U.S. Democratization in Post-Cold War Russia: A Critique

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U.S. Democratization in Post-Cold War Russia: A Critique

A Thesis
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Master of Arts

by
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States are path dependent entities that deviate solely in the face of catastrophic failures in the pursuit of axiomatic ends by conventional means. The inertia of bureaucratic institutions, a foreign policy consensus within a self-reproducing elite of experts, the self-interest of political elites and a sense of “national self” or identity lead states to understand themselves in light of a history and a relative level of status on the world stage. Since the end World War II, the U.S. has a certain path that places the spread of democracy and laissez-faire capitalism extremely important if not vital foreign policy goals. In the case of the transition from the Soviet Union to Russia through the 1990s, movement toward laissez-faire capitalism and democratization were conflated and the U.S.’s democratization programs in Russia from 1989 to 2004 were predominantly focused on the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism to the former socialist republics. These programs were shaped by and in line with a rendition of modernization theory proposed by Francis Fukuyama and scholars sharing his ideologically shaped views. This theory assumed that positive outcomes like democracy and market reform were related, interconnected, and self-reinforcing. This is incompatible with the theory of democratization I’ve built, based on the works of Norm Eisen, Larry Diamond, and
Seymour Lipset. Moving forward this ideological position must be abandoned to implement efficacious democratization programs. However, given the role capitalist values, corporate interests trade play in the U.S.’s political path I struggle to see that change being made.
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CHAPTER ONE: PATH DEPENDENCY

By virtue of existing in a politically, and economically, interconnected world, modern states inevitably evolve an elite of foreign policy officials, intellectuals, and low-level officers with ideological commitments to a state's “path” across what Bismarck calls “the stream of time.” ¹ This path is self-reinforcing as alliance patterns are formed, other states determine the incompatibility of their foreign policy goals with other state’s, and every year new classes of bureaucrats and diplomats learn “the way things are done.” This path dependency is stronger than the wills, and whims, of elected officials and the political appointees they put atop these agencies. Although there is some evidence to suggest destroying the agency entirely is possible, they can do little to change the fundamental goals, and traditional methods of achieving those goals, that agencies engage in. Assuming they didn’t share those same fundamental goals to begin with. ²

Over the course of this paper I will outline the paths I perceive as central to Russian and American political development. This will necessarily include philosophical and ideological conceptions of “identity” and the international order. Secondly, I will consider the question of states engaging in foreign “democratization missions” and then

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directly respond to the theoretical models of democratization put forth by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.

I will, also, build my own action model based on the theories of Juan Linz, Larry Diamond, Seymour Lipset, and Norman Eisen. Thirdly, I will describe the policies and actions the U.S. undertook from 1989 to 2004 in Russia and Eastern Europe. I believe that traditional democracy supporting apparatuses, funded programs, public speeches, and seemingly unrelated actions had a direct effect on the viability of the U.S. democratization mission in Russia. Finally, in comparing the theoretical model of democratization and the policy record of the U.S. I will offer my critique and an insight into the true intentions of U.S. democratization efforts in this instance.

What a state has done in the past is a heavy weight on its future actions; potentially even more so internationally than domestically. A state’s previous actions, history of engagement, and conception of the intention of other actors will compel that state to enact a foreign policy that is, very often, consistent with its historical record. As early realist scholar Hans Morgenthau wrote in *Politics Among Nations*, “a state’s foreign policy is largely consistent within itself.”\(^3\) In fact, Morgenthau argues that his ambition in realism is to create a model of international relations that does not assume the directive preeminence of the wishes and whims of particular leaders; whether that is because they are ineffective at orchestrating change, governing, or simply enunciating what policy changes they envision. In effect, Morgenthau was arguing against the liberal tendency he

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saw at the time to hypothesize that states, undergoing leadership transitions, could also undergo massive policy transitions as well.

He disagrees, and I take as a base assumption, that regardless of transitions of power between political leaders and political parties a state’s foreign policy, dependent on the inertia of entrenched interests, is largely consistent. The failure to enunciate policy wishes was not an issue for current Russian President Vladimir Putin who formed his policy prescriptions in the late 1990s.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its transition into 15 independent nation-states of various sizes, ethnic make-ups, and political wills the modern Russian Federation was born in turmoil. Current President Vladimir Putin described the fall of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent transition, as “the major geopolitical disaster of the century”. 4 Changes to political power centers, economic projections, physical borders and demography, and the calculation of “Russian” national interest happened over the course of years and against a backdrop of societal chaos.

In the U.S., the collapse of the Soviet Union was received with shock by sovietologists, and for some, a world of possibility opened before them. This would be a time in which America could at least share, by gloved hand or iron fist, the gifts that G-d had bestowed on this new land, according to the American Protestant tradition of John

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4 “Did Vladimir Putin Call the Breakup of the USSR 'the Greatest Geopolitical Tragedy of the 20th Century'?.” @politifact. Accessed October 21, 2019.  
Winthrop. Preceding William Krystal and Robert Kagan’s “Project for the New American Century”, that made early calls for a “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy and the forced spread of democracy to Iraq, America’s intention to spread freedom and democracy had already begun in the former Soviet bloc.  

There have been mass amounts of scholarship on the Iraq War project and the intentions of spreading democracy to the Middle East that the Bush Administration professed, partially goaded on by intellectuals like Kagan and Irving, in the modern era. However, the U.S.’ commitment to the spread of democracy has far deeper roots. American democracy building has had dual philosophical underpinnings in American exceptionalism and the ethical implications of liberal hegemony. This phenomenon has, at times, been lauded by the left and right wings of congress for ostensibly different reasons. As such, we’ll explore these philosophical routes beginning with the theology of American exceptionalism provided by John Winthrop aboard the Arbella in 1630. Next, we’ll consider liberal hegemony and a philosophy of inalienable human rights in President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points address and its mirror in CIA Director Robert Gate’s invocation of the Monroe Doctrine and security theory of democratization.

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6 Ibid

Finally, President George W. Bush’s own *Bush Doctrine* and support for democracy building will close our historical review of the philosophical underpinnings and, more-or-less contemporary, manifestations of American democracy building.

In her analysis of U.S.-led legal reformation movements, Cynthia Alkon describes a “cookie-cutter syndrome” at work in the reformation of post-communist legal systems. Roughly stated, consultants and academics assume a perfect model of their own legal system and recommend simply establishing it in these post-communist countries.  

We will briefly address Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington whose conceptions of democratization, I believe, fall into this cookie cutter trap. Finally, as a key project of this paper, relying heavily on Larry Diamond’s *The Spirit of Democracy* I’ll build our theoretical model with which to compare the historical record. This model will necessarily include Diamond’s consideration of enforced democracies, the role of economics in democratization, and the value of a “history of democracy” in the state undergoing a democratizing project.  

In *Critique of the Goethe Program* Marx, addressed the imagined phenomenon of a new socialist system “just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every

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respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.”  

In other words, the new society is necessarily impacted by and, in part, made up of the previous historical movement. In discussing the transition from the Soviet System to the anarchy of the mid-1990s in Russia and then to the modern Russian Federation, we’ll consider “birthmarks of the old society”. In the case of the development of Russia as a modern state these birthmarks are a retarded history of democratization efforts, historical events cemented in the Russian political consciousness, and pre-modern political organizations that reflect the geographic necessity of development on the Asian Steppe.

Finally, we’ll address the empirical question: What were U.S. efforts in Russia from 1989 to 2004, successful or unsuccessful. It is ultimately my goal to outline the governing premises of U.S. democratization efforts in Russia from 1989 to 2004 by first describing those efforts in their historical context. Then we’ll compare them to theoretical models of democratization and develop a theoretical framework for appreciating why the U.S. acted in the way it did. As well as the implicit goals of the programs the U.S. actually adopted and attempted to implement in Russia.

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CHAPTER TWO: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY BUILDING EFFORTS

In 1630 aboard the Arbella, Minister John Winthrop delivered A Modell of Christian Charity. A sermon to his band of pilgrims about their future settlement in the new world. This sermon, I would argue, is the foundational text of a uniquely American religion. Winthrop does two things in his address to the prospective settlers. First, he describes the position of this new land and of the settlers and himself. They are, to Winthrop, in a position of divinely granted superiority and hold an immense responsibility. For Winthrop, there are two groups, divinely ordained, as the rich in spirit, wealth, and potential, and the poor. \(^{11}\) That gap cannot be eliminated but it must not grow so wide that it irrevocably divides society into warring groups dividing the wholeness of the body of Christ enmeshed in every person. The duty for the rich and their posterity is to give and govern justly; “in exercising his graces in them, as in the great [sic] ones, their love, mercy, gentleness, and temperance” says Winthrop. \(^{12}\) He also famously closes his sermon, clearly setting himself and his followers among those who can only be described as rich saying,

\(^{11}\) Winthrop, John. "A modell of Christian charity (1630)." Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society 7 (1838): 47.

\(^{12}\) Ibid
“For wee must consider that wee shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. Soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our God in this worke wee haue undertaken, and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, wee shall be made a story and a by-word through the world.” 13

For Winthrop, and Americans who shared in this theology and labored under the same Calvinist G-d, the U.S. and its people are special among nations and must bear the responsibility that entails or face divine wrath. This thesis provided a theological foundation for American expansion and when, after great effort and bloodshed, the country reached from shore to shore the national identity acquired a second pillar, the civic religion of inalienable rights and liberal hegemony. Or perhaps one could say that for non-believers Winthrop’s theology of exceptionalism assumed the shape of a civic religion. At the same time Exceptionalism transformed from what H.W. Brand calls “exemplarism,” whereby the U.S. is distinct from Old World Politics and is a model for their rebirth, to “vindicationalism” which shares Winthrop’s city on a hill identity but must act to spread its universal political values.

This universal “vindicationalism”, I must be clear, was not always present. John Quincy Adams once said, “‘America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” and although it is stretch to say America had any more than an isolationist streak this was a potential branching point from a

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Jacksonian foreign policy. 14 A Jacksonian foreign policy being a term coined by Walter Russel Mead in his 2002 book, as a foreign policy characterized by, “inward looking, shunned international engagement, but prepared to aggressively defend US national security if the country was threatened.” 15 This is the transition from Winthrop’s conception of America to President Bush and the modern American crusade for human rights. 16

In 2018, in The Great Delusion John Mearsheimer offers a critique of Liberalism as a theory of international relations and tool for developing foreign policy. 17 The heart of his critique is that liberal regimes, especially liberal hegemons where intent is paired with capability, have a core attachment to, and belief in, inalienable human rights. Predominantly in the twentieth century, other states have violated what U.S. liberal democratic regime considers fundamental inalienable human rights. At which point our regime has a moral duty to intervene through any means necessary to cease the violation of fundamental human rights, although it should be clear and Mearsheimer does not make it so, that U.S. government interventions, especially those predicated on force are


extremely divisive amongst self-described liberals. In addition, liberal theorists have argued that liberal democracies are less likely to, indeed virtually never, fight with each other and respect the human rights of their citizens. One such example was Maoz and Russet in their 1993 paper *Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace 1946–1986*, predicated on theoretical works like Thomas Paine’s *Common Sense* and Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*. 18 This, for Mearsheimer, leads to a pattern of behavior present in U.S. foreign policy whereby we merged a concern for human rights and security concerns to justify a policy of intervention. This belief in inalienable human rights has been critiqued by other realist scholars namely George Kennan.

In 1985, George Kennan readdressed his original critique of the moralistic tendencies present in U.S. foreign policy especially during the period of the cold war he studied. 19 In *Morality and Foreign Policy*, Kennan argued,

> “Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience.” 20

The government can’t be driven by the morality of the individual agents who make up the bureaucratic, executive, or legislative arms of the government but, as no internationally recognized system of morality exists, nor can it rely on any other universal system. The

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moral tendency that Mearsheimer identifies as driving Liberal interventionalist policy is condemned by Kennan as the illegitimate addition of a moral position to a fundamentally amoral process: foreign policy. Regardless of Kennan’s condemnation of it or the outputs of this pervasive moral tendency identified by Mearsheimer, the tendency exists and when merged with conceptions of “national interest” it is a strong incentive for a U.S. foreign policy project concerned with spreading freedom and democracy to all of the states controlled by the “bad guys” of the world.

These two rationales, and a moral drive to set the world right, for the duty of the U.S. has guided our democratization efforts as long as we have had them. Strongly present in the William Krystal, the Neo-conservative movement, and The Moral Majority, is a conception of America unique in privilege, and responsibility, to spread freedom and democracy where possible. 21 This responsibility is, in part, to secure the safety of the U.S.; but, also because democracy is a good in and of itself. Although, according to scholar Wendy Brown in her 2006 article, Krystal’s democracy mission is out of a contempt for a truly democratic society in favor of one in which state power is used punitively for moral agendas. 22 Additionally, because, as is stressed by right-wing interpreters of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War,


“the strong do what they can, and the weak endure what they must.” 23 The second conception, of an America that spreads democracy for the safety and preservation of the rights of others has held more sway with the ideological camp of the American “Left”. A seminal statement is embedded in the liberal, but racist, President Woodrow Wilson’s *14 points justifying US entry into World War I*.

In an address to the U.S. Congress at the close of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson lauded his 14 points outlining the ultimate aims of the war efforts. The majority of Wilson’s points from the adjudication of colonial claims, rejection of the “right of conquest”, and the freedom of trade, navigation, and sovereignty granted to post-colonial nations as well as the nations of Russia, Poland, Belgium, and France, whose territorial claims had shifted with the outcomes of the war, are indicative of the duties of democratization and liberalization described by Mearsheimer. For Wilson there can be no question that peace is achievable but not when illiberal regimes refuse to make amicable agreements with their citizens and the rest of the world. The Bretton Woods system, the United Nations, and the Universal System of Freedom of Navigation on the seas guaranteed by the U.S. is an attempt to arbitrate the world’s problems to avoid seeing those problems wash up on their shores the way the British, Spanish, and Japanese did before. The conception of liberal democratization efforts, born not out of a belief in human rights but in an attempt to make the world safer for American capitalism has been a persistent theme of US policy for over a century

President Reagan’s CIA Director Robert Gates was called to testify as a part of the Iran-Contra investigation in congress where he said to end U.S. intervention in Nicaragua would be “totally to abandon the Monroe Doctrine”. The U.S. not only could intervene in the western hemisphere but should to spread freedom and democracy as a safety measure. President George w. Bush took this notion just a step further in what has been called “national security liberalism” by Tony Smith in his 2000 article. Yes, America should spread freedom and democracy in vital areas to ensure national security but with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term “vital areas” became a lot more pliable.

At the 20th Anniversary party for the National Endowment for Democracy President G.W. Bush made a statement that laid bare the logic of national security liberalism. First saying, “As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace” President Bush drew a direct cause and effect between the spread of democracy, at any cost, to the security and stability of the U.S.


According to the 2002 National Security Strategy, the early 2000s were “a moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe” thanks to the position of unrivaled primacy afforded to the U.S. 27

I must stress that an analysis of the history of American philosophical conceptions of democracy and democratization, while useful for our purposes, is a predisposition. There, is and was, a tendency among foreign policy scholars to assume the confluence of cultural and international relations systems, like Lapid and Kratochwil do in their 1996 article. 28 Russian political system was synonymous with Russian cultural figures like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, writing tangentially to political subjects like notions of freedom and duty to the state. 29 This proved inefficient at predicting policy decisions. I want to say that while this philosophical history lends a predisposition to American foreign policy officials educated on a particular cannon this is not a deterministic force.


CHAPTER THREE: A HISTORY OF RUSSIA’S DISPOSITION TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

This predisposition is manifest in the history, bureaucratic structures, and alliance patterns that make up the U.S.’ path as I described earlier. Having discussed the history-created predisposition affecting a U.S. conception of democracy and democratization, however, we should describe the formation of an alternative path in Russian political, and social history.

The historical trajectory of Russian political development is marked by transitions towards democracy followed by harsh contractions when those democratic movements threaten some elite group. This expansion and contraction is mirrored in England and France’s own histories but the key difference is that Russia’s democratic expansion failed to secure democratic rights until much later and their political system was primarily tempered by the Mongol invasion and rule rather than the enlightenment and development of a liberal conception of human rights and the duties of a state. This historical trajectory is described best in terms of art, culture, philosophy, and political development by James Billington in *The Icon and the Axe*. 
For 200 years, proto-Russian communities and villages paid tribute to the Mongol Empire with taxes collected by the Russian princes who were allowed political rule so long as tribute was kept. This period of Mongol rule served to sever Russia from the historical development of Western Europe while leading to the implementation of several new systems of government including a postal system, census, tax collection system, and the expansion of capital punishment, once only applicable to serfs became universal as a punishment and torture was integrated into the judicial system. Historians, like Billington, have argued the degree to which this period influenced Russian political development, but this period does serve, uncontroversitely, as the foundation for a conception of a sovereign whose duty is solely to provide security without an expansive conception of the rights of citizens.

Contrary to this conception of absolute power ensconced in the sovereign; the “obshchina,” a system of communal ownership that preceded serfdom, and followed it until the collectivization of agriculture under the Stalin administration, existed in rural communities across Eurasia and Eastern Europe. As described by Alexander Chuprov, free peasants – in later centuries following the imposition of serfdom – serfs too (often the descendants of free peasants) formed villages where land was allocated to males forming new family units who didn’t inherit land as the eldest son. This allocation was

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carried out by a primitive government made up of the eldest member of each family unit which would mark and distribute new land to new families on the basis that they would provide for the common welfare of the “obshchina.” Jovan E. Howe explains,

"The economic relations so established are essentially distributive: through various categories of exchanges of both products and labor, temporary imbalances such as those occasioned by insufficient labor power of a newly-established family unit or a catastrophic loss, which places one unit at an unfair reproductive disadvantage in relation to its allies, are evened out.” 32

Family, of course, being defined by Patrilineal relations and distinguished from the previous household by a formal request to build a new family farm. This primitive government would also elect a village leader called a “starosta” and a tax collector. As Howe, argues in their book The Peasant Mode of Production, the obshchina developed as a means of practicality to ensure the equitable distribution of land and tax burden in the harsh Asian steppe.

These two systems are the foundations of different political ideologies, one a proto-democratic structure in line with the example of the “commons” described by so many economists and political scientists and the other an unabridged monarchy without constraints, acting as the representative of the nation to the world, and of G-d in the nation. The struggle between these ideas played out, Billington notes, again and again throughout Russian history.

First during the reign of Catherine (the Great), Russia had been going through some democratic reformations since the times of troubles, a period of instability after the

end of the line of Rurik the first monarch of the Kievan Rus. Peter (the Great) was vaunted to Tsardom and implemented westernizing reforms in the Russian court most importantly building the new capital of St. Petersburg, establishing the Russian navy, and emancipating the serfs owned by the Russian Orthodox Church. These reforms continued until Catherine, who saw the violence of the French revolution, cracked down specifically on the expansion of democratic reforms. She went so far as to repeal the specific provision passed by Tsar Peter and reinstated serfdom for those serfs previously owned by the Church. 33 Repeating this pattern, Tsar Alexander II (The Great Emancipator) ended the institution of serfdom universally. 34 Tsar Alexander III and Tsar Nicholas II, following Tsar Alexander II, engaged in nationalizing campaigns finalizing the suppression of separatist movements and purging Swedish and German cultural influences from Russian government and society. In the case of Tsar Nicholas II (The Bloody) regressive political reform went hand in hand with repression in the form of nationalist pogroms, waves of systemic violence against Russian and Eastern European Jews, and the Bloody Sunday massacre. Although Nicholas eventually gave into demands for reform and created the Duma, the Russian parliament, distinct from the previous Boyar duma which was an aristocratic advisory council to the tsar, their relationship was very poor. The Duma in 1906, one year after its seating, authored “An Address to the


Throne” demanding universal suffrage and the expulsion of ministers in favor of those selected by the Duma.

Domestically, the “birthmarks” of the Russian society before the Soviet Union, seem diametrically opposed to democratization, according to Seymour Lipset’s conception of “tendency towards democracy” which we will address later. Having a low literacy rate, a closed social hierarchy, low GNP per capita, and voluntary community participation hampered by geography and climate. With the exception of the institution of the obshchina that seems to be *prima facia* democratic and communitarian with regard to the rights of the individual and the needs of the community. Regardless they did democratize but that democratic expansion has historically crashed against elite institutions and groups without the resolution the democratic expansions of England and France underwent.
CHAPTER FOUR: PREVIOUS THEORETICAL MODELS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

There are existing theories of democratization that posit alternatives, realistic or otherwise, about how a nation should encourage democratization and what the role of a third party, in our case the U.S., should be. As I mentioned previously, the two, we’ll contend with are Samuel Huntington’s “Waves of Democracy” thesis and Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis. However, I’ll first define democratization in order to center a definition in our minds and to better understand what a democratic transition should look like in summation. For our purposes we’ll use Enrique Baloyra’s definition:

“This definition has some necessary and sufficient conditions including: the deterioration of an authoritarian regime, internal political conflict over conceptions of government, and the ushering in of a democratic regime or a popular government committed to establishing a democratic regime. As we’ll see however, Fukuyama and Huntington’s

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theories of this process don’t really contend with this definition or address the role states should play in it. Their theories are far more concerned with historical progression and the perceived ties between democratic and economic reform.

Francis Fukuyama characterized the fall of the Soviet Union and its historical moment as the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western Liberalism.”

36 In other words Fukuyama says that democracy is “the only game in town” Fukuyama makes two claims for his theory of democratization: 1) As stated above, there are no alternatives (not in any major population group or nation anyway) and 2) These alternative systems have not re-sprouted because their ideas have been so thoroughly rebutted. 37 38 39 This is of course a modern example of what scholars of democratization call modernization theory. The idea that the positive outcomes of economic expansion and success are tied, and coterminous, with democratic ones is seen as a means for promoting democratization. Additionally, states making serious attempts at democratic transitions are still precarious if they fail, coincidentally, to achieve some economic success, thus a successful, assumed capitalist, economy is a necessity for sustainable democratic change. This method of democratization is justified a little differently in Samuel Huntington’s *The Third Wave: Democratization in the 20th Century*; who argues states have little to no effect or reason to drive a particular model of democratization

39 Ibid
because, in this case, there is a historical progression taking place that has produced democracies in very unlikely places.

In a very short summary, Huntington analyzes the proliferation of democratic regimes from 1922 to about the 1990s and notices drastic fluctuations in the number of democracies. He determines there must be “waves” of democratization as opposed to the slow and steady march of democracy. Huntington argues that there are four potential explanations for these waves: 1) Single Cause, 2) Parallel Development, 3) Snowballing, and 4) Prevailing Nostrum. These explanations may explain particular waves of democratization; e.g. the third wave of democratization (from 1974 - undetermined) was provoked by the single cause of the oil shock-based economic collapse of the 1970s. Huntington’s theory describes both democratization and what he calls “reverse waves” which are historical patterns that explain failed democratization; waves of democratic expansion follow contractions. Contractions, not only, in the number of states who are democratic; but, how “democratic” these states really are in comparison to past democratic states and administrations.

The common theme of Huntington, and Fukuyama’s works, are that democratization is a natural phenomenon; simply the way of the world. For these theories, democracy is a particular phenomenon, with backstops and eddies, but the best possible response is to allow for its development and promote other policy priorities that can be guaranteed. For Fukuyama, those other policy priorities can be, and are, coterminous with positive democratic outcomes. With Huntington, democracy follows
this expansion and contraction pattern but the states who have adopted democracy, he admits, don’t seem to fit any sort of empirical pattern that could influence policy positions besides exclaiming your support for democracy.

Cynthia Alkon, in analyzing legal reform in post-communist states, writes about the tendency of the programs she studied to fall into “cookie cutter syndrome.” 40 This is the way in which western reformers treat nations as dough the “Western Liberal” cookie shape is pushed on to. If the cookie shape is followed, the rule of law, democratization, and reform will inevitably follow. For Fukuyama, that “cookie shape” is this updated modernization theory; where positive output A is directly correlated, and causative, with positive output B. States should pursue the proliferation of free market economics and the British legal tradition because democratization goes directly in hand with these other positive outputs. 41 The direct inputs in the form of expansion of legal traditions and capitalist economic policies, which can be directly controlled and implemented, lead to the positive outputs of the establishment and maintenance of these capitalist institutions and “democracy” which is so often measured by economic freedom, like in the CATO Institute’s Human Freedom Index. For Huntington, there are historic factors at play that have birthed democracy in the most unlikely of places regardless of the perceived


receptiveness of international and domestic actors to democracy. There is simply nothing to do but further analyze the waves of democratic transitions and either expand the theory into an explanatory position or wait for the next democratic wave after the current democratic crunch.\textsuperscript{42,43} Huntington’s theory clearly does not drive U.S. democratization nor is it particularly useful for understanding democratization as a process promoted by great powers. China, Iran, and Singapore clearly disagree about the viability of alternatives to western liberal democracy and they do not support democratization in any meaningful sense of the word.\textsuperscript{44} Huntington’s work is self-admittedly weak theoretically; succeeding only in analyzing specific historical moments, and even then it is unable to explain some specific democratic transitions or backslides.\textsuperscript{45} For all of these reasons, we will build a theory of democratization complementary to Baloyra’s definition that will analyze democracies not natural phenomena but as process to be driven as the U.S. has attempted since the beginning of its imperial age.


CHAPTER FIVE: A NEW THEORETICAL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION

In 1959, Seymour Lipset published one of the most cited papers in the history of the *American Political Science Review* titled *Some Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy*. In this piece, which was revisited by the author in later years but remained largely unchanged in its theory, Lipset lays out what he considers some necessary factors for democracy and outlines the effect each factor will have on civil society. He closes his piece with this helpful diagram (Table 1).

![Diagram](47)

This model serves as the basis of my own. In his 1993 speech, Lipset revisited the dearth of responsibility that he laid, in his original article, on economic factors in

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democratization. This was because Huntington’s Third Wave had gained prominence and the historical record no longer supported democracy as an exclusively Western phenomenon with the decolonization of Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia whose new states largely became democracies despite their poor economic fortunes. With poor states, like Namibia and Lesotho becoming, and maintaining their democratic status, wealthy, relative to their neighbors, capitalist states like Brazil slipping out of democracy status. The scholars who tend to challenge the view that affluence and a market economy are conditions of democratization have, in my judgment, the more persuasive arguments. In his article, analyzing the relationship between economic success and democratic political regimes, Adam Przeworski concludes, “In the end, there is not a single reason to sacrifice democracy at the altar of development.” Secondly, I have cut the “additional consequences” portion of Lipset’s diagram in my own model simply


because it isn’t particularly useful for my project. This paper is not an attempt to describe the consequences of the implementation of a democratic regime but solely the ways in which states attempt to do so externally. However, I do not have any reason to disagree with, or discount, what Lipset identifies as additional consequences.

Lipset is primarily concerned with the domestic factors that influence and help democratic actors build democratic regimes, and the institutions they rely upon. As such, before discussing the ways in which a foreign power can lean on internal forces in support of democratic reform, we should discuss the extant internal forces in support of, and against, democratic reform in Russia. Lipset points to an open class system as having a positive effect on democratic reform. Of course, for much of Russia’s history their class system with stringent delineations between the boyars (aristocratic class), merchants, and the peasant or serf class. After industrialization a certain percentage of the Russian populous moved to the industrial centers of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Novgorod forming an industrial working class parallel to the rural serf class. Today, this stringent class system has been shifted with oligarchs taking the role of the landed aristocracy and the average Russian citizen certainly doing far better than their serf compatriots but still marked as a lower class of Russian. 53

Lipset also points to a nation’s economic resources and the social safety net it can support as useful for democratization. According to Paul Kennedy, Russia’s gross national product (GNP) was relatively high through the 1800s but fell behind Germany, 53

France, and Britain as they underwent industrialization. Additionally, in Christopher Clark’s *Sleepwalkers*, he remarks on the value of the French state’s lending policies to Russia. Clark argues that much of Russia’s foreign policy in Eastern Europe at the time was dependent on free-flowing French state-backed loans. Today, Russian GDP lags behind most of the rest of the industrial world and is more in line with Middle Eastern states whose economic activity is almost exclusively based on oil production.

According to Lipset, the expansion of democratic reforms, key among them voting, is dependent on the ability of the populous to read, understand, and respond to a ballot because the orchestration of thousands or hundreds of thousands of in-person votes is nigh on impossible. Russia’s literacy rate in the early 1900s was relatively low until the *Likbez* literacy program implemented shortly after the 1917 revolution. In the 1990s and today, Russia’s literacy rate is on par with the rest of the industrialized world at around 99%.

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Later well discuss the implementation of democratic reforms in Russia and the key prevalence of elections and the working model of democratization, described within the text of the U.S. policy, that places elections as they key to democratic reforms. I want to stress that elections do not a democracy make. John Dewey delineates the multitude of systems and requirements that make an actual democracy a democracy. ⁵⁹ Universal suffrage, an independent judiciary, the ability to choose between competing conceptions of governance, etc. As we’ll see the U.S. democracy programs implemented in Russia did not take this same approach towards a serious and long-term implementation of “thick” democracy.

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CHAPTER SIX: DIAMOND AND EISEN’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO A THEORETICAL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Lipset’s work, and diagram, outlines the internal mechanisms that help establish and maintain democracy. Larry Diamond, in *The Spirit of Democracy*, argues for the necessity of some international mechanisms for building and establishing democracy. Likewise, in November 2019, Norman Eisen et. Al. and the Brookings Institute produced *The Democracy Playbook: Preventing and Reversing Democratic Backsliding* with their own set of prescribed actions for nations and other international actors who are looking to establish and promote democracy. Diamond and Eisen agree on some of these prescribed actions and they diverge sharply on another. Diamond and Eisen agree on the efficacy of applying peaceful pressure with sufficient linkages and leverage; supporting democratic actors both nationally and internationally; granting institutional access when appropriate to create a normative standard; and rewarding democratization with conditional funding. Their disagreement on the use of force is telling and will be discussed later but Diamond’s lens of analysis, studying democratic transitions the world over, led to a particular perspective on the use of force using key successful cases in Germany and Japan and key unsuccessful ones like Haiti. Eisen and his colleague’s view omits the use of force specifically because their area of interpretation is solely based on Eastern Europe where massive displays of force would be a massive destabilizing force.
Additionally, Eisen et. Al have no perspective on liberation technology which Diamond talks about, again I think this is due to their geographic perspective with most of Eastern Europe having a level of technological integration that parts of the Middle East, South East Asia, and Africa simply don’t. I have combined their theoretical models and prescribed actions to develop the following diagram. (Table 2)

According to Diamond and Eisen, states that are seeking to support and build democracies abroad should understand and engage in pressure, provide support for democratic actors, and leverage conditional funding. Diamond, exclusively, argues for the national support of liberation technology; and Eisen et. Al. propose the extension of institutional access. Only on the matter of “force” do Diamond and Eisen potentially disagree and exploring all these tools in greater depth can help us flesh out our theoretical model.
I should be clear that the external mechanisms, as I define them, are the tools available to third-party states to further a democratization process. States can and have democratized without external support in these aforementioned forms.

First, there is a distinction in this literature between pressure and force. Here pressure excludes all non-covert or overt militarized actions in defense of a democratic regime; or, in the overthrow of a non-democratic regime. 60 Eisen and his colleagues hold that there is a value to all kinds and intensities of pressure, depending on the circumstances, but they don’t speak to the use of force in terms of democracy production. This might be, as I said, because their case study and rules are highly focused on Europe today but nevertheless, they don’t comment. Diamond, in contrast, talks about the concept of “democratization by force” as a last resort open to states. 61 The oft repeated lessons of Germany and Japan post-WWII, Diamond says, offer very little as narratives counter to U.S. democratization efforts in Grenada, Haiti, and Iraq. What was the difference? Two things; Diamond says that the total destruction of Germany and Japan and the overwhelming international support, in the Western World, for the U.S.’s rebuilding mission make Germany and Japan fundamentally different from the other three cases. 62 Without saying anything about efficiency or efficacy, we can say there is some historic basis for the validity of force as a last-ditch effort to build democracy.

61 Ibid
62 Ibid
Differentiating between pressure and force, Diamond and Eisen agree on the efficacy of pressure. As I said, pressure is all actions including covert or overt military action. Measures could extend from President Carter’s “name & shame” campaign through a wide range of economic incentives and sanctions to outright invasion and occupation. Diamond stresses that “leverage” and “linkage”, two terms from Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Way, affect the efficacy of pressure. 63 “Leverage” is the power to affect the economic and material conditions of a given authoritarian country’s constituencies as well as the power the authoritarian countries leverage against the democratizing power’s constituencies. 64 For example, the reliance of western nations on Middle Eastern oil supplies severely diminishes western powers’ relative “leverage”. 65 Linkages are the material, political, or social connections between either 1) an authoritarian state and groups within the state or external actors promoting democratization or 2) a coalition of democratizing states. The stronger a connection between an authoritarian state and democratizing states the stronger the effects of peaceful pressure. Secondly, the stronger the ties between a coalition of democratizing states the less chance of defection within that coalition and thus the greater collective effect of democratizing states. It is also important that states signal their leverage and


64 Ibid

their resolve. In *The Democracy Playbook*, Eisen argues the U.S. and other western powers should signal clearly that they will react robustly to democratic rollbacks, human rights abuses, censoring of the media, restricting the autonomy of universities, or hampering judicial independence. 66 Eisen argues that having leverage is insufficient unless a state is willing to state it outright, outline the steps which will be rewarded and those that will be punished and is actually committed to substantial rewards and severe punishments as appropriate. With sufficient “linkages” and “leverage” Diamond and Eisen agree, without condition, that states who seek to spread democracy could, and should, do so through peaceful pressure.

Next, Eisen and Brookings, stress several prescribed actions that I’ve lumped into support for national and international democratic actors. These can be actors within civil society, independent investigative media, and domestic and international non-governmental institutions (NGOs). 67 Diamond also stresses the need of supporting actors like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). 68 Actors within civil society, like bureaucrats and politicians, can be supported in creating and adopting any number of liberalizing rules. For example, the European Union (EU) has a series of pre-ascension rules designed to strengthen democracy and the rule of law by forcing civil society

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members, and ultimately states, to agree to, implement, and learn about any number of structures and rules that are fundamentally pro-democracy. Independent media, especially media located outside of the physical capital, can educate the population, carry narratives that are pro-democracy, and expose the fallibility of the ruling regime which, according to Lipset, is so incredibly dependent on external sources of legitimacy when it does not yet possess the legitimacy provided through the consent of the governed.  

Some domestic and international NGOs support democracy and democratic actors. Doing so while distributing necessary material needs can increase the linkage between democratizing states and the constituents of the authoritarian state. Eisen is especially concerned with promoting positive relations between NGOs and the central government to counter the narrative that these two should always be diametrically opposed.  

In addition, Diamond encourages domestic support for state-operated democratization efforts within democratizing states. Actors like the NED, Diamond notes, are unique and flexible in supporting democratizing efforts. The NED, being made up of the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the Center for International Enterprise, and the Solidarity Center, covers the largest U.S. domestic coalitions and can

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71 Ibid 69
act in a variety of ways in support of democracy. 72 Again, Diamond and Eisen agree support for domestic and international actors, both in democratizing states and in authoritarian states, are key for supporting democratization efforts.

Acknowledging the limitations of sanctions and funding to drive behavior, Diamond and Eisen both agree on tying conditional funding to democratization. Whether you agree with Lipset, writing in 1956, that economic success is a key factor in democratizing in the first place or you think that there is some level of coincidence between the relative economic success and the success of democracy in the U.S. and Western Europe, there seems to be an overwhelming level of economic success amongst states who support democracy abroad. 73 Diamond and Eisen argue that states with financial power can use this leverage to shape and shove authoritarian states behavior towards democracy. This ability is amplified when states act in concert like the conditional extension of funding offered by the EU to states like Poland. Conditional funding creates a normative standard of behavior among these authoritarian states reinforcing democratization simply through their own bureaucratic habit, while also potentially reinforcing democracy through the funding of institutions listed above. The key to this mechanism is its conditionality. In recent years, Poland and Hungary have


strained at the bonds of European society.\textsuperscript{74} \textsuperscript{75} So far, the EU has not rescinded their funding or status as full member states but instead has farmed the issue out to the European Commission, with every passing day EU funding supports a new pattern of increasingly illiberal behavior violating the presumed notion of conditionality.

Next, in the way that conditional funding creates an enforcement mechanism for behavior through habit, institutional access enforces behavior through normative ideals and standards. Eisen and Brookings specifically talk about access to institutions like the European Court of Human Rights. Institutions like the court and others monitor and produce reports on member states behavior.\textsuperscript{76} While the Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe, contain states we can unequivocally call authoritarian they still produce reports that have two effects on normative standards. A poor report may hamper a state’s influence within those organizations which the authoritarian state would find it necessary to maintain not only to shield itself from blowback but to link itself to other states to hamper a coalition forming against them. These institutions could also produce reporting that creates a negative reputation. For states concerned with domestic and international legitimacy, as well as normative ideas about themselves being constantly

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subjected to reputational decline and institutional criticism may, in the long term, affect their willingness to change incrementally. Especially when those changes are rewarded with further institutional access and conditional funding.

Finally, there is one last lesson to be learned from two media organizations: Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyyah. These two organizations disseminate some of the best on the ground news for the Middle East and do so in English, Arabic, and other languages to an international audience. They also allow “ordinary Arabs [to] call in and voice their unedited grievances live before 20 million viewers.” While there has been a recent turn in our opinions towards technology as a means of community organizing and general good, Diamond argues there is sufficient evidence that on the whole it will turn out positively. Between mobile communication, free video uploading, anonymity, ease of access to liberation technology like cell phones and computers can, and have, helped millions of online communities form around niche interests. In authoritarian countries one of these communities can be those who are unhappy with the current regime and are willing to work together to make their collective voices heard. Diamond stresses that authoritarian states are very good, and getting better, at shutting down access to these


platforms and this technology. The last thing a state supporting democracy should do is join them and must instead demonstrate a vibrant democracy with access to technology and the freedom to criticize the government at home if they want to support democracy abroad.

These issues and actions are highly interconnected. Their scope is not always agreed upon and in the case of force there may be an outright disagreement. However, scholars of democratization agree that there is a place for states to support democracy abroad. While there are a multitude of ways one can work to support democracy abroad, there some key actions that states and locations of states should do: apply peaceful pressure with sufficient linkages and leverage; support democratic actors both nationally and internationally; grant institutional access when appropriate to create a normative standard; reward democratization with conditional funding; support the use and dissemination of liberation technology; and if all else fails make the decision to support democratization through force from the very ashes up or not at all because half measures, as Diamond argues about the failed democratization efforts the U.S. underwent in Haiti and Iraq, are twice as destructive.

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80 Ibid

81 Ibid
CHAPTER SEVEN: A HISTORY OF U.S. DEMOCRATIZATION EffORTS IN RUSSIA FROM 1989 TO 2004

The U.S. has a long and prolific foreign policy history in accordance with its status as a rising, dominant, and eventually global power from the late 1790s onwards to today. In 1991, the U.S. shifted its foreign policy concerns from the containment of Soviet power to the possible consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet State. The extraordinary shift in concerns inevitably had programmatic consequences. One consequence was a set of programs designed to provide economic aid and assistance including the provision of food, water, and medical care, carte blanche. A second set of policy actions took the form of direct support and funding to democratization programs akin to the ones we have been discussing. A third set of policies and actions don’t seem directly akin to democratization but had an outsized effect on the process of Russian political development in the 1990s. These latter two sets are our focus and I will in short order explain the history behind and effects, both direct and indirect, of these actions. I begin with the explicit democratization programs: the NED, the SEED act, and the FREEDOM support act of 1992. Then I will discuss the policy decisions made by the U.S. that, while being outside of the direct realm of democratization, had a significant impact on Russian development namely Shock Therapy Economics and the events of the 1996 elections in Russia.
In 1982, President Ronald Reagan, in a speech to the British parliament, proposed a joint government program between the U.S. and their Western European allies that would be explicitly aimed at promoting democracy abroad. This program when eventually created by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983 was the National Endowment for Democracy (or NED). The NED became a non-governmental 501C-3 centered in Washington D.C. with four constituent offices that account for half of its budget, with the other half being awarded in grants to other programs abroad. These offices are the American Center for Labor Solidarity (ACILS), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and International Republican Institute (IRI). Throughout the 1980s until the Obama administration, who briefly moved the funding into a separate umbrella within the State Department, the NED was the main funding mechanism for international democratization programs around the world.

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The NED receives funding annually from Congress and the Democracy Fund, as an outlay of the State department budget.  

The Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) act was a bundle of legislation originally directed at Poland and Hungary but eventually expanded to the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and other former socialist states. This legislation provided funding and education materials on agriculture, trade, investment, and cultural and scientific expansion. This funding and material were based on a few prerequisites including the removal of trade restrictions and the export of profits from these countries to U.S. based foreign investors. These programs would, after their establishment, support and fund burgeoning democratic institutions within their field.

Today, it must be remarked, the SEED act has had little to no affect at achieving market or quality of life parity between Western Europe and much of the former socialist republics with Hungary and Poland having some marked success but with significant help from the European Union.

The Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 or simply the FREEDOM Support Act was a democratization

85 Ibid


program not fundamentally different from the one inscribed in the SEED act. The FREEDOM Support act fostered democracy and viable political institutions through the creation of American Business Centers (ABCs) that would operate in the developing markets in Eastern Europe but most important provide for jobs in the U.S. by directing U.S. business interests to invest in Eastern European resource markets. 88 Split between the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, these ABCs would represent the U.S.’s economic interests abroad, support drug eradication programs, and make progress toward the implementation of democratic institutions and governance in these countries. Critically, while the SEED act was targeted at specific states who were arguably more western and more democratic the FREEDOM support act allowed the President to place ABCs where he deemed they would be efficient and profitable and could draw on the SEED fund to establish them.

The FREEDOM support act, the SEED act, and the NED act and its subsequent institution, the National Endowment for Democracy, represented the body of direct U.S. democratization efforts in Russia from 1989 to 2004; and until the Obama Administration rerouted the funding of some of these programs through the U.S. democracy fund in his first term. 89


Although, this funding shift was reversed under the Trump Administration.  

They do not however, represent the end of the U.S.’s actions to spread democracy to Russia by all means. The process of shock therapy economics, as well see directly, also was conceived as an instrument of democratization. Also, the results and processes of the Russian Presidential election and the influence of the Clinton administration had an outsized effect on Russia’s democratic development, had an outsized impact on a Russian conception of democratization.

The concept of shock therapy economics has been attributed to Milton Freidman directly and to economist and professor Jeffrey Sachs who admittedly hated the term and denied his specific use thereof. Regardless of its origin, shock therapy economics is the process of removing price and currency controls, liberalizing trade practices, eliminating state subsidies, and the large-scale privatization of formerly state-owned assets and doing all of these things as close to instantaneously as possible. In theory, these planned shocks would jump-start a nation’s economy, it was believed and argued, by releasing latent entrepreneurial energy hitherto repressed by the state-run economy with its vast regulatory structure and hostility to most or all forms of private enterprise. Critics say this shock creates an unnecessary and dramatic rise in inequality and unemployment where gradualism can address stagnation without these severe jumps. Regardless, Yegor Gaidar, with the advice of the Washington consensus and economic advisor Jeffrey

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Sachs, instituted these shock therapy economic reforms during his time as prime minister from June 1992 to December 1992.

The GINI coefficient rose around 9 points, Russia’s GDP contracted by 18% from 1990 to 1998, and the rates of suicide and alcoholism exploded in step with unemployment and inflation during the same period. Joseph Stiglitz argues that the implementation of these reforms during a moment of political crisis without a strong government and institutionalized law created a race to the bottom “strip Russia for capital” mentality where competition meant if newly private owners didn’t strip their factories and physical capital someone else would forcibly take it from them and sell it off later. 91 This mentality combined with the systemic under evaluation of state-owned enterprises led to a collection of oligarchs today controlling entire industries in Russia.

There is no question as to the failure of the Russian shock therapy program; but, why does Jeffrey Sachs argue it was necessary in the first place? In What I did in Russia, he answers this very question. 92 Sachs first reminds us that he has helped implement reform programs like this in Bolivia, in Russia, and in Poland. Sachs argues each of these states faced the same problems: a failing government, a currency inflating into the hundreds and thousands of percentage points, and productive stagnation. Sachs viewed his role as fundamentally short term and advisory.


In Poland, the shock therapy reforms were far less destructive and depending on your analysis prepared Poland for its economic success today. Why didn’t this happen in Russia? While Sachs agrees the problems facing Poland and Russia were the same, the scale of these problems was not. While Poland required about $1 billion U.S. in direct stabilizing funds Russia, says Sachs, would require around $5 billion U.S. in funds and $15 billion U.S. in direct economic aid. Ultimately, Sachs argues the inability of the U.S. and the international order to meet these funding levels and implement these reforms as stringently as Bolivia and Poland did ultimately led to their failure. I think Sach’s analysis requires some comparison though. In the 1960s and 1970s before implementing the Deng reforms, China faced the same economic stagnation and monetary inflation. President Deng Xiao-Ping and his predecessors engaged in a series of incremental economic reforms that brought China’s GDP from 2.7% growth in the 1960s to 15.7% growth in 2005. Incrementalism produced a strong private sector, massive GDP growth, and a GDP rivaling the U.S., although it coincided with the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian hold on political power. In the midst of this crisis in Russia the Presidential Elections, the first since the fall of the Soviet Union were held; and, left something to be desired.

The results of the 1996 Russian election are relatively uncontroversial in both the Russian and American academies. American scholars and foreign policy officials confirm that the Clinton administration offered funding, technical support,

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and advisors to Boris Yeltsin’s presidential campaign and helped Yeltsin achieve a slight win against the latent Russian Communist Party in the first round and a 10 pt. or so lead in the second. 94 The official Kremlin position on the outcome of the 1996 election is the same. However, multiple opposition candidates, in a meeting with Dmitri Medvedev, current prime minister and former president of Russia, argued that Medvedev was adamant “Yeltsin had lost”. 95 Regardless, this event as the first real exercise of
democratic action in Russia on the federal executive level was marred by contention. Unusual shifts in voting patterns in some of the more ethnically diverse Russian oblasts, huge donations, the promised orchestration of a IMF bailout, the movement of President Yeltsin from 8% in polling to winning with 54% of the vote coincide with a domestic pattern of distrust in democratic outcomes and one of the least popular Russian leaders in history. 96

These programs define the bulk of U.S. democratization efforts in Russia and unfortunately, as we’ll see, they act counter to any academic model of democratization. They also reveal a fundamental premise of American democratization: in the American foreign policy apparatus, the promotion of laissez-faire capitalism and democracy are deemed synonymous.


96 Ibid
CHAPTER EIGHT: COMPARING THE HISTORICAL RECORD TO THE THEORETICAL MODEL AND CRITIQUE

A basic academic conception of a democratization model would advise a state interested in spreading democracy abroad to invest in tools to apply pressure, provide support for national and international democratic actors, be willing to apply force in some instances, provide conditions for institutional access and developmental assistance, and invest in the creation and distribution of liberation technology, whatever that means in each historical context. The actions of the U.S. directly, or seemingly indirectly, in the aid of democratization in Russia from 1989 to 2004 reflect a botched democratization model that assumes that democratization is synonymous with the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism and this is empirically present in the text and provisions of the legislative actions and diplomatic actions that the U.S. undertook from 1989 until 2004 where the U.S.-Russian relationship degraded beyond direct U.S. influence. It presumes, in the model of Fukuyama’s conception of modernization theory, that the expansion of capitalism as a positive outcome is hand in hand with other perceived positive outcomes such as democratization. This model is, and at the time was, directly contradictory to any sense of Russian path dependency which would not allow them to be sublimated into a western international order dominated by the U.S.
These policies and institutions include, as previously mentioned, the NED, the SEED act, the FREEDOM support act, Shock Therapy economics, and the Clinton Administration’s response to the 1996 Russian presidential election on behalf of former President Yeltsin.

The NED and its institutions are the only attempt, on our list, that seem to actively fulfill some of the model of democratization we developed. Their funding expanded support to democratic actors in Russia including youth activists, pollsters, election monitors, and judicial opinion shops on campaign finance and election law. 97 They built linkages and structures throughout Eastern Europe, most importantly including Russia, to encourage the democratization of the entire swath of former socialist states.

Today Russia and several other Eastern European countries and other more “authoritarian” states decry the NED and their programs as western expansionism and invasive. I think however, broadly, that the NED is a legitimate attempt to support democratic actors, expand labor rights, drive judicial reform towards impartial juridical systems that are not inherently or necessarily based on the British legal tradition, and a Liberal conception of civil liberties. Although, the NED, even as the most in line with a model of democratization, is more logically sound and researched based, it has a specific drive through the Center for International Private Enterprise to whose stated mission is, “strengthening democracy around the globe through private enterprise and market-oriented reform” marking democratic reform and economic reform as at least dual

projects. The NED’s stand-alone position in actually supporting democratizing programs and their position alongside other “democratizing” programs weakens their ability to actually provide the support they intend to.

The SEED act explicitly excluded Russia and was aimed at extending capitalism to former socialist states. Despite their mandate to promote democracy and the fostering of democratic institutions the SEED act offered no way or funding to do so. Instead, funding was directed at trade and investment, agricultural expansion, and private sector development. Specifically, the SEED act provides for,

“(1) URGENT ACTION TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY- The scheduling of democratic elections throughout Eastern Europe creates circumstances requiring a prompt and skillful response, using immediately available resources, from U.S. Government-funded agencies engaged in assisting in the development abroad of democratic practice and institutions.”

as its first provision; followed by a slew of market reforms in technical training, credit union support, international trade, most favorable trade status, tax relationships, restructuring of international debt, tourist and student exchanges, and ensuring access to markets for American corporations. That funding was of course not predicated on manifest efforts to build the institutional architecture of democracy nor was it predicated on empirical signs of democratic governance or democratic institution building. Instead, funding was based on the willingness to liberalize trade relationships, allow for direct,

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and indirect, foreign investment on the part of the U.S., and critically to allow the free flow of capital in and out of the target countries. The U.S. model of democratization in the case of the SEED act can be seen either as subordinating democratization to fostering capitalist expansion or as presuming that democracy would spring automatically from the conversion of a statist economy to one dominated by private actors. It calls for the support of democratic institutions but funds economic institutions. It presses for very early elections without consideration of the consequences of such elections for the establishment of a real democratic government.

The FREEDOM Support act of 1992 was equally clear in its prescriptive messaging. Again, the text of the bill provides a direct mission to ensure the fostering of democratic institutions and democratic actors across Eastern Europe saying,

“(1) recent developments in Russia and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union present an historic opportunity for a transition to a peaceful and stable international order and the integration of the independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of democratic nations;
(2) the entire international community has a vital interest in the success of this transition . . .”

This mission would be carried out by ABCs, acting on behalf of the U.S. Commerce Department to establish American business branches in Russia and Eastern Europe and provide for domestic American jobs, through local market investment. One could argue that these ABCs were an attempt to build linkages and apply pressure in Russia. However, the nature of the development of these ABCs, at the discretion of the American

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President would not allow for sufficient linkages between ABCs and Russia to have any real effect on the Russian domestic environment. They didn’t hire local Russians, they’re actions in the resource markets of Russia were, throughout the 1990s, primarily market shorts, where investors buy market instruments that accrue value as the market – or segments thereof – collapse; making money off the failures of the Russian market, and they had no proven connections or mission to interact with domestic governments and non-governmental actors. Their perception, and perceived failure, to pursue the interests of anyone other than the American Business community was documented by Prof. A. V. Yurchernenko in his 2018 article. 101 He argues persuasively that the ABCs built in Russia rejected the advice of both Russian and U.S. economists and in some cases directly denied these economic researchers and advisors from studying the businesses themselves. Additionally, when these ABCs did make internal or external policy decisions they were in line with the economic theories and prescriptions of the U.S. Commerce Department. 102

The SEED act, the FREEDOM support act, and the program of shock therapy economics recommended by the Washington consensus are expressly economic programs shaped by a political agenda. Programs designed to expand a uniquely American neoliberal capitalism to Russia and the former soviet republics, because, in an American


102 Ibid
Libertarian conception the market is synonymous with democracy. All these programs were commissioned with spreading democracy and supporting democratic actors and democratic institutions but were provided with the tools to spread American economic interests.

Scholars argue that conditional funding can encourage democratization as the carrot to the stick of military force or institutional pressure, Eisen and the Brookings institute recommend doing so in Eastern Europe as we mentioned. A key source of contention in the Russian presidential election of 1996 was the rules and arrangement of a much-needed IMF bailout package for Russia. The election of President Yeltsin and his programs of further liberalization were key to the processing of favorable terms to the aid package finalized in 1998. Conditionality was applied but unfortunately on the back end. The aid was given with the promise that Yeltsin would “stay on the right path” and stay he did; overseeing the worst economic decade in the Russian collective memory.\(^{103}\) That funding has continued despite democratic backsliding through the 2000s, thus making a mockery of conditionality.

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

First, I have a general critique that I would be remiss if I didn’t air it. Any model of democratization, including Diamond’s, Eisen’s, my own, Fukuyama’s, or Baloyra’s puts a preeminence on democratization over a conception of state sovereignty. This theoretical preference justifies a very real power disparity when the U.S. is supporting the democratizing project because very few states have the real ability to resist the U.S.’s imposed international order. Taking as a given that democracy and its expansion even in its worst form spreading around the world is laudable; I think any conception of democratization that places it above a conception of state sovereignty and the right to rule as the sovereign, legitimate or otherwise, sees fit is a dangerous misunderstanding of the system of real politic that states operate under. In his book, *Russia Against the Rest* Richard Sakwa argues that Russia, meaning the military and political personnel involved in negotiations and commenting on political affairs, fundamentally sees itself as global power deserving an equal say in international affairs and the U.S. theorized and acted in direct disregard for any sense of Russian sovereignty. As Sakwa puts it so well, Russian policy officials, intelligence officials, and military personnel envisioned joining the international order as equals and voiced that view vociferously; the U.S. was intent on sublimating Russia into a western world order as a new middling power sitting just below the U.S. in the vein of Germany after World War II. No matter what theory of
democratization the U.S. used to drive its policy action it would not give due deference to Russian sovereignty and its political path and would be doomed to failure at the hands of Russian statesmen concerned with piloting their own political destiny; chafing at the international order.

Secondly, to our original question; I think the strongest critique I can make is that the U.S. clearly was overly focused on economic reform, to the de facto detriment of democratic reform in Russia. The direct policy and program implementation the U.S. underwent during this period directly conflated the expansion of capitalism with the expansion of democracy in the way that scholars like Fukuyama theorized. Programs like the SEED and FREEDOM support acts, within their written text, conflated democracy with market reforms and almost single-mindedly directed the bureaucratic power of the executive and the funding power of congress directly to programs and institutions whose stated goals were liberalizing trade agreements, enticing American investors, and ensuring the free flow of capital to, and more importantly, from Russia and the former Soviet Bloc. To the degree that politicians and foreign policy bureaucrats were aware of modernization theory and the other works we have mentioned; revealed preferences indicate that economic reform was certainly primary amongst their concerns.

Going forward, any serious and scholarly attempts at spreading democracy, as defined as a key goal of U.S. foreign policy, must be prepared to deal systemically and holistically with the political path and national sense of self developed in almost every country. In the landmark cases whereby, democracy was instituted abroad at the behest of foreign powers, Germany and Japan, both states were effectively decimated politically,
socially, and economically and were rebuilt from the ground up. In the case of Russia, as I have said multiple times, Russia has a sense of national self; astride east and west, an international player in Europe, Asia, the Pacific, and the Arctic. Since the turn of the 20th century it envisioned playing a legitimate role in shaping the structures of the international system to its own benefit. When confronted with a changing reality in the 1990s Russian political leaders commented to the point of expecting an equal seat at the table with deference given to their role as the successor state of one of two superpowers in the history of the world. 104 American diplomats dismissed these concerns and explained Russia’s contemporary role alongside Germany, France, Brazil, and India as bigger than average powers sublimated into the U.S. international order. 105

Next, future democratization programs must, in the allocation of their mission and funding, divorce the expansion of democracy from the expansion of capitalism to work to provide funding for institutions and actors who actually support democracy abroad by building and applying pressure, tying funding and institutional access to democratic conditionality, and funding and distributing liberation technology in a time when surveillance capitalism in expanding rapidly inside and out of authoritarian countries more in line with the theoretical model we built. 106 Analysis of the subsequent decades and the specific democratization programs implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, parts of


105 Ibid

Africa, and elsewhere around world would be necessary to answer the question of the fundamental concerns of more modern democratization projects after this period stretching across the Clinton, Bush jr., and Obama Administrations. However, the American political path, in development since the time of the founding fathers, has placed the role of capitalism and trade at the forefront of the National mission. So much so that when concerned solely with the spread of democracy John Quincy Adams, as Sec. of State, warned his contemporaries, “America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own” and to the role of economics George Washington said in a letter in Benjamin Harrison, “A people… who are possessed of the spirit of commerce, who see and who will pursue their advantages may achieve almost anything” and so I struggle to imagine a U.S. in which market-based economic reform plays a secondary role to promotion of authentic popular governance.  


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