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From LOS ANGELES BAR ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, May 21, 1936

IN A number of recent opinions, the courts have scored in measured terms the misconduct of attorneys who participate in, or facilitate, the unauthorized practice of law by laymen. The most recent, as well as the harshest, comment of this character is found in *Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association (R. I.)*, 179A 139:

“When this arrangement between these lay respondents and the respondent * * * began to function, not only were they engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, but * * * notwithstanding his license from this court, were practicing law in an illegal manner. It seems to us this conclusion is inescapable. The conduct of the respondent * * * was inconsistent with the ethics of his profession, though presumably he did not realize this. He seems to have given little thought to the nature of his association with these lay respondents, though he was really permitting them to use his authority as an officer of this court to furnish the foundation of an enterprise that degraded his calling to the level of a common huckstering business. This was certainly not the standard of conduct to be expected of a member of the bar of this court. Rather, it was the contrary. As an agent and an aid of the court in the administration of justice, the true lawyer, conscious of the dignity of his calling, will instinctively avoid such associations, notwithstanding that it may mean the foregoing of a more or less lucrative source of business. Chief Justice Cardozo, in *People v. Culkin*, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487, had this idea in mind when he expressed himself in the following words: “Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.” *Matter of Rouss*, 221 N. Y. 84, 116 N. E. 83. The appellant was received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court was due, whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld. He might be assigned as counsel for the needy, in causes criminal or civil, serving without pay.’ These are not idle words, nor mere rhetoric.”