consistent with the claims about the similarities between citizens.

### **Era 3: Post-9/11 and the Hunter Troop**

#### **New Claims for a New Model?**

In both ISAF operations in Afghanistan and United States-led coalition activities in Iraq, Norwegian women played an active role in military operations. In combat their actions were gender neutral, performing their duties based on their assigned occupational speciality with little regard for their gender. The result was women, such as Colonel

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<sup>105</sup> There are provisions for conscious objectors or those pursuing educational opportunities to serve in ways other than the military.

Gjerde, being promoted to leadership positions. However, Norwegian forces struggled in village stability operations, often lacking the cultural skills necessary to interact with women in Afghanistan or Iraq. Counterinsurgency proved difficult for troops that had emphasized gender neutrality.

As a result of the struggles in Afghanistan, discussions in the Ministry of Defense began to center around the importance of highlighting the difference between men and women. Particularly, there was an interest in harnessing the unique differences that women brought to military operations. The creation of the *Jegertroppen* or Hunter Troop, an all-women special operations commando unit, was a result of realizing the unique differences between men and women, and creating a means of harnessing them. Though special operations had been open to women since 1984, very few women had ever attempted to join. Women had not been specifically recruited in the past, nor had a course of training or operations been devised to differentiate between what men and women had to offer.

The Hunter Troop was designed to be women-only in order to both harness women's unique characteristics and show that women were able to do everything that men could in demanding environments. Indeed, the Hunter Troop was truly gender-focused with a Norwegian spin; though designed to capture women's unique contributions, the similarity in training between men and women furthered the claim as to women's equality. Though still in its early days (the Hunter Troop has completed its initial year of training yet not been deployed operationally), benefits are already being seen and the claims made about women's service beginning to change. Through the



training, it was highlighted that women excelled at things that men did not. In addition to being able to access a wider percentage of the population, female trainees excelled at shooting and scout-observation techniques (Braw, 2016).

While the domestic “experiment” with the Hunter Troop has been a success, there is wariness to use it operationally. “It goes against our culture to have men and women be separate,” Frank Steder remarked (August 2017). “I’ve been grappling with the question of increasing the number of women in the military for a long time, and while the Hunter Troop did good work, I just don’t know if they’ll be accepted by their male comrades. They’re too womanly now.”

The tension between claims made about the needs for the Hunter Troop and the historical commitment to internal values and equality of the military, have resulted in a contentious environment for what could be a third cycle of integration. Though the program has been renewed, there are still no plans to operationalize the unit or bring its members into larger military planning exercises. Indeed, while women in Norway’s military were pioneers in the early years of integration, the emphasis on sameness has resulted in a stalling of progress in the changing global security environment. In a security environment that needed women to be different, they did not have the claims nor the space to influence the military.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **United States:**

#### **Ask what you can do, if you can do it like a man**

In the United States, there has been much emphasis on the successes (and failures) of prominent individual women in the military. Indeed, the United States leads Western countries the greatest number of women general officers and senior enlisted. However “women,” as a group, have not benefited from the successes of these prominent individual women. Further, the lack of government involvement in issues of equality has allowed the military to pursue its own rules with regards to women’s participation. While women in the United States have been successful in the private sector, they have lagged behind other Western countries with regards to women’s military integration, despite having a high percentage of women in the organization. The United States highlights the importance of differentiating between integration and inclusion.

The challenges faced by women in the United States military during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight their low level of integration. Early on in the conflicts, both top military officers and DoD civilians recognized the need for women’s service in order to be successful in counterinsurgency operations. The nature of conflict in both Iraq and Afghanistan required service members engaging with villages, at least 50% of whom

were women. The formal restrictions on women's service<sup>106</sup> meant that women could not be permanently assigned to or stationed with ground combat units in the theater of operations. To get around the restrictions, the military created Lioness and Female Engagement Teams (FET).<sup>107</sup> Women in these teams would attach to infantry units for specific missions and be co-located (rather than assigned to) with infantry units. The women usually received less (and different) training than their male counterparts, and were often unprepared for the combat in which they found themselves.

FET teams and the Lioness program served an important function and both objectively and subjectively benefited mission accomplishment (Erwin, 2012). Village Stability Operations in which FET teams were present were more likely to meet both short and long term objectives than those that did not have women formally involved in the operations (Harding, 2012). However, the legal restrictions around women's service proved problematic. Army infantry officer and Iraq veteran Steve Griffith notes that to the general population, the restrictions on women in combat may appear to be a non-issue, but for operators on the ground, the difference is stark. "Combat units can't "own" female soldiers, but they can accept them on "loan" from other, non-combat units" (Griffin, 2012). The result is that while women have been essential to the successes of infantry units conducting counterinsurgency and village stability operations, they have

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<sup>106</sup> Women were not allowed to serve in ground combat units or be stationed with units where their "risk" of ground combat was likely.

<sup>107</sup> For overview of the FET teams see: Lizette Alvarez, "GI Jane Breaks the Combat Barrier," *New York Times*. August 16, 2009; Keally McBride and Annick Wibben, "The Gendering of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol 3, No. 2 (2012); Lemmon, Gayle Tzemach, and Kathe Mazur. *Ashley's War*. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2015.; Stephanie K. Erwin, *The veil of Kevlar: An analysis of the female engagement teams in Afghanistan*. Diss. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2012.

not been fully accepted as part of the units.<sup>108</sup> Though there have been a steady increase of women in the military, they have not been integrated, that is they have not been able to impact the military in a meaningful way. Rather, women have had to conform to male standards in order to find success in the military.

### **United States: Low Level of Integration**

Though there are a comparatively large number of women in the United States military, and there are several prominent individual women in the services, the United States has an overall low level of women's integration. Despite their numbers, and the prominent position of women such as General Janet Wolfenbarger,<sup>109</sup> General Ann Dunwoody<sup>110</sup> and Sergeant Major Evelyn Hollis,<sup>111</sup> women writ large have not been able to make a substantial impact on either military personnel policies or tactics and strategies. The women that have been successful have largely done so despite their gender, and through adhering to masculine norms. Additionally, while the United States has a high percentage of women in the military at any one given point in time, retention is a challenge, with most women leaving the military after their initial contract is done. Though in the past four years the military has dropped all formal restrictions on women's

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<sup>108</sup> The official Army position was that FET teams "do not have a combat function" and therefore did not require infantry training  
[https://www.army.mil/article/101111/fet\\_to\\_fight\\_female\\_engagement\\_team\\_makes\\_history](https://www.army.mil/article/101111/fet_to_fight_female_engagement_team_makes_history)

<sup>109</sup> 4-Star Air Force General and first woman to command Air Force's Material Command

<sup>110</sup> 4-Star Army General and first woman to command Army's Material Command

<sup>111</sup> Army Command Sergeant Major, first woman to be a command Sergeant Major of a combat arms battalion (1<sup>st</sup> Bn, 31<sup>st</sup> Air Artillery Defense Brigade)

service and women are now present in combat arms units, they are still not well integrated. To achieve success in the military in general and combat arms in particular, they have had to adopt and adapt to male standards and a masculine-dominant culture.

The low level of integration in the United States is reflective of the lack of cohesive claims about gender equality. Further, the focus of women's participation in the military has been on emphasizing how the successes of individual women has been within the constraints of military culture and practices. The lack of consensus about the role of women in society, coupled with a military that is rooted in combat operations has left little room for women to influence it.

Table 6.1 Highlights the current measures of the components of integration for the United States Military.

**Table 6.1: Current Measures of Women's Integration in the United States Military**

Measure	Value
Legal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- No Restrictions on Women's functional participation</li><li>- <i>De Facto</i> restrictions on women's geographic participation</li><li>- Service-Dependent parental leave policies (range 2-12 weeks)</li><li>- Privately contracted child care services with no guarantee of availability</li><li>- Chain of command decision on sexual harassment</li></ul>
Functional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 14.9% of military force</li><li>- 0% of ground combat force*</li><li>- 10.1% in international operations</li></ul>
Durability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- -15% retention rate</li><li>- 1% of Flag Officers</li><li>- 9% of Senior Officers</li><li>- 13% of Noncommissioned Officers</li></ul>
Institutional Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Few Changes to policies</li><li>- Continued commitment to primary of conventional arms</li></ul>

\*Though women have qualified in infantry, tank, and artillery MOS', they have not yet been in operational units. This is primarily due to the timeline between training and operational assignment

While the numbers of women appear high, the inability to have an institutional impact is indicative of a low level of integration for women into the United States military. There have been changes in laws and policies that have created more opportunities for women in recent years, yet there have been little changes in the supporting structures that enable women's participation. Further, these changes have been done in such a way that the male physical standard and masculine cultural experience is preferred. In the Women in the Services Review to congress, mandated by the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, for over 90% of the military occupational specialty standards and advanced schools, the male physical standard was listed as the "one

standard” to which all service members would be required to adhere (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness, 2013). While there has been an emphasis on counterinsurgency policy, and the importance of women in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, new policies and doctrine have been written by men, and have treated women as a group to be used in certain tactical situations rather than an integrated part of the overall force.

In this chapter I show how the foundational beliefs that individuals are responsible for proving their own worth coupled with the military’s culture of combat has created a contentious environment for women’s attempts to integrate into the military. I begin by discussing beliefs about the role of the military and military culture in the United States, focusing on how it has continued to remain combat centric in its values despite changes in global politics. I then discuss how throughout the three periods of global politics, integration has not been very successful in the United States. I show how the contention between the claims about women’s service and the military culture have resulted in an inability for women to impact the military in a meaningful way. The changes that have been made that have impacted women’s service have been done in a manner that is inclusive of women at the expense of their integration. I conclude by discussing how the conflict in Afghanistan has created an environment in which integration may be possible, though there remain stumbling blocks for implementation.

## **United States Military Tradition: Combat Tested, Culture Approved**

Perhaps more than any other Western military, the United States has traditionally, and continues, to adhere to a combat-oriented, male-oriented warrior tradition. As army veteran Brian Mitchell asserts on his discussion on the suitability of women in the military, “The major social value of our military is the warrior image, particularly the masculine warrior image” (Mitchell, 1997, p. 44) He continues to decry women in the military, emphasizing that the presence of women shifts the military’s focus away from fighting wars and towards ensuring that women are taken care of and not subject to too much stress. While Mitchell’s views are extreme, they are reflective of a military in which the ideal type soldier remains male, white, conservative, and adherent to Judeo-Christian values (Dunivin, 1994). Both the training for and conduct of war have reinforced the combat-centric nature of the military tradition in the United States (Hunter, 2018). While arguments have been made for the military as a cultural socialization tool (Krebs, 2006), the emphasis in the United States remains on combat achievement and conventional force projection.

As one of the earliest Western militaries to abandon conscription in favor of the all-volunteer force, the United States military has adopted a culture that is been argued to be divergent from the majority of civilian citizens (Janowitz, 1975; Moskos, 2001). Indeed, recent demographic work on the military reflects this. Over 80% of military members come from a family where an immediate family member was also in the military (Zucchini & Cloud, 2015). Nearly half of all active duty troops come from California, Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, most from a town within 25



miles of a military instillation. Further, the size of the military, both in terms of numbers and in percentage of the population that is serving, has continued to shrink. The growing divide between the military and the civilian population has resulted in a military that had both developed a distinct and separate culture, and has become very entrenched in its beliefs.

The roots of the distinct culture predate the all-volunteer force, and are largely entrenched with the way in which the officer corps was treated as uniquely separate from society. In a 1962 address to the cadets at the Military Academy at West Point, General Douglas MacArthur asserted, “Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose the nation will be destroyed” (MacArthur, 1962). The emphasis on winning, and the relative separation between military professionals and the civilian public created a culture that has emphasized the importance of the destructive power of the military as a means of both personal and professional survival (Janowitz, 1988).

The combat-focused identity of the military is reinforced both internally and externally. The origin of this identity is seen, both by service members themselves and from citizens of the country they serve, as a result of the conduct of war. When service members are lauded by civilians as ideal citizens it is more for bravery and willingness to fight in wars on behalf of the citizenry than it is for their possession of certain values or characteristics. Internally, service members have used combat and militarism as a way to distinguish themselves as the “best” among an already small and distinct group of service members (Snider, 2000).

The masculine and combat-focused identity is prevalent in the way that members of the military talk about themselves and others. The roots of this identity are forged in initial training. Broadly, the purpose of recruit training is to take civilians and turn them into members of the military by both “indoctrinating” them into military life and “inoculating” them from the potential horrors of their chosen profession (Mills, 2012). The United States military is focused on creating a new moral code and identity among its members (Toner, 2013). They are not to be ideal civilian citizens, but ideal warriors, ready and able to do violence on behalf of the country. Even service members that are in occupational specialties other than ground-combat undergo extensive small-arms and hand-to-hand combat training, emphasizing and reinforcing that violence is the central part of identity (Hunter, 2018).

The result is a group that feels a separation from, and in some cases a disdain for, the citizenry that reveres it (Ricks, 2007). The separation from the civilian population has resulted both in an entrenchment of military culture and a hierarchy of military identities among service members and veterans (MacKenzie, 2015). Because they are largely separated from the civilian population, and therefore don’t often compare themselves to civilians in a formal manner, members of the military have created an informal internal ranking system. In line with the masculine combat-focused culture, ground combat is seen to be the most prestigious and important job in the military. Seen as the “main effort” in military operations, the infantry is held up as the superior to the rest of the military. While conducting focus groups, several male soldiers and Marines wore patches

that stated “If you ain’t Infantry, you ain’t shit,” not only affirming the primacy of the infantry, but downgrading those not engaged in the direct conduct of war.<sup>112</sup>

Beliefs about the superiority of combat arms are reinforced by both personnel policies and military strategy. The majority of flag officers in the Army and Marine Corps have come from ground combat specialties. Only one Commandant of the Marine Corps<sup>113</sup> and none of the Chiefs of staff of the Army have been from non-ground combat communities. Indeed, leadership sets the tone from their personal experiences, and without diversity in leadership there is little chance that there will be change in the lower ranks.

Strategic guidance has remained focused on ground combat operations and the defeat of the enemy. Though recent national security strategies have noted the importance of new theaters of war (i.e. cyber) and non-infantry tactics (i.e. cultural competency), ground combat remains the primary focus of military doctrine. A central component of the most recent National Security Strategy is to “defeat America’s enemies” through an “expanded force” (National Security Strategy, 2017). Indeed, military defeat is preferenced over restraint of force.

External civilian factors have also contributed to the military’s combat-focused culture. Politicians, in particular, have been instrumental in propping up the idea of the warrior-combatant as the ideal. This was best typified by Governor Mike Huckabee’s

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<sup>112</sup> The Army and Marine Corps are the most severe adherents to this culture. However, in the Air Force it exists within the fighter community and in the Navy among the Special Warfare community.

<sup>113</sup> General James Amos, the 35<sup>th</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps was an F-4 and then later F/A-18 pilot

response at 2016 Republican Primary debate when he asserted that, “the purpose of the military is to kill people and break things.”<sup>114</sup> Such a comment wasn’t made in isolation. During the draw-down of forces in Iraq Congress pressure military leaders to return to combat training and prepare for “real war” now that the cultural missions were over (Brooks, 2017).

Internationally the United States has remained hawkish and emphasized the presence of its military around the world. For example, the United States invaded Iraq without UN approval, a move that then Secretary General Kofi Annan declared illegal, showing its willingness to defy international norms. Additionally, the United States maintains a sizable permanent military force around the world. From Germany to Japan, troops have a permanent residence across the globe. Even when not actively engaged in war, the United States military conducts regular large-scale military training exercises that showcase the combat capability of the its forces.

Because of its size and status, the US military is able to maintain its focus on combat even when other countries are becoming more engaged with values. As a result, the cultural standard of the military has become that of the infantryman. Those that do not fit the mold have a hard time being successful in the military either culturally or professionally. As I will show in this chapter, the pervasiveness of the masculine combat-focused culture contributes to the low level of integration of women into the United States military. The culture has resulted in practical obstacles for women that their claims have not been able to overcome. Moreover, the women that have been successful in the

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<sup>114</sup> Transcript of the debate available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/live/republican-debate-election-2016-cleveland/huckabee-seems-to-hold-back-on-gay-and-transgender-issues/>

United States military have largely done so by conforming to the traditional military culture. While they have been individual successes, they have done little to integrate women as a whole. Indeed, despite the inclusion of women, the military is still very much a man's world in the United States.

## **Era 1: The End of the Cold War**

### **Equality through a Masculine Enterprise? (1970-1992)**

Though discussions about and policies on women's military service began nearly immediately following World War II, the possibility for beginning a process of integration emerged in the 1990s, with the opening of combat aircraft and sea service to women, and genuine discussions about the suitability of and possibility for women in combat roles. Though the early 1990s is the starting point for integration, it is important to note that many of the arguments on both sides of the debate about women's military participation have their roots in the 1970s, in the debates over the ending of conscription and the adoption of an all-volunteer force. Most notably, the debate around women's role in the professional military highlighted the degree to which both emotion and cultural ideal types played a central role in women's service. Since the United States lacked an overarching equality or equal rights law, the military was not required to admit women. This allowed the perpetuation of beliefs about the masculine nature of service, and the resulting exclusion of women.

Concurrently, the lack of structural support, including child care and consistent parental leave policies, resulted in many women leaving the service earlier than they

otherwise would have due to financial needs. The twin challenges of lack of combat service and early departure for family obligations resulted in a dearth of women in leadership positions where they could effectively make change.

### ***Structural Provisions***

Though women have been participating in the military in the United States since the Revolutionary War, and the United States boasts a comparatively high percentage of women in the military currently, the legal status and enabling structures for women in the military are not very permissive. The United States, unlike France and Norway, does not have a comprehensive equal rights or equal status law. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, equal rights laws provided part of the baseline provisions for women to be allowed into all military specialties. Absent such wide-sweeping legislative requirements, policies were created specifically for and by the military and did not necessarily reflect larger trends in policies regarding women in public life.

**Table 6.2: Summary of Structural Provisions during the First Era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Barriers to Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Banned from ground combat roles, combat ships, and combat aircraft</li> <li>- Geographic restrictions on women's service</li> <li>- Segregated training</li> <li>- Not included in the Selective Service</li> </ul>
Childcare / Parental Leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Child care the responsibility of individual service members</li> <li>- Parental leave left up to individual services</li> </ul>
Sexual Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Per commanders discretion under the UCMJ</li> </ul>

Table 6.2 highlights the structural and legal provisions for women in the United States military during the final years of the Cold War. There were many restrictions on women's service. These restrictions were largely based on emotion and historical belief about gender roles and military culture rather than evidence on women's capabilities or operational performance. Additionally, women bore the burden of individually making arrangements for most of the historical "women's issues" such as child care and health services. The extra work contributed to low retention rate of women and difficulty for women in being able to change the military.

The legal provisions for women's military service in the United States have historically been reflective of both the military's culture and the belief in limited government intervention to ensure equality. Though strides were made for women's professional service throughout the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, women were allowed in service positions only. The 1948 "Women's Integration Act" allowed women to serve in the regular military rather than auxiliary corps.<sup>115</sup> However, there was a cap both on the total number of women allowed to serve and the ranks they could achieve. Women could make up no more than 2% of the enlisted ranks, officer corps, or total force. Additionally, while enlisted were unrestricted in rank, officers could only achieve the rank of O-6. Women were also restricted in their benefits. Children and spouses of female service members were not considered dependents, and therefore not eligible for benefits

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<sup>115</sup> Women's Armed Services' Integration Act P.L 625

such as health care or on-base housing. Enlisted women were discharged if they got pregnant.

Public Law 90-130, passed in 1967, lifted the 2% cap on women's service and gave women unrestricted access to rank. It also provided limited benefits to the spouses and children of female service members.<sup>116</sup> However, it did little to actually elevate the status of women in the United States military. Women were still trained separately and had different training requirements. Despite the lifting of restrictions on rank, women were still segregated from and *de facto* subordinates to their male counterparts. As Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote notes:

Women ... were never referred to as soldiers ... they were never trained to defend themselves or to defend their units. They were trained for administrative, personnel, medical, public relations work. They were not permanently detailed to any [operational] army unit; they were detailed only temporarily (As quoted in Katzenstein, 1998, p. 57)

It was not until 1975 that women received any weapons training, and then it was limited to defensive tactics. These restrictions on women's service reinforced the masculine nature of the military culture and prevented women from attaining leadership positions.

The 1970s and the advent of the all-voluntary force provided more structural opportunities for women. With the ending of conscription, manpower numbers necessitated an increasing the pool from which the military could draw. Though there were policy conversations and Congressional testimony as to the impact of the end on the

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<sup>116</sup> Children of female service members were given health care under the law. However, in order for the male spouse of a female service member to receive healthcare, or for the female service member to qualify for base housing or an increased housing allowance she had to prove that her spouse was dependent on her for more than one-half of his financial support.



draft on the need to recruit more women into the armed services (Janowitz & Moskos, 1979) there was no concrete laws passed as to what the status of women in the military would be. Rather, it was left up to the DoD, and often the individual services to implement their manpower plans for the all-volunteer force. Individual services launched recruiting drives to attract women into logistics and supply positions so that male volunteers could be concentrated into the infantry and other combat arms.

The policy changes that came in the 1970s and the professionalization of the armed services were an important part of women having the potential to choose the military as a career. In 1975 women began defensive weapons training in initial recruit and officer training, and in 1977 women began going through the same initial weapons training as men. In 1976 women were first admitted to the Service Academies, and by 1977 administrative, logistics, and medical occupational specialty training schools were integrated. Such changes provided an opportunity for women to be seen as “soldiers” rather than women, and the possibility to obtain the experiences and qualifications (i.e. overseas service or ship-board service) necessary for promotion into leadership roles.

In 1978, Congress also amended the 1948 Act to allow women to serve on noncombat ships such as tenders, repair ships, and salvage and rescue ships. Assignment to such ships, however, was to be a “temporary duty.”<sup>117</sup> While women could serve on ships, they were still effectively banned from holding command positions or senior leadership roles at sea, an essential prerequisite for naval flag officers, due to the ban on permanent stationing.

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<sup>117</sup> Public Law 95-185

### ***Functional Participation***

While women have been a part of every war the United States has fought since the Revolution, both their operational participation and their formal status as service members or veterans has been limited. To understand how the claims about women's service interacted with military culture to constrain integration, it is important to briefly discuss the functional participation of women in the United States military in final years of the Cold War. Until the last part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, women in the United States military were not only banned from combat, but also given differential training. Notably, women were not trained on how to use weapons, nor operate or survive in austere environments. The legal restrictions coupled with lack of training severely restricted women's functional roles.

**Table 6.3: Summary of Functional Participation during the First Era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Level of Participation	- Approximately 8-10% of overall Force
Type of Participation	- Primarily Medical Logistics and Administrative - Banned from Combat Arms
Overseas Participation	- 1-5%

Records on women's overseas participation began in the 1960s. Approximately 7,000<sup>118</sup> women served in Vietnam, with the vast majority as medical personnel (nurses)

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<sup>118</sup> Because the Army still had a separate auxiliary corps, official DoD records are conflicting. There were nearly 6000 active duty nurses from the Army, Navy and Air Force in country, along with 60 female administrative Marines. Auxiliary corps histories range from 300-1500 women serving in Vietnam. 7000 is the most commonly agreed upon number in the historian literature.

and auxiliary corps administrative personnel (Stur, 2011). During the Vietnam War era, women made up less than 1% of professional the active duty force, with most women employed as contractors or on a limited auxiliary status (National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics). In the operational theaters, while women were not engaged directly in the fighting, they played a vital service to the war, despite serving in a highly gendered capacity. Women in the Vietnam War “straddled a line between girl next door, providing an image of home to wounded men, and a combat soldier, who came face to face with the fear and death that accompanied the war” (Stur, 2011, p. 106). The ability to continue to gender women’s Vietnam service, framing nursing and administrative work as inherently “women’s work,” allowed for women to continue to be sidelined in conversations about mainstream military service. While women had an important role, it was a *woman’s* role.

Further, restrictions of the number of the women in the service and their ability to obtain ranks necessary for leadership hindered their functional participation. Indeed, because of the restrictions on numbers, women were primarily utilized to fill administrative roles in the United States while men fought. Though the formal restrictions on women’s rank were dropped in 1967 with P.L. 90-130, women still often lacked the practical experiences necessary to achieve both rank and leadership roles. The lack of weapons training – even defensive – meant that women were only able to have command of units that served a purely administrative or medical function. Women who did attain leadership posts did so as commanders of garrison bases. Such commands

carried a *de facto* ceiling of the one-star rank, as combat service was seen as necessary to be promoted into more senior ranks (DACOWITS, 1980-2000).

The expansion of women's roles in the military, and the introduction of weapons training for women in the late 1970s provided an opportunity for women's expanded functional participation. The introduction of coed military occupational specialties, coupled with women's training on small arms and crew served weapons began the transition from women being viewed as "women" to "soldier." However, this transition period came at a time of relatively low international operations for the United States. Between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, the United States was not involved in any sustained conflict. During this period, combat-focused operations were limited in scope and personnel, with little need for support units. Therefore, given the international environment, women still only had opportunities to lead in garrison, continuing to limit their opportunities. The United States also did not have a large focus on peacekeeping missions in the 1980s, limiting some of the possibilities for women that were seen in other Western Countries.

Though women were afforded more opportunity as a result of the all-volunteer force, they were still largely viewed as unequal members of the military under the law. The first test of the potential for more equal policies came in 1979 with the reinstatement of the Selective Service after the military transitioned to the AVF. Despite the fact that the military had been struggling to retain enough men to fill the ranks in the case of a national emergency (Janowitz & Moskos, 1979), Congress did not believe that women

should be included in the Selective Service. In its official statement on the formation of the Selective Service, the Senate Armed Service Committee Stated:

The committee feels strongly that it is not in the best interest of our national defense to register women for the Military Selective Service Act, which would provide needed military personnel upon mobilization or in the event of a peacetime draft for the armed forces. (Senate, Committee on Armed Services, June 19, 1979)

The arguments on both sides of the debate around women's inclusion in the Selective Service will be discussed below. However, it is important to note the rationale behind the Senate's ultimate reasoning when discussing structural and legal provisions. The Selective Service was envisioned to be the infantry reserve manpower that would be mobilized in case of a total war. Because women were banned from ground combat units, it was reasoned that they should be excluded from the Selective Service as well (Stiehm, 1989). This rationale perpetuates the culture of the masculine warrior and that the military is solely comprised of foot soldiers. As will later be shown, women's exclusion from the Selective Service was also used as an argument against their full integration into the all military specialties.

The Gulf War, from August 1990 – February 1991, was the first opportunity for women to fully participate in the United States military as regular members in an operational capacity.<sup>119</sup> Over 35,000 active duty service women participated in the Gulf War (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2011; United States Department of Defense, 1992). An ABC news report called the Gulf War a “watershed” moment for women in the

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<sup>119</sup> Though women were still banned from combat service, it was the first major international operation during which there was no longer an auxiliary corps and women were regular members of military units.

military and the United States more generally (Herf & Jacinto, 2003). Unlike Vietnam, women found themselves in the thick of battle rather than being relegated to rear-echelon or headquarters bases. While still barred from ground combat roles, women served as truck drivers, logisticians, supply officers, military police, and transport pilots, in addition to the more traditionally gendered medical and administrative roles. With the increased participation of women also came war's consequences. Fifteen women were killed in the Gulf War, and three, Rhonda Cornum, Crystal Rickett, and Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, taken prisoner of war (United States Department of Defense, 1992). The presence of women on the battle field, coupled with the unprecedented media coverage of the Gulf War put women in the military front and center.

Despite their participation in the Gulf War, women in the military faced both cultural and practical barriers to service that led to their departure at higher rates than men. Culturally, they were confronted by (male) senior leaders that did not see them as future leaders. Women often did not have access to the mentorship or encouragement that their male counterparts did with regards to their career progression. They were frequently ignored, or even discouraged from pursuing service after their initial commitment. At an Armed Services Committee Hearing, Dr. Edwin Dorn, a senior staff member at the Brookings Institution and specialist in military and personnel issues, asserted "I was struck by the complete failure of senior officers to assert leadership during a seminar,<sup>120</sup> when a young woman asked a serious question about her career opportunities as a Navy

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<sup>120</sup> The Seminar being referenced was a "flag panel," an open forum where flag officers answered questions from mid-level officers.

flier and was greeted with derision” (United States House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, July 29-30, 1992).

### ***Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture***

To discuss the claims about women’s service in the United States military, it is important to look both at the claims *for* women’s participation in the military and the claims *against* it. The claims for and against came from both inside and outside the military. Further, women were leaders on both sides of the argument. The tensions over women’s military service reflects the women’s movement in the United States lack of unified belief about the role of women in public life and the difference between men and women, as seen in arguments for individual women’s right to serve in the military often being in tension with claims about the role of the military or military culture.

The claims for women’s increased participation in the military largely took the form of feminist interest-group activism, with individual women coming together to “demand the right to job assignments based on competence, not gender ... and the right to be treated with the same respect as the men next to whom they work” (Katzenstein, 1998, pp. 46-47). In the case of women in the military, the “interest” being pursued was individual access to jobs or careers. For those that were vocal about women’s increased participation, it was not to further the equality of women more generally or to enhance women’s political rights, but to ensure that each individual was able to achieve her own desires based on her own competencies.

The role of formal women's groups in lobbying for women's increased participation was limited, and often surprising. Second wave feminist women's movements in the United States were largely anti-war, and saw "peace as a feminist issue."<sup>121</sup> However, despite the general anti-war sentiment, NOW became an unlikely yet important ally to those seeking greater opportunities for women in the military. NOW's 1980 position paper on the "Registration and Drafting of Women" is emblematic of the duality of impact that the women's movement in the United States had. On the one hand, the position paper argued for a shrinking of the military and an abolition of the selective service all together in order to diminish the "war atmosphere" in the United States and by extension the world more broadly. However, NOW is realistic in acknowledging that the military is not going to disappear, nor are the militaristic aspects of government.

In the name of equality, NOW therefor argues both for the inclusion of women in the Selective Service and expanded opportunities for women in the active duty military forces. NOW's logic rests on two primary aspects. First, it focuses on the operational impact and necessity of women in the military. Women "will have to fight," the position asserts, "because the military has difficulty attracting sufficient numbers [of men] who are educated and technically trainable." As 50% of available pool of the youth workforce, women were argued to be necessary to fill the ranks. NOW's argument doesn't end with numbers. Women were argued to be *better*, for both the military and the country. Though overall opposed to war, the position paper recognized that if a war was to be fought, a

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<sup>121</sup> This mantra would continued to be used into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century with protests against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led by members of NOW.



force that was the most competent and most able to handle the changing technological landscape of war would be necessary. As women were proving themselves in university and the workforce, the argument was made that they were better suited for the ever-evolving technological capabilities of the military. Yet the position paper also asserts that including women is the only way to work towards a society “free from war.” If war is to be stopped in a democracy, the whole of society has to be responsible for fighting it. By including women, they would be sure to vote against going to war.

Also pronounced throughout the position paper is the idea that gender-based discrimination in the military has an overall negative professional impact on women. The ultimate result of restrictions placed on women, NOW argued is that “women are given fewer training, educational, and advancement opportunities in the largest single vocational training institution in our country.” The crux of the argument was not about war and fighting, but about affording the opportunity for women to advance within the military as a career, as well as receive equal opportunities for post-military employment in the civilian world.

These claims based on occupation and economics had more staying power, and resonated more closely with members of the military than those based purely on women’s rights or equality. Indeed, individual women in the military were more concerned with their professional prospects than the strategic goals of the nation. In the 1970s and 1980s, women’s claims to service were less about their operational accomplishments and more about their access to the professional aspects of the military. As one enlisted Air Force mechanic put it, “there were no women on the flight line, and you can’t get to be a tech or

master [sergeant] without leadership time on the flight line ... so I knew it wasn't going to be a career for me" (Stiehm, 1989, p. 261).

Absent an overarching equal rights framework, those making claims for increased women's participation relied on the experiences and stories of individual women. For example, individual female military aviators were crucial in gaining support for the language in the National Defense Authorization Act that lifted restrictions on women's combat flight service (Gellman, 1991). In 1991, nearly a dozen female pilots flew into Washington, DC to share their personal experiences with members of Congress on the House and Senate Armed Services Committee. While Air Force General McPeak publically voiced his opposition to women's service based on his beliefs about women, female aviators were there to give their first-hand accounts of being able to "pull-Gs" (physically endure the gravitational force of rapid acceleration and aircraft maneuvering), conduct bombing missions, and endure the possibility of having to survive behind enemy lines or as a prisoner of war (U.S. Senate, June 19, 1991).

In addition to discussing their personal capabilities, women focused on their inability to be professionally competitive with their male counterparts because of the legal restrictions on their service. For examples, experiences and claims by women that did not choose flying careers in the Air Force were as important as those that did in this respect. For example, Heather Wilson,<sup>122</sup> one of the first women to graduate from the Air Force Academy, twice turned down appointments to flight school, despite her lifelong love of aviation (she had learned to fly before she learned to drive). Upon being asked

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<sup>122</sup> Wilson was appointed Secretary of the Airforce in May 2017, and has been a vocal supporter of women's increased combat participation (DACOWITS, 2018).

why, she responded I didn't want to be kind of driving a bus from Dover, Delaware to Frankfurt, Germany ... The Air Force is about combat, you can't get around that ... If you want to command, you really need that experience. Do you want to join a law firm when you know you'll never be a partner?" (As quoted in Gellman, 1991). Wilson left the Air Force as a Captian in 1989, citing her belief that she could do more good for the country out of uniform than in, due to the *de facto* limitations on women's leadership (DACOWITS, 2017). As restrictions have been dropped from women's service, they have been hailed as a win for women's professional possibilities.

While organizations such as NOW and individual service women were supporters of women's increased opportunities in the military, not all women felt that increasing women's role would be beneficial for either the military or women. Both from within and without the military there was a move to discredit those advocating for military integration as "radical feminists" who do not have the "interests nor realities of women in the military or military operations in general" at heart (Miller, 1998). The tensions between feminists, largely self-identifying as liberal, and military leaders, largely identifying as conservative played out in this debate.

From outside the military, Phyllis Schlafly, founder of the Eagle Forum, and Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness, personified what was dubbed the "antifeminist" movement. As noted in Chapter 2, the antifeminist movement was largely a backlash to the possible ratification of the Equal Rights amendment. It focused on self-professed "family values," and argued that a women's role was that of a domestic nurturer. Women's increased military service, especially in positions that could

result in combat service, was antithetical to their professed values. In a 1991 report for the Heritage Foundation, Phyllis Schlafly asserted that

The combat exclusion laws are a rational legislative recognition of fundamental differences between men and women ... Fighting wars is a mission that requires tough, tenacious and courageous men to endure the most primitive and uncivilized situations and pain in order to survive, plus determination to kill enemies who are just as tough, tenacious and courageous, and probably vicious and sadistic, too. Men are attracted to serve in the military because of its intensely masculine character. The qualities that make them good soldiers - aggressiveness, risk taking, and enjoyment of body-contact competition - are conspicuously absent in women. Pretending that women can perform equally with men in tasks that require those attributes is not only dishonest; it corrupts the system. (Schlafly, 1991, p. 6)

Schlafly's arguments were reflective of the masculine combat-focused culture of the United States military. The arguments against women's participation were based largely on emotion rather than the experiences of women in the military or systematic operational studies. They drew on the belief that men would be unable to perform their duties in the presence of women, and that for society to function properly women must be protected from war (MacKenzie, 2015).

The need to protect women, not only from war, but from what was deemed the "reality" of being in the military was used as an argument against women's increased participation. Elaine Donnelley, then a member of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Services deemed sexual assault an "occupational hazard" that women in the military would inevitably be exposed to not only at the hands of the enemy but by their fellow service members (As quoted in *Washington Post*, June 11, 1992).

## ***Outcome***

While the policy changes of the 1970s and the all-volunteer force provided more opportunities for women in the military, structural enabling conditions made the reality of service difficult. For example, women were discharged from service when they became pregnant, and single mothers were not allowed to enlist. To address these issues, women often took legal action against the Department of Defense or particular service. For example, Stephanie Crawford, a 21-year old single woman was discharged from the United States Marine Corps upon becoming pregnant. Further, she was denied reenlistment, even when she presented evidence to a recruiter that she had secured child care to cover any potential duty requirements. For both the discharge and the denial of reenlistment she sued Commandant Robert Cushman, claiming that the decision to discharge her was made solely on the basis of gender. The court in *Crawford v. Cushman* (1974) found that discharging women upon the discovery of a pregnancy was a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, yet upheld the services' right to consider pregnancy on a "case by case" basis.<sup>123</sup> As a result, women could not be discharged merely for being pregnant, but if commanders deemed that motherhood interfered with operational requirements, women could be separated. Because neither Congress nor the Department was willing to engage with motherhood, it was left up to the courts.

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<sup>123</sup> Court transcripts available at <https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/378/717/2124978/>

Benefits for dependents were also decided in the courts. In *Frontiero v. Richardson* (1973) it was decided that benefits could not be differentially given to service members based on sex.<sup>124</sup> Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the Air Force, sued the Department of Defense over the provision that she to prove that her husband was dependent on her for more than one-half of his financial support. Notably, the case had to reach the Supreme Court before Lieutenant Frontiero was granted benefits for her spouse. Lower courts ruled that the provision was “reasonable” because men were frequently the breadwinners, and women claiming support could result in frivolous expenses for the government (Stiehm, 1989). However, the Supreme Court found that the provision violated the due process clause, and made an arbitrary distinction between men and women.

These course cases are representative of the legal action that service women had to take to either receive the same benefits as their male counterparts or overcome gender-based discrimination (Stiehm, 1989). Many of the individual services’ provisions were written by male senior officers and constructed in line with the conservative values that military leadership has historically espoused (Janowitz, 1988). Without overarching legal protection for gender equality, women had to make individual claims and hope to gain structural provisions in a piecemeal manner.

The final years of the Cold War saw two major policy changes initiated from the top-down (rather than through bottom-up pressure). First is the codification of restrictions

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<sup>124</sup> Court transcripts available at [https://scholar.google.com/scholar\\_case?case=14820310635656011394&hl=en&as\\_sdt=6&as\\_vis=1&oi=scholar](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14820310635656011394&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholar)

on women's occupational assignments. In 1988 the Department of Defense adopted a universal policy on women's occupational assignments. Deemed the "Risk Rule," it revised the standard to be used when determining women's military service. Rather than universally barring women from permanent assignment to ships or combat units, it "excluded women from units or missions if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture were equal to or greater than the risks in the combat units they support" (Burrelli, 2013). This rule allowed women to be permanently assigned to support (noncombat) units and ships so long as that unit was not under reasonable risk of engaging in direct combat. While the rule opened nearly half of all occupational specialties to women (U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1988), it was also subjective, leaving it up to the services to determine what constituted "direct combat" and "risk." Decisions on where to assign women were left up to the male commanders who often defaulted to conservative definitions of risk, choosing to keep women non-deployable units as much as possible. While this rule increased the professional opportunity for women in the military, the subjectivity of assignment policies would ultimately hinder women's functional participation. The impact of these restrictions will be discussed in more detail below.

Second is the dropping of some restrictions on women's ship and aircraft service. After the fallout from the Navy's Tailhook scandal (Boyer, 1996) and the reality faced by women in the Gulf War (Nantais & Lee, 1999), there was a renewed push to evaluate and expand the formal roles open to women in the military. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1992-1993 addressed this by repealing the statutory prohibition

on women's assignment to combat aircraft and Naval vessels. It also allowed for women to be permanently assigned to sea-duty, increasing the potential for promotion and command opportunities. The act also established a Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces to study the impact of increased opportunities for women and offer advice and guidance as to whether any more wide-sweeping policy changes should be enacted.

On November 15, 1992, the Commission issues its report (Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, November 15, 1992).

Among the Commission's many recommendations are the following:

- Military readiness should be the driving concern regarding assignment policies; there are circumstances under which women might be assigned to combat positions.
- The sense of the Commission is that women should be excluded from direct land combat units and positions. Furthermore, the Commission recommends that the existing service policies concerning direct land combat exclusion be codified. Service Secretaries shall recommend to the Congress which units and positions should fall under the land combat exclusions.
- Retain the DOD Risk Rule as currently implemented. Navy policies which implement the Risk Rule should be modified to reflect the changes made in the NDAA for FY 1992-1993.

It is notable that the Commission used "combat positions" in their recommendations concerning where women would be necessary, but "direct land combat" for their recommendations on exclusion. This continued the belief that women were unsuited for ground combat and the protectionism spirit of the laws related to women in the military. Indeed, the recommendations of the committee echoed those of many military general



officers at the time.<sup>125</sup> Notably there was little objective research on the suitability for women for or their impact on combat units (Harrell & Miller, 1997). Decisions were made more on emotion and upholding the traditional military status quo.

While there were increased opportunities for women that emerged in the later years of the Cold War, women were not able to effectively impact the military. Women's increased participation was predicated on women adhering to male standards and masculine culture. For women to succeed, they had to adhere to military culture. The structure of the military did little to accommodate women or leverage their unique characteristics.

## **Era 2: The Post-Cold War World**

### **Proving Women's Success**

In the post-Cold War World, the United States military shifted its focus from balancing the Soviet Union to grappling with more complex and multi-dimensional definitions of security (Buzan, 2008). The military began to shift its focus from large-scale war towards "military operations other than war" and "security and stability operations" (Moskos, 2000, p. 17). However, despite this shift in mission, the military remained focused on combat readiness, and continued to preference conventional military operations and forces.

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<sup>125</sup> For example, in a 1991 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, Senator William Cohen (Maine) asked air force General Merrill McPeak whether or not he would permit a "woman pilot of superior intelligence, great physical conditioning, in every way superior to a male counterpart vying for the same squadron position" to fly in combat missions. General McPeak answered "No, I would not. I admit it doesn't make much sense, but that's the way I feel about it."

Additionally, in the post-Cold War era, women were able to take advantage of newly opened positions on ships and in aircraft. However, they continued to face opposition both from within and without the military. Even with women's continued success in the military, the United States was one of the last countries to formally allow women access to all military occupational specialties and operational environments. The individual success of women did little to help "women" more broadly gain access to the military. Women were still largely expected to achieve success on their own, and the military rarely responded to women's presence with changes to policies, tactics, or strategies.

### ***Structural Provisions***

At the end of the Cold War, women had access to previously closed positions on ships and in the air. However, despite these *de jure* allowances, there remained many *de facto* restrictions to their service.

**Table 6.4: Summary of Structural Provisions during the Second Era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Barriers to Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Banned from ground combat roles</li> <li>- Allowed in combat ships and aircraft</li> <li>- Geographic restrictions on women's service</li> <li>- Segregated training</li> <li>- Not included in the Selective Service</li> </ul>
Childcare / Parental Leave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creation of on-base child care facilities, but not guaranteed access</li> <li>- Parental leave left up to individual services</li> </ul>
Sexual Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Per commanders discretion under the UCMJ</li> </ul>

Table 6.4 highlights the structural conditions at the end of the Cold War. While gains were made that allowed women to formally participate in the military, much of the enabling structure was left up to the individual women. Many of legal changes made at this time were a response both to the recommendation of the Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, and needs of the services in the post-Cold War era.

In the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspen issued a memorandum clarifying definitions in the Risk Rule and offering guidance to Service Secretaries with regards to the assignment of women (Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 13, 1994). The memo stated that effective October 1, 1994 “Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.” Direct Combat was further defined as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fires and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile forces personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.” Secretary Aspen further asserted that the services could impose additional restrictions on women’s assignments when:

- The cost of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements being prohibitive;
- Units and positions doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct combat units that are closed to women;

- Units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Forces missions; and
- Job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service members. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 13, 1994)

While these provisions did open more positions to women, they continued to allow for subjectivity in the actual assignments of women.

In addition to changes in what women were allowed to do in the military in the 1990s, there were also changes in structural provisions. H.R. 1277, passed as part of the FY 1990 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to use Department of Defense Funds for the “operation and maintenance of military child care facilities.”<sup>126</sup> The passage of the law was largely in response to concerns about both the unique demands on military life and the affordability of child care for lower-paid enlisted personnel. Unlike Norway and France, the United States did not have a national childcare scheme, and parents were thus left with the burden of both finding and paying for child care that would cover the hours required of military work. While the act expanded the network on on-base Child Development Centers (CDC) and created a payment scheme based on rank and family income, it did not guarantee that childcare would be available for all service members. Both availability<sup>127</sup> and accessibility<sup>128</sup> have often made utilizing

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<sup>126</sup> This is included in the post-Cold War era as it was not to be implemented until 1993

<sup>127</sup> Waitlists for care are upwards of 3 years in the larger duty-station areas (DACOWITS, 2017)

<sup>128</sup> Service members are put on a waitlist for any CDC within 30 miles of their duty station, given infrastructure constraints this can add 2-3 hours of commute time, often resulting in parents exceeding their maximum daily allowance for child care (DACOWITS 2018)

the facilities impractical for service members. While there were changes made to account for child care, parental leave was up to the individual services.<sup>129</sup>

Concerning sexual assault and harassment, it was largely left to commands to handle allegations of misconduct or abuse on a case by case basis under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It was argued that the mission of the military was such that civilian interference in issues of good order and discipline would harm the unit cohesion necessary to win the nations wars (Stiehm, 1989; Stimson, 2013). It was not until 2004 that then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld created the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO). Yet even with the creation of SAPRO, commanders maintained jurisdiction over adjudicating accusations. SAPRO's purpose was the track incidence and create sensitivity and awareness training, not to prosecute or provide legal assistance for victims.

Keeping prosecution of sexual assault and harassment in the hands of commanders has been the subject of much criticism. It has been argued that the relationship between commanding officers and their troops is such that victims will not report incidents that happen within the unit. Further, the inherent bias that exists towards men in the military prejudices commanders. As CEO of Protect Our Defenders asserts, leaving sexual assault prosecution up to unit commanders results in "standalone systems that create friction, broken processes, and victims who do not receive justice" (Jensen, 2018). This has largely undermined the contributions that women have made to the military, and prevented meaningful change (DACOWITS, 2017).

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<sup>129</sup> Maternity leave time ranged from 0-12 weeks, and would often change yearly

### ***Functional Participation***

The functional participation of women in the United States military follows closely from women's participation in the Gulf War. Occurring immediately before the end of the Cold War, the increased visibility of military women on the global stage paved the way for women's increased participation in both domestic and international operations. However, despite increased participation, the United States military had a retention problem with regards to women's service. Women were more likely than their male counterparts to leave the service after each cycle of enlistment.

**Table 6.5: Summary of Functional Participation during the Second Era of Women's Participation**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Measure</b>
Level of Participation	- Approximately 10-12% of overall Force
Type of Participation	- Primarily Medical Logistics and Administrative - Increase in aviation and surface navy - Banned from Combat Arms and submarine service
Overseas Participation	- 5-6%

Table 6.5 highlights the functional participation of women. Most notably during this period the security environment necessitated a change in function of individuals in the military, and women were often called to do things that were outside of the purview of the MOS for which they were trained, and often skirted the laws about women's combat participation. The reality of women's functional participation was thus more a reaction to external forces than an intentionally designed military force and highlighted the struggle that women in the United States faced with regards to integration.

The visible and ubiquitous coverage of women's role in the Gulf War had an impact on their military participation. Women's experiences in the Gulf War were used as claims for increasing women's roles in the military. With women accounting for fifteen of the war's casualties, it was hard to claim that women were not fighting or had been free from harm's way. As Pat Schroeder, Representative from Colorado and member of the House Armed Services Committee asserted during a subcommittee hearing on the ground combat ban, "Women have proved themselves in the worst environment and dispelled the myth in this country that they wouldn't be able to handle it" (United States House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, July 29-30, 1992). Given the experiences of women in the Gulf War, it was difficult to continue the assertion that women were not suited for combat service. Additionally, having already braved bullets, it was further difficult to claim that women needed to be protected from war.

However, not all of women's experiences were positive or praiseworthy. Female POWs recalled stories of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of their Iraqi captors (Nantais & Lee, 1999; Sciolino, 1992). A 1995 Department of Defense survey found that more than half of the women in the military reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment, with the percentage significantly higher for those that had deployed to the Gulf War. This rate was nearly twice the rate of civilian women (Firestone & Harris, 1999; Bastian, Lancaster, Reyst, & E., 1996). Most of the women reporting harassment or abuse claimed that it was perpetrated by men in their own units. The prevalence of harassment between service members, coupled with the 1992 Tailhook Scandal

(Zimmerman, 1995) raised questions not about women's physical or tactical competency, but about whether women were socially and culturally suited for war.

Largely because of the negative coverage of women's service, in the years between the Gulf War and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, women again were primarily relegated to garrison service and leadership roles. With the combat exclusion and Risk Rule still in place, women experienced a *de facto* ban from reaching most of the highest ranks in the military. However, one place where women did make sufficient inroads in the mid-1990s was in the aviation communities. With the ban on combat aircraft lifted women had access to fighter and attack communities, as well as aircraft carrier service, necessary requirements for promotion to flag officer.<sup>130</sup> The air force was the one service that did not experience negative retention rates in the 1990s, and has historically had the highest percentage of women service members.

Despite the limitations on women's service, the number of women in the United States government continued to grow. However, the percentages of women give only a snapshot of women's service. Women spent less time in the military than their male counterparts and have historically been under-represented at senior ranks and in leadership positions. Though by the mid-2000s women comprised nearly 14% of the commissioned officer corps, they were less than 7% of senior officers. For the years that data on women's rank and retention has been reported<sup>131</sup> there is a -15% retention rate

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<sup>130</sup> It is notable that the Navy and the Air Force have had the most senior leaders. In those services there is a clear path to flag officer for aviators, while the Army and Marine Corps largely require infantry service for their most senior leaders.

<sup>131</sup> The DoD does not report data yearly. Data points come from the years that NATO has requested it as part of their committee on gender perspectives or when specifically requested by DACOWITS.



overall between men and women (NATO 2016). In general, the retention rate is worse among enlisted service members than officers. Indeed, at every point in their career, women are more likely than men to leave the service (DACOWITS 2017).

### ***Claims About Service and Interaction with Military Culture***

In the years following the Cold War, women's service remained in tension with military culture. Scandals such as Tail Hook were used as evidence that women didn't belong in previously all-male units. The small number of women in these roles also allowed for dismissive tokenism. After combat aviation units were open to women, there were very few women that chose to fly these aircraft. From 1994-2001, there averaged less than one female aviator per combat unit. The small number of women made it possible to dismiss their success as being exception and out of the norm. Women that were successful recall being told that they were "not like other women," or "really one of the guys."<sup>132</sup>

Individual women that were successful in the military further encouraged younger service women to adopt male characteristics in order to be successful. As Kate Germano, former commanding officer of the Recruit Training Battalion responsible for training female Marines recounts, "my goal was to make the place training women no different than any other place in the Marine Corps, and therefore female Marines no different than any other Marines" (Germano & Kennedy, 2018, p. 81). From the first days of training, women were told to be successful they were to act like men. This reinforced the

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<sup>132</sup> Remarks by Amy McGrath, 2016

masculine culture of the military and made it difficult for women to make inroads to increased integration.

The masculine culture of the military strengthened physical arguments against women's service. Arguments were made that women were not "tough enough" to meet the physical demands of ground combat, or would "run away" if faced with the reality of having to kill the enemy (TRADOC Analysis Center, 2015). Further, the differential physical fitness standards for men and women were frequently used to argue that if women were to participate in ground combat units the standards would be lower, and they would therefore put their fellow infantrymen at risk (MacKenzie, 2015).

During the 1990s, claims against women's service perpetuated because there was little operational evidence of women's success. With the restrictions on women's participation, assertions that women would be ineffective in combat situations went largely untested. It was believed that admitting women to combat positions would weaken the military as a whole (Bell, 2013). The Gulf War forced the conversation about both the changing nature of warfare and the reality faced by women in the military. Given the media coverage of the event, the American people were confronted with the reality that women in the military served an operational capacities. However, the momentum of women in the Gulf War was short lived. While the service of women was seen as exceptional, it was a "flash in the pan." In the post-war years, and it was expected that women would return to "normal" support and administrative roles when they returned home (Nantais & Lee, 1999).

## *Outcome*

In the 1990s, attempts for women to claim increased participation had largely stalled. The military downsized in the post-Cold War World, and the women were not seen as necessary to fill the ranks. And while women were participating in previously closed occupational specialties, promotion and leadership roles remained largely closed due to perceptions of women's service. In an interview on NPR, Major General Heidi Brown asserted that "gender shuts the door for me."<sup>133</sup> Despite commanding an Air Defense Artillery Brigade during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, MGen Brown viewed her gender as her biggest stumbling block. Throughout the interview she recognized how women were often "left behind" by military leadership due to the restrictions placed on them.

The cost of childcare and the demands of family life also caused women to leave the service at a higher rate than men (DACOWITS, 2018). Proposals to increase child care provisions were constantly met with resistance, forcing service members to often choose between a military career or family life. Of the women that have attained the rank of 3 or 4 star in the United States military, most have not had children.<sup>134</sup> Family life is seen as largely incompatible with a military career, and often women feel that they are rewarded for foregoing "traditional" family lives (Rollins, 2011).

Military strategy and doctrine is further reflective of women having little impact on the military. The 2000 National Security Strategy focused on technological

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<sup>133</sup> Rachel Martin, A Lonely Club for Women in Top Army Jobs, National Public Radio (February 25, 2011), <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/25/134025084/a-lonely-club-for-women-in-top-army-jobs>.

<sup>134</sup> Remarks from Lieutenant General Fran Wilson, Seas Service Women's Leadership Symposium 2016

advancements and their ability to contribute to hard power projection against potential threats (House, 1999). While other Western countries were transitioning to focus on the human dimension of conflict, the United States remained focused on traditional military power and technologies. While individual women may have had the ability to succeed, women, in general, were still largely hindered from having a meaningful impact.

### **Era 3: Post-9/11**

#### **Finally an Opening for Integration?**

The post-9/11 era, and the United States' involvement in the Global War on Terror (primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan) provided the testing ground for the impact that women are able to have on the military. The level of troop commitment and the frequency of deployments meant that over 85% of women in the armed services participated in a combat deployment between 2001-2009 (DACOWITS, 2010). Women now had experience to base their claims not only on access to a career but on operational outcomes. Indeed, (male) commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan noted the need for women if they were to be successful in both tactical and strategic outcomes (King, 2014; Lemmon, 2015).

As noted in the opening of this chapter, women in Iraq and Afghanistan were engaged in what essentially was ground combat despite the legal prohibition against it. As a result, women's claims evolved from demanding equal access to a career, to demanding formal and legal access to the occupational specialties in which they were already *de facto* participating. Yet despite women's active (and often public) participation

in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there remained open opposition to formalizing women's participation in ground combat operations.

Even in the mist of operational evidence, requirements for military participation were a large part of claims against formalizing women's participation in combat roles. Though women had proven necessary, and even successful in Iraq and Afghanistan, they weren't infantry soldiers, and had not been through formal infantry training. The physicality of ground combat and the infantry military occupational speciality in particular was frequently discussed in addressing the suitability for women's service. Fears about "lowering standards" so that women could participate was a concern voiced by both military leaders and civilians opposed to increased women's participation (Schogol, 2017). Evidence used to back up these claims was based on the average physiology of men and women rather than the actual performance of women in ground combat training. The reliance on averages<sup>135</sup> was necessary because for most of the time that women's service was argued in the public arena, women had not had the opportunity to attempt to meet the requirements of ground combat service.

Rebuttals to the claims against women's physical capabilities were largely consistent with the individualistic nature through which women have historically fought for equality. While it was generally accepted that the *average* woman was less physically capable than the *average* man, arguments were made that the military was not focused on recruiting "average" citizens, but dedicated to finding the best (Schaefer, et al., 2015). Further, proponents of more formal inclusion for women argued that gender should not

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<sup>135</sup> Often general averages among the American population, not averages of men and women in the military

be an arbitrary barrier for women, and that qualification should be based on *individual* competency.

Despite the role that women played in Iraq and Afghanistan, claims about their participation still largely were in conflict with military culture and the belief about the role of the military. In Afghanistan, women were called back from their missions when members of congress became concerned about their safety and the implications of women “being at the point of the spear” in combat operations (Bumiller, 2010). As a result, the women were severely restricted in what they were allowed to do operationally, causing many of them to leave the unit. As one female Corporal noted, “I’m too much of a girl to make a difference” (Bumiller, 2010). The feelings of helplessness of female servicemembers was reinforced through assertions that their presence was antithetical to the military’s “nearly spiritual glue” that enabled men to be successful in war (Newbold, 2015 ).

Yet even in this contentious environment, on December 3, 2015 then Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced that all military occupational specialties would be open to women. His rationale stated that opening these positions would allow the services to “harness the skills and perspectives that talented women have to offer” (Pellerin, 2015). Yet despite the opening of positions, the skills and perspectives of women have yet to be made a priority.

It is notable that the decision to open all occupations to women was met with fierce resistance both internally and externally to the military. Unlike France and Norway, where women’s military participation was accepted as part of larger measures

on equality, in the United States, the military was seen as different and distinct; not the place to hold “social experiments.” In response to women’s increased participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, lawmakers worked throughout the 2000s to reaffirm and strengthen the “Risk Rule,” and ensure that no women were facing the potential of engaging with the enemy on the ground (Tyson, 2005).

The tension around women’s participation in previously closed ground combat has created an environment in which even with the opportunities to participate in the occupations and mission sets often required for leadership, women are unable to affect meaningful change. Much of this is a result of the way that the military has implemented the new policies. Women who have qualified for infantry or other combat arms are concentrated in one or two units, and are barred from operational participation until a “sufficient number” of women have qualified (DACOWITS, 2017). This also creates the perception of a few special “female centric” units in which standards are lower and they’re not really preparing for combat.<sup>136</sup> As a senior enlisted male noted, “Integration is more about moving women around to look good, not actually make better warfighters.”

Despite both the experience of women in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the changes in laws that have opened positions to women, emotion and opinion have dominated the attempted integration process. Indeed, the externally combat focused culture has allowed argument that women are a “distraction,” or antithetical to combat readiness to perpetuate (MacKenzie, 2015). Such an environment has continued to isolate women, rather than leverage their skills and perspective. A 2016 internal DoD survey found that nearly 70%

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<sup>136</sup> Fort Hood, Texas focus group with first integrated unit.

of women did not feel that their perspectives were valid when it came to either day-to-day operations or tactical missions (Fairley, 2017). Indeed, despite continued increased participation, women are still largely unable to make the change indicative of integration.

Women continue to express that they feel rewarded for acting like their male counterparts and conforming to a culture that “accepts that boys will be boys and that’s how you fight.”<sup>137</sup> The culture of masculinity has indeed persisted, keeping women on the outside unless they are willing to conform.

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<sup>137</sup> Senior Enlisted female, Camp Pendleton, CA



## **Chapter 7:**

### **Conclusion**

In July 2016, civilian and military leaders from all NATO countries gathered in Warsaw, Poland to lay out its future security vision. It addressed issues ranging from cyber security to increased Russian militarism and aggression to how to address the self-proclaimed Islamic State. While each country brought its own specific geographic concerns, and political and military solutions to the table, there was one overarching consistency among participants: the importance of women to the future of both NATO and global security. In the official Communique from the Warsaw Summit, leaders of NATO nations professed:<sup>138</sup>

Empowerment of women at NATO and in our militaries makes our Alliance stronger. We attach great importance to ensuring women's full and active participation in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well as in post-conflict efforts and cooperation. Since our last Summit in Wales, we have made good progress in implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and related resolutions. Yet, more work is to be done, which requires enduring leadership, transparency, and accountability. We welcome recent high-level appointments in both NATO's civilian and military structures. However, there are still shortfalls in the representation of women at NATO that need to be addressed. ... Our Strategic Commands are now operationalizing the approved Military Guidelines on the Prevention of and Response to Conflict-

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<sup>138</sup> Speeches Archived at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm)

Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. ... Our ongoing efforts and commitment to integrate gender perspectives into Alliance activities throughout NATO's three core tasks will contribute to a more modern, ready, and responsive Alliance.

Women's participation, but more importantly their perspectives, was recognized to as essential not just for women's issues, but for global security as a whole. However, the member states do not have a unified or consistent history with women's integration, nor do they operationalize it in the same way. While several member states have National Action Plans, six still do not. Additionally, several of the National Action Plans are primarily externally-facing, highlighting how gender and women's issues will be factored into their interaction with post-conflict societies or in international affairs, not with their domestic governments.<sup>139</sup> Further, it was not until 2016 that the gender advisor program was streamlined within NATO. And while all but two countries<sup>140</sup> are currently participating in the program, it also fails to address improving domestic integration or representation in either military or high-level civilian positions.

The high-level emphasis on the need for increased women's participation yet lack of meaningful details on how to do so is representative of the divergent histories with and understanding of women's integration into the military specifically and thereby the formal security sector more broadly. It has been largely accepted that women are not only a positive force, but a necessary one for enduring peace and security (Simić, 2010;

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<sup>139</sup> For examples, the NAPs of the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, France, and Germany all emphasize the importance of "promoting women's rights around the world. The focus of domestic representation is on their country's representation to organizations such as the UN and NATO, with little to address how to increase women's integration at home.

<sup>140</sup> Hungary and Luxemburg

Paffenholz, 2018; Willett, 2010; Hudson, 2012). However, *how* to ensure women's participation in a sustainable and meaningful way still remains a question. Both civilian policy makers and senior military leaders have committed to increasing the number and influence of women in the military, yet even with increased targeted recruitment campaigns have met with little success (Yeung, Steiner, Hardison, Hanser, & Kamarck, 2017). A contribution of this dissertation is in confirming that culture and meaningful structural support for women, matters. A one-size fits all approach to increasing the impact of women, even among NATO countries, will not be successful due to historical and cultural drivers that have and will continue to shape women's engagement with and integration into the military.

### **Integration: Slow Moving and Impactful**

One of the driving motivations for this dissertation was to understand why women's integration has been so divergent among Western militaries when several other aspects of military policy and doctrine have greatly converged. From air power, to ground scheme of maneuvers, to rules of engagement and escalation of force policies, ISAF countries have adopted nearly identical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in the past fifteen years.<sup>141</sup> This convergence largely emerged out of operational necessity, allowing for militaries to work together in a joint environment towards common tactical and strategic outcomes. Given that gender perspective and increased

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<sup>141</sup> See reports from the Joint Air Power Competence Center, and NATO and Afghanistan topic cell for a broader discussion on the convergence of tactics.

women's rights were an espoused goal of military operations in Afghanistan, the convergence of the use of women in combat could be expected. Yet where operational decisions on the use of aircraft and tactical ground formations were easily adaptable, the cultural norms surrounding women made it harder to pivot both policy and practice towards convergence. Indeed, foundational beliefs about equality are entrenched, and even the exceptional nature of war cannot overcome them.

Notably, the external demands of warfighting in Afghanistan drove the convergence of many of the tactics and strategies of many ISAF countries. Whether the mountainous terrain (Posen, 2002) or the simultaneous kinetic military operations and state building actions (Capstick, 2007), ISAF countries reacted to the environment and worked together to come up with innovative and effective solutions to work jointly. Historically, the exceptional nature of the external demands of warfighting have been argued to be strong enough to overcome norms about women's participation in the military (Goldstein, 2001). However, such studies focused almost solely on the wartime participation, and women's participation in specific moments of fighting. Indeed, the exceptional nature of the war in Afghanistan did lead to women's increased participation, and women engaging in combat activities at an increased rate. However, despite an increased participation by women in nearly every ISAF country, there remain variations on how women were used, the impact that they had, and their experiences in the military. Despite the exceptional nature of war, and the joint tactical and strategic aims, the underlying beliefs about gender equality were stronger than the external factors and these differences endure.

The stickiness of the beliefs about women's equality highlights that integration is a slow-moving process that unfolds gradually overtime. It cannot be understood by looking only at how many women are in the military at a snapshot in history, but requires a holistic and qualitative view of the impact that women have on the military. The twin forces of beliefs about gender equality and military culture interact to create conditions that are either permissive or restrictive for women to integrate. Internal factors and beliefs are more important than external necessities, and are hard to overcome. The process does not happen quickly. As Ronald Inglehart (1977) observed several decades ago, Western values are slow to change, and even when there are shifts in priorities, underlying beliefs and sociopolitical organizing frameworks, including gender roles and hierarchies, endure. The case of women's integration confirms this, in that even in the face of a changing international security environment beliefs about equality endure and greatly influence women's ability to integrate into the military. Additionally, integration as a slow-moving process confirms the assertions by March and Olsen (1989) as to the iterative nature of institutional change. The institutional nature of military culture is an important part of a country's sociopolitical identity. Changing it results in a "series of actions and reactions that need to be calibrated before the ultimate consequences can be understood" (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 56). Integration is a cumulative and cyclical process that requires taking history into account to better understand it.

Further, the dominance of domestic beliefs over international factors during war emphasizes the importance of focusing on the impact that women have, rather than the rate at which they are included. During war, there is often an increase in the number of

women. Women's participation is often highlighted during war, as women's presence on the battlefield is a stark contrast to the traditional image of the soldier. The number and prominence of women during war makes it an attractive course of study. They also provide quick and easily digestible snapshots into a complex and slow-moving process and have given policy makers a platform to tout successes in women's recruitment in the past decade (Schjølset, 2013). However, these quantifiable moments in time do not explain the variations in either the tactical impact that women have had or their experiences in the military. By focusing on how women have shaped military policy and practices I have differentiated between inclusion and integration. Truly, if women are having an impact we can assume that they are more fully integrated as a part of the institution from which they were previously excluded. The experiences of France, Norway, and the United States highlight how integration is not something that can be accomplished quickly nor be measured by the numbers of women or laws pertaining to their involvement.

### **Understanding Women's Integration in a Global Context**

In this dissertation I focused narrowly on three Western militaries. However, the lessons about the interaction between beliefs about equality and military culture are important in a global context. In recent years, nearly every NATO and NATO partner country has opened all military occupations to women<sup>142</sup> (NATO, 2017). Additionally,

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<sup>142</sup> Turkey is the only country that has not yet opened all positions to women and does not have a timeline for lifting of occupational specialties.

the overall number of women in militaries is continuing to increase. However, the experiences of women in the military, and the role and impact that women are able to have in the military remains varied across countries. As laws and numbers become more and more convergent, it becomes more important to understand the drivers of the difference.

While the specific experiences with integration in each of the countries presented here are unique to historical and cultural context, there are lessons learned about integration that can be applied to and tested in a broader empirical context about the interaction between beliefs about equality and military culture and tradition. As Western countries are increasingly emphasizing the importance of joint missions,<sup>143</sup> better understanding an aspect of the military that has not converged will be important for both military commanders and policy makers. While the emphasis of military operations is often on understanding the cultural nuances of the environment in which the military is operating, my findings show that the cultural differences among militaries required to work together is also important.

The findings from the cases of France, Norway, and the United States are highlighted in Table 7.1.

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<sup>143</sup> In 2006 and then again in 2016 NATO countries took a pledge for “Interoperability in Joint Missions.” All NATO members as well as the Partnership for Peace nations signed on to the pledge that their domestic training would be conducted in such a way as to ensure joint operating possibilities.

**Table 7.1: Summery of Findings**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Claim</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Integration Outcome</b>	<b>Key Findings</b>
France	High Difference High Government involvement	Rooted in change and responsibility to former colonies	Permissive environment that allowed the cycles of integration to occur	The value placed on women acting as women created an environment where women were able to drive change and easily adapt to changing external necessities.
Norway	Low Differences High Government involvement	Focused on making Norwegian citizens	Initial leader into integration and then stalled	The value placed on women as citizens created initial expansive opportunities for equality but were slower to respond to external needs
United States	Mixed Difference Low Government Involvement	Continued emphasis on conventional military force	Non-permissive environment that made it hard for women to integrate	The value placed on the success of individual women led to a disparity in experiences and slower advancement for women overall



In France, the claims about women's difference and the view that the government played an active role in promoting and ensuring equality interacted favorably with the military's culture to create permissive conditions for integration. Women were able to draw on their experiences in the past to emphasize the importance of the unique contribution that they bring. This was echoed in the specially selected units in Afghanistan that ensured that women were present as infantry soldiers. The doctrine around values promotion and the definition of national security as being related to peace and democracy emphasized in the 2012 White Paper on National Defense further reflects the impact that women's service has had on the military. While there were initial setbacks because of the focus put on the difference between men and women, the national structure that provided for the unique needs of women made a culture of finding equality in the difference possible. This allowed for adaptability when a women-focused unit was necessary.

In Norway, the claims about women's similarities and strong role of the government in social policies made it an initial leader in women's integration. The military, like much of Norwegian society, as a model of egalitarianism and an incubator for the de-gendering society. However, the emphasis on the de-gendered aspects of service made it difficult to address the changing needs of gender in geopolitics as seen in the response to the cultural needs of women in Afghanistan. Though Norway had one of the most senior female combat commanders in Afghanistan, cultural norms made it hard to leverage gendered aspects of service in the operational environment. When external conditions dictated that women were needed to leverage their unique characteristics, there


was not the language or the claims to express this. This has resulted in a stalling of women's integration. However, new efforts to revamp the military structure through efforts like the Hunter Troop, and universal conscription's influence in increasing the visibility of women in the armed forces may be ushering in a new cycle of women's integration into the military.

In the United States, the individual focus and lack of congruent claims about equality, and a lack of government involvement in promoting equality, coupled with the military's combat focus hindered women's ability to have an impact and truly integrate in the military. Individual women achieved great success, though largely conformed to the conventional military culture to do so. While continually a leader in the number of women in the military at any given point in time, there has been little progress with regards to policies that impact women or tactics reflective of women's unique contribution. Further, while great progress was made with FET and Lioness teams, there has also been backlash due to the temporary nature of the programs and the enduring legacy of the combat exclusion and risk rule policies. Despite the United States being a leader in several areas of military innovation, domestic beliefs have hindered women's integration. It remains to be seen how the roles newly opened to women in the combat arms will either allow claims to be made more strongly or allow those successful in combat arms to serve as a basis on which future claims for increased integration will be made.

Bringing these findings into a broader empirical context further highlights the importance of the nuance of the interaction between beliefs about equality and military

culture. Looking broadly across NATO, we see that France, Norway and the United States are representative of general trends in Western Democracies. One way to see this is through quantifying the measures of gender integration. Quantifying integration provides a helpful visualization of grouping countries for further study, yet is limited in its application. By assigning values<sup>144</sup> to each of the components of integration discussed in Chapter 3, I am able to index the various components in order to quantify the variation between NATO countries.

**Figure 7.1: Quantified Women’s Index for Select NATO Countries 2016**



The quantification of women’s integration is most helpful as a visual representation for the variation that is present in advanced Western democracies, countries are frequently grouped together because of both their mutual security guarantees as part of NATO and their democratic political systems. It also allows for grouping of countries for future, more in depth study.

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<sup>144</sup> See Appendix B for an explanation of measurement

However, the quantification of women's integration suffers from several data-driven limitations. First is the lack of standardized definitions or reporting about women's participation. NATO did not standardize their annual report form until 2016. Prior to that, there was no standard for how women's participation was operationalized. For example, conscripted forces were often excluded from reports on the percentage of women in the services artificially inflating the number of women in the services (Schjølset, 2013). Additionally, for several countries, demographic data on members of the military was not kept until after the passage of UN Resolution 1325. As Frank Steder noted, "the number were so small that demographic data wouldn't be very helpful."<sup>145</sup> Given the limited uniformity of the data, an historical comparative quantitative analysis is difficult. Indeed, the quantitative representation only presents a current snapshot of integration without taking historical progress into account.

Additionally, much of the data, specifically that concerning the use of child care and parental benefits, as well as instances of sexual harassment or assault, rely on self-reporting by service members. Similar to the reporting about women's participation, there was no standardized method of collecting this data until NATO's 2016 annual report. While there is value in being able to see the progress of a country over time in this data, the historical lack of standardization makes comparing across countries difficult. It also carries a potential self-selection bias of those that choose to participate in surveys or feel comfortable enough to report harassment or abuse. As a result, countries with strong norms around reporting harassment and a strong track record of prosecuting offenders

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<sup>145</sup> Interview January 2018

(such as Denmark) look “worse” than countries in which harassment is not reported because it is believed it will not be properly adjudicated (such as Italy), despite antidotal evidence that the problem is wide spread.

The observable difference in women’s participation highlights the importance of taking an historical institutional approach to studying integration and to more closely examining the variations in beliefs about equality that exist between Western countries. While there is value in observing the current variation, rather than focusing on laws or numbers, beliefs about the nature difference between men and women and the government’s role in ensuring equality need to be further examined. The process, and the path that a country took to integration is important for understanding the longevity and durability of integration. There are several countries that have recently opened their militaries to women (for example, Italy), and have achieved a seemingly very high level of integration in a very short time. However, without a greater understanding of the cultural and political history, and the degree to which the claims about women’s participation match with military culture, it will be difficult to determine whether or not integration is truly lasting or merely temporary. Further, with converging policies, yet continued variation, understanding political culture is increasingly important to both the study and practice of military integration.

In addition to highlighting the importance of viewing integration as a slow-moving process focused on qualitative outcomes, this dissertation makes contributions to both the scholarly and policy communities. From a scholarly perspective, it contributes to both the study of women in public life and the study of the military and war. From a

policy perspective, it has implications for the internal military policies as well as the future of joint operations.

### **Other Limitations and Possibilities for Future Research**

The small number of women that have served and the lack of historical data-consistency presents challenges in researching women in the military. Indeed, due to the small numbers of women that have historically served, many countries have not quantified their contributions outside of war-time participation (Steder, forthcoming). Historical accounts are thus reliant on narratives from women that served or those that served with women. Most often such accounts come from more senior women or exceptional cases. While their stories and perspectives are important for understanding women in the military, their experiences may not be generalizable. Military structure preferences seniority, and junior members may not either feel comfortable speaking out or have the mechanisms through which to honestly share their experiences. Similarly, the writings and statements from women's movements often have an elite-bias. The "feminist consciousness" has primarily been recorded by women that have had the access to formal channels of power, or the means to self-publish and promote (Katzenstein, 1987). Additionally, they are also centered on the concerns of more upper class women, often leading to divisions and fissures among women in a particular country (Banaszak, Beckwith, & Rucht, 2003). For this reason, the writings used to inform the claims about women's role in public life may not be reflective of the broader beliefs held by all women in society.

The shifting culture to the all-volunteer force may exacerbate the elite bias in future research. For Western countries in particular, the all-volunteer force is creating a widening cultural and socioeconomic gap between officer and enlisted classes (Griffith & Bryan, 2016). As this gap widens, intersectional forces such as poverty, race, the urban-rural divide, familial affinity for military service, and educational attainment may overshadow gender in their stickiness with regards to the ability of certain groups to impact the military as an institution.

However, this dissertation also creates much opportunity for future and follow on research. First, with the standardization of data collection by NATO, there is an opportunity to more quantitatively track integration, and expand the work done. Especially for countries that have newly opened positions to women, tracking future changes will help to more robustly test the relationship between political culture and women's integration.

Additionally, there is work to be done in testing the impact that female leaders have on the military. While there is a growing body of literature on the impact of women's role in politics, senior military leaders are largely absent from these studies. While there is currently a very small cohort of female senior military leaders, there is an opportunity for systematic engagement at this early time to measure impact on military practices and policies.

## **Broader Implications of the Dissertation**

### ***Implications for Scholarship***

From a scholarly perspective, there are two primary areas in which this dissertation has important implications. First is the study of women in political and public life. Second is the study of militaries and war. While these areas are seemingly contradictory, there are important lessons for each to be gleaned from the process of integration.

### ***For the Study of Women***

Viewed as part of the broader studies on women in public life, this dissertation contributes in two important ways. First, it highlights the importance of viewing women's movements not as isolated events, but as part of a broader social and political dialogue and tradition. Indeed, women's movements are isolated events, nor do they exclusively impact "women's issues." In this dissertation, I show how even though not explicitly targeted by the women's movement, the military was impacted by the types of claims made and the policies for which women's movements successfully lobbied. Indeed, women's movements are part of a culturally dependent and broad sociopolitical beliefs.

Further, the military is a form of political participation by women that is still largely under-studied. As I noted in Chapter 3, most studies of women in the military focus on the relationship as being one way, emphasizing how the military impacts women. However, as I showed in this dissertation, women can have an impact on the military as well. In order to more fully understand the impact of women in public life, it



is important to look not just at how women come to participate in traditionally masculine institutions, but at how they shape and change them. Further examination of women's choice to join and remain in the military, and the ways in which they can impact military life is thus important to more complete understanding of women's public and political participation.

Finally, it emphasizes the importance of qualitative studies of women's roles in public life. The surge of quantitative studies in the mid-2000s were an essential step in emphasizing that "women matter" to and have a positive impact on public and political life (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005; Hudson & Den Boer, 2002). However, despite the near-universal rise in women's participation in public life around the world, there remains variation in the degree to which women have been able to impact their societies and democratic institutions. A more in-depth examination of the process by which women came into public life, and the variations in the culture and institutions is necessary to unpack the impact that women in politics and the public arena have had.

#### *For the Study of the Military and War*

Though charged with the monopoly on the legitimate use of political violence, the military is more than just killing people and breaking things. The military serves both a domestic and international purpose that is beyond violence. Understanding women's integration in the military helps to further illuminate the role of the military in society, and sheds light on the lasting impact that military culture has on the political process. Indeed, militaries often take the culture of the environment in which they are fighting into

account, however rarely evaluate the role of domestic culture in shaping tactical outcomes. The study of women's integration highlights the role that the culture of those fighting is as important as the place where the fighting is being done.

As Risa Brooks notes, political culture, social structures and institutions contribute to military effectiveness (Brooks, 2007). While she was primarily focused on the outputs of the military, and military power, in this dissertation I showed that culture, social structure and institutions are also important for the inputs to military activity. This highlights the importance of studying women in the military outside of war, and incorporating women's integration as part of the broader study of military effectiveness.

Understanding the role of domestic civilian culture helps to better understand what tactics and strategies are transferrable between militaries. In the era of increased joint fighting, there is an increasing push for cross-national military studies (Welle, 2010; Rietjens, 2008; Alford & Cuomo, 2009; Larsdotter, 2011). Women's participation in the military has been no exception to this (McBride & Wibben, 2012; Erwin, 2012).

However, there is often a lack of cultural context to such studies. In this dissertation, I showed that cultural context and institutional history is an important part of understanding of not just integration, but the resultant variations in military tactics and strategies as well.

### ***Implications for Policy Makers***

In addition to scholarship, this dissertation contributes to the policy discussions around women's participation in the military. Especially since the passage of UN

Resolution 1325, increasing the number of women in militaries has been a priority of virtually every country. Indeed, NATO as a whole has made increased gender representation a priority of its leadership core. Numerous countries have commissioned studies on either how to increase the share of women in their military or the lessons to be learned from other countries (Burrelli, 2013; Berkshire Consultancy Ltd, 2010; Cawkill, Rogers, Knight, & Spear, 2009). The most common approach to “solving” the problem of women in the military or responding to internationally-focused studies has been to create new laws that increase opportunities for women, or adopt recruitment policies aimed specifically at female recruits.

However, as I showed in this dissertation, laws alone do not mean that a military is integrated. While important initial conditions, the sociopolitical culture and the military history plays an important role in ultimately determining integration. This helps to explain why despite a convergence of laws still there has still been a divergence of outcomes in integration. Indeed, implementing a law will not be effective if the claims needed to support it are not present. The most evident example of this is seen in the dropping of restrictions on women in combat roles. Despite the convergence on the decision to drop the restrictions on women’s service, women have not joined at similar rates. Indeed, several countries<sup>146</sup> still do not have any women in combat arms positions. Laws and policies must be supported by claims that are compatible with military culture if integration is going to be successful.

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<sup>146</sup> There is no mandatory reporting on the breakdown of occupational specialties. For those that did report, United States, Germany, and Denmark reported no women in ground combat arms. It is reasonable to assume that there are others as well.

Senior military leaders can also benefit from an increased understanding of the troops with which they're working. Understanding the nuance of the variations in integration will help military leaders to better utilize troops under their command in the most effective ways possible. Indeed, militaries could benefit from cultural studies of their allies as well as their adversaries.

### **My Commitment to Women, Peace, and Security**

I came to this dissertation out of a desire to better understand my personal lived and observed experience as part of the United States Military who has taken part in several joint-ISAF combat missions. When I began work, I focused almost exclusively on military policy, and viewing the military as a unique institution in the WPS framework. Through the process, however, I came to better understand the importance of placing the military as an institution on equal footing with others, especially when advancing a comprehensive WPS research and practice agenda.

Especially in Western democracies, WPS is most often viewed as something that is required for international work, especially in newly emerging democracies, or post-conflict societies. However, as shown through the historical-institutional approach to gender integration, cultural learnings are essential for ensuring WPS at home. If we are going to use international frameworks to encourage culturally-appropriate mechanisms for gender integration abroad, we must do so at home.

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## APPENDIX A

### FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

I use a structured focused comparison to evaluate the variations in women's integration in the militaries in France, Norway, and the United States. The below framework is used in each chapter.

#### 1. Military Culture

- a. What are the historical beliefs about the role of the military?
- b. How does the military view itself? (internal vs external orientation)
- c. How does the civilian population view the military? (internal vs external orientation)
- d. What types of missions is the military typically involved in? (values vs combat)
- e. How are individuals promoted and rewarded in the military?
- f. What is the connection between military service and citizenship?

#### 2. Structural Conditions

- a. What are the laws concerning women's military participation?
- b. What are the policies around child care?
- c. What are the policies around parental leave?
- d. What are the policies around sexual harassment / assault?

### 3. Functional Participation

- a. What role did women play in the military?
- b. What occupational specialties did they hold?
- c. What was their role in overseas operations (training, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, war)?
- d. What was their role in domestic military life?

### 4. Durability

- a. How long did women typically stay in the military?
- b. How many women were senior officers? Staff noncommissioned officers?
- c. What leadership roles / command positions did women hold?

### 5. Claims about Service

- a. How did women frame their service?
- b. What did they call upon to make claims about service (historical events, women in other aspects of public life)?
- c. How did the claims about service coincide or conflict with military culture?

### 6. Outcome

- a. What impact did women have on the military?

- b. What policies were made to make it easier for women to serve?
- c. What tactics reflected women's roles in the military?
- d. What strategies reinforced women's participation?

## APPENDIX B

### CODING SCHEME FOR QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF INTEGRATION

#### Legal

Component	Description	Value
Barriers to Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Occupational fields closed to women</li> <li>Geographical restrictions on women's service</li> <li>Quotas/limitations on number of women able to serve in a given unit</li> </ul>	0 = Women excluded from the military 0.25 = Women Auxiliary / Limited ranks 0.5 = Women allowed in gendered roles only 0.75 = Women allowed in all but ground combat 1 = No restrictions on women's service
Childcare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provisions for childcare during all operational hours</li> <li>Provisions for childcare during deployment</li> <li>Equality in maternity / paternity leave</li> </ul>	Division of Parental Leave 0 = No parental leave 0.25 = Maternity leave only 0.5 = Maternity + Paternity, but paternity optional or negligible 0.75 = Maternity + Paternity, but paternity significantly less 1 = Equal maternity + paternity leave  Child Care 0 = No formal child care policy/private care only 0.5 = Mixed public/private care 1 = Nationalized child care
Sexual Harassment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Laws on harassment / assault (military and national)</li> <li>Number of allegations of harassment or assault</li> <li>Nature of investigation and prosecution of alleged instances of harassment or assault</li> </ul>	Laws 0 = No formal laws 0.5 = Military policies that put prosecution in the hands of commanders 1 = Laws that require third-party review

#### Functional Participation

Component	Definition	Value
Level of Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women's Participation as percentage of total force</li> </ul>	Percentage as a decimal
Operational Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women's Participation in overseas missions</li> <li>Breakdown of combat vs peacekeeping vs training missions</li> </ul>	Percentage as a decimal

## Durability

Component	Definition	Value
Staff Noncommissioned Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of SNCOs that are women</li> </ul>	Percentage as decimal
Field Grade Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of field grade officers that are women</li> </ul>	Percentage as decimal
Flag Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of field grade officers that are women</li> </ul>	Percentage as decimal
Retention Rate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage more/less that women reenlisted compared to men</li> </ul>	Percentage as decimal

## Values

COUNTRY	Legal Restrictions	Level of Participation	Flag Officers	Senior Officer	NCO	Durability	Operational	Retention	Childcare	Parental Leave	Sex Assault	Integration Index
USA	1	0.159	0.0068	0.1253	0.3466	0.4787	0.18	-0.15	0	0.5	0.5	2.6677
CAN	1	0.151	0.008	0.082	0.354	0.444	0.117	0.068	0.5	0.75	0.5	3.53
UKG	1	0.101	0.0008	0.1055	0.205	0.3113	nd	nd	0	0.75	0.5	2.6623
FRA	1	0.152	0.0007	0.0406	0.5147	0.556	0.066	0.066	1	1	1	4.84
SPA	1	0.126	0	0.0243	0.0853	0.1096	0.069	0.0726	0.5	0.75	0.5	3.1272
POR	1	0.11	0	0.047	0.2558	0.3028	0.06	-0.03	0.5	0.5	1	3.4428
BEL	1	0.078	0	0.089	0.3935	0.4825	0.05	0	1	0.75	1	4.3605
NTH	1	0.095	0.0003	0.1054	0.3761	0.4818	0.071	0.0141	0.5	1	0.5	3.6619
GMV	1	0.113	0.0001	0.0696	0.548	0.6177	0.056		0.5	1	0	3.2867
DEN	1	0.064	0	0.039	0.2315	0.2705	0.077	0.0483	0.5	0.25	0.5	2.7098
NOR	1	0.107	0.0054	0.249	0.2026	0.457	0.077	0.017	0.5	1	0.5	3.658
ITA	1	0.041	0	0.019	0.127	0.146	0.045	0.108	0.5	1	0.5	3.34