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How Transnational Advocacy Networks Mobilize: Applying the Literature on Interest Groups to International Action

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Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) receive increasing attention in international relations, but little has been written so far about the initial formation of networks and the ways concerned organizations or individuals build a transnational coalition. Difficulties of group mobilization pose a particular puzzle: Why do actors in one country organize around an issue in another country, especially when the resolution of the issue apparently benefits only local actors? When do national/international groups become active and how do local actors facilitate their mobilization? In this paper I argue that in order to get support from international organizations, local groups acting as entrepreneurs will frame the issue in a way attractive to the international organization. I apply concepts of interest group formation and mobilization to the case of the transnational advocacy network that formed in response to near-extirmination of black-necked swans in the Carlos Anwandter Natural Sanctuary in southern Chile after the opening of a pulp mill in 2004.

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) have received increasing attention in international relations in recent years. Some TANs form in response to local problems, like recent resistance to the construction of dams in Chile’s Patagonia region; others coalesce around issues affecting many countries at once, like the international campaign to ban landmines (Mekata 2000), and others still contribute to the development and spread of norms, e.g. the rise to prominence of international women’s issues (Brown Thompson 2002). The main focus of previous research has been the question whether a specific campaign was successful in affecting domestic or international policy, and most

1 I would like to thank Professor Michael Huelshoff of the Department of Political Science at the University of New Orleans for bringing the case to my attention, for sharing the data he collected and for his advice throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the previous draft of this paper. The author can be contacted at ckiel@uno.edu.
of the literature focuses on campaigns that achieve their goals (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mekata 2000; Donnelly 2002). Little has been written so far about the initial formation of networks and the ways concerned organizations or individuals build a transnational coalition. Difficulties of group mobilization pose a particular puzzle, especially for TANs that address local issues: Why do actors in one country organize around an issue in another country when its resolution apparently benefits only local actors? When do national/international groups become active and how do local actors facilitate their mobilization?

Existing literature on TANs combines concepts of the social movements literature (Tarrow 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005) with constructivist theories on norms (Risse 2000) and organizational theory on networks (Powell 1990). I propose that the literature in interest group formation can enrich the developing TAN field by explicitly modeling group mobilization. Clark and Wilson’s (1961) work on incentives and types of organizations and Salisbury’s (1969) “group entrepreneurs” can inform concepts used in the context of transnational advocacy, like the boomerang model developed by Keck and Sikkink (1998; see also Risse and Sikkink 1999).

I apply concepts of interest group formation and mobilization to the particular case of the transnational advocacy network that formed in response to near-extinction of black-necked swans in the Carlos Anwandter Natural Sanctuary in southern Chile after the opening of a CELCO pulp mill in 2004. Local fishermen unions and tourism proponents fought the company, part of the industrial giant Arauco, demanding closure of the pulp mill they saw responsible for the demise of the birds. The local actors were supported by national NGOs, international groups, and even got the attention of the European Parliament. Seven years after the plant opened, and six years since coordinated action on several levels was initiated, the pulp mill is still operating, international attention has faded, and local action has ceased. This paper focuses on the initial mobilization of the international network. It joins recent contributions to the TAN literature probing motives of those making up advocacy networks (Mitchell and Schmitz 2011, Carpenter 2011). My results show that beyond the analysis of TAN and target characteristics, a thorough assessment of TAN mobilization and success requires considerations of the dynamics between TAN members and within individual
organizations considering participation. Shared ideological convictions—underlined by the early TAN literature (Keck and Sikkink 1998)—are a necessary but not a sufficient factor for the emergence of a TAN.

Most groups with an international focus are primarily interested in “big change” (e.g., stopping climate change or ending hunger worldwide). They increasingly use the international system to shape or create norms to this affect (Risse 2000). But despite their global approach, these groups need local issues. Local struggles can illuminate broader problems. They can become symbols. And they show that the group is taking action. International groups, therefore, have a strong interest in taking on local issues and campaigning in support of them. But how do they decide which local campaign they will take on?

I argue that in order to get support from international organizations, local groups trying to influence the organization’s decision whether to become active in the campaign will frame the issue in a way attractive to the international organization. The international actor will join a campaign if the frame fits the organization’s broader mission and goals. My case study lends initial support to my hypothesis.

Literature Review

I first give a brief overview of the transnational advocacy literature and then show how research of interest group mobilization can further our understanding of TAN mobilization. Faced with a collective action problem people involved in advocacy need to offer selective incentives to potential participants. These benefits can be non-material, in particular when the campaign centers on ideological goals. Drawing on the literature of cultural framing, I develop my argument that local group entrepreneurs use different narratives of the campaign goals to attract different supporters.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) formalized the concept of transnational advocacy networks (TANs). The authors define TANs as “networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation” (p.1). Networks have worked towards international justice, women’s rights, environmental
protection on international and local levels, and other issue areas.\textsuperscript{3} These networks usually consist of individuals and non-governmental organizations, but governmental and sub-governmental actors can play decisive roles. According to the literature, TANs develop in a number of ways. Sometimes they are planned in a meeting of like-minded activists (e.g. Mekata 2000). Other times a network develops out of existing contacts that coalesce and intensify around a specific issue (e.g. Evangelista 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). One organization or small collective may start a campaign and other actors join the effort (e.g. Donnelly 2002). And sometimes local groups reach out to international organizations or sympathizers (e.g. Burgerman 1998). To account for the latter process Keck and Sikkink (1998) introduce the “boomerang effect”: when domestic avenues of influence are closed off to local advocacy groups, they may mobilize international allies who then lobby their own government to put pressure on the target state (see also Risse 2000). The boomerang effect illuminates why a local groups may want to approach international actors. However, it does not explain why an international group would mobilize for the local actor.

I compare the dynamics of individual groups joining a network of groups to the dynamics of individuals joining a group (Olson 1965).\textsuperscript{4} If we understand a transnational network as a “group of groups,” Olson’s collective action problem is relevant: Why does

\textsuperscript{3} A commonly accepted typology of TANs does not exist. Keck and Sikkink’s (1999) categorization uses TAN strategies as defining characteristics. Accosta (2008) distinguishes between “value-driven” and “project-driven” TANs. I agree that those TANs that address local issues, like specific development projects (Khagram 2002 describes a campaign against the building of a large dam) or national policies (for example the international support of national conservation policies, Princen 1995) are different from international campaigns that are directed towards global norm development and are usually centered around international organizations (Brown Thompson 2002 on the international women’s rights movement). The case analyzed in this paper falls into the second category: a local issue that (some) international support rallies around. Other examples of this type of TAN include protests against hydroelectric dams in Brazil (Rodrigues 2000) and the international campaign bringing attention to the disappearance of hundreds of women in Mexico (Mueller 2010).

\textsuperscript{4} One might argue that it would be more appropriate to apply concepts of coalition-building among groups: the interest group literature postulates that groups decide to band together when it enhances their chances for success by pooling power and resources and by sharing costs (Hojnacki 1997). Furthermore, such alliances can signal legitimacy. TAN members’ calculations will be similar to those of their coalition counterparts. The difference between individual people and groups is that groups in a crowded interest group system would generally prefer working alone because they want to be clearly distinguishable from similar groups. This calculus, I argue, is different for groups considering joining a TAN. I believe that the decision-making process of groups whether to join a transnational network is closer to that of individual joining groups than groups joining a coalition: The calculations of TAN participants are about the value given to the public good, the resources at one’s disposal, the benefits joining will bring. Questions of competition should be minor because the other groups in the network will often be based in other countries, limiting competition over revenues, issues and members.
one group decide to join a collective effort? Pluralists starting with Truman (1958) assert that groups automatically will form in response to disturbances in the political system. Latent groups exist for every possible disturbance and mobilize when need be. For example, violations of human rights can be considered a disturbance. People who have a low tolerance for such abuses might respond to them with the formation of a group demanding to halt the violations. Seeing that people today know a lot about the world beyond their borders and are more interconnected than in the past, one might argue that mobilizing for issues abroad follows the same automaticity as mobilization at home. However, taking part in a group addressing a geographically distant disturbance is costly. Besides time, energy, and possibly membership dues that always accrue to group members, collecting information on a problem or preparing a response (e.g. coordinating with other groups, contacting media and government actors, or organizing protests) is much more cost-intensive if it happens half-way around the world. This will discourage participation. Thus, international group mobilization remains a puzzle.

TANs, in particular those that address overarching international norms, may fit the definition of social movements as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217). Recent research in this field (Rowley and Moldoveanu 2003) argues that participation in a movement can be an expression of one’s identity. In the TAN context, this might explain why individuals join organizations that address issues not affecting them personally. The perspective is less helpful in answering the question why a group in one country chooses to join a campaign based in another.

One way of refining Olson’s by-product theory, which states people will only join in collective action towards public goods if they receive selective benefits, is to broaden the concept of selective benefits. Interest group researchers argue that these benefits do not have to be material. Clark and Wilson (1961) introduce the concept of incentives as organizational tools. They describe three kinds of incentives—material, solidary and purposive—and claim that individuals will not participate in group activity unless the group provides at least one form of incentives. Utilitarian organizations (e.g., businesses) are providers of tangible material incentives. Solidary organizations, on the other hand,
are structured around social activities and their rewards include participation in social events and social status. Members of solidary organizations take pride and satisfaction in the fact that they belong to a particular group, and the feeling of group identity may not necessarily be tied to the achievement of the group’s stated goals. Finally, purposive organizations are usually based on ideological goals, and achievement of these goals is driven by participation: “The members are brought together to seek some change in the status quo, not simply to enjoy one another’s company” (Clark and Wilson 1961: 136). For members of this group the incentives to contribute to the group and participate in its activities are derived from feelings of accomplishments, of supporting “the cause” or “fighting the fight.”

Transnational advocacy networks usually fall into the “purposive” category, with some solidary elements. TANs explicitly form to challenge the status quo. Individual activists do not expect material rewards for their efforts—they do want the campaign to succeed and fulfill its purpose. Transnational campaigns often target areas like international human rights or global warming—promoting ideals and general social change that do not necessarily affect individual participants directly. Many membership organizations participating in a TAN are purposive groups themselves. NGOs like Amnesty International or Greenpeace often join coalitions addressing local or international problems (e.g. Greenpeace international campaign to stop whale-hunting in Japan), the resolution of which does not provide their members any material benefits. But individual members of such purposive groups will expect purposive benefits—the perception that the stated goal is being advanced. Solidary benefits as defined by Clark and Wilson play a smaller role. During many campaigns, TAN members may never meet or socialize much beyond signing online petitions or loose coordination of strategies, primarily for logistical reasons. Sociability and fun are rarely the motivating factors to join. However, individuals may take personal gratification from joining transnational networks and feel strengthened in their identity as a global citizen. A group considering joining an existing network may look for prestige, in particular when it can be linked to powerful allies, and raise its own profile. But the primary driver of TAN mobilization will be purposive rather than solidary.
A group’s participation in a TAN thus depends on whether the issue around which the network forms fits the group’s agenda or mission. An environmental NGO could take up any issue that addresses an environmental problem. But there are environmental problems in every country of the world – how does a US non-governmental organization decide to campaign against water pollution in Chile, but not deforestation in Papua New Guinea? The TAN literature has largely neglected campaigns that did not happen. Even if a group of people and organizations share “ideas and values,” they do not always come together in a campaign. Why do some organizations that are a good fit for the TAN decide to stay on the sideline? Comparing these non-joiners to groups that do participate adds important insights regarding the processes and difficulties of TAN mobilization.

Group entrepreneurs and their strategies can help explain which issues are chosen for advocacy. Salisbury’s exchange theory (1969) explores the role of interest group entrepreneurs who in exchange for some benefits (salary, political access, personal aggrandizement or other) take on the task of founding and maintaining a group. Nownes and Neeley (1996) posit that entrepreneurs are the most prominent factor for group formation, and Berry’s (1977) study of Washington, D.C. public interest groups finds that in 55 out of 83 mobilization cases an entrepreneur was instrumental. When it comes to international issues, entrepreneurs are important on both the local and the transnational level. Somebody has to be the one taking the first action, calling the first meeting or writing the first letter to the editor in response to a local problem. And somebody—maybe the same person—has to start the effort of building a transnational coalition, contacting international nongovernmental organizations, the UN or international media.

The local entrepreneur has to provide benefits to members of the TAN in order to maintain membership. The benefits for local participants will be different from those for internationals. Locally, a member of a group addressing an environmental problem, like air pollution, may expect benefits like money for health care, or changed environmental policies. She may also be interested in the companionship the group provides and the purposive benefit of feeling good about doing the right thing, supporting a green cause etc., but when facing a personal threat, practical considerations will probably be the main driver of mobilization. As Walsh states, “suddenly imposed grievances” such as

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5 Exceptions include Carpenter (2007) and Huelshoff and Kiel (2011)
environmental disasters, may trigger mobilization (1981). The entrepreneur will have to provide benefits in form of practical progress towards ending local pollution or the member might leave the group.

Benefits offered to potential international TAN members will not be material and rarely are they social (see above: beyond the feeling of a shared identity, solidary benefits like socializing with like-minded people can be incentives, but they are less common in transnational activism, at least socializing in person). Instead, the entrepreneur will have to provide purposive benefits; international groups need to recognize the local campaign as advancing their own mission. Tensions arise when the ideological goals of the local groups differ from those of the international group, which is likely (Torres 1997). While holding an oil company responsible for a spill can unite local and international groups in a campaign, local members have more personal interests—economic damage due to drop in tourism or a ban on fishing. Which purpose will the entrepreneur pursue with more energy? Demanding compensation for local businesses, or banning off-shore drilling? The fact that the entrepreneur (and the issue) is local might indicate that the local goals should have priority. However, if the local actor believes the collaboration of the international actor is essential for achieving the local goal, he might put the international group’s needs ahead of the local, in order to attract or maintain international support (Lerche 2008). The process by which the local actor describes the issue for maximum effect is called framing. Frames are “shorthand interpretations of the world” (Tarrow 2005) and they are constructed by entrepreneurs to define goals, symbols and ideology (Zald 1996). Hansen’s (1985) model of interest group membership describes mobilization as a context-bound cost-benefit calculation. He points to the importance of information: “the format of the information people receive greatly influences its evaluation” (p. 82). For example, interest groups that address threats are more likely to attract supporters than those fighting for future benefits (see also Tversky and Kahneman 1981).

As Tarrow (2005) points out: “No domestic claim is inherently interesting outside a country’s border unless it is framed to appeal to a broader audience” (p. 147). Bob (2005) explains how Mexico’s Zapatista movement redefined itself as an anti-neoliberal force in order to resonate better with international audiences. The framing process brings

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6 Social media have created virtual spaces for socializing.
out “real though secondary elements of the underlying conflicts” (Bob 2005: 180),
elements that speak to potential international supporters.⁷ Thus, framing plays an integral
role in international participation in local campaigns, creating my primary hypothesis:
*Local groups frame the issue at hand to fit the international’s agenda, offering purposive incentives to the international group.*

There are other factors that help or hinder group mobilization in the TAN context:
First, internal organizational considerations are decisive. Individual groups have to
perform cost-benefit calculations when they decide whether to join an international
campaign. International issues that provide fundraising opportunities (Huelshoff and Kiel
2011), rather than just costing resources, will be attractive to international groups. Other
organizational considerations are the potential effects new campaigns may have on
ongoing efforts (Carpenter 2007) or existing relationships with other groups (Jordan and
van Tuijl 2000).

Second, existing personal connections between local and international actors can
be activated by the local actor and will positively influence the international actor’s
decision to join the TAN (e.g. Evangelista 1995). And third, the closed or open nature of
the governmental system in the country under observation will influence TAN

**Case Study**

**Methodology**

The current research program on transnational advocacy networks is based
primarily on case studies, an effective way to collect knowledge, especially in a relatively
new field. Yanacopulos (2007) agrees that a case study approach is “helpful and
necessary” for real-time phenomena (p. 44). While many studies of transnational action
examine issues that simultaneously affect constituents in several countries—such as debt
relief for impoverished countries (Donnelly 2002) or the campaign to stop worldwide
elephant extinction (Princen 1995)—the transnational advocacy campaign targeting

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⁷ An interesting observation regarding framing is that placing an issue in terms that raise interest abroad can lead to compromises in the initial goals of the local group. Lerche (2008) argues that the TAN campaigning for rights of the Indian Dalit caste framed the issue in a way more fitting to the philosophy of international actors than the affected population.
Chilean pulp manufacturer CELCO fits within another category of TAN studies: cases where transnational action is directed towards specific domestic actors in one country (e.g. Khagram 2002). Focusing on an example of this subset of cases is particularly beneficial when considering issues of mobilization, as international actors have less incentive to join local efforts than those that affect transnational issues or norms. In this sense, these cases present “crucial cases” in Eckstein’s (1975) definition. If actors who are geographically remote from the problem and do not stand to gain personally from a solution, we should not expect them to join a campaign. Applying Eckstein’s least-likely case scenario, I argue that if international organizations nevertheless join local campaigns, and if I can show that local entrepreneurs tailored the issue narrative to the international’s agenda, then my theory receives support.

The limitations are obvious: generalizations cannot be drawn from a single case. However, a heuristic approach can be helpful in developing nascent theories and generating hypotheses (Sartori 1991). The case illustrates some mechanics, and even more so the difficulties, of group mobilization. It demonstrates variation in my dependent variable: despite similarities in group mission and past activism that would lead us to expect all of them to participate in the campaign, some international actors join the TAN and others did not. Contributing to these different outcomes – as hypothesized – is the way local entrepreneurs framed the issue. However, any findings remain tentative until the theoretical argument put forward is tested on additional cases.

I test my hypothesis by comparing the language used by local entrepreneurs when talking to internationals and when talking to local or national audiences. News coverage of the issue in media and groups’ communications (like newsletters) might be different internationally compared to the local narrative, reflecting different information given to international groups and media outlets by local entrepreneurs. As an additional test of my hypothesis I will also examine whether there is more than one set of goals, identified by individual participant groups’ assessments of success. When international groups that were approached by local entrepreneurs have a different understanding of what constitutes success than local participants, this indicates that the initiator has laid out the purpose of the campaign differently to those internationals than to locals. Of course, divergent goals might be signs of weak institutionalization of the TAN, weak leadership,
or different worldviews. But I argue that in cases where an international actor joins the TAN in response to an entrepreneur’s request, the international group’s understanding of the issue will reflect the entrepreneur’s framing. I will describe international actors who show different levels of involvement in the campaign and explore whether their level of support can be tied to the local framing processes.

The data collected for this paper are drawn from online media, in particular the Chilean English-speaking newspaper Santiago Times and personal conversations with persons involved in the campaign. I make use of data compiled by Dr. Michael Huelshoff (University of New Orleans) and developed in Huelshoff and Kiel (2011).

**Taking on CELCO**

*Background*

Celulosa Arauco y Constitucion (CELCO), part of the wealthy and well-connected Angelini Group, is one of the world’s largest producers of pulp, essential for paper production. In the mid-1990s, CELCO began construction of a new production site 60 kilometers from Valdivia, in southern Chile. A plan to build a pipeline to dump effluents into the ocean at the village of Mehuin was abandoned when the local indigenous Mapuche Lafkenche population protested and even harassed CELCO engineers. When CELCO opened its plant in 2004, the company instead dumped the effluents into the Rio Cruces, one of the rivers flowing through the Carlos Anwandter Nature Sanctuary, home to various rare species of birds, among them one of the largest populations of black-necked swans in South America. The swans are at low risk of extinction, according to the International Union for Conversation of Nature.

Soon after the plant opened residents as far away as Valdivia complained about bad odors coming from the plant. A few months later, people noticed that the number of black-necked swans had decreased from an estimated 6,000 in 2004 to 289 in February

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The people accused effluents from the CELCO plant to cause near-extirmination of the swans. Also, residents seemed to become sick more frequently and pollution levels in the drinking water rose.

In December 2004 CELCO released a report exonerating its plant and Chilean president Ricardo Lagos publically sided with CELCO. However, after an inspection by the National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA) in early 2005 the mill was temporarily shut down and fined, then shut again when an independent report by the University of the Austral blamed CELCO for the environmental damage. The case became politicized when the State Defense Council found on 24 April 2005 that CELCO had “damaged the state” with its actions. CELCO appealed to the Supreme Court which overruled the earlier verdict. CELCO was allowed to restart production. However, shortly afterwards it was revealed that the reports presented to the Supreme Court as evidence had been forged. The scientists cited as supporting CELCO denied they had done so. A large demonstration in Chile’s capital that addressed, among other, the issue of the Valdivia plant, was broken up by police and several participants were arrested. Formal complaints were filed by members of Congress against judges of the Supreme Court and President Lagos reversed his support for the company.

Local activists now actively approached international actors. Bernardo Reyes from the Institute for Ecological Politics went to Brussels in June 2005 where he addressed environmental groups and members of the European Parliament. Chile and the EU signed a free trade agreement in 2002, which includes provisions for environmental protection. The MEPs brought the issue in front of the European Commission, demanding that the issue be revised with the Chilean government. The also added the issue to their agenda for a meeting with Chilean parliamentarians in October 2005. European parliamentarians visited the CELCO plant in Valdivia in 2005. They even discussed a

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12 ibid
13 ibid
15 Santiago Times. 5 June 2005. “Chile Cellulose Plant Faces False Evidence Charges.”
16 Santiago Times. 14 June 2005.” Arresting Development in Chile”
boycott of CELCO products.\textsuperscript{19} The Commission pushed the Chilean government to get serious about environmental issues, for example by establishing a Ministry of the Environment. A ministerial level government agency for the environment was also a requirement for membership in the OECD, which Chile was applying to join at the time.\textsuperscript{20} In August 2005 CELCO returned to its initial plan of dumping effluents in the ocean, but after a stand-off between the Mehuin fishermen and surveyors involving Navy ships with shots fired, the waste pipeline was abandoned once more.\textsuperscript{21}

The election of a new president in 2006 and the creation of a Ministry of the Environment the same year put pressure on CELCO. The Chilean National Commission for the Environment fined CELCO for illegally dumping waste.\textsuperscript{22} In 2007, scientists from the University of Austral found pollution of the Rio Cruces and the water of the sanctuary twice as high as it had been in 2004 and 2005.\textsuperscript{23} Yet CELCO continues to deny responsibility. An independent study in 2005 indeed found that CELCO was operating according to international standards (CNLT 2005) and while it has been proven that CELCO submitted false documents, it cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the company is responsible for the demise of the local swan population and other environmental damages.\textsuperscript{24} International attention waned and national and international activists moved on to other campaigns.\textsuperscript{25} Local protest in Valdivia fizzled out.\textsuperscript{26} When CELCO decided once more to dump the waste waters in the ocean instead of the river they approached the Mapuche population directly and offered money in exchange for harassment-free pipeline building.\textsuperscript{27} This has split the protest movement and makes consolidated action even more difficult.\textsuperscript{28}

Most groups that were active in 2005 no longer give the issue much attention. Seeing that CELCO still operates its Valdivia plant, that the company is again planning to

\textsuperscript{19} Santiago Times. 29 June 2005. “Foreign Minister Dismisses Revision of EU FTA Due To CELCO.”
\textsuperscript{20} Santiago Times. 20 September 2005. “Chile Pushes for Admission into Exclusive OECD Club.”
\textsuperscript{21} Santiago Times. 28 August 2005. “Fishermen to Resist CELCO’s Waste Pipeline”
\textsuperscript{22} Santiago Times. 17 February 2007. “Chile’s CELCO Charged With Illegal Dumping, Accused of Environmental Terrorism”
\textsuperscript{23} Santiago Times. 1 October 2007. “New Report Implicates CELCO in Swan Deaths”
\textsuperscript{24} Telephone Interview with TAN participant. October 2010.
\textsuperscript{25} Currently, plans to build several hydroelectric dams in Patagonia unite many of the international and national CELCO TAN members.
\textsuperscript{26} Telephone interview with Ana Filippini. World Rain Forest Movement. 28 October 2010.
\textsuperscript{27} Santiago Times. 27 August 2007. “CELCO Attempts to Buy Off Fishermen in Southern Chile.”
\textsuperscript{28} Telephone Interview with Samuel Leiva. Greenpeace Chile. 9 November 2010.
dump effluents into the ocean, and that the black-neck swans did not return to the sanctuary, it is easy to conclude that the TAN did not achieve its goals of shutting down the plant. On the other hand, the Chilean government has taken steps towards stricter environmental regulation and the general public is more aware of environmental issues than just a few years ago, paying more attention and mobilizing around new challenges.  

Analysis

The campaign against CELCO started as a local reaction to the perceived environmental damage inflicted by the new plant in Valdivia. The formation of the initial protest groups can be explained with pluralist disturbance theory (Truman 1958): indigenous fishermen in Mehuin feared diminishing fish stocks if CELCO was to dump their effluents into the ocean and fought the plan of building a pipeline; residents in Valdivia were exposed to noxious smells and polluted water coinciding with the opening of the new plant and accused the company; and businesses relying on tourism were horrified to notice the decrease in numbers of the swans that made the Anwandter Sanctuary famous and drew lots of visitors and mobilized against the perceived culprit. These local actors—for respective reasons—all pursued the public good of stopping environmental damage. Olson’s (1965) by-product theory explains the local activists as high demanders: they have much to gain by organizing and will be the main beneficiaries of the public good, thus making the provision of material incentives to individual joiners less essential. However, when the campaign suffered setbacks and did not achieve its goals, individuals contributed less and less time and resources to the campaign. This shows that in order to sustain a campaign, additional benefits are necessary.

As is often the case with TANs, the relationship between members was only minimally institutionalized. The “Coordination for the Defense of the Cruces River Nature Sanctuary” was founded as an umbrella organization for local and national organizations. International actors, except for those NGOs that have representation in Chile, for the most part seem to have acted outside of the loose structure, connected to the TAN primarily through individuals (see in particular the involvement of members of the

29 Telephone interview with Aaron Sanger. ForestEthics. 11 November 2010.
30 The Valdivia tourism industry experienced a 60% drop in activity in 2005. Santiago Times. 7 November 2005. “Valdivia Tourism Teeters in Wake of CELCO Disaster”
European Parliament). Because the TAN had only a very loose structure, it is difficult to reconstruct which international actors should be counted as members. Some of the international organizations mentioned in media reports as supporting the campaign are Oceana, Greenpeace, and individual members of the European Parliament.

Valdivia residents and local activists came together in the “Accion Por Los Cisnes” (“Action for the swans”) coalition. While there does not seem to be one dominant figure in the protest movement, some names of local activists are mentioned repeatedly in the media as leaders and are referred to by other members. There are at least three I would name as driving forces throughout the period of protest: Eliab Viguera in Valdivia, a local union activist who forged alliances with the local Mapuche population and continued the struggle even after CELCO began buying off local fishermen; Vladimir Riesco, the lead lawyer in the case and contact for some international groups, including the World Rainforest Movement; and Bernardo Reyes of the Santiago Institute for Ecological Politics who reached out to European NGOs and politicians in order to increase the size and influence of the TAN. Viguera seemed to focus his efforts on maintaining local cooperation, while Reyes reached beyond Chile.

Nationally and internationally, there was no immediate feeling of threat that might spur group creation (no evidence indicates a new state-level group formed). But existing groups with an interest in the public good of a clean environment turned their eyes to Valdivia. The World Rainforest Movement in Uruguay published on the matter starting in 2004 (WRM 2004). International groups with offices in Santiago, like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), became involved. WWF commissioned a report, and Greenpeace provided legal advice to local activists. These are purposive groups (although they provide selective benefits to members as well, e.g. a WWF credit card or the Greenpeace newsletter) with general mission statements: Greenpeace seeks “solutions to environmental dilemmas;” and the WWF’s “ultimate goal is to build a future where people live in harmony with nature.” For both organizations, taking on the CELCO case

32 Telephone interview with Ricardo Bossard, WWF, 27 October 2010
33 Telephone interview with Samuel Leiva. Greenpeace Chile. 9 November 2010
as a transnational campaign would have been conceivable. But while Greenpeace became very active in the campaign, WWF was so to a much lesser degree.

The reasons for different levels of engagement are multi-dimensional. Organizational considerations like existing agreements with parties to the dispute are decisive, e.g. ForestEthics, a US based environmental group, had recently signed an agreement with the CELCO’s parent company Arauco committing themselves to more sustainable and ecologically friendly policies; the organization subsequently supported the campaign against CELCO but did not undertake any specific activities. These dynamics are discussed elsewhere (Huelshoff and Kiel 2011). The importance of personal contacts becomes clear when considering how the European Union got involved—existing ties between Bernardo Reyes (Institute for Political Ecology) and European activists made it possible for him to connect to members of the European Parliament, which opened an important avenue in the fight against CELCO. The openness or closeness of the target state’s governmental system may explain the very loose form this particular TAN took; Chile’s government was sufficiently closed-off to societal demands that it made sense for some activists to reach beyond national borders (in particular, the close ties of government and business discouraged the local movement), but at the same time responsive enough that many national and local members seemed to doubt the necessity of international contributions.

My hypothesis states that local activists will approach different actors with different narratives of the issue, highlighting aspects of the fight against CELCO that will make it more likely that the international group will join the campaign. Participants indeed confirm that framing occurred and different narrative strands can be detected, confirming the first part of my hypothesis.

According to a member of the TAN, “local people usually wanted to stress different things according to different groups (for ex. [sic] the death of the fauna for bird watchers etc.)” Another participant agrees that in order to engage people, one uses images that speak to them, but he insists that the swans were the most important issue.

34 Telephone interview with Aaron Sanger. ForestEthics. 11 November 2010.
35 Several interviewees mentioned some local resistance to help from outside.
36 Email Ana Filippini. 10 June 2011.
37 Email Samuel Leiva. 14 June 2011.
When talking to the media or other outsiders, the black-neck swans were central to the narrative. They were the unifying symbol of the campaign. Across the board all TAN members interviewed and news stories mention the birds as primary victims of the pollution. The symbol of the swans was useful nationally where it focused a nation’s awakening demands for environmental protection.\(^{38}\) It was also applied internationally to connect an image to the environmental disaster unfolding in Valdivia. But apart from the swans, different narratives and diverging descriptions of the goals of the campaign confirms the conclusion that local activists framed the issue differently for international audiences.

As explained above, the local protest movement consisted of fishermen, tourism businesses and local environmentalists. Their goal was to shut down the CELCO plant. Local media emphasized local impacts of the ecological disaster, e.g. “Valdivia tourism teeters in wake of CELCO disaster” (Santiago Times, 7 November 2005) and included local concerns in their reporting. For example, a representative of the Valdivia activists said, “The damage is not just to the swans, it’s to public health, the water, the soil, our future projects, our jobs, everything.”\(^{39}\) Increased health concerns and the fear of detrimental effects on businesses were prominent in the local narrative. In interviews with international participants, they do not talk about these specific problems without being prompted. The narrative of international actors in these interviews focuses on pollution more generally and on the situation in Valdivia as a symptom of the disregard of environmental concerns in Chile.

An interesting example of diverging narratives is the EU-Chile free trade agreement: Only two of 37 newspaper articles addressing the CELCO case from a local/national perspective mention the EU-Chile free trade agreement and the fact that CELCO’s actions may lead to a revision of this agreement.\(^{40}\) The European Union wrote in 2007 in a communication regarding CELCO: “The protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable economic development are primary concerns of the

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38 Telephone Interview with Aaron Sanger, ForestEthics. 11 November 2010
40 The FTA did not include specific environmental issues, but environmental sustainability is central to the EU’s philosophy. Members of the European Parliament considered calling for a boycott of Chilean products because they were concerned that “a rise in trade should be the other side of the coin t the destruction of the environment.” Santiago Times. 29 June 2005. “Foreign minister Dismisses Revision of EU FTA Due to CELCO.”
European Union.” The fact that EU representatives highlight this argument in interviews and communications (while the swans are less prominent) demonstrates that the EU uses a different frame for the issue.

Inconsistent evaluations of the success of the campaign are another indication that groups within the TAN did not share one unified perspective. Some international groups see much positive coming out of the CELCO campaign. The World Wildlife Fund (as a less involved participant) claims that the campaign as a success because it played a key role in increasing Chileans awareness of environmental problems. This was a stated goal for this organization (see above). Greenpeace adds to that assessment that Chile’s new environmental institutions are a big step forward. Another member of the TAN, the World Rainforest Movement calls these institutions useless, showing the disunity of purpose. I have no clear evidence that the diverging messages local and international TAN members sent during and after the campaign can be traced back directly to entrepreneurs’ contradicting appeals, but the different frames employed early on will have influenced the goals set by the individual organizations. Further research is needed to determine the exact causal mechanism.

I confirm that entrepreneurs use framing to make the issue attractive to outsiders. According to my hypothesis, these frames must contribute to the outsider’s decision whether to join the campaign. International organizations will hesitate to admit that they joined because locals used a particular narrative - “framing” may sound to them like “manipulation.” Therefore, my evidence remains circumstantial. I focus on four international actors: Greenpeace, the World Rainforest Movement, a group of members of the European Parliament, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).

Greenpeace had been monitoring the CELCO pulp mill construction and successfully campaigned for a more stringent environmental impact assessment. Thus, when environmental damages became apparent, the group was easily convinced to join local efforts, because the campaign was seen as a continuation of earlier efforts.

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41 Telephone interview with Ricardo Bossard, WWF. 27 October 2010
42 Telephone interview with Samuel Leiva, Greenpeace. 9 November 2010.
43 Telephone Interview with Ana Filippini, World Rainforest Movement. 28. October 2010.
44 Email Samuel Leiva, Greenpeace. 14 June 2011.
The World Rainforest Movement actively participated in the campaign against CELCO and is still following the issue in 2011. A representative for the group acknowledges that local groups used framing to attract international participants, referring to images that resonated with the outsider. Once they became involved, international groups in turn tailored narratives to attract further support: “For us the variety of negative impacts are very important […] and depending of the people that could get involved we could stress one or the other.”

Members of intergovernmental bodies (e.g. representatives of the European Parliament) can be TAN participants. In fact, their political clout makes them desirable additions to the network. Much of the TAN literature discusses the “boomerang” local activists employ in order to circumvent closed domestic decision-making processes and get a powerful outsider (a foreign government or international organization) to put pressure on the national government (Thomas 2002, Risse and Sikkink 2005). But in order to attract powerful sub-governmental allies and get the issue at hand on their crowded agenda, local activists will have to use language that fits the international organization’s goals.

The European Union took up the issue after Bernardo Reyes presented it to members of the European Parliament in Brussels. The details of the meeting are not known, but the fact that the EU narrative centered on different issues than the local campaign indicates that the MEPs received information that made the CELCO issue a fit for them. This narrative would have to go beyond local impacts of pollution, widening the problem to include “real, though secondary elements” (Bob 2005: 180) like distortion of competition due to low environmental standards or appeals to promote the European Union’s sustainability platform. The frame that attracted the EU moved the focus from the Valdivia plant to the lack of environmental norms and regulations in Chile more generally. Including the problems in Valdivia as part of the EU-Chile dialog was one of several (including the OECD membership) impetuses for the eventual establishment of a ministry for the environment and for advancing international norms on environmental issues in Chile. When there was evidence of emerging norms and institutions on the national level, the EU claimed success and backed off. This behavior shows that while a

45 Telephone Interview with Ana Filippini, World Rainforest Movement. 28. October 2010
frame highlighting norms can attract a powerful ally and give momentum to a campaign it does not guarantee the achievement of the goals set by the local activists.

The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is an example of a situation where a lack of framing contributed to limited engagement of the group in the campaign. After learning about the problems in Valdivia, WWF officials declared that the Fund should become active through its forestry industry program. However, WWF’s involvement remained low. WWF commented publicly on the environmental damages and commissioned a report (ScienceDaily 2005, WWF 2005), but the organization felt that it could not contribute much expertise to the CELCO case, because “we know a lot about forest, but not so much about industrial processes”.\(^{46}\) It seems that the issue could have been framed more appropriately in terms of biodiversity, which might have encouraged WWF to be more active, but such conscious framing did not happen.\(^{47}\)

The international actors discussed demonstrate that the narratives used by TAN members can influence the decision of international groups whether to join a campaign and how involved they will be. Where frames “fit,” as in the cases of Greenpeace, WRM or the EU, those outsiders become active in the campaign. Where they do not, as in the case of the WWF, the international organization was less engaged.

**Conclusion**

A cause that advances the international group’s agenda entails purposive benefits, e.g. the feeling of accomplishment when ideological goals are reached, which are important for the group’s mobilization and maintenance. Thus, international group entrepreneurs will be more interested in issues that provide potential for purposive benefits than in issues that are as worthwhile, but cannot be tied to a specific program or organizational goal. When local activists find a narrative that resonates with the international group’s own mission, this group is more likely to join the campaign. I find tentative support for my hypothesis: cultural framing can be an effective tool for local entrepreneurs when approaching international actors.

\(^{46}\) Telephone interview with Ricardo Bossard, WWF, 27 October 2010

\(^{47}\) Email Ricardo Bossard. 21 June 2011. Also, the focus of WWF in Chile is getting producers of wood products to use forests that are managed according to Forest Stewardship Council guidelines. Arauco’s cooperation is needed for the implementation of the FSC certification program. This is another example of how appropriate frames may be necessary, but not sufficient conditions to attract outsiders to a campaign.
I admit that my results are not generalizable as they are based on one single campaign, even though I apply my hypotheses to a number of international groups. But I feel confident that this paper, despite its limitations, makes important contributions to the TAN research program.

Firstly, my substantive findings challenge the assumption often found in research on TANs that international actors will mobilize for local causes simply because of shared ideological convictions. I do not deny that a group’s principles and moral beliefs are central to their decision-making process, but the present case study supports my argument that international groups are more likely to join campaigns if local group entrepreneurs, in search for international support, will frame the issue at hand in ways palatable to the outsider. However, in order to have more confidence in this finding, more research is needed. A clearer picture of what exactly local activists said to international actors and how important the form and content of this presentation was to the international group’s decision to join – or not to join – the campaign against CELCO can only evolve in long conversation with those involved in the campaign. Broadening the analysis from the single case to a small N study would allow for cross-case comparisons. I might compare this case to similar ones in the region.

Secondly, I argue that it is not enough to focus on the outcomes and effects of transnational campaigns. The dominant approach has ignored interesting questions, e.g. why international groups mobilize for local causes or how initiators of campaigns get other actors to join. I show that the literature on interest group mobilization offers ways to analyze these new important questions. Applying concepts established by the interest group literature can enrich the TAN literature. This paper is a first attempt at doing just that.

References


