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Carlo Carraro, ed., International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues

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Carlo Carraro, ed., *International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues*

wishes to examine the efficiency of the water market system and understand the economic forces behind the doctrines that control water policy.

Tracy Rogers

Carraro, Carlo, ed., *International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues*, Edward Elgar Pub., Brookfield, Vt. (1997); 199pp; \$80.00; ISBN 1-85898-524-2, hardcover.

Most new environmental phenomena are inherently global. Commodities like air and water are managed as common-property goods. Since no institution has the power to globally regulate the use of these resources, it becomes difficult to achieve broad environmental agreements and necessary to create a method of negotiation that will lead to self-enforcing agreements.

International Environmental Negotiations compiles articles from professors around the world concerning methods of negotiating these self-enforcing agreements. The authors recognize the difficulty in achieving self-enforcing agreements with a large number of signatories; especially where there are significant differences in costs and benefits for the countries involved. Most of the authors use complicated economic formulae to analyze self-enforcing agreements, and conclude that a self-enforcing agreement can only be achieved with a small number of signatories.

The editor's introduction discusses various attempts to achieve international agreement, such as the 1994 Montreal Protocol on chlorofluorocarbons, and explains the difficulties that may be encountered in international environmental negotiations. The editor also gives a brief introduction of the theories and techniques addressed in each chapter.

Chapter Two explores the economics of self-enforcing agreements between countries with differing economic and environmental structures. Such self-enforcing agreements are called "heterogeneous international environmental agreements" ("IEAs"). For example, in the global warming context all countries have different abatement costs that yield different benefits. Those differing costs and benefits can have a large impact on sustaining a potentially globally beneficial IEA. The author notes that two main problems of heterogeneous IEA analysis are: (1) a need for signatories to reach agreement about obligations and (2) a need to devise "credible punishments" to sustain the agreement.

Chapter Three analyzes burden sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations while taking asymmetries between countries into account. Using this approach, countries must decide whether to join a coalition given an agreed upon burden-sharing rule. Each country then sets environmental policy by maximizing its own

welfare function. The authors discuss the two problems that arise under this approach. First, countries must decide which way to cooperate, and second, a strong incentive exists to free ride, which leads to coalition instability.

Chapter Four recognizes the difficulty of achieving environmental agreements without a supranational authority and suggests using an arbitrator to aid in dispute resolution. This approach provides another tool to solve the problems of asymmetries and conflicts between countries.

Chapters Five and Six discuss combining research and development cooperation to achieve stable agreements, and the environmental benefit that can be achieved by offsetting the incentive to free ride. The possibility of using technology transfers to stabilize environmental agreements is analyzed in Chapter Five. Chapter Six analyzes the use of issue linkage. Since stable coalitions tend to be small, transfers and issue linkage have been proposed in environmental economics literature to expand environmental coalitions.

Chapter Seven explores the important issue of asymmetric information and how it affects international environmental agreements. The chapter specifically addresses the problem of finding a viable cost-sharing method for parties to adopt in an IEA where asymmetric information exists. It also discusses the fact that the cost each country must bear, if it decides to take abatement action, will outweigh the benefit but may be smaller than the aggregate benefit to all countries.

Chapter Eight provides an analysis of the problem of trade and environmental policies. The author uses economies with heterogeneous agents as a framework. The magnitude of negative production externalities depend on production volume and technology used. This chapter focuses on technologies that are more costly, but that reduce pollution, which results in a trade-off between productivity and environmental benefits. The chapter also gives suggestions for using trade threats as penalties when negotiations fail.

Chapter Nine discusses new research ideas and uses a different method to analyze self-enforcing agreements. The authors of this chapter show methodological advances to analyze the regional formation of an environmental coalition. They incorporate this into a discussion of how to measure the costs and benefits of carbon dioxide emissions in the context of international agreements aimed at slowing global warming.

In Chapter Ten the authors discuss their theoretical observations of international environmental agreement stability. This chapter defines a self-enforcing international agreement more precisely and explores "the scope for implementing such agreements in different strategic environments." IEAs must be self-enforcing since they are not binding, and each country must find it in its own best interest to sign an agreement and not to free ride.

International Environmental Negotiations provides an excellent overview of analytical methods for addressing international environmental negotiations from an environmental economic perspective.

Shana Smilovits

Mark S. Dennison, *Storm Water Discharges: Regulatory Compliance and Best Management Practices*, CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton, Florida (1996); 447pp; \$59.95; ISBN 1-56670-198-8, hardcover.

As its name suggests, *Storm Water Discharges: Regulatory Compliance and Best Management Practices* offers a practical guide in layperson's terms to help facilities navigate through complex storm water discharge requirements. The author, Mark Dennison, goes beyond a simple discussion of regulatory compliance and its technological aspects and actually provides insight into the development and implementation of storm water pollution prevention plans. The book serves as a practical handbook complete with general and industry-specific tables, checklists, glossaries, and a sample Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan.

Dennison first provides an overview of the storm water pollution problem. He outlines the pollutants in storm water and their associated impacts. He also provides insight into storm water control practices, maintaining that such practices should focus on land disturbance rather than land use, depending upon the area's stage in the urbanization process. Dennison then examines the requirements of storm water discharge regulation. This examination includes the Clean Water Act's NPDES permit program as well as the Environmental Protection Agency's storm water program and nonpoint source pollution control programs.

The next section of the book provides a dissection of the storm water discharge permit process and the technical requirements of that process. Chapter Three describes the options available to facility operators in obtaining permit coverage for storm water discharges associated with their industrial activity. Chapter Four describes the technical requirements of the storm water permit application process discussed in Chapter Three. Dennison provides a pragmatic approach to the technical aspects of compliance, offering solutions to potential problems that may arise during sampling.

Chapter Five offers practical guidance to the development and implementation of storm water pollution prevention plans. This is the focus of Dennison's book and it covers every step from the creation of a Pollution Prevention Team to the identification and evaluation of Best Management Practices ("BMPs"). Dennison explains how to implement the plan, suggests how to evaluate and revise the plan, and details the administrative requirements of such plans. Consistent with the practical approach of the book, Dennison even provides pollution