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# Pathways to Interstate War

## A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STEPS-TO-WAR THEORY

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The steps-to-war theory (Vasquez 1993) suggests that war is brought on by a series of steps that increase hostility and then make the issues under contention more intractable. Power politics strategies, including coercion in the face of territorial disputes, rivalry, hardliners in power, alliances, and arms races, are all important steps to war. This paper utilizes the steps-to-war theory using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). With this method, we can observe differing pathways to war, rather than the correlations associated with war. This research also represents the first attempt to classify domestic leaders according to type as suggested by existing theory. Territorial issues, rivalry, hardliners in power, and alliances are all sufficient conditions for the existence of an interstate war.

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**T**he steps-to-war theory (Vasquez 1993, Senese and Vasquez 2008) suggests that war is brought on by a series of steps that increase hostility and then make the issues under contention more intractable. Power politics strategies, including coercion in the face of intractable issues, rivalry or repeated crises, domestic hardliners in power, alliances, and arms races, are all important steps along the path to war. There have been important recent studies investigating this theory using quantitative techniques (Vasquez 2004, Senese and Vasquez 2005, 2008; Colaresi and Thompson 2005). Left unexplored are the qualitative dimensions of the theory; including a classification of different types of domestic leaders in power during the onset of wars. The research program thus far has failed to utilize small case comparative methodology to investigate associations and connections uncovered in past statistical investigations.

This project will evaluate the steps-to-war research program using the qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 2000) so as to investigate the pathways to the interstate war category. This method is suitable and useful for the task because of the method's focus on selective case causation (Ragin 1987; 2000) which allows us to delineate the causal pathways to war, rather than the steps to war. Here we can attempt to study theoretical predictions by investigating causal connections and associations inherent in comparative research. We find that territorial disputes, rivalry, hardliners in power, and alliances are sufficient conditions for interstate war indicating that they represent important explanations of war. Here we are not interested in whether an event is observed in the presence of the independent variable, but rather in conjunctive causation. In other words, what combination of events leads to war? We know

that some of these independent variables are interactive and multiplicative (Senese and Vasquez 2003) and thus increase the probability of war. We also know that some variables additively increase the probability of war (Vasquez 2004). What we do not know, and what this paper will analyze, are the specific combinations suggested in the steps-to-war theory which are most likely to result in war. This research also follows and supports a wider effort to classify wars by type (Vasquez and Valeriano 2010). This research is useful in its ability to delineate combinational causal pathways to conflict and to test statistical significance in small case design.

Although a regression analysis can be employed to analyze data in which a medium number of cases exist (in our case the 79 interstate wars from 1816 to 1997), we use a method we believe offers more analytical insight into our specific case. The method will allow us to test the specific combinations sufficient to produce war as well as look at the domestic leadership characteristics present before the event.<sup>1</sup> This effort represents added evidence that the steps-to-war theory has strong explanatory power when the cases in question are studied in depth using qualitative techniques not typically utilized by international relations scholars.<sup>2</sup>

### **The Steps-to-War Theory**

The steps-to-war theory is an attempt to explain the onset of war and mainly suggests that power politics behavior is a leading cause of war. Vasquez (1983: 216) defines power politics as “actions based on an image of the world as insecure and anarchic which leads to distrust, struggles for power, interest taking precedence over norms and rules, the use of Machiavellian stratagems, coercion, attempts to balance power, reliance on self-help, and the use of force and war as the ultimo ratio.” Unfortunately, an international system based on power politics too often encourages states to view power as the only means by which to ensure their own security and survival (Morgenthau 1948).

This particular conceptualization of power politics and its role in international relations understands the use of force in terms of its utility (Michalak 2001, 1) with little concern given to the ability of power to create and maintain dangerous and hostile relations among states. The steps-to-war model (Vasquez 1993) holds that there are certain foreign policy choices states make that increase the probability of war occurring between a dyad. Territorial disputes, power politics (alliance building, hard-liners in power, and arms races), and rivalry (or recurring disputes) each move a state closer to war. “Power politics behavior, rather than preventing war, actually increases the probability that it will break out.” (Vasquez 1993, 7) While the probability of war increases with each step taken, war does not become inevitable. Given a range of available strategies states can end the movement towards war by settling an issue or decreasing their demands during a bargaining cycle (Leng 1983; 1993).

Central to the steps-to-war theory are the issues at stake in the conflict, the rivalry situation, the role of alliances, military buildups, and the domestic leadership attributes of the

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<sup>1</sup> Boolean relationships (Ragin 2001) clearly apply to many models in the field. In the past, it was typical (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita 1981, Levy 1981) to examine only the cases of interest but this practice has become rare in the field. The method utilized here is appropriate for the cases and process under investigation. While we can make claims regarding the sample under consideration, we do not make judgments about processes outside of war situations.

<sup>2</sup> The Senese and Vasquez (2008) volume provides for the most exhaustive statistical test of the theory. This project only seeks to support and further specify combinations and connections alluded to in large-N empirical studies.

states.<sup>3</sup> Interstate war almost always results from a dispute over an issue at stake between two states. The trigger for many wars is an issue (usually territory) on which two states disagree. Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) conceive of an issue-based approach to world politics where it is not important where values are allocated, but instead over what values entities fight over. Territorial issues constitute the most common cause of war (Holsti 1991; Vasquez and Henahan 2001). Territorial disputes are difficult to settle and resolve primarily because their value tends to exceed any rational calculations (Vasquez and Valeriano 2008). That is to say many rationalist approaches to war argue territory is often indivisible not in the physical sense but rather due to the extreme salience it holds for states.

Alliances are formal agreements between at least a pair of states that commit an entity to either intervene in a conflict, agree to remain neutral in a conflict, or to consult the other state if conflict occurs (Gibler and Sarkees 2002). Alliances can be used to project power beyond a state's initial capabilities, and may serve as instruments to manage national security objectives (Maoz 2000). Studies exploring the relationship between alliances and peace often show support for an opposite hypothesis, that alliances increase the probability of war (Gibler 2000).

An arms race signifies the rapid buildup of two opposing state's military capabilities. Arms races are a process by which two states compete to develop their arms to prevent attacks by the other state. Two main elements comprise the arms race relationship, interaction and acceleration (Richardson 1960; Sample 1998). The arms race process is relatively simple in that one state builds up its arms for either internal (budget, leadership tenure, or industry) or external (rivals, potential attack, or force modernization) reasons. This buildup compels a competing state to likewise buildup its own arms because of the security dilemma (Herz 1950). The response, according to balance of power logic (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), is to buildup one's own arms to counter the potential threat (Richardson 1960). This allows a window of opportunity to open in regards to conflict (Most, Starr et al. 1989).

Domestic politics is an increasingly important factor to consider when studying conflict. However, the literature involving the role of domestic political decision makers and foreign policy outcomes has traditionally adopted a case-study approach to evaluate theories of conflict rooted in domestic politics. Holsti (1962) was an early proponent of the role of 'belief systems' for domestic political actors arguing that leaders often form an image of the 'other' and then act accordingly. He used this approach to explain decision making processes involved with some of the major actors during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Similarly, Jervis (1968) expanded upon the notion of the belief system in his account of Soviet and American relations and argued that the psychological perceptions of leaders often produce critical misperceptions about the situation at hand that can drastically affect policy decision making.

Other scholars such as Lebow (1981) focused on domestic political actors highlighting (among other things) the role of competition between elite decision makers in crises as well as the danger of leaders relying too heavily upon standard operating procedures, which he argues contributed to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Snyder (1984) also investigated how domestic political actors can become caught up in certain strategies – offensive strategies, for example – even though these may not be the most rational courses of action. He argues the obsession with offensive strategies and plans was also a primary reason for the 1914 crisis. Recent accounts such as Hagan (1994) explain how political constraints upon domestic actors can vary widely

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<sup>3</sup> The steps-to-war theory should not be confused with the territorial explanation of war that posits that a certain class of warfare can explain the need for humans to demark territorial boundaries (Senese and Vasquez 2008).

depending on regime type. In addition, Hagan (1994) provides in-depth case study analysis to show how the individual beliefs and interests of leaders have often had a direct impact on the foreign policies of states. Some scholars even assert the democratic peace proposition is not appropriately understood because it fails to discuss or acknowledge how actual democratic *decision makers* affect the foreign policy outcomes of democratic states (Kegley and Hermann, 1994).

Although these and many other studies have provided important insight into the role of domestic political actors they have done so largely through the use of individual case studies. Our purpose here then is to recognize the important of domestic decision making and integrate such a variable into a more large scale, quantitative analysis of the factors that contribute to interstate war. Vasquez (1993) suggests that the context of decision-making in a crisis situation is always shaped by the domestic political context in which states operate. A key domestic factor that could push a state towards war is hardliners in power. Hardliners in power are prone to take intractable positions over favored issues. Accommodationists in power, on the other hand, will try to settle the issues under contention.<sup>4</sup> Rather than showing resolve and signaling the intent to use force, accommodationists may seek to find solutions to problems. A path out of war may present itself if an accommodationist gains power.

It is important to note here at the outset that although many scholars identify the importance of domestic leadership and although the steps-to-war theory clearly acknowledges leadership-type as a factor along the pathway to war there is little scholarship that has attempted to code this type of variable in studies of conflict and war. We posit this research as a much needed attempt to not only recognize but incorporate a variable that reflects the role of domestic leaders in the onset of war. Although care has been taken to construct a reasonable coding scheme we realize the rather strong (nearly collinear) findings we report later will concern some readers. However, these early statistical findings should be interpreted as both confirmation of the theoretical expectation as well as motivation for future studies to refine the domestic leadership coding scheme presented here for future studies. In the closing sections we offer some suggestions about how future studies may produce coding schemes that will offer a more nuanced account of domestic leadership type.

Rivalry is a condition whereby there is long-standing conflict of a militarized nature with an identified enemy. Vasquez (1993, 75-76) defines rivalry as a “relationship characterized by extreme competition, and usually psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are governed primarily by their attitude toward each other.” The source of that conflict may vary, but all that matters is denying some sort of gain to that rival. This produces a situation of relative positioning, which when coupled with power politics produces a scenario in which rival states tend to experience war more often than any other pair of states. Diehl and Goertz (2000) find that 39 of the 79 interstate wars between 1816 and 1992 occur during enduring rivalries (more than 6 disputes over 20 years).

It should be noted that rivalry, alliances, and the issue at stake are background structural factors that tend to endure. It is the factors arms races and hardliners that are likely triggers to war (proximate causes) since the events need to occur within a few years of the outcome.

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<sup>4</sup> Vasquez (1993) defines accommodationists as “individuals who have a personal predisposition that finds the use of force, especially war, repugnant, and advocates a foreign policy that will avoid war through compromise, negotiation, and the creation of rules and norms for non-violent conflict resolution.” Hardliners are “individuals who have a personal predisposition to adopt a foreign policy that is adamant in not compromising its goals and who argue in favor of the efficacy and legitimacy of threats and force.”

Recent research by Senese and Vasquez (2008) has found strong evidence of an interaction between territorial issues, alliance configurations, mutual military buildups, and repeated disputes prior to the onset of war. Looking at the interactions between the participants of World War II in the Asian region, Vasquez and Gibler (2001) find that the Second World War followed a typical pattern of the steps to war.<sup>5</sup> To this point, the steps-to-war theory has generated robust empirical results. Yet it remains to be investigated with a qualitative comparative method that includes the attributes of domestic leaders and uncovers casual combinations.

## **Hypotheses and Research Design**

The qualitative comparative method of analysis (QCA, Ragin 2000, see also Grofman and Schneider 2009) is a useful tool for international relations researchers who want to investigate hypotheses and analyze data with a medium number of cases (4 to 100 cases). With the method of qualitative comparative analysis (also known as boolean or fuzzy set analysis), we can analyze our particular set of explanatory variables in the context of the steps-to-war research program. The method used in this paper allows the investigators to add the domestic leadership variable into the analysis in a transparent manner. While some may disagree with our coding choices, these choices reflect the best application of the historical past possible at the time in the judgment of the authors.

Qualitative comparative analysis allows for the investigation of set relationships. Differing populations within an outcome group maybe of interest. For example, do major power wars have different characteristics than wars involving minor powers? Do complex wars (multiparty wars) have different patterns when compared to dyadic wars? This is an interesting theoretical question (see Vasquez and Valeriano 2010) and should be investigated with this method with subset analysis or adding dummy variables typical of conventional statistical analysis. Flaws of the method include the limited number of cases that are analyzed leading to selection effects concerns, the lack of the ability to look into omitted variable bias and control for opposing explanations, and the reliance on data input by the user to conduct analysis.

However, this method is again useful in the analysis and understanding of necessary and sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions involve cases in which each time the outcome is observed, the cause is present.<sup>6</sup> Sufficient conditions are cases in which each time the case is observed, the outcome is always present. Understood as complex causation, necessary and sufficient conditions require the combination of causes be observed for the outcome (necessary), and each combination results in the outcome (sufficient). In this paper, we will rely on Ragin's (2000, 114) cut point formula to determine if an event is "usually sufficient," "almost always sufficient", and "more often than not sufficient." "It is possible to assess the quasi-sufficiency of causal combinations using linguistic qualifiers such as "more often than not" (.5), "usually" (.65), and "almost always" (.80)." (Ragin 2000, 109) Cut points also can refer to necessity. Ragin (2000: 110) himself notes that the translation of linguistic qualifiers to proportions are to some extent arbitrary and the research can make their own choices in terms of cut points. We have chosen to use Ragin's cut points to keep the literature in the field consistent.

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<sup>5</sup> Vasquez (1996) also presents evidence for the European World War II cases.

<sup>6</sup> In this paper, we are discussing necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of those states that have observed war. We make no general assumptions about the probability of each factor under discussion here being necessary in the context of the entire sample of interacting states in the system.

The steps-to-war theory outlined in this project approaches the factors associated with war onset through the logic of jointly sufficient conditions. Each step towards war is considered a joint sufficient condition for an outcome of war. States are likely to initiate war when the causal path delineated herein occurs. Alliances, arms races, territorial issues, rivalry, and hardliners in power are events that can help produce war.

Necessary condition logic is not new in social science research, but has only recently been formalized as a method of causal analysis. Goertz and Starr (2003) list every instance of necessary conditions hypotheses in political science research. Scholars must be aware of the kinds of research designs they propose, as well as the implications of such proposals. A necessary condition research design entails that the researcher select on the dependent variable (Most and Starr 1989; Goertz and Starr 2003). This paper uses this logic in that all cases selected have experienced war. While this research design opens the paper up to selection effects concerns, these issues are minimized because this research is part of a larger research program that has previously dealt with some of these issues in prior publications (Senese and Vasquez 2005, 2008).

Hypotheses one through five deals with specific predictions made in the steps-to-war theory. Alliances, mutual military buildups, rivalry, territorial disputes, and hardliners in power may all be necessary conditions for war.

*H1: Pairs of states that experience war are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances prior to a war.*

*H2: Pairs of states that experience war are likely to have participated in mutual military buildups prior to a war.*

*H3: Pairs of states that experience war are likely to have had territorial disputes prior to a war.*

*H4: Pairs of states that experience war are likely to have had more than three militarized interstate disputes in a period of twenty years prior to a war.*

*H5: Pairs of states that experience war are likely to have hardliners in power before the war.*

Hypothesis six suggests a multi-causal sufficient theory of war onset. There are a variety of ways the proposed independent variables interact and/or combine to reach a certain outcome. The qualitative comparative method and the software designed to undertake these operations will suggest which types of causal connections can be made (Drass and Ragin 1999, Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2006). To start, this analysis suggests that the factors of politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, territorial disputes, rivalry, and hardliners in power combine to produce war.

*H6: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, have territorial disputes, experience rivalry, and have hardliners in power likely become involved in war.*

## **The Variables**

The unit of analysis herein is an originator war dyad. Joiners are excluded to allow for an examination of the path that triggers the war in the first place (see Valeriano and Vasquez 2010). The wars in this analysis are taken from the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees 2000; Sarkees, Wayman et al. 2003). There have been 79 wars from 1816 until 1997. Other information,

including revision type of the war has been taken from the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (Jones, Bremer et al. 1996). This dataset codes the revisionist issue claim prior to the militarized dispute. Much of this analysis was also influenced by Vasquez and Valeriano's (2010) discussion of war classification systems. The set relationships and causal conditions investigated flow from this earlier work.

A potential validity problem with using the MID that gives rise to a war is that the dispute in question may not embody the "real" underlying issue; the MID may escalate to war because the underlying hostility produced by previous disputes made things get out of control. To see if this might be a case we use a variable created by Vasquez and Leskiw (2001) that examines all the MIDs between these two parties to see whether their relations have been dominated primarily by disputes over territory, policy, regime, or "other." This variable is called "issue dominance" and provides an indicator of the issue dominating the relations of any dyad over time. To determine the issue that dominates the relations between a pair of states or dyad the revision type of all the pair's MID are examined and the modal revision type is taken as the indicator. If there is a tie, then all the types are taken as the indicator and the issue can be classified in any manner chosen by the investigator.<sup>7</sup>

According to Goertz and Diehl (1992; 1993), the rivalry population will include isolated conflicts (1-2 disputes), proto-rivalries (3-5 disputes), and enduring rivalries (6+ disputes over 20 years).<sup>8</sup> Diehl and Goertz (2000, plus the Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006 update) identify and produce a dataset that first accounts for all types of rivalry and then the militarized disputes that correspond with each rivalry.<sup>9</sup> In this analysis, we looked at whether or not there was an active rivalry prior to the war (were there at least 6 disputes prior to war dispute). Therefore, there are no wars of rivalry that include pairs of states that have not experienced the required number of disputes to account for a rivalry relationship.

Alliance information is taken from the correlates of war alliance dataset version 3.1 (Gibler and Sarkees 2002). A new measure of alliance involvement called politically relevant alliances is used as an independent variable. Senese and Vasquez (2003, 2008: 66-69) create a dataset of politically relevant alliances based on the conditions below. An alliance is classified as politically relevant to a specific dispute if the alliance includes a major power state or if the alliance is operative in the region of the main dispute.<sup>10</sup> Politically relevant alliances allow one to count only those alliances that can directly influence conflict behavior and eliminates needless noise in the alliance data. This new dataset is a significant advance from the usual operationalization of the alliance variable, where a positive observation is noted if there was any alliance present at all. Alliances where states are allied to each other are not counted as politically relevant alliances. Alliances that occur 3 months prior to war are excluded from the analysis. An alliance also must be active (legally in operation since most alliances have end dates and need to be re-ratified) in the year of the dispute. .

Mutual military buildups (or arms races), are taken from Sample's (2002) research who herself actually uses a measure of arms racing developed by Horn (1987). In his measure a buildup has to include an increase in the military expenditures for both sides in the dyad. A ten

<sup>7</sup> Ties that include territorial disputes are coded as territorial issue dominant. This occurred only once in our data.

<sup>8</sup> Isolated conflicts are not rivals. They are included in the study as the non-rival cases.

<sup>9</sup> Available at <http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/faculty/diehl.html>

<sup>10</sup> For example, an alliance between the United States and Japan would only be relevant for disputes in the Asian region. Japan's disputes with other states in different regions would not be counted as occurring during the operation of an alliance.



year average of military expenditures is taken to determine if there is an increase of at least 10 percent in military expenditures for both sides prior to a MID, and to ensure the arms race is actually accelerating, the last 5 years of the 10 year average must be increasing. Minor and major power status states are included in the dataset.

Hardliners and accommodationists prior to war represent a newly coded variable in this analysis. There are specific, methodological rules that are also used to code actors as hardliners or accommodationists (see Appendix A). Actors exhibiting inflexible demands on intractable issues have been coded as hardliners. In addition, actors proposing unreasonable compromises upon other states are treated as a hardliner states. It should be noted here any state with a leader considered 'hardline' should not be immediately assumed as a belligerent nation, or a state in violation of international law. This is most evident with MID's involving national independence; many of the conflicts involve actors and states who, in seeking legitimate sovereignty, must adopt and maintain hardline political policies. It must also be recognized that actors may exhibit the tendencies of hardliner actors to gain concessions in the context of a dispute. The theory proposed here suggests that it is not the underlying motivations of the actors that are important, but how the signals are interpreted by the other side. An accommodationist acting like a hardliner will only lead a state into a needless war when their gambit ultimately fails, and it typically does, in the context of the other variables present in the model.

In coding accommodationist actors, national leaders readily accepting treaties are coded as accommodationist, as are those who propose such provisions and meetings before conflict erupts. Accommodationists typically refer to institutional bodies or international law to settle disputes rather than escalate the conflict through threats. Obviously states not wishing to participate in a given conflict but which are attacked nonetheless are coded as accommodationist nations.

Some readers may question to what extent our research on domestic leadership compares to the work on institutional constraints and war (Buono de Mesquita et al 2003). The institutional constraints literature highlights the role of regime type and institutional structure in affecting the incentives and actions of domestic leaders. Certain regime types demand large win sets to be appeased before action may occur while, other regime types allow for a narrow win set to be dealt with before conflict can erupt. While combining institutional constraints with domestic leadership types as presented in Vasquez (1993) might be an interesting exercise, it is beyond the scope of our analysis because we have not yet begun to deal with the theoretical implications of selectorates on domestic leader type. Here, we are only concerned with leadership outcomes and not how leaders themselves became either hardliners or accommodationists.

It should be noted here that the incorporation of domestic leader type (hardliner/accommodationists) represents a rough attempt to capture the dyadic relationship between domestic leaders, their foreign policy behavior, and the onset of war.<sup>11</sup> It is a measure that should be considered as a general conception of two broadly defined types of domestic

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<sup>11</sup> While there are various actors that make up the policy portfolio of a state, we here have had to confine our analysis to the main domestic leader for each state. It would be impossible to measure the competing domestic interests within a state in way that produces a final coding determination since it would be unclear which actor (foreign minister, congressmen, or other various government employee) sets the final preference. This task is simplified by looking only at the leader who ultimately makes foreign policy, usually the president, prime minister, or monarch of each state. Therefore we are coding domestic leadership types herein and not just domestic actors.

actors, hardliners and accommodationists.<sup>12</sup> The conception of and coding guidelines for both types of actors should not be interpreted as definitive rules and measures but rather should introduce readers to an important strain of theoretical oriented literature which tries to parse out important differences in the leadership styles and the proclivities of domestic actors.<sup>13</sup>

The authors of this paper coded all the data for the main actors (usually initiating dyads) in the 79 wars and the domestic attributes of each leader prior to war (Appendix B lists all wars and coding decisions). To ensure reliability, two independent reviewers were commissioned where the operational rules were provided and the coding decisions were made again. Overall, 2/9s of the entire dataset were checked again, and the reliability was measured at 94% (17/18 cases). The negative case was rechecked and the original coding decision stood.

## **Set Relationships**

As mentioned previously, an important advantage of the fuzzy set method is the method's ability to delineate set relationships or group memberships. In this analysis, there will be two distinct sets or groups that will be analyzed for necessary and sufficient conditions. The first will be the status of the original dyad at war. The dyads were coded as jointly major powers, jointly minor powers, or mixed dyads. Steps-to-war theory is intended to suggest the path to war for equal powers so it would be appropriate to look at the steps in the context of status relationships.

The other set will be complex versus dyadic wars. Vasquez and Valeriano (2010) suggest that since all wars are not alike, it would be useful to create a typology of wars with the number of actors in a war a major consideration for a typology of war. Dyadic wars include two participants while complex wars include multiple actors. The most important distinction would be between complex and dyadic wars because their onset and diffusion processes are different.

## **Results and Analysis: Bivariate Statistics**

To give a general sense of the composition of our data we provide the basic bivariate statistics for important variables used in this analysis. Following Vasquez and Valeriano (2010), the data presented here looks at war as an outcome and codes the relevant variables in question prior to the occurrence of war. The qualitative comparative method can only look at combinational sufficient conditions in the context of set relationships (major-major powers), so it is first useful to look at the basic bivariate statistics for the dataset in order to investigate necessary conditions.

Table 1 presents a cross tabulation for the variables of status and complexity. There are only four major-major onset wars in the dataset. Three of those wars are between Russia and Japan. Mixed dyads represent 36 of the 79 total wars (45.6 percent). Minor-minor dyads account for 39 total wars (49.4 percent).

There are 51 purely dyadic wars in our dataset. Twenty eight complex wars with more than two parties are observed. Data for expected wars were calculated by multiplying the base probability for the event by the total observed. Expectations for observations of complex and

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<sup>12</sup> A more nuanced view of domestic regime types might include pragmatists (Obama), pacifists, and belligerents (Hitler). Our only goal here is to test the steps-to-war conditions in the context of observed wars so this is beyond the scope of this analysis.

<sup>13</sup> Milner and Rosendorff (1997) and Hagan (2001) have contributed a significant amount of insight into the identification and analysis of domestic actors' effects on international relations.

dyadic wars are in line with observed outcomes in most cases. It is interesting to observe that 15 of the total 28 complex wars occur between minor-minor status states. While minor states make up a majority of the states in the membership list, the story of complex war is typically one of major powers versus major powers.<sup>14</sup> A revision of that story might be in order to focus on the propensity of minor powers to fight minor powers and bring in further joiners to the conflict. Valeriano and Vasquez (2010) explore the complex war classification grouping and the group's dynamics more fully in a different analysis.

**Table 1 -Power Status and Complexity of War**

Status Type	Dyadic War Observed	Dyadic War Expected	Complex War Observed	Complex War Expected	Total
Major-Major	2	2.6	2	1.4	4 (5.06%)
Mixed	25	23.2	11	12.8	36 (45.57%)
Minor-Minor	24	25.2	15	13.8	39 (49.37%)

Exp. = base prob. \* total

Rivalry is a key for the analysis of war and peace. The prior history of conflict between states is an important consideration in whether or not to start a war due to the buildup of hostilities throughout history prior to deadly interactions. Table 2 presents the frequencies of rivalries observed prior to war. We find that 55 of the 79 wars (69.6%) were either proto or enduring rivals prior to the war occurring. Since a rivalry (more than 2 disputes) needs to be observed prior to a war, our results differ slightly from Diehl and Goertz's (2000) cross tabulations.<sup>15</sup>

**Table 2 - Rivalry Type and War**

Rivalry Type	#	Percent
No Rivalry	24	30.4
Proto or Enduring Rivalry	55	69.6

In this analysis, we have two different measures of how to code the issues at dispute between warring dyads. First, we look at the issue that initially brings rise to the war in the first place (Table 3). Using the MID coding, we find that 43 (54.4 percent) of the wars were directly over territorial issues. Six were over other or non applicable issues. There were 21 policy wars (26.6 percent) and 9 regime (11.4 percent) wars.

<sup>14</sup> Data of state system membership and status categorization, as well as interstate war participants can be found at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>

<sup>15</sup> A prior test showed that Thompson's (2001) strategic rivals occurred at a similar rate (54 percent of wars occurred between strategic rivals) prior to war when compared to the Diehl and Goertz (2000) method. We have dropped these cases from our analysis to save space since most results do not differ greatly unless noted.

**Table 3 - MID Revision Type and War**

Revision Type	#	Percent
N/A	2	2.5
Territory (1)	43	54.4
Policy (2)	21	26.6
Regime (3)	9	11.4
Other (4)	4	5.1

Another way to look at issues is to analyze the modal issue at stake between the dyad during its lifetime (Table 4). We call this measure issue dominance (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001). Here we see that 37 (46.8 percent) of the wars have been between states that fight mainly over territorial issues. Thirty three of the wars were fought over policy issues throughout the main war participant's lifetime. Finally, only seven of the wars were fought between pairs of states who fight over regime type issues.

**Table 4 - Issue Dominance and War**

Issue Dominance	#	Percent
NA	1	01.0
Territory	37	46.8
Policy	33	41.7
Regime	7	08.9
Other	1	01.0

Looking at alliances, we find that there are 54 wars fought between states that had relevant alliances (Table 5). This total represents 68.4 percent of the total possible wars. The findings for arms races are not as significant when one looks only at warring dyads (Table 5); only seven of the wars were fought between states engaged in an arms race (8.9 percent). Although this suggests arms races may not play a significant role in actual war dyads our results do not speak to the presence of arms races for those dyads not involved in war and nor do these results address the larger relationship between arms races and the onset of interstate conflict.

**Table 5 - Alliances/Arms Races and War**

	Alliance	%	Arms	%
No	25	31.6	72	91.1
Yes	54	68.4	7	08.9

After reviewing the tabulated data, the results for hardliner coding seem to correlate well with the original hypothesis (Table 6). The most significant finding is that 75 of 79 (94.9%) of states that are coded as Side A actors had hardliner actors in power.<sup>16</sup> This is in stark contrast

<sup>16</sup> Side A is simply the first actor to express a revisionist demand during a dispute in the Correlates of War coding (Jones, Bremer, Singer 1996). We make no decisions as to the originators of the dispute since first action is based on the first military action. Side B states may also be revisionist.

with Side A states having accommodationist leaders, of which only 4 of 79 (5.1%) became involved in an interstate war. These figures illustrate the effects of prewar conditions; of all actors exhibiting hardline positions prior to conflict, 94.9% ended up in war. Such a high percentage means a hardline state is almost always a necessary condition for interstate conflict.

It is frankly troubling sometimes to find that a factor is exhibited prior to war in almost all occasions and this finding motivated a more rigorous check of the data and revisions in the coding rules. In statistical research, we almost never find factors that are this closely correlated with an outcome. While this is troubling, it also must be remembered that the predictions in the steps-to-war theory were generated after reading and studying war for decades. Yet we must temper our reception of these initial results until the domestic leadership coding can be extended to all leaders throughout recent history so as to control for selection effects. Before this is done it cannot be ruled that our findings represent a tautology. The best method to study domestic leadership would be to code all domestic actors prior to elevation to office to uncover patterns, shifts, and stability in actor motivation. Unfortunately this coding is virtually impossible to undertake due to the time and resources required.

The results differ when observing incidences of war with respect to Side B states, meaning those states that reacted to an initial display or threat by Side A. The finding for Side B states led by hardliners shows that war occurred in 61 of the 79 (77.2%) cases. Seventy seven percent is lower than the nearly perfect correlation observed with Side A hardliners, yet it still constitutes a usually necessary condition for war (and is extremely close to being almost always necessary at 0.80).

Observing cases involving hardliners on both sides of a prewar context reveals 57 of these 79 cases (72.1%) developed into interstate war. This result suggests such conditions are usually necessary for interstate conflict. As expected, only 22 of the 79 interstate wars coded involved accommodationist leaders representing both sides of the conflict. This is a particularly strong finding supporting the hypothesis that prewar conditions involving accommodationists leaders will tend not to develop into war; in this study, it appears accommodationists on both sides are an important but not absolute condition for avoiding war.

**Table 6 - Hardliners and War**

Side A Only	#	Percent
No Hardliner	4	5.1
Hardliner	75	94.9

Side B Only	#	Percent
No Hardliner	18	22.8
Hardliner	61	77.2

Both Sides	#	Percent
No Hardliner	22	27.9
Hardliner	57	72.1

## Necessity, Coverage, and Consistency<sup>17</sup>

We now move to interpreting necessity of factors prior to the onset of interstate war. In interpreting these results and percentages we will refer to them based on the accepted thresholds of ‘more often than not necessary, usually necessary, and almost always necessary’. The first threshold is met with any result above 0.50, or 50% to 0.65. ‘Usually necessary’ conditions involve results ranging from 0.66 to 0.79, with ‘almost always necessary’ conditions found above 0.80. The findings of this research project span the entirety of these thresholds with 94.9% at the very top level of almost always necessary.

It is also important to present results for consistency and coverage of various factors prior to war. Consistency represents the proportion of subset or set that observes the factor(s) under consideration. Coverage represents the proportion of total observations for the independent variable under consideration that are covered by the subset or set under consideration. Coverage simply reports the percentage of observed cases and is mainly relevant for set analysis. Coverage is useful for the investigation of the number of cases an explanation covers in a dataset.

As far as necessity goes for all the warring dyads in the dataset, Table 7 suggests there are four necessary conditions for interstate war, with three of those conditions achieving statistical significance. Territorial disputes prior to a war are observed in 43 of the 79 cases in the data representing a consistency of 0.54. The pvalue for the factor is 0.25 which is not statistically significant. When analyzing the entire category of warring dyads in Table 7, all factors experience a coverage score of 1.00 since the entire sample is represented. Coverage will become more important when we move to set relationships within the interstate war category.

For rivalry, 55 of the 79 wars are wars of rivalry. This suggests that a consistency score of 0.70 for the entire dataset. The pvalue for this factor is 0.000 suggesting these findings are statistically significant. These two statistics confirm that rivalry is an important and necessary condition for war.

The factors of hardline leaders and relevant alliances reach a high proportion and are statistically significant. Using only the hardliner on the Side A variable, we find that 75 of the 79 cases have hardliners in power. Side A is used since these leaders are typically driving the disputes, but this might not always be the case. Consistency for this factor is 0.95 and the factor is statistically significant at 0.000. Since consistency is so high for this variable, it would be interesting to explore the wars that do not have hardliners in power in the Side A state, rather than exploring the hardliner cases.<sup>18</sup>

Alliances also demonstrate a high consistency score at 0.68. Fifty four of the 79 cases have experienced alliances prior to the war. The factor is statistically significant at 0.001. Lastly, mutual military buildups do not score well in our data. This factor only achieves a consistency score of 0.09 showing that less than 10 percent of all wars experience an arms race prior to its occurrence. Using the Ragin cut points for the evaluation of necessity we find that the hardliner variable is almost always necessary for interstate war. Alliances and rivalry are

<sup>17</sup> The users guide (Ragin 2006) to the software can be found at <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/index.shtml>. All estimation procedures and technical processes are detailed within.

<sup>18</sup> The four wars are the Russo-Japanese, World War II, Palestine, and Russo-Hungarian. During World War II, the allied powers are considered actor A since they declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. All other wars indicate the actors are accommodationists but transitioning to hardliners. Due to our coding rules, the shift to hardliner strategy occurs too close to the onset of war to count as a true hardliner actor.

usually necessary for the onset of war. Territory disputes are ‘more often than not’ necessary for interstate war but fail to reach statistical significance.

**Table 7 - Results for Analysis of Necessity for All Warring Dyads**

(Goertz and Diehl rivalry and Territory MID Revision Code)

N= 79

Causal Condition	Cases	Consistency	Coverage	PValue
Territorial Dispute	43	0.54	1.00	0.25
Mut. Mil. Buildup	7	0.09	1.00	NR*
Rivalry	55	0.70	1.00	0.000
Hardliner Side A	75	0.95	1.00	0.000
Relevant Alliance	54	0.68	1.00	0.001

NR = software does not report p-value for this variable

Necessary conditions for the four war subsets were analyzed and reveal some interesting findings. The first subset analyzed is the major power war subset (Table 8). There are only four wars with major powers on both sides at the start. The factors of relevant alliances and territorial disputes both reach statistical significance and a consistency level of 1.0. Reaching a consistency level of 1.0 suggests that all cases in the subset (the major power wars) have territory and alliances as absolute necessary conditions.

Mutual military buildups and rivalry each achieve a consistency score of 0.75 (meaning 3 cases meet the conditions) but the factors are not statistically significant. Oddly enough, two of the four cases where there is no hardliner on Side A occur in the major power subset (reaching a consistency score of 0.50). Another interesting result for the major power subset is that the coverage proportion of the mutual military buildup factor reaches 0.43 (all others don’t rise above 0.09). This means that a sizeable proportion of the arms races in the dataset occur in the major power war subset.

**Table 8 - Results for Analysis of Necessity for Major Power Subset**

(D+G Rivals)

N= 79, Cases with outcome = 4

Causal Condition	Cases	Consistency	Coverage	PValue
Territorial Dispute	4	1.00	0.09	0.063
Mut. Mil. Buildup	3	0.75	0.43	0.313
Rivalry	3	0.75	0.05	0.313
Hardliner Side A	2	0.50	0.03	0.68
Relevant Alliance	4	1.00	0.07	0.063

**Results for Analysis of Joint Sufficiency for Major Power Wars**

N= 79, Outcome=4 Test Proportion: 0.50 \*p<0.10

Causal Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases
Alliance, Territory	3	0.667
Alliance, Arms, Territory	2	0.500
Rivalry, Alliance, Arms, Territory	4	0.500
Rivalry, Alliance, Arms Hardliner A, Terr	4	0.500

The next subset analyzed is the non-major power status war subset (Table 9). All non-major power dual dyad originators were collapsed into this category for the ease of analysis. Hardliner actors, rivalry, and relevant alliances meet the required proportions for necessity and are all statistically significant factors. Territorial disputes are more often than not necessary, reaching a consistency level of 0.52, yet the factor is not statistically significant.

**Table 9 - Results for Analysis of Necessity for Non-Major Power Subset**

N= 79, Cases with outcome = 75

Causal Condition	Cases	Consistency	Coverage	PValue
Territory Revision	39	0.52	0.91	0.41
Mut. Mil. Buildup	4	0.05	0.57	NR
Rivalry	52	0.69	0.95	0.001
Hardliner Side A	73	0.97	0.97	0.000
Relevant Alliance	50	0.67	0.93	0.003

**Results for Analysis of Joint Sufficiency for Non-Major Power Wars**

N= 79, Outcome=75 Test Proportion: 0.50 \*p<0.10

Causal Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases
Rivalry, Alliance, Hardliner A	19	0.25
Rivalry, Alliance, Hardliner A, Terr	19	0.25

There are 28 complex wars in the dataset. For this subset, the factors of hardliner actors, rivalry, and relevant alliances reach the required proportions and are statistically significant (Table 10). Territorial disputes as a factor come close to being statistically significant at 0.172 yet the consistency score is 0.61. Just like the major power war subset, we also find that there are three mutual military buildups in the complex war subset reaching a coverage level of 0.43.

**Table 10 - Results for Analysis of Necessity for Complex War Subset**

N= 79, Cases with outcome = 28

Causal Condition	Cases	Consistency	Coverage	PValue
Territory Revision	17	0.61	0.40	0.172
Mut. Mil. Buildup	3	0.11	0.43	NR
Rivalry	22	0.79	0.40	0.002
Hardliner Side A	26	0.93	0.35	0.000
Relevant Alliance	25	0.89	0.46	0.000

**Results for Analysis of Joint Sufficiency for Complex Wars**

N= 79, Outcome=28 Test Proportion: 0.50 \*p<0.10

Causal Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases
Rivalry, Alliance, Hardliner A, Terr	19	0.68

The final relevant subset of wars analyzed is dyadic wars. There are 51 dyadic wars in the dataset. Here the factors of relevant alliances, territory, hardliner actors, and rivalry reach the required proportions yet only the hardliner factor reaches statistical significance (Table 11).



Obviously we can make few claims about dyadic wars overall since statistical significance is not reached for most factors.

**Table 11 - Results for Analysis of Necessity for Dyadic War Subset**

N= 79, Cases with outcome = 51

Causal Condition	Cases	Consistency	Coverage	PValue
Territory Revision	26	0.51	0.60	0.50
Mut. Mil. Buildup	4	0.08	0.57	NR
Rivalry	33	0.65	0.60	0.25
Hardliner Side A	49	0.96	0.65	0.00
Relevant Alliance	29	0.57	0.54	0.20

**Results for Analysis of Joint Sufficiency for Dyadic Wars**

N= 79, Outcome=51 Test Proportion: 0.50 \*p<0.10

Causal Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases
Rivalry, Hardliner A	4	0.07
Rivalry, Hardliner A, Terr	7	0.13

**Jointly Sufficient Conditions**

To analyze jointly sufficient conditions, the arms race variable was dropped from the analysis. This variable hindered the analysis in that the absence of arms races became jointly sufficient for war (resulting in the investigation of many false positives theoretically). This is not the case empirically for a large-N dataset, but with a dataset with only 79 cases, the strong negative findings for this factor will hinder and muddy up jointly sufficient causal analysis.

Table 12 presents analysis for the joint necessity of factors for all the warring dyads in the sample. This is called joint necessity since we are not using a subset thus this analysis cannot be a sufficient condition analysis since there is no set variation. Various combinations of two variables (excluding mutual military buildups) at any one time are common throughout the analysis. The variables of territory, rivalry, alliances, and hardliners in power are jointly necessary for 19 total cases. The joint conditions mentioned here are statistically significant.

**Table 12 - Results for Analysis of Joint Necessity for All Warring Dyads**

N= 79 Test Proportion: 0.50 \*p<0.10

Causal Combination	# Cases	Proportion of Cases	P
Rivalry+ Alliance+ Hardliner	19	0.24	0.00
Rivalry+ Alliance+ Hardline + Territory	19	0.24	0.00

Solution: Rivalry, Alliance, No Arms, Hardliner A  
Fit Measure .481

There are some notable jointly sufficient cases for the major power war subset (Table 8). Alliances and territorial disputes are jointly necessary for 3 cases in the subsample. The non-major power subset produces similar results to the entire warring states sample. There are 19 cases where rivalry, alliances, hardliners, and territorial disputes are jointly necessary (Table 9).

Looking at the complex war set, we find that there are 19 cases where rivalry, alliances, hardliners, and territorial disputes are jointly sufficient for the onset of a complex war. Table 10 shows the sample proportion to be 0.63. Table 11 demonstrates there are few jointly sufficient cases for the dyadic war subset.

## **Assessment**

A majority of wars occur in a rivalry. In relation to territorial disputes, over half of the wars are fought directly over territory (54.4 percent). When the issue dominance measure is used, territory accounts for 46.8 percent of the wars. For alliances, 68.4 percent of all wars are fought with at least one side having an active relevant alliance. The coding of hardliners in power during wars is a new variable added to the analysis of warfare. For initiators, 94.9 percent of all wars had a hardliner in power. Both sides have hardliners in power for 72.1 percent of all interstate wars. Both of these numbers indicate how conflict might be triggered if a hardliner is in power, as Vasquez (1993) suggests.

In terms of necessary conditions for all warring dyads, the statistically significant factors are rivalry, hardline actors, and relevant alliances. Territorial disputes do not reach statistical significance, but represent 54 percent of the entire sample. While this finding may be troubling for the territorial explanation of war, it must be remembered that the steps-to-war theory is different from the territorial explanation of war. The steps-to-war theory encompasses the territorial explanation but also suggests that other issues, when handled with power politics tactics, can lead to war (Senese and Vasquez 2008). Vasquez and Valeriano (2010) discuss types of war and suggest that different theories have different domains. The domain of the territorial explanation of war is located solely with those wars that have territorial elements. The theory makes no pretensions of being universalistic (Vasquez and Valeriano 2010).

In regards to sufficiency, the arms race variable was dropped from the analysis. This shows that the factor is not jointly sufficient for the onset of war. This would falsify part of hypothesis six, but not the whole proposition. Arms races work as a factor predicting the onset of war from the dyadic dispute standpoint, but not from the individual war standpoint. This is because the event is so rare, each instance of an arms race in the context of a MID leads to strong correlations with the outcome of war. Yet, only seven wars have ongoing arms races during the outbreak of the event. These results present a challenge to arms race scholars and highlight the need for new examinations of the process of arms races.

Hypothesis six suggests that pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, have territorial disputes, experience rivalry, and have hardliners in power become involved in war. This hypothesis would have to be rewritten as pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, have territorial disputes, experience rivalry, and have hardliners in power become likely to be involved in war. Support for this hypothesis is found in Tables 7 and 12. The wars with these combined factors in operation are listed in Table 13. It might be interesting to investigate each individual case and tell the story of the road to war as it followed the power politics course.

**Table 13 - Wars with at least three variables present, N=25**

Assam (Sino-Indian)
Austro-Sardinian
Changkufeng
Ethiopian-Somalian
Falklands
First Balkan
Franco-Thai
Gulf War
Iran-Iraq
Israeli-Egyptian
Italian Unification
Italo-Ethiopian
Korean
Manchurian
Nomonhan
Pacific
Russo-Finnish
Second Balkan
Second Kashmir
Seven Weeks
Sino-Japanese
Six Day
Ugandan-Tanzanian
World War I
Yom Kippur

It might be useful to briefly compare the results in this analysis to other steps-to-war investigations. The analysis in Vasquez (2004) allows the best opportunity for us to do so since that article contains simple probability models that demonstrate that as variables are added, the probability of war increases. Of course, probabilities are not the same as raw percentages of outcomes as presented here but the results do line up very well. For example, Vasquez (2004) notes there is a .524 probability that a territorial dispute will escalate to war when territory is dominant and we find that that there is a coverage rate of 54 percent for the territorial variable for all warring dyads. Other results for consistency and coverage apply in a similar manner to the results as presented by Vasquez (2004: 17) yet further comparisons are inadequate since the methodology is different. The work of Vasquez and Valeriano (2010) and Valeriano and Vasquez (2010) presents of the raw percentages further explored herein. This research only reaffirms the utility of the some of the variables and demonstrates that most of these factors are not random occurrences in the war data.

### **Selection Effects**

Selection effects may be a concern for this analysis. Selection effects are relevant for any type of analysis that looks only at the outcome of events and not the process leading up to the event (King, Keohane et al. 1994, 203; Lemke and Reed 2001). Herein, our research is open to

claims of selection bias in that the coding of domestic actors is dependent on the event of war being observed. In the absence of war, we know nothing of the process and interactions between domestic actors and interstate conflict. This limitation is clear, yet it is also unclear how much of an impact selection effects has on outcomes in general. Studies by other scholars (Bennett, Baker et al. 2002; Braitwaite and Palmer 2003, Senese and Vasquez 2003) demonstrate that selection effects can have a minimal impact on results. Other studies demonstrate the opposite (Reed 1999, Signorino 2000).

If this research were to make claims regarding the impact of hardliners on conflict in general we would be in danger of making claims that are exceeding the bounds of our data. Yet, this analysis clearly looks at only those states that have gone to war. This analysis can say nothing of those states that do not end up in war or the theory behind the steps-to-war in regards to non-war actions and foreign policy events. Here, we only have ambitions to make claims regarding the observed cases of war. Since we study only the cases of observed war we can only make claims regarding the course of observed wars. It is our hope that this research encourages others to investigate the veracity of our claims in the context of all conflict operations.

There may well be a selection effect at work in this research, but this should not prevent one from studying the research question in the first place. Fear of a selection effect should not impair the course of research. We only seek to make some initial claims regarding the impact of domestic leaders on wars. One can learn a lot from studies that select on a dependent variable. Before this research was undertaken, one could not make the claim that the majority of wars in a system occur with the presence of hardliner actors. In this context we have delineated a few common paths to war which include the impact of domestic leadership. Others may demonstrate that the results are confined only to the cases of war, yet this research is a necessary first step before one can move on to step two and investigate the claim in the context of all interactive dyads.

Lastly, it is important to reiterate that the coding scheme employed in this research represents an earnest but first attempt to systematically identify and report the effects of different types of domestic leaders on the likelihood of war. The empirical results regarding the relationship between hardliners and war are indeed nearly perfectly correlated (at least for incidents where war occurred). However, this again should be taken as at least early partial if imperfect evidence regarding the relationship between domestic leadership and war. Most importantly, we hope our early attempt motivates others to continue this specific line of research and to develop more and better coding strategies of domestic leaders. A more nuanced approach to coding leadership type than used here would allow for more variation in the statistical relationships between leaders and war and therefore more robust and less tautologically inclined conclusions. There are at least two possible ways future attempts could improve upon our efforts here.

First, we have relied primarily on historical accounts of the decisions or leaders in our coding of hardliners and accommodationists. These historical accounts are themselves interpretations of the decisions and thought processes of leaders in the lead up to the cases of war we examine. An ideal coding scheme would be able to assess the true desires and beliefs of a leader without any intermediary interpretations or speculation (be it by an historian or political scientist). Although this is impossible, one acceptable strategy might involve the use of primary writings and manuscripts of the leaders themselves. Many historical leaders and statesmen author manifestos and documents in which they reveal and discuss their beliefs regarding a wide range of topics of which war and conflict are often central themes. Even post-tenure memoirs

would be of use if they were accurate reflections and accounts of the leader's particular decision making and disposition during the lead up to war. Such source material would inevitably involve more legwork for the researcher (and may not even be available in all cases) but would pay dividends in the realm of coding accuracy and validity.

Besides source material, it may also be useful to look at the context in which different leaders operate. Specifically, the domestic political system in which a leader operates often has a direct impact on the types of decisions made. An authoritarian leader is not constrained by a domestic audience in the same way as a democratic leader. This has important implications for a coding scheme because one could argue the decisions and behavior of an authoritarian leader can be reasonably interpreted as the true preference of such a leader whereas a democratic leader may be forced by the domestic constituency to pursue a policy he or she might otherwise not prefer. For example, suppose that in the lead up to a particular war a democratic populace is strongly in favor of a hardline foreign policy and strategy while the democrat leader (the president or prime minister) is not but employs a foreign policy consistent with the public's desire in order to avoid electoral consequences. How might such a decision be coded? It is clear the actual leader was not a hardliner yet the hardline policy is instituted, nonetheless. This is a decision that would be left to the coder but one that cannot exist lest a more nuanced account of the domestic political context be taken into account.

## Conclusion

According to the steps-to-war theory, war is brought about by a series of power politics tactics being utilized. This analysis largely confirms the theory in light of a medium case analysis. The only negative finding is in relation to arms races. There are only seven arms race wars so the factor cannot meet any definition of necessity and sufficiency.

At this stage, it would also be important to extend the new analysis of domestic hardliners to all possible dyads. In this way we could be confident that domestic hardliners are a probabilistic positive factor for the onset of war. By selecting on the dependent variable, we know that a majority of wars have this factor present but we can suggest nothing about the cases where there is no war.

The qualitative comparative method is a useful tool to supplement statistical analysis. To this point many statistical studies have confirmed the steps-to-war hypothesis but we can learn much by studying the dynamics of the individual wars. This research shows continued support for the steps-to-war research program and demonstrates that the factor of domestic hardliner actors is evident in most cases of war.

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## **Appendix A**

### **Coding guidelines for Hardliners and Accommodationists**

The historical synopses of the road to war should be read through entirely for each case. Based on the scholarly accounts of each of the most important domestic leaders on both sides, a determination of whether the primary domestic leader acted as a hardliner or an accommodationist before war erupted should be made based on the following criterion.

Coders investigated cases as far as two years prior to the war and up until 3 months. We had a 3 month cut off to duplicate the alliance measure so we do not capture shifts that occur late as a war is about to begin. We only go as far as two years back to make sure the actions and posturing of a leader is relevant for dispute we are referring to. Going further back might add in noise regarding other disputes or issues unconnected to the dispute in question. Going further back in time might also miss much on the context leadership (rivalry) makes in determining strategy.

Classification of a domestic leader as either hardliner or accommodationist follows the guidelines specified below.

#### Guidelines for coding HARDLINERS:

- (1) They will use power politics (demonstrations of resolve and force) in prewar negotiations and diplomacy as a means to political ends, even rejecting pre-conflict peace treaties or summons for negotiations.
- (2) They will see coercion as a first option, not a last.
- (3) They will use coercion and power politics even when the outcome will be completely uncertain (such as a conflict between equals) or when it is obvious that his state will lose the war.
- (4) They may pursue war to the extreme detriment of his and others' peoples; he/she will probably have a history of initiated interstate conflict and/or war.

#### Guidelines for coding ACCOMMODATIONISTS:

- (1) Accommodationists see war as not only a last option, but also as an irrational option,
- (2) Accommodationists avoid war at all costs, perhaps by readily accepting treaties or proposing such provisions themselves, even if these actions are detrimental to their own standing as a leader.
- (3) Accommodationists typically appeal to international institutions, international law, or allies for assistance prior to war rather than resorting to displays of force.
- (4) Responses to coercive and threatening action typically take the form of non-force level responses, such as embargos, blockades, trading bans, and suspension of diplomatic exchanges.
- (5) An accommodationist might participate in a form of passive resistance to avoid conflict.

## Appendix B

### Domestic Leadership Coding Results

War	Start Year	Side A	Side B
Anglo-Egyptian War	1882	Egypt: hardliner	Great Britain: hardliner
Anglo-Persian War	1856	England: hardliner	Iran: hardliner
Austro-Prussian War	1866	Prussia: hardliner	Austria: hardliner
Austro-Sardinian War	1848	Sardinia-Piedmont: hardliner	Austria: accommodationist
Bangladesh War	1971	Pakistan: hardliner	Indian: hardliner
Boxer Rebellion	1900	China: hardliner	United States: hardliner
Chaco War	1932	Bolivia: hardliner	Paraguay: accommodationist
Changkufeng	1938	Russia: hardliner	Japan: hardliner
Crimean War	1853	Great Britain: hardliner	Russia: accommodationist
Ecuadorian-Colombian War	1863	Ecuador: hardliner	Colombia: hardliner
Ethiopian-Somalian War	1977	Somalia: hardliner	Ethiopia: accommodationist
Falklands War	1982	Argentina: hardliner	Great Britain: hardliner
First Balkan War	1912	Bulgaria: hardliner	Ottoman Empire: accommodationist
First Central American War	1885	Guatemala: hardliner	El Salvador: hardliner
First Kashmir War	1948	Pakistan: hardliner	India: hardliner
First Schleswig-Holstein War	1848	Denmark: hardliner	Prussia: hardliner
Franco-Mexican War	1862	France: hardliner	Mexico: hardliner
Franco-Prussian War	1870	France: hardliner	Prussia: hardliner
Franco-Spanish War	1823	France: hardliner	Spain: hardliner
Franco-Thai War	1893	France: hardliner	Siam (Thailand): hardliner
Franco-Thai War	1940	Thailand: hardliner	France: hardliner
Franco-Turkish War	1919	Turkey: hardliner	France: accommodationist
Greco-Turkish	1897	Greece: hardliner	Turkey: hardliner
Greco-Turkish War	1919	Turkey: hardliner	Greece: hardliner
Gulf War	1990	United States: hardliner	Iraq: hardliner
Hungarian-Allies War	1919	Hungary: hardliner	Romania: hardliner
Iran-Iraq War	1980	Iraq: hardliner	Iran: accommodationist
Israeli-Egyptian War	1969	Israel: hardliner	Egypt: hardliner
Israeli-Syrian (Lebanon) War	1982	Lebanon: hardliner	Israel: hardliner
Italian Unification	1859	Austria: hardliner	Piedmont-Sardinia: hardliner
Italo-Ethiopian War	1935	Italy: hardliner	Ethiopia: accommodationist
Italo-Sicilian War	1860	Piedmont-Sardinia (Italy): hardliner	Sicily: hardliner
Italo-Turkish War	1911	Italy: hardliner	Turkey: accommodationist
Korean War	1950	North Korea: hardliner	South Korea: accommodationist
La Plata (Brazilian-Argentinean)	1851	Brazil: hardliner	Argentina: hardliner
Lithuanian-Polish War	1919	Poland: hardliner	Lithuania: accommodationist
Lopez War	1864	Paraguay: hardliner	Brazil: hardliner
Manchurian War	1931	Manchuria: hardliner	Japan: hardliner
Mexican-American War	1846	United States: hardliner	Mexico: hardliner
Nomohan War	1939	Russia: hardliner	Japan: hardliner
Pacific War	1879	Bolivia: hardliner	Chile: hardliner
Palestine War	1948	Arab League: accommodationist	Israel: hardliner

Roman Republic War	1849	Italy (the Republic): hardliner	France: hardliner
Russo-Finnish War	1939	Russia: hardliner	Finland: hardliner
Russo-Hungarian War	1956	Russia: accommodationist	Hungary: hardliner
Russo-Japanese War	1904	Japan: accommodationist	Russia: hardliner
Russo-Polish War	1919	Poland: hardliner	Russia: hardliner
Russo-Turkish War	1828	Russia: hardliner	Ottoman Empire: accommodationist
Russo-Turkish War	1877	Russia: hardliner	Turkey: hardliner
Saudi-Yemeni War	1934	Saudi Arabia: hardliner	Yemen: accommodationist
Second Balkan War	1913	Serbia: hardliner	Bulgaria: hardliner
Second Central American War	1906	Guatemala: hardliner	Honduras: accommodationist
Second Kashmir War	1965	Pakistan: hardliner	India: hardliner
Second Schleswig-Holstein War	1864	Denmark: hardliner	Holy Roman Empire: hardliner
Sinai War	1956	Egypt: hardliner	Israel: hardliner
Sino-French War	1884	France: hardliner	China: hardliner
Sino-Indian War	1962	China: hardliner	India: accommodationist
Sino-Japanese War	1894	China: hardliner	Japan: hardliner
Sino-Japanese War	1937	China: hardliner	Japan: hardliner
Sino-Soviet War	1929	Russia: hardliner	China: accommodationist
Sino-Vietnamese War	1979	China: hardliner	Vietnam: hardliner
Sino-Vietnamese War	1985	China: hardliner	Vietnam: hardliner
Six Day War	1967	Egypt: hardliner	Israel: hardliner
Football War	1969	El Salvador: hardliner	Honduras: hardliner
Spanish Moroccan War	1859	Morocco: hardliner	Spain: hardliner
Spanish-American War	1898	Spain: hardliner	United States: accommodationist
Spanish-Chilean War	1865	Spain: hardliner	Peru: hardliner
Spanish-Moroccan War	1909	Spain: hardliner	Morocco: accommodationist
Third Central American War	1907	Nicaragua: hardliner	Honduras: hardliner
Turco-Cypriot War	1974	Turkey: hardliner	Cyprus: hardliner
Ugandan-Tanzanian War	1978	Uganda: hardliner	Tanzania: hardliner
Vietnamese War	1965	United States: hardliner	Vietnam: hardliner
Vietnamese-Cambodian War	1975	Cambodia: hardliner	Vietnam: hardliner
World War I	1914	Austria-Hungary: hardliner Great Britain: accommodationist	Serbia: hardliner
World War II	1939	Germany: hardliner	Germany: hardliner
Yom Kippur War	1973	Egypt: hardliner	Israel: hardliner
Sino-Russian	1900	Russia: hardliner	China: hardliner
Fourth Central American	1907	Nicaragua: hardliner	Honduras: hardliner
Italo-Roman	1860	Italy: hardliner	Papal States: hardliner