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Reconciling Moral Dissonance: A Framework for Re-Integrating Moral Orientation with Life Agency During Warfighters' Struggles with Military Moral Injury

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Abstract

This dissertation uses case studies to critically examine the Three Mirror Model (TMM) as a framework for understanding the formation and healing of Military Moral Injury (MMI). I adapt the work of Stephen Brookfield and Neal Krause to evaluate using the TMM as a methodology for dealing with the complex issues of MMI within a military deployment cycle (training, warfighting, and healing) (Brookfield 2012, 2017; Krause 2022). Specifically, I use theorists, researchers, healers, and warfighters as key stakeholders to identify and critically examine the intersections of disciplines and the subsets of models where warfighters' moral orientations and moral agency form and reconcile the moral dissonance that results in MMI.

A warfighter's moral orienting system is a composite of core values used to "guide individual[s] along preferred pathways to significant destinations" (Pargament and Exline 2022, 29-30, 243-ff). These destinations include the moral agency that individuals use to: 1) regulate their cognitions and reactions, and 2) process their emotions and life narratives.

Within the military ethos, moral orienting systems are driven by warrior codes that define the moral standards that direct warfighters' identity and ethical agency. Therefore, the content and processes of warfighters' moral orientations need to be considered when defining and treating MMI. During military training, warfighters integrate military values and professional competencies into the moral orienting systems that drive the moral agency they perform during combat. Specific events in warfighting can dis-integrate relationships between moral orientation and moral agency, causing levels of moral dissonance (Litz et al. 2009; Shay 2014; Maguen et al. 2011; Tick 2005).

Moral dissonance can be examined as struggles that 1) disorient the nature of individuals' moral orienting systems, 2) disrupt their formations of life purpose and meaning, and 3) result in a spectrum of maladaptive behaviors (Pargament and Exline 2022, 32-34). Following combat, warfighters need to reconcile their moral dissonance. Their inability to do this results in MMI. Multiple treatment modalities and programs support warfighters' reconciliation of moral dissonance through the creation of adaptive post-traumatic meanings (Park et al. 2017). The TMM is a framework that explains this process. It provides a multi-discipline, research-based approach for understanding, mitigating, and healing moral dissonance from warfighting.

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This dissertation uses case studies to critically examine the Three Mirror Model (TMM) as a framework for understanding the formation and healing of Military Moral Injury (MMI). I adapt the work of Stephen Brookfield and Neal Krause to evaluate using the TMM as a methodology for dealing with the complex issues of MMI within a military deployment cycle (training, warfighting, and healing) (Brookfield 2012, 2017; Krause 2022). Specifically, I use theorists, researchers, healers, and warfighters as key stakeholders to identify and critically examine the intersections of disciplines and the subsets of models where warfighters' moral orientations and moral agency form and reconcile the moral dissonance that results in MMI.

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KEY WORDS: Moral Injury, Military Moral Injury, Military Ethics, Moral Orientation Systems, Warfighting, Moral Dissonance, Warrior Codes, Post-Traumatic Stress, Post-Traumatic Growth, Spiritual Care, Moral Identity, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Just War, Just War Theory, Spiritual Integration, Spiritual Struggles, Moral Foundations Theory, OODA Loop, Kill Chain Theory, Operational Mindsets, Mission Command, Targeting Bias, Moral Reflexivity, Moral Reasoning, Alterity, and Exceptionalism.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter One: The Reasons Why: A Critical Methodology for a Model explaining

the Formation and Healing of Military Moral Injury (MMI)

"From any nation each man [person] returning from war stands alone in the

rubble of his [her/their] personal homecoming" (Mason 2018, 18).

Steve Mason, Vietnam Veteran and Poet

Introduction

> Moral injury, characterized by guilt, shame and self-condemnation, is
> conceptualized either as an adjunct to post-traumatic stress disorder or as a
> new syndrome. Studies of symptoms and potentially morally injurious
> events have produced a possible definition and informed the design of
> rating scales. The current challenge remains the design of effective
> interventions. Because moral injury relates to ethical behavior, the
> meaning attached to events and perceptions of the self, moral philosophy
> and spirituality could contribute to the design of treatments. (E. Jones
> 2020, 127)

There is not a common definition or terminology to describe Military Moral

Injury (MMI). Some view moral injuries as a consequence of Traumatic Brain Injury

(TBI), or a manifestation of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as defined in

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V (DSM-5) (Nash 2011; Bonura

2016; D. Peters 2016). However, others describe MMI as value-based emotional,

cognitive, and spiritual reactions to traumatic combat experiences (Shay 2014; Litz et al.

2009; Evans et al. 2018). Some theorize that MMI may be related to both physical and

psychological causes (Larson and Zust 2017). PTSD is caused by intruding and enduring,

anatomical-based reactions to traumatic events triggered by the Autonomic Nervous

System (van der Kolk 2015). Contrarily, moral injuries from traumatic events are described as enduring, cognitive struggles over value-based perceptions and judgements (Litz et al. 2009; Shay 2014; Tick 2005).

Regardless of causation, all the above viewpoints include the importance of an individual's creation of post-traumatic meaning for well-being, and this raises the question, "what is the basis for evaluating trauma and building post-traumatic meaning?" Research demonstrates the key role individual's value-based systems have in the formation and treatment of traumatic injuries (Park et al. 2017; Pargament and Exline 2022, 221; Farnsworth et al. 2017). In this dissertation, I will build upon this research by focusing on how the moral orienting systems of the warfighter, along with the sources for their suffering, need to be accounted for when designing effective interventions and treatments for MMI.

A moral orienting system is a construct based upon Pargament's and Exline's biopsychosocial description of the orienting processes individuals use to think about their personality, beliefs, attitudes, habits, experiences, coping skills, and relationships. They also have subsets of spiritual dimensions, "that guide the individual along preferred pathways to significant destinations" (Pargament and Exline 2022, 29-30). Because these orienting systems extend beyond cognitive processes to help people deliberate and regulate their emotions and behaviors using core values and beliefs to resolve struggles caused by incongruous beliefs and actions (Pargament and Exline 2022, 243) they can be labeled and studied as moral orienting systems.

MMI is the spiritual and psychological damage caused by chronic moral dissonance between warfighters' values and their actions when they are not able to

reconcile what they did, failed to do, witnessed, or experienced during combat (Litz et al.

2009; Pargament and Exline 2022, 246-248; Drescher et al. 2011, 8; Shay 2014; Tick

2005; L.K. Graham 2017, 87). I argue in this dissertation that warfighters' moral

judgements are based upon warrior codes embedded within their moral orienting systems.

Military ethicist Shannon French defines warrior codes as the internalized acceptance of

certain moral constraints that, "allows warriors to hold onto their humanity while

experiencing the horror of war – and when the war is over, to return home and reintegrate

into the society they so ably defended" (French 2017, 12).

French focuses upon the broader purposes of these codes, but states that it is the

specific constructions of these codes applied in specific contexts that makes them

effective. Thus, warrior codes set moral limits related to "whatever they [warfighters]

hold most dear" (French 2017, 17). There is another aspect to this. Military veteran and

educator David Grossman claims that the military ethos also creates permissions that

allow warfighters to use violence in service to moral purposes for the sake of winning

and surviving in combat. The order of these two goals is specific and deliberate. He uses

the metaphor of a sheepdog to describe the different purpose and mentality between a

protector, predator and prey in their use of lethal force (Grossman and Christensen 2004,

177-179). Thus, warrior codes function as the standards upon which warfighters base

permissions and constraints for their moral agency.

Warrior codes integrate ultimate senses of values and beliefs with professional

practices to form what psychologists Kenneth Pargament and Julie Exline define as a

person's "biopsychosocial" orienting system (Pargament and Exline 2022, 9 and 29).

Thus, warrior codes function as moral orienting systems by integrating the, "attitudes,

habits, experiences, practices, coping skills, and personality characteristics… [and] network of social relationships that provide a sense of direction and stability" (Pargament and Exline 2022, 29). Pargament and Exline argue that these moral orienting systems are linked with subsets of spiritual dimensions composed of sacred beliefs, emotions, and practices to form pathways to personal significance (Pargament and Exline 2022, 30). Early Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) research has found that people use broad, theological and non-theological social senses such as purity/degradation along with moral senses of care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, and authority/subversion (Atari et al. 2022, 3; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009, 111-112) to define ultimate meaning. These senses are expressed as virtues that guide, "The ability to endow ideas, objects, and events with infinite value, particularly those ideas, objects, and events that bind a group together into a single entity" (Haidt 2012, 193).

Currently MFT measures the moral sense of purity/degradation by a person's self and social comparisons of their ultimate values against their conduct and context (Atari et al. 2022, 4-ff). Thus, the moral sense of purity blends spiritual dimensions with other moral senses to integrate individual core values, beliefs and practices with social values, beliefs, and practices into a person's moral orienting system. Within the military ethos, this means that a warfighter's personal standards become integrated with the professional standards within the military ethos to function as warrior codes that define the moral orienting systems that they use to determine their moral agency and ethical action.

Warfighting can dis-integrate the connections between core values, beliefs, and practices that warfighters use to judge their moral agency, and ethical actions. This dis-integration generates the moral dissonance which warfighters may experience as

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biopsychosocial or spiritual struggles (Pargament and Exline 2022, 32 and 246; L.K.

Graham 2017, 87; Larson and Zust 2017, 7). The nature of biopsychosocial or spiritual

struggles affects the life orientations that define a broad spectrum of religious and non-

religious populations (Pargament and Exline 2022, 57; Pargament et al. 2005; Sedlar et

al. 2018; Evans et al. 2018; Saucier and Skrzypinska 2006). Thus, conflicts within

warfighters' moral orienting systems can alter their sense of purpose and life meaning.

The effects from these struggles are often life changing and pivotal, much like a

fork in the road. They can either lead to a maladaptive decline, or an adaptive re-

integration of cores values with life behaviors to produce positive life meaning and

committed life practices (Borges et al. 2022, 2-3; Park et al. 2017, 77-94; Pargament and

Exline 2022, 35). This re-integration of core values with life practices is an iterative

reconciliation process that involves post-traumatic meaning-making to address the

particular causes and effects of moral dissonance. Because warrior codes contain the core

values, beliefs, and practices that warfighters use to judge their moral agency and ethical

practices, they hold the key for understanding, preventing and treating MMI.

There is one caveat. The above argument assumes that warrior codes provide

positive moral guides for warfighters' well-being. However, French warns that warrior

codes can also set the conditions for unjust behaviors that place warfighters' humanity

and their professional identities in conflict (French 2017, 18-19). When this happens,

warfighters can experience a betrayal that extends from their ethos, through their chains

of command to the national political level (Shay 1994, 145). Thus, warrior codes might

be obstacles that need to be de-constructed in the process of reconciling moral dissonance

during treatments for MMI. So, for better or worse, warfighters' warrior codes operate

within complex levels as moral orienting systems to navigate battlefields, and they are defined by individual/social values, military ethos, political expectations, and national/international laws.

Each of these levels has implications for how warfighters reconcile moral dissonance generated from struggles between their moral orientations and their ethical agency. These struggles do not have single origins, they are not "diagnosed" from a list of recognized criteria, and they are not reconciled through linear, cause and effect treatments. Sociologist Hans Joas believes that histories are complex because plans and policies do not always produce desired social outcomes. Thus, the formation and resolution of wars have social and historical implications for meaning-making that must take into account the cumulative losses that warfighters and civilians experience as the "contingent nature" of personal outcomes for their actions (Joas 2003, 16-17). Such is the iterative process of reconciling the moral dissonance that accompanies the integration, dis-integration, and re-integration of the warrior codes that regulate warfighters' moral orienting systems.

Methodology and Thesis

MMI forms in violent contexts defined by the intersections of moral theology, military ethics, rules of engagement, behavioral psychology, traumatology, and spiritual care. My dissertation compares conclusions derived from research, theory, and warfighter experiences to critique The Three Mirror Model (TMM) which proposes an explanation for how warrior codes function within warfighters' moral orienting systems during the three phases of a combat deployment cycle (training, warfighting, and recovery). I originally developed the TMM for my work at the National Defense University using a

similar methodology to the Core Latent Variable Model developed by Neal Krause to explain the relationships between religion, virtues, and health. Krause used subsets of "evidence based" models to form a series of relationships based upon theoretical arguments to construct an empirically estimated, core model that provides a focal point that integrates insights from specific research into a "larger conceptual whole" that can serve as the basis for future research studies (Krause 2022, 10).

The TMM was constructed in 2013 from subsets of theoretical concepts and research studies. However, much has changed in our understanding of MMI since then. This dissertation will use an interdisciplinary, critical reflection methodology adapted from the pedagogical philosophy of educator Stephen Brookfield to analyze the commonly accepted cause-and-effect relationships, prescriptive assumptions, and paradigms (Brookfield 2012, 17-20; 2017) that form the TMM as a core model to explain MMI.

Brookfield suggests that critical reflection upon teaching practices involves feedback collected from students, colleagues, theories, and self-reflection to reveal and critique the systems that harm us by controlling our instincts and responses (Brookfield 2012, 59-75). However, I am working in the context of the military, so I will substitute and extrapolate material from researchers, theorists, and warfighters to critique the military systems that can form MMI. Some of this material fits into more than one category. For example, the work and experiences from some of these people reside in multiple categories: for example, a researcher like William Nash is also warfighter, who

proposes theory. My goal is to provide a research literate, theoretically sound, and practically focused critical reflection on the formation and treatment of moral dissonance in MMI.

My dissertation is driven by my desire to critically examine the limits of different disciplinary approaches to MMI, and to discover interdisciplinary connections that allow researchers, theorists, and warfighters to cross the multiple academic and spiritual boundaries that are present in MMI. My desire derives from the methodology of theologian Paul Tillich, a WWI German Army Chaplain, whose life work viewed the unconditional essence of human existence in the conditional forms of religious life practices through the foundational lens of his WWI experiences(Tillich 1966, 68-69). Tillich explained the practical application for his theology as the discipline that allowed him to understand and find meanings in the boundaries between, "religion and culture, the sacred and the secular, heteronomy and autonomy" (Tillich 1966, 80-81).

I believe that MMI exists within similar religious-cultural, spiritual-material, and social-individual boundaries that are defined by the relationship between moral agency (a judgment upon essence) and ethical practices (a judgment upon form). The form of these boundaries is defined by disciplines of theology, psychology, and military ethos/ethics/law. The dissonance between the defined boundaries of perceived moral agency and ethical practice is what injures warfighters. Furthermore, these perceptions are often complex, and the ambiguity increases the dissonance.

My experiences as a military chaplain shape my critical reflection, but my work is not an ethnography of my combat experiences. I present chosen topics because warfighters have told me these topics are issues for them, and I protect my privileged

communications with them by using substitute illustrations taken from public sources. My experiences have led to the formation of the TMM model for understanding MMI. My model explains my "hunting assumption" (Brookfield 2012, 7) for proposing that unreconciled moral dissonance from military actions is the source of MMI. My critical reflection of research, theory, treatment modalities and warfighter experiences will provide a wide lens to 1) appraise the TMM, and 2) apply my conclusions to test cases derived from specific military events. My goal is to provide informed actions, or a *phronesis* (a practical wisdom for living) that researchers, theorists, care providers, and warfighters can use in their future work.

My critical reflection is also a type of reflexive praxis that is common to studies of lived religion and ethics. Liberation theologies begin with the lived experiences of peoples and social groups struggling with systemic social oppression. This applies to critical reflection upon my construction of military ethos embodied in warrior codes that functions as moral orienting systems which control the instincts and practices of warfighters who may, or may not, act willfully in a just manner during combat. My correlation of research and theory with the lived experiences of diverse warfighters allows for an analysis of military ethos as a social construction that regulates uses of power in the public sphere through moral orientations that control ethical practices. These uses of power have implications of personal well-being and social justice based upon transcendent values and ultimate senses of meaning. Thus, my analysis of how warrior codes function in the formation of moral dissonance includes the theological language

that informs personal identity and calls for social action by correlating how a warfighter's moral agency, defined by value-based orientations, informs ethical practice, defined by value-based actions.

Exploring lived experiences of military ethos can also be a form of "writing from the margins," because less than 7% of the U.S. population has ever served in combat (Vespa 2020).[1] Because of this, warfighters numerically represent a marginalized ethos within society who are aligned with political authorities, and who wield great power in protective and/or destructive ways. Warfighters are given privileges and exceptional permissions by governments and groups with political agendas. Critiquing these agendas is not the intent of my dissertation. However, the subject of MMI requires critical analysis of the political influences that govern the moral agency and ethical practices for harm done to others. Thus, my critical reflection will include social justice in my composition of the lenses I use to analyze research, theory, and warfighter experiences.

My exploration of lived experiences within military ethos also reflects the racial, gender, sexual orientation and religious diversity of the men and women who are warfighters. My work will largely reflect the experiences of the U.S. Military, because of the limited availability of resources from the militaries of other nations and cultures. However, certain aspects of being a warfighter link the warrior codes of American warfighters with the warrior codes and combat experiences of warfighters from other nations and time periods. I will include as much as possible of these experiences in my

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[1] It is probably lower for the world population.

critical reflection. I am continually trying to locate resources that make these connections possible. But at best my dissertation only provides an "on ramp" for further academic work by myself and others.

However, my purpose is not to critique war as a phenomenon. My purpose is to contribute to the growing knowledge of preventing the formation of MMI and increasing the effectiveness of treatments for MMI through the reconciliation of warfighters' moral dissonance. The reconciliation of moral dissonance requires critical reflection upon issues in warfighting and I will do this using the categories of moral agency and ethical practices to parse the formation of treatment of religious/spiritual, and moral struggles from combat (Pargament and Exline 2022, 35-ff). My dissertation will analyze 1) how military training integrates warfighters' core values and personal beliefs with professional standards and ethical practices into the warrior codes they use as moral orienting systems to determine their moral agency in combat, 2) how warfighting can dis-integrate the connections between warfighters' moral standards and ethical practices to cause chronic levels of moral dissonance within the moral orienting systems they use to process traumatic events and life meaning (L.K. Graham 2017, 86-87), 3) how different treatment modalities help warfighters re-integrate their moral values with their ethical practices to reconcile moral dissonance and create new life meanings, and 4) how emerging trends in warfare will challenge future warfighters, theorists, researchers, and theorists to find new ways of healing MMI.

Definitions

Warfighter

I choose to use the term "warfighter" to designate the identity of individuals in military service because it is inclusive with respect to branch of service, race, gender, and life orientation. The term warfighter draws attention to the purpose, function, and conduct of military service in its use of lethal force in war. I will use the specific nouns of Soldier, Marine, Sailor, Airmen, Coastguardsman, and Guardian when referring to specific individuals in specific contexts. I will only identify rank, gender, race, sexual orientation, culture, and nationality when necessary to a specific narrative, argument, or event.

Military Moral Injury (MMI)

The specification of "military" needs to be added to the term moral injury to differentiate the unique origins and effects of this injury from combat service as opposed to general participation in the military or trauma experienced by a civilian (Drescher et al. 2011, 8). This addition agrees with the work from a combination of theorists, researchers, and care providers. In his work with Vietnam Veterans, Jonathan Shay defined moral injury as the betrayal of "what's right" by those in authority in high stake situations(Shay 1994, 9-21). However, subsequent research with warfighters has shown that some of this betrayal is self-inflicted. So, a working definition of MMI must also include what warfighters did, failed to do, or witnessed in combat (Litz et al. 2009; Maguen et al. 2011). The definition of MMI must also include the spiritual dimensions of "soul wound" (Tick 2005; Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012), and the spiritual struggles associated with meaning making experienced by combat veterans (Park et al. 2017, 77-ff; Pargament and Exline 2022, 248-249; Bachelor 2012a, 17-41).

A working definition of MMI must also address questions about the origins of MMI, what is damaged by MMI, and how MMI is manifested. Thus, my working definition of MMI combines aspects from each of the above studies and theories to specify the relationship between warfighters' core values and ethical agency as the cause for MMI. Thus, my working definition for MMI is:

> Military Moral Injury is the complex "soul" wound resulting from a warfighter's post-trauma inability to reconcile the moral dissonance between the values and agency that define his/her/their identity. This moral dissonance produces a chain of maladaptive emotions, thoughts, and behaviors that wounds and altars the warfighter's core identity and damages his/her/their capacity for living.[2]

Religious and Spiritual Dimensions

Researcher Neal Krause defines spirituality as "a personal and subjective phenomenon that focuses upon an individual's beliefs and values… religion refers to an individual's involvement in an ongoing faith tradition that is practiced in a religious institution" (Krause 2022, 18). Thus, the corporateness and individuation of beliefs and practices form a general differentiation between "religion" and "spiritual" that is reflected in research and social structures. I will use this boundary throughout my dissertation, with the caveat that this boundary is routinely crossed in the practical theologies and values used for determining moral agency. A critical reflection of MMI requires an examination of the layers of deeper meaning that are provided by a "braiding" of Religious/Spiritual (R/S) contents within the military ethos.

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[2] This definition is adapted from the work of (Larson and Zust 2017, 11; Zust 2015b, 1-2; Litz et al. 2009; Shay 1994; Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012).

Spirituality is the solitary or communal search directed towards ultimate values and practices connected with a transcendent being, or the ideals used for defining life meaning, transforming goals, setting priorities, and determining closeness (Pargament, Desai, and McConnell 2006, 122-124). For some people "spiritual" is theological relationship, for others it is philosophical principle. However, the importance of spirituality is that it defines moral senses of sacredness, sanctity, purity, or ultimate meaning that function in the confluence of the moral senses and values within moral orienting systems. Spiritual Dimensions are parts of the amalgamation of elements that animates people and allows them to, "make homes and cross boundaries" in life (Tweed 2006, 54). The military ethos is full of such amalgamations and crossings and warrior codes are built around the integration (confluence) of values that compose moral orienting systems. Thus, warfighters' searches for meaning and self-identity are manifested in the spiritual dimensions that are strands in a braided set of values that compose their human and professional identity (Taylor 1992, 495-ff; Larson and Zust 2017, 94-95). Warfighters will use these braided spiritual dimensions within their warrior codes for warfighting, mitigating posttraumatic effects, and facilitating healing (Smith-MacDonald et al. 2017; Sharma et al. 2017; French 2017). I will address these issues in future chapters.

Moral Orienting Systems and Conscience

As stated earlier, a moral orienting system is a construct based upon Pargament's and Exline's biopsychosocial description of the orienting processes that individuals use to deliberate and regulate their character, emotions, and behavior (Pargament and Exline 2022, 29-30 and 243-244). This construct is more robust than a theological or

psychological construct of conscience because it includes connections between spiritual dimensions, beliefs, worldviews, values, thoughts, emotions life narratives, and relationships, and ethos. Conscience has been studied from the ancient to modern times as some form of socialized knowledge of community standards binding the individual to forms of expected beliefs and behaviors (Churchland 2019, 11-ff). This type of standardization can become an internalized, cognitive, moral dialogue that excludes consideration of the significant emotion reactions and social affects that occur from incongruous values and actions. Thus, I consider conscience as a part of a person's larger moral orienting system that describes the processes used for moral/ethical deliberation and judgement. This holistic approach allows for my critical reflection of warfighters' moral orienting systems using evidence-based research and theory.

Moral Agency, and Ethical Practices

The differentiation between "moral" and "ethical" is important for understanding the orientations and practices that contribute to the function of warrior codes. I define "moral" in terms of the prescriptive values and standards expected from wide, diverse groups of people and cultures. These values and standards are reflected in their orientations and their agency. I define "ethical" as the narrower, prescriptive praxis that is required from members of specific groups in specific contexts. Specific elements in these categories are complex and should not be solely considered as "bright lines" for directing behavior, although they do include prescriptive elements.

Imagine the differentiation between moral and ethical this way. Suppose three different people are traveling down deserted roads and they come across a vehicle accident with an injured person signaling for help. There are no laws that require any of

these three people to stop. However, there is a broader, social expectation that all three of these people should stop. Thus, "stopping to help" is a moral orientation for expected behavior that is applicable to all three people. Luckily all three people share this basic, moral orientation, so they stop.

Now, suppose that one of the three people is a paramedic, the other is a licensed emergency medicine physician, and the third person is a dog groomer. In stopping, all three people obey an expected moral orientation, regardless of their awareness that they are protected by Good Samaritan Laws. However, the paramedic and physician will be required to treat the injured person according to the ethical practices defined by their professional training. So, they can be held publicly accountable for what they do or what they fail to do in helping the injured driver. These higher standards include both moral obligations and ethical expectations defined by their training. By rule of law and public opinion, the doctor will be held to a higher moral and ethical standards than the paramedic, and both will be held to higher standards than the dog groomer. More importantly, the doctor and paramedic may hold themselves *personally* responsible for their actions as judged by the moral and ethical standards associated with of their profession.

Warfighters have similar moral and ethical expectations defined by their humanity, and their profession. They are expected to act differently than civilians. This difference is established by law and national policy. It is also embodied in the warrior codes that are embedded in their training and enabled by the chains of command in which they serve.

Thus, warfighters have moral expectations and ethical practices for which they are publicly and personally accountable which they regulate through the moral orienting systems that direct their performance of duty.

Warrior Codes and Moral Orienting Systems

Warrior codes are the practical forms (*phronesis)* of the moral orienting systems used by warfighters to determine their moral agency and ethical practices in combat. These codes are firmly rooted in the mythologies, histories, cultures, traditions, ceremonies, and competencies that compose the military ethos with the purpose of integrating the core values, lived experiences, technical competence, and social expectations that regulate the identity and behaviors of its warfighters (French 2017, 3).

Some common examples of warrior codes in the American military can be found in the mottos and basic creeds of each service branch. They are: "Semper Fidelis" (Marine Corps - always faithful), "Semper Paratus" (Coast Guard - always ready), "Aim High, Fly-Fight-Win" (Air Force), "Ship, Shipmate, Self" (Navy)," "Always Above (Space Force)," or "I will always place the mission first, I will never accept defeat, I will never quit, and I will never leave a fallen comrade" (Army). Thus, a warrior code can become a form of a heuristic that a unit leader can use to enforce conduct by simply stating, "We don't do that," or a warfighter use as a rational for instinctively volunteering for dangerous duty.

Whether informal standards or formal doctrines, warrior codes create intrinsic and extrinsic expectations and values that serve to motivate and guide warfighters' moral orientations and ethical practices in extremis conditions. These same codes also exist to protect warfighters' identity during combat and they contribute to their post-traumatic

recovery. They are the "reasons why" that support warfighters' moral orienting systems. However, warrior codes may also contribute to MMI by creating values that support an immoral ethos that grants localized permissions that harms non-combatants and combatants (Grossman 1995, 188-ff). Thus, warfighters' positive and negative uses of warrior codes influence the levels of moral dissonance they experience in combat. The function of warrior codes will be analyzed in depth in future chapters.

Moral Agency

Warrior codes specify the standards of conduct that function as a moral orienting system to determine moral agency. Moral agency is the practical application (*phronesis)* determined by a moral orienting system. Warfighters are trained to kill as members of a unit, and this creates the societal expectation that they will act under national command authority by operating with codes of conduct that regulate their use of lethal force.

This expectation existed in ancient societies as it does today. Ethicist Shannon French demonstrates the function of a warrior code by using the story of a Spartan mother sending her son off to war with the words, "Come back with your shield, or on it." Spartan shields were designed to link Spartan warriors in phalanx formations where each warfighter was personally responsible and publicly accountable for protecting the warfighter next to him. Spartan warfighters' safety and success depended upon the physical integrity of their formation, and so the Spartan shield also served as a warrior code that signified a standard for individual self-integrity and honor for protecting other warfighters. Thus, the mother's words communicated a moral orientation for ethical practice; the warrior was to come back victorious, dead, or wounded with his honor intact (French 2017, 268-ff).

18

Similar expectations are carried over into the warrior codes that influence the moral agency of modern warfighters. They are moral agents who are accountable for what they do or fail to do. It is not difficult to imagine how traumatic events cause intense emotional, relational, and physical reactions in individuals. However, it is more difficult to understand how warfighters process their combat experiences. They have been trained to endure hardships and fight back while under extreme, traumatic stress, and they may repress their cognitive and emotional reactions to combat. More important, warfighters are often the creators and active participants in the traumatic stress they experience. Therefore, they will not morally or ethically react as civilians, and this needs to be accounted for when applying research gathered from assault and abuse victims.

This is not to say that survivors of assault, abuse, and traumatic accidents have not experienced moral injuries. They do. They may perceive they are responsible for their traumatic events, but they do not bear the same personal responsibility or public accountability as the warfighters who have public accountability to cause traumatic harm, and public responsibility for protecting others from the harms they cause.

It is the responsibility and accountability for traumatic events that separates moral injuries experienced by warfighters from moral injuries experienced by civilians. Responsibility and accountability also apply to the prevention and protection of warfighters who have been assaulted by military members (Dunnaback 2014). Current events demonstrate that warfighters have been morally injured from sexual assault, physical abuse, toxic leadership, and activities not directly associated with combat. However, responses to these traumatic events manifest differently in warfighters than they do in civilians, because warfighters who have been assaulted will process these

19

events as a betrayal of the warrior codes that make them moral agents (Hoyle 2014a; Falsetti, Resick, and Davis 2003). This is also true of combat events where warfighters who have been ambushed, or experienced indirect fire while performing non-combat duties, will process their traumatic stress as moral agents, not moral victims. This will be analyzed in depth in Chapter 3.

Moral Dissonance, Spiritual Struggles, and Reconciliation

Moral dissonance is directly related to the function of warrior codes in moral orienting systems. It is the emotional and cognitive reactions experienced by warfighters as their values conflict with their moral convictions and behavior. My definition of moral dissonance is based upon social science concepts of cognitive dissonance and human development applied to the construction of self-identity. In developmental theory, inconsistencies and conflicts between personal and social needs produce a cognitive dissonance that motivates individuals to seek consonance or resolution of the conflicts, and they mature with each successful resolution (Erickson 1950, 268-274). However, there is also a regressive element that happens when social needs overcome individual needs. This results in an ongoing cognitive and emotional dissonance that blocks individual development and manifests in behaviors such as social avoidance or affirmation seeking from peer groups (Festinger 1957, 2-4; Erickson 1950, 270-ff).

Cognitive dissonance is related to these types of maladaptive behaviors. The concept of cognitive dissonance can be applied to the way adolescents form their self-identity. Young adults who experience small amounts of dissonance between their ideal and perceived identities have stronger self-identities than those who experience large amounts of dissonance. Thus, large amounts cognitive dissonance are linked with maladaptive

20

behaviors and stunted development, and positive identity development is linked with small amounts of cognitive dissonance (Olson 1984, 26-32). Other researchers and theorists have applied similar concepts of dissonance to explain how value-based, moral judgments influence the development of self-identity (Gilligan 1989, 54; Farnsworth et al. 2017; Chu and Gilligan 2014; Gentile 2010; J. Rest et al. 1999).

I will use the concept of moral dissonance to describe effects from the dis-integration of moral orientation from ethical practices that warfighters experience during combat. I will use the concept of reconciliation to describe the re-integration of warfighters' values with their actions. In earlier work with my writing partner, we used the concept of "resolution/resolve" to describe the treatment goal of bringing consonance to moral dissonance (Larson and Zust 2017, 20-ff). However, the term "resolution" is inadequate for what happens in the treatment of moral injuries. The treatment goal of resolution makes healing moral dissonance a choice/decision and a linear practice to solve a moral/ethical dilemma, rather than facing the deep, contextual, and reoccurring spiritual struggles for meaning that are reported by researchers, theorists, and combat veterans. Therefore, I will use the concept of reconciliation to describe the treatment processes necessary for dealing with moral dissonance.

Reconciliation implies re-integration or re-connection, and this is the treatment goal used by many treatment modalities. Reconciliation is a word used in sacred texts to describe the process of reuniting what has been broken apart, harmed, separated, or alienated. The goal of reconciliation is wholeness, harmony, and integrity (Bianchi 1969, 7-14). Reconciliation respects the individuation and the plurality of values along with

transcendent dimensions and the contexts "at hand". Such respect is what makes specific integration of these elements as possible as a "gumbo" where each elements contributes to the whole (J.C. Augustine 2022, 4-5).

Theologian Jonathan Augustine views reconciliation as healing orientations and practices that help individuals and communities rehabilitate and repair their broken lives. Such work includes ownership of the past, awareness of the present, and critical contemplation of the future. Reconciliation includes dimensions of salvific, social, and civil meaning that are driven by the question, "Where do we go from here" (J.C. Augustine 2022, 99-ff)? Augustine's concept of reconciliation fits with the cultural and religious diversity that is present within the military ethos, and it also fits with constructions of spirituality as the amalgamation of what animates warfighters constructions of life meaning. Finally, my use of "reconciliation" as a treatment goal seeks to be true to the re-integration of what morally injured warfighters report as broken – the ultimate values, practices, relationships, and life meanings that compose their self-identity.

Warrior codes function within warfighters' moral orienting system to link their moral orientations with their ethical practices. It is the dis-integration of warfighters' moral orientations from their ethical practices that form moral dissonance and initiate types of spiritual struggles. Spiritual struggles can be defined as expressions of conflict, question, and doubt within a person's "general orienting system" regarding matters of supernatural, interpersonal, and intrapersonal relationships. They are linked to poorer health and well-being. across different religious groups and cultures (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Exline 2015, 127-128). These struggles can be reconciled over time

through iterative processes that promote the re-integration of warfighters' moral orienting system with their life practices to create posttraumatic growth (Krause 2022, 154-160; Pargament and Exline 2022, 9-21; Pargament 2007, 134-136). This is the reoccurring message in Chapters 2-4.

The Reasons Why

The subject of MMI is important to me because I am a combat veteran who served 33 years as a soldier and chaplain at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the Army. I am also a military ethicist who taught senior military leaders at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy and the National Defense University. So, I view MMI through the lenses of a warfighter, pastor, and ethicist. When I entered the military, I was given a mimeographed booklet entitled *The Reasons Why.* The book contained 105 pages of quotes and inspirational messages from past military leaders to define the moral and ethical obligations of military duty. In a way, each passage served as a heuristic intended to become part of future warfighters' moral orienting systems.

These *reasons why* were a catalyst for my development of a warrior code that connected me with other warfighters. The issues raised and the examples I use in my dissertation are here because I have witnessed them in the contexts I have served, and other warfighters have reported them to me. However, with rare exceptions my experiences are not included in my dissertation. This is necessary to preserve classified information and the privileged communication I owe to the warfighters I served. This is also an internal, critical check to ensure that my selection of issues and examples are not solely based upon personal interpretations of my experiences. This dissertation reflects

my own academic conviction, and not the official position of United States Government, Department of Defense, United States Army, the Department of Veteran Affairs, or the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.

As I ministered in different combat zones, I came to understand that *The Reasons Why* represented internalized warrior codes that guided warfighters in the performance of their duties. I also witnessed how these codes protected or condemned warfighters perceptions of their moral agency during combat. Towards the end of my military service, I began to understand how moral dissonance from moral judgements become haunting struggles that can prevent combat veterans from returning home.

In the quote at the beginning of this chapter, veteran Scott Mason alludes to these haunting struggles as the "rubble" that some veterans carry away from their combat service. This "rubble" is caused by warfighters' inability to restore consonance by reconciling their moral dissonance. Thus, my conviction that moral dissonance from value-based conflicts between warfighters' moral orientations and their ethical practices becomes the "primary wound" that causes the "secondary" wounds of the struggles they carry with them through life. Research shows that the source of such struggles can be the reasons behind maladaptive such as substance abuse, domestic abuse, depression, and suicide (Tripp, McDevitt-Murphy, and Henschel 2016; LeardMann et al. 2021; Van Winkle and Safer 2011; Jacobson et al. 2008).

Try to imagine moral dissonance from the perspective of a soldier who is obligated to act as a moral agent in combat after events go wrong. In 1966 Marshall Storeby was a young Private First Class (PFC) in Vietnam. While there, he participated in a long-range patrol, where he refused to participate with his Sergeant (SGT) and three

members of his squad as they kidnapped, raped, and murdered a young Vietnamese woman named Phan Thi Mao. During the patrol Storeby was torn between his duty as soldier to perform as a member of his squad, and his duty as a human being to protect Mao. The patrol took his rifle and gave him a grenade launcher, so he was no threat to them at close range. A corporal (CPL) ordered him stand watch over an injured Mao, who was unable to flee because of her weakened condition. Later the same corporal stabbed Mao and ordered Storeby to fire his grenade launcher at Mao. Instead, Storeby fired at a different target, and this was confirmed by forensic evidence. Storeby was repeatedly threatened with injury by the patrol, and he consistently refused to participate in Mao's rape and murder. However, he failed to keep her alive. As he struggled to survive that patrol, he vowed, "I wouldn't rest until something was done about Mao's murder. It was the least I could do – I had failed her in so many ways. The only thing that could stop me was if I became a friendly casualty" (Lang 1969, 54; 1970, 54).

Storeby returned to his patrol base and tried to report the crime to his chain of command. His immediate chain of command failed to act, so Storeby reported Mao's murder to a chaplain, "who had the rank and conscience to help me" (Lang 1969, 73; 1970, 74)". This resulted in the Army investigating the crime, but his efforts brought more death threats and some reprisals. Storeby escaped the "friendly fire" that killed the interpreter who accompanied the murder scene investigators, and he was told that members of Mao's family had disappeared(Storeby 1999).

Eventually, the SGT, CPL and two other squad members were court martialed, and Storeby testified at their trials. The SGT's defense attorney tried to portray Storeby as a malcontent who did not like the SGT, a loner who did not fit in with his squad, and a

coward who traded Mao's life for his own. The defense attorney also tried to legitimize

the SGT as a war hero doing his duty by identifying Mao as stranger and a suspected Viet

Cong who might endanger the patrol. PFC Storeby answered with conviction by

reminding the defense attorney, "I wouldn't say that sir, they are all strange faces… Sir,

that girl wasn't supposed to be on this patrol" (Lang 1970, 93; 1969, 92).

At this point, it is important to examine why Storeby acted contrary to the other

members in his patrol. Warfighters in combat experience all-encompassing moral,

spiritual, and ethical challenges that can change elements of the warrior code that they are

operating under. These changes can run contrary to personal moral orientations, and the

warrior codes embedded in military doctrine. These changes form a mindset, or bias, that

binds individuals to groups, and influences decisions at the "point of the spear" (tactical

level). Storeby as well as the other members of his patrol, were struggling with

challenging contexts that conflicted with their warrior codes.

Strangely, the members of the patrol confirmed Storeby's non-participation in

Mao's kidnapping, rape, and murder. But predictably, they testified to their adherence to

moral values and ethical practices that elevated their roles as lethal warfighters and

minimized their responsibility for the protection of non-combatants. However, both lethal

capacity, and humanitarian capability were expectations of the warrior code and Rules of

Engagement that should have guided the patrol's moral orienting systems. However,

Storeby and the members of his patrol were operating with different values.

Lang's interview with Storeby reveals the conflicting nature of these values and

how they affected him as he entered Vietnam. Storeby explains:

From one day to the next, you could see for yourself changes coming over guys on our side—decent fellows, who wouldn't dream of calling an Oriental a 'gook' or a 'slopehead' back home. But they were halfway around the world now, in a strange country, where they couldn't tell who was their friend and who wasn't. Day after day, out on patrol, we'd come to a narrow dirt path leading through some shabby village, and the elders would welcome us and the children come running with smiles on their faces, waiting for the candy we'd give them. But at the other end of the path, just as we were leaving the village behind, the enemy would open up on us, and there was bitterness among us that the villagers hadn't given us warning…. It could keep them from believing that life was so valuable—anyone's life, I mean, even their own… Of course, I was a foot soldier all this time. I was operating in a forward area and probably seeing the war at its ugliest. In daylight it was search-and-destroy missions, and at night it was setting ambushes for the enemy. I discovered it's not difficult to kill a human being—in combat it's as instinctive as ducking bullets. You never knew whose turn it was to die, and that isn't how it was in rear areas. The farther back you got, the closer you approached the way people lived in civilian life. (Lang 1969, 19-20; 1970, 18-19)

The court martial testimony from Private (PVT) Diaz, who was the youngest member of the patrol reveal the vulnerable position of Soldier whose life depended upon acting as a member of his unit. When questioned why he participated in the rape when Storeby (an older and higher-ranking soldier than Diaz) refused, Diaz answered that he was in Vietnam longer than Storeby:

I don't think I'm braver than Storeby, [it was] better to go into the hootch [where the rape took place], sir, and keep contentment in the squad, and keep a better – well, how can I explain it? – keep the thing running smooth. It makes for an easier mission and no problems. The Army expects you to do it the Army way, and that's follow orders. (Lang 1970, 102; 1969, 100)

Diaz reasoned that longevity in the unit, not maturity or rank, or the morality of rape and murder determined the appropriate moral agency for a warfighter on a patrol in enemy territory. Some civilians may reason that Storeby was only doing his moral duty as "good" human being, while Diaz and the others were moral failures. This is partially

true, but there is more involved. Diaz testified to the all-encompassing values that were a part of the warrior code that Storeby had to overcome in order to refuse participation in Mao's rape and murder, and later report the actions of his squad. He couldn't leave his fellow soldiers in a combat zone, and he couldn't remain silent to what he witnessed. Thus, the loyalty owed to his unit conflicted with his core values as a human being. He reasoned that Mao was a non-combatant, and his Army values conflicted with the intentions and actions of his unit.

Notice that Storeby expressed similar values and practices as Diaz when it came to obedience to his chain of command with one important difference; he believed that conscience, "crossed over from civilian life to war … It was as much a part of us as our legs and arms" (Lang 1969, 73; 1970, 74). PFC Storeby's answer is a powerful testimony to the warrior codes he lived by, *and the warrior codes he expected his SGT, his squad, and the Army to uphold*. Later he told Lang:

> We all figured we might be dead in the next minute, so what difference did it make what we did? But the longer I was over there [Vietnam], the more I became convinced that it was the other way around that counted— that because we might not be around much longer, we had to take extra care how we behaved. Anyway, that's what made me believe I was interested in religion. Another man might have called it something else, but the idea was simply that we had to answer for what we did. We had to answer to something, to someone -- maybe just to ourselves. (Lang 1969, 110; 1970, 112)

What is remarkable about Storeby's actions are that he operated with a different warrior code and moral orienting system than the other members of his unit. His decisions were not simple choices, because they required him to act contrary to his unit under threats to his own life. He believed he was acting like soldier, counter to what he was ordered or pressured to do. Under extremis conditions where everyone was

"strange," Storeby differentiated between enemy threats and civilian safety. His story

demonstrates how his integration of moral values with ethical practice formed into a

warrior code that functioned as his moral orienting system – *the reasons why* that defined

his moral agency. His comments also reflect spiritual dimensions about conscience, the

value of life, and compassion entwined with his professional convictions of what it means

to be a Soldier. Because of this, PFC Storeby held himself and others accountable for

what happened to a non-combatant civilian caught in midst of a war. In a way Storeby's

code provided a source of resilience that helped him perform moral agency under duress.

Unfortunately, this same code didn't provide him immunity from moral dissonance

caused by his witness of Mao's murder and his perceived failure to save her life.

Subsequently, Storeby took his moral dissonance home with him, his life has been an

enduring attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable.

In 1968 writer Daniel Lang interviewed Storeby and wrote two best-selling books

about experience where he gave him the pseudonym "Erickson."[3] In 1989 Brian DePalma

made his story into the movie *Causalities of War,* where he took the preceding quote

from the books, and placed it into the script as a passing conversation between

friends(DePalma 1989). In 1990 Sonja Groenewald interviewed Storeby for an article

she published in *The Lutheran* magazine, titled, "And He Never Came Home," In the

article she focused on the depth of Storeby's ongoing reactions to Mao's murder, and this

allowed him to express his moral dissonance in terms of his ongoing spiritual struggles:

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[3] *Casualties of War* was released in America and *Incident on Hill 192* was released in
England. Philosopher Glen Gray quoted Storeby when writing his classic work, *The
Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle.*

> I was unable to save the woman, and I have to live with that the rest of my life… The incident replays itself in my mind and has since 1966. Each time it is replayed, it reinforces my feeling that there has to be some meaning in this. I failed. There's no question. For one with my background, that's tough. I have to live with that… I believe that God forgives. God is more forgiving to us then we are to ourselves. (Groenewald 1990, 15)

Groenwald's article returned Marshall Storeby's identity and his moral voice (Gilligan 1993). In 1999, I brought Marshall to Fort Bragg to tell his story to the leaders and Soldiers of my brigade prior to our deployment to the Balkans. He talked openly about the crime, his feelings of guilt, and what was then diagnosed as PTSD. However, he also talked about the ongoing emotions, ruminations, and struggles that made him, "a haunted, angry veteran." He described his scars from the causes and effects of moral dissonance upon his moral orienting system, and he talked about how different Soldiers, Marines, VA counselors and his church helped him to restore his "equilibrium"(Storeby 1999). His talk provided a testimony to the core values and beliefs that are the *reasons why* behind the function of warrior codes in warfighters' moral orienting systems during the formation and treatment of MMI. The work of researchers, theorists, and other warfighters support PFC Storeby's narrative of his moral injury.

Literature Review and Two MMI Models

In this section, I will review of the foundational theories and research for MMI, and then I will present two models for the formation and treatment of MMI: 1) the trauma narrative model of Crystal Park et al. and, 2) a revised moral dissonance model for MMI that I developed at the National Defense University. Both models utilize the foundational theories and research and will provide the framework for my dissertation.

The earliest mentions of moral injury are from North American Christian sermons published in the mid 1800s. Pastors used the term to describe the effects of sin and the degradation of moral standards amongst congregational members (C. Walker 1845). In this context moral injury referred to a spiritual state caused by a damaged conscience/soul. In modern times reporter Peter Marin used the term moral pain to describe the psychological effects from a damaged conscience experienced by Vietnam Veterans (Marin 1981).

The phenomenon of moral pain described similar conditions reported by military psychiatrists working with Vietnam Veterans. These appraisals of psychological battlefield casualties changed during the Vietnam War. Care providers found that battlefield breakdowns attributed to "combat fatigue" caused by prolonged exposure to battle decreased from Korea to Vietnam, but the number of warfighters suffering from delayed neuropsychiatric reactions increased (Goodwin 1987, 3). Vietnam Veterans were complaining of symptoms that psychiatrists diagnosed as Delayed Stress Response Syndrome (DSRS). These symptoms included:

- difficulty in integrating reflections with past, present, and future events,
- impaired self-concept
- depersonalization of interpersonal experiences
- depression
- shame
- frustration and reactive rage

- impaired social relationships

- aggressive and destructive behavior

- fear of loss of control over hostile impulses. (Figley 1978)

Psychiatrists linked veterans' symptoms with similar symptoms reported by victims of sexual assault, abuse, and traumatic events. Their findings resulted in the inclusion of the new diagnosis of PTSD in the DSM-3 in 1980 (Goodwin 1987, 4). Thus, research and treatments for possible MMI followed a medical model that was based upon a diagnosis of PTSD (Nash and Baker 2007; Hoge 2004; Nash 2011; van der Kolk 2015; Menakem 2017).

During the same time frame VA Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay and Army Veteran Grossman began linking posttraumatic stress reactions of shame, guilt, and rage to moral causes associated with the ethical practices of warfighters. Shay uses exegesis of the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey" to describe the rage, betrayal, and alienation expressed by modern warfighters in their journey from home to battlefield to back home, Shay began using the term "moral injury" to expand the medical model for PTSD treatment to include a critical look at the structures of political and military leadership that contributed to veterans' post-traumatic stress reactions (Shay 1994, 2002).

Grossman, a former Army Ranger, and educator, analyzes the role of military training and combat leadership to assess the "psychological costs of learning to kill in war and society." He uses research gathered from WWII to examine the need for military recruits to overcome deep seated, internal prohibitions against killing, and he describes how operant conditioning methods used in modern training changes warfighters' ability to effectively target and kill in combat.

Grossman links the operant conditioning used in military training to increase lethality with trends in civilian computer gaming and he concludes that there is a moral danger in the increased capacity for killing unless there are also conditioned restraints to control the skills and motivations used to kill. He proposes the ethical metaphor of a sheepdog protecting sheep as a warrior code to regulate increased capacities and capabilities for killing. Grossman also links acts of killing in war to negative emotions and behaviors experienced by combat veterans(Grossman 1995; Grossman and Christensen 2004). Thus, Shay and Grossman associate the violation of moral standards and ethical practices with the formation of moral injuries.

Later, Ed Tick, Rita Nakashima-Brock, and Gabriella Lettini built upon the work of Shay and Grossman to include spiritual dimensions of the human "soul" to define moral injury (Tick 2005; Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012). Like Shay and Grossman, they view the posttraumatic reactions of warfighters in terms of actions that violate moral standards. But unlike Shay and Grossman, they do not conduct a deep analysis of the training and leadership that influence the moral values systems and ethical practices that warfighters use as standards for their moral agency. Instead, their focus on moral injury is based upon warfighters' psychiatric and emotional responses to the social issues surrounding war and the spiritual care of returning veterans as victims of combat.

Tick proposes a theory for mature warriorhood to demonstrate the internal disassociation warfighters' experience in combat through violations of the "Geneva Convention of the soul" (Tick 2014, 144; L. Dewey 2004, 73). Tick defines the soul as the self-awareness, conscience, will, and power to create and preserve life. He argues

that warfighters experience a spiritual and psychological separation of their soul from body during combat, and their post-war recovery requires a restoration of soul as a mature warrior for the return of internal peace (Tick 2005, 17-19; 2014).

Pastoral theologians Nakashima-Brock and Lettini are theorists who use a definition of social justice to consider moral injuries as violations of conscience and forms of moral suicide (Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012, xi-ff). Their work focuses upon the violations of spiritual values that cause moral injuries in warfighters and they advocate a counseling process based upon just war criteria. Their goal is to, "understand how moral conscience is deeply important for those who choose military service… we believe a society must never rush to war but challenge its leaders to explain why it is the only alternative" (Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012, 117).

Like Grossman and Tick, Nakashima-Brock and Lettini focus upon acts of killing as the primary cause behind the subsequent effects of moral injuries. However, unlike Shay and Grossman, Tick, Nakashima-Brock, and Lettini do not provide a close examination of the military ethos and its influence upon the standards warfighters use to differentiate acts of killing. Current research studies support the importance of differentiating acts of killing in war for identifying and treating MMI in warfighters (Drescher et al. 2011; Farnsworth 2014; Krauss et al. 2020; Komarovskaya et al. 2011; Maguen and Burkman 2013; Maguen et al. 2017).

From 2003 to 2013 the military conducted the Mental Health and Advisory Team (MHAT) studies with redeploying Army and Marine warfighters to determine their responses to combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The MHAT studies reported that a higher percentage of warfighters used lethal force than the number who reported their

responsibility for the actual harming of enemy combatants or those who reported post-trauma stress issues related to their actions. The MHATs also found that lower percentages of warfighters witnessed harm to noncombatants without experiencing issues related to their perceptions of responsibility for the injuries (TSG 2006). This witnessing without admission of responsibility is understandable because of the legal implications associated with reporting. However, Warfighters also reported reactions to acts of cruelty that resembled similar reactions to bullying associated with embitterment disorder (Linden et al. 2007; Trice 2011). Thus, the MHAT studies are a significant indicator of warfighters valued-based reactions as perpetrators of harm.

In 2009, a review of empirical studies reaffirmed the above findings and recommended that further MMI research should include the study of effects from, "potentially morally injurious events, such as perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations" (Litz et al. 2009). Such transgressions serve as criteria for determining the impacts of killing upon warfighters (Maguen et al. 2010). However, these impacts depend upon individual warfighters' moral judgments if these acts of killing were just or unjust (Krauss et al. 2020). These types of moral judgements were also reported in research that compared findings from the MHAT studies of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans to the National Vietnam Veterans' Readjustment Study (NVVRS). This comparative study found that adverse reactions from warfighting were associated with value-based reactions from veterans of two different time periods and three different theaters of war (Vargas et al. 2013).

The preceding studies focused on the participation, specific actions, and experiences of warfighters. However, other researchers and theorists have focused upon types of Morally Injurious Events (MIE) (Evans et al. 2018; P. Held et al. 2017; Nash 2013; N.R. Stein et al. 2012). These studies and theories have provided the basis for taxonomies and instruments that differentiate Moral Injury as a value-based, religious/spiritual struggle. Other groups of researchers and theorists have focused upon Moral Emotions (ME) from combat (Breslavs 2013; Farnsworth et al. 2014; K. Gray and Wegner 2011; Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek 2007). These studies and theories reinforce the conclusion that moral injuries need to be assessed along a spectrum of causes and subsequent reactions.

All of the above studies and theories support conclusions that differentiate MI from PTSD, but they do not provide a model to conceptualize how moral values and ethical practices form into a moral injury, nor do they provide a model that conceptualizes how warrior codes function within warfighters' moral orienting systems in the formation and treatment of MMI. This is where Park, Currier, Harris, and Slattery provide a meaning-making model that helps researchers, theorists, and care providers conceptualize the processes experienced by a warfighter who is going through life-altering trauma. They frame moral injury in three phases: 1) the global meanings a person takes into a traumatic event, 2) the shattering effect that traumatic events have upon a person's global meaning, and 3) the transformative meaning-making processes a person must go through following traumatic events.

The Park Model for Post-Trauma Meaning

The following graphic (Figure 1.2) represents what happens to the global meanings that people use to interpret life events due to traumatic experiences they face in life. Global meaning is the internal orienting system that helps people interpret life events, and it includes subsets of spiritual and social values (Park et al. 2017, 15-38; J.I. Harris et al. 2015). As a person moves from low stress events (green) to higher stress events (yellow to red) they experience increased pressures upon their global meaning. When people experience severe traumatic events (red explosion), they can experience a shattering of the values and goals they use for constructing situational life meanings.

CORE Narrative Global Meaning

Combat Narrative Situational Meaning

The Assimilation and Accommodation of Adaptive Meaning

The Assimilation and Accommodation of Maladaptive Meaning

Figure 1.1 Narrative Model for Post-Trauma Meaning (Park et al. 2017)

The ongoing task that traumatized people face is to assimilate and accommodate new meanings from their traumatic experiences (Park et al. 2017, 15-18). A failure to do so results in maladaptive meanings that produce cognitive and behavioral problems (Park et al. 2017, 51-54). Thus, constructing posttraumatic meaning involves a reciprocating trajectory, that moves between pre and post traumatic meanings as well as adaptive and maladaptive meanings" (Park et al. 2017, 75-96).

Now look at Figure 1.2. The purple line and purple text boxes are my own insertion into Park's model to show the pathway of warfighters' moral orienting systems and their struggles to create life meaning in the extremis situations they encounter during military service. My insertion accounts for: 1) the integration of warrior codes into warfighters moral orienting systems, 2) the dis-integration of these moral orienting systems as warfighters become moral agents in the trauma they experience, and 3) the iterative, re-integration of moral orienting systems that warfighters experience in their creation of post-traumatic meanings. Along this pathway warfighters experience moral dissonance caused by the conditions of their profession. This is represented by the fluctuating, broken purple line.

Figure 1.2 Revised Narrative Model for Post-Trauma Meaning

The Three Mirror Model (TMM) of MMI

The TMM (Figure 1.3) is the revised model from my past work at the National Defense University. I have changed my original model to include: 1) the concept of moral orienting systems, and 2) the effects from moral reasoning that drive the integration, dis-integration, and re-integration between moral agency and ethical practice in the deployment cycle, and 3) a third mirror to explain the role that healing modalities have in warfighters deployment cycle.

Figure 1.3 The Three Mirror Model (TMM) of MMI

The left mirror of the TMM reflects the formation of warfighters' moral orienting systems that occur during training. Here civilians' moral values and spiritual beliefs embedded in their humanity become integrated with the moral and ethical standards of warrior codes embedded in the military ethos. Thus, civilian recruits become warfighters with integrated moral orienting systems that guide their moral agency and ethical practices in war.

The right mirror of the TMM reflects the influence warfighters' moral orienting systems have in directing their ethical practices in combat. During warfighting,

warfighters participate in, and witness, events that can dis-integrate their moral orientations. When this happens, warfighters experience levels of moral dissonance represented by the diamond shape with gradient shading. The shape and gradation of the diamond reflect proportions of dis-integration and re-integration that warfighters experience during combat.

The bottom mirror of the TMM reflects the outcomes from the healing processes that allow warfighters space for: 1) critical, post-traumatic reflection that helps them re-integrate what they consider fragmented combat experiences, and 2) the creation of new meanings that help them to reconcile elements within their moral orientations and promoted their well-being.

Warfighters exist in the spaces between the three mirrors, and those who experience great separation between their moral orientations and agency experience large amounts of moral dissonance because of what they've done, failed to do, or witnessed.

The aqua circle in the TMM model represents the ongoing double loop moral reasoning cycles that form a cyclical, iterative process between warfighters moral orientations and their agency. It is here their moral dissonance is created and reconciled during combat. This cycle drives their processing of combat experiences, and it is the product of natural reasoning processes and trained military targeting practices that will be examined throughout this dissertation.

The widening shape of the diamond represents the level of dis-integration and degree of separation between warfighters' moral orientations and agency as determined by their judgments of actual combat experiences. The darkening gradient of the diamond represents increased levels of moral dissonance and intensity of their moral/spiritual

struggles. Thus, the wider diamond the greater the distant between moral orientations and

ethical behavior (agency), and the darker the diamond the higher the level of moral

dissonance. Warfighters who experience high levels of moral dissonance need to lessen

the distance between their moral agency and their ethics and this requires some type of

healing process that reconnects their values with their life practices. This is the

reconciliation task that occurs in the recovery phase of the model.

Thus, what is integrated during training can be dis-integrated during warfighting,

and re-integrated during recovery. The path of recovery completes warfighters'

deployment process. However, the reality is that this process occurs within a fluctuating

moral reasoning cycles that are represented by 1) the aqua double loop, and 2) the shape

and gradient of the diamond. During the reconciliation process, warfighters' life meaning

is continually formed and re-formed through their reconciliation of their moral

orientations with their combat experiences and their desired life practices. This process

happens during training, in combat, and in treatment processes. Reconciliation depends

upon 1) the structure of the moral orienting systems that serves as warfighters standard

for determining their life meaning, and 2) the circumstances and level of the warfighters'

moral dissonance and 3) the type of treatment modality.

The TMM (figure 1.3) should be considered as a viable framework for

understanding the processes warfighters go through during the formation and healing of

MMI. The TMM forms a specific function within Park's meaning-making models

(figures 1.1 and 1.2), but it is not a "mathematical formula" to determine a timeline and

specific pathways for the formation and treatment of MMI. Instead, it suggests a process that existing treatment modalities can incorporate into their existing frameworks to help warfighters reconcile their harmful moral dissonance.

Three Types of Treatment Modalities

There are three basic types of evidence-based treatment modalities for MMI. The first type of modality focuses upon cognitive reframing warfighters' perceptions of traumatic events and their reactions to traumatic stress. These modalities may combine individual with group psychotherapy to treat MMI (Shay 2014, 1994, 2002; Menakem 2017). Generally, these treatments are related to Cognitive Behavior Treatment (CBT) in that they are action-oriented treatments focused around three types of practices: *think* (strategies for training thought), *act* (behavioral techniques for choosing actions), and *be* (training behaviors to live in the moment) (Resick, Monson, and Chard 2008; Resick et al. 2017; Schnurr et al. 2007).

Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) is a 12-session modality that uses Socratic dialogue to help warfighters heal from their traumatic experiences by clarifying their questions, challenging their assumptions, labeling their emotions, and modifying their thoughts and behaviors (Resick, Monson, and Chard 2017, 64-ff). The treatment goal of CPT is to help warfighters evaluate, change, and control their physical and cognitive reactions to traumatic events (Foa et al. 2007; P. Held et al. 2018; van der Kolk 2015). Two marginally related modalities are 1) Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) and Prolonged Exposure Therapy (PE). EMDR focuses on

restructuring limbic reactions in the brain to modify warfighter's imprinted, somatic responses to traumatic events. PE repeatedly returns warfighters to their traumatic events in order to cognitively reframe their traumatic responses.

The second modality is Acceptance Commitment Therapy (ACT). ACT focuses upon the present, instead of helping warfighters reconcile past traumatic events. ACT focuses upon acceptance, mindfulness, commitment, and behavioral change to increase warfighters' ability to connect their present and changing contexts with their chosen values (Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 2012; T. Gordon and Borushok 2017; Nieuwsma et al. 2015; Santiago and Gall 2016; Walser and Westrup 2007). ACT is based on the way, "language entangles clients into futile attempts to wage war against their own inner lives … [and] … learn how to make healthy contact with thoughts, feelings, memories, and physical sensations that have been feared and avoided."[4] The goal of ACT is to help warfighters develop clarity about their personal values, and commit to adaptive behavior changes that reconnect them with positive life practices and less emotional suffering (Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 2012; Park et al. 2017).

The third type of treatment modality is Adaptive Disclosure Therapy (ADT). ADT is a hybrid using CBT for processing traumatic events with ACT for processing mindfulness, values, change, and committed action. ADT operates with four critical assumptions: 1) "war zone narratives" need to be uncovered, and 2) warfighters to resolve entanglements of their war trauma with their present struggles, 3) this resolution will create a foundation for warfighters' healing by introducing them to iterative methods

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[4] This definition is taken from Al Harub Medical Center website.
https://alharubmedical.com/acceptance-commitment-therapy-act/

(instead of static goals) for dealing with their traumas, and 4) some type of substitutionary forgiveness exercises will help warfighters to create new-meaning from haunting experiences (Litz et al. 2015; M.J. Gray et al. 2012).

CBT, ACT, and ADT are not the only healing strategies, but they represent the three broad theories and practices that care providers use to intervene and treat MMI. I argue that psychotherapy and spiritual care practices share similar treatment practices and goals. However, these treatment theories and practices are only one-third of the process where MMI is formed. Training and warfighting are the other two-thirds of the process. This is important not only because military deployment cycles work this way, but also because moral injuries can be prevented and mitigated as well as healed. The Park Narrative and TMM models break the structure of MMI into three phases to provide frameworks for critical analysis of the integration, dis-integration, and re-integration of warfighters' moral orienting systems.

Chapter Summaries

Chapters 2 and 3 will critically examine the formation and integration of warfighters' moral orientations to include warrior codes, foundational moral senses, professional moral senses, conscientious acceptance, the moral impacts of killing in combat, and discernment of ethical practices within the military ethos.

Chapters 4 will examine the dis-integration of warfighters' moral orientations within their practices of moral agency. Specifically, Chapter 4 will examine: the heuristics used in kill chain operations, mission command, double loop

reflexive/reflective reasoning, and targeting. Chapter 5 will examine dis-integration in terms of the guideposts and guardrails warfighter use to determine the R/S, moral, ethical, and legal limits for warfighting.

Chapters 6 and 7 will examine moral dissonance in terms of the dis-integrating consequences from warfighting and the healing re-integration processes used to help warfighters reconcile their moral orientations with their life practices and agency. Chapter 6 will examine specific healing modalities for the reconciliation of moral dissonance, and Chapter 7 will examine three experiential activities for healing morally injured warfighters and future moral challenges from emerging trends in warfare.

I will structure my dissertation using the three phases for military deployments (training, warfighting, recovery) associated with the TMM framework that reflects the integration of moral orienting systems during training, the dis-integration of moral orienting systems during warfighting, and the re-integration of moral orienting systems during recovery. I will incorporate test cases in each chapter that use warfighter narratives to provide data that supports the work done by theorists, researchers and healers to help past, present, and future warfighters. This methodology will provide an analysis of how warfighters moral orientations and agency function at multiple levels of warfighting in the formation and healing of moral dissonance.

Test Cases: Okinawa, Baghdad and Ukraine

Moral dissonance may result from a healthy, but hurting, conscience, or its absence may reflect the dysfunctional moral orienting system of a warfighter no longer able to distinguish right from wrong. Some things are ethically and morally wrong, no matter how we may justify them, and every part of our being should react negatively

towards them. This is the conviction of PVT Storeby that was not shared by the members in his squad. Warfighters exist in complex, contested contexts where moral orientation can become separated from ethical action. This is the case of PVT Storeby as he struggled against members of his squad in combat, and with his own identity after he returned from Vietnam.

Moral agency describes what is and ought to be, and this is the purpose of warrior codes (Fried and Fried 2010; Farnsworth 2019). Yet some warfighters do not view it this way. Instead, they believe their status gives them permission to perform acts that violate moral and ethical boundaries. Combat can provide temptations that move moral boundaries and change ethical practices. However, humanity and warfighting are lived in their integration. Thus, the presence of moral dissonance can be the sign of a healthy moral orienting systems reacting to immoral events or the absence of moral dissonance can be the sign of an unhealthy moral orienting system reacting to the same events.

Such is the case of Storeby, and his SGT cited earlier. Storeby operated with a moral orienting system and warrior code that had well-defined moral boundaries that constrained him from acting with his SGT. His moral orienting system also prompted him to prevent Mao's rape and murder, and then struggle with his failure to save her life. The SGT and the squad operated with moral orienting systems based upon contextual desires and personal abuses of power. Thus, they operated with flexible moral boundaries that that permitted them to willfully commit murder with little contrition for their actions. Consider the following three cases: the first is from an American Marine fighting on

46

Okinawa in 1945, the second is from an American Soldier serving in Baghdad in 2007, and the third is from a Russian Soldier fighting in Bucha in 2022. All three cases involve warfighters killing non-combatants in different contexts.

Okinawa

During combat on Okinawa, a young Marine PVT Sledge found a woman who had been wounded during the battle. Sledge tried to treat her wound, but there was only so much he could do. Her abdomen was torn open, and she was in agony. She motioned and begged him to kill her, but he couldn't do it. Instead, he went to find the medic, and when they returned to the woman they found her dead from a gunshot delivered by a Marine who was standing over her. Sledge exploded with rage and cursed the Marine, and so did the Doc (a combat medic is often referred to as "doc" by unit members). When a SGT came by and asked about what happened, Sledge and Doc told him. The SGT then screamed at the young Marine, calling him a "dirty bastard" (Sledge 1981, 289-291). Was this a justifiable mercy killing or murder?

Somehow during high intensity combat operations, a young Marine PVT and two older Marines were able to uphold a moral distinction between combatant and non-combatant that another Marine transgressed. The severity of the woman's wounds didn't enter into Sledge's moral equation to fulfill the woman's request, and his sense of compassion motivated him to find help even at some risk to his own safety. The Doc didn't distinguish between nationality, or combatant status in his decision to aid the woman. Only the unidentified Marine operated with a warrior code that allowed him to kill an unarmed, wounded civilian, and later justify the killing as an act of mercy. Years later, Sledge was still ruminating over his moral dissonance from this event when he

wrote a book about his experiences on Okinawa. His *reasons why* testify to the influence

his warrior code as a Marine had upon the moral orienting system that, informed his self-

identity, and directed his ethical practices. It also generated his moral dissonance.

Baghdad

In 2007, I ministered to a Sergeant First Class (SFC) in the aid station of a

Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Iraq. One of his Soldiers, a young Private (PVT), had

just committed suicide after coming off a patrol where he had killed unarmed civilians

who were driving their car at a high rate of speed towards his convoy. At that time,

insurgent groups were using car bombs to attack American Soldiers, and there was no

way to know the intent of the driver. There were only seconds to react, so the PVT

engaged the vehicle with his machine gun. He probably did the correct, but difficult,

thing according to the Rules of Engagement that permitted him to engage active threats to

his unit (even if there was a degree of doubt about the intent of the perceived threat).

However, the PVT was shaken by his killing of non-combatants, and he subsequently

shot himself shortly after returning to FOB, after he was informed that the incident would

be investigated. Was this a justified shooting, manslaughter, or murder?

The SFC was in shock at his PVT's suicide, and sick over the deaths of the

civilians. The investigation was procedural, and he did not intend the young PVT's death.

So, I listened to his lament, not wanting to deny his emotional response to the deaths.

After a while, and not knowing what to say or do, I acknowledge the level of his

emotional reaction, and I asked him, "Why does this bother you so much?" He looked at

me like I had lost my mind. However, he stopped and collected his thoughts before answering me. Then he began to explain his *reasons why,* and they revealed the standards he tried to uphold as a professional Soldier.

His core values included moral boundaries to 1) protect non-combatants and, 2) bring *all* his Soldiers home alive and well. Perhaps, his warrior code set standards that he couldn't fulfill, and in this traumatic moment, the SFC's moral orienting system became an accuser and a source for lament over his perceived moral and ethical failures. The civilians his platoon was supposed to protect were dead. A young PVT, who he was supposed to bring home was also dead. The SFC's moral dissonance was palpable, and he was morally and ethically struggling with in this tragedy. However, "my ridiculous" question allowed him to begin re-integration of elements within his moral orienting system. Was he a moral failure or a struggling moral agent?

Ukraine

During combat in the Ukraine in 2022 a young Russian SGT named Vadim Shishmarin shot and killed a 62-year-old Ukrainian man, Oleksandr Shelipovas, who was pushing his bicycle along a road near the border of Russia. Shishmarin was later captured by Ukrainian forces and put on trial for pre-meditated murder under Ukraine's criminal code in accordance with its interpretation of the Law of Armed Conflict. Shishmarin admitted to killing Shelipovas, but he claimed that the unarmed man was talking on a cellphone, and Shishmarin's fellow soldiers feared that the man was acting as a spotter for Ukrainian artillery. If Shelipovas was truly acting as a spotter or spy, such an action could lose his non-combatant status. However, he wasn't, and Shishmarin shot him out of

49

his own fear, and he justified his action by stating that he was ordered (or prodded) by fellow warfighters to shoot Shelipova. Thus, he was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.

At this time Russia is justifying its invasion of Ukraine as a security mission to protect Russian nationals from Neo-Nazis and Ukrainian persecutions. During the trial, Shishmarin was confronted in court by the Shelipovas' widow who accused him of violating his warrior code by failing to protect the Ukrainian civilians he was deployed to protect. Shishmarin replied to her, "Yes, I admit guilt. I understand that you will not be able to forgive me. I ask for forgiveness for what was done" (Pietsch, Chapman, and Timsit 2022).

Shishmarin's case is unique because it is a rare occurrence when a warfighter is held publicly accountable for personal moral agency during the battle they are fighting by a court from the nation they are invading. So, Shishmarin's ethical practice and the warrior codes that influenced his moral orienting system are on trial. His level of moral dissonance from the event can only be guessed from his words to Shelipova's widow. Is Shishmarin a murderer and an immoral agent? Or was he a warfighter operating with a moral orienting system who was set up for failure by a flawed warrior code?

Conclusion

The warfighters in each of these test cases represent different cultures, generations, and battles. Yet, each one struggles with issues of moral agency in the deaths of noncombatants, and each one experiences some level of moral dissonance generated by the moral orienting systems that regulated what they did, failed to do, or witnessed. Each of these test cases occurred within moral and ethical boundaries defined by the 4

50

principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Each of the previous situations required the warfighter to 1) distinguish civilians as combatants or non-combatants, 2) establish the military necessity for using lethal force, 3) determine the proportionality of the warfighter's response to a perceived threat, and 4) to a lesser extent consider the unnecessary suffering inflicted upon the target (Solis 2022, 250-ff). The Marine on Okinawa had time to consider these principles, the Soldier in Baghdad and Shishmarin did not. Yet each individual operated with warrior codes that overrode legal constraints and permitted their choices to use lethal force in situations that were not morally or ethically clear. In the final report of the My Lai Inquiry, General Peers stated a common command assumption governing warfighters' moral orientation, "there were some things a soldier did not have to be told were wrong – such as rounding up women and children and then mowing them down, shooting babies out of mothers arms, and raping" (Peers 1979, 230). However, that is exactly what soldiers at My Lai did.

Each of the previous warfighters "knew" that their warrior codes included Rules of Engagement (ROE) based upon LOAC that did not allow them to kill non-combatants. Nevertheless, LOAC and ROE didn't prevent these killings, and each killing occurred in contexts where these warfighters performed their duties based upon some sense of morality linked with their warrior codes. Here is a source for the formation of moral dissonance demonstrated in the diverse test cases presented in this chapter.

What made PVT Storeby oppose a direct order from his SGT and the peer pressure from his squad and protect a non-combatant? What made Shishmarin obey an illegal order and pressure from his peers to kill an unarmed civilian? What made one Sledge risk his life to help a wounded civilian and another Marine at no risk to himself

shoot her? What made one SGT ignore the welfare of his squad by involving them in the commission of a war crime, and another SFC grieve his failure to protect his soldier and a car full of civilians in a situation that he didn't control? Why did one warfighter kill himself over his actions, and another warfighter condemn himself at his trial? Why did one Marine justify the actions that made others condemn his as a "bastard," and another Soldier condemn himself as a "bastard" for failing to accomplish what he considered to be morally right?

The answer to all these questions is related to the integrated warrior codes that informed their moral orienting systems. The moral struggles experienced by the warfighters in the preceding test cases indicate levels of moral dissonance that could result in MMI. The post-traumatic narratives reported by Storeby and Sledge indicate that they probably experienced some degree of MMI, and the suicide committed by the young PVT indicates that he was probably experiencing a moral injury. But we don't know, because there are no approved criteria for diagnosing a moral injury.

Warfighting requires the navigation of moral boundaries in extremis contexts under conditions that can dis-integrate the elements that compose the moral and ethical standards that guide warfighters' moral orientating systems. Thus, warfighters need the capacity to reconcile their moral dissonance and the capability to re-integrate their fragmented moral orienting systems. MMI is an occupational hazard for warfighters, and their moral orienting systems are what guard their identity from becoming the personal rubble caused by unreconciled moral dissonance. For each of the preceding warfighters, their warrior codes are the "reasons why," in their moral orienting systems that either accused or excused their morals and ethics. The following chapters will present a critical

reflection of the commonly accepted cause-and-effect relationships, the prescriptive

assumptions, and the paradigms used to explain the function of warrior codes in the

integration, dis-integration, and re-integration of warfighters' moral orienting systems.

Chapter Two: What am I? Integrating Warrior Codes into

Warfighters' Moral Orienting Systems

"The songs of the wars are as old as the hills; they cling to the rust on the cold steel that kills. They tell of the boys [girls] who went down to the tracks, in a patriotic manner with the cold steel on their backs" (Lightfoot 1972, 41).

Gordon Lightfoot, songwriter

"I'm average… If I'm a hero, then every man that stands around me, every woman in the military, everyone who goes into the unknown, is a hero. So… think I'm a hero – as long as you include everyone with me." (Dunwoody and Collins 2015, 29).

Staff Sergeant Salvatore Giunta, Medal of Honor Recipient, United States Army

Introduction

Why does this mean so much to you? The answers to this question reveal the core values from which human beings, as warfighters, compose the narratives of their life meaning (Park et al. 2017, 15-18). It does not profit warfighters seeking post-trauma recovery to ignore the integrated, and sometimes spiritual, values embedded within their warrior codes and their humanity. Nor does it profit care providers to attribute MMI to traumatic events or emotional responses from military service without understanding the specific values of military ethos that warfighters integrate into the moral orientations that shape their sense of moral agency, and ethical practice. This is a social, corporate, journey, not an individual pilgrimage.

This chapter presents a deep, critical examination of how warfighters' life meaning is shaped by warrior code, embedded values, and structures that influence warfighters' moral orienting systems and moral agency. The shaping process begins in military training with the braiding of personal values with unit relationships, service values, historical myths, and military symbology that integrate warrior codes into warfighters' moral orienting systems. My goal is to provide a critical reflection of how personal/foundational moral orientations blend with corporate, military moral orientations to form standards for warfighters' character and competence. These standards serve as a practical wisdom relevant to action (a *phronesis*) for warfighters' moral agency. It is warfighters' discernment of their character compared with their judgements about their competence and behavior that forms into the moral dissonance that can damage their well-being.

Before we can examine warfighters' moral dissonance from military operations, we must first examine the formation of the moral standards they use to inform their moral orientations/character. These standards are embedded in the warrior codes that form warrior ethos. Some elements of these codes are universal and ancient, and other elements are contextual to time and location. Warrior codes function as constructions of meaning that influence warfighters' moral orienting systems in a "double-loop cycle" of decision and reflection. This chapter will examine the formation of military standards during training and education that shape the values of civilians into the moral orientations of warfighters. Chapter 3 will then examine how these moral orientations function in the actions, reflection, and bias loops that exist within warfighters' practice of mission command and mission accomplishment. The integration and dis-integration that occurs

between moral orientations and moral agency during military operations influences the formation of moral dissonance, and it is this type of moral dissonance that is revealed in veterans' narratives about their war experiences.

"People shape their daily lives by stories … [as] a portal through which a person enters the world and by which their experience of the world is interpreted and made personally meaningful" (Clandinin and Rosiek 2006, 4). Thus, veterans' narratives are stories in a personal form that reveal various religious and spiritual meanings that are linked to values associated with their moral orientations of character and competence. Their core moral orientations are probably formed before they join the military. However, their military training integrates their individual, civilian moral orientations into a corporate warrior code that recalibrates their moral orientations. The content of this warrior code is revealed in veterans' narratives about how their warfighting experiences changed the structure of their life meaning (Park et al. 2017). I will deal with the integration of moral orienting systems that compose military character in this chapter and the processes associated military competence in chapters three and four. The formation of warfighters' character and the practice of their competence should inform the reconciliation processes that care providers incorporate into treatment modalities when working with combat veterans who experience moral trauma. This process is the subject of chapters five and six.

The Integration of Values into Warfighters' Warrior Codes

The integration of warfighters' moral orienting systems begins in the immersive training environment where civilians adopt warrior codes and become warfighters. It is here they combine military values with their life practices to form the moral orientations

that will shape their life narratives. Warrior codes are integrated moral orientations focused upon warfighters' character that include the moral values that individual civilians bring into the military. In the following sections I will first focus upon American warfighters' integration of R/S beliefs/practices into the warrior codes which calibrate their moral orientations. Second, I will examine the how warfighters' moral orientations help them answer questions of conscientious acceptance and just/unjust participation to determine their moral agency. Finally, I will examine how warfighters' narratives reveal the standards they use in their moral orienting systems to discern the moral complexities they will face in their service.

Warrior Codes as Moral Orientations

Shannon French, a military ethicist at the United States Naval Academy, defines warrior codes as the integration of core values, technical competence, and social expectations that regulate the identity and behaviors of its warfighters (French 2017, 3). Warfighters' acceptance of these codes allow them internalized, moral constraints, "to hold onto their humanity while experiencing the horror of war – and when the war is over, to return home and reintegrate into the society they so ably defended" (French 2017, 12).

French focuses upon the broader purposes of warrior codes but concedes that it is specific constructions of these codes applied in specific contexts that makes them effective. Thus, warrior codes set moral limits related to "whatever they [warfighters] hold most dear" (French 2017, 17). It is this characteristic of warrior codes that function within warfighters moral orienting systems.

However, French warns that warrior codes can also set the conditions for unjust behaviors that place warfighters' humanity and their professional identities in conflict (French 2017, 18-19). Warrior cultures have long understood that their relationship with death and a range of emotions that provides the foundation for their self-discipline and commitment to their codes. Against all instincts, warfighters must accept that discipline and restraint is essential to their survival and survival of their fellow warfighters. In the first chapter, I borrowed from French the story of a Spartan Shield as an example of the integration of character and competence within a warrior code. French makes a stronger connection.

> The warrior's code is the shield that guards our warriors' humanity.
> Without it, they are no good to themselves or to those with whom and for
> whom they fight. Without it, they will find no way back from war. I have
> met so many present and future warriors. They are not abstractions or
> alien beings to me; they are friends, students, and fellow travelers, trying
> to navigate ethical lives. Each time they go into combat I want them to be
> able to return from it intact in body and soul. I want all of them, every last
> one, to come back with their shields (French 2017, 269).

French is every bit a warfighter as the sailors she teaches in a curriculum formula that assumes warrior codes, doctrine, and training form warrior ethos. Warrior ethos is a dynamic concept. A few years ago, when I was the command chaplain for the Army's Research and Development Command, I attended a briefing at a missile research lab, and I sat next to one of the civilian scientists. He asked me if I understood what I heard. Trying to be clever, I responded that it was all rocket science to me. He corrected me with the comment, "Rocket science is easy – it's all about aerodynamics and propulsion. The hard part is the guidance system."

Recent research shows that America's military is a mixture of well-compensated government employees who are motivated to become well-trained warfighters for a variety of reasons that range from patriotism and sense of duty, to personal adventure and challenge, to employment opportunity and economic condition (Krebs and Ralston 2022, 4-5).

Thus, the military ethos has diverse motivations, and it can be more focused upon aerodynamics (physical training) and propulsion (motivation) than the moral orientations that guide warfighters in combat. However, warfighters' moral orientations are the guidance systems that help them navigate the moral complexities that exist in war. Americans are more comfortable sending warfighters into danger when they believe their warfighters are motivated by patriotism and good citizenship.

Two events occurred, while I was writing this dissertation. The first event happened on the border of Texas and Mexico, and the second event happened in a night club in Colorado Springs. Both events present examples of how integrated warrior codes intersect with civilian values to define the moral agency and ethical practices of warfighters in diverse contexts apart from war.

On 22 April 2022 Specialist Bishop Evans of the Texas National Guard was serving on the border between Mexico and Texas. During a guard shift, he witnessed two people drowning while illegally crossing the border. Instead of turning them away or ignoring them, he entered the water to assist them(Hernandez 2022). His actions were against the command guidance he received, but his moral orientation led him into the water without personal flotation equipment (Winkie 2022b). Thus, he risked his life to preserve life, in a context where "illegals" are left to drown or shot in the line of duty

(Barragan 2022). He sensed a different call of duty, and he drowned while saving these civilians. Some people criticize Evan's actions by pointing out that he lost his life outside of his duty by rescuing alleged smugglers. But others honor Evan's selfless service for acting as a Soldier and human being who lived and died by his moral orientation, regardless of the identity of those he saved (Martinez 2022). Evans was posthumously promoted to sergeant and buried with honors in Arlington National Cemetery (K. Walker 2022).

On November 19, 2022, Major Richard Fiero, a retired Army combat veteran, was attending a birthday party with his family and friends at Club Q in Colorado Springs, CO. During the celebration, a gunman entered the club and began randomly shooting patrons. Fiero reacted, and though unarmed, he rushed to confront and subdue the gunman. The club owner described his actions, "He [Fierro] stopped the man cold. Everyone else was running away and he ran toward him [the gunman]" (Hennessy-Fiske and Gowen 2022). Fiero explained his motivation, and his narrative reveal his moral orientation. "I had my whole Colorado Springs family in there. I had to do something. He was not going to kill my family… I just want people to take care of people, the people who are hurt and no longer with us. I still got two of my best friends who are in the hospital. They still need prayers; they still need support" (Hennessy-Fiske and Gowen 2022).

Evans or Fiero had no ethical obligation to act. One was on duty, one was not, and neither was under orders to act in the situations they faced. So, who would blame them for doing nothing? However, their decisions and their actions embodied moral orientations that integrated their warrior codes with their humanity. Let's ask two

60

rhetorical questions. First, do you think they could have walked (or ran) away from these situations and still believed they did the "right thing?" Second, would they have a positive life meaning defined as, "a cognizance of order, coherence, and purpose in one's existence, the pursuit and attainment of worthwhile goals, and the accompanying sense of fulfillment (Krause 2022, 177; Reker 2000, 41)?

Military service requires warfighters to navigate moral boundaries associated with R/S values that define life meaning as they build and defend homes for themselves and others. It can be argued that Evan's and Fiero's actions had a R/S element because of the values they attached to their life meanings, which were integrated into their warrior codes. Warrior codes function as a part of warfighters' life meaning in and out of uniform. Moral injuries happen when their moral agency is separated from their ethical practices. These same moral injuries can be healed through the reconciliation of their moral orientations with their life practices.

The task confronting any military (volunteer or drafted) is how to shape the character and competence of its recruits into warfighters who can fight and win in combat. So, regardless of motivation for enlistment, the development of warfighters' moral orienting systems for combat becomes the focus of military training, and this training must integrate a myriad of a pluralistic elements into the moral orienting systems that will guide a unified ethos. What follows in this chapter, is a top-down critical examination of the elements that are integrated into warfighters' moral orientations. This top-down approach is helpful because it is based upon standards of leadership that are foundational over time and units, as civilians develop into warfighters.

This process begins in basic training, and I will focus upon the example of the Cadet Prayer from West Point as a starting point to examine the broad integration of warrior codes into the life of warfighters using a R/S practice. This is logical, because the cadet corps from the three major military academies (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are also composed of a select group of highly motivated, well-trained individuals who will become future officers who are expected to be the standard bearers for the U.S. Military. Thus, they have similar practices that are followed by other military schools and programs. They also have demographics and issues that are present in training environments throughout the U.S. Military and global militaries.

The Cadet Prayer and Honor System as Sources of Moral Orientations

My dissertation assumes that the purpose of Religious/Spiritual Orientations (R/S) is to cross life borders to build homes and form life meaning. R/S experiences are apprehensions of value in relation to a divinity, ideal, or concept that transcends oneself to form bridges of personal and social meaning(James 1994 (1902), 24, 207). This is accomplished informally through personal R/S experiences focused upon individual beliefs and practices, and it is accomplished formally through social, doctrinal and institutional participation in religious activities (Tweed 2006, 54; Krause 2022, 22). Psychologist Abraham Maslow viewed these bridges of meaning as the building blocks of a unitive consciousness that provide a "zest for life," and a direction for growth (Maslow 1964, 4-7, 22).

These bridges support multi-directional traffic as communal values become foundational for individual moral orientations, and individual values support the establishment of community. This has implications for the way that R/S orientations

influence the crossing of the boundaries that differentiate civilian from military moral orientations to influence moral agency in the military (Bartles-Smith 2022, 1748; Pargament and Exline 2022, 32-34). This is not a matter of forming a civil religion, but of integrating R/S beliefs and practices into moral agency within the public sphere. One point of this integration is the Cadet Prayers used in America's military academies.

The Cadet Prayer was written between 1918 and 1926 for cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point by Protestant Chaplain Clayton Wheat. Wheat's intent was to habituate accepted moral standards of military character with standards of ethical leadership, and cadets' R/S practices. Later, the Naval and Air Force Academies adopted their own versions of this prayer (See appendix B for these versions).

> O God, our Father, Thou Searcher of Human hearts, help us to draw near
> to Thee in sincerity and truth. May our religion be filled with gladness and
> may our worship of Thee be natural.
>
> Strengthen and increase our admiration for honest dealing and clean
> thinking and suffer not our hatred of hypocrisy and pretense ever to
> diminish. Encourage us in our endeavor to live above the common level of
> life. Make us to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong, and
> never to be content with a half-truth when the whole can be won.
>
> Endow us with courage that is born of loyalty to all that is noble and
> worthy, that scorns to compromise with vice and injustice and knows no
> fear when truth and right are in jeopardy. Guard us against flippancy and
> irreverence in the sacred things of life. Grant us new ties of friendship and
> new opportunities of service. Kindle our hearts in fellowship with those of
> a cheerful countenance and soften our hearts with sympathy for those who
> sorrow and suffer.
>
> Help us to maintain the honor of the Corps untarnished and unsullied and
> to show forth in our lives the ideals of West Point in doing our duty
> to Thee and to our Country. All of which we ask in the name of
> the Great Friend and Master of all. AMEN (*Forging the Warrior's
> Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadets Prayer* 2007).

Chaplain Wheat explained the purpose for the prayer, "I have found some of these virtues and ideals set forth in the songs cherished by the cadets… but I found no expression of the Corps virtues in a form which the cadet might use in voicing his desire to attain those qualities and standards which the Corps expects and demands of its members" (Cook III 2007, 316). Thus, Wheat assumed that a cadet prayer could be used in a variety of religious and public contexts to supplement the cadet code of honor, and this carried over into the other academies (Snider 2007). However, the intent of the prayer is problematic for two reasons.

The first reason is that 82% of the military is enlisted personnel and only 18% of all officers graduated from the military academies. Thus, a large portion of the military has neither seen nor used the Cadet Prayers(Occupational Outlook Handbook 2023; Military Service Academies: Actions Needed to Better Assess Organizational Climate 2022). The second reason is the religious and spiritual diversity within the American military ethos is also present in the academies, and this also effects the usage and intent of the prayer.

In 2019, the Department of Defense listed the religious preferences of warfighters as 70% Christian (about 32% no denominational preference, 20% Catholic, 18% Protestant,), 24% as unclassified, 2% as Atheist or Agnostic, 1% as affiliated with an Eastern religion, and .4% as Jewish or Muslim (Kamarck 2019, 46-47). These percentages are close to the percentages recorded by the Pew Research Center when polling religious identity within the U.S. populace; 63% Christians (43% Protestant, 19% Catholic, and 2% Mormon), and, "28% are "Nones" (including 4% who describe themselves as atheists, 5% who are agnostics, and 18% who are "nothing in particular)"

(Pew 2022). The military academies report similar religious preferences among cadets.[5] Thus, the military academies closely reflect the religious preferences larger populations in the military and the nation. The difference between civilian and military population is that militaries are served by military chaplains with staffs and contractors charged with serving the R/S needs of warfighters and cadets through centralized chapels with diversified R/S programs and unit training. This "centralized diversity" affects the practice of prayer and specifically the use of a Cadet Prayer.

A core value of the US Military is its mandate to support and defend the US Constitution. Part of which is the guarantee of religious freedom and the prohibition of the establishment of religion by the state and its representatives. This is embedded in Title X of the U.S. Code and the regulations that order religious practices within the military(JCS 2004, I-2; 2018b, III-5).[6] The regulation of this has been tasked to commanders, and some of their efforts are questioned as possible violations if religious freedom by attempts to establish and perform religion practices within commands. Specific command practices to survey warfighters about their religious needs, and command uses of theology and religious practices such as public prayer in mandatory formations to habituate moral orientations have been challenged by groups who appeal to Title X for support. These groups of warfighters and cadets want to treat religion

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[5] The author's phone polling of U.S. Military Military Academy Chaplains' Offices. Conducted in December 2022.

[6] The respective service Religious Support and Operations Regulations follow this Joint Publication guidance.

neutrally by ensuring that no member of the armed forces is involuntarily, coerced, exhorted, pressured, evangelized or proselytized while on duty (Stancy-Correll 2023; Weinstein 2006).

Proselytization can, and has, weaponized religion. This will be examined in the section on Just War Theory. However, the point of examining Cadet Prayer is its linkage to the Cadet Code of Honor as an example of the crossing personal and professional boundaries and the blending R/S and military values. At its worst, the prayer is a form of a forced, civil religion. At its best, it encourages young warfighters to begin the assimilation of warrior codes into their moral orienting systems.

The military academies are undergraduate immersion experiences that integrate classroom instruction, field training, and daily living to develop the moral orienting systems of future military leaders. The cadets' lives revolve around strict honor systems that are peer enforced. West Point's Cadets have an Honor Code that states, "A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do." Air Force Cadets have a similar code, "We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us anyone who does. Furthermore, I resolve to do my duty and to live honorably, (so help me God)." The Naval Academy Midshipmen have an Honor Concept that states, "We stand for that which is right; We do not lie; We do not cheat; We do not steal." Their honor concept doesn't include the toleration clause because Midshipmen embrace the challenge of owning the moral standard and helping their peers act as persons of integrity.[7]

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[7] All Academy Honor Code information cited from("West Point Cadet Honor Dode and Honor System" 2023; "Academy Mission and Vision" 2023; "What is the USNA Honor Concept?" 2020).

Discipline of the codes follows three basic rules: Is the action intentional deceptive, does the action gain or allow entitlement, would the cadet be satisfied if they were on the receiving end of the action? Cadets accused of Honor Code/Concept violations face an investigation and then a hearing process with a jury of their peers. If they are found guilty, they can face sanctions or expulsion. These codes are strictly enforced, and their enforcement supports the respective academy's set of core values:

USMA (Army)	USNA (Navy and Marines)	USCGA	USAFA (Air Force and Space Force)
Duty	Honor	Honor	Integrity First
Honor	Courage	Respect	Service Before Self
Country	Commitment	Devotion to Duty	Excellence in All We Do

Table 2.1 Military Academy Core Values

Larry Donnithorne, a former philosophy professor at West Point and College President, writes about how cadets begin to integrate a warrior code into their moral orienting system in four stages (also called passes). The integration begins on day one with "bag dropping" at the first formation. Here civilians are ordered to literally "drop" their belongings on the ground and stand at the position of attention ready for instruction. This practice is used at every basic training institution in the U.S. Military. Donnithorne explains the rationale for this process:

> Before plebes (new cadets) can learn the skills of leadership, the Academy must first remind them of all they don't know… In fact, they know a great deal… They are capable young men and women. Many have been leaders in their communities and families. But here they are not leaders. Not yet… Because from this point on, the only thing that's important is what they don't know… Cadets don't know how to lead soldiers well. They don't know how to motivate or train or reward or discipline effectively… Point

Zero for new cadets is followership. Cadets spend a year learning the lessons of followership: self-discipline, stress, and time management. From there, the cadets embark on four passes of leadership training.

The First Pass shows how the academy forges the bonds that strengthen the organization… by emphasizing teamwork and the satisfaction of absorbing the institution's value system,

The Second Pass helps the individual begin to find his or her own voice in the organization by emphasizing direct or face-to-face leadership… and moral reasoning, the basis of honorable leadership.

The Third Pass teaches the self-reliance and leadership skills necessary to lead people who lead others. This is called indirect leadership.

The Fourth Pass, executive leadership, which in corporate life occurs at the upper echelons of management, shows the cadets how to act in their organization's long-term interest.

Chaos may be pervasive, but it needn't be accepted as inevitable… the value of rule, the value of honor, the point of living by your word—all of these are fundamentals that bring stability in the midst of chaos, provide a shelter from the storm, and will surely benefit any leader in any business (Donnithorne 1993, 13-15).

Military ethicist Nancy Sherman further describes the rationale behind this approach in the context of a basic training "boot camp."

… boot camp experiences crush cockiness and selfish independence. More fundamentally, boot camp attempts to change the core values of a self, so that one is ready to sacrifice in a way uncommon in civilian life, and prepared as well to overcome the fear of and aversion to killing that is bred in the bone as a civilian... A subordinate must trust that a superior is stripping neither himself nor his subordinates of dignity… that involves respect for their capacity to assess the legitimacy of his rule. (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 1218-1233)

The Cadet Prayer assumes theological concepts and metaphors such as deism, and gender in a form that reinforces the honor systems that supply cadets with the moral orientation of a professional warfighter. This identity represents what a young officer must know, do and be, "which is, a warrior, a servant of the nation, a member of a

profession, and a leader of character… [who] in the face of moral complexity and disequilibrium shows self-regulation and reflection… and maintains public trust" (Snider 2007, 33; Hannah and Sweeney 2007, 139-144, 173).

Through the Honor Code and the Cadet Prayer, a cadet's R/S orientations and practices become integrated with their mind, will, and emotions. These are the building blocks of moral character (or what Pargament and Exline label as moral orienting systems). Moral character can be defined as the integration of, "the honor of being true to oneself… informed by self-awareness, social awareness, a sense of agency, and faith" (Sweeney, Hannah, and Snider 2007, 58, 60-65). The goal of the moral character is to help young officers develop, "moral sensitivity to recognize problems, moral judgment to discern moral complexity, moral agency, and mral efficacy" (Hannah and Sweeney 2007, 127-128).

Thus, the Cadet Prayer is not solely a theological reflection on moral values as an academic exercise, because it invites consideration and reflection upon core values such as duty, truth, honesty, loyalty, and courage, it is also a "common operating picture" that binds cadets/future warfighters to their mission, to their unit, and other transcendent realities that are present in their military service. It is important to examine how Wheat's sectarian prayer transfers to modern interpretations and uses of the prayer within faith groups. This differentiation is imperative for understanding its importance for R/S meaning and practice within the public sphere.

Roman Catholic Chaplain Edson Wood used the prayer to support cadet development over three domains spiritual, ethical, and social as Aristotelian and Thomist

virtue linking well-being with practical wisdom grounded in a piety to conform the self in

relation to the profession and the Corps. One of his cadets writes,

> The prayer of 'living above the common level of life,' has really helped
> me to get through my time at West Point… there is always some sort of
> shortcut that while it would make the task easier, it would detract from the
> quality of the product. I feel the fulfilling your responsibilities to the best
> of your ability not only helps others, but it sets an example for others to do
> the same (E.J. Wood 2007, 261).

Rabbi Carlos Huerta views the prayer as the heart of leadership in that it is a means

of bringing cadets into a holistic relationship with G-d through their becoming aware of

the infinite outside of themselves. He says the task of understanding the meaning of

leadership apart from the infinite is a futile pursuit that is irreverent to the sacred things in

life. Thus, military service begins by bringing cadets to their own burning bush in the

desert to recognize G-d in the ordinary and in service to others(Huerta 2007, 271, 282).

Imam Sharifa Zuhur view the prayer as submission to Allah, a part of a cadet's

larger duty to live as a Muslim by applying "the hard right" as the path of Allah in life.

This duty cannot be discussed in the abstract – it is a moral orientation towards, "the best,

the truest, the most honest, and the spiritual," in becoming better, "persons, Soldiers, and

Muslims" (Zuhur 2007, 301-308).

I was unable to find a Hindu or Buddhist chaplain commentary on the prayer, but I

solicited comments from a Buddhist, military veteran. He comments on the inherent

struggle a Buddhist cadet will have with the prayer and honor code:

> The intent of fusing institutional values of a constructed self is
> problematic for a Zen Buddhist because it layers multiple levels of
> delusion onto a practitioner which impedes the process of spiritual
> enlightenment and the deconstruction of the self… In doing this, the cadet
> can choose to inject Buddhist values such as compassion, loving-kindness,
> equanimity, etc. into a situation… The point of tension is the level of

70

autonomy tolerated in a soldier by the institution and the situation…The solution to this is for the cadet, again, to become experientially aware of the various karmic and psychosocial currents exerting pressure upon them, and be intentional and mindful about their chosen response, which would generally correlate to Buddhist principles… (Kearney 2022)

Humanist or non-religious groups can find value in the spiritual readiness concepts within the prayer. These concepts include the values of honor, courage, and loyalty as a call to sacrifice for the greater good, and the pursuit of positive life meaning and purpose. This greater meaning is what enables warfighters to place their lives on the line by interpreting spiritual "transcendence" as human horizontal relationships bonded by something that is greater than the self: such as members of their unit, their family, or a collective good (Koenig, Carey, and Al Zaben 2022, 81).

The Cadet Prayer assumes that good people make good soldiers. The integration of values and practices supported by the Cadet Prayer and Honor Code/Concept encourages the discipline and competence that provides a defense against the brutalization that may erode their humanity and their professional ethics during experience in combat operations (Hartle 2007, 202).

The National Health and Resilience in Veterans Study (NHRVS) collected and analyzed data from 564 combat veterans and found that Potentially Morally Injurious Events (PMIEs) are associated with a higher risk for mental disorders and suicide (Wisco et al. 2017). The experience of war seems to drive the religiosity of soldiers to extremes. Current research is finding warfighters who have a faith that is deeply anchored in religious traditions and practices, possess an acquired confidence, to adapt their beliefs in response to traumatic events and, emerge from war with their beliefs intact, or

strengthened. On the other hand, warfighters with weaker R/S connections may suffer from a low capacity to draw on spiritual resources for managing their loss of values and meaning from their traumatic events (Hassner 2016).

Perhaps these studies are a form of confirmation bias for conditions that the Cadet Prayer and the Honor Codes/Concept were created to prevent. This bias will be examined in Chapters 3 and 4. However, it is essential to notice here how military training in the academies: 1) integrates R/S meanings with warrior codes to form the moral orienting systems of cadets, and 2) how a similar process is used throughout many forms of military training in the U.S. and global militaries. This integration is all about the presence of warfighters' R/S beliefs and practices in public sphere, not the formation of a civil religion within the military. This will be further examined in the following sections and chapters.

The Integration of Service Values into Warfighters' Moral Orientations

What researchers define as "moral orienting systems" the military defines as "character." The two-fold purpose of military training is to; 1) shape warfighters' character and 2) combine it with warfighting competence. This chapter will examine the integration of a warfighters' character as it relates to the content of their professional competence. Chapter 3 will examine warfighters' competence as it relates to their warfighting skills and mission accomplishment.

The military develops character and competence through tough, realistic training that is similar to the training process of Roman Legions described by the historian Josephus, where training exercises resemble "unbloody battles," so that real combat resembles "bloody exercises" (Josephus 2016, 2190). This process begins with entry-

level training and continues through levels of individual professional military education and collective unit exercises. Thus, modern military training is an iterative, crucible designed to develop resilient warfighters with the capability to fight, survive, and win in war. Each military service accomplishes this goal in its own, unique way.

Philosopher Michael Foucault theorizes that such training is a "panoptic mode of power" designed to conform "docile bodies" into a "skilled unity" for the "projection of power" (Foucault 1995, 188, 220-221). Foucault is accurate in describing entry level training as a "panopticon" with the goal of transforming civilians into skilled units for power projection. However, he misunderstands the purpose and desired end-state of military training when he asserts that military discipline creates "docile bodies" of the state. The opposite is true. Professional Military Education and unit exercises are designed to link warfighters' moral agency and ethical praxis with values embedded within the ethos. The Marine Corps Operations Concept summarizes the desired purpose and end-state for this training.

> The profession of arms is unforgiving; mistakes are paid for in blood and incompetence can lead to catastrophic defeat. When we fight, we must win. There is no alternative… We need every Marine and Sailor to seek creative solutions to todays and tomorrow's complex problems. We need your ideas and your critical thinking…Our ability to adapt more quickly than our enemies will be vital to our future success. fight in the future. Your proactive involvement in validating our operating concept is critical to ensuring we can *Innovate, Adapt, and Win. (Marine Corps 2016, i)*

The Marine Corps core values are honor, courage, and commitment, and Marines strive to live up their motto: "Semper Fidelis, or "always faithful." They believe that they are stewards of a warfighting capability that is only as effective as the Marines employing it (Marine Corps 2011b, 1-1-5). Their core values come from the principles that help to

further define the cultural identity and beliefs of Marines in the most basic terms. They

take care of their own and they further define these values in terms of the following

operational concepts:

> … 1) Every Marine is a rifleman, 2) Marines are soldiers of the sea who
> are lean, versatile, flexible, and ready, 3) Marines are a combined arms
> organization with warfighting capabilities that are unique, integrated and
> self-sustaining, 4) Marines will serve as the Nation's "force in readiness"
> capable of rapid response to emerging crises, and 5) Marines are agile and
> adaptable and can operate quickly and effectively across an extraordinary
> range of operational environments (Marine Corps 2011b, 1-4-5).

Their mission depends upon transforming civilians into Marines through entry-

level education, profession military education, unit level training, and service level

exercises. Their training is accomplished according to a Doctrine that, "establishes a

particular way of thinking about war… a way of fighting… a mandate for

professionalism, and a common language" (Marine Corps 2023b, 1-2). Thus, common

values, language, and training defines the Marines' ethos and warrior code.

What is true for Marine warfighters is true for all the services. Entry-level training

begins as recruits (as well as newly commissioned academy cadets) take the following

oath upon entering service:

> (Enlisted) I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
> defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign
> and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and
> that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the
> orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the
> Uniform Code of Military Justice. So, help me God (optional).

> (Officer) I, _____, having been appointed a (rank) in the United States
> Air Force, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
> Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
> domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take
> this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of

evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God (optional). (Air Force 2022, 3)

These oaths form the authority for Civil-Military Relations (CMR) within the U.S. that defines the commitment expected from American warfighters as a way of life (Ulrich, Chandler-Garcia, and Fitch 2023). Each service has its own set of values embedded in doctrines that flesh out the details for fulfilling this commitment and these become each service's standards for excellence in the art and science of warfighting (Navy 2020a, 1-2). The purpose of these values and doctrine is to educate, empower and prepare warfighters for the future fight by helping them learn and incorporate lessons from the past and into new concepts and technologies to form best practices for the future (Air Force 2021, 1).

The Navy defines its core values in terms of: 1) honor – defined as ethical conduct with an uncompromising code of integrity that takes responsibility for actions and accountability for professional and personal behavior that is mindful of the privilege of national service, 2) courage – defined as the mental strength to meet adversity in the performance of duty and loyalty to the needs of the Navy and the Nation above personal interest, and 3) commitment – defined as the obedience to orders and the demand for respect up and down the chain of command to care for the safety, well-being, quality work, and improvement of every Sailor, and self(Navy 2020b). The Coast Guard's core values of Honor, Respect, and Devotion provide a common ground, binding Coast Guardsmen together by guiding their conduct, performance, and decisions to live up to the high standards of excellence exhibited by their predecessors, whether on active duty, reserve, civilian, or auxiliary (Coast Guard 2012, 63)

The Air Force teaches that, "the two fundamental elements of leadership are the mission and the Airmen who accomplish it" (Air Force 2021, 4-5). Its core values are: 1) integrity first, defined as honesty, courage, accountability and humility, service before self, defined as duty, loyalty, and respect, and 3) excellence – defined as mission accomplishment, discipline, and teamwork (Air Force 2022, 9-11). The Air Force desires to create wingmen, leaders and warriors who incorporate its core values as a foundation for life-long decisions that demonstrate accountability, perseverance, communication, flexibility, resilience, initiative, and self-control (Air Force 2022, 22).

Marines Corps	Navy	Coast Guard	Air Force	Space Force	Army
Honor	Honor	Honor	Integrity First	Character	Loyalty
Courage	Courage	Respect	Service Before Self	Connection	Duty
Commitment	Commitment	Devotion to Duty	Excellence in All We Do	Courage	Respect
				Commitment	Selfless Service
					Honor
					Integrity
					Personal Courage

Table 2.2 U.S. Service Values

The Space Force expects Guardians to display character, connection, commitment, and courage that produces mission accomplishment Semper Supa (above all). It defines 1) character as the foundation of integrity, grit, honesty, authenticity, and trustworthiness, 2) connection as the common purpose greater than self, 3) commitment as the life-long mastery of self, the profession, and the domain of space, and 4) courage

as the steadfast bias towards action by doing what needs to be done and saying what needs to be said. The Space Force seeks to develop and maintain a competency-based, diverse ethos that is intentionally placed into high-performing teams with the ability to connect and fight in a collaborative environment (Space Force 2021, 2-4).

The Army values are based upon its commitment to an ethic with legal and moral foundations to form a shared identity from which to develop self-disciplined leaders through years of training, education, and experience from the unit to the organizational and strategic levels. Its values form the acronym for its goal: LDRSHIP – Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage (Army 2019a, vi, 1-2, 1-9-22). All these values can be found in the values or definitions of values from the other services, and combined, they form the basic elements of a warrior code. The service values are summarized in table 2.2.

However, Army Doctrine is different in that it codifies its basic values into The Soldiers' Creed:

> I am an American Soldier.
> I am a warrior and a member of a team.
> I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.
> I will always place the mission first.
> I will never accept defeat.
> I will never quit.
> I will never leave a fallen comrade.
> I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained, and proficient in
> my warrior tasks and drills.
> I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.
> I am an expert and a professional. I stand ready to deploy, engage, and
> destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
> I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
> I am an American Soldier. (Army 2019a, 2-9)

Pay close attention to the ordering of the phrases: "mission first, never quit, never accept defeat, and never leave a fallen comrade." These statements do not only define the warrior code of the Army. They are also present within the lists of service values that are intended to influence the moral orientations of warfighters. Thus, warfighters are expected to act with an integrated, behavioral moral agency that equips them for warfighting. Whether a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, Coast Guardsman, or Guardian; they will accomplish their mission, they will not quit, they will not accept defeat, and they will not leave a fallen comrade. These high, moral standards are supported by the oaths, myths, and civil-military relationships that define their service.

The Integration of Myths, Symbols, and History into Warfighters' Moral Orientations

Warfighters are not panoptic, docile, automatons. Instead, they are required to specialize in combat skills as individuals with the purpose of acting as members of a unit (which can be considered as a tribe, a clan, or a profession). The latest Army and Marine recruiting videos show fit and motivated show teams of military members using lethal technology to win the fight as messages of "warriors wanted," "battles won," and "be all that you can be" flash on the screen.[8] These commercials show that fighting and winning in combat requires strong, intelligent warriors with the fortitude and skills to

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[8] The reader can view examples of these commercials on www.YouTube.com at the following locations. "Warriors Wanted,", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epuNdCUoHtw . "Marines, Battles Won," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMqmP5C5WHI, "Be All That You Can Be," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lwx-2R9swDg

overcome all challenges, and they challenge viewers to ask themselves, "do you have what it takes to become one of us?" However, these commercials fail to show viewers that military service requires more from its personnel than just the identity and skills of a warrior, and in doing so they perpetuate a warrior myth that is only one part of warfighter's moral orienting system.

The transformation of a civilian's moral orientations to military moral orientations can recalibrate the motivations, intentions, relationships that govern how they function in life. Recruiting commercials signify this changing mindset, and the deep roots for this transformation are to be found in the warrior myths that support these changes. Religion historian Bruce Lincoln defines myths as ideologies in narrative forms that arise out of specific contexts to become heuristics to convey meanings that maintain social validity and authority (Lincoln 2014, Kindle Location 2333-ff; 1999, 209). Myths are guides that order life and define meaning. Myths fail if they do not provide new insight or lead into the deeper meaning of life, but they are valid if they compel a change of mind/orientation (Armstrong 2005, 10-11). Thus, warrior codes are forms of myths that validate the moral orientations that influence the behavior of warfighters. In the military these myths are reinforced by the design of uniforms, unit symbology (crests/flags), unit slogans, songs, peer evaluations, promotions/rank, awards, and most important – unit history.

For example, I belong to the Army's 506th Infantry (note my use of the word *belong*). Our motto is "Currahee," which is a word that was borrowed from the Cherokee Language and translated "Stands Alone." The unit formed during World War II, and it trained as a unit at the base of Mt. Currahee near Toccoa, Georgia. It was

designated as parachute regiment, and as part of its training, recruits ran six miles up and down Mt. Currahee. Later, they were assigned to the 101st Airborne Division and they; 1) jumped into Normandy on D-Day, 2) jumped into Holland for operation Market Garden, 3) fought while surrounded at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge, and 4) liberated Dachau. Subsequently, the unit fought in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and it is the subject of several books, the television series *Band of Brothers*, *and the movie Hamburger Hill*.

Figure 2.3 Currahee Regimental Crest (506th Infantry)

I didn't take an active part in any of this history. However, I did train and serve under the same Currahee standards from 1996-1997. My combat deployments were with other units, yet I was a Currahees, and I found that their history and their standards influenced my 33 years of military service. I still bond with other Currahee veterans easier than other veterans that I meet. I still proudly wear my unit crest (figure 2.3), which features the outline of Mt. Currahee (our origin), with six parachutes (our airborne mindset and heritage), a lightning bolt (signifying our strike capability), and our unit logo. General Mark Milley, who is the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, does the same. Though we never fought in combat with the legendary Currahees,

we are members of this unit, a tribe, or a "brotherhood" (concept borrowed from Shakespeare's *Henry V*) that belong to a mythological heritage that is foundational for our identity and service as Soldiers.

The spirit of the Currahees is a mythological meaning that is integrated into the lyrics of the unit song, "We stand alone, we stand together, strong as the mountain Currahee…" These lyrics add meaning into the lyrics of the 101st Airborne Division song, "We have a rendezvous with destiny...", and they add meaning linked with the lyrics to the Army song, "First to fight for the right…" Thus, in history, training, and symbology the myth of a "Currahee" warrior code became integrated into my life meaning and it became a part of my moral orientation as an Army Soldier and Military Chaplain.

Another example of this can be viewed in the movie *Blackhawk Down: The Untold Story* which documents the experience of the 2-14 Infantry and Special Operations Soldiers who fought to reach the crash sites of two downed helicopters during the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu. During his interview, Command Sergeant Major Counts describes the wordless exchanges he had with several Soldiers before they went into battle. Each glance affirmed their training and conveyed that he was with them and that they were confident in their abilities. Special operator Lee Van Arsdale talks about the ability of leaders to take command in chaotic conditions by simply displaying confidence in the ability of Soldiers to do their jobs. Lieutenant Colonel David (the battalion commander) summarizes the mission focus of his Soldiers in terms of their living up to the unit's history. His Soldiers also talk about how they lived up to the standards they set for themselves(R. Larsen 2019).

Thus, the unit functioned in combat with a character that controlled their competence, and a competence that built their character. This is the stuff that unit myths and legends are made of. However, during these interviews there were moments when Soldiers revealed that even, they still had deep emotional reactions associated with their values and agency (R. Larsen 2019). It is these types of reactions that reveal the association between warfighters' post-trauma stress and their discernment of moral orientation.

The Moral Discernment of Myths as Moral Orientations

Lincoln points out the above types of unit mythologies can convey positive meaning, but they can also produce a cultural *volkgeist* that justifies, or excuses, patterns of harmful behaviors(Lincoln 1999, 120). He uses the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche to demonstrate how myth can be used to form a warrior class, an *uber mensch,* with a will to power not bounded by "the weaker mindsets that control societies" (Nietzsche 1969, 40-41). This parallels Foucault's concern about the end-state of the panopticon upon society. His concern is warranted because such end-states can use warrior codes to normalize violent biases that can damage warfighters' character by influencing their ability to discern between just and unjust moral agency in war.

This is not theoretical distinction. In a recent article retired Marine General James Livingston expresses his concerns about how the modern shaping of a warfighter's character and competence combined with changing force structures, technologies, and missions is destroying the fragile ethos of the Marine Corps. He argues that ethos is a state of mind that allows Marines view themselves as different

with "Every Marine a rifleman," becoming a warrior code that governs their character and competence to serve as shock troops who are ready to deploy anywhere and anytime to fight any foe and win. These are essential warfighting capabilities that are embedded in their history from Tripoli to Afghanistan and if Marines no longer see themselves as a breed apart, they will lose the values and skills that make them an "offensive spirit and combined arms force" (Livingston 2023).

In 2013 veterans Peter Fromm and Douglas Pryer published an influential paper *The Myths We Soldiers Tell Ourselves (and the Harm these Myths Do)* through the Army War College. They argued that the US military must break harmful patterns within its myths because they erode the ability of warfighters to see and correct errors in their moral and ethical judgment to the extent that their subsequent actions nullify the standards that support their identity and purpose.

> In an organization as large as our military, one expects the institution to be vulnerable to myth making and to moral errors. The fact that these errors have already contributed to gross and counterproductive outrages at home and abroad, while greatly disturbing, is not what is most troubling. What is most troubling is that we can do far better than we have been doing but remain too blind, complacent, and self-deceived. Earning lasting success in war and the full trust of all will be impossible to achieve until we, soldiers, [note the intentional use of the category] challenge, head on, the myths we tell ourselves. (Fromm, Pryer, and Cutright 2013, 65-66)

Lincoln's solution for this type of warrior *volkgeist* is an ongoing, critical assessment of the origins, meanings, contexts, and uses of the myths that influence cultural mindsets. These mindsets are forms of moral orientations. He writes:

> If myth is ideology in narrative form, then scholarship is myth with footnotes.… There is, however, a second form of critical history that maintains a principled distance not only from fiction, myth, and official history, but from revisionism as well. This is the kind of storytelling that

self-consciously emphasizes the gap separating the present from the past, taking note of how much has been irretrievably lost, and stressing the unsatisfactory, lacunary, and potentially misleading nature of the slender and always tendentious sources on which we rely when attempting to conjure up some vision of "what actually happened." Critique founded on

epistemological doubt, evidentiary inadequacy, and scholarly humility, it seems to me, is that form of narrative least inclined to stray toward the mythic. (Lincoln 2014, Kindle Locations 2333-2374)

Nowhere is this type of critical reassessment more necessary than in approaching how warrior myths influence the warrior codes that define the moral and ethical standards of what it means to be a warfighter. In the U.S. military these myths are a blend of civilian and military values, supported by R/S elements, that are exemplified by certain "heroes." Critical reflection upon these myths can restore moral and spiritual depth to warfighters' character/moral orienting systems, and it help them deal with the moral complexities they will face in combat. The absence of such reflection creates Nietzsche's *uber mensch*, and it sets the conditions for a normalization (a banality) of standards that allow for the misuse of miliary power and position by those in authority, and those who follow (Arendt 1963).

To separate harmful from helpful myths, historian Michael Hillyard differentiates between "legends, heroes, and myths" by using critical examination of historical records and primary resources to evaluate their influence upon life meanings. This examination is essential for two reasons; 1) the focus upon "superhuman" deeds creates a harmful *volkgeist* that veils the humanity that makes a human life significant, and 2) reducing a human life or significant event to common biography or hero worship

fails to recognize the redeeming qualities that inspire and motivate us (Hillyard 2001, xxii, 172-175, 256-257). It also fails to teach how to deal with the inherent ambiguity and dissonance that is present when making moral decisions.

The military has used heroes to create a type of "spiritual-warrior myth" that blends transcendent qualities with the mindset of a warrior to support prescriptive codes for future warfighters. George Washington is an example of the spiritual/warrior myth. Whether it is the legend that inspired the paintings of him praying in the snow at Valley Forge that is embraced by the military chaplaincy, or crossing the Delaware River in the bow of a boat and defeating the British at Yorktown that is embraced by military leaders – Washington serves as an icon for the American Military.

However, it is his imperfect humanity and struggles that qualify him as an iconic legend and an exemplar for warfighters. He was a resilient military leader who never quit while losing more battles than he won; he was a businessman who struggled with debt; he was a slave holder that struggled with the institution of slavery; he and he was a prudent political leader known for his quiet, steady decisions who struggled with his temper and indecision. Yet it was his peaceful transition of power after his term as President ended that made him noteworthy. Historian Mary Thompson, the custodian of his papers at Mount Vernon, documents how his behaviors dispel the mythic views of Washington as a spiritual warrior and favor the conclusion that he viewed religion as a deistic resource for moral responsibility and public accountability.

Washington seldom missed worship in his Anglican congregation, but he was never confirmed and never participated in communion. Thompson believes this was a matter of conscience linked to his unresolved issues as a general, politician, and slave

owner (M. Thompson 2008, 30-124). For the military, his humility comes through in his response to the New York Legislature, after they questioned him about the status of the soldiers in the Continental Army. He responded, "As to the fatal, but necessary Operations of War. When we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the citizen, and we shall [after the war ends and liberty is established] … return to our private stations in the bosom of a free, peaceful, and happy country" (Washington 1775). Thus, he established the standard of a citizen-soldier based upon rule of law that has served as the embedded warrior code that identifies American Warfighters. This code is grounded in their oaths of service and the civil-military relationship they maintain through their chains of command.

More important, Thompson recovers a self-critical quality in Washington that corrects misuses of myths by critically discerning the meaningful and the human from the insignificant and the legendary that is present in warrior codes. This type of historical discernment contributes to present and future contexts because it calls attention to the integrity between the values that are embedded in warrior codes and the conduct regulated by warfighters' oaths of obedience to sources of authority.

The Integration of Obedience, Oaths and Authority into Warfighters' Moral Orientations

In 1957 Political Scientist Samuel Huntington argued that obedience and loyalty are the core virtues for military service because they create an ethical obligation to civil authority that warfighters are bound to obey (Huntington 1957, 73). Such obedience was

set-up in Washington's conception of the citizen-soldier under the authority of Continental governments, and it was confirmed in the U.S. Constitution's regulation of the military under the Executive and Legislative branches of federal government.

Such examination is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it is important for understanding how the moral agency of the military relates to public authority. In 1950 military historian and veteran S.L.A. Marshall wrote the *Armed Forces Officer* where he described the bedrock, ethical and moral principles that unite the military service of warfighters begins with their "lasting obligation to cherish and protect his [her/their] country and to… serve its arms and the welfare of his [her/their] fellow Americans with increasing wisdom, diligence, and patriotic conviction" (S. Marshall 1950, 3). This fidelity is a practical application of arms with the obedience, responsibility, and accountability to stand and serve in ways that make the warfighter unique among other government officials. General James Mattis characterizes this fidelity in a young Marine, who lives with the warrior code of "no better friend, no worse enemy," who is guarding civilians while simultaneously fighting off insurgents. "Now think, Mattis concluded, what that says about a 19-year-old who could discriminate" (Swain and Pierce 2017, 9-10).

Yet, this uniqueness is not a blind obedience that is negligent to outside authority or greater principles of conduct. The Military Ethics Professor at the Naval War College Paula Shanks-Kaurin argues that there are practical, moral/ethical and legal arguments that defines military obedience, "but that what has been missing from the debate are the moral arguments for an obligation to obedience that provide the internal motivation and consistency that enable and support what I call "critical obedience"[as opposed to a blind

follower] even in the absence of external motivations or factors" (Shanks Kaurin 2020, 20-21). This obligation requires a different kind of citizen whose discipline is based upon collective moral grounds that are rooted in the integration of common good and ordered authority as a holistic moral orientation.

This orientation begins with induction and continues with promotion ceremonies where every warfighter is required to affirm/swear to "support and defend the U.S. Constitution," not a person or political agenda. This collective orientation is further developed through training, and who can critically reflect upon personal experiences and "enter into the sentiments of others" (Shanks Kaurin 2020, 75, 207-209). Sometime dissent and disobedience are essential for doing the right thing, and Shanks-Kaurin believes that this end-state for a warfighter's moral development is their capability to conduct an internal and external dialogue where shared and individual agency and responsibility can inform and reinforce one another (Shanks Kaurin 2020, 231, 241).

An example of this moral dialogue is General Mark Milley's and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee when they were questioned by a member of Congress about critical race theory and white rage in the U.S. military. General Milley responded, "So what is wrong with understanding — having some situational understanding about the country for which we are here to defend …I personally find it offensive that we are accusing the United States military… of being, quote, 'woke' or something else, because we're studying some theories that are out there … I want to understand white rage … what is it that caused thousands of people to assault this building [the Capitol Building] and try to overturn the Constitution of the United States of America?" Secretary Austin responded, "We are focused on extremist

behaviors and not ideology — not people's thoughts, not people's political orientation.

Behaviors are what we're focused on … Thanks for your anecdotal input, but I would say

that I have gotten 50 times that amount of input on the other side that have said, 'Hey,

we're glad to have had the ability to have a conversation with ourselves and with our

leadership" (Kurtzieben 2021). Such testimony drives home the moral orientations of

two warfighters to be obedient to their service oaths and lead a diverse force of

warfighters.

The Integration of Civil-Military Relations (CMR) into Warfighters Moral Orientations

The United States has a long-standing expectation for military obedience to

civilian control over military affairs: barring evidence to the contrary. Orders from the

President and policies from Congress are presumed to be legal and followed upon receipt.

Yet in this non-combat issue, Austin and Milley publicly demonstrated a form of Shanks-

Kaurin's moral dialogue where shared and individual orientations inform and reinforce

public moral agency. By disagreeing with a member of Congress, Austin and Milley

spoke with candor and competence to authority in the performance of their duty, and they

defended the diversity that is present in the military forces they lead. This type of moral

obedience is what Huntington envisioned when he argued that although warfighters are

subordinate to civilian authority, they have a higher, moral obligation to defend rule of

law and the Constitution in the performance of their duties. When faced with legally and

morally questionable orders or policies, warfighters can voice dissent and request

clarification/or changes, or they can object/refuse to obey on legal and moral grounds

Senior leaders can also resign quietly or publicly. This is referred to as the "Normal

Theory of the Civil-Military Relationship (CMR)" (Huntington 1957, 68-74; E.A. Cohen

2002, 230-ff). However, each of these courses of action have consequences.

However, the moral orientations within the American military ethos have proven

more "Clausewitzian than Huntington," because politicians determine the policies that

send warfighters into combat, and they also want to control the outcomes (Katz 1999).

While Washington and Huntington prescribe an American ideal that seeks to exclude

warfighters from politics, Clausewitz and Cohen describe war as a complicated trinitarian

relationship consisting of emotion, chance, and reason that creates a complex moral

reality between government, the people, and the military. Thus, "there is no neat way

dividing civilian from military responsibility in war," because all activity in war has

consequences and repercussions that bend war to serve political goals" (E.A. Cohen

2002, 8-10; Von Clauswitz 1968, 121-ff). This moral complexity will become the focus

in later portions of this dissertation when I examine modern rules of war and mission

command.

In his book Dereliction of Duty, military historian H.R. McMaster argues that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) committed dereliction of duty during the Vietnam War.

McMaster uses a moral dialogue between Huntington's and Cohen's understandings of

the nature of obedience and CMR to show that the JCS violated their moral and legal

obligations to the Constitution when they refused to confront the consequences of

military actions, and present a strategy that was consistent with national interests instead

of political outcomes (McMaster 1997, 262-264).

McMaster's critique is embedded in the generation of junior leaders who fought in Vietnam and later commanded forces in Desert Storm. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he advised the President and Secretary of Defense that America needed to "own what it broke in" the liberation of Kuwait (C. Powell 1995). He reasoned, "One should not discount lessons learned in Vietnam and the impact they had on these generals… When our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons" (C. Powell 1995, 149). In 2003, as Secretary of State he gave a speech to the UN that erroneously reported that Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction to gather support for the U.S.'s decision to invade Iraq. Later, when reporter Barbara Walters asked Powell if he considered this a blot on his record, he responded:

> Yes… Most people in public life have passed through a defining experience they'd prefer to forget, and to be forgotten, but won't be. So, what can you do about it? How do you carry the burden?... I am glad Saddam Hussein was removed from power … That threat is gone. I admire the dedication of our troops and those of our coalition partners who fought the battles and are now home… [and] I share a soldier's grief and sympathy for those who made the supreme sacrifice and for those who were wounded and scarred. And for their families. As we move on, we must make sure the lessons learned are never forgotten or ignored. (C. Powell and Koltz 2012, 217, 224)

Generals don't get to choose which wars the country fights. Nor do they have the right to refuse to follow legal orders that they find morally distasteful (Joyner and Bracknell 2022). The Constitutional authority for making such policy lies with the elected, civilian leaders in the Legislative and Executive branches of government. However, they have a moral duty to refuse and question illegal orders, and they can choose to resign their commissions. Powell's narrative contains the integrated values that

are the standards he uses to guide and judge his military service, and it also contains how these values spilled over into his civilian duties as Secretary of State. The young officer who promised to learn from the moral and professional failures by the JCS during after Vietnam War, made corrections in how he led during his tenure as Chairman of the JCS. However, when Powell experienced his own, similar failure as a Secretary of State

Such is the fluctuating, complex nature of CMR and politics described by Clausewitz and Huntington. However, these cycles need to be viewed as a part of collective ethos. In 2006, at least seven retired Army and Marine general officers criticized the handling of the Iraq War effort and publicly called for the resignation of the Secretary of Defense claiming his refusal to listen or accept divergent advice from strategic military leaders contributed to the decline of security and stability in Iraq. Military ethicist Martin Cook concludes that the generals' public actions were necessary, "to protect the 'trust' between the American people and its professional military… [because] the obligations of military professionals, need to exceed the conduct governed by rules derived from more routine contexts" (M.L. Cook 2008, 14). Such dissent is an essential element of mission command that will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Generals' Revolt is not the most recent time that this has happened in U.S. History. President Trump's attempt to use military troops to control crowds during the January 2020 protests over the murder of George Floyd drew public protests from 14 retired four star generals and former Secretaries of Defense who were concerned about the presence of troops and the misuse of military force and they called on the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make a religious/political statement

condemning the action (Stracqualursi 2020). After the events of January 6 several four-star generals published a public protest over the Constitutional violations by the National Command Authority. These protests by military leaders and Secretaries of Defense highlight the importance of high standards for moral agency/military character to maintain CMR and public trust. They wrote:

> Americans may take it for granted, but the strength of our democracy rests upon the stability of this arrangement, which requires both civilian and military leaders to have confidence that they have the same goal of supporting and defending the Constitution. We hope that the country will never face such a crisis again. But to safeguard our constitutional order, military leaders must be ready or similar situations in which the chain of command appears unclear or the legality of orders uncertain. (Abbot et al. 2022)

The moral complexities of CMR and warfighters' moral orientations question the military adage that states, "We don't make policy, we execute it." The generals' actions are evidence that CMR places a higher value for professional military officers to put aside self-gain, and mindfully dissent actions of immoral agency for the sake of public benefit and good (Seagren 2019). This dissent should not be viewed narrowly. Instead, it must be viewed through a lens of obligation defined by professional character and relationships that shapes a decision-making framework that reinforces warfighters' purpose and scope of military duty and clarifies their responsibility and accountability for building public trust (Sewall and White 2009, 1-4).

Test Narratives

> Inquiry is not a search 'behind the veil' of appearances that ends in the identification of an unchanging transcendent reality. Instead, inquiry is an act within a stream of experience that generates new relations that then become a part of future experience. (Clandinin and Rosiek 2006, 7)

Narrative inquiry allows researchers a method to examine the life meanings that subjects create from their experiences as "snapshots" of events, and the "motion pictures" of broader, social constructions of a subject's world. Inquiry can also be considered as points of data to establish particular kinds of mindsets that map out individual moral voice, and the social landscapes of larger groups, and reveal the moral voice (Clandinin and Orr 2007; Gentile 2010, xiii-xiv; Gilligan 1989).

The military uses exemplars to establish boundaries and standards for warfighter behaviors. I will use the following narratives from a diverse group of warfighters as examples of men and women who reached the pinnacle of military command, and decorated heroes who embody service values and military competence. Their words demonstrate how the oaths, values, myths, and relationships form the warrior codes that normalize moral orientations and ethical practices across generational, racial, and gender boundaries within the military ethos. What values do you hear represented in the following leaders and heroes as they summarize "the reasons why" that guided their military service? These narratives reveal the integrated values guide warfighters' moral agency, and it is the violation of these types of values that form moral injuries.

General Exemplars

General Colin Powell was the first black, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. This is the highest rank and position in the United States Military. He ascended to the position from a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program at a state university, and throughout his career he looked for inspiration from other black officers and other black soldiers who served the nation honorably, even when their nation didn't support

them. He explains, "I had an obligation to stand on their shoulders and reach higher. I had to let race be someone else's problem, never mine. I was an American Soldier who was black, not a black American Soldier" (C. Powell and Koltz 2012, 265).

He tells this story to junior officers about a formative lesson he experienced when, as a young lieutenant, he lost his side arm (a pistol). Though fearing punishment that could end his career, he reported the incident to his Company Commander. Instead of charging Powell with a Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) violations is commander did something different. He told Powell that two kids had found it, and fired off a round which alerted the sentries, and they recovered the weapon from the kids before they could fire another round and hurt someone. As he handed the weapon back to Powell he said, "For God's sake son, don't ever let that happen again."

Powell said he was scared to death, because he didn't want kids hurt, and he didn't want to lose rank for losing his weapon. Later, when he checked his weapon, he found that no rounds had been fired. In fact, some Soldiers had found the weapon next to his cot. Powell appreciated that his commander found a way to teach him an important lesson he would never forget, and in a zero-defect Army he tried to treat others with same compassionate discipline throughout his career (C. Powell and Koltz 2012, 264-265). Such leadership is essential to mentor and train discipline and discernment in young soldiers, because the line between discipline and growth is narrow and the consequences learned from these lessons can either help or harm future subordinates.

General Martin Dempsey was also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who graduated from the U.S. Military Academy. He was a competent cavalry commander, who kept the names and obituaries of Soldiers who died under his command in a box on

his desk. Occasionally, he read through the cards in the box to remember them and their families. Among his leadership lessons he lists: 1) leaders create safe space, 2) take out the slack in communicating orders and expectations, and 3) combat "ain't" no time for spectators. He relates the following story from 2003 when he was the commander of Task Force Ironsides (Armor) in Iraq. He was about to roll out of the gate as part of a convoy and he slapped the leg (the only visible part) of the machine gunner in his vehicle and asked the gunner's name. She responded, "Amanda, sir." He was surprised, and asked, "Amanda, do you know how to use that machine gun?" She fired back, "You bet your ass I do." He responded, "Well, that's exactly what I'm doing when we drive out this gate." Everyone laughed, and off they went. He didn't forget this encounter, and he says that Amanda's spirit, character, and competency were on his mind when he recommended that the Secretary of Defense end the combat exclusion for women (Dempsey 2020, 185-186).

Ann Dunwoody was also an ROTC graduate from a state university, and she was the first woman to be promoted to four-star general in the Army. As Commander of the Army Material Command, she focused upon the responsibility and accountability of her position. Some of the lessons in her life narrative are:

> Once you achieve the rank of general you may think that whatever you say goes, but in reality, the higher your rank, the political your decisions. You compete for limited resources, and not every battle is worth fighting… If you compromise your integrity and principles on minor issues, it gets easier to make bad choices on the big issues… [and] the fallout inevitably costs even innocent people their jobs and reputations [and lives] because no one had the courage to speak up. (Dunwoody and Collins 2015, 111 and 114)

> I believe the strength in diversity comes from being able to leverage diversity of thought. It's about creating teams of people from various

backgrounds to solve complex problems. They need to strategize and
provide a full range of alternatives and ideas that allow leaders to make
the best-informed decisions. To maximize potential—be it in a war zone,
Wall Street, or Main Street—leaders need to look in the mirror and at their
immediate surroundings to figure out what's missing. Those courageous
enough to embrace the power of diversity will thrive. (Dunwoody and
Collins 2015, 158)

In 2005 General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the US Army,
delivered a new warrior ethos: the Soldier's Creed. To this day, even
though I am a retired four-star general, this creed takes precedence for me
over every creed I hold dear except the Apostles' Creed… This is the
creed of the American soldier. It's not a creed just for Rangers, Infantry,
or other combat arms or for members of an exclusive club. It's the creed
that most accurately reflects our profession, our mission, our commitment,
and our warrior ethos. The Quartermaster Creed unifies quartermasters.
The Rigger Creed unites riggers. And the Airborne Creed bonds
paratroopers. General Schoomaker introduced a creed that connects all
soldiers. I will always proudly wear my Quartermaster Regimental Crest,
Rigger Wings, and Airborne Wings. I am equally proud of my dog tags as
I am of my four stars. (Dunwoody and Collins 2015, 32-33)

Lieutenant General (LTG), Dr. Nadja West was the 44th Army Surgeon General

and former commander of the Army Medical Command. LTG West was the first black

woman appointed to lieutenant general and the highest-ranking woman to graduate from

the U.S. Military Academy. She explains her reasons for joining the military, "I joined

the Army because I come from a military family… My dad was in — he joined the Army

in 1939, when the Army was segregated, and stayed in for 33 years. Nine of my siblings

were serving. I'm the youngest, so to me it was just something I could not wait to do. I

knew I would be serving in some capacity in the military(Polson 2018)." Throughout her

career, doing her job was what mattered most.

She tells the story about being deployed as battalion surgeon to Desert Storm for a

combat unit in 1991. When she arrived her commander asked her, "Doc, can you fix

broke soldiers?' And she said, "Yes, sir, I can." He responded, "Glad to have you with

us." LTG West concludes, "And so he didn't ask me where I went to medical school or ask what my grades were. He looked me in the eye and asked me if I could take care of soldiers. And in my heart of hearts, I knew I would do my darndest to live up to that." (Polson 2018).

Heroes as Exemplars

Living up to a warrior code makes warfighters, and the previous leaders show how their codes became standards that shaped their military service. However, it is quite another thing to live up to these standards under direct fire when life is on the line. This is what makes heroes, and the following narratives reveal the role that warrior codes have in shaping the life meanings of warfighters who have been decorated for actions that others considered to be extraordinary.

One does not "win" the Congressional Medal of Honor (MOH). It is awarded after a strenuous vetting process for, "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his [her/their] life above and beyond the call of duty."[9] Warfighters receive the MOH because they use lethal violence against an enemy. They participated in the killing, and some were killed in the line of duty. Thus, the MOH is awarded for exceptional, moral and ethical actions that represent the warrior codes that define the highest values within the military ethos, and because of this, the MOH can also be rescinded for actions that fail to represent these standards (Winkie 2022a). The following narratives are from MOH

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[9] "Honors for Valor," https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/honors-for-valor/

recipients explaining their life meaning in and out of the military after the events that warranted their award. Notice how their narratives coalesce around values that are similar to the previous leaders, even though their actions differ.

During World War I Sergeant Alvin York was initially a conscientious objector, who slowly accepted military service as he reconciled his religious beliefs with the duties he was being asked to perform. In combat, he was awarded the MOH for single handedly assaulting and capturing multiple German positions. Legend has it, that his commanding officer commended York for his actions by saying, "Well York, I hear you have captured the whole German army." York replied: "No sir. I got only 132" (D.D. Lee 1985, 39).

However, his community and family remember him for something other than his hero persona. York said, "I occupied one space in a fifty-mile front. I saw so little it hardly seems worthwhile discussing it. I'm trying to forget the war in the interest of the mountain boys and girls that I grew up among" (D.D. Lee 1985, 76). He didn't think that the war coarsened him or challenged his basic beliefs. York went home to Tennessee, married, raised a family, and farmed (D.D. Lee 1985, 124). He avoided public attention, and he chose not to cash in on his fame when invited to run for public office. However, he did champion causes that he valued. His grandson later said, "the greatest battle he [York] had was not in France but was in Fentress County [Tennessee] building a high school. People did not want a high school. They thought, why did their kids need education… [because] They needed them to farm." So, York spent most of his life fighting for financial support from the state and county to build and run the high school near his home (Lowary 2018).

During World War II, Sergeant Audie Murphy received a battlefield promotion to

Lieutenant after receiving multiple Bronze Stars and Purple Hearts for his actions in

combat. He was awarded the MOH for standing on a burning tank and firing its .50

caliber machine gun at a superior force of Germans soldiers while his own soldiers took

cover to repel the German attack. At the end of the war only Murphy and one other man

assigned to his company remained. After the war, Murphy became a popular actor, and

he gave most of his war medals away to children. However, he also experienced

nightmares, and slept with a loaded pistol, and drank. In 1970 he was charged with

assault and found not guilty in a trial that introduced his medical history of PTSD

(Davidson 1988, 433; D.D. Lee 1985, 121; Wickham 2021).

Currently there is a petition to posthumously award Murphy the Presidential

Medal of Freedom for his lifetime efforts to promote PTSD awareness. When asked

about the number of enemies he killed during his heroic stand, he answered, "I didn't

keep count. I don't know how many, I don't want to know." In 1967 he told an

interviewer, "… to become an executioner, somebody cold and analytical, to be trained

to kill, and then to return to civilian life and be alone in the crowd it takes an awful

long time to get over it. fear and depression come over you. it's been twenty-odd years

already, and the doctors say the effect of all this on my generation won't reach its peak

until 1970. So, I guess I got three years to go"(David A. Phillips 2017; David A.

Phillips 2019b). In his 1949 autobiography *To Hell and Back,* Murphy wrote about some

of his dissonant life meanings:

> … But I cannot sleep. My mind still whirls. When I was a child, I was told
> that men were branded by war. Has the brand been put on me? Have the
> years of blood and ruin stripped me of all decency? Of all belief? Not of all

belief. I believe in the force of a hand grenade, the power of artillery, the accuracy of a Garand [a M-1 Rifle]. I believe in hitting before you get hit, and that dead men do not look noble.

But I also believe in men like Brandon and Novak and Swope and Kerrigan [men from his unit]; and all the men who stood up against the enemy, taking their beatings without whimper and their triumphs without boasting. The men who went and would go again to hell and back to preserve what our country thinks right and decent. My country. America!

That is it. We have been so intent on death that we have forgotten life. And now suddenly life faces us. I swear to myself that I will measure up to it. I may be branded by war, but I will not be defeated by it. Gradually it becomes clear. I will go back. I will find the kind of girl of whom I once dreamed. I will learn to look at life through uncynical eyes, to have faith, to know love. I will learn to work in peace as in war. And finally–finally, like countless others, I will learn to live again. (Murphy 1949, 273-276)

Army Staff Sergeant (SSG) Clinton Romesha was awarded the MOH for actions he took at Combat Outpost (COP) Keating in Afghanistan in 2009 when insurgents attempted to overrun his platoon. Romesha organized a counterattack against a superior force, and he rallied his fellow Soldiers to "take the [deleted] back." His efforts prevented a massacre. He pays little attention to his command's estimates of his contributions in defending the COP, he reasons,

Such estimates are notoriously inaccurate, but the real reason I place little stock in them is that official accounts tend to possess a cleanness, a sense of order, that could not be more at odds with the reality of what unfolds during combat. In the end, only one set of numbers means anything to me: the lives that were lost, and that might have been saved if we—if I—had acted differently. It's true that I did the best I could. What's also true is that I could have done more. in the space between those two facts reside eight graves, the memories of the men whose names are etched on the stones that mark those graves, and my own deeply mixed feelings about receiving the highest medal this country can bestow. (Romesha 2016, 368)

Romesha regards himself as a "custodian or caretaker" of an award that he would "instantly trade" to bring back any of his fellow soldiers, and his mixed feelings are signs

of an elusive moral dissonance, and moral injury that will be examined in Chapters four through

7. Listen for the values that support his warrior code:

> As for me, I never bothered to get a duplicate [of his medal] and I
> eventually took to carrying the original around in my front pocket. As a
> result, it's taken several accidental trips through the washing machine, so
> the gilded surface is a bit tarnished, and the blue ribbon has begun to fade.
> But that doesn't bother me a bit. In fact, I kind of like it that way,
> perhaps—in part—because I don't truly regard it as mine. Like it or not,
> there are eight other guys with whom I served to whom that medal rightly
> belongs, because heroes—true heroes, the men whose spirit the medal
> embodies—don't ever come home. By that definition, I'm not a true hero.
> Instead, I'm a custodian and a caretaker. I hold the medal, and everything
> it represents, on behalf of those who are its rightful owners. That, more
> than anything, is the truth that now sustains me—along with one other
> thing too, which is a belief I hold in my heart. I know, without a shred of
> doubt, that I would instantly trade that medal and everything attached to it
> if it would bring back even one of my missing comrades in arms.
> (Romesha 2016, 368-369)

Army SSG Salvatore Giunta describes himself as a former Subway "sandwich artist" from Hiawatha, Iowa who enlisted in the Army to get one of the free T-shirts the recruiter was handing out at the recruiting center. In 2007 he was awarded the MOH for actions he took in the Korengal Valley of Afghanistan when his unit was ambushed, and several soldiers wounded. Giunta organized a counterattack which silenced the ambush and kept the wounded from being captured by the Taliban. Listen for the warrior code in his narrative.

> Now, just a few short years later, I can hear the words describing what I
> did, and I know exactly what they represent: I remember every minute,
> every second, of that awful day in the Korengal Valley. And yet—even
> now—it still seems almost impossible to comprehend. Two of my friends
> and comrades were killed that day; three others were seriously wounded.
> That day [the day he was notified of the award], all I could say was "[___]
> you," because that's what I really felt. A medal? For what? My buddies
> died that day. There is nothing to celebrate. I did what any of my fellow
> soldiers would have done, got lucky, and lived through it. For that you
> want to give me a seat at such a prestigious table? No, thanks… [But] I get

it now. I look out from the stage and see my wife and family. I see the other guys who were with me on the mountainside that night. I see the parents of those who didn't make it out: Sergeant Josh Brennan and Specialist Hugo Mendoza. I see all the brass in the audience, and there, in the front row, eight of the surviving Medal of Honor recipients from previous wars. I can't help but be moved beyond words. I can't help but understand: This isn't for me. It's for all of us… and I can feel the weight of it now… But I know it's not for me alone. I know I am part of something bigger, something vast and still incomprehensible… And I try to communicate to Brennan and Mendoza wordlessly: This is for you . . . and for everyone who has fought and died. For everyone who has made the ultimate sacrifice. I am not a hero. I'm just a soldier. I think they understand. I hope they do. (Giunta and Layden 2012, 2-4)

Army SSG David Bellavia is the first living veteran of the Iraq War to receive the MOH for actions he took in 2005 during the second battle for Fallujah when he engaged enemy insurgents in hand-to-hand combat. His speech at the Pentagon Ceremony went viral on TikTok because he expressed some of the "fire" that lies at the heart of the warrior codes that others before him displayed in their acts of bravery. "We [the United States] don't want war, but if you [other nations] want war with the United States of America, there's one thing I can promise you, so help me God: Someone else will raise your sons and daughters" (Stilwell 2023).

One can contrast Bellavia's fiery words with York's, Murphy's, Romesha's, and Giunta's "bittersweet" words, but one cannot compare the acts of bravery that each one displayed as a warfighter, and it is this bravery/courage that lies within the meanings conveyed by a hero's narrative. One emotion and value lies in the undercurrents of these meanings and that is the moral and ethical sense of responsibility and accountability spoken of by Murphy, Romesha, and Giunta, Dempsey and Dunwoody that translates as a type of remorse and anguish over the deaths of fellow warfighters in combat. During World War I Major C.W. Whittlesey was awarded the MOH for action he took in saving

his battalion when it was surrounded and cut-off from allied forces. Whittlesey refused to surrender and encouraged his soldiers to fight on for five days until they were rescued. Whittlesey later commanded the ceremony that established the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Ceremony. He was a private man who kept in contact with his fellow soldiers after the war, and he made it a point to attend the funerals of those who died from their wounds after returning home. In 1921 he probably committed suicide by jumping from a ship, but his reasons were left unknown (Welker 2013).

Warfighters derive such ambivalent in life meanings from warrior codes, this dissonance is not reserved for general officers and Medal of Honor recipients. It is also experienced by "ordinary" warfighters who are elevated to "hero" status simply by responding to challenges presented to them in combat and practicing the values habituated into their moral orienting systems.

In 2005 SSG Leigh Ann Hester (Army Military Police) became the first female soldier to be awarded the Silver Star, America's third highest combat award, for actions she took to protect a convoy that was ambushed. Her citation reads that during a 30 minute firefight, Hester rushed an enemy trench with two fellow soldiers, and together they killed and captured several insurgents (Guard 2023). Hester remembers it differently, "After my leaders truck was hit by an RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) I remember getting out of my truck and hearing the bullets wiz by and pinging off of the concrete and puffs of dust around my feet, and somehow I came out unscathed" (Cavallaro and Goldenberg 2023, 12)She keeps her award in a closet and she summarizes the meaning it has for her in terms that describe her own warrior code, "I don't know, it's something I haven't gotten used to… You know, it's just something that happened one

day, and I was trained to do what I did, and I did it. We all lived through that battle"
(Martin 2011). In 2009 Hester left the service, but she continued to serve as a police
officer. Then in 2010 she re-enlisted saying, ""I'm glad that I took a break… I really am.
It made me realize that I really enjoyed being a soldier, and it's something that I missed
and it's something that I'm good at. And I look forward to getting deployed again"
(Martin 2011).

Hester's humility is matched by Colonel Paris Davis who in 2023 was finally
awarded the MOH for actions he performed in 1965 as a Special Forces (SF) Captain in
Vietnam. Davis' (SF) team was stationed with a South Vietnamese unit when it was
overrun. Davis was shot twice during the fight, but he continued to rescue wounded
American Soldiers while under fire. He crawled 150 yards to one of his soldiers who'd
been shot in the temple still was still alive. Davis remembers, "Seeing him [the Soldier]
going in and out of reality, at one point he grabs my hand and says, 'am I gonna die?' and
I say, holding his hand, 'not before me'" (South 2023b; Tan 2023, 14-15).

Davis refused to leave the area until all his men were evacuated. "Was I scared?
Yeah… Am I a real brave man? No. Every person on that team could have been me"
(South 2023b; Tan 2023, 14-15). His commander recommended him for the MOH, but
the paperwork was lost – twice. "At that time, I thought something happened and I might
not get the medal … and I just completely forgot about it, I really did," Davis said (South
2023b; Tan 2023, 14-15). Fellow Soldiers thought prejudice might have had something to
do with the lost paperwork, and they kept pushing for the award. Davis continued to

serve in the Army and retired as a Colonel. When he was finally awarded the MOH Davis

said he was proud to be an American Soldier and "Forever a Green Beret" and he

remarked,

> I am grateful for what the Army provided for me and what America has
> given me -- opportunity, purpose, and pride… Receiving the Medal of
> Honor is quite overwhelming, but it reminds me that with cooperation, all
> things are possible. My hope is that Americans and the members of the
> armed forces will take a moment to reflect, and I hope you will find a way
> to serve your community, our country. (Tan 2023, 17)

Conclusion

The military is not a profession by self-proclamation. It is a *vocational ethos* with

a corporate spirit whose members "love, kill, die, and weep for other"(Moore and

Galloway 1993, xviii). It is also a legal community formed under the Constitution and

regulated under U.S. Code Title X with a practical expertise and social responsibility that

understands its purpose is to learn and promote the skills, attributes, and behaviors that

define it as a profession(Swain and Pierce 2017, 17-19; *The Noncommisioned Officer and*

Petty Officer: Backbone of the Armed Forces 2014, 14). Thus, a warfighter's oath guides

the character/moral orientations that determine his/her/their moral agency and

competence. These orientations are a blend of transcending personal and professional

values integrated into a warrior code that is best explained by applications of Moral

Foundations Theory, cognitive schema, and Stoic philosophy within the military ethos.

Chapter Three: Who am I? The Function of Warfighters'

Integrated Moral Orientations

"I'm not a natural killer. I'm a trained killer."

Sergeant Benjamin Peters, United States Marine Corps (Moon 2019a, 93)

"You grow up wanting to be Luke Skywalker and you end up being a

Stormtrooper for the Empire" (Garret 2015).

Specialist 4 Daniel Crimmins, United States Army

"Before I went to Vietnam, I was very active in the church, because of my

mother's influence… But each year since I've been back, I have read the Bible from

cover to cover. I keep looking for the explanation. I can't find it. I can't find it" (Terry

1984, 30).

Specialist 5 Harold "Light Bulb Bryant," United States Army

Introduction

The integration of military values, R/S beliefs and practices, oaths, and Civil

Military Relations (CMR) is not adequate to explain the depth of warfighters' moral

orientations and the warrior codes that inform them. It is here that Moral Foundations

Theory and the Four Component Model of Moral Behavior (Cognitive Schema) offer

evidence-based explanations for what is happening within warfighters' moral orienting

systems. However, these theories do not explain how warfighters' put their moral

orientation into ethical actions. The practice of Stoic philosophy describes how warfighters' habituate personal and socialized, military discipline into integrated moral orientating systems that they use to discern issues of conscience, justice, and agency. These moral orienting systems (MOS) are associated with their character and competence through 1) conscientious acceptance or objection of duty, 2) just or unjust moral agency, and 3) their specific attitudes and behaviors. This chapter will provide a critical examination of the how three associations are integrated into the warrior codes that inform moral orientation and agency.

Integrating Moral Foundations into Warfighters' Moral Orienting Systems

There are multiple moral orienting processes that warfighters use to determine their moral agency, and these will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5. This chapter will examine how Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explores the formation of the moral senses that human beings use to interpret their contexts, determine their actions, and construct their life meanings. MFT provides an evidence-based framework for exploring the links between warfighters' value systems, moral orientations, and moral agency. MFT links emotional responses with cognitive processes to explain how human beings "feel" their values, make moral decisions based upon their "gut instincts," and later develop reasons for their agency. MFT theory.

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz included emotion as part of his trinity for understanding warfare, and psychiatrist Jonathan Shay uses the concept of *thumos* (rage at dishonor) to unpack veterans' moral responses to their combat experiences (Shay 1994, Kindle location 314; Von Clauswitz 1968, 124). Military ethicist Nancy Sherman writes,

"Emotions themselves are modes of moral response that determine what is morally relevant and, in some cases, what is required to act rightly… to act from the sort of [practical] wisdom that itself includes the vision and sensitivity of the emotions" (N. Sherman 1989, Kindle Locations 88-93). Thus, there is an interdisciplinary recognition of the role that emotions perform in warfighting.

Moral Psychologist Jonathan Haidt proposes that humans operate with a set of inborn foundational senses (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity, and liberty) that function like the inborn taste receptors that allow individuals to develop preferences for different types of foods. The socialization of these moral senses allow individuals to develop social awareness and shape social behaviors (Haidt 2012, 179-188). This theory suggests that warfighters use their foundational senses to adapt their personal values with the values of warrior codes. This contributes to the diversity that exists within the military ethos. Thus, I am a different kind of "Currahee" than General Milley, even though both of us are different from a sailor, and all of us are different from a civilian.

MFT states that emotions drive moral action with cognitive reasoning following, and this challenges traditional moral/ethical reasoning theories that focus upon cognitive reasoning as the *source* for moral behavior. However, MFT does not propose that human morality is a mindless activity, but it means that human beings think and act with both reflexive and reasoned alternatives. Haidt labels these alternatives as, "homo duplex," which he defines as acting according a "social intuitionalist model," where 1) individuals initially reacts to contexts with internal, foundational senses, then 2) reflect and construct reasons for their social responses (Haidt 2012, 261-270). In this way, deeply embedded foundational senses can either be reliable guides for moral agency,

or they can bind and blind an individual to contexts of moral complexity (Haidt 2003, 2006; 2012, 301-ff). Haidt has likened the "homo duplex" of the foundational senses to the "the emotional dog that wags its rational tail," and "a rider on an elephant, and the rider's job is to serve the elephant (Haidt 2001, 2-ff, and 301-ff; 2012).

Haidt's theory provides two ways for examining the integration of warrior codes into warfighters' moral orienting systems. The first way examines how foundational senses become "recalibrated" to function within warfighters' moral orienting systems as civilians transition into warriors. The remainder of this chapter explores the pathways and content of this integration. The second way examines how warfighters use their recalibrated foundational senses during combat, and how their moral orientations can contribute to the dis-integration of values they experience from combat. This will be the subject of chapter four.

Haidt proposes that all human beings possess similar, foundational moral senses. These senses are not the same as values, instead they are sensory responses that are related to each other, that combine to determine the content and intensity of values. Human beings develop their values from their moral senses like the ways they develop dietary preferences from their "taste buds." Thus, human values depend upon experiential preferences, and the meanings they attached to these preferences. Furthermore, the grouping of these preferences is shaped by familial, cultural, religious social inputs. The definitions for the foundational moral senses and their relationship with traditional virtues and emotions follow (Haidt 2012, 131-149; J. Graham et al. 2011; Jesse Graham et al. 2013):

1. Care vs. Harm: protection and care for others: familiar and/or vulnerable. Related virtues: kindness, gentleness, and nurturance. Related emotion: compassion.

2. Fairness vs. Cheating: equality or proportionality of practice. Related virtues: justice, trustworthiness. Related emotions: Gratitude, guilt, anger,

3. Loyalty vs. Betrayal: formation and sustainment of bonds and coalitions. Related virtues: patriotism and self-sacrifice for the group. Related emotions: group pride; betrayal

4. Authority vs. Subversion: deference to recognized authority and respect for traditions. Related virtues: obedience. Related emotions: respect; fear.

5. Purity vs. Degradation: reverence for transcendent being or values, disgust for contamination, Related virtues: cleanliness, chastity, temperance, piety. Related emotion: disgust; reverence/awe.

6. Liberty vs. Oppression: reactance and resentment against domination and restriction. Related virtues: independence, liberation, autonomy Related emotion: solidarity, hatred of oppression, uninhibited

It is important to understand that although foundational moral senses may be shaped by external social forces and contexts, they in turn influence human convictions, belief, and behaviors. For example, the first two foundational moral senses "care and fairness" influence values that are associated with individual protections, whereas foundational moral senses "loyalty, authority, purity, and liberty" influence values that are associated with of group cohesion and boundaries. Recent work in MFT has led to a rethinking of the foundational moral senses based upon a revision of the assessment survey used for testing, and the results show cultural variations in results that include how subjects use moral senses of "equity" and "proportionality" to preference values related to group cohesion over senses related to individuation (Atari et al. 2022).

There is further research showing that a triad of emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) are cued by violations of communal senses (liberty, authority, and purity) in certain moral situations (Rozin et al. 1999; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew 2014; Russell and Giner-Sorolla 2011), and these cues can focus individuals upon certain foundational senses to motivate or change group behaviors (Chan 2021). This social-functionalist approach accounts for the role "moral emotions" have in "sharpening the resolution of how morality is considered in broader, cognitive contexts" (J. Graham et al. 2011; Jesse Graham et al. 2013; Hutcherson and Gross 2011). It also explains how values are linked with emotions to form "circular structures" that link motivations with behavior(Schwartz 2012).

Thus, moral emotions function as internal motivations that link moral judgment with moral behavior, and this accounts for how human beings construct life from moral behaviors (Prinz 2006). Haidt reasons,

> The capacity to feel contempt, anger, disgust, shame, embarrassment, guilt, compassion, gratitude, and elevation may or may not separate humans neatly from other animals, but it certainly separates us from Homo economicus… because it ties us all to something greater than ourselves: each other. (Haidt 2003, 866)

In this way foundational moral senses help clarify how the military ethos may favor senses of "loyalty and authority," and define senses of "care, fairness, and liberty" in terms of its values for group cohesion and individual character. It may also help explain how specific ideologies provide meaning within individual and collective narratives and how these narratives animate individual and group behaviors (Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009). People possess mixed character traits, "with some positive moral features and some negative ones… [and realization of this contributes] to reducing

the gap between what our actual moral character looks like, and what it should look like"

(C.B. Miller 2014, 238-239). Part of reducing this gap is defining the interrelated roles

that intuitive emotions and conscious cognitions have in controlling the descriptive and

prescriptive values that form the military ethos (Farnsworth 2019; Greene 2014).

MFT is limited in its ability to helping close this gap because veterans may

respond differently to assessment questions than civilians because their association with

military culture influences their moral orientations, and researchers conclude that military

specific measures need to be constructed to measure their moral foundations(Ford et al.

2022). In 2016 I proposed five senses to measure warfighters moral foundations: fidelity,

responsibility, accountability maturity, and efficacy (FRAME). Each of these FRAME

senses are based upon adaptations of Haidt's theory "recalibrated" by the values that are

commonly used to develop military character (Greene 2014; Larson and Zust 2017; Zust

2015b). A brief definition of each FRAME sense, combined with some of their

associations with MFT's foundational senses, corroborating evidence-based research, and

theories of organizational structures, follows:

1. Fidelity (loyalty, authority, fairness, sanctity) measures warfighters acceptance of the core values, standards, and relationships that define the moral orientations of their organization. Habituating this "buy-in" is the focus for entry level training into the military, and research suggests that this "buy in" begins as individuals invest themselves in organizational successes or failures. Thus, a warfighters' fidelity is both an emotive and cognitive sense that helps them define the parameters of their moral orientations (Galtung 1990; Shils and Janowitz 1948; Rawlins 2009).

2. Responsibility (care, fairness, authority, loyalty) measures warfighters' structural ownership for the military's ethical commitments. Ownership depends upon unique intentions that create the conditions for specific actions through the giving and enforcement of command orders (Skerker 2013; W.C. Peters

2009). The military requires warfighters to be morally responsible agents, and this duty/obligation is necessary for their own integrity, promoting their moral growth and psychological well-being, and mapping their moral domains. These domains set the conditions for personal and social responsibility that warfighters use to interpret trauma. (Wolfendale 2008; Gilligan 1989)

3. Accountability (care, fairness, authority) measures warfighters answerability or culpability for consequences from their exercise of legitimate authority to hold itself liable to serving national needs and social norms (Hedahl 2012; Watson 2006). Responsibility accepts credit, accountability accepts blame. Organizational accountability is determined by the visible priorities of leaders whose oversight creates a culture motivated to making moral decisions by using a wide range of information to reduces judgmental bias(Mayer and Cronin 2008; Tetlock and Boettger 1989). Together organizational responsibility and accountability provide the military agency to plan and act in extreme emergencies abroad. (Moran 2016)

4. Maturity (authority, liberty, loyalty) measures warfighters' capacity for exercising their moral agency. All warfighters, regardless of age or rank, are expected to act morally, so their maturity is determined by their experience. Maturity is the ability of warfighters to discipline themselves, and their subordinates, to judge right from wrong in making "right" choices when confronted with conflicting issues and competing values(Duffield and McCuen 2000). Organizational maturity requires mentoring process to develop credible and competent leaders who can communicate, collaborate, compromise, and perform under duress(Gabel 2015; J. Thomas and Thomas 2015)). Organizational maturity also includes warfighters comprehension of moral reasoning processes, and their development of a moral orienting system to guide mediated actions that integrate their moral agency with the means they use to accomplish a given action. (B.R. Marx et al. 2007; Tappan 2006)

5. Efficacy (care, loyalty, liberty, sanctity) measures warfighters' capability to exercise moral agency. In the military efficacy is influenced by rank, position, and context, but it depends upon warfighters' competence to act. Organizational efficacy is also based upon warfighters self-assessment of their capabilities to organize and mobilize the motivational and cognitive resources needed to attain desired moral ends while persisting in the face of moral adversity ((Bandura 1977; Hannah and Sweeney 2007, 153).

> Organizational efficacy is developed across multi-dimensions that include motivations, strategies, techniques, character building, and the managing stressful and traumatic experiences. Thus, warfighters' sense of efficacy positively influences their psychological wellbeing and negatively influences their psychological distress. (J.E. Lambert et al. 2012; N.D. Myers, Wolfe, and Felz 2005)

These five FRAME senses recalibrate and combine Haidt's foundational senses into the service values that compose the military ethos, and this provides a way to name and understand the origins and causes of moral dissonance generated between warfighters moral orienting systems and the performance of their moral agency. For example, an individual's moral sense of "care/harm" becomes a part of a warfighter's moral senses of "accountability and responsibility" and part of service values such as "honor, commitment, loyalty, and respect." To be clear, these moral senses mix and become an emotional/instinctual/somatic and cognitive basis for the military values that form the warrior codes that influence warfighters' moral orienting systems. But this is not always a linear relationship. Emotional responses can trigger subsequent positive or negative emotional responses. Thus, a warfighter's FRAME senses of fidelity, responsibility, and accountability to a unit or fellow warfighters become mixed with their foundational moral senses of care, fairness, loyalty, liberty, authority, and sanctity (think Currahee). Then, in different contexts, this mixture can then generate emotional reactions of "pride" or "guilt" that impact warfighters moral judgements, actions, and identity (Robles 2019). Perhaps, these reactions depend upon the warfighter's sense (or level) of "maturity and efficacy." It is here that Haidt's emotional dog unites with its cognitive tail.

Integrating Cognitive Schema into Warfighters' Moral Orienting Systems

In theory individuals can use multiple processes for moral orientation, but in practice they usually use some type of unified moral orienting process and the "classification of such structures has been an important focus of the cognitive developmental approach to moral psychology" (B.R. Marx et al. 2007). A universal metric for describing a warfighter's foundational sense or cognitive stage of maturity does not exist. Haidt proposes an intuitionist model that proposes moral judgment is a socialized response followed by moral rationalization (Haidt 2001). On the other hand, Kohlberg's theory claims that moral reasoning is cognitive and reflects a person's level of moral comprehension (Kohlberg 1984). Thus, it is possible to predict the relationship between moral judgement ability and value orientations using instruments such as the Defining Issues Test(J.P. Wilson 1983; Duffield and McCuen 2000; Biggs and Colesante 2015).

This relationship is vital for understanding the effects that moral orientation have within the planning, decision, and reflection processes used for warfighting. These will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Right now the important issue is how emotive and cognitive processes unite warfighters' moral orientations of their character with their competence.

Research Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg constructed a framework for moral reasoning based upon six stages of development beginning with self-avoidance of punishment, moving through levels of social interactions using law and contract, and culminating with principled decisions. His developmental stages parallel Piaget's cognitive stages (concrete to abstract thinking) and Erickson's psychosocial stages (basic

trust through social roles to ego integrity) to explain the development of moral judgment in a sequential pattern over a person's lifetime. However, all people do not progress at the same rate, or reach the highest stages of moral reasoning (Erickson 1950; Kohlberg 1984; Piaget 1965).

Research Psychologists James Rest and Darcia Narvaez propose the Four Component Model for Moral Reasoning that explains Kohlberg's cognitive stages in terms of four, interdependent schemas: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character. These evidence-based schemas provide a framework for interpreting the results from DIT testing to describe how people determine and judge their professional behaviors (J.R. Rest and Narvaez 1994, 22-25). They revised the DIT, creating the DIT2, based upon Kohlberg's later theories of "just communities," defined by "justice thinking" schemas that describe transitions from conventional (maintaining norms schema) to post-conventional (primacy of moral criteria/ ideals schemas) based upon sub-categories of moral thinking.(Kohlberg 1984, 217; J. Rest et al. 1999, 8-10, 35-43, and 183-186).

Measuring professional levels of cognitive moral development has implications for how the military considers warfighters' integration of character. The basic assumption is that warfighters' moral development occurs in stages that moves them from entry level training, where they follow basic orders, to intermediate and advanced levels of professional military education, where they assume leadership roles, as they mature through experience and rank. The corollary assumption is junior warfighters will use conventional moral thinking, and senior leaders will use post-conventional moral

thinking in their moral orientating systems. In 2021 researchers Raj Agrawal and Ken Williams used the DIT2 to assess the moral reasoning levels of students at the National Defense University (NDU).

NDU is the culmination of military education for academy and Officer Candidate School graduates. Students at NDU are selected from each branch's list of the eligible senior service college officers from whom general/admiral officers are selected. These officers join senior international military officers, and senior civilians from other branches of government and industry. NDU courses are structured around small group seminars that reflect the diversity of organizations and professional experiences of students. This structure provided Agrawal and Williams an identifiable population for using the DIT2 to conduct a comparative study of differences in levels of moral thinking among senior military leaders and document any changes in their moral thinking upon completion of their studies.

Agrawal and Williams reasoned that, "the profession of arms requires … the need for learning outcomes for ethics education that empower students to lead, strategize, and develop policy in unconventional and complex contexts" (Agrawal, Williams, and Miller 2021, 312-313). They were sensitive to growing numbers of misconduct cases among senior military leaders, and they wondered if schemas of moral thinking limited senior officers' moral capacity and capability. To understand this possibility, they used the DIT 2 as a pre-course survey, and as a post-graduation survey to answer two questions: 1) What level of moral development do strategic leaders have, and 2) does the NDU curriculum influence their development (Agrawal, Williams, and Miller 2021, 313)?

Agrawal and Williams found that civilian students operated with higher post-conventional moral thinking schemas than military students, who operated with maintaining norms schemas. They also found that NDU's curriculum, content and methods did not improve students' capacity or capability for post-conventional moral thinking. So, "despite commonly exercised beliefs, morality is not inherent in officership, and promotion to higher rank does not account for how a higher-ranking officer will behave in a moral dilemma," and, "an institution whose curriculum does not promote moral development has at least some responsibility for unethical decisions." They recommended three empirically validated mechanisms to develop postconventional moral development for students: 1) the use of moral exemplars to help student practice postconventional moral reasoning in the classrooms, the incorporation of dilemma discussions and debate, and the use of role-taking exercises that require students, "to empathize with and take the perspective of the main character in a dilemma" (Agrawal, Williams, and Miller 2021, 321-328).

The NDU study describes differences between the moral thinking of military and civilian students, but it doesn't account for why the differences exist. It is possible that the NDU results were influenced by habituated moral senses (foundational and FRAME) mixing with the moral sensitivities and motivations behind military students' moral judgments and character. Over the course of their careers, these officers were conditioned to think in terms of group behaviors, norms, and consequences that focused upon "us and we" instead of "I and them." This does not account for their misconduct, but it does explain how warrior codes place a premium upon principles such as placing mission first, never accepting defeat, never quitting, and never leaving a fallen comrade,

119

and how these principles redefine the ways warfighters use approach norming and post-conventional schema in moral thinking. Thus, the function of warrior codes in recalibrating moral senses and cognitive thinking may be examples of phenomena that require us to rethink the empirical, philosophical, and theoretical basis for moral competence (Biggs and Colesante 2015). The final component of warfighters' integration of their moral orienting systems comes from stoic philosophy.

Integrating Stoicism into Warfighters' Moral Orienting Systems

Students at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (the culminating education level for enlisted warfighters) were given the following definition of a standard by Command Sergeant Major Mack Vereen, "The purpose of a standard is to be so high that you are unable to reach it, and in failing, you become better than you are."[10] These types of absolute standards should be questioned to discern whether they are used to support powerful and unobtainable "*uber*" myths, or they are used create, "greater clarity for our choices and thereby narrow the margin of remaining doubt… to return to all the borderline difficulties with firm ground under our feet" (Bok 1999, 16). In his commencement speech to students at the University of Texas, Admiral William McCraven (Navy SEAL) explained the application of Vereen's and Bok's use of standards this way:

> And while these lessons were learned during my time in the military, I can assure you that it matters not whether you've ever served a day in uniform, it matters not your gender, your ethnic or religious background, your orientation, or your social status. Our struggles in this world are similar and the lessons to overcome those struggles and to move forward, changing ourselves and changing the world around us will apply equally to all. (McCraven 2014)

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[10] The authors personal attendance in these presentations.

Each of the above quotes uses a form of ancient stoic philosophy for the purpose of shaping modern moral orientation and behavior. Stoicism is the practice of inner virtues to keep impetuousness in check(French 2017, 126). Ethicist Nancy Sherman defines stoicism within the military as:

> …the notion of decorum and the aspects of outer comportment that are under one's control. This focus is instructive for the military where the uniform, the gaze in one's eyes, and the attitude conveyed in voice can be all-important for showing solidarity and leadership… The consequence of this claim is that those combatants who fight for an unjust cause ought not be regarded as moral "equals" with those who fight with a just cause on their side. (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle locations 36-47)

Stoic philosophy functions as reflective practice of virtues instead of prescribed rules for behavior. Classic virtue ethics uses primary virtues such as prudence, temperance, courage, and justice as standards to determine and correct excessive or deficient behaviors for the purpose of promoting wellbeing (*eudaimonia*) and practical action (*phronesis)*. A person using virtue ethics determines his/her/their appropriate, contextual behaviors by triangulating between an "idealize virtue" and two opposing vices. For example, the virtue of "courage" can become a vice through "rashness" or "cowardness." Thus, virtue ethics seeks to habituate moral agency and ethical practice through ongoing cognitive reflection (Kohlberg) and mindful intuition (Haidt). This is also the intent of stoic philosophy.

At age 14 George Washington began to write 110 rules of behavior that he sought to practice in life (Washington 2009). Throughout his life, he incorporated transcending

values linked with his providential theology into his rules as he used them to track his behaviors while on morning rides and in private spaces (M. Thompson 2008). In a way Washington sought to practice what Roman Stoic Marcus Aurelius proposed:

> Further, let the god that is within you be the champion of the being you are – a male, mature in years, a statesman, a Roman, a ruler: one who has taken his post like a soldier waiting for the Retreat from life to sound, and ready to depart, past the need for any loyal oath or human witness. And see that you keep a cheerful demeanor, and retain your independence of outside help and the peace which others can give… Your duty is to stand straight – not held straight. [Consider] what is at this particular time the need and benefit of the community. Whatever I do, either by myself or with another, should have this this sole focus – the common benefit and harmony. (Aurelius 2006, 21,26,83)

This dissertation has focused upon doctrines taught amongst the top echelons of the military, but moral development theories show that this doctrine is ahead of the developmental stages present in most warfighters. The military is composed of 18% officers and 82% enlisted (Kamarck 2019). Thus, the military seeks to create the capability and capacity of a Washington and Marcus Aurelius through leadership in training, education, and experience into the least mature and empowered warfighters. So, the early training of warfighters stresses the importance of oaths, standards, history, obedience to develop warfighters with the habituated senses of fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy (FRAME) to become leaders with the character and competence to fight and win in war.

The American military practices a form of Stoicism as a cognitive self-discipline to enhance warfighter performance and praxis with the goal of developing warrior athletes, more than creating individual well-being. So, warfighter well-being is considered a secondary, contributing benefit. The integration of Stoic-type philosophies

into the moral development of "professional" warfighters also provides the means of developing a moral "resilience or hardiness" that is useful for helping warfighters process and construct positive meanings from their experiences (Swain and Pierce 2017, 8-10).

Warfighters' "hardiness or resiliency" does not appear from nowhere, nor does it exist for itself. It is developed through the integration of external elements defined by tactics, strategies and principles within the military ethos that combine with the internally controlled character and competencies defined by a mixture of Foundational/FRAME senses with cognitive schema. Thus, warfighters are moral agents that exercise choices based upon integrated norms and standards that compose their warrior codes (C.B. Miller 2014, 238-239).

Stoicism compels warfighters to question their attitudes and motivations to consider how they should physically live with their limitations and what efforts they take when they fail (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 327-329). For military ethicist Nancy Sherman a blending virtue ethics with stoicism creates a warrior code linking performance with wellbeing to move beyond individual considerations of self to form a social construction that concentrates upon "social repair instead soul repair." She reasons, "What we [warfighters] cannot accept, we have to change. And we have to change it by changing not just us, but institutions and social structures that frame who we collectively are…" (N. Sherman 2021, 220). Thus, she argues that stoics offer insights into the "reasons why" warfighters are motivated by an affiliation, or sense of "love for their buddies," and how their cognitive and emotional survival is dependent upon their relationships with their buddies (N. Sherman 2005, Locations 345-347). This identification is part of their "cohesive" self-identity that allows warfighters to "stand in

123

the spaces" within their units, and this identification may help to explain why the injury or death of a "buddy" creates a moral dissonance within warfighters that presents itself as profound grief (Larson and Zust 2017, 164-165; N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 345-347, 2642-2645).

Stoicism is not a detachment from the emotional and cannot be the limit of the regard of moral consequences. Instead, it is a way to conceive of a community, "whose bonds go beyond the partialities of love and affection and religious or tribal kinship" (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 2759-2761). Being a warfighter is, not only an obligation to kill others in war: it is also a commitment is to put oneself in harm's way if necessary for the good of others. Thus, the value of self-sacrifice is viewed more as a practical virtue than a static value.

As warfighters we joked about the hidden "die on demand" clause in our contracts: but this reality was a powerful (often unspoken) undercurrent in our existence. Sherman asks, "Is it rational to resent having to honor that commitment" (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 1489-1493)? Then, she uses Aristotle to answer, "the more one is possessed of excellence in its entirety ... the more one will be pained at the thought of death… [but] is none the less brave, and perhaps all the more so, because he [she/they] chooses noble deeds of war at that cost" (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 1489-1493).

Thus, warfighters attempt to use stoic practices to maintain moral/ethical borders that distinguish between just and unjust participation in combat. The purpose of which is to "offset a vicious warrior model of lethality" by cognitively mediating warfighters' instinctual habits and impulsive reactions by bringing, "the outermost circles of our world

inward" (N. Sherman 2021, 160-161). This goal is to cultivate a warrior's code of honor based upon a deep identity with human compassion and respect (Seneca 2020, 118; N. Sherman 2005, Kindle locations 2866-2870).

In 1965 Vice Admiral William Stockdale, was piloting an aircraft that was shot down during a bombing raid over North Vietnam, and he became the senior Prisoner of War (POW) at the Hoa Loa Prison (the Hanoi Hilton). Prior to capture, Stockdale told himself that he was entering the world of Epictetus (an early Stoic philosopher), and he spent the next seven and a half years using stoic practices to resist the effects from torture and interrogations upon his self-identity. He also used stoicism to help his fellow prisoners recover their identity after being tortured. Stockdale explained his reasons for this approach:

> When integrity was inevitably challenged under torture, self-shame became the residue of perceiving oneself as falling short, as having traded betrayal for relief from pain. So, when a prisoner would return from the "cold soak" ...The typical whisper back, as Stockdale recounted to me, was: "You don't want to talk to me, I'm a traitor." To that, the initiator replied in essence, "Listen, pal, there are no virgins here. You should have heard the kind of statement I made." These brief remarks suggest both the appeal of Stoicism to military life and the subtlety, at times, of its doctrine. (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 258-262)

Later he explained how stoic philosophy influenced the warrior codes POWs used to self-discipline their reactions to circumstance beyond their control:

> I'm talking about having looked over the brink, and seen the bottom of the pit, and realizing the truth of that linchpin of Stoic thought: that the thing that brings down a man is not pain but shame! I know of not a single case where a man was able to erase his pangs of conscience with some laid-back, pop-psychology theory of cause and effect. (Stockdale 1995, 15)

125

Any reasonable conception of morality requires an adherence to high

standards, but this adherence shouldn't result in a "zero-defect" policy that requires

merciless punishment of those who fall short of the high standards (N. Sherman

2005, Kindle Locations 269-271). As Admiral Stockdale and CSM Vereen point

out, the purpose of these standards is self-improvement and control, not

condemnation. Eastern and Western cultures share an agreement about the purpose

of moral standards is to demand concepts of justice, self-rule, and freedom that go

beyond social contracts to form "braided identities" that allow people to function in

community (Cooper-White 2011, 141-162; Larson and Zust 2017, 87-89; Taylor

1992, 485). This definition applies to the common moral orientations that composes

the vocational identity and practices of warfighters use as they operate in their units.

One can hear "braids" of service values, foundational senses, FRAME

senses, and cognitive schema functioning as an integrated unity as POWs resisted

their own destructive reactions to traumatic stressors and efforts by their captors to

dis-integrate their self and group identity. One can also hear similar integrated

"braids" in the narratives from two World War II Marines.

98-year-old Staff Sergeant Larry Kirby is surprised he lived through Iwo Jima.

Recently he addressed an audience and described the lifelong lessons he took away from

combat:

> It was a terrible place … Love, Strange for a Marine, love. But we all
> realized that our most important possession was our life. We fight to stay
> alive; without life, you have nothing, and nobody would ever trade his life
> for money, or positions, anything … But I saw young Marines risk their
> lives, and deliberately give their lives, for their friends. Because they
> loved them. So that was the lesson I learned: love is the most valuable
> thing in the world. Priceless. (Medsger 2023)

126

96-year-old Medal of Honor recipient Woody Williams describes his lifetime of moral dissonance from close combat where he exposed himself to intense fire as he used a flame thrower to kill Japanese soldiers in their pillboxes (fortified, concealed fighting positions).

> Everybody has some instinct of bravery. And, as long as they can control the fear, you can be brave. But if fear overtakes you and becomes the dominant instinct, you cannot operate. You cannot operate under fear. Your brain won't let you… I feel our upbringing had some influence on our bravery because we were taught in the depression years, if you didn't have it, you had had to make it… and the only way you could make it was to work at it. Our upbringing gave us the confidence that developed into bravery … This medal doesn't belong to me. It belongs to them [his fellow Marines] because they gave their lives for me. I was just doing a job that I was trained to do … Every time we do something to help another person, we get a residual of that that makes us feel good, makes us feel proud that we could do something for someone else. And there's no feeling like it. (Vergun and Lange 2021)

> [but] I was raised in an era where the family taught you that you do not kill anything. Not even a bird. Nothing, unless there's a purpose for it. I know there's no way you can win a war without eliminating the other party. That's war. But there's still something within every human being of sound mind that says, 'There's only one life. You can't restore it.' (Simpkins 2020)

Warfighters who cannot reconcile their moral dissonance in the performance of their duties are in danger of inflicting moral injuries upon themselves and others. However, warfighters who can learn and process the difficult lessons from their moral dissonance, who can form positive post-combat narratives that help them to re-engage with their lives. Warfighters may obey by obligation, but they follow voluntarily based upon their moral senses of fidelity, responsibility, and accountability (combinations of the foundational senses of care, fairness, liberty, loyalty, authority, and sanctity). It is impossible to speak of any of these moral

127

senses without reference to the others (Swain and Pierce 2017, 60-61). Warfighters develop, habituate, and integrate their foundational/FRAME senses into their warrior codes throughout their training and military experiences (senses of their moral maturity), and they implement them through their moral agency (senses of their moral efficacy).

Thus, the social construction of moral voice best describes the outcome from young civilians integrating foundational senses from their upbringing with habituated values and competencies within warrior codes into the moral orienting systems they will use as warfighters in combat (Chu and Gilligan 2014; Gentile 2010; Gilligan 1993). During this transformational process, their moral senses, cognitive schemas, and stoic reasoning become parts of an integrated whole that they will use to measure their identity base upon their conscientious acceptance or objection of duty, their judgement of just or unjust moral agency, and their behavior as warfighters/warriors/or pirates. Does this sound complex? Maybe it is, but this discernment is important for guiding warfighters during combat, the leaders who command them, and the care providers who help them processes their moral trauma.

Warfighters' Moral Orientations of Conscience, Justice, and Ethical Practice

Conscientious Acceptance/Objection of Duty as Directed Conscientious Action

The issue of conscientious acceptance/objection creates a categorical duality between those who support war for moral reasons and those who will not. However, there is a large gray area between these poles, where people morally struggle over issues related to their participation. Major Jeff Hall summarizes this gray area in this duality when he describes his duty as a company commander in Iraq, "Truly, I'm not a

conscientious objector, but I was and I am very conscious of my morality" (Hall 2014).[11]

A Vietnam veteran further describes this conscientious duality, "What the hell am I doing

here?... I really didn't think about the fact that I was trying to kill another human being

until it was over, and the VC [Viet Cong] had headed for the hills, it didn't bother me …

[and] the fact that it didn't bother me bothers me, not the fact that I shot at him." The

issue became more real when he lost one of his men, and he did not sugarcoat the details

in the letter home to his wife, "He had the top of his head blown off" (Bowden 2017,

Kindle location 1204-ff).

Conscientious acceptance or objection is not solely determined by obedience or

disobedience to a source of authority. Nor is it necessarily determined before a civilian's

induction into military service. For warfighters, these categories reside in a vocational

duality between obedience defined by Civil-Military Relationships, mission command,

and a broader service to humanity defined by transcending values. Some theorists will

speak of the "gray area" between acceptance and objection as "selective conscientious

objection." However, warfighters will comment that they cannot pick and choose

between their wars and people with conscientious objections will avoid the "slippery

slopes" that accompany selective choices. However, the alternative to a conscientious

duality has been supported in the theological realism of Reinhold Niebuhr and the

responsible activism of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Bonhoeffer 1971, 5-ff; R. Niebuhr 1932,

90-91).

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[11] Jeff Hall, Personal Interview with Jeff Zust April 2014, and Unpublished War Diary.
Used with permission.

Some theologians, philosophers, and political activists view pacifism as the cornerstone of humanity, and advocate for moral positions and ethical practices that oppose the use of military force by the official state (Hauerwas 1983, 146-151). This opposition can become fixed points of intentional justice that comes from freedom of conscience to make moral judgements for justice. This is based upon the assumption that respect for conscience is the most significant manifestation of democratic societies who function, "because they implicitly recognize the challenge of balancing… individual liberty and an impartially justified social morality" (Swan and Vallier 2012). However, this freedom of conscience can be suppressed. Warfighters can be surrounded by aggressive modes of reasoning that suppress and reject moral questioning of their agency, and this is a consequence of transitioning from a "civilian code" into a "warrior code" that includes a willingness to kill when ordered (Lynd and Lynd 2017, 21). Such transition should be considered as a transformation because warfighters can and will kill based upon formal and informal command intents that influence their moral orientations.

Given that warriors cause wars' destruction and harms, some argue for a fixed or situational conscientious objection that is applicable when wars fail to satisfy certain moral or political conditions. This is particularly true in contexts where military participation is voluntary. Philosopher Jeff McMahan concludes, "increased tolerance of resistance within the military to participation in unjust wars could… be less disruptive of the integrity, cohesion, and efficiency of military institutions than continuous adherence to the ideas that role-based duties are absolute" (McMahan 2009, 76). Theologian and combat veteran Michael Yandell uses his own experiences to argue that unquestioned,

inflexible obedience contributes to the formation of moral injuries by causing warfighters

to violate their moral orientations and human relationships that bond them in combat

(Yandell 2019).

Each of the above arguments depends upon the function that foundational senses,

FRAME senses, and cognitive schema play in warfighters' moral orientations.

Theologian John Howard Yoder agrees with the previous fixed orientations for

conscientious objection but concedes that participation in war may be permissible if: 1)

both combative parties self-impose and follow just limits to the use of force, and 2)

warfighters were trained and given enough information to act as just agents (Yoder 1996,

75-80). However, Yoder's concession doesn't necessarily help unpack the moral

complexity warfighters must deal with in facing situational conscientious objection.

Theologian Danial Bell writes that Just War Theory developed over time as a

critical reasoning process to determine conscientious participation prior to war (jus ad

bellum) and in war (jus in bello) as exception actions to norms that are associated with

pacifism (Bell 2009, 230-ff). Each of these criteria are incorporated into the training that

warfighters receive throughout their time in service. However, the complexity of war

mixed with the criteria associated with just war often exceed the moral capability

(maturity) and capacity (efficacy) of young warfighters, and this complicates how

warfighters morally reason through categorical conscientious acceptance and selective

conscientious objection.

Hauerwas writes that individual make moral decisions based upon their life

narratives, and these decisions exist in a contention between community needs and

individual concerns that challenge life narratives. Thus, individuals need to live in

communities that embody the values of the group and provide its members the skills to live their life narratives (Hauerwas 1983, 119-120). Warfighters exist in environments that challenge their purpose for existence. Thus, Marine Corps Captain Dwight Horn assumes that warfighters must be trained to operate with a just war moral orientation that, "grounds their purpose in the truth that rises above that of the enemy… and that is the only way for moral goodness to be realized" (Horn 2020, 288-290, and 324).

Horn understands the intent of military training, but this intent is missing the moral complexity that Hauerwas speaks of. Combat veterans perceive morally injurious events differently. Grounded Theory research suggests that veterans' moral sense of personal responsibility defines issues and intensities experiences that warfighters consider to be morally injurious(Schorr et al. 2018). This research suggests that the moral senses of fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy (FRAME) define warfighters moral agency, set the conditions for their conscientious acceptance of military service, and define issues for their selective conscientious objection.

Warfighters' moral agency is the product of moral orienting systems that provide them with, "dual aspects manifested in both the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely and the proactive power to behave humanely… [these powers are] self-regulatory mechanisms rooted in personal standards linked to self-sanctions"(Bandura 2002). These dual powers shape warfighters' moral reasoning by applying standards embedded in their warrior codes for self-evaluations of their character, performance, and purpose. This type of moral reasoning can either condemn warfighters, or it can empower the private reflections and social dialogues that clarify the binding commitments determine their identity and agency (Gilligan 1989).

Conscientious acceptance and selective objection imply that warfighters have a moral choice. The military ethos is embodied into an organization that acts within a civil-military relationship in accordance with a superior rule of law and a subordinate warrior code. Superior orders are not enforced at the point of a gun, and military discipline in the actual context of war requires warfighters discernment of the dangers they face. Thus, their moral orientations, must be considered in the judgements they make (Walzer 2015, 314-315).

One example of a warrior code is from the vow of a Dog Soldier – a warrior society within the Cheyenne and Lakota Nations. A Dog Soldier was a specialized warrior who,

> vowed before a battle to drive his pin [a stake] into the ground and tie himself to it with his dog rope… [he] would then remain there and fight until either the enemy was beaten, or he was killed." Others could stand with him and try to save him if they wished to. A warrior who sided a pinned comrade four times gained the eminent right to free a friend in future wars; he could intervene when the warrior was about to be killed, pull the pin, lash him across the back with it, and by so doing cancel the vow. (Mails 1972, 49; French 2017, 171)

Ethicist Shannon French uses the story of a Lakota Warrior named White Bull to explain the power of a warrior code in the conscientious acceptance of combat:

> They shot at me, but they didn't hit me. That was good. It was one of these Flatheads that I counted coup upon [touching an enemy in combat]. My father was a chief and because of this I showed no fear. It was because of him that I wanted to be in the thick of the fight. It was a hard thing to do but I accomplished it. They were all shooting at me, but they didn't hit me. I was right in the middle of things. Afterwards they [the enemy] pursued me a long way clear back to my own line. It was a great fight. I did this difficult deed and count it among my coups. (White Bull 1968, 43-44; French 2017, 159)

Modern warfighters learn positive and negative lessons from other cultures, traditions, and nations, and these are incorporated into their own forms of warrior codes. These codes are habituated through training to help warfighters build bonds of trust, a pride of accomplishment, and a confidence associated with their character and competence. These are skills they carry into combat, and they are associated with the moral orienting systems from which they derive meaning. "The specific skills and abilities that warriors [warfighters] need to succeed in responding to modern threats will continue to evolve, but as long as war involves killing and dying, there will be a need for warriors who feel like warriors (French 2017, 180).

Ultimately this character must be linked with moral orientations that control warfighters' toughness and competence because they will probably enter combat with an idealistic and conscientious acceptance that is defined by their warrior codes. This can result in their experiencing a shattering of their idealism and the forced reality of re-evaluating their moral reasons for conscientious acceptance.

> The problem for the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq, just as in Vietnam, has not been caused by how American soldiers get to the battlefield but by what they are asked to do when they get there. These men and women see incredible evil. Thy come home with that weighing on them and they do not know how to fit back into society. (Lynd and Lynd 2017, 7)

Unpacking arguments for and against conscientious acceptance/objection is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, it is important to note that the category of selective conscientious exists, and its existence allows warfighters to critically examine their moral orientations and agency. Naval Academy Ethics professors Christopher J. Eberle and Rick Rubel propose Directed Conscientious Action (DCA) as an alternative to

categorical conscientious acceptance/objection. DCA is an intersection of moral voice, moral agency and moral conduct that advocates for a holistic moral reasoning process uniting belief with practice in the public and private realms (Eberle and Rubel 2016, 171-185). In the context of military vocation, DCA insists on integrating foundation/FRAME senses into cognitive moral sensitivity, judgment, motivation, and character schema (J. Rest et al. 1999). Such integration is essential for helping warfighters to morally struggle with issues involving their participation in Just/Unjust War Events and their purpose for their conscientious acceptance of military service.

Just and Unjust Moral Agency for Killing in Combat

"Killing provokes a moral conflict with a lasting impact on their [warfighters] sense of self, spirituality, and relationships with others," that is rooted in the "unique perspectives, actions, and experiences of individual veterans, as well as the social worlds they confront upon returning from war"(Purcell et al. 2016).

Just/unjust moral agency involves warfighters' self-assessment of the consequences from combat events based upon their moral senses cognitive reasoning. In the classical Civil-Miliary Relationship, civilian leadership is said to be responsible at the strategic level for the considerations of justice in going to war (*jus ad bellum*), while military leadership is responsible for the command and control of waging just war (*jus in bello*). Thus, politicians and senior officers decide when and where to kill (apply the brakes), while subordinate officers, NCOs, and enlisted decide how and who to kill (apply the accelerator). This latter responsibility is sometimes even further parsed so that only politicians and senior officers are thought to be morally responsible for the causes behind waging war, and subordinate officers, NCOs, and enlisted, are thought to be

responsible for specific consequences from actions on the ground. This creates a division of moral labor and warfighter equality where moral responsibility and accountability is diffused(Walzer 2015, 345-ff). Except, for the warfighters whose moral orientations will not let them compartmentalize issues of their purpose from their participation. Thus, their moral orienting systems possibly accuse or excuse them.

The underlying assumption is that there is a moral distinction between "killing" and "murder" that legitimizes warfighters' participation under orders in a "just" war (Buckingham 2022; J.G. Gray 1959; Grossman 1995, 245-ff). This distinction will be examined in chapter five in the context of Just War Theory and the Law of Armed Conflict. For this discussion, it is important to note that warfighters carry different moral definitions of what constitutes "killing" linked with the moral reasoning behind their conscientious acceptance of military service, and these definitions how they interpret and judge their participation in combat.

Impacts of Killing in Combat

> War doesn't observe neat moral boundaries… if we are to fight wars with some sense of honor, courage, and commitment, then we must be committed to being morally scrupulous… about the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence. (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 2860-2864)

Just War Theories (JWT), the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and Rules of Engagement (ROE) attempt to establish legal and moral boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate uses of lethal violence. However, these boundaries become blurred when warfighters consider their acceptance of responsibility and accountability for their moral agency, which often segments these boundaries into a moral continuum differentiated by distinctions between good/evil, better/best, and warfighter/warrior/pirate.

At one end of this continuum is moral vindication, and at the opposite end is what psychiatrist Larry Dewey describes as violations of Geneva conventions of the soul, or Army Chaplain Herm Keizer describes the equivalent of moral suicide (L. Dewey 2004, 73-75; Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012, Kindle location 29-ff). Both ends of this spectrum are constructed from an inflexible, justice-based, "purist war ethic" that leaves little room for the moral complexities warfighters encounters in combat (Benjabi 2007). Military ethicist Marc Livecche uses this complexity to describe the "moral bruising," that is experienced by warfighters as a moral effect from combat (LiVecche 2021, 2-7). I describe this "bruising" as "moral dissonance" based upon its cause from warfighters' moral orientations and agency.

A basic assumption in moral injury research is that the Impact of Killing (IOK) is the triggering event (not a pun) for: 1) warfighters' moral distress, and 2) a novel approach that care providers can use to treat moral injury(Burkman, Purcell, and Maguen 2019). This assumption comes from findings of two foundational research studies done with combat veterans. The first study, *The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study* (NVVRS) linked veteran responses to questions about their exposure to killing, wounding, dead bodies, direct fire, abusive fire, and loss of meaning/control with their later adjustment issues. The study concluded that: 1) actual combat experience and exposure was the principal factor in predicting PTSD in veterans, 2) 30% of the veterans with combat exposure experienced PTSD, and 3) half of the veterans with PTSD still experienced symptoms years after returning home. Thus, the NVVRS conceptualized PTSD as a chronic, rather than an acute, disorder (Kulke et al. 1988, 2, C-1 to 8; Van Winkle and Safer 2011).

137

The second group of studies, *The Mental Health Advisory Team Studies* (MHAT) were conducted from 2004-2013 with combat veterans redeploying from Iraq and Afghanistan. These studies measured warfighters' responses to their inability to help wounded or sick women and children, mistreating noncombatants, treating noncombatants with dignity and respect, the use of torture for get information from suspected insurgents, responsibility for killing combatants and noncombatants, damaging property, distinction of insurgents from noncombatants, and unresolved ethical issues. The studies found correlations between combat exposure, levels of participation in traumatic events, and post-traumatic readjustment issues (TSG 2006).

Both the NVVRS and MHAT studies focused upon PTSD diagnostic criteria to measure warfighter reactions, but they also found evidence that warfighters reacted to combat events based upon their senses of professional and personal values. None of these studies found direct links between moral agency in the form of IOK because they did not ask warfighters about the moral senses or cognitive reasoning that they used in making their decisions or evaluations of combat events. Thus, the NVVRS and MHAT studies only provide a partial picture of *who* is "troubled" and what "troubles" them. But these studies do not provide answers to questions related to the reasons *why* warfighters are troubled, and *how* they struggle with their issues.

Rather than assuming PTSD symptoms drive MI-related outcomes, recent research assesses the possibility that veterans' struggles with moral issues can cause their own trauma-related issues, and this needs to be understood for effective treatment planning and implementation. Recent research supports a Primary Model where MI causes PTSD, and a Reciprocal Model where PTSD and MI are mutually reinforcing

(Currier et al. 2019). This explanation is supported by research linking the traumatic effects from Morally Injurious Events (MIEs) to betrayals, witnessing harm, or commission of harm. These findings suggest that meaning making could be a mediating factor for how MIEs contribute to trauma-related problems, and the importance of screening for MIEs during post-trauma care (Currier, Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al. 2015). Early research data also suggests that moral injuries are likely to be associated with: changes in moral/ethical attitudes and behavior, change or loss of spirituality, reduced trust in others, and difficulties with meaning making (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al. 2015; Drescher et al. 2018; Maguen et al. 2010; Nash 2013).

Military personnel returning from deployments are at risk of adverse mental health symptoms related to killing in war. Multiple evidence-based studies support these findings by linking IOK with post-combat stress symptoms. One study surveyed 317 U.S. Gulf War veterans found that 11% of these veterans reported participating in acts of killing during their deployment. After controlling for perceived danger, exposure to death and dying, and witnessing killing of fellow soldiers, the researchers found that these acts of killing were a significant predictor of post-trauma stress symptoms, and problem alcohol use (Maguen et al. 2011). A subsequent study found that 40% of the warfighters redeploying from Iraq and Afghanistan reported killing or being responsible for killing, and that IOK was a significant predictor of their PTSD symptoms, alcohol abuse, anger, and relationship problems (Maguen et al. 2012; Tripp, McDevitt-Murphy, and Henschel 2016). These types of studies highlight the greater potential for mental health issues from killing, or seriously injuring, someone in the line of duty, and the greater need for mental health services following exposure to these types of events (Komarovskaya et al. 2011).

Each of the previous studies also identify some type of existential dissonance caused by moral agency, but they do not provide a basis for understanding why warfighters would have adverse reactions for specific actions that they have been trained and commissioned to perform. Thus, there must be a counter set of moral obligations that warfighters use to critically examine their actions and make sense of, "the suffering that is buried deeper than normative determinations of moral expediency" (T.W. Shaw 2018).

Chapters four through seven examine a framework for understanding these conflicting senses and schema of moral obligations. But for now, it is sufficient to understand that warfighters have conflicting moral judgments linked to their moral orientations, moral agency, and ethical practices. Recent research is finding that a generic definition of "killing" does not cover the moral complexity that warfighters face when making these moral judgements.

Research and Theories on the Impacts of Killing

In 2020 Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) conducted a longitudinal study using a sample of combat veterans who had deployed multiple times and found evidence that warfighters, "are resilient to just war events, such as killing enemy combatants and life-threatening experiences, but these same soldiers appear to struggle with unjust war events, such as killing a noncombatant or being unable to help civilian women and children in need" (Krauss et al. 2020). This study was the first to examine how veterans' perceptions of just and unjust war experiences are associated with the length and quality of their treatment outcomes. The study defined unjust war events as: 1) seeing ill/injured women or children who you were unable to help, 2) feeling directly responsible for the death of a non-combatant, 3) witnessing

brutality/mistreatment toward non-combatants, and observing abuse of the Laws of War/Geneva Convention. The study controlled for other kinds of MIEs and concluded that warfighters' participation and subsequent perceptions of "unjust war events" predicted short and long-term outcomes related to their mental health. Participation in acts of killing enemy combatants was linked to senses of pride and accomplishment with little post combat issues, and exposure to life-threatening events was linked to PTSD symptoms with short term effects (Krauss et al. 2023; Krauss et al. 2020).

The Krauss study suggests that assessments of IOK upon warfighters' must be measured by the moral standards they use to judge their moral agency in specific contexts rather than effects from generalized events. The one weakness in all the previous studies is that they did not measure *why* and *how* warfighters made their moral assessments. I have found no research that does this. This leaves it up to philosophers, and warfighters to describe the "reasons why" they judge something just or unjust, and "how" they experience dissonance from their moral judgements. These reasons fall along a continuum between pacificism and vindication.

At one end of the continuum, philosopher Robert Emmet Meagher uses pacifist interpretations of Christian theologies behind the Just War Tradition and narratives from combat veterans to construct criteria for a "peace without arms, without killing"(Meagher 2014, xx). He writes:

> When the two most influential thinkers in the history of Western Christianity [Augustine and Thomas] came to the conclusion that not all killing was murder and that not all wars were evil, they sealed away in silence one of the most profound and potentially transformative bits of 'good news' at the core of the very faith to which they had confessedly dedicated their lives—that love is more powerful than hate and that it is better to die than to kill. (Meagher 2014, 129)

141

Meagher reasons that "intent" as much as "just cause" determines the culpability of those who participate in combat. So, warfighters fighting well in a justifiable cause becomes the primary criteria for determining their moral health. However, Meagher doubts that clear lines of recognized authority, just cause and pure intention are possible in modern warfare, because "war is a stern teacher" that results in the moral dis-integration of warfighters, who have no choice but to participate under the authority of their nations (Meagher 2014, 92-98).

Christian Theologian and Ethicist Mark Allman furthers Meagher's pacifist reflection upon the Just War Tradition, by asking the question, "Who would Jesus Kill?" His point is that the criteria for the killing are tenuous at best, and when they are supported by theology that uses constructions of Just War as a deadly ethic, conscientious people (especially Christians) should be uncomfortable with justified killing in war (Allman 2008, 11-16, 266).

Meagher and Allman create criteria where warfighters "conscientious acceptance" and "just" moral agency become false categories for their moral orientations. Theologian and combat veteran Michael Yandell uses similar constructions to interpret moral injury as a negative revelation that compels veterans to define new courses for their well-being (Yandell 2023, 2022). He describes his transition from warfighter to theologian.

> I was medically discharged from the Army in 2006, all my weapons were gone. The rifle was locked safely in an arms room, and it was the only weapon I carried that (I assume) still functions… My thinking took the shape of guilt and shame that no wealth of talking points could ever articulate; the flag that had once prompted me to stand proudly at attention now compelled me to cast my eyes downward. As for certainty regarding God, it was at this point in my life that I was perhaps closer to the truth than I had ever been before: God's will had become an unfathomable

mystery, something that I could not connect in any meaningful way to my service in war. What is one to do when one's way of making sense of the world crumbles? (Yandell 2022, 7-8)

Army Chaplain William Mahedy's assesses the spiritual failure of military chaplains during the Vietnam War as, "the inability to name the reality for what it was. We first should have called it sin, admitted we were in a morally ambiguous and religiously tenuous situation, and then gone onto deal with the harsh reality of the soldier's life" (Mahedy 2005, 135). Meagher concludes his assessment of moral injury in the lives of soldiers by advocating for pacifism [conscientious objection] as the alternative to a failed concept of Just War. He writes:

> Pacifism cannot be about selfishness and expect to preserve a nation, much less challenge it to greatness…Peacemakers like war makers, must be prepared to give up their lives – or as James would have it, at least several years of the lives – to the daunting but not impossible challenge of creating a moral alternative to war. (Meagher 2014, 150)

This type of categorical thinking rules out warfighters' conscientious acceptance, and leaves veterans with the conclusion that their participation was unjust. However, this moral distinction is not black and white with regards to who falls into which category. The WRAIR study shows degrees of differentiation in what warfighters judge to be just or unjust conduct.

At the opposite end of Meagher's and Allman's thoughts is work of Ethicist Paul Ramsey who focused on the necessity for situational realism in defining justifiable and interventionist actions in war. Ramsey asks a theological question, "what would Jesus have the good Samaritan do if he came upon a robbery in progress" (Ramsey 1994, 62)? Ramsey argues that just/unjust criteria were originally constructed when the weapons of

143

warfare were the bow, arrow, spear, sword, and axe and warfighters faced each other on the field of battle. Therefore, warfighters' moral judgement is not simply an extenuation of ancient just war criteria but a realization that constructions of just/unjust actions grew out of "political and moral understandings" that armed force is essential for the defense of society and the establishment of peace, justice, and mercy (Ramsey 1983, 149-ff).

Along this continuum Philosopher Jeff McMahan acknowledges that killing in war rests with political leaders, with the caveat that they cannot accomplish warfighting without, "the complicity of all those who, rationalize, pay, for, and perpetrate those killings" (McMahan 2009, vii-viii). It is this realization that creates stringent applications of just and unjust war criteria that allows combatants to assume the "justness of the authority under which they fight without the guarantee that this justifies of how they fight" (McMahan 2009, 64-83). It is from this exceptionalism that warfighters derive their moral purpose and meaning, but this also creates a moral paradox between what is "just and unjust," and from this paradox warfighters experience moral dissonance. McMahan explains the purpose behind this paradox, "we must stop reassuring soldiers that they act permissibly when they fight in an unjust war, provided that they conduct themselves honorably on the battlefield by fighting in accordance with the rules engagement" (McMahan 2009, 95).

To correct this paradox, some military ethicists impose a duty of dissent upon warfighters as a civil-military obligation whenever obedience to authority might result in unjust, illegal, or malfeasant actions (Lucas Jr. 2009). This obligation of dissent parallels Rublel's and Eberle's intent for a warfighter's Directed Conscientious Vocation, but it

144

may not be feasible for junior warfighters who have the least maturity and efficacy in their units or on the battlefield.

Alleviation of warfighters' moral paradox is the intent of ethicist Marc Livecche. He introduces the concept of moral bruising to explain the emotional and cognitive realities of combat, and he offers remedies for bruising without becoming "disorder." Livecche reasons that not all killing in war is morally wrong and it, "comes in different kinds of matters" (LiVecche 2021, 2-3). These matters must be accounted for in the moral orientations that warfighters apply to their agency. Thus, theories of categorical killing that ignore justifiable uses of lethal force are harmful to the moral orientations that warfighters use to define their character and competence. He writes:

> Moral injury resulting from perpetrating moral evil is appropriate; its absence would be a crisis. Indeed, we once called this the consciousness of sin. However, large numbers of warfighters are suffering from having done the most basic business of war: killing the lawful enemy even under conditions commensurate with the rules of armed conflict and the guidance of moral frameworks such as the just war tradition. (LiVecche 2021, 3)

Livecche distinguishes between moral bruising caused by grief over "just actions" and moral injuries which are caused by guilt, anger, shame, and betrayal associated with "unjust actions" and failed moral agency (LiVecche 2021, 6-7; J. Butler 2009). Livecche is realist in the stream of Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer, and Ramsey and he argues that killing to protect the innocent is necessary in war, but at times it can also result in unavoidable moral injuries. Thus, he argues for a thickening of the "warrior mindset" (warrior code) which recognizes that there is no contradiction between the moral foundational senses linking love with the professional FRAME sense of responsibility. This "thickening" helps "just warfighters" to distinguish between their emotional responses of grief from

145

guilt, and to morally navigate "bruising combat experiences without becoming morally injured" (LiVecche 2021, 10-12).

Livecche believes this "thickening" begins by warfighters unpacking the "killing is wrong, but in war it is necessary tension" that dominates how many interpret national conflict (LiVecche 2021, 38-39). And this "thickening" ends with men and women conscientiously accepting their traumatic experiences as warfighters and flourishing as moral human beings. Livecche argues that these identities can an integrated whole that disentangle warfighting from moral injury. He concludes:

> To the well-organized mind and the properly formed spirit, the traumatic experiences of war, while sometimes injurious and often bruising, can also be opportunities for posttraumatic growth. They can be steppingstones that double as whetting stones … my hope is that we may begin to unburden warfighters from unnecessary burdens of guilt. At the very least, in distinguishing actions that issue in sorrow [just] from those that issue in sin [unjust], we may uncover different sets of remedies to address different kinds of wounds. (LiVecche 2021, 202)

The Three Mirror Model Applied to Impacts of Killing

In the TMM model, Livecche's distinction is visualized by the gray scale diamond which represents the varying levels of warfighters' moral dissonance measured by the distance between their integrated moral orientation and their dis-integrated moral agency (Figure 3.1). This distance can be caused by ambiguity in their acceptance/objection of duty or the justness/injustice of their actions. Both are measured by their moral senses and cognitive reasoning. Failed or unrealized standards for just moral agency are related to warfighters moral orientations, but they are not the same as impossible or unrealistic obligations for their moral agency. Forensic Psychiatrist Robert Simon says there is a point where people who risk "unjust" actions achieve the results

that good people dream. In popular media we can witness these types of justifications in "Jack Bauer" or "Raymond Reddington" scenarios where killing and violence are tolerated and overlooked by the good outcomes they produce.[12]

Figure 3.1 The Three Mirror Model

This does not always work for warfighters. However, their conscientious acceptance of warrior codes supported by "just" moral orientations and agency can enable this to happen. The integration between warfighters moral orientations and their moral agency is not inevitable nor is it permanent. It is a frangible standard that continually links warfighters' specific moral challenges to their character and competence (Crawford 2013, 4-12). What remains is the question of how they deal with their moral judgements of their own behavior.

Warfighter-Warrior-Pirate as the Discernment of Ethical Practice

[12] This refers to primary characters int the television series *24 Hours* and *Blacklist.*

DCA requires purposeful conscientious action directed towards just ends. Academics may characterize warfighters by categories such as, "the pacifist, the patriot, the protector, and the warrior" (Koenig, Carey, and Al Zaben 2022, 34). However, they are more likely to view their character with regards to self-evaluations of their behaviors. Their self-evaluations are better explained by three categories: warfighter, warrior, or pirate.

One often hears military members described as warriors. This description is used in their training manuals, creeds, and public addresses (Air Force 2021; Army 2019a; Marine Corps 2014; Navy 2020b). However, in these places "warrior" refers to standards for the integration of military character with competence, not the moral or ethical performance associated with these standards. Thus, one acts a warrior when they aggressively engage an enemy in action, seize an objective, or defend a position. Being a warrior is a value-neutral, minimum competency expected of all Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Sailors, Coastguardsmen, and Guardians. How conscientiously or justly they do this is another matter, and this is where the self-assessments of warfighter or pirate become important.

Psychologist and former Army Ranger David Grossman explains that most warriors want to make a difference by being the "good guys." It's a part of their human moral foundations, and it's a part of the military ethos. However, they are also trained to react and function with warrior skills in extremis conditions. The training of reflexive combat skills provides a moral and ethical authority that can

present a moral risk for warriors in combat (Grossman 1995, 302-306). He uses the

analogy of the relationship between a sheepdog, wolf, and sheep to explain the moral

senses separating a warfighters, warriors, and pirates:

> Most citizens are kind, decent people who are not capable of hurting each
> other, except by accident or under extreme provocation. They are sheep….
> Then, there are wolves the old war veteran said, and the wolves feed on
> sheep without mercy…. Then, there are sheepdogs, he went on, and I am a
> sheepdog. I live to protect the flock and confront the wolf… The sheep
> live in denial and that's what makes them sheep … the sheep, generally,
> do not like the sheepdog. He looks a lot like a wolf. He has fangs and the
> capacity for violence. The difference, though, is that the sheepdog must
> not, cannot and will not ever harm the sheep… The sheepdog is a funny
> critter: He is always sniffing around out on the perimeter, checking the
> breeze, barking at things that go bump in the night, and yearning for a
> righteous battle. That is the young sheepdogs yearn for a righteous battle.
> The old sheepdogs are a little older and wiser, but they move to the sound
> of the guns when needed right along with the young ones… when you are
> truly transformed into a warrior and have truly invested yourself into
> warriorhood, you want to be there. You want to be able to make a
> difference. (Grossman and Christensen 2004, 176-179)

Grossman's definition of a warrior follows ancient Greek logic for specialized

civilian-guardians trained in warrior skills who were dedicated to preserve a civil

society (Plato 1992, 137-147; J.L. Cook 2017, 27-ff). This carried over into the

Stoics' focus upon self-control in the use of warrior skills (Aurelius 2006, 51-ff; Rago

2017, 97-99). Thus, moral values and practices, not warrior skills, separate

warfighters from pirates. All three possess lethal competence, but they do not have the

same moral orientations or practice the same moral agency. Warfighters will be the

warriors who conscientiously use their skills for just actions. While pirates will be the

warriors who use their skills for selfish or unjust actions.

149

Military ethicist and Navy SEAL Dick Couch believes that moral orientation

and competency is trained and practiced on combat ranges by combining cognitive

reasoning with motor skills and weapons proficiency to discipline "dialed responses"

to control reflexive firing. Conditioned, reflexive responses can lead to warriors

"switched on or switched off" moral orientations. In contrast, "dialed responses" help

warfighters critically, learn from their past experiences, and then apply their lessons

learned to their actions in future operations. Couch views this type of learning as a

proactive corrective for potential immoral behaviors by warriors. He writes:

> I contend that a warrior's performance on the battlefield is not only
> complemented, but also enhanced, by a firm moral foundation. Ethics
> and martial skills can and should be part of the same training package
> and the same deployment package… If our best and brightest are
> tempted to cover up wrong behavior in a school setting, what are we
> to expect of our Soldiers and Marines whose brotherhood is forged on
> the battlefield? . . . You must make honor and right conduct a part of
> your unit's branding: impress your men with the idea that wrong
> conduct tarnishes your brand and is a form of disloyalty to all
> warriors who fight for the brand. Train them, trust them, and hold
> them to standard. . . Keep your honor on par with your marvelous
> professional skill. if some pirate in your unit tries to minimize you or
> tarnish your honor, take a stand, take action… (Couch 2010, 11, 80, and
> 111-112)

Couch's and Grossman's distinctions support how FRAME senses of fidelity,

responsibility, accountability, maturity and efficacy help describe the content of the

standards and codes that warriors use to judge their behaviors. Nowhere is this more

present than in the use of warrior codes to control ethical practice.

Warrior codes exist to control warriors, for their own good as much as for the

good of others. Therefore, the essential element of a warrior's code is that it must set

definite guides and guardrails on what warriors can and cannot do if they want to

continue be regarded as warriors, or warfighters, and not pirates, criminals, or cowards.

"For the warrior who has such a code, certain actions remain unthinkable, even in the

most dire or extreme circumstances" (French 2017, 253). Marine veteran Tom Hannah

writes:

> From my first day at Officer Candidates School, to my last day as a
> Marine Captain, I was taught "Marines Don't Do That". Marines don't lie,
> cheat, or steal. Marines don't abandon another Marine. Marines don't take
> advantage of others. Marine Officers don't eat first. Marines don't quit.
> Marines don't put their hands in their pockets… The list goes on and on!
> But here's the thing; regardless of the situation, within the Marine Corps it
> is universally understood what "Marines Don't Do." That's called
> ethos…and it informs <u>every</u> decision that a Marine makes,
> and <u>every</u> action that he [she/they] takes… Most importantly, it also
> empowers Marines to hold one another accountable. Spend time with
> Marines and you quickly notice that, more often than not, it's not a
> superior saying to a subordinate that "Marines Don't Do That." If it needs
> to be said at all (which isn't often), it is usually a peer saying to a peer,
> "Marines Don't Do That". I've even seen (sometimes embarrassingly)
> subordinates remind their superiors that "Marines Don't Do That." And
> I've seen former Marines remind current Marines of the same thing.
> (Hanna 2016)

Such discipline comes into focus under fire when Marines associate their

character with their weapons proficiency. From the beginning are taught:

> This is my rifle. There are many like it, but this one is mine. 2. My rifle is
> my best friend. It is my life. I must master it as I must master my life. 3.
> My rifle, without me, is useless. Without my rifle, I am useless. I must fire
> my rifle true. I must shoot straighter than my enemy who is trying to kill
> me. I must shoot him before he shoots me. I will … My rifle and myself
> know that what counts in this war is not the rounds we fire, the noise of
> our burst, nor the smoke we make. We know that it is the hits that count.
> We will hit…. My rifle is human, even as I, because it is my life. Thus, I
> will learn it as a brother. I will learn its weaknesses, its strength, its parts,
> its accessories, its sights and its barrel. I will ever guard it against the
> ravages of weather and damage as I will ever guard my legs, my arms, my
> eyes and my heart against damage. I will keep my rifle clean and ready.
> We will become part of each other. We will …. Before God, I swear this

creed. My rifle and myself are the defenders of my country. We are the masters of our enemy. We are the saviors of my life. So be it, until victory is America's and there is no enemy, but peace! (Marine Corps 2023a)

Other military units use similar creeds to stress the integration of warriors with a weapon or a weapon system. Thus, the individual assumes the values of the group (Duckworth 2016, 247). Pargament and Exline consider this integration a moral orienting system, Crystal Park labels this a Global Narrative, and Butler examines this as a braided identity (Pargament and Exline 2022; Park et al. 2017; Taylor 1992). The important thing to understand is that this training integrates moral orientations where use of a weapon, or a weapon system, is factored into warriors' purpose and performance of duty. Thus, moral senses and cognitive reasoning are integrated into warriors' conscientious practice of their moral agency, and this integration influences their command and control of warfighting.

The same moral orientations that influence warriors' performance in combat will also determine how they process and evaluate the consequences of how they perform. What remains to be seen is whether they will act justly as warfighters, unjustly as pirates, or a little bit of both. It will also determine how they will later cope with their self-assessments. In the complexity of war, the outcome is not guaranteed, or controllable. The outcomes of these processes will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

Test Narratives

In modern warfare the values and moral orientations that form life narratives can become altered by what warriors experience at the "tip of the spear" (Miniter 2005, 6-10). The result is a widening gap between the idealized values and practices that make a warrior a warfighter or a pirate. This gap can change as they move through the

deployment cycle from training to operations to recovery. Thus, the pathway of the integrated character of a warrior can be like the moral orientation that Bruce Lincoln reports about his father who was a WWII combat veteran. When Lincoln told his father that he thought he was brave because he fought against a tough enemy. His father responded, "They [the Germans] were just like us: a bunch of scared kids" (Lincoln 1999, xii). This type of humble mindset is common amongst disciplined warfighters whose performance of duty may reflect their intact character determined by an integrated warrior code that functioned according to a code practiced by the following warfighters. As you read their short self-narratives, notice how their moral senses and cognitive reasoning converge to form the moral orientations that define their character.

While commanding a SEAL team in Vietnam Dick Couch declined an order that he believed placed his team in danger by taking an unnecessary risk for no military gain. Because of his decision, a less qualified unit was sent on the mission, and they suffered many casualties. Later in life, Couch reflects upon the consequences of his decision. Can you hear the values of SEALs, his commissioning oath, and FRAME senses mix in his narrative?

> I did not feel right about it [my decision, but] … My men applauded the decision. . . I debate the order to this day. There was no question in my mind that the order was stupid and ill-conceived, one that would have put my men at needless risk. The work we did was dangerous enough without inviting disasters and getting caught at night in the mangrove swamp by a large VC [Viet Cong] force was just that. You either ran, fought, or died—sometimes all three. But I had sworn to obey the lawful order of "those appointed over me" and that day I refused . . . my men counted on me not to put them at risk unless it really counted. They had followed me into some hard situations that tour. I owed them a lot. . . I don't really have a sure answer for this one.

I didn't then, and I still don't. Had there been a Junior Officers Training
Course for SEAL officers in my day, as there is now, I might have
made a better decision. or a more informed one. (Couch and Doyle
2014 103-105)

The mixture of moral senses and cognitive reasoning is active in the moral

orientation and self-evaluation of a young Marine Officer named Karl Marlantes as

he describes the numbing effects a morale visit from a chaplain had upon him and his

platoon during the Vietnam War. In his narrative Marlantes also reflects upon his

own R/S struggles.

I was engaged in killing and maybe being killed. I felt responsible for
the lives and deaths of my companions. I was struggling with a
situation approaching the sacred in its terror and contact with the
infinite, and he was trying to numb me to it. I needed help with the
existential terror of my own death and responsibility for the death of
others, enemies, and friends, not Southern Comfort. I needed a
spiritual guide. Many will argue that there is nothing remotely spiritual
in combat. Consider this. Mystical or religious experiences have four
common components: constant awareness of one's own inevitable
death, total focus on the present moment, the valuing of other people's
lives above one's own, and being part of a larger religious community
such as the Sangha, ummah, or church. All four of these exist in
combat. The big difference is that the mystic sees heaven and the
warrior sees hell. (Marlantes 2011, 7-8)

These two narratives reveal the differences between what writer David Brooks

describes as the lip service values of the "Resume Self" and the substantive values of

the "Obituary Self" which produce maturity and a type of efficacy (Brooks 2015,

253-ff). These substantive values lie at the heart of the professional character that

differentiates warfighters, warriors, and pirates (Caslen and Finney 2011, 18-20).

These values are a part of the historical narratives belonging to diverse warfighters

from many historical contexts.

After the battle of Gettysburg, burial details found the bodies of women soldiers from the Union and Confederate Armies. They had disguised their identities and gone to war with probably similar motivations as Sarah Emma Edmonds and Frances Clayton, whose letters home described their willingness (conscientious acceptance) to suffer the same hardships and dangers as their fellow soldiers(Blanton and Cook 2002, Kindle Location 3178-ff). Women like them fought bravely in the ranks. Catherine Davidson lost an arm. Mary Galloway was shot in the neck, and "in May 1864, several Confederate women soldiers were killed in an assault on Union lines. 'They fought like demons,' Sgt. Robert Ardry of the 11th Illinois Infantry wrote to his father, 'and we cut them down like dogs'" (Schulte 2013). Cathay Williams began enlisting at age 17. She was accepted, discovered, and then discharged multiple times before enlisting as a "Buffalo Soldier." She likely saw battle and was medically discharged, denied a military pension, and was buried in Trinidad, Colorado (Jojola 2022).

But the distinction of combat leader belongs to Harriet Tubman who after her work as a conductor on the Underground Railroad and Union Army Spy, she officially commanded a raid against a larger Confederate Force at Combahee Ferry and anonymously leading multiple other raids under the name Moses. The Confederate commander evaluated her leadership, "The enemy seems to have been well posted as to the character and capacity of our troops… and to have been well

guided by persons thoroughly acquainted with the river and country" (Clinton 2004, 152-ff, and 204). However, her warrior code may be captured in her comments addressed to President Lincoln:

> Suppose there was an awfully big snake down there on the floor. He bites you. You send for the doctor to cut the bite; but the snake, he coils up there, and while the doctor is doing it, he bites you again. The doctor cuts down that bite, but while he is doing it the snake springs up and bites you again, and so he keeps doing it till you kill him. That's what Mister Lincoln ought to know. (Clinton 2004, 120)

The above quotes address her competency, but her character is captured in her self-evaluation, "I was conductor of the Underground Railroad for eight years, and I can say what most conductors can't say—I never ran my train off the track and I never lost a passenger" (Clinton 2004, 140-141). Thus, Tubman shares the same moral senses of fidelity, responsibility, and accountability as Couch.

Her character resonates in the narrative of Combat Veteran and Purple Heart recipient Senator (Major-Retired) Tammy Duckworth who writes:

> I will always place the mission first. I WILL NEVER QUIT. I WILL never accept defeat. I will never leave a fallen comrade. These statements are portions of the soldiers Creed. They are referred to as the Warrior Ethos. These words were a lifeline that helped me survive my injuries and the tedium of day after day of endless pain in the hospital. They are gender-neutral statements that get at the heart of what it means to be an American Soldier today…They are about being tough and professional. (Holmstedt 2007, viii-ix)

Of course, officers are supposed to be tough and resilient, and possess integrated FRAME senses mixed with their foundational senses and cognitive reasons, but this same mixture is also found among Non-Commissioned and enlisted warfighters. When asked

by infantrymen what she was doing in a combat area, Marine Gunnery Sergeant Yolanda

Mayo, who was serving as a public affairs specialist, responded, "I'm fighting a war,

what are you doing here?"(Holmstedt 2007, 235). Her spirit resonates in the narratives of

a Private First-Class Jessica Lynch and Navy Aviation Boatswain's Mate Handler Marcia

Lillie who add their humanity to their self-evaluations of themselves as warfighters.

> Lynch (Army). I'm not a hero. If it makes people feel good to say it, then I'm glad. But I'm not. I'm just a survivor. When I think about it, it keeps me awake at night… We went and we did our job, and that was to go to the war, but I wish I hadn't done it -- I wish it had never happened, I wish we hadn't been there, none of us… I don't care about the political stuff. But if it had never happened, Lori would be alive and all the rest of the soldiers would be alive. (Bragg 2003, Kindle Locations 69-72 and 2111-2115)

> Lillie (Navy). Life, dedication, and discipline on the flight deck where safety is life itself… You always have to have fear in your heart on the flight deck. I you don't, and you get comfortable, something will go wrong… I think I'm a cat…I think I have nine lives. (Holmstedt 2007, 115,137)

Lynch and Lillie might barely consider themselves warriors, nevertheless their

narratives reveal a linked human morality linked with professional fidelity, responsibility,

and accountability of a warfighter's moral orientation. This is not true in the following

narratives provided by historian Wallace Terry in his book *Bloods*, where he documents

the experiences of Black combat veterans during the Vietnam War. These infantrymen

are competent warriors who describe how they sought conscientious and just service as

warfighters, yet ended up struggling with moral, ethical, and spiritual issues that left them

feeling like pirates.

> Specialist 4 Richard Ford. I remember February 20, the Twentieth of February. We went to this village outside Duc Pho. Search and destroy… We didn't see anybody in the village. But I heard movement in the rear of the hut. I just opened up the machine gun. You didn't want to open the

door, and then you get blown away. Or maybe the booby-trapped. Anyway, this little girl screamed. I went inside the door. I'd done already shot her, and she was on top of the old man. She was trying to shield the old man. He looked like he could have been about eighty years old. She was about seven. Both of them was dead. I killed an old man and a little girl in the hut by accident. I started feeling funny. I wanted to explain to someone. But everybody was there, justifying my actions, saying "It ain't your fault. They had no business there." But I just – I didn't want to hear it. I wanted to go home then. It bothers me now. But so many things happened after that, you really couldn't lay on one thing. You had to keep going. (Terry 1984, 42)

SPC 4 Charles Strong. Most of the nightmares are gone. Except one. I still think about this North Vietnamese soldier. We took two hours to kill him. This was a brave dude. I'll never forget him. It took a whole platoon to kill him… [he was trapped in a tunnel] … So when they pulled him out, he was hit badder than an ol'boy. He had a hunk of meat out of his leg, big as that. He had shrapnel all over his body. He had a hole in his side. But he wouldn't give up… Because he really believed in something. This man was willing to die for what he believed in. That was the first time I ran into contact with a real man. I will never forget him. (Terry 1984, 61)

Conclusion

Warfighters define themselves by their character and competence. They are what they value, what they know, and what they do. Their identity involves complex moral orienting processes they use to determine their conscientious acceptance of duty, the justness of their agency and their self-identity. Warfighters' integrate intuitional moral senses (Haidt 2012), professional FRAME senses(Larson and Zust 2017), cognitive reasoning schema (J. Rest et al. 1999; Kohlberg 1984), moral voice (Chu and Gilligan 2014; Gilligan 1989, 1993), and somatic, skills training (Couch 2010; Grossman 1995; Grossman and Christensen 2004) into their moral orienting systems.

Chapters two and three provided a critical examination of what "puts warfighters together" -- the warrior codes that function as the integrated standards they use in their moral orientating systems to determine and judge their moral agency. Chapters 4 and 5

will provide a critical reflection of what "tears warfighters apart" -- the moral processes within mission command and warfighting that can dis-integrate their character from their competence.

Chapter Four: Where am I?

Dis-integrating Warfighters' Moral Orientations in the Kill Chain

"Your Moral Compass is so [deleted] up I'll be surprised if you can find the

parking lot" (Fuqua 2007).

From the Movie *Shooter*.

"My moral compass isn't broken; it just points to hell."

Spoken to me by one of my Soldiers

"There is a fundamental difference between leading warriors and breeding

pirates."

Colonel Jay Aanrud, U.S. Air Force

Introduction

These opening quotes are forms of military humor, but each one conveys a basic

truth about warfighters' moral orienting systems – they function as *phronetic* processes

that allow warfighters to operate conscientiously and justly in the performance of their

duties. In the military, a compass is useful for navigation because it always points

towards a fixed direction (a magnetic north versus a north star), and a common, fixed

direction makes orientation and navigation possible. However, a fixed direction is only

helpful, if it is used in combination with other navigational elements such as destination

points, terrain analysis, maps, and instincts. In the same way, moral orientation is

possible only because it is based upon the habituation of fixed standards and skills that

warfighters integrate into their warrior codes during basic training and continue to

incorporate into their identity throughout their time in service. Warfighters use the

integrated elements of their moral orientations during combat, and it is the dis-integration

of these elements that disorients warfighters, leaving them feeling lost and asking

questions such as "Who am I or where am I?"

Combinations of training and professional education integrate warrior codes with

operational processes to guide warfighters' moral orientations as they encounter

dilemmas and dissonance that causes them to struggle with questions of identity and

purpose. Admiral James Staviridis, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe,

summarizes the scope of a warfighter's moral orienting struggles:

> In the end, the measure of our lives is weighted on the scales of the
> choices we have made, and the ability to see oneself clearly is crucial on
> the voyage to character. In a sense, we each have three lives: a public one,
> defined clearly by the open statements we make from conversations at
> work to our posts on social media; a private one, the face that we share
> only with our very closest family and a few chosen friends; and a deeply
> personal one, known only to ourselves, where we struggle – often
> desperately – to make the right choices. (Stavridis 2019, xviii-xix)

Cognitive theory and research studies demonstrate that these choices and the

ability to see oneself clearly are linked with complex emotions and subconscious senses

of values that control human agency.

> Military life is not only about the external, vertical line of command… It
> is also about internalized, horizontal bonds of camaraderie, affection, and
> love, and the boundless gratitude for buddies who put their own lives on
> the line, shattering limbs and nerves, in order to save others. (N. Sherman
> 2005, Kindle Locations 1042-1045).

However, warfighters behavior is also by command not choice. This is where an

understanding of kill chain and mission command is essential for understanding

161

warfighters' moral orientations. This understanding can be summarized: warrior codes provide the way, mission command provides the means, and kill chain operations provide the ends for modern warfighting.

Military service is generally defined by virtue (value)-based leadership. However, warfighters' obedience to command cannot be defined by an independent list of virtues because it depends upon: 1) collective aspects of leadership linked with moral senses of fidelity, responsibility, and accountability to others, 2) a maturity and efficacy determined by professional capabilities and capacities, and 3) a nuanced moral orientation linked with kill chain and mission command practices through which warfighters exercise and judge their moral agency (Shanks Kaurin 2020, 20-21; Larson and Zust 2017, 151-ff). The kill chain is the process of understanding situations, deciding courses of action, and targeting (Brose 2020, xviii-ff). Mission command describes the integration of the practices the military uses to organize and control warfighting(JCS 2022, xxiv). Thus, warfighters use their integrated warrior codes to fight as members of a team defined by their joint services, combined arms (infantry/armor/artillery), and multi-domains (land/sea/air/space/cyber/space)(JCS 2022, ix-ff). The ultimate testing of this teamwork is the struggles warfighters encounter during combat.

War is a cycle of cause and cruelty, and to debate which comes first is a circular argument. During the Civil War, the citizens of Atlanta complained to General William T. Sherman that his barbarous command tactics were destroying their industry, crops, and livelihoods. He responded with his rational for this cycle:

> War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into
> our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out.
> I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more

sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop… You [the people of Atlanta] might as well appeal against the thunderstorm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home, is to stop the war, which can only be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. (W.T. Sherman 1864)

Sherman responded as a commander from his assessment of the current contexts, the risks and costs to his own soldiers, the potential for civilian casualties, and his mission to defeat enemy forces. It is little known that he also relocated many civilians from Atlanta, and he treated them in such a manner that the Confederate General James Calhoun wrote him a letter of gratitude (Marszalek 1993, 340)

Sherman is better knowns for his comment, "War is hell," which he officially spoke in a short speech that he gave during a reunion of Union Veterans in Ohio. The full quote is, "You all [veterans] know this is not soldiering here [the reunion]. There is many a boy here to-day who looks on war as all glory, but, boys, it is all hell" (Marszalek 1993, 576-577). Sherman probably used his famous phrase many times, but the contrast of his remarks between Ohio and Atlanta is interesting. In Atlanta he was speaking as a soldier who was fighting a war. In Ohio, he was speaking as a veteran who was reflecting upon the consequences of his wartime experiences and inviting other veterans to do the same.

Warfighting bastardizes the noblest virtues of humanity. I found this quote while doing research during seminary, and I copied it into my study Bible without recording its source. I refer to it from time to time, because after 33 years of military service (including multiple combat tours), I still find the "bastardization of virtues" adequately describes the reality of what happens to warfighters serving in combat.

Warfighting also reveals character. The first two chapters showed how warfighters integrate personal values, lived spiritualities, philosophies, and virtues into the warrior codes that function as the standards for identity and agency in their ethos moral orienting systems. In combat, warfighters become war itself as they use their warrior codes as a moral voice to operate. Besides revealing character, military operations can dis-integrate warfighters' character by dis-integrating their moral standards from their performance of agency. The dissonance from this separation causes moral injuries. Therefore, following combat, morally injured warfighters need to reconcile their moral dissonance by re-integrating the core values with the lived agency that defines their life meaning.

Warfighting can be considered as a "lethal clash of wills, and an inherently human endeavor that requires perseverance, sacrifice, and tenacity" (Navy 2020a). Warfighting can also be considered as a planned activity where warfighters must, "deploy, fight, and win the Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels" (Army 2019c). This chapter will examine the warfighting processes that can dis-integrate warfighters' moral orientations through the command and control of lethal force during warfighting operations. Specifically, this chapter will critically examine: 1) the function of moral orientation processes, 2) the function of fast thinking and slow reasoning processes within kill chain operations, 3) the operational mindsets, mission command, and targeting biases that influence warfighters' moral orientations and behaviors, and 4) three test narratives involving negligence, admonishment, command guidance, and drone targeting.

Chapter 5 will then critically examine the guides and guardrails that influence warfighters' moral deliberations over orientation and agency using Just War Theory and the Law of Armed Conflict/International Humanitarian Law. Each of these processes have a role in how warfighters discern their moral orientations, perceive their identity, dis-integrate their character, and experience moral dissonance. Understanding the cause and process of this dis-integration is essential before examining warfighters' post-combat re-integration of moral orientation and reconciliation of moral dissonance.

The Function of Warfighters' Moral Orientation

"The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards" (W.F. Butler 1889, 85). British General Sir William Butler wrote this statement as part of his public argument against the social disassociation of warfighting from education. Butler's words have become a heuristic used by present military educators to describe the need to educate combat leaders with the capability to think for themselves and the capacity to act independently when necessary (Reeves 2022; Caslen and Finney 2011). One paradigm that connects concepts of deep reasoning with appropriate action is the "moral compass" that guides warfighters' moral orientations and judgments. However, a moral compass symbolizes only one of five moral reasoning processes that make moral orientation possible. Each of these reasoning processes roughly correspond to five tools used for land navigation. All five tools and moral reasoning processes are used by the military.

Pastoral theologian Larry Graham described moral injury as a process that, "reorients persons towards the consequences of past harm perpetrated by them or upon

them… and a form of letting go of harmful moral codes and instituting new modes of personal and communal practices" (L.K. Graham 2017, 10). These consequences are a part of the moral tensions and spiritual struggles that disorient a person and result in a "wobbly gyroscope" that throws them off-life balance (L.K. Graham 2017, 13-15, and 39-41). Graham is correct in naming the spiritual effects caused by moral dissonance, but he fails to account for the moral complexity and depth of the dissonance warfighters' encounter during warfighting.

A gyroscope does not function as a compass. Gyroscopes are used to determine the level of orientation to the ground. Compasses are used for determining direction and location. Neither of these instruments can be used to determine destination, distance, elevation, or route for travel. However, they are helpful in determining orientation, and they can be metaphorically used to describe warfighters' disorientation with their self and their environment that leaves them feeling "wobbly" or "lost." At times, warfighters can describe situations where they are completely "lost" and "out of control" within spaces defined by kill chain operations. They literally become the wrong person, who is in the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong motivation, who is doing the wrong/bad/evil thing. Orientation and disorientation are complex problems.

As stated earlier a compass needle will point towards magnetic north. One then needs to turn the directions on the dial of the compass, so the "N" is aligned with the needle, and this provides one a "fixed/known" direction from which to travel. However, for accurate travel, one then needs to align the compass with a map, and maps are drawn according to a declination angle based upon the lines and angles that determine a

mathematical north and south poles. Therefore, true north on a map, is different from the fixed magnetic north on a compass. The difference is very small at close distances, but over large spaces the differences can be miles apart. This makes "alignment" a critical skill for land navigation. Similar processes are used when navigating by stars. However, modern Global Positioning Systems have already factored in this alignment.

Alignment of true with magnetic north makes orientation possible, and this is why using the metaphor of a moral compass is inaccurate for moral and ethical reflection. Such reflection is usually based upon how we think our "moral maps" are drawn rather than how they are aligned with agreed-upon, "fixed positions" in the universe. It is a different discussion to speak about the alignment of our maps with an oriented compass towards magnetic north, than to discuss our movements based upon our readings of constructed maps. Such discussions have physical, psychological, social, and spiritual ramifications when we are dealing with moral standards and ethical practices.

I have never been so lost, then the time on a night, land navigation course when I parachuted into an unknown location and mistook a road for a fixed location, and I used it for my "known" position. I then oriented my compass with my map and the road. However, the road I was using was constructed in the 1970's, and the map I was using was drawn in 1938. I ended up miles off course, because I ignored the fixed, "magnetic north" on my compass which disagreed with the direction of the road that I thought was depicted on my map. This is an anecdotal story about a military exercise where the only casualty was the blisters on my feet. The outcome from my mistake would have been different if I had been in combat, where bad orientation has life and death consequences.

Moral orientation in kill chain operations is an unusual topic for a seminary dissertation, but perhaps a seminary is the best place for such a dissertation to be written. For centuries warfighters have used various moral codes to guide their moral reasoning, and their codes have been the sources for agency that have harmed both noncombatants and combatants. Historically, warrior codes have been stereotyped as the moral and ethical standards for warfighters serving a just cause on behalf of a legitimate authority. However, the very presence of warfighters' moral injuries challenges the validity of this stereotype. Therefore, current theories for healing moral injuries need to account for how warrior codes function in the combinations of moral reasoning and agency that form warfighters' moral orientations and their post-trauma conditions.

Moral orientations are dependent upon the ability to deliberate between intuitive emotional responses and controlled cognitive responses (Greene 2014, 1016). Such deliberation includes: 1) the capability to deal with issues of complexity, agency, and efficacy, and 2) the capacity to recognize, judge, and act (Hannah and Sweeney 2007, 134-135). Furthermore, these same processes can be used to normalize and regulate individual and group processes associated with moral orientation, and to examine the consequences of moral agency (Hannah and Sweeney 2007, 151). The following sections will use a moral deliberation process to examine how warfighters navigate the complex boundaries that define their moral orientation, and the reasoning processes that control their moral agency.

First, consider moral orientation as a land navigation process to create a mindfulness of the self in relation to social contexts in which warfighters move through

unknown environments. This process exceeds the heuristic of following a moral compass because it requires the alignment of a map (character), with principles (compass), utility (end/destination points), situation (terrain), and moral senses (instincts).

Moral Maps, Virtue, and Character

Maps diagram the scaled association between human-made and natural terrain features. In a similar way, human values and virtues provide a scaled "moral map" of how we order our world (Aristotle 1962, 100-ff; Gilligan 1989; J. Graham et al. 2011; Wiener and Hirschmann 2014, 27-ff). Moral mapping provides a way of describing perceptions, prescribing order to social relationships, and assigning meaning to life events. Virtue ethics asks the question, "What is acceptable?" Aristotle would view a given virtue, such as courage, as a practical course of action between excessive (bravado) and deficient (cowardice) behaviors. Wiener and Hirschman describe how moral maps overlap practical and social values with transcendent, spiritual meanings. Thus, moral maps are constructions of virtues based upon modulating behaviors measured by the motivations, contexts, and consequences we use to determine "self" identity in relationship to social position. However, in land navigation, these maps have a limited physical worth without a compass, terrain analysis, end points, and self-awareness. The same is true for limited worth of moral maps in moral orientation without consideration of principles, utility, situational awareness, and moral senses.

The military uses moral maps defined by virtue ethics and stoic practices for character development. However, these moral maps cannot determine fixed directions, desired destinations, adequate situational awareness, or purpose. Aristotle believed that

the purpose of moral and ethical inquiry is to provide a knowledge [gnosis] and a target to aim at for well-being (N. Sherman 1989, Kindle locations 183-188). The military service requires warfighters to operate with moral maps that serve as regulative ideals in relationship to, "the broader values to which those roles answerable" (Oakley and Cocking 2001, 1, 25-27).

This legitimizes and normalizes the job of warfighting, but vices condemned in civilian life can also become praised as virtues in the context of warfighters' professional roles as the requirements of mission command and the character of leaders and peers influences the agency of warfighters. Thus, the individual virtues defining warfighters' character and competence must be understood within the broader framework of the military ethos and its relationship with the social authorities that determine purpose (MacIntyre 2012, 278). This is where the moral reasoning processes defined by deontology, teleology, situation, and moral foundations serve similar functions as mission command processes of orders, intents, situational analysis, and character. To summarize: warfighters' moral maps provide the character that legitimizes the orders, intents, and situational analysis with which the kill chain functions. This will be discussed in following sections.

Moral Compass, Deontology, and Mission Orders

As discussed earlier, a compass provides a magnetic (not true) north to orient maps for travel. In the same way principles (Kant 2012, 4:433-435) and "rules of law" (Rawls 1999, 13-30)provide a "fixed" direction from which warfighters determine the moral orientations that they use for navigating unsure terrain (J. Graham et al. 2011).

Deontology asks questions about what thoughts, and behaviors are required or necessary in the moment? These requirements can be internal and/or external, written and/or unwritten. However, they are not dependent upon personal motivations or desires. Warfighters are expected to conform to these requirements, not conform the requirement to their personal preferences. Hence, duty and obligation direct moral agency. Such duties may include obedience to superior authority, and higher, expectations that reside within warrior codes such as, "never leave a fallen comrade or Marines don't do that."

In land navigation, a compass provides direction but not destination, terrain awareness, spatial awareness, or motivation. In a similar way a moral compass does not provide a moral map, situational awareness, destination, or motivation for moral agency. A moral compass establishes a "fixed" reference point from which warfighters determine subsequent actions. However, these reference points may also feed a mythological identity that destroys a warfighters' character by requiring standards that can never (nor should they ever) be required.

Deontological principles/laws, and rules function as prescriptive requirements that may be useful, "to distinguish the objectively falsifiable descriptive cognitions often associated with trauma from the subjectively determined prescriptive cognitions that characterize moral injury" (Farnsworth 2019). Mission orders, command policies/guidance, Rules of Engagements, and the Law of Armed Conflict as examples that influence warfighters' moral orientation by providing requirements that permit direct actions. This will be discussed in subsequent sections, and Chapter 5.

Moral Endpoints/Waypoints, Teleology, and Commander Intents

Endpoints and way points determine destinations for travel. In the same way, that teleological or utilitarian reasoning measures moral progress and determines the desired end states for moral agency (Mill 1987, 278-ff; Bentham 1987, 65-71). Teleology/Utility asks the question, "what is appropriate?" Then it forms answers based upon "cost"-based analysis of the means and benefits of achieving acceptable goals. Thus, moral agency conforms warfighters' character to mission achievements and aversion of consequences.

In land navigation endpoints are not sufficient for map reading, orientation of direction, environmental awareness, or measuring instincts. Within mission command, commander's intent/guidance influences warfighters' moral orientations based upon a desired end state. Thus, warfighters conform their character and utilize their competencies to achieve whatever produces the greatest/best/most beneficial results. This will be examined in the section on targeting.

Moral Terrain, Contextual Ethics, and Situational Awareness

Terrain influences the means, route, and rate of travel. In a similar way moral reasoning based upon situational awareness and contextual sensitivity determines the proper means for our moral agency. In *Situation and Context* Joseph Fletcher applied principled values (such as a construction of Christian Love) to determine proper moral agency in specific contexts (Fletcher 1966, 100-ff). Situational reasoning asks the questions, "What is relevant or appropriate?" Thus, situational moral reasoning influences warfighters' moral orientation through their interpretation, awareness, and adaptations to external contexts.

As in land navigation, situational terrain analysis is insufficient for orienting to a moral map, determining principled direction, destination, or motivation. Travelers can't move directly from point A to B if a terrain obstacle like a river or cliff is in their way. Within mission command, situational awareness and adaptation is vital for warfighters' survivability and success. Situational moral reasoning insists that warfighters' moral agency must conform to their external environment. However, warfighters can also use situational moral reasoning to justify an "anything goes" moral agency based upon their operational environments. This will be discussed in the sections on targeting bias and command guidance.

Experience/Instincts, Moral Senses, and Mindfulness

Experience, intuition, and instincts and mindfulness can determine location in land navigation without using a map, a compass, terrain analysis, or waypoints. We can "know" the way home, or "feel" the way forward. However, we can also find ourselves lost and off course. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) asks questions such as, "What is intuitive, instinctual, or tolerable?" Moral senses influence warfighters' moral orientations by focusing their attention on their internal instincts, intuitions, and emotional responses to direct their moral agency (Haidt 2012, 193-ff).

In land navigation, people can travel by intuition or instinct, but they also can get lost by ignoring the other orientational tools they have at their disposal. Mission command depends upon warfighters' fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy to direct their moral agency and conscientious actions during combat. However, these same moral senses can also support preferences and biases that result in

misorientations when warfighters use their moral senses to override their principles, virtues, end states, and situational analysis. Much more will be written about this in the section on targeting bias.

Land Navigation as a Framework for Moral Orientation

Standing alone, none of the above land navigation elements provide sufficient tools or data from which to travel, just as none of the above moral reasoning processes provide sufficient reasoning processes, or data, to navigate the moral complexities that warfighters encounter in combat. However, when warfighters use these moral reasoning processes in conjunction they to align their moral maps, principles, desired outcomes, situational awareness, and moral senses to determine their moral orientations and moral agency.

Consider this, if warfighters are asked why they did X, they can answer that they did X because: 1) they were following orders (deontology), or 2) they accomplished their mission (Teleology), or 3) they appropriately responded to operational needs (Situation), or 4) they followed their warrior code (Virtue), or 5) they followed their instincts (MFT and FRAME). Any of these could be correct answers, and the military awards warfighters for successful mission accomplishment, showing personal initiative, and living up to their values. However, it also court-martials warfighters for bad orders, disregarding orders to get results, bad judgements of contexts, dishonorable character, and corrupted instincts.

Now, consider that the same soldiers answered they did X because their actions: 1) were consistent with their orders (deontology), 2) accomplished the desired end state of their mission (teleology), 3) were appropriate to the operational context (situation), 4)

upheld their service values (virtue), and 5) upheld their own instincts (moral senses, MFT, and FRAME). Even if a superior disagreed with the soldiers' actions, their moral agency would be supported by a moral orientation that aligned their moral reasoning.

Research shows moral injuries that occur during traumatic events are related to value-based behaviors, and that recovery from combat trauma is mediated by the meanings, moral philosophies, and spiritual values that sufferers attach to these events(E. Jones 2020). Thus, moral orientation involves a balance of cognitive and emotive processes that support warfighters' well-being during kill chain operations.

Cognitive Reasoning and Emotional Processing in Kill Chain Operations and Mission Command

The kill chain is a general framework used to describe the totality of military operations from training and procurement, through planning and deployment, to targeting and engagement. It can also refer to a specific framework that describes the cognitive reasoning processes used in targeting. Military policy advisor and military strategy officer Christian Brose explains the kill chain:

> It involves three stops: the first is gaining understanding about what is happening. The second is, making a decision about what to do. And the third is taking action that creates an effect to achieve an objective... And though that effect may involve killing, more often the result is all kinds of non-violent and non-lethal actions that are essential to prevailing in war or military contest short of war… [W]hen members of the US military complete that process of understanding, deciding, and acting, they refer to it as 'closing the kill chain.' And when they thwart the ability of a rival military to do so itself, they call that 'breaking the kill chain.' How fast, how often, and how effectively militaries can do both of these things is what determines whether they win or lose. (Brose 2020, xviii-xix)

Both strategic and operational levels of kill chain operations are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Our focus is tactical kill chain operations within mission command

and warfighters' control of targeting. However, it is important to note that kill chain operations at the strategic and operational levels include mission command processes that influence warfighters' moral orientations and agency at the tactical level, and their cognitive and emotional responses to warfighting at the personal level.

The mission command process uses a combination of mission orders, commander intent, situational analysis, and professional competencies to influence action(Dempsey 2012). At the tactical level, the kill chain processes of understanding, deciding, and acting function like the concurrent, targeting operations described by Marine General Charles Krulak's three block war: 1) on the first block warfighters are conducting full-scale combat, 2) on the second block they are conducting security (policing) operations, and 3) on the third block they are supporting support and stability (humanitarian) operations (Krulak 1999). I've had conversations with warfighters who describe their experience of the three-block kill chain during combat as a three-second war where they have 1) one second to understand what's happening, 2) one second to decide what to do, and one second to act. After that, they have the rest of their lives to think about it.

The three-second war within kill chain operations is the temporal space where warfighters' moral orientation links up with their moral agency, and this is where cognitive reasoning intersects with their emotional processing of events. Thus, it is important to establish a framework for moral reasoning within kill chain operations and mission command to understand how warfighters' experience moral dissonance. The work of research psychologist Daniel Kahneman and Colonel John Boyd provides this framework.

Processing Combat Trauma, Dialed Responses, and Double Loop Learning

Research conducted with Vietnam veterans has found that direct involvement with killing in combat mediates higher rates of post-trauma disorders than witnessing or association with traumatic events, and it results in even higher rates for veterans who associate feelings of guilt and shame with abusive violence or unjust war events (Krauss et al. 2023; Krauss et al. 2020; MacNair 2002, 2005; B.P. Marx et al. 2010). Uniting the work of Daniel Kahneman with the work of John Boyd and Jonathan Haidt is helpful for understanding the findings from these studies.

Warfighters become operantly conditioned to think and physically react through training on individual firing ranges and simulators, unit level live-fire exercises, force on force maneuvers, and operational rehearsals. This training and conditioning has increased warfighters' physical survivability and lethality (Grossman 1995, 187-ff; Kitfield 1995, 155-ff; G.C. Wilson 1989, 189-ff). Warfighters will speak about an OODA loop, where they observe, orient, decide, and act based upon their continual evaluations of 1) external stimuli, 2) their perceptions of context, and 3) their habituated experiences. Daniel Kahneman's research suggests that most human beings make decisions based upon forms of "fast thinking" that operates like Boyd's OODA loop. However, he also suggests that there is also a slower, reflective loop where people critically evaluate their thinking and performance to reform their patterns of reasoning and behavior. In combat, warfighters exist in this first loop, but this second loop is never far away, though it is often suppressed.

Educator and leadership theorist Stephen Covey summarizes the essence of these two loops by using the work of psychologist Viktor Frankl, "Between stimulus

177

and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom" (Pattakos 2017, vi). This chosen response is what Navy SEAL Dick Couch refers to as a trained, "dialed response" that differentiates warriors' moral agency from the agency of pirates. However, the space of this chosen response is not neatly defined, easily controlled, or experienced, because it is situated within the nexus of reflex and reflexivity (Couch 2010, 90-91).

The confusion between fast (reflexive) thinking and slower (reflexivity) reasoning manifests itself in combat when individual warfighters must make quick decisions to deal with a perceived threat. These quick decisions link their operant conditioning of skills used for targeting with their sub-conscious processing of traumatic meanings associated with their character (Grossman 1995, 130-ff; van der Kolk 2015, 105-ff). Under traumatic stress, the autonomic nervous system simultaneously decreases cognitive functions and increases sensory functions to facilitate motor functions motor that serve survival reflexes. This doesn't mean that warfighters cease to cognitively process during combat. It does mean that traumatic stress can decrease the ability of warfighters to thoroughly process their experiences, and this produces a range of subsequent emotions, thoughts, and actions that lead to, "ethically [or morally] questionable behavior that contradicts their own preferred ethics"(Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011, 5-ff). Chapters 4 and 5 will examine the moral effects associated with military targeting, and Chapter 6 will examine warfighters processing of traumatic meanings.

Adam Lineham, an Army veteran who served in Afghanistan, describes the moral relationship between targeting reflex and reflexivity within the three-second kill chain in the following assessment of a decision he made not to shoot people riding on a motorcycle near his unit. Keep in mind he had no idea in this moment whether these people were or were not combatants. They were only a possible, perceived threat to the safety of his unit.

> … instead, without thinking, I raised my rifle, flipped the selector lever from "safe" to "semi," and started walking toward the motorcycle. It all happened within seconds. I remember yelling, *wodiraga*! — the Pashto word for "do not move"—again and again. I remember the pressure of my finger on the trigger. I remember being scared that I'd miss, and I remember the incredible relief I felt when the bike skidded sideways across the dirt road and stopped in a cloud of yellow dust about 30 meters away. I could've killed those men on that bike. and had we not found a single weapon on their bodies, or bombs under their shirts, that would've been perfectly fine. I know because after the motorcycle came to a halt, everyone in my platoon let out a collective sigh and guys patted me on the back. I know because a few months later, one of our sister platoons, which had also been the target of a devastating suicide attack, was approached by a motorcycle on that same road. This time, despite desperate pleas from both American and Afghan soldiers, the driver didn't stop. Someone shot him in the chest. The guy turned out to be a local shopkeeper. His death, we all agreed, was justified. Even the Afghan soldiers said so. Nobody was punished. It was just another day in Kandahar. (Lineham 2017)

Organizational theorist Chris Argyris proposed a framework of two loops of learning to describe the parts of a living dialogue where human beings intentionally use external and inward criteria to critically examine the values, norms, and consequences that shape their reasoning and actions. Single Loop Learning is about "doing things right." It describes processes of making decisions, adjusting to new information, and/or correcting mistakes to solve problems. Single Loop Learning supports reflexive thinking and responses. "Should I or should I not shoot." Double Loop Learning is about learning

and "meaning making." It describes the process of modifying the assumptions, strategies and techniques used to determine significance, action, and lessons learned. Double Loop Learning supports reflexivity and reasoned change. It asks questions such as "Why did I make this decision, and what did I learn from this experience?" (Argyris 2017, 33 and 52).

Together, both loops provide individuals and organizations the ability to test past assumptions and causality through the repetitive examinations of past results and their inclusion of new data (Argyris 1991, 45-ff, and 70-71). "Double loop" learning has implications for how kill chain processes and cognitive therapies combine to affect the warfighters' moral orientations and assignment of meaning. However, the emphasis of cognition in both loops can exclude the emotional inputs and responses that also influence reasoning and action (Argyris 1991, 25). This is where the theories of Daniel Kahneman and John Boyd provide a framework for linking the work of psychologists Jonathan Haidt, Bessel van der Kolk, and Martin Seligman to the work of warfighters David Grossman and Dick Couch. This combined linkage forms the basis for critically examining how mission command and kill chain operations can integrate, dis-integrate, or re-integrate warfighters' moral orientations.

Kahneman's System 1 and System 2 Thinking and Heuristics

Kahneman states that human beings reason according to two cognitive processes or systems. The first is an intuitive system, which he labels System 1. System 1 does the fast thinking. A slower, System 2 monitors System 1 and articulates judgments, and rationalizes choices (Kahneman 2011, 414-418). This parallels Haidt's explanation that moral choices are initially responses to combinations of reactions from our moral senses

that we later rationalize(Haidt 2012, 260-271). This is essentially Argyris' double loop

learning in action. However, Kahneman adds a layer of complexity to this framework that

connects the faster, System 1, single loop with the slower, System 2, double loop. He

suggests that our System 1 functions by using heuristics which are developed and

habituated over time through System 2 thinking. This also parallels Haidt's explanation

for the way that moral senses are socialized over time into specific values or moral

orientations.

Heuristics are simplified cognitive patterns related to more complex sets of

external data. Thus, they function as a shortcut, to simplify problems and avoid cognitive

overload. Heuristics are formed from experiences and post-event reasoning that become a

part of instinctual, reflex memory. This allows individuals to quickly fill in missing

pieces of data to quickly reach conclusions or solutions to complex problems (Kahneman

2011, 98-ff)). Heuristics also help triage the importance of data and, "the ease with

which they are retrieved from memory" (Kahneman 2011, 8). Heuristics explain why

humans faced with difficult, uncertain conditions often respond by simplifying the

problem without noticing the presence of newer, critical details (Kahneman 2011, 12-13).

They are a form and source of our biases. Kahneman explains:

> We can be blind to the obvious, and we are also blind to our blindness… It
> is an illusion—a cognitive illusion… [and] the question that is most often
> asked about cognitive illusions is whether they can be overcome…
> Because System 1 operates automatically and cannot be turned off at will,
> errors of intuitive thought are often difficult to prevent. Biases cannot
> always be avoided, because System 2 may have no clue to the error. Even
> when cues to likely errors are available, errors can be prevented only by
> the enhanced monitoring and effortful activity of System 2… System 2 is
> much too slow and inefficient to serve as a substitute for System 1 in
> making routine decisions. The best we can do is a compromise: learn to

recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high… it is easier to recognize other people's mistakes than our own. (Kahneman 2011, 28)

Heuristics are economical and effective ways for making decisions and forming opinions, but they can also lead to errors, especially in situations where there are higher degrees of uncertainty (Kahneman 2011, 431). Kahneman describes three common categories of heuristics that human beings use in making judgments when faced with uncertainty:1) representativeness, which is used in judging the probability that an object or event belongs to a particular class or process, 2) availability, which is used to assess the frequency or plausibility of a particular development; and 3) adjustment from an anchor, which is used to predict identity or action when relevant data is available.

The reliance upon heuristics challenges theories of rational choice because it isn't clear if the effects from decisions should be treated as errors caused by biases, "or whether they should be accepted as valid elements of human experience" (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). There is also evidence that complex uncertainty creates multiple emotional responses that overload cognitive reasoning causing a fixed adherence to biases creating a myopia that limits choice. Thus, overload and myopia increase the need to develop types of an "experienced utility" where individuals can develop situational awareness and skills to increase their predictability of pattern recognition and "proxies for action" that offset the stresses and limits placed upon their capability and capacity for System 2 reasoning (Kahneman 1997).

Kahneman's research and framework highlight a problem that has a special importance for warfighters making targeting decisions under duress. Haidt and Grossman speak of these problems in their frameworks. For Haidt, heuristics are the moral senses,

or the emotional tail, that guides the actions, or wags the tail of the rational dog. Humans

emotionally react first, and later rationalize their instinctive, moral choices (Haidt 2001,

815-ff). This is why Grossman argues that the operant conditioning of warfighters to use

a weapon system in combat is secondary to the emotional control and moral orientation

that allow warfighters to competently target an enemy while under duress. He reasons

that a mature warfighter must develop the ethical and moral capability and capacity to

function like a protective sheepdog in extremis conditions instead of like an adrenaline

overloaded puppy. Grossman's argument goes like this:

> When a sheepdog gets bit, he gets pissed off and bites you back. A warrior
> meets the predator and survives. (Grossman and Christensen 2004, 173)

> However, a puppy experiences adrenaline overload which causes it to tear
> a hole through the screen door and, "jump into his [owners] lap, pee, gnaw
> at his throat, and cry out, "Gunfight! Gunfight! Where's the gunfight?
> Where? Where? Where?" (Grossman and Christensen 2004, 276)

> Whether you are a peacekeeper in Bosnia or a police officer on the street,
> you go where the predator is. When our soldiers go into a cave in
> Afghanistan, they go into his lair, which means he has the home court
> advantage. When our police officers go into a predator's house and into
> his bar, they are going into his lair… the mission is hard and the deck is
> stacked against you. But a warrior, with proper training and mindset can
> and will survive. (Grossman and Christensen 2004, 173)[13]

This linkage of Kahneman with Haidt and Grossman provides the basis for a

framework to critically examine the heuristics and reasoning warfighters' use in moral

orientation and targeting during combat. However, one more element is needed to link

these emotional and cognitive processes with the kill chain and mission command, and

this is Colonel John Boyd's OODA loop.

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[13] I have heard these phrases quoted in this order as part of many training events that I
have attended during my time in the military.

Boyd's OODA Loop

Air Force Colonel John Boyd, a Korean War fighter pilot, developed the OODA loop as a double loop, targeting process to incorporate learning models into the decision cycles that pilots use in warfighting. The OODA Loop predates the work of Agyris, Kahneman, Haidt and Grossman, and he anticipates the need to correct some of the problems that Kahneman and Tversky found in their research. The OODA loop emphasizes the development of "rapid," cognitive feedback loops used in System 1 thinking to offset the negative weaknesses in slower System 2 processes. However, Boyd's framework fails to account for the role that slower System 2 reasoning plays in changing the heuristics and moral senses influence warfighters moral orientation and agency. In an early paper Boyd explained the process of the OODA loop:

> To comprehend and cope with our environment we develop mental patterns or concepts of meaning [heuristics]. The purpose of this paper is to sketch out how we destroy and create these patterns to permit us to both shape and be shaped by a changing environment… we [pilots] cannot avoid this kind of activity if we intend to survive on our own terms. The activity is dialectic in nature generating both disorder and order that emerges as a changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to a changing and expanding universe of observed reality… Summing up, we can see that: general-to-specific is related to deduction, analysis, and differentiation, while, specific-to-general is related to induction, synthesis, and integration. (Boyd 1976)

Boyd viewed survival in aerial combat as dependent upon the continuous loop of observation and orientation that pilots use to connect threads of data to produce meaning from chaos and create decisive actions (Boyd 1976). He chose to begin with processes of induction to describe the necessity of warfighters "taking in" external data to begin their targeting process. This induction helps them to deconstruct their preconceived notions of what their operating environment should look like, and then re-structure the meaning of

184

their environment through deductive comparison of previous experiences to determine

their actions. Thus, Boyd sought to develop warfighters who could dialectically compare

and link isolated facts to deconstruct their rigid conceptual models and reconstruct new

orientations to match their perceived reality (Boyd 1976). Thus, the OODA loop is

double loop learning condensed into a single loop learning process – or quick heuristic

revision.

Lineham's decision not to shoot the riders on a motorcycle is a tactical example of

Boyd's OODA in motion. Somehow, Lineham's fast (System 1) thinking, met with some

type of his slower (System 2) thinking to create a targeting decision and ethical action.

This is the essence of the OODA loop (Figure 4.1) – the capability and capacity for a

warfighter to operate at a quick tempo – not just moving faster than an adversary but to

operate within an opponents' decision cycle to disrupt it. Boyd used to talk about

thinking in time warp, or at wicker speeds to operate with the effects of an operational

blitzkrieg or a tactical Entebbe operation.

Figure 4.1 Boyd's OODA Loop

This drew him into a concept that pushed operational planning into flow that

blurred distinctions between "orthodox and unorthodox" conceptions of warfare. Boyd's

system of reasoning contrasted a traditional, western system of warfare designed to manage friction and "bring an enemy to battle" (Clausewitz) with a system that relied upon uncertainty and chance to unravel competition by driving them "bananas" (Sun Tzu) (Coram 2002, 328-ff). For Boyd speed and adaptability come from active, deep, intuitive understandings of warfighters' relationships with their changing environments, and in these realms internal trust and situational comprehension have primary importance (Coram 2002, 332-337; Richards 2012). Boyd's theory has multiple applications ranging from making tactical decisions, to operational planning, to strategic designs. The following graphic depicts Boyd's theory:

Boyd describes the OODA Loop:

In the first phase the pilot observes the situation around him and takes in data about the environment around him. He then goes through an orientation phase that creates and/or modifies a mental model of the world around him via a process of analysis and synthesis of the data in context of previous experience, cultural beliefs, genetic heritage, and of course, new data…So orientation is important to place the new data into some kind of context from which meaning can be extracted and a mental model created that allows one to make predictions about what our opponent is likely to do next. From these predictions in the mental model certain decision paths arise and this leads to the decision phase. In the decision phase a specific decision path is chosen from all the others and that leads to the final phase. The action phase is where the person carries out the physical action that was decided on in the decision phase. This action phase changes the environment and causes new data to be taken into the observation phase and the cycle repeats. (N.J. Johnson 2014, 4)

Two things are important for linking Kahneman's framework with Boyd. The first is his description of the cognitive processes that occur in the loop. Essentially Boyd combines single and double loop learning to demonstrate the role that continuous feedback plays in a learning/reasoning cycle. This creates a way of conceptualizing the mental processes that accompany *phronesis*, or practical action. The second is Boyd's

conceptualization of what happens during the orientation process. Notice how warfighters will conduct an internal dialogue that analyzes and synthesizes inputs from previous experiences with new information. It is here that Kahneman's slower System 2 thinking meets faster System 1thinking in ways that construct and de-construct the heuristics that people use in making decisions and forming actions. This is Grossman's mature warrior, or sheepdog, in action, and it adds complexity to the order of cognitive processes occurring between the tail and head of Haidt's dog (Haidt 2001; 2012, 32-ff, 222).

Thus, Boyd operationalized a double loop learning by creating a continuous learning cycle that emphasized the role that cognitive processes have in developing and controlling movements in uncertain and changing environments (N.J. Johnson 2014). However, as Boyd's OODA loop became operational, new considerations for planning became a part of his cycle and the sequences and timing of his processes became revised. Military forces or individual warfighters do not always wait to observe until they have acted, and their decisions occasionally derive as consequences from others' actions (Storr 2008, 39).

Warfighters may enter the OODA loop from any point within a mission cycle, so Boyd's processes cannot be conceptualized as sequential order in the kill chain. Thus, the goal of orientation becomes a transitory form of situational awareness, or mindfulness, where warfighters' actions directly and implicitly flow without explicit commands or instructions (Richards 2012, 11). The warfighter sees, identifies a threat, reacts, then reviews and corrects the decision. So, the OODA Loop allows for visualization and action as a continual linking of Kahneman's fast, heuristic thinking for action with

slower, reflexivity processes for revision and change. This linkage is also driven by autonomic processes that will be considered in Chapter 6. Combined, these processes have deep implications for the functions of warfighters' moral orientations and agency.

Reflexive and Reflexivity Loops in Kill Chain Operations

Figure 4.2 The Revised Kahneman/Boyd Double Loop Model\

Imagine Kahneman's two systems as a double loop cycle where System 1, fast thinking (blue), accomplishes the primary functions of Boyd's OODA Loop, and then connects with System 2, slow thinking (red), to finish the continual feedback system proposed by Boyd (Figure 4.2). The exception to the OODA loop in this model is that Kahneman's System 2 processes include robust reflexivity processes that have been theorized by others as part of reflective thinking cycles. In this new model, warfighters who observe new events, orient themselves to their new environment using their existing heuristic drawn from their experiences and their existing moral orientations for decision and action (red cycle). This alone forms a single loop of fast, active learning that is no

different from the after-action processes that are used throughout military training to create a shared understanding (Army 2019c, 1-72; Burgoyne and Marckwardt 2009; JCS 2018a, III-15; Learned 2008; Swinton 2012).

Now imagine warfighters completing a series of fast-paced, stressful missions, and after their world slows down these same warfighters begin to deeply reflect upon what happened (blue cycle). They begin to review their decisions and actions and perhaps they also begin to reframe their initial impressions of the whole event. Then, as they analyze this information, they either begin to reconcile or (ruminate over) differences between what they experienced and what they previously believed, and in doing this they assimilate and accommodate new meanings to what they think they already know (the language used in Park's narrative model). The results are then added back into their collective pool of biases/heuristics and experiences, and memories. Thus, these new meanings reform their existing heuristics/biases and experiences. This forms a double loop model that is a more robust process than described by Boyd's OODA Loop, but not contrary to the feedback function he proposed for analysis and synthesis of new knowledge for targeting. What differentiates this double loop model is the possibility of deep reflection that alters life meaning and moral orientations.

Thus, warfighters learn, and their learning influences how they respond in combat. Double loop learning is a vital part of the militaries combat training programs, and one can find it used on firing ranges, in shoot houses, and in combat exercises to prepare warfighters to function and win in combat. Warfighters may be shocked by

uncontrollable combat events, but they have been physically and mentally preparing for these events beforehand. However, there is no guarantee that double loop learning will result in warfighters' progressive development.

Warfighters can easily incorporate the wrong lessons from training as well from surviving combat events. Research suggests that lessons learned from traumatic events can also result in regressive development caused by dysfunctional heuristics that influence warfighters' moral orientations and life narratives as well as their character and competence. This will be examined in the following sections, and it is the basis for Chapters 6 and 7.

For now, it is important to understand the Revised Double Loop Model functions like a sine wave over time instead of an independent closed loop. Kahneman believes that System 1 and System 2 operate concurrently instead of sequentially. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the double loop learning functioning as in left graphic of Figure 4.3:

Figure 4.3 The Effects of Time and Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) on Double Loop Cycles

However, operation tempo (OPTEMPO) in warfighting forces warfighters to predominately use combinations of System 1 (red) reflex cycles. Combat conditions can cause warfighters' heart rates to exceed 150 beats per minute, as their autonomic nervous system reactions decrease their abilities for System 2 type reasoning/reflexivity for processing their experiences. Thus, warfighters become "tactically fixated" and unable to engage in System 2 type reasoning to deal with their System 1 reactions to combat (right graphic in Figure 4.3).

Research shows that prolonged sleep deprivation, and the interruption of sleep cycles impairs decision making through a reduction of critical thinking and ability to revise plans to unexpected changes(Harrison and Horne 2000). Such deprivation is a part of rapid OPTEMPO, and Kahneman's work has implications for why and how rapid OPTEMPO affects the quality of decisions through the reliance upon System 1 thinking processes over System 2 reflexivity.

Post-trauma stress reactions and moral injuries are linked to these moments (Army 2011, 68-74; Hoge 2010, 54-57; Nash 2011, 107-120; Zust 2015b). Kahneman believes harmful thinking judgements can be prevented by the enhanced monitoring and "effortful activity" of System 2 reasoning (Kahneman 2011, 28). He writes, "systematic examination of alternative framings offers a useful reflective device that can help decision makers assess the values that should be attached to the primary and secondary consequences of their choices" (Kahneman 2011, 444). Research studies support the assumptions that personal growth and stress release often occurs in slower, deliberate, and critical thinking, or what some have labeled deep, System 3, practices,(S.K. Lee 2019, 28-ff; Schon 1983, 54). Here individuals begin to intentionally processes their life

events in ways that produce resilience to stressors and post-traumatic growth. These reflexivity processes are similar to parts of Kahneman's description of System 2 Thinking and they can be defined as:

Review

Review processes begin a critical and contemplative attempt to assess past events to gain new insights from the results(Krause 2022, 39-40; Sinischlchi et al. 2011). Review also helps individuals to identify and explore links between the congitive thoughts and the emotional responses that influence the norms (heuristics) they use for orienting and acting. Self-reflections upon the connections between these links provide a locus for developing the self-dialogue and self-regulation necessary for solving complex challenges and critically reviewing the heuristics that separate virtuous from vicious dispositions(Narvaez 2010; Narvaez and Mrkva 2014). Haidt's Moral Foundation Theory describes quicker, intuitive responses followed by slower, justifications used for rationalization and Rest's Four Component Model describes slower, cognitive practices of review used in moral reflection. Both include value-based, religious, and spiritual considerations as part of this review process(Atari et al. 2022; Haidt 2012, 193-ff; J. Rest et al. 1999, 159-ff).

Reframe

Reframing is the practice of exploring alternative throughts and actions to counter entrenched modes of emotional and cognitive processing that result in distortions, confusion, and inflexibility(McGraw and Tetlock 2005). Reframing is embedded within the OODA Loop feedback used in kill chain targeting, and the deeper reasoning used within mission command planning. However, reframing is also the integrated practice of

using appraisal and analysis to develop self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills (Emotional Intelligence) within treatment modalities and spiritually oriented care (Goleman, Bayatzis, and McKee 2013, 37-ff, and 162-ff). It is a form of moral imagination that is aware of uniqueness within new social, contexts and generates useful ideas to deal with uncertainty (Narvaez and Mrkva 2014, 25-29). Failures to assimilate new information and adapt new ways of thinking that can result in warfighters becoming fixated upon heuristics and biases that distort their perceptions and influence incompetent decisions (N.F. Dixon 1976, 388-389; Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011, 19-ff). Thus, reframing becomes an important reflective process for moral orientation.

Reconcile

Reflexivity includes practices where warfighters reconcile conflicting values, beliefs, and moral senses associated with their agency. This dialogue plays a critical role in how they understand, manage, and resolve their traumas (Pargament, Desai, and McConnell 2006). Reconciliation also allows warfighters to deal with issues of rumination and moral dissonance.

Rumination is a slower cognitive process that can be a trigger and coping strategy for intrusive memories, and a predictor of persistent PTSD (Michael et al. 2007; Monfils et al. 2009; Moulds et al. 2020). Moral dissonance is carried in the embodied cognitions and emotions that haunt memories and influence warfighters' future sense of agency (van der Kolk 2015, 33). A degradation of agency can result in patterns of learned "helplessness" that causes fatalistic or despondent life orientation(Seligman 2006, 20-ff). The first steps in rebuilding positive agency are taken by slowing down, observing

reactions, and working through emotional and cognitive dissonance (Menakem 2017, 125-ff and 263-ff). Reframing and reconciliation provide processes where warfighters can ask critical questions to avoid being trapped in dissonant thoughts, experiences, and harmful biases (C.A. Thomas 2006, 64-65). Thus, reflexivity processes of review, reframing, and reconciliation make revision of the harmful heuristics and biases that influence System 1 thinking possible.

Revise

The process of revision is making changes to the basic assumptions, biases and heuristics that inform moral orientations, decions and actions. Changes to heuristics and biases have the potential to influence how warfighters orient and adapt to their contexts. Change a matter of quick feedback in reflex-action, single loop learning, and it is a process of slower, reflexivity practiced in double loop cycles. Boyd's theory describes these loops as a single, complex system of continuous feedback. Kahneman's and Haidt's theories describe these loops as a tension between habituated intuitions and cognitive reasoning. In all these theories the slower, cognitive loop has a secondary function in relation to the primary, reactive loop driven by heuristics, intuition and emotion (Weaver, Reynolds, and Brown 2014).

There is evidence to suggest that warfighters can become fixated in patterns of converntional moral reasoning that can simplify their OODA Loops, and negatively influence their ability to adapt in unique, unforseen, and challenging contexts (Agrawal, Williams, and Miller 2020; Agrawal, Williams, and Miller 2021; N.F. Dixon 1976, 18,173-ff; Sloman and Fernbach 2017, 5-10; Zmigrod 2022, 1022). Research studies

using samples of veterans have concluded that warfighters' moral orientations, reasoning and psychospiritual development play a role in the decisions and actions that form moral injuries (Usset et al. 2020).

However, research studies also conclude that perspective (orientation and perception) transformation is vital process for intervention, self-directed learning, and problem solving (Mezirow 1981). Research also suggests that moral reflection creates the spaces where warfighters change their moral orientations, decisions, and moral appraisals of combat events (Paxton, Ungar, and Greene 2012; Lancaster and Erbes 2017).

This later research may indicate that moral reasoning may have a greater *proactive* effect upon moral agency through the changing of criteria used for orienting to environments than *concurrent* reasoning where decisions are made by the careful analysis of all relevant data. How warfighters grasp reality in changing, uncertain contexts and act appropriately are probably based upon "intuitional" processes and chance, but they are shaped by some type of reflexivity that is a combination of individual and social "reflection and experience grounded in historical consciousness and context" (T. May and Perry 2017, 10). This reflexivity also shapes how warfighters will differentiate between, "clean pain" experiences that can result in post-traumatic growth and "dirty pain" events that can result in post-traumatic disorders (Menakem 2017, 19-25). This difference will be dealt with in Chapter 6. Here, it is important to view this distinction as part of the operational process.

Reflexivity is a part of the double loop learning process that supports warfighters' task and purpose and affects their resiliency as human beings throughout the deployment cycle as they train, fight, and recover. The military ethos has the power to shape moral

orientations through the habituation of group norms and values that determine, "The way

we do things around here and why eventually become the way I do things and why"

(Duckworth 2016, 247). Thus, the habituation of warrior codes, kill chain targeting, and

mission command practices can prove to be a blessing or a curse to warfighters. It is their

development of adaptive reasoning practices that helps them review and reframe their

experiences, reconcile dissonance, and revise the biases and heuristics that inform their

moral orientations. This becomes apparent in the examination of the functions that

operational mindset, mission command and targeting bias play within the kill chain to

dis-integrate warfighters' moral orientations.

Moral Orientation within the Kill Chain: Operational Mindset, Mission

Command, and Targeting Bias

The kill chain involves a three-step targeting process to achieve an objective: 1)

gain understanding, 2) make a decision, and 3) take action (Brose 2020, xviii). It

incorporates Boyd's OODA Loop into a mission command planning processes to direct

the use of lethal force. This process can reduce double loop reasoning and System 2

learning into a single loop targeting process. Also, this process is not "morally neutral."

Veteran Tom Voss describes the reduction of moral and ethical reasoning within the kill

chain:

> Bearing witness to the moral indifference of others, or the premeditation
> of violence, is enough to warp your understanding of morality and make
> you question the moral character of everyone you meet. This makes it hard
> for veterans to trust other people and to assume the best in others, and in
> themselves. In addition to participating in and witnessing violence, there's
> a third, lesser-known cause of moral injury that impacts soldiers returning
> from war. It's the sense of confusion, powerlessness, and betrayal that
> soldiers feel when they come home and try to transition back to civilian

life. Some people call them heroes, but most veterans don't feel like heroes, so there's a disconnect between the actual experience of war and the perceived experience of it. (Voss and Nguyen 2019, xiv)

Warfighting is filled with layers of meaning as warfighters create asymmetries by transferring risk and consequence from friendly forces onto enemy combatants and their sources for support (this can include non-combatants). Militaries (and paramilitaries) accomplish asymmetry through mission orders and command intents focused upon the use of operational timing (OPTEMPO) and decisive actions that are based upon heuristic System 1 reasoning processes. It is here that Boyd's complex OODA Loop becomes a single loop, kill chain cycle that compromises warfighters' capability and capacity to deal with the moral complexities and uncertainties described by Voss. Learning and meaning making are System 2, double loop process involving reflexivity practices. Thus, mission command can potentially dis-integrate the principles, virtues, and foundational senses composing warfighters' moral orientations from the utilitarian considerations and situational reasoning processes that directs their moral agency. This happens at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The resulting moral dissonance becomes a mechanism for psychological and spiritual injury. I will deal with the dis-integration of warfighters' moral orientation within the kill chain according to three categories: operational mindset, mission command, and targeting bias.

Operational Mindsets

Operational mindsets are dependent upon concepts of the operational environment. Currently, military planning begins with the assumption that warfighters will be operating within uncertain and complex conditions in which they may not be dominant with regards forces, weaponry, or physical position. Therefore, they must

197

operate with a "risk-based prism," that allows them to rapidly interpret and adapt to threats within their environment (Freier 2016, 24). However, such orientations can create mindsets that simplify situations and fail to distinguish critical connections that allow large organizations to negotiate complex changes (B.G. Hoffman 2017; L. Hoffman 2023, 249-250). However, operational environments are often complex.

Economist Nassim Talib uses the term "Black Swan" to describe events that lie outside the realm of regular expectations and carry extreme impacts that force human beings to "concoct plausible" predictions for action (Taleb 2007, 17). Such random and unexpected events can challenge "normalized" mindsets and they can cause inappropriate, "quick" reactions to perceived events (Taleb 2007, 77). To address such events, Talib advocates organizations to develops systems of planning and thought that critically examine their heuristics and biases and optimize their capacity for interpreting uncertainty. He explains:

> It is more difficult to be a loser in a game you set up yourself. In Black Swan terms, this means that you are exposed to the improbable only if you let it control you. You always control what you do; so make this your end (429) … it is only a "black swan" for the turkey, is not a black swan for the butcher." (Taleb 2007, 478)

Others use the acronym of VUCA (violent, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous) as a way for organizations to assess risks and create mitigation strategies to deal with complicated environments and create new understandings that help them orient their responses in changing environments. This type of planning discipline helps them to allocate resources to enhance their performance that shape and control their operational environments (Bennis and Nanus 2003, 79-ff; Bennett and Lemoine 2014, 6-7).

Much of operational planning depends upon a System 1 OODA Loop dependent upon a situational awareness and the ability to make rapid decisions and disassociated them from emotional reactions (Litz and Kerig 2019; Storr 2008; Richards 2012). Operation planning creates an essential mindset within warfighters for them to recognize, control, and overcome helplessness caused by their operational environments. However, resilience and the ability to change reside within the capability and capacity of warfighters to use System 2 type reflexivity (Boyhill, Szalma, and Hancock 2015, 23-ff; Gerras 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1982). Thus, change and adaptability shape and empower resiliency and winning under adversity (Seligman 2006, 67-75; Duckworth 2016).

Warfighting creates dissonant events that warfighters can perceive as too much, too fast, or too soon, and the first steps in rebuilding agency is by slowing down, observing reactions, and working through the emotional and cognitive dissonance (Menakem 2017, 125-ff and 263-ff). Much has been written about Grossman's explanation of how the practice of operantly conditioning warfighters to shoot at human-shaped, realistic targets increases their competence and lethality in combat (Grossman 1995, 96-98, 232-233, 314-323). Rolf Larsen found that 59% of a group of young military officers fired upon the human-like 3-D dummies when they were suddenly introduced next to human-like targets during a live fire exercise. The other 49% refused to fire, sensing types of uncertainty caused by their identification of the 3D human forms. However, only 1% of these officers warned, or told, their peers not to fire. This study

suggests that stress and peer orientations may have a greater affect upon the perceptions that shape leadership decisions and group behavior during combat rather than uncertainty and individual conduct (R.P. Larsen 2001).

In war the simplest thing can become difficult, thus the objective of operational planning is to understand the nature of combat and overcome "frictions" caused by contexts, principles, and "chains of conclusions derived from maxims, and character." (Von Clausewitz 1968, 151-164). Here virtue (as a warrior code) can become a secondary driver of a warfighter's tactical moral agency in commander and staff planning (Von Clausewitz 1968, 256-257). Classical Western military theory attaches great importance to winning by annihilating the enemy's military strength through the concentration of firepower. However, Classic Eastern Military Theory attaches greater importance to the blending of violent and non-violent means to achieve military victories. Here, operational planning must build a momentum that overcomes friction though maneuver and unification of forces to combine orthodox direct attacks with unorthodox indirect attacks (SunTzu 1991, 17, 32-35). Sun Tzu writes:

> When the speed of rushing water reaches the point where it can move boulders this is the force of momentum. When the speed of a hawk is such that it can strike and kill, this is precision. So, it is with skillful warriors – their force is swift, their precision is close. Their force is like drawing a catapult, the precision is like releasing the trigger. (SunTzu 1991, 35)

Such precision and momentum involve the planning of leaders who solve the problems of war through the application of tactics and strategies to create favorable conditions that subject enemy forces to their will (R. Li, Hong, and Runhao 2013, 6-8). Thus, they pass this operational orientation unto subordinate warfighters, and the risks unto enemy combatants.

Boyd incorporated the theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu into the OODA loop to design an operational mindset that combined self-awareness to minimize one's own frictions using observation and orientation of the enemy's frictions to revise and maximize one's own advantages for decision and action (Boyd 1976; Coram 2002). Historically, this has proved to be the ability of military leaders to: 1) grasp ideas without concrete forms, 2) identify decisive points, 3) link training and doctrine with organizational processes, that 4) operate as the hub of the wheel to direct the maneuver of appropriate forces (Van Creveld 1985, 11-16 1nd 268). Clausewitz and Sun Tzu left some room for chance and luck in operational planning. However, modern commanders are told that "hope is not a method" for developing people and systems that are responsive to their competitive environments, adaptive to change, and create positive actions (G.R. Sullivan and Harper 1996, Kindle location 3706 - ff).

Only the U.S. Air Force Operations Doctrine mentions the OODA Loop(Air Force 2016). None of the service operational doctrines mention Black Swans, VUCA, positive change, or kill chains. However, all service doctrines for operations use words such as volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity to define operational environments. They also define warfighting in terms of mission command processes that are based upon assessing vulnerability and risk, and they include Boyd's processes for operational planning to influence actions, and define targeting in terms of understanding, decision, and action (Air Force 2016; Army 2019c; Coast Guard 2012; JCS 2020, 2022; Marine Corps 2011a; Navy 2010; Space Force 2021; USASOC 2011).

Boyd and classic theorists left moral orientation and spiritual considerations out of operational planning process. However, the Joint Forces, Army, and Coast Guard

manuals include moral, religious, and spiritual orientations as part of the operational planning process (Army 2019c, 3-59; Coast Guard 2012, 63; JCS 2022, lll 49-52), and all services have separate manuals for religious support doctrines, included with sub-categories associated with warfighter character and competence embedded.

Thus, all U.S. operational doctrine describes uses of natural System 1 thinking supplemented by System 2 reasoning to describe kill chain processes. Research finds that forms of spiritual dimensions are inherent parts of human identity. This complex operational mindset influences warfighters' moral orientation by 1) compartmentalizing the religious, moral, and spiritual dimensions integrated into their warrior codes, and 2) minimizing the function of System 2 critical reflexivity as the basis for reforming the heuristics and that inform warfighters mission command and targeting.

Mission Command

General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defined the basic principles of mission command as mission type orders, commander's intent, and decentralized execution. The purpose of these principles is mission accomplishment driven by adaptable leaders who: 1) possess the authority and responsibility to act, 2) blend the art of command and the science of control and 3) integrate all staff and joint warfighting functions (Dempsey 2012). This responsibility and scope of operations are reflected in the operational doctrine of all services (Army 2019c, 1-1-3, 2-2,21 and 35; Air Force 2016, 2-4; Coast Guard 2012, 96-ff; JCS 2022, III-5-ff; Marine Corps 2011a,

5-7; 2016, 18; Navy 2020a, 6-7).[14] Dempsey defines mission command in terms of Kahneman's System 1 thinking and Boyd's OODA Loop:

> The key to victory in Colonel Boyd's thinking was the ability to create situations wherein one can make appropriate decisions more quickly than one's opponent. The practice of mission command in the Joint Force 2020 is in this spirit. Mission command is not a mechanical process that the commander follows blindly. Instead, it is a continual cognitive effort to understand, to adapt, and to direct effectively the achievement of intent. (Dempsey 2012)

Thus, mission command requires military leaders at all levels to understand the intent of the mission, adapt the mission to the capabilities of subordinates, clearly translate his/his/their intent to subordinates, and then trust them (not blindly) to do it(Dempsey 2012). Such purpose is embedded in the doctrinal concept of command and control (C2) which is defined as the "exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission… [including] the authority and responsibility to use resources to accomplish assigned missions" (JCS 2022, xiii).

The above definitions of mission command outline the unified planning and coordination of joint battle systems[15] and units to provide warfighters with a common operating picture and accurate estimates of the situation from which can make operational decisions (JCS 2022, xi-xiii; Michel 1990). Mission command is both a hierarchal and a flat concept of leadership that is based upon authority and the expectation that officers and non-commissioned officers at all levels of command will empower and delegate

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[14] The Space Force doctrine is still in process. However, current operations parallel the Air Force Doctrine and it is embedded within Joint Doctrine.

[15] Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

authority for subordinate warfighters to act. Thus, mission command provides warfighters' professional initiative and moral agency at every level of command (JCS 2022) to fight. This also creates the expectation that warfighters at all levels will exercise their senses of fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy (FRAME).

The concept of unified planning and decentralized execution may differ between militaries and units, but the mindsets and moral orientations that warfighters take with them into combat are similar. In an often-quoted speech, General Douglas MacArthur described the essence of warfighters' initiative and moral agency when he spoke to West Point Cadets, "Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the Nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country" (MacArthur 1962).

MacArthur describes how warrior codes (character) get linked with mission command as a matter of ethos, mindset, and practice. This linkage can be defined by the military ethos and law as command responsibility. Within the ethos, command responsibility is believed to be, "commanders are responsible for everything their warfighters are required to do, do, or fail to do."[16] However, codes of law narrowly define command (superior) responsibility as a *sui generis* (particular class alone) liability that is used to hold military officers, by virtue of their mission command authority, specifically accountable for their knowledge of, and their failure to prevent, crimes committed by their subordinates (Quenivet 2022; Hobbs 2012). Like the Uniform Code

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[16] From my own experience, and many hours of training.

of Military Justice (UCMJ), IHL adjudicates warfighters' criminal offenses by charging them with specific violations related to their direct actions. Uses of IHL and UCMJ with moral issues and war events will be examined later and in chapter 5.

Mission command contributes to warfighters' operational mindsets through the orders and expectations that commanders place upon them. In *The Mask of Command,* historian John Keegan offers historic examples of heroic (Alexander the Great), false heroic (Adolph Hitler), and un-heroic (Ulysses Grant and the Duke of Wellington) leaders who exercised mission command in various ways (Keegan 2012, 10-ff). However, Keegan concludes that modern warfare places commanders in a post-heroic model of leadership that requires them to exercise command through their prudence, self-discipline, and competence by finding, "the conviction to play the hero no more" (Keegan 2012, 351). This places mission command within a chain of command performed by staffs and unit organizations.

In the post-heroic style of mission command, strategy takes on meaning as commanders lead planning processes that uphold the unique characteristics and personalities of the warfighters who live the consequences of their commands, and so gain understandings of themselves (Builder 1989, 11-14, 52-53, 205). It is here that operational mindsets and mission command processes influence warfighters targeting biases. These operational mindsets, mission command processes, and targeting biases also have the potential to cause the moral dissonance that dis-integrates warfighters' moral orientations when their warrior codes and principles conflict with the utility of their mission orders and the end-states expressed by commander intents. Thus, warfighting situations stress warfighters' character, competence, and moral senses.

Targeting Biases, Risk Transference, and Kriegsraison

War is a cycle of cause and cruelty fueled by the character and competence of warfighters who target according to operational mindsets directed by mission command. Sociologist Martin Shaw characterizes the conventional western way of war in terms of warfighters' biases for force protection, their extreme aggressiveness, their mission objectives to deploy weapons against enemy forces without suffering loss, and their ability to operate with impunity (M. Shaw 2005, 34). These targeting biases lead to the systemic transference and management of risks that prioritize the lives of friendly warfighters over civilians by focusing upon uses of air power, efficient kill chain operations, the use of coalitions to deflect responsibility, media management to control narratives, and the creation of physical distance to minimize contact with warzone suffering (M. Shaw 2005, 77-94).

Targeting biases create operational norms (mindsets) where noncombatant casualties are understood, accepted, and consciously intended as forgone consequences of operational necessity (Rockel 2009, 60-61). Thus, a mission command bias emerges to plan, and then justify, the "inevitable," secondary killing of noncombatants, instead of regarding their deaths as unintended, unacceptable and regrettable (Guy 2009, 130; Herod 2009, 318). This becomes a "deliverer's dilemma" for warfighters operating in foreign environments, whose successful use of violence in tactical short-term battles undermines their long-term operational success and forces them into the same circle of suffering they inflict upon others and to see the impossibility of squaring the ethics of occupation and violence with the morality of justice and deliverance, or violence with justice (Brook 2009, 233).

Targeting bias is a heuristic, a predisposition, that determines when, how, and why to kill an "enemy" (Gregg 2009, 183). In an often-quoted speech General George Patton offered his command intent to his Soldiers:

> But a real man will never let his fear of death overpower his honor, his sense of duty to his country, and his innate manhood…From time to time there will be some complaints that we are pushing our people too hard. I don't give a good [deleted] about such complaints. I believe in the old and sound rule that an ounce of sweat will save a gallon of blood. The harder WE push, the more Germans we will kill. The more Germans we kill, the fewer of our men will be killed. Pushing means fewer casualties. I want you all to remember that. (Patton 1944).

Some paraphrase his guidance as the heuristic, "you don't win a war by dying for your country, you win a war by making other guys die for their country." Navy SEAL Marcus Luttrell translates this logic into his own targeting bias:

> The truth is, in this kind of terrorist/insurgent warfare, no one can tell who's a civilian and who's not. So, what's the pint of framing rules that cannot be comprehensively carried out by anyone? Rules that are unworkable, because half the time no one knows who the [deleted] enemy is, and by the time you find out, it might be too late to save your own life… nothing's fair in war, and occasionally the wrong people do get killed. It's been happening for about a million years. Faced with the murderous cutthroats of the Taliban, we are not fighting under the rules of Geneva IV Article 4. We are fighting under the rules of Article 223566 [.223 or 5.56mm] – that's the caliber and bullet gauge of our M4 rifle. (Luttrell and Robinson 2007, 169-170)

In his work *On Protracted War* Mao Tse-Tung broadens Luttrells' narrow targeting mindset by using the example of the Duke of Hsiang's defeat in combat to illustrate the futility of using virtue-based, principle-centered codes of ethics in warfighting. Instead, he prescribes the use of utilitarian-based, situational reasoning within mission command to achieve desired outcomes in combat. He writes:

> The resolute rallying of the people on a broad scale is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all the requirements of the war.

207

Moreover, it will definitely play a big part in carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading him and catching him unawares. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his *asinine ethics* [italics mine]. In order to achieve victory, we must, as far as possible, make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds. (Tse-Tung 2020; Walzer 2015, 226-ff)

Army Judge Advocate Gary Solis is concerned that such utilitarian, targeting mindsets can result in combat zones that would, "spiral into chaos, an old west Dodge City without a sheriff, where one can shoot first and ask no questions at all"(Solis 2022, 210). Theologian and ethicist Daniel Bell writes that questions about just targeting are meant to trigger (pun intended) warfighters' struggles with issues of displaying consistent, virtuous character in situations that compartmentalize their moral behavior (Bell 2009, 219-230). Thus, the presence of moral dissonance can be a sign of warfighters' healthy moral agency as much as their operational uncertainty.

Thus, a targeting blends with the operational mindset defining a warfighters' warrior code and military competence. This bias can be directed and controlled, like rocket propulsion. Here, warfighters observe the enemy, orient themselves to the situation, aim and then kill. This is the use of kill chain targeting within mission command. The very nature of asymmetries in combat can cause overmatched (or differently matched) opponents to use strategies and tactics that counter the advantages of stronger opponents and force them to adapt to unfamiliar conditions (W.E. Lee et al. 2021). This is Boyd's, Sun Tzu's, and Mao's understanding of warfighting, and it is especially true in intercultural wars where tactics can change the moral conditions for warfighting. Such practices create the moral dissonance witnessed in the language that warfighters' use to describe their experiences (W.E. Lee et al. 2021, 5-10, and 210-211).

208

Marine veteran Eugene Sledge summarized his self-identity after fighting against an often-unseen enemy in the South Pacific during World War II, "war made savages of us all" (Sledge 1981, 19).

For warfighters, the presence of moral dissonance can be a signal that something is going wrong. More importantly, it is a sign of the dis-integration between elements that determine the moral and ethical boundaries associated with targeting. Army commander Pete Kilner describes to his subordinate leaders the necessity for including deliberate System 2 moral reflexivity to fast, OODA Loop reasoning.

> Every act of killing is a very serious, permanent action that requires moral justification… Killing someone, even justifiably, is upsetting at some level. That's normal and healthy. If the killing is morally unjustified, the psychological impact will likely be much greater… A commander-initiated conversation will make your soldiers comfortable with the topic and provide them a shared vocabulary for talking about it… A professional dialogue among you and your soldiers will be a lot healthier than the tortured internal monologues that so many soldiers are currently experiencing. (Kilner 2010)

Targeting biases drive the type of moral reasoning warfighters use in System 1/OODA Loop thinking. But it is System 2 reasoning that warfighters use for moral navigation. System 2 reasoning processes (review, reframe, reconcile, revise) can be conceptualized as the self-examination processes associated with Kolb's four stages of learning: concrete experiences (feeling), reflective observations (watching), abstract conceptualization (thinking), and active experimentation (doing) (Kolb and Kolb 2017, 26-ff; N. Sherman 2021, 185). These stages accomplish Couch's and Kilner's intent for combat-oriented training under controlled stress. Here, warfighters can develop reasoned, "dialed responses" that they can rapidly apply to future situations they will encounter in war (Couch 2010, 10-12). These processes can change harmful and develop

helpful heuristics to help warfighters align their moral compasses (orders, principles, and doctrine) with their desired destinations (command intents/guidance and mission end states), terrain (situational awareness and contexts), moral maps (virtues, and warrior codes), and instincts (Foundational and FRAME senses).

At one time the National Defense University (NDU) used four case studies to teach senior military officers from all the services about the necessity for incorporating moral and ethical orientation into their styles of leadership and mission command practices: 1) *The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders* (Ludwig and Longnecker 1993*), 2) Ethical Marginality: The Icarus Syndrome and Banality of Wrongdoing* (Balch and Armstrong 2010*), 3) Lee's Mistake: Learning from the Decision to Order Pickett's Charge* (Gompert and Kugler 2006a) and, 4) *Custer in Cyberspace* (Gompert and Kugler 2006b*)*.[17] Each of these case studies examine critical issues in making mission command decisions that can cause moral dissonance and disorient warfighters.

First, the Bathsheba study uses the Old Testament story of King David, Bathsheba, and Uriah to examine how leaders' misuse of privilege and prerogative can manipulate subordinates and cause personal and organizational mission failures (Ludwig and Longnecker 1993). Second, the Icarus study uses the myth of Icarus' flying to close to the sun to examine the ways that leaders' drive to achieve and maintain competitive advantages can cause moral and ethical fading that results in disastrous personal and organizational consequences (Balch and Armstrong 2010; Wong and Gerras 2015, 17-

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[17] These were used in the Strategic Leadership courses during my assignment as adjunct faculty at NDU from 2013-2016.

33). Third, the Gettysburg study uses General Lee's insistence to use a frontal assault against a fortified position contrary the advice of subordinate commanders to examine how past successes can result in biases and convictions that produce the inability to assess and adapt mission planning and execution during combat (Gompert and Kugler 2006a). Finally, the Custer study uses his failures during the battle of the Little Bighorn to examine the necessity for leaders to combine intuitive thinking with critical awareness to test their operational assumptions and assess operational risks before making command decisions in rapidly changing situations (Gompert and Kugler 2006b).

All these studies examine the cognitive and character lapses that Dixon identifies as causes for military incompetence (N.F. Dixon 1976, 159-ff, 180-ff), and the "betrayals by those in authority" that Shay identifies as causes for moral injuries (Shay 1994, 2002, 2014). These studies also invite military leaders to ask and answer the essential, critical question, "what am I possibly getting wrong?" before they make decisions, publish orders, and issue their commander intents.

Risk transference is a targeting bias. The intent is to mitigate risk on friendly forces by forcing greater risks upon enemy forces. This is understandable in direct combat, but what happens when risk is placed upon the centers of gravity that support an enemy's infrastructure?[18] Such risk transference occurred in mission command decisions to burn Atlanta, drop nuclear bombs upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, unleash shock and awe on Baghdad, drop barrel bombs in Homs and Aleppo, fire rockets and artillery into Kyiv, fly airplanes into the Twin Towers, carry exploding vests into a crowded

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[18] A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or the will to act (JCS 2022, 2020).

marketplace, shoot into a crowded street after an IED attack, or perform mass machete attacks in a village. Every one of these attacks was committed by warfighters operating with various moral orientations that allowed them to complete and justify their missions by using risk transference.

A majority of modern conflicts have been intercultural, involving asymmetrical tactics and uses of weapons that introduce moral complexities and traumatic consequences inflicted upon noncombatants (W.E. Lee et al. 2021, 11-ff; Pinker 2011, 222-ff). General James Dubik writes, "war justifies, more importantly demands, what in peace time, would be unjustifiable… war is the abnormal ruled normal… [that begs] questions that often don't arise until years after war: 'what kind of person am I to have done this?" (N. Sherman 2015, xiv).

There is a distinction between discerning moral responsibility prior to targeting, and later experiencing grief over inevitable consequences of the decision after the blast. The difference lies in the *kriegsraison* (war reasoning) that warfighters use in making their moral orientations and targeting decisions.

> Kriegsraison holds that military necessity overrides and renders inoperative ordinary law and the customs and usages of war; in extreme circumstances of danger, one may abandon humanitarian law in order to meet the danger. Necessity might permit a commander to ignore the laws of war when its essential to do so to avoid defeat to escape from extreme danger, or for the realization of the purpose of the war. Kriegsraison grants belligerents, even individual combatants, the right to do whatever is required to prevail in armed conflict; to do whatever they believe is required to win. Kriegsraison is the unlimited application of military necessity. (Solis 2022, 266)

Kriegsraison is a cognitive variation of the warfighter-warrior-pirate orientations associated with warfighters' character. Warfighting requires accurate intelligence backed

up by professional discipline, solid plans, quick timing, the potential to strike hard, follow up with contingent plan, and later justify why actions were necessary without apology (Van Creveld 2008, 269). However, does good planning categorically eliminate inappropriate risk transference?

Economist Gary Shiffman documents how military operations do not always lead to success over violent adversaries because human biases often confuse correlations of events with causation, and this results in the labeling and targeting of larger groups of people. Thus, care must be used to differentiate between crimes, acts of terrorism, and wide-spread insurgencies prior to targeting suspected agents for the damage (Shiffman 2020, 11-ff, 106-108, and 122-ff).[19]

Kriegsraison supports targeting biases and risk transference that transforms the pursuit of a positive end state into the ethical fading that results in an opposite, negative outcome (Manson 2016, 7; Shortland, Alison, and Moran 2019, 1-10). This can accompany ethical decision models that justify utilitarian decisions based upon non-critical "right vs. right" or "good-bad, least-worst" outcomes (Kidder 1995, x-5; Shortland, Alison, and Moran 2019, 34-ff). Here ethical fading can cause moral disorientation when warfighters tolerate adversity, accept bad outcomes, and finally settle for, "least-worst decisions because they… held values that trumped any adversity they would experience because of their decision" (G. Klein 1993, 180; 2008). Thus, warfighters end up using a moral calculus that assumes that their actions will cause harm regardless of their intended moral agency, and they automatically settle for risk adverse

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[19] Shiffman advises policy within the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.

outcomes (G. Klein 1993, 183). These types of decisions can also feed into the learned

hopelessness and skepticism that erode resiliency to traumatic stress(Seligman 2006).

This is the moral dilemma warfighters face when making moral decisions to

inflict harm or accept person risk to obtain victory. Research studies have found that 85%

of decisions are made in less than one minute using fast, System 1 cognitive thinking

(G.A. Klein 1989, 176-177). They have also found that slower, System 2 reflexivity

increases participants considerations of wider utilitarian reasoning to critically examine

their initial assessments of situations, their responses, and their cognitive control of future

meaning (Greene 2014).

Such reflexivity has the potential to challenge the myths imbedded within

warfighters' warrior codes, and change the harmful heuristics that influence operational

mindsets, mission command decisions, and targeting bias. However, the goal would be to

equip warfighters with the capability and capacity to deal with the moral dissonance

described by the following soldier and the warfighters in the test narratives:

> In retrospect I don't know if what I did was the right decision or not. He
> [another man] looked threatening and could have hurt, you know, uh, my
> friend, other Americans. And so, from the one side of me I still regret not
> seeing him and firing. On the other side of it, he was an innocent guy, and
> as far as I know he didn't intend any harm to us…if I fire, I kill an
> innocent person, if I don't fire, I risk my friend's life. So, they talk about
> the training taking over at that point, and at this point I don't know, my
> training has taught me to do things like building clears, to defend myself
> in firefights. I don't know if this is dangerous or not, and that is where it
> became very murky for me… we did do training, this looked nothing like
> the training. (Shortland, Alison, and Moran 2019, 161)

Test Narratives

A six-word story attributed to Ernest Hemingway reads, "For sale, baby shoes, never worn."[20] This concise story conveys a profound narrative that invites readers to create the meaning behind the provided details. A six-word story for explaining warfighters' moral meaning could read, "Professional warfighters required, human beings volunteered." Warfighters complete the meanings for the narratives from their warfighting experiences by measuring the outcomes of their moral agency against the values within their warrior codes and moral orientations. This comparison can result in levels of moral dissonance that cause moral injuries. Operational mindsets, mission command processes, and targeting biases directly influence the outcomes of these comparisons, and the following narratives provide examples of how this happens. These narratives are grouped according to three themes: 1) negligence and admonishment, 2) command guidance, and 3) drone targeting.

Negligence and Admonishment

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) defines simple negligence pertaining to homicide as, "the absence of due care" by a person who has a duty to use a degree of care for the safety of others which, "a reasonably careful person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances" (Congress 2019, Article 134 c. iv-147 and subparagraph 57.c.(2)(a).). In a tangential issue, the UCMJ allows for the

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[20] This story is probably urban legend. However, it is used in schools to stimulate creative narrative. From 2013-2016 the Eisenhower School at the National Defense University used this story to create student discussions about moral imagination in operations. http://www.openculture.com/2015/03/the-urban-legend-of-ernest-hemingways-six-word-story.html

nonjudicial admonishment (usually in the form of a letter written by a senior commander) to, "to improve, correct and instruct subordinates who depart from standards of performance, conduct, bearing and integrity, either on or off duty, and whose actions degrade the individual and unit's mission" (Congress 2019, A 2-5 §815). These letters can negatively affect promotions or re-enlistment. Interpretations of negligence and admonishment are supported by the ethical and moral senses of fidelity, responsibility and accountability embedded within warrior codes.

A negligence discharge is the firing of a weapon or weapon system due to malfunction, or a failure to follow safe procedures, or careless handling. Weapons have mechanical safeties to prevent discharge, and warfighters are taught to keep their fingers off their triggers until they are ready to engage legitimate targets. Thus, safety is built into the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and the mission command processes that control targeting. Safety is an act of moral agency for warfighters, and a negligent discharge of a weapon that injures someone is considered a failure of moral agency and discipline more than as an issue of incompetence or law violation. An "experienced" warrior may joke that his/her/their trigger finger is all the safety they need, but a wiser warfighter will carefully adhere to clearing and targeting procedures as a matter of conscience and honor.

During the fall of 2000 an Army unit was visiting a school in Kosovo following the cessation of hostilities between NATO and Serbia. The unit was responsible for guarding the area against potential reprisals, and it also sponsored school activities where warfighters interacted with local children. Outside threats and armed risks were minimal at this time. A platoon of soldiers was returning to base after finishing a game with students on the playground, when a Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) that was being

216

placed in a vehicle (muzzle pointed at the ground) discharged and killed a 12-year-old

boy. The weapon belonged to a young private (PVT) who sponsored the boy. The private

did not have his finger anywhere near the trigger when the weapon discharged. However,

because of a malfunction, or a failure to have the weapon on safe, or some other reason --

the weapon fired, and discharged three rounds through the engine block that killed the

young boy who was standing in front of the vehicle.

The soldiers provided first aid to the boy, and they later mourned with the boy's

family and the people of the village. They also experienced anger at their failure to

protect these people. The PVT, who was also emotionally falling apart over the event,

was charged with negligent homicide. Both the unit leaders and family were left

wondering how jailing an 18-year-old soldier would heal the psychological wounds from

the shooting(Piatt 2000). The PVT was later acquitted of the more serious charges, but

questions remained as to why force protection procedures required soldiers to have

loaded weapons with rounds chambered on the playground. Some soldiers wondered who

was negligent – the PVT who handled the weapon, or his chain of command who set the

ROE? Why couldn't they have maintained a perimeter guard around the school that

allowed other soldiers to unload their weapons before interacting the children?[21]

There is a continuum linking the moral responsibility for the handling of weapons

and the mission command decisions that influence and control the ROEs used in combat

operations. In 2006, the 10th Mountain Division established a combat outpost (COP

Keating) at the bottom of a mountain valley located between villages in Nurestan

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[21] At the time of this incident, I was one of the unit chaplains serving within this chain of
command.

Province, Afghanistan. COP Keating was named after one of the two officers who lost

their lives while serving at the site. Rotational platoons and supporting elements (about

50 personnel) served year-long rotations at COP Keating.

Prior to their assumption of mission in 2008, the incoming brigade and battalion

commanders from 4th Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division visited the outpost. They

determined that the COP was in an indefensible position, and this placed their Soldiers at

great risk. They requested permission to close the COP, but the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander didn't want to get ahead of the President's force

reduction plan for Afghanistan. So, the date to abandon the COP was planned for 10

October, with soldiers preparing to depart on 4 October (Judson and Winkie 2023;

Tapper 2012, 432-437, 489-490, 500-501).

On 3 October over 300 Taliban fighters attempted to overrun COP Keating which

was successfully defended by 50 Soldiers from the Black Knight platoon of the 3-61

Cavalry (consisting mostly of soldiers with prior combat experience). The Battle of

Kamdesh subsequently claimed the lives of approximately 100-150 Taliban and 8

American Soldiers, with 27 wounded(Romesha 2016, 355). The battle resulted in 2

Soldiers awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor (MOH), 1 Soldier awarded the

Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), and 8 Soldiers awarded Silver Stars.[22] Following the

battle, the U.S. Army abandoned COP Keating and the Taliban publicly claimed

victory(Tapper 2012, 596). The Army also issued 3 Letters of Admonishment (LOA) to

the brigade, battalion, and company commanders for their negligence in providing

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[22] The DSC and Silver Stars are the 2nd and 3rd highest combat awards presented by the
U.S. military.

adequate force protection for their Soldiers(Judson and Winkie 2023; Tapper 2012, 595-ff). Lieutenant Colonel Brown (the battalion commander) responded that the force protection and leadership issues cited in the LOAs paled in comparison to the "challenges posed by the camp's geography [an indefensible position] and the [senior] command's decision to scatter small and remote bases throughout one of the most dangerous corners of the world" (Tapper 2012, 596).

However, the LOAs also failed to account for the moral dissonance experienced by the Soldiers who fought the battle. MOH recipient Clint Romesha believed that he was the wrong man to receive the award, and he characterizes the battle as:

> a small battle that unfolded inside the frame of a larger one and by dint of how hard it was fought and how much Mace [one of soldiers who lost his life] meant to all of us, would color the feelings of everyone who was there that day and survived. More than anything else that took place inside that miserable outpost, the story of what happened to Mace would come to define our understanding of whether we lost, whether we won, or whether the final outcome fell through some weird crack leading to a dark space that partook of both victory and defeat while amounting, in the end, to neither. (Romesha 2016, 327)

The officer in command of the COP, Lieutenant Andrew Bundermann, was awarded the DSC for his actions. He considered himself a failure, while rest of the platoon considered him to be the reason they survived(Romesha 2016, 361). Specialist Ed Faulkner became the "ninth victim" from COP Keating as he later suffered from PTSD, and other related issues attributed to his death from methadone toxicity. Staff Sergeant Ty Carter, MOH recipient, and other platoon members attributed Faulkner's death to Army and Veteran Administration indifference (Tapper 2012, 602). Another contributing factor to Faulkner's death, besides the conditions at COP Keating and PTSD, might be the

attitude platoon members assumed after the battle when they remained in Afghanistan for

the better part of a year. Romesha explained this attitude,

> We all knew the drill. Bottle your feelings inside, bury them deep, and if
> any of those emotions refuse to stay down, harness that energy and
> channel it into doing your job well until the deployment is complete and
> it's time to head home. Then when you're back in the States you can
> unlock the door to the room where all that pain has been stored and try to
> take stock of what it all means. Or not. (Romesha 2016, 363-364)

This battle is an example of possible outcomes from operational mindsets,

mission command decisions, and the moral costs experienced by warfighters. Any of the

warfighters involved in the previous events could ruminate over questions such as, "Why

did we have loaded weapons on that playground, or why were we in that valley?" But the

meanings they assign to their answers will probably be linked to the command guidance

that influenced their moral agency. Sergeant Daniel Rodriguez summarizes the moral

dissonance associated with such outcomes:

> I hope it [the narrative of the battle] emphasizes the tragedies,
> unforgettably, so the remembrance of good men is permanent. I hope it
> will open our eyes and help us better understand the sacrifices made by
> service members. Lastly, I hope it's a lesson to military leaders that war
> has consequences and that leaving your troops in an indefensible location,
> in the middle of hell, is a pretty shitty idea. (Tapper 2012, Foreward)

Command Guidance

Command guidance functions as a source for the motivations, permissions, and

intents that support warfighters' operational mindsets, mission command, and targeting

biases. Command guidance provides the expectations, means, and ends that warfighters

use to perform their missions, and it can be the deciding factor between the principles,

utility, contexts, virtues, and foundational senses warfighters use for moral orientation.

However, in combat the enemy has a vote, and a temptation exists for warfighters to

justify their actions based upon a moral logic (or kreigsraison) that supports a, "you did it, and so did we," rationale (Solis 2022, 113). Such reasoning forms the boundaries that differentiate between warfighter/warrior/pirate agency and just versus unjust war events. Thus, a commander's guidance can provide clarity that empowers warfighters, or it can:

> … aggravate the strains on their subordinates because they are in effect encouraging the development of the characteristics which are unsuited to this particular type of operation, whilst retarding the growth of those which might be useful. In other words, they are leading their men away from the real battlefield on to a fictious one of their own imagining.
> (Dixon 449-450)

John Keegan believes that combatant commanders need two virtues: 1) the courage to envisage and pursue valued goals uninhibited by infantile fantasies, and 2) the wisdom to detached concern for life itself in the face of death. However, he concedes that these two virtues are rare, and their possession might deter a person, "from ever wanting to be a senior military commander" (Keegan 2012, 450). Leadership theory prizes people who temper ambition and fierce resolve with the humility that places the good and success of the organization over self (J. Collins 2001, 20-21, 190-195). However, these virtues do little good without addressing the thinking traps that accompany fast and slow thinking within the OODA loops that shape kill chain operations(N.F. Dixon 1976, 526). The tipping point may well be the small changes brought about by System 2 reasoning that provide tipping points for larger changes in their moral orientations that affect kill chains operations (Gladwell 2021, 8-10 and 277).

The following five excerpts are taken from the command guidance issued by combatant commanders to their warfighters. Ask yourself how their guidance might

influence the moral agency of their subordinates, and lead to issues of negligence and

admonishment.

Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins, commander or the 1st Battalion, Royal Irish

Regiment (British Army) issued the following command guidance to his warfighters prior

to their invasion of Iraq in 2003.

> We go to Iraq to liberate not to conquer. We will not fly our flags in their country. We are entering Iraq to free a people and the only flag which will be flown in that ancient land is their own. Show respect for them. There are some who are alive at this moment who will not be alive shortly. Those who do not wish to go on that journey, we will not send. As for the others I expect you to rock their world. Wipe them out if that is what they choose. But if you are ferocious in battle, remember to be magnanimous in victory…Tread lightly there… you will have to go a long way to find a more decent, generous and upright people than the Iraqis. You will be embarrassed by their hospitality even though they have nothing. Don't treat them as refugees for they are in their own country…
>
> Bury them properly and mark their graves. It is my foremost intention to bring every single one of you out alive but there may be people among us who will not see the end of this campaign. We will put them in their sleeping bags and send them back. There will be no time for sorrow. The enemy should be in no doubt that we are his nemesis and that we are bringing about his rightful destruction… As they die, they will know their deeds have brought them to this place. Show them no pity.
>
> It is a big step to take another human life. It is not to be done lightly. I know of men who have taken life needlessly in other conflicts, I can assure you they live with the Mark of Cain upon them. If someone surrenders to you then remember they have that right in international law and ensure that one day, they go home to their family… The ones who wish to fight, well, we aim to please.
>
> If you harm the regiment or its history by over-enthusiasm in killing or in cowardice, know it is your family who will suffer. You will be shunned unless your conduct is of the highest for your deeds will follow you down through history. We will bring shame on neither our uniform or our nation… As for ourselves, let's bring everyone home and leave Iraq a better place for us having been there… (T. Collins 2008)

Lieutenant Colonel Nate Sassaman, commander of the 1st Battalion 8th Infantry (US) self-describes his role as "the "Warrior King" because of his unit's mission to keep order and facilitate open elections in Balad, Iraq. Sassaman did not want his soldiers to assume a higher risk than the enemy and he summarized his intent, "We [his soldiers] are going to inflict extreme violence" to counter insurgent actions(Filkins 2005). He reasoned,

> It's like Jekyll and Hyde out here… By day, we're putting on a happy face. By night, we are hunting down and killing our enemies. There was no playbook… If grown-ups throw rocks at me, we're throwing them back… But the Iraqi mind-set was different. Whoever displays the most strength and authority is the one they are going to obey. They might be bitter, but they obey." (Filkins 2005)

During his unit's deployment, from 2003-2004, five of his Soldiers detained two Iraqis and threw them into the Tigris River, resulting in the death of one of their prisoners.[23] Sassaman never believed his Soldiers had any criminal intent, and he withheld information from investigators (Ricks 2004). The lieutenant in charge pled guilty to charges of assault and obstruction of justice, the junior soldiers received lesser sentences, and Sassaman received a Letter of Reprimand (a form of Admonishment) that ended his career (Sassaman and Layden 2008, 288-ff; Solis 2022, 456). Sassaman felt betrayed by his senior leaders "lack of a will to win," and he writes his conclusions from the event and the trial:

> If something went wrong, the battalion commander was responsible. I made mistakes—I don't deny that. I take responsibility for everything that happened on my watch, but I tried to do the right thing. I tried to be a warrior. I tried to protect my men and serve my country to the best of my ability. (Sassaman and Layden 2008, 279)

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[23] One Soldier refused to participate in the incident (Solis 2022, 455)

You either followed the laws of land warfare to the T . . . or you didn't. It's just not that simple; that's not reality…I was chastised by the prosecutor for not understanding "army values," a laughable assertion considering that the Eagle Vision [Command Standards] cards carried by every member of my battalion were based on army values. We knew army values—inside and out—and, in fact, strictly followed them. (Sassaman and Layden 2008, 289)

Other military officers view Sassaman's attitude and guidance as contributing to his Soldiers' inability to adhere to the laws of war and their breakdown in discipline. They focus upon: 1) Sassaman's self-assessment as a risk-taker, 2) his desire to transfer risk away from his own soldiers, and 3) his disobedience of superiors' orders as causes for his Soldiers mistreatment of prisoners(Dietz 2010, 30-39). Sassaman believes his command guidance was intended to give his Soldiers the tools to win an unfair fight(Sassaman and Layden 2008, 292). The content of his command guidance to his Soldiers can be deduced from the speech he gave to his Soldiers as he relinquished battalion command:

We are winners and we always fight to win. And this outfit not only discovered the formula to success on the battlefield in Iraq, but we also have so enjoyed keeping the Seventh [Fourth] Infantry Division Fort Carson Commander's Cup, courtesy of the commanding general, in our battalion trophy case this past year. Whether on the ball field or on the battlefield, this battalion is loaded with winners! … Two memorials remain today at Thermopylae. Upon the modern one, called the Leonidas Monument, in honor of the Spartan king who fell there, is engraved his response to the Persian king Xerxes' demand that the Spartans lay down their arms. Leonidas's reply was two words: *Molon Labe*. "Come and get them… That memorial reminds me of this battalion: tough, aggressive, unrelenting, and always focused on winning the fight! (Sassaman and Layden 2008, 296)

Air Force Commanding General Michael A. Minihan is described as a "natural disrupter" for his aggressive, direct style of command. He has recently told his airmen to prepare for war against China. In a recent memorandum to his command he wrote, "I

hope I am wrong … My gut tells me we will fight in 2025" (D. Lamothe 2023). He

concluded with memorandum with the phrase, "LIMA FOXTROT GOLF, meaning let's

f[deleted] go" (D. Lamothe 2023). He explains, "I'm not trying to be somebody that I'm

not, nor am I trying to use theater, or a pedestal… I'm simply trying to make sure that my

command is ready to win if called upon" (D. Lamothe 2023). Amongst Minihan's

command guidance are statements such as, *"fly it like we stole it,"* and in a recent public

speech he said:

> … nobody is going to care what the U.S. military's plans are for 10 years
> from now if it loses a war tomorrow… Lethality matters most… When
> you can kill your enemy, every part of your life is better! Your food tastes
> better. Your marriage is stronger… We are not looking for blue skies or
> smooth air. We are looking to deliver… fire a clip into a 7-meter target
> with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most… Aim
> for the head when doing so… (D. Lamothe 2023)[24]

General Minihan's statements parallel Patton's speech to his Soldiers, and they

exemplify Keegan's heroic style of leadership by relying upon leader bravado and

position to redefine the moral boundaries that define warfighters character and

competence. This can become a catalyst for moral injuries. However, General Minihan is

also described by others as an exemplary "lead from the front commander," who acts by

the same standards he expects from his airmen. He sought help from mental health

professionals following traumatic stresses he encountered during deployments. He shared

his decision through public media, tweeting, "Warrior heart. No stigma." He explains,

> What I discovered is that when you pack a body on ice in the back of C-
> 130 and it smells horrific, and you can't wash it off you, that's something
> to deal with [he said, misty-eyed] When you're in the Pentagon on 9/11,
> that's something to deal with. When your squadron is supporting
> operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2003 to 2006, and your squadron

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[24] Speech reconstructed from direct quotes contained in Lamothe's cited article.

moves hundreds of angels [deceased U.S. troops] … there's something to talk about. (D. Lamothe 2023)

Lieutenant Colonel Mark McCurley presented a different tone of command guidance when he took command of a deployed Predator Squadron flying combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. McCurley views himself and the airmen in his command as warfighters, and he provided them with this brief guidance to influence their operational mindsets, mission command, and targeting:

> It's my honor to stand here before you. I look at people with whom I have worked for years but have never gotten to know. I want you to know now that we are a family, all of us. The aircrew, the maintainers, and the security forces all belong to this great squadron. As we settle into our role here, understand that we have an important mission, one that is in the direct sight of the president. As such we need to ensure we are sharp at all times. We are not Creech [An Air Force Base in Nevada]. We don't cut corners. We don't use cheater checklists. We follow the tech orders to the letter. We do that and we will succeed, I have no doubt. (McCurley and Mauer 2015, 248)

During the invasion of Iraq in 2003 a Marine platoon was given the command guidance to treat all personnel on the airfield as "hostile," and as they attacked quickly and aggressively to secure an airfield. During the attack Fick's Marines wounded two Iraqi shepherd boys. They provided first aid, and the platoon leader Second Lieutenant (2 LT) Nathan Fick and the battalion surgeon successfully argued with their superiors to MEDEVAC (aerial transport) the boys to a field hospital for care (Fick 2005, 237-242). After the boys left for the hospital, 2LT Fick met with his Marines to discuss the incident, and "draw out" the lessons he wanted them to learn from the incident (E. Wright 2004, 170-176). Fick told them:

> … today was [deleted]-up, completely insane. But we can't control the missions we get, only how we execute them. I failed you this morning by allowing that 'declared hostile' call to stand. My failure put you in an

226

impossible position… first, we made a mistake this morning we don't
shoot kids. when we do, we acknowledge the tragedy and learn from it.
(Fick 2005, 242)

The purpose for command guidance is to influence the attitudes and behavior of

subordinate warfighters. It adds to their performance and shapes their operational

mindsets, mission command actions, and targeting biases. It also influences the meaning

warfighters attach to events when things go wrong. None of the previous guidance is

criminal. But ask yourself, "If you were a warfighter, how would the previous examples

of command guidance influence your moral orientations?" Would this guidance help you

understand the scope of your duties, and would it increase your capacity and capability to

perform as a warfighter? Or would this guidance increase the potential for ethical fading

and moral disorientation? Could it influence unjust behaviors where warriors act as

pirates? Or, would it simply set the conditions for moral dissonance when warfighters

believe themselves to be less than what they desire to be? It is this last group of test

narratives that demonstrate how command guidance works during kill chain operations.

Drone Targeting

The use of drones for the targeted killing of High Value Targets (HVTs) is a

variation in the use of air power to bomb enemy assets based upon military necessity.

Technology now allows for the observation and engagement of a potential target with

precision weapons fired from remotely controlled platforms. This type of agency

decreases the risk to friendly forces and places greater risks upon enemy forces.

However, it also increases the moral risk to the operators who now directly experience

the effects from potentially traumatic events, and it transfers a greater risk to non-

combatants within the blast radius of the munitions. In effect it places a sniper's dilemma

upon the pilots, crew members, and operations personnel who observe the movements of a particular enemy, directly fire upon a human target, and then assess the battle damage from their direct agency (Chatterjee 2015).

Warfighters have often talked upon the links between distance and "the ease of aggression," and their war narratives show the emotional relationship between the immediacy of their victim(s) and the methods they use for killing, such as: hand-to-hand, rifle, artillery, or bombing. The belief is that the closer the distance to the kill, the greater the affect upon the combatant, the more distance, the lesser the affect(J.G. Gray 1959, 177-ff; Grossman 1995, 139-ff). The technology to see up close and fire from a great distance has brought combat directly into the operations centers and the psyches of the operators who fly the missions and fire the weapons. Furthermore, the legitimacy of drone strikes has been questioned within the military as attacks have moved away tactical strikes to "over the horizon," strategic strikes with regards to legality, the veracity of intelligence, territorial integrity, and subsequent implications for national security (Lushenko and Carter 2024; Lushenko and Raman 2024, 15-ff, and 62-68).

In 2015 the movie *Eye in the Sky* showed a fictional drone operation from the strategic, government level authorizing the mission, to the operations center controlling the attack, to the tactical level of the pilots and crew flying the drone and firing the Hellfire Missile, to the operator observing the targets and calling for fire, and the non-combatant family living next door to the target. the movie depicted the operational assumptions driving the killing of a HVT, and the moral dissonance that resulted from the fictional event(Hood 2015). The actors portrayed some of the dilemmas and targeting biases within mission command along with the operational mindsets and legal opinions

that drove their Rules of Engagement. The film also depicted the moral dilemmas

experienced by warfighters and the changing targeting calculus politicians and

commanders used to create options and determine command solutions during changing

conditions.

The movie is not far from reality. During the War on Terror Coalition Forces have

used drone attacks to kill HVTs. The highest profile attack happened in 2020 when the

United States used a drone attack to kill Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani the

commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards(Crowley, Hassan,

and Schmitt 2020). The U.S. was criticized for conducting the attack because it could not

establish military necessity for the attack by linking the killing of the HVT who

controlled strategy and actions of Iranian forces in Syria, with an imminent threat against

U.S. forces or interests (BBC 2020). Such controversy demonstrates the uncertainty

involved in calculating the physical and moral risks when making strategic targeting

decisions within the kill chain.

Lieutenant Colonel McCurley describes the operational view of a drone pilot

during the targeting to kill an HVT:

> The trucks sped forward. "Five, four, three . . ." The sensor relaxed his
> grip a mite. The cross hairs drifted toward the lead vehicle. The pilot
> paused to let the sensor focus on his cross hairs. A black streak entered the
> picture from above, raced downward, and slammed into the hood of the
> truck. It hit right where the sensor had placed the cross hairs. Smoke
> mushroomed out of the hood and debris shot out of the engine in all
> directions. The truck skidded awkwardly, spun sideways, and rolled to a
> stop. The truck containing the security team frantically hit the brakes and
> swerved to miss the first vehicle. [a second Predator drone] was trailing
> behind. He rolled in, cleared by the Task Force JTAC [Joint Terminal
> Attack Controller], and put a missile into the hood of the second truck.
> Months of tracking ended in a matter of seconds. There was little reaction
> in the operations center. No cheers. No high fives. The Task Force was too

professional for that. Frog and I shook hands. He was smiling. We were one team. We'd earned a victory, evident by the trucks smoldering in the monitor… We also saw message traffic from the enemy about his death almost as fast as CNN announced the air strike. (McCurley and Mauer 2015, 332-ff)

Such an event may look different at the tactical level to the drone pilot and others watching. An Air Force drone operator reflects on the cumulative effects from his missions, "I felt like I was haunted by a legion of the dead. My physical health was gone, and my mental health was crumbled. I was in so much pain, I was ready to eat a bullet myself" (Chatterjee 2015). Another drone operator described how he killed a HVT while sparing his child, and then watched as the child picked up parts of her father and tried to place them back together (Press 2018). Their moral dissonance is palatable. Airman Heather Linebaugh speaks about her moral dissonance as a drone imagery analyst.

How many women and children have you seen incinerated by a hellfire missile? How many men have you seen crawl across a field, trying to make it to the nearest compound for help while bleeding out from severed legs? . . . when you are exposed to it over and over again it becomes like a small video, embedded in your head, forever on repeat, causing psychological pain and suffering that many people will hopefully never experience. (Chatterjee 2015)

Some of the above warfighters focus upon mission success, and others focus upon the human costs. But notice how each of their narratives conveys a sense of life meanings that are related to senses of duty defined by moral orientations and warrior codes. In combat, these are driven by the operational mindsets, mission command and targeting biases at work within the fast and slow thinking cycles that determine the function of warfighter competency within kill chains.

Conclusion – The Beginning of Moral Dissonance

Where am I? Warfighters habituated moral orientations are sources for determining their moral agency, and their agency is aimed through the reactive thinking and the slower reasoning cycles they use within kill chain operations. The moral orientations and disorientations they experience within the kill chain can leave them with questions about what they did, did not do, or witnessed. I've come to think that these questions become embodied in combinations of warfighters feeling sad, mad, bad, or had. Their emotional reactions are accompanied by cognitive reasons of "why" they think, believe, and feel this way. Educator John Dewey's defined morality as habits that demand certain kinds of activity that constitute self-identity and empower human will (J. Dewey 1922, 12).

Philosopher Elaine Scarry believes that deliberation and habit share key features, which she attributes to the critical questions for human agency: 1) what habit structures will come into play, and will coherent (integrated) or incoherent (dis-integrated) actions will emerge from the deliberation and control processes (Scarry 2011, 71-ff, 99, 108). General of the Army George C. Marshall phrases a similar concept in the context of warfighting:

> The Soldier's heart, the Soldier's spirit, the Soldier's soul, are everything.
> Unless the Soldier's soul sustains him, he cannot be relied on and will fail
> himself and his commander and his country in the end… there is a beast in
> every fighting man which begins tugging at its chains. And a good officer
> must learn early on how to keep the beast under control, both in his men
> and himself. (G.C. Marshall 1953, 1941)

Military moral injuries begin where resilience breaks down and levels of moral dissonance reach a breaking point. This "tipping point" resides in combat when warrior

codes collide with the thinking and reasoning systems that form operational mindsets, mission command, and targeting biases. The resulting disorientation can dis-integrate what psychologist Abraham Maslow describes as, a collective, unitive consciousness of spiritual and moral values that not only judges the past and present, but also directs the future (Maslow 1964, xvii-xviii, 4-7). This breakdown is not only personal; it also affects the collective norms the determine miliary ethos. This results in a moral/ethical fading that corrodes the public and self-regulation of warfighters to the point where they consider their character and competence as acts of betrayal or piracy.

Writer Phil Klay summarizes the problem:

…if you think the mission your country keeps sending you on is pointless or impossible and that you're only deploying to protect your brothers and sisters in arms from danger, then it's not the Taliban or al-Qaeda or ISIS that's trying to kill you, it's America. (Klay 2018)

Theologian Michael Yandell believes that such negative revelations are based upon, "claims of goodness and justice that one believes to one's core, in which one is confident… [and] as it turns out, what one thought they knew about goodness and justice was wrong" (Yandell 2022, 115). For Yandell, and for many warfighters, "goodness and justice" are not just concepts, they are actions. The corrective is training, leading, and recovery that allows warfighters to learn difficult lessons from their moral dissonance, and then correct harmful biases, construct new meanings, and re-engage with their lives in and out of uniform.

For this to happen, Marshall's "beast" needs institutional-containment and self-control which are a part of the habituated warrior codes that inform warfighters' moral orientations. Such codes may also include moral senses associated with their well-being.

232

These values are not fungible. Making these controls too stringent invites one type of disregard (Luttrell's statement) and making them too loose invites another type (Sassaman's statement). Warfighters who believe they fought justly have easier, and quicker, transitions back home than those who self-reported that they were associated with unjust war events (Krauss et al. 2020). Warfighters exist to win their nations' wars, but their internalized warrior codes require the integration of values and agency to function as moral orienting systems within the VUCA environments they will experience during combat. Chapter five will examine how the Just War Tradition (JWT) and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) serve as external guides and guardrails to control the function of kill chains.

Chapter Five: Why am I Doing This?

Influences of Just War Theory and the Law of Armed Conflict

Upon Warfighters

"The warring State permits itself every misdeed, every act of violence, as would disgrace the individual man.' Under these conditions, 'thou shalt not' becomes not only 'thou shalt', but 'woe betide you if you don't.'" (Freud 1939, 5; N.F. Dixon 1976, 335).

Sigmund Freud, Psychiatrist

"Moral injury does not pertain simply to perception of the event's objective facts, but also includes what clients [warfighters] judge to be the ethical and behavioral implications of those facts" (Farnsworth 2019, 374).

Jacob Farnsworth, VA Psychologist

"Once we know our job, have a genuine code of ethics, and maintain unquestioned personal integrity, we have met the first and most demanding challenge of leadership."

Sergeant Major of the Army Silas L. Copeland

"We are an institution of values, rules, regulations, doctrine, and military laws… They have meaning in our thoughts, and they are engrained in each of our services from privates and seaman to generals and admirals… It's all about responsibility and accountability" (Taguba 2005, 7-8).

Major General Antonio Taguba, Investigating officer for Abu Gharib

Introduction

After the Vietnam War Private Marshall Storeby summarized his rational for moral reasons behind his agency, "We had to answer to something, to someone – maybe just to ourselves" (Lang 1969). His searching suggests that there is more to being a warrior is more about using moral orientation (guidance systems) to determine ethical practice than the technical competencies used to accomplish missions (propulsion).

The quotations at the beginning of this chapter suggest that warfighters' moral standards control their ethical practices, and, when integrated with their competence, they hold warriors responsible and accountable for answering the critical question, "why am I doing _____ (this)?" Answers to this question distinguish warriors as warfighters or pirates. But more important, these answers differentiate their self-meaning, and well-being, because at the end of the mission, they will have to answer to something, to someone, or maybe just themselves.

Throughout my time in the military, I heard an often-repeated phrase, "it is the duty of junior leaders to 'turn on' the killing, and it is the duty of senior leaders to 'turn-off' the killing." Every time I heard this, or a similar heuristic, I thought, "Great, here is the accelerator, but where exactly is the steering wheel and the brake?" I especially thought about this when the ranking warriors, who were supposed to be responsible for guiding and controlling a warriors' actions, were the same ones who were motivating and ordering their lethal agency.

The previous chapters examined how habituated warrior codes become integrated into the moral orientations and practical ethics associated with military kill chains,

mission command practices, operational mindsets, and targeting biases. These chapters focused upon the strategy, operations, and tactics associated with fighting and winning wars. It is here that utilitarian and situational moral reasoning often become prioritized over the principles, virtues, and moral senses that compose warriors' moral orientations. This affects warrior agency, when they can become focused upon "accelerating" combat actions (targeting) to achieve mission success instead of "stepping on the brakes" to avoid moral failures (restraint). Combine this dynamic with their existential issues for personal survival, and one can begin to understand how warriors intending to be warfighters, can end up acting like pirates, and experience damaging levels of moral dissonance from what they do, fail to do, or witness. It is this dynamic relationship that makes moral injury a potential occupational hazard for warriors.

The Guideposts and Guardrails Provided by the R/S Roots of JWT and LOAC/IHL

Warfighting is grounded within principles that are rooted within intersections of R/S traditions with Just War Theory (JWT), and Law of Armed Conflict/International Humanitarian Law (LOAC/IHL). All of these seek to control the speed and direction of warfighting by placing expectations and limits upon warfighters' agency through the reflective moral orientations that integrates their moral reasoning into their kill chain operations.

R/S traditions, and LOAC/IHL form intersections of moral and legal limits that are deontological in nature, and these limits are external to the internalized values and codes that define warfighters' identities. Pastoral theologian Larry Graham writes that,

"Whether one believes in God or not, or whether one identifies with a religious tradition or not, the mental and moral furniture of all parties in monotheistic cultures has a "God label" on it somewhere" (L.K. Graham 2017, 43).

Graham's observation can also apply to non-theistic and polytheistic cultures because of the deontological and virtue-based structures and functions of this moral furniture. These structures, as moral furniture, allow for an examination of the multiple, diverse traditions that contribute to modern JWT and LOAC/IHL. These function as guideposts to provide moral direction and guardrails to prevent bad moral agency. Together, these guideposts and guardrails provide the "is and ought" principles for warfighters' moral orientation(Farnsworth 2019). They can also contribute to their moral injuries.

This chapter will examine intersections of R/S traditions, JWT and LOAC/IHL that influence warfighters moral agency. This examination is essential for understanding the origins of Military Moral Injuries (MMI). These origins: 1) address meanings that bridge cultural, R/S, and temporal boundaries, 2) function as global norms used for judging warfighters' moral agency), 3) allow for comparisons of warfighters' diverse experiences of moral dissonance, and 4) allow for the creation of a model to help care providers adapt treatment modalities to the needs of diverse populations of morally injured warfighters (this will be examined in Chapter Six).

Being a warrior is central to the profession of arms. But it is not the essential part when it comes to understanding the moral continuum between acting with the agency of a warfighter or the failed agency of a pirate (criminal). This continuum is composed of a spectrum of principles that define; 1) personal moral orientations, 2) military ethos, 3)

mission orders, 3) command intents, 4) permissions for targeting enemy combatants, 5) the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and 6) the treatment of noncombatants. Warfighters judge their moral agency by combinations of actions within this spectrum, and they determine meaning from the consequences of their actions (Farnsworth 2019; Horn 2020, 296; Snider 2005; Snider et al. 2005). The first three points were examined in previous chapters, the final four points will be examined in this chapter.

Some academics define moral judgements as matters of conscientious service that are defined by the motivations of pacifists, patriots, defenders, or warriors (Horn 2020, 182; Koenig, Carey, and Al Zaben 2022, 34-36). Each of these motivations can morally justify or condemn killing in war, if/when necessary. However, warriors define their moral orientation and agency based upon professional standards and the parameters of their duty. These standards and parameters determine the moral judgements and meanings they derive from their military service.

Dwight Horn, a retired Navy chaplain, argues that some warriors may perceive that rigid moral codes negatively restrict their agency, and emasculate their identity by compromising their mission success (Horn 2020, 297-308). However, Horn also includes the following quote from a Navy SEAL who argues for the necessity of standards to determine moral agency.

> We train for war and fight to win. I stand ready to bring the full spectrum of combat power to bear in order to achieve my mission and the goals established by my country. The execution of my duties will be swift and violent when required yet guided by the very principles I serve to defend. (Horn 2020, 308)

Military Ethicist and Navy SEAL Dick Couch believes that the source of these struggles comes from tensions between the habituated values warriors use to construct the

idealized moral fabric that makes them "effective and splendid" and critical mission

essential conditions that require them to move, "instantly from deadly force to restraint,

then compassion, and back to deadly force" (Couch 2010, 10-12). This movement is

controlled by external rules that are symbiotic with internalized warrior codes and

competencies that these differentiate between the behavior of warfighters (my label) from

pirates (Couch 2010, 9-ff, 73-77).

Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay began his work on moral injury by comparing the

narratives of Vietnam Veterans to the ancient stories of Greek warriors morally

struggling with tensions between principles/virtues/moral senses and utility/context

resulting in emotions of betrayal, rage, and honor that affected their identity and well-

being (Shay 1994, 2002). Recent research has found that warfighters' moral struggles are

the product of warfighters' judgments upon war events based upon external norms that

define "just" versus "unjust" behaviors, and the meanings they derive from these

struggles mediate the traumatic impacts upon their lives upon their return home (Krauss

et al. 2023; Krauss et al. 2020; Maguen et al. 2017). Educator and Army Ranger David

Grossman uses the following veteran narratives to demonstrate the wide range of moral

dissonance formed in the meanings warriors associate with killing. Notice how their

diverse moral orientations and reasoning still create common moral struggles.

> This was the first time I had killed anybody and when things quieted
> down. I went and looked at a German I knew I had shot. I remember
> thinking that he looked old enough to have a family and I felt very sorry.
> —British World War I veteran after his first kill.

> It didn't hit me all that much then, but when I think of it now—I
> slaughtered those people. I murdered them. —German World War II
> veteran.

And I froze, 'cos it was a boy, I would say between the ages of twelve and fourteen. When he turned at me and looked, all of a sudden, he turned his whole body and pointed his automatic weapon at me, I just opened up, fired the whole twenty rounds right at the kid, and he just laid there. I dropped my weapon and cried. —U.S. Special Forces officer and Vietnam veteran.

I fired again and somehow got him in the head. There was so much blood…I vomited, until the rest of the boys came up. —Israeli Six-Day War veteran. (Grossman 1995, 130-131)

The contexts of these narratives seem to be driven by moral boundaries each warrior used to judge their actions and the meanings they derived from their agency. It could be argued that the actions of each veteran were "justified," because they were acting under orders during combat. So, why did they morally judge the consequences from their agency as negative? Each of these veterans acted according to their internalized warrior codes by using fast, OODA loop reasoning to act with lethal force. However, they also used slower moral reasoning to later process their dissonant experiences from killing, and they reached moral conclusions based upon their judgements of their agency. The above narratives demonstrate how warriors can judge themselves as "unjustified" pirates, instead of "justified" warfighters. The implications for this will be the focus of Chapters 6 and 7.

This chapter will examine how JWT and LOAC/IHL place principled (deontological) moral limits upon warriors to form guideposts and guardrails that differentiates their agency as warfighters or pirates. This separation is essential for understanding the effects from moral dissonance and the possibilities for healing moral injuries. This examination will focus upon four areas:

1. The nature and character of war as cycles of cause and cruelty that are associated with moral concepts of exceptionalism and alterity that are practiced through forms of tribalism. This concepts form standards for the permissions and restraints that influence moral and legal tensions along the pathway between peace and war.

2. The development of LOAC/IHL from JWT to create legal boundaries for modern warfighting, and their impact upon the agency of modern warfighters.

3. The development of JWT within R/S traditions and cultures that create the guideposts and guardrails used by modern warfighters for moral orientation.

4. An examination of moral effects from kill chain violations of JWT and LOAC/IHL upon warfighters associated with post-9/11 practices of torture/enhanced interrogation techniques.

The Nature and Character of War

For the purpose of this dissertation, the nature of war is defined as cycles of cause and cruelty where human motivation (cause) becomes justifications for uses of force that incorporate spectrum of behaviors (to include cruelty) against others. The character of war then becomes defined by the moral values that individuals and groups use to determine the ethical practices they will use to settle conflicts with others. The character of war is more important for understanding moral injuries, and it is here that an examination of JWT and LOAC/IHL become important for understanding the boundaries the modern warfighters use for moral orientation and agency.

At the basic level these moral values and ethical practices are associated with distinctions between an "in" group verses an "out" group, and this is a function of

239

tribalism used to determine the recognition of alterity between groups and exceptions for action. When these conflicts become violent, the moral character of tribal members determine the permissions and restraints used along the pathway between peace and war.

Exceptionalism and Alterity as Useful Concepts for Moral Orientation

There are three opposing moral orientations for going to war: 1) a moral orientation that war is categorically wrong, 2) a moral orientation that war is a "just" conflict where one side is justified in exerting a right to act and "punish" unjust actors, and 3) a moral orientation that war is a conflict between two or more equal parties where no side has an *a priori* right, or a privileged protection, for their actions whether they are combatants or noncombatants (Walzer 2004, 338-ff; 2015). These moral orientations distinguish between exceptional justifications to kill and prohibitions for murder. Furthermore, each of these distinctions uses considerations of alterity and emotional reactions such as fear to control the operational mindsets that influence targeting decisions (Buckingham 2022; Grossman 1995, 129-ff; Ramsey 1983, 65-67; Mapel 1998).

Research suggests that combatants' moral senses mediate their post-deployment well-being (Krauss et al. 2023; Krauss et al. 2020; Maguen et al. 2011; Purcell et al. 2016; Purcell, Burkman, et al. 2018; Tripp, McDevitt-Murphy, and Henschel 2016; Van Winkle and Safer 2011). It is here that the concepts of exceptionalism and alterity developed by Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas are helpful.

Exceptionalism

Exceptionalism can be defined as the exercise of power by making exceptions to established norms based upon political contexts and claims of necessity(Schmitt 1985

(1922), 5-ff). There are moral orientation for combat that create a sacred duty, or a *Gott mit tuns* (God with us) mentality, to defend the nobility of "our side" against the evil/wicked embodiment of "the other." This approach can be found in ancient texts that link R/S reasoning with "muscular" warrior motivations, political causes, and warfighting competencies to justify exceptions for making war (Kearney 2023, 39-ff, and 68-ff; Juergensmeyer 2000; Laden 1996).

There are other moral orientations of combat where no side is viewed to have *a priori* rights, or privileged protections for their exceptional actions. These orientations form an equality between combatants where norming restrictions for "winning and fighting well" provide critical obstacles to exceptional behaviors by all sides involved in the conflict (Walzer 2015, 45-46). Warriors act as representatives of groups/states who exercise the power to make exceptions to established norms based upon political contexts and claims of necessity (Schmitt 1985 (1922), 5-ff). This can be a good, or a bad thing.

It can be bad thing if warriors might act as sovereign individuals (*ubermensch*) who exercise agency outside of conventional moral constraints and become an end unto themselves and prove to be pirates (Couch 2010, 9-ff. 73-77; Heidegger 1953, 39-41; Nietzsche 1969, 44-45). It can be a worse thing if warriors act as automatons who disregard their moral orientations in favor of acting as exceptional agents of the state where they exist as a banality, or totality for immoral/illegal purposes that are piracy on a grand scale (Arendt 1963, 174, 363-374; Foucault 1995, 195-ff; Hand 2009, 37-ff; Levinas 1969, 22-28). However, might be a good thing if justifying exceptional practices for harming others provides warriors a way to act in accordance with their moral orientation. It is here, that conscience functions as the internalized process for moral and

ethical reflection upon the socialized norms that influence behavior (Churchland 2019, 11-ff; Heck 2014). This also becomes the point where considerations of alterity become complementary with exceptionalism and warriors begin acting as warfighters instead of pirates.

Alterity

Alterity can be defined as an awareness of the lives and vulnerabilities of others who do not get to choose sides in war (O'Driscoll 2008, 2013). Alterity is best focused through a lens provided by philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas, a Jewish French intelligence officer who became a German prisoner of war during World War II. He constructed a philosophy of being based upon the alterity of the other verses a self-identity based upon an exceptional state of being and a social totality (Hand 2009, 37-ff; Levinas 1998, 103-ff). For Levinas alterity is an external discourse with the Other, and a recognition of the Other's face, that is essential for the direction and intent of just, ethical practices and conscientious actions (Levinas 1969, 50-88).

Sociologist Hans Joas argues that these qualities are based upon the "sacredness of the person" where, "institutions do not perpetuate themselves, but are sustained through the actions of individuals" (Joas 2003, 5-ff). Levinas would agree with this, but he also insists that this sense of "sacredness" is external to oneself, and it can only be found in the alterity of the other, as strangers who, "never have been present, [and] absolutely cannot be accounted for as the object of common memory" (Levinas 1969, 50-51; 1996, 481-ff).

Ethicist Timothy Shaw uses Levinas' concept of alterity to demonstrate how the limits placed upon acts of killing in war provide pathways for understanding the

242

psychological distress (moral dissonance) that warfighters connect with their moral agency and legal responsibilities (T.W. Shaw 2018, 168-173). Philosopher Elaine Scarry points out that there is a large discrepancy between, "the degree of alteration that occurs at the active end of a weapon, or a tool, and what occurs at the passive end… so the change in the position of a finger at one end of a gun may bring about a change from life to death in the body at the other end"(Scarry 1995, 315).

Alterity directs moral agency away from the self through concrete encounters with a faceless other. These encounters modify self-perceptions, moral orientations, and ethical actions (Levinas 1969, 65; Pessin 2016, 620-621). In a similar way JWT and LOAC/IHL establish principles that place moral requirements upon warriors' ethical practices. These principles are not derivative, nor dependent upon warriors' mindsets, biases, or orientations. They are external, principled requirements that 1) reinforce warfighters' moral senses of fidelity, responsibility, and accountability, 2) create a moral mindfulness based upon alterity, 3) restrain warrior's exceptional actions, and 4) regulate the pathways between peace and war. However, these requirements are also related to the traditions and deep human emotions that fuel tribal warfare.

Tribalism

The concept of tribalism is problematic because it has been used in pejorative ways to demean the alterity of particular cultures and groups. This concept is used to justify many exceptional/privileged practices used against marginalized groups ranging from exclusion to genocide. This is why the concept needs to be included as social phenomenon to examine the character of war. Tribalism can be used to define the localized meanings and purposes that specific groups use for defense and survival, and

243

these groups. Groups demographics can range from small clans/bands to social organizations to kingdoms and nation states. Tribalism is supported by R/S and cultural traditions to promote group well-being over a range of activities that include maintaining peace and going to war (Fry 2007, 68-ff; Greene 2013, 50-ff).

As a social phenomenon tribalism supports the values and tasks of warriors to defend the tribe. It operationalizes strengths, minimizes weaknesses, makes the most of opportunities, and decreases threats. It is here that exceptionalism and alterity become peripheral to the necessities of group well-being, and survival.

The Melian Dialogue exemplifies this type of tribalism. Around 404 B.C.E. the Athenians tried to coerce the island-state of Melos to gain their support for Athen's war against Sparta. When the Melians refused to comply with their demands, the Athenians invaded Melos. The Melians were in no position to defend themselves against the powerful Athenians, so they sued for peace. The Athenians refused their offer, by responding, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides 1951, 331). The Athenians then laid siege to the Melian kingdom, executed the men, enslaved the surviving families, and occupied the land. Was this just or legal behavior? There was no judge, and it was up to the warriors, or the gods, to decide.

The Melian dialogue is based upon a form of alterity that favors the "in" group, and its justifications for exceptional necessity and targeting. Tribalism involves these aspects of the Melian Dialogue to: 1) provide justifications for sending warriors to war and bringing them home, 2) create new meanings from past conflicts to strengthen a shared ethos, and 3) form intergenerational bonds for the future (Bullchild 1985; Junger 2016; Wiener and Hirschmann 2014).

Tribalism recognizes the right of groups of people and nations to defend themselves against unwarranted aggression, and it permits exceptional uses of offensive force against individual threats. These exceptions for war grant warriors the permission to engage armed enemies as equal, legitimate, targets. These exceptions are supported by a practical, moral logic that reasons, "because they can kill me, I can, and I must, try to kill them" (Walzer 2015, 36-37). These exceptions then become legalized permissions for larger groups of warriors to defend their own others against outsiders based upon perceived threats to the community (Armstrong 2005, 30-39,149-ff; N.F. Dixon 1976, 212, 335-ff). It is here that alterity is either reinforced, or narrowed, localized, and contextualized.

Tribalism permits violence when there is a consensus and a moral outrage within the in-group, that another group has done something wrong, harmful, or dangerous (A.P. Fiske and Rai 2014, 208). This consensus and outrage is sustained by the mythologies, meanings, and symbols that are built upon individual acts of self-sacrifice for the sake of the group, and these shaped the conditions for warfighting (Ehrenreich 1997, 114-115, 139-ff, and 282-283; Hedges 2002, 10; Woodward 1999, 61-62; Snyder 2002).

Sociologist Bronislaw Malinowski characterizes tribal warfighting as socialized aggression that uses R/S practices and moral senses of loyalty for the purpose of defense, influence, and conquest. These practices and moral senses also form the norms that govern rules for training and fighting, mobilizing warriors, the treatment of enemies, negotiations for peace, and making treaties (Malinowski 1941; Kestnbaum 2009).

Ghanian military officer Festus Aboagye in his work *Indigenous African Warfare* documents how R/S practices and cultural traditions supported tribal warfare led by

245

chieftains and elders who achieved operational depth by mobilizing numbers of

echeloned warriors. These tribes would then conduct tactical, offensive operations,

enforce political/resolution mechanisms, punish troublemakers, impose vassalage,

maintain order, and control territory (Aboagye 2010). The intensity and shape of tribal

warfare continues to provide localized groups the capacity to resist and combat outsider

threats (Callwell 1996; Kilcullen 2013, 126-127; Aboagye 2010).

Research shows that ancient tribalism included levels of systemic warfare that

parallel modern battles and includes incidents of violent death, mutilation, enslavement,

sexual assault, and mass burials (Bamforth 1994; Chacon and Mendoza 2007, 235-239;

J.E. Lambert 2007, 202-ff; Mendoza 2007, 205-ff; Reid 2012, 11-ff and 118-119; Sanft

2020, 419-ff; Tse 2020, 277-ff).[25] Examples of tribal warfare can be witnessed in the

Balkans, China, Myanmar, Rwanda, Gaza and anywhere insider groups are threatened by

exceptional violence from outsider groups based upon alterity (Chang 2012; Gourevitch

1998; Harrow 2005; Honig and Both 1997; Petrila and Hasanovic 2021; A. Jones 2022).

The critical point in examining tribalism is to establish a baseline for the

emergence of just war principles to limit the shape and character of warfighting. Consider

the following narratives spoken by different warriors who: 1) consider their agency as

defense of their "in" group, and not exceptional actions to their moral codes as warriors,

and 2) target their enemy ethnocentrically (not with alterity), in terms of an existential

threat.

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[25] For a complete discussion see: Fagan, Garrett G., Linda Fibiger, and Mark
Hudson. *The Cambridge World History of Violence. Volume 1: The Prehistoric and
Ancient Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, 299-ff.

These two narratives come from Lakota warriors remembering their actions

against the Seventh Cavalry during fighting at the Little Big Horn River.

> [Black Elk speaks] … There was a soldier on the ground, and he was still kicking. A Lakota rode up and said to me: "Boy, get off and scalp him." I got off and started to do it. He had short hair, and my knife was not very sharp. He ground his teeth. Then I shot him in the forehead and got his scalp. (Neihardt 2014, 122-123)

> [Iron Hawk Speaks] … I met a soldier on horseback, and I let him have it. The arrow went through from side to side under his ribs and it stuck out on both sides. He screamed and took hold of his saddle horn and hung on, wobbling, with his head hanging down. I kept along beside him, and I took my heavy bow and struck him across the back of the neck. He fell from his saddle, and I got off and beat him to death with my bow. I kept on beating him awhile after he was dead, and every time I hit him, I said "Hownh!" I was mad, because I was thinking of the women and little children running down there, all scared and out of breath. These Wasichus wanted it, and they came to get it, and we gave it to them. I did not see much more. (Neihardt 2014, 130)

The next narrative comes from Chief Joseph (In-mut-too-yah-lat-lat of the

Nimilpuu). He is speaking from the perspective of a warrior, a chieftain, and an elder

who led his tribe during a long string of battles from their ancestral lands in the

Northwestern United States to the Dakota Territories.

> I would have given my own life if I could have undone the killing of white men by my people. I blame my young men, and I blame the white men. I blame General Howard for not giving my people time to get their stock away from Wallowa… When my young men began the killing, my heart was hurt. Although I did not justify them, I remembered all the insults I had endured, and my blood was on fire... Still, I would have taken my people to the buffalo country without fighting if possible. I could see no other way to avoid a war… When an Indian fights, he only shoots to kill, but soldiers shoot at random. None of the soldiers were scalped. We do not believe in scalping, nor in killing wounded men. Soldiers do not kill many Indians unless they are wounded and left upon the battlefield. Then they kill Indians. (Laughy 2002, 290-291)

The next narratives come from a group of tribal enemies during the Plains Wars, who today are considered as immoral agents of a massacre (Tinker 1993, Kindle locations 1661-ff, 2691-ff; De La Torre 2017, 39-ff). The first narrative is from Colonel (COL) John Chivington, commander of the Third Colorado Cavalry Volunteers (3d CAV). He led an attack against bands of Arapahoe and Cheyenne who were camped near Sand Creek after peace negotiations with Colorado Territorial Governor Evans and Indian Agents in Denver during the summer of 1864. The attack was a reprisal for the raids conducted by Dog Soldiers, who were bands of young warriors dedicated to tribal defense (Dunn 1985; Hoig 1961). The Arapahoe and Cheyenne believed that they were not sheltering Dog Soldiers, and they were under the protection of the cavalry garrison at Bent's Fort at the time of the attack. They attempted to surrender, before trying to defend themselves against the cavalry, or flee from the area.

During the attack the 3d CAV was accused of ignoring flags of truce, murdering, raping, and mutilating innocent members of the Arapahoe and Cheyenne (Hoig 1961, 176-ff). COL Chivington considered this action his duty, and he defended his actions and the actions of his soldiers throughout his life. In 1883 C.E. he wrote:

> What of that Indian blanket that was captured [during the attack], fringed
> with white women's scalps? What says the sleeping dust of the two
> hundred and eighty men, women, and children, immigrants, herders, and
> soldiers who lost their lives at the hands of these Indians [This is the
> disputed number of victims killed during raids by Dog Soldiers during the
> summer of 1864]? I say here, as I said in a speech one night last week – I
> stand by Sand Creek. (Hoig 1961, 176)

Others considered COL Chivington's conduct a crime, and it was characterized as "foul and dastardly" by the Congressional Committee for the Conduct of the War that investigated and condemned the 3d Cavalry attacks (Dunn 1985, 142; Hoig 1961, 168).

248

The congressional investigations and the War Department barred him from military and

public service, and these actions were instigated by letters from cavalry officers (regulars

not militia) who were present during the attacks who:1) actively refused to participate in

the massacre, 2) ordered their troops not to participate, and 3) later testified at the

congressional hearings.

Lieutenant (LT) Joe Cramer also refused to participate in the attack and wrote the

following in a letter to Major Wynkoop:

> … I would not burn powder, and I did not. Capt. Soule the same. It is no
> use for me to try to tell you how the fight was managed, only that I think
> the Officer in Command should be hung... After the fight there was a
> sight, I hope I may never see again… Bucks [men], women, and children
> were scalped, fingers cut off to get the rings on them… But enough!
> (Cramer 2016, 122-123)

Captain (CPT) Silas Soule wrote the following in a letter to his former

commander:

> … We arrived at Black Kettle and Left Hand's Camp at day light… Poor
> old John Smith and Louderbeck ran out with white flags, but they [the
> soldiers] paid no attention to them, and they ran back into the tents.
> [Major] Anthony (indecipherable) to within one hundred yards and
> commenced firing. I refused to fire and swore that none, but a coward
> would… White Antelope, War Bonnet and a number of others had ears
> and privates cut off. Squaw's [women's] snatches were cut out for
> trophies. You would think it impossible for white men to butcher and
> mutilate human beings as they did there, but every word I have told you is
> the truth, which they do not deny. It was almost impossible to save any of
> them… (Soule 2016, 119-121).\

The importance of the previous narratives is to examine the range of moral

justifications used by warriors in tribalism. Notice how Black Elk, Iron Hawk, and

Chivington assumed their actions were justified in defense of their social groups, and

they probably didn't consider their actions as exceptional. They also considered alterity

249

only in the threat their enemy posed to themselves and to their groups. They probably also assumed that their actions as warriors were affirmed, justified, and supported by their groups. Only Chivington crossed a boundary, that was recognized by Joseph, Iron Hawk, Black Elk, Cramer, and Soule. These types of moral reasoning and actions reflect forms of tribalism as uses of violent power against a perceived enemy, and they are similar to the moral reasoning used by the modern American warriors who kill in combat.

First, there is the tanker, Clint Romesha, who remembered his commander's "rah-rah" speech prior to battle, which he interpreted as a permission to kill his enemy by any means possible. After an Improvised Explosive Attack (IED) against his tank, he fired a depleted uranium round from a 120mm canon to protect his crew and kill the enemy trigger man at close range – reasoning, "dead is dead" (Skovlund 2024).[26] Second, there is Special Forces Sergeant Anthony Pryor, who was injured when he was grabbed by an enemy who dislocated his shoulder. Pryor's first reaction was, "it's showtime," before killing his enemy in hand-to-hand combat (Cosner 2011; Lineham 2016).

Then, there is the Air Force pilot, Amy McGrath, who was known for always doing her job in flying multiple bombing missions in Iraq that killed both combatants and non-combatants. Upon returning home she began to have negative reflections about her combat experiences, and she found comfort and affirmation in the words from an uncle who was a Marine combat veteran from Vietnam. He simply told her, "I know, I know…" (Holmstedt 2007, 113).

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[26] This is overkill. A sabot round is a kinetic energy artillery round, that travels at ultrasonic speeds to destroy enemy armor. These shells are not intended for human targets.

McGrath's moral reflection is the same point of divergence as for Chief Joseph, Cramer, and Soule. They all fought in defense of their groups, and they probably did not consider their agency as exceptional, or above the norms of their groups. However, they also considered the alterity of others in discerning their agency and this formed a moral and ethical boundary for them. So, they concluded that lethal actions were not justified.

These considerations took a different turn in the strange case of *United States v. Plenty Horses*. In 1891 C.E., after the Battle/Massacre at Wounded Knee, the surviving members of the Oglala organized defenses for their protection. During a parley, a Lakota Warrior named Plenty Horses shot and killed LT Ned Casey. Casey was well connected with senior Army officers, and Plenty Horses was captured and put on trial for murder. Plenty Horses and his lawyers defended his actions by arguing that the Army was at war with the Oglala, and Casey was a legitimate target. The military judges concurred, and Plenty Horses was acquitted. Some argue that his acquittal was necessary to vindicate the Army's attacks of the Lakota at Wounded Knee, others see this verdict as an affirmation of the "equality of equals" that exists between combatants (Solis 2022, 30-34; Walzer 2015, 45-46).

In tribal warfare warriors engaged in combat are likely to use any means to gain a competitive advantage over their enemy. Although tribalism explains uses of warfare to ensure group defense and survival against outsiders, the above actions and narratives also demonstrate that warriors within these same groups possess values and meanings that regulate their positions on the pathways between peace and war.

The Moral and Legal Pathways Between Peace and War

Figure 5.1 Pathways to War

Writing prior to the Vietnam War, Christian Church historian Roland Bainton suggested that a spectrum of war could be examined by linking the extreme of pacifism, which renounces political violence, with the extreme of holy war, which sanctions total violence. He reasoned that these extremes were mediated by categories of just war (Bainton 1960, 15-ff). Thus, each extreme can be connected by the pathways that are used to justify the cycles of violence and cruelty practiced in war. These pathways are pictured in Figure 5:1.

The center of this graphic shows that the conditions for maintaining peace are connected along a continuum with the conditions for conducting war. The middle arrow and the darkening color gradient signify the increasing, collective costs of warfighting (psychological, spiritual, and physical) that occur at different levels of warfighting. This does not imply that no harm is inflicted during peacekeeping or stability operations, or

that there are no benefits from defensive/offensive operations. This graphic only

visualizes the lighter amount of systemic harm that occurs during times of peace and

activism than during times of insurgency and holy/total wars.

The left side of figure 5.1 visualizes levels and categories of war that were

developed by theologians, philosophers, and political theorists to minimize harms to

populations (V. Held 2004, 59-ff; Lucas 2020; Orend 2000; Patterson 2023). These

categories can be defined as:

1) *jus ad vim* principles maintain well-being (Braun and Galliott 2019;

   Brunstetter 2019; Brunstetter and Braun 2019; Frowe 2019; S. Kaplan 2019;

   Ketcham 2019; Lupton and Morkevicius 2019; S. Miller 2019)

2) *jus ad bellum* principles that restrict uses of warfare and limit justifications for

   going to war (Bell 2009; Biggar 2013; J.T. Johnson 1981; Cumming 2013;

   Morkevicius 2018; Ramsey 1983; Walzer 2015; P.D. Miller 2021; Yoder

   1996).

3) *jus in bello* principles that restrict practices during warfighting (Bell 2009;

   Biggar 2013; J.T. Johnson 1981; Couch 2010; Cumming 2013; Grossman

   1995; Grossman and Christensen 2004; Morkevicius 2018; Ramsey 1983;

   P.D. Miller 2021; Walzer 2015; Yoder 1996).

4) *jus post bellum* principles for the restoration of peace (Barton 2018; Charles

   and Demy 2010; Hauerwas 1983; Philpott 2012; R. Williams and Caldwell

   2006; Yoder 1996).

The right side of figure 5.1 visualizes types of military operations that occur

across the physical domains of land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace (Army 2019c, 3-1-ff;

JCS 2022, II 10-11, VIII 15). Military theorists have argued these types of warfare serve practical needs for peace and security that are driven by political/national interests, military science, and international relations (Machiavelli 1981; McFate 2019; SunTzu 1991; Tse-Tung 2020; Van Creveld 2015; Von Clausewitz 1968). More importantly this pathway is regulated by international law to form a *realpolitik* approach to peace and war. It's interesting to note that these sources leave out religious influences.

The roots of all these pathways are grounded in western and eastern R/S traditions and cultures prior to being codified into modern constructions of JWT and LOAC/IHL (P.D. Miller 2021, 7-ff). These roots will be examined in the following sections, but for now it is important to visualize the principles and categories of these pathways

Table 5.2 visualizes the multiple connections between JWT and LOAC/IHL categories that influence warfighters' moral orientations. JWT principles form moral boundaries that limit exceptions for uses of lethal force for the protection of threatened groups of people or states. LOAC/IHL forms a body of legal laws and processes that restrict lethal force for the protection of threatened groups of people from actions of states and non-state actors. Understanding the formation
 of these specific boundaries begins by examining how JWT and the derivative LOAC/IHL are historically situated within the evolving pathways that cultures and nations use to support the causes and cruelties of just war.

Just War Theory (JWT)	Law of War (LOAC) International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Jus ad Vim (Braun and Galliott 2019; Brunstetter 2019; Brunstetter and Braun 2019; Frowe 2019; Kaplan 2019) • Law Enforcement Models • Military Command Models • Modified Jus ad Bellum Criteria • Prevention of Escalation	**Formation of the Red Cross 1859** **Lieber Code (General Order100) 1863** **The Hague Conventions 1907**
Jus ad Bellum (Bell 2009; Walzer 2015) • Legitimate Authority • Just Cause • Right Intention • Aim of Peace • Reasonable Success • Proportion of ends to means • Last Resort	**The Geneva Conventions 1949** • Conditions of Land Forces • Conditions of Sea Forces • Treatment of POWs • Protection of Civilians
• ***Jus in Bello*** (Walzer 2015; Couch 2010; Grossman 1995) • Military Necessity • Proportionality • Distinction • Human Suffering	**IHL/LOAC** • Necessity • Proportionality • Distinction • Human Suffering
• ***Jus post-Bellum*** (Philpott 2012; Schultheis 2005; Williams and Caldwell 2006) • Vindication of Human Rights • Economic Reconstruction • Restoration of Self-Determination • Punishment of IHL Violations	**Geneva Protocols 1977** • I Protection of Victims in International Conflicts • II Protection of Victims in Non-international Conflicts • III Red Cross Emblems **UN Charter 1949** Chapter 7 Article 51

Table 5.2 JWT and LOAC/IHL Criteria

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to conduct a deep examination of the *jus ad vim, jus ad bellum, and jus post bellum* principles that reside within these traditions. Instead, I will focus upon how the *jus in bello* principles of proportionality, distinction necessity, and humanity (human suffering) form external norms that shape warfighters' conduct and their consideration of exception and alterity. However, warfighters also use these principles internally to assess their moral orientations, judge their moral agency, reconcile their moral dissonance, assign meaning, and create well-being.

Each of the four *jus in bello* principles were introduced in the Lieber Code and they have become interconnected principles within the LOAC/IHL. They can be broadly defined as follows:

1. Military Necessity, "justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war" (Solis 2022, 218; DoD 2023, para 2.2). Military necessity is the principled application for exceptional uses of military force based upon factors other than tribalism, and they must provide moral and ethical reasons for their operational targeting. The principle of military necessity seeks to answer the question, "why is this action required/essential for mission success?" Thus, military necessity is related to proportionality, distinction, and human suffering.

2. Proportionality is a cost-benefit analysis used for comparing the consequences of attacking an objective against the outcome achieved. Warfighters use proportionality to determine whether it is most appropriate to drop a bomb, fire artillery, conduct a ground assault, or bypass a target based upon the amount and types of casualties incurred during an operation. Such determinations are related to the principles of necessity, distinction, and human suffering.

3. Distinction (or discrimination) is the imperative warfighters have for separating combatants from noncombatants and categorizing threats during targeting. Distinction requires warfighters' consideration of alterity, and it is essential for preventing unintended consequences that

may occur during combat. Warfighters use objective identifiers such as uniforms, equipment, insignia, location, and appearance to determine the legitimacy for use of lethal force. However, they also make complex distinctions based upon subjective identifiers such as: physical characteristics, motivations behind observed actions, interpretations of intelligence, affiliations, or emotional reactions. Thus, distinction is prone to biases, but together with proportionality and necessity it forms accurate boundaries for permitting or limiting warfighters' targeting. However, when distinction is combined with principles for assessing alterity it becomes a moral force for judging warfighters' moral orientation.

4. Human Suffering. The principle for minimizing human suffering considers the alterity of others in warfighters' moral reasoning and conduct, and it widens warfighters' ethical practices of necessity proportionality, and distinction. Principles for limiting human suffering are a modern consideration within JWT to control the methods, munitions, and levels of harm that warfighters inflict upon others. LOAC/IHL also require special treatment for categories of medical, clergy, prisoners, wounded, shipwrecked, and refugees.

Combined the *jus in bello* principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and human suffering seek to influence just uses of military force to avoid "double effect," or the occurrence of unintended consequences, or harms, that can accompany the intentional and legitimate targeting of enemy combatant forces. Double effect adds moral and ethical weight to military problems because it calls attention to consequences that happen

257

between kill chain decisions and targeting. Thus, it contributes to moral injury as a form of moral dissonance that either accuses or excuses warfighters' agency in combat and the culpability of their nations at war. At this point we need to examine the formation of the moral (JWT) and the legal (LOAC/IHL) principles that regulate the moral agency and ethical practices of modern militaries. The next section will examine the development of LOAC/IHL as the guideposts and guardrails used by modern warfighters before examining their origins that reside within the R/S traditions that produced JWT.

The Formation of LOAC/IHL: Legal Expectations from Just War Aspirations

LOAC/IHL and JWT are both expectations and aspirations for warfighters' performance of duty. LOAC/IHL provides legal norms that function as the boundaries for their ethical practices during warfighting, and JWT provides the moral principles that warriors for moral orientation. Together they provide the guideposts and guardrails for reflexivity and action that influences warfighters' moral orientations, agency, and healing. This section will examine the development of LOAC/IHL from its origins into the global codes and norms that regulate modern warfighting.

As witnessed in tribalism, the use of lethal force can be justified in any context when based upon internalized, ethnocentric perceptions of outsider threats, and parochial interpretations of group security. However, the emergence of LOAC/IHL sets external, legal limits and restrictions upon what is permitted, prohibited, and prosecuted. It is false to assume that the internalized values and reasoning processes used by warfighters are sufficient to keep them on course through the traumatic contexts of combat without greater, external boundaries that set limits on their actions (T.W. Shaw 2018). This is where LOAC/IHL informed by *jus in bello* (justice in war) principles are important.

One can visualize legality as the floor of a structure, with ethics, and morality supplying the walls and roof. One does not live on the floor, but within the whole structure. The question then becomes, what happens in the basement?[27] The purpose of LOAC/IHL is to prevent warfighting from happening in the basement, which often happens during tribalism. The roots of these legal, ethical, and moral boundaries being place upon warfighting can be found in ancient writing from middle eastern, eastern, and western cultures in the Code of King Hammurabi (1750 B.C.E.), the philosophy of Lao Tzu (571 B.C.E), the writings of Sun Tzu (500 B.C.E), and the philosophy of Cicero (100 B.C.E.). In each of these provide historical examples where tensions between exception and alterity tempered tribal warfighting practices.

The Code of Hammurabi included laws for the parole of prisoners, fidelity of soldiers, and distribution of property taken in war(Hammurabi 2022). Philosopher Lao Tzu's *Tao-Te Ching* discussed categories of military necessity and last resort to set limits upon uses of military force. His writings also integrated human virtues with warrior agency(Lao-Tzu 1996). Chinese General Sun Tzu anticipated modern *jus ad bellum* principles of right intention, necessity, aim of peace, and last resort to describe the essential qualifications for rulers and generals (SunTzu 1991, 171-172). Finally, Roman Philosopher Cicero argued that empires were gained and sustained by war, but wars were unjust when they were waged without proper declaration, cause, authority, and last resort (Cicero 1998, 69-ff, 130-ff, and 211-ff). He also wrote, "[warriors] shall

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[27] This metaphor was often used to teach Just War/Just Peace concepts at the National Defense University from 2013-2016.

treat the allies with consideration… they shall exercise control over themselves and their staff… they shall increase the glory of their country and return home with honor" (Cicero 1998, 153).

None of these codes or philosophies formally codified just war principles, but their existence demonstrates that just war concepts existed within diverse, ancient warfare practices. Law Professors Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro in their work *The Internationalists* examine the development of international law from Grotius through the internationalist orientations that became embodied in the Hauge Conventions, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, and the Geneva Conventions. They write:

> The account of the world that rests on state power is fatalistic [think Melian Dialogue between the powerful and weak], leaving little room for human agency. But the story of the transformation of the Old-World Order to the New demonstrates that even as law shapes power, ideas—and those who develop and spread them—shape the law… If law shapes real power, and ideas shape the law, then we control our fate. We can choose to recognize certain actions and not others. We can cooperate with those who follow the rules and outcast those who do not. And when the rules no longer work, we can change them. (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 423-424)

Thus, the formation of LOAC/IHL demonstrates that nations, non-state actors, and their warrior have choices and responsibilities that reside within the legal, ethical, and moral senses of justice that emerged over time from numerous principles embedded within R/S and cultural traditions (Galliott 2019, 2).

Modern international law began to formalize when Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583-1645 C.E.) began to codify moral, theological principles developed within Christianity. Grotius incorporated Hobbes' Social Contract, Machiavelli's political theories, and traditional JWT principles into his code of international law (Hobbes 1651; Machiavelli 1981; Patterson 2023). Grotius founded his construction upon, "the right of

armed execution against an armed adversary," based upon the rights of ownership and permissions to correct an injustice on land, or sea. Thus, war was the means for sovereign states to enforce their legal rights with their warriors legally acting as their agents. Infractions were enforced through "just" reprisals against "unjust" offenders. These reprisals included rights of seizure of property and people, and other punishments (Grotius 2022, Kindle locations 1520-ff, 5651-ff; Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 10-33, 77-ff). Warriors who operating under established authorities, or as agents of an unjust ruler, were not criminally accountable for their actions, unless they committed exceptional acts such as poisoning, murder, assassination, or rape (Brown 2017; Grotius 2022, Kindle locations 1619-ff, 3779-ff, 5475-ff; Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 69-77).

Grotius' code of law sought to bring consensual order to tribal warfare (*just ad bellum*), but some argue that these laws became permissions for war instead of peace because they granted legitimized uses of force for conquest, killing, and gunboat diplomacy. Others argue that the greater danger was in the perception that nations and people could not remain neutral during conflicts, and his code of law created no obligations for combatants to protect non-combatants, nor specific protections for non-combatants from collateral harms from war (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 96-97).

By the mid 1800's concerns over the effects from war began to dominate and *jus in bello* principles became formalized within rules of international law. Formalization began when humanitarian Henri Dunant, Florence Nightingale and others formed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) after the Battle of Solferino (1859 C.E.). Dunant's letter, *A Memory from Solferino* described the growing horrors of war

261

upon combatants and non-combatants that he witnessed during the battle, and he advocated for measures that would prevent and alleviate the human suffering experienced by warriors and civilians during combat. He concluded:

> The moral sense of the importance of human life; the humane desire to lighten a little the torments of all these poor wretches or restore their shattered courage; the furious and relentless activity which a man summons up at such moments: all these combine to create a kind of energy which gives one a positive craving to relieve as many as one can (Dunant 1939, 73).

Dunant's letter became the founding purpose of the Red Cross movement, and this influenced Francis Lieber, a lawyer, who wrote a set of rules of engagement in 1863 C.E. that became General Order Number 100 for the Union Army during the American Civil War. General Order 100 established the need for military necessity, but it conveyed the idea that wars were not fought by arms alone and it established responsibilities for commanders and soldier conduct during the war. Lieber's Code embodied the intent of traditional JWT:

> Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult… (Lieber 1863)

General Sherman was operating under General Order 100 when he wrote his letter to the citizens of Atlanta to justify his actions against their city, and the Lieber Code became the basis for reunification and reconstruction after the war (W.T. Sherman 1864; Grant 1885). It can be argued that COL Chivington failed to follow General Order 100 at

Sand Creek, and his junior officers (Soule and Cramer) sought to uphold it. However, larger developments in international law happened when principles contained in the Lieber Code and the founding documents of the Red Cross Movement became the basis for the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to set restrictions for the conduct of nations at war and limits upon specific warfighting behaviors.

After World War I the Kellogg-Briand Treaty and the formation of the League of Nations sought to limit the conduct of nations by outlawing war through a transformation of international law that established processes for the resolution of international conflicts and the formation of international institutions. "By prohibiting states from using war to resolve disputes, it [The Pact] began a cascade of events that would give birth to the modern global order… [and] it catalyzed the human rights revolution,"(Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 136). By enabling the use of economic sanctions and other non-military tools to enforce world order, advocates of the pact sought to use collective diplomacy to dis-incentivize war. This is arguably the beginning of a concerted effort to use political "Soft Power" (i.e. diplomacy, economic sanctions, or media) as an alternative to rewarding war and legitimizing displays of military power as tools for enforcing world order (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 136-146; Nye Jr. 2004, 100-ff).

On the surface, the Kellogg-Briand Pact failed, but its principles are still in effect today and embodied in1) the Geneva Conventions and Protocols that established prohibitions against rape, torture, and the use of certain types of munitions, 2) the United Nations Charter that sets conditions for maintain peace and waging war, and 3) the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC/IHL) that regulates warrior conduct in combat. These treaties

and agreements are the product of an international consensus from a majority of nations with diverse cultural, religious, and spiritual traditions who have ratified them and continue to participate in their processes.[28]

History records that none of these bodies of laws, treaties, and agreements have prevented nations and non-state actors from going to war, nor have they stopped warriors' illegal behaviors warriors. Arguably, this was never the intent. The intent was to place restrictions and controls on human behaviors that have existed in asymmetrical, tribal warfare since antiquity, and continue to exist with the emergence of new formations, technologies, and constructions for warfighting (Bartles-Smith 2022, 1745-ff; Galliott 2019, 21-29; Van Creveld 1991, 58-ff; Von Clauswitz 1968, Kindle locations 829-ff).

Walzer states that war is judged twice. First with reference to the reasons combatants have for fighting (*jus ad bellum*), and second, with reference to the means they use to fight (Walzer 2015, 21). The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the U.N. Charter provide *jus ad bellum, jus ad vim,* and *jus post bellum* processes to limit war. Examination of these principles are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

However, the Hague and Geneva Conventions formalize *jus in bello* principles into the legal requirements for military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and the prevention of human suffering that are embodied within LOAC/IHL and judicated by the International Criminal Court (ICC). These principles also form the legal basis for military

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[28] For listings see: Hague Convention Nations 2024
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/hague-convention-countries ,
United Nations Member Countries https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states ,
Geneva Convention and Protocols https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties

operations and the Rules of Engagement that are enforced under the Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ), or similar laws from other nations (Congress 2019;

Fruchterman 1983, 303-ff; Solis 2022, 125-ff).

The goal of LOAC is to confine fighting as closely as possible to combatants and

to spare non-combatants. This is more easily accomplished in defensive conflicts where

aggressive, offensive military actions are prohibited and the actions of warfighters can be

controlled (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 115-117; Solis 2022, 27). The U.N. Charter

prohibits unilateral aggression, but it supports the rights of nations to defend themselves

(U.N. 1945, Chapter VII).

However, there is a "gray area" in the post-modern world, where conflicts

involving Non-State Armed Groups fighting in post-colonial revolutions, and insurgent

groups fighting for "just" causes, push the boundaries of LOAC/IHL. Into these types of

conflicts nations have deployed military forces as peacekeepers and to intervene in

intrastate conflicts under an international doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P

places warfighters in morally ambiguous situations within low-intensity conflicts where

1) distinctions/alterity between combatants and non-combatants becomes paramount and

difficult, 2) conventional uses of force (once prohibited by ROE) become necessary to

prevent disproportionate harm and suffering, and 3) military necessity for operations

becomes exceptional (Gargo 2014; U.N. 2014; Gourevitch 1998; Petrila and Hasanovic

2021; Honig and Both 1997).

Thus, requirements for the enforcement of peace, as much as the prevention of

war become moral and legal concerns for political leaders as well as for warfighters from

localized, tactical contexts to international, strategic levels that are regulated by the

framework of external, standards contained in LOAC, and military codes from the

nations they serve (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 108-ff; Solis 2022, 27-ff). It is here that

the classification of these conflicts and the status of individuals on the battlefield become

important for determining warfighters' level of responsibility and accountability under

the LOAC. This also allows for prosecuting certain actions as war crimes, violations of

military codes, or "grave breaches" depending upon the nature and severity of the offense

and the jurisdiction of the court (Solis 2022, 123-124, 248-ff). A war crime can be

defined:

> There are four requirements for an act to constitute a war crime. First, an
> armed conflict must be in progress at the time of the charged act; second,
> the charged offense must be incorporated in an applicable criminal or
> prosecutorial code; third, there must be a nexus between the charged act
> and the armed conflict; and fourth, if the prosecuting tribunal is a law of
> war military commission (see Chapter 21.8), the charged offense must be
> an internationally recognized violation of the laws and customs of war.
> (Solis 2022, 248)

Thus, moral infractions became punishable as criminal offenses. However,

warriors can become immoral pirates without becoming criminals, because these laws

remain grounded in JWT principles that are essential for the moral orientations that

warfighters' use to determine the limits of their moral agency (Bell 2009, 78-79; P.D.

Miller 2021, 252). These principles are guideposts and guardrails for agency developed

from deeply rooted meanings and values within diverse R/S and cultural traditions.

Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the content of these traditions.

The Influence of R/S Traditions upon JWT in Modern Warfighters

This section will examine the R/S and cultural traditions and practices that

influenced the development of JWT principles, and how these principles relate to modern

warfighters from these traditions. Professor of Religion Thomas Tweed defines R/S traditions as, "organic-cultural flows that intensify joy and confront suffering by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make homes and cross boundaries" (Tweed 2006, 54). Some of these cultural flows involve participation in conflicts that range from maintaining peace to waging war. These cultural flows rely upon common moral perspectives and communal needs to resolve social problems involving larger group activities (Tweed 2006, 131-ff; Greene 2013, 4-16).

In *Religion, War, and Ethics* theorists Gregory Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Nicole Hartwell concluded that R/S traditions assume a stasis of peace, that is based upon practices of war. First, these practices are grounded in a realism that permits defensive warfare and exceptional atrocities for the sake of group protection. Second, these practices are grounded in an idealism that uses considerations of alterity to create and maintain peace on favorable terms. They write:

> … religions can be both defenders of peace and promoters of war, noble protectors of the weak and innocent, and motivators for brutal attacks in the name of God, or gods, even against human beings who could not possibly know that they had done anything wrong or believed anything erroneously. By learning from the contrasting sides of religion, one may also learn to practice one's faith in ways that incline more toward peacefulness and legitimate, measured defense than brutality. (Hartwell and Syse 2014, 6-7)

Although R/S traditions may, or may not, be causal for war, they serve as force multipliers in contested spaces by informing the political philosophies and paradigms that cultures and nations use to define and regulate state security (Guskowski 2013, 123-133).

These traditions contain tensions between 1) group and others (distinction and alterity), 2) the exceptions to kill verses murder (necessity and human suffering), and wage justified war or maintain peace (proportionality).

This practical wisdom may also link warfighters' capacity for moral reasoning (examined in Chapters 3 and 4) with their capacity to create post-traumatic meaning(J.I. Harris and Leak 2013). The importance of this can be examined in the warrior values and practices that developed within Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam.

Hinduism

In Hinduism, the guideposts and guardrails for just warfighting are based around four spiritual concepts: 1) *brahman* (the cosmic order of the universe), 2) *dharma* (righteous conduct), 3) *karma* (life activities that influence the cycle of rebirth), and 4) *moksha* (the liberation of the soul). Thus, a Hindu warrior code represents warfighting as part of a natural order that accepts self-aggrandizement and dominance in the ritual and secular relationships that are shaped by sacred writings that blend religious meaning with a way life itself more than a doctrine (Doniger 1988, 28-ff; K. Roy 2014, 471-480).

Early Hindu writers took very little interest in the moral conditions underlying the inception of war, and they made no distinctions between private duels and public violence. One of the most authoritative sacred texts, the Bhagavad Gita, contains a dialogue between prince Arjuna and his charioteer guide Krishna, an avatar of the deity Vishnu, that took place before the Kurukshetra War. Arjuna is having a moral dilemma over going to war to punish his kin for their unjust conduct. Arjuna wonders if he should renounce going to war for religious reasons, and he seeks Krishna's advice about what to

do. Krishna counsels Arjuna to fulfill his warrior duty (*dharma*), and he then extends their conversation to cover a wide range of moral and ethical dilemmas encountered by warriors on the battlefield.

For a Hindu warfighter, this text defines just war as the ultimate reality of *dharma* by subordinating a warrior's duty to the collective protection of *brahman* (social order) (K. Roy 2014, 481-ff). This conversation can also be interpreted in terms of Arjuna's moral dissonance over who has a right to fight in a war and the cost of getting one's hands dirty in combat. Arjuna approaches Krishna with three arguments against fighting his kin: 1) there is no joy in victory because there is death on both sides, including family, 2) the spilling of blood makes warriors agents of evil, and 3) lawlessness committed in war undermines the warrior virtue and the safety of non-combatants. Thus, Arjuna struggles with questions of exceptionalism and alterity, and he uses principled, utilitarian, situation, and virtue-based arguments against going to war that are traditionally associated with moral orientation and modern JWT principles of necessity, proportion, distinction, and human suffering (Ranganathan 2019, 171-176).

However, Krishna advocates a departure from Arjuna's moral reasoning by arguing for the necessity for a moral exception that dissolves the boundaries between the means used for warfighting and the ends achieved in war (Nietzsche 1969; Schmitt 1985 (1922)). Krishna shows Arjuna that conventional morality places constraints upon warriors, and the only way to defend a just cause is by redefining "good and just" in terms of the results achieved. Thus, warfighting becomes: 1) a *karma yoga* – a willingness to act within the cosmic order, 2) a *bhakti yoga* – a devotion to just cause and agency, and 3) a *jhana yoga* – a discipline of knowledge, thoughtfulness, and courage

while acting (Ranganathan 2019, 176-186). This gives warriors the permission to defend a just cause by operating free from restraints imposed by the potential for casualties or amounts of suffering caused by their actions (Ranganathan 2019, 185-187).

Such moral reasoning was carried over into other ancient texts that required the king to use military force to acquire, preserve, invest and distribute resources throughout his realm(K. Roy 2014, 512). However, later Hindu texts limited the king by mandating the pursuit of: 1) the spiritual benefits of *dharma* (following the right path for living), 2) *karma* (the rewards for good deeds), 3) *artha* (material advantages), and 4) *moksha* (freedom from the eternal cycle of rebirth). All for the benefit of the kingdom (K. Roy 2014, 517-519).

These texts came in tension with other textual traditions that permitted various types of militarism in which the twin concepts of *dharmayuddha* (righteous war or just war) and *kutayuddha* (unjust war, involving trickery or deceit) were developed for the protection of the collective order (*brahman*). In the twentieth century these traditional duties assumed a different political focus within anti-colonial movements that used military violence as responses to oppression from outsiders. These responses ranged from small acts of protest and insurgency, to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons for national protection (K. Roy 2014, 479-480).

As a counter, non-violence was emphasized in the writings and practices of leaders, liked Mahatma Gandhi, who used the *Bhagavad Gita* and other Hindu practices to integrate spiritual will and intent into political knowledge and actions(K. Roy 2014, 531-533). Thus, Gandhi sought to reconcile tensions between violence and peace in Hindu thought and practice. He wrote:

I do believe that where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence.... I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honor than that she should in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonor. But I believe that non-violence is infinitely superior to violence, forgiveness is more manly than punishment… Forgiveness adorns a soldier. But abstinence is forgiveness only when there is the power to punish; it is meaningless when it pretends to proceed from a helpless creature.... But I do not believe India to be helpless. (K. Roy 2014, 533)

Hindu spiritual tradition resides within the modern Indian Military as a mixture of traditional Hindu thought, Colonial British practices and Gandhi's concepts of national identity, justice, and piety. Together these streams integrate the guideposts and guardrails that direct the moral orientations of Hindu warfighters by influencing their moral senses of fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy (Brekke 2013, 13; Misra 2021). The result is a Hindu concept for just war that is inseparable from its cultural ethos, spiritual practices, and political directions.

Implications for Modern Hindu Warfighters

After 9-11, Hindu warfighters have focused upon practices of just courage and duty related to the protection of societal order from outsider threats (K. Roy 2014, 473-474). Military journalists Shiv Aroor and Rahul Singh use one of Gandhi's lesser-known quotes to introduce the role that moral and spiritual courage have for the modern Hindu soldier, "Fearlessness is the first requisite of spirituality. Cowards can never be moral" (Aroor and Singh 2017, 12). Thus, the virtues of courage, duty, and devotion to public order (community/family) become the moral standards (principles) used by warfighters' to defend: 1) the path of *dharma*, 2) the moral discernment of *karma*, 3) the ethical norms and practices of moksha, and the social order of *brahmin*.

Aroor and Singh use narratives from multiple Hindu warfighters to demonstrate the virtues of courage and duty in the context of India's modern border wars. They write:

> Becoming a part of the lives of the men we have written about, their units and their families, we found ourselves dealing with our own sense of trauma… One often hears the phrase 'supreme sacrifice' being used to describe the death of a soldier in the line of duty. It is a paradoxical term, heavy with implication. Yet, it instantly conveys what it intends to: an act of selflessness so high that the most basic instinct—to survive—fades away and yields to the decision to fight to the death. (Aroor and Singh 2017, 10).

One example Aroor and Singh use is Indian Special Forces Soldier Lance Naik (Lance Corporal) Mohan Nath Goswami who was posthumously awarded the *Ashok Chakra* (India's highest non-combat award) for the specific actions he took against terrorists in Kashmir to rescue wounded comrades. He told his commander that there was, "nothing more important than reaching their comrades in trouble"(Aroor and Singh 2017, 60). He was shot twice while he continued towards the wounded men, and he was eulogized a courageous soldier who exemplified duty and devotion to family (Aroor and Singh 2017, 57-71).

Contrast Goswami's story with the story of Lance Naik Lal Chand Rabari a Hindu Soldier serving in the Pakistan Army who died while fighting against tribal insurgents in Waziristan. Rabari stated his reasons for military service were his loyalty to his tribe and his duty to the county in which his family was living (Pakistan). Rabari also stated that he wanted to, "take revenge for every drop of blood from those who have inflicted loss to the children and people of our country" (Ahmad 2017). After his death, his mother told reporters that she, "had no remorse for losing her son while defending its boundaries" (Ahmad 2017).

272

Perhaps, the above narratives border on forms of propaganda and they do not convey stories of warfighters damaged by moral dissonance. However, they do reveal R/S and cultural elements within the warrior codes of Hindu warfighters from two different nations whose standards for moral agency (*brahmin, dharma, karma, and moksha*) are related to exceptional uses of military force measured against the alterity of others as friends or enemies. These types of moral orientations leave room for asking, "what happens to the Hindu warfighters who believe that they have failed to live up to these standards, or witnesses their violation?"

Buddhism Within Other Eastern R/S Traditions

Eastern R/S traditions are too numerous to examine in detail. However, Buddhism contains many common beliefs and practices that resonate within other Eastern R/S traditions, and these connections allow for an examination of Buddhism as a basis for studying how R/S traditions contribute to JWT and the moral orientations and agency modern warfighters.

Buddhism is best understood as a flow of meanings and practices that follow Four Noble Truths, and an Eightfold Path as a practice for life in diverse contexts. Some of these contexts are political ideologies used to justify or protest uses of military force in defense of individual and corporate *dhamma* (Frydenlund 2013, 102-111). In Buddhism, the guideposts and guardrails for just warfighting are also determined by practices that have been assimilated with the R/S, cultural and political traditions of Shintoism, Taoism, Confucianism and Communism.

Buddhism began within Hindu culture around 450 B.C.E. with the spiritual awakening of Prince Siddhartha Gautama to the "middle path" (*Bodh Gaya*) after he

encountered suffering, sickness, death, and religious asceticism. Siddhartha was from the warrior caste, and the middle path allowed him to eliminate all of his desires and ignorance and to exit the continuing *karma* cycles of death and rebirth (*samsara*) that define human existence. This allowed him to reach the state of *nirvana*, and he became known as Buddha (the awakened one). He taught *dhamma* as the "middle path" toward *nirvana* in discourses he delivered to followers (Takahashi-Brown 2002). His discourses compose the three main tenets of Buddhism (*buddha, dhamma,* and *sangha*) embodied within the practice of Four Nobel Truths and the Eightfold Path (Table 5.2).

Four Nobel Truths	Eightfold Path
• The Truth of Suffering • The Truth of the Cause of Suffering • The Truth of the End of Suffering • The Truth of the Path Leading to the End of Suffering	• Right View • Right Intention • Right Speech • Right Action • Right Living (Respect for Life) • Right Effort • Right Concentration • Right Mindfulness

Table 5.3 Buddhist Practices

After Siddhartha's death, Buddhism spread from India to Tibet, China, and other cultures as it split into three traditions: 1) Theravada (Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos), where the written tradition of elders showed the middle path to end *samsara*), 2) Mahayana (Nepal, Tibet, China, Japan, and Korea), where the practices of Buddha are used as antidotes for *samsara*, and 3) Vajrayana (Tibet) where Mahayana Buddhism is a subset for focusing upon practices that create freedom from *samsara (Namchak 2023)*.

These Buddhist truths and practices became formalized within the basic written texts of Buddhism 1) suttas (discourses), 2) vinaya (disciplinary rules), and 3) abhidhamma (higher teachings) (Deegalle 2014, 544-ff).

In seeking enlightenment, Prince Siddhartha became aware that temporal, legal authority used coercive force to punish wrong and defend nations, so he renounced temporal power and abstained from participation in violence and war (Deegalle 2014, 548). As the Buddha he lived and taught by five precepts that became foundational for later followers: 1) to abstain from taking life, 2) to abstain from taking what is not given, 3) to abstain from sensuous misconduct, 4) to abstain from false speech, and 5) to abstain from intoxicants as tending to cloud the mind (Deegalle 2014, 593).

One of the few examples of early Buddhist thought about the role of a warrior and war is recorded in the *Book of the Six Sense Bases* where the Buddha assured a warrior that those who died in battle were destined to either "hell or the animal realm" in *samsara* because of their misplaced intentions and desires. The warrior concluded that he had been "deceived" by his warrior code and he sought to live as, "one who has gone for refuge for life [following the enlightened path]" (Deegalle 2014, 551-553; *The Book of the Six Sense Bases*, 3 "Yodhajiva.").

Thus, Buddhists viewed war as a form of suffering, and early texts placed injunctions against warfighting to instruct *bodhisattva* (those resolved to the path of Buddha) how to seek and follow precepts, truths, and paths that led away from military service (Deegalle 2014, 546, 583-ff). This resulted in early Buddhism not developing warrior codes or categories for justified war (Deegalle 2014, 552-ff). These teachings are still practiced today.

However, this changed as Buddhism blended with other cultures and spread into kingdoms that required communal participation in defense and security. Some writings began to use the ethical values of warriors as victorious exemplars for those who overcame *samsa* struggles to pursue *dhamma* as *bodhisattvas*, or the defense of *sambuddha* (full enlightenment) for communal unity against injustice (Deegalle 2014, 553-555, 583-586; *The Book of Gradual Sayings (Anguttara-Nikaya* 1934, 70-77 and 177-ff). These teachings were held in tension with practices like the edicts of King Asoka, who renounced violence and war (Deegalle 2014, 579-580; *The Edicts of Asoka* 1959, 53-54).

Thus, Buddhism focused upon the motivations for practical actions that alleviated and reduced suffering in others and oneself (Harvey 2004, 51-54). Therefore, the preservation of peace became the ultimate socio-political objective, and war, if conducted by a legitimate king, was permitted as an exceptional measured that was limited by the intentions of the person who commits violence, the nature of the victim (alterity), the status of the one who commits the violence (Jerryson 2018, 459). Rulers were compelled to rule with a calm mind and use minimal force to avoid harming innocents (Jerryson 2018, 466-467; Kent 2010).

Some Mahayana texts further limited uses of violence to *bodhisattvas* because they could act as enlightened beings not encumbered by ill thoughts (Jerryson 2018, 470-472). This led to concepts of warrior monks/priests who were led by two of Buddha's questions, "Can they uphold safety and justice by focusing on love for the sake of those they protect rather than hate for the ones they must kill, and can they walk in *dhamma*?" (Fleischman 2002, 34). The Buddha's questions limit warfighting by making it a practice

of *karma* consisting of military skills (*appamada*), mindful duty, and moral agency to integrate attention, intention, and actions (Muitha, Gnanawasa, and Pagnagnawansa 2021, 355-356; Rathheiser and Kariyakarawana 2021, 103-ff; Simhanada 2021, 190; Tho, Favoreu, and Trew 2021, 431). This creates a paradox for Buddhist warriors determining paths of *dhamma,* because their military agency can only be justified for exceptional actions if they act as warfighters with compassionate intentions and fearless virtues that are proportional to the consequences of karma (Harvey 2004, 56-59, 251-ff; Kilby 2021, 323-ff; Trew 2021, 223-ff). These tensions are found within other eastern cultures.

Implications for Buddhist and Eastern Warfighters

These understandings connect Buddhist warfighters with the principles of JWT and LOAC/IHL, and it is here that they may experience suffering and illusion in struggles with moral dissonance between the priority of non-violence and the necessity for the use of violence to protect life (Bartholomeusz 2002, 26-27, 47- 68). This paradox is a part of the moral orientations informing modern Asian societies and their militaries (Samarakoon 2021, 318-319; Simhanada 2021, 196-ff).

For some Buddhist warfighters, their fearless virtue and compassionate intentions are done for the protection of others, and this turns their acts of violence towards the self instead of outward towards others. In 1963 Buddhist Monk Thich Qunag Duc burned himself in the middle of a street in Saigon to call attention to the sufferings of the Vietnamese people under the Diem Regime. He acted as an unconventional warfighter, who directed violence towards himself, rather than others. The Dalai Lama has viewed self-immolation, if done for reasons of following the Five Paths, as a legitimate self-

sacrificial action to prevent political and social violence (Jerryson 2018, 454-458).

Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh explains Qunag-Duc's motivation in a letter to Martin

Luther King:

> To burn oneself by fire is to prove that what one is saying is of the utmost
> importance. There is nothing more painful than burning oneself. To say
> something while experiencing this kind of pain is to say it with utmost
> courage, frankness, determination, and sincerity… In the Buddhist belief,
> life is not confined to a period of sixty or eighty or one hundred years: life
> is eternal… To express will by burning oneself, therefore, is not to commit
> an act of destruction but to perform an act of construction, that is, to suffer
> and to die for the sake of one's people. … I believe with all my heart that
> the monks who burned themselves did not aim at the death of the
> oppressors but only at a change in their policy. (Nhat-Hahn 1967, 147-
> 148)

Sometimes this R/S practice supports a form of modern tribalism. In Sri Lanka

Buddhism supports nationalist thought (*jathika chintanaya*) to justify war as the

protection of *dhamma* as a duty assumed by monks, politicians and soldiers

(Bartholomeusz 2002, 12-15, 157-166). Corporal K.G. Sirisena wrote a poem entitled

Our Own Nation's People Are Against Us to justify his involvement in a war against

Tamil insurgents (who are Hindu, Muslim, and Christian). He writes, "… I believe that

the blood flowing in me is the same that ran through mighty heroes… Who have done

much for our country and for Buddhism; To protect our motherland" (Bartholomeusz

2002, 156-157). This type of justification is also expressed by Buddhist warfighters in

Myanmar and South Korea (Charney 2021, 367-377; Harvey 2004, 270-283; WAPO

2023; W.E. Lee et al. 2021).

In Japan, R/S connections with JWT come from an amalgamation of Shinto, folk

belief, and forms of Mahayana Buddhism (Zen and Pure Land) to form complex warrior

codes such as *samurai* and *budo.* These codes integrate martial skills with virtues to form

278

the life-path of a warfighter that is defined by psychospiritual, philosophical orientations (French 2017, 214-218; Harvey 2004, 266-269; Kearney 2023, 54-55; Machida 2014, 631-638, 663-668). These codes can also support extreme violence against others, motivated by moral senses of duty, honor, anger, shame, and guilt (Chang 2012, 19-35; Nitobe 1905, 50-60; Ohnuki-Tieney 2006, Kindle Locations 115-649; Tanaka, Kindle Locations 739-ff).

However, these codes can form standards for peace and ethical practices associated with JWT. As early as the 1600's Zen Buddhist Master Takuan Soho wrote *The Unfettered Mind* in which he argued that it is proper to take a life in service to one's leader (*daimyo*) as a practical duty, but the swordsman must refrain from emotional anger, self-interest, or throwing one's life away for misconceptions of honor or fame (Soho 2002, 68-74). So, warfighting was not by exception or alterity, but a skill used in a cycle of restraint and violence that finds perfection in the self, as mindful living as a warrior(Soho 2002, 92-93). The blending of these moral senses of duty, honor, competence, and control can also be witnessed in Sergeant Yokoi, who refused to surrender at the end of World War II but lived a disciplined life in isolation and peace until he was discovered in 1972 and returned to Japan. He hoped to return his weapon to the emperor (Kristof 1997; Trefalt 2003, 111-136; Kishadan 1972).

Such blending of Buddhist R/S traditions with other traditions also influences the moral reasoning of warfighters from Vietnam and China whose warrior codes are defined by Confucian, Taoist, and Communist teachings. During the Vietnam War two Buddhist Viet Minh, Che (a guerilla fighter) and Xuan (a commissar), fought in the battle for Hue (1968 C.E). Their combat narratives do not reveal moral dissonance from fighting for

what they considered to be a just cause, but they do reveal moral struggles over the harms that were committed by their side against noncombatants that they intended to protect. Che's group created the lists of Hue citizens who were targeted by groups of Viet Minh, and Xuan's group led purge killings that he was unable to prevent (Bowden 2017, Kindle locations 4816-4891). Both narratives reveal Buddhist concepts of the necessity for following the correct to path of *dharma* to preserve life and minimize *karma* as moral senses of responsibility and accountability.

In China, this blending reinforced socio-political stability and traditional clan structures that prized group survival about individuality and balanced war with peace by blending Buddhist right mind/right action with Confucian moralism, Taoist balance, Chinese Military Philosophy and Communist collectivism to produce social principles that include:1) the need for every human being and society to have a moral compass, 2) the primacy of right thinking or virtue, and 3) the importance of self-cultivation (French 2017, 197-ff; Lao-Tzu 1996; H. Lee 2021, 381-385; R. Li, Hong, and Runhao 2013; X. Li 2007, 30-31; Sohn 2022, 29-33, 132-ff; Tikhonov 2014, 599-601).

However, these social principles are in tension with political forces that sought to regain power after colonial humiliations by prioritizing internal security and external defense through the establishment of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) (CISA 2023; X. Li 2007, 52-ff, 127-ff). The PLA operates with a utilitarian ethic that results in two distinct, yet related, moral issues affecting the moral agency of Chinese warfighters (Tse-Tung 2020, 240-241; 1961, 20-26,47-48). First, expectations for exemplary virtue defined by loyalty to the CPC (Blasko 2012, 56-ff; X. Li 2007, 160-ff). Second, the CPC's compulsions of the center that

expects conformity and permits the targeting of marginalized groups such as the Uyghurs (Muslim), or the people of Hong Kong, or citizens of the China (Ahmed 2014, 340-341; X. Li 2007, 127-ff; Mahtani and McLaughlin 2023, 135-ff). These expectations create moral dissonance within PLA warfighters between deeper R/S and cultural roots and modern values related to their service.

Lieutenant General (LTG) Li Zhen was the first woman general in the PLA. She lost her child while she served as a guerilla on the Long march, and then continued to fight against the Japanese during WWII, and the Americans in the Korean War. She remembers being told at the beginning of the long march:

> From now on you're fighting for yourself, for your own family, and for the poor peasants. Your parents and your village will be so proud of you… [Then she told herself] After you see so many comrades die, you don't want to give up your own life easily. You feel like they're living in you. You want to go on. (X. Li 2007)

Private Xu Xiangyao describes his feelings and moral reasoning when he was deployed to the front during the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, and given orders to sacrifice himself:

> [I was told] 'It's time for you to shed blood for your country. The entire country is watching you. Our people depend on you, Go ahead, cry now, but no more crying later in battle'… I really regretted joining the army at that point… All the men received a pocket tin with a gold ring called *gaungrong dan* (glory bomb) … [and we were told] 'If you are wounded, disabled, or about to be captured by the Vietnamese, you can use it. Just pull the ring; it will explode for an immediate, heroic death. You will be remembered as a revolutionary martyr.' (X. Li 2007, 260-261)

In 1989 the PLA was mobilized against student protestors in Tiananmen Square. LTG Xu Qinxian was the commander of the 38th Group Army that was responsible for protecting Beijing. He was ordered to suppress the protesters and take back Tiananmen

Square, but he refused to obey because he believed the protests were an internal political matter and military intervention, "would risk indiscriminate bloodshed and stain the reputation of the People's Liberation Army." He told his superiors, "I'd rather be beheaded than be a criminal." LTG Qinxian was later arrested, expelled from the CPC, and sentenced to four years in prison (Lap-hak 2018).

Thus, Buddhist concepts of causes for suffering, the path of *dhamma*, the consequences from *karma*, and mindful practice of right actions resonate themes consistent with JWT principles. They also provide moral tensions between compassionate alterity to prevent harm, and exceptional permissions for violence. These tensions can become sources for moral injury or post-traumatic growth in Buddhist warfighters.

Judaism

In Judaism the guideposts and guardrails for just warfighting are determined by Torah and theologies embedded within its oral traditions and R/S practices. Judaism is a monotheistic, covenantal relationship between G_d and a chosen people. The narrative and practice of this relationship is contained in the *Tanakh* (torah law, writings, and prophets)*, Mishnah* (oral traditions), and *Talmud* (rabbinic interpretations). Together these form a sacred, monotheistic narrative of creation, covenant, deliverance, sin, atonement, people, land, and diaspora that integrates spiritual beliefs with life practices in the formation of ancient Israel (Afterman and Afterman 2014, 8-ff; Trepp 1974, 194-214; Schecter 1961, 199-242).

Included within this narrative are concepts of violation, sin, and impurity that require rituals for atonement and cleansing. These concepts contain principles for just warfighting that include permissions and prohibitions for war that involve,

282

proportionality of violence/human suffering, distinctions of alterity between peoples, and the necessity for exceptional uses of violence (Sklar 2005; Douglas 2002 (1966)).

Some aspects of biblical Judaism resemble tribalism. Religion scholars Adam and Gedaliah Afterman write that the *Tanakh,*

> The Bible [*Tanakh* or Old Testament] contains no explicit (ethical) requirements beyond defining absolute victory in war… Common to all is the requirement for victory in war, with no limitations.... It is rare to find in the Bible any demands vis-à-vis soldiers who have exceeded the limits. To the contrary, it seems that when compassion is shown toward enemies, we encounter the prophet's vehement criticism... The Midrashic rabbinic literature also lacks the foundations for preventing excessive harm to those outside of the arena of combat. (Afterman and Afterman 2014, 60)

However, there are multiple requirements within Judaism that limit participation in war through prohibitions associated with killing and being killed (Afterman and Afterman 2014, 61-ff). The basis for these tensions can be found within different periods of thought represented in *Tanakh, Mishnah*, and *Talmud.*

Early *Tanakh* texts considered war as a part of the natural order, and just war practices as religious law applied to warfighting (Afterman and Afterman 2014, 8-ff). These earlier *Tanakh* texts record events of just killing by key religious/political leaders in defense of others and going to war as a duty commanded by G_d for the conquest of a promised homeland.[29] These texts also include 1) prohibitions against murder and instructions for the intentional versus non-intentional shedding of human blood,

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[29] (Exodus 2:10-11, Joshua 1- 24, 1 Samuel 16:1-7, 1 Samuel 17:12-51, and I Chronicles 28:3 [ESV]), and (Genesis 14:13-16, Deuteronomy 21 and Joshua 1: 1-19, 1 Samuel 30:8 [ESV])

2) preparations for going to war and rules for besieging a city, 3) the taking of captives, 4) the treatment of women captives, 5) purification after the shedding of blood, and 6) cleanliness within the military camp.[30]

As Israel divided into two kingdoms and both kingdoms were conquered by invading armies, later *Tanakh* texts placed limited permissions for warfighting upon the kingdoms or forbid them from going to war. These texts emphasized G_d's protection instead of human militarism (1 Samuel 17:47, Isaiah 9:6-9, Ezra 8:22. Hosea 14, Micah 3 [ESV]). Other texts demonstrated moral reasoning for the futility of war (Psalms 2, 11, 20, 33, 44, 76, and 146-147 [ESV]), or they addressed the vulnerability of leaders, combatants, and non-combatants during war (Psalms 10, 25, 27, 64, 74, 91, 107,108, 110, 120, and 141-144 [ESV]). Finally, after a remnant of the people of Israel returned to the land and rebuilt the destroyed walls of Jerusalem and the temple, *Tanakh* texts introduced the necessity for the use of defensive/protective force (Nehemiah 4:14-21 [ESV]).

After the conquest of Israel by Rome in 70 C.E., Judaism was participated in state affairs throughout dispersed nations (the diaspora), and Rabbinical exegesis of these textual traditions created oral traditions that differentiated between; 1) an obligatory duty to participate in a war commanded by G_d for the conquest of land, 2) a moral duty to participate in a war declared by a legitimate legal and religious authority for the defense of the kingdom and its people, and 3) an optional permission to participate in a war

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[30] 1. (Genesis 9:6, Exodus 20:13, Numbers 35:6-33 [ESV]), 2. (Deuteronomy 20:1-19, Deuteronomy 23:9-14 [ESV]), 3. Deuteronomy 23, Leviticus 25:44-46, 1 Samuel 22, 2 Samuel 8, and 1 Kings 20 [ESV]), 4. (Deuteronomy 21:10-14, Deuteronomy 22:25-27, 5. (Numbers 31:1-51{ESV]), 6. (Deuteronomy 23:9-ff [ESV])

conducted for earthly and political interests. These distinctions form the foundation for Jewish JWT, and participation in the wars of diverse nations (Afterman and Afterman 2014, 9-15).

Rabbi Maimonides (1138-1204 C.E.) codified these principles to limit the duties and permission for participation in war based upon the intent and end state of any give conflict. He prohibited participation in offensive wars of conquest, and he permitted participation in defensive wars based upon the necessity for protection against unjust aggression, oppression, and threats (Afterman and Afterman 2014, 16-64). Later rabbis expanded Maimonides' principles to link emerging theologies of messianism (the appearance and rule of G_d's savior), with the preservation of life, the prevention of human suffering, and deliverance. These theologies supported the formation of the ICRC, the Lieber Rules, The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and LOAC/IHL.

However, the moral tensions that existed in early Jewish traditions also existed in the Holocaust experience (*Shoah*), the formations of modern Zionism, and the establishment of the modern state of Israel (Afterman and Afterman 2014, 8-9; Linn 1991). With the formation of Zionism and the *Eretz Israel,* other rabbis further expanded Maimonides' principles to declare that an obligatory war could once again be conducted for defense of Israel without compromising warfighters' emotional health or moral character.

The moral struggles of an ideal Jewish warfighter from antiquity is King David who demonstrated bravery, vulnerability, and humanity throughout his life, he; demonstrated bravery by killing his enemy in close combat, displayed compassion by sparing the life of another enemy in guerilla warfare, grieved over his fallen enemies and

friends after battle, experienced failure by causing the death of a loyal soldier, and was prevented from building Israel's holy temple because of his agency in the shedding of blood (Samuel 17, 1 Samuel 24, 2 Samuel 1, 2 Samuel 11-12, and 1 Chronicles 22 [ESV]).

In modernity, Rabbi Schlomo Goren, the Chief Military Rabbi of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), advocated for an operational code for the IDF that would serve as a warfighting norm for its warfighters. Some viewed motivations for this code as a form of tribalism, but Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli argued that this code needed to adopt standards from customary conventions and international laws and applied them to the conduct of the Jewish state as well as the individual warfighter (Afterman and Afterman 2014, 19-ff; A. Gordon 2006; Khalidi 2010; Linn 1991; Zagor 2010).

Implications for Modern Jewish Warfighters

The IDF created the Purity of Arms doctrine to serve as a moral guidepost and guardrail for its warfighters, and it manifests the moral tensions experienced by IDF forces and the *refusenik* (Conscientious Objection) movements within modern Israel (S.A. Cohen 2013, 11-21; Waxman 2013, 236-ff). The Purity in Arms doctrine is a warrior code of ethics for the IDF based upon R/S concepts that combines self-restraint (*hallagah*) with the purity of intent (*tohar ha-neshek*). These concepts are foundational within Judaism, and they are embedded within LOAC/IHL to determine: 1) necessary, exceptional uses of lethal force and 2) distinctions of alterity intended to prevent harm to non-combatants.

Conditions within Israel's conflicts create conditions where The Purity of Arms doctrine can be compromised when the motivations of the enemy are labeled as

"terrorism" and war becomes obligatory for national defense. This obligation can then

blur the boundaries for proportion, distinction, necessity, and human suffering. This

"blurring" can alter warrior behaviors, and they assume that the Purity of Arms doctrine

needs to be circumvented because it is a potential impediment to mission accomplishment

(Zagor 2010, 571-588). This makes targeting decisions based upon modern *jus in bello*

principles extremely difficult as requirements for protection override the restraints base

upon distinction, proportion, and humanity (Gordon 2006; Khalidi 2010; Plaw 2010).

When IDF warfighters begin to question these moral thresholds, they may assume the

attitudes and roles played by the Nazis during the Holocaust. This is an unintended and

unwanted outcome (Linn 1991, 84; Chazan 2009).

The consequences from these moral dilemmas place IDF warfighters in contexts

where they either shoot, shoot and protest, or shoot and cry (Linn 1991, 74-ff). An IDF

soldier explains his choice to shoot, and then reflect upon the moral consequences:

> One of the major arguments against disobedience in the army is that if we
> care about the situation, we should change it from within…that if you go
> to serve in the occupied territories or in Lebanon and treat the people well,
> this is your contribution to the change. I cannot accept this argument
> because when young children begin throwing stones at you, you cannot
> just stand up and say, "Just a minute, calm down." Instead, you begin to
> run wild even though you don't want to ... and then come the unfortunate
> shootings. (Linn 1991, 73)

Another IDF soldier and folk singer, Yehoram Gaon, describes his moral

dissonance associated with this threshold:

> The Intifada is the worst war we ever had, since [because] it hurts the IDF
> directly. In our previous wars, the IDF was damaged physically, but this
> time it is being damaged mentally. It has transformed the soldier into
> something else, not a soldier who defends his homeland. It is not by

accident that a distinction is made between a soldier and a storm trooper. When women and children are facing you; that is a different war. (Linn 1991, 81)

The above comments demonstrate the dis-integration of the Purity of Arms Doctrine within the IDF. This is felt in the current war against Hamas because it is being fought in urban environments filled with noncombatants and insurgent fighters, who have been accused of committing atrocities (Berger, Hill, and Balousha 2023; Rauhala and hendrix 2024; Sieff 2023; Spencer 2023). Thus, the potential for moral and legal violations of conscience is high. Here IDF warfighters are caught between 1) their purpose to defend their homeland, restrictions placed upon them by international law and their own moral codes, and 2) the methods used by Hamas This moral frustration is expressed in the words of an IDF soldier,

> 'Yes, people will die… More Israelis will die. A lot of Palestinians will die. But what choice does Israel have?... We're here to defend our right to exist in front of an enemy that wants to destroy us'… 'Very often, people are looking for a good guy and a bad guy… If anything, I have learned that this is complex and there is a long history and a lot of pain.' (D. Lamothe and Horton 2023)

However, the current conflict has also produced a new purpose for one *refuseniks*, who explains the reasons for his and other *refuseniks* voluntary service in the current war:

> We come because we've developed an infrastructure… and we have teams that are simply ready to work… The decisions they [current political parties] made were insane and we've seen the tragedy that they have led to…but those politicians are irrelevant to us now… We who are physically out in the field … are already building a new future for our country. (Rubin 2023)

Whether the current conflict is interpreted as an obligatory, permitted war, or a chosen war, the choices made in this newest cycle of cause and cruelty will undoubtedly

place IDF warfighters in moral dilemmas caused by 1) the priorities for national defense, 2) the guideposts provided by their Purity of Arms doctrine, 3) the guardrail/legal limits for restraint provided by LOAC/IHL, and 4) their own emotional tribalism.

Christianity

In Christianity, the guideposts and guardrails for just warfighting are determined by constructions of JWT derived from interpretations of sacred scriptures, church doctrines, and denominational polity. The three main practices of Christianity are Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestantism. This section will only examine common themes of Christian JWT, and only deal with significant sectarian differences when they affect current applications of JWT by modern, Christian warfighters.

Christianity is a trinitarian expression of monotheism that grew out of Rabbinic Judaism beginning in 30 C.E. It has diverse theologies, but it basically teaches that life with God is lived and practiced in relationship with 1) creation, 2) redemption accomplished through the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus as the promised Messiah (Christ), and 3) presence of the Holy Spirit. This relationship is lived in a community of worship and sacramental practices.

Throughout history Christians have applied theologies of creation, redemption, and presence to practical questions about maintaining civic order and human well-being which resulted in the formalized principles for modern JWT (Bell 2009, 14-ff; Joustra 2013, 45-46; Marsh 2013, 22-23, 50; G.F. Powers 2013, 40-42). Early Christianity interpreted Jewish teachings about war through the teachings of Jesus contained in the Gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John). Jesus radicalized prohibitions against killing and taught ways of nonviolence for peace, and he made no direct teachings about war.

However, Jesus and early followers interacted with Roman Soldiers, and these accounts are included in the Gospels and later Apostolic Writings of the New Testament. These scripture passages have been used as teachings for the moral orientations of warfighters. Other Apostolic texts use soldier practices as metaphor for Christian ethical practices and an apocalyptic war waged by God. These teachings are a part of the earliest New Testament writings, and they are listed in Table 5.4.

Non-Violence Teachings	New Testament Texts Interactions with Warfighters	Teachings Applicable to Warfighters
Luke 12:57-59 Luke 22:36-38	Luke 3: 1-17 Luke 7:1-10 Luke 13:1-2 Luke 23:47-48 Acts 10:1-48 Acts 27:1-44	Luke 20:25 Acts 10 Romans 13: 1-6 Ephesians 6:10-18 2 Timothy 2:3-7 James 4:17 1 Peter 2:13-14 Revelation 13

Table 5.4 New Testament Teachings for Supporting Military Service

In the beginning, Christianity was a marginal, and often persecuted, religion that was practiced under Roman rule. Thus, its focus was counter to civic governance, and Christians were forbidden from serving as soldiers (Reichberg 2014, 82-ff). Tertullian (200 C.E.) argued that the civil oaths required of soldiers conflicted with Christian baptismal oaths, and circumstances within the Roman world nullified the use of *Tanakh* (Old Testament) exemplars to justify military service or the holding of civic office. He wrote:

> … the question now is whether a member of the faithful can become a soldier and whether a soldier can be admitted to the Faith even if he is a member of the rank and file who are not required to offer sacrifice or decide capital cases. There can be no compatibility between an oath made to God and one made to man… Joshua, son of Nun led an army, and the

Jewish nation went to war. But how will a Christian do so? Indeed, how will he serve in the army even during peace time without the sword that Jesus Christ has taken away? (Tertullian, 19:1-35; Reichberg 2014, 82-83)

Nevertheless, first century Roman Soldiers became Christians, and Christian theologies began to focus upon questions involving the individual moral agency of "good/faithful" soldiers (Hutchinson 2017, 9-11; Larson and Zust 2017, 204-ff; Loyola-Press 2023). During this time issues about believers' respect for social order/authority created tensions with Christian moral discernment and individual conscience and these questions were later reflected within Christian formations of JWT (Bell 2009, 14-ff; Churchland 2019, 3-8, 181-ff).

These questions became linked with practices for civic governance after the Edict of Milan (313 C.E.) and Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, and Christians assumed accountability for maintain the *pax dei* (Peace of God) or *treuga dei* (Truce of God) (Reichberg 2014, 83-85). The biggest changes came when Augustine, Thomas, Gratian, and the Salamanca School began to formalize moral principles for warfighting that differentiated between the warriors' faithful conduct and the responsibility and accountability of rulers for going to war (P.D. Miller 2021, 2-ff).

Christian monk Augustine of Hippo (circa. 413 C.E.) reasoned that war was the result of unjust/foolish actions that forced violence upon the wise(Augustine 2008, Book 19, 7). For him, war was not intrinsically good; but it may be considered as *instrumentally* good, if it serves the ends of peace and justice (Augustine 2008, Book 19 Chapter 7; Pavlischek 2017, 111-ff; Van Neste 2006, 1-2). He proposed a dualistic order for the human condition to regulate human discourse between the fallen City of Man

defined by sin (to include war) and the redeemed City of God based upon an ethic of

unconditional love, or *agape* (Augustine 2008, Books 11-14). *Agape* is the noun and

action verb used in Jesus' teaching to describe the two priorities for Christian ethics:

> You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your
> soul and with all your mind. This is the great and first
> commandment. And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as
> yourself. (Matthew 22:37-38 [ESV])

Augustine developed his theology for just war grew out of this *agape* ethic, but he

didn't define specific principles for just war. Instead, he advocated for right intent of the

warrior (defined by love, and care of neighbor) as *minimal* permissions for warfighters to

protect and defend others against unjust conduct (Augustine 2008, 14-ff; Wynn 2013,

321-ff; Van Neste 2006, 6,11-ff). This intent required them to think ethnocentrically

instead of egocentrically (1 Corinthians 13 [ESV]). Augustine's intent for warfighter

agency is summarized in a pastoral letter, where he acted as a Bishop (an agent from the

City of God) to the Roman General Boniface (an agent from the City of Man). He wrote:

> Peace should be the object of your desire; war should be waged only as a
> necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the
> necessity and preserve them in peace… Let necessity, therefore, and not
> your will, slay the enemy who fights against you. As violence is used
> towards him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due to the vanquished or
> the captive, especially in the case in which future troubling of the peace is
> not to be feared. (Augustine 2019, Letter CLXXXIX)

Augustine made alterity an essential criterion for uses of exceptional violence,

Later, theologians developed categories of *just ad bellum* and *jus in bello* based upon his

arguments. Gratian (1100 C.E.), a monk credited with codifying Canon Law, used

Augustine's works to argue for the goal of peace as the primary principle for just war, and later Church councils began to use just war arguments to place limits upon types of weaponry used in warfighting (J.T. Johnson 2001, 104-ff; Elveraton-Dixon 2011, 25-ff).

However, it was Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274 C.E.) who combined natural law with Gratian's work to codify just war as: 1) defense for the common good, and 2) punishment for the sinful behavior of enemies (Reichberg 2014, 94-ff). Thomas' codification made sovereigns, as representatives of the state, responsible and accountable for just warfare as a matter of fidelity to God. He wrote:

> ... for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the prince by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private person to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights… Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault (culpa)… Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a right intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.... For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered illicit through a wicked intention. (Aquinas 1948, II-II, Q 40, Art. 1)

Thomas believed that war inflicted harms through intentional acts and accidental consequences, and his remedy was for political leaders and warfighters to practice Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity (love/*agape*) along with the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, courage, and temperance to regulate warfare (Aquinas 1948, II-II, Q. 41, Art. 1-2; Durward 2017, 121-ff). Individualized warrior codes for chivalry, and sovereign justifications for war, grew out of Thomist theologies for just war, but it was the work of Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546 C.E.) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617 C.E.), from the Salamanca School, that formalized JWT as a social critique against the misuses of military power.

Many rulers and warriors used the work of Augustine and Thomas to justify unjust abuses using military force (De La Torre 2014, 124-ff; 2017, 39-100). De Vitoria sought to correct these abusing by using Thomas' natural law arguments to reason that war was more than a just cause or a last resort to prevent an even greater of evil, and he linked his lectures on just war to focus upon instances of Conquistador mistreatment of indigenous people (Justenhoven 2017, 134-ff). Specifically, he argued that war was only justifiable for self-defense against outsider attacks, and as a punishment for unjust aggression, when supported by supported by the people, for the defense of the people, and in proportion to harms inflicted upon the same people (De Vitoria 1991, 39-ff). His ideas sought to rule out war for conquest, and they opened the door for just wars to be waged against tyrants who used war for: oppression, conquest, glory, and conversion (De Vitoria 1991, 250-ff).

Together, de Vitoria and Suarez considered just causes for war (*jus ausus belli*) as matters of the law of peoples (*jus gentium*) for individual states (*jus gentium inter se*) and common law between states/international law (*jus gentium intra se*) (De Vitoria 1991, 304-ff; Justenhoven 2017, 145-ff; Reichberg 2014, 96-ff). Thus, JWT principles began to place importance upon 1) alterity over exceptionalism, 2) accountability and responsibilities for limiting war and its consequences upon sovereigns as rulers of the state, and 3) warriors and agents of the state. These constructions changed during the Great Schism, the Reformation, and the Peace of Westphalia as the principles for a just war became the prerogatives of the emerging nation-state (P.D. Miller 2021, 8-ff).

The Great Schism (1054 C.E.) between the Roman and Orthodox churches coincided with the advent of the Crusades where Christianity clashed with Islam from the

Balkans through Turkey to Northern Africa. The Orthodox Church focused the Roman Church's developments of JWT into its support for defensive warfare to repel invaders, establish R/S guidance for individual warrior worship and penance, and success on the battlefield (Stoyanov 2014, 167-ff). The biggest effect was that Orthodox JWT believed that warfare was undesirable, but necessary to support the state against the outsider. Thus, supported nationalistic theologies that regarded rulers and warriors as "protectors of the state" who were entrusted with a sacred duty to defend national interests and security (Marsh 2013, 22-23,30-33; Stoyanov 2014, 170-191).

After the Reformation, similar themes can be found in the Protestant forms of JWT that extended traditional theological constructions for just war into emerging constructions of nation states and international law. These constructions permitted religious wars to establish political order, and pacifist restrictions upon all uses of military force (Morkevicius 2014, 235-244).

Martin Luther (1483-1546 C.E.) did not write about JWT. However, he used Augustine's theology to legitimize defensive war for the preservation of societal order against internal insurgencies and external invaders. This made warfighting a matter of conscientious agency for rulers and warfighters (Luther 1967a, 1967c). He publicly published a letter to Asa Von Kram, a soldier and counselor for the Duke of Brunswick-Luneberg in which he wrote:

> Think for yourself… For if the sword were an instrument of wrong when used for fighting, it would also be an instrument of wrong when punishing evildoers or when keeping the peace… for what is waging a just war but punishing the evildoers and maintaining peace… but by waging a just war a whole mass of evildoers who are doing harm in proportion to their

number is punished at the same time… Therefore, one work of the sword good and right, all its works good and right. After all, it is a sword and not a foxtail and it is called the "wrath of God." (Luther 1967b)

This guidance resembled the eastern metaphor of a life-giving sword by expecting warfighters to act with marital disciple as R/S stewards acting under legitimate, civic authority (Luther 1967b; Soho 2002, 68-74). However, the inflection point, was warfighter intent was to be discerned by the alterity of neighbor instead of personal vulnerabilities. At the same time, John Calvin (1509-1564 C.E.) systematized traditional JWT into church doctrine by combining civic duty with religious stewardship. He wrote:

> [agents of the state] … must not allow themselves to be carried away by any private feeling but be guided solely by regard for the public. Acting otherwise, they wickedly abuse their power which was given them, not for their own advantage, but for the good and service of others. On this right of war depends on the right of garrisons, leagues, and other civil munitions. (Calvin 2008, Book IV XX, 11-12)

Subsequent protestant theologians and philosophers developed these understandings to develop principles of JWT to 1) justify exceptional uses of military force, 2) limit harms to others, and 3) preserve/restore civil peace. Others, like Erasmus and Grotius, would help turn these principles into LOAC/IHL listed in Table 5.2. (Biggar 2013; J.T. Johnson 1981; H.R. Niebuhr 1963; R. Niebuhr 1932; Ramsey 1983; Walzer 2015).

However, some Christian theologies used JWT principles to question basic assumptions for warfighting and participation in military service based upon considerations for the protection of humanity, and these grew into categories of *jus ad*

vim and *jus post bellum* (Araujo 2014, 124-142; Bell 2009, Kindle locations 217-326;

Hauerwas 1983, 114, 132-133; Yoder 1996, 78-80*)*. These theologies are embedded

within the aspirations and angst contained in Church social statements such as *Pacem in*

Terris, *War and Peace 2000*, *Statement on War in Palestine and Israel 2023:*

> … in this age which boasts of its atomic power, it no longer makes sense
> to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of
> justice… Nevertheless, we are hopeful that, by establishing contact with
> one another and by a policy of negotiation, nations will come to a better
> recognition of the natural ties that bind them together. (JohnXXIII April
> 11, 1963)

> … war is considered to be necessary though undesirable means. In all
> times, Orthodoxy has had profound respect for soldiers who gave their
> lives to protect the life and security of their neighbors… Among obvious
> signs pointing to the equity or inequity of a warring party are its war
> methods and attitude toward its war prisoners and the civilians of the
> opposite side, especially children, women, and elderly... War should be
> waged with righteous indignation, not maliciousness...The Church has a
> special concern for the military, trying to educate them for the faithfulness
> to lofty moral ideals… [(Bishops 2000, 222; Stoyanov 2014, 201-ff)

> We yearn for peace and for justice, for an end to the seemingly endless
> cycle of violence and suffering, and for its fundamental root causes to be
> addressed. We lament the abject failure of the international community
> and of political leaders in the region who did not persist in the search for a
> sustainable peace founded on justice and mutual respect for the equal
> human dignity and rights of all, and who kept the cycle of violence
> turning. As we stand on this precipice of morality and faith, we pray for
> peace, for justice, for wisdom, for understanding, and for restoration of
> our humanity. (WCC 2023)

Implications for Modern Christian Warfighters

Christian JWT provides warfighters principled, character-based guideposts and

guardrails for their moral orientations that place moral limits upon warfighting.

Theologian Paul Tillich was a front-line chaplain for the German Army during WWI who

experienced great personal turmoil that he eventually reconciled and incorporated into his

theology (D. Peters 2016; R. May 1973). In a sermon entitled *Shaking the Foundations*, Tillich applied his war experiences to the spiritual struggles associated with moral dissonance between moral orientation and agency experienced by American veterans:

> A tremendous anxiety expresses itself through the words of these men. Not only do they feel the shaking of the foundations, but also that they themselves are largely responsible for it … I see American soldiers walking though the ruins of these cities [Europe and Japan], thinking of their own country, and seeing with visionary clarity the doom of its towns and cities... It is the message of the shaking of the foundations, and not those of their enemies, but rather those of their own country. (Tillich 2011, 5-7)

For Tillich, human identity is defined by spiritual tensions between the truths that humans use to define meaning and their life experiences (Tillich 1966, 31-36, 82-89). JWT developed by Christian theologians suggests that this identity resides within the intents and conscience of soldiers wrestling with contradictions between their duty (moral orientation), just consequences of the harms they cause (moral agency), and post-trauma meanings of their experiences (moral dissonance).

Research conducted with German WWII veterans concluded that social and moral contexts associated with life meanings affected their identity more than their levels of competence or skills (Madej 1978). Interviews conducted with Dutch war veterans concluded that their ethical re-assessments of beliefs and meanings after experiencing traumatic events affected their identity and well-being more than the clinical conditions addressed by traditional psychotherapy modalities (Molendijk 2018). Australian studies with allied nations concluded that constructions of moral standards need to be considered alongside traumatic events when treating combat veterans with post-trauma complaints (Neilsen 2016).

Russian paratrooper Pavel Filatyev who was wounded in combat and struggled

with moral issues concerning his participation in what he now considers to be an unjust

war in the Ukraine based upon violations of LOAC/IHL (Associated-Press 2022;

Aljazeera 2022; Antonova 2023; Boot 2022; R. Dixon and Abbakumova 2024; Gramer

2023; Ibrahim 2023; Tharoor 2023). Filatyev published his141-page war journal in which

he includes the following statement:

> I survived, unlike many others. My conscience tells me that I must try to
> stop this madness. … We did not have the moral right to attack another
> country, especially the people closest to us. This is an army that bullies its
> own soldiers, those who have already been in the war, those who do not
> want to return there and die for something they don't even understand. I
> will tell you a secret. The majority in the army, they are dissatisfied with
> what is happening there, they are dissatisfied with the government and
> their command…The main enemy of the Russians and Ukrainians is
> propaganda, which just further fuels hatred in people. I can no longer
> watch all this happen and remain silent. (Ilyushina 2022)

Filatyev's journal exemplifies Tillich's shaking of foundations, and of warfighters

to derive just war meanings from their war experiences (Walzer 2015, 125-127). Last

summer I observed the following exchange between two Ugandan, Christian soldiers.

During an ethics class as they discussed the issue of encountering child soldiers linked

with the Lord's Resistance Army (Christian) and the Allied Defense Forces (Islamic) in

battle.

> [Soldier 1] In Uganda we have had incidences of child soldiers being used
> by rebel groups (some as young as 9 years)? You could [go] to the battle
> knowing you're going to face these kids. How do you prepare your mind,
> knowing that even tomorrow or another day you will face these kids every
> time you're in contact?
>
> [Soldier 2 Responds] That is a very good question. If in that situation I
> would have to spend as much time as possible praying for the boys before

the engagement, asking God to spare them for His name's sake -- that they surrender or flee; anything but encounter my soldiers and be killed. I'd beg God's intervention.

These warriors are veterans of wars that are different from Tillich's war. All of them are trying to determine their duty to do "right thing" based upon 1) JWT principles, 2) exceptions for violence, and 3) considerations of alterity (Joustra 2013, 45-46; Marsh 2013, 22-23, 50; G.F. Powers 2013, 40-42). It is these R/S and moral struggles that make them warfighters.

Islam

Islam is a monotheist religion that seeks to integrate spiritual beliefs with corporate life practices in submission to the primacy of Allah (God). In Islam, the traditional guideposts and guardrails for just warfighting are determined by the Qur'an and *hadith*. The Qur'an is sacred revelations from Allah received by the Prophet Muhammed (570-632 C.E.), peace be upon him (PBUH), and written into *surahs* (verses). Later followers interpreted *surahs* (verses) from the Qur'an, and other authoritative sayings from the Prophet (PBUH), as teachings called hadith (B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 87-88; Salim 2020, 36).

A Muslim is defined as "one who submits to Allah," and his/her relationship with Allah, "is inseparable from the very name of Islam as the preservation of *salam* (peace). *Salam* is experienced through *jihad* which is best defined as meaningful life struggles for obedience in submission to Allah" (Faghfoory 2014, 439-ff). Muslim life practices are based upon interpretations of sacred commands found in passages from the Qur'an such as, "Obey God, obey His Prophet, and those who hold authority among you" (Qur'an, 4:59, 4:79, 26:150)

Islam split after the Prophet's death (PBUH) over violent disagreements about succession of leadership. Sunni leadership passed through religious and political authorities who were supported by schools of interpretation/jurisprudence. Shi'a leadership passed through descendants of the Prophet (PBUH) with temporal leadership exercised by *imams* (clergy) who lead through collective councils called *ulema* (B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 62-ff and 133-ff).

There are seven sects of Islam (Sunni, Shia, Whabbi, Salafi, Berelvi, Sufi and Deobandi). This section will examine common themes within Islamic JWT, and it will only deal with significant sectarian differences when they affect current applications of moral agency by modern, Muslim warfighters.

Islam is practiced through; the declaration of faith *(shahadah),* daily prayer (*salah*), giving alms (*zakat*), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (*hajj*), and it views the world in terms of three realms: 1) the *Dar-al-Islam,* the House/Realm of Islam, 2) the *Dar-al-Harb*, the House/Realm of War, and 3) the *Dar-al Suhl/Ahd ,* the house of Truce or Pact (B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 148-ff).

The *Dar-al-Islam* (House of Islam) can either be the political or physical environment where Muslims live in obedience to Allah as: 1) a global community of Muslims living in diaspora, 2) a modern political state such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, 3) a manifestation of Muslim unity engaged in conflicts within contested spaces (B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 148-ff). The *Dar-al-Harb* (House of War) is where people live in rebellion against Allah, and here that Muslims must struggle for internal and external obedience to Allah (Faghfoory 2014, 431-ff; Faruqi 1979, 59-69; Kelsay 1993, 33-61; O. Roy 2004, 1-59; Bonner 2006, 3-8, 92-93). The *Dar-al-Sulh/Ahd* (House of Truce)

describes historical locations where non-Muslim rulers (usually monotheist/*dhinna*) are allowed to govern their own subjects under Muslim authority by paying *jizya* a poll-tax to a Muslim ruler in accordance with *shari'ah* law (B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 148-ff).

The realms of *Dar-al-Islam, Dar-al-Harb*, *Dar-al Sulh/Ahd* are different from Augustine's two kingdom construction, because they are physical states of submission, struggle, and treaty that exist as part of Allah's created order (B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 148-ff; Malik 1986, xviii-ff). Between these realms Muslims use the concept of *jihad* to discern their spiritual and physical struggles for obedience to Allah. *Jihad* must not be translated as "holy war," although it may permit uses of armed violence under certain conditions (Faghfoory 2014, 404-ff). *Jihad* is best described as an internal and external struggle for peace with restrictions upon exceptional uses of violence permitted only for protection of the *ummah* (community). Modern Islamic societies possess both global and parochial perspectives for *jihad* that are influenced by traditional Muslim theology as well as Marxist, pan-Arab, fundamentalist, Zionist, and post-modern/western thought (O. Roy 2004, 41-ff, 326-ff).

The Qur'an forbids indiscriminate killing as murder:

That is why We ordained for the Children of Israel that whoever takes a life—unless as a punishment for murder or mischief in the land—it will be as if they killed all of humanity; and whoever saves a life, it will be as if they saved all of humanity ˹Although˺ our messengers already came to them with clear proofs, many of them still transgressed afterwards through the land. (Qur'an 5:32)

However, notice the word "although" in *surah 32* introduces the following instruction written in the next *surah*.

Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and spread mischief in the land is death, crucifixion, cutting off

302

their hands and feet on opposite sides, or exile from the land. This ˈpenaltyˈ is a disgrace for them in this world, and they will suffer a tremendous punishment in the Hereafter. (Qur'an 5:33)

These *surahs* do not issue a blanket permission for Muslims to use violence against transgressors. However, they do invite Muslims into struggles over obedience, communal security, and existential well-being caused by disbelief and disobedience that Muslims use as boundaries for *jihad*. Traditional Muslim teachings restrict *jihad* under conditions that require obedience to Allah, legitimate temporal authority, and necessity for the preservation of community (*ummah*), and restoration of peace (Badawi 2014, 224-234).

Like tribal forms of defensive warfare that are found in many ancient, religious texts, Muslims are not commanded to, "turn the other cheek, or to love their enemies, or beat their swords into plowshares." Thus, war is sometimes required or permitted, but it is always regulated by Qur'anic law, which provides considerable details for: 1) the opening, interruption, and termination of war, 2) conduct in warfighting, 3) the treatment of noncombatants, prisoners, and vulnerable classes of people, 4) permitted and forbidden weapons and tactics, and 5) the qualifications for warriors (Aboul-Enein and Zuhur 2004, 1; Badawi 2014, 341-344; Faghfoory 2014, 437-ff; B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 148-ff).

In a foundational work, *The Quranic Concepts of War* Pakistani General S.K. Malik writes that the Muslim warfighter must take on the "the color of Allah" which provides both moral orientation and directs moral agency (Qur'an, 29:69). He writes:

> The Holy Quran does not interpret war in terms of narrow national interests, but points towards the realization of universal peace and justice. It provides a built-in methodology for the attainment of this purpose… [and] makes maximum allowance to its adversaries to cooperate in a combined search for a just and peaceful order. (Malik 1986, 1)

The intent of the the Qu'ran is the protection of *Dar-al-Islam* in places of struggle (*Dar-al-Harb*), and to increase the potential for locations of truce/treaty (*Dar-al Suhl*). *Jihad* is defined by a framework of Islamic theology and expressions of national power through "the law of equality and reciprocity" that balance exceptions for violence with restraint of force and tolerance for the promotion of human well-being(Malik 1986, 143-ff). One of the most commonly cited sayings of the Prophet (PBUH) is, "there is no obedience in sin," meaning that when either a Muslim or unbeliever/*kafir* commands something sinful, a Muslim no longer has a duty to obey. Some Muslims go even further, and claim that obedience to authority (family, tribal, or civil) is replaced by a duty to disobey when those in authority establish practices that permit rebellion against Allah (B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 88-ff, 151-ff).

The Qur'an contains more than 100 *surahs* denouncing violence and restricting warfare, but it also contains many *surahs* that authorize uses of force against those who threaten Islam or break their agreements with the Prophet (PBUH). Qur'anic teachings differentiate between a greater, spiritual *jihad (Qur'an, 22:78)* and a lesser, physical *jihad* that includes violent struggle (Qur'an, 2:190-193, 4:95, 7:72, 9:5-6, 9:42, 9:81-88, 22:38-40, and 66:9). These teachings further differentiate between 1) obligatory *jihad* for the protection and defense of *Dar-al-Islam* against rebellion/oppression/and aggression from the frontiers, and 2) non-obligatory *qital/qitilu* (sword/fighting) under an established authority against threats to the *ummah* within the realm of *Dar-al-Harb*.

Qital includes a range of operations from raids to full-scale military operations, (Faghfoory 2014, 399-410; B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 147-ff, 191-ff). Muslims identify five types of *jihad/qital,* and each type has its own conditions for struggles

against: 1) unbelievers, 2) apostates, 3) sedition, 4) brigands/deserters, and 5) people of the book (Christians, Jews, Magians, and Sabeans) (Aboul-Enein and Zuhur 2004, 1-5). However, all forms of warfare require the issuance of a *fatwa,* a pronouncement from a recognized authority, which grants permission for Muslims to fight by using specific Qur'anic rules "in the path of Allah" (Aboul-Enein and Zuhur 2004, 1-5; J.T. Johnson 2001, 35-36, 115--164; B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 147-ff, 191-ff).

Abu Bakr, the son-in-law of the Prophet (PBUH), established ten rules for Muslim warfighter targeting (Aboul-Enein and Zuhur 2004, 29-ff). Al-Shaybani (circa 805 C.E.) was a jurist who was considered to be the founder of Muslim International Law. He argued that war was a practical matter of *siyar* (state relationships) that did not supersede *jihad*, and it needed to be enforced, regulated, and guided by balancing equality with reciprocity for the creation of peace (Khadduri 1996, 4-47). He published *hadith* that set limits upon: who, when, and what could be targeted in war, how to target, and who can target (Aboul-Enein and Zuhur 2004, 59-ff). For Al-Shaybani, the agency of Muslim warfighters was directed by their moral orientations, and the distinguishing factor for *jihad* was the Muslim who dwelt within the *Dar-al-Harb* and practiced *jihad* as, "a legal duty prescribed by the law… to grant security or protection to non-Muslims for certain specified purposes… and the achievement of them brings the grant of peace to an end" (Khadduri 1996, 53-54). Thus, he argued that the alterity of others directs exceptional uses of violence.

All types of *jihad/qital* involve struggles against *fitn'ah*, which is defined as forms of injustice, revolt, persecution, oppression, sedition, and aggression that threaten Muslim well-being and spiritual obedience (Badawi 2014, 368-370; Aboul-Enein and

Zuhur 2004, 191-192; Faghfoory 2014, 419-ff). *Fitnah* is associated with the concept of *bid'ah* (innovation) that disrupt Muslims' ability to discern between good and bad, obedience and disobedience, belief and unbelief. The worst consequence from *bid'ah* produce apostasy. Thus, discerning consequences from *fitnah* and *bid'a* is necessity for Muslims to differentiate between the behaviors of non-Muslims that can be corrected and the behaviors of *kafir* (apostates) who are Muslims that have been influenced by sources of *fitnah* and *bid'ah* and rejected Islam (B. Lewis and Churchill 2008, 52-ff; Winn 2019).

These categories are related to defense and targeting in traditional Islamic JWT, and the Qur'an permits actions against internal and outsider threats in times of conflict. Islam also practices of mercy and forgiveness to promote atonement, well-being, and peace as desired endstates for conflicts (Qur'an, 3:159, 4:31, 16:106, 24:22, 39:30, 42:40). However, internal and external challenges to traditional functions of *ummah, jihad, qital, fitnah,* and *bid'ah* are causing new struggles for the use of these correctives within modern Islam.

For Sunnis, these challenges come from Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIL, Hamas, and Al-Shabaab and their operations in countries from Israel to Iraq, Africa to Afghanistan and Asia. Their challenges have led Sunnis to rediscover and reform the foundations of Qur'anic law that define the global responsibilities of established Islamic states (Aldawoody 2018; Ayaz and Ahmad 2013). These VNSAs embrace forms of conservative Qur'anic teachings known as *Salafi*sm from Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703al –1792 C.E.). They seek to restore a pure, monotheistic form of submission/obedience to Allah within the *Dar-al-Islam* through strict adherence to *shari'ah* law (Bonner 2006, 161-ff; B. Lewis and

Churchill 2008, 158-159; Rashid 2002, 148, 220-223). These groups also seek to punish sources for *bid'ah* (innovations) and *fitn'ah* (injustices/revolts/oppression), and they believe these threats are just causes for violent *jihad/qital* against apostates and infidels.

The biggest challenge from these groups comes from the theological reversal of traditional Muslim teachings related to *jihad/qital* (struggle/warfighting)*, mujahiddeen* (warfighter), and *shahid* (one who voluntarily gives their life) by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966 C.E.), Muhammad Abd-al-Salam Faraj (1952–1982 C.E.), and Osama Bin Laden (1957-2011 C.E.). Their writings and actions resonate with different VNSAs and influence the orientations and agency of modern Sunni warfighters (Algar 2006, Kindle locations 127-ff; Juergensmeyer 2000, 83-ff).

Qutb believed that modern Muslims live in a state of *jahiliyyah,* the condition of society before Allah's revelation to the Prophet (PBUH), and he summoned Muslims to *jihad* as a necessary R/S practice to counter modern sources of *fitnah* (Qur'an, 4:75, 14:22, 16:98-100, 95:4-6; Bonner 2006, 162-ff; Qutb and Algar 2006, Kindle locations 275-351; Qutb 1990, 170-ff; 1953, Kindle locations 5283-ff).

Faraj published a pamphlet entitled *The Absent Obligation (The Neglected Duty*) in which he argued that traditional Islam and *Salafism* incorrectly placed the five pillars (practices) of Islam ahead of *jihad* and this weakened and degraded Muslims physically and spiritually (Faraj 2000, 50-51). He formed a type of muscular, Islamist spirituality that permitted Muslims to target marginalized Muslims and all infidels as *kafir* and *takfir* (apostates under judgement) (Faraj 2000, 63-76 and 83-87), and he redefined traditional meanings for *jihad* (struggle)*, mujahiddeen* (warrior)*,* and *shahid* (voluntary surrendering life). *Jihad* became the obligatory and greater (not lesser) armed struggle for all Muslims

307

to fight as: 1) *mujahiddeen* (righteous warriors in the cause of Allah), and 2) become

shahid (martyrs for the cause), to 3) defeat the enemies of Islam (Qur'an, 9:14; Faraj

2000, 14-ff, 35-ff, 91-94; Faraj and Jansen 1986, Paragraphs 84, 102, 109, and 103;

Heikal 1983; Jansen 1986, 199, 210-213; Juergensmeyer 2000, 81-83; B. Lewis and

Churchill 2008, 214-ff).

Osama Bin Laden put their teachings into action. Before 9/11 he and Al Qaeda

formally issued "a summons to Islam" (*da'wa) w*ithin its formal declaration of war on

America. This was obedient to tradition Islamic teachings, but they then used innocent

victims in sacrificial/martyr bombing raids that intentionally harmed protected categories

of people (Laden 1996; Qur'an, 9:11-14).[31] Other Islamist groups have used similar ideas

to justify permissions for insurgencies, revolutions, hijackings, beheadings/executions,

bombings, hostage-taking, piracy, raids against innocents, assassinations, and human

trafficking. Uses of these theologies to support warfighting have blurred the boundaries

with Muslim JWT the differentiate between struggle and fighting (*jihad* vs. *qital*),

apostates vs. struggling Muslims/ and non-Muslims (*takfir/kafir/Al-al-Kitab,* and the role

of *ummah* (community) and the duty of individual Muslims (Aboul-Einen 2004; Andalusi

2016; Winn 2019).

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[31] *Surah* 9:11 is an invitation to Islam (*da'wa*) that should not be confused with the hoax
translation of the *surah* that circulated on the internet following 9/11. For information on
this hoax see https://www.deseret.com/2012/5/20/20413589/sacred-texts-must-be-read-
with-caution#:~:text=%22For%20it%20is%20written%20that,(Quran%209%3A11). The
accurate translation is, "But if they repent and establish Prayer and give *Zakat,* they are
your brothers in faith. Thus, do We expound Our revelations to those who know. But if
they break their pledges after making them and attack your faith, make war on the leaders
of unbelief that they may desist, for they have no regard for their pledged words(Qur'an,
9:11-12).

For Shi'a Muslims, these modern challenges involve establishing and maintaining a revolutionary authority within Iran that secures its future Iran as a nation state that can acts as a protector and guardian for Shi'a populations (*ummah)* globally. Iran supports the defense of Shi'a states and the armed activities of state-sponsored armed groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Jaysh al-Mahdi (Gross 2013; Hoyt 2013; Iran 1980, Ch.2, Art. 11).

The militant activities of state-sponsored Shi'a groups and VNSAs are supported by theologies that blend traditional Islamic theologies for *jihad/qital* with themes found in western, liberation theologies and warfighting doctrines (SunTzu 1991; Tse-Tung 1961; R. Wright 1985, 278-ff), The result is a mixture of political and religious symbols and meanings that forge an identity from the past with the goals of 1) defeating perceived, unjust oppression (*fitnah*) from outsiders, and 2) securing a Muslim state, and create forms of a religious/cultural nationalism (Amanat 2001, 25-ff; Rashid 2002, 10, 95-118).

Implications for Modern Muslim Warfighters

Qutb's, Faraj's, and Bin-Laden's teachings have resonated in groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIL, Hamas, and Al-Shabab. Recently, Hamas initiated attacks against Israel by intentionally targeting people protected under traditional Islamic law. They justify their actions as righteous *jihad* against *kafir* (infidels and oppressors), others view their actions as war crimes committed against "innocent people (Gettleman, Schwartz, and Sella 2023; Staff 2024; U.N. U.N. 2023). Qutb and Faraj were executed in

Egypt for their influence upon the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Bin-Laden was targeted and killed by U.S. Special Operators in Pakistan for his influence upon Al-Qaeda.

The critical point here is that the moral orientations of Muslim warfighters' who are engaged in conflicts from Gaza to the Philippines are being affected by contradictions between traditional Muslim teachings for just warfighting and emerging interpretations for *jihad* by Islamist and socialist groups (Kelsay 1993, 18-38; J.T. Johnson 2001, 122-ff; Singh and Bin-Jani 2017). For example, a letter was found in the 9/11 hijackers' belongings that combined R/S values with permissions for targeting. The letter included instructions for: 1) their R/S purification, 2) the righteous killing of their hostages, 3) specific operation instructions, including prayers, and 3) the rewards they would have for their martyrdom (Atta and Al-Omari 2001; Lincoln 2006, Kindle location 1268-ff; Fouda and Fielding 2003, 108-115).

Cultural anthropologist Talal Asad writes that pseudo religion begins where, "cruelty is an indispensable technique for maintaining a particular kind of international order… [where] the lives of some peoples are less valuable than the lives of others and therefore their deaths less disturbing" (Asad 2007, 94). Anthropologist Akbar Ahmed argues that this is happening within a triangle of conflicting values formed between western powers, modern Muslim states, and *Islamist* groups that trap Muslim warfighters in struggles for their own physical survival and identity based upon deep R/S beliefs and meanings (Ahmed 2014, 16-24).

This dissertation argues that these challenges are also happening within a triangle of moral dissonance between moral orientations, moral agency, and reconciliation

310

(Chapters 1 and 6). Research studies using samples of Muslim veterans from England, and Russia reported that issues of prejudice, alienation, and betrayals that happened during their service resulted in negative R/S struggles, but events associated with belonging/inclusion, achievements, trust, and purpose contributed to positive identity (Bradfield 2016; Hosein 2019; Sheikh 2018). These findings are supported by the following three narratives.

First, a recent research study with Nigerian soldiers revealed they had higher incidents of moral injury from deployment stress and Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACES). This is significant because: it is research conducted with non-western, and Muslim soldiers using western assessment tools, and 2) it is research finding levels of moral injury from PMIEs and MEs (Sonter et al. 2023).

Second, writer Chris Hedges interviewed a community of Iranian veterans in the village of Naushaur eight years after the end of the Iraq-Iran war, and he recorded their struggles in his book, *War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning*. Hedges documents their isolation, self-medication, suicide rate, and symptoms that suggest their PTSD. However, he also documents their anger, shame, disillusionment, and sense of betrayal based upon life meanings that suggest these veterans are also affected by issues of moral dissonance between the political and religious ideals that sent them to war and their combat experiences. He writes about two veterans:

> I will never be normal again," said one of the men, who spent twenty-three months at the front. "I am nervous. I can't control my anger. If anything disturbs me, like a minor car accident, I explode." The second man, who was a lieutenant in the war, looked out over the water and said in a monotone, "My battalion was ordered across the flats early one morning.

Within a couple of hours 400 soldiers were dead and hundreds more wounded. It was a stupid, useless waste. When we got back they called us traitors. (Hedges 2002, 179-180)

Third, there is a Muslim belief and practice (*sha'ir*) called *Basmala* or *bismiallah* that focuses upon, "Allah the all merciful" (Qur'an 1:1). This quality is revealed 114 times throughout the Qur'an, and the *Basmala* is spoken at the beginning of each daily prayer (*salat*), and it "acts as a bridge that binds the sacred to the mundane and it draws no distinction between them" (Ansari 2019, 1). Research suggests that the practice of mercy (*Basmala*), or its absence, is critical element for destroying or restoring self/social identity and well-being in war torn Muslim communities within Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Azar, Mullet, and Vinsonneau 1999; Hamidi 2009).

After the battle of Rhodes, Sultan Suleiman the Great (1494-1520 C.E.) demonstrated *basmala* in his: 1) humanitarian control of his own army following the siege, and 2) mercy in sparing the lives of his conquered enemies (French 2017, 245-249; Khadduri 1996, 63-ff, 79-98). The practice of *basmala* is presently being used to restore ex-child soldiers who have experienced brutal training and trauma from Islamist insurgent groups. These groups use children as quick "draftees" who are easily trainable converts to their forces.

There is evidence that the practices used by these groups to "undo" childrens' embedded religious and cultural value systems cause high rates of PTSD, depressive disorders, and imprinted somatic disturbances. There is also evidence that practices of mercy as part of their rehabilitation help to correct their "indifferences to pain" (Kizihan and Noll-Hussong 2018).

Writer Hassan Santur documents the story of Abdi and Hussein (both pseudonyms). Abdi is a child soldier who defected from Al-Shabab after the group killed his brother, and Hussein runs a school for ex-child soldiers, who were immersed within Al-Shabab. Abdi's goal is to recover from traumatic experiences with the group, and Hussein's goal is, "to counteract what they [children like Abdi] have been taught" (Santur 2018).

One of the main struggles that former child soldiers, like Abdi, face is shame/guilt over, "falling for al-Shabab's deceptive messages and tactics… promises of wages in return for defending their land from invaders and appeals to their religious idealism through martyrdom" (Santur 2018). Hussein offers them *basmala* as a healing corrective. He explains, "Our mandate is to change minds, to take all the bad things they learned and replace it with something good … We believe that all human beings can change, can improve, so we don't give up on them. … I believe in forgiveness " (Santur 2018).

It is arguable that Islamist practices are a form of tribalistic warfare that can be practiced within all R/S traditions, and that can present challenges to JWT within all R/S traditions. Within Islam, *Basmala* provides an authentic, restorative alternative for moral *jihad* that is 1) grounded in traditional Muslim R/S practices, 2) consistent with principles and laws of Muslim JWT and LOAC/IHL, and 3) provides preventative guideposts and protective guardrails for Muslim warfighters' moral orientation and agency. It is necessary to identify such practices in all R/S traditions and ask, what happens if such guideposts and guardrails do not exist? At this point it is appropriate to consider the New Rules of War as a challenge to both the moral and legal boundaries for just warfighting.

The New Rules of War: Agnostic Challenges to Just Warfighting Principles

The New Rules of War (TNRW) describe the shift from traditional boundaries and limitation for just warfighting from traditional JWT principles to pragmatic and utilitarian exceptions for success, security, and survival. TNRW are considered agnostic because they acknowledge that religious/spiritual/cultural values exist, but they are relative and subordinate to other factors for determining the dynamics of warfighting. TNRW are variations of ancient, tribal warfare that are re-emerging in post-modern contexts to justify agency in warfighting in modern conflicts, but they are flexible when it comes to applications of ROE. Thus, they may or may not present challenges to LOAC/IHL. The New Rules of War can be defined by a triad of theories provided by Martin Van Creveld, Robert Kaplan, and Sean McFate.

Martin Van Creveld is a modern military theorist who challenges Clausewitz's traditional trinitarian model for war. He is not the first to do so, most modern and post-modern theories for warfighting, ranging from Schmidt's promotion of sovereign exceptionalism to Mao's rejection of "Asinine Ethics," rely upon contextual and utilitarian ethics to determine the boundaries for warfighting (Schmitt 1985 (1922), 5-ff; Tse-Tung 2020). All of these challenge parts of Clausewitz's trinitarian model.

Van Creveld begins by differentiating between the nature and character of war. Traditionally, military theorists assumed Napoleonic General Carl Von Clausewitz's (1780-1831 C.E.) explanation for the nature of war. To him war was a series of reinforcing triads: 1) primordial violence, hatred, and animosity that occurred through, 2) instinct, chance, and probabilities that were 3) controlled by the people, the military, and the government (Von Clausewitz 1968, Kindle locations 829-ff). In *The Transformation*

of War van Creveld makes his case for changing Clausewitz's warfighting triad by examining the political dynamics of the regional, post-colonial conflicts that occurred in the shadow of nuclear warfare and the emerging tactics, and atrocities that occurred in the shadow of World War II (Bassford 2011, 45-54).

First, he asserts that Clausewitz's trinity is too narrow in focus to describe what is happening in modern warfare through individuals and non-state actors, who are in centers of power, and who are not restricted by traditional moral boundaries. Second, he attempts to establish the roles that "might and right" have in determining the outcomes of "non-trinitarian" war (Van Creveld 1991, 58-ff).

Finally, he proposes five key elements that control the outcomes of modern warfare: 1) by whom war is fought, 2) the relationships between the actors and non-combatants, 3) the issues, strategy and tactics that are used in determining how the war is fought, 4) the desired political outcomes for the war, and 5) the motivations of the warfighters. Thus, the justice, the legality, and the means for the conflict become subject to the *realpolitik* of the participants, and this is a post-modern sequel to the Melian Dialogue described earlier in the chapter (Van Creveld 1991).[32]

In his book *Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos*, political theorist Robert Kaplan describes the utilitarian and contextual ethics that support the emerging TNRW. He argues for: 1) establishing a new political ethic that can change the current political and social illusions that create fallibility and vulnerability to catastrophes, and 2) creating an international stability that counters the need for

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[32] These principles are contained in extended arguments that Van Crevald presents throughout Chapters 2 through 5.

escalating war (R. Kaplan 2002, 50-ff). Kaplan argues that Kantian and Rawl's

deontological laws and principles may provide "yardsticks" to measure aspirations and

intentions for agency, but they fail to account for the consequences caused by extremism.

Instead, Kaplan advocates for the utilitarian ethics of Machiavelli paired with the social

intent of Hobbes to determine and measure correct ethical actions between state and non-

state actors (R. Kaplan 2002, 110-115). Such actions need to be contextual and remain

formless until the participants/stakeholders determine specific, but transitory, agreements

based upon their characters not absolute laws (R. Kaplan 2002, 137-150). Kaplan writes:

> The most sincere and heartbreaking truth of the ancients is the vast gulf
> that separates political-military virtue from individual moral perfection. It
> is such a truth that may help define the twenty-first century, as we are
> forced to choose in the midst of high-tech war between what is right and
> what is unfortunately necessary. (R. Kaplan 2002, 128)

The work of Van Creveld and Kaplan supports the work of military theorist Sean

McFate who argues that,

> …the laws of war [defined by JWT or LOAC/IHL] are a marvelous
> fiction. These "laws" exist in name only. No one can legislate combat, or
> regulate it, and it is hubris to try. Kindhearted solutions to war just get
> more people killed. (McFate 2019, 3)

In his book, *The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder,*

McFate lists the following ten rules to replace traditional JWT principles for modern

warfare. His work reflects contextual and utilitarian ethical processes that redefine the

traditional *jus in bello* and LOAC/IHL categories of necessity, proportion, distinction,

and human suffering used to determine warfighter agency. The ten rules are:

1. Conventional war is dead, and it will be replaced by hybrid warfare.

2. Technology will not save us (future wars will be people centric).

316

3. There is no such thing as War or Peace– wars will be fought along a

continuum.

4. Hearts and minds do not matter -- they are superfluous at the tactical and

operational levels.

5. The best weapons don't fire bullets – cyber and information warfare will

determine outcomes.

6. Mercenaries will return.

7. New types of world powers will rule – the rise of non-state actors.

8. There will be wars without states.

9. Shadow wars will dominate.

10. Victory is fungible – and so is peace. (McFate 2019, 3-10)

McFate's ten rules are not immoral or lawless. They are intended to 1) describe

the strategic and operational means that state and non-state actors currently use to

conduct global military operations, and 2) alleviate restrictions placed upon warfighters

during combat. Arguably, TNRW are already in place and Van Crevald, Kaplan, and

McFate are merely describing what is already taking place.

Implications for Modern Warfighters

Arguably, TNRW have the potential of creating a post-JWT/LOAC/IHL world,

that makes traditions JWT fungible. This shift could support a return to tribal forms of

warfare that would grant impunity for exceptional uses of military force to ensure victory

and disregard alterity for the sake of stability. These types of impunity and disregard can

change the moral calculus that warfighters use for determining necessity, proportionality, distinction, and human suffering (*jus in* bello), and make them act as warriors or pirates. However, TNRW could also force nations and individuals to discover: 1) what really matters to them, 2) what they're willing to accept to keep the peace, and 3) what they are willing to suffer in war. This type of moral orientation would require value-based leaders and warfighters who can hammer out a stable peace that they will honor and maintain.

The implications for the modern warfighter can be summarized in the words of General Curtis LeMay, the planner for strategic bombing. LeMay adhered to a utilitarian/contextual strategy for warfighting that revealed a tribal banality for making the rules of war fungible values dependent upon ethnocentrism. He responded:

> [When asked about proportionality] … I'll tell you what war is about. You've got to kill people, and when you've killed enough, they stop fighting. (Rhodes 1995)

> [When asked about moral considerations affecting his decisions to bomb a target] … I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal. Fortunately, we were on the winning side. (Rhodes 1995)

> [When asked about distinction] … There are no innocent civilians. It is their government, and you are fighting a people, you are not trying to fight an armed force anymore. So, it doesn't bother me so much to be killing the so-called innocent bystanders. (Sweeney, Rhodes, and Boling 2012)

LeMay is not the only warrior who has these sentiments; but imagine if all warriors did, because these were the standards for their moral orientations, operational mindsets, and targeting decisions. After 9/11, the U.S. made a strategic decision to use enhanced techniques to interrogate enemy prisoners, and this blurred the boundaries of JWT and LOAC/IHL that warfighters used for moral orientation. The consequences from

this decision will be examined in the following section because it is a prime example of how changes to warriors' guideposts and guardrails can result in damaging moral dissonance by changing their moral boundaries.

Test Narratives – The Moral Exceptions and Alterity Associated with Torture

Research studies are finding that the concept of moral injury is embodied in the forms of moral authority (values not hierarchy) that warriors use to guide them through the ideological gap between permissions and prohibitions for warfighting (Beneda 2022, 22-23; Larson and Zust 2017, 19-ff). The dissonance that occurs within this gap creates post-combat consequences for warfighters' identity and well-being (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle Locations 2765-2775).

Post 9/11, policies that followed TNRW formed operational mindsets for torture were contrary to moral principles of JWT and legal restraints of LOAC/IHL, and they caused negative effects in warfighters. Earlier, this chapter examined the Sand Creek Massacre (Civil War) in terms of its consequences upon the operational mindsets and moral orientations of warriors. These policies existed on the legal and moral boundaries that separated warfighting from criminal behaviors. Similar dynamics drove what happened during two other occurred that occurred in American military history -- My Lai (Vietnam War) and Haditha (Operation Iraqi Freedom).

These incidents are important for understanding the moral effects that mission command orders have upon warriors. At My Lai, an infantry company attacked a village and killed 504 unarmed civilians. At Haditha a platoon of Marines killed 24 unarmed civilians, after a unit member was killed by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) at the same location. Were these acts of killing or murder?

319

In both incidents, the warriors believed they were in contact with enemy combatants, but later investigations found that they were not under fire at the time of the killings. Similar to Sand Creek, both incidents were investigated and tried by the military according to existing ROE at the time. Junior leaders received light sentences or non-judicial punishments, and senior leaders received reprimands for their command failures (Englade 2015, 180-ff; Helms and Faraj 2016, 283-ff; Peers 1979, 238-ff; W.C. Peters 2009, 925-ff).

The enlisted warriors who committed these killings/murders were under orders from their superiors to engage non-combatants. These orders violated the ROE, but testimonials from some of the warriors' revealed that they justified their actions by rationalizing that they were protecting themselves and their buddies. However, at My Lai, one pilot, Hugh Thompson, and his crew testified that they weren't threatened by enemy fire and they tried to stop the killings and rescue some of the villagers. They acted similar to Wynkoop, Soule, and Cramer at Sand Creek. This type of intervention did not happen at Haditha.

Later, two junior leaders, arguably, expressed some remorse their actions at My Lai (Calley) and Haditha (Wurterich) following their trials (Larson and Zust 2017, 243-ff; McDaniel 2009). LT Calley told a civic group, "If you are asking why I did not stand up to them [his superiors] … I will have to say that I was a second lieutenant getting orders from my commander and I followed them — foolishly, I guess… this is not an excuse; it was just what happened(McDaniel 2009)." Staff Sergeant Wurterich told the

judge at his court martial, "I have to accept that my name will be forever associated with a massacre… all I can do is continue to be who I've always been: me. And none of those other labels have ever been… who I am" (Englade 2015, 208).

Junior warfighters who were present at My Lai and Haditha expressed moral reactions that revealed deeper consequences for their self-identity. After Haditha, Sergeant (Sgt) De La Cruz testified that he shot into the dead bodies of unarmed civilians and urinated upon their corpses. When asked why he did this, he responded, "… I wasn't really thinking right … I know I should not have done something like that, but I did it. That's not an excuse. It wasn't appropriate to do, but I did it. That's what happened. You're mad; you're angry over what had happened … Whether anyone else knew … [it] didn't really matter. I knew" (B. Smith 2008). After My Lai, Private Olson wrote his father, "It was murder, and I'm ashamed of myself for not trying to do anything about it. This isn't the first time, Dad" (Lindsay 2012). Later, Private Meadlo yelled at Calley, "God will punish you for what you made me do," and after he returned home to his family, his mother described his demeanor to a reporter, "I sent them a good boy and they made him a murderer" (Hersh 2015).

Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson finished his career in the Army, but experienced rejection by Peers, and he fought depression and alcoholism before being rewarded for Heroism for his actions at My Lai (Bilton 2006; Larson and Zust 2017). He explained his actions to others:

> … I saved the people because I wasn't taught to murder and kill… I can't
> answer for the people who took part in it… I apologize for the ones that
> did. I just wished we could have helped more people that day. I personally

wish I was a big enough man to say I forgive them [the troops at My Lai], but I swear to God I can't." (Anderson and Kohn 1999; Larson and Zust 2017, 248-249; H. Thompson 2003)

Exceptional Permissions for the Practice of Torture

The Rules of Engagement (ROE) expect warriors to act with necessary force (including deadly force), to protect themselves and noncombatants, but they also expect them to use force as an exception consistent with UCMJ and LOAC/IHL(Congress 2019). The ROE are guaranteed in combat by the training, leadership and performance of warfighters who act in accordance with the moral principles and legal boundaries set by JWT and LOAC/IHL (Solis 2022, 512). Moral consequences happen when these legal boundaries are ignored, crossed, and violated. This explains what happened to warfighters during the War on Terror when permissions were granted by the National Command Authority to use enhanced interrogation techniques/torture upon prisoners. Much has already been written on the legal prohibitions and effects of torture. This examination will focus upon the moral effects from uses of torture upon warfighters who were the agents for the torture.

In 1625, Grotius reasoned that, "A war criminal was not someone who harmed the enemy for the wrong reason, [but] someone who harmed the enemy in the wrong way and, in so doing, lost his license to kill" (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 72; Grotius 2022, 3.10.13). Torture in war had been used since ancient times, so Grotius, de Vitoria and others were familiar with it, yet they placed limits on its uses because of its humanitarian consequences that later the Geneva Protocols, LOAC/IHL, and UCMJ forbid (Solis 2022, 436). The dangers of torture upon agents and victims were also known by philosophers, researchers, and healers.

Philosopher Elaine Scarry describes torture as an agency of savage power to exert control, where the life of the victim no longer matters, and the means of torture becomes an extension of the torturer's desire to produce a desired result – all else becomes "collateral damage" (Scarry 1995, 51, 67-ff). In 1961 and 1971 Stanley Milgram and Phillip Zimbardo conducted studies that concluded that there were negative psychological, social, ethical and moral effects upon controllers, and those controlled, in confined environments where discipline and pain were used to create desired outcomes. Neither researcher directly examined torture, but their findings directly applied to its uses (Milgram 1963; Greene 2013, 48-99, 275-293; Zimbardo 2007, 19-ff). In 2003, psychiatrist Jean Arriago began communicating her ethical concerns to the Department of Defense about the involvement of helping professions with counterterrorism operations and enhanced interrogations. Later, she and her associates published aritcles that led to changes in the American Psychological Association (APA) code of ethics to measure intent and limit consequences of harm from these practices (Arriago, Eidelson, and Bennett 2012, 384-ff).

Thus, the negative effects from torture were known, and they continued to be discovered. Nevertheless, the U.S. government sought to use types of tortue to gather intelligence. After 9/11 emotions ran high in the U.S. and attorneys from the U.S. Department of Justice issued guidance through a series of memorandums addressed to the National Command Authority that: 1) defined the status of prisoners as unlawful combatants, and 2) justified the use of enhanced interrogation techniques by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. These memorandums created an operational/ "reprisal" mindset based upon the logic that a, "Flagrant breach by one side

of a bargain generally releases the other side from the obligation to observe its end of the bargain"(Yoo 2006, 23-ff). This is a form of utilitarian, contextual tribalism, and the moral and legal agency of American warriors was determined and justified by the perceived agency of their enemies instead of the principles embedded in their warrior codes (Yoo 2003, 16 and 81).

In essence, the U.S. policy permitted exceptional actions with impunity that denied the alterity of others, disregarded the moral guideposts, and crossed the legal guardrails that were in place to direct warfighters, and protect warriors from becoming pirates.

The Moral Effects Upon Warfighters

The goal of these interrogations was to create uncertainty and dread by decreasing prisoners' control over basic human needs and forcing them to value their personal welfare(Solis 2022, 486-489). Such practices were proven to be ineffective for the stated purposes by U.S. military veterans who were former Prisoners of War (POWs) (McCain and Salter 2018, Kindle locations 967-1471; Stockdale 1993; Toliver, 165-166). The CIA used military intelligence specialists, trained interrogators and contractors at establish sites in Guantanamo Bay, Aghanistan, and Iraq that were authorized to use enhanced interrogation techniques on detainees who were now considered to be unlawful combatants, not protected by international or domestic law. These interrogators also solicited the help of medical, social, and spiritual specialists to complete these missions. This led to moral and ethical issues in these specialized communities.

Torture and The Dis-integration of Warfighters Moral Orientations

At Guantanamo Bay, Muslim Army Chaplain James Yee was arrested in
association for doing his duty to advise his commander on issues related to religious
accomodation, ethics, morale, and moral climate. Yee was charged with violations of
personal conduct, considered a traitor, and held in isolation for 76 days (similar to the
initial treatment given detainees), before being cleared of all charges. Afterwards, he
requested to be honorably discharged from the military (Army 2019b, 1-3, and 1-9;
2015b, 2-3; Goodman 2022, 217-ff; Yee and Molloy 2005). Yee summarizes his
experience,

> In many ways, this experience has made me more committed to the goals I
> set for myself as a Muslim chaplain and has given me an even greater
> sense of purpose…What happened to me is about civil liberties, military
> justice, and bigotry and paranoia. It's certainly not about frivolous
> accusations made about my personal life. (Yee and Molloy 2005, 218-219)

Some intelligence professionals joined with the helping professions to argue that
torture is counter-productive to mission because it endangers warriors' identity as it
simultaneously steels the enemy's will to fight (Solis 2022, 473-474). Prior to 9/11 the
standard for interrogator training in the U.S. military was the techniques used upon
American and British Airmen by Luftwaffe interrogator Hanns-Joachim Scharff, who
used manners, kindness, and patience with the goal of engaging prisoners in a dialogue
from which operational intelligence could be gleaned. His warrior code was "*Ehr, Lehr,
Wehr*" (Honor, Education, Defense), and he was judged by the Wehrmacht, the Allied
Military, and POWs to be a very effective (Toliver, 364-ff).

The U.S. manuel for Intelligence Interrogation used prior to 9/11 stated that the
goal of interrogation is to "obtain reliable information in a lawful manner, in a minimum

amount of time, and to satisfy intelligence requirements of any echaelon of command"
(Army 1992, 1-6). The manuel warned about the effects of stress upon interrogators and
the potential for abuse to gain quick information (Army 1992, 2-2 and 2-13), and it
expressly prohibited, "acts of violence or intimidation, including physscial or mental
torture, threat, insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to
interrogation" (Army 1992, 1-8). However, the manuel did allow interrogators to
manipulate situations that created somatic-mind reactions, or "breaking points, such as
exhaustion or fear to deepen rapport and dialogue (Army 1992, 3-11-ff). The enhanced
interrogation techniques went beyond that.

Tony Lagouranis was an Army Intelligence interrogator assigned to Abu Gharib
after the publicized incidents and subsequent investigations occurred from 2004 to 2006.
He describes the moral dissonance created between his own training and the contexts he
experienced at the prison.

> The Abu Ghraib I knew looked nothing like the pictures we all later saw
> of MPs turned sadists. I saw no nudity, sexual humiliation, or use of dogs.
> The hard site stank and was a terrible place to be, but it seemed well run
> and humane. Only after I read the Taguba Report [the military
> investigation of Abu Gharib] … did I see that the humane treatment and
> by-the-book approaches to interrogation had arrived at Abu Ghraib at
> about the same time I did. I was lucky. I know now that if I had been there
> during the worst of the scandal, I would have been disgusted with most of
> these sadistic acts. I might have reported them. But I also know that when
> it came to other interrogation "enhancements," I would have joined right
> in. (Lagouranis and Mikaelian 2007, 31)

Lagouranis was a junior, enlisted soldier who was also considered to be a
professional interrogator, and so he decided that he could make case by case exceptions
for some of the techniques he used. He reasoned that "the hazy morality" of the war was
designed, not to protect, "heinous" insurgents, but to obtain information that could

protect helpless innocents. This dissonance urged him to push against the moral boundaries and expectations that were placed upon him (Lagouranis and Mikaelian 2007, 46, 51-60, 70-ff). He concluded that his moral senses brought him to a place where he considered himself to be a "bully" or a "pirate" instead of a "warfighter," and he looked for a way back home through the values that brought him to his breaking point. He writes that torture isn't a slippery more than a boundary between the agent and the victim. He summarizes his combat narrative:

> My opposition to torture rests entirely on moral grounds. I'm opposed to its use in all circumstances. Americans should never use torture, and to this there should be no exceptions … the consequences of torture go far beyond individuals and individual circumstances, so we can't let short-term gain or practical considerations decide this question for us. We have to look at a much larger picture before we decide… (Lagouranis and Mikaelian 2007, 244)

Lagouranis was a trained interrogator, but for other warriors, torture was an added duty within their kill chains, and units began creating and using techniques from their training and imaginations believing they were supported by the memorandums and command guidance that operationalized torture. So, what was created at strategic and operational levels of mission command became carried out by junior warriors at the tactical levels. In the investigative report on the conditions at Abu Gharib Major General Antonio Taguba concluded that, "leadership failures resulted in an environment that allowed those [junior warfighters] criminally culpable of the abuse to feel they had free rein in their treatment of detainees…" (Taguba 2004, 1). Eleven Abu Gharib Soldiers were put on trial and found guilty of the maltreatment of prisoners based upon violations of the UCMJ and LOAC, but some chose not to participate and became "whistle

blowers" (Taguba 2004, 5-14). After his sentencing, SGT Smith critically examined his

participation and told a reporter, "It [my behavior] was foolish, stupid, and

juvenile…There is nothing I could do to take it back. If I could, I would"(NBC 2006).

This kind of exceptional moral agency harmed other warriors who were deployed

in theater. In an unrelated incident, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Allen West, a battalion

commander, was convicted of abusing a prisoner by using his sidearm (pistol) to conduct

a mock execution to coerce information. He argued that his actions were minimal and

necessary to produce actionable intelligence for a greater good (Solis 2022, 455-456).

Lagouranis reached the conclusion, "I am ashamed not only of my own deeds, not

only of my nation's deeds, but of human deeds as well. I am ashamed to be a man"

(Lagouranis and Mikaelian 2007, 151). Others hurt more deeply, Army Specialists (SPC)

Adam Gray and Jonathan Millantz were friends and members of an Armor battalion.

They were not trained interrogators. However, they participated in some unit-level

interrogations, and they suffered from their experiences. After SPC Gray's suicide SPC

Millantz described his and Gray's battles with moral dissonance:

> Adam [Gray] was the most gung-ho soldier I ever met in my entire life—
> the first guy to kick down a door. Obviously, he suffered deeply from
> what he saw. He wasn't a coward or a bad guy. He was just a guy who
> was put in a position … (J. Phillips 2010, 187-188)

> I was contemplating suicide—I couldn't believe what I did. It's very tough
> when you have a conscience that is filled with atrocities [and] you know
> what you did to people. I went to confession. I went to counseling. I still
> can't forgive myself for what I did to those poor people … It's been hard
> over the years coming to terms with what actually happened over there. I
> don't know if I'll ever have closure. (J. Phillips 2010, 191)

Finally, SPC Daniel Keller describes how "soldier practices" in the same armor

unit as Millantz and Gray contributed to his ongoing issues with dissonance:

There's a lot of stuff that you're not supposed to do, that you do over there, and… of course it raises the morality issues… [at night] That's when you really start thinking about it, you're there alone at night in bed, staring at the ceiling, and you're thinking about all the bad stuff you did. And that's kind of how it hits you…. It's [torture] always shown as a bad thing; the bad guy's doing it, and the bad guy is always portrayed as this ugly person, so, you're seeing how in effect everybody else sees you, and eventually you just can't escape that. And you start seeing yourself that way. (J. Phillips 2010, 135)

The Re-establishment of Moral Guideposts and Legal Guardrails as Corrective Alterity

Zimbardo describes a process, he labels as the Lucifer Effect where good people can be induced, seduced, and initiated into behaving in evil ways even though they invest in goodness and the ability for "rational appraisal and rejection of situational temptations" (Zimbardo 2007, 211). Military training can hone sadistic, psychological tendencies that are manifested when warriors are confronted by real-life situations that can create social pressures that blur ethical boundaries and result in situational ethics (S.T. Fiske, Harris, and Cuddy 2004; H.C. Kelman and Hamilton 1989; B.S. Powers 2019, 39-41; Wolfendale 2007, 182-192; Zimbardo 2007, 485-ff). Thus, it becomes essential to establish standards and principles that protect the, "nobility to a profession that would otherwise degenerate into senseless slaughter… [acting] as moral and psychological armor that protects the warrior from becoming a monster in his or her own eyes" (Bartles-Smith 2022, 1252). This moral armor is composed from the principles, virtues, and moral senses that form professional character and competence (Wolfendale 2007, 6, 27-ff).

Zimbardo also describes the process where ordinary people reverse the Lucifer Effect and become "heroes" by resisting the sway of "systematic and situational forces"

that could disrupt established moral orientations (Zimbardo 2007, 444). This process is

through the principled actions that critically limit exceptionalism and form the guideposts

and guardrails that protect the moral orientations of warfighters and the alterity of others

along the paths to war. In 2003, Major Nathan Hoepner, the operations officer for the

501st Military Intelligence Battalion, responded to a request for use of enhanced

interrogations by a subordinate combat unit:

> … As for "the gloves need to come off" … we need to take a deep breath
> and remember who we are… Those gloves are … based on clearly
> established standards of international law to which we [the U.S.] are
> signatories and in part the originators… something we cannot just put
> aside when we find it inconvenient …We have taken casualties in every
> war we have ever fought – that is part of the very nature of war. We also
> inflict casualties generally many more than we take. That in no way
> justifies letting go of our standards. We have NEVER considered our
> enemies justified in doing such things to us… BOTTOM LINE: We are
> American Soldiers, heirs of a long tradition of staying on the high ground.
> We need to stay there … (Pryer 2010, 13)

In 2006 the Army changed its training for interrogators. The new manuel

specifically makes interrogation a command responsibility defined by LOAC/IHL,

UCMJ, and the Geneva Conventions/Protocols (Army 2006, 5-50-82). In 2012 the

Office of the Director of National Intelligence created *Principles of Professional Ethics*

for the Intelligence Community based upon principles to defined the ethic conduct

expected of personnel throughout the communtity (Intelligence 2012).

In 2013, the APA adopted a policy that allowed its professionals to participate in

oversight to control abuses, aligned with the U.N. Convention Against Torture, by stating

that psychological professionals:

> …shall not conduct, supervise, be in the presence of, or otherwise assist
> any national security interrogations for any military or intelligence
> entities, including private contractors working on their behalf, nor advise

on conditions of confinement insofar as these might facilitate such an interrogation. (APA 2015)

The most fitting epithet for this chapter was written by Senator, and former POW, John McCain, who wrote:

> The moral values and integrity of our nation, and the long, difficult, fraught history of our efforts to uphold them at home and abroad, are the test of every American generation. Will we act in this world with respect for our founding conviction that all people have equal dignity in the eyes of God and should be accorded the same respect by the laws and governments of men? … That is the most important question history ever asks of us. Answering in the affirmative by our actions is the highest form of patriotism, and we cannot do that without access to the truth. The cruelty of our enemies doesn't absolve us of this duty. This [the use of torture during the War on Terror] was never about them. It was about us. (McCain and Salter 2018, Kindle location 1541)

Conclusion

This chapter is too long, but it is necessary to examine in depth the principles that: 1) guide and guard warfighters' moral orientations and agency, and 2) allows them to return home after their traumatic military service. Warrior's will seek to legitimize their actions with the rules of war, and the principles of their profession will require them to answer the question, "Why am I doing this?" In answering these questions, the principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity (human suffering) can shape their ruminations, along after the combat events. Their responses will influence their post-trauma meaning and identity as warfighters or pirates.

McCain's statement summarizes the duty of warfighters to answer this question by accepting Zimbardo's definition of the hero as the person who resists forces that find exceptions to moral orientations that cheapen their moral agency. The boundaries

established by JWT and LOAC/IHL establish guideposts and guardrails that allow warfighters to view themselves through the alterity of others, and then ask the critical, reflective questions about their moral orientations that moral agency.

War is cycles of cruelties and causes and much happens to warriors along the paths to war that can dis-integrate their moral orientation from their agency. The past chapters have examined these, and the following chapters will examine applications of modalities that will help warfighters reconcile the dissonance between them. When signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aristide Briand understood that renouncing war would not end war, and he spoke words that remain true today for all military veteran's returning home after war, "Peace is proclaimed: that is well, that is much. But it still remains necessary to organize it . . . that is to be the work of tomorrow" (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017, 424). This new construction needs to include veterans' reconciliation of moral dissonance.

Chapter Six: I Am Here: The Re-Integration of Moral Orientation to

Reconcile Moral Dissonance

"Healing begins where the wound was made."

Alice Walker, American Novelist, *The Color Purple*

"We have learned that trauma is not just an event that took place sometime in the

past; it is also the imprint left by that experience on mind, brain, and body. This imprint

has ongoing consequences for how the human organism manages to survive in the

present" (van der Kolk 2015, 21).

Bessel van der Kolk, Psychiatrist

"All any of us can do is wrestle with our own noble and ignoble intentions so that

when we are asked to consider life-and-death issues, we'll do it honestly" (Marlantes

2011, 58).

Karl, Marlantes, USMC Veteran

Introduction

Moral injuries begin when warfighters' physical/ psychological /social/spiritual

resilience breaks down and their levels of moral dissonance reach the point of dis-

integrating their moral orientations from their agency. When this happens, their purpose,

or their "reasons why," no longer make sense to them. They may begin to struggle with

questions of: 1) identity, such as, "what, or who am I?" and, 2) life meaning, such as, "where am I, and why am I, doing this?" At this point their moral senses, emotions, and cognitions from combat can combine to dis-orient their life narratives, and they might struggle to assimilate, and accommodate their experiences into new life meanings that will allow them to affirm, "I am here" (Park et al. 2017, 15-38; Park, Mills-Baxter, and Fenster 2005).

This process can be positive or negative, but either way, war veterans' narratives indicate that these struggles are life-altering. Theologian Paul Tillich and Chaplain (CH) Dave Peters describe this process as a "shaking of foundations" (Tillich 2011, 5-7; D. Peters 2016). Others view this process as an honest wrestling match between noble and ignoble orientations to form positive life narratives (Marlantes 2011, 58). Within the military ethos, warfighters train and exercise moral agency through operational mindsets and targeting processes Marine Veteran Frederick Garten left the following note at the Vietnam Memorial Wall.

> This wedding ring belonged to a young Viet Cong fighter. He was killed
> by a Marine unit in the Phu Loc province of South Vietnam in May of
> 1968. I wish I knew more about this young man. I have carried this ring
> for 18 years and it's time for me to lay it down. This boy is not my enemy
> any longer. (Palmer 1987)

Warfighters targeting is directed by systems of mission command and localized kill chain decisions. Their targeting is also connected to moral meanings and religious/spiritual (R/S) consequences that are tribal in nature. Warfighters command decisions and targeting biases can push them past the established boundaries of Just War Theory (JWT)/International Humanitarian Law (IHL)/Rules of Engagement (ROE) that were created to serve as guideposts and guardrails for moral orientation that were

334

designed to protect them and others in war (Farnsworth 2019, 43-ff; L.K. Graham 2017).

Author William Krueger describes what some warriors experience during warfighting:

> In the end, a soldier kills because all the circumstances of a moment drive him to it. It isn't for freedom or God or for the people back home. It's because he has no choice but to kill. And in that moment, he's not thinking of it as a good thing or a bad thing. He's not thinking about ethics. He's thinking about keeping himself alive and keeping his comrades alive. And in all that mess, the only thing he wants is for it to end and for him to be alive to see that end. (Krueger 2023, 189)

However, warfighting is also filled with cognitive decisions and emotional responses that produce moral dissonance. This dissonance is described by Afghan Veteran Ethan McCord:

> There's no easy way to kill somebody. You don't just take somebody's life and then go on about your business for the rest of the day. That stays with you. And cracking jokes is a way of pushing that stuff down. That's why so many soldiers come back home and they're no longer in the situations where they have other things to think about or other people to joke about what happened ... and they explode. (Zetter 2010)

Operation tempo can cause warfighters to simplify the moral challenges they face in combat, and they might rationalize their choices for agency and experience struggles with the resulting moral dissonance (Molendijk 2023). The moral dissonance from these struggles can negatively influence their life meanings and change their life narratives. Thus, understanding the formation and meanings of warfighters' narratives becomes essential for helping warfighters reconcile their moral dissonance and heal their moral injuries.

It is appropriate to use concepts of moral dissonance and reconciliation to examine Military Moral Injury (MMI). I have defined moral dissonance as the dis-integration between moral orientation and life agency. My definition draws upon the

work of Erik Erickson and Leon Festinger who describe dissonance as inconsistencies and conflicts between the values and definitions that individuals use for life orientation and guidance (Erickson 1950, 268-274; Festinger 1957, 2-4). The assumptions of this dissertation are: 1) humans seek to integrate their moral orientations with their life agency, 2) the presence of moral dissonance indicates a dis-integration between moral orientation and agency (Bianchi 1969, 33), and 3) moral dissonance is also related to types of maladaptive behaviors and problems with self-identity (Chu and Gilligan 2014; Farnsworth et al. 2017; Gentile 2010; Gilligan 1989, 54; Olson 1984, 26-32; J. Rest et al. 1999).

The reconciliation of moral dissonance can be defined as the processes used for re-integrating warfighters' values with their actions in ways that are adaptive for healing from trauma and future well-being. These adaptive pathways are opposite to the maladaptive pathways and patterns of behavior that are dysfunctional and lead to further injuries (Larson and Zust 2017, 20-ff; Park et al. 2017, 51-54). Reconciliation is not necessarily a single choice, nor is it: 1) a prescriptive, linear solution to a problem, or 2) a program for resolving moral and ethical dilemmas. Instead, reconciliation is a contextual, iterative, and transformative process for re-integrating what has been dis-integrated, broken apart, harmed, separated, and/or alienated.

Reconciliation processes are a vital part of the spiritual elements that produce well-being. Research is showing that there are physiological changes to the brain associated with spiritual practices that counter a fragmented personal identity and produce a "core awareness of love, interconnection, and the guidance and surprise of life" (L. Miller and Schwall-Weigand 2021, 8). Researcher and clinical psychologist Lisa

Miller attributes these benefits to an "awakened brain" which creates new paradigms for

being. She defines the awakened brain as:

> … a set of innate perceptual capacities that exist in every person through which we experience love and connection, unity, and a sense of guidance from and dialogue with life. And when we engage these perceptual capacities—when we make full use of how we're built—our brains become structurally healthier and better connected, and we access unsurpassed psychological benefits: less depression, anxiety, and substance abuse; and more positive psychological traits such as grit, resilience, optimism, tenacity, and creativity. (L. Miller and Schwall-Weigand 2021, 9)

Reconciliation processes help care seekers re-integrate their moral and R/S

orientations with life practices to create new and healthy life meanings after they

experience spiritual struggles (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Exline 2015, 127-128; J.C.

Augustine 2022, 4-5; Bianchi 1969, 7-14). These internal, individual reconciliation also

external re-connections for civil/social relationships (J.C. Augustine 2022, 99-ff; Krause

2022, 154-160; Pargament and Exline 2022, 9-21; Pargament 2007, 134-136). Thus, the

struggles for new meanings are both individual and social.

This scope for reconciliation is consistent with concepts of restorative social

justice where moral righteousness and justice do not reside in the perfect performance of

agency but in the capacity of individuals and communities to speak truthfully about their

past involvement in traumas for the purpose of healing (Philpott 2012, 116-124). This

restorative justice element adds depth to the concept of reconciliation for individuals as

well as communities in accordance with JWT and LOAC/IHL. Thus, the capacity to

successfully reconcile moral dissonance differentiates warfighters from warriors, or

pirates.

The reconciliation of moral dissonance forms the third side of the Three Mirror Model (TMM -- introduced in Chapter1), and it will be examined in this chapter. The reconciliation process does not require a new treatment modality. Instead, reconciliation processes should be incorporated into existing treatment modalities with the goal of helping warfighters resolve their struggles with moral injuries through the re-integration of their moral orientations with their life practices. This chapter will explore processes for the reconciliation of moral dissonance by examining: 1) the effects of MMI upon the well-being of warfighters, 2) current research on moral injury as a basis for applying the TMM to current treatment modalities, and 3) applications of the TMM in existing treatment modalities for healing moral dissonance in a hypothetical support group consisting of fictional combat veterans.

The Effects of MMI Upon Warfighters' Well-Being

The effects from MMI cause warfighters problems that are related to: 1) the intersectionality of their moral orientations, professional ethics, and agency, 2) the moral dissonance generated from the totality and alterity of warfighting, and 3) the complex dynamics between PTSD and MMI.

The Intersectionality of Moral Orientations, Professional, Ethics,

and Agency

Warfighters' experiences with moral dissonance begin where their moral orientations and agency intersect with their experiences of trauma and their efforts to construct post-trauma narratives. This intersection includes ontological, experiential, subjective, and objective perceptions of trauma the include R/S meanings. Sociologist Neal Krause defines spirituality as "a personal and subjective [cognitive and social]

phenomenon that focuses upon an individual's beliefs and values," and he will expand this definition to include larger social contexts in which individuals live and create objective meanings within societies (Krause 2022, 18). This expansion allows for the inclusion of R/S practices. Psychologist Abraham Maslow's research suggests that individuals think "atomistically," and then link their significant life experiences and processes into a unitive consciousness that forms broader, moral values that become foundational and spiritually (transcendent) for communities (Maslow 1964, vii-xvii, 4-10).

Marine veteran Sebastian Junger proposes that a unity (or integration) of meaning forms within warfighters during combat, and after they return home, they realize that they were not, "fighting for an ideal or abstract concept… [but] they were fighting for small group/units with whom they were charged with the responsibility to take care of others, practice self-discipline, and provide leadership" (Junger 2016, 121-ff). The presence of moral dissonance in warfighters signals a dis-integration of this unity, and the process of reconciliation seeks a re-integration of this unity (J.C. Augustine 2022, 4-5; Bianchi 1969, 7-14).

The Theater of War uses the theories of Jonathan Shay and the narratives of ancient Greek warriors to bring closure to war veterans who are experiencing a dis-integration of what was once a unified, life narrative. Director Brian Doorhies reasons that the experiences of ancient Greek warriors bear witness to the "extreme pain, suffering, and death," experienced by modern warfighters (Healy 2009, 334-ff; van der Kolk 2015, 483-ff). This naming of common experiences is where the moral foundations of FRAME (examined in Chapters 1-3) become relevant for helping warfighters reconcile

moral dissonance, because these moral senses can help them to examine and own the values that drive their orientations and agency, and that form their life narratives in the intersections of their military service.

If religion and spirituality can be defined as, "organic-cultural flows that intensify joy and confront suffering by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make homes and cross boundaries" (Tweed 2006, 54). Then, R/S meanings, values, and practices can be examined as parts of a warfighter's moral orientation that function in the intersection of their personal moral foundations with the common: 1) values of the military ethos, 2) standards of military, professional ethics, and 3) principles of JWT/LOAC/IHL. Thus, the critical examination of warfighters' moral orientations are possible because of the cultural flows that form intersections and layers that consist of common moral values and communal perspectives to resolve problems that involve larger group activities (Tweed 2006, 131-ff; Greene 2013, 4-16).

Kimberle Williams Crenshaw originally defined intersectionality as the interconnection of complex and overlapping domains of power that are used to oppress and marginalize groups of people (Hill-Collins and Bilge 2020, 2-6). However, these same domains also contain the structural, cultural, and interpersonal values that provide sources for the values, meanings, identity, strengths, and relationships that people use for moral orientation when struggling against external injustices (Frankl 1959, 24-ff, 90-ff, 138-ff). Thus, the concept of intersectionality can be useful for defining diversity within warfighters' ethos to include and examine the multiple dimensions of moral orientation and agency that form moral risks within operational environments that result in moral

injuries (Molendijk 2018). It is here that warfighters' moral senses of FRAME (fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy) intersect with their operational mindsets and targeting practices, they experience moral consonance or dissonance.

The purpose of Chapters 2 to5 was to establish a basis for examining the validity of a framework for healing MMI. This framework, the TMM, is based upon the theory that unreconciled moral dissonance between warfighters' moral orientations (embedded within the military ethos) and their moral agency (organic to warfighting) is the primary cause for MMI. This framework is supported by cross-disciplinary intersections of theory and research, which are then used to understand veteran narratives. For some care providers and theorists, MMI involves a betrayal of what warfighters consider "morally right" by sources of authority (Shay 2014, 182-ff; 1994, 178-179; Yandell 2022, 8-ff). These betrayals can also occur during uses of force by public stewards, warriors or police, when their personal, moral values conflict with situations, orders, and/or organizational policies (Papazoglou and Chopko 2017).

Other theorists, researchers, and clinicians conclude that MMI results from causing, witnessing, or failing to prevent traumatic events, and this definition includes front-line caregivers who are frustrated over the personal "costs of caring," and limitations that prevent treating traumatic injuries (Figley 2002; Litz et al. 2009; Maguen and Litz 2012). Finally, other theorists, clinicians and researchers conclude that the effects from moral injuries can extend into families and communities (Berry 2018; Gourevitch 1998; Honig and Both 1997; Nash and Litz 2013; Petrila and Hasanovic 2021). All of the above research demonstrates that in different contexts the dis-integration of moral orientation from moral agency forms moral injuries.

This dissertation also examines the validity of the TMM by using: 1) R/S orientations to provide critical mechanisms for determining moral agency, and 2) moral reflexivity to aid in the reconciliation of moral dissonance and the promotion of post-traumatic growth (Pargament and Park 1995; Larson and Zust 2017). R/S orientations are more than a source of resilience, or a coping mechanism, for reducing personal struggles or tensions caused by moral conflicts. These orientations are a part of the moral boundaries that mark intersections of political causes, operational mindsets, targeting biases, warrior codes, moral orientations, and JWT/IHL/ROE(Bell 2009; Brunstetter and Braun 2019; Couch 2010). These orientations may, or may not be, formally present in System 1 (OODA loop) targeting, but afterward they influence System 2 reflexivity (Kahneman 2011; T. May and Perry 2017). Reflexivity is when and where warriors begin an internal, moral argument with their past experiences to form judgements and meanings that alter their orientations and identities. This process can become a negative, injurious experience:

> There is, among many who fight in war, a sense of shame, one that is made worse by… The tensions between those who were there and those who were not, those who refuse to let go of the myth [of war] and those that know it to be a lie… The shame and alienation of combat soldiers, coupled with the indifference to the truth of war by those who were not there, reduces many societies to silence. It seems better to forget. (Hedges 2002, 176)

People shape their daily lives through narratives that become portals into their past experiences of the world, their present worldviews, and their future aspirations (Clandinin and Orr 2007). It is here that narratives become processes of inquiry where the person (a signifier) also becomes the object of his/her/their study (the signified), and they begin to form transactional meanings that: 1) are deeper than transitional perceptions of

events, 2) convey meanings that continue to unfold over time, and 3) are driven by values that become the beginning and end point for personal understanding (Clandinin and Rosiek 2006, 4-19).

Narratives relate the moral meanings (orientations) that allow people to generate life knowledge, establish localized "homes," live in complex contexts filled with overlapping meanings (borderlands), and cross boundaries (Anzaldúla 1987, 3-30; Basso 2001, 11-ff; Tweed 2006, 54). Warfighters cross these boundaries when they experience war as a borderland. It is here that they enter intersections of meaning that include locations, events, senses, foundational values, warrior codes, kill chain decisions, effects of exceptional causes, and consequences of cruelties. Thus, war meanings can become the intersection of a specific location (e.g. a checkpoint in East Baghdad), an event (e.g. an IED explosion and ambush), sensations (e.g. smells, sounds, pain, fury, hyper-movement), memories (e.g. darkness confusion, chaos, control, duty), and ruminations (e.g. grief, loss, regret, anger, guilt, waste).[33]

These intersections offer possibilities for warfighters to co-create life-meaning, in which they connect their pre-existing beliefs with their internal perceptions of new experiences and their external expectations engrained in their training. Thus, new, post-traumatic meaning is not created by searches "behind the veil," to recover ontological truths, or to uncritically replace these truths with perceptions of new experiences. Instead, new meaning is constructed through the blending, assimilating, and accommodating of

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[33] Autobiographical

gained experiences to form an expansion of one's core narrative (J. Dewey 1922; Park 2010; Park et al. 2017). It is here that warriors can become morally bruised or injured, warfighters or pirates.

For warfighters this process includes the challenge of wrestling with the consequences from traumatic events that cause moral dissonance between their sources for normative moral authority and the utilitarian, contextual agency of kill chain operations that is organic to warfighting. Moral reflexivity (System II Thinking) can involve warfighters questioning their training, moral maturity, operational mindsets, targeting biases, and mission command decisions (Beneda 2022, 10-23).

The resulting moral dissonance from this questioning can then form into: 1) a re-affirmation of their identity as a warfighter, 2) psychosocial, R/S chronic struggles that draw warfighters into dysfunctional conclusions, 3) re-evaluations of their role as agents in their own traumas, and/or 4) formation of a public awareness, mindfulness, or consciousness informed by their experiences (Fujimura 2016, 92-106; Park 2010; D. Peters 2016; Tillich 2011; Yandell 2022, 8-ff).

System II reflexivity is similar to the intentional, narrative process that is used as a spiritual care modality to help morally injured individuals identify and integrate their emotional responses, core values, embedded beliefs, and coping strategies into self-compassionate and positive life narrative (Doehring 2015a, 17-24).

One way of looking at the effects from military agency upon the formation of moral injuries is to briefly examine the consequences from sexual assault upon the military ethos from the perspective of warfighters and leaders. This must be done with the following understandings. First, sexual assault is a crime that traumatizes victims, and

it is punishable under civil law, UCMJ, and LOAC/IHL. Second, sexual assault crimes violate moral values that are embedded within the military ethos that are designed for the protection of warfighters (French 2017; Army 2015a; Air Force 2022; Navy 2020b; Marine Corps 2014; Space Force 2021). These values link the crime with failures in the moral and ethical requirements that seek to prevent fratricide, "friendly fire," or "Blue on Blue" targeting. Third, warrior codes imply that warriors are expected to be agents who accept responsibility and accountability, commensurate with their rank and authority, for the consequences. These expectations help in the development of character through the enforcement standards, but they leave warfighters who have been victimized through the criminal agency of others in danger of self-judgement, and the resulting moral dissonance, from events that they did not invite, want, or willingly participate.

The crime of sexual assault violates all three understandings as it makes victims of moral agents by violating: 1) unit standards for warfighter care/safety/trust/cohesion, 2) military discipline, chain of command, and 3) targeting (fratricide). Military members should expect the respect, protection, and care from their fellow warfighters and chains of command. Furthermore, they should expect to exert control over the behavior of their subordinates and peers. In addition to the traumas suffered from the commission of a crime, sexual assaults unleash forms of moral dissonance within victims that are related to their belonging within the ethos and their identity as a warfighter.

Captain Erin Scanlon was assaulted by a special operations sergeant who was later acquitted of the charges. She correctly reported the crime, and she summarizes her experience and the experience of most military victims, "it was a solid case and… Only

afterwards did I realize I didn't stand a chance" (Harp 2021). Later, Scanlon was a part of

Senator Kirsten Gillibrand's efforts to establish structures for independent investigation

and prosecution of sexual assault crimes in the military. Scanlon's message to congress

and the military includes the power dynamics involved in victims getting care and

protection within military units:

> I've had all these difficulties as a LT [lieutenant] who can tell my
> commander and soldiers when I need to leave work for an appointment. I
> can't even imagine how a young soldier would feel having to try to explain
> this to his or her NCO [Non-Commissioned Officer] … They're taking
> care to make sure that a service member doesn't get put away unless it's
> proven reasonable beyond a doubt, but what about me?... I was also in the
> Army. (Torres 2020)

The military views the protection of its warriors and the prosecution of

indiscipline/crimes as matters of leadership under UCMJ (Congress 2019). Leaders

issued appropriate guidance to its members to re-affirm its standards for fidelity,

responsibility, and accountability, and the military established programs that specifically

dealt with issues of harassment and assault (Austin III 2021; Ingalsbe 2014; Thayer

2022). However, violations of sexual assault continue to be a problem for all warfighters

(regardless of gender) as agents and victims, and only recently have independent and

uniform structures been established to require the investigation and prosecution of sexual

assaults outside of local chains of command (Z. Perez 2024; Hlad 2023; M. Myers 2023).

Sexual assaults in the military occur in a context of military discipline that

focuses upon moral foundations of agency that are not required from civilians, and these

same foundations create consequences from moral dissonance that can best be estimated

in the following narratives provided by the recently retired Sergeant Major of the Army

(SMA) Michael Grinston, and Sergeant C. (pseudonym).

346

Upon his retirement, SMA Grinston lamented leadership failures that resulted in the rape and murder of Specialist (SPC) Vanessa Guillen, and the subsequent mishandling investigations at Fort Cavazos (Hood). SMA Grinston was not in SPC Guillen's chain of command, but he assumed an accountability and responsibility for the consequences based upon his position as the top enlisted soldier in the Army. He commented in his final remarks to the Army:

> But make no mistake, policy did not create the culture at Fort Hood [Cavazos]… Policy means nothing without leaders who enforce it ... Army personnel, especially those entrusted with the mantle of leadership, will lead by example and do what is right to prevent abuse treatment of others. (South 2023a)

> I feel that I failed to communicate the importance of being a part of a cohesive team that is highly trained, disciplined and fit … [and] how to take ownership and treat people with dignity and respect. I failed to get [my message] down to the NCOs on Fort Hood [Cavazos]. (South 2023c)

Notice how SGT C. combines CPT Scanlon's and SMA Grinston's sense of agency with her own experiences as a sexual assault victim in her narrative about how she drew strength and protection from fellow NCOs after being sexually assaulted by a senior officer:

> I had no words for what happened to me. I didn't ever say out loud "sexual assault." I didn't say "stalking." I didn't use the words victim or survivor. And I certainly didn't recognize that I had the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder … All I knew was something unfair had happened to me… I was nineteen and serving on my first overseas deployment. I was so proud to be working in the hospital, doing my job, learning, and growing. On St. Patrick's Day, my life was forever changed. At my place of work, a patient sexually assaulted me. When it happened, I froze. He was an officer, and I was just a junior enlisted soldier.

As is common with perpetrators of sexual violence, there was also trickery and deception involved that had me questioning what just happened. But as a survivor, I don't want us to lose sight of all the soldiers who do uphold our shared values. Though I was traumatized and wronged by soldiers, I was protected and consoled by them as well.

That is why I am writing this, to shine a light, and showcase the hope that can be found in times of seemingly unrelenting suffering. I want to illuminate the way that by stepping in when you see something wrong happening to those with less power or rank than you, you can change, or save someone's life. Without the care and protection of those NCO guardians, I believe I would have killed myself. To all the NCOs who saved my life: Thank you …

… I am married now, I have children, and I am an NCO that tries to slow down and notice soldiers more, because of the way you slowed down and noticed me in my sorrow. It didn't take a movement or a spotlight for you to notice the road I was walking. And I never had to ask you to walk it with me. (Pseudonyum 2023)

The effects from MMI upon warfighters are not only the moral dissonance experienced from the causes and cruelties related to military service. They also include the healing agency and post-traumatic growth that comes through moral orientation, discernment, direction, and reconciliation. It is here that an examination of Emmanuel Levinas' construction of totality and alterity contrasted with the framework of the TMM sheds light on how treatment modalities can help warfighters reconciled their moral dissonance and reconstruct new meanings from their traumas.

Moral Dissonance from the Totality and Alterity of Warfighting

The key point in this examination of the TMM is to understand the roles that cycles of suffering and rumination have in the formation and reconciliation of moral dissonance. The healing goal for warfighters and care givers is to make changes in this cycle to allow warfighters spaces to transition from combat to peace. The nature of war is

348

probably not going to change. What can change is how warfighters determine their agency in warfighting and process their traumatic experiences within their life narratives. It is here that post-traumatic growth might begin.

The following two models visualize structures of how warfighters construct meaning and agency. The first model is based upon the work of philosopher Emmanuel Levinas that derives life meanings from values that are formed within social constructions of identity between totality and the alterity of the Other (Levinas 1998, 103-ff; Hand 2009, 36-ff). Levinas does not specifically address warfighters' ethics of warfighting, but his work creates a framework that is applicable for them.

For Levinas, a warfighter's self-perceptions of ethics (agency) is linked to a mystery that is contained in the command of 'Thou Shalt Not Kill.' This intangible command also "grips" individuals in concrete, face-to-face, encounters with Others (enemy or non-combatants) and these encounters engender responses that include, yet exceed, reason-based consciousness (Pessin 2016, 601-621). For an example of concrete moral reasoning encountering transcendental values, consider the following quotation from a decorated Army Ranger describing his reasons for leaving military service after the death of Specialist Pat Tillman.

> The only two times where I personally was in a position to see where the Army had the choice to do the right thing or the wrong thing, both times they chose to do the wrong thing … It made me realize that the Army does what suits the Army. That's why I won't put that uniform back on. I'm done… If I had been killed that day, and it had not suited the Army to disclose to my wife the manner in which I died, nobody would ever know what really happened because I'm not famous. I'm not Pat. It wouldn't have been a news story. For the rest of her life, my wife would think I was killed by whatever bullshit story they decided to make up. They'd write up a couple of medals like they did for him, and that would be it. (Krakauer 2009, Kindle location 5413)

Imagine: 1) his response to the embodied alterity of the Other, 2) his perception of agency within this event, and 3) the unpardonable anger, guilt, and shame connected with his moral dissonance from Tillman's death. For Levinas, such moral dissonance is the painful expression of a separated self that internally experiences a radical revulsion and powerlessness from external encounters with the Other that lead the separated self to seek redemption and modification of the separated self which is simultaneously a social construction of a dysfunctional totality and a life-altering experiences (Levinas 1969, 69-ff).

It is here that the separated self (i.e. the Army Ranger) exists within a moral dissonance that is critical of the illusion/totality in which he/she/they operated as a member of the Army. Levinas never mentions MMI, nor does he deal with the exceptionality of warfighting, or the protection of alterity sought by LOAC/IHL/ROE. However, his work is helpful for interpreting warfighters' combat experiences. For Levinas, war is a manifestation of *il ya* is, "the way things are," and an annihilating chaos (totality) in which all humans participate. This chaos falsely promises mythic life, but actually delivers death through violence, limiting laws, and misdirected political agency (Levinas 1969, 281-ff; Levinas and Hand 1990, 217-ff; Critchley 2012, 220-ff). The alterity of the Other cannot be defined as an expression of the totality in which warfighters exist, because the presence (or face of the Other) is an embodiment of transcendental values that belong to an infinity that is oppositional to the temporal, physical values, and social structures that compose the totalities in which humanity exists

(Levinas 1969, 245-ff). Thus, alterity becomes the locus for the restraint of violence, and locations for the restoration of the self through an ethics of responsibility that is dependent upon the Other.

Figure 6.1 A Depiction of Moral Dissonance Using Levinas' Concepts of Totality and Alterity

Levinas does not address the concept of Moral Injury. However, consider Figure 6.1 that depicts 1) Levinas' concept of self-descent into totality as warfighters' struggles with moral dissonance and 2) his concept of a new possibility (infinity) that is present in the protection of others. Boundaries for this new possibility are established within existing JWT and LOAC/IHL principles. For Levinas insists that these boundaries belong to totality. Thus, warfighters become pulled in two directions between the totality of war's violence and their agency for the protection of others defined by infinite possibilities and the limited political agendas of the states in which they serve (Critchley 2012, 220-227; Levinas 1969, 65-104). As warfighters become pulled in two directions,

they also become trapped in the teal circle that represents recurring cycles of moral

dissonance generated from conflicts between their realizations of infinite possibility and

their destructive dependence upon the totality of their social agency (Levinas 1998, 104-

117; M.B. Smith 2006).

Levinas' work provides a philosophical model that explains the political, R/S,

psychological, and social realities that warfighters experience from warfighting.

However, it is based upon a duality that similar theories have used to explain moral

dissonance from warfare (Arendt 1963; Allman 2008; Nakashima-Brock and Lettini

2012; D. Peters 2016; Tick 2005; Tillich 2011). These explanations may not be the most

helpful for warfighters who are struggling with the intersectional complexities between

their own moral foundations and their perceptions of warfighting agency. It is here that

the TMM offers a viable clinical model for healing MMI.

Figure 6.2 The Three Mirror Model (TMM) of MMI

The TMM (Figure 6.2) accounts for the complex internal and external

intersections of meaning that are present within the specific phases of warrior's

deployment cycle (training, warfighting/command operations, and recovery/healing). Each phase influences the formation and reconciliation of warfighters' moral dissonance. The TMM allows for individuality, and it provides a broadening framework for avoiding the narrow dualities to understand the meanings that warfighters attach to their moral orientations, agency, and dissonance.

Warfighters may exist between Levinas' concepts of totality and infinity, but they live within the moral dissonance that is generated between their moral orientations and the guideposts/guardrails that regulate their moral agency. The values that keep warfighters within the cycle of moral dissonance are the product of their moral foundations (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity), and their professional senses (FRAME -- fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy). These moral senses (examined in Chapters 2 and 3) inform warfighters' agency through a double loop reasoning cycle of targeting and reflection that occurs during combat (examined in Chapters 4 and 5). It is within these intersections that high levels of moral dissonance can negatively alter their self-identities and subsequent well-being.

Figure 6.2 illustrates the ongoing process, where warriors reflect upon perceptions of their moral orientations and agency (represented by the left and right oval mirrors). They accomplish this reflection by using a double loop reasoning cycle (the teal figure 8), that is natural to human moral reasoning processes. These processes are conditioned and re-calibrated through their military training, they are habituated into their uses of System 1 and System 2 thinking. Thus, warriors experience light levels of moral dissonance when their perceptions of images reflected in the two mirrors are unified/integrated, and they experience dark, higher levels of moral dissonance when their perceptions of images

reflected in the two mirrors are incongruent/dis-integrated. The gradient diamond between the two mirrors represents the degree of warfighters' 1) dis-integration of moral orientation/agency, and 2) their changing levels of moral dissonance.

The military ethos is built upon standards that seek to integrate orientation with agency, however, the nature of war and conflicted moral reasoning within kill chains contributes to a widening between the warfighters' idealized moral orientations and the realities of their agency during combat. Thus, warriors can affirm themselves to be just warfighters (at the top of the integrated mirrors) or condemn themselves to be unjust pirates (at the bottom of the mirrors). It is here that recovery/healing processes (represented by the third oval/mirror) become necessary for helping warriors reflect upon their self-perceptions by reconciling the moral dissonance between their moral orientations and agency.

In a way, the TMM is an intuitive model for what humans are already doing in their experiential, double loop reasoning cycles (Chapter 4). However, the TMM further applies a medical model to warriors who are psychologically and religiously/spiritually wounded in combat. Just as physical injuries require medical help to restore wounded warriors, so psycho/religious/spiritual treatment modalities can help morally injured warriors reconcile their moral dissonance and live as warfighters.

The gradient of moral dissonance allows for multiple self-perceptions where warriors critically examine their experience and question if they are what psychiatrist M. Scott Peck labels "People of Lie" for their agency in the dark side of human existence. Peck points out that "evil" is live spelled backward, and these encounters take life from moral agents instead of promoting their well-being (Peck 1983, 42-43). The gradient of

moral dissonance also illustrates that there are fine borders between what Arendt labels the "banality of evil," and what Shay describes as the "real stuff of life …not lessons learned in parochial school" (Arendt 1963, 363-ff; Shay 2002, 153).

These fine borders have clinical significance because these are the issues and "locations" where warfighters honestly wrestle and reconcile with the moral complexities that falsely label them as heroes or villains. These struggles with moral dissonance allow warriors to embrace R/S meanings connected with a concept that Reformation theologian Martin Luther defined as *simul justus et peccator*, a state of being where a person is simultaneously justified and a sinner. *Simul justis et peccator* signifies the internal and external struggle between one's desire for good conduct and one's human fallibility, or what Kant described as a propensity towards acting against principles of moral law (Luther 1972, 335-343; McCue 1980; Frierson 2007).

Luther's concept is borrowed from Augustine, and it is based upon specific Christian beliefs and practices related to divine grace and forgiveness. However, concepts associated with simultaneity in struggles between the desire for goodness and the realization of human failings are present in Hindu, Jewish, Buddhist, and Muslim theologies of JWT (explained in Chapter 5), and these can be used in broader contexts to help warriors struggle with rigid dualities imposed by their moral dissonance and explore forms of compassion, mercy and forgiveness.

The causes and cruelties of war, as well as military codes can create mythical standards for ethical behavior that generate levels of moral dissonance to leave warriors: 1) morally disoriented, 2) dis-integrated from their foundational senses of agency, and 3) self-condemned as pirates (Beneda 2022). It is here that their moral injuries become

negative revelations of false realities that masquerade as life while bringing about a form of living death (Yandell 2022, 98). Philosopher Sissela Bok in her book *Lying* writes that military service is based upon moral choices that are often complex and filled with life dilemmas driven by rationalizations for agency that yield moral consequences with negative results that break down warrior's personal and social integrity (Bok 1999, xxxiii-ff, 19-ff, and 249-ff).

Warriors can and do act honorably according to the internal and external standards that validate their agency as warfighters. However, some warriors act as criminals and pirates, and there is also a population that seeks to do the "right thing" under extremis conditions. It is this later group that subsequently struggles with the moral consequences. Thus, it may be true that it is only the warriors who are struggling to be competent, honorable warfighters that end up being the ones who are morally injured, self-condemned pirates by choice and/or circumstance. These choices and circumstances are influenced by intersections of cognitive moral with the autonomic/physical realities imposed by exposure to traumatic stressors, and they influence formations of warriors' post-traumatic meanings.

The Complex Dynamics Between PTSD and MMI

There is a standard for diagnosing PTSD as a medical disorder requiring treatment, and this standard is also the basis for identifying and measuring the effects from combat stress upon warfighters. The DSM-5 diagnosis for PTSD uses multiple diagnostic clusters to assess specific trauma-related symptoms that reoccur over time and contexts. However, there is no universally accepted definition or criteria for diagnosing MMI.

This absence makes it is difficult to 1) diagnose and treat MI as a primary injury, or 2) examine and treat sources of moral dissonance as traumatic stressors, and 3) determine the types and levels of moral dissonance where warriors' moral struggles become injuries. Thus, moral injuries are often treated as secondar/tertiary wounds related to other presenting problems.

This dissertation assumes that MMI is a primary injury that drives other related problems. Research, theory, and caregiver/veteran narratives seem to validate this assumption. For this dissertation I combined multiple MI definitions from researchers, caregivers, and researchers into the following working definition:

> Military Moral Injury is the "soul wound" caused by the dis-integration of a warfighter's moral agency from their ethics. The dis-integration is instigated by what they have done, failed to do, or experienced as betrayal. Such dis-integration generates a chain of emotions, thoughts, and behaviors that can maladaptively alter warfighters' core identity and damage their capacity for living. (Larson and Zust 2017, 11; Litz et al. 2009; Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012; Shay 1994)

This definition for MI can be combined with the DSM-5 criteria for PTSD, and post 9-11 force protection data to create Figure 6.3 (next page) that illustrates the relationship between PTSD and MMI.

The top left Venn diagram in Figure 6.3 illustrates the theoretical populations of U.S. warfighters who deployed during the War on Terror and experienced: 1) symptoms of PTSD according to the DSM-5, 2) symptoms of MI as defined by Litz et al., and 3) symptoms of both PTSD and MI. The bottom right diagram illustrates known percentages of American warfighters who deployed during the War on Terror and who were potentially exposed to traumatic stress or experienced PTSD. However, these "known" statistics are incomplete because they do not include known data from morally injured

warriors because there is no medical diagnosis for MI. This issue will be discussed in detail in the next section. But first, it is important to examine the relationship between traumatic stress and the development of moral meaning in narratives.[34]

Figure 6.3 Force Structure Comparisons of PTSD/MMI Criteria (Tanielian and Jaycox 2008; TSG 2006; Dursa et al. 2014).

Research suggests that there is a relationship between post-traumatic stress (PTS) and the formation of meaning contained in veteran's narratives (Tanielian and Jaycox 2008). The National Health and Resilience Veterans Study (NHRVS, 2013) determined that 41.8% of combat veterans claimed exposure to, "at least one type of morally injurious event (MIE) during their time in the military" (Wisco et al. 2017). This result is similar to the results found within other studies and the Mental Health Advisory Team

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[34] The dates for these studies roughly coincide with the highest points of troop involvement in combat operations. The Dursa study reported lower PTSD rates (13.8%) than the Tanielian Study (18.6%). But the main point of the graphic is still valid – the population of veterans with PTSD is much smaller than the population of combat veterans exposed to traumatic events.

(MHAT) studies conducted from 2003-2013 with redeploying warfighters after their

rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan (Drescher et al. 2011; TSG 2013; Vargas et al. 2013).

The MHAT found variations of links (not correlations) between post-deployment mental

health issues and high levels of anger and trauma from combat (TSG 2006). The NHRVS

and MHAT studies can be combined with recent research conducted by the Walter Reed

Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) to determine the impacts of trauma, killing, and

unjust war upon modern U.S. warfighters serving in Afghanistan (Krauss et al. 2023;

Krauss et al. 2020; Krauss et al. 2024). These studies concluded that exposure to unjust

war events place warriors at risk for morally related injuries above and beyond exposure

to other combat-related traumatic events, and these types of injuries require focused

treatment options (Krauss et al. 2020). Furthermore:

> exposure to unjust war events carry a heavier long-term mental health
> burden than other types of events. Additionally, Soldiers exposed to unjust
> war events had an unmet need for care one year post deployment that was
> not directly tied to PTSD or depression. The results question the emphasis
> on life-threat within mental health pathogenesis models. (Krauss et al.
> 2023)

None the above studies resolve the relationship between PTSD and MMI because

they did not gather data on the specific: 1) criteria that warriors used to judge/process

their traumatic experiences, and 2) details of their subsequent mental health and R/S

struggles. However, these studies do support what warrior narratives have conveyed

across generations and cultures in their narratives – the moral orientations that warriors

use to practice their agency *in* war influences the consequences that they experience *from*

war. Whether this dissonance is caused by warriors: 1) direct agency in traumatic events,

or 2) indirect processing of traumatic events in their post-trauma narratives, or 3) a combination of both. Thus, factors for the formation and reconciliation of moral dissonance from combat remains the key issue for theorists, researchers, and healers.

Meanwhile, the clearest indicator we have of warriors' moral struggles from warfighting come from the narratives they tell. Research studies detail how traumatic stresses and events become imprinted stress reactions that are cognitive and somatic. Psychiatrist Bessel van der Kolk summarizes how this imprinting occurs:

> Trauma results in a fundamental reorganization of the way mind and brain manage perceptions. It changes not only how we think and what we think about, but also our very capacity to think … helping victims of trauma find the words to describe what has happened to them is profoundly meaningful, but usually it is not enough. The act of telling the story doesn't necessarily alter the automatic physical and hormonal responses of bodies that remain hypervigilant, prepared to be assaulted or violated at any time. For real change to take place, the body needs to learn that the danger has passed and to live in the reality of the present. (van der Kolk 2015, 21)

These imprinted responses are formed within physical, Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) processes, and they are documented in PTSD research that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Van der Kolk defines the concept of imprinted responses to include ongoing experiences and consequences on the mind, brain, and body for how:

> … the human organism manages to survive in the present. Trauma results in a fundamental reorganization of the way mind and brain manage perceptions. It changes not only how we think and what we think about, but also our very capacity to think. We have discovered that helping victims of trauma find the words to describe what has happened to them is profoundly meaningful, but usually it is not enough. The act of telling the story doesn't necessarily alter the automatic physical and hormonal responses of bodies that remain hypervigilant, prepared to be assaulted or violated at any time. For real change to take place, the body needs to learn that the danger has passed and to live in the reality of the present. Our

360

search to understand trauma has led us to think differently not only about
the structure of the mind but also about the processes by which it heals.
(van der Kolk 2015, 45-46)

Cognitive and somatic effects from imprinting are important for understanding how agency and participation in traumatic events change veterans' world views and perceptions of their experiences. They report their changed perceptions in their narratives and this is especially important for understanding the impacts of trauma upon veterans who do not qualify for PTSD (according to DSM-5 criteria), and experience ongoing moral struggles that effect their wellbeing.

Van der Kolk believes that traumatic stress reactions can be linked with combat veterans' "fits of anger" long after their return from war (van der Kolk 2015, 8-11). These imprints can also be linked to veterans' struggles for identity that are revealed in their post-combat narratives that contain the disorderly details of traumatic events, fragments of their perceptions, jumbled sensations, and mixed emotions. These narratives require them to endure, "the dark nights of the soul" defined by bouts of anxiety, loss of control, and depression that prevent them from staying on task and engaging with other human beings (van der Kolk 2015, 136-137, 205-ff). Thus, the goal of recovery for veterans experiencing PTS symptoms becomes re-integrating the rhythms between their body and mind to help them re-define their life agency and well-being. This also helps with veterans' experiences of disassociation, or feelings of being out of body, during combat and their subsequent depression upon their return home (Tick 2014, 173-ff; van der Kolk 2015, 333-ff).

Psychologist Resmaa Menakem reasons that trauma is anything that the body perceives as, "too much, too fast, or too soon," and the most important part of post-

traumatic healing involves mending any dysregulation caused by traumatic events by allowing the body to settle and process the emotions, memories, perceptions, and physiological responses associated with the event. This post-trauma work includes intentional reflective practices as forms of trauma-informed care based upon three standards for practice: 1) safety; (2) connections; and (3) managing emotional impulses (Bath 2008, 2015).

Within these standards for practice, care-seekers learn to monitor their ongoing responses to their psychological and physiological traumas (Menakem 2017, 128-ff). These responses differentiate between "dirty" pain, or uncontrolled responses, and "clean" pain linked with five anchors that link body with mind; 1) soothing ANS responses, 2) noticing sensations, 3) accepting discomfort, 4) staying in the present, and 5) safely discharging negative energies (Menakem 2017, 165-175). Such healing includes a re-integration of moral orientation with agency for conscientious action in the positive uses of past experiences as opportunities for post-traumatic growth (Menakem 2017, 230-231). These forms of healing can also include forms of restoration of trust, compassion, and forgiveness. These will be discussed in subsequent sections.

Van der Kolk's and Menakem's work have also been the of various medical models and older military models that regarded MMI as a form of PTSD. In these models, moral injury is seen as one of the *consequences* of combat operational stress instead of as a *cause* of mental and emotional forms of post-traumatic stress (Hoge 2010, 134-168; Figley 1978; Gurvitis et al. 1996; McNally 2003; Nash 2011, 90-92; Nash and Baker 2007, 65-94).

This association is based upon research of physiological responses to physical traumas. However, these responses are not based upon research of the social constructions associated with warfighter meanings, social expectations for their behavior, and combat leadership. Training and mission command expect the integration of warriors' moral orientations with performance of their agency in violent, traumatic conditions, and this basic assumption is behind other forms of research.

Other research supports that: 1) morally injurious events (MIE), social expectations, veterans' expressions of moral injury, and spiritual struggles (EMISS) may be causal for the negative moral emotions (ME) that form into PTSD, and 2) self-directed forms of moral injury may worsen the burden of care-seekers' distress (Barnes, Hurley, and Taber 2019; Boudreau 2011; Currier et al. 2019; Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al. 2015; Friedman, Schnurr, and McDonagh-Coyle 1994). Newer research has found that the administration of fluoxetine (Prozac) shortly after experiencing traumatic shocks (possibly PMIEs) blocks the neurotransmitters that form into the generalized fear reactions that accompany PTSD (H.-Q. Li et al. 2024). This research supports the work of van der Kolk and Menakem on the role that imprinted stress reactions have in connecting somatic responses with emotions, memories, and cognitive reasoning. This research also applies to studies that connect PTS reactions with symptoms that are subthreshold for a DSM-5 diagnosis but are associated with elevated occurrences of psychiatric disorders that require treatment (Mota et al. 2016).

The resilience work of psychologist Martin Seligman is being used by the military in training programs designed to assess and prevent harmful effects from traumatic stress

and events (Cornum, Matthew, and Seligman 2011; Peterson, Park, and Castro 2011). Resilience implies an emotional tensile strength that allows individuals the capacity to resist, withstand, bounce-back, and re-engage with life after experiencing debilitating traumatic injuries. The building of such strength (cognitive flexibility) is an important goal of Acceptance Commitment Therapy (ACT), which will be examined later.

Psychologist Martin Seligman demonstrates that animals and humans can develop a learned helplessness and debilitating anxiety through life experiences, that can be prevented or "immunized" through learned behaviors that form resiliency to the negative patterns of behavior that result in helplessness (Seligman 2006, 17-29). Furthermore, his research has also found that ruminations over negative experiences combined with pessimistic explanatory solutions are a recipe for depression, and negative, somatic reactions. Seligman states that this cycle of reasoning can be changed through cognitive therapies where people recognize, dispute, and replace depressive thoughts with positive meanings and actions (Seligman 2006, 75-92).

Seligman argues psychological treatments can present a danger to care seekers by focusing upon suffering and misery, but their healing capacity is their interventions into destructive cycles of thought and their focus upon, "… something more, meaning, purpose, and accomplishment of the good/things," that reshape the present and future (PBS 2011). Psychologist Angela Duckworth describes the capacity for interventions lies within care seekers wrestling with powerful sources of personal and social adversity in which they develop and redevelop their identities. Thus, post-trauma growth is the formation of "grit" defined by a self-conception of: 1) overcoming tremendous levels of

adversity, and 2) an inner energy for continual engagement and accomplishment (Duckworth 2016, 247-252). This concept of grit is also embraced in the military's concept of "hardiness" as, "a strong sense of commitment, control, and challenge," that allows warriors to, "remain healthy under stress compared to those low in hardiness" (Bartone 2002).

The U.S. military also embraces forms of cognitive resiliency based upon positive psychology to influence how warriors process traumatic events through critical assessment and expansion (System 2, reflexivity) of their perceptions, reasoning, assumptions, and life-meanings (Hicks and Petersen 1991, 142-154; Reivich and Shatté 2002, 53-ff). However, the key concept in resiliency is *cognitive* control over involuntary reactions, which is the concept that van der Kolk specifically questions.

According to van der Kolk, warriors can become imprinted with somatic effects from traumatic experiences, and these somatic imprints subconsciously influence warriors' post-combat meanings, schemas, or life-narratives. Van der Kolk argues that theories of positive psychology/resiliency interacting with combat trauma is like, "Dale Carnegie meeting the Killing Fields." His reasoning explains how the "horrendous levels of violence" experienced in combat can overwhelm the primal emotions of warriors and cause confusion in how their cognitive moral orientations become attached to their emotional responses during traumatic events. This attachment can include imprinted paradoxical reactions such as terror, horror, excitement or joy associated with combat agency (PBS 2011; Grossman 1995, 228-ff; Koenig, Carey, and Al Zaben 2022, 34-35).

Research has found that the success of military resiliency training is helpful in regulating somatic reactions, but it is limited in immunizing warriors from the effects of PTS (Steenkamp and Nash 2013; Waysman, Schwarzwald, and Solomon 2001).

Van der Kolk and Menakem focus upon the effects and consequences from traumatic experiences, while positive psychology focuses upon the building of resiliency instead of the formation of symptoms from traumatic experiences. Research supports both approaches to trauma. Some research has found that traumatic events result in forms of rumination and negative, maladaptive reasoning that are associated with the development of PTSD (Kang et al. 2024; Pugach, Campbell, and Wisco 2020 ; Ehring and Ehlers 2014). Other researchers and theorists have found that people have a natural tendency to respond to traumatic events with a negativity bias that leads to rumination accompanied by somatic effects that need to be deliberately countered through the reforming or "rewriting" their post-trauma narratives (Tierney and Baumeister 2019, 19-ff, 240-ff). Thus, there is a need to include both van der Kolk's and Seligman's types of approaches in the healing moral traumas.

For warriors, surviving combat is one thing. It is another to thrive after returning home. Thus, their long-term, well-being depends upon their reconciliation of what happened with their moral orientations, and this includes the mindful integration of somatic regulation with cognitive processing of their imprinted perceptions from traumatic events (Kilner 2005; Zust 2015a; Zust and Krauss 2019). This path of reconciliation follows multiple pathways. Consider the following three warriors and the

stereotypical paths for reconciliation they traveled in their struggles with their moral

dissonance to re-form their life narratives. Also notice how these struggles included R/S

dimensions within their moral orientations (Bremault-Phillips et al. 2019).

Sonny Sisk was a WWII American paratrooper, who was ordered by his

commander to execute a suspected SS Officer. Sisk killed the man, and his emotions

from the event were later linked with his depression and alcoholism. This changed for

him in an encounter with his niece. He explains:

> My career after the war was trying to drink away the truckload of
> Krauts that I stopped in Holland and the diehard Nazi that I went up
> into the Bavarian Alps and killed all the killings that I did was going
> to jump into the bed with me one these days and they surely did. I
> had a lot of flashbacks after the war and I started drinking Then my
> little sister's daughter, four years old, came into my bedroom and she
> told me that Jesus loved me and   if I would repent god would forgive
> me for all the men I kept trying to kill all over again . . . that little girl
> got to me. (Brotherton 2009, 188)

Sisk's reconciliation was part of a conversion experience that continued

throughout his lifetime as a Christian pastor. Claude Thomas became a Buddhist monk

after his combat experiences as a helicopter aircrewman in Vietnam. However, Thomas

did not have a conversion experience to put him on this path. Instead, he gradually

learned to live in a mindfulness of the real choices that made him responsible and

interconnected with others in ways that allow him to, "celebrate life not hide from it"

(C.A. Thomas 2006, 63-79). Along this path of reconciliation, he has conducted long

distance walks as a Zen Peacemaker. He describes his path:

> In Vietnam I wasn't fighting for democracy of any ideals. That myth died
> within the first couple of weeks. What was left then was just to be the best

soldier I could be so I could help myself, and as many of the other soldiers as possible, stay alive. That became the reality of serving. (C.A. Thomas 2006, 19)

I didn't know what to do for those I had killed in Vietnam until Thich Nhat Hanh taught me: "Just practice. Because when you walk, you walk for all those who have ever been abuse, exploited, terrorized, crippled, maimed, or killed under any circumstance" … So when I walk, I walk for all victims of violence and aggression. When I walk, I walk for all veterans. For and with them all. (C.A. Thomas 2006, 131)

Tom Voss was an infantryman in Iraq where he encountered experiences that left him feeling like two different versions of himself: 1) the person he was before the war, who was ingrained with moral values from his family, religion, culture, and society, and 2) the person he became during war where his morality was replaced with a "sense of right and wrong that helped him survive (Voss and Nguyen 2019, xiii-xiv). The moral dissonance he experienced warped his moral orientation, and it caused a "wound in his soul" that made him question and mistrust others to the point he forgot what it meant to be human. For Voss, the healing began on a 2,700-mile cross country walk with a battle buddy in an encounter they had with a Native American healer, name Wolf Walker. There he began to reconcile the sources for his pain with his values when he learned:

> … if you take the things that happen to you and try to push them down … you never learn the lessons you're meant to learn from those painful experiences. Pain gets transformed to power when you stop running from it … Only then can the thing that hurts the most be the thing that sets you free. (Voss and Nguyen 2019, 145)

Voss concludes:

Healing begins when you stop resisting the teachers in your life, no matter their form, and start getting curious. Get curious about your pain. Start asking questions about it — about where it comes from, what's causing it, and what might make you feel better. Then get curious about the ways in which you're trying to heal. You might ask questions like, "Why am I always in such a shitty mood after I drink?" or "Why do I still feel

depressed even though I'm on medication?" If you ask questions and seek truth with an honest heart, the answers will appear. In the meantime, a good place to start is right where you are. So sit down, get still, and take a deep breath. Then maybe take another. If it's hard to sit still, ask why. If you feel lots of resistance, get curious about that. Be gentle with yourself. Setbacks are okay. Setbacks will happen. If you're still breathing, there's more right with you than wrong. If you're still breathing, there is hope. (Voss and Nguyen 2019, 263)

The healing and reconciliation experienced by these warriors included moral struggles that occurred in forms resembling the R/S diversity ranging from traditional beliefs and practices to emerging no-preference/nones practices (Pew 2022; Center 2012; Funk and Smith 2012). Their narratives also describe moral senses of new meaning, responsibility, and healing that escape Army interrogator, Specialist Tony Lagouranis, who describes his ongoing moral struggles with dissonance after he returned home after his service at Abu-Gharib:

> I liked my psychotherapist… but I had to argue with what she was trying to achieve. She wanted to cleanse the guilt I carried around with me, which would help give me a start on dealing with the depression and remove some of the inner conflict that was causing the anxiety. The quickest way out was to get me to deny responsibility. People do terrible things during war. I was acting under orders. Had I heard of the Milgram experiment? Yes, I told her, I had. (This surprised her.) …. "People go into a state of agency and act not on their own volition," she explained to me. She made it sound like I didn't have a choice, and I knew that was wrong. (Lagouranis and Mikaelian 2007, 231-232)
> As we talked over several sessions, we discussed the circumstances surrounding the actions [of interrogation] more than the actions themselves. I could see what lay ahead if I chose this direction, and it seemed to me like the worst kind of moral relativism. If I could legitimately absolve myself of responsibility, anyone could, in just about any situation. (Lagouranis and Mikaelian 2007, 231-232)

What does this mean? Lagouranis like Sisk, Thomas, and Voss is struggling with buried, emotional meanings fueled by imprints within their ANS. According to van der Kolk and others these struggles are forms of PTS that must be addressed by PTSD

369

treatment processes (van der Kolk 2015; Menakem 2017). However, these warriors are also ruminating over moral values driven by cognitive reasoning processes that need to be addressed by other treatment modalities that account for operational mindsets, targeting biases, guideposts, guardrails, and moral pain. According to Seligman and others, the effects from these struggles and the subsequent, harmful life-narratives can be prevented, modified, or treated through processes that promote resiliency and well-being (Seligman 2006; Farnsworth et al. 2017; Duckworth 2016; Haidt 2006, 23-45; Hicks and Petersen 1991; Reivich and Shatté 2002; T.D. Wilson 2011, 72-ff; Bartone 2002; Cornum, Matthew, and Seligman 2011). Thus, the inclusion of PTS regulation and cognitive flexibility are needed for warriors' post-trauma recovery and resiliency.

Warriors are trained through the pairing of autonomic, stress reactions with cognitive processing to hone their targeting competencies. Thus, physical, emotional, and psychological reactions to being under fire results in a warfighter's capacity to fight back instead of fleeing (Grossman 1995, 50-ff, 302-306; Grossman and Christensen 2004, 176-179). This training occurs within controlled, but stress-inducing, extremis conditions. The intended outcome forms the double loop kill chain processes described in Chapter 4. It is logical to expect that warriors will then use their training to form post-traumatic meanings, and their life narratives will reflect their training in positive ways. However, Sisk, Thomas, and Voss experienced moral dissonance from their combat experiences after their training, and they were not solely struggling with DSM-5/PTSD symptoms. Lagouranis does not complain of such symptoms. Also, he intentionally will not let go of

his moral orientation and dissonance in struggles between his moral agency and the agency of fellow warriors. All are seeking to be warriors seeking to be warfighters after experiencing their potential for piracy.

The above narratives reveal the connections between the voluntary and involuntary moral boundaries of what researcher Anil Seth labels "a person's inner universe" (Seth 2019). For warriors, their ethos is dictated by personal moral foundations and professional military senses of fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy (FRAME) that differentiate between acceptable warfighter and unacceptable pirate behaviors. Thus, warriors' universes function through a combination of cognitive reasoning processes and imprinted autonomic reactions where:

> As one neuroscientist put it, the brain forms "best guesses by combining prior expectations or 'beliefs' about the world, together with incoming sensory data."[1] Going into combat is by definition fraught with unexpected input. Add to that an enemy with a wholly different cultural framework, and the brain struggles to fill in the gaps with the right assumptions. All combat, after all, is also an experience created by the opposition [exception and alterity]. (W.E. Lee et al. 2021, 3-16; Seth 2019, 42)

These guesses and gaps form points that differentiate PTSD from MMI and where warriors may, or may not, seek help with their struggles to reconcile moral dissonance. Before examining specific warrior interactions with current treatment modalities, it is vital to consider theories and research studies that help define the blended intersection of sources, effects, and measurements that allow for the identification, intervention and reconciliation of specific sources for injurious moral dissonance.

Research for the Sources, Effects, and Measurement of MMI

If warrior narratives reveal anything about their struggles it is this – their interpretations and judgements of their agency are defined by blends of psycho-spiritual perceptions that become "frozen in carbonate" to contribute to form negative and positive post-trauma meanings(J.I. Harris et al. 2015). Research shows that for some veterans, their re-formation of life meaning after combat occurs within conditions of depression, personality disorders, substance abuse, physical abuse, marital/relationship/family problems, and suicide (Koenig, Carey, and Al Zaben 2022, 30-48).

This raises the question of the relationship between moral struggles and other responses to PTS, where MI is considered either the primary or secondary condition. As stated earlier it is difficult to diagnose MI when there is no medically accepted definition for the condition and no specific DSM diagnostic criteria to assess the symptoms. Research has found that significant percentages of veterans with no psychiatric history get diagnosed with the onset of a disorder following their combat deployments, and these findings have been correlated with veterans' self-reporting of events and emotions that related to their constructions of moral meanings (Koenig, Carey, and Al Zaben 2022, 39-40; Koenig, Ames, Youssef, Oliver, Volk, Teng, Haynes, Erickson, Arnold, and Pearce 2018; Koenig 2018; Koenig, Ames, Youssef, Oliver, Volk, Teng, Haynes, Erickson, Arnold, O'Garo, et al. 2018; Volk and Koenig 2019).

Sources for MMI

At this point, it is helpful to examine theory and research of the sources, effects, and measurement instruments used to study MMI. Early research studies concluded that the concept of MI is helpful for explaining veterans' combat experiences, but there was a

need to develop conceptual frameworks for defining its sources and effects (Litz et al. 2009; Drescher et al. 2011). Newer research has concluded that, "there are multiple types of traumas in the military context, each with unique perievent and postevent response patterns" that need to be included in the identification and treatment of PTS stress injuries (N.R. Stein et al. 2012).

There is also research that has measured different effects upon different types of warriors, such as, one study found that, "sensation seeking plays a significant role in both performance during the war and subsequent long-term adjustment," and sensation seekers experience lower rates of PTSD symptoms than lower-sensation seekers (Neria et al. 2000). Perhaps this result was obtained because higher sensation seekers enlist for combat related occupations within the military, or because they tolerate combat and ANS reactions better. However, these types of research studies reinforce conclusions that fear-based or life-threat reactions as causal for post-traumatic stress (PTS) related injuries do not account for all veterans' post-combat difficulties.[35]

There is a growing amount of research that supports the transgression of moral values as an important source for negative emotional affects to veterans' well-being (Hanselman and Tanner 2008; Vetmetten and Jerly 2018; Griffin et al. 2019). Multiple studies have differentiated between Impacts of Killing (IOK) and Life Threat as sources for PTS symptoms, but further research has shown that it is warriors' moral judgements

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[35] These research studies will be cited in order of discovery, oldest to newest, to demonstrate progression in research.

of combat events not simply IOK'S that are associated with PTS conditions (Komarovskaya et al. 2011; Maguen et al. 2011; Purcell et al. 2016; Purcell, Burkman, et al. 2018; Krauss et al. 2020; Krauss et al. 2023).

Other research has sought to discover predictors for PTS symptoms in warriors. However, a meta-analysis of studies has shown that psychological and physical stress from traumatic events is a better predictor of PTS symptoms and outcomes than pre-existing conditions (Ozer et al. 2003). These injurious outcomes have "unique pathologies" that are not confined to particular events or individual affects, so they require interventions that include families, communities, and cultures (Griffin et al. 2019).

Veteran and theologian Michael Yandell recently defined veterans' struggles with MI as the moment when they see beyond the circumstances of their combat experiences to view the betrayal of their moral senses of what is good and just (Yandell 2023). Yandell's comments are witness to the effects that unjust war events have upon veterans' moral orientations (Krauss et al. 2024; Krauss et al. 2023; Krauss et al. 2020; Zust and Krauss 2019). His comments are also witness to the effects that veterans' moral orientations have upon healing when their realizations of unjust violations become the inflection points where their moral senses become linked with reconciling the harmful for engagement with the good.

Effects from MMI

Author Peter Marin introduced the concept of Moral Injury to describe the pain, anger, and suffering veterans carried with them after combat, and their need for therapies

to help them re-engage with life. He theorized three categories of moral pain :1) bad conscience/bad faith/betrayal, 2) taking on the world's pain, and 3) suffering when, "we cannot act out in the world our response to the suffering we have seen"(Marin 1981).

Others have designated specific emotions for moral pain. For Shay it is betrayal by someone in authority (Shay 1994, 2002, 2014). For Litz and others it is combinations of shame, guilt, and betrayal (Litz et al. 2009; Maguen and Litz 2012; Litz et al. 2015; Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012). The use of moral emotions to determine the presence of moral injuries and effects from moral dissonance is common.

However, the critical factor is that moral emotions are connected with types of harmonious belief systems and moral commitments that "co-exist in tension" within themselves and life narratives (Molendijk 2018). This makes sense if emotional responses are: 1) connected with senses of moral foundations (Haidt 2003; 2012, 32-58; K. Gray and Wegner 2011; Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek 2007), and 2) linked with post-traumatic struggles that involve life practices (Sedlar et al. 2018; Wilt et al. 2019; Wilt et al. 2020; Nielsen 1998). Thus, the presence and level of emotional responses, such as guilt, shame, despair, anger, etc., can be linked with physical symptoms, and then studied for causality.

It is here that researchers use moral emotions to measure reactions to PTS to measure the psychological and spiritual effects from war that form moral injuries (Rauch and Foa 2006; Argento 2021; Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew 2014; Russell and Giner-Sorolla 2011; Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek 2007). This

methodology is also used to determine the association between traumatic events, such as killing in combat, with maladaptive behaviors, such as suicide ideations (Maguen et al. 2012).

There are three problems with using the presence of moral emotions for determining the causes for moral injuries. First, emotional reactions to combat have been categorized differently in diverse conflicts and this forces a redefinition of PTS symptoms and conditions in each time period. For example, the condition of Soldiers' Heart during the Civil War became Shell Shock during WWI and Combat Fatigue in WWII etc. (Levandoski 2018). Second, emotional responses, like moral values, are not the same across cultures, and this may lead to misreading results(Atari et al. 2022; Gilbert and Andrews 1998). Third, the unsure relationship between moral emotional responses, such as guilt, and the causation of DSM-5 symptoms for PTSD, may lead to misinterpreting the depth of the moral injury when applied to warriors trained for combat (Argento 2021).

However, the presence of veterans' unique, emotional responses to combat experiences also provides ways to: 1) identify and name specific issues, 2) work through struggles, 3) gather insights, and 4) facilitate post-traumatic growth (Farnsworth et al. 2014; Calhoun et al. 2010; Leach and Cidam 2015). For example, 1) expressions of loneliness can help assess veterans' perceptions about the loss of identity and their connections with sources for support (J.Y. Stein 2018), or 2) expressions of guilt and/or shame can help assess issues of conscience and strategies for self-correction, forgiveness, and letting go (Breslavs 2013; S. Norman 2019; S.B. Norman et al. 2014; P. Held et al. 2011).

This is where the assessment of moral emotions and somatic responses linked with cognitive reasoning helps with understanding the role that rumination has in the reconciliation of moral dissonance. Rumination is studied as a predictor for PTSD (Michael et al. 2007). It is also a cognitive-based process that is different from reactions to fear, and this origin helps in the assessment, understanding and treatment of rumination (Monfils et al. 2009; Moulds et al. 2020). Whether rumination is part of a veteran's imprinted cognitive/somatic combat reactions, or it's part of his/her/their cognitive will to "not let go," it is indicative of maladaptive struggles with life meaning and level of moral dissonance.

For example, some veterans like Lagouranis have an emotional and moral sense/value attached to their combat experiences that they choose to hold on to. It is here that an understanding of moral emotions helps to build reflexivity/moral reasoning through the dialogical self as a way of helping veterans work through the intersectionality of their moral orientations to reconcile the "morally vexing realities of war" with their perceptions of moral agency (Farnsworth 2014; Bravo, Mason, and Ehlke 2020). This concept will be examined in the section on modalities.

Measurement Instruments as Predictors for MMI

There is always the need to predict the effects of combat upon warriors for the purposes of training, mission command, or medical recovery. The outcomes from combat events, such as IOKs or unjust agency, are not just measured by events, or the emotional responses of guilt, shame, betrayal, anger, or disgust. They are also measured by effects that lead theorists, researchers, and care-givers to conclude that combat traumas can result in ongoing conditions described as: 1) the shaking of foundations (Tillich 2011), 2)

the rupture of meaning(Bonhoeffer 1955), 3) the shattering of assumptions (Janoff-Bulman 1992), and 4) the origins of perpetration-induced stress (MacNair 2005) or post-traumatic embitterment (Linden et al. 2007).

The biggest problem from research of trauma is that some of it often mixes PTS criteria with moral emotions and measures the data using PTSD criteria as opposed to MI/MMI. So, it is easy to misidentify research on PTSD with research on MI or MMI. This is true for this dissertation. However, this dissertation theorizes that all the above conditions are related to the moral dissonance that exists between moral orientations and agency that influences life meaning and well-being. This dissertation also theorizes that the presence of moral dissonance provides the potential for post-traumatic growth (PTG) through the reconciliation of life values with life practices. Thus, all research for sources, effects, and measurement of PTS can be helpful for examining MMI.

Dissonance is the prerequisite for learning and the assimilation of new life meanings (J. Dewey 1922; Festinger 1957; Park et al. 2017; Park, Mills-Baxter, and Fenster 2005). Van der Kolk observes that there is a paradox where the intersection of traumatic stress with the promotion of psychological resilience is like, "Dale Carngie meeting *The Killing Fields*" (PBS 2011). However, this dissertation considers the reconciliation of moral dissonance as a natural progression for post-traumatic growth that is like, "John Dewey meeting *Saving Private Ryan.*" This analogy will be explained in the conclusion of this chapter. Meanwhile, this explanation requires an examination of the instruments used to collect, measure, and evaluate data from combat veterans.

Researchers and caregivers use self-reporting instruments that include prior exposure to traumatic stress to help warriors label emotional reactions and their

relationships with specific behaviors and events to promote mindfulness through the reduction of maladaptive coping skills (Fleming 2022). Other researchers have used pre-existent psychological conditions to measure and predict the potential for adverse traumatic stress reactions in warriors. For example, Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) are forms of toxic stress that may predict the susceptibility of combat veterans to PTSD (Portell 2019). It is here that combat veterans with prior exposure to sexual, racial, and domestic violence may experience higher rates of adverse traumatic stress reactions that include substance abuse, PTSD diagnosis, and suicide ideations/actions (Bryan et al. 2018; Cunningham et al. 2017; Jacobson et al. 2008; Norris 1992; Hoge, Auchterlonie, and Milliken 2006).

Many instruments focus upon warriors' self-reporting of their participation in Potentially Moral Injurious Events (PMIE), and their subsequent maladaptive behaviors to correlate higher risks to warriors' well-being with combat exposure. PMIEs can be defined by behaviors such as: general combat exposure, harm to others, mistreatment of civilians, failing to perform duties, immoral acts etc., and subsequent experiences can be defined by emotional responses or specific behaviors such as substance abuse, depression, suicide/suicide ideations, domestic abuse, crimes etc. (Corona and Van Orden 2019; Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al. 2015; Evans et al. 2018; Krauss et al. 2023; LeardMann et al. 2021; Maguen et al. 2011; Nichter et al. 2021; Maguen et al. 2021; Schoenbaum et al. 2014; Tripp, McDevitt-Murphy, and Henschel 2016; Ursano et al. 2014; Van Winkle and Safer 2011). Higher risks to warriors' well-being have also been associated with PMIEs such as insufficient training and abusive leadership within units (Campbell-Sills, Sun, and Kessler 2013; Renshaw 2010). Ongoing research is also

finding that stressors from operational tempo and conditions (i.e. sleep cycles, performance demands, rates of engagements) also influence rates of suicide and self-harm in warriors (Winkie 2024b, 2024a; Nassif, Mesias, and Adler 2022; Schoenbaum et al. 2014; Orak et al. 2023; N. Monson 2016).[36]

Each of the above studies has blurred the line between sources of traumatic stress and outcomes of PTSD and/or MMI, and these blurred lines provide credibility to the possibility that warriors may suffer from either PTSD, MMI, or both. The Venn diagram in Figure 6.3 illustrates this reality, but this possibility may be the result of the measurements we use to assess how warriors process their combat experiences. Physical exposure to combat does not guarantee a straightforward prediction of the myriad of warriors' responses (Koren et al. 2005).

Measurement instruments have been created to differentiate between PTSD and MMI by using warriors' self-perceptions of their experiences and their reactions to different types of traumatic events. These instruments are: 1) the Expressions of Moral Injury Scale-Military Version (EMIS-M) (Currier et al. 2018), 2) the Religious and Spiritual Struggles scale (RSS) (Exline et al. 2014), 3) the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PTDS) (Foa et al. 1997; S. Powell and Rosner 2005; S. Powell et al. 2003), 4) the Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI) (Foa et al. 1999), 5) the Moral Injury Symptom Scale -Military Version (MISS-M) (Koenig, Ames, Youssef, Oliver, Volk, Teng, Haynes, Erickson, Arnold, O'Garo, et al. 2018; Koenig, Ames, Youssef, Oliver, Volk, Teng, Haynes, Erickson, Arnold, and Pearce 2018), 6) Perpetration-Induced

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[36] The PCL-5 and CAPS 5 are also used for clinical diagnosis of PTSD.

Distress Scale (PIDS) (Steinmetz, Gray, and Clapp 2019), 7) The Deployment Risk and Resilience Inventory (DRRI) (Vogt et al. 2013), 8) Moral Injury Outcome Scale (MIOS) (Yeterian et al. 2019), 9) the Brief Moral Injury Screen (BMIS), 10) the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) (Nash 2013; Nieuwsma et al. 2022), and the 11) Moral Injury Questionnaire-Military Version (MIQ-M) (Nieuwsma et al. 2022).

Each of these assessment instruments provide data for differentiating between the stress-coping, stress-injury, and moral injury models that are used to assess, monitor, and treat warriors and family member reactions to traumatic stress (Nash and Litz 2013). However, few of these models provide an assessment of the values, standards, and processes that warriors use to assess and judge moral meaning. Instruments such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) and the Defining Issues Test (DIT) are designed to assess the values that individuals within larger popular populations and can be used to provide data about how warriors make moral decisions and judgements (Haidt 2012, 183-ff, 334-354; J. Rest et al. 1999, 79-ff; Narvaez and Mrkva 2014).

Some attempts have been made to use the DIT to assess the development of Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning within groups of warfighters at the junior and senior levels. These studies have concluded that military training: 1) did not necessarily change/increase the type of moral reasoning used by warriors, and 2) senior leaders tended to rely upon conventional reasoning more than their civilian counterparts (Agrawal, Williams, and Miller 2020; Agrawal, Williams, and Miller 2021; K. Williams 2010). This might be due to the nature and structures of mission command used in operational planning and embedded in military training.

The MFQ has been adapted to assess the moral senses warriors use for moral reasoning (Ford et al. 2022; Currier et al. 2018). Other researchers have combined the MFQ with the EMIS-M to study moral injury, and they concluded that there are two subtypes of moral injury: self-directed moral injury (SDMI) and other-directed moral injury (ODMI). These subtypes are further differentiated by warrior preferences for: 1) individualizing moral senses (care and fairness), and 2) binding moral senses (loyalty, authority, and sanctity).

Thus, binding and individualizing preferences influence the direction that warriors experience moral injury. Warriors who process traumatic events with medium to high levels of individualizing sense violations experience SDMI, and warriors who process traumatic events with high levels of binding senses also experience SDMI. However, warriors who process traumatic events with high preferences of both binding and individualizing moral senses experience SDMI and ODMI (D. Perez, Larson, and Bair 2021). Another way of interpreting these results is the violation of: 1) binding or individualizing moral senses can result in internalized processing of moral dissonance, and 2) all moral senses can result in both internalized and externalized expressions of moral injury.

This type of research is promising for helping establish criteria for defining and diagnosing moral injury, but for now theorists, researchers, caregivers, and military leaders are left with the individual narratives of warriors to identify and treat moral injuries. These narratives describe their struggles with moral meanings attached to their

imprinted somatic responses, memories, ruminations, and moral dissonance. This is where the TMM provides a useful framework for researchers, theorists, caregivers/healers, and leaders.

Applications of the TMM for Reconciling Moral Dissonance

The final section of this chapter will apply narratives from a hypothetical composed of five combat veterans seeking help with moral struggles to existing treatment modalities to test how the TMM can be used to help veterans reconcile moral dissonance. Often veteran combat narratives focus on the binding and lighter side of their deployments to avoid intrusive thoughts and the pain associated with their experiences. For example, a veteran may joke that he was only scared once during his deployment, and that was when he got on the boat to deploy, and he stayed scared until his disembarked back home (D.C. Wilson 2022). However, the pain and the memories are never far away, and they can become complex.

Christian theologian C.S. Lewis was a British infantry officer who served in the trenches during World War I. He was wounded by an artillery round that also killed his sergeant and a fellow officer, (who was Lewis' friend from a time before the war). While in the trenches, Lewis and his friend had many critical conversations about theism and Christianity, which Lewis later rejected after being wounded.

After the war, he struggled with issues of moral dissonance and he considered himself an atheist (C.S. Lewis 1055, iv). Lewis never explicitly wrote about his war experiences and only once wrote about his friend's death (C.S. Lewis 1055, iv-ff). However, his brother, a career soldier, said that Lewis' writings were filled with his thoughts about war (Gilchrist 2004, 187).

Lewis did write general comments about the war in his earliest writings, as he began to form his post-trauma narrative, "We lost our ideals when there was a war in this country, it was the mud and the blood" (C.S. Lewis 1933, 54; Gilchrist 2004, 211-ff). His complaint against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. However, this was also a point of inflection for him, as he realized, "[but] a man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line… for the [my] argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my fancies…" (C.S. Lewis 1955, 38). This thought began Lewis' life-long process of reconciling transcendent, enduring principles with life practices that were reflected throughout his writings (C.S. Lewis 1949, 52-54). Such is the complex path where veterans re-integrate their moral orientations with the values that shaped their life purpose, and direction.

During the Battle of Algiers, psychiatrist Franz Fanon documented psychological reactions to the violence, and he included the cases of two French policemen, a French family member, and four Algerians. Without identifying or addressing issues of moral or combat trauma, Fanon described the variety of traumatic effects which he diagnosed as anxiety disorders experienced by both sides participating in a liberation conflict, and his work contributes to understanding experiences of moral orientation, agency, and dissonance during war. Fanon divided his patients into the categories: 1) Series A experienced clearly defined symptoms of severe reactive disorders, 2) Series B experienced reactions triggered by the atmosphere of war, and 3) Series C and D displayed mental changes and emotional disturbances after torture.

Fanon placed the French in Categories A and B because of panic attacks associated with torturing others, increases in smoking, fits of anger, nightmares, abuses of family members, overwhelming guilt over national hypocrisy, and dissonance caused by loss of relationships with neighbors (Fanon 1963, 194-199, 204-206). The Algerians were placed in all categories. The Algerians who were victims of torture were placed in category C, and they experienced post-traumatic reactions that qualified as DSM-5TR PTSD symptoms (Fanon 1963, 207-218). However, Fanon placed Algerians who participated in the violence in categories A and B and he described the range of their moral reactions from their agency as hyper alertness, rage, a desire to kill, visions of the victim, guilt, lack of concern for the consequences, lack of anger at their victim, and rationalizations of their feelings to their context and events of war (Fanon 1963, 185-194, 199-203).

Fanon provides a rare look at the complex conditions of moral dissonance in both sides of a war. It is here that warfighters like Sisk, Thomas, Voss, Lagouranis, and Lewis are struggling with moral dissonance between their moral orientations and agency as they seek to reconcile values and meanings that they may experience as unreconcilable. As stated earlier this process is an ongoing contextual, iterative, and transformative struggle. To examine this struggle, I will use the narratives of five veterans, who form a hypothetical support group and apply them to current treatment modalities to examine how each of these modalities can assist veterans' reconciliation of their moral dissonance.

Hypothetical Warrior Group

"In war, we have to live with heavy contradictions. The degree to which we can be aware of and contain these contradictions is a measure of our individual maturity. You can't be a warrior and not be deeply involved with suffering" (Marlantes 2011, 44). Throughout this dissertation you have met warfighters who have experienced moral dissonance from their combat service and developed R/S struggles which are related to MMI. Now imagine the following fictional group of veterans who are forming a support group, who report the following narratives as reasons for joining the group. The content of their complex narratives is real, but each veteran is fictional. Their presenting narratives are constructed from multiple public sources, that are cited to avoid plagiarism.

The purpose of this methodology is to: 1) provide real details that provide rigor to an examination of current treatment modalities, and 2) respect individual, real veterans from publicly subjecting them to personal post-trauma therapy in which they did not take part. Nothing will be attributed to these constructed, presenting narratives that is not contained in the public sources to avoid adding false meanings and fictional statements to the real-life narratives. Finally, the use of the following narratives will be restricted to demonstrating how caregivers can use the TMM by applying it within specific treatment modalities to reconcile veterans' moral dissonance based upon their presenting narratives.

The Commander (Finkel 2009, 2013, 2024; Hall 2014).

He is an older, white male from the South, who served as an infantryman on multiple deployments in Iraq. He is married and they have a strong relationship. During his deployments he served as a company commander, battalion executive

officer, and battalion commander. During his tours, several members of his unit were killed and wounded during missions he planned or commanded. Over this time, he began to despise leaders who failed to show compassion and respect for their soldiers.

Early in one deployment his soldiers found the dismembered body of an Iraqi male thrown into a cistern. He insisted his soldiers treat the body with respect. He told them, "I would hope someone would do the same for my body. And for any human being. Otherwise, we're not human." Another time he paid money out of his own pocket to an Iraqi family as a condolence payment for a family member who was accidently killed during nearby fighting. He was angered by $750 dollars the U.S. government paid them, so he also gave them all the money he had in his possession ($100). (Boros, Shaw, and Kehoe 2014). However, he had trouble looking them in the eye. He says this incident made him realize that this was no war that he was trained to fight.

He also experienced moments of anger that offset these moments of humanity. One day he was watching the live video feed of his soldiers being ambushed, when the camera focused on a soldier shooting a .50 caliber machine gun at an insurgent who was trying to flank them. He found himself screaming, "Die monkey die!" He was then aware that the rest of his Soldiers were screaming it too, and he felt ashamed. He experienced pain and bewilderment after one his "steady" soldiers killed himself and his family after returning home.

Later he wrote in the journal he kept, "I was unable to save anyone of them [a multitude of soldiers and Iraqi civilians] but I tried… I hate the ones who have used this opportunity to advance their [deleted] careers. But I will always love those that gave up

387

everything for a cause … Lots of my experience in Iraq was too little too late." He began

having dreams where he was in the dark and hearing people, that he can't see, laughing at

him. The dreams leave him feeling naïve that he was foolish enough to believe his life

should have purpose and meaning, and he also feels like the blackness is trying to pull

him in. He retired to the suburbs in the south with his wife and children, and he began

working for a company that trains international policemen. He attends church with his

family, but after the 2016 and 2020 elections he began to experience disillusionment and

alienation with the political and religious polarity in the

 nation, and currents protests over police involvement in current domestic and

international incidents. The nationalism he is experiencing does not represent the national

values he respected throughout his life and his years of service. "It's slipping," he says.

The Loggie (Lehrfeld 2022; Holmstedt 2007; Bragg 2003).

Loggie is military slang for a logistics specialist. She is a young, white, enlisted

combat veteran, who participated in ambushes that wounded or killed some personal

friends and fellow Soldiers. She is now a schoolteacher near her hometown.

Upon entering the service and graduating from her Advanced Training and

Specialty School she thought, "I hope I can inspire many others to come…It's not an easy

school, but it's not meant to be. It challenges our knowledge… to be confident,

competent and lethal leaders… we keep going and pushing. In combat, she was twice in

convoys that were ambushed, and in which her fellow soldiers were killed.

The first time she was in the middle position of a vehicle, so she was unable to

use her weapon because it was jammed due to the sand. She remembers sitting scrunched

up with her hands holding her legs and her head pressed against her knees. Soldiers on both sides of her were firing their weapons and her best friend was driving while the sergeant in front was yelling "speed up." She watched fellow Soldiers die, close up, and she closes her eyes to remember what she doesn't want to. She describes the event as "Chaos … like being in a bad dream. You just want to wake up and have everything back like it was. But you can't wake up. You can't make it just go away." Her friend was killed that day, leaving behind a son. Other soldiers died that day, and the Loggie survived. She has contact with the son and remembers them all.

She returned to duty, and she was later in second incident in which she was the driver of a vehicle that struck an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). She thought she was going to die. She couldn't feel anything, and she was terrified. She thought she had been blown in half. She thought, "Oh God, how am I going to get out of here? She could feel the heat intensify as the blaze closed in on her. Then she saw her battle buddy with her head slumped over and unconscious. She was pulled from the burning vehicle by a fellow Soldier. She had trouble breathing, and if she hadn't been wearing the neck guard, shrapnel could have cut a jugular vein and killed her. The Soldiers reassured her that she wasn't going to die, but she didn't know about the condition of her battle buddy.

She had a chest wound caused by the shrapnel, and her battle buddy died. She received the shrapnel from the OR nurse, and remembers the pain, chest tubes, and wheelchair after her surgeries. She blamed herself for her battle buddy's death, and she thought she should have seen the IED before she hit it. After Walter Reed Hospital, she returned to her post and was put on medical hold before returning home to work at a National Guard Armory near her hometown until she was released from duty.

She still experiences chronic pain and tightness in her chest. She is susceptible to pneumonia when she is sick. She has been physically able to rebound and pick up where she left off before she deployed to Iraq. She prefers not to focus on her combat experiences, and instead she focuses upon her friends and the fun they had. However, she is saddened because her hometown treats her as a hero after she returned, and she doesn't feel that way. She says, "It was weird, for twenty years, no one knew my name. Now they want my autograph. But I'm not a hero. If it makes people feel good to say it, then I'm glad. But I'm not. I'm just a survivor. When I think about it, it keeps me awake at night… We went and we did our job, and that was to go to the war, but I wish I hadn't done it—I wish it had never happened… I wish we hadn't been there, none of us… if it had never happened [name deleted] would be alive and all the rest of the soldiers would be alive. And none of this would have happened… I can't do anything about that… I'd give four hundred billion dollars… I'd give anything."

The Vietnam Veteran (Terry 1984; Marlantes 2011).

He is an older, Black male who served as a scout on long range patrols. He describes himself as a church goer who tried to live right before the war, but still thinks, "Lord why am I here, why did you do this to me?" He says, "I'm okay… a lot of things that might scare a lot of other people in terms of dangers, I can just walk right on through without backing away, shying away, or making compromises that really should not be made. I've been there."

At times he gets introspective and talks of war as, "meaningless and terrible suffering or a profound religious experience" but the horror remains the same where he

390

identified with a threatened group, and others were no longer human. He got to the point where he didn't kill people. He killed "Crispy Critters" that could have been anybody other than his mission and survival.

He speaks about a chaplain who showed up at their outpost one day and brought with him several bottles of Southern Comfort and some new dirty jokes. He says he accepted the Southern Comfort, but years later he was seething inside because he was engaged in killing and maybe being killed and, "the terror of my own death and responsibility for the death of others, enemies and friends, not Southern Comfort. I needed a spiritual guide." He also speaks of two incidents that influenced how he operated.

The first incident, he was crawling uphill, under enemy fire, to help a Marine who was crying out for help. As he crawled, he kept firing his weapon until he could retrieve the man. Back inside the perimeter, the man died, and the medic showed him a bullet hole in the top of the man's head. He thought, how could the man have cried out "I'm hit" with a bullet in his brain? The bullet must have gone in after he'd cried out." Since the man was lying head downhill toward him, "I could have put it there myself when I was trying to keep the machine-gun fire down as I crawled up to get him. I'll never know."

The second incident, he led a patrol to search for a downed helicopter and its crew. After three days, they discovered one of the crewmen, who was barely alive, staked to ground. He had been tortured, and his chest was skinned down to his waist exposing his internal organs and allowing maggots to get into his wounds. The crewman was begging to die, and "we did not have the means to call for medevac."

391

The patrol couldn't leave him there, and he was in charge. He radioed his command, and they told him that it was his call. He sent his team away and talked with the crewman. The man begged to die, so, "I stopped thinking I just pulled the trigger. I cancelled his suffering… we buried him… very deep… then I cried." He calls the man "brother" because, "in war circumstances, we all brothers, and he wishes he had the courage to do what that crewman did."

He saw other atrocities committed against fellow soldiers and he became what he calls, "an animal." He began to consider himself as the "baddest [expletive] in the valley." He also began to think, "Why in the hell did I do that? … I basically became an animal… I was in charge of a group of animals, and I had to be the biggest animal there. I allowed things to happen. I had leaned not care, and I really didn't care." He also did things…

However, he remembers trying to save a wounded boy. He carried him off the battlefield back to the aid station and he did not leave the boy's side. But all he really felt was emptiness. He went to Vietnam as a teenager, and never had anyone on his team die, but he felt like an animal who was angry at what America, the war, and the military had caused him to become.

When he returned home, his mom had a hard time recognizing him. He was awarded five Bronze Stars for valor, but he couldn't deal with going back to school and he began to use drugs He credits his mom with bringing him back home and helping him deal with his shame, and anger at himself, his nation, and the war. He also credits a small support group that started in a local church with finding his way back home, and he still cries.

He has this nightmare where he is staked out, trying to be "man enough to ask someone to end his suffering." Then he wakes up. He doesn't want to forget, nor does he think he should. He finishes his narrative, "I think that I made it back here and am able to sit here and talk because he died for me, and I'm living for him."

The Nurse (McCain and Salter 2014; Palmer 1987; Doherty and Scannell-Desch 2017; Eisenbrandt 2015).

She is an older, Hispanic women who served as a nurse in Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm Veteran. She went to war fresh out of nurses' training and saw horrific wounds. She takes comfort in knowing that her role was to save and heal, not to kill and destroy, and she returned to a small town in the Midwest where she received community support as a veteran. She is still a nurse.

However, she wonders about the cost behind the medical experience she gained. She says, "We were literally taking apart what had been whole, and now, they were tragically changed forever. I can still see the heap of biologic bags waiting to be transported to the incinerator, and our OR [Operating Room] floor covered in blood … I can smell it; I can see it; and I can hear it."

She remembers the outgoing and incoming fire, and going without sleep, and being scared. She remembers the alarm in the night and running for the shelter that had rats! She also remembers that incoming fire was followed by incoming casualties. She realizes that no one could truly be prepared for the types of traumas that she experienced during her tour of duty.

Soldiers were brought in with their limbs attached which gave them some semblance of a whole person. She describes a young man who was brought in on a

stretcher missing both legs, and how it was up to her to take it from there. Time was critical, and modesty was optional, so she cut off his clothes and prepared him for surgery. When she got off duty, she celebrated her birthday with a cake sent from mom, and thinking about her patient who would wake up the next morning to begin a new life without legs.

She remembers, "bloodied and broken bodies, and the smell of burning flesh, the blood dripping on our boots, body bags cradling their silent contents, and escaping into scotch…" On a good day, she would see one amputee, maybe a double amputee. On a bad day she would see many doubles and triples. She says, "You did your best, of course, but it could really get to you at the end of the day when you would process things. Sometimes I went back to my quarters and cried at the end of my shift. I was not alone in crying…"

She says her experiences taught her to be humble, but it also, "taught me to be an aggressive, assertive nurse and to stand up for what I believe in as a nurse. It was one of the most positive experiences of my life because I was part of the effort to get these guys home to their families."

One day they brought in someone she knew which made the hurt even deeper. "Later in the recovery room, he told me that he pleaded with the surgeon to not amputate his legs. They granted his wish though not offering him much hope about his rehabilitation possibilities… [later I] visited him stateside when I returned. He was recovering in the hospital at Ft. Benning and still had his legs though they were weak and facing years of physical therapy."

At one point while struggling with her pain from Vietnam she left a note at the Vietnam Memorial Wall that reads, "The first few times you cut someone's uniform off and the leg falls off, yes, your mind screams, but you stuff that down very, very quickly. You have to. If you lose control, they're going to die. It's as simple as that…the wounded kept coming, the war was getting worse, and I was good at what I did … these people would have a future because of all of the [expletive] I was going through. Goodbye David – I'm the last person you will see, I'm the last person you will touch, I'm the last person who will love you. So, long David – my name is [blank] – David –who will give me something for my pain?"

She returned home and joined the Army reserves. As a senior nurse she was deployed to Operation Desert Storm, where she saw very little trauma, and the survival rate of wounded evacuated from combat had increased. She was a senior member in the unit, and she looked on the younger members as "her kids." However, prior to the invasion of Kuwait, while her unit was encamped in Saudi, Iraq fired a SCUD missile that hit the warehouse where her unit was quartered. She was away at the time, but she rushed to the site where she found that her younger friend had been killed. Later, as the senior member of her team she identified their bodies and visited the wounded. She still experiences guilt from this incident, and she suffers from other body complications that began shortly after the incident.

She wonders, "Do I have PTSD?" She remembers that, "When I returned from Vietnam, little things troubled me—loud noises, the whop-whop of a helicopter flying overhead, a song, maybe a news report. I did have dreams; I suppose that they could be called nightmares… but I do not recall waking up in a cold sweat or screaming out… the

one personality trait that I found… was my inability to control my tears… the weepy tendency became even more pronounced… just the sight of an injured person or animal was enough to set me off. While she tries to show a tough exterior, she seems to be more sensitive to everyday disappointments… perhaps I saw enough pain and destruction during the war; I just don't want to endure more sadness." She also avoids violent or stressful movies and media.

However, she finishes by saying, "I would never wish for another war but would not change the experience that I had for anything. It is deeply entwined within the fiber of who I am. I chose not to ignore my past but rather to embrace it and share it in order that others may learn…"

The Marine (Biggio 2021; Jaffe 2023).

He is a middle age, white male, combat veteran who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. When he went to war, he took an American flag with him. He imagined that he would take a picture with the flag somewhere in Iraq that he could show his family, a symbol of where he had served and fought. His unit was the first to reach Firdos Square in Baghdad, where he and other Marines helped to tear down a statue of Saddam Hussein. His flag was draped over the head of the statue as a crowd of Iraqis cheered, but later they were ordered to remove the flag because it sent the wrong message -- U.S. troops didn't come to occupy Iraq.

Three days later one of his Marines was killed while they were guarding the Water Ministry Building, and the war changed. On the way home he began to reflect upon the war and how he viewed the war through the magnified optics on his tank, and the facial expressions on civilians and enemy soldiers. He had written his thoughts in his

green field notebook, and his entries described the killing he took part in. He remembers a car that swerved and struck a tree amid a flurry of machine gun fire and a civilian shot 5 times in back and legs. At some point on the way to Baghdad, the violence and death caused his emotions to shut down. Later, he wrote that the Iraqis are, "no longer just enemy, but human beings caught up in a maelstrom partially of his own making."

He redeployed home, then redeployed to Afghanistan, where he was involved in a firefight where a young man was shot while trying to flee the fighting. The Afghan was unarmed and most likely fleeing for protection. The Marine describes what happened next, "I wanted to get to him and render aid … but bullets kept cracking into the mud wall we hunkered behind, so I stayed put… twenty minutes later, the firing stopped, my unit regrouped, I took a final look at that spot in the grass, and I turned my back and marched away with the rest of the platoon. Two hours later, at the ramshackle [Afghan] police station, an officer frantically asked us to call in a medevac for a barely conscious man — a teenager, who I recognized."

He was the young man wounded in the firefight. "I grabbed his scarf and shoved it into my cargo pocket… then I noticed the blood streaks it left on my hands, and I felt the first stabs of guilt. Our job — my job — was to help the Afghans and protect them from the violence of the Taliban. When I had a chance to do just that, I had turned my back, rationalizing that the Afghan writhing in agony after being shot in the guts wasn't a Marine — not from my tribe — so I hadn't thought he was worth the risk. Thirty minutes. After I turned my back on the boy — whose name I later learned was Mir Wut — he had bled out for at least an hour before he was dumped in a wheelbarrow and rushed to the police station So even though I didn't fire the shots that killed Mir Wut —

shots I later learned were from an AK-47, not a U.S. weapon — I killed him. The shame of that day lingers with me and casts a shadow over everything else I am proud of from my service."

He returned home, and he began having a reoccurring nightmare where he's a small boy having a sleepover at his best friend's house when faceless invaders burst through the sliding glass doors and kill his friend as he tries to stop them, but he can't. He took prescription medicine to help sleep at night but believed he could manage his symptoms.

He says, "the emotional side never got turned back on for 17 years … I Superman-ed… as a Marine Corps officer, we don't have problems. That's just the way it is…eventually, I just ran out of rope…to start them back up again meant dealing with those emotions, which sucks by the way."

He credits the VA Vet Center with saving his life. His therapist suggested that he try to paint some of his traumatic memories from the war. He says, "I painted a picture of a burning bus packed with anguished civilians. The lines on the bus are crisp and clean… [but] the civilians are blurry and abstract… I haven't told my boys what it is…."

Today, he is a lawyer who lives in a house with a metal peace sign over his garage, and his Baghdad flag is stored in the back corner of his basement next to his old uniforms. His painting sits on a shelf in his bedroom closet next to a photograph of his tank and his platoon.

Applications of the TMM in Existing Treatment Modalities

"How does any form of treatment/therapy/counseling help a warfighter identify and reconcile their moral dissonance?" This is the critical question for examining the use

of the TMM as a framework for healing MMI. The narratives from the previous section will now be used to examine how the TMM can be applied to different treatment modalities to help veterans reconcile their moral dissonance and assimilate new meanings into their post-combat narratives.

As stated earlier, reconciliation is a contextual, iterative, and transformative process that re-integrates values with agency to create new life meanings that contribute to the well-being of the whole person (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Exline 2015, 127-128; J.C. Augustine 2022, 4-5; Bianchi 1969, 7-14). This re-integration process includes external, civil/social re-connections as well as an internal, R/S personal re-connections that form self-identity (J.C. Augustine 2022, 99-ff).

The military profession is filled with tensions, dilemmas, and occasions for moral struggles because it places individuals and units in contexts where intersections of psycho/social/spiritual/physical actions can dis-integrate their moral orientations from their agency. These resulting struggles then generate levels of moral dissonance that affect warriors' post-trauma constructions of life meanings. It is here they judge themselves as warfighters, pirates, or combinations of both.

As a chaplain deployed with combat units, I tried to work with other caregivers to provide a team approach for warfighters to process their experiences throughout the moral reasoning cycles they used during combat (see Chapter 4). We used a process similar to the TMM, and it was particularly helpful when warfighters experienced physical stress reactions to combat events, and later struggled to find life meanings as they processed their thoughts and emotions. I do not view my role as a pastor and chaplain in terms of being a trained therapist, sociologist, or psychologist. However, my

purpose is to learn what I can from theory and research to test a model (the TMM) for understanding warfighters' narratives that provides a working framework for caregivers from multiple disciplines to work with veterans who are struggling with MMI.

Each of the veterans in the fictional support group describes a narrative that has complex issues from PTS that represent the overlapping, imprinted cognitive/somatic reactions associated with PTSD and the ongoing struggles with moral dissonance associated with MMI (see Figure 6.3). Each one of these fictional veterans requires different types of care for issues they express in their narratives(Evans et al. 2021). These are the presenting signs for indicating the hidden wounds, that may be cloaked in layers of language and values relayed in stories.

Traumatic events reorganize the ways that we manage perceptions, and it changes not only how we think, and what we think about, but also our capacity to think. For transformative changes to take place: 1) warfighters need to cognitively learn (cognitively and somatically that the danger has passed, and 2) they need to experience trust and practices of compassion in their present contexts so they can adapt new meanings and adopt their own practices of well-being (van der Kolk 2015, 21-ff).

In a way, the unity between life meaning and life practices is what ancient Greek philosophers theorized when they integrated well-being (*eudaimonia*) with *arete* (excellent in virtue) and *phronesis* (practical action). The process of re-integrating moral orientation with moral agency is the intention for the reconciliation of moral dissonance within treatment modalities.

For an initial triage of our hypothetical group, is fair to assume that their narratives demonstrate that: 1) all members of the support group are struggling with

moral meanings, 2) they have sought individual treatment for PTSD before coming to the group for these issues, 3) they are seeking ongoing care and support in their struggles that are complementary to the healing that they have already sought, and 4) their narratives contain moral orientations which are forms of resiliency and healing as well as moral injury. Thus, the following examination will examine and assess how different treatment modalities can help these veterans identify and reconcile their moral dissonance to reform life meaning and engage in life practices. This methodology is hypothetical, just as the group members. In reality, a specific process would be tailored and assigned to individual members of the group depending upon their individual symptoms and needs.

Spiritually Oriented Care (SOC) for Reconciliation

Spiritually Oriented Care includes:

> … the awareness and integration of one's narrative history, socio-cultural identity, and spiritual/values-based orienting systems. ACPE defines the word "spiritual" as inclusive of theistic and non-theistic/values-based orientations. (ACPE 2020)

Pastoral theologians Carrie Doehring and Larry Graham define Spiritually Oriented Care (SOC) as a narrative approach that integrates larger social contexts that "encompass" the full range human meanings that provide illumination and a guiding vision (Doehring 2015a, xxi-ff; Pargament 2007, 136). SOC is a process of System 2 reflexivity that contains elements of trust, compassion, deep listening, assessment, accountability to identify embedded/lived theologies, overcome life limiting narratives, and explore life-giving alternatives (Doehring 2015a, xiii-ff, 1-11; L.K. Graham 2017, 50-ff).

In dealing with moral injuries, SOC is focused upon contextual, iterative, and transformative meanings for life practices through the reconciliation of moral dissonance. It is concerned with the whole person and all of life, and it seeks to create sacred, safe spaces, or a specific location, for care seekers to: 1) ask fundamental questions and seeking answers for life struggles, doubts, and insecurities in the presence of a supportive community (Foster 2018, 186; Nouwen 2006, xiii, 5-6), 2) affirm a quest for life between internal, external, and eternal transitions of life meanings (Nouwen 2006, 6; Thandeka 2018, 164), and 3) address, and be addressed by God, or the infinite/transcendent (Fernandez-Carajal 2012; Foster 2018; Merton 1961; Nouwen 2006; Tanquerey 1930; Thandeka 2018). SOC is intended to be a process that provides safe guidance and development of the necessary means for virtue and rules for life (Tanquerey 1930, 110, 386). SOC can be a comprehensive form of spiritually integrated psychotherapy that:

> … uses somatic practices like mindfulness meditation not simply as calming practices but also as part of a search for meanings. Intrinsically meaningful practices that help veterans experience goodness will likely reveal new values and beliefs about suffering and hope that can be incorporated into a veteran's search for meanings (Barrs and Doehring 2022, 299-300).

Thus, SOC practices a form of spiritual re-integration and reconciliation that is based upon the freedom and responsibility for moral orientation, not as the indoctrination of orthodoxy, but as a way to help care seekers expand their horizons and discern the azimuths for their agency (Fernandez-Carajal 2012, Kindle locations 262-ff; L.K. Graham 2017, 96-ff; Larson and Zust 2017, 119-ff; Zust 2003). SOC as a practice can include a variety of 1) R/S and moral orientations such as *dharma/karma/moksha, jihad/basmala,* sin/suffering/mercy/forgiveness/grace, and sanctity/impurity, 2) R/S

practices such as prayer, meditation, confession, absolution, retreat, worship, acts of

giving, self-compassion, somatic-regulation and communal gathering. Each of these

forms is determined by individual relationships within specific cultures, traditions and

communities.

Psychologist Steven Sandage and colleagues propose a Relational Spiritual Model

(RSM) that unfolds through dialectical processes of spiritual dwelling and seeking. They

describe these processes:

> Spiritual dwelling refers to stable patterns of relational dynamics with the
> sacred often embedded within a particular spiritual or religious tradition or
> familiar context, while spiritual seeking involves exploring existential
> questions or new spiritual experiences and understandings. But numerous
> other dialectics are also part of the RSM, including hope and humility,
> emotion processing and emotional regulation, autonomy and connection,
> forgiveness and justice, among others… The wisdom of dialectical
> thinking has been a centerpiece of… both acceptance and change or wise
> mind that integrates reason and emotion [with] other dialectics…
> (Sandage et al. 2020, 38-39)

Such seeking and dwelling involve individual and communal practices that are

grounded within multiple spiritual traditions that involve surface and in-depth ways of

relating to the sacred for spiritual grounding, commitment, self-regulation, orientation,

and wisdom (Sandage et al. 2020, 51-81). It is possible to compartmentalize spiritual

reflection in treatment so that once care seekers are able to use somatic practices to

experience spiritual dwelling, they will then be able to trust the process of searching for

meanings. However, Kahneman's system of reasoning suggests that these processes

happen simultaneously, Thus, the somatic and emotional response is connected with

meaning making from the moment of trauma, and at some level of cognitive perception

and reasoning. So, one of the healing issues in treatment is to slow the "trauma response down" through reflective practices that empower care seekers to identify, differentiate, and process the events that are dis-integrating their life narratives.

SOC can be incorporated within psychotherapy as a methodology for the co-creation of post-trauma meaning to provide healers/care-givers with additional pathways to build trusting relationships that utilize somatic and spiritual practices to help care seekers reconcile moral dissonance. Reconciliation is not a single choice solution, nor is it a mechanism for resolving moral/ethical dilemmas. Reconciliation is a contextual, iterative, and transformative process for re-integrating what has been dis-integrated, broken apart, harmed, separated, and/or alienated. It seeks wholeness, harmony, and integrity of all elements that contribute to the well-being of the whole (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Exline 2015, 127-128; J.C. Augustine 2022, 4-5; Bianchi 1969, 7-14). Thus, reconciliation also includes re-connection of both internal, personal elements of self-identity and external, civil/social relationships (J.C. Augustine 2022, 99-ff).

Psychiatrist Larry Dewey describes MMI as a "soul wound," that is equivalent to "breaking the Geneva Convention of the Soul" (L. Dewey 2004, 73-75). Such damage requires the equivalent of trustworthy truth commissions and *jus post bellum* conciliation efforts to restore the balance between justice and order for the ending of conflict and the restoration of peace, trust, and security (Philpott 2012, 257-291; Patterson 2012, 16-ff). Army chaplain David Peters describes conciliation efforts as internal dialogues, and struggles, leading to new understandings that are grounded in transcendent, post-traumatic relationships that are no longer defined by shattered, traumatic perceptions (D. Peters 2016, 72-73). In other words, the reconciliation of

moral dissonance involves seeking and using somatic and cognitive practices for self-regulation, and spiritual dwelling that make it possible to create new meanings from the dis-integrated, broken perceptions that veterans ruminate over after combat.

Reconciliation is a process for change that uses forms of trustworthy and compassionate reflexivity (System 2 reasoning) to help warfighters understand how intersections of PTS, MIE, ME, R/S practices, and moral orientations shape and re-shape their life meaning and agency. System 2 reasoning (see Chapter 4) is a form of self-examination that incorporates concrete experiences (feelings), reflective observations (watching), abstract conceptualization (thinking), and active experimentation (doing) (Kolb and Kolb 2017, 26-ff; N. Sherman 2021, 185). Reflexivity also includes practices of spiritual dwelling that help care seekers, "face the complexity and ambiguity of suffering with compassion and resiliency…[to] align[s] practices, beliefs, and values in ways that liberate persons, families, and communities" (Doehring and Kestenbaum 2021; Doehring 2015a, 15; Sandage et al. 2020).

Research suggests that PTS and MIE can cause changes in moral orientations and agency that result in spiritual struggles (Falsetti, Resick, and Davis 2003; Pargament and Exline 2022, 24-ff; Smith-MacDonald et al. 2017). For some, R/S beliefs and practices actively promote resiliency and the formation of positive, post-traumatic meanings (Sharma et al. 2017; Wilt et al. 2019). Self-described atheists also experience struggles related to traumatic stress, although they associated their struggles with interpersonal and ultimate meanings associated with concepts of "the good," and this allows religious and

non-religious care providers to facilitate healing and promote "moral repair" with diverse belief systems (Drescher et al. 2018; Saucier and Skrzypinska 2006; Schuhmann and Damen 2018; Sedlar et al. 2018; Vieten et al. 2013).

Warfighters can perceive multiple barriers for seeking help from care providers, but leaders who have been through similar experiences can help to provide guidance for community programs that allow individuals to seek help (Nassif, Mesias, and Adler 2022; Prazak and Herbel 2022). The same is true for care providers. Research suggests that the relationship between care providers and care seekers is vital for creating understanding, empathy, and trust that promotes healing (Doehring 1993; M.J. Lambert and Barley 2001; Bulling et al. 2014). When crossing R/S boundaries in counseling, non-judgment and empathy support dialogues that help care seekers process and reconcile the dissonant thoughts, emotions, and experiences that affect them (Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas 2010; K.A. Harris, Spengler, and Gollery 2016; Meador and Nieuwsma 2018; Oxhandler et al. 2017; Tweed 2006). Research also shows that interdisciplinary approaches by care providers are beneficial for care seekers (Cenkner et al. 2021; Nieuwsma et al. 2014).

The key questions for SOC are "when, how, and why" certain issues, beliefs, thought, or emotion take constructive or destructive forms, and it is here that empathy and deep listening along with calming practices provide safe spaces for care seekers to interrogate and share their moral pain, accept their responses, and search for meaning (Doehring 2019a, 2019b, 2018).

SOC is dialectic discourse that requires a safe space for others to "flourish in their becoming," which in turn, allows for practices of mutuality and reciprocity that make moral orientation and the formation of new meanings possible (Lartey 2020). This safe

space for dialogue is vital for the SOC of combat veterans because of: 1) the tremendous

levels trauma they may have experienced and need to process, and 2) the difficulty of

finding the appropriate language, and concepts for self-expression escapes them.

> Many will argue that there is nothing remotely spiritual in combat.
> Consider this. Mystical or religious experiences have four common
> components: constant awareness of one's own inevitable death, total
> focus on the present moment, the valuing of other people's lives above
> one's own, and being part of a larger religious community such as the
> Sangha, ummah, or church. All four of these exist in combat. The big
> difference is that the mystic sees heaven and the warrior sees hell.
> (Marlantes 2011, 7-8)

Research shows that veterans are open to R/S approaches that help them with

moral struggles over PMIEs (Volk and Koenig 2019; Evans et al. 2018). Often this

healing dialogue occurs through a chaplain who is situated in a military unit, and

military culture. So, issues of identity and authority must be negotiated as part of the

counseling process for a healing dialogue to occur (Morris 2017, 118; Nancy Ramsay

1998, 15 and 115-ff).

The goal for reconciliation is to help veterans locate and name issues associated

with their agency in terms of the moral foundations, professional senses of FRAME,

embedded theologies, and spiritual elements that compose their moral orienting systems.

It is here that veterans can, "reconcile the damage he [she/they] did to another human

because of the interconnectedness of humanity. In process theology, sin always has both

a 'personal and transpersonal aspect'" (Morris 2017, 116; Faber 2008, 225).

The reflexivity that occurs within reconciliation may also occur within a

transcendent space, not a location or a set time. It is up to the care seeker to explore this,

not the care provider to define the boundaries for their exploration. There is a quality in

Livecche's mournful warrior (who is seeking orientation, direction, and healing) that is more open to SOC than Nietzsche's resilient *ubermensch* (LiVecche 2021; Nietzsche 1969). The former struggles for new meanings, and the latter resists struggles and dictates meanings. Both types exist within veterans, but it is those who know they are wounded who desire to change their destructive behaviors and accept the paradoxical nature of forgiveness and compassion who heal (Hart et al. 2020; Hope 1987; Koenig, Youssef, et al. 2018).

Theologian Miroslav Volf addresses the brokenness caused by dissonance and resistance to change in terms of the Christian concept of sin as unreconciled guilt: "There are two kinds of sin: one is confessed, and this no one should leave unforgiven; the other kind is defended, and this no one can forgive, for it refuses either to be counted as sin or to accept forgiveness" (Volf 2005, 153-154). "Sin" and "forgiveness" are not just R/S concepts. They are terms borrowed from military archery that convey "missing the target, and correcting aim," and these concepts are used to express moral senses of "failed agency" as referenced by moral orientations. These concepts are also associated with practices of confession, repentance, cleansing, and absolution connected to moral senses of care, fairness, authority, sanctity, and concepts of purity, mercy, and grace. However, can one ever feel sorry enough for what one has done?

If, social opinions on this subject are one side of this issue, then internal moral judgements are the other side. During the War on Terror the President of the United States pardoned a Navy SEAL, a Special Forces Officer, and an Army Infantry Lieutenant who were convicted of committing war crimes. All willingly took part in the

killing of unarmed, defenseless people, and all three defended their actions by claiming they were acting as warriors defending their units. However, their units were the ones who turned them in and served as witnesses for the prosecution. As a result of the pardons, these three warriors said that they felt exonerated, while their unit members felt betrayed. All of these convicted men received honorable discharges, but the special operations community stripped the SEAL and Special Forces Operator of the badges that are viewed within the military as identifiers of character and competence (Dimmick and Canepari 2019; Ismay 2019; D. Phillips 2019a; Rempfer and South 2020).

The reconciliation of failed agency to create new meaning and the alleviation of suffering are the purposes for compassion and forgiveness in healing MMI. Examination of the embedded theologies and spiritual orienting systems are beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is sufficient to understand that they exist, and they inform the core values within moral orienting systems and life narratives. Their importance to the care seeker and the caregiver makes the difference during effective SOC.

Reconciliation comes through the linking of attitudes and acts that are directed towards the self and others regardless of the origins of the linkage (Krause 2022, 43-44; Lundberg 2010, 237; Witvliet et al. 2004). It is here veterans can experience wholeness and healing through *phronesis* (practices) that promote coping, life meaning, wisdom, humility, forgiveness and compassion (Krause 2022, 148-ff, 209-230).

Research suggests that difficulties in forgiving oneself and others are related to negative coping, depression, and anxiety (Witvliet et al. 2004). Thus, resilience and wellness are the result of caring relationships that, "help people spiritually integrate moral stress" across intersecting social systems (Doehring 2015b). Self-forgiveness is a

part of ADT therapy (Litz et al. 2015, 60-ff), but research has found that its benefits are dependent upon the R/S orientations of the care seeker. For some, self-forgiveness provides cognitive-emotional structures for reconciling past agency failures and issues of shame, guilt, grief, and betrayal (Davis et al. 2015; McConnell 2015; Webb et al. 2017).

For others, self-forgiveness is, "… a misleading and inaccurate concept for understanding the conditions to which it is applied" (Vitz and Meade 2011). These conditions include: 1) applications of theologies that do not allow for self-forgiveness, 2) applications of self-forgiveness that cause a splitting of the self by creating "a conflict of interest" between the "self that judges and the self that is judged," 3) applications of self-forgiveness that promote narcissism, and 4) applications of self-forgiveness that categorically exclude elements of interpersonal forgiveness (Vitz and Meade 2011). As one young veteran once told me, "All the people who can forgive me, are dead." This attitude displayed values of condemnation that severely limited practices for self-compassion, forgiveness, and reconciliation.

MMI is humanity fighting experience to alleviate suffering, make sense of dissonance, and find purpose in the face of trauma and perceived evils (Nakashima-Brock and Rushton 2020; Nelson 2003). Sometimes these evils reside outside of the self, and sometimes these evils are the result of personal agency, and/with embedded experiences from previous traumas that require healing from outside sources encountered over time (Scobie and Scobie 2001; Neimeyer 2001).

> For military veterans struggling with moral injury, forgiveness can become both an animating concern and a potential path to healing. Clinicians… can create a space for open and compassionate exploration of painful moral traumas, and help veterans chart a course toward the

renewal of their moral self. Many veterans… can and do achieve that renewal—honoring their values, making amends to those they harmed, and finding ways to respect the self they have become. (Purcell, Griffin, et al. 2018)

Reconciliation is a deliberate contextual, iterative, and transformational process where individuals and communities can experience post-traumatic growth through R/S struggles that involve: 1) somatic practices for experiencing self-compassion, 2) coping with one's own failures, guilt, and mistakes, 3) awareness of their own moral and spiritual resources, 4) meaning making through the re-integration of life values, and 5) a willingness and readiness to face future existential questions (Bussing, Rorigues-Recchia, and Toussaint 2018; J.I. Harris et al. 2011; S. Sullivan et al. 2014; Owens et al. 2011; A. Shaw, Joseph, and Linley 2005; Park, Mills-Baxter, and Fenster 2005).

Only the Vietnam Veteran and the Commander in our hypothetical support group speak about religious struggles in their narratives. The Vietnam veteran may benefit from SOC as he explores his religious roots and the roles of compassion and forgiveness related to his participation in traumatic war events. Likewise, the Commander may benefit from SOC in exploring compassion and forgiveness related to his feelings of accountability and responsibility for events that: 1) happened during his deployments, and 2) are happening in his current job and neighborhood.

SOC may also benefit the Marine as he processes new, adaptive post-traumatic meanings that include compassion and forgiveness into the post-combat meanings behind the flag in his basement, the peace sign on his garage, and the painting in his closet. Likewise, SOC may help the Loggie struggle through issues of forgiveness and

compassion related to the loss of friends and memories of her actions in ambushes. Finally, SOC may help the Nurse use compassion and forgiveness to find new meanings in the work she has done in war, and the work she continues to do with patients.

It is here that SOC provides tools and the presence of a guide and a community that walks alongside veterans to provide them resources for their reflective journeys and remind them of their strengths as the brood, lament, ruminate, and reconcile their moral dissonance and engage in new meanings and purposes for their lives (Nouwen 2006, 94-ff).

Psychotherapies

Psychotherapy is a general term for treatments provided by specialized caregivers to identity and treat specific issues using a variety of modalities. The goal of psychotherapy is to help care seekers work through obstacles to their well-being and improve their quality of life.[37] When applied to warfighters experiencing MMI, the goal of psychotherapy is to help care seekers resolve moral issues (Shay 2014, 1994, 2002; Tick 2005, 2014). Or, if using the TMM model, reconcile moral dissonance.

Effective trauma treatment occurs over three stages: 1) safety and stabilization, 2) reconstructing and processing the trauma, and 3) re-connection with community and significant others (Herman 1997, 9-11). Research suggests, psychotherapy for PTSD leads to a large initial improvement especially when it includes therapies that first address the intensity of somatic trauma symptoms. However, a majority of care seekers continue

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[37] National Institute of Mental Health. https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/psychotherapies#:~:text=In%20general%2C%20the%20goals%20of,and%20improve%20quality%20of%20life

to experience residual symptoms that need to be addressed by treatments that focus upon moral meanings and practices of compassion (Bradley et al. 2005; Steenkamp et al. 2015). Perhaps, this is because it is easier for, "care seekers to look at what was done to them or what is wrong… than it is to look at their own perceived failure or shame" (Amidon 2016).

Research on how therapy helps people change demonstrates that the trust relationship formed between therapist and client is important in the change process. Thus, the stronger the alliance between therapist and client, the more likely treatment will have positive outcomes (Baier, Kline, and Feeny 2020). This finding is consistent across a range of treatment modalities, and it addresses the necessity for establishing trust in helping veterans regulate their somatic reactions, emotional responses, and cognitive perceptions to combat trauma as they search for post-trauma meanings.

Betrayals of what is "right" or "fair" violate specific morale senses of care and fairness that are integrated with warrior codes associated with fidelity(Haidt 2012; Larson and Zust 2017). Furthermore, these betrayals also violate warrior codes of responsibility and accountability (FRAME) that depend upon unit/team cohesion and mission command for survival (Larson and Zust 2017). These violations create "an uneven playing field" for survival, which in turn, influences the meanings warriors form from their combat experiences (Amidon 2016).

The narratives of the Commander and Vietnam Veteran particularly convey moral senses of these violations carried over into their civilian lives. Post-traumatic Embitterment Disorder (PTED) therapy can be used to help him reconcile elements of FRAME within his narrative that put him in tension with the polarization he is

experiencing in current society. It would also help him address nagging feelings and cognitions of being "let down by injustices," and his "drive to fight back" but not finding the purpose that sustained him during his time in the military (Linden et al. 2007, 21-25). For the Vietnam Veteran, some form of Perpetuation Induced Traumatic Stress therapy could be used to help him address issues related to the intrusive imagery in his experiences and the indifference of his agency that generate his moral dissonance (MacNair 2005, 16-22, 91-ff). This type of therapy may also be useful in helping the Marine process his moral senses of responsibility and accountability for the death of the young Afghan boy.

Perhaps, the Loggie's experience of being wounded and surviving ambushes, and the Nurse's experiences of helplessness and grief from her work and the deaths of unit members need to be addressed through therapies that focus upon responses to shattered assumptions, re-interpretations of traumatic experiences, and reforming of meaning (Janoff-Bulman 1992, 49-ff). These needs can also be addressed by the changing of an original perception, a first naivete, to a second naivete as forms of post-traumatic growth (Wallace 1995 69-ff; Ricoeur 1967, 367-ff; 1974, 369-ff).

Psychotherapies can address all of these issues from a unique perspective. The narratives of each member in our hypothetical support group contain types of moral struggles driven by moral orientations for "the way things should have gone" that conflict with the "way things happened." The resulting moral dissonance influences their present lives through the life meanings they express in the narratives. Psychotherapy modalities provide specific ways for each group member to address somatic traumatic symptoms and trust the meaning making process.

Trust allows them to wrestle with their moral dissonance by: 1) assessing the moral contents within their narratives, 2) gathering new insights from their sufferings, and 3) deriving new meanings to reform their life narratives (Denis 2021, 164-184; Park 2010; Park et al. 2017; Park, Mills-Baxter, and Fenster 2005). For example, The Nurse, the Marine, and the Loggie can re-assess specific somatic triggers and issues associated with emotions such as "shame, guilt, and grief" and moral senses of fidelity, responsibility, and accountability to reform their responses to past events and change their present life practices (S. Norman 2019).

There are significant interactions between moral injury and trauma-related emotions. Each of the fictional support group members reports somatic PTSD symptoms associated with emotional responses and cognitive perceptions. These can be seen in the reoccurring dreams experienced by the Commander and the Marine. However, a focus upon diagnosing and treating these symptoms as PTSD reactions may disregard their moral struggles as secondary wounds. Each of the group members' primary complaints involve moral struggles, and it is here that treatment modalities focusing upon MMI as a primary wound may be more effective in helping them reconcile moral dissonance and treating PTS symptoms from the past, in the present, and for the future.

Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR), and Brainspotting (BSP)

EMDR and BSP focus upon mind and body connections for reprocessing traumatic events to help care seekers reframe past traumatic experiences. They are specialized trauma treatments that are beyond the scope of this dissertation, however they may help veterans sort out their processing of traumatic events related to PTSD, and their

ongoing ruminations associated with MMI. EMDR and BSP are independent therapies that can be integrated with Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) or Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) techniques, or they can be incorporated into Cognitive Behavior Therapies, or Adaptive Disclosure Therapy (ADT) as needed (Everly Jr., Flannery Jr., and Mitchell 2000).

Research shows that EMDR and BSP are effective treatment for the imprinted neurological and somatic reactions that form into PTSD, but other evidence suggests that once these therapies have helped veterans regulate their somatic stress responses, they need to be supplemented with values-based activities, and programs that support their willingness to embrace their moral pain (Bornyea and Lang 2012; Evans et al. 2021; E.R. Smith, Duax, and Rauch 2013; Matiz, Gabbro, and Crescentini 2022). There is also some evidence that younger veterans have trouble completing therapy, so these therapies need to address obstacles that prevent completion of treatment, especially when further (or other) therapies are needed for healing (Kehle-Forbes et al. 2016).

Intuitively, the benefits from EMDR, and BSP therapy make sense because the chaos warriors experience during combat often generates overwhelming physiological stress responses that scramble the physical senses, emotions, memories, and moral perceptions that they use to assign meaning to their traumatic experiences. However, the formation of post-traumatic meaning is not the primary focus for EMDR or BSP, but they can provide ways for warriors to identify, reconnect, and process somatic responses and perceptions associated with their traumas. Thus, combining EMDR, and BSP with other treatment modalities to regulated somatic responses may help veterans form post-trauma meaning (P. Held et al. 2018; Schnurr et al. 2007; Steenkamp et al. 2011).

For our hypothetical group, EMDR, and BSP could benefit the Loggie, the Vietnam Veteran, and the Marine in initial stages of therapy by helping them reconnect and process the intensity of their somatic and emotional responses that drives the memories and perceptions behind their combat narratives. These modalities might be less helpful to the Commander and the Nurse because their narratives are less related to autonomic reactions. Probably, EMDR and BSP apply less to all group members because time has passed and they are in stages 2 and 3 of trauma treatment where they have already accomplished some levels of initial recovery.

Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) and Prolonged Exposure (PE)

CPT is a type of CBT. It is an action-oriented approach for building positive emotions and meaningful engagement focused around three types of practices associated with (think, act, be). These practices are: 1) cognitive strategies (think), for training thoughts 2) behavior techniques (act) for choosing actions, and 3) mindful choices (be) to live in the moment (Gilihan 2019). For healing changes to occur, one must begin with the origins for the moral dissonance that reside within tensions between moral orientations and contexts of agency. These origins also reside within warfighters' somatic and emotional experiences associated with specific traumatic events. Their processing of these events can leave them "stuck" in time, with dysfunctional meanings that influence their quality of life in the present.

PE and CPT are types of Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT) that were originally designed as treatments for PTS caused by fear reactions. However, other emotional reactions from fear-based reactions to trauma such as betrayal, shame, blame and disgust

reported by sexual assault survivors led theorists to widen the focus for PE and CPT treatment to include cognitive reactions to traumatic events (Resick, Monson, and Chard 2017, 3-7; Beck and Haigh 2014).

Both PE and CPT are "Janus faced" in that they deal with cognitive reactions to past traumatic events. The difference between PE and CPT is that PE is focused upon relieved symptoms from past traumas, and CPT is more focused upon the assessment of past traumas for helping care seekers construct new life meanings in the present and future. (Evans et al. 2021; Foa et al. 2007; P. Held et al. 2018; Kehle-Forbes et al. 2016; E.R. Smith, Duax, and Rauch 2013)

Research supports the use of CPT as an effective treatment for PTSD (C.M. Monson et al. 2006; Resick et al. 2017; Resick et al. 2015). Its therapeutic strategies are flexible and can be tailored to a variety of formats to address various trauma related conditions ranging from anxiety to depression, and from abuse to assaults and accidents (Resick, Monson, and Chard 2017, 37-ff; Galovski, Nixon, and Kaysen 2020, 5-ff). CPT can also be adapted to a limited number of sessions, and this helps it fit into the chronological periods (train, deploy, recover) within military deployment cycles of training, operations, redeployment, and recovery (Resick, Monson, and Chard 2017, 83-ff).

CPT seeks to equip care seekers to become their own therapists by, "giving them tools to examine their thoughts and label their emotions… with the goals of feeling the natural emotions arising from the trauma and changing thoughts that keep them stuck" (Resick, Monson, and Chard 2017, 83). CPT restructures thoughts to make them more balanced by helping care seekers identify their "stuck points," and change their reactions

(feelings, thoughts and behaviors) to present cognitions (Galovski, Nixon, and Kaysen 2020, 20-ff). Thus, CPT specifically addresses the: 1) ruminations and the issues that warfighters cannot, or will not, let go, and 2) reconciliation of the moral dissonance between warfighters' moral orientations and dissonance.

The National Veteran Veterans Readjustment Study found: 1) veterans with the greatest maturity, education, and social support were the most resilient, and 2) the most powerful predictor of PTS reactions were associated with the commission of unjust war events (Herman 1997, 251-252; Kulke et al. 1988; Vargas et al. 2013). The first finding can be associated with levels of maturity and efficacy (FRAME) in predicting conditions associated MMI (Usset et al. 2020). The second finding is supported by the Krauss et. al. studies with OIF/OEF warfighters that suggest failures of moral agency determine negative post-trauma reactions (Krauss et al. 2023).

Healing the effects from complex, traumatic combat events requires treatment modalities that help care seekers control somatic stress responses and intrusive memories so that they can then process past experiences (Currier, Drescher, and Nieuwsma 2021, 127-139). PTSD criteria are based upon: 1) the uncontrolled intrusions of imprinted post-trauma events, 2) avoidance behaviors, 3) negative alterations of cognitive memories and emotions, and 4) the focus upon combat reactions when confronted by tensions in current life events (van der Kolk 2015, See 257-ff, 290-ff, and 333-ff). This makes CPT a valuable modality for Combat Operational Stress Control that treat moral injuries as one consequence from PTS (Nash 2019, 2011; Air Force 2014; Army 2009; Navy-Marine Corps 2010).

However, MMI is caused by ruminations generated by moral dissonance from combat experiences (Currier et al. 2019; Currier, Drescher, and Nieuwsma 2021; Bravo, Mason, and Ehlke 2020; Michael et al. 2007; Moulds et al. 2020). Research shows that forms of CBT, such as CPT, can be affective for veterans struggling with moral effects from killing events (Maguen et al. 2017). This effectiveness requires expanding CPT theory to include a functional contextualism that addresses the relationships between descriptive and prescriptive cognitions to identify the evolutionary effects upon character that are not traditionally associated with PTSD (Farnsworth 2019; Farnsworth, Borges, and Walser 2019; Farnsworth et al. 2017; Pearce et al. 2018; Steenkamp et al. 2015).

All members of our hypothetical support group experience moral dissonance from their combat experiences and they can benefit from CPT. The Loggie, Marine, and Vietnam Veteran describe PTS reactions from combat trauma that carry over into the present. PE might be helpful to them, but at this stage of their recovery, CPT is better designed to address their concerns. Their narratives contain "stuck points" connected with their behaviors and current life agency. The Loggie morally struggles with moral dissonance related to her identity as a wounded warrior and a town hero. The Vietnam Veteran struggles with moral dissonance related to thoughts that he became an "animal" to function and survive in combat. The Marine struggles with dissonance related to his failure to protect those he was supposed to defend. CPT can also help the Commander and the Nurse to address patterns within their moral reasoning and perceptions from past events that causes the present ruminations that affects patterns of their behaviors

All of these veterans report moral struggles that depend upon moral orientations that drive the present meanings that they associate with their combat agency. These meanings are embedded in their narratives, and they form the "The reasons why…" that influences their self-identity. If CPT is to have a positive effect upon them, it must address these issues and widen the focus for treatment beyond PTSD criteria to include effects from their moral dissonance.

Adaptive Disclosure Therapy (ADT)

ADT is an evidence-based, hybrid therapy that combines treatments for physical reactions to PTS with cognitive treatments for struggles with post-traumatic meaning and life practices. Simply speaking, the form used for ADT therapy is designed to be flexible based upon the needs of the care seeker, so forms of PE can be used with forms of CPT to treat PTSD and MMI. This makes ADT a "multi-tool" that is applicable to our hypothetical group and the TMM model.

ADT facilitates healing by providing: 1) the immediate safe space for warriors to process their somatic and emotional responses to trauma, 2) an intentional process to reconstruct post-traumatic meaning, and 3) the way to establish a pathway to reconnect warriors with their chosen communities (Herman 1997, 9-11). The problems experienced by care seekers within treatment modalities to fully resolve their post-trauma struggles suggest the need for some type of trustworthy, sequenced therapy that facilitates somatic and emotional regulation with cognitive processing, and therapeutic relationships (Bradley et al. 2005; Steenkamp et al. 2015).

Without transformed cognitions, safe spaces, and positive pathways for reconnection, the efforts of combat veterans to construct post-trauma narratives from their narratives of violated moral orientations and failed agency will be difficult. ADT was created, "to augment and extend existing, well-established treatments for fear-based events to target directly the complications related to moral injury and traumatic loss, as well as life-threatening trauma" (Litz et al. 2015, 8).

If the presenting problem is life-threat based, ADT sessions use PE or other appropriate forms of therapy. In cases of MMI, or traumatic loss, ADT employs imaginary conversations with a "relevant other," or a "moral authority" to plant corrective information to positively modify perceptions to the trauma," and address needs for forgiveness and reconciliation (Litz et al. 2015, 9-10). ADT can also structure therapy using elements of PE, EMDR, BSP, and CPT to address post-traumatic stress reactions (van der Kolk's imprinted, somatic reactions) with cognitive struggles involving negativity bias, learned hopelessness, and moral meaning (Seligman). The intent is to break the recycling of Moral Injurious Events (MIE) and counterproductive Moral Emotions (ME) that fuel maladaptive ruminations.

ADT operates under four critical assumptions. First, it prepares care providers to accommodate the military ethos and war trauma to help warfighters who are struggling to recover from past deployments, while they prepare to redeploy. Second, ADT creates a foundation for healing by, "presenting the treatment as the beginning of a different way of dealing with the psychological trauma… rather than an endpoint." This provides a commitment to the ongoing resolution of troubles rather than a "quick fix." Third, ADT assumes "war zone narratives" need to be uncovered. This allows for an iterative

understanding of warfighters that will grow throughout therapy. Fourth, ADT

understands that warfighters moral orientations as well as their somatic and emotional

responses are sources for psychological injury during warfare. Fifth, ADT employs

strategies for meaning making that are focused upon helping warfighters "uncover and

clarify the unfolding meanings they ascribe to the experiences that haunt them" (Litz et

al. 2015, 1-11).

The mixtures of imprinted somatic responses and cognitive perceptions that

compose the complexity of warfighters' struggles hold the keys to understanding the

moral dissonance that can haunt them. These struggles are physical, emotional, mental,

and spiritual in nature, and research shows that each of these factors need to be examined

using different methodologies. These needs are accented in the following quotations.

> Working with trauma survivors in PE enables them to reexamine the
> context of the trauma and their actions at the time of the trauma and since
> then. This allows the survivor to see the context instead of judging from a
> position of everyday life. Through PE, patients are able to take back their
> lives from PTSD and reengage with the community family and life.
> (Currier, Drescher, and Nieuwsma 2021, 138)

> People can develop beliefs that become problematic when they are either
> overgeneralized or overly narrow in scope… People may be largely
> unaware of what Carrie Doehring has described as their "embedded
> theologies" …Whether overgeneralized or overly narrow, these types of
> spiritual beliefs are likely to leave the individual more vulnerable to
> spiritual struggles, especially when people experience problems that
> underscore the limits of their worldview. (Pargament and Exline 2022, 46-
> 47; Doehring 2015a, 18-ff)

ADT is designed to help warfighters address threat-based PTSD and moral

dissonance driven MMI by offering warfighters a way forward to reduce negative post-

traumatic behaviors while promoting post-traumatic growth (M.J. Gray et al. 2012; M.J.

Gray, Nash, and Litz 2017; Yeterian, Berke, and Litz 2017). The treatment goal of ADT

is to empower new behaviors and thoughts that promote post-traumatic growth. ADT

usually consists of eight 90-minute sessions that include PTS education, exposure therapy

combined with forms of CPT, and future planning. The sessions follow a specific

guideline to: 1) identify distressing events and thoughts, 2) exposure through retelling, 3)

reprocessing dialogue, 4) exploration of unfolding meanings and new behaviors, and 5)

implications for future experiences (Litz et al. 2015, 72-153). Therapy may also include

an imaginary dialogue with a lost person, or a compassionate dialogue with a forgiving

moral authority (Litz and Carney 2018).

> The premise behind ADT is that:

> In the context of loss and moral injury, the exposure component is
> necessary but not sufficient. Sadness and guilt from loss, shame and self-
> loathing from personal transgression, or anger about others' moral
> transgression, cannot be extinguished by repeated intensive processing.
> For these principal harms, the goal of the exposure is to help patients to
> disclose the events in detail, experience raw feelings, and reveal their
> emerging narrative about the meaning and implication of the events. This
> information is used to start the experiential components for both loss and
> moral injury. (Litz et al. 2015, 78)

ADT is uniquely designed to help warfighters to identify and reconcile the

sources and issues of their moral dissonance. Let's apply ADT to the narratives from our

hypothetical support group. ADT addresses the issues that have been examined in the

previous sections. However, ADT can offer an integrated approach to address the

imprinted somatic and cognitive perceptions and embedded meanings they express in

their narratives.

ADT can be used to help the Commander reconcile the issues of his helplessness

to prevent: 1) the tragedies he experienced in the deaths of his soldiers, 2) the brutalities

he tried to remedy for Iraqi victims, 3) his anger at the enemy, 4) the moral ideals behind his service and his disillusionment over political climate in the country he served.

ADT can be used to help the Vietnam Veteran reconcile: 1) his self-image as "the animal" that fought and survived in combat with his self-image as the young man who went and returned from war, 2) his values with his perceived agency for the deaths of the men he tried to rescue and help, and 3) his purpose for carrying these men with him in his daily life and issues he faces in his daily life.

ADT can be used to help the Loggie reconcile: 1) her somatic responses, and her cognitive perceptions of agency during the ambushes with the connections she feels for her friends that were killed, 2) her ongoing issues of recovery from her wounds with issues she faces as a teacher, and 3) her ideals for serving as a Soldier with her perceptions of what happened and the "role" that has been placed upon her as a hometown hero.

ADT can be used to help the Nurse reconcile: 1) her feelings of compassion for the warfighters she tried to help (as expressed in the letter she left at the Vietnam wall) with her memories as a surgical nurse, 2) the loss of her friends and unit members during the SCUD attack with her absence from the area of attack, and her responsibility as a senior leader, and 3) the imprinted somatic and cognitive memories and embedded values associated with her life-saving skills with costs others paid for competence to help others in crises as a nurse.

ADT can be used to help the Marine reconcile: 1) his perceived failure of agency for the death of the young Afghan with his duties, 2) his service in a war with the deaths

of his own marines as well as non-combatants, and 3) his own moral orientations as a lawyer and father with the reasons for the peace sign on his garage and the memorabilia (flag, painting, and uniforms) stored in his basement and closet.

Warfighters use their somatic reactions, cognitive perceptions, memories, embedded values, warrior codes, and moral senses to judge agency and assign meanings to the narratives they create from combat experiences. Combinations of contributions from different psychotherapies can help them identify, reframe, and reform these meanings by reconciling moral dissonance and other issues. However, all of these focus upon the past to create new meanings in the present and the future. Thus, a treatment modality such as Acceptance Commitment Therapy is needed to provide warfighters with the tools to work through the present obstacles that prevent them from engaging in life as a compassionate openness to the present and future rather than a resiliency from the emotional reactions to past actions (Luoma and Platt 2015).

Acceptance Commitment Therapy (ACT)

ACT attempts to get warfighters to critically examine their narratives from outside the context of self in order to live their values, even in the presence of their moral pain. ACT views MMI as a constellation of factors that cause suffering instead of a collection of symptoms that need to be reduced (Borges et al. 2022). Thus, it does not focus upon the perceptions behind warfighters' deep narrative. Instead, it practices the simultaneous, iterative, dialogical, and transformative concepts associated with reconciliation that were examined earlier in this chapter.

ACT is "a psychological intervention that uses acceptance and mindfulness strategies, "to change the contextual relationship between the client and the pain the

client is experiencing so as to increase psychological flexibility" (Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 2012, 284; Hayes 2009). Psychological flexibility is defined as the capability to contact the present moment fully in changing situations and, "persisting or changing a behavior in the service of chosen values" (Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 2012, 96-97). ACT also uses Relational Frame Theory that understands cognition as an underlying action that:

> … illuminates the ways that language entangles clients into futile attempts to wage war against their own inner lives. Through metaphor, paradox, and experiential exercises clients learn how to make healthy contact with thoughts, feelings, memories, and physical sensations that have been feared and avoided. Clients gain the skills to recontextualize and accept these private events, develop greater clarity about personal values, and commit to needed behavior change. (Hayes 2009)

To accomplish this, ACT uses concepts such as openness, awareness, engagement, acceptance, conscious choice, and committed action to focus care seekers emotions, cognitions, and behaviors in the present. This provides a flexible, Functional Contextual, treatment modality for healing MMI (Farnsworth, Borges, and Walser 2019; Farnsworth et al. 2017; T. Gordon and Borushok 2017; Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 2012, 57-ff). ACT is a process for reconciling moral dissonance through mindful awareness integrated with embedded spiritual values, life practices and relationships.

The goal of ACT is to facilitate a compassionate, trustworthy listening dialogue that focuses upon the nature of the language, concepts, and thoughts that care seekers use to construct consistent meaning and agency (Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 2012, 61-62 and 97; Nieuwsma et al. 2015). ACT use six processes that are designed to help care seekers examine and accept contexts of themselves by looking at their values and committed actions (Nieuwsma et al. 2015, 201; Nieuwsma et al. 2022).

Technically, any methodology that reliably helps produce psychological flexibility in care seekers can be a considered as a form of ACT (Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 2012, 97). This means that ACT can incorporate elements of Seligman's positive psychology, Reivich's resilience, Duckworth's grit, van der Kolk's transformation of imprinted pains, Menakem's mending of the body and mind, and spiritually oriented therapies and approaches (Barrs and Doehring 2022). These methodologies mesh well with the military's intention of building resilience in warfighters as a preventative for PTS injuries. These measures seek to heal PTSD and MMI through resilience exercises that build mindfulness to : 1) counter Hopelessness, 2) avoid maladaptive perceptions and actions, and 3) build willingness to view the self-as contexts for value-based living and committed actions (Walser and Westrup 2007, 41-194).

The goal is for care seekers to quit "hanging out in the past" and to engage their present and his future. This isn't easy because the language used to provide meaning to the past is often used to give meaning to the present and drive the future. When this happens, one might avoid unpleasant situations in the present to avoid reliving the past. These actions can help care seekers to rethink perceptions and practices from the past and co-create new meanings for life in the present (Walser and Westrup 2007, 35-63). Living within these new meanings depends upon "letting go" of ruminations and finding workable alternatives to self-defeating reasoning and practices (Walser and Westrup 2007, 73-85).

The difference between workable solutions and self-defeating practices is cognitive defusion – "the ability to recognize one's thoughts as internal phenomena versus literal truth" (Walser and Westrup 2007, 91), and choosing to live one's life

despite trauma and everything that associated with it (Walser and Westrup 2007, 108). This is an issue for warfighters with highly developed moral senses of fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity, and efficacy (FRAME) that are grounded within the warrior codes that make them answerable for consequences from their operational mindsets, mission command agency, and targeting biases. It is here that moral emotions such as guilt, shame, disgust, anger, despair, embitterment, etc. become "fused" with their present life narratives and practices. The resulting moral dissonance colors their self-identity.

It will take many sessions to reconcile this complex dissonance. A veteran's initial distrust of this iterative process should not be confused with an unwillingness or inability to change. The goal is to help warfighters defuse from various thoughts, feelings, and body sensations by becoming an observer and overcoming the urge to fix or get rid of the experience. ACT processes help veterans assimilate new understandings that allows them to change harmful life narratives (Park et al. 2017, Kindle location 794-ff; Walser and Westrup 2007, 116-134). It may take time for a warfighter to change through ACT because their identity as a warrior is linked with what they do, or fail to do. Thus, they are trained to hold onto these values under extreme duress, and this quality creates both resiliency and rumination.

Finally, the goal is to help warfighters embrace life by living according to their core values and making life choices that defuse them from maladaptive thoughts and feelings derived from past traumas (Walser and Westrup 2007, 139). Warfighters will have battle scars from combat, but they are just that – scars – not open wounds. ACT practices trust, compassion and mindfulness as ways of helping warfighters reconcile

their moral dissonance, and its valued living exercise become moral orientations that are practiced in the contexts of self, family, vocation, and larger communities (Walser and Westrup 2007, 156-169).

The integrated reconciliation of moral orientation with life agency also involves a reconciliation of the conflicted embedded R/S values and moral emotions that compose warfighters' moral struggles. ACT is helpful in addressing these elements because it, "… does not distinguish between psychological and spiritual domains because such distinctions are relevant only insofar as the client either does or does not make the distinction, in a way that supports value-driven and effective personal agency" (Santiago and Gall 2016, 252).

Forgiveness and compassion come along the way, not the beginning of a traumatic journey, and they are the byproducts of an iterative, transforming process. ACT views forgiveness and compassion as actions, not emotions, related to mindfulness (Walser and Westrup 2007, 170-174). The final component of ACT is applying commitments to value-based actions applied to present contexts that allow for positive life changes (Walser and Westrup 2007, 186).

For our hypothetical support group, ACT can help its members focus away from past struggles towards reconciling the current moral dissonance that affects their well-being. These issues may not be apparent from the presenting narratives, but each narrative contains thoughts and patterns of behavior that can help to determine needs to that can be addressed through the processes of ACT.

ACT can help the commander to reconcile his struggles with embitterment and isolation caused by dissonance between the ideals under which he served and the political

polarity he is experiencing after retirement. It can also help him address the dissonance he experiences between his agency in training police and the current conflicts these programs are having.

ACT can help the Vietnam Veteran reconcile the dissonance he is experiencing from his religious struggles over the beliefs and values he held as a young man and as a veteran returning home. He is older than most members of the group, and ACT can help him examine and transform the way he struggles (ruminates) to "live for the crewman" he buried in Vietnam, and for the person he is today.[38]

ACT can help the Nurse reconcile the residual moral dissonance she experiences from the work she performed in Vietnam and Desert Storm, and the work she performs today. She is older, like the Vietnam Veteran, and her narrative doesn't speak of current issues. But she came to the group for some, unknown current reason, and ACT is a useful modality for helping her: 1) identify issues, 2) speak about them with others in a safe, trusting context, and 3) make reaffirming, value-driven choices for in her current contexts.

ACT can help the Loggie reconcile her reluctant role as town hero with the reality of who she is today as a local teacher. She is young, and she is still working through issues related to her physical wounds, and grief. ACT can help her do this in ways that put her core values to work in her present contexts. ACT can help the Marine reconcile

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[38] For an in-depth case study of how a spiritually oriented approach to ACT can help a Vietnam veteran like this, see Barrs and Doehring (Barrs and Doehring 2022, 297-320).

his moral orientation and the reasons behind: 1) the peace sign on his garage, 2) the painting stored in his closet, 3) his reasons for not talking about his experiences with his sons, 4) and his work as a lawyer.

Each of the veterans in our hypothetical group has demonstrated resiliency and reconciliation in their survival, successfully returning home from combat, and attempts to integrate into their communities. These are the most common accomplishments for determining recovering from traumatic events (Galatzer-Levy, Huang, and Bonanno 2018). Age and military experience have also contributed to some of the veterans well-being (Jennings et al. 2006). However, their narratives demonstrate that they all continue to struggle with dissonance from the past and between values within their moral orientations for their purpose for life agency. Their presence in our hypothetical support group indicates that they still seek forms of healing to help them engage with their lives.

Research shows that moral orientations are complex combinations of embedded moral senses, values, and emotions that also contain elements of meaning for life agency that the transcend imprinted affects and cognitive reasons often expressed in terms of moral dilemmas (Wilt et al. 2020; Nielsen 1998). Some research shows that these transcending affects and reasons can also lead to blaming, broken relationships, and spiritual struggles that involve a deity/deities, others, or self (Knabb, Ashby, and Ziebell 2010). It is here that the process of spiritually oriented care can be applied within existing treatment modalities to aid care seekers reconciliation of their moral dissonance.

Conclusion

In Christianity forgiveness and compassion are entwined with reconciliation in transcendent and earthly domains that are dependent upon a reconnection with internal sources for core identity and external relationships with others(J.C. Augustine 2022, 38-52). These elements are present within other R/S traditions as well. Reconciliation follows a curvy road that is Janus-faced between the scars from past moral pain and promises of post-traumatic growth (Maercker and Zoellner 2004). This simultaneous paradox is witnessed in the adaptive and maladaptive narratives from combat veterans and victims of war told over the courses of their lives (Znoj 2005; S. Powell et al. 2003). R/S communities can offer life-giving resources to veterans in their struggles with moral dissonance (Janoff-Bulman 1992; Moon 2019a; Morris 2017).

This dissertation theorizes that the moral dissonance generated between warfighters' moral orientations and agency can result in moral injuries that dis-integrates their life meanings and threaten their well-being. This dissertation also theorizes that the presence of moral dissonance provides the potential for warfighters' post-traumatic growth (PTG) through the reconciliation processes that use trustworthy helping relationships to help them re-integrate their moral values with their life practices.

Dissonance is the prerequisite for learning, and the assimilation of new life meanings (J. Dewey 1922; Festinger 1957; Park et al. 2017; Park, Mills-Baxter, and Fenster 2005). Van der Kolk observes that a paradox between the physiological and emotional reactions to trauma and the cognitive processes for resilience that are like, "Dale Carngie meeting *The Killing Fields*" (PBS 2011). This dissertation argues that this

intersection also involves a natural progression between the formation and reconciliation of moral dissonance that is like "John Dewey meeting *Saving Private Ryan.*"

At the end of the movie *Saving Private Ryan* a World War II Paratrooper stands as an aged veteran with his family at a grave in the American Cemetery at Normandy. He turns to his wife and pleads with her to tell him that he has lived a good life, and she is puzzled by his request. She doesn't know the story behind his question. However, the movie audience knows that he is Private Ryan, and they have witnessed the trauma and the sacrifices he experienced after D-Day. His family sees his tears and reaction, but they don't have a clue for the "reasons why" the man they obviously love is breaking down. He is "dad" to them, not Private Ryan, and they probably agree with his wife (mom), that he has lived a good life, but… does he agree? There is some moral dissonance from the war that is invisible to them, but very real to him. He has carried this dissonance with him for many years. It has haunted him, and it has driven he goodness that he has tried to achieve throughout his life. Evidently, Private Ryan has learned and grown from his moral dissonance, and he has lived good life according to his wife and the theories of John Dewey. But he is still haunted by the imperative to "earn this," from the man, whose grave he now stands in front of (Spielberg 1998). This is the MMI experienced by combat veterans.

It is here that moral orientation intersects with moral agency, and moral trauma intersects with post-traumatic growth as hidden battle scars become motivations for more intentional and conscientious living. This is where I stand in awe of the men and women

in my life who taught me to fish, camp, drive, cook, farm, and play sports. All without

ever telling me about the battlefields they fought on as veterans, and the costs of waiting

for a spouse to return home.

Their lives make me wonder when, or if, my wife and I will tell our children and

grandchildren about the war zones that I served in, or what it was like for her to wait for

me to return home when some of our friends didn't. Honestly, there are some things that I

haven't told her about. It's not so much a code of silence, as it is the question of, "why

would I ruin your day by talking about this?" I also wonder if there are some things that I

don't tell myself.

The father of my great aunt, a World War I combat veteran wrote many letters

home from the trenches to his fiancée, and she kept them. After returning home, they

were married, and later the family published his letters. In one of these letters, he wrote

the following:

> Yes, war is an awful thing, and if it were not for the great good that we
> hope to gain from it, we might think it wasn't worth the price. We are
> quite a ways back of the "lines" now taking a rest and it seems kind of
> nice to be out of the sound of the big guns for a while. Still, I almost wish
> we were at it again you know. I want to get this war over with so I can go
> back home to you. That's about the way all the U.S. boys feel about it.
> (Vos-Etiene and Stults 1960, Entry 20 October 1918)

Notice how he talked about the costs of war, without talking about the war. I

never met him, but I heard similar stories about the war from my grandpa, also a WWI

combat veteran, none of which involved the war, but all of which conveyed meanings

filled with their dissonance. Another great uncle finally told me about his experiences

driving a landing craft while under fire during the island-hopping campaigns in the

Pacific, and he showed me the hat he wore. It had a zipper sewn into the lining to hold

the letters he received from my great aunt. He carried them with him. He also told me about his haunting memories of driving his craft over struggling warfighters from sunken crafts who were helpless in the water. He couldn't change directions because he had to stay in formation to deliver his load of Marines. He then had to drive his craft over the bodies floating in water as he returned to his ship with a load of wounded Marines in need of care. The letters were his link back home, his memories continued to link him to his landing craft. He told me this story as a ninety-year-old man, and after I served 33 years in the Army.

Combat trauma causes dissonance between moral orientations and agency that is physical, psychological, social, and spiritual in nature, and this moral dissonance results in various consequences that warfighters will need to reconcile in their thoughts, emotions, beliefs, and life practices.

Moral injuries begin when warfighters' physical/ psychological /social/spiritual resilience breaks down and their levels of moral dissonance reach the point of dis-integrating their being. When this happens, their purpose, or their "reasons why," no longer make sense to them. They may begin to wrestle with questions of: 1) identity by asking, "what, or who am I?" and, 2) life meaning, by asking, "Where am I, and Why am I, Doing This?"

When does a combat veteran's war end? Is it when a truce is called and he/she/they return home, or is it when they finally accomplish some kind of conciliation that allows to return to life? Is it when they can stand in front of a grave filled with bad emotions and thoughts and be affirmed as good. These are existential questions that can

be positively answered by moral senses that are affirmed by life practices. However, these questions become harder to answer them when moral foundations are shattered, shaken, ruptured, or dis-integrated.

Military ethos is built upon standards that seek to integrate moral orientation with kill chain agency. However, the nature of war contributes to a widening between idealized moral orientations and the realities of their warfighters' agency during combat. This widening results in warriors': 1) self-affirmations as just warfighters who operate with integrated moral orientations and agency accompanied by experiences of post-traumatic growth, or 2) self-condemnations as unjust pirates who operate with dis-integrated moral orientations and agency accompanied by maladaptive life experiences. It is quite possible that most warriors experience themselves as combinations of both warfighter and pirate.

This dissertation has critically examined the TMM as a framework for understanding how warfighters can reconcile moral dissonance and form new visions of what is possible for life (Egendorf 1986, 1-12). The contexts for reconciliation are contextual because warfighters arrival at this point depends upon their processing past moral traumas in new ways by re-integrating their "*global* beliefs/values about suffering, hope, and life purpose with their *situational meanings* about moral stressors from harms they caused and/or experienced in combat (Barrs and Doehring 2021, 4).

The contexts for reconciliation are iterative and transformational because veterans may experience and reconcile their moral dissonance in stages. Today they may experience shame, guilt, anger, betrayal, embitterment, depression, or harm, and tomorrow they may reflect, self-differentiate, reconcile, and learn for new meanings and

life practices from their moral dissonance. The Japanese artist Makato Fujimura likens

the reconciliation of moral battle scars to Kintsugi, an artform that uses melted gold to

bond pieces of broken glass into colorful forms that reflect light. He uses this concept in

his paintings to express how remaining brokenness can be transformed into new

meanings that are revealed by the presence of light. He writes:

> … the observer can begin to see the rainbow crated by layer upon layer of
> broken shards of minerals. Such a contemplative experience can be a deep
> sensory journey toward wisdom. Willingness to spend time truly seeing
> can change how we view the world…(Fujimura 2016, 20)

It is here that warfighters embrace and honor the hiddenness, ambiguity, and even

beauty within the reality of their pain to begin new journeys towards life based upon the

core values that give their lives meaning. This journey can be conceptualized by the

existential question of "who will I be?" and it is answered in emerging contexts that will

present moral challenges for future warfighters.

Chapter Seven: Who Will I Be?

Conclusions About Emerging Moral Challenges for Theorists,

Warfighters, Researchers, and Healers

"A code of honor may be likened to an endlessly prolonged initiation rite" (N.F. Dixon 1976, 213).

Norman Dixon, Psychologist

"I'm a normal guy who got sent to Iraq and became crazy, so they sent me back to America to become sane, and now it's America, that's driving me crazy" (Finkel 2009, 247).

Adam Schumann, US Army combat veteran

"The people who survived the sword found grace in the wilderness" (Jeremiah 31:2, English Standard Version).

The Prophet Jeremiah

New Moral Challenges for Old Moral Dissonance

These quotes demonstrate the course and depth of a warfighter's journey through the brokenness caused by moral dissonance as he/she/they transition from war towards a grace and wholeness that is found in barren places through the re-integration of their core

439

values with life practices (Doehring 2015a, 6-18). In the last chapter I concluded my critical examination of the TMM with the processes needed for the reconciliation of moral dissonance and the healing of MMI.

In 1992 Leonard Cohen wrote the song *Anthem* to describe the reclaiming of agency in the midst of brokenness. His lyrics include the phrases, "Ring the bells that still can ring. Forget your perfect offering. There is a crack, a crack in everything. That's how the light gets in" (L. Cohen 1992, 20). I finished the previous chapter by using the example of Kintsugi as a metaphor for understanding reconciliation as the re-integration and healing of a warfighter's brokenness after the dis-integration of his/her/their core values. In Kintsugi broken fragments of glass are bonded by gold into new forms, and this represents what happens in the reconciliation of moral dissonance and struggles to become whole.

The process of reconciliation is how "the light gets in" from 1) the darkness created by warfighting (B.S. Powers 2019, 13-39), and 2), and 2) emerging healing practices that incorporate trust, compassion, and forgiveness (Doehring 2015a, 37-49; Barrs and Doehring 2022; Pargament and Exline 2022, 103-139; L.K. Graham 2017, 97-108). This process of reconciliation is described by combat veteran Tom Voss:

> But if you take one thing away from my story, I hope it's this: even when you feel consumed by moral injury and alone in the world, you are not separate from the beauty and good that exist here. You are still a part of that. You are connected to that, whether you feel it right now or not. Start asking questions about it — about where it comes from, what's causing it, and what might make you feel better. Then get curious about the ways in which you're trying to heal… Be gentle with yourself. Setbacks are okay. Setbacks will happen. If you're still breathing, there's more right with you than wrong. If you're still breathing, there is hope. (Voss and Nguyen 2019, 262-263)

Marine combat veteran Karl Marlantes argues that effective moral warfighters must not lose their individuality, their allegiances, and their connections with "an entity so large as to be incomprehensible, namely humanity or God" (Marlantes 2011, 144). Marlantes isn't doing theology, but he is doing spiritual orientation and reconciliation. He is trying to emphasize the importance for warfighters, "to see these smaller entities [theological doctrines] as only pieces of the larger one we'll never comprehend… [so] when the moment comes for a tough decision, we can make it in light of the larger ghosts, even if we are scared to death…" (Marlantes 2011, 144).

Marlantes' goal is to equip warfighters to deal with moral paradoxes caused by transitions between the "civilized" and "savage" contexts they experience, and this gets more difficult as the time and distances between battlefield and home become more compressed (Marlantes 2011, 25). The compression of these external distances can be experienced internally as a loss of purpose and meaning. This makes a warfighter a fragmented, dissonant self, not two different people. It is here that a wounded veteran experiences the realities between distance and time from the traumatic moment when "the floor exploded" and subsequent moments when he wonders what "the future looks like… for a man with no legs who can 'no longer' do the things he once did" (D. Peters 2014, Kindle location 1116).

Warfighters are dependent upon each other for safety, success, and survival. They form unspoken agreements, or warrior codes, that stipulate their commitments to "stick together" no matter what. These commitments: 1) reassure them that they won't be abandoned, and 2) help them prioritize their whole unit over themselves (Junger 2010, 123-124). Sometimes, these commitments include a type of suicide pact, where

warfighters won't abandon others, and they will risk everything to defend their comrades in the face of death. But what happens when something goes wrong, and survivors return home? Veterans Tim O'Brien and Michael Yandell describe alternate realities that are experienced by many warfighters. Their moral dissonance is expressed in their narratives of searches for post-traumatic meanings:

> I was heavily armed when I went to war. My least potent weapon was my rifle. I carried the passion of youth and a feeling of invulnerability. By the time I was medically discharged from the Army in 2006, all my weapons were gone. The rifle was locked safely in an arms room… My passion turned to cold-hearted cynicism. What is one to do when one's way of making sense of the world crumbles? (Yandell 2022, 7-8)

> I was once a soldier. There were many bodies, real bodies with real faces, but I was young then and I was afraid to look. And now, twenty years later, I'm left with faceless responsibility and faceless grief… What stories can do, I guess, is make things present. I can look at things I never looked at. I can attach faces to grief and love and pity and God. I can be brave. I can make myself feel again. (O'Brien 2009, 191-192)

Narratives have a way of encouraging reflexivity and this allows warfighters to look at the people and things that matter instead of gawking in the face of horror. It is this discernment that guides them to differentiate between the lines of good and evil that are embedded within their internalized, core values instead of external events (Brecht 1957, 127; Solzhenitsyn 1973, 746). Past military recruiting videos have focused upon using idealized values entwined with warrior codes to enlist future warfighters, but the reality of combat causes them to realize the costs related to the core values that are behind this six-word story for military service, "Warriors wanted, soldiers required, humans volunteered."[39]

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[39] I created this six-word story based upon a legendary incident attributed to Ernest Hemingway (Haglund 2013).

Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr warns that the choices in moral decisions are not between the moral and the immoral, but between the immoral and the less immoral (R. Niebuhr 1932; Kidder 1995, 2006). It is within kill-chain mission command decisions that warfighters experience the physical, psychological, and spiritual distress that betrays their core values (Shay 1994, 2002, 2014). Psychiatrist Viktor Frankl reminds us that those who live under such stress have made constant choices where they struggle with moral dissonance as they decide, "… whether you would or would not submit to those powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom; which determine [sic d] whether or not you would become the plaything of circumstance…?" (Frankl 1959, 65-66).

Moral dissonance can be defined by conflicting moral meanings. Army Veteran Brian Turner wrote a poem entitled *A Soldier's Arabic* that includes the following stanza, "The word for love, *habib*, is written from right to left starting where we would end it, and ending where we might begin. Where we would end a war, another might take as a beginning, or as an echo of history, recited again" (Turner 2014, 1). His wording resonates the complex ambiguities that warfighters' experience after combat

MMI forms in violent contexts defined by the intersections of embedded theologies, internalized moral orientations, military ethics, behavioral psychology, kill chain decision cycles, JWT/IHL/LOAC/ROE, traumatology, and post-trauma care. It is within these intersections that warfighters: 1) ruminate over their "reasons why," 2) compare their core values against their senses of moral agency, 3) answer moral/spiritual orienting questions such as "who, what, and where am I?", 4) seek to re-affirm "I am here", and 5) discern "who I will be."

This dissertation used conclusions derived from theorists, researchers, healers, and warfighters to critically examine the TMM as a viable framework for understanding: 1) what happens between warfighters' moral orienting systems and their practice of moral agency during combat, and 2) how the consequential formation and reconciliation of moral dissonance is vital for healing MMI.

Research suggests that the integration of moral reasoning (orientation) with mission command (agency) and reflexivity practices (reconciliation) helps warfighters serve honorably and return home ready for the future (Farnsworth et al. 2017). Warfighters' existence as individual members of collective units do not "inevitably control or dictate [their] moral reasoning, nor does it nullify their exercise of conscience (Simon 2008, 5). Thus, warriors' reconciliation of moral dissonance is a collective journey into their "dark side," and it is also their discovery that they are a simultaneously a mixture of justified warfighters and unjustified pirates according to their moral orientations. Through reconciliation processes they become mindful of their humanity and the human suffering associated with their agency. Forensic psychologist Robert Simon speaks about the dualities involved in this reconciliation process:

> I find it truly remarkable that we have so many good people in this world, even if they are all limited in their goodness… Good people are able to dream and to contain the impulses that bad people act out. Taming our demons and acknowledging our humanity with its attendant dark side can be empowering. Those who become psychologically resourceful may be able to put the demons to useful work, in the same way as humankind has learned how to tame and use fire, though the sparks inevitably fly upward. It is the essence of the human condition that we struggle against our dark demons, that our spirit strives to harness these demons in the pursuit and the fulfillment of our human destiny. (Simon 2008, 295)

The rest of this chapter will: 1) summarize the methodology I used to critically examine the TMM, 2) examine examples of reunion, retreat, and engagement as healing strategies that use a TMM understanding of MMI to help warfighters reconcile moral dissonance and form new life narratives, and 3) propose applications of the TMM to help theorists, warfighters, researchers, and healers deal with emerging moral challenges in future warfighting.

Methodology

My dissertation research is quantitative, and I used the work of educator Stephen Brookfield, social scientist Neal Krause, and psychologist Crystal Park to design a methodology for the expansion and critical examination of the TMM framework I developed at the National Defense University to provide an understanding of the formation and healing of MMI.

Brookfield uses the collected inputs from theories and feedback from students and colleagues to: 1) critique the self-reflections, prescriptive assumptions, and paradigms used in education programs and systems, and 2) analyze commonly accepted cause-and-effect relationships in these programs that can potentially harm students by controlling their instincts and responses (Brookfield 2012, 59-75; 2017). I substituted the work of theorists, researchers, healers, and warfighters to critique how military systems create and heal moral dissonance by using the TMM as framework for what happens in the process of warfighting. I chose these groups because they are the creators, practitioners, and stakeholders for the body of knowledge we have about MMI. My goal is to provide a

research-based, theoretically sound, and practically focused critical reflection on the

training, operation, and recovery processes that occur in the military deployment cycles

where warfighters experience the formation and healing of MMI.

I also used the methodology of Neal Krause, who uses subsets of "evidence

based" models to: 1) critically examine the relationships between theoretical arguments

and practical applications of healing modalities, and 2) validate his Core Conceptual

Model of Religion, Spirituality, and Health. Krause intended his model to be a framework

for integrating multiple insights from specific research and practices into a "larger

conceptual whole" that integrated effective healing practices between practitioners and

care seekers (Krause 2022, 10). The coded relationships in his conceptual model are

pictured in Figure 7.1

Figure 7.1 Krause's Core Conceptual Model of Religion, Spirituality, and Health
(Krause 2022, 12)

Krause summarizes his methodology:

In order for this process [outlined in his model] to happen, our individual
efforts must begin with an honest and open disclosure of the limits of what
we have accomplished, coupled with a call for a dialogue about the next
steps that is free from petty personal concerns. The solutions we propose

as individual investigators may not pan out. But we can rest in the assurance that those who follow us will be able to keep research in the field on target. (Krause 2022, 72)

I intend the TMM to invite dialogue that keeps future research and healing practices on target for the benefit of combat veterans. Traumatic events cause complex problems, and a myriad of needs for those who are victims and agents. One of these needs is the formation of new, post-traumatic meanings after combat, and research from Crystal Park and her associates provides a model for how people process and assimilate knowledge from past traumas to construct new life meanings. Figure 7.2 illustrates the narrative process that care seekers travel as they experience traumatic events and struggle with complex solutions to create post-traumatic meanings.


Figure 7.2 Park's Model for the Construction of Post-Traumatic Meaning (Park 2010; Park et al. 2017; Park, Mills-Baxter, and Fenster 2005)

Healing requires mixtures of techniques, practices, and modalities (Krause 2022, 47). I created the TMM to address how this happens with MMI. I combined the models of Brookfield, Krause and Park to organize subsets of evidence-based theories, research and

practices that can be used to critically examine and validate the TMM as a framework for understanding how moral injuries are formed and healed throughout a warfighter's deployment cycle (Larson and Zust 2017; Zust 2015a, 2015b, 2002).

The key issue is what happens to warfighters' moral senses of meaning during combat, and this is represented by the explosion in Figure 7.2. Explosions tear things apart, and that is what traumatic events do to a warfighter's life meaning, and this dis-integration results in physical/psycho/social/spiritual struggles associated with the task of re-integrating his/her/their life meaning with life practices. The TMM explains what happens from the explosion to the "Y" where adaptive or maladaptive meanings and practices are formed.


Figure 7.3 Evolution of the Original Graphic to the TMM Framework (Zust 2015a, 2015b; Larson and Zust 2017)

The TMM began as a graphic (far left Figure 7.3) to explain what happens in MMI using two mirrors (moral orientation and moral agency) based upon the work of Marin, Shay, Grossman, and Litz (Marin 1981; Shay 1994; Grossman 1995; Litz et al. 2009). I later expanded the graphic to form a basic model (middle Figure 7.3) that

focused upon the formation of moral dissonance during combat, and this allowed for the consideration of cycles for moral reasoning, targeting, and reconciliation that occur during warfighters' deployment cycles. In the course of my dissertation research, I added a third mirror to the TMM (far right Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4) to include the reconciliation of core values with life agency that warfighters need to form post-traumatic meanings.

My critical examination of the TMM (Figure 7.4) in the previous chapters utilized multiple intersections between theorists, researchers, healers and warfighters to address the complexities faced by stakeholders associated with MMI. Descriptions for these processes were provided in Chapters 1-6.


Figure 7.4 The TMM

What is important to my critical examination of the TMM is the rigor that Brookfield, Krause, and Park provide for identifying the contents and processes that key stakeholders bring into the formation, identification, and treatment of MMI. Figure 7.5 illustrates how I applied Krause's methodology to examine intersections between the

multiple disciplines and contents that theorists, researchers, healers and warfighters provide for understanding the formation and healing MMI. The critical intersection for my examination is warfighter narratives (highlighted in yellow). These narratives provide the "raw data" for exploring these intersections, and they serve as ombudsmen for all other intersections because they relate practitioner narratives behind how all other intersections associated with MMI form.


Figure 7.5 Wire Diagram for My Methodology

Before dealing with emerging moral challenges in future warfighting, I want to include a short section about healing programs and practices that use experiential learning to reconcile warfighters' moral dissonance. This inclusion is necessary for demonstrating how warfighters' positive reconciliation of past struggles determine, "who they will be," and how they can face these emerging moral challenges.

450

Practices of Reconciliation: Reunion, Retreat, and Engagement

Reunion

"Survive, Revive, and Thrive!" is a recovery motto for abuse victims. It is grounded in the process of neuroplasticity that is defined by adaptive, structural and functional changes that occur within the brain (Reed 2023). These practices are readily applicable to research that stresses physiological effects from traumatic events (van der Kolk 2015; Menakem 2017). These practices are also a bridge to the work of Seligman and Positive Psychology that focuses upon resiliency, as the capability and capacity to "bounce back" after experiencing traumatic stress (Duckworth 2016; Reivich and Shatté 2002; Seligman 2006). This motto also describes the processes warfighters need to go through as they return from combat and seek to re-integrate fragments of their life meanings that have been dis-integrated by combat.

The intent of reconciliation is the reintegration of core values with life agency where care seekers create new meanings and wellness after they experience spiritual struggles (Abu-Raiya, Pargament, and Exline 2015, 127-128; J.C. Augustine 2022, 4-5; Doehring 2015a; Bianchi 1969, 7-14). This transforming process can be described in terms of multiple points of contact, events, or actions where wandering warfighters become pilgrims towards healing. These points of contact can be found in experiential learning opportunities that are designed to help warfighters assimilate and accommodate new life meanings (J. Dewey 1938; Park et al. 2017).

Moral and spiritual orienting systems are vital for determining life meaning, direction, and balance before, during, and after traumatic events (Pargament, Desai, and McConnell 2006, 130). Treatment modalities that solely focus upon generalized fear

reactions may overlook and fail to treat moral and spiritual injuries that occur in the context of war, so therapies and programs that focus upon positive changes that integrate personal values with life practices are needed to help restore combat veterans' identity and vitality for life (Barrs and Doehring 2022).

Reconciliation processes incorporate elements of embedded theologies and spiritualities such as *dharma, karma, moksha, jihad, basmala,* sin, suffering, mercy, forgiveness, and grace with experiential practices such as prayer, meditation, confession, absolution, retreat, worship, acts of giving, and communal gathering. Together these elements and practices determine individual meanings and social relationships for warfighters consistent with the core values embedded within their specific cultures, traditions and communities. Thus, reconciliation is contextual, iterative, and transformative.

Psychiatrist Ed Tick has used reunion trips to take groups of Vietnam War Veterans back to Vietnam to meet with former North Vietnamese Soldiers, Vietcong, and villagers to engage in healing conversations. These trips are external types of socially just, conciliation that are designed to break destructive cycles of PTS reactions and help veterans construct new meanings for the future (Barrs and Doehring 2022; L.K. Graham 2017, 31-ff; Patterson 2012, 16-ff; Philpott 2012, 257-291; Tick 2014, 138-ff; 2005, 224-ff).

Tick's reunion trips are opportunities for veterans to reunite separations caused by the disassociation between their emotional souls and their cognitive experiences (Tick 2005, 16-ff, 105-ff). These types of separation are also defined by the linkage of emotions with foundational moral senses and physical senses (Haidt 2001, 2003). Tick

reasons that spiritual encounters through practices such as reunions or sweat lodges,

provide ways for veterans to develop themselves and help their peers in journeys towards

well-being (Tick 2005, 265-ff). He describes these encounters as, "following the way of

the dove," to: 1) reconcile dissociative perceptions and experiences, and 2) return

warriors full circle to the person who went to war. He writes:

> To complete warrior ordeals that would crush us, follow the dove. We call
> for this. We call for restoration of the spiritual warrior, the recreation and
> revivification of this archetype, this collective Soldier Soul, after its 5,000-
> year history of denigration and betrayal. We call today's warriors and
> survivors to evolve out of their soul wounds, and into elders who serve the
> world community through the wisdom, skill, and guiding pain in their
> Soldier's Hearts. We call for communities everywhere to embrace their
> witness, tend their wounds, and share their burdens. We call all citizens to
> become involved in warriors' return. We call for our military to model and
> fulfill the spiritual warrior ideal and for our politicians to so honor it that
> they would never misuse or betray it. A nation's wars and warriors belong
> to everyone. Out of the devastation of 5,000 years, we call for this rebirth
> (Tick 2014, 260)

These types of return also rely upon warfighters' professional moral senses of

fidelity, responsibility, accountability, maturity and efficacy (FRAME) that are rooted

within their foundational moral senses (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity)

described in Chapters 1-3 (Haidt 2012). Army chaplain Charlie Reynolds describes this

full cycle and as a healing unity where the identity of a warrior becomes integrated with

the sacred identity of a priest as, "a genuine love for Soldiers and a sincere burden for

others to experience the fulfillment in life that can only be found in a relationship with

God" (Reynolds 2024, 10).

For some, this cycle is a specific, theological relationship, for others it is

transcendent, social/communal, and R/S relationship. I argue that this cycle can be all of

these, and it is completed within processes of reconciliation. Reconciliation is a Janus-

faced, internal and external connection that integrates warfighters' core values from their past with their present life practices to provide moral re-orientation, awareness and direction to live in the present and future.

Rewriting the Narrative: Reconciliation as Reunion, Retreat, and Engagement

The intent of reconciliation is to rewrite one's core narrative for the future. In 1913 various military organizations arranged for veterans from the Battle of Gettysburg to camp on their former battlefield on the anniversary of their combat. Many came and experienced forms of reconciliation from their wartime dissonance. Southern Veterans walked the route of Pickett's ill-fated attack across the open fields where many had died during the battle. Northern Veterans met them at the end of their route, at the bloody angle on top of Cemetery Ridge. Both sides shook hands, and then Northern Veterans helped their former enemies across the wall they defended fifty years earlier (Allen 2013).

The reunion was an opportunity for the Gettysburg Veterans to forge their personal reconciliations, on their own terms, and this is similar to the reunion of a German fighter pilot, Franz Stigler and the pilot of an American bomber, Charlie Brown. During the war, Stigler safely guided Brown and the crew of their disabled plane to safe territory. They met after the war, and developed a lasting friendship that allowed them to reinterpret their war experiences (Makos 2012, 5-7, 212-ff).

All reunions may not be so idyllic, but nevertheless provide some form of healing reconciliation. General Hal Moore took a group of his soldiers back to the Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam to meet with the Vietnamese soldiers they fought against in 1965.

Together, they walked the actual battlefield, and discussed their experiences. Reporter

Joe Galloway, who was embedded with Moore's unit during the war, returned with the

group and recorded how conversations between the American and Vietnamese helped

them resolve some of their wartime trauma (Moore and Galloway 1993, 2008). He

writes:

> While standing at the position of a machine gun emplacement on the
> battlefield, a former Vietnamese officer tells the American machine
> gunner Bill Beck, "You killed my battalion, you killed my best friend. I
> am a godfather of his daughter and only last month I married her off. This
> is not very easy for me." Beck, whose memory of those terrible hours
> alone on that machine gun mowing down waves of attacking North
> Vietnamese is photographic and whose nightmares linger to this day,
> replays his hours alone on that machine gun, responded simply and
> quietly, 'It isn't very easy for me, either.' (Moore and Galloway 2008, 50-
> 51)

After thirty years, Hugh Thompson returned to Vietnam and met with

survivors of the My Lai massacre. As a helicopter pilot, he tried to prevent the

massacre by landing his aircraft between soldiers and villages. He ordered his

gunner to protect the villagers, and they were able to fly some of them to safety.

Thompson couldn't stop the massacre, so he reported it to his superiors, and was a

witness at the trial to prosecute some of the perpetrators. Ethicist Nancy Sherman

describes Thompson's reunion.

> A frail, aging woman who survived the massacre rushed up to meet him.
> She implored, "Why didn't the people who committed the murder[s] come
> back with you . . ." She finished her thought without pause but the
> interpreter's translation lagged behind. "... so that we could forgive them."
> This was not how Thompson thought the sentence would end. At that
> point, he recalls, "I totally lost it. How could this woman have compassion
> in her heart for someone who was so evil? She's a better person than I am.
> (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle locations 1056-1058)

In 1955, an American TV show, *This Is Your Life,* brought together a victim of the Hiroshima bombing, a Methodist Pastor Kiyoshi Tanimoto*,* with the co-pilot of the Enola Gay, Captain Robert Lewis. The Enola Gay was responsible for dropping the first Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, and its pilot never expressed any negative emotions about his participation. Pastor Tanimoto was in the United States arranging care for 25 young women (the Hiroshima Maidens) who were seeking restorative surgery for their injuries.

During the show, Tanimoto and Lewis met briefly, shook hands, and Lewis read a short portion of his diary, written on the day of the bombing. He had written, "My God, what have we done?" After the war, Lewis suffered from PTSD, and he became a sculptor. He created a work, *God's Wind at Hiroshima*, depicting the explosion of the bomb with blood running from it, and he donated his work to charity.[40]

Some believed that the show ambushed Tanimoto, who remained silent for much of the meeting. He went on to minister in the United States, and he corresponded with Lewis after their meeting. Later, his daughter told reporters that their relationship helped reconcile the bitterness she and her family experienced from the bombing. Lewis became a public critic of nuclear warfare (Barrett 2024).

Veterans are not wrong about condemning past events as negative revelations that caused their dissonance (Yandell 2023), but they may be wrong about the moral judgments (related to their professional senses of fidelity, responsibility, and accountability) that they pronounce on themselves and others that trap them in personal

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[40] The work and the story can be viewed at
http://conelrad.blogspot.com/2010/10/shroom-odyssey-of-robert-lewiss-atomic.html

emotions, memories, and ruminations. Theologian Miroslav Volf relates a story about how moral senses of maturity and efficacy can combine with forgiveness to help them to overcome condemning moral dissonance and empower transformational reconciliation.

Five-year old Daniel Volf was killed in an accident while playing with a group of soldiers who let him ride in their wagon. The soldier in charge struggled with the consequences, and he was later put on trial. At the trial, Volf's father testified on behalf of the soldier. Later, Volf writes:

> … After the soldier was discharged from the army and went home
> unpunished, my father visited him even though it took him two days to
> make the trip. He was concerned for the soldier and wanted to talk to
> him once more of God's love, which is greater than our accusing hearts,
> and of my parents' forgiveness. The reason why my parents forgave was
> simple. God forgave them, and so they forgave the soldier. (Volf 2005,
> 122-123)

Traumatic events can imprint sensations, emotions, memories, and perceptions from the past and compel warfighters to use their foundational moral senses to create meanings that result in moral dissonance and maladaptive narratives in the present. Thus, the post-traumatic challenge for warfighters is how to struggle with their dissonance and find genuine meanings that allow them to reconcile meaning and find pardon for their perceptions of failed agency. This reconciliation includes every element within their embedded theologies, spiritual orientations, core values, and moral orientations.

The R/S concepts of sin, forgiveness, and reconciliation are relational, and they are linked with Greek words for military practices. They literally mean: 1) to miss the mark (sin), 2) to let go (forgiveness), and 3) to alter, change, or to make other than it is

(reconciliation) (Bromily 1985, 40-51, 88-90,).[41] One can almost see an archer taking aim, then changing, or correcting, the flight of an arrow, and their targeting. Reconciliation happens in such a manner, when warfighters seek to re-orient, correct courses of action, and reconcile relationships between what they desired (orientation) and what happened (agency) in order to re-integrate what they believe to be broken apart or dis-integrated.

Thus, reconciliation is contextual, iterative, and transformative. It occurs over time, long after the battles have been fought. The moral senses of maturity and efficacy in warfighters are measured by warfighters' capability and capacity to run marathons rather than sprints. Thus, the process of reconciliation is not instant, "cheap forgiveness" (Nakashima-Brock and Lettini 2012, 106-ff). Instead, reconciliation is a deliberate, non-linear, healing strategy that empowers care seekers to identify, name, reconnect, and restore the brokenness caused by war.

Reunion trips do not have guaranteed, perfect endings. Instead, they demonstrate that reconciliation happens at great cost over time as warfighters reconnect and rewrite their narratives. Reconciliation is Pastor Tanimoto meeting with Captain Lewis, and it is Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson meeting with My Lai Villagers. Reconciliation is Sergeant Adam Schumann meeting with one of his Soldiers after their deployment. The Soldier blames him for the death of a popular NCO, and he tells Schumann that he hated

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[41] sin (αμαρτια), forgiveness (αφιημι), reconciliation (αλλασσω, καταλλασσω)

him while they were in Iraq. Schumann acknowledges this, and then both of them continue to talk about their "unfinished business," to find their way forward (Finkel 2009, 246-ff).

Retreat

Reconciliation trips empower warfighters to name their "nasty," and externally work their way forward. Retreats are locations for withdrawal and safe spaces for warfighters to internally reconcile their struggles and process their moral dissonance. I do not know how I'd respond to returning to where I went to war and talking with my enemies. I don't know how they'd feel about talking with me. Maybe someday. Right now, I find reconciliation in retreat and withdrawal to spaces where I can seek peace, pray, and process my struggles. I do this alone and in community.

In retreat warfighters practice forms of reflexivity to: 1) correct life-limiting beliefs and practices, 2) participate in spiritual care relationships that promote life-giving meanings, and 3) practice compassion to engage in life. "Liberative spiritual integration [sic] aligns practices, beliefs, and values in ways that liberate persons, families, and communities" (Doehring 2015a, 15-16). Practicing reflexivity may also help warfighters to: 1) un-attach, or defuse, their identities from past events, 2) remain mindful in the present, and 3) engage painful memories instead of detaching or isolating themselves from sources of their moral dissonance.

Most cultures have warrior initiation rites (Junger 2016, 114-ff), but the key to recovery comes in what societies do to return warfighters after combat. These recovery practices can be found in ancient tribal practices, and spiritual rituals where warriors were

welcomed back into their communities through ritual cleansings, absolutions, and ceremonies (Bachelor 2012a, 92-106; 2012b, Kindle locations 606-ff; Verkamp 2006, 23-31; Wiener and Hirschmann 2014, 103-127, 156-ff).

It has become popular to label these practices "as warrior washes to transition warfighters and back to civilian with the intention, "We don't want our people just to come home physically; we want them to come back close to the human beings they were before they went in" (N. Sherman 2005, Kindle locations 1949-1953). This intention has been foundational for the creation of post-deployment training, soldier/family retreats, and "Yellow Ribbon" programs that help warfighters and their families to gradually re-integrate from battlefield to home (M.D. Wood et al. 2017; Sippola et al. 2000). However, this process has similar obstacles as reunions because the moral dissonance experienced by warfighters is reconciled over time rather than singular events.

Some chaplains have initiated reflective retreat programs to address needs for post-trauma meaning making based upon using a warrior camp, or practices such as Stations of the Cross for homecoming (Larson and Zust 2017, 173-175; D. Peters 2016, 134-142; Sippola et al. 2000). Others have written books with sections of spiritual resources for care givers to interact with care seekers during counseling (Koenig, Carey, and Wortham 2023; Kelle 2017, 2020; Bachelor 2012a, 2012b).

Each of the above are forms of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and Spiritually Oriented Care (SOC) that promote well-being, re-integration, and reconciliation. Contemplative meaning-making and reflexivity begin with processes and practices that define, broaden and deepen the core values and spiritual connections that nurture relationships with life, others, and God (Merton 1961, 159-165). Such

460

contemplation and reflexivity occur over the course of a lifetime as individuals focus on the content of the virtues, principles, utility, situational awareness, and moral foundations that compose their spiritual orientations. Such contemplation embodies healing as reflexivity through moral/spiritual orientation, integration of life agency, and creation of post-traumatic meaning.

Reconciliation retreats begin when warfighters return to living in communities with whom their experiences matter and with whom they experience healing (Shay 2002, 20-ff; 1994, 194-ff). Sometimes these communities provide reconciliation through experiential learning with people, animals, and nature. Two such communities are: 1) Project Healing Waters that guides veterans through calming practices, compassionate camaraderie, connectedness with nature, and the physical activity of fly fishing (Project-Healing-Waters 2024), and 2) Operation Equine that facilitates unique, therapeutic experiences with horses to lead veterans to a deeper understanding of themselves, empower healthy relationships and feel better (Operation-Equine 2024). Here veterans experience compassion as they practice compassion.

Veterans' struggles end when they transition from being care seekers to becoming healers. This transformation happens as they enter exterior spaces where they haven't been before, with battle scars and new life meanings that come from their reconciled moral dissonance that includes the re-integration of their core values with their life practices. Reunion and retreat are experiential learning forms of CPT, ADT, and ACT, in which veterans can achieve the end state prescribed by psychiatrist Ed Tick where, "Soul is found in unexpected places… [including] in the Temple of Mars" (Tick 2014, 260). However, other veterans seek forms of reconciliation through engagement activities.

Engagement

Engagement activities include sports or service organizations that seek to actively involve warfighters in physical challenges that become extensions of their warrior codes and core values. The goal of engagement activities is experiential growth where warfighters are active agents in their own healing, and they become healers as they learn about themselves in relation to other warfighters. Thus, engagement activities can be viewed as forms of Acceptance Commitment Therapy in that individuals are engaged in "committed action" in accordance with their identified values.

Engagement activities can be differentiated by the purpose for the group: 1) physical challenge, 2) service projects, and 3) support to veterans. For example, surfer Mark Visser describes himself as the Ocean Warrior as he uses the extreme challenge of finding and riding 100-foot waves in the open seas as a R/S practice for reconciliation (Visser 2019). In a similar way the organization Fight Oar Die, challenges a four-person crew of veterans to row across the Atlantic Ocean to ensure that they, "can grow, develop, excel, and achieve ANYTHING they want" (Fight-Oar-Die 2024).

These extreme challenges are similar to the cross-country healing walk that Tom Voss accomplished (Voss and Nguyen 2019). However, two other organizations have sought to include large numbers of wounded warrior in athletic competitions. The Invictus Games were established so veterans, "can achieve post injury and celebrate their fighting spirit, though an inclusive sporting competition that recognizes the sacrifice they have made (The-Invictus-Games 2024). The Warrior Games were established as, "the

culmination of a service member's involvement in an adaptive sports program and demonstrates the incredible potential of wounded warriors through competitive sport" (Warrior-Games 2024).

Other organizations challenge veterans to put their core values to work in compassionate service projects on behalf of others. Team Rubicon is a veteran led, humanitarian organization that is, "driven to serve, ready for anything." The volunteer organization serves as a Non-Government Organization (NGO) that utilizes a rapid deployment force mindset with the skills of veteran warfighters to help victims from natural disasters. In 2023, Team Rubicon mobilized support for 134 global crises operations, and it describes itself as a:

> Veteran-led humanitarian organization, built to serve global communities before, during, and after disasters and crises. For us, no operation is too large or small. We go where disaster strikes, helping the people that need us most in the moments they need us most. (Team-Rubicon 2024)

The Pink Berets use veteran skills and core values to help and support military members who have been sexually assaulted. This support is crucial for meaningful prevention, policy reform, and victim recovery (Gonzalez-Prats 2017; Hoyle 2014b). The Pink Berets describe their purpose:

> Our goal is to help those who struggle with their invisible injuries, and emotionally charged wounding to experience a fresh perspective of themselves, their lives, and the act of limitless possibilities. Our hope is to re-inspire in our clients the motivation, willingness, and courage to excel to their best selves so they can continue to live the life they were authentically meant to lead. (The-Pink-Berets 2024)

Others have used creative writing and reporting as ways to reconcile moral dissonance from combat (Junger 2010; Turner 2014). Pastoral theologian Nancy Ramsay advocates for writing as a way to validate suffering by creating openings for lament that

463

allow for witness, protest, the reclamation of meaning, and the restoration of life purpose (Nancy Ramsay 2019, 149-ff). The Veterans Writing Project is a group that has taught writing to 3600 veterans across 26 states as a way of healing (Veterans-Writing-Project 2024).

Reunion, retreat, or engagement organizations – all are experiential growth opportunities outside of the formal counseling modalities examined in Chapter 6. They promote post-traumatic growth by helping warfighters: 1) reconcile their moral dissonance, 2) find direction, and 3) form adaptive life narratives from past traumatic events. In these processes veterans follow the TMM framework, as they experience healing and determine who they will be in facing future moral challenges. For the conclusion of my dissertation, I would like to speculate on uses of the TMM as a framework for helping warfighters, theorists, researchers, and healers face moral challenges from emerging trends in warfare.

Facing Moral Challenges in Emergent Warfare

Warfighters and Theorists

Theorists will establish the paradigms and frameworks that future warfighters will put into practice during warfighting. Ethicists Shannon French and Nancy Sherman argue that new ethical and moral standards are not needed to prepare warfighters for the stressors they will encounter in future wars (French 2017; N. Sherman 2021, 2015). They argue that current JWT and LOAC/IHL are sufficient to set guideposts and guardrails for future warfighters because future warfighting will not change the substance of warfighters' moral orientation, nor their need to integrate their values with their moral agency.

464

But this is true only if future governments, groups, and warfighters heed this guidance. I believe that future warfighting will not change the need for warfighters to reconcile their moral dissonance, but it will change the moral challenges presented by emerging trends and technologies used in warfare. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the changing political exceptions that will be used to justify future cycles of cruelty and cause. However, potential conflicts in Asia and South America and current conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Central America and Africa offer clues to how a full spectrum of warfighting will continue to leverage new technologies to support political exceptionalism and deny the needs of human alterity in emerging conflicts (K. Roy 2014, 474). Each of these challenges will require new considerations for how warfighters morally train, fight, and heal.

In this section, I will comment on three emerging trends: 1) the continual need for warfighters' ethical/moral training, 2) the moral challenges from the extension of operational domains into cyber and space, and 3) the ethical and moral challenges from the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Automated Weapon Systems (AWS). Each of these trends will morally challenge warfighters and theorists to consider applications of JWT, and LOAC/IHL as accountability for moral orientation, mission command and targeting when the exceptions for going to war change (Rambo 2013; O'Driscoll 2008). This consideration needs to include critical examination of the traditional, cultural and historical tensions that will fuel future conflicts (Tetlock 2003; O'Driscoll 2013; Huntington 2013, 1993).

Warfighting will continue across the full spectrum of violence ranging from low intensity insurgencies to interstate wars involving large alliances formed from the

interests of powerful governments and the interests/alignments of smaller states and non-government groups. This spectrum will include the current existence of small arms to long range missiles, and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it includes the use of future weapon systems ranging from non-kinetic systems that produce wide ranges of targeting affects upon combatants and non-combatants, and new forms of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW).

Proxy wars, false-flag operations, mercenaries, and Non-State Armed Groups will use traditional and modern, highly lethal technologies, and these will challenge the existing legal boundaries and moral practices intended to restrain violence (Hedahl 2012; Krieg and Rickli 2019). It is here that future conflicts will become new types of tribal warfare that will justify the use of traditional and new weapons to "defend the homeland or group." The causes and uses of these weapons will require the training of the warriors who will command and use these weapons, and the content of their moral orientations will be vital for the containment of conflicts, the prevention of war crimes, and the protection of civilian populations (Kilcullen 2013, 2020; McFate 2014, 2019; Osiel 2002; Woodward 1999).

The agenda for training moral warfighters isn't new, and it will continue to require the integration of ethical targeting, range competency, and mission command to conduct operations in accordance with LOAC/IHL instead of political expediency (Couch 2010; Grossman 1995; M. Shaw 2005; T.W. Shaw 2018). This training must include senior leaders who plan strategic campaigns and operations as well as the "strategic corporals" who exercise tactics. This training must also leverage the embedded,

religious/spiritual/moral senses and values that define just conduct and offer critical consideration for the balances between human alterity and exceptionalism that control uses of violence.

Emerging operational mindsets and risk transference will intentionally seek to target population centers as the means to achieve victory, and new weapons will continue to make this easier and possible. This was true in the past and the present in places such as 1) Sand Creek and Wounded Knee (Hoig 1961; A. Kelman 2013; Winkie 2022a), 2) Nanking (A. Kelman 2013; Chang 2012), 3) My Lai (Peers 1979), 4) Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Lindquist 2001; Walzer 2015), 5) Rwanda (Gourevitch 1998), 6) Srebrenica (Honig and Both 1997; Petrila and Hasanovic 2021), 6) Bucha (Aljazeera 2022; Antonova 2023; Gramer 2023; Ibrahim 2023; Sherlock 2023), and 7) Gaza (Berger, Hill, and Balousha 2023; D. Lamothe and Horton 2023; Rauhala and hendrix 2024; Rubin 2023; Spencer 2023; U.N. U.N. 2023). This will also be true in future contested areas.

Moral challenges in future conflicts will continue to reside within the warriors who will always defend themselves and seek to leverage competitive advantages on the battlefield. This is lethal, but the real danger occurs when they cross the internal and external moral boundaries designed to control violence (the guides and guardrails identified in Chapter 5). In the future, "new" rules of war (or engagements) will seek to remove these boundaries and extend operations over the horizon to distant territories. Think about comparing the causes, means, ends, and consequences for bombing Pearl Harbor or Hiroshima verses the use of hijacked airliners to bomb New York City and Washington DC on 9/11 or the uses of guided munitions to bomb Baghdad during and

after Desert Storm. Future warriors will continue to be trained and ordered to fight in similar conventional and unconventional ways, and they will leave generations of embittered victims behind.

Future wars will be fought in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments filled with unpredicted and unanticipated, "Black Swan," problems that will have severe consequences (Taleb 2007). These problems will be compounded by new technologies that will leverage available weapons that move future battlefields from conventional conflicts conducted in the traditional domains of land, sea, and air into the domains of space and cyberspace (Brose 2020; Clarke and Knake 2019; JCS 2022).

As the generations of warfare, domains of war, and the means of fighting expand, so does the possibility of risk transference from essential military objectives to strategic centers of gravity that include political and non-combatant infrastructures (Biddle 2021; Clarke and Knake 2019; Von Clausewitz 1968; Faraj 2000; Lindquist 2001; M. Shaw 2005; Sanger 2018; Tse-Tung 2020). Here warfighting, as politics by other means, increases operational risk to populations and the need for establishing guideposts and guardrails for distinguishing legitimate targeting and protecting these centers of gravity (Fujimura 2016, 92; Nickerson et al. 2015).

So, what happens to warriors who wage space, cyber, proxy, or hybrid warfare, and then witness its consequences? We know that warfighters' proximity to violence and their subsequent judgements upon their agency increase their moral risk (Grossman 1995; Grossman and Christensen 2004; Komarovskaya et al. 2011; Krauss et al. 2023; Maguen et al. 2017; Purcell et al. 2016). We also know that increases in the technology used in drone warfare (and over the horizon warfare) has brought the same types of moral

dissonance from close combat that were experienced by ancient warriors and traditional infantry/artillery/sailors/airmen to drone pilots, crew, and operators who have killed from a distance. These warfighters have tracked high value targets, hovered over areas of engagement (sometimes in populated locations), killed their targets, remained to assess the battle damage (including unintended casualties), and then gone home to their families and/or friends -- all in a span of a few hours.

The time and distance between sensor and shooter have been compressed, as well as the timeline for traumatic stress. These pilots and crewmen have experienced PTS, PTSD, and MMI from their kills. Distant combat has become up-close and personal, with minimal fear because mortal risk has been transferred to distant locations and peoples. Drone warfare has not solved the moral dissonance that occurs in incidents of mistaken targeting or intelligence associated with long distances (Anand and Nagaveni 2018), nor has it decreased the negative political and moral effects upon de-stabilized regions, or made killing in war more just (Chatterjee 2015; Frankel 2024; Mirra 2013). Will future cyber warriors and space guardians experience similar levels of moral dissonance from remote targeting, and will those levels increase as measurements for determining necessity, proportionality, distinction, and human suffering change in future warfare (Kimhi and Kasher 2015; Hollifield et al. 2002)? It is doubtful.

Another moral challenge can be addressed by asking the question, will the risk of moral dissonance decrease if the responsibility and accountability for moral agency is transferred from a human being to AI and AWS? The hope behind the argument for AI/AWS is that machines will decrease risk to the warfighter and increase efficiency in warfighting by making fast and accurate assessments of targeting data. However, there is

a tradition military standard for implementing mission command, "you can transfer authority, but you CANNOT transfer responsibility." Thus, the responsibility for targeting and the subsequent consequences of AI and AWS will always reside within the warfighter responsible for commanding the shooter, and moral injury as an occupational hazard will still be in effect (Wolfendale 2008; Murat 2012).

AI/AWS function like the Greek mythological giant Talos that guarded Crete. The animated bronze statue was good at identifying and killing all invaders. However, it was not so good at differentiating between friend and foe, and ancient Greeks foresaw this as a problem (Buxton 2013, 73-99). The myth of Talos is not so different from the ways that nations and groups develop and use weapon systems to defend their security interests. AI/AWS are new generations of weapon systems that usher in new methods of warfare as they function across all five operational domains. Like Talos, they will have offensive capabilities that provide strategic advantages to reach beyond national borders and engage targets long before they threaten national interests or territories. However, like Talos, is their use determined by fear of vulnerability to threats that becomes catalyst for violent conflicts instead of maintaining and promoting trust and peace between nations (Buxton 2013, 73-99)?

The moral challenge behind emerging uses of AI/AWS will be in how the training and command of these platforms will be accomplished. The integration of AI into AWS does not resolve questions concerning meaningful control of the weapon system and the targeting processes it will use (Amoroso and Tamburrini 2016). Such control relies upon moral orientation using combinations of moral reasoning, ethical navigation, and double loop learning describe in Chapter 4.

When the moral reasoning behind these checks and balances goes wrong, or it is cut short, then lethal warriors cease to function as warfighters, and they become pirates. So, if AI determines AWS targeting decisions through embedded algorithms programmed into the machine, then the moral challenge becomes how to program machines to function so that AI/AWS would not become something that we would have to convict or pardon if it was human.

AI driven AWS platforms are designed to: 1) decrease the reaction time between sensor and shooter, and 2) increase lethality by incorporating new technologies for guiding and propelling munitions. The integration of these technologies may change the targeting equations used for determining necessity, proportionality, distinction, and human suffering in future conflicts (Galliott 2019, 24). All targeting is biased. The operational mindset, competence, and discipline of a warfighter make just targeting possible because their moral orientations use moral, ethical, and legal checks and balances to make targeting decisions. Can the weighing of these criteria be programmed into a machine?

Some may argue that the risk is the same as in current combat. Thus, an AI/AWS interface will take human emotion and indecision out of the equation, and eliminate atrocities fueled by passion. Others may argue that it is human emotion and slow decisions that allow for humanity during war. Warriors in combat must use fast, System 1, OODA loop decisions cycles, but they are also trained to understand that a larger part of their thinking and healing occurs within slower, reflective reasoning loops (Kahneman 2011; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). This combination of quick and slow moral reasoning must become part of the deep learning algorithms used by AI.

Deep learning uses artificial neural networks (ANN) and representational learning. These processes can be compared to students who learn by seeking a working understanding of the subject material versus students who use superficial approaches to reproduce knowledge for a test (Goodfellow, Benigo, and Courvilee 2016, 1-26). However, deep learning tools begin as "image classifiers" by analyzing and classifying objects. ANN are trained to recognize objects through supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised processes that then combine "lessons learned" into stored data bases for future orientation and decision making (A. Wilson 2019a).

ANN works in a certain direction: Input → Hidden Layer → Output, and this determines the performance of AI with an AWS (Goodfellow, Benigo, and Courvilee 2016, 1-26). This equation makes the use of AI/AWS morally feasible. However, AI has trouble with meaning in context. It performs exceptionally well on simple translation and language-related tasks, but it can fail when it is required to interpret and understand nuanced, contexts (Allibahi 2018; Goodfellow, Benigo, and Courvilee 2016; A. Wilson 2019a).

Meaning in context determines targeting bias through the ways it collects and processes data. Thus, living warfighters may choose to not shoot, or shoot, when they observe a child who is picking up a weapon system. AI may only recognize the presence of a living being with a weapon, making it an "unfriendly" combatant, and fire with whatever weapon system is at its disposal. The status of the being as a child instead of a small enemy may be irrelevant to the decision, but not to the moral outcome. Furthermore, ANN will eventually stop improving, thus limiting the layers from which it

can learn from in future iterations (Allibahi 2018). In addition, the lack of transparency and control in how AI makes decisions, makes it difficult to correct (Dickson 2019; Gompert and Kugler 2006b).

AI agents will make intuitive decisions faster than human agents with good results, but do they make good, or better, decisions that require deliberative, processes (Sari, Kuspriyanto, and Prihatmanto 2012)? Meaning in context determines targeting bias through collected and processed data. AI/AWS can collapse time and space, but it can also blur the thresholds for determining just warfare within the guideposts and guardrails set by LOAC/IHL It is a technology that is designed to "improve" warfighting capacity to fight, but it can also draw nations into unexplored territories of legality, legitimacy, and trust (Kissinger 2014, 341-347; Lushenko and Raman 2024, 9-ff).

All of these factors make it tough to determine the reliability of the AI/AWS with regards to moral decision making. Currently, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is creating the following forms of AI/AWS:

1. Rapid Target Acquisition (RTA) between warrior reticles and their weapon systems. (Cox 2020)

2. No Manning Required Ships (NOMAR) that are drone ships that will provide a range of offensive capabilities. (Larter 2020)

3. Cyber Hunt Forward Teams that are transhuman teams and have the means to challenging adversary activities wherever they operate including space and cyberspace. (Pomerleau 2020)

4. Swarming Warfare. enables drone swarms, made up of cooperative, autonomous robots that react to the battlefield as one, as they do colonies of insects, or packs of wolves. The was executed by Iran recently when it combined 300 drones plus missiles in an attack against Israel. The attack was countered by air defenses using similar advanced technologies. (Scharre 2018; Ledur, Meko, and Ganados 2024)

5. Gunslinger is an unmanned, gun-armed "missile" that would be launched like a drone to engage multiple targets on the ground, air, or sea with its own missiles. (Trevithick 2020)

6. Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV with undersea "GPS-like" capability designed for dominating undersea warfare with the capability to strike undersea and surface targets. (J.R. Wilson 2019b)

7. Unmanned Fighter/Drone. This system is reaching reality as the Secretary of the Air Force recently flew in a fighter drone controlled by AI. (Copp 2024)

The way AI/AWS will make targeting decisions is *THE* future moral challenge for the warfighters who will command the deployment and operations of these weapons, and live with the results. Will they be programmed to function in accordance with JWT/LOAC/IHL and to operate under an established ROE like a warfighter? Or, will they be allowed to operate under the rules of "tribal or new rules of war that only require the identification and targeting of a perceived threat, regardless of the outcome?

In 2019 the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) released recommendations for the ethical uses of AI/AWS that placed their development and deployment in a broader context of technologies that can be used to perform goal-oriented tasks in accordance with 5 criteria used for judging intents and purpose that are consistent with national policy, and international law. These criteria are summarized:

1. Responsible. Human beings remain responsible for the development, deployment, use, and outcomes of AI in DoD systems.

2. Equitable. DoD personnel must be deliberate to avoid unintended bias in the development and deployment of AI combat or non-combat system that could inadvertently cause harm to persons.

3. Traceable. DoD engineers must possess an appropriate understanding of its AI systems to include transparent and

474

auditable methodologies, data sources, and design procedures and documentation.

4. Reliable. AI systems should be tested and assured to be safe, secure and robust throughout the life cycle and domain of use.

5. Governable. AI systems should be designed and engineered to fulfill their intended function while possessing the ability to detect and avoid unintended harm or disruption. This includes unintended escalatory or the glossing over of contentious issues that are aligned with DoD's mission to deter war and protect our nation. (DIB 2019)

In 2017, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began pursuing these issues under the classification of Lethal Automated Weapon Systems (LAWS), and they consider uses of LAWS in compliance with IHL if they meet principles of IHL and public conscience to include: 1) predictability of outcomes, 2) reliability in performance, and 3) human control to allow for intervention responsibility, and accountability. These performance standards must occur throughout development, activation, operational stages (Davison 2018, 7-15).

The moral risk in creating a Talos, is that its AI/AWS will be influenced by the mindsets of its creators, trainers, and users who will write and correct the algorithms for its deep learning. Will they develop, train and task AI/AWS platforms with the ability to correct their own targeting biases in accordance with JWT/LOAC/IHL guidelines, and will they operate with the "humanity to take its [their] own mortality and fallibility seriously" (Fromm, Pryer, and Cutright 2013, 66; Koch 2010)?

A continuing moral challenge for future theorists and warfighters will be to maintain a morally responsible agency where combatants (whether state/non-state agents or human/AI actors) understand and are accountable for the consequences of their actions

(Wolfendale 2008). Military theorists, ethicists, and warfighters are stakeholders who will create the future, but it should be with the critical skepticism of Stephen Hawking, who reasoned that, "We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn't want to meet" (BBC 2010). But the future should also be created with the critical optimism of Nobel Peace Prize recipient Shirin Ebadi wrote the following to her daughters:

> I hope you forgive us for the mistakes we made. Although we did not intend it, we have darkened your world. Yes, we wanted to make the world a better place. We were dreamers. We dreamed of creating a country where both human rights and human dignity would be guarded by strong democratic institutions. We thought that we had every right to translate these beautiful ideas into reality. (Ebadi 2020)

The Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy once stated, "Only a human being can bring context to a decision" (Benitz 2020). The day might be coming when AI/AWS systems will use their layered, ANN to provide their own contexts for moral orientation and agency on the battlefield. However, it will still be up to humans to reconcile the moral dissonance that they will create. Will we be able to live with this new format for morality?

Researchers and Healers

Researchers and healers will work in tandem to address two critical moral challenges for how MMI will be examined and treated in the future. These two challenges will be: 1) how to conduct cross-cultural research that addresses warfighters' formation and use of moral orientation in their agency and in what ways their moral orientation and agency contribute to moral injuries and post-traumatic growth, and 2) to

create criteria that allow for the diagnosis and treatment of moral injuries either as a distinct phenomenon, part of a greater category of Post-Traumatic Stress Injury (PTSI), or a sub-category of PTSD.

We think we know MMI exists because of warfighter narratives. We have linked it to:

1. Moral emotions (ME) (Breslavs 2013; Farnsworth et al. 2014; Fleming 2022; K. Gray and Wegner 2011; Haidt 2003; Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Rozin et al. 1999; Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew 2014; Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek 2007).

2. Morally Injurious Events (MIE) (Evans et al. 2018; P. Held et al. 2017; Burkman, Purcell, and Maguen 2019; Komarovskaya et al. 2011; Maguen et al. 2017; Maguen et al. 2010; Maguen et al. 2011; Purcell, Burkman, et al. 2018; Purcell et al. 2016; Krauss et al. 2024; Krauss et al. 2023; Krauss et al. 2020).

3. PTS or PTSD (Barnes, Hurley, and Taber 2019; Belanger et al. 2018; Borges et al. 2020; Van Winkle and Safer 2011; Vetmetten and Jerly 2018; Volk and Koenig 2019; Nash 2013, 2019; Nash and Baker 2007; Nash and Litz 2013).

However, there is much we do not know about how warfighters' core values specifically relate to their moral judgements about agency and their own intersecting identities. We know about particular service values and how they related to JWT, LOAC/IHL, and ROE, but we do not know how they operate in differentiating just vs. unjust war events, or how they form into moral dissonance from military service. We

only know about these processes from anecdotal warfighter narratives that describe what

happened and the resulting spiritual struggles (Shay 2014; Tick 2014; Nakashima-Brock

and Lettini 2012; Litz et al. 2009).

These narratives get codified and quantified by the various assessment

instruments we use to research MI. For example, researcher Steven Krauss and his team

have found that warfighters' judgments of just vs. unjust war events determine how they

respond to battlefield violence, but their instruments have not established how moral

agency directly mediates moral injuries, or how warfighter definitions of "unjust" are

comorbid with particular types of post-trauma suffering, or comorbid with the duration of

their post-trauma recovery (Krauss et al. 2024; Krauss et al. 2023; Krauss et al. 2020).

Krauss' team doesn't know because it didn't structure the study to research the

question. They couldn't because it was "a bridge too far" for the methodologies in place.

Currently the Veteran's Administration (VA) Office of Research and Development are

working with Brett Litz to:

> … conduct a mixed-methods study "to determine the U.S. Veteran
> population prevalence of moral injury." The research effort will include an
> online survey of "a nationally representative probability sample of U.S.
> veterans," expected to include 3,000 respondents; and a secondary
> comparison study in which 20 veterans who identify as having moral
> injury and 20 who do not, all with similar exposure to "morally injurious
> events" participate in a series of interviews about their thinking and
> experiences. Brett Litz, a clinical psychologist at VA Boston Health Care
> System and Boston University who has pioneered VA research on the
> topic of moral injury, told Military Times via email that the concept of
> moral injury makes intuitive sense, even as it has not been studied in-
> depth as a separate phenomenon. (Hodge-Seck 2023)

The importance of this study is that it combines research of veteran's core values

with their responses to specific events and outcomes. However, the question remains: can

it quantify what is happening on the battlefield in real time? In preparation for my doctorate I proposed conducting a mixed method, longitudinal study to research the formation of core values into the moral orientations of a group of Army Soldiers as they entered basic training, completed basic training, processed into their unit, deployed into combat, and returned to their duty station. I would also give a similar test to a sample of veteran Soldiers from the same unit. Thus, I would have a pre and post deployment assessment from which to compare changes in the samples from the new Soldiers as they became combat veterans with older, veteran Soldiers from the same unit who are experiencing the same traumatic stressors.

This type of study was a "bridge too far" to conduct for a doctoral dissertation. However, the military has the research enterprises and the chain of command connections to conduct such a study. The results would be valuable for establishing a baseline for what morally happens to warfighters during a combat deployment cycle. However, all of the above studies only focus upon U.S. warfighters, studies of warfighters from other cultures and nations will be necessary to complete an accurate assessment.

It is difficult to research what happens to warfighters without such a baseline. Research could also be conducted with warfighters from both sides in current conflicts such as Ukraine, or Gaza (Theil et al. 2023) to collect cross-cultural data about moral injuries in warfighters and noncombatants. This type of research could help to establish a baseline for future moral injury research and it could help healers with the moral challenge for determining criteria where moral injuries exist within the DSM.

Currently MMI or non-military MI are not diagnosable conditions, so veterans experiencing these struggles connected to moral dissonance are treated under different

479

categories such as PTSD, anxiety, depression etc. Furthermore, warfighters who are struggling with issues stemming from moral dissonance are not covered by the VA, Tri-Care, or other insurance as medical conditions, unless they qualify under another condition. Thus, the medical care for warfighters' experiencing MMI is and will be a social and moral challenge.

This is where healers can use theory and research to include MMI/MI in the DSM whether as a new, separate classification, or a sub-diagnosis under a current diagnosable condition such as PTSD, or under a new category such as PTSI. Currently, Military Stress control manuals list MMI/MI as a subcategory of a PTS reaction (Air Force 2014; Army 2009; Navy-Marine Corps 2010). The establishment of PTSI as a diagnosable condition related to moral struggles will legitimize warfighters suffering from the effects of moral dissonance and PTSD symptoms to be treated for related primary wounds instead of secondary consequences. If MI/MMI is to be established as its own diagnosis, then research will have to support ways that its symptoms and consequences can be diagnosed and treated. The future moral challenge for healers and researchers to answer is this question: If combat veterans' primary wound is the damage caused by moral dissonance from dis-integration between their moral orientations and their life agency, then how can they be identified from their reported PTS injuries and treated without some form of reconciliation of their moral dissonance incorporated into current healing modalities?

Conclusion

Warfighter narratives matter! It is my hope that theorists, researchers and healers will never listen to veterans' war stories the same way again, because: 1) their narratives

are their witness to the core values that inform their moral orientations, and 2) their

narratives relate the moral/spiritual struggles and suffering they experience from combat.

Even veterans' silence is informative. I created the TMM to change the way we: 1) listen

and understand warfighters, 2) learn the hidden costs of warfighting, 3) help warfighters

reconcile the cycles of cause and cruelty in which they served, and 4) prevent future

moral injuries by helping warfighters develop by training that integrates their moral

orientations with their operational mindsets, and targeting competencies.

The existence of moral injury as told in the narratives of warfighters is the loudest

protest against war because it is their narratives that witness to the alterity of others and

allows us to identify the humanity in issues connected with moral orientation and agency.

Warfighters' narratives also show us what is at stake when we become agents in the

violation of the guideposts, guardrails and the embedded values that determine what is

considered just or legal. To rephrase Jonathan Shay, the reality of moral suffering from

combat is not the stuff we learned as a child during religious education. Shay writes:

> To all readers I say: Learn the psychological damage that war does, and
> work to prevent war. There is no contradiction between hating war and
> honoring the soldier. Learn "how" war damages the mind and spirit, and
> work to change those things in military institutions and culture that
> needlessly create or worsen these injuries. We don't have to go reprint the
> same mistakes. Just as the flak jacket has prevented many physical
> injuries, we can prevent many psychological injuries. (Shay 1994, xxiii)

The TMM provides a framework to incorporate warfighters' embedded values,

R/S orientations, training and experiences into their healing journeys. These healing

journeys can take many forms based upon their needs. The goal is for warfighters to

reconcile what has been damaged by war, whether that damage is the dis-integration of their moral orientations, or it is the destruction of the social and transcendental relationships that make their lives meaningful.

The reality of war can peel away warfighters' life "myths" as they "come to their senses" during combat and they create new artificial myths attached to maladaptive meanings linked with traumatic events. They do not deserve to carry these myths with them through life. These narratives from traumatic events might be too hard to utter, but the healing process begins when veterans are able to acknowledge the tragedy, accept their share of agency, and look forward (Hedges 2002, 21-ff, 141-ff).

Warfighters looking forward is the process of reconciliation, and it begins with their knowledge of their past (R. LaMothe 2017). It is here that practices of goodness, compassion, forgiveness, and grace become essential in helping warfighters with moral injuries to connect their past, present and future (Doehring 2018; Litz and Carney 2018; Hope 1987; Purcell, Griffin, et al. 2018). These practices are a part of counseling, reunion, retreat, and engagements. During these processes healing happens in ways that are contextual, iterative, and transformative.

What warfighters learn in combat shouldn't determine the reality of how they live in the present or in the future. When my grandfather returned from WWI, he was met at the train by his fiancée (my grandmother). On their way home they walked by a store where he bought a new set of clothes. He changed his clothes, and he stuffed his uniform into his duffle bag. As they crossed a bridge, near their home, he threw his duffle bag into a garbage pile under the bridge. Then he went home with my grandmother and they started a family. He never talked about the war with anyone, except fellow veterans, after

that. However, one of his last requests was to be buried with his Veteran Pin from WWI. My father seldom talked about the Marines, but he never failed to let us know, "Once a Marine, always a Marine." He always wore a USMC hat on Veterans Day and the Marine Birthday every year. These men weren't damaged veterans, they were the ones who survived, and taught us to love, laugh, and live well.

When I retired from the Army, I was issued a "Soldier for Life" pin. I never wear it. However, I still wear my battle cap from OEF/OIF. Why? Because I am a soldier for life. I am a product of my moral orientation, and I carry the emotions, memories, and events of my moral agency in war with me. Just as we develop scars from past wounds or surgeries, so veterans carry battle scars that are both hidden and visible. These scars are signs of past traumatic events, and they are also signs of healing.

In the story *The Five People You Meet in Heaven,* author Mitch Albom tells the story of a man who is reunited with two people he met in war. One was his platoon leader, and the other was a young, Asian girl. All three were related by a war event where the girl was killed, and the man was wounded. The man had to make peace with them, and in the course of their meeting he discovers his past encounters with them had profound and redeeming meanings upon himself because they were related in life, death, and eternity (Albom 2003, 189-ff). Albom's fictional tale is similar to the real narrative of a young infantryman who must reconcile his killing a young girl who was being used as a human shield by insurgents. He still sees the girl in his sleep, and a chaplain describes their healing encounter: "Her life is connected to his. I try to help him look at

the girl and not run from her. He can see himself turning towards the little girl who is following him. When she's close, he hugs her. They are one now and always will be" (D. Peters 2014, 80).

The reconciliation of moral dissonance results in scars that are no longer open wounds. Veterans' narratives tell the tales behind their open wounds and scars. Their post-trauma narratives are also witnesses to their post-traumatic growth. These narratives are about the South African Soldier who traded places on the duty roster with a friend who died while serving that duty (Wolf 1989, 154). They are also about a Russian paratrooper who witnesses fellow soldiers shooting themselves to get out of combat after witnessing atrocities, and his witness led to advocacy. He writes, "I must try to stop this madness. … We did not have the moral right to attack another country, especially the people closest to us" (Ilyushina 2022).

Theologian Michael Yandell believes these narratives must be about warfighters finding an end to their connection with the military and a cessation of the, "primordial feelings associated with the moral reasoning of warrior codes and kill chains, of which some warfighters despair as a catalyst for post-traumatic growth characterized by hope" (Yandell 2022, 110).

Pastoral theologian Zachary Moon describes moral injuries as an identity crisis that literally traps warfighters between worlds (Moon 2019b, 94-ff). In this dissertation I argued that moral injuries are caused by the dis-integration of what was meant to be an integrated whole, and with others I believe that warfighters' post-traumatic narratives are witnesses for a restored sense of purpose related to their renewed sense of humanity (Rambo 2017, 113-ff).

Figure 7.6. *Moral Injury* by Major (Ret.) Jeff Hall

After combat, Major Jeff Hall was diagnosed with PTSD. However, he struggled more with moral issues that were related to what he witnessed during his tour of duty, and with what he considered to be moral failures that he couldn't prevent. During recovery he drew the above picture (Figure 7.6) to portray the limiting, maladaptive moral dissonance he experienced from his service, and his inability to regain what he valued.

Upon his retirement from the Army, Hall's family and friends held a ceremony in the town hall near his home in rural Oklahoma. His ceremony was a witness to his reconciliation and healing. The highlight of the ceremony was Jeff and his family placing items from his combat service into a handcrafted wooden container (which Hall built). The container was topped off with a carved, wooden sword beaten into a plowshare. Jeff explained that they weren't locking away memories as much as signifying his transformational, moral healing as he transitioned from being a warfighter back to a civilian. Jeff wrote the following in the program, Sheri [his wife] was the one that held on

when the world spun out of control. "In sickness and in health" always meant something to her. I was not that strong. Thanks, is not enough" [42]

In 1982 Maya Lin, an undergraduate, architecture student from Yale, designed the Vietnam Memorial as a V-shaped, dark marble wall, inscribed with the names of the warfighters who were killed in action during the war. Maya was aware of the social and personal costs of the war, and she designed the memorial to reflect the images of the people who came to view the wall through the names of the warfighters who fought and died. She reasoned, "I just wanted to be honest with people… I didn't want to make something that said, "They've gone away for a while." I wanted something that would just simply say, 'They can never come back.' They should be remembered" (Blakemore 2017).

The memorial wall reflects both life and death in the veterans who fought and the nation who sent them to war. But what was meant to be a place of reconciliation, later became a symbol for struggle. Some veterans and civilians opposed the structure of the wall, and they succeeded in erecting a statue of three soldiers standing together looking toward the wall and the future beyond the death (Atkinson 1989, 449-ff). Later, a statue was added for the women who served.

However, in the aftermath of the turmoil, an unexpected reconciliation took place. Veterans and their families began to place tokens and memorials by the names of fallen warfighters (Palmer 1987). Thus, the memorial wall and statues accomplished what the TMM intends to create within counseling practices – a place for healing reconciliation

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[42] From Jeff Hall's retirement ceremony bulletin. My personal copy.

that integrates warfighters core values with their purpose for living. In 1986, George

Skypeck, a wounded Vietnam Veteran, wrote and left the following poem at the

memorial wall. His words are a fitting close for my dissertation because they state what

the TMM intends for theorists, researchers, healers who join with warfighters in the

process of preventing and healing MMI.

> I was that which others did not want to be.
> I went where others feared to go and did what others failed to do.
> I asked nothing from those who gave nothing and reluctantly accepted the
>   thought of eternal loneliness ... should I fail.
> I have seen the face of terror; felt the stinging cold of fear; enjoyed the
>   sweet taste of a moment's love.
> I have cried, pained and hoped ... but, most of all,
> I have lived the times others would say were best forgotten.
> At least someday, I will be able to say that I am proud of what I was ... a
>   soldier. (NPS 1986)

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