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From Reform to Resignation: Explaining Why Some Protest Movements Escalate Demands

Abstract

One of the unresolved puzzles in the civil resistance and contentious politics literatures relates to the fact that some movements that begin as reformist (seeking redress in a certain policy space) escalate to maximalist claims (demanding the ouster of a national leader or the entire regime) – a process I call “demand escalation.” For instance, in the summer of 2019, thousands took to the streets of Hong Kong to protest a proposed extradition bill that would allow criminal suspects to be sent to mainland China to face trial in courts controlled by the Communist Party. However, even after Hong Kong’s leader Carrie Lam announced the formal withdrawal of the controversial bill, protests continued with some calling for greater democracy and others demanding Lam’s resignation. Existing literature has largely treated demands as fixed and focused on different methods of resistance to pursue predefined ends. In contrast, I show that demands can change as a result of the state-dissent interaction.

The core assumption of my argument is that demand escalation is not predetermined, and the central finding is that demand escalation is equifinal. I develop a dynamic theory of demand escalation, in which movement characteristics determine a campaign’s escalatory potential and government response determines whether and how the potential is triggered. I take a multi-method approach to test different aspects of the proposed theory – conducting a large-N analysis on a new dataset that catalogues both reformist and maximalist opposition campaigns globally, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) on 78 reformist campaigns, as well as in-depth case studies on three mass movements from Hong Kong. The findings largely support the claim that campaigns can escalate demands both organically and strategically, and further illustrate how leader-led and leader-less campaigns are differently positioned to find resolution.

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From Reform to Resignation:
Explaining Why Some Protest Movements Escalate Demands

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In Partial Fulfillment
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Doctor of Philosophy

by
Sooyeon Kang
June 2021
Advisor: Erica Chenoweth

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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Revolutions are not made: they come.”

Wendell Phillips

Not all revolutions demand revolutionary change from the start. Even the French Revolution, one of the most written about events in Western history and a “watershed of the modern era,” was not necessarily predetermined to be a revolution (Hunt 2004, 3). Some of the earliest and the most significant events of the French Revolution were in fact much more reformist¹ in nature than maximalist.² The high price and shortage of bread are often cited as the “common grievance” of the French Revolution, and the March to Versailles³ on October 5, 1789, an early form of a mass mobilization campaign, was initiated by a group of women in the marketplace desperate for bread (Packham 2014). While the French Revolution had both social and intellectual origins,⁴ in the early phases, most people did not seem to have in mind the overthrow of the “Old Regime” but merely

¹ “Reformist,” “limited,” and “single-issue” protests are used interchangeably to describe sustained mass movements with demands that pertain to certain policy areas and do not call for a change in government authority.

² “Maximalist,” “regime change,” and “revolutionary” protests are used interchangeably to describe sustained mass movements that demand change in government authority or territorial autonomy.

³ Also known as the October March, the October Days, or the Women’s March on Versailles.

⁴ For a synthesis on the social and intellectual origins of the French Revolution, see Tarrow (2012).

wanted assurances from the rulers that sustenance would be accessible and affordable (Doyle 2018). The French would eventually abandon the monarchy and guillotine both King Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, but the people's initial trust in the king and his responsiveness (albeit reluctant) could be evidenced by the masses escorting the royal family back to Paris in 1789.

230 years later, halfway across the globe, a similar phenomenon occurred. In the summer of 2019, thousands took to the streets of Hong Kong to protest a proposed extradition bill that would allow criminal suspects to be sent to mainland China to face trial in courts controlled by the Communist Party.⁵ However, even after Hong Kong's leader Carrie Lam announced the formal withdrawal of the controversial bill, protests continued with some calling for greater democracy and others demanding her resignation. The slogan, "Liberate Hong Kong; revolution of our time,"⁶ gained in popularity among protesters and came to encapsulate the fight between pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong and the Chinese government. These cases, far from being unique, are indicative of an unresolved puzzle in the civil resistance and contentious politics literatures: why do some movements that begin as reformist (seeking redress in a certain policy space) escalate to maximalist claims (demanding the ouster of a national leader or systemic change), while others do not?

⁵ Chan, Holmes. "In Pictures: 12,000 Hongkongers march in protest against 'evil' China extradition law, organisers say," *Hong Kong Free Press*, 31 March 2019. <<https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/03/31/pictures-12000-hongkongers-march-protest-evil-china-extradition-law-organisers-say/>>.

⁶ Hui, Mary. "A guide to the most important chants of Hong Kong's protests," *Quartz*, September 2, 2019. <<https://qz.com/1699119/chants-and-slogans-of-hong-kongs-protests-explained/>>.

Campaigns calling for reformist or maximalist change have both been described as “anti-regime.”⁷ But while the two may be similar in form, they are fundamentally different in their political dynamics and implications. Inferring from their demands, reformist protests assume that the incumbent government is capable of making changes to improve the current situation, and the campaign in essence asks the government to prove itself. Maximalist campaigns, on the other hand, neither desire nor offer the chance for the regime to show that it can be responsive to the people’s needs. Posing a more direct challenge to the incumbent’s rule, maximalist campaigns are essentially saying that any other government would be better than the current leadership, despite all the discomfort associated with uncertainty. So how do members of the citizenry come to seemingly lose hope in state leadership? This research aims to get at the heart of what happens in the transition from asking something of the government to demanding that it must go.

While the situational context (e.g., aggrieved society, regime type, economic conditions) might offer clues for when demands escalate, I contend that structural and societal conditions have limited explanatory power. In contrast, I argue that demand escalation is a multi-causal dynamic process dependent on movement characteristics and government response. I focus on the state-movement interaction to theorize multiple paths to demand escalation. Whether or not a movement will escalate its demands and which path it will take is a function of the movement’s characteristics as well as the government’s response to the initial reformist campaign. I argue that movements are not

⁷ For example, the Mass Mobilization in Autocracies Database (version 3.0) takes a broad approach to “anti-government” protest as not only including demands for the resignation of the central government but also protesting actions made or sanctioned by it.

homogenous entities and simple binary descriptors (such as centralized versus decentralized) do not capture the essence of different campaign orientations. Rather, the role of leadership, the cohesiveness around strategies and goals, along with the composition of the participants are important factors that can either facilitate or prevent demand escalation. These movement characteristics, in conjunction with whether the government represses and, or, offers concessions determine whether a reformist campaign will demobilize or redouble its efforts.

The core assumption of my argument is that demand escalation is not predetermined, and the central finding is that demand escalation is equifinal. I take three campaigns from Hong Kong to show how the 2012 protests against Chinese patriotism classes could have escalated into a maximalist campaign but ended with the acceptance of government concessions, while the 2014 Umbrella Movement escalated demands without concessions, and the 2019 anti-extradition campaign escalated demands despite concessions. I also conduct qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) on 78 reformist campaigns (half of which escalated demands) to assess the limitations and generalizability of my theory. Calls for reform may be genuine or masking deeper desires for regime change, but the motive does not necessarily determine whether demands will escalate. If demand escalation is like catching fire, government response is the spark to a movement configuration that may or may not have the fuel and oxygen necessary to turn it into a flame.

1.1 Defining Demand Escalation

Escalation in the context of social movements and protest activity has primarily been thought of as “phase shift,” a change from peaceful to violent techniques (Salehyan et al. 2012, Shellman, Levey, and Young 2013, O'Brien and Li 2006). The strategic logic of tactical escalation has emphasized the ability for movements to regain momentum through change when current techniques of protest fail to create the sense of crises and excitement they once did. In this regard, most of the existing literature has focused on enterprising activists turning to more disruptive acts to demonstrate their commitment (Gamson 1990, Tarrow 2011, Koopmans and Statham 1998), mobilizing larger numbers of participants (Rasler 1996), or at times appealing to higher levels of authority (O'Brien and Li 2006). These studies have largely assumed goals to be fixed and the focus on methods of resistance have been framed as strategies to pursue predefined ends.

In contrast, this research considers how mass campaigns asserting reformist claims can escalate into mass civil unrest calling for a change in government or territorial independence. Hundreds of protests occur every year over wages, corruption, inflation, and other regulations, and the reformist roots of many recent maximalist anti-government movements (such as Algeria 2019, Hong Kong 2019, France 2018, Nicaragua 2018, and Sudan 2018, among others) suggest the need to study this particular path of unscheduled government change.⁸

⁸ Many maximalist protests have a reformist spark or trigger that catalyzes mobilization, but this study differentiates between protests that escalate their demands from reformist to maximalist and protests that call for resignation from the beginning (e.g., 2017 Serbian protests against President Aleksandar Vucic, 2017 protests in Turkey against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the 2017 Togolese protests against President Faure Gnassingbe are all campaigns that were maximalist from onset).

The commonality in all cases of demand escalation is the presence of a reformist campaign that temporally precedes a maximalist campaign, and sufficient evidence that the two are related. A stylized example is a gradual buildup in which a group of individuals asks the government to address limited grievances before they begin to challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent. But the buildup can take a myriad of forms. Some are more straightforward with a group increasingly gaining power, as was the case in the Bolivian Anti-Juntas campaign (MEC ID: 28/2767) where pro-labor strikes won the legal recognition of the Bolivian Workers' Union (Central Obrera Boliviana or COB), and the COB then took the lead in calling mass marches and general strikes to usher out General Guido Vildoso and the military junta in 1982. But momentum can also build from disparate groups coming together over shared concerns or a common enemy.

An example of uniting over shared grievances is the Benin Anti-Kérékou campaign (MEC ID: 27/2756). The sub-maximalist campaign centered around economic troubles with a series of teacher's strikes, student's strikes, and civil servants strikes separately demanding their arrears in salaries and student grants before coming together to call for democratization and the overthrow of President Mathieu Kérékou in December 1989. An example of an unlikely coalition forming against a common enemy is the Anti-Serrano campaign (MEC ID: 111/2751) in Guatemala. Student protests over government-issued identification cards, which were seen as a form of military control to track student leaders, united with local protests against high electricity prices. Concerns over President Jorge Serrano Elias' autogolpe further increased public opposition and brought together

businessmen, indigenous leaders, human rights activists, and other groups all in an alliance to call for Serrano's ouster in 1993.⁹

However, other cases are less straightforward with a reformist campaign functioning as one of many precursors to a maximalist campaign. In Argentina, the origins of the pro-democracy movement (MEC ID: 14/1898) are rooted in social campaigns that began in the mid-1970s, such as the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Disappeared), but was also affected by Argentina's loss in the Falklands War. Although the Mothers of the Disappeared did not directly escalate their demands against President Reynaldo Bignone, it is considered the sub-maximalist precursor because their focus on the regime's brutality was foundational to eventual calls for a return to civilian rule. This is also an instance in which reformist demands continued alongside maximalist ones, as when massive protests broke out against the military government there were continued calls for accountability of the forced disappearances.


The phenomenon of demand escalation can also be differentiated by the time it takes to escalate demands. If we conceive of "speed" as the number of days between the start of a reformist campaign and when demands notably escalate to encompass leader removal or regime change, the speed of demand escalation ranges from 7¹⁰ to 2527 days

⁹ Scott, David. "Public Demands Lead to Reforms in Guatemala," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 16, 1994. <<https://www.csmonitor.com/1994/0316/16041.html>>.

¹⁰ This is an artifact of the coding criteria, as a reformist campaign must last longer than a week to qualify as a reformist campaign. Additionally, because of the coding rules, there is not a complete synchronization between how reformist campaigns are coded in MEC and how those same reformist campaigns are coded as a precursor to a maximalist campaign in EMEC. For example, the 2011 Food Riots (MEC ID: 2248) is a harbinger to the Anti-Bouteflika Campaign (MEC ID: 10). MEC codes the food riots as primarily an economic campaign around high food prices and unemployment, in coding the reformist roots of the Anti-Bouteflika Campaign, we identified electoral, economic, as well as political grievances. So, while the 2011

with a median of 286 and a mean of 498 days (see Figure 1). While the majority of reformist campaigns escalated demands in less than two years, if they escalated at all, it took nearly 7 years for the *Zambian Civil Rights Campaign* to evolve into the *Zambian Independence Movement* (MEC ID: 402/2755). In 1953, the newly formed *Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC)* made a national call for noncooperation with the federal government, and for several years challenged the racist discrimination policies against the black majority in Northern Rhodesia. In 1958, popular support for NRANC was revived and the *United National Independence Party* was formed in late 1959 with a renewed vision of creating an independent Zambia that would be free of British colonial rule.

Figure 1. Temporal Variation in the Speed of Demand Escalation



Food Riots are coded as escalating to the *Anti-Bouteflika Campaign*, the escalated campaign is coded as having three reformist claims.

These examples show that there is no standard transition between a reformist campaign and a maximalist one. I plan to explore the question of timing and the configuration of demand escalation in future projects, but the focus here is on *why*. Even among these diverse set of cases in which calls for limited change precede bigger asks of the government, I argue that looking at movement characteristics and how the state chooses to engage with the movement helps answer this question in a systematic way.

1.2 Possible Explanations for Demand Escalation

Although the question of why some protest campaigns escalate their claims has not been asked in the literature, a few competing hypotheses may be inferred from the mobilization and civil conflict sub-fields. I highlight three plausible drivers of demand escalation from the literature before proposing the dynamic theory of demand escalation which focuses on movement characteristics and government response.

First, grievance-based arguments loom large in the study of civil unrest and the unequal distribution of power or wealth in society has been significant in explaining the onset of rebellion (Gurr 1970), social conflict (Esteban and Ray 1999), civil wars (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013), as well as social movements (Tilly 2003). The argument emphasizes injustice and points to feelings of “relative deprivation” motivating individuals to collectively organize against incumbent regimes. By this logic, a limited campaign that seeks redress for one specific group of people may be a trigger that catalyzes others to join and escalate demands for change. The linkage of various issues

can constitute a spillover of both membership and collaboration between different coalitions seeking to affect politics together (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999, Meyer and Whittier 1994). For example, the spark for the 2018 protests in Iraq was a health crisis in Basra, but grievances over access to jobs and corruption are thought to have intensified the unrest.¹¹

Second, the political opportunity structure afforded by different settings provides a more nuanced alternative explanation. The institutional features of the political system coupled with the economic context can play a decisive role in the movements' activity through creating a favorable, or less favorable, opportunity structure (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999, Meyer 2004). Weakly democratic states and authoritarian regimes, therefore, may be more prone to being targeted with escalating protests in cases where the economy is not performing well because the people are likely to blame the incumbent regime for their dissatisfaction regarding the economy (Brancati 2014). In these instances, economic grievances may escalate beyond leader removal to regime transformation, such as calling for democracy, the regime type "most likely to maximize the people's economic welfare" (Brancati 2014, 1507). This argument plausibly explains the Sudanese Revolution that started over the price of bread, escalated to unseat President Omar al-Bashir from power, and continued to demand a civilian government.

Third, political entrepreneurs, opposition elites in particular, may play a significant role in shaping the protests to achieve political gain. In the ethnic conflict

¹¹ Robin-D'Cruz, Benedict. "How violent protests in Iraq could escalate," *The Washington Post*. 11 September 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/11/how-violent-protests-in-iraq-could-escalate/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9815e5b355be>.

literature, politicians and elites are given a lot of agency in being able to magnify, distort, and manipulate contentious events for “external use in wider political arenas” (Brass 1997, 178). “Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs” can build on the fears of insecurity and polarize society to magnify anxieties; and as groups are driven further apart, a “toxic brew of distrust and suspicion” can explode along ethnic lines (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 41). Applying the insight more broadly, demand escalation could be a function of opportunistic opposition members trying to politicize legitimate grievances to bring down the incumbent government. In December 2018, President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan arrested dozens from the opposition coalition on these grounds, charging them for “crimes of sabotage” and accusing them of hijacking protests that started off with legitimate demands.¹²

Taking these insights from the existing literature, one can expect that limited demands might be more likely to escalate into maximalist ones when there are multiple grievances among the population, there is an organized opposition ready to capitalize on the people’s feelings of deprivation, and the context is a non-democracy facing an economic crisis (Brancati 2016). In Chapter 4, I introduce truth tables and use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to test these hypotheses derived from the literature. Ultimately, I show that none of these conditions are necessary or sufficient in understanding demand escalation and an additive approach to the literature-derived variables fails to explain this phenomenon.

¹² “Sudan police disperse protesters with tear gas on sixth day of unrest,” *Reuters*, December 24, 2018. <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-protests/sudan-police-disperse-protesters-with-tear-gas-on-sixth-day-of-unrest-idUSKCN1ON11Q>>.

1.3 A Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation


To better explain when and why demand escalation occurs, I develop a dynamic theory with two parts: the first identifies the factors that increase the likelihood of demands escalating, and the second identifies ways that the escalatory potential can be triggered.

When we relax the assumption of a unitary campaign, campaigns can be described in a number of different ways. I consider three dimensions that provide campaigns with their “shape.” First, the diversity of participants in the campaign matters to the extent that the campaign is seen as legitimate and representative of the society at large. Second, the overall cohesion and agreement around desired goals and strategies is important for capturing divergent interests and assessing the potential for unified action. Third, the presence of identifiable leaders is important not only in terms of the direction and discipline it can provide the movement, but also because it offers the governments someone to engage with. The escalatory potential is determined by the first two movement characteristics: whether a campaign is broadly or narrowly composed and whether a campaign is largely cohesive or internally fragmented.

Figure 2 shows that these two characteristics provide four different combinations of movement configurations. The most discriminating factor between reformist campaigns that escalate and those that do not pertains to the campaign’s ability to attract diverse participants to rally for its cause. I argue that reformist campaigns that have limited public appeal have little chance of escalating demands because it has little interest or incentive to do so. The second movement characteristic that matters is the campaign’s

level of fragmentation. Campaigns that are cohesive have a higher escalatory potential because they are better able to maintain a unified front to fuel continued contestation.

Figure 2. Campaign Configurations and their Escalatory Potential



The potential for escalation is largely determined by the movement’s configuration, but whether and how escalation is triggered depends on the interaction of movement leadership and government response. In terms of state response, I argue that regime violence elevates the escalatory potential (while its absence deactivates it), and government concessions determine the escalatory path.


Taking the demands of a reformist campaign at face value, there is an underlying trust in the government and hope that its leaders will enact or retract policies to meet the people’s request. If the government then responds to these largely unarmed reformist campaigns with disproportionate force, participants and observers of the campaign are likely to question the allegiance of the incumbent regime and lose faith in the government’s willingness to act on behalf of the people’s interests. Similar to tactical

escalation, I argue that demand escalation is another way that state repression can backfire on the regime. On the other hand, when states do not violently repress a reformist campaign, any escalatory potential it might have had is neutralized.

The dynamic component of my theory pertains to campaign leadership and government concessions. The fundamental difference between leaderless and leader-led movements is that movements with clear leadership provide the state an opportunity to engage productively to negotiate a settlement. If the state invites representatives of the movement to dialogue and adequately responds to some of their demands, the leaders have made the protest participants better off, and are likely to call off future protests.

However, if the state dismisses the campaign and refuses to engage with the movement in any meaningful way, the campaign's leadership may consider a variety of strategies to get the government's attention. Doing more of the same or lowering demands are not likely options, since the government signaled its refusal to engage with the initial set of demands and the movement's leaders face a reputational cost if it fails to deliver on mobilization promises. Already fueled by state repression, in the absence of state accommodation, protest leaders are more likely to escalate demands as part of a bargaining strategy with the goal of getting the government to engage. If successful, escalating demands will allow greater scope for negotiating the outcomes the movement initially wanted.

Figure 3. State Response and Escalatory Paths



Leaderless campaigns differ on several fronts. First, as protesters self-mobilize over a reformist cause, they are not fully aware of their potential bargaining power. If the government chooses to ignore their limited demands, individuals are likely to think that they do not have enough leverage to contend with the government. Lacking a central figure to encourage continued mobilization, the movement may dissolve over time. However, if the government decides to accommodate some of the movement’s requests out of fear or seeing them as legitimate, the masses are likely to feel empowered to demand more. Because the government has no individual or organization to negotiate with when faced with de-centralized movements, whatever concession the government makes is a unilateral decision meant to appease the protesters. The government may think

that offering a concession will quell the masses, but there is no mediator or movement leadership to translate the government's thinking to meet them halfway. Information is revealed through concessions, and the mass-led protesters have the newfound knowledge of their bargaining power – they will not be ignored.

1.4 Overview

Chapter 2 takes a step back and sets up the context for this dissertation, clarifying terms and concepts and introducing a new dataset that will be referenced in the remainder of the dissertation. In Chapter 3, I build the dynamic theory of demand escalation introducing the relevant movement characteristics and government responses that serve to both predict the occurrence of demand escalation and the pathways by which it is likely to occur. In Chapter 4, I test my theory against competing hypotheses using truth tables and QCA, and in Chapter 5, I tests the theory on three Hong Kong case studies. Chapter 6 offers concluding thoughts and policy implications, along with the limitations of this research and future questions to be explored.

Chapter 2: Weapons of Mass Mobilization

2019 has been called “the year of the street protester,”¹³ with an unprecedented “tsunami of protests”¹⁴ sweeping across six continents affecting both democracies and autocracies, advanced and developing economies, alike. In countries as diverse as Algeria, Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Honduras, Hong Kong (China), Iraq, Lebanon, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Sudan, people took to the streets often with little warning and with much anticipation. 2020, despite a global pandemic that imposed severe restrictions on mobilization, continued the trajectory with the United States seeing the largest movement in America’s history¹⁵ and contentious activity erupting all over the world over old and new grievances (e.g., Argentinians protesting the government’s handling of COVID-19, deepening economic


¹³ Diehl, Jackson. “From Hong Kong to Chile, 2019 is the year of the street protester. But why?” *The Washington Post*, October 27, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/from-hong-kong-to-chile-2019-is-the-year-of-the-street-protester-but-why/2019/10/27/9f79f4c6-f667-11e9-8cf0-4cc99f74d127_story.html>.

¹⁴ Wright, Robin. “The story of 2019: Protests in every corner of the globe.” *The New Yorker*, December 30, 2019. <<https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-story-of-2019-protests-in-every-corner-of-the-globe>>.

¹⁵ Buchanan, Larry, Quoc Trung Bui and Jugal K. Patel. “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,” *The New York Times*, July 3, 2020. <<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html>>.

crises, and plans for judicial reform¹⁶) in common and novel ways (e.g., through physical, virtual, and hybrid actions¹⁷). What’s more, seven¹⁸ of these mass mobilization campaigns in 2018 and 2019 started as protests against limited reform before escalating demands to call for leader removal or greater systemic change.

Figure 4. Map of Countries with Campaigns that Escalated Demands in 2018 and 2019



This recent surge, not just in the last few years but in the last decade, has revealed the limits of our knowledge regarding these weapons of mass mobilization. In this

¹⁶ Lister, Tim and Stefano Pozzebon. “Protests across Latin America reflect a toxic cocktail of pandemic and recession,” *CNN – World*, August 20, 2020. <<https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/20/americas/latam-covid-19-protests-intl/index.html>>.

¹⁷ Chenoweth, Erica, Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick, Jeremy Pressman, Felipe G. Santos, and Jay Ulfelder. “The global pandemic has spawned new forms of activism – and they’re flourishing,” *The Guardian*, April 20, 2020. <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/20/the-global-pandemic-has-spawned-new-forms-of-activism-and-theyre-flourishing>>.

¹⁸ Chile 2019, Ecuador 2019, France 2018, Haiti 2018, Hong Kong 2019, Nicaragua 2018, and Sudan 2018.

chapter, I will clarify what I mean by mass mobilization in the context of this research and unpack three dimensions of these contentious campaigns, examining what we know and do not know about their triggers, their structures, and their goals.

2.1 Varieties of Mobilization

Mass mobilization efforts have played a significant role in fundamentally changing the social and political structures in many parts of the world. For scholars, this has provided an essential justification for the study of movements and contentious campaigns, and for many activists, this has fueled their hope to even put their lives at risk in pursuit of such change. Political movements, social movements, popular protests, civic activism, civil resistance, people power movements, opposition campaigns, rebellions, uprisings, dissident action, contentious political challenges, domestic political unrest, among others, are terms that have been used interchangeably at times and selectively at other times to describe large segments of ordinary people coming together for a social or political cause.

The specific forms of collective action such as strikes, demonstrations, rallies, public meetings, marches, occupations, blockades, among others, become a campaign or a movement when it extends beyond one-time events, often incorporating multiple forms of public action. All varieties of mobilization can be considered a part of the “broader universe of contentious politics,” which spans from institutional politics to revolutions

and uses disruptive techniques to change government policy or make a political point (Tarrow 2011, 7).¹⁹

While contentious politics goes back to the dawn of history, “mounting, coordinating, and sustaining” mass movements against powerful opponents is an “invention of the modern age and an accompaniment of the rise of the modern state” (Tarrow 2011). Mass mobilization campaigns are now a major feature of global politics, but the emergence of these types of social movements was a new approach that developed in the West after 1750 (Tilly 2004). It was during the course of democratization in Europe that types of political contention evolved from being “parochial, particular, and bifurcated,”²⁰ to “cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous”²¹ forms of action with more leverage and staying power than its predecessors (Tilly 2010, 54). Particularly in Great Britain between the 1750s and 1830s, ordinary British people developed various repertoires of contention that engendered mass participation in national politics (Tilly 1995, 41).

¹⁹ While the government can also apply mass mobilization techniques to win support for policies favorable to the regime, such as President Richard Nixon organizing counter protests in favor of the Vietnam War, the majority of cases of mass mobilization are anti-government in nature and will be the focus of this research.

²⁰ “*parochial* in concentrating on local target, and basing themselves on local groupings rather than local segments of regional and national groupings; *particular* in having highly differentiated forms of action for different groups, situations, and localities; and *bifurcated* in dividing between direct action with respect to nearby objects of claims and action mediated by dignitaries and powerful people with respect to distant objects of claims” (Tilly 2010, 51-52)

²¹ “cosmopolitan because they facilitate making claims on scales far larger than the locality... “Modular” means that the performances in the repertoires transferred easily from place to place, issue to issue, group to group... “autonomous” calls attention to the greatly diminished roles of patrons and intermediary authorities in making claims; the people involved spoke directly to the objects of their claims, including national authorities” (Tilly 2010, 51-52)

There are many ways to categorize mass movements – including by scope (limited vs. comprehensive), type of desired change (progressive vs. conservative), target (governments vs. non-government actors), tactics used (violent vs. nonviolent), among others. While acts of resistance need not be overt and organized – there are everyday acts of resistance that are more subtle and covert, such as feigning ignorance or deference, slander and sabotage, false compliance (Scott 1985, 1990) – the focus of this research is on observable acts of mass contention where everyday people come together in sustained interaction against opponents, particularly the government. The unit of analysis here is a “contentious campaign” defined as sustained mobilization involving over a thousand participants and lasting longer than a week.²² While the selection criteria is agnostic to the demands of a campaign, the scope is limited in such a way as to differentiate between crowds (or isolated instances of a riot or a mob) versus more systematic gatherings, and the analysis is further limited to mobilization efforts that target a government to make all campaigns more directly comparable.²³

Movements referred to as ‘revolutionary’ and ‘social’ have historically been treated as a distinct phenomenon, with revolutions being studied “in comparison with

²² This definition is taken from the Major Episodes of Contention dataset (Chenoweth, Kang, Moore, *in progress*)

²³ It is worth noting that contentious campaigns or opposition movements are not discrete things that exist in the world. Some movements and notable events have come to be known by a common name (e.g., the Umbrella Movement, Athens Polytechnic uprising, etc.) because an analyst, journalist, a government, or actual participants gave the collective action a name. Because MEC uses a more systematic coding scheme to identify “campaigns,” the campaigns of contention identified here will often overlap but not be identical to movements identified elsewhere. For example, the Wikipedia entry of the “Umbrella Movement” lists its start and end dates to be September 28, 2014 and December 15, 2014. In MEC, the start and end dates of the “Hong Kong pro-democracy (Umbrella Movement)” campaign is coded as starting on September 22, 2014 and ongoing as of December 31, 2018.

other revolutions... and almost never compared with the cycles of protest that it in some ways resembles” (Tarrow 2011, 7). I draw on the works of social movement scholars in the sociological tradition and the research program on civil resistance and conflict studies to conceptualize all contentious collective action as falling along a spectrum that warrants internal comparison (Goldstone 1998, Tarrow 2011, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Because the focus of this research is on the evolution of civil conflict, I consider a broad array of relevant actors that participate in a campaign – from civil society groups and student organizations to rebel groups and warlords – and the campaigns of contention considered are made up of general strikes to armed struggles, and everything in between.

2.2 Beyond Free-Riding

When we see mass mobilization in action, people have somehow solved the collective action problem (also known as the free-rider problem), which some consider to be one of the most troubling dilemmas of social science (Olson 2009). The dilemma is that while a collective act (such as voting or joining a protest) may be desirable or effective for the group, individuals have little incentive to participate because personal gains are minimal and the chance for affecting the outcome are slim. So, what can explain the global rise of mass protests, particularly those calling for an incumbent’s ouster?

For one, the fact that collective action is often difficult to bring about is a statement describing its relative occurrence, not a law of the social world. In many situations and against so many odds, collective action has occurred and continues to occur among people with limited resources and power (Lichbach 1995). Reasons may

range from “the desire of young people to flaunt authority all the way to the vicious instincts of the mob,” but a common theme among many campaigns, historically and globally, has been to mount a shared claim against authorities (Tarrow 2011, 10-11). It may seem rather intuitive that a common purpose unites and spurs people to engage in contentious politics, but the specific demands, desires, or grievances that mass campaigns have mobilized over have often been conflated or assumed, and not fully categorized or analyzed.

If we consider just the recent wave of maximalist movements, the triggers of the contentious campaigns were as varied as a government tax on WhatsApp (Lebanon), increase in transportation fares (Chile), and the proposal of a controversial bill (Hong Kong). People have united over many different issues and grievances in the past and the list of reasons will likely increase over time. It is impossible to predict which event (e.g., policy change, an abuse of power, tragedy, etc.) will serve as a trigger for mobilization, but this project assesses whether certain types of reformist campaigns are more likely to increase claims and what combination of factors heightens the probability that demands will escalate. In so doing, it also addresses whether the rise in maximalist campaigns could partly be attributed to governments mishandling reformist campaigns that then escalate to challenge the incumbent regime more directly.

Beneath the proximate claims of contentious campaigns are often decades of corruption, inequality, decline in political freedoms, mismanagement of public goods and expectations, and betrayals of public trust. Sometimes maximalist campaigns are not preceded by a reformist campaign, but “protests erupt in dramatic fashion when both an immediate trigger and longer-term frustrations are powerfully present and interlock with

each other” (Youngs 2019, 150). The rise of inequality and the decline in social mobility globally may have ripened many societies for a spark to catalyze the masses to push for deeper change.

Other factors that may be contributing to the rise of contentious campaigns are the contagion effect and the role of social media. Contagion of political conflict has been theorized to occur through a process of social learning, and proximity is not necessarily the determinant of contagion. A society is not likely to “catch” outside civil strife unless a group is already “disaffected, has at least a latent sense of collective identity and has considered the possibility of taking political action” (Hill and Rothchild 1986, 720). Seeing groups of people in other societies organize and engage in contentious behavior can heighten a sense of collective identity and inspire action, thereby spreading modes of confrontation – revolutionary (Beissinger 2007) or nonviolent (Gleditsch and Rivera 2017) – in contexts where it otherwise would have been unlikely.

Similar to the underlying conditions necessary for triggers, the receptivity to outside political conflict may be heightened for countries with a recent history of domestic strife and if the society is polarized among just a few contending groups (Hill and Rothchild 1986). The contagion effect and emulative contention (Weyland 2014, 2012) partly explains how mass campaigns can occur in waves – including the Atlantic Revolutions at the end of the 18th century, the 1848 Spring of Nations and the 1917-1919 waves in Europe, the 1968 student movements, 1989 anti-communist protests, and the 2011 revolutions of the Arab Spring, among others.

The current wave, however, is far wider geographically than any previous clustering of protest events, and the increased role of the Internet and social media cannot

be overlooked when considering the breadth of these contentious campaigns. Scholars have long found a significant link between mass media, collective protest, and conflict in society (Hill and Rothchild 1986), and certain regimes are known to censor news coverage as a way to limit potential threats to their power. Within countries, social media allows protesters to share information and organize in unique and unprecedented ways. Across countries, social media can draw attention to politically salient issues and facilitate the spread of a tactic or methodology of a prominent protest, violent or peaceful. While demonstrations, boycotts, and protests are long established political tools that people do not need to be shown how to use, information about innovations and new forms of mobilization and resistance can be shared from one civil society to another and serve as a form of inspiration.

Additionally, collective action is often thought of as a problem to overcome in the standard consequentialist logic but participating in mass action could be rational and even moral, if “rationality” is not limited to self-regarding instrumental behavior. The framework of distributed effectivity explains participation that is “materially costly but personally rewarding,” and rationalizes participating in collective action that could benefit the interests of demographic, ethnic, and/or social groups with which an individual identifies (Gintis 2016, 47). The risks and costs of engaging in collective action remain, but they do not always outweigh the incentives, such as rewarding people to collectively strive for the public policy that they believe in (Hirschman 1982).

In this reading, the barrier to participating in collective action is not all that high, even when the chance for victory is slim. One 27-year-old Hong Kongese protester noted his willing participation in the civil disobedience campaign in 2019, despite

acknowledging that the campaign has maybe a “1 percent chance to win.”²⁴ Other protesters echoed similar sentiments about the grim prospect for success, even while choosing to show up and risk their lives.²⁵ What is noteworthy is that the typical hurdles of collective action coupled with the increased use of violence by security forces were not enough to keep the protesters at home. The Hong Kong protests grew throughout 2019, not because the chance of success increased, but arguably because joining the movement gave the participants satisfaction and fulfillment in knowing that they were fighting for a cause that they believed in with likeminded citizens.

Ultimately, there is no formula to predict when people will mobilize, and I do not seek to explain why the first protestor takes to the street. I have merely surveyed a few of the drivers that may be contributing to the rise in mass civil action across the world, where conflicts between challengers and authorities increasingly appear to be “a normal part of society” and not an “aberration” (Tarrow 1998, 11). Underlying grievances, proximate triggers, contagion effects, the rise of social media, and the benefits of collectively fighting for something on principle can operate as “clues for when contentious politics will emerge” and set in motion a sequence of events that may lead to sustained confrontation with authorities and result in unscheduled regime change (Tarrow 2011, 33).

²⁴ Mahtani, Shibani and Tiffany Liang. “Why Hong Kong protesters rage on, even though they cannot win.” *The Washington Post*, 3 July 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/why-hong-kong-protesters-rage-on-even-though-they-cannot-win/2019/07/03/0c738850-9cd9-11e9-83e3-45fded8e8d2e_story.html>.

²⁵ Kirby, Jen. “6 Hongkongers on how the protests have transformed their lives and their city,” *Vox*, 28 August 2019. <<https://www.vox.com/2019/8/28/20799049/hong-kong-protests-first-person>>.

2.3 Harnessing the Power of the People

Early theorists of social and political mobilization efforts looked to the French and Industrial Revolutions to derive a rather negative portrayal of mass movements as extreme, violent, and disorganized (Durkheim 1951). Some may still hold these views, but many more increasingly consider popular contention to be rather orderly, rooted in “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities” (Tilly 1986, Tarrow 2011). Over time, people have come together to fight for better wages, corruption, inflation, environmental issues, women’s rights, racial justice, and indigenous rights, among other reasons.

Historically, the most common source of contention were “food riots and grain seizures that accompanied times of dearth and increases in the price of food” (Tarrow 2011, 42). Many of these campaigns had a triggering event that became closely related to their demand, such as an increase in the price of bread prompting calls for the reduction in the bread price, but other times a trigger merely functioned as a catalyst for greater anti-regime mobilization. In either case, previous studies of movements largely assume that demands are fixed from the beginning, and how a movement’s goals shift during the course of a campaign is not well understood.

While contentious campaigns take up a wide variety of goals, the quantitative civil resistance literature has focused on only a subset of these campaigns with “maximalist” demands (i.e. those seeking the ouster of the incumbent leader, the entire regime, or territorial independence) (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Works like *Why Civil Resistance Works* remain foundational to the study of nonviolent resistance and

effectively compared nonviolent civil unrest to violent civil wars, but the broader literature that overlooks the vast majority of contentious campaigns that have non-maximalist demands²⁶ has left a gap that I hope to fill. Reformist campaigns matter because they occur much more frequently and because they can transform into a mass uprising, and sometimes a violent insurgency. Understanding the strategic and organic mechanisms behind why protest movements escalate their demands can help identify avenues for intervention that allow people's needs to be met without violence, death, or destruction.

There are undoubtedly cases where a reformist campaign expands to include more and more reformist demands, such as in Brazil in 2013 when street demonstrations over the increase in transportation fare grew to become a march against corruption, poor public services, and the government's excessive spending in hosting the World Cup.²⁷ However, I use the term "demand escalation" to specifically mean going from reformist demands to maximalist ones, thereby crossing a threshold.

²⁶ Some datasets that look at a wider range of social unrest include the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) and the Mass Mobilization (MM) data project, but both of these are at the event-level and not directly comparable to larger campaigns. William Gamson's *Strategy of Social Protest* does provide systematic data to analyze the characteristics of protest groups but the data is limited to 53 protest groups active in America between 1800 and 1945, and he suggests that the findings are not entirely applicable to the post-1945 era. See (Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992) for a discussion of the criticisms of Gamson (1975, 1990) on methodological and theoretical grounds.

²⁷ Watts, Jonathan. "Brazil erupts in protest: more than a million on the streets," *The Guardian*, June 21, 2013. <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/21/brazil-police-crowds-rio-protest>>.

2.4 Introducing the Enhanced Major Episodes of Contention (EMEC) Dataset

Previous work on civil resistance has assessed predominantly maximalist campaigns, largely because it focused on violent and nonviolent forms of regime change in comparing civil resistance to civil war. The Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) database (Chenoweth, Kang, and Moore *in progress*) broadened the scope of anti-government campaigns to include contentious activity below the threshold of regime change but above isolated events, and identified a larger universe of sustained mass action challenging the government in some form.

The fundamental difference between reformist and maximalist campaigns is that the former pressures the existing government to enact or reverse some sort of policy measure, while the latter calls for a change in leadership or governance structure. In MEC, maximalist campaigns include self-determination movements, secessionist movements, and movements seeking leader removal or regime change, and the five categories of reformist claims include Economic, Electoral, Political, Social, and Other.²⁸ Extending the coding from MEC,²⁹ I identified a total of 2101 campaigns³⁰ targeting their own government³¹ between 1955-2018, of which 1640 (78%) were reformist campaigns and 461 (22%) maximalist.

²⁸ See the codebook for a more detailed explanation and examples within each category.

²⁹ Numbers are slightly different from MEC because of differing coding criteria.

³⁰ Following MEC, a “campaign” is defined as “multiple contentious events with more than 1,000 observed participants” that last longer than a week (MEC codebook).


³¹ The options for “target” include one’s own government, foreign government, or a non-government entity (not mutually exclusive). Self-determination and secession campaigns are coded as targeting their own government as well as a foreign government.

In trying to understand why demands escalate from reformist to maximalist claims, two new variables were coded for each maximalist campaign – “reformist trigger” and “reformist campaign.”³² “Reformist trigger” is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether there was an identifiable event of reformist nature (e.g., changes in the cost of bread or fuel, alleged corruption, etc.) that precipitated the maximalist campaign, and “reformist campaign” is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the reformist trigger led to sustained mass action over the reformist demand.³³ To differentiate between maximalist campaigns with different precursors, I use the term “tripartite,” “bipartite,” and “unipartite” to describe the number of stages in a given campaign (see Figure 5). A tripartite maximalist campaign has three parts: a reformist trigger, a reformist campaign over that trigger, and then a maximalist campaign; a bipartite maximalist campaign has two parts: a reformist trigger that quickly escalates into a maximalist campaign; and a unipartite maximalist campaign are cases in which there is no clear reformist precursor and the campaign makes maximalist demands from the onset of mobilization.

³² Ideally, I would have gone through the 1,641 reformist campaigns to see whether there was an escalation in demand, but to make the project more feasible I started with the 460 maximalist campaigns to identify the presence or absence of reformist triggers.

³³ In cases where a maximalist campaign is coded as being preceded by a reformist campaign, there was no time criteria; the duration between the start of a reformist campaign and time of escalation varies between 7 and 2527 days.

Figure 5. A Typology of Different Maximalist Campaigns




Identifying the reformist campaigns associated with maximalist movements resulted in linking 13 existing reformist campaigns to their respective maximalist campaigns and adding 26 new reformist campaigns to the database.³⁴ In the updated database, out of 460 maximalist campaigns, 223 (48%) had some sort of a reformist trigger (either bipartite or tripartite), and among these, 39 (18%) had an associated reformist campaign (tripartite). Put another way, out of 1641 reformist campaigns seeking limited change for longer than a week, 39 (2.4%) escalated demands to become maximalist campaigns. The EMEC dataset will be further elaborated upon and referred to in subsequent chapters, but it was introduced early on to act as a backdrop in differentiating escalated (tripartite) campaigns from other episodes of contention. Tripartite maximalist campaigns are the focus of this research as they provide the space to interrogate what happens in the interim of seeking something from the government to challenging its authority.

Figure 6 plots all escalated campaigns by its start year, polity score of the country in which it occurred, and region. There are no observable association, suggesting that demand escalation is a phenomenon not limited to a certain era, regime type, or geographical location.

³⁴ See Appendix B for the list of newly added reformist campaigns.

Figure 6. Plot of Campaigns with Escalated Demands³⁵



³⁵ Four points are missing as they do not have polity scores for the associated country-year.

Chapter 3: Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation

Why is it that tens of thousands of students took to the streets to protest controversial laws³⁶ in both Indonesia and Hong Kong in 2019, and only Hong Kong experienced an escalation in demands to include the resignation of Hong Kong's chief executive, Carrie Lam? The answer to this puzzle becomes clearer when we disaggregate the internal characteristics of the movements as well as state response. First, I introduce campaign-related variables in EMEC to show that leadership, hierarchy, and cohesion are distinct elements of a campaign that should not be conflated. Then, I incorporate a discussion on the role of government responses to build the dynamic theory of demand escalation.

3.1 Disaggregating Movement Structure

It goes without saying that no two campaigns are alike, and the characteristics of a campaign can change over time. While movements and campaigns are often made up of different factions with varying organizational structures, many scholars have treated movement as unitary actors in applying a bargaining framework to analyze the interaction

³⁶ In Indonesia the protests were against new legislation that weakened the authority of the Corruption Eradication Commission and a proposed criminal code that discriminated against minorities; in Hong Kong the protests started over a proposed legislation of the 2019 Hong Kong extradition bill.

of nonstate actors with states in ways similar to interstate conflict.³⁷ Recent works have started to challenge this assumption and taken disaggregation seriously; Cunningham (2011, 280), for example, found that among a sample of campaigns making self-determination demands, “only 37% remained unified during most of their interaction against the state.”

Whether the fissures occur along ethnic lines or the moderate-extreme spectrum, most non-state parties in civil conflicts are often “shifting coalitions of groups with malleable allegiances and at times divergent interests” (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012, 4). Not only is understanding internal structures important because most movements are not unitary, but recent studies have found the internal structure of movements to be an important dimension affecting conflict behavior (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012), intragroup competition and outbidding (Bloom 2004), defection and side-switching (Staniland 2012), government response and dispute settlement (Cunningham 2011), peace negotiations and settlement (Kydd and Walter 2002, De Mesquita 2005, Pearlman 2009), and post-war peacebuilding (Driscoll 2012), among others. I contend that movement structure is also a crucial factor in demand escalation.

If movements are not homogenous entities, we can better conceive of contentious campaigns as “strings of more or less connected events, scattered across time and space...with various levels of formalizations, linked in patterns of interaction which run from the fairly centralized to the totally decentralized, from the cooperative to the

³⁷ Fearon (1995) first introduced bargaining theory to the study of war and Walter (2009) has looked at the bargaining failures that could occur in civil wars.

explicitly hostile” (Diani 2003, 1). Among studies that prioritize disaggregation, centralized-decentralized, cohesive-fragmented, hierarchical-flat are commonly used spectrums along which organizational structures are conceptualized.

Centralized, cohesive, hierarchical movements are generally associated with strong leadership and seen to have “the organizational power to mobilize mass participation, enforce strategic discipline, and contain disruptive dissent” while decentralized, fragmented, and flat campaigns lack “the leadership, institutions, and collective purpose to coordinate and constrain its members (Pearlman 2011, 2). However, I speculate that the presence or absence of leadership, hierarchy, and cohesiveness are distinct characteristics of a movement that warrant individual and joint considerations. Differentiating between these attributes matters all the more when trying to understand the increasingly prominent type of “leaderless” campaigns that are often treated as residuals of one or more of these characteristics.

In EMEC, I trained two research assistants to code several different movement characteristics.³⁸ If these variables related to movement structure are highly correlated, then they may be describing the same feature of a movement and having distinct terms would be redundant. However, after coding movement characteristics of the 233 bipartite and tripartite maximalist campaigns, Figure 6 shows that having identifiable leaders, a hierarchical structure, and movement cohesion are not all highly correlated. Having a centralized or hierarchical structure is a feature of campaigns with leadership (no campaign is coded as having a hierarchical structure without also having clear leaders),


³⁸ See Appendix A for the codebook.

but not all campaigns with leaders are organized hierarchically, and campaigns need not have leaders to be cohesive.

For example, under the organization of the Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC) chaired by Undule Mwakasungula, Malawians formalized a 15-page petition including a list of 20 reformist demands for President Bingu wa Mutharika to address in 2011. Although the campaign had clear identifiable leadership, the campaign was de-centralized and not hierarchical, as the HRCC operated as a loose confederation of pre-existing organizations. Furthermore, it was incohesive, as evidenced by various groups pursuing divergent campaign strategies particularly in the aftermath of extreme state repression.

In contrast, the 2008 anti-US beef protests in South Korea started on university campuses and quickly drew the support of the public. It lacked identifiable leadership, but the campaign remained cohesive in its demands for the resumption of the ban on US beef imports and later for President Lee Myung-bak's resignation. Thus, disaggregation of movement characteristics matters and when we conflate them, we miss out on understanding which dimension is important for what function. For example, Ives and Lewis (2020) argue that when protesters are "loosely connected" and lack an identifiable hierarchy, they are more likely to break out into violence. But the degree to which group cohesion, organizational structure, or leadership is doing the work is unclear.

Figure 7. Correlation Plot of Movement Characteristics among Bipartite and Tripartite Maximalist Campaigns




For the dynamic theory of demand escalation, I consider three dimensions that provide campaigns with their “shape”. First, the diversity of participants in the campaign matters to the extent that the campaign is seen as legitimate and representative of the society at large (broad vs. narrow composition). Second, the overall cohesion and agreement around desired goals and strategies is important for capturing divergent interests and assessing the potential for unified action (cohesive vs. fragmented). Third, the presence of identifiable leaders is important not only in terms of the direction and discipline it can provide the movement, but also because it offers the opposition (i.e. the government) someone to engage with (leader-led vs. leaderless).

Figure 8 (previously introduced in Chapter 1) shows that campaign composition and internal cohesion provide four different movement configurations that determine a movement’s escalatory potential. Among the combinations, I argue that campaigns that

have a more diverse array of participants (are more representative of the general public) have a higher potential to challenge the government because public support is crucial in any opposition campaign (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

Movements derive power from a large and diverse base “because the more people who are mobilized, the more the legitimacy of the authorities and their policies is called into question” (Koopmans 1993, 653). In contrast, reformist campaigns that are only able to draw a specific group of people to its cause have little chance of escalating demands because it has little interest or incentive to do so. A narrowly composed campaign lacks leverage in terms of popular support, and the government is not likely to take the campaign more seriously if it escalated demands without broader appeal. Thus, the most discriminating factor between reformist campaigns that escalate and those that do not pertains to the campaign’s ability to attract broad segments of society to rally for its cause.

Figure 8. Campaign Configurations and their Escalatory Potential



However, among broadly comprised campaigns, I expect that campaigns that are cohesive (vs. fragmented) will have higher escalatory potential, given their ability to maintain a unified front. From gangs to armed rebel groups, factionalism and fragmentation have consequences for any group that acts in the pursuit of a collective interest, particularly if internal factions find themselves in a “dual contest” – competing against the state they challenge but also struggling with in-group factions over political relevance (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). Infighting can divert “groups from the aims for which they claim to be fighting,” and a lack of cohesion can undermine “their potential for collective action” by redirecting energy inwards (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012).

The fragmentation research program has largely focused on nonstate actors in armed conflicts and the effect of fragmentation has centered around violence, but in-group fragmentation could be similarly debilitating for mass movements in non-violent contexts. It is hard enough to sustain any mass campaign, and a fragmented one has an added challenge of preventing each sub-group from going its own way. Therefore, cohesive campaigns are likely to have an edge over fragmented ones in terms of having the unity and energy needed to elevate their challenge on the state through escalating demands. Having clear leadership is often associated with movement cohesion, but plenty of leaderless movements are also cohesive, and this disaggregation allows the focus to be put on the outward-facing role of leaders in representing and negotiating on behalf of the movement at the next stage.

The potential for escalation is largely determined by the movement’s configuration, but whether and how escalation is triggered depends on the interaction of

movement leadership and government response. In terms of state responses, I argue that regime violence elevates the escalatory potential (while its absence deactivates it), and government concessions determine the escalatory path.

3.2 How Regime Response Elevates the Escalatory Potential

Escalation generally suggests an increase in intensity or severity, and it has been conceptualized in a few different ways in the civil resistance and social movements literature. Escalation can occur quantitatively to focus on numbers, size, and frequency (e.g., incorporating greater numbers of participants, more diverse groups of participants, longer duration of confrontation/engagement, and broader geographical coverage) or qualitatively (Sørensen and Johansen 2016). If the starting point is unarmed civil disobedience, qualitative escalation can remain nonviolent through the innovation of a new method, creating a dilemma for the opponent, provocation, and persistence (Sørensen and Johansen 2016, McAdam 1983), but escalation to violence, also known as tactical escalation, has received the preponderance of analytical attention (Ron 2001, O'Brien and Deng 2015, Hess and Martin 2006, Ryckman 2020).

In this section, I first survey the literature on tactical escalation to juxtapose it with demand escalation. Similar to tactical escalation, I show that demand escalation is more likely when the state responds to initial nonviolent action with disproportionate force. But different from tactical escalation, demand escalation does not necessarily emerge from a failure in the pre-escalation approach. I then describe the role of state concessions and theorize how state attempts to accommodate a movement can also backfire and facilitate demand escalation.

3.2.1 Dissent-Repression Nexus

When people come together to challenge the government on some grounds, policy or otherwise, opposing forces often try to stop them. State or pro-government agents can use a number of different techniques to undermine burgeoning movements – such as through limiting the flow of resources available to organizers, raising the cost of participation, defiling the movement’s public image, instigating internal conflict, and damaging morale, among others (Marx 1979). However, historically, the state’s preferred method to counter or eliminate the behavioral threat has been to employ some form of repressive action and this regularity has been termed the “law of coercive responsiveness” – that is, dissent³⁹ increases repression⁴⁰ (Davenport 2007).⁴¹

State coercion can take many forms (e.g., bans, arrests, torture, harassment, surveillance/spying, and mass killing) and regime violence can be actual or threatened, but I focus on repression that is “observable” and directed against an opposition campaign by state agents (Earl 2003). In general, repressive behavior can be thought of as the application of state power that violates “First Amendment-type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security” (Davenport

³⁹ Dissent, domestic conflict, opposition campaigns, resistance movements, anti-government campaigns, and contentious activity, are used interchangeably to minimize redundancy.

⁴⁰ Repression, repressive behavior, state coercion, state violence, and regime violence, are used interchangeably to minimize redundancy.

⁴¹ Some have started to challenge this “law-like” regularity, arguing that dissent and state repression are endogenous and once empirical models are corrected for this endogeneity, the strong positive relationship disappears (Ritter and Conrad 2016), or finding that the modal response of government to dissent is to ignore it (Klein and Regan 2018).

2007, 2), and these acts are often justified in the name of some political or military objective – most notably, regime survival. Research on state repression has been built on the assumption of rationality, with state violence often targeting “persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key governmental policies, because of their perceived political beliefs” (Goldstein 2001, xxviii).

The logic of state repression on mass movements is that as dissidents are met with “paroxysms of state violence,” this dispels the immediate dissent by imposing costs for further mobilization as well as deterring future dissident behavior through a demonstration effect (Regan and Henderson 2002, 123, Tilly 1978, 100-102). Thus, governments that exercise their monopoly on the use of force to minimize domestic dissent do so largely through fear, using explicit and perceived threats of intimidation to quiet actual and potential challengers, both in the present and the future.

3.2.2 When Repression Backfires

But repression is risky, and harming civilians, particularly those that are unarmed, violates human rights and social norms which can solicit condemnation (Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014). To ensure that repression has its intended effect of reducing “the internal threat to the regime’s rule” and allowing the state to maintain control (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 517), the state often couples its coercive actions with strategies to diminish the likelihood and, or, the severity of backlash. These “methods of inhibiting outrage” from the public include covering up their actions, devaluing the

targets of the abuse, reinterpreting events for mass consumption, using official channels to sound authoritative, as well as using intimidation and bribery (Hess and Martin 2006).

States often have the upper hand in the “credibility battle”⁴² in which different sides attempt to portray and establish as truth their version of the facts of the repressive event. But when an issue or incident “begins to escape elite definition and control” (Hess and Martin 2006) and the state cannot credibly convince the public of their status as defenders of law and order, state repression can become counterproductive. In such cases, regime repression can backfire and fuel greater mobilization (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 69), leading to various negative outcomes for the regimes (Martin 2007, Martin, Varney, and Vickers 2001, Nepstad 2011).

Backfire⁴³ is “an action that recoils against its originators,” and the outcome is not only worse than anticipated, but worse than having done nothing (Martin 2007). While not all repressive acts backfire, state coercion meant to stifle dissent can paradoxically empower a movement and weaken a regime if it is viewed as excessive and information about repression is “communicated effectively to receptive audiences that are substantial enough that authorities must take their outrage into consideration” (Hess and Martin 2006, 451). Movements can weaken the effectiveness of repression by mobilizing backlash protests and using adaptive tactics to elude subsequent repression (Francisco 2004), and additional strategies for dissidents to increase the likelihood of backfire

⁴² Credibility refers to “the believability of claims and claims-makers” and more specifically, the “capacity of claims-makers to enroll supporters behind their arguments, legitimate those arguments as authoritative knowledge, and present themselves as the sort of people who can voice the truth” (Epstein 1996, 3).

⁴³ Backfire is also known as “moral jiu-jitsu” (Richard Gregg), “political jiu-jitsu” (Gene Sharp), and the “paradox of repression” (Kurtz & Smithey).

include articulating grievances in apolitical terms, “building clear lines of leadership succession, and bridging social distance between a movement’s participants and domestic and international groups” (Ackerman and Merriman 2014).

There are several different mechanisms at play in the backfire dynamic, but one can think of the state and the opposition movement as being trapped in a zero-sum game of fixed legitimacy. When a government uses violence against its own citizens, this can be seen as arbitrary and “lower the government’s legitimacy and raise the society’s revolutionary potential” (Greene 1974, 112). Gregg (1934) called this “moral ju-jitsu” to signify the moral advantage that nonviolent actors have to throw powerful opponents off balance, while Sharp (1973) renamed the dynamic “political ju-jitsu” to emphasize the pragmatic advantages of nonviolent discipline in being able to make supporters of uncommitted third parties, cause splits among the regime’s allies, and mobilize support from members of the grievance group. Thus, repressive events may become transformative for social movements to gain the upper hand (Hess and Martin 2006).

In addition to legitimizing the opposition and de-legitimizing the regime, excessive government repression of nonviolent activities has been found to increase violent activities (Lichbach 1987, Francisco 1995). As state agents follow a policy of coercion, the policy itself may become the target of dissent, and the apathetic could “become polarized, the reformers become radicalized, and the revolutionaries redouble their efforts” (Lichbach 1987, 269). For example, when governments suppress nonviolent movements, particularly those targeting vulnerable citizens such as the elderly, this can produce a “protest spectacle” that draws in onlookers and new participants or supporters to the movement; the result is greater mobilization and a noticeable radicalization of

tactics on the part of the movement as they feel supported and empowered by the increase in solidarity (O'Brien and Deng 2015).

Tactical escalation has been noted to take the form of terrorist violence (Tarrow 1989), political insurgency (White 1989), or armed conflict (Regan and Norton 2005), and previous research has considered how the organizational capacity of opposition movements can facilitate the transition of repressed dissent to civil wars, particularly in ethnonational politics (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). However, tactical escalation may not be the only way that state violence intensifies domestic dissent. I argue that demand escalation is another example of repression backfire and I use a large- N analysis to test my hypotheses in the next section.

3.2.3 Testing the Link between State Repression and Demand Escalation

Taking the demands of a reformist campaign at face value, there is an underlying trust in the government and hope that its leaders will enact or retract policies to meet their demands. If the government then responds to these unarmed reformist campaigns with disproportionate force, participants and observers of the campaign are likely to question the allegiance of the incumbent regime and lose faith in the government's willingness to act on behalf of the people's interests. As a result, a reformist campaign is likely to escalate its claims from asking something of the government to demanding that it must go.

Hypothesis 1: Contentious campaigns making reformist demands are more likely to escalate their demands to maximalist claims when targeted with state repression

If demand escalation and tactical escalation are both triggered by state repression, they can be considered alternatives. However, I hypothesize that they are not pure substitutes as campaigns with violent flanks are less likely to escalate demands for two reasons: because regime repression is less likely to backfire if a campaign has a simultaneous violent flank, and because campaigns with violent flanks are more likely to escalate tactically. Violent flanks, or contemporaneous armed challengers, have been theorized to both help and hurt popular movements achieve maximalist change.

One reason why a violent flank might undermine the potential of maximalist unarmed uprisings is because “nonviolent discipline among challengers is an important requirement for backfire to occur” (Chenoweth and Schock 2015, 429). Repression backfire hinges on outrage, and “outrage is maximized when the injustice is clear-cut” (Hess and Martin 2006). When dissidents use violence, it contributes to the perception that force is needed to restore order (Nepstad 2013). If potential third-party supporters of the campaign perceive state repression to be legitimate, then they will not experience the outrage needed to stand in solidarity with the campaign and regimes will have the tacit approval to repress without repercussion.

Second, campaigns with violent flanks may escalate into armed conflicts for a few reasons. In a campaign comprised of both moderate (nonviolent) and militant elements, the more moderate elements tend to drop out first in a prolonged struggle, which could shift “the balance of the core” and lead to violent radicalization of contention (Tarrow 2011, 206). Additionally, campaigns with violence wielding groups are better equipped to withstand repression and are more likely to confront the state militarily given their

capacity for violence (Ryckman 2020). Particularly when progress seems lacking using nonviolent means, violence-wielding groups may take over and transform the movement into a violent campaign (Ryckman 2020). Therefore, I expect that reformist campaigns with violent flanks will be more prone to escalating with violence, and less likely to escalate with demands; while reformist campaigns without violent flanks are more likely to escalate through demands while remaining largely nonviolent.

Hypothesis 2: Reformist contentious campaigns with violent flanks are less likely to escalate their demands to maximalist claims

To test these hypotheses, I conduct a regression analysis using the Enhanced Major Episodes of Contention (EMEC) dataset. The unit of observation is a contentious campaign defined as a series of events involving over a thousand participants and lasting longer than a week. The universe of cases are all reformist campaigns from 1955-2018 that directed some or all demands to their own government.⁴⁴ I use the Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Firth method) as well as the Bias Correction method (rare events logit) (King and Zeng 2001), as the dependent variable involves rare events and low frequency data. I also include a non-penalized logit model, as some argue that logistic regression models are suitable even for extremely rare events (Westphal 2013).

The outcome variable is a dichotomous variable “Escalated” coded as “1” if the reformist campaign escalated to a maximalist campaign. The main independent variables

⁴⁴ If not otherwise specified, all variables are coded using historic newspapers and databases (i.e. NexisUni, ProQuest, Global Nonviolent Action Database).

pertain to regime violence and violent flanks, and both are also dichotomous variables. “Regime Violence” (REGVIOL) is coded as “1” if the reformist campaign experiences any kind of government repression, and “Violent Flank” (VIOLFLANK) indicates whether a nonviolent reformist campaign had a radical (violent) flank.

Nineteen campaigns are coded as “missing” the violent flank variable as there are 19 violent reformist campaigns, and violent flanks only pertain to nonviolent movements.⁴⁵ Political, Economic, Social, Electoral, and Other, are types of reformist demands. Each of these categories are dichotomous variables and most campaigns are coded as having one dominant type of demand.⁴⁶ These demand types are included as control variables in the regression, as certain categories of reformist demands are plausibly more likely to escalate to maximalist claims than others. For example, electoral fraud has been found to be a particularly motivating trigger for citizens to mobilize around, especially in oppressive societies, and campaigns pertaining to election results or election laws could have a higher likelihood of escalating demands (Tucker 2007).

“Democracy” indicates whether the country in which the campaign occurred was a democracy one year prior to campaign onset (as determined by a score of 6 or greater on the Polity revised combined score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers 2014)). This dummy variable also serves as a control because political institutions have been found to influence the risk of civil conflict, albeit with mixed evidence. For example, democracies

⁴⁵ These are excluded from the regression.

⁴⁶ However, the types of reformist demands are not mutually exclusive and some campaigns do have multiple demands.

have been noted to facilitate more extreme non-state action, such as terrorist violence, as compared to authoritarian regimes (Tarrow 1989, Chenoweth 2013, Eubank and Weinberg 2001, Li 2005, Chenoweth 2010, Findley and Young 2011, Young and Dugan 2011); but evidence for well-established democracies being safe from terrorism (Eyerman 1998) and failed states attracting terrorism (Piazza 2008) exist as well.

Although regime type has been found to condition different dynamics of the state-dissent nexus, such as affecting the propensity to use state repression as well as to offer concessions (Carey 2006), there is no theoretical prior for speculating how different institutional settings are likely to influence demand escalation. Two other variables are used as controls in the regression: the population of the country one year prior to campaign onset (based on World Bank Development Indicators), and the number of participants at the peak of the campaign.⁴⁷ Below is a summary table of all the variables included in the regression:

Table 1. Dichotomous Variables from EMEC

Variable	Coded “0”	Coded “1”	Missing (NA)
Escalated	1601	39	--
Regime Violence	1019	621	--
Political	1230	410	--
Economic	764	876	--
Social	1442	198	--
Electoral	1537	103	--
Other	1302	338	--
Violent Flank	1149	472	19

⁴⁷ The population and number of participants are collapsed into a single variable (participation/population) and logged.

Democracy	535	1060	45
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Table 2. Numeric Variables from EMEC

	Min.	Median	Mean	Max.	Missing
Total Population	175,600	30,800,000	165,100,000	1,357,000,000	148
Number of participants	1,000	10,000	186,863	50,000,000	0

Across all three models, demand escalation is positively and significantly correlated with regime violence (REGVIOL), and negatively and significantly correlated with violent flanks (VIOLFLANK). Based on the standard logistic regression, the likelihood of demand escalation is almost eight times higher⁴⁸ if a reformist campaign is violently repressed by the state. However, reformist campaigns with violent flanks are 61%⁴⁹ less likely to escalate demands, as compared to reformist campaigns without violent flanks.

Table 3. Model Estimates of the Likelihood of Demand Escalation

VARIABLES	(1) Firth Method	(2) Rare Events Logit	(3) Logistic Regression
REGVIOL	2.077*** (0.478)	2.077*** (0.515)	2.148*** (0.494)
VIOLFLANK	-0.897** (0.412)	-0.897** (0.421)	-0.936** (0.424)

⁴⁸ The odds of a campaign escalating demands when it is repressed by the state: $\exp(2.148) = 8.57$.

⁴⁹ The odds of a campaign escalating demands when it has a violent flank: $\exp(-0.936) = 0.39$.


POLITICAL	0.925** (0.400)	0.929** (0.415)	0.936** (0.414)
ECONOMIC	0.565 (0.417)	0.570 (0.449)	0.588 (0.434)
SOCIAL	1.165** (0.460)	1.174** (0.489)	1.144** (0.482)
ELECTORAL	1.002* (0.524)	1.013* (0.590)	0.960* (0.554)
OTHER	-0.655 (0.586)	-0.636 (0.612)	-0.796 (0.634)
Log(PARTICIPANTS / POPULATION)	0.097 (0.079)	0.097 (0.084)	0.100 (0.080)
DEMOCRACY	-0.590 (0.375)	-0.588 (0.402)	-0.612 (0.384)
Constant	-3.455*** (0.955)	-3.451*** (1.008)	-3.556*** (0.981)
Observations	1,449	1,449	1,449

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Based on the standard logistic model, the predicted probabilities of demand escalation are as follows: 0.8% among reformist campaigns that do not have violent flanks and are not repressed, 0.3% among reformist campaigns that have violent flanks and are not repressed, 6% among reformist campaigns that do not have violent flanks and are repressed, and 2.6% among reformist campaigns that have violent flanks and are repressed. All else being equal, reformist campaigns are more likely to escalate demands if they are violently repressed by the state, but reformist campaigns with violent flanks are proportionately less likely to escalate demands, as compared to campaigns without violent flanks.

Figure 9. Predictive Probabilities of Demand Escalation



Given that state repression is not intended to fuel conflict, demand escalation is another way that regime violence can backfire. The negative relationship between reformist campaigns with violent flanks and escalating demands is expected because backfire is less likely when a campaign fails to maintain nonviolent discipline, and campaigns with violence wielding groups have a greater likelihood of escalating tactically. A reformist campaign could also escalate demands and tactics concurrently, but only five nonviolent reformist campaigns escalated to becoming a violent maximalist

campaign (three of which had violent flanks)⁵⁰ and there seems to be a lot more tactical homogeneity over time than is often argued in the literature. Future research can address the degree to which demand and tactical escalation are alternative strategies that a movement can take when faced with state repression.

It is also worth noting that having reformist demands that are political, social, or electoral in nature are also significantly and positively correlated to demand escalation (political and social claims at an alpha of 0.05 and electoral claims at an alpha of 0.1); ceteris paribus, reformist campaigns that seek economic redress or “other”⁵¹ goals are less likely to escalate demands. One reason for this might be that the criterion for economic demands is too broad and inclusive.


According to the codebook, there are four different sub-types in the “economic” category: demands related to price or tax increases, economic corruption, labor or wage disputes, and land tenure. While the categories are justifiable in that they all relate to the production, consumption, or distribution of goods and services, some economic-based grievances are much more threatening to people’s livelihoods than others. For example, civil servants demanding a wage increase is fundamentally different from people protesting the high cost of living because they cannot afford bread for their families

⁵⁰ 1967-72 Northern Ireland Nationalist campaign for equality → IRA/Irish Nationalists Campaign, 2016-17 Lawyers and Teacher’s Anglophone Strikes → Anglophone Crisis (Cameroon), 1988 Protests over Declining Economy → Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria), 2011 Libyan Housing Protests → Libyan Civil War, 1969-1971 East Pakistan Rights Campaign → Bengalis Campaign (Pakistan).

⁵¹ “Other” claims are those that could not be categorized as “Electoral,” “Social,” “Economic,” or “Political,” goals and are typically public policy concerns that are idiosyncratic or highly context specific. Examples include issues related to spending on the World Cup (Brazil in 2014), privatization of water (Bolivia in 2000), and unfunded prisons (France in 2018), among others.

anymore. So, although plenty of maximalist campaigns have economic roots, the lack of significant correlation between reformist economic claims and demand escalations could be because most reformist campaigns with economic demands are not related to matters of subsistence and not repressed by the state. Among all reformist campaigns, there are 876 campaigns that had economic claims and of these 241 campaigns (24%) were repressed, while there were 410 campaigns that had political claims and of these 213 campaigns (52%) were repressed.⁵²

Figure 10. Breakdown of Demands Among All Reformist Campaigns



⁵² One caveat is that some campaigns had both political and economic claims; among 1640 total reformist campaigns, 73 campaigns (4%) had both political and economic claims.

Despite the similarities between demand and tactical escalation, however, there is a noteworthy difference. In theorizing tactical escalation as a response to state coercion, there is an assumption that nonviolence was not producing the desired results and the opposition needed to do something else to regain momentum and leverage.⁵³ Ryckman (2019) more explicitly argues that slow or no progress encourages the turn to violence by convincing the participants that nonviolence cannot achieve meaningful concessions. The case of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is often cited to show that their turn to violence in the 1970s happened only after peaceful protests were violently repressed by British troops (White 1989, 1993). White argues that the people's support for violence develops when they see peaceful protest as futile, and we can see this dynamic having occurred in Hong Kong 2019 when protesters graffitied "it was you who taught me peaceful marches did not work" in the Legislative Council.⁵⁴

Demand escalation, on the other hand, does not necessarily follow from failure in seeking reformist claims. Put another way, reformist campaigns can escalate to becoming maximalist ones after receiving concessions from the government as well as when the government refuses to accommodate the reformist claims. Of the 39 reformist campaigns that escalated, 18 did so after failing to achieve any of its goals, but 15 escalated after

⁵³ Limited research has found that concessions can also lead to breakdown in nonviolent discipline, but this was noted among campaigns active during periods of non-democratic rule in 14 specific countries from 1991-2012, of which nonviolent action was accommodated only 2.5% of the time (Pinckney 2016). Given the limited generalizability, Pinckney admits to the inability to "offer specific suggestions why this might be the case," although he provides plausible mechanisms, such as concessions causing nonviolent campaigns to lose focus, causing divisions and a breakdown in discipline, or splitting the movement among moderates willing to be accommodated and those that want to pursue more radical goals by violent means (39).

⁵⁴ "Hong Kong protest: What LegCo graffiti tells us," *BBC News*, July 2, 2019. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48836048>>.

finding limited success (some concessions) from the government, and another 5 escalated even after fully attaining their stated demands. The next section will unpack the logic of state concessions and theorize how that too can backfire and embolden movements to escalate demands.

3.2.4 The Role of State Concessions

In addition to the state's monopoly on the use of force, the state also has distributive power to allocate resources and the ability to meet the demands of most campaigns. Scholars frequently interpret state concessions or accommodation as success or partial success for an opposition movement. However, concessions are not just the outcome of a dispute but rather "part of the strategic bargaining process" (Cunningham 2011, 276), and similar to repression, state concessions can also theoretically embolden or weaken subsequent protest actions. I define concessions broadly to include any government response that can be interpreted as "a measure of success" for the movement (Thomas 2014, 806). Concessions go beyond a government's willingness to engage and negotiate, and include a leader admitting fault, certain members of the regime resigning (by will or by force) to take the blame, and any other government response meant to appease the movement and stop further mobilization.⁵⁵

Concessions are by no means the modal response of the governments in dealing with dissent, but the literature shows that the likelihood of governments accommodating

⁵⁵ Others have also defined "state accommodation" broadly to encompass both low-intensity action (e.g., agreement to talk with the opposition) as well as high-intensity action (e.g., ending civil war) (Carey 2006).

the demands of an anti-government campaign are also not negligible. In a study of seven Latin American countries from 1981-1995, about 20% of protest events were accommodated, in comparison to 30% that were met with repression (Franklin 2009). In a study of nine African and Latin American countries (disaggregated into 18 sets) from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, government accommodation followed protests in one third of the sets, irrespective of regime type (Carey 2006). Governments also offered concessions during the 1994-2003 Zapatista protests in Mexico (Inclán 2009) as well as the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Rasler 1996).

In deciding whether or not to make concessions to an ongoing campaign, the state is likely to think strategically about how to minimize the costs put on them by the ongoing dispute,⁵⁶ and concede as little as possible because there is also a cost to making the concession. The cost of concession could entail economic or political costs associated with instituting or reverting a policy change, as well as a reputational cost that might make future movements more likely to expect accommodation. Depending on state resources, a state may enact or propose a variety of actions to appease a campaign. Ryckman (2016) lists a range of available concessions to include: firing state officials, reshuffling cabinets, promising reform, creating various committees, lowering the cost of foodstuffs or giving financial benefits to individuals, scheduling elections, drafting new constitutions, and lifting emergency law.

⁵⁶ As mentioned in a footnote in Cunningham (2011): “these costs can be diverse, including loss of life and resources devoted to fighting, diverted productivity from work stoppages, policing of protest activities, and diminished political support” (276).

The paradox of concessions is that the government is trying to offer the movement something it wants in order to get them to stop mobilizing, but doing so could embolden more dissent because individuals may be more likely to participate in collective action if they perceive it as a way to obtain their desired outcome (Klandermans 1984, Muller and Opp 1986). Prior studies have found support for government concessions drawing more people to the streets based on this value-expectancy model (Rasler 1996), and through the logic that government accommodations could signal weakness “that is to be taken advantage of in the form of popular dissent” (Carey 2006). In the case of Iran in 1977 and 1978, concessions by the Shah had a direct effect in increasing both violent and nonviolent protest activity, the frequency of strikes, and the geographical spread of contentious action (Rasler 1996).

Alexis de Tocqueville more broadly conjectured that reforming governments had the greatest risk of facing a revolution because as conditions improve, frustration grows more quickly (De Tocqueville 1955). Finkel and Gehlbach (2018) argued that this was because the conditions for rebellion are facilitated when there is a discrepancy between “what citizens expect and what they receive... when the complexity of reform overwhelms the capacity of the state to carry it out, the implementation of reform will typically fall short of its promise, producing feelings of loss that encourage rebellion against those responsible.” While unfulfilled promises may play a role in turning the people against the regime, there does not seem to be anything inherently dangerous about government concessions.

Quite often, reformist campaigns are satisfied after the state gives them some or all of what they want. In EMEC, among 1640 reformist campaigns, 772 achieved partial

or complete success in terms of getting their stated demands, and 752 (97%) of these campaigns did not further escalate their demands. So, when are movements likely to be appeased by concessions versus emboldened to ask for more?

3.3 How Movement Leadership and Government Concessions Interact

The dynamic component of my theory pertains to campaign leadership and government concessions and extends previous scholarship that shows how dissidents and the state react to one another – sometimes escalating and other times deescalating conflict (Moore 1998). As states try to minimize disruptions to the status quo while mass movements strive to channel popular discontent into political and social change, the resulting political order is likely to be the result of a bargaining process. The state-dissent interaction has been conceptualized as a “bargaining situation in which either side, if adequately disciplined and organized, can deny most of what the other wants” (Schelling 1968, 304).

In the strategic interplay between movement activists and the power holders (Klein and Regan 2018), much of the maneuvering happens outside of direct engagement. But in key moments of the bargaining process, one side can initiate direct contact. Governments may be more willing to engage with nonviolent mass campaigns, because “they do not threaten the lives or well-beings of members of the target regime” and they appear more amenable to negotiation than their violent campaigns (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 13). However, not all movements afford the state a chance at negotiating settlement and this hinges on whether the movement has individuals who are willing and able to represent the interests of the campaign.

3.3.1 The Primacy of Leadership

Given the challenges associated with collective action, it is often assumed that some sort of centralized leadership is required to coordinate mass action. Tarrow (1998, 3) stressed the importance of “organizers” who “use contention to exploit political opportunities, create collective identities, bring people together in organizations, and mobilize them against more powerful opponents.” Leaders have also been identified to play crucial roles of defining goals, advancing strategies, and forging coalitions to advance a group’s cause (Nepstad and Bob 2006). Some have argued that a unified leadership system that is responsive to changing circumstances is what ultimately determines the effectiveness of a movement (Selbin 2018), and Ives and Lewis (2020) theorized how protest leaders exercise social controls to increase the efficacy of protests towards success.

But there are also liabilities associated with having clear leadership. First, leaders must have “sufficient credibility and authority so that their decisions do not generate divisions that could undermine a movement’s capacity to act” (Nepstad 2011, 6). Clear but factionalized leadership increases the likelihood of movement fragmentation and the likelihood of infighting and “spoilers” when settlement is proposed (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012). Additionally, campaigns with clear leadership are susceptible to more attacks from the government, either in the form of lethal repression as governments often target a movement’s leadership in an attempt to annihilate a movement altogether (Bob and Nepstad 2007), or through informational warfare as governments try to create divisions within the movement and tarnish the leaders’ credibility (Nepstad 2011, 17).

Leaders can also have “incentives independent of the groups they represent,” (Prorok 2016), and state actors may try to use inducements to co-opt leaders of opposition groups (Gamson 1990, 32-33), in an attempt to “satisfy the greed and reduce the grievance of politically restive groups” (Le Billon 2003, 420). Furthermore, among self-determination campaigns, leadership has been deemed a necessary criteria⁵⁷ to maintain nonviolent discipline (Stephan 2006), but a strong, unified leadership can also lead the movement into greater violence if the leadership itself is not “clearly and consistently committed to maintaining a purely nonviolent strategy” (Pinckney 2016, 73).

Whether and what kind of leadership a movement has is an empirical question. In focusing on the role of leaders, I am not adjudicating whether or not a campaign definitively lacks leaders or leadership. I also do not argue that one is preferable to another. The “leader-led” and “leader-less” labels I use here are merely descriptive and predicated on the identifiable presence of an individual or organization that is providing strategy and leadership to a campaign.

In civil wars, the vast majority of rebel groups have been found to have identifiable central leadership (Prorok 2016), and maximalist resistance campaigns are expected to have discernible leadership that allows organized and coordinated action (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 16). But having a “clear and uncontested leader” who can make commitments about the future behavior of a movement is in no way a foregone conclusion for opposition campaigns at large (Cunningham 2013, 664). In EMEC, out of

⁵⁷ Along with training and communication.

223 maximalist campaigns with reformist triggers (bipartite and tripartite campaigns), 130 campaigns (58%) had identifiable leadership while 93 campaigns (42%) did not.⁵⁸

In my theory, the fundamental difference between leaderless and leader-led movements is that movements with clear, identifiable leadership provide the state an opportunity to engage productively to negotiate a settlement. If the state invites representatives of the movement to dialogue and adequately responds to some of their demands, the leaders have made the protest participants better off, and both sides can mutually adhere to the “fundamental bargain of civil resistance” and call off future protests in exchange for political concessions (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017, 6).


However, if the state dismisses the campaign and refuses to engage with the movement in any meaningful way, the protest leaders may consider a variety of strategies to get the government’s attention. Doing more of the same or lowering demands are not likely options, since the government signaled its refusal to engage with the initial set of demands and the movement’s leaders face a reputational cost if it fails to deliver on mobilization promises.⁵⁹ Existing research has shown that maximalist demands can increase the chance of achieving policy concessions (Ryckman 2016) and stronger demands have the ability to impose higher costs on the state (Klein and Regan 2018).

⁵⁸ There are two caveats in the “leadership” variable. First, the presence or absence of leadership does not take into consideration factions. Multiple leaders (for multiple factions within a campaign) are undifferentiated from a singular leader, as fragmentation is accounted for in the “cohesion” variable. Second, the coding is heavily affected by reporting bias. Many more campaigns could have had identifiable leaders in reality, but if that information was not reported in the news and not verifiable, then a campaign was coded as lacking identifiable leadership.

⁵⁹ See Prorok (2016) for incentives that leaders have, outside of shared group interests, such as “incentives to avoid punishments such as loss of power, exile, imprisonment, or death.”

Therefore, campaign leaders may be more likely to escalate demands as part of a bargaining strategy with the goal of getting the government to engage.

Figure 11. State Response and Escalatory Paths



Leaderless campaigns differ on several fronts. First, as protesters self-mobilize over a reformist cause, they are not fully aware of their potential bargaining power. The modal response of any government to protest activity is to disregard them (Klein and Regan 2018, Franklin 2009), and if the government ignores the people’s limited demands and tolerates resistance (Cai 2010), individuals are likely to think that they do not have enough leverage to contend with the government and lower their expectation of success (Franklin 2009). If the government further uses “tactics of attrition” to nonviolently wear

out and increase the cost of protests (e.g., through maintaining elite cohesion, mobilizing counter-movements, and leveraging legal interventions) (Yuen and Cheng 2017), the movement is likely to weaken and dissolve over time without a central figure to encourage continued mobilization.

However, if the government decides to accommodate some of the movement's requests out of fear or seeing them as legitimate, the masses are likely to feel empowered to demand more, thus triggering concession backfire. Because the government has no individual or organization to negotiate with when faced with de-centralized movements, whatever concession the government makes is a unilateral decision meant to appease the protesters. Based on prior experience, governments may assume that political concessions will quell the masses and mitigate direct action (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017, 6), but there is no mediator or movement leadership to translate the government's thinking to meet them half way.

A few different mechanisms (as referenced in "The Role of State Concessions" section) link government concessions to demand escalation – 1. protest participants may feel emboldened by their own success in extracting concessions from the government and ask for even more; 2. protest observers may feel emboldened by the success of the people's movement and facilitate escalation through mobilization; and 3. concessions may be interpreted as a sign that the government lacks resolve, thereby providing a potential political opportunity to further fracture and divide the government by demanding leader removal.

In a leaderless campaign, individuals are likely to perceive participating in a mass movement to be "rational" if it is seen as an effective "way to obtain desired outcomes"

(Klandermans 1984). Because people's expectations are based on experience, the logical response to limited concessions from the government would not be to demobilize, but to continue asking for more. This logic extends beyond the participants of the reformist campaign to bystanders who observe the dynamic. Government concessions to highly visible campaigns can enhance their perceived influence, causing previous observers to join them for future mass action (Muller and Opp 1986). When there is no dialogue between the government and the campaign, information can only be inferred from action. When a leaderless movement receives concessions from the state, they have newfound knowledge of their bargaining power – they will not be ignored.

The disaggregation used here puts emphasis on the presence or absence of individuals who have the external and internal legitimacy to represent the movement at large. While there are meaningful differences between protests that have clear leadership and those that do not, this project takes for granted that their escalatory potential and ability to draw concessions from the government are not predefined. The comparability of the two types can be noted by their interchangeability – some movements that start out centralized can fracture as the campaign progresses, and similarly, some movements that start out de-centralized can coalesce around clear leadership over time.

What is crucial for my theory is whether or not movement leadership exists at the moment when the government desires to address the opposition's demands and at the moment when the movement's demands change from being reformist to maximalist. Leaders are motivated to achieve something and face a heavy reputational cost if they do not "win" anything for the group that they claim to represent. Therefore, movements with clear leadership are more likely to settle when the government offers concessions, and

more likely to escalate demands when the government ignores their reformist agenda (through strategic calculation). In contrast, movements without identifiable leaders are both unable and unwilling to compromise and are more likely to go big or go home. Therefore, leaderless movements are more likely to escalate demands when the government offers concession (through organic exacerbation), and more likely to dissolve over time if they are ignored.

3.3.2 Example of Demands Escalating through Strategic Calculation

In Malawi 2011, what started out as protests for various reforms ranging from electoral changes, economic development, and anti-corruption measures,⁶⁰ eventually escalated to calling for President Bingu wa Mutharika's resignation. When the protests started in June 2011, calling for leader removal was not predetermined or inevitable. The Malawians just wanted their concerns addressed and even Malawi's Vice-President Joyce Banda recognized this and "called on the government to open up to more constructive and positive dialogue so that Malawians could amicably solve their problems and achieve long-lasting and mutually beneficial results."⁶¹ However, the protests were severely repressed from the outset, with the Malawi police using "unnecessary lethal force against

⁶⁰ "July 20 Protesters Demands," *Malawi Today*, July 22, 2011. <<https://web.archive.org/web/20141222161648/http://www.malawitoday.com/news/896-july-20-protesters-demands>>.

⁶¹ Silwamba, Chibaula. "Malawi's V/President backs protests," *The Post Online – Zambia*, July 24, 2011. <https://web.archive.org/web/20120911073627/http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=22220>.

initially peaceful protests.”⁶² Far from acknowledging the people’s grievances, Mutharika accused the protesters of “working for Satan”⁶³ and vowed to “use any measure [he could] think of” to quell the demonstrations.⁶⁴

The campaign had an identifiable leader and organizer, the Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC), a group of 80 human rights and civil society organizations chaired by Undule Mwakasungula. There were multiple leaders in the campaign and they all received death threats and many went into hiding “for their personal safety and that of their family’s after the president said he would arrest them,” according to a rights activist and protest organizer, Moses Mkandawire.⁶⁵ Harsh repression had a polarizing effect for the campaign.

The movement was comprised of many members of civil society ranging from university students, academics, workers, and members of religious institutions, but it was not very cohesive.⁶⁶ Government repression was successful in forcing a change in opposition strategy and fracturing the HRCC coalition, as certain groups attempted to negotiate with the government rather than risk more repression. Fueled by the lack of

⁶² “Malawi: Use Restraint in Upcoming Protests,” *Human Rights Watch*, August 17, 2011. <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/17/malawi-use-restraint-upcoming-protests>>.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ “Malawi army deployed over anti-Mutharika protests,” *BBC News*, July 21, 2011. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14231251>>.

⁶⁵ “Malawi president given ultimatum,” *Al Jazeera*, July 26, 2011. <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/7/26/malawi-president-given-ultimatum>>.

⁶⁶ Nathan, Laurie, Adam Day, Joao Honwana, and Rebecca Brubaker. (2018), “Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work?” *United Nations University - Policy Paper and Case Studies*, April 2018. <<https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/post/2739/UN-Preventive-Diplomacy-Policy-Paper-and-Case-StudiesWEB.pdf>>.

engagement and continued indifference to the people's plight, campaign leaders announced an ultimatum for Mutharika to address their grievances or face more protests.⁶⁷

For the segment of the campaign that wanted to escalate demands, it is noteworthy that the case for continued protests was not the original 20-point petition that was demanded of the government. Rather, it was Mutharika's strong hand and his inattention of the reformist campaign that became the target of further action. Macdonald Kadawati, head of the Public Affairs Committee, an umbrella group of Christian and Muslim activists said, "should government continue to harass people for no proper reasons, another demonstration will be inevitable."⁶⁸ When the national dialogue facilitated by the United Nations failed to address the people's grievances,⁶⁹ the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) asked President Mutharika to resign or face more civil disobedience.⁷⁰

3.3.3 Example of Demands Escalating through Organic Exacerbation

In contrast, the Anti-Kérékou Campaign in Benin (MEC ID: 27/2756) is an example of organic exacerbation. First, the campaign attracted broad public support with

⁶⁷ "Malawi president given ultimatum."

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Nathan, Laurie, Adam Day, Joao Honwana, and Rebecca Brubaker.

⁷⁰ Jomo, Frank. "Malawi Organizations Ask President to Resign or Face Strike," *Bloomberg*, March 15, 2012. <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-15/malawi-organizations-ask-president-to-resign-or-face-strike>>.

students, teachers, civil servants, and opposition party members all taking part in strikes related to the failing economy. The government responded early on with repression, taking away jobs of protesters and threatening to defeat the demonstrators with force, thus meeting the necessary conditions of demand escalation.⁷¹ The campaign as a whole had broad appeal but it was also leaderless and fragmented. Different groups essentially represented themselves and negotiating with one segment (students, teachers, or civil servants) could not control the behavior of other parts of the movement. The government started offering major concessions in August, when President Mathieu Kérékou reformed the government and an amnesty law was passed which released around 100 members of the banned Communist Party of Dahomey from prison (Bierschenk 2009, 3). However, there is no evidence that these measures were negotiated outcomes and thus they did not have the intended effect of appeasing the campaign.

Evidence of growing grievances can be noted in the teachers' letter to President Kérékou at the end of August, which reiterated demands for the payment of salary arrears as well as "repatriate[ing] money invested in other countries and identify[ing] people who had tortured and killed demonstrators earlier in the year."⁷² The growing demands reflected displeasure towards the government's heavy hand on the initial reformist protest and the people's growing distrust towards the regime. On November 30, Kérékou gave his usual annual keynote address, which contained vague promises of reform (Bierschenk

⁷¹ "Beninese campaign for economic justice and democracy, 1989-90." *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. <<https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/beninese-campaign-economic-justice-and-democracy-1989-90>>.

⁷² *Ibid.*

2009), and on December 7, the government renounced its Marxist-Leninist ideology and announced political reforms for the new year. But instead of calming the situation, both concessions backfired, provoking major demonstrations in many of the country's cities on December 2, and stimulating 40,000 strong demonstrations against the government on December 11.⁷³

3.4 Repression-Concession Ricochet?

It could be that concessions have a general reactive effect in fueling demand escalation when government concessions come in the heels of brutal repression, irrespective of movement leadership. Lichbach (1987, 287) argued that inconsistent government policies increased dissent and described many prerevolutionary regimes “incoherently mix[ing] reform (accommodation) and reaction (repression)” to weaken the regime and facilitate revolution.

Lichbach anchored his argument in a rational choice model with the opposition group weighing the costs and benefits of violent and nonviolent tactics. Others have similarly argued that “when state behavior is erratic, it sends a noisy signal to dissidents, making it hard to assess the likely costs of their actions” (Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010, 179).⁷⁴ While my argument has less to do with dissidents opting for the less costly action, the observable implication is the same: when governments mix and match

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ However, not all studies argue that inconsistent government actions advantages movements. Inclán (2009) finds that the inconsistent use of repressive threats and procedural concessions contributed to the Zapatista movement's relative weakness

repression and concession on the same movement there will likely be a change in approach, in this case, in the form of escalated demands.

In my argument, the focus is on what happens when reformist campaigns are first repressed then tried to be appeased. As described previously, state repression elevates the level of people's grievance against the regime and increases the escalatory potential.

While early efforts at accommodation might have turned away wrath, offering concessions when distrust and disdain toward the government are mounting is likely to anger the opposition and fuel more confrontation. People cannot be expected to check their emotions in challenging the state, and rather than dismiss them as too amorphous, emotions should be recognized for the role it can play in coordinating "motivations and effectively point[ing] a legion of individuals in one particular direction" (Petersen 2002, 3).

Emotional mechanisms – particularly those of fear, hatred, resentment, and rage – have been used to explain ethnic violence, and here I focus on the role of anger and disappointment as additional emotional mechanisms that can coordinate political behavior – particularly in leaderless mass action. Thus, when state response leads with the fist, delayed concessions are not likely to be seen as acts of good will and the campaign is unlikely to be appeased by them. Once the people lose trust in the incumbent regime, government concessions are more likely to be interpreted as acts of weakness or desperation that the emboldened movement uses to push for greater change. In this way, repression douses a campaign in fuel and concessions either provide the trigger for demands to escalate or fans the flames of an already escalated campaign.

For example, on April 22, 2018, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega cancelled the welfare reform package that set off days of deadly protests,⁷⁵ but the very next day saw the largest anti-government mobilization against the Ortega government.⁷⁶ Cancelling the welfare-overhaul initiative did little to appease the demonstrators whose anti-regime sentiments were already inflamed by the state's use of violence on the largely nonviolent campaign.⁷⁷ Contrary to government intention, the concession served as a catalyst for demands to grow and encompass the release of jailed protesters in addition to Ortega's resignation.

The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in the next chapter will assess the degree to which the movement leadership matters in this repression-concession ricochet.

3.5 Conclusion

A campaign's configuration and a government's response both matter in understanding demand escalation. The potential for escalation is largely determined by the movement's characteristics and whether the state responds to the initial reformist campaign with excessive force. The escalatory path then depends on government concessions and campaign leadership. This chapter has argued that demand escalation is

⁷⁵ Diao, Alexis. "Nicaragua's President Withdraws Social Security Reforms that Sparked Violent Unrest." *NPR – International*, April 22, 2018. <<https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/22/604762080/violent-unrest-continues-in-nicaragua-over-social-security-reforms>>.

⁷⁶ Rivas, Oswaldo. "Protesters demand resignation of Nicaraguan president after unrest." *Reuters*, April 23, 2018. <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-protests-usa/protesters-demand-resignation-of-nicaraguan-president-after-unrest-idUSKBN1HU1YA>>.

⁷⁷ "Nicaragua: Shoot to Kill: Nicaragua's Strategy to Repress Protest." *Amnesty International*, May 29, 2018. <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr43/8470/2018/en/>>.

another variant of escalation that is triggered by state repression. However, demand escalation differs from tactical escalation in that the former can occur after winning government concessions, whereas the latter is largely premised on unfruitful government engagement.

In terms of the concession-dissent nexus, I balance the existing literature that shows how governments strategically use concessions to divide movements (Cunningham 2011) to argue that movements can also use concessions to further mass action. When a government tries to accommodate a campaign unilaterally, concessions can backfire and act as a catalyst for demands to escalate if state repression has already turned the people's hearts away from the government. In this sense, not all maximalist campaigns are predetermined, and it matters how a government chooses to engage with a reformist campaign to temper broader criticism of the regime.

Chapter 4: Theory Testing using Truth Tables and Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In this chapter I evaluate my proposed theory with competing hypotheses derived from the literature through the use of truth tables and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). A truth table lists all possible combinations of conditions (akin to dichotomously coded independent variables) to indicate the presence or absence of plausible causal factors. QCA is a methodology that bridges the qualitative and quantitative divide in social science research and uses a Boolean algorithm to identify minimal causal configurations to explain a particular phenomenon. This methodology provides a way to test all possible causal combinations and eliminate irrelevant factors by way of logical deduction, and further allows relevant factors to be differentiated between necessary and sufficient conditions in producing the outcome of interest. The method of QCA has been successfully used in conflict research where context dependence and the interaction between different conditions matters (Ide 2015, Ide et al. 2020, Ide, Kristensen, and Bartusevičius 2021).

Perhaps the most important advantage of the QCA approach is its ability to embrace equifinality: this methodology is suitable even when multiple causal factors and mechanisms produce the same outcome and helps identify factors that may be substitutable. For example, a toddler could throw a temper tantrum, lie to her parents, or refuse to eat dinner to be put in timeout. Each behavior is enough to get her in trouble,

but in the regression approach, the expectation is that the more each behavior is present, the more likely the toddler will be put in timeout. Additionally, if there is multicollinearity among the independent variables, relevant factors are likely to be deemed irrelevant, based on a regression output. In contrast, QCA would conclude that the three conditions in the hypothetical example are causally equivalent. The focus is on the presence or absence of conditions, rather than frequency or severity, and the aim is to examine cases configurationally.

In QCA, set membership is calibrated using empirical evidence and here, all data is derived from EMEC, which uses contemporaneous news reports, historical accounts, and global datasets to code whether a campaign is observed to have each of the conditions in question. If a reader disagrees with how certain campaigns are coded, one can easily determine whether the analysis results are subject to change after recalibration.⁷⁸ While partial or fuzzy set memberships are also possible, I use a “crisp-set” QCA in which all conditions are binary because when the relevant outcome is dichotomous (e.g., whether or not a reformist campaign escalated demands), fuzzy-set analysis is mathematically infeasible (Ragin 2009).

EMEC lists 39 instances of demand escalation between 1955 and 2018. Although there is both a reformist and a maximalist campaign associated with demand escalation, here, the reformist campaign is treated as the unit of observation to assess the conditions of demand escalation hypothesized in the last section. I first analyze the literature-informed variables using a truth table to show their limitation in explaining demand

⁷⁸ See Appendix C and D for case descriptions and coding decisions.

escalation. I then conduct a more comprehensive analysis to compare the determinants of campaigns that escalated with those that did not escalate.

4.1 Testing Competing Hypotheses

Table 4 lists the countries in which escalated campaigns occurred, the start and end years of the reformist campaign, and the variables that the literature suggests may be important to explaining demand escalation: whether the reformist campaign presented multiple demands for the state to address, whether an opposition political party played a leading role in the reformist campaign, whether the state in which the reformist campaign occurred was a democracy,⁷⁹ and whether the state had a poorly functioning economy.⁸⁰ The expectation is that reformist campaigns escalate into maximalist ones when there are multiple grievances, an opposition party takes the lead, and the country is a non-democracy facing an economic crisis.

⁷⁹ Based on Polity Revised Score the year prior to campaign onset, from Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2015).

⁸⁰ Based on whether the state experienced a negative GDP growth the year prior to campaign onset, from VDEM (Coppedge et al. 2020).

Table 4. Reformist Campaigns that Escalated Demands between 1955-2018, with Literature-Derived Variables

Country	Start Year	End Year	Multiple Demands?	Opposition Led?	Democracy?	Poor Economy?	Combination
1. Algeria	1988	1988	Yes	Yes	No	No	ABcd
2. Algeria	2011	2011	Yes	No	No	No	Abcd
3. Argentina	1977	1983	Yes	Yes	No	No	ABcd
4. Bangladesh	1972	1975	No	Yes	--	Yes	--
5. Benin	1989	1989	No	Yes	No	Yes	aBcD
6. Bolivia	1981	1981	Yes	No	No	--	--
7. Bolivia	1983	1985	No	No	Yes	--	--
8. Brazil	2014	2015	No	Yes	Yes	No	aBCd
9. Burkina Faso	2014	2014	No	Yes	No	Yes	aBcD
10. Cameroon	2016	2017	No	No	No	Yes	abcD
11. China	1989	1989	Yes	No	No	Yes	AbcD
12. Colombia	1958	1964	No	Yes	Yes	No	aBCd
13. Ecuador	1997	1997	No	No	Yes	Yes	abCD
14. Ecuador	2005	2005	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	AbCD
15. Egypt	2002	2004	No	No	No	No	abcd
16. Estonia	1987	1988	No	No	No	No	abcd
17. France	2018	2018	No	No	Yes	No	abCd
18. Greece	1973	1973	No	No	No	No	abcd
19. Guatemala	1993	1993	Yes	No	No	Yes	AbcD
20. Guinea	2007	2007	No	Yes	No	Yes	aBcD

21. Haiti	2018	2018	No	No	No	No	abcd
22. Hong Kong	2014	2014	No	No	No	Yes	abcD
23. Japan	1959	1960	No	No	Yes	No	abCd
24. Libya	2011	2011	Yes	No	No	No	Abcd
25. Malawi	1955	1957	No	Yes	--	Yes	--
26. Malawi	2011	2012	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	AbCD
27. Moldova	2015	2016	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	AbCD
28. Nicaragua	2018	2018	No	No	Yes	No	abCd
29. N. Ireland	1967	1972	Yes	No	Yes	No	AbCd
30. Pakistan	1969	1971	No	Yes	No	Yes	aBcD
31. Serbia	2017	2017	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	ABCd
32. South Korea	2006	2012	No	No	Yes	No	abCd
33. Sudan	2018	2018	No	No	No	No	abcd
34. Thailand	1991	1992	No	Yes	No	No	aBcd
35. Turkey	2013	2013	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	ABCd
36. Venezuela	1991	1992	No	No	Yes	--	--
37. Yugoslavia	1988	1990	Yes	No	No	No	Abcd
38. Yugoslavia	1990	1990	No	No	No	No	abcd
39. Zambia	1955	1960	Yes	Yes	--	No	--

Table 5. Truth Table of Literature-Derived Conditions (only for Escalated Campaigns)⁸¹

<i>Conditions</i>						
<i>A: Multiple Demands</i>	<i>B: Opposition-led</i>	<i>C: Democracy</i>	<i>D: Poor Economy</i>	<i>No. of non-escalated cases</i>	<i>No. of escalated cases</i>	<i>Outcome Code</i>
0	0	0	0	-	6	1
0	0	0	1	-	2	
0	0	1	0	-	4	1
0	0	1	1	-	1	
0	1	0	0	-	1	
0	1	0	1	-	4	1
0	1	1	0	-	2	
0	1	1	1	-	0	
1	0	0	0	-	3	1
1	0	0	1	-	2	
1	0	1	0	-	1	
1	0	1	1	-	3	1
1	1	0	0	-	2	
1	1	0	1	-	0	
1	1	1	0	-	2	
1	1	1	1	-	0	

⁸¹ Campaigns that had missing values are excluded from the truth table (6 campaigns had democracy levels or economic conditions that could not be ascertained).

Following convention, an upper-case letter indicates the presence of a condition and a lower-case letter indicates its absence. Among the literature-derived conditions, A = multiple demands, B = led by an opposition party, C = occurring in a democracy, and D = occurring in poor-economic conditions. From Tables 4 and 5, the most common combination is “No-No-No-No” or “abcd”: not having multiple demand, not led by an opposition party, and occurring in a non-democracy that did not have poor economic conditions. Six campaigns⁸² had this combination of factors.

Other common combinations include: four instances of abCd (single demand, not led by an opposition party, occurring in a democracy that did not have poor economic conditions), four instances of aBcD (single demand, led by an opposition party, occurring in a non-democracy with poor economic conditions), three instances of Abcd (multiple demands, not led by an opposition party, occurring in a non-democracy that did not have poor economic conditions), and three instances of AbCD (multiple demands, not led by an opposition party, occurring in a democracy with poor economic conditions). The combinations which occur three or more times are stated in Equation 1 and simplified in Equation 2.⁸³

$$\text{Demand escalation (lit. variables)} = abcd + abCd + aBcD + Abcd + AbCD \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Demand escalation (lit. variables)} = abd + bcd + aBcD + AbCD \quad (2)$$

⁸² Egypt 2002-2004, Estonia 1987-1988, Greece 1973-1973, Haiti 2018-2018, Sudan 2018-2018, Yugoslavia 1990-1990

⁸³ Although all occurring combinations could be included in the analysis, discounting categories with infrequent occurrences is a way to introduce “a more demanding standard” for accepting the conditions causing the outcome of interest (Chan 2003). This threshold is applied for all subsequent analysis.

Looking at the dominant combination (“abcd”), only one factor among the theoretical expectations derived from the literature is salient – occurring in a non-democracy. However, in conjunction with other combinations that also produced escalated demands, “abcd” and “abCd” can be simplified to “abd” which makes “C” (whether the campaign occurred in a democracy) irrelevant. A campaign is likely to escalate demands if it has a single reformist demand, is not led by an opposition party, and occurs in a country that does not have poor economic conditions. Similarly, “abcd” and “Abcd” can be simplified to “bcd” which makes “A” (whether the campaign had multiple demands) irrelevant; a campaign is likely to escalate when it is not led by an opposition party and occurs in a non-democracy without poor economic conditions, regardless of how many demands it starts with.

Thus, the literature derived variables do not help us understand demand escalation, at least not in the way of validating expected hypotheses. Not only is there no instance of “ABcD,” which the literature suggests would be most likely to bring about demand escalation, the fact that “abd” (a combination that goes directly against expectations derived from the literature) accounts for two of the most commonly occurring combination of demand escalation (ten campaigns) shows evidence of its limitations.

The case that best matches the theoretical expectations might be the campaign in Benin 1989, which had a combination of “aBcD”, exhibiting three of the four characteristics derived from the literature. In early 1989, Benin faced growing economic troubles with the government failing to pay many public servants, which prompted a series of strikes. Although the grievances were singular in type, demanding payment of

salaries and grants,⁸⁴ discontent was widespread with a teachers' strike followed by a students' strike, and then a civil servants' strike. The labor unions and the Communist Party of Benin played pivotal roles in mobilizing the movement through circulating leaflets and eventually calling for the democratization of the government and the overthrow of President Kérékou. However, focusing on the opposition party, the regime type, and the poor economic context leaves much to be desired in terms of understanding why and how demands escalated.

4.2 Testing the Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation

Table 6 lists the same 39 campaigns as above, but with variables about movement configuration and government response that are related to the dynamic theory of demand escalation: whether the reformist campaign had identifiable leadership, whether the campaign had broad membership (i.e. composed of more than four specific groups of people or evidence of general public involvement), whether the campaign was cohesive, and whether the government offered concessions and/or responded with repression to the reformist campaign.

⁸⁴ "Beninese campaign for economic justice and democracy, 1989-90."

Table 6. Reformist Campaigns that Escalated Demands between 1955-2018, with Variables from the Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation

Country	Start Year	End Year	Clear Leader?	Broad Comp?	Cohesive?	Gov. Concession?	Gov. Repression?	Combination
1. Algeria	1988	1988	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	AbcDE
2. Algeria	2011	2011	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	aBcDE
3. Argentina	1977	1983	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	aBCDE
4. Bangladesh	1972	1975	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	ABCdE
5. Benin	1989	1989	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	aBcDE
6. Bolivia	1981	1981	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
7. Bolivia	1983	1985	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	AbCDe
8. Brazil	2014	2015	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	aBCDE
9. Burkina Faso	2014	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
10. Cameroon	2016	2017	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
11. China	1989	1989	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	abCdE
12. Colombia	1958	1964	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	AbCdE
13. Ecuador	1997	1997	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
14. Ecuador	2005	2005	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	ABCdE
15. Egypt	2002	2004	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	aBCdE
16. Estonia	1987	1988	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
17. France	2018	2018	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	aBcdE
18. Greece	1973	1973	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	abCDE
19. Guatemala	1993	1993	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	aBCDE

20. Guinea	2007	2007	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	AbCdE
21. Haiti	2018	2018	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	ABcdE
22. Hong Kong	2014	2014	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	ABCdE
23. Japan	1959	1960	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	ABCdE
24. Libya	2011	2011	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
25. Malawi	1955	1957	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	ABcdE
26. Malawi	2011	2012	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	ABcdE
27. Moldova	2015	2016	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	aBcDe
28. Nicaragua	2018	2018	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
29. N. Ireland	1967	1972	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
30. Pakistan	1969	1971	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	ABcDE
31. Serbia	2017	2017	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	aBCde
32. S. Korea	2006	2012	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	aBCDE
33. Sudan	2018	2018	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	aBCdE
34. Thailand	1991	1992	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	aBCDe
35. Turkey	2013	2013	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	aBCDE
36. Venezuela	1991	1992	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	aBcDE
37. Yugoslavia	1988	1990	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	ABCdE
38. Yugoslavia	1990	1990	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	ABCDE
39. Zambia	1955	1960	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	ABcDE

Table 7. Truth Table of Conditions from the Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation (only for Escalated Campaigns)

<i>Conditions</i>					<i>No. of non-escalated cases</i>	<i>No. of escalated cases</i>	<i>Outcome Code</i>
<i>A: Leader</i>	<i>B: Broad Composition</i>	<i>C. Cohesion</i>	<i>D: Gov. Concession</i>	<i>E. Gov. Repression</i>			
0	0	0	0	0	-	0	
0	0	0	0	1	-	0	
0	0	0	1	0	-	0	
0	0	0	1	1	-	0	
0	0	1	0	0	-	0	
0	0	1	0	1	-	1	
0	0	1	1	0	-	0	
0	0	1	1	1	-	1	
0	1	0	0	0	-	0	
0	1	0	0	1	-	1	
0	1	0	1	0	-	1	
0	1	0	1	1	-	3	1
0	1	1	0	0	-	1	
0	1	1	0	1	-	2	
0	1	1	1	0	-	1	
0	1	1	1	1	-	5	1
1	0	0	0	0	-	0	
1	0	0	0	1	-	0	
1	0	0	1	0	-	0	

1	0	0	1	1	-	1	
1	0	1	0	0	-	0	
1	0	1	0	1	-	2	
1	0	1	1	0	-	1	
1	0	1	1	1	-	0	
1	1	0	0	0	-	0	
1	1	0	0	1	-	3	1
1	1	0	1	0	-	0	
1	1	0	1	1	-	2	
1	1	1	0	0	-	0	
1	1	1	0	1	-	5	1
1	1	1	1	0	-	0	
1	1	1	1	1	-	9	1

I conduct two different analyses to test the dynamic theory of demand escalation. First, similar to the literature-derived variables, I consider all common combinations of demand escalation to evaluate the different ways in which demand escalation has occurred. Then, I compare the combinations of campaigns that escalated demands with those that did not to note their similarities and differences in identifying the combinations *more likely* to escalate demands.

In Tables 6 and 7, A = campaign had an identifiable leader, B = campaign had broad membership among the public, C = campaign was largely cohesive, D = government offered concessions to the campaign, and E = government responded to the movement with targeted or widespread repression. The combinations associated with three or more campaigns that escalated demand escalations are stated in Equation 3 and simplified in Equations 4 and 5.

$$\text{Demand escalation} = aBcDE + aBCDE + ABcdE + ABCdE + ABCDE \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Demand escalation} = BE(acD + aCD + Acd + ACd + ACD) \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Demand escalation} = BE(aD + Ad + AC+CD) \quad (5)$$

Among my variables, the most common combination is “Yes-Yes-Yes-Yes-Yes” or “ABCDE”: having an identifiable leader, having broad membership among the public, being cohesive, receiving concessions from the government, and being repressed by the government. Nine campaigns⁸⁵ had this combination of factors. Other common

⁸⁵ Bolivia 1981-1981, Burkina Faso 2014-2014, Cameroon 2016-2017, Ecuador 1997-1997, Estonia 1987-1988, Libya 2011-2011, Nicaragua 2018-2018, N. Ireland 1967-1972, Yugoslavia 1990-1990

combinations include: five instances of aBCDE and ABCdE, and three instances of aBcDE and ABcdE. Each combination of demand escalation had “B” and “E” in common, which shows that these are the two necessary conditions for demand escalation: a broadly comprised movement (“B”) and the violent repression of the reformist campaign (“E”).

Equation 5 shows that there are four predominant paths to demand escalation. While “B” and “E” are necessary conditions, they are not sufficient to bring about demand escalation. In addition to the movement having broad public appeal and experiencing disproportionate state repression, in order for a reformist campaign to escalate demands, the campaign must also be leaderless and receive concessions from the state, be leader-led and not receive any concessions, be leader-led and cohesive, or be cohesive and receive concessions from the government. In this sense, aD, Ad, AC, and CD are causally equivalent when combined with B and E to bring about demand escalation. To check that these combinations are not common across all reformist campaigns and specific to campaigns that escalated demands, I compare the conditions of campaigns that escalated demands with those that did not escalate in the next section.

4.2.1 Comparing Campaigns that Escalated Demands with Non-Escalated Campaigns

To conduct a comparative analysis, I matched each escalated campaign with a reformist campaign that did not escalate. The selection for matching included identifying the closest reformist campaign (occurring before or after a corresponding escalated campaign) in the same country that had either similar demands and/or had similar numbers of peak participation. If there was more than a 30-year difference between an

escalated campaign and the next closest reformist campaign in the same country, another campaign in a different country (but in the same region) was selected that had similar onset years and claim type(s). Table 8 lists the 39 escalated campaigns with matched campaigns that did not escalate demands.

Table 9 presents the truth table for both the escalated and non-escalated campaigns, which lists all 32 combinations of the five factors hypothesized to influence demand escalation. It indicates the number of campaigns that occurred under each combination of factors for 39 reformist campaigns that escalated demands along with 39 matched reformist campaigns that did not escalate demands. Some combinations are not associated with any reformist campaigns, and some combinations are associated with both campaigns that escalated demands and those that did not escalate demands.

The last column of Table 9 codes the outcome according to the preponderance of evidence; it is coded “1” when three or more⁸⁶ campaigns escalated demands and this exceeds the number of campaigns that did not escalate, “0” when three or more campaigns did not escalate demands and this exceeds the number of campaigns that did, and the column is left blank when there are two or fewer historical instances of these combinations. Table 10 is a simplified truth table of Table 9 that shows only observed combinations with three or more instances of either escalated or non-escalated campaigns.

⁸⁶ I discount the combinations with infrequent occurrences to set a more demanding standard for accepting conditions causing demand escalation (see Chan (2003, 61) for this suggestion).

Table 8. List of Escalated Reformist Campaigns with Matched Campaigns that did not Escalate

16

Country (Escalated)	Start Year	End Year	Initial Claim	Country (Not escalated)	Start Year	End Year	Initial Claim
1. Algeria	1988	1988	Economic	Algeria	1997	1997	Electoral
2. Algeria	2011	2011	Economic	Algeria	2017	2018	Economic
3. Argentina	1977	1983	Political	Argentina	1984	1989	Economic
4. Bangladesh	1972	1975	Social	Bangladesh	1991	1991	Economic
5. Benin	1989	1989	Economic	Benin	1998	1998	Economic
6. Bolivia	1981	1981	Economic	Bolivia	1977	1978	Political
7. Bolivia	1983	1985	Economic	Bolivia	1994	1994	Economic
8. Brazil	2014	2015	Political	Brazil	2013	2013	Economic/ Political
9. Burkina Faso	2014	2014	Political	Burkina Faso	2011	2011	Economic/ Political
10. Cameroon	2016	2017	Economic/ Social	Cameroon	2002	2002	Economic
11. China	1989	1989	Social/ Political	China	2000	2002	Economic
12. Colombia	1958	1964	Economic	Colombia	1959	1959	Economic
13. Ecuador	1997	1997	Economic	Ecuador	1993	1993	Economic
14. Ecuador	2005	2005	Political	Ecuador	2006	2006	Economic/ Social
15. Egypt	2002	2004	Political	Egypt	2007	2007	Electoral/ Political
16. Estonia	1987	1988	Social	France	1986	1986	Other
17. France	2018	2018	Economic	France	2017	2017	Economic
18. Greece	1973	1973	Social	Greece	1979	1980	Economic
19. Guatemala	1993	1993	Economic/ Other	Guatemala	2012	2012	Economic
20. Guinea	2007	2007	Economic	Guinea	2006	2006	Economic
21. Haiti	2018	2018	Political	Costa Rica	2018	2018	Economic
22. Hong Kong	2014	2014	Electoral	Hong Kong	2012	2012	Social

23. Japan	1959	1960	Political/ Other Economic/	Japan	1958	1958	Political
24. Libya	2011	2011	Political	Libya	2014	2014	Political
25. Malawi	1955	1957	Political Economic/	Uganda	1958	1959	Economic/ Social/ Political
26. Malawi	2011	2012	Electoral/ Social/ Political/ Other Electoral/	Malawi	2002	2003	Political
27. Moldova	2015	2016	Political/ Other	Moldova	2016	2016	Electoral/ Other
28. Nicaragua	2018	2018	Economic Economic/	Nicaragua	1998	1998	Economic
29. N. Ireland	1967	1972	Electoral/ Political	United Kingdom	1974	1974	Political
30. Pakistan	1969	1971	Social	Pakistan	1972	1972	Social
31. Serbia	2017	2017	Electoral	Serbia	2016	2016	Political
32. South Korea	2006	2012	Political	South Korea	2004	2006	Political
33. Sudan	2018	2018	Economic	Sudan	1979	1979	Economic
34. Thailand	1991	1992	Political	Thailand	1996	1997	Economic/ Social
35. Turkey	2013	2013	Social/ Political	Turkey	2017	2017	Political
36. Venezuela	1991	1992	Economic	Venezuela	2007	2007	Political
37. Yugoslavia	1988	1990	Social	Yugoslavia	1968	1968	Other
38. Yugoslavia	1990	1990	Social Economic/	Yugoslavia	1987	1987	Economic
39. Zambia	1955	1960	Electoral/ Social/ Political	Sierra Leone	1955	1955	Economic

Table 9. Truth Table for Escalated and Non-escalated Campaigns⁸⁷

<i>Conditions</i>							
<i>A:</i>	<i>B:</i>	<i>C:</i>	<i>D:</i>	<i>E:</i>	<i>No. of non-</i>	<i>No. of</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
<i>Leader</i>	<i>Broad</i>	<i>Cohesion</i>	<i>Gov.</i>	<i>Gov.</i>	<i>escalated</i>	<i>escalated</i>	<i>Code</i>
	<i>Comp.</i>		<i>Concession</i>	<i>Repression</i>	<i>cases</i>	<i>cases</i>	
0	0	0	0	0			
0	0	0	0	1	1		
0	0	0	1	0			
0	0	0	1	1			
0	0	1	0	0			
0	0	1	0	1	5	1	0
0	0	1	1	0	2		
0	0	1	1	1	4	1	0
0	1	0	0	0			
0	1	0	0	1		1	
0	1	0	1	0	1	1	
0	1	0	1	1	1	3	1
0	1	1	0	0		1	
0	1	1	0	1	1	2	
0	1	1	1	0		1	
0	1	1	1	1	6	5	* ⁸⁸
1	0	0	0	0			
1	0	0	0	1			
1	0	0	1	0			
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	
1	0	1	0	0			
1	0	1	0	1	1	2	
1	0	1	1	0	3	1	0
1	0	1	1	1	6		0

⁸⁷ For QCA, it is a best practice to code the conditions in the correct “direction” such that their presence is theoretically expected to be associated with a positive outcome (Rihoux and De Meur 2008, 42) . However, I cannot do this with my theory since the presence of movement leadership and absence of government concessions is expected to result in demand escalation as well as the absence of movement leadership and the presence of government concessions.

⁸⁸ This is a “contradictory configuration” with the same conditions producing demand escalation in 5 cases but non-escalation in 6 cases; this configuration is excluded in the analysis below as suggested by Rihoux and De Meur (2008, 44).

1	1	0	0	0			
1	1	0	0	1		3	1
1	1	0	1	0			
1	1	0	1	1		2	
1	1	1	0	0	2		
1	1	1	0	1	1	5	1
1	1	1	1	0	2		
1	1	1	1	1	2	9	1

Table 10. Simplified Truth Table for Escalated and Non-escalated Campaigns

<i>Conditions</i>					<i>No. of non-escalated cases</i>	<i>No. of escalated cases</i>	<i>Outcome Code</i>
<i>A: Leader</i>	<i>B: Broad Comp.</i>	<i>C: Cohesion</i>	<i>D: Gov. Concession</i>	<i>E: Gov. Repression</i>			
0	0	1	0	1	5		0
0	0	1	1	1	4		0
0	1	0	1	1		3	1
1	0	1	1	0	3		0
1	0	1	1	1	6		0
1	1	0	0	1		3	1
1	1	1	0	1		5	1
1	1	1	1	1		9	1

The combinations associated with three or more campaigns that escalated demands are stated in Equation 6 and simplified in Equations 7 and 8; the combinations associated with three or more campaigns that did not escalate demands are stated in Equation 9 and simplified in Equations 10 and 11.

$$\text{Demand escalation} = aBcDE + ABcdE + ABCdE + ABCDE \quad (6)$$

$$\text{Demand escalation} = BE(acD + AcD + ACd + ACD) \quad (7)$$

$$\text{Demand escalation} = BE(acD + Ad + AC) \quad (8)$$

$$\text{No escalation} = abCdE + abCDE + AbCDe + AbCDE \quad (9)$$

$$\text{No escalation} = bC(adE + aDE + ADe + ADE) \quad (10)$$

$$\text{No escalation} = bC(aE + AD + DE) \quad (11)$$

From Tables 9 and 10, one can see that reformist campaigns that escalated demands and those that did not have largely different combinations of factors.⁸⁹ The necessary conditions of broad composition and regime repression remain a fixture of campaigns that escalated, but there is a qualification in the leaderless path to demand escalation. When looking just at escalated campaigns previously, there seemed to be four paths toward demand escalation: $aD + Ad + AC + CD$ (assuming “B” and “E”). Here, adding non-escalated campaigns into the analysis resulted in three: $acD + Ad + AC$ (again, assuming “B” and “E”). The comparative analysis largely validates the dynamic theory of demand escalation, but also introduces some qualifications. Among broadly comprised campaigns that are repressed, “strategic calculation” remains a pathway in which leader-led campaigns that do not receive concessions (“Ad”) escalate demands.

“Organic exacerbation,” previously theorized as a pathway in which leader-less campaigns that receive concessions escalate demands, is qualified by the condition of

⁸⁹ Although the conditions that do not produce demand escalation can technically be all such combinations that do not result in demand escalation (including the combinations that have zero observations), I have narrowed the analysis to combinations that have historical precedence to minimize bias in terms of raising the threshold for accepting conditions that have been hypothesized to escalate demands. Setting unobserved combinations to 0 would assume that all unobserved conditions do not result in demand escalation and the analysis would give the conditions under which demand escalation has been observed to occur; while setting missing observations to 1 (given that I have no information that demand escalation cannot occur in these combinations) would show the possible conditions under which demands can escalate.

lacking cohesion (“acD”). The absence of cohesion suggests that when demands escalate via organic exacerbation, only a segment of the leader-less reformist campaign is aggravated by the concession while some groups within the campaign might be appeased.


Additionally, the effect of cohesion seems to differ depending on whether or not the campaign has identifiable leaders. Different from leaderless campaigns, leader-led campaigns that are cohesive (“AC”) can escalate demands irrespective of state concessions. I initially theorized cohesion to elevate the escalatory potential for any campaign, but it seems that only leader-led campaigns are afforded the platform for unified action that comes with campaign cohesion. I call this newly identified pathway “preemptive consolidation.”

But the role of cohesiveness is further complicated by the fact that campaign cohesion is also a common condition among campaigns that do not escalate demands. It could be that reformist campaigns that do not escalate tend to be mobilized around single-issues and are narrowly composed, and therefore better able to maintain unity and cohesion. Without conducting a comparative analysis, I might have mislabeled “CD” (in conjunction with “B” and “E”) to be a fourth pathway of demand escalation. However, comparing campaigns that escalated with those that did not provides a fuller picture of their differences and clarifies the importance of combinations, and not individual conditions.

The simultaneous presence of multiple conditions determine a campaign’s escalatory potential and the use of truth tables helped detect these complex causal relations with “conjunctural causation” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Figure 12 shows a Venn diagram of the simplified truth table and visually reinforces the notion that

demand escalation is a result of a complex interaction of several factors. The areas in green are associated with demand escalation, yellow with non-escalation, blue with contradictory combinations, and white areas are unobserved combinations.

Figure 12. Venn Diagram of Simplified Truth Table



Performing the classical Quine-McCluskey (QMC) and the enhanced Quine-McCluskey (eQMC) minimization function on the simplified truth table resulted in the identification of the same pathways highlighted above, with additional information. The QCA algorithms take the cases where the outcome is present and performs the necessary minimizations to generate the simplest prime implicants. The consistency score of 1.00

indicates that the solution is free of contradictions – all cases where the combination of conditions is present, the outcome is present as well.

The QCA identified three sufficient pathways for the onset of demand escalation as shown in Table 11, and the resulting solution formula is the same as the simplified equation of demand escalation (Equation 8) listed above. The consistency (1.00) and coverage (0.8) values of the solution formula are above the established thresholds⁹⁰ for sufficient analysis in QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

The following three pathways all have in common a broad campaign composition and state repression: the “strategic calculation” pathway (leader-led and no concession) has a raw coverage of 0.32, meaning that 32% of the escalated campaigns are explained by this pathway, and a unique coverage of 0.12, meaning that 12% of all covered cases are uniquely explained by this pathway; the “organic exacerbation” pathway (leaderless, fragmented, and receiving concessions) explains 12% of the escalated campaigns and 12% of all cases are uniquely explained by this pathway; and the “preemptive consolidation” pathway (leader-led and cohesive) accounts for 56% of all escalated campaigns and uniquely explains 36% of the cases.

Table 11. Results of the QCA using the Simplified Truth Table

<i>causal pathway</i>	<i>leader*broad* ~concession*repression -> escalate</i>	<i>~leader*broad* ~cohesive*concession* repression -> escalate</i>	<i>leader*broad* cohesive*repression -> escalate</i>
---------------------------	--	---	---

⁹⁰ The conventional threshold is 0.8 for consistency and 0.6 for coverage

consistency	1.000	1.000	1.000
raw coverage	0.320	0.120	0.560
unique coverage	0.120	0.120	0.360
solution formula	broad*repression* (leader*~concession+~leader*~cohesive*concession+leader*cohesive) -> escalate		
solution consistency	1.000		
solution coverage	0.800		
cases not covered⁹¹	(~E): South Korea 2004, Burkina Faso 2011, Brazil 2013, Benin 1998, Cameroon 2002, Serbia 2016, Guinea 2006, Algeria 2017, Algeria 1997, Turkey 2017, Uganda 1958, Moldova 2016, Thailand 1996, Japan 1958, Ecuador 2006 (E): China 1989, Greece 1973, France 2018, Moldova 2015, Serbia 2017, Sudan 2018, Egypt 2002, Thailand 1991, Algeria 1988, Colombia 1958, Guinea 2007, Bolivia 1983, Zambia 1955, Pakistan 1969		
contradictory cases⁹²	(~E): Venezuela 2007, Bolivia 1977, Sierra Leone 1955, Malawi 2002, Libya 2014, Pakistan 1972 (E): Guatemala 1993, Brazil 2014, Argentina 1977, Turkey 2013, South Korea 2006		
* = and + = or ~ = absence of -> = sufficient for			

4.2.2 Analysis of Necessity and Sufficiency

While all conditions in a complex causal configuration have an impact, some conditions are more important than others such that the outcome does not happen in their absence. Although my argument centers around configurations and the different combinations of factors that come together to make demand escalation more or less

⁹¹ These are campaigns that were dropped as a result of discounting the combinations with infrequent occurrences mentioned above: 15 non-escalated (~E) campaigns and 14 escalated (E) campaigns. The country and the year in which these reformist campaign began are listed here for reference.

⁹² These are campaigns that had the contradictory configuration of “aBCDE” mentioned above: 6 non-escalated (~E) campaigns and 5 escalated (E) campaigns.

likely, I conduct an analysis of necessity and sufficiency to compare how the two necessary conditions of demand escalation – having broad composition and experiencing state repression – differ in terms of their coverage and relevance.

Necessary conditions do not trigger an outcome on their own, but a causal combination *always* contains those necessary conditions. Braumoeller and Goertz (2000, 846) present two complementary definitions about necessity: “X is a necessary condition for Y if X is always present when Y occurs,” and “X is a necessary condition for Y if Y does not occur in the absence of X.” The conditions of a campaign having a broad composition and experiencing state repression were theorized to elevate the escalatory potential of any campaign and are largely validated in the truth tables above, but necessary conditions can differ in terms of their relevance. For example, oxygen is necessary for fire but is largely “an irrelevant necessary condition” because fire cannot be started from the mere presence of oxygen and there are many situations when air is present without a fire (Duşa 2018).

In QCA, a consistency score ranges from 0 to 1 and this measures the degree to which “one set is included by another” (Thiem and Dusa 2013). A condition is commonly considered “necessary” if its consistency score is 0.9 or higher (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). As expected, having broad composition, and being repressed by the state both have a score of 1.0 (see Figure 24) and are perfect necessary conditions, as all cases of demand escalation have these features. However, “coverage” measures how trivial or relevant a necessary condition is for the outcome. The “necessity coverage” or “raw coverage” calculates the proportion of a condition covered by its intersection with the outcome, and a small proportion means that there are many cases in which a condition

is present without the outcome present; 80.6% of broad composition overlaps with demand escalation while only 54.3% of state repression is covered by demand escalation. This shows that having a broad composition is a more relevant condition for demand escalation than experiencing state repression, as many campaigns that do not escalate demands also experience repression.

The “relevance of necessity” further tests the relevance of a condition with low relevance scores indicating the trivialness and high values indicating the relevance of each condition (Schneider and Wagemann 2012); a higher score indicates bigger relative importance of that condition as a necessary condition (Duşa 2018). With a relevance score of 0.750 for broad composition and 0.125 for state repression, this validates the relative importance of having broad composition over experiencing state repression for understanding demand escalation. Alternatively, in understanding the absence of demand escalation, the only condition that meets the threshold to qualify as a necessary condition is campaign cohesion with a consistency score of 1.0 (see Figure 25). But with a raw coverage of 55.8% and relevance score of 0.240, it is not a highly relevant condition, as many campaigns that escalate are also cohesive.

Table 12. Analysis of Necessity Among Condition for Demand Escalation

	Inclusion score for necessity	Relevance of Necessity	Raw Coverage
Clear Leader	0.680	0.719	0.654
Broad Composition	1.000	0.750	0.806
Campaign Cohesion	0.760	0.200	0.442
State Concession	0.680	0.406	0.472

State Repression	1.000	0.125	0.543
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Table 13. Analysis of Necessity Among Condition for Non-Demand Escalation

	Inclusion score for necessity	Relevance of Necessity	Raw Coverage
Clear Leader	0.375	0.575	0.346
Broad Composition	0.250	0.419	0.194
Campaign Cohesion	1.000	0.240	0.558
State Concession	0.792	0.433	0.528
State Repression	0.875	0.107	0.457

Lastly, I further analyze the feature of having a broad composition for explaining demand escalation to see if this necessary condition qualifies as a sufficient condition. Inclusion and consistency both refer to the same thing in QCA – if the inclusion of X (condition) into Y (outcome) is high, then X is highly consistent, or X has a high consistency score (Duşa 2018). From Table 14, having a broad composition has a high sufficiency inclusion score with 0.806, which can be understood as the probability of demands escalating given a broad composition. With the highest score being 1, Duşa (2018) notes that a sufficiency inclusion score above 0.8 can be considered high enough to conclude that a condition is sufficient, “or at least an important part of an expression that is sufficient for the outcome.”

The proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) score takes into account the negation of the outcome as well as its presence (as there could be logically contradictory cases in which having a condition results in both the presence and the absence of the outcome of interest). Seeing that having a “broad composition” has a low sufficiency

inclusion score and a low PRI score among non-escalated campaigns (see Table 14), I can conclude that having a broad composition qualifies as a sufficient condition for demand escalation. As initially hypothesized, having a broad composition (versus narrow) is the most discriminating factor between reformist campaigns that escalate demands and those that do not.

Table 14. Analysis of Sufficiency Among Condition for Demand Escalation

	Inclusion score for sufficiency	Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI)	covS (raw coverage)	covU (unique coverage)
Clear Leader	0.654	0.654	0.680	0.000
Broad Composition	0.806	0.806	1.000	0.000
Campaign Cohesion	0.442	0.442	0.760	0.000
State Concession	0.472	0.472	0.680	0.000
State Repression	0.543	0.543	1.000	0.000

Table 15. Analysis of Sufficiency Among Condition for Non-Demand Escalation

	Inclusion score for sufficiency	Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI)	covS (raw coverage)	covU (unique coverage)
Clear Leader	0.346	0.346	0.375	0.000
Broad Composition	0.194	0.194	0.250	0.000
Campaign Cohesion	0.558	0.558	1.000	0.000
State Concession	0.528	0.528	0.792	0.000
State Repression	0.457	0.457	0.875	0.000

4.3 Conclusion

The use of truth tables and QCA provided evidence for the two theorized pathways of demand escalation (strategic calculation and organic retaliation) and uncovered an additional pathway (preemptive consolidation). Campaigns having a broad composition and experiencing state repression are part of all pathways to demand escalation, but having a broad composition is the more discerning of the two conditions as many campaigns that do not escalate demands also experience disproportionate state violence.

Statistical methods try to explain an outcome using a single model for both the presence and absence (or high and low values) of the dependent variable, but QCA finds multiple causal combinations that lead to the same outcome with causal asymmetry – that is, the joint conditions causing a certain outcome are not necessarily the mirror image of those conditions causing the absence of the outcome (Ide 2015). This is very much in line with studies of peace and conflict that do not treat the presence and absence of violent conflict as binary oppositions (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). Accordingly, the failure to escalate demands is not explained by campaigns having a narrow composition and not experiencing state repression. Rather, the necessary condition for the absence of demand escalation is movement cohesion, albeit not a highly relevant condition as many campaigns that do escalate demands are also cohesive.

Lastly, the use of truth tables and QCA also exposed the limits of the dynamic theory of demand escalation. In addition to the unclear role of movement cohesion, a noteworthy “contradictory configuration” of “ABCDE” emerged from the analysis. If I had only focused on campaigns that escalated demands, this combination could have lent

additional support for the “organic exacerbation” pathway, but among campaigns that are leaderless, have a broad composition, are cohesive, receive government concessions, and face state repression, six did not escalate their demands while five did, and all campaigns with this combination were excluded from the analysis (Rihoux and De Meur 2008, 44). Although it is regrettable that 11 out of 78 campaigns (14%) could not be accounted for with the dynamic theory of demand escalation, it is “perfectly normal to detect contradictory configurations” (Rihoux and De Meur 2008, 48), and seeking the resolution of these contradictions could be the basis of future research projects.

Chapter 5: Theory Testing through Hong Kong Case Studies

In this chapter, I apply the dynamic theory of demand escalation to three reformist campaigns in Hong Kong using the spirit of the most similar systems design (or Mill's Method of Difference). This method typically compares similar cases which only differ in the dependent variable and one independent variable that explains the variation in outcome, however, my theory of demand escalation does not fit neatly into this comparative approach. The dynamic theory of demand escalation takes two factors (movement characteristic and government response) to explain how demands escalate, and I argue that different combinations can result in the outcome of interest. Therefore, I chose the following three reformist campaigns, two of which escalated and one that did not, because it allows me to compare the different escalatory paths with each other, as well as compare the conditions of escalation with those of non-escalation while controlling for country-level and decade-level differences.

Hong Kong is unique in many respects and is not the average state with modal state-society relations. However, I posit that these differences are not fundamentally important for my argument and Hong Kong's idiosyncrasies make it a critical case in which if the dynamics of demand escalation can be observed here then it is likely to occur anywhere (Patton 1990). Additionally, the comparison of three mass campaigns within Hong Kong highlight vital information that may not have been gleaned in other settings

and its hybrid context allows for lessons that can generalize to both democracies and autocracies.

5.1 The Case for Hong Kong

Since its handover from the United Kingdom in 1997, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has been under Chinese sovereignty but self-governed by the formula of “One Country, Two Systems.” Relying on its free-market institutions and economic freedoms, HKSAR developed into a global economic powerhouse and has largely enjoyed enviable growth and basic social stability. However, parallel to this narrative of success is a less triumphal story, “one punctuated by episodes of mass protests that aimed to reveal deepening social inequalities and to challenge the governance and legitimacy of the SAR government” (Yuen and Cheng 2018, 7). The first notable episode in the counter-narrative goes back to July 2003 when hundreds of thousands of Hong Kongers marched to the Hong Kong government (HKG) headquarters to oppose the proposed national security law, the very same ones that took effect in 2020.⁹³

While annual marches commemorated the 1997 handover of Hong Kong on July 1 (also known as HKSAR establishment day), 2003 was unique in galvanizing half a million people to take to the streets to oppose the legislation of Basic Law Article 23, which would prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the

⁹³ After the massive demonstrations on July 1, 2003, James Tien resigned from the Executive Council and the bill was withdrawn and shelved indefinitely – until 2020.

Chinese government. The Hong Kong people worried that it would infringe on their rights and freedoms as these crimes carried maximum life prison sentences, and legal experts criticized it for lacking “clarity in specifying what acts are criminal, and whether they must be conducted with intention or some state of mind.”⁹⁴ In response to the largest protest seen in Hong Kong since the handover, the Liberal Party withdrew support of the bill and the government shelved it without enough support to pass it in the Legislative Council.⁹⁵

This was a “bipartite maximalist” campaign in my categorization. There was a reformist trigger (proposed anti-subversion laws) but calls for Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa’s resignation were heard alongside opposition to the bill from the beginning on July 1.⁹⁶ As Hong Kong’s first chief executive, Tung was handpicked by Beijing to head the HKG and was frequently perceived to be more interested in pleasing China than representing the Hong Kong people. Thus, anger towards the controversial bill were “fueled by a broader frustration with Mr. Tung’s government itself,” particularly over the poor handling of the slumping economy and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak.⁹⁷ Tung seemed to recognize the public’s sentiment and publicly

⁹⁴ Tong, Elson. “Reviving Article 23 (Part I): The rise and fall of Hong Kong’s 2003 national security bill,” *Hong Kong Free Press*, February 17, 2018. <<https://hongkongfp.com/2018/02/17/reviving-article-23-part-i-rise-fall-hong-kongs-2003-national-security-bill/>>.

⁹⁵ Gunia, Amy. “A Brief history of Protest in Post-Handover Hong Kong,” *Time*, June 20, 2019. <<https://time.com/5606212/hong-kong-history-mass-demonstrations-protest/>>.

⁹⁶ “Huge protest fills HK streets,” *CNN*, July 2, 2003. <<https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/>>.

⁹⁷ “Hong Kong to Delay Controversial Bill – 2003-07-07,” *VOA*, October 30, 2009. <<https://www.voanews.com/archive/hong-kong-delay-controversial-bill-2003-07-07/>>.

acknowledged the people's "dissatisfaction over government policies and over [his] governance in particular," when he agreed to soften the bill that he subsequently tabled.⁹⁸ This campaign did not result in the immediate resignation of Mr. Tung, but it was seen as indirectly contributing to his early departure two years later.⁹⁹

The 2003 protests "proved to be a watershed moment" that dramatically increased activism from Hong Kong civil society groups seeking to participate in policy-making processes (Dapiran 2017). The three case studies that follow have this "successful campaign"¹⁰⁰ to look back on, which was largely remembered as a spectacular failure on the part of the Hong Kong leadership.¹⁰¹ However, only two of the campaigns that follow escalated their demands from reformist to maximalist, which discounts a possible alternative explanation that the success of the 2003 campaign, or the reputation of the government established by its past concessions (Walter 2006), is what is driving subsequent campaigns to escalate demands.

Another set of alternative hypotheses pertain to the Hong Kong people's relationship with the HKG as well as China. It could be that a campaign's tendency to

⁹⁸ Pan, Philip. "Hong Kong's Top Leader Softens Controversial Bill," *Washington Post*, July 6, 2003. <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/07/06/hong-kongs-top-leader-softens-controversial-bill/2a07bbcd-f0db-4207-b0b3-5db16059e099/>>.


⁹⁹ Reuters. "Hong Kong chief executive 'quits'." *Al Jazeera*, 2 March 2005. <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/3/2/hong-kong-chief-executive-quits>>.

¹⁰⁰ The campaign technically achieved partial success, since it stopped the enactment of Article 23 but did not bring about the immediate resignation of Mr. Tung.

¹⁰¹ Kang-chung, Ng. "Fear and loathing: which way forward for Article 23 national security law in face of still opposition in Hong Kong?" *South China Morning Post*, November 22, 2017. <<https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2121035/fear-and-loathing-which-way-forward-article-23-national>>.


escalate demands is a reflection of the people's distrust in their government and skepticism toward the mainland, in the case of Hong Kong. When looking at public opinion polls as a proxy for state-society relations, Figure 13 shows that the Hong Kong public was generally dissatisfied with the HKG in the last decade. Similarly, Figure 14 shows that the Hong Kong people had more distrust than trust toward the mainland in the last decade. In both figures, the blue boxes indicate the timeframe of the three campaigns that will be explored in the next section. Satisfaction with the HKG drops significantly in 2019 and distrust of Beijing peaks during the course of all three campaigns, but there does not seem to be a clear association between these trends and when demands escalate. So, while anti-government and anti-Chinese sentiment existed for each campaign to leverage, not all campaigns tapped into this potential to ask more from the government than initially sought.

Figure 13. Public Opinion Poll Assessing Satisfaction with HKG¹⁰²



¹⁰² Data from Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI). <<https://pori.hk/pop-poll/hksarg/h001>>

Figure 14. Public Opinion Poll Assessing Satisfaction with China¹⁰³



While I can largely dismiss the legacy of prior success, the Hong Kong public’s dissatisfaction of the HKG, and Hong Kong’s distrust towards the mainland as alternate explanations for why demands escalate, there are still limitations to my case selection strategy. For one, timing may be seen as a key challenge to external validity. Because the three campaigns occur a few years apart and some participants are likely to have been involved in multiple campaigns, later campaign inevitably learned from earlier campaigns in ways that the older campaigns could not learn from the more recent ones;

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

the 2019 anti-extradition campaign explicitly did things as a result of lessons derived from the 2014 Umbrella Movement.

However, this limitation does not necessarily jeopardize my argument because the HKG did not have a predefined way of dealing with different campaigns, such as only offering concessions to movements with clear leadership. Hence, the people's adaptations to make subsequent campaign "more effective" result in variation of campaign configuration while not necessarily affecting the government's response. For example, a lesson from 2003 and 2012 was that if you push hard enough, the government will give in¹⁰⁴ – but the government did no such thing in 2014 while offering concessions again in 2019. In this way, movement characteristics and government responses are not endogenous, and the case studies add value in allowing me to more specifically consider the mechanisms of demand escalation in ways that the quantitative analyses and the QCA could not.

The following case studies were developed through triangulating information from academic articles, media reports, and in-depth interviews.¹⁰⁵ I focus on movement characteristics and government responses to assess whether and how the pathways of strategic calculation, organic exacerbation, and preemptive consolidation shed light on why the 2012 campaign against Chinese patriotism classes ended with the acceptance of government concessions, while the 2014 Umbrella Movement escalated demands without

¹⁰⁴ Interviewee 9

¹⁰⁵ Interviewees were selected through snowball sampling, in which I asked my initial contacts for recommendations on others to interview. See Appendix E for the list and description of interviewees.

concessions, and the 2019 anti-extradition campaign escalated demands despite government attempts at accommodation.

Table 16. Different Characteristics in the Hong Kong Case Studies

	Campaign Name	Movement Leadership	Government Response	Demand Escalation?
Hong Kong case studies	2012 Patriotism Class Movement	Yes	Concession	No
	2014 Umbrella Movement	Yes	Repression	Yes
	2019 Anti-Extradition Campaign	No	Concession & Repression	Yes

5.2 2012 Patriotism Class Movement

In March 2012, an elite committee of 1,200 prominent Hong Kong residents (which included many Beijing allies) appointed a new leader Leung Chun-ying (C.Y. Leung) as Hong Kong's next Chief Executive. Soon thereafter, the HKG announced plans to implement “moral and national education” in public schools to foster a sense of national pride and belonging. A group of secondary school students, led by then 15-year-old Joshua Wong, formed a group called Scholarism to fight the proposal they saw as an attempt at indoctrination. On July 29, the campaign against the curriculum changes brought tens of thousands of people together who feared that the classes would brainwash the students into supporting China’s Communist Party (CCP).

Initially, the government dismissed such fears and stood firm on its plans to make the curriculum compulsory in primary schools starting in 2015 and in secondary schools the year after. But after dozens of activists began hunger strikes and “impassioned but

well-organized and peaceful student-led demonstrations” drew a broad cross section of the population to the streets, the HKG backed down.¹⁰⁶ On September 8, C.Y. Leung abandoned the 2015 deadline for the introduction of the compulsory patriotism classes and announced that he would give schools discretion on whether to implement the curriculum.

During the campaign, the placard and banners specifically called for the government to withdraw its plans to introduce the Moral and National Education curriculum but there were deeper issues at play. The protests were described as “the latest sign of growing discontent in Hong Kong” over China’s increasing influence, stoked by growing economic inequality and stunted democratic development.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, most of the Hong Kong people were excluded from the process of choosing their own leader earlier in the year, and they faced growing concerns over eroding media freedoms as well as increasing visibility of mainland Chinese in Hong Kong life.¹⁰⁸ The reformist campaign therefore had high escalatory potential in terms of the growing grievances against the government and the extent of the general public supporting the reformist cause.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Ko, Vanessa. “Why Hong Kong Wants Nothing to Do with ‘Patriotism’ for Now,” *Time*, September 10, 2012. <<https://world.time.com/2012/09/10/why-hong-kong-wants-nothing-to-do-with-patriotism-for-now/>>.

¹⁰⁷ AP. “Thousands in HK protest China patriotism classes,” *Yahoo News*, July 29, 2012. <<https://news.yahoo.com/news/thousands-hk-protest-china-patriotism-classes-102106600.html>>.

¹⁰⁸ Ko, Vanessa.

¹⁰⁹ This view was corroborated by Interviewee 10, who noted that this campaign had a good chance to escalate demands.

What prevented escalation was an effective government response – namely, a compromised concession without repression. It is important to note that the major concession came in the heels of a 120,000-strong rally outside the central government offices, but the concession was not a one-sided appeal to demobilize the campaign. There was a senior official in government, Anna Wu, who played a key role in defusing the tension.¹¹⁰ Wu, a progressive on the Executive Council (a top advisory body for the Chief Executive), was tasked with leading a government review committee for the contentious national education curriculum.¹¹¹

Although I could not find public evidence of Wu meeting or negotiating with the leaders of the campaign, she did suggest that prior engagement with the public had been inadequate and encouraged the government to “adopt a more innovative approach in public engagement.”¹¹² According to Interviewee 10, Wu had been in communication with the movement during the time she convinced the Chief Executive to back down, and a government source said Leung would meet with the protest leaders following his announcement.¹¹³ The fact that the government decided to accommodate the movement

¹¹⁰ Cheung, Gary. “Leung ‘caught off guard’ by national education row, Wu says,” *South China Morning Post*, October 20, 2012. <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1065283/leung-caught-guard-national-education-row-wu-says>>.

¹¹¹ “Anna Wu: The absurdities of HK politics and how to fix them,” *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, March 6, 2017. <<https://www.ejinsight.com/eji/article/id/1505818/20170306-Anna-Wu-the-absurdities-of-HK-politics-and-how-to-fix-them>>.

¹¹² Cheung, Gary.

¹¹³ Lau, Stuart and Amy Nip. 2012. “Leung’s 11th Hour u-Turn on Education Victory for Protesters Besieging the Government Headquarters, as Chief Executive Axes Mandatory National Education Lessons Ahead of Vote.” *South China Morning Post*, Sep 09, 1. <https://du.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.du.idm.oclc.org/newspapers/leungs-11th-hour-u-turn-on-education-victory/docview/1038475187/se-2?accountid=14608>.

through engagement, as opposed to a unilateral decision, is crucial because this ensured a reciprocal response from the campaign – namely, demobilization. The day after Leung announced the concession, Scholarism said they would end the Admiralty protest.¹¹⁴

Another key aspect preventing escalation was the lack of state sanctioned violence. In contrast to the campaigns in 2014 and 2019, there were no instances of police brutality or regime repression to fuel the people’s anger or distrust in the HKG. It is noteworthy that while not everyone was satisfied with Leung’s accommodation and smaller class boycotts and hunger strikes continued to press the government to scrap the proposal entirely, demands did not escalate.¹¹⁵ Following the victory, Scholarism remained active, supporting other political and social causes, and the group would come to play a key role in the Umbrella Movement as well (Dapiran 2017).

5.3 2014 Umbrella Movement

Article 45 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law says: “The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.”¹¹⁶ Beijing ruled out the potential for universal suffrage in Hong Kong for the first three chief executive elections, then in December 2013, the HKG started a 5-month public consultations for a

¹¹⁴ Lau, Stuart and Amy Nip.

¹¹⁵ Chan, Thomas. 'CityU appeal for support for hunger strike Staff association hopes hundreds will sign up for strike against national education', *South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)*, 20 Sep, p. 03, (online NewsBank).

¹¹⁶ “The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.” <<https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/text/en/facts/index.html>>.

constitutional reform regarding the election of the Chief Executive in 2017.¹¹⁷ Under the method put in place in 2012, candidates were elected by a committee of 1,200 representatives composed predominantly of pro-Beijing politicians and business elites, and as a result, the most powerful figure in Hong Kong did not have “any popular mandate from the broader citizenry” (Dapiran 2017).

Universal suffrage would give all Hong Kongers the right to vote for the chief executive, but at the heart of the issue was the question of how the candidates for the election would be nominated. Many pan-democrat politicians and pro-democracy activists strongly pushed for a mechanism of civil nomination. In this vein, Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), a pro-democracy activist group led by two academics Benny Tai and Chan Kin-man, and a Baptist minister, Reverend Chu Yiu-ming, announced early on that there would be peaceful civil disobedience in the streets if the electoral reforms did not meet the Hong Kong people’s expectations.¹¹⁸

In June 2014, as the time neared for Beijing to announce its official decision on the chief executive election process, China published a white paper stating the Chinese Communist Party’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong.¹¹⁹ This was the first official document since the 1997 handover that set out Beijing’s authority over the territory, and was seen by many as a warning to pro-democracy activists pushing for the

¹¹⁷ Xinhua. “HK starts public consultation for reform.” *China Daily*, December 4, 2013.

¹¹⁸ But, Joshua. “Occupy Central Hong Kong supporters ready to block traffic and go to jail for democracy,” *South China Morning Post*, March 28, 2013. <<https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1201371/occupy-central-supporters-ready-block-traffic-and-go-jail-democracy>>.

¹¹⁹ “China media: White paper on Hong Kong.” *BBC Monitoring*, 11 June 2014. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27790302>>.

introduction of universal suffrage by 2017.¹²⁰ The white paper emphasized “One Country” over the “Two Systems” and created “an atmosphere of mistrust and discontent with the Mainland” (Dapiran 2017).

There were two notable responses to China’s strongly worded publication. On June 20, OCLP organized an unofficial city-wide referendum asking voters how they wanted to reform the city’s election process. To China’s chagrin, 787,767 ballots were cast with 42% favoring a proposal from the Alliance for True Democracy in which candidates for the chief executive position would be nominated by the public, without conditions.¹²¹ Second, the annual pro-democracy march on July 1 commemorating the 1997 handover, drew a larger than usual turnout with half a million protesters marching to demand full electoral freedom.¹²² Prominent leaders pushing for genuine universal suffrage included the OCLP trio, Alex Chow and Lester Shum of the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), an alliance of university student unions, and Joshua Wong of Scholarism.¹²³

¹²⁰ Hume, Tim. “Alarm in Hong Kong at Chinese white paper affirming Beijing control,” *CNN*, June 13, 2014. <<https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/11/world/asia/hong-kong-beijing-two-systems-paper/index.html>>.

¹²¹ Chan, Wilfred and Euan McKirdy. “Hong Kong’s Occupy Central democracy ‘referendum’ – What you should know.” *CNN*, June 30, 2014. <<https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/24/world/asia/hong-kong-politics-explainer/index.html>>.

¹²² “Hong Kong: Democracy rally ‘draws 510,000 protesters,’” *BBC News*, July 2, 2014. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28102644>>.

¹²³ In identifying leaders in the campaign, I am simply stating that there were clear identifiable leaders that the government could have engaged with, and not arguing that these individuals fully controlled the campaign. Even those that have described the Umbrella Movement as “self-mobilized” and “horizontal” acknowledge the “indisputable role” that students leaders and the leaders of OCLP played in the movement (Cheng and Chan 2017).

On August 31, 2014, the National People's Congress, China's parliament, announced its official decision on universal suffrage for the selection of Hong Kong's Chief Executive.¹²⁴ Hong Kong's Chief Executive, C.Y. Leung, called it a step in the right direction, saying that the majority of Hong Kong citizens "will be able to cast their votes to select the chief executive."¹²⁵ However, Beijing had brushed aside the people's demands for a fully open election by only allowing the option to vote among candidates vetted by Beijing, namely those who "love [China] and love Hong Kong."¹²⁶ Pro-democracy segments of society called the proposed framework a farce, and maintained that "genuine universal suffrage includes both the rights to elect and to be elected" and continued to push for elections in which any candidate could run for chief executive.¹²⁷

In response to the disappointing decision, protests continued to mount and on September 3, hundreds of demonstrators were arrested at a peaceful pro-democracy rally drawing around 100,000 participants.¹²⁸ HKFS and Scholarism subsequently organized class boycotts and mobilized sit-ins in public spaces (Cheng and Chan 2017). The rallies throughout September were largely a show of defiance against Beijing's vision for Hong

¹²⁴ "Full text on NPC decision on universal suffrage for HK Chief Executive selection," August 31, 2014. <http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-08/31/content_33390388.htm>.

¹²⁵ Stevens, Andrew. "Beijing says no to open elections in Hong Kong," *CNN*, September 4, 2014. <https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/31/world/asia/hong-kong-elections/index.html>.

¹²⁶ Stevens, Andrew.

¹²⁷ "Official statement of OCLP in response to the decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee on Hong Kong's constitutional reform," *Occupy Central with Love and Peace*, August 31, 2014. <http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/eng_detail&eng_id=20>.

¹²⁸ Hume, Tim and Zoe Li. "Hundreds arrested at sit-in following huge pro-democracy rally in Hong Kong," *CNN*, September 4, 2014. <<https://www.cnn.com/2014/07/01/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-protests/index.html>>.

Kong's political future and efforts to pressure Beijing into allowing genuine universal suffrage in Hong Kong continued. Thus, the Umbrella Movement "unfolded and diffused from structural, conjunctural and endogenous conditions in Hong Kong's democratic movement," and the intended civil disobedience action meant to last a few days was substituted by a resilient occupation that would last 79 days (Cheng and Chan 2017, 3).

Although C. Y. Leung's approval ratings were already very low, calls to remove him from office were not yet pervasive. In late September, after weeks of continued contention, the Hong Kong police used pepper spray and tear gas to dispel thousands of pro-democracy protesters near the government complex while protesters used umbrellas and face masks to protect themselves.¹²⁹ Riot police fired a total of 87 canisters of teargas, and images of police brutality quickly spread through social media and television (Cheng and Chan 2017, 7). As expected with repression backfire (Hess and Martin 2006), this level of police violence not seen in Hong Kong since the 1967 riots (Dapiran 2017) outraged the public and served as a catalyst for greater mobilization as well as demand escalation.

Shortly after this clash between the police and the unarmed protesters, Chan Kin-man, a leader of OCLP, was asked how the crisis might be resolved, to which he answered: "Leung Chun-ying must step down."¹³⁰ The campaign's leadership structure

¹²⁹ "Hong Kong: Tear gas and clashes at democracy protest," *BBC*, 28 September 2014. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29398962>>.

¹³⁰ Kong, Tsung-Gan. "In full: The testimony of protest organizer Chan Kin-man at the trial of the Umbrella Movement 9." *Hong Kong Free Press*, January 12, 2019. <<https://hongkongfp.com/2019/01/12/full-transcript-umbrella-movement-convener-chan-kin-mans-testimony-trial-occupy-9/>>.

was becoming increasingly complicated with OCLP being sidelined by the students and tensions forming between recognized leadership and informal leaders.¹³¹ The fragmented leadership would later be seen as a weakness contributing to the campaign's eventual demise,¹³² but the infighting had minimal impact on the escalation of demands. The maximalist demand was soon taken up by the campaign at large, and the student leaders announced four key demands: "1. Chief Executive C.Y. Leung should resign. 2. The NPC decision on chief executive elections should be revoked. 3. A new election process should be proposed, allowing for 'civil nomination' of candidates. 4. 'Genuine universal suffrage' should be implemented" (Dapiran 2017). By October, calls for Leung's resignation were clear. Alex Chow, the secretary-general of HKFS indirectly addressed the chief executive in front of a cheering crowd saying, "You thought you can rule this place... if you don't respond to the demand of the Hong Kong people, we will paralyze the government."¹³³ The protesters went so far as to set a deadline for C.Y. Leung to step down: midnight on Thursday evening, October 2, 2014.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Interviewee 7

¹³² Bush, Richard C. "Hong Kong: Examining the Impact of the "Umbrella Movement." *Testimony delivered before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, December 3, 2014 . <<https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/hong-kong-examining-the-impact-of-the-umbrella-movement/>>.

¹³³ Wen, Philip. "Hong Kong protesters demand Leung Chun-ying resigns as city leader," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, October 2, 2014. <<https://www.smh.com.au/world/hong-kong-protesters-demand-leung-chunying-resigns-as-city-leader-20141002-10p419.html#ixzz3F0UnHIO0>>.

¹³⁴ Denyer, Simon. "Hong Kong chief says protesters are making 'impossible' demands." *Washington Post*, October 12, 2014. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/hong-kong-chief-says-protesters-making-impossible-demands/2014/10/12/3c5e1a01-0d97-4b2f-93e3-8c8f25374c66_story.html>.

The escalation in demands can be traced to mounting frustration over the government's indifference to the campaign's initial demands and fueled by the regime's disproportionate violence against unarmed protesters and activists. Whereas a leaderless campaign might have lost momentum from a lack of progress, the leaders of the Umbrella Movement knew their potential and derived additional power from the cohesiveness of the campaign.

At the end of July, Chan Kin Man had met with Carrie Lam, Chief Secretary for Administration at the time, in which there was no opportunity to discuss constitutional reform proposals, but rather "Secretary Lau Kong-wah just continued saying [the movement was] radical. And Carrie Lam just repeatedly ask[ed] [them] to end this movement as soon as possible."¹³⁵ The movement's leaders saw civil disobedience as their "bargaining power,"¹³⁶ and escalating demands was a way to up the ante to get the government's attention. Chan Kin-man said in an interview at that time, "Only when the government makes a substantial response, then we will advise people to retreat... we are always ready for dialog and negotiation."¹³⁷

If demands were escalated by leaders as part of the bargaining process, then this suggests that the desire for Leung's resignation was not necessarily widespread.

According to an onsite survey of respondents who visited the protest site on or after

¹³⁵ Kong, Tsung-Gan.

¹³⁶ Stevens, Andrew.

¹³⁷ Neuman, Scott. "Hong Kong Tense as Democracy Activists Face Down Police," *NPR*, September 29, 2014. <<https://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/09/29/352417457/hong-kong-tense-as-democracy-activists-face-down-police>>.

September 28 (the day that the police fired the teargas), the motivation for participation was higher for supporting universal suffrage (86.4%) than for opposing the current administration (68.8%) (Cheng and Chan 2017). Additionally, one can infer from the campaign's mixed reaction to Leung's refusal to resign that his dismissal was not really what the people wanted.

As the October 2 deadline came to a close, instead of resigning, Leung offered to negotiate with student leaders. This appeased some and angered others in the campaign. Some journalists at the scene noted that the tension between the protesters and the police gathered outside the office of the Chief Executive quickly dissipated following the announcement, as "the crowd started thinning out, people were checking their phones, turning around and going home."¹³⁸ Others noted the crowd's displeasure, with some protesters calling Leung's speech "totally useless," and others saying, "We hoped for a reversal on universal suffrage [reform] – not just a meeting."¹³⁹ As for the campaign's leaders, they welcomed the proposed talks.¹⁴⁰ If the goal was sincerely to get Leung to resign, the campaign might have been a bit more outraged by his refusal to leave.

Was the escalation of demands inevitable? To the extent that strategic calculation was driving demand escalation, earlier efforts by the government to negotiate settlement

¹³⁸ Bell, Matthew. "Hong Kong's leader offers to meet protesters, but refuses to resign." *The World*, October 2, 2014. <<https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-02/hong-kongs-leader-offers-meet-protesters-refuses-resign>>.

¹³⁹ Guilford, Gwynn and Lily Kuo. "Hong Kong is attacking the protest movement's biggest weakness – its fragmented leadership," *Quartz*, October 2, 2014. <<https://qz.com/275263/hong-kongs-chief-executive-just-called-the-protesters-bluff-but-for-some-of-them-it-wasnt-a-bluff/>>.

¹⁴⁰ "Hong Kong protests: CY Leung refuses to quit as leader," *BBC News*, October 2, 2014. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29467239>>.

with the movement's leaders might have appeased the campaign. However, given that this leader-led campaign was also largely cohesive, preemptive consolidation also could have played a role. In this pathway, leaders derive power from the movement's unity and demands can escalate irrespective of government concessions. When movements are leader-led, broad, and cohesive, the only chance for neutralizing the escalatory potential is for the government to refrain from repressing the campaign.

In this reading, the HKG's biggest mistake was condoning police brutality on September 28. Even though the "dramatic backlash prompted the authorities to halt repression and reconsider their response" (Yuen and Cheng 2017, 615), its effects could not be undone. The dynamic theory of demand escalation cannot adjudicate how much of each pathway mattered in the 2014 Umbrella Movement, but it provides a useful framework to understand the strategic role of movement leadership and the extra leverage cohesion provided the campaign to contend with the government.

5.4 2019 Anti-Extradition Campaign

In March 2019, the HKG proposed a bill that would allow criminal suspects to be extradited to China under certain circumstances. The proposal was triggered by a murder case in Taipei, but because the amendment covered mainland China, there were strong public concerns and suspicions about the HKG's motivations (Lee et al. 2019). Critics feared that this would expose Hong Kongers to unfair trials and give China undue influence over Hong Kong to target activists and journalists.

Protests against the controversial bill occurred as early as March 31, 2019,¹⁴¹ but June 9 kicked off the campaign in earnest, drawing hundreds of thousands (more than a million by some accounts) to Hong Kong's sweltering streets.¹⁴² The next day, Chief Executive Carrie Lam essentially disregarded the widespread fear and anger among Hong Kong's populace and doggedly forged ahead by saying, "there is very little merit to be gained to delay the bill... it'll just cause more anxiety" and divisiveness in society.¹⁴³ The second reading of the extradition bill was to proceed as planned on June 12.

Protesters knew that if the Legislative Council (LegCo) was allowed to meet, then the pro-Beijing majority would likely push the bill through. In an effort to stall the second reading, an estimated 40,000 protesters showed up outside the government headquarters and LegCo building. Around mid-morning, pan-democrat legislator Eddie Chu Hoidick addressed the crowd with a megaphone, announcing that legislators were unable to reach the building to get into the chamber and the LegCo meeting had been cancelled (Dapiran 2020, 52). With the forced postponement of the second reading¹⁴⁴ came violent clashes between the police and the protesters that left dozens of people injured.

¹⁴¹ Chan, Holmes. "In Pictures: 12,000 Hongkongers march in protest against 'evil' China extradition law, organisers say." *Hong Kong Free Press*, March 31, 2019. <<https://hongkongfp.com/2019/03/31/pictures-12000-hongkongers-march-protest-evil-china-extradition-law-organisers-say/>>.

¹⁴² Ramzy, Austin. "Hong Kong March: Vast Protest of Extradition Bill shows Fear of Eroding Freedoms." *New York Times*, June 9, 2019. <<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-protest.html>>.

¹⁴³ Hui, Mary. "Hong Kong's government has a message for one million protesters: We can't hear you." *Quartz*, June 10, 2019. <<https://qz.com/1639462/mass-protest-hasnt-convinced-hong-kong-to-shelve-extradition-law/>>.

¹⁴⁴ *Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. "Press Release,"* June 12, 2019. <<https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/press/pr20190612-3.html>>.

Chief Executive Lam quickly lambasted the protesters for “organizing a riot.”¹⁴⁵ In a video released by the government news service, Carrie Lam doubled down on the bill, maintaining that she had a clear conscience to push it through, and used a metaphor describing herself as a mother with a duty to discipline her wayward children.¹⁴⁶ The interview angered the activists for several reasons. Not only were there legal consequences to the characterization of the incident as a riot (protesters charged with rioting could face up to 10 years of imprisonment), Lam was defending the police who were being accused of using excessive force by tear-gassing, beating, and dragging unarmed protesters.¹⁴⁷

Additionally, China and Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing elite continually claimed “foreign meddling” and accused protesters of being “hoodwinked by the opposition camp and their foreign allies into supporting the anti-extradition campaign.”¹⁴⁸ These statements depicting the protesters as pawns and dismissing their grievances as externally

¹⁴⁵ Ng, Joyce. "Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam Accuses Anti-Extradition Bill Protesters of 'Organising a Riot': Chief Executive Says She has a Clear Conscience and Decries the Violence." *South China Morning Post*, Jun 13, 2019. <<https://du.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.du.idm.oclc.org/newspapers/hong-kong-chief-executive-carrie-lam-accuses-anti/docview/2238690757/se-2?accountid=14608>>.

¹⁴⁶ Ng, Joyce.

¹⁴⁷ "The Hong Kong Government must do Whatever it can to Defuse Extradition Row." *South China Morning Post*, Jun 15, 2019. <<https://du.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.du.idm.oclc.org/newspapers/hong-kong-government-must-do-whatever-can-defuse/docview/2239825812/se-2?accountid=14608>>.

¹⁴⁸ “Closing of extradition loophole strengthens rule of law in HK: China Daily editorial.” *China Daily*, June 9, 2019. <<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201906/09/WS5cfd0916a3101765772301f8.html>>.

driven contributed to the people's disillusionment with the HKG and exacerbated tensions.¹⁴⁹

Then, in an about-face, Carrie Lam expressed her "deep sorrow" over the controversy and announced an indefinite suspension of the bill.¹⁵⁰ Although it is unclear why exactly Carrie Lam decided to suspend the bill on June 15, two things are for sure: one, the intention was not to fuel anti-regime sentiment and two, the announcement was not the outcome of any meaningful engagement with the opposition. The HKG likely expected that the suspension of the bill would restore peace and order in Hong Kong,¹⁵¹ even outsiders such as Britain's Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt applauded the HKG for "heeding concerns of the brave citizens" who objected to the bill.¹⁵² But the striking "U-turn"¹⁵³ from a leader who previously showed little regard for the people's concerns backfired and "what seemed a possible end to the protests turned out to be the beginning" (Lee et al. 2019, 10).

The campaign redoubled with an unprecedented turnout of 2 million people the very next day. This time, calls for Carrie Lam's resignation were heard alongside demands for the bill's full withdrawal, "an investigation into police violence against

¹⁴⁹ Sudworth, John. "Hong Kong protests test Beijing's 'foreign meddling' narrative." *BBC News*, December 15, 2019. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50753963>>.

¹⁵⁰ Interviewee 9.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² BBC. "Hong Kong extradition protests: Government suspends bill." *BBC*, June 15, 2019. <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48645342>>.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

protesters, retracting the designation of prior protests as “riots,” and an assurance that the protesters would not face criminal charges.”¹⁵⁴ Contentious activities continued for several months, taking forms as diverse as airport sit-ins and Baltic-inspired human chains to collective singing of movement songs in malls and the erection of “Lennon Walls” for posting pro-movement messages (Lee et al. 2020).

Why did the concession backfire? The HKG made a series of bad judgments about a highly contentious bill.¹⁵⁵ For one, without engaging the movement, the government officials could only guess what would be acceptable to the campaign, and they guessed wrong. Temporary suspension of the bill was not seen as a solution and opponents of the extradition bill, from the Civil Human Rights Front organization to pan-democratic lawmakers, made it clear that delaying the bill was not enough.¹⁵⁶ There were others who saw a more fundamental problem and assumed the government was being disingenuous. People Power lawmaker Raymond Chan Chi-chuen warned Hongkongers to not be fooled by the government’s tricks in trying to pacify the public and demobilize the campaign.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Hui, Mary. “Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam’s “sincere” apology wasn’t sincere enough.” *Quartz*, June 18, 2019. <<https://qz.com/1646660/extradition-law-hong-kong-chief-carrie-lam-apologizes-again/>>.

¹⁵⁵ Interviewee 4

¹⁵⁶ Lam, Jeffie and Elizabeth Cheung. “Don’t Rethink Joining March, Organisers Say: Pan-Dems and Activists make Clear Shelving Extradition Bill the Only Option Despite Exco Members Urging Officials to Take More Time with Legislation.” *South China Morning Post*, Jun 15, 2019. <<https://du.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.du.idm.oclc.org/newspapers/dont-rethink-joining-march-organisers-say/docview/2239825308/se-2?accountid=14608>>.

¹⁵⁷ Lam, Jeffie and Elizabeth Cheung. “Hong Kong extradition bill: rally organizers urge residents to keep pushing against proposed law.” *South China Morning Post*, June 14, 2019. <<https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3014628/hong-kong-extradition-bill-rally-organisers-urge-residents>>.

Additionally, the concession incentivized rejection because the announcement itself served as evidence of the campaign's growing power; to accept the concessions risked losing momentum.¹⁵⁸ Thus, Carrie Lam's efforts to placate the campaign served to invigorate them, and every time Lam tried to appease the public, it ramped up mobilization.¹⁵⁹ One protest participant noted how the government's unilateral actions continually fueled the movement: "I don't know if [the government] was stupid or too clever, but they seemed to choose the exact moment when the [campaign's] momentum was low to act and push the movement to an unprecedented level."¹⁶⁰

In addition to seeing the concessions as insufficient, insincere, or too instrumental to accept, others suggested that it was fundamentally too late.¹⁶¹ Although hypothetical, several protest participants and local observers believed that had Carrie Lam been more responsive to the people's demands early on, the campaign would have been satisfied and the movement appeased.¹⁶² However, I argue that it was not just a time delay but what happened in the interim that exacerbated the leaderless campaign: the concession came in the heels of unprecedented police brutality that went unchecked by the HKG, and the

¹⁵⁸ Interviewee 9.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ Interviewee 3

¹⁶¹ Lahiri, Tripti, and Mary Hui. "Hong Kong has pulled off an amazing win against a dire threat to its freedoms," *Quartz*, June 15, 2019. <<https://qz.com/1644726/hong-kong-leader-carrie-lam-indefinitely-suspends-extradition-bill/>>.

¹⁶² Interviewee 3, 4, 6, 7, 9

constant denial of the people's grievances as illegitimate made the people lose their trust in public institutions and the administration.

Police brutality came to be seen as *the* government response, because the HKG was not responding in any other way.¹⁶³ The government was seen as treating a political problem as a law and order problem which further fueled public discontent,¹⁶⁴ and the outrage over state-sanctioned violence formalized into calls for an independent investigation into police brutality.¹⁶⁵ The final proximate event prior to demand escalation was the death of a 35-year old protester (Mr. Leung) wearing a yellow raincoat with the words "Carrie Lam kills Hong Kong."¹⁶⁶ He plunged to his death after unfurling a banner on the side of a shopping mall and while the police treated it as a suicide, protesters hailed him as a "martyr" and he came to represent the final mark against Carrie Lam's repressive regime.¹⁶⁷ Mr. Leung's banner read, "No extradition to China, total withdrawal of the extradition bill; we are not rioters; release students and the injured;

¹⁶³ Interviewee 8

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Interviewee 2

¹⁶⁶ "A Hong Kong Extradition Protester Who Fell to His Death is Being Hailed as a 'Martyr'." *Time*, June 15, 2019. <<https://time.com/5607742/hong-kong-protester-dies-anti-extradition/>>.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

Carrie Lam step down; help Hong Kong,”¹⁶⁸ and this formed the basis of the “five demands” that would become a rallying cry for the campaign at large.¹⁶⁹

If this was a case of organic exacerbation, early efforts by the HKG to listen to the people’s grievances without the use of disproportionate force might have maintained the public’s trust and averted the escalation of demands. The government’s unilateral decision to suspend the bill could also be considered a mistake, but less consequential as it is not clear who the government could have negotiated with if they wanted to.

There were clear mobilizers especially early on with the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), a local NGO coalition, requesting the police permits required to hold mass rallies.¹⁷⁰ But CHRF only played a coordinating role and their role faded once police stopped granting permissions for protest altogether.¹⁷¹ The campaign’s strategic decisions were made “open source” through an online forum (LIHKG¹⁷²) and messaging channels like Telegram.¹⁷³ Protest participants used virtual platforms to brainstorm ideas and

¹⁶⁸ Withers, Rachel. “Hong Kong’s leader suspends China extradition bill following mass protests,” *Vox*, June 15, 2019. <<https://www.vox.com/world/2019/6/15/18680181/hong-kong-suspends-china-extradition-bill-mass-protests-carrie-lam>>.

¹⁶⁹ In the course of the campaign, there were several different versions of the “five demands.” See Lee et al. (2020) for some of the more prominent versions of the “five demands” proposed between mid-June and mid-July 2019.

¹⁷⁰ Lam, Oiwan. “The organization and future of Hong Kong’s ‘open source’ anti-extradition law movement.” *Hong Kong Free Press*, July 21, 2019. <<https://hongkongfp.com/2019/07/21/organisation-future-hong-kongs-open-source-anti-extradition-law-movement/>>.

¹⁷¹ Interviewee 8.

¹⁷² LIHKG is not an abbreviation and the forum does not have a formal English name

¹⁷³ Lam, Oiwan.

popular comments and suggestions were pushed to the top through electronic votes.¹⁷⁴

During the campaign, public figures sometimes acted as facilitators but “if a public figure attempted to make a speech or give instructions in any way during the protest, the crowds would boo at them.”¹⁷⁵ The protesters did not want to be led and no one had the capacity or authority to represent the movement at large.¹⁷⁶

While the HKG was not interested in engaging the campaign prior to escalation, after more than three months of unrest, there were government officials who sought out individuals who they could strike a deal with, to no avail.¹⁷⁷ Carrie Lam ended up holding a public meeting with more than a hundred citizens randomly drawn from a pool of more than 20,000 applicants at the end of September, but it was largely meaningless.¹⁷⁸ Lam was accused of putting on a show as she concurrently refused talks with pro-democracy lawmakers and presented no sign of wanting to meet the demonstrators’ demands.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ Interviewee 2.

¹⁷⁵ Lam, Oiwan.

¹⁷⁶ Interviewee 2.

¹⁷⁷ Schmidt, Blake. “In Hong Kong’s Leaderless Movement, Officials Don’t Know Who to Negotiate With.” *Bloomberg*, September 9, 2019. <<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-09/hong-kong-leaders-grow-more-frustrated-by-leaderless-protesters>>.

¹⁷⁸ Interviewee 2.

¹⁷⁹ Chun, H. W., & Yang, J. “Hong Kong leader unbowed by anger at rare public forum; Carrie Lam holds public meeting as part of a dialogue strategy to end unrest, but doesn’t announce measures sought by demonstrators.” *Wall Street Journal (Online)*, September 26, 2019. <<https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-leader-pledges-to-listen-at-televised-citizen-forum-11569523905>>.

Not only did the campaign have no clear leaders, many young people felt that the older generations had been too eager to compromise in the past, allowing Hong Kong's freedoms to be chipped away at.¹⁸⁰ As the campaign was leaderless by design, even if a deal could be reached with any group of individuals claiming to represent the masses, demobilization could not have been guaranteed. To some protest participants, negotiations were seen as something that would only benefit the government and create divisions among protesters.¹⁸¹ The double skepticism towards leadership and compromise are summed up in this anonymous demonstrator's words who felt that "many leaders just come out and they're not actually representing the voice of many protesters... there's no room for negotiation."¹⁸²

5.5 Conclusion

The dynamic theory of demand escalation provides a framework to understand whether and why demands escalated in three mass movements in Hong Kong, and also how escalation might have been prevented in 2014 and 2019. The 2012 campaign against Chinese patriotism classes drew the support of the general public and had the potential to escalate into a maximalist campaign. However, the absence of regime violence and the

¹⁸⁰ Interviewee 4; Hernandez, Javier. "Hong Kong Protesters Storm Legislature, Dividing the Movement." *The New York Times*, July 1, 2019. <<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/world/asia/china-hong-kong-protest.html>>.

¹⁸¹ Interviewee 3

¹⁸² Schmidt, Blake.

state's willingness to engage with leaders of the campaign resulted in the movement being satisfied by government concessions.

The 2014 Umbrella Movement had clear leadership and campaign unity, and in the aftermath of brutal state repression, the escalation of demands can be understood through the pathways of strategic calculation and preemptive consolidation. In contrast, the 2019 anti-extradition campaign lacked clear leaders, but individuals were sufficiently angered by the government's heavy hand such that when concessions came it backfired on the regime, triggering the campaign's escalatory potential through organic exacerbation.

One caveat in understanding the anti-extradition campaign through the lens of organic exacerbation is that the movement was uniquely cohesive, such that there was even a high degree of solidarity between the movement's moderate and violent flanks (Lee 2020). This was one of the lessons from the 2014 campaign, in which people saw the detrimental effects of infighting amongst the leadership. In reaction to 2014, the 2019 campaign opted for leaderless unity and adopted several slogans towards this end, such as "Brothers climbing mountains, each offering one's own efforts," where each participant chose their own lines of action while maintaining internal solidarity (Lee et al. 2020, 35).

As a result of this leaderless strategy, participants had more agency and felt more attached to the movement as they gave more of their money, time, and ideas.¹⁸³ The QCA analysis found organic exacerbation to be a pathway for leaderless campaigns lacking

¹⁸³ Interviewee 2, 4

cohesion, but the 2019 anti-extradition campaign shows that movement unity can give leaderless campaigns leverage to escalate demands as well.

Additionally, the results of the QCA found that in general, having a broad composition was more important than experiencing disproportionate state violence in terms of explaining demand escalation. But analyzing these three cases in Hong Kong, which all had broad public appeal and the potential to escalate, highlights the fundamental role of regime repression in turning the people's trust away from the government, and points to the value of conducting multi-method research to understand complex social phenomena.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this dissertation, I put forward a dynamic theory of demand escalation that considers how different combinations of movement structure and government response can trigger protest campaigns to escalate demands. The biggest difference between reformist campaigns that escalate demands and those that do not is whether the campaign has a diverse participant base. When campaigns with broad public support experience disproportionate state repression, this elevates the escalatory potential. Demands can then escalate when leader-led movements are ignored (strategic calculation), when leader-less campaigns receive unilateral concessions (organic exacerbation), or when leader-led movements have high internal cohesion (preemptive consolidation). I triangulate information from academic articles, news sources, and in-depth interviews and use both quantitative and qualitative analysis to find support for the equifinal nature of this phenomenon.

Fundamental to the dynamic theory of demand escalation is the different opportunities (and sometimes deliberate orientations) leader-led and leaderless campaigns have in terms of bargaining with the government. The fields of negotiation and civil resistance have largely operated in different orbits, with “revolutionary” and “resolutionary” approaches to conflict transformation growing in mutual ignorance (Dudouet 2011). From the civil resistance side, negotiation is often viewed negatively by

dissidents and some of the activists I interviewed echoed these sentiments about engaging the government as equivalent to surrender and giving in. But negotiations can be used instrumentally by both the state and the movement. Gene Sharp, a prominent contemporary advocate of nonviolent strategy has taken this approach, warning about the dangers of capitulation, appeasement, and premature resolution “lurking within the negotiating room” (2011, 19) but also showing how negotiation can be a tactical trap that civil resisters use against their opponents (2005).

In the growing effort to bridge the divide, scholars have highlighted their shared underlying principles (Finnegan and Hackley 2008), identified complementary ideas and practices (Dudouet 2017), and shown how negotiations can be a critical element of civil resistance strategy (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017). There are also notable examples that show the long-standing “symbiosis” between mass campaigns and negotiations: Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. considered negotiation to be the very purpose of direct action and compelled segregationists to negotiate the terms of greater social justice, Mahatma Gandhi negotiated with the British Raj to gain access to the British authorities after the Salt March, and the Polish Solidarity movement “negotiated its way into power and transitioned Poland away from authoritarianism” (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017, 5).

Opposition groups may opt out of direct negotiations because they view engaging the government as “equivalent of surrender of the principles at stake and surrender of the overarching cause” (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017, 5). However, even if dissidents keep themselves out of the negotiating room in fear of compromise, this does not mean that bargaining does not happen. In the absence of direct talks, negotiation happens indirectly and less efficiently. The dynamic theory of demand escalation shows how

unproductive disengagement can be, both for the government (as ignoring or offering unilateral concessions can backfire) and for the movement (as refusing to talk with the government can mean miss opportunities for the gains sought).

There is still a lot to learn about demand escalation. The QCA pointed out the conditional effects of movement cohesion when it is paired with leader-led versus leaderless campaigns, and I hope to explore further the circumstances under which movement cohesion serves as liability or leverage for the campaign at large. QCA also identified the “contradictory configuration” of campaigns that are leaderless, have a broad composition, are cohesive, receive government concessions, and face state repression. A deeper analysis of why some campaigns with this configuration escalate demands while others do not could help refine the dynamic theory of demand escalation and help clarify the function of movement cohesion.


Second, while I focused on the question of why demands escalate, going from reformist to maximalist, there are various ways that demands can evolve and sometimes even revert from maximalist to reformist. Theorizing how demands transform through expansion or consolidation, and how this affects the bargaining process is also something that I hope to analyze further. Third, for this dissertation I blanketed the question of success or failure, but many different aspects in the escalatory dynamic can theoretically matter for different outcomes of interest in the conflict process and state-society relations more broadly.

For one, subsequent research can compare unipartite, bipartite, and tripartite campaigns in terms of achieving maximalist change. Previous work has shown that maximalist movements are more effective at achieving their goals when they elicit

diverse participation from society (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). If escalated campaigns are predisposed to having a diverse participation base, then they may be more likely to succeed as maximalist campaigns. Additionally, one can consider the time to escalation (days between the start of a reformist campaign and when demands escalate to call for leader removal or broader systemic change) and test if slower escalation is a function of rational decision making, and therefore more likely to succeed (Weyland 2014).

In terms of the speed of escalation, there seems to be a trend in the number of days shortening over time; reformist campaigns have taken longer to escalate demands in the past, and demand escalation has occurred more quickly in recent years. Figure 15 shows the average days it took for a campaign to escalate demands in each decade. This can factor into the analysis of outcomes or be used as a basis to explore what factors might be affecting this trend and how it might matter for the future of mass campaigns.

Figure 15. Plotting Time to Escalation



In sum, many regimes are increasingly facing existential threats from mass movements, and this project helps to understand how sometimes a government's best and worst intentions to stem the tide of reformist campaigns can result in escalation to maximalist campaigns. Regan and Norton (2005) proposed that "the etiology of civil war is rooted in grievances and responses by the state to demands that are not necessarily initially expressed in terms of organized armed rebellion" (335). I expand upon this notion to suggest that both violent and nonviolent maximalist campaigns are part of this complex process that often starts from lower levels of anti-state activity. Previous research has considered how repressive structures and actions of the state can facilitate the onset of civil wars (Brancati 2006, Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008). Similarly, it would behoove governments trying to prevent maximalist campaigns against its rule to repress reformist protests sparingly (if at all) and offer concessions more thoughtfully.

For mass movements and their participants, there should be ongoing conversations within campaigns about goals and ways to achieve shared objectives. Especially among leaderless campaigns that are on the rise,¹⁸⁴ the merits of lacking centralized leadership should be carefully weighed against its alternatives. Ella Baker, an American civil rights activist, famously said, "strong people don't need strong leaders," and I am not suggesting that charismatic leaders are needed to make leaderless movements more effective. Leaderless movements have proven to be capable of functioning strategically, but to the extent that people want to participate in solving the

¹⁸⁴ Serhan, Yasmeen. "The Common Element Uniting Worldwide Protests," *The Atlantic*, November 19, 2019. <<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/11/leaderless-protests-around-world/602194/>>.

problems that spurred them, they must be willing to dialogue and engage with the powers that be.

As it stands, leaderless movements take a risky gamble with an all or nothing approach. Many leaderless campaigns threaten to sustain mass action until all of their demands are met, taking up slogans like “Five demands, not one less,” and “All of them means all of them” (referring to the rejection of all political elites without exception).¹⁸⁵ But up against a formidable government, this is a gamble movements are far more likely to lose than win. Thus, the rise of leaderless movements could be another change that is contributing to the declining effectiveness of all revolutions (Chenoweth 2021, 227).

Mass movements often create “openings for negotiation” but these can become missed opportunities if no one is willing or able to come to the table (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017). Recent movements may be deliberately leaderless to model the kind of representative democracy that they desire to achieve, but perhaps they should go even further and elect representatives from within the movement to practice what they seek. Having elected leaders, or representatives, would not diminish the people power that is driving the campaign but allow the campaign’s interests to be better articulated and equip movements to engage the government for positive change.

¹⁸⁵ Serhan, Yasmeen.

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Appendix A – Dissertation Codebook

Scope condition: While campaigns continue to evolve over time, this project is interested in the initial moment of escalation, when a campaign goes from reformist demands (trigger or campaign) to being maximalist, and thereby crossing a threshold.

Movement demands:

- “REFORMIST_TRIGGER”: whether a maximalist campaign had a reformist trigger (1 or 0)
- “REFORMIST_CAMPAIGN”: whether a maximalist campaign had a sustained protest over the reformist trigger (1 or 0). “Sustained protest” means that it would qualify as a separate reformist campaign.
 - “CAT2_MEC_ID”: if a reformist campaign did precede the maximalist campaign, indicate the MEC ID of the CAT2 campaign
- Reformist Claims: indicates one or more of the following variables that describe the nature of the reformist demand(s)
 - “REFCLAIM_ELECTORAL”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim was electoral in nature, see examples of claims below
 - “REFCLAIM_SOCIAL”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim was social in nature, see examples of claims below
 - “REFCLAIM_ECONOMIC”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim was economic in nature, see examples of claims below
 - “REFCLAIM_POLITICAL”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim was political in nature, see examples of claims below
 - “REFCLAIM_OTHER”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim pertained to other public concerns, see examples of claims below

Claims	Examples of targets
ELECTORAL	
1. Pre-election results	Opposition rallies, etc.
2. Post-election results	Claims of election fraud, etc.
3. Election law	E.g., single-member districts, voting registration rules, or ranked voting
SOCIAL	
1. Social issues	Restrictions on social behavior
2. Ethnic self-determination	Autonomy, self-determination, language rights, etc.

3. Anti-immigration/xenophobic	Immigration laws, foreigners
4. Religious freedom	Restrictions on religious freedom, religious discrimination
5. Religious discrimination	Religious freedom of others
6. Environmental degradation	Environmentally-damaging businesses, government practices, etc.
ECONOMIC	
1. Price/tax increase	Food prices, oil prices, etc.
2. Economic corruption	Rent-seeking, patronage of economic elites
3. Labor/wage dispute	Organized labor or wage claims
4. Land tenure/	Farm issues, housing, etc.
POLITICAL	
1. Police brutality	Arbitrary security actions; perceived unjust repression
2. Political corruption	Non-election-related political corruption/insider favors
3. International action	Protest against foreign policy
4. Irredentism	Pro-annexation
5. Government structure	Constitution, federalism, other governance arrangements, etc.
6. Judicial/legal system	Fair trials, unpopular court rulings, etc.
7. Pro-government	Loyalists
8. Support of former leader/deposed figure	Short of demanding that current government stand down
9. Politician behavior/scandal	Other than corruption
OTHER	
1. Other public concerns	Typically public policy concerns; often idiosyncratic or highly context-specific.

- “REFORMIST_COUNT”: integer variable (from 1-5) describing the number of reformist demands of the campaign, 1= one specific demand (e.g., predominantly economic), 2= two specific demands (e.g., predominantly economic and social); 3

= three specific demands; 4 = four specific demands; 5 = five or more specific demands

- “DEMAND_ESCALATION_DATE”: date of when the campaign demands encompass leader removal or regime change

Movement structure:

- “LEADERSHIP”: dichotomous variable of whether there is/are identifiable leader(s) or organization(s) providing strategy and leadership for the campaign
- “MOBILIZATION”: dichotomous variable of whether there is/are identifiable individual(s) or organization(s) mobilizing and coordinating the campaign
- “ORGANIZATION” Is the leadership or mobilization provided by at least one identifiable preexisting organization? If so, what type? (Adapted from Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence Dataset)
 - 0 = no pre-existing organization
 - 1 = group evolved/splintered from a pre-existing rebel group included in UCDP
 - 2 = group evolved/splintered from a pre-existing armed non-state group that did not cause 25 or more battle deaths (e.g., terrorist organization, private militia)
 - 3 = group developed from a political party
 - 4 = group developed from a non-party political movement
 - 5 = group developed from a student/youth group
 - 6 = group developed from a labor/trade union
 - 7 = group splintered/emerged from the government’s armed forces
 - 8 = group emerged from a non-military faction within the government
 - 9 = group emerged from the country’s former armed forces
 - 10 = group developed from a religious organization
 - 11 = group developed from foreign fighters/mercenaries
 - 12 = group emerged from a refugee/exiled community (but not a formal organization)
 - 13¹⁸⁶ = group emerged from an ethnic group or indigenous organization (formal or informal)
 - 14 = group emerged from another type of organization
 - 15 = group emerged for specific issue, related to the campaign
- “STRUCTURE”: (Adapted from Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns) Binary variable capturing whether the movement in question was largely centralized or decentralized, 0 = if sources refer to the movement as a “confederation,”

¹⁸⁶ This grouping variable diverges from FORGE

“federation,” “loose alliance,” “umbrella,” “decentralized”, or “leaderless”; 1 = centralized/ hierarchical; NA = unclear

- “COHESION”: Binary variable capturing whether the movement in question had largely cohesive demands, 0 = if sources refer to parts of the movement as having disparate demands; 1 = unified demands (e.g., as evidenced by formal drafting of demands); NA = unclear
- “COMPOSITION”: integer variable (from 1-5) describing the general composition of the campaign, 1= one specific group of people (e.g., predominantly students), 2= two specific groups of people (e.g., predominantly students and laborers); 3 = three specific groups of people (e.g., predominantly students, laborers, and political opposition); 4 = four specific groups of people; 5 = five or more specific groups of people, or evidence of general public involvement

Government response:

- “GOV_ENGAGED”: dichotomous variable of whether or not the government tried to engage with members of the movement
- “MOVEMENT_ENGAGED”: dichotomous variable of whether or not the movement tried to engage with members of the government
- “ENGAGE_DATE”: date when members of the government and movement first met or negotiated
- “GOV_CONCESSION”: dichotomous variable of whether or not the government made a concession to the movement (e.g., an action meant to appease the movement)
- “GOV_CONCESSION_DATE”: date of first government concession
- “CONCESSION_BACKFIRE”: dichotomous variable of whether or not government concession is cited as a reason for joining/continuing the campaign (e.g., seen as insincere)
- “TARGETED_REPRESSION”: dichotomous variable of whether or not the government targeted specific individual(s) or organization(s) in an effort to thwart the campaign
- “WIDESPREAD_REPRESSION”: dichotomous variable of whether or not state apparatus used widespread repression in an effort to thwart the campaign
- “REPRESSION_BACKFIRE”: dichotomous variable of whether or not government repression is cited as a reason for joining/continuing the campaign

Appendix B – List of 26 newly added reformist campaigns to MEC

Campaign	Location	Start Year	End Year
Petrochallengers	Haiti	2018	2018
1993 Student ID Protests	Guatemala	1993	1993
Communist Party of Columbia and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	Colombia	1958	1964
Anti-Perez (reformist)	Venezuela	1991	1992
1997 Anti-austerity Campaign	Ecuador	1997	1997
Anti-Petrobras/Corruption protests	Brazil	2014	2015
Pro-Union Miners Strike	Bolivia	1981	1981
Northern Ireland Nationalists campaign for equality/NICRA	Northern Ireland	1967	1972
Gilet Jaunes "Yellow Vest" Protests (reformist)	France	2018	2018
Serbian National Council	Yugoslavia	1990	1990
Kosovo Albanian (reformist)	Yugoslavia	1988	1990
2017 Presidential Election Protest	Serbia	2017	2017
Greek anti-military (reformist)	Greece	1973	1973
Phosphate War	Estonia	1987	1988
Benin Public Servants Strike	Benin	1989	1989
Guinean pro-democracy movement (reformist)	Guinea	2007	2007
Lawyers and Teacher's Anglophone Strikes	Cameroon	2016	2017
Zambian Civil Rights/ Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC)	Zambia	1955	1960
Nyasaland African Congress (reformist)	Malawi	1955	1957
2011-2012 Anti-Mutharika	Malawi	2011	2012
2011 Libyan Housing Protests	Libya	2011	2011
Gezi Park Protest	Turkey	2013	2013
Tiananmen Square (reformist)	China	1989	1989
East Pakistan Rights Campaign	Pakistan	1969	1971
Shanti Bahini (reformist)	Bangladesh	1972	1975
pro-dem movement in Thailand (reformist)	Thailand	1991	1992

Appendix C – Case descriptions and coding decisions for the 39 escalated campaigns (in numerical order by the reformist campaign ID)

MEC ID: 85/84¹⁸⁷

Maximalist Campaign: The Forajido Rebellion

Reformist Claim(s): President Lucio Gutierrez was democratically elected in 2002. By 2005, a series of unpopular policy actions had generated significant discontent among the people. Notable among these policy actions were increasing Ecuador's IMF debt, allowing indigenous lands to be exploited for oil, and perhaps most controversial, replacing Supreme Court justices with his own supporters. In March 2005 this new court dropped charges against exiled leader Abdala Bucaram, who was removed from office following unpopular economic policies and accusations of corruption, embezzlement, and insanity. When Bucaram was allowed to return to Ecuador, students, local governments, indigenous groups, urban workers, and teachers took to the streets to demand Gutierrez's resignation. During one protest in front of the president's home, Gutierrez called demonstrators "*forajidos*," or "outlaws." This insult became the people's battle cry and the movement was soon branded as the Forajido Rebellion. The movement maintained its commitment to nonviolence by employing creative tactics and using local radio to communicate with one another. Police, on the other hand, used aggressive crowd control tactics like tear gas, rubber bullets, and high-pressure hoses. This violence prompted the military to withdraw its support of the president in order to protect civilians. Soon after, Ecuador's congress voted to remove Gutierrez from power.

The sequence of events was as follows: Beginning in January 2005, protests against Gutierrez's removal and subsequent appointment of supreme court justices occurred, continuing through February. By March 5, around 1000 protesters attempted to march to Congress to pressure lawmakers to fire Supreme Court judges aligned with President Lucio Gutierrez's government. The protesters were charging President Gutierrez with attempting to take control of the judicial system as pro-government lawmakers fired 27 of the 31 Supreme Court judges in a simple majority vote earlier. Moreover, the high court had annulled the criminal charges against former president Bucaram, who had returned to Ecuador a few days earlier. Although the protesters were dispersed by the police, other demonstrations continued, such as a sit-in in Quito's cathedral by indigenous people and peasants.

On April 13th, Quito's mayor halted bus service and other activities for a day to protest against President Lucio Gutierrez, the first call directly against the president (vs. In favor of ousted judges/to oust the regime-aligned judges). Most businesses opened

¹⁸⁷ The first number is the maximalist campaign ID, the second number is the reformist campaign ID.

even though Quito's Chamber of Commerce supported the protest. Although this protest did not receive the expected support, after lawmakers ratified a decision to dissolve the Supreme Court a few days later, thousands of people took to streets in Guayaquil and Quito. The protests were supported by mayors of Quito and Guayaquil as well as the indigenous organization groups. The number of demonstrators in Quito reached around 30,000-50,000 as they marched to Congress.

Gutierrez was ousted by the Congress on April 20th, after the military had withdrawn its support and police forces refused to carry out his orders to quell the protests. Congress named Vice President Alfredo Palacio as the new head of state. Although protesters and opposition parties demanded Gutierrez put to trial and face charges, he was granted exile by Brazil.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 3; political, judicial, support for judges; austerity measures; indigenous rights

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 84

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 04/13/2005

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, Quito's mayor and Guayaquil's mayor later were clearly key leaders in both strategy and mobilization, with Quito's using his office to enable protests and utilizing the Chamber of Commerce
- **Mobilization:** 1, Quito's mayor and Guayaquil's mayor later were clearly key leaders in both strategy and mobilization, with Quito's using his office to enable protests and utilizing the Chamber of Commerce
- **Organization:** 6,8 (6= chamber of commerce, 8=mayor of Quito)
- **Structure:** 0, there is no evidence of hierarchy in the campaign, it was largely mobilized political rallies but there's no evidence that the mayor or Chamber tried to control them.
- **Cohesion:** 1, both pre- and post-escalation.
- **Composition:** 5 (mayors, civic groups, Ecuadorian citizens)

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, on March 5, the demonstrators marched to Congress, but were unsuccessful in securing a meeting with the government.
- **Concession(s):** 0
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** Yes, targeted and widespread. Attempts at widespread repression largely failed, though targeted repression did occur
- **Repression Backfire:** Substantial amounts of backfire in the form of the military withdrawing its support and police refusing to hose down protests

Sources:

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MEC ID: 59/533

Maximalist Campaign: Hong Kong pro-democracy (Umbrella Movement)

Reformist Claim(s): On August 31, China's Standing Committee of the National People's Congress announced the electoral process for the 2017 Chief Executive election in Hong Kong. In this process, voters could elect the chief executive, but candidates for the position must be vetted by a pro-Beijing nominating committee, like the Election Committee which currently chooses the Chief Executive. Led by student groups and pro-democracy activists, protests began with a university student walk-out beginning September 22, and then expanded to occupation of the area surrounding government buildings beginning September 26. Over 50,000 people joined the protests at their peak, with some estimates as high as 60,000 or 80,000 participants. In addition to calls for free elections, protestors have demanded that current Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying step down. The protest camps have concentrated in Hong Kong's Admiralty—the location of government buildings—Mong Kok, and Central districts. Attempted talks between protestors and the government have been mostly unsuccessful. Police have repeatedly clashed with protestors, responding with arrests and using batons, pepper spray, and tear gas in efforts to disperse demonstrations and clear protest sites. Demonstrators have also clashed with counter-protestors who support the government and oppose the sit-in occupation. Public support for the demonstrations has gradually waned, with the number of protestors at the camps shrinking to hundreds from earlier heights of more than 50,000 demonstrators. Hong Kong police cleared the Mong Kok protest camp on November 26, violently clashing with and detaining protestors, including leaders of the student groups Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students. After further violence between

protestors and police on the night of November 30, the founders of the pro-democracy group Occupy Central symbolically surrendered to police on December 3 and urged protestors to retreat from occupation. Arresting over 250 protestors who refused to leave, police forcefully dismantled the remaining Admiralty and Causeway Bay sites on December 11 and December 15. Although pro-democracy groups repeated their demands for free elections at marches in December and February, these rallies abandoned the occupation's maximalist demand for the resignation of Chief Executive Leung.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 533

Demand Escalation (date and description): On September 23, as the student protest continued, 1,000 students moved the protest to the government headquarters and promised to escalate action if the leader of Hong Kong, Leung Chun-ying, refused to meet with protestors; On September 25, 2,000 students marched on Chun-ying's residence and called on him to resign.

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, student leaders (later joined by Occupy Central)
- **Mobilization:** 1, students
- **Organization:** 5, student groups
- **Structure:** 0, no clear structure; movement was not centralized or hierarchical
- **Cohesion:** 1, demands were mostly cohesive and unified
- **Composition:** 5, students and Occupy Central, general public participation

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** leaders of the protest movement agreed to talks with the government on October 2; on October 9, the government called off the talks and accused protest leaders of undermining constructive dialogue and using the talks to incite more people to join the protest.
- **Movement Engagement:** protestors demanded talks (after escalating demands); leaders of the protest movement agreed to talks with the government on October 2 but vowed to continue their demonstrations; protestors later announced they were calling off talks with the government following inaction by the police to curb the violence committed by the attackers.
- **Concession(s):** 0
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** NA
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** Both targeted and widespread
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** Yes, police brutality resulted in greater mobilization

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MEC ID: 166/782

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Kishi Campaign

Reformist Claim(s): “In early 1959, negotiations began to revise and strengthen the mutual security treaty (AMPO) between Japan and the United States. Leftist groups opposed to Japan’s close relationship with the US and particularly to American bases on Japanese soil joined together to create the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty. The Council began demonstrations against the new Security Treaty in April

1959, primarily led by student activists and trade union members. In November, 20,000 student protesters stormed the Diet building in Tokyo, an event which was condemned by mainstream political parties, but which served as a powerful rallying point for future demonstrations. The new treaty was signed in January 1960 and scheduled to be ratified by both houses of the Diet by June 19th, on which date President Eisenhower would travel to Japan to celebrate the ratification.”

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 782

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 05/20/1960; on the 19th, during a late-night meeting of the lower house of the Diet Prime Minister Kishi pushed through the AMPO amendments without consulting the opposition parties. The following day anti-treaty protesters and opposition groups began demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1; The campaign was led by the executive council of the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty, made up of 15 to 16 different representatives of various major pre-existing movements.
- **Mobilization:** 1; Mobilization was led by the People’s Council organized by the Japanese Socialist Party and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, joined at founding by 134 existing political and social movements.
- **Organization:** 15; Group emerged in regard to the revised treaty negotiations.
- **Structure:** 1; The campaign was centralized around the People’s Council.
- **Cohesion:** 1; The People’s Council was the sole organization making demands.
- **Composition:** 5; Opposition Parties, Students, Trade Unions.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Concession(s):** 0
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** 1, targeted; 0, widespread; “Nobusuke was determined to get the treaty passed at all costs, and took the risky move of having the Socialist Party members removed through physical force by the police. Without those members present, the treaty was voted through within fifteen minutes. This police order, along with other strong-armed actions he took, became Nobusuke’s downfall. Although the treaty had been passed, and the campaign failed to achieve its original goal, the protest now became a larger protest against the government. Protesters were angered by Nobusuke’s behavior and demanded that he step down. The campaign became a campaign to protect Japanese people’s democratic rights.”

- **Repression Backfire: 1**

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MEC ID: 2771/963

Maximalist Campaign: 2008 Anti-US Beef Protest

Reformist Claim(s): In April 2008, South Korea announced that it was lifting the ban on imported beef from the United States as part of free trade agreement negotiations with the United States. On April 27, a television program aired by MBC in South Korea investigating safety of US Beef sparked widespread controversy over this part of the agreement. In early May, candlelight vigils began among student groups and grew rapidly to protest the lifting of the ban. An online petition calling for the impeachment of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak began and quickly accrued over a million signatures. By May 29th, protesters began calling for President Myung-bak's resignation. The president's approval rating dropped significantly, and in early June his entire cabinet and prime minister offered to resign. The president apologized, and in response to criticism, there was a slight delay in the resumption of imports, an inspection of US facilities, and a promise to not ease imports of other categories of US beef beyond what was already negotiated. However, imports resumed at the beginning of July and were received in South Korea by the end of the month and have continued since. Protests largely died out by the beginning of August, and new cabinet officials replaced the agriculture and health ministers who had resigned.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1, Political (foreign policy/free trade agreement provision)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 963

Demand Escalation (date and description): 05/29/2008, First publicized call for President Lee Myung-bak to resign--earlier petitions for impeachment, calls for various government ministers and general unpopularity notwithstanding, this was the earliest public explicit identification of maximalist demands identified.

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0, no evidence of individual leadership found--protest movement began on university campuses by students and quickly

- **Mobilization:** 0, no evidence of mobilization of specific groups--students were at the center of initial candlelight vigil but the movement was largely grassroots and organic, driven in part by the MBC television program.
- **Organization:** 5 students began protests, though they quickly grew to encompass general public involvement
- **Structure:** 0, no evidence of formal hierarchy found.
- **Cohesion:** 1, yes, protest demands for the resumption of the ban on imports were cohesive until the end of the campaign.
- **Composition:** 5, evidence of general public involvement (1 million protest participants at the peak of the movement in June)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0, no evidence of direct engagement between movement and government was found for the duration of the campaign
- **Movement Engagement:** 0, no evidence of direct engagement between movement and government was found for the duration of the campaign
- **Concession(s):** 1, the president apologized twice and did negotiate further with the US and eventually reached agreement restricting the age of beef imported
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 0
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** 0, targeted; 1, widespread; no evidence of targeted repression found, however, some evidence of some widespread repression in the form of use of water cannons resulting in hundreds of injuries and several thousand arrests was found, though no deaths were found
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 0, no campaign backfire found.

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MEC ID: 41/1062

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Compaore Campaign

Reformist Claim(s): This was a clear government structure/constitutional reform campaign. Hundreds of protestors erected barricades and burned tires in the capital since the proposal to extend Compaore's rule was announced on October 21. On October 24, secondary school children deserted classes to join the protests. Schools and universities closed on October 27, 2014 in Burkina Faso as incensed opposition members vowed to fight a proposal to amend the constitution to extend President Compaore's 27-year rule. Hundreds of women got a jump on the opposition's plan for protests by staging their own demonstration on the 27th in Ouagadougou. They held spatulas in their hands in symbolic defiance. Youth clashed with security forces on October 28 as gendarmes deployed to disperse several dozen youths barricading the country's main highway. They fired tear gas at the crowd, who hurled stones in response. Hundreds of thousands of people set off from the capital's main Nation Square, blowing whistles and trumpets before violence broke out. Protests grew on October 29, and a general strike was called. On October 30, demonstrators set fire to Parliament after ransacking the building in protest. The national television building was also stormed. Protests turned violent on 10/29, with protestors storming Parliament and setting it on fire. At least 30 were killed when security forces fired at protestors, but they succeeded in forcing Compaore to scrap his plan to run for another term, by changing the constitution. The press reported on October 30 that around 30 people were killed and more than 100 injured in violence that rocked the country that same day. On October 31, Compaore announced that he would step down to make way for elections. His resignation came as tens of thousands of protestors demanded that he quit.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1 (Political, government structure/constitutional)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 1062

Demand Escalation (date and description): 10/28/2014 (“28 October saw demonstrations from over a hundred thousand people against the extension of term limits. Protesters massed in central areas of the city and made clear that they would not accept Compaoré staying as president. Many also called for him to leave immediately.”)

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, “One large organizing party was the Movement of People for Progress (MPP), which was formed by former Compaoré supporters who defected in January. The main founders of the party were Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, the

National Assembly's former president; Simon Campaoré, the mayor of Ouagadougou; and Salif Diallo, a former cabinet minister. Labor unions were also key organizers of the protests.”

- **Mobilization:** 1, see above, MPP/labor unions/opposition party members played roles in mobilizing for protests, as did a pair of musicians, Sams’K Le Jah and Serge Bambara who were popular with youth and called for the president’s resignation.
- **Organization:** 3, MPP= opposition parties
- **Structure:** 0, no strong evidence for any hierarchical structure.
- **Cohesion:** 1, calls for constitutional reform and later the president’s resignation were shared by the entire movement.
- **Composition:** 5, opposition political parties, youth, women, general public involvement.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** None
- **Movement Engagement:** None
- **Concession(s):** None
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** NA
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** 1, 1; targeted and widespread repression occurred during demonstrations, with the worst incident being live fire into a crowd, killing at least 6. (8)
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** Yes, the largest protests occurred after initial use of force, and repression was likely part of this, though it’s unclear to what extent.

Sources:

1. AFPR. 2014. "Burkina braces for protests over move to extend leader's rule," Agence France Presse, October 27.
2. AFPR. 2014. "Clashed in Burkina over move to extend leader's rule," Agence France Presse, October 28.
3. AFPR. 2014. "Clashes as 'one million' protest Burkina leader's power bid," Agence France Presse, October 28.
4. AFPR. 2014. "Burkina protestors set fire to parliament," Agence France Presse, October 30.
5. AFPR. 2014. "Around 30 dead, 100 injured in Burkina Faso violence: opposition," Agence France Presse, October 30.
6. Hien, Romaric Olo. 2014. "Burkina's Blaise Compaore ousted," Agence France Presse, October 31.
7. Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action Database, “Burkina Faso protesters remove Blaise Compaore from power, 2014”, Retrieved 1/18/2020

from:<https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/burkina-faso-protesters-remove-blaise-compaore-power-2014>

8. Christian Science Monitor, “Could Burkina Faso protests signal end of president's 27-year rule?” October 27.

<https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2014/1030/Could-Burkina-Faso-protests-signal-end-of-president-s-27-year-rule>

MEC ID: 213/1727

Maximalist Campaign: Moldovan Anti-Government Protest

Reformist Claim(s): On May 3, more than 10,000 Moldovans gathered in the capital city of Chisinau to protest the disappearance of over a billion dollars from the three largest banks in Moldova. In April, the Moldovan Central Bank notified the public loans to unidentified individuals had extracted the wealth from the country over several days prior to elections the previous year, with some of the money located in Russian banks. Protesters called for anti-corruption reforms and demanded the resignation of the Prosecutor General, several supreme court judges, and other politicians tied to the scandal.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 2 (political and economic corruption)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 1727

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 09/06/2015; Following several months of failed government actions to resolve the case of the missing money protesters gathered again, this time demanding the resignation of the government.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 0; The unofficial leader of the mobilizing organization was lawyer Andrei Nastase, but it is unclear how much of a leadership role he held over the entire campaign.
- **Mobilization:** 1; The Civic Platform for Dignity and Truth (PCDA) was the mobilizing organization of this campaign, utilizing traditional and new media sources to organize the protests.
- **Organization:** 4, Pre-existing non-political movement; PCDA was formed in Feb. 2015 to coordinate a number of anti-government movements planned during the year.
- **Structure:** 0; While the PCDA was responsible for much of the mobilization participation and campaign control was largely decentralized, with many other groups involved including the liberal democratic and socialist political parties.
- **Cohesion:** 0; Sources indicate that the campaign had a difficult time unifying protest demands prior to escalation, which in part, resulted in lower turnout.

- **Composition:** 5; indications of widespread involvement drawing from opposition parties and civil society groups, though the campaign also relied on general mobilization using social media
- **Movement Engagement:** 0; neither the movement nor government attempted engagement.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0; neither the movement nor government attempted engagement.
- **Concession(s):** 0
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** 0
- **Repression Backfire:** NA

Sources:

1. "Thousands protest in Moldova over missing \$1 billion". Agence France Presse -- English. May 3, 2015 Sunday.
2. Brett, Daniel, Ellie Knott, and Mihai Popșoi. "The 'billion-dollar protests' in Moldova are threatening the survival of the country's political elite." LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (2015).
3. "Thousands protest in Moldova over missing \$1 billion". Agence France Presse -- English. May 3, 2015 Sunday.
4. Goșu, Armand. "Republic of Moldova. The Year 2015 in Politics." Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 16, no. 1 (2016): 21-51.

MEC ID: 14/1898

Maximalist Campaign: Pro-democracy movement in Argentina

Reformist Claim(s): The origins of the pro-democracy movement in Argentina are rooted in other social movements that began in the mid-1970s such as the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, also known as the Mothers of the Disappeared. These protests specifically focused on the regime's brutality and demanded to know the locations of those disappeared'. Economic concerns and Argentina's loss in the Falklands war also triggered protests. The day after Argentina surrendered, the largest protest since the dictatorship gained power was held, with 7,000 chanting, "it's over, it's over, the military dictatorship is over". In October 1982 las madres held a "march for life", despite government threats and statements calling las madres the mothers of terrorists. By December 1982, days after Argentina surrendered in the Falklands Wars, massive protests broke out pushing for elections. In 1982, rallies and strikes began in Argentina to protest the military government headed by President Reynaldo Bignone. Protests were against inflation, the forced disappearances of thousands of Argentines during the

government's anti-terrorism campaign, and for a return to civilian rule. On March 30, 1982, around 1,500 Argentine protesters were arrested in one of the largest protests against the military regime to that date. The "March for Life" on October 5 against the forced disappearances of Argentines was attended by around 7,000 protesters. Weeks before, 25,000 labor members had protested against economic issues in the country. During the month of December, protests and strikes against the military regime occurred on a near-daily basis. December activities included a strike of around nine million Argentines against inflation and human rights abuses on December 6 and a demonstration in Buenos Aires against the disappearances on December 10. On December 16, during a "March for Democracy," tens of thousands of Argentines protested for Argentina to return to civilian rule by October 1983. Over 100 arrests were made, and one demonstrator was shot and killed. Thirty protesters and thirty-five police were injured in clashes.

Protests continued in 1983 against the disappearances, proposed amnesty for the military, inflation, and for a return to civilian rule. Around 25,000 Argentines on May 29 protested a report absolving the military of responsibility for human rights abuses while a protest of around the same size on August 19 rejected proposed amnesty for perpetrators of abuses. Tens of thousands marched on July 3 for a return to civilian rule.

Wildcat strikes beginning in the latter half of August through mid-September protested inflation. These strikes affected hospitals, schools, banks, ports, factories, the mint, police, telephone operators, and tax collectors. Labor unions held a nationwide strike affecting businesses, transportation, and industry on October 4. Democratic elections brought Argentina under the control of a civilian government led by President Raúl Alfonsín on October 30, 1983.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 3 (Economic issues, including inflation; political, police brutality/forced disappearances, eventually adding Electoral reform (competitive elections))

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 1898

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): December 16, 1982 (Multi-Party March; "Multipartidaria") (4).

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** Unclear. Prior to escalation, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were leaders, though that group was decentralized and non-hierarchical. No formal leadership emerged, though the Multi-party Group was an organizer of the December 1982 march.
- **Mobilization:** Clear, "While not formally unified, opposition groups frequently cooperated in order to organize mass demonstrations, such as those of 1983–84 calling for direct presidential elections".

- **Organization:** 3,4 (Madres = non-party political movement, Multi-Party group = political parties)
- **Structure:** No hierarchical structure found.
- **Cohesion:** Yes, the protests consistently mobilized for democracy and elections and were cohesive early on (the reasons for doing so being economic mismanagement and forced disappearances)
- **Composition:** 5, “The opposition consisted of labor unions, the Catholic Church, intellectuals, and other segments of civil society.” “Opposition to the government has covered a wide range of the political spectrum - from middle-class housewives banging pots outside the Ministry of the Economy to a large group of Falklands war veterans speaking out against their generals and staging a sit-in during a recent parade to honor the fallen”¹⁸⁸

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** None.
- **Movement Engagement:** Yes, the Madres attempted to engage the government and know the locations of the disappeared, but there was no evidence of the government meeting with them.
- **Concession(s):** Yes, Dec 2, “the ruling military junta announced that it was putting forward the date of presidential elections to the last quarter of 1983 in an attempt to defuse civilian unrest”
- **Concession Backfire:** NA.
- **Repression:** Yes – targeted and widespread; considerable repression before and after escalation. The December 1982 march left at least 1 dead and hundreds more arrested as well as dozens of injured.
- **Repression Backfire:** Yes. Before mobilization, the repression used against the disappeared triggered the initial Madres movement and subsequent repression of protests in the early days of the escalation triggered additional participation and mobilization, as well as strikes.

Sources:

1. Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action Database, “Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo campaign for democracy and the return of their “disappeared” family members, 1977-1983”, accessed 1/6/2020
from:<https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mothers-plaza-de-mayo-campaign-democracy-and-return-their-disappeared-family-members-1977-19>

¹⁸⁸ <https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/1217/121753.html>

2. UPI, Smith, Geri, 1982. "Mass march for Argentine democracy" December 16, accessed 01/08/2020 from: <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/12/16/Mass-march-for-Argentine-democracy/4381408862800/>
3. Burns, Jimmy. 1982. "Argentines strike as pressure for reform mounts," *Financial Times*, December 6.

MEC ID: 29/1937

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Siles Zuazo

Reformist Claim(s): The three-year presidency of Siles Zuazo was plagued by some of the worst inflation in modern history which resulted in frequent strikes and economic protests. On Jan. 17 many factories in La Paz went on strike, taking factory executives hostage as part of their negotiating strategy. These strikers were demanding back pay owed as part of a previous successful strike, as well as holiday pay. Negotiations on the 18th between labor leaders and the President secured the release of the executives but failed to end the strike. The following day a general strike was declared, spreading across nearly all industries and covering the entire country. Over the next several months the economy continued to decline, and the general strike continued with periodic strikes and protests. On March 4, a new series of strikes began demanding the resignation of the President, growing into another general strike by the 7th.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 1937

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 03/04/1985; Following the failure of the initial general strike, demands increased to include the resignation of the president

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** Clear; While unnamed in most accounts, it is clear the strikes are being led by union leadership
- **Mobilization:** Mobilization was initially led by the miner's union before being joined by the larger Bolivian Labor Confederation
- **Organization:** 6. Pre-existing labor unions
- **Structure:** 1, hierarchical
- **Cohesion:** Yes, the movement presented a unified series of demands when engaging with the government.
- **Composition:** 1. Trade Unionists
- **Movement Engagement:** Labor leaders met with the government during the initial hostage-taking incident on 1/4/1985

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** Labor leaders met with the government during the initial hostage-taking incident on 1/4/1985

- **Concession(s):** 0, no concessions were made during the reformist portion of the campaign
- **Concession Backfire:** NA.
- **Repression:** 0; The government threatened repression during the hostage-taking incident but otherwise allowed the strikes to continue.
- **Repression Backfire:** NA

Sources:

1. "600 Factories in La Paz Shut in Protest Over Hostage Taking". *The Associated Press*. January 17, 1985, Thursday, PM cycle.
2. "Hostages Released But General Strike Begins". *The Associated Press*. January 19, 1985, Saturday, AM cycle.
3. "Currency Devalued by Nearly 81 Percent, Prices Hiked 400 Percent". *The Associated Press*. February 9, 1985, Saturday, PM cycle.
4. "Miners Throw Dynamite During Protest". *The Associated Press*. March 4, 1985, Monday, AM cycle.
5. "Bolivia Paralyzed by General Strike; Government Warns of Coup". *The Associated Press*. March 8, 1985, Friday, AM cycle.
6. Buitrago, Miguel A. "Civil Society, Social Protest, and Presidential Breakdowns in Bolivia." *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America*. Llanos, Mariana and Marsteintredet, Leiv, (eds). Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

MEC ID: 9/2241

Maximalist Campaign: Islamic Salvation Front

Reformist Claim(s): Prior to the formation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1989, widespread protests occurred over high prices and economic problems, aided by corruption on part of the ruling FLN party. These protests in late 1988 (including the 1988 October Riots) laid the groundwork for the FIS to take root after competitive elections were instituted the following year and led to a sweep of local government seats in 1990 (4). Following the October 1988 riots, the Benjedid government promised political reforms with a "greater democratization of political action," and "political and institutional changes (5). While religious motivation remained a key part of the FIS platform, economic issues and anti-corruption rhetoric were frequently cited as well. For example, beginning in 1991, the FIS released statements critiquing government economic mismanagement (3) and eventually succeeded in winning the general election of 1992, only to be banned by the government.

Violent clashes erupted in Algeria on February 7, 1992 between Muslim fundamentalists and security forces after the military forced President Chadli Benjedid out of office on January 11. The ouster was followed by a crackdown on the Islamic

Salvation Front (FIS), which had been set to win an overwhelming majority in the country's parliamentary elections. The FIS was officially outlawed in March 1992. The clashes became a full-fledged insurgency in 1993, and grew to involve a number of non-state armed groups, including the Groupe Islamiste Armé (GIA); the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS); and various splinter groups (e.g., the Groupe salafist pour la predication et le combat, GSPC). Following the initial clashes in 1992, a number of unelected, army-supported regimes ruled Algeria. Bouteflika was elected in 1999 and remained president until 2019. Over time, the army's countermeasures against the insurgency became increasingly brutal, resulting in a large number of gross human rights violations. Both sides are accused of massacring civilians. The intensity of the violence decreased in 2002 (most databases record the end of the conflict between Algeria-FIS as 2002 or 2003), a number of Islamist groups that fought in the insurgency – including the FIS – laid down their arms. A number of groups, however, remained active as anti-government forces in Algeria (e.g., GSPC, AQIM).

A number of foreign states provided support to both the Algerian government and non-state armed groups during the conflict. France supplied Algeria with arms initially, and other states including Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and the U.S. have also all contributed. Organizations such as the Islamic Relief Organization, affiliated with al Qaeda, provided economic support to the AIS, and Sudan may also have provided aid to the GIA in the late 1990s.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 2 – economic problems and corruption

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2241

Demand Escalation (date and description): 2/7/1992

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, the FIS was the leader of the campaign and played a key role in the armed group's leadership as well as mobilization of troops. Hierarchical leadership was present in FIS and the armed groups
- **Mobilization:** 1, the FIS was the leader of the campaign and played a key role in the armed group's leadership as well as mobilization of troops. Hierarchical leadership was present in both FIS and the armed groups
- **Organization:** GIA/AIS = 2; FIS = 3
- **Structure:** Centralized, clear hierarchy present in FIS, with military groups also exhibiting hierarchy.
- **Composition:** FIS= political party, GIA and AIS =splinter military groups
- **Cohesion:** No, the GIA opposed the FIS and other armed groups, though they fought the government, they differed on ideological grounds.
- **Movement Engagement:** Unclear. No evidence for direct engagement. Prior to escalation, engagement occurred politically at a local level and via mobilization

against government, but a strike in 1989 and in 1992 made it difficult to discern if any direct engagement occurred. Coded as zero.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** None prior to escalation
- **Concession(s):** Yes; prior to escalation, the 1991 general strike resulted in concessions promising a fair election, but these were reneged on and were never concrete
- **Concession Backfire:** N/A
- **Repression:** Targeted & widespread; prior to escalation, repression occurred against FIS, with leadership and members being arrested in purges. After escalation, substantial repression in the form of armed campaigns against FIS/AIS/GIA lasted for years.
- **Repression Backfire:** The total repression of the FIS and widespread arrests in the wake of the 1992 election triggered an armed backlash that lasted for decades.

Sources:

1. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Algeria:Government,More Information, accessed 1/2/2020 from: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/386>
2. Khiari, Rachid. 1992. "Clashes erupt at mosques around country during Friday prayers," The Associated Press, February 7.
3. Willis, Michael. 1996. "ALgeria's troubled road towards liberalization, 1988-1995". In Nonneman, Gerd (ed.). Political and Economic Liberalization: Dynamics and Linkages in Comparative Perspective. Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 220.
4. Kepel, Gilles 2002. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Harvard University Press. (Ch 7 pp, 159-176)
5. "Algeria: Riots of October 1988." *Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada*, 1 September 1989. <<https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aba95c.html>>

MEC ID: 10/2248

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Abdelaziz Bouteflika Campaign

Reformist Claim(s): Abdelaziz Bouteflika became president of Algeria in 1999 in an uncontested election. By his second term, he had changed the laws and abolished the law on term limits. In 2009, he again ran uncontested and won a third term. This sparked several small and uncoordinated protests against the change in the law and uncontested elections. By the end of 2010, the groups had bound together to form a solidified resistance movement.

Protests began in December 2010 over housing prices, the high price of basic food and oil, and high unemployment, similar to Tunisia's ongoing events at the time. The protests

didn't have cohesive demands, but widespread economic discontent was a consistent theme.

On December 28, 2010, over 9700 people gathered in Algiers calling for Bouteflika to step down, as well as for constitutional reforms. The movement spread throughout Algeria and in the first weeks of January 2011, there were continual nationwide protests. In addition to calling for Bouteflika's resignation, protesters called for electoral, economic and judicial reform. By the end of January, several opposition and human rights groups had formally formed the National Coordination for Change and Democracy, in an attempt to reform the system politically. President Bouteflika promised to meet with the group, however, their demands fell upon deaf ears. Spurred by the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, protest numbers swelled in 2011, with protests frequently reaching over 15000 participants. Labor unions and professional associations joined in and conducted mass strikes and walk-outs through the summer of 2011. Protesters and picketers were met with violence and oppression from the government forces. Hundreds of protesters were killed, and thousands imprisoned. Self-immolations became a popular response to the government repression. In late summer of 2011, President Bouteflika promised to amend the constitution to restore democratic rule. The National Coordination for Change and Democracy welcomed this announcement and began to expand its membership to include previously exiled Islamist groups in anticipation of impending elections. Protests petered out in January of 2012, and following another constitutional amendment, Bouteflika won a fourth term in 2014.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 3 (ECONOMIC: Price/tax increase, ELECTORAL: election law, Amending the constitution, and POLITICAL: constitution)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2248

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 12/28/2010 (explicit call for Bouteflika to step down); 1/21/2011 (when the National Coordination for Change and Democracy for formed)

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** No, the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD) was a leader in the protests and the loose coalition it formed was highly inclusive, though not particularly strong
- **Mobilization:** Yes, The CNCD did mobilize for protests.
- **Organization:** 15 (CNCD = umbrella organization for the campaign)
- **Structure:** No hierarchical structure evident, largely grassroots movement.
- **Cohesion:** No, no cohesive set of goals found, though frustration with Bouteflika government was generally shared
- **Composition:** Labor unions, opposition political parties, professional associations, limited general public involvement

- **Movement Engagement:** Not prior to escalation; movement engaged in dialogue during April 2011, though the results of the dialogue were uncertain

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** Not prior to escalation, Bouteflika did engage with protestors, albeit indirectly, via associations, particularly after the summer when he circulated drafts of the constitutional amendment
- **Concession(s):** Yes, January 8, government agreed to a temporary cut in taxes and duties on sugar and cooking oil
- **Concession Backfire:** the Socialist Forces Front responded to the government's lowering of food prices on 8 January with the slogan "The government cannot buy Algerians' silence"
- **Repression:** Yes, thousands of arrests and many injuries, plus several deaths in January 2011, (2)
- **Repression Backfire:** Yes, backfire likely as protest attendance spiked after January 2011, though it's difficult to parse out how much backfire contributed to escalation given concurrent events in neighboring countries.

Sources:

1. Nossiter, Adam and Timothy Williams. 2011. "Algerian Riot Police Break Up Protest." The New York Times. February 12. Access at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/world/africa/13algeria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&
2. Staff Writer. 2011. "Algerian Protesters Push for Change." Al Jazeera. February 12. Access at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201121235130627461.html>
3. Staff Writer. 2011. "Algeria Leader vows to "Reinforce" Democracy." The Wall Street Journal. April 15. Access at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703327404576194363244985344.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
4. Foreign Policy. 2012. "Algeria's Revolution that Wasn't" Real Clear World. January 7. Access at: http://www.realclearworld.com/2012/01/07/algerias_revolution_that_wasnt_131549.html
5. Ouali, Aomar. 2011. "Algerian police break up march protesting ban on public gatherings; at least 19 injured," The Associated Press, January 22.
6. AFPR. 2011. "Thousands in Algeria protest march: organizers," Agence France Presse, January 29.
7. AFPR. 2011. "Protest strikes dog Algeria," Agence France Presse, February 22.
8. Gainley, Elaine. 2011. "Algeria sitting in circle of fire but keeps lid on social unrest_for now," The Associated Press, March 2.

9. AFPR. 2011. “Thousands of police rally in Algeria,” Agence France Presse, March 7.
10. AFPR. 2011. “Nine hurt in student demo in Algiers,” Agence France Presse, May 2.
11. AFPR. 2011. “Algeria passes budget law as public anger grows,” Agence France Presse, June 15.
12. Ouali, Aomar and Paul Schemm. 2011. “Facebook call for Algeria protest ignored, but nation still rife with discontent,” The Associated Press, September 25.
13. Northey, J 2017, 'Associations and Democracy in Algeria' Democratization, vol 24, no. 2, pp. 209-225 <https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1144590>
14. Chikhi, Lamine. 2011. “Algeria announces food price cuts to quell riots,” *Reuters*, January 8. <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-riots/algeria-announces-food-price-cuts-to-quell-riots-idUSTRE7053EL20110108?pageNumber=2>>.

MEC ID: 88/2280

Maximalist Campaign: Kefaya

Reformist Claim(s): The origins of Kefaya begin in the protest against the US invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, drawing 20,000 protesters into the street. Criticism of the action was highly stymied by the close relationship between the Egyptian regime and the US, but it represented some of the early mobilization of those who would come to found Kefaya.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2280

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 08/01/2004; Kefaya put out its first initial set of demand seeking to remove President Mubarak’s control of the government.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 0; These protests had no clear leadership.
- **Mobilization:** 1; Mobilization was led by various student groups and islamist groups.
- **Organization:** 15, Kefaya = new group
- **Structure:** 0; Various groups took part in the overall protest without a unifying structure.
- **Cohesion:** 1; The groups were all protesting the US invasion of Iraq. [2]
- **Composition:** 5; Though initially started by university students, numerous other groups joined the protests.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Concession(s):** 0
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** Yes – targeted and widespread¹⁸⁹
- **Repression Backfire:** 0

Sources:

1. Killian Clarke (2011) Saying "Enough": Authoritarianism and Egypt's Kefaya Movement. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*: December 2011, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 397-416.
2. Oweidat, Nadia, Cheryl Benard, Dale Stahl, Walid Kildani, Edward O'Connell, and Audra K. Grant. "Kefaya's Origins." In *The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative*, 3-16. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2008. Accessed January 13, 2020.

MEC ID: 229/2489

Maximalist Campaign: 2019 Anti-Ortega Protests

Reformist Claim(s): While a nascent anti-Ortega protest movement began in late 2014/early 2015 with sporadic activity protesting a proposed canal in Nicaragua, this campaign was triggered by initial protests which started on 19 April 2018 with about 10,000 demonstrators over a proposed social security reform by Daniel Ortega's government that would have reduced benefits and raised taxes. The government's response to the protests had angered Nicaraguan citizens and protests continued, shifting demands to Ortega's resignation.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1, economic

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2489

Demand Escalation (date and description): On April 23, protesters began to demand Ortega's resignation.

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, Initially led by workers during the social security reform phase, students at Central American University were integral to initiating the demand for Ortega's removal. After the National Dialogue began in May, opposition has formally coalesced into Alianza Civica (Civic Alliance), led by a diverse group of former Chamber of Commerce and business leaders, nonprofit leaders and religious leaders.

¹⁸⁹ <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kefaya-protests-mubaraks-referendum-and-re-election-egypt-2005>

- **Mobilization:** 1, Superior Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP) played a key role in mobilizing against the social security reform. Subsequent protests mobilized by Civic Alliance.
- **Organization:** 4, 5, 6, 10; COSEP = labor union; Civic Alliance = coalition of students, academics, business, and labor, as well as opposition political parties.
- **Structure:** 0, Civic Alliance has formal leadership elected from each of the sectors comprising it but is non-hierarchical.
- **Cohesion:** 1, calls for Ortega's resignation were shared across the movement.
- **Composition:** 5; Students, farmers, politicians and academics

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1, on May 16, Ortega agreed to meet leaders of the protest in a National Dialogue, brokered by religious church pressure. However, these quickly fell apart. By May 22, talks ceased.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, on May 16, Ortega agreed to meet leaders of the protest in a National Dialogue, brokered by religious church pressure. However, these quickly fell apart. By May 22, talks.
- **Concession(s):** 1, Prior to escalation, the government cancelled the social security reforms.
- **Concession Backfire:** 1, Cancelling the reform was insufficient to halt protests and atone for government repression, triggering the subsequent maximalist campaign.
- **Repression:** 1, targeted; 1, widespread; Initial reformist protests quickly escalated in size and scale and the government repressed protests with considerable force. Dozens were killed and the Nicaraguan government faced significant domestic and international condemnation. Troops were sent to repress student protests at universities, resulting in deaths. By the end of 2018, protests left at least 322 people dead and 565 others in jail.
- **Repression Backfire:** Repression used during the initial protests significantly backfired, escalating to hundreds of thousands of people. After escalation, significant repression thereafter shrank the number of protesters as the regime cracked down hard. The repression has drawn international condemnation from the U.N. and OAS's IACHR and caused his allies to reverse course and support his removal.

Sources:

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3. AP. 2018. "Cardinal: Nicaragua talks at impasse, suspended indefinitely" Associated Press, May 23, 2018.
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MEC ID: 322/2685

Maximalist Campaign: Sudanese Uprising

Reformist Claim(s): On December 13, 2018, protests broke out in Sudan over sharp increases in the price of food and fuel due to economic mismanagement. Led and mobilized in part by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), the protests spread quickly to the capital. By the end of December, protests escalated to demanding Omar Al-Bashir's resignation. Repression was swift and violent, with hundreds being injured, arrested and detained. On January 1, 2019, the opposition coalesced into the Forces of Freedom and Change, formally calling for Bashir's resignation. Protests continued amidst a media blackout for several months. On April 6, the SPA organized a march of hundreds of thousands to the headquarters of the military, where they were attacked by pro-Bashir security forces. Members of the military actively joined the protests, sheltering them and protecting them from the security forces. On April 11, Bashir was removed from power by a military coup, after which a transitional military council was formed. However, protests continued, as the organizers continued to demand a democratic civilian government. Over the summer, several large scale incidents occurred in Khartoum and El-Albeid where hundreds were killed, triggering calls for civil disobedience by the SPA.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2685

Demand Escalation (date and description): By December 18, protestors demanded Bashir's resignation and the call became widespread by the end of December.

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0, While Mohamed Yousif Ahmed Al Mustafa led the Sudanese Professionals Association, and leaders of the Forces for Freedom and Change came from a variety of sectors, the protests themselves were decentralized, and no individual took clear leadership
- **Mobilization:** 1, Forces of Freedom and Change, Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA)
- **Organization:** 6 (SPA = labor)
- **Structure:** 0, no formal hierarchical leadership found.
- **Cohesion:** 1, calls for Bashir's resignation were shared across the movement.
- **Composition:** 5; General Public Involvement, students, women, academics, doctors, teachers, later in the campaign, defections from military
- **Movement Engagement:** 0, the call for Bashir's resignation was firm and the protests didn't seek concessions or engagement.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Concession(s):** 0

- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** 1, targeted; 1, widespread; Significant repression occurred throughout the campaign, beginning immediately when protests broke out and police used live ammunition and teargas against largely peaceful demonstrators, and continuing throughout the campaign. At least 246 died over the course of the campaign with thousands more injured.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1, Considerable violence against protesters by Bashir led to increased participation and defections from the military, eventually resulting in a coup. Post-coup, violence against protestors, particularly the June and July massacres in Khartoum and El-Albeid further amplified support for a civilian transitional government.

Sources:

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9. Radio Dabanga, 2019. More than 240 people killed in Sudan uprising. Radio Dabanga.

MEC ID: 100/2708

Maximalist Campaign: Yellow Vest Protests

Reformist Claim(s): Yellow Vest protests began on Nov. 17, 2018 over a proposed raise in the gas tax, shutting down traffic across the country while donning yellow safety vests. Quickly protests expanded to encompass a number of economic problems facing France, such as economic stagnation and a lack of concern by Macron. Millions would eventually participate in the protests across the entirety of France.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2708

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 12/01/2018; New protests were declared throughout France with the expressed goal of forcing President Macron from power.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 0; While there were regional leaders and organizers of the movement there was not a unified leadership structure.
- **Mobilization:** 0; No single group was responsible for mobilization or for coordination the protests, instead they involved ad hoc coordination. [1][2]
- **Organization:** 15; Group emerged for a specific reason, fuel tax.
- **Structure:** 0; The structure was organized around regional structures rather than a unified structure.
- **Cohesion:** 0; Incohesive.
- **Composition:** 5; Many parts of French society took part in the protests including the both the middle and lower classes, unions, various civic groups and individual French citizens.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1; both the government and the movement attempted talks, but they collapsed prior to the actual meeting, “after a request to broadcast the talks live was rejected”

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1; both the government and the movement attempted talks, but they collapsed prior to the actual meeting, “after a request to broadcast the talks live was rejected”
- **Concession(s):** 0; Macron made vague promises of reform, but it wasn’t until after Dec. 1 that the government began making solid offers of concession to the protesters.
- **Concession Backfire:** NA

- **Repression:** 0, targeted; 1, widespread. Initially the French government allowed the protests to go on undisturbed, but eventually as the protests expanded, utilized water cannons, tear gas, and arrests to repress the protest.
- **Repression Backfire:** Increased Mobilization.

Sources:

1. "'Yellow vest' protests against Macron snarl traffic across France". *Agence France Presse -- English*. November 17, 2018 Saturday.
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3. "Paris police use tear gas, water cannon against 'yellow vest' protesters". *Agence France Presse -- English*. November 24, 2018 Saturday.
4. "Paris the prize as French tax revolt rumbles on". *Agence France Presse -- English*. November 22, 2018 Thursday.
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MEC ID: 290/2718

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Vucic

Reformist Claim(s): Since Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic's presidential election win on April 2, thousands of protesters have taken to Belgrade's streets each evening blowing whistles and chanting slogans such as "Vucic thief, you stole the elections!", "Against the government terror" and "Down with dictatorship." (Protests were also triggered by assault on opposition Serbian Left party leader Borko Stefanovic).¹⁹⁰ Similar protests were held in the towns of Novi Sad and Nis. Vucic secured 55% of the vote against a fractured opposition, but demonstrators say the poll was unfair and accuse him of becoming increasingly authoritarian. There is no clear leader of the campaign that claims to be self-organized through Facebook; the protests peaked at more than 20,000 participants. Many of the demonstrators are students, but they have been joined by protesters of all ages, including those who marched against Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s. Vucic said he has nothing against the protests, "as long as they are peaceful." The nightly protests gradually shrank from thousands to about a hundred in May, and the movement split along ideological lines - one focusing on Vucic's policies and the other on the socio-economic reality in Serbia. Vucic was sworn in as Serbia's president on May 31 despite the protests of opposition groups. Members of the opposition

¹⁹⁰ <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/01/04/serbian-protesters-face-dilemma-over-movement-s-goals-01-04-2019/>

clashed with Vucic supporters in Belgrade and were prevented from protesting downtown. A few thousand people participated in the May 31 protests, and no incidents were reported. In September, Serbia's independent media staged a blackout to warn against Vucic's muzzling of the press by intimidation, threats, and financial pressure. Dozens of Serbian media outlets and non-government organizations darkened their web pages for one hour at noon. In October, several hundred people gathered at an opposition protest demanding that an upcoming local election in Belgrade be free and fair. Opposition leaders have accused Vucic of stifling democratic freedoms, exerting pressure on the media, and threatening opponents. On October 17, two Serbian students appeared before a court over street protests in April against the election of President Vucic. The police accused them of organizing a protest without notifying authorities, and dozens of people gathered outside the court in support of the students while alleging government intimidation. After a year of lull, anti-government demonstrations erupted after thugs beat up opposition politicians in November 2018. Thousands of people rallied in Serbia against Vucic for four consecutive weekends, accusing Vucic of stifling democratic freedoms and calling for his resignation. On December 29, around 25,000 joined the rally.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2 (electoral, pre- and post-election results)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2718

Demand Escalation (date and description): 4/10/2017¹⁹¹; initial message was "simply that they viewed the presidential election as illegitimate"¹⁹²

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0, there is no clear leadership in this campaign
- **Mobilization:** 1, students were clear mobilizers, as were NGOs and opposition parties
- **Organization:** 3, 5; Students, opposition parties
- **Structure:** 0, no evidence of hierarchy found
- **Cohesion:** 1, movement appeared cohesive
- **Composition:** 5 students, political parties, opposition movements, NGOs and public figures

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Movement Engagement:** 0
- **Concession(s):** 0

¹⁹¹ <https://balkaninsight.com/2017/04/10/new-anti-govt-protests-starting-in-serbia-04-10-2017/>

¹⁹² <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/18/who-are-the-protesters-in-serbia-and-what-do-they-really-want/>

- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** NA
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** 0, though it's possible that limited targeted repression was used
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** NA

Sources:

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2. AP. 2017. "Thousands protest Serbia presidential outcome for 7th day," *The Associated Press*, April 9.
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4. Rudic, Filip. 2017. "Serbia's Fading Protest Movement Splits," *Balkan Insight*, May 4.
5. Stojanovic, Dusan. 2017. "Vucic sworn in as Serbia's new president amid protests," *The Associated Press*, May 31.
6. Gec, Jovana. 2017. "Serbia's media stage blackout over pressure on free press," *The Associated Press*, September 28.
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8. AP. 2017. "2 Serbian students appear in court over April protests," *The Associated Press*, October 17.
9. AP. 2018. "Thousands march against Serbian president's autocratic rule," *The Associated Press*, December 8.
10. AP. 2018. "Thousands brave snow to rally against Serbian leader Vucic," *The Associated Press*, December 15.
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12. AP. 2018. "Thousands march against Serbia's president for 4th week," *The Associated Press*, December 29.
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MEC ID: 198/2744

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Mutharika

Reformist Claim(s): On July 20, thousands of protesters from various NGO and CSO members of the Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC) protested for various reforms ranging from Electoral changes, economic development, and anti-corruption measures. During the protest the organizer gave the district commissioners this list of 20 demands “1. Ensure availability of, and access to, forex. 2. Facilitate the importation of fuel without interruptions. 3. Replace top management of ESCOM and Water Board with independent experts to reverse shortages within three months. 4. The Anti-corruption Bureau (ACB) to investigate those implicated in the Malawi Housing Corporation (MHC) scandal. (Peter Mutharika and other senior officials and politicians allegedly jumped the queue and received houses at knock-down prices. In October 2011 the former manager of the MHC had been charged by the ACB, which said the politicians were innocent.) 5. The ACB to investigate all cabinet ministers and public servants about unexplained wealth accumulated while holding office, and the Declaration of Assets Bill to be ‘ratified’. 6. President Mutharika to declare his assets and explain the source of funds for building his new Ndata Farmhouse. 7. Nullify Callista Mutharika’s contract and require her to repay her salary. (She was appointed to a ‘volunteer’ job on maternal health and is paid a generous salary by the government.) 8. Law Commission to review Penal Code (the new Section 46 allows the minister of information to ban publications) and the new Injunctions Act (delaying for three days any action on injunctions filed against government; Mutharika had signed the act into law even though there was an injunction filed against it) and to make recommendations on their constitutionality within six months. 9. Mutharika to act in good faith toward Vice-President Joyce Banda. (She was expelled from the DPP, had her motorcade withdrawn, and had been barred from official duties as she was seen as a political threat to the DPP’s 2014 presidential candidate, Peter Mutharika. She started her own political party thereafter. The president filed a constitutional case to see if he could remove her from office, and in October there were rumors that she would be arrested for sedition.) 10. Government should hold local council elections within the next year. 11. The University Council should readmit the four dismissed lecturers and affirm that no spies will be allowed in lecture rooms. 12. Nullify the president’s order for NGOs to pay MWK2 million prior to any demonstration. (This decree was challenged in court.) 13. Halt the inequitable and politicized use of public broadcasters (MBC and TV Malawi). (This is a complaint going back to the pre-transitional period.) 14. The executive to stop disregarding court rulings and contempt of court charges. 15. Provide essential drugs to all hospitals and clinics. (This and following demands reflect the presence of health-sector activists among the demonstration’s leadership. Other sectors had similar complaints but were not directly represented.) 16. Provide capacity building for health workers. 17. Pay overdue allowances (up to three years are overdue) to nurses. 18. Raise the national minimum wage to

MWK25,000/month. 19. Ensure ‘decent jobs and conditions for all workers’. 20. Institute a social protection system for the welfare of the poorest.”

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 5+

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2744

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 03/15/2012; Government repression during the July 20 protests led to considerable disagreement and a fracturing of the HRCC, a majority of whose constituent groups wanted to pursue negotiation out of fear of subsequent government repression. Following this one of the constituent groups, the religious rights Public Affairs Committee (PAC) began calling on President Mutharika to resign alongside several opposition groups.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1; The HRCC had a leadership structure chaired by Undule Mwakasungula.
- **Mobilization:** 1; The HRCC and its constituent organizations were responsible for its mobilization.
- **Organization:** 4, 5, 10; included with the HRCC was existing human and civil rights organizations, student groups, and several Christian religious denominations.
- **Structure:** 0; The HRCC operated as a loose confederation of the preexisting orgs.
- **Cohesion:** 0; Ultimately the various groups would begin to pursue divergent campaign strategies.
- **Composition:** 5; various different civil society groups participated.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, in August various groups attempted to negotiate with the government rather than risk more violent repression due to their protesting. These negotiations were set for September but were postponed following an outburst Mutharika’s against the protesters.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0, despite initially agreeing to UN led talks, these efforts were rejected by the government.
- **Concession(s):** 0
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** 1, widespread; 0, targeted; the government used tear gas, arrests, and live ammunition to break up the protests which led to the arrest of 275 individuals and the deaths of at least 18 protesters.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0; Repression was successful in forcing a change in opposition strategy and fracture the HRCC coalition.

Sources:

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2. Diana Cammack (2012) Malawi in crisis, 2011–12, *Review of African Political Economy*, 39:132, 375-388.
3. "Rights group ask Malawi leader to resign". Agence France Presse -- English. March 15, 2012 Thursday.
4. Makuwira, Jonathan. "Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the Changing Nature of African Politics: The Case of the CSO–Government Relationship in Malawi." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. 46, no. 6 (2011): 615-28.
5. "Malawi riots death toll rises to 19 as army chief replaced". Agence France Presse -- English. July 23, 2011 Saturday.
6. "Over 275 arrested in Malawi riots: police". Agence France Presse -- English. July 22, 2011 Friday.

MEC ID: 37/2745

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Rousseff

Reformist Claim(s): Following the revelation of a massive corruption scandal involving senior members of President Dilma Rousseff's administration and the state-owned oil company, Petrobras, over a million Brazilians have been involved in demonstrations calling for the resignation or impeachment of Rousseff. Recently re-elected to a second term, Rousseff's popularity was already waning due to a flagging economy, but the discovery of the corruption scheme has plummeted the President's public support. Though Rousseff herself has yet to be directly implicated, many high-level political figures have been snagged in the investigation and much of the corruption took place while Rousseff was the chairwoman of Petrobras. The scandal involved kickbacks and money laundering that resulted in an estimated \$3.8 billion dollars being skimmed off the top of inflated contracts over the course of a decade.

On March 15, about 1.5 million protesters took to the streets in 83 cities and towns across Brazil. Major, peaceful, protests were held in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro. Protesters were calling for the impeachment of President Rousseff due to the failing economy and the Petrobras corruption scandal. Two days prior, a rally in support of Rousseff drew little support. In light of the large turnout, the Government quickly responded and sought to appease the protesters. The Justice Minister, Jose Eduardo Cardozo and Rousseff's chief of staff, Miguel Rossetto, gave a press conference in which they said immediate steps would be taken to fight graft and impunity. A second nationwide demonstration calling for the impeachment of President Rousseff drew

slightly smaller crowds than the first. The protest was organized largely through social media by an array of groups. Estimates indicate that the April protest only drew about half the number of participants as the March demonstrations. Many analysts said the comparatively low turnout did not bode well for the movement, although leaders from numerous groups vow to continue the campaign.

On August 16, the third major demonstration of the campaign drew hundreds of thousands of participants demanding President Dilma Rousseff's resignation. The crowds blamed Rousseff and her leftist Worker's Party for flagrant corruption and an economy in recession. Crowds sang the national anthem and chanted "Dilma out!" as they marched through the streets of Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and dozens of other cities. The opposition in Congress has been considering taking up impeachment proceedings. House Speaker Eduardo Cunha, a formal member of the President's governing coalition, withdrew his support in July and is now considering beginning the impeachment process.

On October 21, Brazil's opposition filed an impeachment petition against President Rousseff, accusing her of illegal accounting practices. The petition was submitted to the House Speaker, Eduardo Cunha, himself under investigation for involvement in the Petrobras scandal. Though Rousseff has yet to be tied explicitly to the Petrobras issue, the latest petition accuses the President of unauthorized state bank loans to cover holes in the budget ahead of and after the start of her second term. Rousseff's approval ratings are sitting at a dismal 10 percent.

On December 02, Lower House Speaker, Eduardo Cunha, launched impeachment proceedings against President Rousseff. Cunha accepted a petition filed by several attorneys in the first step of what could be a long process. A special committee must now approve the measure for it to go any further. On December 13, 2015 about 81,000 protesters participated in peaceful demonstrations held across the country calling for the removal of President Rousseff from office. Thirty-nine cities reported demonstrations. However, the days' marches marked a stark decline from the 2.4 million who had participated in earlier demonstrations. Earlier in the week the Supreme Court suspended the committee determining if impeachment proceedings should continue for one week, citing irregularities.

On March 13, protests calling for the end of the Dilma Rouseff administration continued after the former President, Lula da Silva was charged in the ongoing corruption investigation that has implicated much of Brazil's political class. Law enforcement estimated 1.4 million demonstrators took to the streets of Sao Paulo, in addition to smaller protests across the country. Protesters, wrapped in the national flag, chanted "Dilma out!" On March 17, thousands once again protested in Brasilia and Sao Paulo after a leaked phone call between President Rouseff and Lula da Silva exposed that the President was attempting to appoint Lula to her cabinet to protect him from prosecution. Protesters chanted "Resign!" and called for impeachment proceedings to continue. Riot

police broke up anti-government protests in Sao Paulo by firing water cannons and stun grenades into the remnants of the previous day's demonstration.

On March 22, in a speech from the Presidential Palace, Rousseff repeated her claim that she had committed no crime and vowed that she would "never resign." However, on March 29, the country's largest party, the PMDB, announced that it would be leaving the governing coalition of Dilma Rousseff. The loss of PMDB greatly reduces the chances that Rousseff will be able to garner the votes required to survive impeachment proceedings.

On April 17, as lawmakers began contentious impeachment hearings, protesters took to the streets of cities throughout the country. In many town squares large screen televisions aired the hearings live for the demonstrators. Though there were pro and anti-Rousseff demonstrations taking place, there were no reports of violence. Lawmakers in the lower house overwhelmingly voted to advance the impeachment process to the Senate. The Senate voted to suspend Rousseff on May 12; she is temporarily removed from her office while an impeachment trial is conducted; the Senate will have up to 180 days to vote whether to permanently remove Rousseff on the misconduct charges, and in the interim, Vice President Michel Temer will assume the presidency. Outside Congress, about 6,000 supporters of impeachment chanted "out with Dilma" while police used pepper spray to disperse Rousseff supporters.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1 (Political, non-electoral corruption)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2745

Demand Escalation (date and description): 03/14/2015, 1.5mn+ turned out to call for Rousseff's resignation

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. While opposition parties and grassroots groups from a variety of ideologies opposed Rousseff and worked to impeach her, there was no formalized leadership or clear focal leader during this campaign.
- **Mobilization:** Yes, while formal leadership and structure/strategy are uncertain, evidence linking a number of mobilizing organizations to opposition parties was found, and they played a significant role in mobilizing for protests; VemPraRua¹⁹³
- **Organization:** 3, opposition political parties were the earliest opposition to Rousseff
- **Structure:** 0. No evidence of hierarchy, movement indicates widespread grassroots characteristics.
- **Cohesion:** 1, the campaign was united in calling for Rousseff's impeachment

¹⁹³ https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movimento_Vem_pra_Rua

- **Composition:** 5. This campaign began with general public involvement. (15,16,17)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Movement Engagement:** 0
- **Concession(s):** Yes, Roussef proposed a package of anti-corruption measures following initial protests, March 18, 2015
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** Yes, the protest continued and escalated in terms of participation following concessions, resulting in impeachment and removal within two months.
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** Yes, some widespread repression occurred, from arrests to injuries to tear gas/pepper spray
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** No specific evidence of backfire, although the movement grew in the months following initial protests. However, this was likely due to widespread frustration with inaction from the regime, not in response to repression.

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MEC ID: 94/2746

Maximalist Campaign: Singing revolution

Reformist Claim(s): The genesis of this campaign is in part tied to protests against phosphorus mining (See the corresponding Cat 2 entry on the Phosphorus War for more details). Protests against environmental damages from phosphate aimed at preventing future mining efforts were successful, and one of the earliest anti-Soviet mobilizations.

On August 24, 1987, hundreds to thousands of Estonians protested in Tallinn against Soviet rule. The protest was held simultaneously with protests in Riga, Latvia and Vilnius, Lithuania and occurred on the anniversary of the signing of the 1939 non-aggression pact that paved the way for Soviet takeover of the Baltic region. By September, this sentiment was more widespread. On October 21, nationalists in Estonia again demonstrated for freedom from the Soviet Union in the town of Viru. In the town of Tartu, they attacked the graves of Russian soldiers who fought in World War II. In early 1988, nationalist sentiment, along with an application by a separatist group to form a political party, led the Soviet Union to begin to crackdown on these groups and repress their attempts to demonstrate against the Soviet government. On February 25, 4000 Estonians gathered in the capital to demonstrate for independence on the anniversary of Estonia's original declaration of independence during the interwar years. Small protests continued to be held throughout the year. At the Communist Party conference in June, the Estonian delegates submitted a platform for economic independence from Moscow. On August 23, 10,000 Estonians rallied in Tallinn and many others in smaller cities to again demand independence on the anniversary of the signing of the 1939 non-aggression pact. In October 1988, the Popular Front, a movement formed six months prior, released its platform calling for an independent Estonia with its own political system and free-market economy. The Front claimed 60,000 active members. On November 9, Gorbachev met with Estonian leaders following outcry against proposed constitutional changes that would centralize power in Moscow. Estonians had launched a petition drive to call on the government to drop the changes and grant greater sovereignty to the constituent republics. The local Estonian government asserted that it had the right to reject Soviet laws that infringed on local autonomy, though the Supreme Soviet declared this invalid.

In January 1989, the Estonian government passed a law that made Estonian the sole official language of Estonia, removing that status for Russian. In June, Gorbachev met with Estonian leaders and reassured them that their calls for economic independence fit in with Gorbachev's wider reform plans. However, as nationalist movements in several republics began to heat up, Gorbachev reversed his earlier reassurances and warned against ethnic violence and calls for greater autonomy in July. Despite this, the Supreme Soviet began to debate a proposed law to authorize Lithuania and Estonia to begin market-style experiments, allowing the two republics to control their own budgets, tax policies, prices, financial markets and foreign trade. The law was bitterly debated in the legislature. On July 27, the Soviet legislature endorsed the plan but postponed final actions on the laws until October. On August 23, the 50th anniversary of the 1939 non-aggression pact, hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians linked hands across their countries to form a human chain and demanded independence. Following Kremlin warnings against excessive demonstrations towards autonomy, 15 officials of the Estonian Communist Party were replaced, though two of these were

among the most conservative members of party leadership. On November 27, the Soviet legislature voted to grant Estonia, along with Latvia and Lithuania, economic autonomy beginning January 1. On December 7, the Estonian Communist Party voted to drop its leading role, paving the way for a multi-party system.

In February 1990, 100 prominent Estonians published an appeal calling for a free Estonia within a common European home and a multi-party democracy. Members of the Communist party broke off to form the Social Democratic Party and others were mulling a decision to form a Democratic Reform Party. After Lithuania declared independence, Gorbachev called the Estonian President on April 4 to warn him not to declare independence, warning him that the repressive actions taken against Lithuania would also be taken against Estonia. However, in 1991, Gorbachev was more conciliatory, appointing panels for discussion with representatives from the three Baltic republics. On March 3, Estonians voted overwhelmingly for independence from the Soviet Union in a non-binding referendum on the issue. Following the failed coup in the Soviet Union on August 21, the Soviet Union began to break up and Estonia declared independence.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1 Social, environmental/anti-phosphate mining, later leading into calls for nationalism and separatism.

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2746

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 10/04/1988, Popular Front is the first movement to call for independence.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, The Heritage Society (led by Trivimi Velliste), the Popular Front (led by Marju Lauristin), the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP), Citizens' Committees Movement (led by Tunne Kelam), the Congress of Estonia, the Estonian Supreme Council
- **Mobilization:** 1, The Heritage Society (led by Trivimi Velliste), the Popular Front (led by Marju Lauristin), the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP), Citizens' Committees Movement (led by Tunne Kelam), the Congress of Estonia, the Estonian Supreme Council
- **Organization:** 4 (generally considered political opposition movements, civic organizations)
- **Structure:** 1, these organizations were formal, hierarchical, and eventually became political parties
- **Cohesion:** 1, the movement was cohesive in calling for independence
- **Composition:** 5, general public involvement

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1, multiple meetings between campaign leaders and Soviet authorities occurred

- **Movement Engagement:** 1, multiple meetings between campaign leaders and Soviet authorities occurred, as early as 11/08/1988.
- **Concession(s):** 1, economic independence and more autonomy were granted
- **Concession Backfire:** Yes, concessions were not enough and the campaign grew, protests continued until independence.
- **Repression:** 1, targeted; 0, widespread. Shows of force with tanks, arrests.
- **Repression Backfire:** No

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MEC ID: 116/2747

Maximalist Campaign: Haitian anti-Moise protests

Reformist Claim(s): In August, a social media campaign known by hashtag #petrocaribechallenge demanded an accounting of the money that was supposed to be spent on social and economic projects in Haiti. Former government officials have been accused of embezzling the fund. Protests sprang up in September. This campaign helped spur tens of thousands of Haitians to participate in nationwide demonstrations on October 17, and for a week in November. While the protests initially focused on demands for action against government corruption, President Jovenel Moise was accused of not investigating allegations of corruption in the previous administration and calls for his removal increased over time. In November, thousands of Haitians marched in Port-au-Prince in a display of public fury at the government over rampant corruption, economic

malaise, and other grievances. Chanting anti-government slogans, some demonstrators set piles of tires on fire and threw rocks, and the police fired tear gas to control the protests. Protesters clashed with police, and at least 11 people died in the protests. Weeks of protests paralyzed commerce, forced schools and shops to close, and compelled many Haitians to stay home. After the tense week of violence and protests against the government, Haiti's Prime Minister Jean-Henry Ceant promised a cash program to create jobs in poor neighborhoods.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1 (political, anti-corruption)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2747

Demand Escalation (date and description): 10/17/2018 (first calls for removal of Moise)

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, the “petrochallengers” were led by a group of clearly identifiable individuals, pre-escalation, who primarily organized via Twitter. Post-escalation, the “Michel/FL coalition and Dessalines Children” wings were also leaders, though there is not cohesion on goals between these three groups.
- **Mobilization:** 1, the “petrochallengers” were led by a group of clearly identifiable individuals, pre-escalation, who primarily organized via twitter. Post-escalation, the “Michel/FL coalition and Dessalines Children” wings were also leaders, though there is not cohesion on goals between these three groups. Both groups were significant mobilizers, especially during October and November, and well into 2019.
- **Organization:** 15 (petrochallengers formed around this specific issue, and came from a wide variety of backgrounds)
- **Structure:** 0, No evidence of hierarchy found. The Petrochallengers largely organized via twitter, and no individual has identifiable influence over the rest of the movement.
- **Cohesion:** 0, The Petrochallengers primarily sought to account for embezzled money. The movement escalated in October 2018 to call for Moise’s resignation, but prior to that, and even subsequent to that, not every protest can be traced to anti-Moise sentiment vs. a general anti-corruption goal, though several wings appear to support this goal.
- **Composition:** 5. General public involvement.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Government has not engaged demonstrators at all, no evidence to suggest they have any interest in doing so.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Movement refuses to meet or negotiate with the current administration.
- **Concession(s):** 0

- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** NA
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** 1, both targeted and widespread. Hundreds of protesters have been killed, including at funerals of those who had been killed. The government has targeted protesters, but has also engaged in widespread repression
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 1, the intensity and participation in protests continued to escalate in to 2019, in part due to consistent repression

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MEC ID: 243/2748

Maximalist Campaign: Bangladeshi Liberation War

Reformist Claim(s): Having been politically active since the protests against the previous Pakistani leader Ayub Khan, Eastern Pakistani political forces had begun to mobilize demanding greater rights and roles within the territorially divided state. Escalation of these demands began following the nationwide parliamentary elections which saw the Awami League secure a majority by solely winning nearly every seat in the East, as compared to the splintered results in the West. The Awami League had been a long-standing party within East Pakistan but following the previous protests had seen significant growth due to their pursuit of Bangladeshi rights. Immediately following this surprise victory, the Pakistani military and western parties began to attempt to prevent the seating of an East Pakistani controlled parliament. Multiple dates set for the first parliamentary meeting were delayed by President Khan, which many Awami League supporters saw as an attempt to stymie the results of the democratic elections. Mass protests began throughout East Pakistan, with multiple cities coming fully under the control of protesters as both sides engaged with each other and maneuvered for better political positions. Eventually, the Pakistani military took to the streets of East Pakistan, violently suppressing protests, though this led to increased turnout. Recognizing that stalling escalation may splinter the movement, Awami League leadership officially declared their intent to pursue secession from Pakistan and the formation of an independent state of Bangladesh.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2748

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 03/07/1971; Sensing an increased desire for a more radical position from the street and hoping to head off West Pakistani attempts to undermine his leadership, Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared the movements intention of secession at a rally before hundreds of thousands of supporters. This followed months of demands from the more radical elements of the League, particularly from the students, for the party to adopt a stronger position against Western rule.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1; The movement for Bangladeshi independence was led by the head of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujabur Rahman.
- **Mobilization:** 1; Mobilization was led by the Awami League, a longstanding “front” party within Bangladesh representing a broad cross-section of Eastern Pakistani society.
- **Organization:** 3, 5, 6; pre-existing political parties, student organizations, and trade leagues; The Awami League represented a number of sub-organizations including the leftist parties and radical student organizations.
- **Structure:** 0; The Awami League could largely be described as a “front” organization or an umbrella organization.
- **Cohesion:** 0; Throughout the period of escalation Mujabir faced calls from the radical elements of the party to escalate the conflict with West Pakistan, though he held off these calls until escalation of March 7.
- **Composition:** 5; Widespread involvement.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1; Sheikh Mujibur met with the President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, on December 12 to attempt to negotiate around East Pakistani demands; These talks were ultimately unsuccessful

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1; Sheikh Mujibur met with the President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, on December 12 to attempt to negotiate around East Pakistani demands; These talks were ultimately unsuccessful
- **Concession(s):** 1; the government offered to negotiate on an initial set of demands set forth by the Awami League, though these were not taken as serious overtures but rather as attempts to divide moderates and radicals within the movement.
- **Concession Backfire:** 1; due to the perceived insincerity of the concessions, this action led to the escalation of the campaign.
- **Repression:** 0, targeted; 1, widespread; As East Pakistani protests began to take to the street the government began to respond by sending the military, staffed predominantly by West Pakistani’s into the streets. This led to widespread bloodshed, the West claiming hundreds of civilian deaths and Bangladeshi sources citing much higher numbers.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1, Increased mobilization.

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MEC ID: 376/2749

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Perez

Reformist Claim(s): Beginning around October 3, various groups throughout Venezuela began to protest the declining economic conditions and growing levels of corruption throughout the country. The cause of the economic decline stemmed from the global decrease in the price of oil; Venezuela's economy was nearly completely dependent on commodities and in response had begun to take out large international loans to mitigate the falling export income. To deal with these economic issues, President Perez enacted a policy of systemic gas price increase on domestic consumption, upending long standing subsidies. On Oct. 16 10,000 university students and workers from the Central Venezuelan University protested against the force privatization and increased funding for the university. Smaller protests continued to mount through the rest of the month as the price of gas steadily increased, with the government responding to these protests with rubber bullets and tear gas. On November, further strikes followed numbering in the hundreds of thousands, "Four major unions called for the dawn-to-dusk strike in Caracas, a neighboring port and the southeastern state of Bolivar to protest increases in government-regulated gasoline and public transport prices. Police arrested at least 39 union and student leaders who were accused of plotting violence, according to a human rights group." Further, smaller protests continued throughout the rest of the year in waves of unrest, sparked by high school and university students and workers as the economic situation continued to worsen. The following month protests began again after the holiday season in a series of violent clashes between the police and students from universities around the country.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2749

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 02/04/1992; Following months of protests throughout Venezuela a group of military officers, led by Hugo Chavez, was put down by the government in a few hours. Protests began following the failed coup, though they had taken on a distinctly anti-government tenor.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 0; While there were certain groups, and presumably group leaders, the overall trajectory of the campaign remained spontaneous and without any overall leadership.
- **Mobilization:** 0; As with the leadership, individual groups involved did not appear to have a role in campaign-wide mobilization; some groups, such as labor unions, unified to mobilize their workers at times, but these did not extend throughout the entirety of the campaign.
- **Organization:** 5, 6; Pre-existing student groups and labor unions.
- **Structure:** 0; There did not appear to be a central organizing group unifying the various student and worker protests and strikes.
- **Cohesion:** 0; Despite being instigated by the increase in gas prices, group demands often varied based on their personal interests, as with the students protesting university privatizations and lack of funds. [2]
- **Composition:** 5; Indication of widespread involvement, including University and Highschool students, Teachers, Labor workers, and everyday Venezuelans.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0; No indication that either the movement or government attempted to engage with the other side.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0; No indication that either the movement or government attempted to engage with the other side.
- **Concession(s):** 1, "President Carlos Andres Perez, responding to the pressure, proposed raising the country's minimum wage to about \$ 130 a month."
- **Concession Backfire:** 0
- **Repression:** 0, targeted; 1, widespread; The government used tear gas and rubber bullets to attempt to repress the protests, leading to the deaths of several protesters.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0; Repression was not given for any backfire described in the sources consulted

Sources:

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2. "Venezuelan police fire tear gas on protesters". Agence France Presse -- English. October 16, 1991.
3. "Venezuelan Economy May Be Improving, But Poor Don't Feel It". The Associated Press. November 5, 1991, Tuesday, AM cycle.
4. "Strike Paralyzes Parts Of Venezuela". The Associated Press. November 7, 1991, Thursday, AM cycle.

5. "Fears of Social Breakdown in Venezuela". The Associated Press. November 22, 1991, Friday, AM cycle.
6. "High School Students The New Protest Leaders in Venezuela". The Associated Press. November 23, 1991, Saturday, PM cycle.
7. "Student protests at Venezuelan universities". Agence France Presse -- English. December 3, 1991.
8. "Venezuela On Edge Amid Fresh Round of Protests and Violence". The Associated Press. December 4, 1991, Wednesday, PM cycle.
9. "Divide Between Haves, Have-Nots Spurs Venezuelan Riots". The Associated Press. January 22, 1992, Wednesday, PM cycle.
10. "Military Units Attempt Coup in Venezuela". The Associated Press. February 4, 1992, Tuesday, PM cycle.

MEC ID: 82/2750

Maximalist Campaign: 1997 Anti-Bucaram Campaign

Reformist Claim(s): In early January 1997, students of Ecuador started demonstrations in Quito against President Bucaram's belt-tightening economic programs, which substantially increased the prices of power, communications, fuel, and public transport. After two weeks of protests, the students were joined by union movements, led by the country's biggest union, the United Workers' Front, which announced a general, nationwide strike planned for February 5th. Moreover, demonstrators in Quito were also supported by the mayor, journalists' union, manufacturing executives and neighborhood groups. Bucaram initially supported the announcement of strike and announced he would reshuffle his cabinet by replacing 60 percent of his government's 13 ministries. However, the protests calling for his resignation continued as many organizations began their demonstrations ahead of the announced date for the strike. Most notably, peasants in the Andean province of Tungurahua, 120 kilometers (74 miles) south of Quito blocked regional highways and the trucker's union started to strike 2 days earlier by halting fuel deliveries. Moreover, the indigenous people movement has joined the protests one day before the strike. On February 5, Bucaram withdrew to the presidential palace where he was cordoned by the military and police forces and withdrew his support from the strike, calling it a "conspiracy". After the national strike was extended an additional day, Bucaram promised to roll-back the austerity measures and declared a "state of national mobilization," ordering the armed forces and the national police to enforce a return to work. However, the same day the Congress ousted Bucaram, declaring "mental incapacity". The armed forces, who refused the state of emergency declared by Bucaram, accepted the Congress' decision to remove Bucaram and mediated the appointment of a

new interim president, Alarcon. Alarcon swore in as the interim President on February 12th and announced he would roll back all the economic measures taken by Bucaram.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1 (economic, price increase/anti-austerity)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2750

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 02/03/1997

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, the Patriotic Front was clearly the leader in this campaign, consisting of a wide coalition of Ecuadorian groups and set the strategy for the campaign
- **Mobilization:** 1, the groups comprising the Patriotic Front, including student, labor and indigenous organizations were all active in mobilizing during this campaign.
- **Organization:** 5, 6; Students, Labor
- **Structure:** 0, hierarchy existed within several groups, including Ecuador's largest union, but it was not universally shared among the campaign
- **Cohesion:** 1, Pre-escalation Bucaram's austerity measures were universally unpopular, even in Congress, and the post-escalation campaign reflected widely shared sentiment that he was unfit for office
- **Composition:** 5 "the Patriotic Front...this all-encompassing organization boasted the ranks of the Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales, the United Workers Front, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador, women's interest groups, environmentalist groups, petroleum workers, and the lower, middle, and upper classes.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, the movement attempted to engage with Congress directly in calling for Bucaram's removal.

Government Response:

Government Engagement: 0. No evidence suggesting protest leaders were successful in meeting with Congress, although the pressure was enough to allow Congress to oust Bucaram.

- **Concession(s):** 1, Bucaram intended to reshuffle his cabinet and announced he was making significant policy changes
- **Concession Backfire:** 1, the concessions were not enough to quell the movement and were insufficient to prevent his removal from office.
- **Repression:** 1, though very limited and targeted. There is very little evidence of repressive violence, but police were mobilized in response to protests and some reports of tear gas
- **Repression Backfire:** 0

Sources:

1. Agence France Presse, January 12 1997, “Peruvian, Ecuadoran leaders to meet despite domestic troubles”
2. Agence France Presse, January 25, 1997 “Street protests to build into national strike in Ecuador”
3. Agence France Presse January 26, 1997 “Ecuadorans reject their president: survey”
4. Agence France Presse February 02, 1997 “Ecuador's Bucaram says government supports massive strike”
5. Agence France Presse February 03, 1997, “Truckers grind Ecuador to a halt before general strike”
6. Associated Press February 03, 1997, “Protests begin in advance of national strike in Ecuador”
7. Agence France Presse February 04, 1997 “Ecuador at a standstill one eve of general strike”
8. Agence France Presse February 05, 1997 “Bucaram promises far-reaching corrections to his government”
9. Associated Press February 05, 1997 “Nationwide strike begins against Ecuador's Bucaram”
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11. Associated Press February 07, 1997 “Ecuador's Congress votes to oust 'El Loco' president”
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13. Agence France Presse February 12, 1997 “New president of Ecuador sworn in, six-day crisis ends”
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MEC ID: 111/2751

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Serrano

Reformist Claim(s): What began as a student protest over government issued ID cards and local protests against high electricity prices ultimately ended in a government coup. On 05/12/1993, students demonstrated against Government ID cards that students claimed were intended to facilitate government tracking of student leaders. Police broke up the protest with tear gas and one student was shot and killed. The death sparked further protests and united the students with a broader movement protesting government austerity measures. Throughout the following week protesters clashed with riot police, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. Eighty percent of schools and universities were closed after the protests began.

On 05/21/1993, most of Guatemala's public employees stayed away from work in a pre-planned 24-hour strike over President Jorge Serrano's policies. At the end of the day, more than 10,000 Guatemalans demonstrated peacefully in the capital city. Many carried placards with pictures of President Serrano and shouted "Resign!" In response to the growing civil unrest, the President dissolved the congress and the Supreme Court on 05/25/1993. He said he would rule by decree until a new constitution could be drafted. The action ended a brief period of relative peace and democracy in Guatemala. The move was widely condemned by the international community.

On 05/26/1993, troops were deployed throughout Guatemala City and harsh censorship of the media was enacted. The next day, tanks and tear gas were used to break up a protest of about 1,000 court workers who gathered outside the Supreme Court to protest the President's power grab. An umbrella group representing some 20 unions, student groups, peasants, religious, and human rights organizations called for another demonstration later in the week.

The situation began to change rapidly on 06/01/1993 when the Army dropped its support for the President. Despite conflicting reports and statements early in the day, by the end it was clear that Serrano had been ousted and the military had taken control of the country in response to the President's suspension of democracy. The military high command made the move after meeting with many business leaders from the Guatemalan community. After taking power, the military vowed to restore the constitution and move towards holding elections.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2 (other, situation-specific, gov't ID cards; Economic, high electricity prices)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2751

Demand Escalation (date and description): 5/21/1993 – on this day, protests began calling for Serrano's resignation and protests escalated

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. No clear leaders or organizations found--the movement appeared to be widely grassroots until 5/26, when the umbrella group formed, and there's still no evidence of either hierarchical leadership or strategic contributions.

- **Mobilization:** 1, the students at Guatemala's schools and universities were clear pre-escalation leaders, leading to the closure of schools, and post-escalation, the general strike indicates significant mobilization support among labor/public employees, though not leadership in the strategic sense.
- **Organization:** 5, 6; Students and public employees
- **Structure:** 0. No evidence of hierarchy found.
- **Cohesion:** 1, the outrage against Serrano's actions were widely shared, no evidence of dissent found.
- **Composition:** 5. Students, Public Employees, unions, religious and human rights groups, later Army/military forces.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, both pre-escalation and post escalation, the movement wanted government action taken, and protests were held directly at government bodies, though the government didn't meet with any protestors.
- **Concession(s):** 1, the actions taken by Serrano on 5/25/1993.
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 0
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** 1, targeted; 1, widespread. At first targeted, later widespread, until the military dropped support for the president
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 1, the army dropped support for the president after it became clear that repression wasn't going to be enough, and Serrano was eventually forced to flee

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MEC ID: 188/2752

Maximalist Campaign: Libyan Civil War

Reformist Claim(s): In January 2011, street protests broke out over high housing prices and government corruption, lasting largely until the beginning of this civil war on the 16th of February 2011. The Libyan civil war erupted in February 2011 after several days of disorganized street protests led to massive defections from Muammar Qaddafi's regime. With heavily armed defectors prepared to fight Qaddafi loyalists, Qaddafi issued a statement threatening to go door to door in the rebel-held areas and kill all those engaged in rebellion against him. This statement prompted international action, with a UN Security Council resolution calling for an armed force to protect civilians and a NATO campaign that ultimately tilted the balance in favor of the rebels. By October 2012, Qaddafi had been killed after being found in hiding, the NATO-backed rebels had seized Tripoli, and the Transitional National Council (TNC) assumed sovereign power.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2 (political, corruption, economic, high housing prices)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2752

Demand Escalation (date and description): 2/16/2011

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, the National Transition Council (NTC) was the de facto leader of the campaign and later government.
- **Mobilization:** 1, the National Transition Council (NTC) was the de facto leader of the campaign and later government.
- **Organization:** 7,8, (NTC evolved from military and civilian government leaders)
- **Structure:** 1, NTC was hierarchical
- **Cohesion:** 1, NTC sought the downfall of Qaddafi with no other goals or internal disagreement (until later challenge by rival factions, see 2014 Civil War)

- **Composition:** 5 (Libyan citizens, military defectors, govt employees, students, etc. strong evidence of general public involvement)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Movement Engagement:** 0
- **Concession(s):** 1, on 1/27/11, the pre-escalation campaign had limited success, extracting promises of billions in housing, but the protests continued and escalated into civil war
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 1, the sub-maximalist demands eventually escalated into calls for Quaddafi's resignation
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** 1 targeted; 1 widespread; extremely brutal widespread and targeted repression resulting in thousands of deaths
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 1, extremely brutal widespread and targeted repression resulting in thousands of deaths also triggered domestic escalation of the movement and eventually international intervention, effectively destroying Quaddafi's forces.

Sources:

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4. Reuters, 2011. Libya sets up \$24 bln fund for housing . Jan 27. <https://www.reuters.com/article/libya-fund-investment/libya-sets-up-24-bln-fund-for-housing-idUSLDE70Q1ZM20110127>

MEC ID: 239/2753

Campaign: IRA/Irish Nationalists

Reformist Claim(s): While the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is the most well-known of the Irish nationalist groups having its roots in the original or "old" 1919 IRA that fought for the establishment of a Republic of Ireland, it is important to note that a civil rights campaign predated the modern IRA that originated in Northern Ireland. On January 29, 1967, a group of political leaders and tradesmen formed the Northern Ireland Civil Rights

Association, which had 5 demands pertaining to political freedoms, but didn't call for secession or independence. Events escalated on August 12, 1969 during the Battle of the Bogside, which resulted in the assembly of barricades in Derry, and escalation in demands. After this period, violence was more common, and splits occurred in the movement between nonviolent activists and the nascent IRA became the primary mobilizer after the events of Bloody Sunday, when the British security forces opened fire on an unarmed civil rights demonstration killing 14. While NICRA organized a protest of 100,000 citizens immediately after this, it was their last large mobilization, and support for the IRA and armed conflict skyrocketed. The IRA and subsequent splinter groups then waged an armed campaign against the British government until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1997.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 4 (Economic, Labor Dispute over unfair employment laws to Catholics/Republicans & Housing discrimination; Political, Police brutality with Arbitrary security actions against Catholics/Republicans and Government structure reforms – e.g., Bill of Rights type protections for freedom of assembly, speech association for Catholics/Republicans)"

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2753

Campaign Escalation Date: 12/28/1969

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, initially led by NICRA, later the IRA emerged, key individuals included John Hume (NICRA/nonviolent mobilization) and Gerry Adams (IRA/after Sinn Fein)
- **Mobilization:** 1, initial mobilization was encouraged by NICRA, after 1972, IRA and splinter IRA groups mobilized, though scattered nonviolent mobilization increased in the 1990s.
- **Organization(s):** 1 (IRA), 6 (NICRA)
- **Structure:** 1, the pre-escalation movement was hierarchical and formally organized, and its successors were decidedly hierarchical
- **Cohesion:** 1, though the IRA did fracture, its groups shared the goal of Northern Irish reunification.
- **Composition:** 5; Students, political party leaders, labor unions, religious leaders, later near exclusively Catholics.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, the movement attempted to gain civil rights by engaging with government formally and informally, but was met with no success
- **Concessions:** 1, Five Point Reform on November 22, 1968
- **Concession Backfire:** 1, Five Point Reform was seen as insufficient

- **Repression:** 1, targeted and 1, widespread; Significant repression occurred during both phases of the campaign, both targeted and widespread repression escalating into war between the IRA and British government.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1, Repression beginning in the early phases of the campaign escalated in 1969 during the Bogside and again during the Bloody Sunday incident, mobilizing considerably more support than was present prior to repression.

Sources:

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MEC ID: 361/2754

Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Erdogan

Reformist Claim(s): Following the Gezi Park protests calling for economic, political, and social reforms, scattered protests continued throughout the country through 2013. However, protestors mobilized on December 26, 2013 explicitly calling for Erdogan to step down and remained mobilized at significant levels. Mass demonstrations have been met with police repression, including a notable mobilization of 40,000 police on the May Day demonstrations in Taksim Square. Nevertheless, anger over mishandling of a mining disaster in Soma resulted in more widespread demonstrations throughout the country, continuing through August 2014. In December, police arrested over two dozen people thought to be supporters of Gulen. The arrests were aimed at pro-Gulen media outlets. Ergodan believes this movement is guilty of plotting to overthrow his government. A protest was held in commemoration of Berkin Elvan, who was killed as a result of the anti-Erdogan demonstrations in 2013. The death of Elvan brought together opponents of Erdogan, with demonstrations taking place in 20 cities in Turkey. Some protesters had Molotov cocktails and firecrackers and engaged in clashes with police. Police used tear gas and water cannons to break up demonstrations. Days later, three people were arrested for insulting Erdogan on Twitter. On March 31, a leftist group claiming to be avenging the death of Elvan took a prosecutor hostage in a courthouse. 22 people were arrested, all of whom were suspected to be linked to the group.

Violence in the run-up to the July 7 election included clashes and attacks, mainly targeting the HDP, a mainly Kurdish party. The election carried particular importance because HDP reached the threshold needed to enter Parliament, which prevented President Erdogan from reaching the majority needed to change the constitution, which would have given him executive powers. Hundreds of HDP party supporters demonstrated in response to an attack on regional HDP headquarters on May 18. This was also after the party reported that 73 attacks had been made on HDP offices since the previous month. On June 4, clashes occurred between about 1000 nationalists and 2000 HDP supporters at an HDP rally. Police responded by using water cannons and tear gas on the demonstrators. Explosions at an HDP rally of tens of thousands in Diyarbakir on June 5 killed two and injured hundreds more.

During May Day protests, clashes took place between protesters and police. Police used tear gas and water cannon trucks to halt protesters trying to move toward Taskim Square. Istanbul's governor reported 203 arrested and 18 wounded. Protests on May 31 to mark the anniversary of anti-Erdogan protests were blocked by thousands of police stationed to prevent such demonstrations. The July 7 elections dealt a blow to Erdogan's party and prevented him changing the constitution to gain executive power. The campaign is coded as completed as of July 7.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 5 (Social, Social issues, Environmental damages, Political, unjust police brutality/security repression, political corruption, foreign policy)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2754

Demand Escalation (date and description): 12/26/2013

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Prior to escalation, the Gezi Park protests had no clear leadership though it assembled a very large coalition that had largely fizzled out by September 2013. The maximalist campaign had no clear leadership, though mobilization was clearly done by opposition party supporters
- **Mobilization:** 1, Prior to escalation, the Gezi park campaign had very clear mobilizers across civil society, ranging from opposition parties to environmental groups to trade and journalism unions. The maximalist campaign had no clear leadership, though mobilization was clearly done by opposition party supporters.
- **Organization:** 3 (opposition parties)
- **Structure:** 0, no evidence of hierarchy found
- **Cohesion:** 1, protests appeared cohesive, though the goals were more focused for the maximalist campaign than during the Gezi Park Protests
- **Composition:** 5 students, environmentalists, women, opposition parties, evidence of general public involvement

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1, during the Gezi park protests prior to the maximalist campaign, the government did indeed meet with movement leaders, some of whom were in the opposition party that opposed Erdogan in this campaign.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, just as mentioned above, while the Erdogan regime didn't meet with protest or opposition leaders during the maximalist phase of this campaign, there is evidence that the movement pushed for meeting with the regime during the Gezi park protests, and they eventually succeeded in meeting and extracting some concessions
- **Concession(s):** 1, Gezi park protests elicited some concessions in that the government didn't end up developing the park
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 0
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** 1, Targeted; 1, Widespread; both widespread and targeted repression used.
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 1; substantial backfire during the Gezi Park protests, including the (eventually resulting in over 3.5 million Turkish protesters)

Sources:

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MEC ID: 402/2755

Maximalist Campaign: Zambian independence movement

Reformist Claim(s): Beginning in the mid 1940's, resistance against a planned consolidation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia into a Central African Federation that would tilt the balance of power further in favor of white colonists grew into a political movement for African Nationalism within what would later become Zambia. Of note, "In addition, campaigners called for an end to racist discrimination against the black majority within the political, economic, and social spheres of Northern Rhodesia." Reformist claims are thus political (constitutional), economic (high prices/unemployment), and social (discrimination against Africans). Tensions escalated in 1953 with a call for a general strike by leaders within the newly formed Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC) and the leadership began direct engagement with the British government in London to formally protest the proposed Federation on the grounds that black African voices were not represented. Fearing additional African political control, the colonists continued to arrest and intimidate leaders of the opposition. Despite this, the campaign continued to further call for boycotts and strikes against British economic

interests. By 1958, support for NRANC resurged, aided by economic problems including a decline of the price of copper, the region's primary commodity and high unemployment. At this point, the movement fractured, with Nkumbula and Kaunda splitting on strategy, one favoring congressional reforms and push for re-enfranchising African voters and the other favoring a boycott. Kaunda formed his own political party. By 1959, the colonial government spread rumors about murders of white colonists and repressed both African political parties, arresting their leaders until they were freed in 1960.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 3

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2755

Demand Escalation (date and description): 01/31/1960, c.f. NAVCO date, presumably when Kaunda took over the United National Independence Party (UNIP).

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, Kenneth Kaunda and Harry Nkumbula were clear leaders of the movement, along with their subsequent parties.
- **Mobilization:** 1, Kaunda was active in calling for strikes and boycotts and mobilizing against the colonial government.
- **Organization:** 3 (UNIP + NRANC were both political parties).
- **Structure:** 1, the political parties were hierarchical, though small, and Kaunda is widely regarded as the leader.
- **Cohesion:** 0, the leadership's notable split and subs indicate substantial differences in strategy and possibly goals, though eventually Nkumbula's party did back Kaunda's in a vote that led to independence.
- **Composition:** 5. Students, Teachers, Black Africans of Northern Rhodesia, Mineworkers, tribal chiefs, clerks

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1, both prior to escalation and subsequent to escalation. British Gov't considered the petition on May 4, 1953.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, British parliamentary notes that the letter of engagement was sent on 4/12/1953.
- **Concession(s):** 1, the governance structure of then-Southern Rhodesia was changed to accommodate more African political representation. "As a result of the campaign, the colonial government revised the constitution once again in 1962, allowing UNIP to participate in the October 1962 elections". Exact date uncertain, though first reference in British parliamentary records occurred on March 8, 1961.
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 1. "However, this proposed concession and its ultimate revision prompted UNIP to begin a stronger civil disobedience campaign throughout the northern and eastern parts of the region in 1961(1)." Additionally, while not backfire in the traditional sense of increased

mobilization, the concession did lead to the independence vote and can directly be factored into the eventual formation of Zambia.

- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** 1, targeted; 0, widespread; prior to escalation “the colonial government responded with beatings, assaults, and arrests (1)” including the arrests of leaders of the campaign, Kenneth Kaunda and Harry Nkumbula.
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** 1, both pre and post escalation. In the above incident, arresting Kaunda and Nkumbula increased strikes. In 1959, “these arrests only helped to fuel black African resistance, and prompted demonstrators to turn to property damage for two months.” Post escalation, repression in 1961 of the push for African representation resulted in additional participation in civil disobedience.

Sources:

1. Global Nonviolent Action Database, “Zambians campaign for independence, 1944-1964”, retrieved 8/30/19
from:<https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/zambians-campaign-independence-1944-1964>
2. Fergus Macpherson, *Kenneth Kaunda: The Times and the Man* (1974)
3. Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South* (1969)
4. David C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957–1964* (1967)
5. Hall, Richard, "Zambia, 1890-1964: the colonial period, 1976
6. CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION. HC Deb 04 May 1953 vol 515 cc37-16737, §3.46 p.m. retrieved 1/15/2020 from: <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1953/may/04/central-african-federation>
7. P Murray, (2005). *British Documents on the End of Empire: Central Africa*, pp.lxxx-i-iv.
8. R. I. Rotberg, (1965). *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa*, pp. 311–12, 315.
9. CENTRAL AFRICA HL Deb 08 March 1961 vol 229 cc398-508

MEC ID: 27/2756

Maximalist Campaign: Benin Anti-Kerekou Campaign

Reformist Claim(s): In early 1989 Benin faced growing economic troubles with the government failing to pay many public servants, leading to widespread series of escalating strikes. These strikes began on Jan. 9 with a teacher’s strike, followed by a student’s strike the following week. “Towards the end of the month there was unrest on the streets of Porto Novo and shortly afterwards civil servants demonstrated against a proposal put forward by the single trade union that they should forego three months’ salaries so as to provide some relief for the public finances. In April, the teachers started

an indefinite strike with the result that the school year of 1988/89 could not be completed and had to be cancelled. By July, finally, the employees of 13 of the 16 ministries were on strike.” In June, reformists were elected to parliament and provided President Kerekou with a set of demands of various reforms. “30 November, Kerekou gave his usual annual keynote address which contained some vague promises of reform. It did nothing to calm the tumultuous situation: on the contrary, it provoked major demonstrations in many of the country's cities.” These protests led to the end of one-party rule on Dec. 7 and the creation of a national conference establishing a new government on Feb. 19-28.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2756

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 12/2/1989; “30 November, Kerekou gave his usual annual keynote address which contained some vague promises of reform. It did nothing to calm the tumultuous situation: on the contrary, it provoked major demonstrations in many of the country's cities.”

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** Unclear; Despite the presence of figures such as parliamentarian reformist Robert Dossou, no figure clearly leads the movement.
- **Mobilization:** Clear; Multiple different groups were responsible for the mobilization, such as labor unions and the Communist Party of Benin (CPB). “Around the same time protest leaders began to circulate leaflets calling for a full general strike in Benin.”¹⁹⁴
- **Organization:** 3, 5, 6; There were multiple pre-existing organizations such as political parties (CPB) and the teachers and students’ unions.
- **Structure:** 0; Multiple different organizations made up the structure of this campaign.
- **Cohesion:** 0; Despite the demands presented by the parliamentarians, the different groups lacked a unified set of demands.
- **Composition:** 4; Initial composition included students, teachers, civil servants, and communist party members.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0; various individuals within the movement attempted engagement, but without unified engagement.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** None; there was no direct engagement by the government.
- **Concession(s):** 1; promise of reform was given, 11/30/1989.

¹⁹⁴ <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/beninese-campaign-economic-justice-and-democracy-1989-90>

- **Concession Backfire:** 1; the vague nature of the promised concessions set off further protests and an escalation of the campaign.
- **Repression:** Targeted; some of the early students' protests were repressed through police break-ups, but otherwise the campaign was largely unrepressed.
- **Repression Backfire:** None; Repression was not given as a reason for mobilization.

Sources:

1. Bierschenk, Thomas. "Democratization without Development: Benin 1989-2009." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 22, no. 3 (2009): 337-57.
2. Jennifer C. Seely (2005) The legacies of transition governments: post-transition dynamics in Benin and Togo, *Democratization*, 12:3, 357-377.
3. Rachel M. Gisselquist (2008) Democratic Transition and Democratic Survival in Benin, *Democratization*, 15:4, 789-814.

MEC ID: 52/2757

Maximalist Campaign: Anglophone Crisis

Reformist Claim(s): On October 11, 2016 a series of strikes and protests began by South Cameroonian lawyers organized a protest of several hundred demanding a return to a Common Law and the change to a federal government system and the use of English in courts. On November 21, teachers on strike over the same language issue were joined by several thousand South Cameroonians demanding more Anglophone teachers, before being violently dispersed by the police. A series of further protests followed throughout Nov. and early Dec. Though originally separate organizations, they quickly joined together as the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) on December 6. From Dec.-mid Jan. an ad hoc government committee attempted to negotiate with the Consortium but talks collapsed due to the police violence. During this early period, organizing was led largely by domestic Anglophone Cameroonians until the arrest of the Consortium leadership in January 2017. At the same time the government shut down the internet to the region and closed many schools. While this repression continued, the government also offered new concessions, including measures to increase bilingualism and multiculturalism. Following The arrest of Consortium leaders on Jan. 17, groups advocating secession from the rest of Cameroon grew in strength with the support of many diaspora communities.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2757

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 01/17/2017; The diaspora community leadership was much more inclined to pursue a secessionist movement following the arrest of the Consortium leaders.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1, Until their arrest the movement was led by the leadership of the CACSC with Felix Khongo Agbor Balla serving as president.
- **Mobilization:** 1; Mobilization was led first by lawyers and teacher's organizations, then the CACSC.
- **Organization:** 6; Pre-existing trade organization.
- **Structure:** 1; After the initial protests the movement came together under the CACSC.
- **Cohesion:** 1; Under the CACSC the movement presented a unified set of demands.
- **Composition:** 5; Though initially led by lawyers and teachers the movement quickly included broad representation.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1; Engagement first began on Nov. 25, between the Cameroonian Prime Minister and CACSC leadership. This was unsuccessful and followed up with negotiations with the government ad hoc committee.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1; Engagement first began on Nov. 25, between the Cameroonian Prime Minister and CACSC leadership. This was unsuccessful and followed up with negotiations with the government ad hoc committee.
- **Concession(s):** 1; 12/1/2016. During the negotiations the government agreed to a number of demands before the CACSC pulled out of talk due to repression.
- **Concession Backfire:** 0
- **Repression:** Targeted and Widespread; The police used arrests and intimidation against both protests and CACSC leadership. The government also closed schools and shut down the internet.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1, Government repression led the CACSC leadership to break off talks with the government.

Sources:

1. "Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads." International Crisis Group. August 2, 2017. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-camerouns-anglophone-crisis-crossroads>.
2. Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle, Hans De Marie Heungoup. "The "Anglophone crisis": A tale of the Cameroonian postcolony". *African Affairs*, Volume 116, Issue 464, July 2017, 526–538.
3. Okereke, C. Nna-Emeka. "Analysing Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 10, no. 3 (2018): 8-12. Accessed January 9, 2020.

MEC ID: 63/2758

Maximalist Campaign: Tiananmen Square

Reformist Claim(s): On April 15 Communist Party reformer Hu Yaobang died of a heart attack. Hu was highly regarded by the students of Beijing for his moderate policy regarding student protest; to honor this effort the students of various Beijing universities planned to march to Tiananmen Square on April 16 and 17. “On the 16th several hundred students marched and by the next evening, approximately 2,000 students took part in marches to the square.” These marches were organized by a new student organization, the Autonomous Student Union of Beijing Universities and Colleges.” “Starting on the night of April 17, three thousand PKU students marched from the campus towards Tiananmen Square, and soon nearly a thousand students from Tsinghua joined. Upon arrival, they soon joined forces with those already gathered at the Square. As its size grew, the gathering gradually evolved into a protest, as students began to draft a list of pleas and suggestions (Seven Demands) for the government:

1. Affirm Hu Yaobang's views on democracy and freedom as correct.
2. Admit that the campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization had been wrong.
3. Publish information on the income of state leaders and their family members.
4. Allow privately run newspapers and stop press censorship.
5. Increase funding for education and raise intellectuals' pay.
6. End restrictions on demonstrations in Beijing.
7. Provide objective coverage of students in official media”

During these initial periods the government had not settled on a clear response to the protests, instead opting to occasionally peacefully dispersing the protests. “Although the government prohibited student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square during Hu’s funeral on April 22, the students continued to protest in the Square. 50,000 students occupied the square the night before the funeral and remained there through the next day.” On April 26 the Central Government released an editorial in the *People’s Daily* which polarized both students and average citizens by condemning the acts of the students as a form of anti-government action. Despite the increased attention caused by the editorial, the government and several student leaders met on April 28, though these had little result as the government failed to make concessions to the entire movement. Throughout the next several weeks there were multiple new protests in Tiananmen Square, with both an increasing number of protesters and growing demands. At times the protest would reach over one million protesters from various walks of life, including students, workers, and everyday citizens. On May 19 the government formally declared martial law and began

military operations to clear the Square, utilizing increasing violence. Violence continued for the next several days before the government was able to completely stem the protests.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 7

Demand Escalation (date and description): 04/26/1989; The Central Government Editorial published on this date made clear that the student protests would not be tolerated going forward, catalyzing the protests towards more maximalist goals. “In a twist of irony, student factions who genuinely called for the overthrow of the Communist Party gained traction as the result of an April 26 editorial” (THE POWER OF TIANNAMEN)¹⁹⁵

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2758

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 0; These protests were organized across multiple universities and student groups without a clear leadership structure, despite the presence of senior student leaders such as Wang Dan and ASU President Wuer Kaixi.
- **Mobilization:** 1; Early mobilization was led by the Autonomous Student Union of Beijing Universities and Colleges.
- **Organization:** 5, students
- **Structure:** 0, Decentralized
- **Cohesion:** 1, Cohesive
- **Composition:** 2, fairly narrow composition prior to escalation with various students
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. The protesters attempted to negotiate with the government by presenting various officials with sets of demands regarding their reformist goals.

Government Response:

- **Engagement:** 1. The Central Party attempted to engage with individual leaders within the movement but not the Autonomous Student Union.
- **Concessions:** 0. Concessions were never made due to the government’s failure to recognize the central organizing body, a bare minimum requirement of the protests
- **Concessions Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** Widespread; Initially the protests were peacefully broken by Beijing police, who used little to no force and the students left without resistance. The government response to the protests did not turn violent until May 19 when martial law was declared.

¹⁹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Tiananmen_Square_protests#Turning_point:_April_26_Editorial

- **Repression Backfire:** Initially, the repression of the protests led to a greater turnout by the protesters, who flocked to the square and block government troops. The protests were effectively crushed following the entry of large numbers of government troops into the square on June 3.

Sources:

1. Atshan, Nida; Tedia, Aden (2010) "Chinese students campaign for democratic reform (Tiananmen Square), 1989" Global Nonviolent Action Database, Swarthmore College [online], accessed 8/15/19
<https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chinese-students-campaign-democratic-reform-tiananmen-square-1989>
2. Calhoun, Craig. "Revolution and Repression in Tiananmen Square." *Society* 26(6) 1989.
3. "Students Mourn Hu Yaobang, Demand that China's Politburo Resign". *The Associated Press*. April 17, 1989, Monday, AM cycle.
4. "Students Stage Sit-In At Great Hall Of People, Demand Reforms". *The Associated Press*. April 18, 1989, Tuesday, PM cycle.
5. Francis, Corinna-Barbara. "The Progress of Protest in China: The Spring of 1989." *Asian Survey* 29, no. 9 (1989): 898-915.
6. "Police Break Up Student Protest At Communist Party HQ". *The Associated Press*. April 18, 1989, Tuesday, AM cycle.
7. "Students Demanding Reforms Peacefully Dispersed by Police". *The Associated Press*. April 19, 1989, Wednesday, AM cycle.
8. "Campuses Quiet as Students Prepare For Talks With Government". *The Associated Press*. April 28, 1989, Friday, AM cycle.
9. "China Declares Martial Law To End Student Protests". *The Associated Press*. May 19, 1989, Friday, PM cycle.
10. By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, Special to The New York Times. "CHINA HARD-LINERS SEND TROOPS TO BEIJING; PARTY HEAD MAY BE OUT, REPORTING IS CURBED". *The New York Times*. May 20, 1989, Saturday, Late City Final Edition.
11. "Police Beat 45, Demonstrators Mass in Streets to Defy Martial Law". *The Associated Press*. May 20, 1989, Saturday, PM cycle.
12. "Violence at Tiananmen Could Leave Permanent Scar on China". *The Associated Press*. June 3, 1989, Saturday, AM cycle.
13. "1989 Tiananmen Square protests." Wikipedia.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Tiananmen_Square_protests#Turning_point:_April_26_Editorial>.

MEC ID: 65/2759

Maximalist Campaign: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and National Liberation Army

Reformist Claim(s): Throughout the 1950's and 1960's the Communist Party of Columbia mobilized rural peasants in an effort to alleviate the economic conditions and corruption. This came in the form of strikes and protests against the labor conditions that disadvantaged labors against the landowners. As the repression against the peasants grew, they also began to form defense units. Following the formation of the National Front between Liberal and Conservative groups in Columbia, peasants began to face increased repression leading to the formation of FARC out of the communist party.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2759

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 04/27/1964; FARC was established out of the peasant defense units of the Columbian Communist Party following increased regime repression.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1;
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilization was led by the Colombian Communist Party.
- **Organization:** 3. Pre-existing political party.
- **Structure:** 1;
- **Cohesion:** 1; demands were unified under the PCC.
- **Composition:** 3; initially made up of leftist intellectuals, peasants, and laborers
- **Movement Engagement:** 0;

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0;
- **Concession(s):** 0;
- **Concession Backfire:** NA;
- **Repression:** Widespread and targeted; The Colombian government utilized military action to target peasants sympathetic to or aligned with the PCC, as well as eventually banning the communist party.
- **Repression Backfire:** Repression led to the creation of more defense units and the eventual creation of FARC to combat the military repression.

Sources:

1. Brittain, James J. *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia : The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP / James J. Brittain ; Foreword by James Petras*. 2010.
2. Alfredo Molano (2000) The Evolution Of The Farc: A Guerrilla Group's Long History, *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 34:2, 23-31.

MEC ID: 107/2760

Maximalist Campaign: Greek Anti-Military

Reformist Claim(s): On Feb. 1, 4000 students at Athens Polytechnic went on strike seeking a greater role in school policies and the abolition of laws on student behavior. In response the government threatened to revoke the students' draft deferments if they did not return to class, followed by police raids and arrests. Protest spread to the major universities in Greece, though they were centered around Athens, while 88 student leaders were ordered to report for military service. Clashes continued sporadically between the regime and students as the regime underwent an attempt at liberalization.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2760

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 11/14/1973; Like previous protests, students gathered to press for greater academic freedom, though on this occasion protest quickly escalated and demanded the downfall of the regime.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 0; There was no centralized leadership within the movement.
- **Mobilization:** 0; there was no central organization mobilizing the movement.
- **Organization:** 5, Students.
- **Structure:** 0; Each university was autonomous in its effort, without any clear internal structure.
- **Cohesion:** 1; The various universities generally took direction from the first university to protest, Athens Polytechnic
- **Composition:** 1; University Students.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0; there were no observed attempts to negotiate on the part of the movement or the government.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0; there were no observed attempts to negotiate on the part of the movement or the government.
- **Concession(s):** 0
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** 1, targeted; 0, widespread. The government revoked students' military deferments, followed by arrests and beatings. Lastly the government shutdown the main point of protest, Athens University.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1, Increased mobilization.

Sources:

1. Special to The New York Times. "Greece Threatens to Draft Students in Campus Protests." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Feb 14, 1973.
2. Special to The New York Times. "Protesting Greek Students and Police Clash in Athens." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Feb 15, 1973.

3. Special to The New, York Times. "STUDENTS BEATEN BY ATHENS POLICE: ABOUT 100 ARE ARRESTED AS THEY PROTEST A CURB ON DRAFT DEFERMENTS SOME 2,000 INVOLVED STUDENTS IN ATHENS ARE BEATEN BY POLICE." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Feb 17, 1973.
4. Special to The New, York Times. "Athens University is Shut for a Week by Regime." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Mar 07, 1973.
5. Special to The New, York Times. "STUDENTS IN ATHENS STAGE MASS PROTEST." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Nov 15, 1973.

MEC ID: 113/2761

Maximalist Campaign: Guinean Pro-Democracy Protests

Reformist Claim(s): On January 10, the two largest Guinean labor unions began a nationwide strike with the support of 14 opposition parties, protesting the recent release of Guinea's wealthiest citizen and a former minister arrested for corruption. The strikers, accompanied by opposition protests, demanded an end to the corruption and the re-arrest of the suspects. On January 15 the protests turned violent, with police arresting and breaking up segments of the protests, while protesters turned to stone throwing. The leaderships' demands escalated on January 18 following the death of protesters, demanding the removal of the president. With mounting casualties, the Unions entered into negotiations with the government on the 20th, which ultimately proved unproductive. On February 27, Guineans returned to work after the trade unions and President Conte agreed on the ending the weeks of unrest – "Ex-diplomat Lansana Kouyate was chosen as a new prime minister on Monday night from a list supplied by unions and the opposition after a deal at the weekend. He replaces Eugene Camara - a close aide to the president whose appointment sparked the violence."¹⁹⁶

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Demand Escalation (date and description): 01/18/2007; Following the killing of a protester by the government repression the campaign took on new maximalist claims.

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2761

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1; Union leadership (Rabiatou Serah Diallo, CNGT), alongside that of the 14 opposition parties.
- **Mobilization:** 1; Trade unions CNGT and USTG

¹⁹⁶ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6399235.stm>

- **Organization:** 3, 6, pre-existing Labor Unions - CNGT, USTG; Pre-existing Political Parties
- **Structure:** 1;
- **Cohesion:** 1; The political parties involved in the protests appeared to have followed the lead of the labor unions, leading to a single set of demands.
- **Composition:** 2; union and opposition members.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, on January 20 the government and labor unions met for talks that were ultimately unproductive.

Government Response:

- **Engagement:** 1, on January 20 the government and labor unions met for talks that were ultimately unproductive.
- **Concessions:** 0;
- **Repression:** 0, targeted; 1, widespread; Government arrests and the breakup of protests.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1, after the initial strikes were met with government resistance many opposition members and average Guinean citizens joined the protests.

Sources:

1. "Guinea opposition calls for 'civil disobedience'". *Agence France Presse -- English*. January 9, 2007 Tuesday.
2. "Guinea opposition calls for 'civil disobedience'". *Agence France Presse -- English*. January 9, 2007 Tuesday.
3. Mouctar Bah. "General strike in Guinea turns violent". *Agence France Presse -- English*. January 15, 2007 Monday.
4. Mouctar Bah. (January 18, 2007 Thursday). One killed, several wounded in Guinea protests against president. *Agence France Presse -- English*.
5. Mouctar Bah. "Guinea police break up demo, arrest union leaders behind strike". *Agence France Presse -- English*. January 17, 2007 Wednesday.
6. Alexandre Grosbois. "Four more killed in Guinea as crisis talks under way". *Agence France Presse -- English*. January 20, 2007 Saturday.

MEC ID: 196/2762

Maximalist Campaign: Nyasaland African Congress

Reformist Claim(s): The early years of the Nyasaland African Congress were marked by a reformist tradition, due in large part to its composition of intellectuals and Africans with governmental posts. From 1944, when the party was founded, to 1956 it pursued a policy of increased African representation within the government bodies. This policy and its reliance on the intelligentsia and bureaucracy limited the size and ability of the

organization, reaching a high of 5000 members in 1953. 1953 was a turning point, both for the movement and for Malawi generally due to the outbreak of protests in the south over enforced Federation with Rhodesia. During this period the NAC nearly collapsed due to infighting between the moderate and radical wings of the party. During this period the party occasionally utilized nonviolent noncooperation favored by the more radical wing, though the moderates still favor working from within. This infighting allowed the radicals to come to power within the NAC which led to its transformation into a mass party structure, expanding its operations into the village level. By 1957 the party membership had risen to 13,000 and was actively pursuing the more radical program of non-cooperation. Political agitation increased through the next few years, particularly under the leadership of Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, who led the organization following his return to Malawi in July 1958. At this point the NAC had fully shifted from any form of reformism, to the outright removal of colonial rule, though the roots of this change go as far back as 1956. This radical position led to the subsequent banning of the party and the arrest of some of the party leadership, essentially shuttering the party.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Demand Escalation (date and description): 07/01/1957

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2762

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1; The party was headed by a party president throughout its history, during this period being led by Dr. Banda.
- **Mobilization:** 1; Mobilization was led by the NAC, along with its subsequent village, women's, and youth wings.
- **Organization:** 3; Pre-existing Political organization – Nyasaland African Congress.
- **Structure:** 1; Centralized
- **Cohesion:** 0; The internal makeup of the NAC was prone to infighting over strategy and didn't coalesce into a cohesive unit until at least 1956.
- **Composition:** 5; Originally the party was largely just intellectuals and bureaucrats, but later many different social actors joined.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1, During the early years of the movement leadership focused on engaging with the government, mostly unsuccessfully.

Government Response:

- **Engagement:** 1; During its reformist period the colonial government recognized the role of the party, though it did little with its recommendations.
- **Concessions:** 0
- **Concessions Backlash:** NA

- **Repression:** 1, widespread and 1, targeted; The party was banned and its leadership arrested during its radical phase while many of its members were assaulted by police.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1, the NAC was replaced by the much larger Malawi National Congress following its banning by British authorities.

Sources:

1. McCracken, J. (1998). Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: The Case of Malawi. *African Affairs*, 97(387), 231-249. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.du.idm.oclc.org/stable/723265>
2. Power, Joey. "Building Relevance: The Blantyre Congress 1953-1956." *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Special Issue: Malawi (Mar., 2002), pp. 45-65.
3. Tangri, Roger K. "The Rise of Nationalism in Colonial Africa: The Case of Colonial Malawi." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jan., 1968), pp. 142-161.

MEC ID: 341/2763

Maximalist Campaign: Pro-dem movement in Thailand

Reformist Claim(s): On April 19, 1991, 19 organizations representing various interest groups in Thailand joined with the Students Federation of Thailand (SFT) to form the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD). Their goal was to fight against the military's attempts to seize control of the country through a rewrite of the Thai constitution. Major protests began in November. The protesters' biggest concerns were the constitutional changes which would have allowed for an unelected Prime Minister and granted greater powers to the military appointed senate. On November 19, 70,000 protesters turned out, but after the protest the Thai King intervened, asking protesters to wait until after the March 1992 election and allow the passage of the new constitution. To further diffuse the situation, the head of the military, General Suchinda, promised he would not accept the position.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2763

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 04/07/1992; Following the March elections, General Suchinda went back on his previous agreement not to accept the role of Prime Minister. The following day the movement began to remobilize towards the removal of Suchinda and the end of military government.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 0; Despite unifying under the Campaign for Popular Democracy the movement did not appear to have a singular leader or leadership structure.

- **Mobilization:** 1; Campaign for Popular Democracy.
- **Organization:** 3, 4, 5; Pre-existing Student Groups - SFT, Pre-existing Political Parties, Pre-existing non-political movements - NGO's.
- **Structure:** 0, the campaign was centralized within the CPD.
- **Cohesion:** 1; The movement coalesced around the CPD.
- **Composition:** 5; widespread public involvement.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Concession(s):** 1; following the Nov. 19 protests, General Suchinda promised not to accept the position of Prime Minister if offered to him, conceding a key concern of the protesters.
- **Concession Backfire:** Following the election Suchinda went back on the concession, leading to the campaign's escalation.
- **Repression:** 0
- **Repression Backfire:** NA

Sources:

1. Global Nonviolent Action Database: "Thai People Successfully Defend Democracy Against Military Coup, 1992."
<http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/thai-people-successfully-defend-democracy-against-military-coup-1992> accessed 8/26/16.
2. Schock, Kurt, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2005,
3. Sharp, Gene. *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*. Boston, Porter Sargent. 2005.

MEC ID: 396/2764

Maximalist Campaign: Kosovo Albanian

Reformist Claim(s): In November 1988 Albanian miners in Kosovo led a series of strikes and protests against the growing rule of Milosevic and his attempts to reduce the rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. "At dawn that day, 3,000 miners from Trepça left their pits and set off to march 45 kilometres (28 miles) to Prishtina. They were marching not for an extension of Albanian rights, but in defense of Yugoslavia and the constitution of 1974." "Throughout Kosovo, other marches formed to join in – perhaps 300,000 people." "In March 1989, the Kosovo Assembly, coerced by Yugoslav forces, voted for constitutional amendments annulling key aspects of Kosovo's autonomy. For the rest of 1989, protests started non-violently, but repeatedly degenerated into clashes between the armed police forces and protesters throwing stones or petrol bombs and even using firearms." Over the next several months various other protests and street demonstrations

would be held, as Kosovars continued to protest the denigration of their status and the elevation of the Serbians, though these protests would not escalate until the secessions of Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia and their subsequent conflicts with Serbia.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 2, social and political

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2764

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 07/01/1990; As the rest of Yugoslavia began to disintegrate the Kosovo Albanians began to demand secession of their own.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1; There was not any unifying leadership during the initial periods of the campaign, but as the LDK was formed its leader, President Ibrahim Rugove, took over leadership of the movement
- **Mobilization:** 0; Following the spontaneous mobilization during the initial protests the Democratic League of Kosovo was founded in December 1989, but it is unclear what the extent of their role was during this period. According to sources, the LDK failed to extend control over the entirety of the movement.
- **Organization:** 6; Pre-existing labor union - Miners Union
- **Structure:** 0; Prior to the escalation protest was largely decentralized, led by various groups (miner's strike) or began spontaneously (post-constitutional reform protests).
- **Cohesion:** 1; Despite the lack of unified leadership or organization, most protests were unified in the demand to uphold the right of Kosovo within the Yugoslavian Republic.
- **Composition:** 5; The protest participants appeared to have come from a wide breadth of Kosovian society.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0; There is no indication that either the government or movement attempted engagement with the other side.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0; There is no indication that either the government or movement attempted engagement with the other side.
- **Concession(s):** 0; The government did not offer concessions to the movement.
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** 0, targeted; 1, widespread; Following the initial strikes Serbian police repeatedly used violence to repress the protests, which led to increased violence on the part of protests and an escalation of the campaign.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1; increased mobilization

Sources:

1. Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Kosovo Albanians resist Serbian rule, 1990-1998" <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kosovo-albanians-resist-serbian-rule-1990-1998>

2. Clark, Howard. *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*. London: Pluto Press, 2000.
3. Judah, Tim. *Kosovo : What Everyone Needs to Know®*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
4. Rogel, Carole. "Kosovo: Where It All Began." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 17, no. 1 (2003): 167-82.

MEC ID: 416/2766

Maximalist Campaign: Serbian Republic of Krajina (Secession Campaign)

Reformist Claim(s): The Serbian National Council was created in response to Croatian attempts to separate from Yugoslavia, with the intention of supporting union with the Serbian-dominated state. Prior to Croatian independence, the party to pursue a policy of supporting this union through both referendum and pro-union protest. Following a breakdown of talks between Croatia and Yugoslavia, the SNC declared a policy of secession in response to any Croatian Independence.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Demand Escalation (date and description): 12/21/1991; The movement escalated following the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia.

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2766

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** 1; The Krajina movement was led by the Serbian National Council and its leader Milan Babic.
- **Mobilization:** 1; Mobilization was led by the Serbian National Council. [1]
- **Organization:** 15; No pre-existing organizations
- **Structure:** 1, Centralized
- **Cohesion:** 1, Cohesive
- **Composition:** 5; The movement was composed of ethnic Serbians from the Krajina region of Croatia, with support from the Yugoslavian Army (JNA).
- **Movement Engagement:** 0

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1; The Croatian Government attempted to engage with the Krajinans, who rejected these attempts
- **Concessions:** 0
- **Concessions Backlash:** NA
- **Repression:** 1, targeted; 0, widespread; The Croatian military fought multiple engagements with Krajinan separatists who were aided by the JNA.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0, there is no indication that mobilization demonstrably changed due to this repression.

Sources:

1. "OTHER REPORTS ON CROATIA; Serbian Krajina leaders reject talks offer by Croatian government". *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. January 10, 1991, Thursday.
2. "Yugoslavia's Collective Presidency Meets, Without Croatian Chief". *The Associated Press*. March 1, 1991, Friday, AM cycle.
3. Croatia Adopts New Constitution Authorizing Secession. *The Associated Press*. (December 21, 1990, Friday, AM cycle).
4. "Ethnic Serbs Say They Will to Secede from Croatian Republic". *The Associated Press*. February 28, 1991, Thursday, AM cycle.

MEC ID: 28/2767

Maximalist Campaign: Bolivian anti-juntas (General Guido Vildoso)

Reformist Claim(s): In 1982, momentum grew in Bolivia to oust a series of dictators ruling by military junta owing to widespread issues with the economy involving worker's wages and substantial increase in prices. By September, protests began in La Paz, growing to demand full resignation of the ruling regime. By the 17th, the size of marches had grown to over 100,000 participants. Eventually, the junta accepted the demands and ceded power.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2 (Economic, Price/tax increase and Labor/wage dispute)

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2767

Demand Escalation (date and description): 9/7/1982, "On September 7, the Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR) held its own hunger march in La Paz, attracting crowds of tens of thousands (some of whom went on to vandalize public buildings). Protesters rallied for three hours on La Paz's central avenue, waving orange and white placards and chanting slogans such as "Down with misery, hunger, and the military dictatorship.""

Movement structure: "COB had to organize clandestinely, political parties had been suppressed, and civil society organizations were weak, so many of the pro-democracy initiatives were led by small groups, such as the mineworkers' wives. During the struggles in 1980, the movement was led primarily by CONADE, which included the pro-democratic political parties, the COB, Christian base communities, and other smaller groups. By 1982, the COB was playing a more central role in leading the struggle" (Zunes 2018).

- **Leadership:** Yes, the Bolivian Workers' Union (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB) was the clear leader and mobilizer of this campaign.
- **Mobilization:** Yes, the Bolivian Workers' Union (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB) was the clear leader and mobilizer of this campaign

- **Organization:** 6 (the Bolivian Workers' Union (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB))
- **Structure:** No evidence of hierarchy found; clusters, multiple organizations
- **Cohesion:** Yes, campaign was cohesive
- **Composition:** 5 (unions, students, laborers, miners, churches)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 11/24/81, the military regime opened negotiations with miners
- **Movement Engagement:** 11/24/81, the military regime opened negotiations with miners
- **Concession(s):** 12/19/81, Torrelio agreed to recognize independent plant unions within 3 months and promised to legalize the Bolivian Workers' Union (COB) within one year
- **Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** none
- **Repression (describe both targeted and widespread):** Yes
- **Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire):** NA

Sources:

1. Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action database, "Bolivians successfully oust military regime, 1982" retrieved 3/31/2020 from:
<https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivians-successfully-oust-military-regime-1982>

MEC ID: 20/2769

Maximalist Campaign: Shanti Bahini

Reformist Claim(s): Following the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan the new government went about constructing a new constitution. Fearing a document which instilled the domination of the majority Bengali group, a delegation from the Jumma communities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) led by Manobendra Narayan Larma met with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister rejected their demands for regional autonomy and the Larma returned to CHT and formed the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS). Until 1975 the group attempted to gain minority rights through constitutional pressure, with Larma being elected to parliament in 1973. Throughout this period the Jumma people continued to be repressed by the Mujidar regime through the heavy policing of these communities and the settling of Bengali people in the CHT region. On January 25, 1975, the Prime Minister made Bangladesh into a one-party state, forcing members into his recently created party or leave the parliament. In response Larma returned to CHT and took the PCJSS underground, which alongside its armed group Shanti Bahini as part of the maximalist campaign.

Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1

Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2769

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 01/25/1975; On January 25 the Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of Bangladesh, turned the country into a one-party state. In response the parliamentary representative of the Chittagong Hill Tracts returned home and formed the Shanti Bahini to fight for greater autonomy for the Jumma ethnic minorities living in the region.

Movement Structure:

- **Leadership:** Clear; The movement was led by Manobendra Narayan Larma, the sole parliamentary representative from the Chittagong Hills Tracts.
- **Mobilization:** Clear; Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) founded by Larma on March 7, 1972 following the failed constitutional attempts.
- **Organization:** Political party, 3
- **Structure:** Centralized; Clear hierarchy present in the PCJSS.
- **Cohesion:** Unified; Due to the centralized structure the movement was relatively cohesive.
- **Composition:** Broad; The movement was made up of broad members of Jumma social groups.
- **Movement Engagement:** In February 1972 a delegation from the Jumma communities, led by Larma, met with the Prime Minister, who rejected their claim for constitutional autonomy.

Government Response:

- **Government Engagement:** In February 1972 a delegation from the Jumma communities, led by Larma, met with the Prime Minister, who rejected their claim for constitutional autonomy.
- **Concession(s):** None
- **Concession Backfire:** None
- **Repression:** Widespread; The Bangladeshi government utilized two methods to repress the Jumma people first by stationing military units in these communities and second through the settling of ethnic Bengali's in CHT.
- **Repression Backfire:** Unclear

Sources:

1. Panday, Pranab Kumar, and Ishtiaq Jamil. "Conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh 1: An unimplemented accord and continued violence." In *Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia*, pp. 143-160. Routledge, 2015.
2. Lailufar Yasmin. The Tyranny of the Majority in Bangladesh: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 20:1. 2014. 116-132.
3. Bhumitra Chakma. 2010. The post-colonial state and minorities: ethnocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 48:3. 281-300.

4. Islam, Syed Nazmul. "The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh: Integrational Crisis between Center and Periphery." *Asian Survey* 21, no. 12 (1981): 1211-222.

Appendix D – Case descriptions and coding decisions for the 39 non-escalated campaigns
(in numerical order by the reformist campaign ID)

MEC ID 493: Bangladesh Civil Servants Strike

Location: Bangladesh

Target: The Government of Bangladesh

Dates: 08/05/1991 - 08/27/1991

Outcome: Failure

Summary: Civil servants in Bangladesh campaigned for higher wages in August 1991, presenting the first major challenge to 5-month-old Zia government. Although around a million civil servants were involved in dispute although, only around 10,000 are reported to actively join the demonstrations. The civil servants staged daily 3 hours strikes as well as several 48 to 72 hour strikes over the course of 3 weeks. Furthermore, they staged demonstrations.

Civil servants demanded an increase from 1,605 taka (45 dollars) with allowances, to minimum of 2,400 taka (67 dollars). The government of Prime Minister refused the demands of civil servants, citing lack of funds. The strikers returned to work on August 27th after the Prime Minister threatened to dismiss the strikers.

Several clashes occurred during the strike as the police forces tried to disperse demonstrating civil servants with batons and tear gas. Furthermore, several leaders were arrested.

Campaign: 1991 Bangladesh Civil Servants Strike

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - wanting higher wage

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Leadership under Employee's Action Committee
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilization by Employee's Action Committee
- **Organization:** 6. Employee's Action Committee = Labor union
- **Structure:** 1. Centralized under the Employee's Action Committee, which is formed by four employees' federations, but acts as a single cohesive entity with its own centralized leadership structure. (Sources 2, 3)
- **Composition:** 1. Government employees
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand of higher wage
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Requested meeting with President Zia which was initially refused. Sources say unannounced talks were held with government ministers on Friday August 23, 1991. Talks with the President were held on Monday August 26, 1991. (Sources 1, 4)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Requested meeting with President Zia which was initially refused. Sources say unannounced talks were held with government ministers on Friday August 23, 1991. Talks with the President were held on Monday August 26, 1991. (Sources 1, 4)
- **Concession(s):** 1. Government offered to raise monthly salaries on a range between 900 taka (25 dollars) and 10,000 taka (28 dollars), retroactive to July 1. Civil servants at the bottom of the salary scale would still only receive a total of 1,605 taka (45 dollars) with allowances, short of the demanded minimum wage: 2,400 taka (67 dollars). Unclear on the exact date but likely August 19 or 20, 1991. (Sources 1, 4)
- **Concession Backfire:** 1. Protesters rejected the offer and strike continued with a daily three-hour token strike and planned for a 24-hour stoppage Thursday
- **Repression:** 1. Targeted; 1. Widespread. Union leaders arrested; police and paramilitary used baton-wielding police and paramilitary, as well as tear gas
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Protests dissipated soon afterwards.

Sources

1. Bangladesh civil servants fight police as strike continues, Agence France Presse, August 24, 1991
2. Bangladeshi civil servants report to work after failed strike, Agence France Presse, August 27, 1991
3. "Bangladesh government employees demonstrate for wage hike". *Agence France Presse -- English*. August 5, 1991. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TDD-SC30-0031-V15K-00000-00&context=1516831>.
4. "Civil servants strike collapses after government's dismissal threat". *Agence France Presse -- English*. August 26, 1991. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TDD-S9G0-0031-V0T3-00000-00&context=1516831>.

MEC ID 532: 2012 Patriotism Class Protest

Location: Hong Kong

Target: Hong Kong and Chinese Gov't

Dates: 9/1/2012 – 9/8/2012

Outcome: Success

Summary: On September 1, around 40,000 students and parents demonstrated outside of the government headquarters to force the government to scrap mandatory Chinese patriotism lessons for students. Rallies continued every day, with hundreds protesting

during the day and thousands joining them in the evenings. On September 7, the largest crowd yet, estimated by organizers to be around 120,000 but by police to be 36,000, rallied outside of government headquarters. On September 8, after days of protesting, the government backed down on their plan for making the patriotism classes mandatory.

Campaign: Patriotism Class Protests

Reformist Claim(s): Other - highly context specific demand of removing mandatory Chinese patriotism classes (1)

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Leadership by Scholarism and the National Education Parents' Concern Group which held negotiations with government ministers before the protests began.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilization by National Education Parents' Concern Group
- **Organization:** 5 = student-led, 15 = National Education Parents' Concern Group
- **Structure:** 0 - decentralized
- **Composition:** 3 - teachers, students, and parents
- **Cohesive:** 1 Cohesive demand of getting rid of mandatory patriotism classes
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Education Minister met with National Education Parents' Concern Group, though negotiations broke down on July 28, 2012.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Education Minister met with National Education Parents' Concern Group, though negotiations broke down on July 28, 2012. (1) The city's Beijing-backed leader, Leung Chun-ying, had rejected demands to meet the students, saying he would not negotiate the withdrawal of the policy he inherited from the previous government in July.
- **Concession(s):** 1. Government conceded, and patriotism classes were no longer mandatory. In a dramatic about face on the eve of the election, the Chief Executive held a press conference late Saturday 8 September 2012 to say the mandatory aspect of the policy had been scrapped
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped after concession
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 0 Widespread
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. NA

Sources

1. AFP. 2012. "Thousands hold rally in Hong Kong against patriotism class," Agence France Presse – English, September 1.

2. AFP. 2012. "H.K. students protest over 'brainwashing' classes," Agence France Presse – English, September 4.
3. AFP. 2012. "Hong Kong relents on patriotism classes on poll eve," Agence France Presse – English, September 8.

MEC ID 781: Anti-Police Bill Campaign

Location: Japan

Target: Government of Japan

Dates: 10/9/58 – 11/22/58

Outcome: Success

Summary: In October 1958 the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), holding a majority in both houses of the Japanese Diet, began pushing a bill to greatly strengthen the power of the police. Among other things, the bill would have given police greater flexibility in dispersing labor strikes and political demonstrations and the power to make preventive arrests. The bill was vehemently opposed by leftist forces in Japan. While the Socialist Party delayed passage of the bill through obstructive parliamentary maneuvers, leftist student unions and the powerful Sohyo federation of trade unions staged demonstrations and a 24-hour strike in which over 4 million workers participated. Because of the scale of popular opposition, on November 22nd PM Kishi of the LDP agreed to drop the bill.

Reformist Claim(s): Social - greater restrictions on social behavior such as labor strikes through increased police powers (1)

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Leadership by opposition parties, student unions, and trade unions
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilization by opposition parties, student unions, and trade unions
- **Organization:** 3 = opposition parties, 4= 'organizations of liberals and intellectuals', 5 = student unions, 6 = trade unions
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized alliance of various groups
- **Composition:** 5 broad - politicians, students, various workers, general sense of popular public support
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand calling for the prevention of the bill proposing to increase police powers

- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Leaders of opposition parties represented the movement and met with leaders of the government to reach a settlement deal on November 22, 1958

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Leaders of opposition parties represented the movement and met with leaders of the government to reach a settlement deal on November 22, 1958
- **Concession(s):** 1. Because of the scale of popular opposition, on November 22, PM Kishi of the LDP agreed to drop the bill
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped after concession
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression was not cited as a cause for protest. But this is ambiguous because the initial demand was related to increasing police powers, which is linked to police crackdown repression.

Sources

1. Special to The New York Times “Kishi Challenged on Police Reform.” The New York Times (1958, October 26).
2. “Japanese Fight Police Bill.” The New York Times (1958, October 29).
3. Trumbull, Robert. “Socialist Party Strikes in Japan.” The New York Times (1958, October 10).
4. Trumbull, Robert. “Japanese Battle New Police Bill.” The New York Times (1958, November 6).
5. Trumbull, Robert. “Kishi Drops Fight over Police Bill.” The New York Times (1958, November 23).

MEC ID 874: 1972 Language Riots

Location: Pakistan

Target: Provincial Government of Sindh

Dates: 07/07/1972 - 07/14/1972

Outcome: Success

Summary: The Sindh Provincial Assembly passed a bill that recognized Sindhi as the only official language. The bill led to widespread riots in the Urdu-speaking communities, who wished that Urdu given the same status. The riots often led to lootings and clashes between both communities as well as the police. During the week of rioting, several towns were placed under curfew. Nevertheless, at least 60 people were killed, most of them by police gunfire. After a week of riots, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced that Urdu and Sindhi will both be official languages.

Reformist Claim(s): Social - ethnic language rights.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 0. Unclear.
- **Organization:** 0. Unclear.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 5 - sense of general public involvement.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Including Urdu as an official language.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Unclear.
- **Concession(s):** 1. Urdu was included as an official language.
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests ended after concession.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown included at least 60 deaths.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0.

Sources

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Language_violence_in_Sindh
2. PAKISTANI TOLL 47 IN LANGUAGE RIOTS: 19 Reported Killed in New Protests Over Sindh, New York Times ; Jul 11, 1972
3. Another Pakistani Town Put Under Curfew After Violence New York Times ; Jul 15, 1972

MEC ID 957: 2004-2006 Farmers Protest

Location: South Korea

Target: Government of South Korea

Dates: 11/13/2004 – 3/23/2006

Outcome: Failure

Summary: In November, some 15,000 angry South Korean farmers marched from Seoul's railway station to the City Hall in a protest against government plans to allow foreign rice-producers a greater share of the domestic market. Following the march, about 3,000 farmers with bamboo sticks and bricks fought with riot police swinging sticks and shields. Another violent protest erupted the following week, as South Korea and China held talks in Beijing on rice market liberalization. Seoul has been engaged in rice talks with China, the US, Thailand, Australia, and 5 other countries. Under a 1994 agreement, South Korea limited rice imports to 4% of total domestic need for 10 years and while

South Korea hopes to extend its annual import quota for another decade, other countries want it to raise the quota or adopt a tariff system in 2005. In December, the police detained some 300 farmers for staging illegal street protests and at the end of the month, the government unveiled a trade deal under which it will double rice imports in return for another 10-year grace period before fully opening up its agricultural markets. Protests continued in 2005, with over 150,000 farmers in 90 areas dumping rice bags and farming machines outside government offices on October 28. The day before, a national assembly committee passed a rice import motion and forwarded it to the plenary session for ratification. The government pledged greater financial benefits for the farming community, but farmers say they will step up protests if the national assembly endorses the rice deal. Violent rallies protesting the opening of South Korea's rice market continued in November and December, with farmers hurling stones and pummeling riot police as police blocked roads with buses and sprayed water over the protesters. In March 2006, farmers clashed with riot police as the first shipment of foreign rice for sale to consumers arrived in the port of Busan.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - protest greater introduction of foreign rice-producers.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Unions.
- **Organization:** 6 = unions (e.g., Korean Peasant League, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions).
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 2 - farmers and workers.
- **Cohesive:** 0. Workers/unions called on the government to abolish a labor reform bill aimed at allowing employers to hire more temporary workers. Farmers, meanwhile, are opposed to the opening up of the country's rice market to foreign competition.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None.
- **Concession(s):** 0. None.
- **Concession Backfire:** NA.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as a reason for continued protest.

Sources

1. AFP. 2004. "South Korean farmers clash with police in protest against rice import," Agence France Presse, November 13.

2. AFP. 2004. "South Korean farmers stage violent protests," Agence France Presse, November 19.
3. AFP. 2004. "South Korean police detain 300 farmers over rice demonstrations," Agence France Presse, December 20.
4. AFP. 2004. "South Korea unveils deal on doubling rice imports for 10-year grace period," Agence France Presse, December 30.
5. AFP. 2005. "South Korean farmers protest against rice import law," Agence France Presse, October 28.
6. AP. 2005. "South Korean farmers stage violent rally in Seoul against rice deal, warn of more protests," Associated Press, November 15.
7. AP. 2005. "South Korean rice farmers in battle for livelihood against plans to open domestic market," Associated Press, November 22.
8. AFP. 2005. "Angry South Korean farmers stage protest ahead of WTO talks," Agence France Presse, December 1.
9. AFP. 2005. "South Korean workers, farmers rally," Agence France Presse, December 4.
10. AFP. 2006. "US rice arrives in South Korea, farmers clash with police," Agence France Presse, March 23.

MEC ID 1037: Forum of the Poor

Location: Thailand

Target: Gov't of Thailand

Dates: 3/30/1996 – 5/2/1997

Outcome: Success

Summary: On March 30, a coalition of various groups, including farmers, industrial workers, slum dwellers, displaced villagers, and students, joined forces as the Forum of the Poor. They began protesting in front of the Government House in Bangkok over land rights, labor rights, and social services. On March 30, 6,000 protesters gathered, with that number rising higher on March 31. By April 7, that number had risen to 13,000 and the group threatened that even more demonstrators would join them if the government continued to ignore their demands. Prime Minister Banharn spurned all their demands. On April 8, at least 10,000 demonstrators remained, and leaders of the Forum of the Poor said they would remain in front of the Government House until they were sure the government was committed to addressing their grievances. Negotiations were set to begin; however, the outcome of these negotiations was unknown and no further protests were reported until January 1997. On January 25, thousands of rural protesters began streaming into Bangkok to stage a sit-in in front of the Government House in Bangkok.

By January 28, the number of protesters participating in the sit-in had grown to 20,000. The group vowed to stay in front of the Government House until concrete action is taken to address their demands. On January 29, 300 representatives of the protesters met with government officials to discuss their concerns and demands. While little progress was made, the protesters viewed the meetings as a positive sign, as they showed the government's willingness to listen to the people. Talks continued for at least 3 days, with little concrete progress reported. Protests continued for 3 months, with up to 10,000 people camping out in front of the Government House. On April 29, the government approved a 47-million-baht fund to compensate villagers displaced by infrastructure projects. A spokesperson for the protest group said the government had addressed about 90% of their grievances. On May 2, after the prime minister created several committees to follow through on their concerns.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - land rights, labor rights, anti-poverty measures

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Forum of the Poor.
- **Organization:** 15 - Forum of the Poor.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized coalition.
- **Composition:** 5 = farmers, industrial workers, slum dwellers, displaced villagers, and students.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand for land/labor rights and social services.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Movement leaders and government met on unknown date(s) in 1996 and again on Jan 29, 1997 for at least three days.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Movement leaders and government met on unknown date(s) in 1996 and again on Jan 29, 1997 for at least three days.
- **Concession(s):** 1. On April 29, the government approved a 47-million-baht fund to compensate villagers displaced by infrastructure projects. A spokesperson for the protest group said the government had addressed about 90% of their grievances. On May 2, after the prime minister created several committees to follow through on their concerns.
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. NA.

Sources

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2. AFP. 1996. "Thousands in second week of protest at Thai Government House," Agence France Presse – English, April 7.
3. AFP. 1996. "Thousands of Thailand's poor protest at government house," Agence France Presse – English, April 8.
4. AFP. 1997. "Thousands of Thai farmers converge on Government House," Agence France Presse – English, January 26.
5. AFP. 1997. "Up to 20,000 Thais join protest outside government," Agence France Presse – English, January 28.
6. AFP. 1997. "Protesting Thai villagers meet with government officials," Agence France Presse – English, January 29.
7. AFP. 1997. "Thai protesters meet with government officials," Agence France Presse – English, January 30.
8. AFP. 1997. "Thai protesters start third day of talks with government," Agence France Presse – English, January 31.
9. AFP. 1997. "Thai cabinet approves compensation fund for protesting poor," Agence France Presse – English, April 29.
10. AFP. 1997. "12,000 end three-month protest at Thailand's Government House," Agence France Presse – English, May 2

MEC ID 1053: Civil Servant Strike

Location: Benin

Target: Gov't of Benin

Dates: 2/16/1998-2/27/1998

Outcome: Success

Summary: Benin's civil servants started a four-day general strike on February 16, 1998 to demand salary increases and better living conditions. Government workers across most departments heeded the call to not go to work, although the private sector was not affected. Most education facilities were closed. The strike was renewed on February 23, after unions rejected the government's offer to pay US\$8.2 million of salary increases accrued at the end of 1996. Benin has 37,000 civil servants. Some 37,000 workers resumed work on February 27th after eight days of general strike. All the public services opened their doors with the exception of schools and the national university. The workers embarked on this strike to demand salary increases and to press for improved working conditions. The trade unions and the government reached an agreement at dawn on March 1st, after 14 hours of negotiation.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - better pay and living conditions

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilized by unions
- **Organization:** 6. Unions
- **Structure:** 0. De-centralized
- **Composition:** 1. civil servants
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive economic demands for better pay
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. On February 23, unions rejected the government's offer to pay US\$8.2 million of salary increases accrued at the end of 1996. The trade unions and the government reached an agreement at dawn on March 1st, after 14 hours of negotiation. (Sources 3, 5)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. On February 23, unions rejected the government's offer to pay US\$8.2 million of salary increases accrued at the end of 1996. The trade unions and the government reached an agreement at dawn on March 1st, after 14 hours of negotiation. (Sources 3, 5)
- **Concession(s):** 1. On February 23, unions rejected the government's offer to pay US\$8.2 million of salary increases accrued at the end of 1996. (Source 3)
- **Concession Backfire:** 1. The strike was renewed after the initial rejection of the government's offer. (3)
- **Repression:** 0. Unclear.
- **Repression Backfire:** NA.

Sources

1. AFPR. 1998. "Benin's Civil Servants Strike," *Agence France Presse*, February 16.
2. AFPR. 1998. "Benin Opposition Calls for Dialogue as Civil Servants Strike," *Agence France Presse*, February 16.
3. AFPR. 1998. "Benin Civil Servants Renew General Strike," *Agence France Presse*, February 23.
4. "BENIN: STRIKING WORKERS END STRIKE, RESUME WORK". *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring*. February 28, 1998, Saturday. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3W49-6B80-00KJ-D089-00000-00&context=1516831>.
5. "BENIN: GOVERNMENT, TRADE UNIONS REACH AGREEMENT ON PAYMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS". *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring*. March 3, 1998, Tuesday. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp->

MEC ID 1061: Soldier Mutiny

Location: Burkina Faso

Target: Gov't of Burkina Faso

Dates: 4/14/2011-4/19/2011

Outcome: Limited success

Summary: Dozens of members of President Compaoré's personal guard fired shots into the air on April 14, 2011, in apparent protest in two army barracks. The shots were fired in protest at outstanding housing subsidies that had been promised but not paid. The initial shots were followed by a day of massive protests on April 15, and a night of rioting by mutinous soldiers. Troops also set fire to the home of Compaoré's chief of staff, and the president dissolved his government on the 15th and named a new army chief, seeking to reassert his authority. The mutiny continued on April 16, and by the 17th the army revolt had spread to the southern parts of Burkina Faso, where soldiers seized a key town. Students joined the violent protests on April 18, and a new Prime Minister was named the same day as mutinous soldiers and police poured into the streets of several towns. The goals of the riots came to encompass many of the grievances expressed during the massive protests of April 8, to include government's impunity over deaths such as that of Norbert Zongo. In April, President Compaore dismissed his cabinet and his army chief and calm appeared to return to the city's streets. Campaign is coded as "limited success" because housing subsidies were not reinstated (no reports in press), but governors in all of its 13 regions were replaced.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - unpaid housing subsidies. Eventually encompassed political aims - impunity of deaths that the government was responsible for. More economic demands were also added, protesting the rising cost of living by unions and other people. (Sources 3, 8)

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. None
- **Mobilization:** 1. Initially mobilized by dissatisfied soldiers, and later included students
- **Organization:** 7. Splintering of armed forces. 5. Students. 6. Trade unions, National Coalition against the High Cost of Living (CCVC) = an alliance of trade unions, consumer organizations, rights groups and small businesses (Source 2)

- **Structure:** 0. Initially centralized within the army but increasingly decentralized with students and trade unions joining in
- **Composition:** 5. Largely military but students, trade unions, rights groups, small businesses, and a sense of the general public joining
- **Cohesive:** 0. Initially cohesive demand of housing subsidies but increasingly disparate with students and unions joining and evolving to encompass generally rising cost of living and political aims of government impunity
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. On April 15 and 17, 2011, government and armed forces met (Sources 2, 7)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. On April 15 and 17, 2011, government and armed forces met (Sources 2, 7)
- **Concession(s):** 1. On 16 April the president dissolved his government and named a new army chief (Source 3)
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests continued after the initial personnel changes though they were not cited as a reason for continued protests. Protests stopped after further personnel changes
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0

Sources

1. AFPR. 2011. "Presidential Guards in Burkina Faso Protest," Agence France Presse, April 14.
2. AFPR. 2011. "Burkina Faso Leader Battles Mutiny," Agence France Presse, April 15.
3. AFPR. 2011. "Burkina Faso Leader Dissolves Government Amid Mutiny," Agence France Presse, April 15.
4. AFPR. 2011. "Burkina Faso Mutiny Enters Third Day with Widespread Looting," Agence France Presse, April 16.
5. AFPR. 2011. "Burkina Faso Army Revolt Spreads to the South," Agence France Presse, April 17.
6. AFPR. 2011. "Burkina Faso Mutiny Spreads to Fourth City," Agence France Presse, April 18.
7. AFPR. 2011. "Youths Stage Violent Demo in West Burkina Faso," Agence France Presse, April 18.
8. AFPR. 2011. "Burkina Faso Gets New PM as Mutiny Spreads," Agence France Presse, April 18.
9. AFPR. 2011. "Soldiers Open Fire in North Burkina Faso but Calm Returns," Agence France Presse, April 19.

MEC ID 1075: Oil Pipeline Strike

Location: Cameroon

Target: Dispute with Doba Logistics contracted under the Gov't of Cameroon

Dates: 5/14/2002-5/28/2002

Outcome: Success

Summary: Thousands of Cameroonians working on the pipeline that would link oilfields between Chad and Cameroon went on strike starting on May 14, 2002 to protest low wages and poor working conditions. The workers were demanding health insurance for themselves and for their families, the establishment of a solidarity fund, payments to the national social security fund, and the payment of salary arrears. The workers returned to work on May 28, 2002 after a deal was signed with the government whereby salaries and working conditions would be brought into line with those practiced in the lucrative oil industry. As many as 5,000 people worked on the construction of the oil pipeline.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - better wages and working conditions.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear - several unions involved without any figurehead
- **Mobilization:** 1. By unions
- **Organization:** 6. Unions
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized with several unions
- **Composition:** 1. Oil pipeline workers
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand for better wages and working conditions
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. On May 23, unions tried to engage the government in complaining about their contractors, Doba Logistics

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Government agreed to a deal with movement sometime between May 23-May 28
- **Concession(s):** 1. Government agreed to a deal with movement sometime between May 23-May 28
- **Concession Backfire:** 0.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. NA

Sources

1. AFPR. 2002. "Work Resumes on Cameroon-Chad Pipeline after Strike," Agence France Presse, May 28.

2. Gus Selassie. "Striking Workers End Action on Cameroon/Chad Pipeline". *IHS Global Insight*. May 29, 2002. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:497X-4NX0-01DF-W2Y0-00000-00&context=1516831>.

MEC ID 1111: 2006 Poverty Protests

Location: Conakry, Labe, Kindia & Pita, Guinea

Target: Guinean government and private sector employers

Dates: February 23, 2006 - June 16, 2006

Outcome: Limited

Summary: On February 23, 2006 two labor movements, The National Confederation of Workers of Guinea (CNTG) and the Public Service Workers Union of Guinea (USTG) called for a nationwide strike in protest against the government and private sector's indifference to poverty as prices of basic food commodities have risen beyond the reach of the majority of the country's eight million people inhabitants.

Originally intended to be a five-day strike, but recurring in June 2006, the protest picked up momentum attracting teachers and students alike; negatively impacting final exams-reason for student protest. Campaign objectives included a demand in reduction of fuel prices, reduction in food prices (specifically rice), and a four-fold hike in government workers' salaries.

Student clashes with the nation's security forces resulted in 18 deaths, escalating from retaliatory stone throwing, regime use of tear gas, and non-lethal measures to use of force, and in some cases reportedly rape. Protest participants numbered 3,000 for Unionists in Conakry and 6,000 for protesters in Conakry, but no numbers for nationwide participants.

The limited success of the campaign can be attributed to union and government agreement on salary hikes, but only promise of talks on fuel prices, and no mention of food prices.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - salary hikes, reduction in fuel and food prices, Other - students and teachers protesting the cancellation of their exams

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Leadership provided by National Confederation of Workers of Guinea (CNTG) and the Public Service Workers Union of Guinea (USTG)
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilization by National Confederation of Workers of Guinea (CNTG) and the Public Service Workers Union of Guinea (USTG)

- **Organization:** 6 - labor unions; 5 - to a much smaller scale, students too (Source 1, 7)
- **Structure:** 0. An alliance between two organizations as well as the inclusion of several smaller stakeholders like teachers and students
- **Composition:** 3 - workers (by and large), students, and teachers
- **Cohesive:** 0. By and large the workers had economic demands but different parts of the movements (students and teachers) were protesting the cancellation of their exams
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Ongoing dialogue between government and unions during 13-16 June 2006

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Ongoing dialogue between government and unions during 13-16 June 2006
- **Concession(s):** 1. Accord was reached with government conceding some demands on 16 June 2006
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. None. Workers went back to work the next day
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread. Violent clashes with police resulting in at least 21 deaths
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Protests continued but repressions not cited as a reason

Sources

1. "Guinean labour movements call for five day general strike." Agence France Presse -- English. February 23, 2006 Thursday 10:06 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
2. "General strike shuts shops, schools across Guinea." Agence France Presse -- English. February 27, 2006 Monday 12:03 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
3. "Guinea government calls on workers to end strike." Agence France Presse -- English. March 2, 2006 Thursday 7:28 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
4. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
5. "Tensions high in strike-hit Guinea after student killed: witnesses." Agence France Presse -- English. June 11, 2006 Sunday 5:06 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
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7. "Thousands of students protest suspension of exams in Guinea; Red Cross says 6 killed." The Associated Press. June 12, 2006 Monday 11:52 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

8. "Guinea unions reject government pay offers." Agence France Presse -- English. June 15, 2006 Thursday 4:40 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
9. "Accord reached to end Guinea strike." Agence France Presse -- English. June 16, 2006 Friday 9:14 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
10. "Guinea forces raped, killed demonstrators, says rights group." Agence France Presse -- English. July 6, 2006 Thursday 4:24 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

MEC ID 1141: Protests Against Muluzi's Reelection

Location: Malawi

Target: Gov't of Malawi

Dates: 11/1/2002 - 1/31/2003

Outcome: Success

Summary: A series of demonstrations took place when it was announced that Bakili Muluzi would seek an as-yet illegal third term as president. Protests remained largely peaceful, however in one instance police fired on crowds and injured two participants. Students in Blantyre staged a riot in response to the proposed third term, setting fire to party offices and breaking windows in university buildings. Parliament met to consider the bill that would allow Muluzi to run for a third term. The measure was not approved, and after a great deal of internal and external political pressure Muluzi ceded power to his successor in 2004.

Reformist Claim(s): Political - protesting an amendment to the political system that would allow third presidential terms.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear
- **Mobilization:** 1.
- **Organization:** 3 = opposition parties, 4 = movements (Forum for the Defense of the Constitution) 5 = students, 10 = Christian lobby groups (Public affairs Committee) (1, 2)
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized
- **Composition:** 5 - Broad with general public involvement
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand to stop a third presidential term
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Unclear
- **Concession(s):** 1. The bill that would allow a third presidential term did not pass
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped after the concession was made
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - largely peaceful but police shot into crowds and injured at least two protesters
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as a reason for continued protest

Sources

1. "Malawi lobby group plans demonstrations against Muluzi". *Agence France Presse -- English*. January 26, 2003 Sunday. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:47SR-DPY0-00GS-K3M5-00000-00&context=1516831>.
2. FELIX MPONDA. "Around 1,000 demonstrators in Malawi march against Muluzi ATTENTION - UPDATES, INCORPORATES Malawi-parliament-demo". *Agence France Presse -- English*. January 27, 2003 Monday. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:47SY-DK90-00GS-K484-00000-00&context=1516831>.

MEC ID 1203: 1955 Tax Riots

Location: Sierra Leone

Target: Gov't of Sierra Leone

Dates: 12/1/1955 – 12/13/1955 (dates approximate)

Outcome: Success

Summary: In the early 1950s, Sierra Leone's economy appears to enjoy a period of economic boom with increases in the production of iron ore and diamond. However, the economic benefits did not seem to be distributed equally throughout society and failed to ameliorate the living conditions of the broad public. The result was a labor strike in 1955, followed by unrest in the northern parts of the country. The rioting affected in large part those chiefs whose authority was more dependent on the British. Local farmers refused to pay taxes, disobeyed orders to perform communal labor, and discontinued their customary tributes to the chiefs who depended on the British for their security in power. As the rioting progressed, chiefs' properties around the country were destroyed. The rioting eventually prompted far-reaching reforms in the existing system of local governance. A new constitution in 1956 declared that representation in the House of Representatives was to be by election. Newspaper reports from the time report that

rioters were wounded and killed by police rifle fire in Freetown on December 22. Crowds of rioters reached 1,000. The dates of the campaign are approximate due to lack of reporting.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - equal distribution of the country's wealth.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 0. Unclear.
- **Organization:** 0. Unclear.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 5 - general public involvement.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive economic demand.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None.
- **Concession(s):** 1. A new constitution declared a by-election for the House of Representatives.
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Unclear.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown including deaths.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as a reason for continued protest.

Sources

1. <http://www.issafrica.org/Af/profiles/SieraLeone/Politics.html>
2. Reuters. 1955. "Tax rioter killed in Sierra Leone," The Washington Post and Times Herald, December 23.

MEC ID 1265: Student riot over rising living cost

Location: Khartoum, Sudan

Target: Sudanese Government

Dates: 8/9/1979- 8/19/1979

Outcome: LIMITED

Summary: On August 9, 1979 "the government ordered the armed forces on alert because of student riots over the rising cost of living, including gasoline prices". The students barricaded the streets in two sections of the capital, hurled stones at cars, burned some of them and set fire to a filling station. No casualties were reported. "The price of a gallon of gasoline has gone up more than 25 percent to \$3".

August 11, 1979- Riots continue. Reports of some students being injured but no casualties. The source says the riots started in Khartoum and also in Omdurman where food and petroleum prices have risen dramatically. "Authorities closed three schools after University and Secondary school students attacked gas stations and stoned automobiles". "Officials said special courts would be set up to try those involved in disturbance. "Extra guards were placed around the government radio station in Khartoum, police trucks patrolled the streets and police were assigned to protect service stations".

August 13, 1979- Major General Gaafar al-Nimeiry took over the leadership of his nation's only political party and promised tough punishment for what he called the "Communist instigators" that led the student to protest. He announced he was reducing the price of meat and fuel and limited the use of Government cars.

August 19, 1979- "President Gaafar al-Nimeiry" removed seven ministers and two top advisors and brought the Moselm Brotherhood into his cabinet. This announcement was followed by the Government lifting subsidies on basic commodities such as flour and fuel which lead to 10 days rioting by students and workers.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - rising living costs.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Students.
- **Organization:** 5 = student protest.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 1 - students.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive protest against rising living costs.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Unclear.
- **Concession(s):** 1. Temporary reduction of costs, several replaced cabinet members.
- **Concession Backfire:** 1. After the lifting of subsidies, riots began again.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown, closed schools.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as a cause for continued protest.

Sources

1. The New York Times. 1979. "Sudanese Armed Forces on Alert as Students Riot on Living Costs".
2. The New York Times. 1979. "Sudan Leader Takes Over Party Saying He'll Punish Communists". In The New York Times, August 14, 1979.

3. The New York Times. 1979. "World News Brief". In The New York Times, August 19, 1979.

MEC ID 1279: African boycott against non-African goods/services

Location: Uganda

Target: British Protectorate Government

Dates: 03/07/1958 - 12/13/1959

Outcome: Unknown

Summary: A boycott by Africans in Uganda of Asian shops and some products and services provided by whites took a heavy toll. It was promoted by the Uganda National Movement, a young political organization, to demonstrate African dissatisfaction with the Government, to emphasize a dislike of Asians and to encourage trade exclusively among Africans. In the nine months since it began, it cost the British protectorate Government nearly \$2,000,000 in lost revenue from such sources as import duties and excise taxes. Hundreds of Asian shopkeepers have been forced out of business and 10,000 African workers have suffered unemployment. In response to the boycott a new law became effective making it a serious offense to advocate or encourage a boycott. The boycott only affected Buganda province.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - demand for intra-African trade.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Led by the Uganda National Movement
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilized by the Uganda National Movement
- **Organization:** 5 = Uganda National Movement is a youth political organization
- **Structure:** 0. Promoted by the single entity of the Uganda National Movement but the movement evolved to be a broadly public alliance
- **Composition:** 1. Broad with a sense of general public involvement
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive protest against non-African economic activity
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Unclear
- **Concession(s):** 0. None
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. NA
- **Repression:** 1. Targeted - Uganda National Movement banned; subsequent groups founded by the UGM leaders also banned; eight leaders subsequently

exiled from region. 1. Widespread - passed a law making it an offense to advocate for or encourage boycotts

- **Repression Backfire:** 0.

Sources

1. NYT. 1959. "African Boycott Costly to Uganda: Asian-Run Shops Forced to Close -- Products Sold by Whites Affected," New York Times, December 13.

MEC ID 1531: Student Riots

Location: France

Target: Central Government

Dates: 11/25/1986 - 12/7/1986

Outcome: Success

Summary: Students demand the abandonment of plans to overhaul French university system; Chirac warns that Government will not tolerate interference by 'street toughs'; protests have developed into what many believe is worst social turmoil to hit France since demonstrations and general strike of 1968; at least 68 people, including 58 policemen, were injured in fighting this weekend and 28 people arrested. French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac surrenders to key demand of protesting students and announces that Government is withdrawing legislation to overhaul country's university system; legislation provoked largest student demonstrations in France in almost 20 years. Chirac cites 'risks of violence' as reason for withdrawing university plan, which led to street protests by hundreds of thousands of students and created an atmosphere of crisis. Thousands of students march in Paris on Dec 10 to mark student victory in three-week confrontation with French Government and as act of bereavement for student who died after being beaten by police

Reformist Claim(s): Other - context specific concerns against proposed changes to the French university system.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear
- **Mobilization:** 1. Student mobilization (Source 1)
- **Organization:** 5 - student movement
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized
- **Composition:** 1. Students
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand to block changes to the university system
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Unclear
- **Concession(s):** 1. On 28 Nov, the proposed legislation was temporarily shelved for further review (Source 5). On 5 Dec 1986, the government made an initial concession to temporarily withdraw the most disputed parts of the legislation, but was rejected. On 8 Dec 1986 Government eventually conceded demands of the students and withdrew legislation. (Source 6)
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests ended
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread. Police crackdown with arrests, injuries, and at least one student death
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as reason for continued protest although a victory march was held celebrating the concession and commemorating the death of a student protester

Sources

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2. RICHARD BERNSTEIN. Special to The New York Times. (1986, Nov 27). Shades of '68 on campus? (yes, but not so red). New York Times (1923-Current File).
3. "Students Protest University Plan; Some Clash with Police". *The Associated Press*. December 4, 1986, Thursday, AM cycle. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJD-GRT0-0011-8076-00000-00&context=1516831>.
4. "Student Protests Force Government to Retreat". *The Associated Press*. November 29, 1986, Saturday, AM cycle. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJD-GTN0-0011-84FM-00000-00&context=1516831>.
5. By RICHARD BERNSTEIN Special to the New York Times. "FRANCE TO DROP PART OF UNIVERSITY PLAN". *The New York Times*. December 6, 1986, Saturday, Late City Final Edition. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3S8G-8G80-0007-H3Y3-00000-00&context=1516831>.
6. By RICHARD BERNSTEIN, Special to the New York Times. (December 9, 1986, Tuesday, Late City Final Edition). STUDENTS PREVAIL IN FRENCH DISPUTE. *The New York Times*. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3S8G-8F40-0007-H2HF-00000-00&context=1516831>.

MEC ID 1605: 1979 Bank Strike I**Location:** Greece**Target:** Gov't of Greece**Dates:** 7/5/1979 – 2/23/1980**Outcome:** Limited

Summary: On July 4, banks in Greece closed as a result of an indefinite strike called by the Federation of Bank Employees protesting an extension of working hours as an energy-saving measure. Greek bank workers began an extended strike on January 18, seeking pay increases and a return to former working hours, and what began as a 10-day strike turned into a 6-week strike. Emergency staffs of management officials manned central branches of Athens banks to serve the public and tourists. On February 22, Greece's 35,000 bank employees ended their strike after the Government partially satisfied their demands for higher pay and better working conditions. An arbitration court ruling increased their salaries by 11% and the banks' management decided to introduce staggered working hours earlier in the week.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - better pay and work conditions.**Number of Reformist Claims(s):** 1**Movement structure:**

- **Leadership:** 1. Led by the Federation of Bank Employees
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilized by the Federation of Bank Employees
- **Organization:** 6. Bank union
- **Structure:** 1. Centralized - organized by a single entity
- **Composition:** 1. Bankers
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive economic demand for better work conditions and pay
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Unclear
- **Concession(s):** 1. Government conceded and partially satisfied demands of better pay and better working conditions on Feb 22, 1980. An arbitration court ruling increased their salaries by 11% and the bank's' management decided to introduce staggered working hours earlier in the week. (Source 3)
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped.
- **Repression:** 0. Unclear.
- **Repression Backfire:** NA.

Sources

1. NYT. 1979. "Strike shuts Greek banks," *New York Times*, July 5.
2. NYT. 1980. "Bank workers strike to paralyze Greece," *New York Times*, January 18.

3. NYT. 1980. "Greek Bank Strike Ends," *New York Times*, February 23.

MEC ID 1728: Unity Protest

Target: Government of Moldova and Pro-Romanian activists

Dates: 04/04/2016 - 04/18/2016

Outcome: Limited

Summary: In April, thousands of people marched in Comrat in support of Moldova's statehood. The protest was organized by the Party of Socialists and by Our Party, which created a new movement, called Statehood. On April 18, Statehood organized rallies attended by 20,000 supporters in five towns across Moldova. The protesters also bitterly criticized the incumbent authorities and asked for the organization of a snap parliamentary election.

Reformist Claim(s): Social - statehood/self-determination of Moldova

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Party of Socialists and Our Party
- **Mobilization:** 1. Party of Socialists and Our Party
- **Organization:** 3 = Party of Socialists and Our Party, 15 = Statehood, which evolved out of the alliance two political parties
- **Structure:** 1. Centralised under the Statehood movement
- **Composition:** 5 - general public involvement
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand for the statehood of Moldova
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None
- **Concession(s):** 0. Unclear
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. NA
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. NA

Sources

1. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2016. "Anti-Romanian rally held in Moldova's pro-Russian autonomy", BBC Monitoring Kiev Unity, April 04.
2. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2016. "New movement against unification with Romania created in Moldova", BBC Monitoring Kiev Unity, April 07.
3. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2016. "Pro-Russian party stages anti-Romanian rallies in five Moldova's towns", BBC Monitoring Kiev Unity, April 18

MEC ID 1773: Anti-demolition Protests

Location: Serbia

Target: Gov't of Serbia

Dates: 5/25/2016 – 7/11/2016

Outcome: Failure

Summary: Thousands of protestors gathered in Belgrade, Serbia on May 25, 2016 to protest against the development of a \$3 billion deal with an Arab developer to transform part of Belgrade into an upscale housing and shopping complex. The protestors accused the authorities of corruption and violence. Protests were held again on June 11, attracting thousands more to Belgrade. Organizers claimed that 15,000 people joined this second march, while police put the number at closer to 4,000. The protestors also demanded the resignation of a number of masked men who on the night of April 24, 2016 tore down old buildings to make way for the development.

Reformist Claim(s): Other - protesting the building of a shopping complex.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Organized by "Ne Davimo Beograd" (Don't Drown Belgrade).
- **Organization:** 15 = "Ne Davimo Beograd" (Don't Drown Belgrade).
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 5. Sense of general public involvement.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive protest to stop the building of a shopping complex.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None.
- **Concession(s):** 0. None.
- **Concession Backfire:** NA.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0.

Sources

1. AFPR. 2016. "Thousands rally against demolitions in Serbian capital," Agence France Presse, May 25.
2. AFPR. 2016. "Thousands protest massive development in Serbian capital," Agence France Presse, June 11.
3. AFPR. 2011. "Belgrade demolitions deepen fears over waterfront plans," Agence France Presse, July 8.

MEC ID 1835: March for Justice

Location: Ankara and Istanbul

Target: Government

Dates: 15/06/2017-07/09/2017

Outcome: Failure

Summary: On the 14th of June, an opposition MP, Enis Berberoglu, was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison for providing journalists with footage suggesting that the Turkish intelligence service had been smuggling weapons to Syrian Islamists. The next day, the leader of the opposition Republican Peoples' Party (CHP), Kemal Kilicdaroglu, began a 425km march from the Turkish capital towards Constantinople. Kilicdaroglu declared the march to be in favour of justice and in solidarity to Berberoglu and all those purged—either jailed or killed—since the failed coup attempt in July 2016. Being the leader of the opposition notwithstanding, Kilicdaroglu made general statements calling for justice, due process, democracy, and the end of the state of emergency declared since the coup attempt—but with no direct reference to Erdogan or explicit call for regime change, maintaining the purpose of the protest rather ambiguous.

Thousands of people joined the march which eventuated in a demonstration gathering of hundreds of thousands in Constantinople on the 9th of July. (Less than two weeks later, Erdogan extended the state of emergency by another three months; and Berberoglu remains in custody after a retrial appeal was struck down.)

Reformist Claim(s): Political - protest for democracy and corruption.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Led by the leader of the opposition.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilized by the opposition party.
- **Organization:** 3 = Political party Republican People's Party (CHP).
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized - people joined the protest as the march went along.
- **Composition:** 5 - general public involvement.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand for justice and democracy.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None.
- **Concession(s):** 0. None.
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. NA.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread.

- **Repression Backfire:** 0. NA.

Sources

1. The Associated Press. “Turkish Opposition Party Begins 265-mile ‘March for Justice’”. AP. 15 Jun 2017.
2. Agence France Press. “Turkish Opposition Chief Enters Istanbul in ‘March for Justice’”. AFP. 7 Jul 2017.
3. Agence France Press. “Turkish Opposition Leader Ends 25-day March, Rallies Backers”. AFP. 9 Jul 2017.

MEC ID 1856: 1974 Ulster Strike

Location: United Kingdom

Target: Northern Ireland Provincial Government

Dates: 05/15/1974 - 05/29/1974

Outcome: Limited

Summary: Protestant workers started a widespread work stoppage and started delaying essential service deliveries such as water, electric and sanitation in May 1974. Although the strike was triggered by plans to create a Council of Ireland, a body designed to provide official cross border links between Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland, it demanded that the Northern Ireland’s governing Assembly to step down and new elections. The Assembly was a coalition of Catholics and moderate Protestants. Although the British Government reaffirmed its support for the province’s executive after failed negotiations on May 24th, the complete shutdown of the industry and service deliveries forced the provincial government to resign on May 29th. In response, a direct rule by London was established temporarily, which the strikers accepted as a major victory and called off the work stoppages. Although paramilitary supporting and enforcing the stoppages demanded a continuation of strikes until promise of early elections, the Protestants started resuming work.

Reformist Claim(s): Electoral - new/early elections. Other - protesting against the creation of a Council of Ireland - a body designed to provide official cross border links between North Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. (1)

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Sources cite protestant leaders in negotiations.
- **Mobilization:** 1.
- **Organization:** 2 = paramilitary, 6 = unions.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 2. Workers and paramilitary.

- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand for early elections and protest against the Council of Ireland
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Negotiations occurred but failed on May 17th and 24th, 1974.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Negotiations occurred but failed on 17th and May 24th, 1974.
- **Concession(s):** 1. Government stepped down on May 29, 1974
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Strikers went back to work
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0.

Sources

1. The Washington Post; May 18, 1974; Strike Negotiations Break Off in Belfast
2. New York Times ; May 25, 1974; British Bar Negotiations With the Ulster Strikers
3. New York Times ; May 29, 1974; ULSTER COALITION RESIGNS AS STRIKE CHOKES ECONOMY: Chief Minister
4. New York Times ; May 30, 1974; STRIKE IN ULSTER ENDED IN 15TH DAY; LONDON WILL RULE: Protestant Group
5. The Washington Post; May 30, 1974; N. Ireland Militants End Strike: N. Ireland Militants End 2-Week Strike

MEC ID 1872: 1968 Student Protests

Location: Yugoslavia

Target: Gov't of Yugoslavia

Dates: 6/2/1968 – 6/11/1968

Outcome: Success

Summary: Students in Yugoslavia began protests for social reforms on June 3, 1968 in Belgrade. A teach-in was held at Belgrade University on June 5, following two days of clashes between rebellious students and the police. Students retained control of the university, and about 30,000 attended meetings at colleges scattered throughout the capital. Tito announced on June 10 that he would strive for solutions together with students. The students eventually ended the sit-in at Belgrade University on June 11, encouraged by President Tito's remarks the day prior.

Reformist Claim(s): Political - police brutality and dismissal of relevant ministers and police chiefs; Other - education quality like the quality of dorms, of teacher engagement, and swelling class sizes.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Students.
- **Organization:** 5 - Students.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 1. Students.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Initially a range of demands on various aspects of student life but evolved to a single demand for police corruption and brutality. (Source 4)
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Tito promised to meet with students. Unclear whether they actualized. (4)
- **Concession(s):** 1. Tito promised to meet with students which was perceived as a concession and protests stopped after that. (Source 4)
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - student-police clashed.
- **Repression Backfire:** 1. Police brutality became the leading demand for protesters after repression.

Sources

1. AP. 1968. "Belgrade bans rallies after student riots: Police ring school list of demands," The Washington Post, June 5.
2. Reuters. 1968. "Teach-in at university," The New York Times, June 5.
3. Shub, Anatole. 1968. "Tito says students demands are justified: Personal prestige students meet Djila sympathetic," The Washington Post, June 10.
4. Randal, Nathan. 1968. "University students in Belgrade end 8-day sit-in," The New York Times, June 12.

MEC ID 1873: Protest against Wage Freeze

Location: Yugoslavia

Target: Gov't of Yugoslavia

Dates: 2/27/1987– 3/25/1987

Outcome: Failure

Summary: Thousands of wage workers went on strike in Yugoslavia beginning on February 27, 1988 when the PM imposed a freeze on wages. At least 70 strikes occurred throughout the country, with as many as 20,000 workers involved. PM Mikulic

announced on March 22 that he would use the military to impose order as necessary. The wave of strikes ended on March 25.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - protest against wages.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Workers.
- **Organization:** 6 - unions.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 1 - workers.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive protest against wage freeze.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None.
- **Concession(s):** 1. The national legislature amended the bill that would implement wage freezes, 3/23/1987
- **Concession Backfire:** 1. Protests continued with unions saying that the amendments were still not enough.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - threatened military crackdown.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped after repression.

Sources

1. Reuters. 1987. "Yugoslav leader warns dissenters," The Washington Post, March 23.
2. Diehl, Jackson. 1987. "Yugoslavia awaits 2d wave of strikes," The Washington Post, March 25.

MEC ID 1899: Union Anti-Austerity/ Alfonsín Economic Plan

Location: Argentina

Target: President Alfonsín, Argentine Government

Dates: June 22, 1984 – May 14, 1989

Outcome: Limited

Summary: On June 22, 1984, 90,000 protesters marched in Buenos Aires, Argentina against International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity measures adopted by the Argentine government. The General Labor Confederation (Confederacion General de Trabajadores, CGT) led the first of 13 national strikes held during the Alfonsín presidency against these measures on September 3, 1984. Smaller strikes and protests occurred on a near-daily basis for the first months of 1985 and first months of 1986. In May 1989, at least 15

Argentines were killed in a week of food riots that ended after arrests of some of the leaders. The food riots led Alfonsín to create a new cabinet and implement emergency economic measures.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - IMF austerity measures

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Led by the General Labor Confederation (Confederacion General de Trabajadores, CGT) and its union leaders
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilized by the CGT
- **Organization:** 6. CGT is a labor union that represents the majority of Argentine workers
- **Structure:** 1. Centralized under the CGT
- **Composition:** 1. Workers, albeit encompassing a variety of industries, primarily in the form of strikes
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None
- **Concession(s):** 1. President Raul Alfonsin swore in a new cabinet on May 27, 1989, to draft and carry out an emergency plan to prop up the battered economy
- **Concession Backfire):** 0. None.
- **Repression:** 1. Targeted arrest of opposition leaders; 1. Widespread repression in the form of riot police. Food riots in 1989 due to rising inflation left 15 people dead and about 80 wounded. In addition, about 1,700 people have been arrested around the country. (Source 19)
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. None

Sources

1. Edward Schumacher. "Defending Argentina's New Democracy: Argentina." The New York Times. 10 June 1984.
2. NYT. "Argentine Protests." The New York Times. 23 June 1984.
3. Edward Schumacher. "Alfonsin, in Turnaround, Calls for More Austerity." The New York Times. 28 June 1984.
4. Lydia Chavez. "Argentine Labor Movement Stages One-Day Strike." The New York Times. 04 September 1984.
5. WSJ. "Argentine Unions Stage Walkout for Higher Pay." The Wall Street Journal. 04 September 1984.
6. WSJ. "What's News." The Wall Street Journal. 26 September 1984.
7. WP. "Strike Called in Argentina." The Washington Post. 30 August 1984.

8. Graham, Bradley. "Argentina to Sell 6 State Companies." The Washington Post. 02 February 1986.
9. Graham, Bradley. "Argentine Workers Strike to Protest Austerity." The Washington Post. 25 January 1986.
10. Chaves, Lydia. "Hitting the Bricks in Argentina." The New York Times. 16 February 1986.
11. NYT. "Argentine Unions in 24-hour Strike." The New York Times. 27 January 1987.
12. WP. "Argentine Unions Strike to Protest Alfonsin's Economic Policies: Thousands Rally in Largest Demonstration Yet Against President." The Washington Post. 24 May 1985.
13. Christian, Shirley, "Argentines Ask Shultz for Flexibility on Debt," The New York Times, 04 August 1988.
14. Kessler, Robert A. "Argentine Unions Set Strike After Violence Erupts." The Washington Post. 11 September 1988.
15. NYT. "New Cabinet is to Address Argentina's Economic Woes." The New York Times. 27 May 1989.
16. NYT. "Democracy Versus Hunger in Argentina." The New York Times. 31 May 1989.
17. WSJ. "What's news: business and finance." The Wall Street Journal. 01 June 1989.
18. WSJ. "Will Reality Force the Hand of Argentina's Peronists." The Wall Street Journal. 09 June 1989.
19. NYT. "Argentina in Chaos as Food Prices Rise Daily." The New York Times. 02 June 1989.

MEC ID 1925: 1978 Hunger Strike

Location: Bolivia

Target: Government of Bolivia

Dates: 12/29/1977 - 1/19/1978

Outcome: Success

Summary: Around 1200 people, including students, journalists, religious leaders and union members went on a hunger strike in December 29, to demand amnesty for people banished for political or union activities. Although the government initially agreed to negotiate with the strikers, it started to arrest the strikers in January 18. Around 600 strikers were arrested. However, the next day President Hugo Banzer declared a general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles.

Reformist Claim(s): Political - release of political prisoners.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear
- **Mobilization:** 1. Some mobilization through unions and students
- **Organization:** 5, 6. Student groups and Unions
- **Structure:** 0. Largely decentralized
- **Composition:** 5. Broad (students, miners, religious peoples, union affiliates, journalists etc.)
- **Cohesive:** 1. Unified demand for amnesty and release of political prisoners
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Negotiations between government and strikers on 01/16/1978 (Source 1)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Negotiations between government and strikers on 01/16/1978 (Source 1)
- **Concession(s):** 1. On January 19, 1978, President Hugo Banzer declared amnesty for all political prisoners. The president also called on all political parties to join in preparations for general elections in July. Banzer said a new civilian president will be chosen in a return to constitutional rule after more than a decade of military governments. (Source 2)
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. None
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread; on Jan 18 1978, just 24 hours before declaring the general amnesty, Banzer had ordered police in La Paz and in 10 other Bolivian towns to arrest scores of persons participating in the strike. (Source 2)
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. None. Repression was withdrawn and concessions were made the very next day.

Sources

1. The Washington Post; Jan 18, 1978; "Bolivia Moves to Break 20-Day Hunger Strike"
2. The Washington Post; Jan 19, 1978; "Bolivian Agrees to Amnesty Demanded in Hunger Strike"

MEC ID 1938: 1994 Workers Strike

Location: Bolivia

Target: Government of Bolivia

Dates: 4/4/1994 - 4/28/1994

Outcome: Unknown

Summary: The Bolivian Workers Confederation's (COB), the umbrella group that represents almost all of the nation's worker went on strike in April 4, demanding higher salaries. The strikes occurred without incidents during the first three weeks, but clashes started in April 22 when strikers attempted to blockade railways and highways. In addition, more than 2000 union leaders went on hunger strike. In response the government deployed troops to railroads and highways to prevent blockades and arrested several union leaders. Furthermore, there were daily clashes between the police forces and protesters, where the police used rubber pellets and tear gas to disperse the marches. Although the government offered a wage increase of 8 percent, it fell short of the 600 percent increase that the unions demanded. It is unknown whether the unions later accepted the offer or not.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - higher wages.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Led by Bolivian Workers Confederation union
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilized by union
- **Organization:** 6. Labor union = Bolivian Workers Confederation
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralised, a confederation/umbrella group
- **Composition:** 1. Workers
- **Cohesive:** 1. Unified demand of higher wages
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Negotiations planned for April 28, 1994.

(Source 2)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Negotiations planned for April 28, 1994.
(Source 2)
- **Concession(s):** 1. Government proposed an 8% increase in wages, a far cry from the 600% demanded by protesters. (Exact date unclear, sometime in April 1994)
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Unclear if concessions were accepted or not
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread. Involving police with rubber bullets and tear gas and arrests
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Protests continued but repression was not cited as a reason for continued protest

Sources

1. Agence France Presse, April 28, 1994, "Bolivian strikers try to block highways, railways"
2. Associated Press, April 28, 1994, "Bolivia Mobilizes Armed Forces to Prevent Labor Unrest from Spreading"

MEC ID 1982: Transit Price Protests

Location: Brazil

Target: Brazilian Government

Date: 6/7/2013 - 11/5/2013

Outcome: Limited

Summary: Protests began in Brazil over a seven percent increase in bus, metro, and train tickets. Prices went from \$1.50 to \$1.60. Protesters called for lower bus fares, as well as free fares for students. While the increase in transit cost was the initial cause of the protests, demonstrators took the opportunity to voice anger about Brazil's poor education, health, and transport systems. Around 2000 protesters marched through the streets, some burning trash cans and vandalizing bus stops. Police fired rubber bullets and tear gas at protesters to break up demonstrations. Demonstrations continued, with some protesters smashing windows and throwing petrol bombs. Police continued to respond with rubber bullets and tear gas, and some protesters were arrested. Protesting took place in various cities throughout Brazil. Protests continued to escalate. Tens of thousands of protesters demonstrated to express their anger over the transit price hikes, poor education and health care systems, and the government's excessive spending on hosting the World Cup. In response to the protests, transit costs were decreased. Despite the fact that the demand was met, protests continued. Protesters were still angry over corrupt government acts and poor infrastructure. Protesters began to demand higher spending on education and health, a cut in salaries for public officials, and an end to political corruption. The number of people protesting grew to over one million. One protester was killed in clashes between protesters and police. The president addressed the nation, promising to improve public services and crackdown on corruption. However, protests continued. Some protesters continued to press for free transit passes. In response to the protests, the president promised to spend \$23 billion more on public transportation, push for political reform, and will focus on five core areas to improve government services - fiscal responsibility and controlling inflation; political reform; health care; public transport; and education. After this announcement, protests continued but took place on a smaller scale and only in a few cities. The president went ahead with her push for political reform despite the continued protests. Rousseff met with youth leaders in charge of organizing the protests in order to work out some of the demands of the protesters. Additionally, the president advocated for reforms to be approved by congress by October 2013. Due to the reform efforts, most protests ended. However, small protests did continue in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, usually led by radical groups. Protests became increasingly violent, with protesters vandalizing property and looting stores.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic → Economic/Political/Social

Number of Reformist Claims(s): Initially 1 (transit price hike) but eventually 3 - a broad set of demands that included economic (better budgeting of state resources and free public transport), political (corruption), and social (better healthcare, education). (Source 7)

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear
- **Mobilization:** 1. Some mobilization by groups
- **Organization:** 3, 4, 5, 6; Political parties, Trotskyist Unified Socialist Workers' Party, Free Pass Movement, Students, Labor groups (Source 5)
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized
- **Composition:** 5. Involving over a million people, it encompassed the general public. (Source 15)
- **Cohesive:** 0. Incohesive - several demands with dynamic and different demands.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. On June 29, 2013, the president and education minister met with youth leaders (Source 27)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. On June 29, 2013, the president and education minister met with youth leaders (Source 27)
- **Concession(s):** 1. On June 19, 2013, the government lowered transit costs as per the initial demand. (Source 8). On June 24, 2013 Rousseff promised \$23 billion on urban public transport and reform in several areas such as public transportation, healthcare, and corruption. (Source 23)
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests continued after the first set of concessions lowering the cost of transit but stopped after promising more reform. Concessions were not cited as a cause for protests continuing (Source 18)
- **Repression:** 0. No targeted; 1. Widespread with arrests, rubber bullets, and tear gas. Countless injuries and one death (Source 15)
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Although protests continued, repression was not cited as a reason for continued protest.

Sources

1. AFP. 2013. "Brazil hit by protests over rising mass transit prices," Agence France Presse, June 8.
2. AFP. 2013. "Sao Paulo hit by worst protest over higher transport prices," Agence France Presse, June 12.
3. AFP. 2013. "Rail strike adds to Sao Paulo's transport unrest," Agence France Presse, June 13.

4. AFP. 2013. "Hundreds arrested in Brazil transport protests," Agence France Presse, June 14.
5. AFP. 2013. "Brazilians back on the street against high travel fares," Agence France Presse, June 14.
6. AP. 2013. "Brazil protesters promise more demonstrations soon," The Associated Press, June 14.
7. AFP. 2013. "Brazil shaken by largest protests in 20 years," Agence France Presse, June 18.
8. AFP. 2013. "Sao Paulo, Rio roll back transport fare hikes," Agence France Presse, June 19.
9. AFP. 2013. "Brazilians protest ahead of Mexico match," Agence France Presse, June 19.
10. AP. 2013. "Brazil protesters keep up pressure on government," The Associated Press, June 19.
11. AFP. 2013. "Rio protest draws 300,000, police fire tear gas," Agence France Presse, June 20.
12. AFP. 2013. "10 days of unrest in Brazil," Agence France Presse, June 20.
13. AFP. 2013. "Brazil fare hikes rolled back in victory for protests," Agence France Presse, June 20.
14. AFP. 2013. "Rousseff to address the nation on street protests," Agence France Presse, June 21.
15. AFP. 2013. "One killed as more than a million protest in Brazil," Agence France Presse, June 21.
16. AFP. 2013. "Brazil protests ramp up, with 800,000 in streets," Agence France Presse, June 21.
17. AP. 2013. "1M Brazilians fill streets with protest, violence," The Associated Press, June 21.
18. AFP. 2013. "Fresh protests erupt in Brazil despite Rousseff speech," Agence France Presse, June 22.
19. AFP. 2013. "Three quarters of Brazilians back protests: poll," Agence France Presse, June 23.
20. AFP. 2013. "Brazil's protest group to fight on for free transport," Agence France Presse, June 24.
21. AFP. 2013. "More protests as Brazilian street speaks," Agence France Presse, June 24.
22. AP. 2013. "Brazil sets \$23B hike for transit after protests," The Associated Press, June 25.
23. AP. 2013. "Brazil protests back despite proposed reforms," The Associated Press, June 25.

24. AFP. 2013. "Street protests in Brazil ahead of Confed semi-final," Agence France Presse, June 26.
25. AFP. 2013. "Brazil's Rousseff pushes plebiscite amid new protests," Agence France Presse, June 27.
26. AP. 2013. "Brazil protesters, police clash near match," The Associated Press, June 27.
27. AP. 2013. "Brazil president meets youth representatives," The Associated Press, June 29.
28. AFP. 2013. "Brazil leader readies reforms to defuse social unrest," Agence France Presse, July 1.
29. AP. 2013. "Brazil protesters give Rousseff tenuous truce," The Associated Press, July 2.
30. AFP. 2013. "Brazil's president backs key demand of demonstrators," Agence France Presse, August 10.
31. AFP. 2013. "Scores arrested in violent Brazil transportation demo," Agence France Presse, October 26.
32. AP. 2013. "Police: Brazil protesters beat up officer," The Associated Press, October 27.
33. AP. 2013. "Brazil protests turn violent after police shooting," The Associated Press, October 29.
34. AFP. 2013. "Brazil protest groups call fresh demos," Agence France Presse, November 5.

MEC ID 2051: 1959 Bus Fare Riots

Location: Colombia

Dates: 1/1/1959 to 3/4/1959

Target: Government of Colombia

Outcome: Unknown

Summary: One thousand protesters, mostly students, demonstrated for over two months to strike back against the increase of urban transport fares. At least 50 protesters were arrested, nightsticks and tear gas were used by police in an effort to dispel rioters. The outcome is unknown.

Reformist Claim(s): Other - bus fare.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear leadership
- **Mobilization:** 1. Students

- **Organization:** 5, 6. Largely student mobilization and unions
- **Structure:** 0. De-centralized
- **Composition:** 2. Largely students (around 80%) and some workers
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive protest against bus fares
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Unclear
- **Concession(s):** 0. Unclear
- **Concession Backfire:** NA. Unclear if concessions were made.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted; 1. Widespread. Arrests, nightsticks, and tear gas under modified martial law.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as a reason for protest.

Sources

1. New York Times, "50 Held in Colombian Protest", January 13, 1959
2. New York Times, 1,000 STAGE RIOTS IN BOGOTA STREETS, March 4, 1959.
3. "Students Riot, Battle Police in Colombia." 1959. The Washington Post and Times Herald (1954-1959), Mar 04, 1. <http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/149261822?accountid=11311>.

MEC ID 2093: 1993 Teachers Strike

Location: Ecuador

Target: Government of Ecuador

Dates: 10/04/1993 - 12/06/1993

Outcome: Success

Summary: In October 4th 1993, about 120,000 teachers started a strike, demanding 50 percent wage increase. Initially, the President Sixto Duran has offered a 15 percent raise, which the strikers refused. In addition to the walk-out, 100 of the teachers went on a hunger-strike in late November. In the beginning of December, a state of emergency was declared which gave the government the right to ban public meetings, restrict press freedom, arrest union activists and fire striking teachers. Moreover, the army was mobilized to take control of state schools. Two teachers were killed in separate incidents and several teachers were arrested.

The teachers returned to work on Monday December 6th after the National Educators Union announced that they had reached a deal with the government over the weekend, in which the government had accepted their demands.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - 50% increase in wage

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. National Educators Union (Source 2)
- **Mobilization:** 1. National Educators Union (Source 2)
- **Organization:** 6 - National Educators Union
- **Structure:** 1. Centralized - under the single structure of the National Educators Union (2)
- **Composition:** 1. Teachers
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive economic demand of increased wages
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Talks with government over 4 Dec 1993, which eventually led to a deal

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Talks with the government over 4 Dec 1993, which eventually led to a deal
- **Concession(s):** 1. Government initially offered a 15% wage raise which was rejected. Later the government agreed to meet demands. (Sources 1, 2)
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protesters accepted the deal
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread. A state of emergency was declared which gave the government the right to ban public meetings, restrict press freedom, arrests union activists and fire striking teachers. The army was also mobilized to take control of state schools. Two teachers were killed. (Sources 2)
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Protests continued but not because of the repression.

Sources

1. Associated Press November 30, 1993, "State of Emergency Declared over Teachers' Strike"
2. Associated Press December 6, 1993, "Ecuador Teachers Call off Strike"

MEC ID 2099: 2006 Oil Strike

Location: Ecuador

Target: Government of Ecuador, Oil Companies

Dates: 02/07/2006 - 02/23/2006

Outcome: Limited

Summary: Inhabitants of Baeza in Napo province took over a state-controlled pumping station to protest against the US group Occidental Petroleum in February 7th 2006 and demand bigger cut of the country's oil profits. In addition, the protesters also blocked the highways throughout the region and took some 24 workers hostage. In response to the

protests, the government of Ecuador declared a state of emergency and deployed troops to the region. The protesters threw rocks and dynamite to the security forces, which led to the serious injury of two soldiers. The protests were backed by regional leaders such as mayors and governors, and two of them as well as some local officials were arrested. The leaders demanded that government spend \$40US million to build two highways and an airport. The projects had been promised by former President Lucio Gutierrez, a native of the region, who was forced out of office in April 2005.

The protests ended in February 23rd after the leaders agreed on a truce with the government. As a part of the truce, the government forces took control over the stations and arrested leaders were released. However, the actual signing of the agreement was set for a later date in the capital.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - better allocation of oil profits to the public good of the region. This included a project to build two highways and an airport (Source 2)

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Napo Regional Governor Gina San Miguel acted as the truce broker although earlier reports don't suggest that she was the leader (Source 2).
- **Mobilization:** 0. Unclear
- **Organization:** 0. General public.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized
- **Composition:** 5. Sense of general public involvement
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand for better allocation of oil profits
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. On February 23, 2006, a truce between protesters and the government was agreed upon (Source 4)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. On February 23, 2006, a truce between protesters and the government was agreed upon (Source 4)
- **Concession(s):** 1. On February 23, 2006, a truce between protesters and the government was agreed upon
- **Concession Backfire:** 0.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1 Widespread. A state of emergency and deployed troops to the region. Some local/regional officials who had supported the protests were arrested but not in a targeted fashion. For instance, the regional governor had been arrested during the state of emergency for breaking curfew. (Source 2, 4)
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Protests continued but repression not cited as reason for continuing protest

Sources

1. Agence France Presse 7 February 2006, “Ecuador shuts off oil pipeline amid unrest”
2. Agence France Presse 22 February 2006 “Ecuador declares state of emergency, deploys troops amid oil protests”
3. Associated Press International 22 “Violence surges as Ecuador seeks release of oil workers, pumping station”
4. Agence France Presse 23 February 2006 “Ecuador government negotiates truce with oil protesters in eastern jungle”

MEC ID 2105: Natives March Over Land Rights

Location: Guatemala

Target: Government

Dates: 03/19/2012-03/28/2012

Outcome: Limited Success

Summary: About 10,000 Maya natives and peasants marched for over nine-days from their home region of Coban to the capital, Guatemala City. The marchers are protesting for an end to government mining operations on their land and the cancellation of \$100 million in government loans the natives used to purchase the land. The marchers, under the leadership of the Peasant Unity Committee (CUC), stretched for six kilometers as they made their way to Constitution Square at the heart of the city. The newly elected President Perez agreed to meet with a delegation from the protesters and recommended a panel of “high-level” government representatives began negotiations with them.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - land rights

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Leadership of the Peasant Unity Committee (CUC)
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobility by CUC
- **Organization:** 6. CUC is a labor organization
- **Structure:** 1. Centralized into a single organization
- **Composition:** 1. Indigenous peasants
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand against the mining of the land.
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Meet with the president. Date unclear - sometime after March 28, 2012

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Meet with the president. Date unclear - sometime after March 28, 2012

- **Concession(s):** 1. High-level government panel for negotiations. Date unclear - sometime after March 28, 2012
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. None
- **Repression:** 0. None.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. NA

Sources

1. Agence France Press. 2012. "Guatemalan natives protest over land rights." In Agence France Press, March 28, 2012.

MEC ID 2159: Doctors Strike for Higher Pay

Location: Nicaragua

Target: Government

Dates: 02/27/1998-Unknown

Outcome: Unknown

Summary: On 02/27/1998, public sector doctors went on strike demanding a 1,000 percent pay raise. The strikers later lowered the demand to 200 percent paid out immediately, with rest of the increase paid out over the subsequent two years. The Government offered the physicians a 100 percent raise, stating they lacked the funds to fully accommodate the demands. The strike limited public hospitals to providing only emergency care, forcing the Government to pay private clinics for other services.

Several demonstrations during the protest turned violent when police clashed with demonstrators. On 05/12/1998, several physicians were hurt after being beat by police during a protest. The demonstrators had blocked traffic in several parts of Managua, Masaya, and Granada. Several protesters were arrested. On 06/02/1998, more than 24,000 health workers began a series of rotating work stoppages in support of the doctors. Talks between the doctors and the Government were being mediated by Managua Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo. There is no reporting on the outcome of the campaign.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - pay raise.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Source cites leaders calling for more protest
- **Mobilization:** 1. Doctors
- **Organization:** 6 = unions
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized
- **Composition:** 2. Doctors, then later joined in support by health workers
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand for higher pay

- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Talks between the doctors and the Government were being mediated by Managua Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo. Date unclear

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Talks between the doctors and the Government were being mediated by Managua Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo. Date unclear
- **Concession(s):** 1. The government offered the physicians -- who make between 50 and 200 dollars per month -- a 100-percent raise, saying it lacked the resources to give the doctors what they want
- **Concession Backfire:** 1. Movement rejected this and recommenced protests
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police clash with protesters, president orders to clear the streets, arrests
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as reason for protests

Sources

1. Agence France Press. 1998. "Nicaraguan riot police break up striking doctor protests". In Agence France Press, May 12, 1998.
2. Agence France Press. 1998. "Nicaraguan health workers strike in support of doctors". In Agence France Press, 06/02/1998.

MEC ID 2232: Proposed Referendum Prompts Protest

Location: Venezuela

Target: Government

Dates: 10/23/2007-12/03/2007

Outcome: Success

Summary: A protest campaign over President Hugo Chavez's proposed changes to the constitution began on 10/23/2007. Police used tear gas to break up thousands of bottle-throwing students demonstrating against Chavez's proposal. In addition to clashing with police, opposition protesters also fought with pro-Chavez demonstrators. The campaign was launched over a referendum to be held on 12/02/2007 that would amend almost 70 constitutional articles and allow Chavez to remain in office indefinitely. Additionally, the reforms would grant the President authority to restrict civil liberties in a state of emergency, regulate monetary policy and promote members of the armed forces, among other powers.

One week later, led by university students, tens of thousands of protesters demonstrated outside the electoral agency's office. Protesters threw rocks and bottles at

police. Some removed and threw metal barricades against police holding riot shields. The protest dispersed when police used tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets to break up the demonstration. At least six were reported wounded in the demonstration. On 11/29/2007 hundreds of thousands marched through the streets of Caracas in a final protest over the impending referendum. Demonstrators blew whistles and waved placards. One protester was quoted as saying, "There can't be a communist Venezuela, and that's why our society is reacting this way."

Announced on 12/03/2007, Venezuelans rejected the proposal and Chavez accepted the outcome. Chavez tried to bolster his supporters, stating they had only lost by a slim margin. According to the National Electoral Council the final tally was 51 percent "no" and 49 percent "yes." Stopping the acceptance of the proposed constitutional amendments, the largely non-violent campaign was a success.

Reformist Claim(s): Political - protesting constitutional amendments that would give the president more power.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 1.
- **Organization:** 5 - students.
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized.
- **Composition:** 5 - general public involvement.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive protest against increasing presidential power.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None.

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None.
- **Concession(s):** 1. Referendum was called to gauge public opinion and it did not pass, so the constitutional amendments did not pass.
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped.
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police with tear gas.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as a reason for continued protest.

Sources

1. Agence France Press. 2007. "Venezuela police clash with students protesting constitutional reforms". In Agence France Press, October 23, 2007.
2. The Associated Press. 2007. "Venezuelan troops use tear gas, water cannons to break up protest against Chavez reforms". In The Associated Press, November 02, 2007.
3. The Associated Press. 2007. "Venezuelan students protest, ask supreme court to postpone vote on Chavez reforms". In The Associated Press, November 07, 2007.

4. The Associated Press. 2007. "Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans protest Chavez's referendum". In The Associated Press, November 29, 2007.
5. The Associated Press. 2007. "Tens of thousands of Venezuelans protest Chavez's referendum". In The Associated Press, November 30, 2007.
6. Agence France Press. 2007. "Venezuelans reject constitutional change, Chavez accepts". In Agence France Press, December 03, 2007.

MEC ID 2242: Protests over Fraud in Municipal Elections

Location: Algeria

Target: Gov't of Algeria

Dates: 10/27/1997 – 11/12/1997

Outcome: Failure

Summary: On October 27, 1997, thousands of demonstrators in Algiers protested against alleged fraud in municipal elections that took place on October 23. The march was organized by the leading opposition party (Socialist Forces Front), and was also supported by the banned FIS, the National Liberation Front, and the Islamist Movement of Society for Peace. Protests in Algiers swelled the following day, with some sources reporting as many as 100,000 demonstrators. The series of demonstrations was unique in that, for the first time since 1989, it united the country's Islamic parties, which had otherwise remained divided. In addition to street demonstrations, opposition party supporters also organized daily sit-ins at the ruling party headquarters in a bid to force the government to cancel election results. In a first public response to protestors, Algerian president Zeroual announced that only the country's judiciary would be able to settle the controversy. Riot police eventually responded on November 3, 1997 in a move to prevent student protests, but no violence was reported on either side. On November 9, Zeroual announced the decision to move forward with elections to the second house of parliament on December 25, effectively ignoring protestors' demands. The protests lost steam around November 12, 1997 not having achieved any concessions from the government.

Reformist Claim(s): Electoral

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Leadership by opposition party, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS)
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilization by opposition party, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), and 3 other political parties
- **Organization:** 3, 5. Opposition party the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), the National Liberation Front (FLN), the Islamist Movement of Society for Peace

(MSP), and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), Islamic Salvation Front (FIS); Student groups

- **Structure:** 0. Alliance among different political parties that have traditionally been fractured
- **Composition:** 5. General public involvement with protest leaders citing as many as 100,000 protesters
- **Cohesive:** 1. Unified demand calling for fair elections
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None
- **Concession(s):** 0. None
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** 0. No violence reported
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. None

Sources

1. AFPR. 1997. "Demonstration against electoral fraud in Algiers," Agence France Presse, October 27.
2. Ganley, Elaine. 1997. "Political economies join in protest against Algerian government," The Associated Press, October 30.
3. AFPR. 1997. "Algerian president leaves vote-fraud protests to judges," Agence France Presse, October 31.
4. AFPR. 1997. "Anti-riot police deploy to foil student protest," Agence France Presse, November 3.
5. AFPR. 1997. "Algerians ignore general strike call," Agence France Presse, November 12.
6. APRS. 1997. "Police bar national march to protest election fraud," The Associated Press, November 13.
7. AFP. 1997. "Algerian riot police muzzle opposition protest protest protest". Agence France Presse, November 13.

MEC ID 2290: 2007 Constitutional Amendment Protest

Location: Egypt

Target: Government of Egypt

Dates: 3/18/07 – 3/25/07

Outcome: Failure

Summary: Opposition MPs, primarily independents associated with the banned Muslim Brotherhood, boycotted parliamentary proceedings and held a demonstration outside of

the Egyptian parliament building to condemn proposed amendments to the Egyptian constitution which the opposition claimed would further tighten President Mubarak's grip on power. After the amendments passed through parliament the Muslim Brotherhood organized further protests on university campuses and organized a boycott of a referendum to approve the amendments. The protests failed to prevent passage of the amendments.

Reformist Claim(s): Political - constitutional amendments that allegedly strengthened the president's power.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Some leadership by the Muslim Brotherhood because it made up the majority of the protesters but encompassed other opposition MPs (Source 2)
- **Mobilization:** 1. Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition parties (Source 2)
- **Organization:** 3 - opposition and independent parties (Source 2); 5 - 3,000 student protesters also joined (Source 3)
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized bringing together different political groups including the Muslim Brotherhood.
- **Composition:** 2. Politicians and students.
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand of constitutional amendments.
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None
- **Concession(s):** 0.
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. NA
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - regular police crackdowns. (Source 2)
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Protests continued but repression was not cited as reason (Source 2).

Sources

1. "Egypt Opposition MPs Boycott Constitutional Debate." Agence France Presse (2007, March 18).
2. Abou el-Magd, Nadia. "Egyptian Opposition Boycotts Parliament Talks on Constitutional Amendments." Associated Press Newswires (2007, March 18).
3. Abou el-Magd, Nadia. "Egypt's Opposition Group Boycotts Vote." Associated Press Newswires (2007, March 21).

MEC ID 2468: Libyan Protest against extending transition government

Location: Libya

Target: Libyan transitional government

Dates: Feb 07, 2014 - Feb 16, 2014

Outcome: Success

Summary: Thousands of Libyans took to the streets to protest the decision of the interim parliament (General National Congress) which voted to extend their mandate until the end of the year. While not formally organized there were a number of armed groups backing the protesters. For a second consecutive Friday, Libyans took to the streets to protest the interim government's decision to extend its mandate. Libya's parliament yielded to pressure from protesters and agreed to hold early elections.

Reformist Claim(s): Electoral - protesting against the delaying of elections

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear
- **Mobilization:** 1.
- **Organization:** 2 = a militia of former rebels. (1) 4 = Alliance of National Forces, a liberal grouping and non-party political force
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized
- **Composition:** 5. Broad with public involvement
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive protests against the delaying of elections
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. Unclear

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. Unclear
- **Concession(s):** 1. Government conceded demands and held the elections early on 16 Feb 2014
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. None
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - military crackdown supported by ex-rebel militias.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression was not cited as a reason.

Sources

1. Libya braces for protests against protracted transition (Agence France Presse -- English) Feb 07, 2014
2. Libyans protest against protracted transition (Agence France Presse -- English) Feb 14, 2014
3. Libya MPs 'agree on early elections' (Agence France Presse --English) Feb 16, 2014

MEC ID 2482: Labor strike protesting President Alvarado's fiscal plan

Location: Costa Rica

Dates: 9/10/2018-12/7/2018

Target: Costa Rican Government

Outcome: Failure

Summary: On September 10, a public sector strike was launched in opposition to the fiscal reforms proposed by President Alvarado. Thousands protested in the streets the following weekend, including limited clashes with police. Participation in the strike was initially in multiple sectors, but various court rulings left just the teachers union.

Negotiations continued without success for three months. This strike lasted until December 7, when the teachers voted to end the strike without reversing the reforms.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - the president's proposed fiscal plans.

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear.
- **Mobilization:** 1. Various public sector unions
- **Organization:** 6. Public sector unions
- **Structure:** 0. De-centralized coalition of public sector unions
- **Composition:** 1. Just the public sector
- **Cohesive:** 1. Protest against fiscal plan
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. "On 9 November, the Association of Secondary School Teachers (APSE), together with two other bodies, denounced the government of Costa Rica to the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International Labour Organization (ILO) for violations of freedom of association, collective bargaining rights and the right to strike. In a video, teachers' union ANDE (the National Association of Educators) denounced multiple abuses and the lack of openness to dialogue." (Source 3)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0
- **Concession(s):** 0. No concessions were made
- **Concession Backfire:** NA. No concessions were made
- **Repression:** 1. Targeted; 1. Widespread. Court rulings against particular sectors to stop their strikes; clashes with police
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Repression not cited as reason for continued protest.

Sources

1. AP. 2018. "Costa Rica shaken by rare and unruly unrest, labor strike", September 15.
2. APSE. 2018. "APSE AGREES TERMINATION OF STRIKE BY AUTONOMOUS AND DEMOCRATIC DECISION OF ITS BASES", December 7.
3. Equal Times. 2018. "In just seven months in power, Costa Rica's new government has experienced three months of confrontation with public sector unions", December 14. (retrieved 3/28/2018 from: <https://www.equaltimes.org/in-just-seven-months-in-power?lang=en#.XJz4EyhKhPZ>)

MEC ID 2688: Health Sector Strike of 2018

Location: Algeria

Target: Gov't of Algeria

Dates: 11/01/2017 to 06/28/2018

Outcome: Unknown

Summary: Some 1,000 striking trainee doctors took to the streets of Algeria's capital Monday to demand the scrapping of compulsory public service in defiance of a ban on protests in the city. The demonstrators -- wearing black armbands or surgical masks emblazoned with "angry doctors" -- managed to gather for a sit-in in the heart of Algiers despite a heavy deployment by the security forces. Surrounded by riot police the protesters chanted for "dignity" as they push for an end to mandatory work placements after they qualify and exemption from military service. Demonstrations have been banned in the capital of tightly controlled Algeria since 2001 and are usually quickly dispersed. Police violently put down a protest by trainee doctors in the city on January 3, wounding 20 people according to demonstrators. Roughly 13,000 doctors undergoing the residency stage of their graduate studies have been on strike for some three months despite the courts declaring their action illegal last month. They are calling for an end to compulsory public service once they finish studying, which can see doctors obliged to spend up to four years working in often remote areas.

Reformist Claim(s): Other. Highly context-specific concern for trainee doctors protesting against mandatory public service after the end of their education

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 1. Led by Autonomous Collective of Algerian Medical Residents (CAMRA)
- **Mobilization:** 1. Mobilized by Autonomous Collective of Algerian Medical Residents (CAMRA)

- **Organization:** 6. Independent union of resident trainee doctors = Autonomous Collective of Algerian Medical Residents (CAMRA)
- **Structure:** 1. Centralized in one organization
- **Composition:** 1. Resident doctors only
- **Cohesive:** 1. Unified demand of removing mandatory public service for doctors
- **Movement Engagement:** 1. Thirteen meetings between the Ministry of Health and CAMRA have failed to agree on any satisfactory way to end the strike. On 29 April, CAMRA announced that it would boycott dialogue with the ministry on the grounds that the meetings are futile (Source 2)

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 1. Thirteen meetings between the Ministry of Health and CAMRA have failed to agree on any satisfactory way to end the strike. On 29 April, CAMRA announced that it would boycott dialogue with the ministry on the grounds that the meetings are futile. The Ministry of Health has called upon the residents to return to normal working patterns and the dialogue sessions with the government. (Source 2)
- **Concession(s):** 0. None
- **Concession Backfire:** NA
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted; 1. Widespread. Ministry of Health's dismissal of 800 medical residents in several government hospitals because of the strike action.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. No effect on campaign. Campaign progressed as it had.

Sources

1. "Striking trainee doctors brave ban to protest in Algeria". *Agence France Presse - English*. February 12, 2018 Monday. [https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5RM R-X461-DY93-M22C-00000-00&context=1516831](https://advance.lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5RM R-X461-DY93-M22C-00000-00&context=1516831).
2. "Ongoing Health Sector Strike Is The Longest Protest In Algeria'S History". 2018. *Middle East Monitor*. June 20, 2018. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180620-ongoing-health-sector-strike-is-the-longest-protest-in-algerias-history/>.

MEC ID 2702: 2017 Labour Reform Protest

Location: France

Target: French Government

Dates: 9/12/2017 - 10/19/2017

Outcome: Failure

Summary: Over 220,000 protesters marched against President Emmanuel Macron's flagship economic reforms in 9/12/2017, in the first major demonstrations opposed to his pro-business agenda. The day of strikes and rallies were seen as a key test for the young French leader as he stakes his presidency on overhauling the sluggish economy. About 4,000 strikes and 180 protests were called by France's biggest trade union, the CGT, with rail workers, students and civil servants urged to join the demonstrations against changes to the country's rigid labor laws. France's interior ministry said 223,000 people joined marches nationwide, with 13 arrests made. The Communist-backed CGT, for its part, put the total at 400,000. The protests were overwhelmingly peaceful despite isolated clashes between anarchists and police in Paris, where teargas was fired. "It's a first one and it looks like it's a success," the head of the CGT, Philippe Martinez, told reporters in Paris. Attendance was being scrutinized as a measure of the resistance to Macron's economic agenda, which is intended to help bring down stubbornly high unemployment. Thousands of protesters took to the streets of France on Oct 19, 2017 to denounce President Emmanuel Macron's planned labor reforms, but low turnouts suggested the resistance is running out of steam. Numbers have steadily dwindled from a peak of around a quarter of a million who protested nationwide on September 12, the first major demonstration against Macron's reform agenda seen as pro-business.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - protesting President Macron's pro-business policies

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear - a collection of unions and other parties
- **Mobilization:** 1. Some mobilization by unions
- **Organization:** 6. Mostly union organized
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized
- **Composition:** 2. Primarily workers and students
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive demand for economic reform
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None
- **Concession(s):** 0. None
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. NA
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 0 Widespread - presence of police but not repression per se.
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. NA

Sources

1. "Thousands protest Macron labour reforms in France". Agence France Presse -- English. September 12, 2017 Tuesday.
2. "The Latest: Paris protesters: Labor changes favor employers". The Associated Press. September 12, 2017 Tuesday.
3. "French labour reforms: why workers are protesting". Agence France Presse -- English. September 12, 2017 Tuesday.
4. "Turnout down in second French protest against Macron's labour reforms". Agence France Presse -- English. September 21, 2017 Thursday.
5. "New protests as France set to enshrine labour reforms". Agence France Presse -- English. September 21, 2017 Thursday.
6. By ANGELA CHARLTON. "French marchers fill Paris streets to protest new work rules". The Associated Press. September 23, 2017 Saturday.
7. "French left stages street showdown over Macron reforms". Agence France Presse -- English. September 23, 2017 Saturday.
8. "French truck drivers block roads to protest labor changes". The Associated Press. September 25, 2017 Monday.
9. "French truckers block motorways, fuel depots". Agence France Presse -- English. September 25, 2017 Monday.
10. By PHILIPPE SOTTO and SYLVIE CORBET. "French public sector strike disrupt schools, hospitals". The Associated Press. October 10, 2017 Tuesday.
11. "French public workers in the street over Macron reforms". Agence France Presse -- English. October 10, 2017 Tuesday.
12. "The Latest: French protesters express fear of more cutbacks". The Associated Press. October 10, 2017 Tuesday.
13. "Protests on the wane against Macron's labour reforms". Agence France Presse -- English. October 19, 2017 Thursday.

MEC ID 2723: 2000 Farmer Tax Protest

Location: Jiangxi, China

Target: Jiangxi Government

Dates: 8/17/2000 – 8/23/2000

Outcome: Failure

Summary: 20,000 Farmers throughout Jiangxi Province protested over the course of 10 days in response to increasing taxes on top of existing fees. The protests were stopped by the Chinese riot police who dispersed the largest crowds. Ultimately, many protesters were killed and over 100 injured ending the protests without significant changes.

Reformist Claim(s): Economic - tax increase

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1

Movement structure:

- **Leadership:** 0. Unclear
- **Mobilization:** 0. Unclear
- **Organization:** 0. Unclear - farmer protesting but no organization cited
- **Structure:** 0. Decentralized, unclear
- **Composition:** 1. Farmers
- **Cohesive:** 1. Cohesive protest against tax hike
- **Movement Engagement:** 0. None

Government response:

- **Government Engagement:** 0. None
- **Concession(s):** 0. None
- **Concession Backfire:** 0. NA
- **Repression:** 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - riot police broke up the crowds
(Source 1)
- **Repression Backfire:** 0. Protests stopped after successful repression

Sources

1. "Chinese police presence strong after rioting by 20,000 farmers". Agence France Presse -- English. August 30, 2000, Wednesday.
2. Elisabeth Zingg. "China confronts increasing rural unrest". Agence France Presse -- English. August 31, 2000, Thursday.
3. By KATHERINE ARMS. "Farmers in China protest high taxes". *United Press International*. August 29, 2000, Tuesday. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4133-1HS0-00RC-82K9-00000-00&context=1516831>.

Appendix E – List of interviewees

Alias¹⁹⁷	Description of Interviewee
Interviewee 1	Hong Kong-based international news correspondent
Interviewee 2	Professional Media Consultant and Public Intellectual in Hong Kong
Interviewee 3	Pro-democracy activist and protest participant
Interviewee 4	Former legislator and Hong Kong government official
Interviewee 5	Former member of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force
Interviewee 6	Hong Kong scholar on Hong Kong culture and politics
Interviewee 7	Hong Kong scholar on contentious politics in Hong Kong, protest participant
Interviewee 8	Lawyer and on the ground observer of HK protests
Interviewee 9	China specialist and professional consultant with government experience
Interviewee 10	Communications specialist and former consultant to HK government

¹⁹⁷ All interviewees are de-identified to maintain their anonymity