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Alliances and Preferences: Party System Institutionalization's Potentially Intervening Role on Pre-election Cooperation in Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea

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Alliances and Preferences: Party System Institutionalization’s Potentially Intervening Role on Pre-election Cooperation in Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea

A Thesis

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By

Lee T. Barrow

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Advisor: Timothy Sisk
Abstract

This research project examines the intervening role of party system institutionalization in determining the effect of electoral rules on the behavior of political parties. Highly institutionalized systems differ across multiple dimensions—supply stability, volatility of results, and rootedness of parties—from fluid systems. Party behavior can be depicted rationally as a response to both institutional incentives and the historical and sociological context of a nation’s party system. Electoral incentives promoting certain types of party behavior can be negated by party system mechanics that deter those behaviors. The research uses a medium-N structured, focused comparison of elections from Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea held under preference voting rules, a majority formula that rewards parties for cooperating formally prior to elections. Preference voting is assumed to offer a middle ground between the problems of concentration inherent to single member district plurality systems and the problems of coordination necessitated by multi-member district list PR models. Despite similar incentives, the cases differ in the type and number of pre-electoral alliances. Using party system institutionalization as an intervening variable, the thesis constructs a heuristic model to assess whether cooperation is likely in preference voting systems.
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Chapter One: Party System Institutionalization and Strategic Behavior

This research project examines the intervening role of party system institutionalization in determining the effect of electoral rules on the behavior of political parties. An intriguing line of scholarship contends that democratic party systems have varying levels of institutionalization, which could potentially explain diversity in party behavior under virtually identical electoral systems. The principle logic presented in this paper is that party behavior can be depicted rationally as a response to both electoral incentives and the contextual specifics of a nation’s party system. Looking only at electoral rules obscures potentially competing incentives in the party system that ultimately muddle the ability to predict party behavior. I suggest that electoral incentives promoting certain types of party behavior could be negated by party system mechanics that deter those behaviors.

In the last century, there is a lengthy history of democratic nations changing their electoral rules in an effort to stimulate different political party behavior (Norris, 2004). The ensuing research focuses specifically on preference voting, an electoral system that is said to foster cooperative party behavior. Australia, Ireland, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, and Fiji have all used preference voting for national elections. The system is also common in regional and local elections in the United States, Australia, and throughout Europe (Reilly, 1997A).
Under preference voting, individual voters rank candidates in their preferred order. The mechanism through which cooperation unfolds is alliance formation between parties, particularly prior to elections. In districts without an outright majority winner on the initial count, preferential voting’s redistribution rewards parties that reliably obtain second preferences from a different party’s supporters. Parties therefore are incentivized to seek out potential partners with which to exchange second preferences through formal alliances.

This study examines the potentially interactive effects of preferential voting and the institutionalization of the party system on alliance formation prior to elections. The analysis covers eight elections from Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. The departure point emerges from differences concerning alliance formation among the three countries. In Australia, the major parties have formed alliances along the same lines for multiple electoral cycles. In Fiji, the two most successful parties consistently formed alliances against each other, but their minor partners changed frequently. In Papua New Guinea, formal alliances as such have not occurred at all and pre-electoral collaboration has been sporadic at best.

Using recent scholarship on how to assess the relative levels of institutionalization of democratic party systems, this study attempts to unpack distinctions between the straightforward causal mechanisms at work in the Australian case and the increasingly complex and occasionally contradictory causal mechanisms in Fiji and Papua New Guinea respectively. By incorporating party system variation into a rational choice framework, the research provides a heuristic for how specific contextual and institutional arrays could either highlight or obscure the cooperative incentives of preference voting.
Fluid party systems possess barriers for pre-electoral cooperation that might be difficult to surmount. First, in these contexts, stability of party supply is low while volatility of election results is high. Therefore, as the following research will hypothesize, parties might not accurately be able to determine their own standing among the electorate, nor might they reasonably be able to predict the standing of potential allies or presumed competitors. Secondly, fluid party systems typically feature elites who behave independent of the party system. When independent candidates are successful, and individual politicians are not beholden to the parties under whose banners they are elected, then the multi-district aggregation of interests that is necessary for formal alliances of preference trading is not present. Reciprocity does not appeal when the individual trumps the party.

**Preferential Voting Systems**

Preferential voting, also known as instant run-off voting, is a majoritarian system that requires winning candidates to earn 50 percent plus one of the overall votes. Following Australian custom, preferential voting is often given the proper title of the Alternative Vote (AV).\(^1\) It is most commonly, but not exclusively, used in single member districts. Preference voting offers a middle ground between the two electoral extremes of proportional list PR and plurality first past the post (FPTP) systems. Similarly to FPTP models, preference voting awards only one winner per district. At the aggregate level, therefore, the majoritarian preference voting system will disproportionately reward the most popular parties with seats in the government. However, similarly to list PR,

\(^1\) Technically, the Alternative Vote (AV) is a subset of preferential voting.
preference voting allows for less popular parties to have a say in the final outcome. While they do not necessarily earn seats in the government, minor parties can influence the results in some districts through the redistribution of their votes in the mathematical process required to reach the winning threshold.

The intricacy of preference voting is in how the winning threshold is reached. Voters assign preferences to each candidate, ranking their most preferred candidate through their least preferred. Ballots are initially counted using only the first preferences, the same as any other plurality or majority system. If any candidate earns 50 percent plus one of the initial votes, they are immediately declared the winner. However, if no candidate earns 50 percent plus one, then the candidate with the least amount of votes is eliminated and those ballots’ second preferences are redistributed as marked. The process repeats itself, with one candidate being eliminated and his or her ballots redistributed according to the next preference, until a candidate reaches a majority of the vote.²

Limited Preferential Vote (LPV) is a preferential voting system slightly modified from the Alternative Vote. The LPV system requires voters to rank only three preferences on their ballot. Again, any candidate receiving an absolute majority of votes is declared the winner. If that threshold is not obtained initially, the lowest ranking candidate is eliminated and their second or third preferences are redistributed, identical to the Alternative Vote process. Under LPV, but not AV, a ballot can be “exhausted,” meaning all three marked preferences have been eliminated in previous counts. When that occurs,

² AV is related to, but not identical with, the Single Transferable Vote. The crucial difference is that in STV, typically associated with multi-member districts, victorious candidates’ excess votes above the quota for election are also redistributed to second preferences. STV is used in elections for the Australian senate, multiple types of Irish elections, and in Malta.
the ballot is removed from the overall total necessary to reach an absolute majority, thus reducing the denominator used to calculate 50 percent plus one (Standish, 2006, 195). The differences between LPV and AV are miniscule, and importantly, the incentives for parties to form pre-election alliances remain the same. Therefore, the two varieties of preference voting will be analyzed interchangeably in this paper.

There has been general scholarly consensus in evaluating preferential voting within the larger framework of democratic electoral systems. First and foremost, preferential voting fits within the greater branch of majoritarian systems (Norris, 2004, 49-50). Second, despite its ordinal, rather than categorical, balloting structure, preference voting displays effects similar to plurality systems (Rae, 1979, 107-108). Third, preference voting encourages the crossing of party lines in an effort to produce a single-party government (Sartori, 1994, 5-6). This process occurs through vote-pooling, as parties are rewarded for cooperating with other parties in the sharing of preferences (Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 316).

Criticisms of the redistribution of votes focus on the consequences of vote-pooling behavior. There is disagreement on the outcomes for small parties, with some experts arguing that small parties have no access to government representation under a majoritarian system while others contend that vote-pooling elevates small parties to a significant pre-election and post-election role as collaborators with major party allies (Kumar and Prasad, 2004; Reilly, 1997A). Ben Reilly argues for a preferential voting bias towards ideologically centered parties that can recruit allies from both sides of the political aisle (Reilly, 1997A, 1). He also suggests there is an increase in independent candidates who can win seats by overcoming major party candidates. These independents
are theoretically popular enough to overcome major party opponents who receive a large initial share of votes, but do not earn steady preference transfers. Independents can defeat party members who are simultaneously the most “most liked” and the most “least liked” (Reilly, 1997A, 5). Lastly, Peter Fishburn and Steven J. Brams have used mathematical modeling to show how slight differences in turnout and head-to-head comparisons can produce seemingly paradoxical results in preference voting elections that deviate from first past the post logic (Fishburn and Brams, 1983). Overall, preference voting is treated as a close relative of first past the post systems with an incentive structure that fosters more cooperation.

**Research Question**

This study investigates party behavior, measured through formal pre-election alliances between parties, in Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea, in an attempt to determine why pre-election alliances are more likely and lasting in some preference voting countries than others. As indicated by Douglas Rae, parties are the groups who should feel the weight of electoral laws the most and therefore make an appropriate choice for studying preference voting’s behavioral impact (Rae, 1979, 4). Despite using nearly identical variations of preference voting, Australian, Fijian and Papua New Guinean parties do not behave similarly. In particular, major Australian and Fijian parties are much more likely to form political alliances than major Papua New Guinean parties.

What explains this discrepancy? In this study, two potential explanations are proposed and examined. First, party systems can vary in their degree of institutionalization. Variation in stability, volatility, and rootedness among the sample countries could negate the incentives for alliance formation. Specifically, a fluid party
system could deter parties from cooperating with each other by making electoral results and elite behavior too unpredictable. In this case, preferential voting rules do not serve as sufficient catalysts for changes in party behavior. While preferential voting could promote cooperation and moderation on the behalf of parties, it is far from guaranteed if parties do not make alliances in the first place.

Secondly, there could be purely mathematical reasons that Papua New Guinea parties do not form the types of alliances found among their Australian and Fijian counterparts. Preference voting, after all, does not differ from first past the post voting in contests where parties can gain an initial majority of the vote. If most races do not require the use of preference transfers, than there is little to incentivize parties to pursue vote pooling, especially if it requires concessions towards competitors. Furthermore, if initial gaps between first and second place candidates are massive, it is highly unlikely that any amount of cooperation can overcome the gap. Finally, if all parties appear to benefit and suffer equally from the distribution of preferences, in other words if the success rate for parties in overcoming initial gaps and holding on to initial leads appears random, than there is no need for parties to alter their policies in pursuit of alliances.

Both hypotheses are rooted in rational choice perspectives. The primary assumption is that parties seek to win the most seats possible in government, and that motivation trumps strict adherence to party ideologies and platforms that would negate forming alliances with any other group. While additional theories are certainly possible, the selection of cases allows for the control over cultural and socioeconomic factors that could be posited as major explanations of party behavior. The two hypotheses are not
necessarily mutually exclusive; it is entirely possible for low levels of institutionalization to be combined with a lack of mathematical incentives.

Quantitative data will be used to assess the level of institutionalization of the party system and the distribution of the vote in each country. While desirable, intensive statistical analysis through multivariate regression is not possible considering the small sample of cases. Attempts to build a large N study would rely heavily on longitudinal samples from Australia’s lengthy history of preference voting, exposing the results to unhealthy bias from the Australian experience. Therefore, this study takes the form of a medium-N structured, focused comparison that develops a heuristic to assess the intervening impact of party system institutionalization on party behavior in preference voting nations.

**Institutional, Sociological, and System Impacts on Party Behavior**

A daunting amount of political science literature has examined the effects of democratic electoral systems. Maurice Duverger famously argued that the structure of the electoral system heavily influences the behavior of political parties. Using plurality and proportional representation systems, Duverger’s law suggests that the former promotes a two party system while the latter develops multiple parties (Duverger, 1963). Douglas Rae concluded that plurality and majority systems benefit strong parties, and the leading party in particular, over small parties (Rae, 1979). Giovanni Sartori went beyond measuring the numerical structure of the party system and added an in-depth focus on the interactions between parties. To Sartori, party behavior is motivated in part by institutional design and therefore is subject to change (Sartori, 1976). Sartori modified Duverger’s law by determining that plurality systems lead to two party systems only
when the party system is structured and racial or linguistic fractures in the electorate are minimal (Sartori, 1994, 40). Most recently, Pippa Norris has concluded that parties in majoritarian or pluralist systems will shift in centripetal ways to attempt to gain the high threshold of votes for office. Conversely, proportional systems do not incentivize parties to move towards the middle due to their lower thresholds for election (Norris, 2004, 11).

All of these scholars rooted their theories in rational choice, on the part of voters choosing whom to vote for and parties in providing the maximum utility in their supply.

Proponents of the preferential voting system are institutionalists who advocate for the ability of preferential voting to heavily influence party behavior. Donald Horowitz believes that the vote-pooling incentives of the Alternative Vote model help mitigate the potential problems of both majority ethnic-group rule and minority ethnic-group rule that plague deeply divided societies (Horowitz, 2007). Parties will pool votes by offering reciprocal concessions on ethnic issues, so long as no single party is strong enough to win enough votes and seats to govern on its own (Reilly, 1997A). Looking specifically at Fiji, Horowitz considers Alternative Vote incentives as vital in creating coalitions that cross ethnic lines and encourage moderation (Horowitz, 2006). In Papua New Guinea under the closely related Limited Preferential Vote, Ben Reilly sees measurable mathematical improvements and the beginnings of strategic shifts on the part of parties and elites (Reilly, 2006A). This is in line with preference voting’s supposed ability to widen support bases and encourage politicians to seek a larger mandate (Standish, 2006). Kumar and Prasad emphasize the egalitarian nature of preference voting’s vote-pooling incentives. All parties are able to manipulate the exchange of preferences, and therefore
the ultimate results in competitive districts, to the best of their abilities (Kumar and Prasad 2004, 315).

Many experts have criticized the institutional perspective for ignoring contextual and sociological factors that are also considered to be influences on party behavior.\(^3\) Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan caution that party politics do not always conform to institutional pressures. Historical context, economic divisions, and cultural affiliations all influence party behavior (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Arend Lijphart’s typology of democratic systems contrasts majoritarian and consensus democracies, based on opposing measurements in an executive-parties dimension and a federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart, 1999). Lijphart also posits a strong link between relevant issue dimensions, similar to Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavages, and the behavior of parties within the party system (Lijphart, 1999). Speaking directly to ethnically divided societies, Ben Reilly contends that party formation, development, and strategy differ in ethnically heterogeneous states from homogenous ones (Reilly, 2006B).

Critics of preferential voting point to the sociological roots of party behavior. Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman have vociferously criticized the ability of the Fijian electoral system to modify political behavior that is rooted in ethnic identity (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006). They acknowledge that preference voting yields new potential strategies for parties and elites, but they dispute that parties will respond uniformly or that moderate behavior will necessarily be rewarded. In another work, Fraenkel contends that the conciliatory behavior suggested by Horowitz is, at best, one possible pathway to

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\(^3\) For a complete review of the debate between institutional and cultural-sociological schools of thought, see Norris, 2004.
electoral success under preference voting, rather than a *fait accompli* (Fraenkel, 2004, 125).

Arend Lijphart, the foremost advocate of consociational politics that emphasize the need to use, instead of undermine, ethnic parties as the basis for power-sharing, doubts that minority parties will accept a system that favors the majority through its single-member districts. Therefore, Lijphart has consistently criticized preference voting as a solution for ethnically divided societies (Lijphart, 2004; Lijphart, 1991). Lijphart instead champions list PR within multi-member districts. Using a closed list, proportional system with multi-member districts would, in Lijphart’s eyes, allow for strengthened minority representation at the party level while allowing for power-sharing among various ethnic elites at the parliamentary level. Additionally, list PR is subjectively “simpler” to understand for voters and eases the burden of rules communication for parties and institutions alike (Lijphart, 2004; Fraenkel and Grofman, 2004). These features are especially significant in developing democracies with multiple languages, low literacy rates, and less robust communication infrastructure. Furthermore, the rounds of counting required by preference voting could theoretically be ripe for corruption and manipulation by electoral management authorities, a problem potentially stifled through the proportional single round of counting in list PR.

**Party System Institutionalization**

A middle-ground approach looks at both sociological and historical development, as well as institutional constraints, in explaining party behavior. The party system refers to the patterns of competitive interaction among the parties (Rae, 1979, 47). According to Dalton and Weldon, parties “form and structure the functioning of democratic
government” (Dalton and Weldon, 2007, 179). The party system implies multiple parties, an amount of regularity in the level of party support, and relative continuity over time. Institutionalists have offered tentative, but underdeveloped suggestions that something more than electoral rules shapes parties’ rational calculations. Giovanni Sartori differentiated between structured and unstructured party systems, depending on the level of allegiance to elites as individuals versus parties (Sartori, 1994, 37-38). In unstructured environments, Sartori predicted that plurality electoral systems normal reductive tendencies would be mitigated. Digging deeper, Rein Taagepera codes Sartori’s unstructured systems as party constellations, deeming them insufficiently stable for the use of system terminology (Taagepera, 2002, 249).

The most influential contribution towards party systems comes from Scott Mainwaring. Mainwaring’s innovative descriptions of party system institutionalization have transformed how party systems are viewed. To Mainwaring, “party system institutionalization means that actors entertain clear and stable expectations about the behavior of other actors, and hence about the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior” (Mainwaring, 1998, 69). This newer line of thinking provides measurable conceptual distinction between the workings of the party system in older democracies and newer ones.

In order to best model the behavior of party systems in younger democracies, Scott Mainwaring emphasizes that institutional and sociological factors interact in unpredictable ways. Scholars must measure the degree of institutionalization of the party system itself in order to predict its behavior. At the two ends of the spectrum, party systems that are fluid should behave differently than party systems that are
institutionalized, even if the electoral rules are identical. Fluid party systems produce distinct strategies for elites to capitalize on the institutional setting (Mainwaring, 1998; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005).

Four fundamental dimensions shape the level of institutionalization in a given system. Stability reflects the extent to which party competition is patterned in a regularized fashion. Party rootedness indicates how thoroughly parties have reached the voters in communicating their positions and ideologies. Legitimacy represents the extent to which elites respect and funnel their activities through parties as mechanisms for political competition. Finally, organizational strength refers to the ability of parties to exist independent of their leaders.

Mainwaring offers multiple potential ways to measure each of his four dimensions of party system institutionalization. Stability is frequently assessed through electoral volatility using Pedersen’s Index, which calculates the total change in percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the subsequent one, then divided by two (Mainwaring, 1998, 71). Allan Sikk adds an additional component to measuring stability by differentiating between new parties and old ones. When high volatility is paired with high levels of success for new parties, the system is at its most unstable (Sikk, 2005).

Mainwaring’s second dimension of institutionalization is parties’ roots in society, a much more difficult concept to measure. In his 2005 study with Mariano Torcal, Mainwaring uses survey analysis to compare the extent of party voting in 33 democracies with respondents’ ideological positions on the left-right scale. Their conclusion is variance in ideological voting is closely tied to stability (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005,
211). Other tests include the percentage of survey respondents who have a consistent party preference, the difference between party votes in concurrent presidential and legislative elections, and the duration over time of the most successful parties. Additionally, Mainwaring considers the ability of independent candidates to win office as a sign of rootedness (Mainwaring, 1998).

There is some disagreement over how the causal mechanisms of stability work. Margit Tavits uses instrumental variable regression with Central and Eastern European democracies to test if there are measurable differences between electoral volatility and party system instability. Tavits concludes that elite behavior is the prime driver of electoral volatility. Rather than party elites responding to the inconsistent behavior of voters by consistently changing the supply of parties, changes in the supply of parties produce higher rates of electoral volatility (Tavits, 2008, 547). Conversely, Dalton and Weldon assert high levels of partisanship to have a dampening effect on electoral volatility and system stability, suggesting that voter behavior precedes elite decision making in relation to supply (Dalton and Weldon, 2007, 180).

Mainwaring’s third dimension is legitimacy of parties and elections. Survey analysis can be used to assess how voters feel about parties’ role in the democratic process. If citizens have high degrees of trust in parties as vital components of democracies than the party system is more institutionalized (Mainwaring, 1998).

Finally, the fourth dimension of institutionalization is party organization. Qualitatively, this can be determined through inspection of how parties choose leaders and the amount of resources and professional staff accorded to parties versus individual leaders. A quantitative measure of party organization assesses how often political elites
switch parties; when organizational loyalty is high, the system is said to have strong organization (Mainwaring, 1998, 78-79).

**Selection of Cases**

The research sample includes eight election cycles from three countries: Australia (2004, 2007, 2010), Fiji (1999, 2001, 2006), and Papua New Guinea (2007, 2012). Every election used preferential voting electoral in a national parliamentary election with all seats contested. The three countries share relative geographic proximity and Commonwealth history, and Australia’s influence certainly played a role in the diffusion of preference voting to Fiji and Papua New Guinea. To summarize according to Rae’s classification system, the population for analysis is uniform in its ordinal ballots, district magnitude of one, and Majority rule for declaring winners (Rae, 1979). Other preference voting elections, from Ireland or Sri Lanka, most prominently, are ruled out of consideration because they are not parliamentary and therefore feature a different set of theoretical incentives.

Australia represents the seminal case of preference voting, using the alternative vote system in state and federal elections since World War I. Preference voting was presented as an improvement over first past the post voting because it allowed ideologically compatible parties to work together rather than splitting their votes to the detriment of both parties (Reilly, 1997A, 3). As a result, the possibility of minority winners is negated in favor of most preferred candidates. Initial scholarship suggested that results under alternative vote varied little from first past the post (Rae, 1979). However, more recent analysis indicates results under preferential voting have differed from hypothetical calculations using FPTP. In other words, the major winner of an
election can hinge on seats won by parties initially trailing in a given constituency (Reilly, 1997A). With its highly stable party system, Australia serves as a test for how the causal mechanism between electoral system and party behavior is supposed to function. Alliance formation between relatively like-minded parties should play an instrumental role in determining winners in races without an initial majority.

Fiji adopted the Alternative Vote system in an attempt to move past the racial politics enshrined in its post-independence constitution and reinforced through subsequent armed coups that have occurred when an Indo-Fijian party has defeated a splintered Fijian majority. After a lengthy constitutional review process, AV was used in three national elections: 1999, 2001, and 2006. AV was seen as a prescription to cure many of the ailments of modern Fijian politics, most significantly the politicized cleavage between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians, the descendants of indentured laborers from Fiji’s past as a British colony. First past the post rules rewarded candidates and parties that aligned with the largest ethnic group in each district, regardless of potentially racist or ethnically exclusive policies. By introducing preference voting, Fijian reformers sought to encourage parties to reach out to different ethnic groups in order to gain preference votes. Parties that relied on simple plurality were now at risk of losing elections if they could not acquire the second preferences of competing parties. As a consequence, ethnic parties would adopt broader issue-based platforms and embrace moderate multiethnic agendas.

There is considerable debate over the impact of the AV system in Fiji. Jon Fraenkel cautions that it is hard to isolate the role of AV on the results of the elections due to the massive increase in voter turnout as a result of new mandatory voting
regulation, the continued use of racially reserved districts, and the discrepancy in district size between rural and urban areas (Fraenkel, 2000, 89-90). The major thesis of Fraenkel’s work is that there is no clear reason why parties should become more moderate under AV. If ethnic fragmentation is a clear cleavage, then moderate parties may gain an advantage from pursuing alliances with radical partners. Furthermore, moderate parties may ally with radical parties on the opposing ethnic group purely to defeat a key rival, even if the partners’ views stand in clear opposition to each other (Fraenkel, 2001, 22). Fraenkel and Grofman object theoretically to the underlying assumptions of how voters rank preferences in divided societies. Using a two-dimensional model of Fijian political space and the ways in which preferences impacted certain districts in 1999 and 2001, the authors assert that Fijian voters and parties have not congregated on moderate lines (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006; Fraenkel, 2004). Robert Stockwell has blamed AV, through disproportionate outcomes that have favored extreme parties, for fostering even more extreme party behavior and punishing moderation (Stockwell, 2005).

Donald Horowitz has responded to many of Fraenkel and Grofman’s arguments. He consistently asserts that many ethnic parties will rationally behave moderately prior to and after elections in an effort to attract cross-ethnic preference transfers (Horowitz, 2006). Secondly, Horowitz disputes the authors’ modeling of rational voting behavior, which he feels mischaracterizes the preference decisions of moderate voters (Horowitz, 2006, 655; Horowitz, 2007).

Kumar and Prasad stress that Fiji’s recent political instability stems from powerful institutions that do not embrace democratic rules, not the electoral system
(Kumar and Prasad, 2004). The authors highlight the hypocrisy in criticizing AV as a system for producing the 1999 results in Fiji while the 2001 results under the same set of rules led to a much more well-received outcome. As far as party behavior is concerned, Kumar and Prasad reiterate that alliance-formation cannot be viewed in a one-party vacuum. Instead, different arrangements of alliances within the entire system can combine with vacillating initial vote shares to produce inconsistent “elasticity” for a given election. Changing combinations of alliances can alter the potential impact of preference trading (Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 326). The debates over labeling respective parties in Fiji and modeling the behavior of voters remain contentious.

Two items are of note in the selection and study of Fijian elections. First, this study does not depend on placing Fijian parties along any spectrum from radical to moderate. Instead, the actual existence of formal alliances will be analyzed in cross-national comparisons with the Australian and Papua New Guinean cases, without attempting to measure each alliance’s character or legitimacy. Second, the Fijian cases stop at 2006, providing only three elections to analyze. Fiji has not had an election since 2006, as Commodore Frank Bainimarama has ruled the island state through decree from his position as self-appointed Prime Minister.

Papua New Guinea initially used the Alternative Vote model in the buildup to its independence from Australia in 1975. In its first thirty years of independence, Papua New Guinea enjoyed uninterrupted democratic experience without ever having a government last a full five-year term. No confidence votes, resignations, and coalition chaos became the hallmarks of Papua New Guinea politics (Okole, 2005). In an effort to increase political legitimacy, raise the number of people with a link to the winning candidate,
lower the overall number of candidates, and decrease electoral violence, Limited
 Preferential Voting was adopted for 2007 (Standish, 2006, Reilly, 2006A, Reilly,
 2007A).

**Operationalization and Measurement**

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable in the study is formal pre-election alliances between political parties. These pre-election alliances serve as pledges to communicate to party supporters the desire to transfer second preferences to the reciprocating party. The raw number of alliances serves as the primary indicator, using information gathered from newspapers, political websites, party declarations, and previous scholarly research.

**Independent Variable 1**

The first independent variable in the study is the level of institutionalization in the party system. In an attempt to marry the scholarship on party system institutionalization with the data available, three dimensions will be considered: stability, volatility, and rootedness. First, I have chosen to separate pre-electoral and post-electoral measurements of stability into two categories. For this analysis, stability refers to the level of consistency found in the party supply. The volatility dimension examines the changes in electoral results at both an individual and party level. These two dimensions are not equivalent, as it is entirely possible for there to be massive change in the party supply without a significant shift in election results. In a dominant two-party system, this scenario would suggest that minor parties come and go without much influence on the actual outcome. Conversely, changing calculations on the behalf of parties or voters could lead to dramatic shifts in the results, high volatility in other words, while the supply
remains the same. The final dimension is party rootedness. Rootedness concerns the strength of linkages between elites and parties. These three dimensions represent a variation of Mainwaring’s four dimensions discussed previously. Legitimacy of parties is not considered due to lack of relevant survey data for both Fiji and Papua New Guinea, while party organization is folded into my definition of rootedness.

**Stability.** Multiple indicators exist to measure stability of party supply, most of which require longitudinal analysis to track changes over the course of multiple elections.

- The number of parties contesting elections, broken down incrementally based on the percentage of seats each party contested.
- Parties Entering: the percentage of new parties contesting a given election.
- Parties Exiting: the percentage of parties not running after having run in the previous election.

**Volatility.** Volatility will be measured in five ways. From a theoretical perspective, it is vital to capture a nuanced view of both stability and volatility. Because parties vary in their electoral and parliamentary relevance, not all unit shifts in the party system are equal (Norris, 2004; Sartori, 1994). For this reason, the indicators below cover a variety of perspectives on relevancy.

- How successful Parties Entering were at winning representation in government.
- How successful Parties Exiting were at winning representation in government.
- The effective number of parliamentary parties; calculated using the Laakso-Taagepera Index. The Index is one divided by the sums of the
squares of each seat-winning parties’ proportion of seats. (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).

- The percentage of incumbents who win reelection.
- The Electoral Volatility between two consecutive electoral cycles. The standard measure for this indicator is Pedersen’s Index, which takes the sum of the absolute value of change in vote share for each party in two consecutive cycles and divides it by two (Pedersen, 1979).

**Rootedness.** Four indicators will be used to determine this dimension.

- The number of independents contesting seats.
- The number of independents who win seats.
- The number of incumbents who win reelection after switching parties.
- The number of elected MPs who switch parties within one year of an election.

The hypothesis suggests that level of institutionalization serves as an intervening variable between the electoral system and the formation of party alliances. Party institutionalization exists across a spectrum, not a binary opposition, ranging from high to low.

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4 Golosov (2010) provides an alternate measure of effective parliamentary parties that weights all parties in relation to the strength of the party that won the most seats. Typically, this results in a slight reduction of the effective number of parliamentary parties calculated by the Laakso-Taagepera Index. Because this study contrasts the very small number of effective parties in Australia and Fiji with the much larger number of effective parties in Papua New Guinea, the subtleties of the Golosov Index are unnecessary.

5 There are some difficulties in assessing party mergers and splits that can lead to different outcomes in Electoral Volatility (Sikk, 2005, 392). Therefore, careful and consistent use of expert analysis will help provide accurate measurements in each case study as to how to most accurately capture volatility.
low. In party systems with low degrees of institutionalization, fluid systems, parties may be less likely to form alliances with others for several reasons. Instability and volatility prevent parties from estimating the benefits from prospective alliances, while also hampering the potential for long-term partnerships between parties. The programmatic compromises that are potentially necessary to cement alliances are increasingly difficult in settings where new parties quickly emerge on the scene and old parties rapidly disappear, seemingly irrespective of electoral success.

Personalistic elite behavior, the opposite of rootedness, suggests that parties have less power than elites. When this is true, as in cases where independents consistently win large shares of seats and politicians’ allegiances to parties are ephemeral, the incentives of preference voting are dampened. This is because preference voting benefits parties in the big picture far more than it benefits individual politicians at the district level. At the level of the single electoral contest, the transfer of preferences is unidirectional, whereas at the national level, preferences are traded multi-directionally. Therefore, personalistic politicians need only consider themselves, negating the motivation to make alliances to give away their own votes if they happen to lose. In a system without a network of politicians beholden to the party, the mutually beneficial rewards of preference trades are harder to realize. Coordination between politicians in one district makes little sense when there are no potential rewards for those politicians in other districts.

**Independent Variable 2**

The second independent variable in the study is strategic viability. This variable emphasizes a level of strategic imagination following institutional choice theory on the part of parties and political elites. Under this approach, it is significant to consider both
the previous election and the expected results of the impending one in determining rational party behavior. The theory posits that party behavior is learned and based on previous patterns. In the case of Papua New Guinea, a reasonable argument could be made that there has been little opportunity to observe difference in outcomes based on alliances precisely because there have been so few alliances. While this is unavoidably true, there is also a diffusion argument that Papua New Guinea party leaders could have learned from the experiences of dozens of elections in Australia, a close political partner and donor nation, and the three elections in Fiji, a regional ally. Indicators for strategic viability include:

- The frequency of outright majority wins on the first preference count.
- The frequency that the winner of a seat was in second place or worse after the initial count.
- The frequency that parties in an alliance maintained initial leads compared to the success rates for parties not in an alliance.
- The frequency that the parties in an alliance overcame gaps compared to the success rates for parties not in an alliance.
- The overall effectiveness of parties in alliances compared to parties of comparable size not in alliances.

The causal mechanism advanced through this hypothesis is that parties are more likely to use alliances as a strategy if they know electoral success will be enhanced. If alliances are unnecessary for success or if they lead to similar rates of success as non-alliances, than parties will not be incentivized to make pre-election alliances.
Data Sources

The data for measuring each independent variable, and their associated indicators, comes from a combination of electoral results available through the three nations’ electoral commissions and my own calculations. Using the electoral data for district races and national results, I have calculated all the measurements of party system institutionalization presented in the case studies. Electoral data for each case study has been accumulated from numerous sources. For Australia, the Australia Electoral Commission serves as a thorough resource on preference voting breakdowns by district. For Australia and Fiji, Adam Carr’s Election Archive documents previous elections results based on national electoral reports. In particular for Fiji, this resource is invaluable due to the continued military rule and its effect on the public availability of information on the AV electoral system through the Fiji Election’s Office. For Papua New Guinea, multiple sources are necessary for corroboration. Information from the National Research Institute and Carr’s Election Archive provides fully documented information on the 2007 election. For the recent 2012 election, the Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission has the most complete set of records. Political websites, such as The Garamut run by political commentator Deni ToKunai, have updates on the behavior of elites in-between the election cycles. Personal communication with Mr. ToKunai has been established for aid in this project. Personal communication with Australian scholar Norm Kelly has also been invaluable in acquiring the most complete data possible for the 2012 Papua New Guinea election. Additional sources for data include Melanesian newspapers, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), and the IFES.

**Alliances and Institutionalization**

There remains a dearth of comparative research on political party behavior under preferential voting systems. The studies that do exist are principally focused on one particular party system and in using that evidence to condemn or celebrate the voting system at large. Studies on the Australian model highlight the extent to which preference voting differs from hypothetical first past the post results. Another principle issue, as seen in Fiji, is the obsession with moralizing on the behavior of parties. As a result, published work assesses the moderation of winning parties in comparison with the presumed moderation of the election’s losers. These moderation effects, or lack thereof, are then used to assess the validity of using preference voting to change party platforms in multiethnic and highly fragmented societies. These studies have rightfully indicated that preference voting bears more of a resemblance to plurality and majoritarian systems than proportional ones. However, the potential reward for cooperative and moderate parties breaks from the winner-take-all effects of pure two-party plurality systems.

A more fundamental question that should be asked is if the preferential voting model is actually able to change party behavior, rather than grading the behavior and automatically attributing it to the electoral system. The most direct test is to examine alliances. After all, the prime reason for the adoption of the preferential model in Fiji and Papua New Guinea was to encourage parties to seek preference votes outside of their core group. Are parties seeking alliances in a patterned way? Or, are intervening factors such as weak party system institutionalization somehow blocking the incentives of preferential
voting and even offering conflicting ones? If parties are behaving in a myriad of ways under the same institutional rules, then it changes how the institutional model is viewed and weighted.

Alternative Voting’s advocates claim that it fosters moderation and cooperation through electoral incentives that benefit parties that consistently receive second and third preferences. It follows that parties must attempt to earn these preferences through pre-election efforts, and that party-to-party commitments carry more potential benefit than appeals to individual voters. Even preference voting’s critics agree that there are substantial benefits to forming alliances, moderate or not. The remaining questions are, first, do all party systems respond to these incentives in the same ways? And second, do alliances have the same effects in all types of systems?

The following chapters will consider these questions, first by examining the case studies from each country, and second through a synthesis of the entire sample. The next three chapters cover Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea respectively. In the final chapter, by analyzing alliances in conjunction with party system institutionalization and electoral impacts, a heuristic device for predicting party behavior in diverse party systems will be presented.
Chapter Two: Australia

Australia provides a baseline for testing the interplay of electoral system choice and party system institutionalization on the formation of alliances. Beginning with Australia makes sense: the nation has used the Alternative Vote for elections to its lower house for close to a century. In addition to electoral seniority among the sample, Australia also has the largest population at over 23 million and the largest legislature at 150 members. Furthermore, Australian politics, particularly elections, are well documented and thoroughly researched, leaving a lengthy trail of scholarly evidence to consult for trends. Australia’s touted political stability makes for an intriguing contrast with the fledgling democracies of Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

By almost any indication, Australia’s federal parliamentary democratic system is a success. The nation boasts elite scores from Freedom House, the Democracy Index, and countless others. Australia’s free and fair elections are made all the more unique through the nation’s use of the Alternative Vote and compulsory voting, features that the Australian government has recently sought to diffuse across the antipodean world in its role as an exporter of democracy.

One of the major proclaimed virtues of the Australian political system is its competitive stability. On the left of the ideological spectrum, the Labor Party reigns supreme even as it has shifted ideologically in its degree of radicalism (McDonald, Mendes, and Kim, 2007). On the right, an enduring partnership between the Liberal Party
and the National Party, collectively dubbed the Coalition, functions essentially as a single unit. In the words of L. Lipson, Australia’s party system can be effectively described as “a trio in form, but a duet in function.”6 If one considers the Coalition as a collective whole, which as will be discussed later is conventional if not wholly uncontroversial, than Australia has a remarkably stable two party dynamic. Only once has a non-Labor, non-Coalition party won even ten percent of the vote since World War I (Farrell and McAllister, 2005). The two dominant powers combined have earned roughly ninety percent of the vote each election since World War II (Papadakis and Bean, 1995, 100).

Levels of class voting are far lower than in most established democracies, making Australia relatively immune to demographic changes in that regard (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza, 2006). Yet, Australian politics are enduringly competitive as well. Since 1937, no party has won four straight elections. Over that period, the Labor Party has won between 38 and 50 percent of first preferences while the Coalition has hovered between 40 and 53 percent.7

This chapter considers the recent consistency of this stability and the role it plays, along with the preferential voting system, in influencing Australian party behavior. After a brief review of the history of the Alternative Vote in Australia and its lasting impacts, the three most recent elections to the lower house of Parliament are reviewed. For each election, the alliances, party system institutionalization, and actual preference voting mechanics are considered within the context of the results. A final section will draw

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6 Quoted in Farrell and McAllister, 2005, 81.

7 Data obtained from the Australian Electoral Commission.
tentative conclusions on the role of the party system in influencing party behavior under preferential voting incentives.

**A History of the Alternative Vote in Australia**

Preferential voting’s origins date to the nineteenth century. Liberal British political thinkers initially proposed the system of instant run-offs, but it was conservative Australians who implemented the model for the first time in major elections in 1918 (Farrell and McAllister, 2005). Only a few elections removed from the inception of the federation, Australian political competition had showed signs of crystallizing around a particularly common result: a unified Labor party defeating a divided conservative majority, split between urban and rural elements of the National Party, the predecessor of today’s Liberal Party. A Royal Commission recommended preferential voting for the lower house, under the theoretical premise that it would negate the issue of vote splitting, and the National government passed preferential voting into law in 1918 (Reilly, 1997A; Bean, 1986; Graham, 1962).

Oddly, the preferential voting system was immediately championed by all factions in the broader conservative umbrella as a solution for their woes. The National Party had originally formed as a merger between free trade and protectionist interests and was soon threatened by urban versus rural factionalism as well. The powerful urban National officials looked favorably upon the chances for its most diehard farming constituents to act independently without undermining the parties’ overall chances at success. According to historian B.D. Graham, preferential voting was seen as a way to embrace decentralization, which would decrease conservative tensions, without harming the chances of electoral success (Graham, 1962, 175). The rebellious rural leaders within
the National Party pushed for the changes in an effort to highlight their agenda in specific constituencies under a new Farmer’s Union Party. Even the Labor Party favored the change as a means of cementing a two-party system.

Experts have viewed the Alternative Vote system as little more than an austral idiosyncrasy. Douglas Rae compared results from the AV system to those achieved under plurality formulae and concluded that the two were virtually identical. Fractionalization of the government, disproportionality favoring the top party, and magnification of small voting shifts into major seat displacement in the elected body are all comparable under preference voting’s majority formula and the more conventional plurality systems (Rae, 1979). Many of Rae’s contemporaries agreed, summarizing the impact of the Alternative Vote on voting results as unsubstantial if not wholly irrelevant (Butler, 1973; Hughes, 1977).

Nevertheless, many of the same authors have suggested ways in which preference voting under the Alternative Vote method has impacted Australian political dynamics. Most obviously, the Liberal Party and Nationalist Party have maintained a close partnership, albeit under different monikers, without having to fuse entirely (Bean, 1986, 64).8 There have also been benefits for parties outside the main competitors. The most viable third party of the 1960s, the Democratic Labor Party, possessed an ability to influence policy far greater than its vote share would suggest in a pluralist system. By reliably transferring preferences to the Liberal-Nationalist contingent, the DLP functioned as the major lever for the Coalition to defeat Labor in close races and received

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8 It is easiest to consider today’s Liberal Party as the descendents of the old National Party, while the present day Nationalist Party has roots in the Farmer’s Union Party.
policy concessions as a result (Butler, 1973). C.A. Hughes has shown that from 1949 to 1975, Labor lost far more seats than it won in races decided by preferences. Of the 84 elections in which the Alternative Vote redistributions yielded an ultimate winner different from the initial first preference leader, the Labor Party won only four times (Hughes, 1977, 294). Clive Bean and others have suggested that Alternative Vote helps centrist parties, which can win elections despite initial deficits as a result of their proximate positioning to a defeated party on either side of the spectrum (Bean, 1986; Graham, 1962).

The significance and direction of preference exchanges have shifted relatively recently. During the 1990s, preferences were used to determine winners in close to half of the districts, while eventual winners who did not initially lead remained at about five percent (Reilly, 1997B; Farrell and McAllister, 2005). Minor parties have also shown slight growth trends over the last twenty years. Consistently below eleven percent of the vote cumulatively since the 1950s, and without a single seat in the House of Representatives to show for it, minor parties could exert control only through the occasional exchange of preferences (Papadakis and Bean, 1995). However, as Western and Tranter have shown, a growing number of Australians are voting according to post-materialist principles, increasing the share of the vote for the Green Party and the revitalized Australian Democratic Party in recent years at the expense of the materialist-oriented appeals of Labor and the Coalition (Western and Tranter, 2001). Originally to the benefit of the Coalition, preferences have come increasingly towards Labor candidates as left-wing minor parties have exceeded the vote shares of right-wing small parties and carved into Coalition totals. Even independent candidates have won seats in
Parliament as a result of vote transfers directed away from major party candidates (Reilly, 1997A, Reilly, 1997B). The Alternative Vote, and the strategies of parties adopted as a result of the preference system, has never been more important.

The 2004 Election

The 2004 Australian Federal Election resulted in a triumphant victory for the Liberal Party and reigning Prime Minister John Howard. The win allowed Howard to serve a fourth term as Prime Minister, a rare feat in Australian political annals. On the losing end, the Labor Party earned its lowest vote share in a hundred years. Analysts reviewing the election determined the massive Coalition victory was most directly due to Howard’s comfortable edge in leadership appeal over Labor chief Mark Latham. While health, education, and taxation proved to be the major issues in voter’s minds, the cumulative evaluation of the two parties on those topics cancelled out. If anything, strong economic performance and surprising levels of support for Australia’s role in the Iraq War helped the Coalition (McAllister and Bean, 2006).

Table 2.1—Results by Party 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of first-preference votes</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family First</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Democrats</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nation</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alliances

Two major alliances featured in the 2004 election. The Liberal Party continued its long-running formal partnership with the National Party: a situation so institutionalized that most political commentary refers to the two parties as a single political force, the Coalition. They were joined by the Country Liberal Party, a Northern Territory based proxy of the two Coalition partners that is, for all intents and purposes, an amalgam of the two. Also in the fold was the Family First Party, which allocated the vast majority of its preferences to the Liberal Party. The Labor Party secured a deal with the Green Party, the minor party that ultimately performed best on first preferences.

Party System Institutionalization

The institutionalization of the Australian party system in 2004 can be measured using three key dimensions: stability, volatility, and rootedness.

Figure 2.1: Australia 2004 Party Sponsorship of Candidates

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Table 2.2—Party and Candidate Data 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Parties</th>
<th>Average number of candidates per district</th>
<th>Number of Entering Parties</th>
<th>Number of Exiting Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.1 provides the breakdown in party size for the 2004 election. Despite a seemingly large number of competing parties, the election was primarily contested by a small contingent of major parties. Aside from the National Party, which won half of the 24 seats it contested largely due to the Liberal Party withholding candidates in the majority of those races, the lion’s share of parties with under sixty percent candidate representation were fundamentally irrelevant. Another way to look at stability is through the rise and fall of parties, presented in Table 2.2. Slightly less than a third of all the parties contesting the 2004 election were new, and overall the 26 parties represented an increase over the previous election.

The next dimension considered is volatility. Continuing from the stability measurements, it is vital to track the actual electoral performance of Exiting Parties and Entering Parties. Table 2.3 reveals the lack of impact made by any of the new parties and the complete lack of electoral power held by the Exiting Parties.

Table 2.3—Exiting Parties and Entering Parties 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Seats won in previous election by Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Number of Entering Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of Entering Parties in total number of parties</th>
<th>Seats won by Entering Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 The exclusively Northern Territory based Country Liberal Party won one of the two Northern Territory seats.
Volatility can also be tracked through aggregate measurements that capture the performance of all parties. Table 2.4 summarizes the two-party nature of the party system in 2004 using the effective number of parliamentary parties, which attempts to succinctly represent the presence and voting power of parties elected to the Parliament. In 2004, Australia’s effective number of parliamentary parties based on the Laakso-Taagepera Index was 2.44, showing the dominant role of the Liberal and Labor parties and the small presence of the National Party (which the index does not recognize as affiliated with Liberal) and three independents. Incumbency reelection percentage provides an indication of how consistent individual district results are. With 85.3% of all elected MPs retaining their seats, volatility was remarkably low in 2004. Lastly, Pedersen’s Index of Electoral Volatility corroborates the evidence presented thus far. An Index rating of 7.5 means that there was very little change in the percentage of votes earned by Australian parties in 2004 compared with the previous election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (Laakso-Taagepera Index)</th>
<th>Incumbency Reelection Percentage</th>
<th>Electoral Volatility (Pedersen’s Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final dimension of party system institutionalization to be considered is rootedness, or its opposite, personalistic elite behavior. Table 2.5 provides data on the role of independents in the 2004 election. While many independents ran, almost a hundred in fact, only three were victorious. At a glance this suggests that party-sponsored candidates have a distinct advantage over the unaffiliated. A second way to measure personalistic elite behavior focuses on the actions of members of parliament after they are
elected. Zero members of parliament switched parties between 2004 and the subsequent election in 2007, demonstrating how disciplined members of the class were.

Table 2.5—Rootedness 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Independent Candidates</th>
<th>Average Number of Independent Candidates per District</th>
<th>Number of Independents Elected</th>
<th>Incumbent MPs reelected with new party</th>
<th>Elected MPs switching parties post-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mechanics

We will now turn to how preferential voting played a role in the 2004 election.

Table 2.6 shows that the 2004 election continued from the trends of the 1990s in terms of the frequency of preference use to determine winners. While the average winning candidate received an initial vote over the 50% threshold, more than 40% of races were determined through preference exchange. Of those districts, almost 13% saw the eventual winner come from behind, thereby reversing the assumed winner under a plurality formula. It is important to keep in mind that this assumption is a tenuous one. Voters under the counterfactual FPTP hypothesis might have voted differently, knowing their votes were counted only for their party of choice.

Table 2.6—Use of Preferences 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outright Majority Wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Preference-required wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Average first preference percentage for victorious candidate</th>
<th>Winner initially in 2\textsuperscript{nd} or worse after first count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>88/150 (58.7%)</td>
<td>62/150 (41.3%)</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>8/62 (12.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Labor Party was the clear victor in the races that went to preference exchanges. All eight of the come-from-behind victories were Labor candidates, primarily using preferences from Green candidates, passing members of the Coalition. While the Coalition conclusively won the election, the results possibly would have been even worse for the Labor Party if not for their ability to use preferences to defeat eight leading Coalition candidates and to maintain all of their own leads.

Table 2.7—Preference Success by Alliance 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Leads Maintained After Use of Preferences</th>
<th>Leads Lost After Use of Preferences</th>
<th>Gaps Overcome After Use of Preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent (Liberal-CLP-National-FF)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger (Labor-Green)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-aligned Parties and Independents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2007 Election

In 2007, the Labor Party reversed a decade of Coalition rule with a dominant electoral victory. Described as “one of the most dramatic reversals in Australian political history,” the Labor Party’s victory has largely been attributed to new leadership and a scandal-plagued Liberal government (Williams, 2008, 105). The Coalition’s attempts to deregulate Australian labor through the Work Choices Bill led to massive pushback against the Howard government. In 2006, news broke of a major scheme involving illegal kickbacks, in violation of United Nations’ Oil-for-Food agreements, from the Australian Wheat Board to Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government. Adding to the misery for the
Liberal Party, John Howard’s personal ratings took a hit when it was revealed that he had broken promises to treasurer Peter Costello to hand over party leadership. Howard’s decline coincided with the Labor Party’s election of Kevin Rudd as its new leader. The media-savvy Rudd quickly skyrocketed Labor’s leadership appeal and contributed significantly to the victory in 2007 (Williams, 2008).

### Table 2.8—Results By Party 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of first-preference votes</th>
<th>Seats won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family First</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Democrats</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Alliances**

In 2007, the Labor Party continued in its alliance with the Green Party. The Liberal Party, still tethered to the Nationals, also struck a deal for the second preferences of the Family First Party. No other formal preference transfers emerged.

**Party System Institutionalization**

Only 20 parties contested the 2007 election, down six from the 2004 election. As evident from Table 2.9, more minor parties exited the system than entered, contributing most acutely to the drop. The overall decline in candidates was miniscule, as the major parties wielded similar numbers of candidates to 2004. Broadly speaking, the 2007
election featured instability among the small parties but continued stability among the major electoral powers.

Figure 2.2—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 2007

Table 2.9—Party and Candidate Data 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Parties</th>
<th>Average number of candidates per district</th>
<th>Parties Entering</th>
<th>Parties Exiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.10 demonstrates the negligible electoral effect of the changes in party supply. None of the twelve Exiting Parties had won representation in the 2004 government, and none of the six Entering Parties won in 2007.
Table 2.10—Exiting Parties and Entering Parties 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Seats won in previous election by Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Number of Entering Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of Entering Parties in total number of parties</th>
<th>Seats won by Entering Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Laakso-Taagepera Index for effective number of parliamentary parties in 2007 dipped slightly to 2.25, reflecting mainly a decrease in the number of National Party and independent winners. Changes in the effective numbers of parliamentary parties from one election to the next suggest some volatility, although the amount in this case is minimal. The election also revealed a decline in the ability of incumbents to win reelection. The drop is easy to explain: a triumphant Labor Party claimed many seats previously won by Coalition members. That said, the 2007 election showcases the way in which one-member district magnitudes amplify changes in seats without necessarily reflecting dramatic changes in the vote. The Labor Party was able to win 23 more seats with only a 5.7% increase in its first preference vote share. On the other side, the Liberal Party lost 19 seats while losing only 4.2% of first preference votes from 2004 to 2007. Cumulatively, the Electoral Volatility was only 6.5.

Table 2.11—Volatility 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (Laakso-Taagepera Index)</th>
<th>Incumbency Reelection Percentage</th>
<th>Electoral Volatility (Pedersen’s Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>69.3%</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To measure rootedness, we will again consider the success of independents and the amounts of personalistic elite behavior. Independents ran as frequently and performed
about as well in 2007 as 2004. While the number of independents per seat rose slightly to 0.68, only two independent candidates won seats following incumbent Andren’s loss in the New South Wales seat of Calare. Within the elected parliamentary body, no politicians switched parties following the 2007 election. Personalistic elite behavior remained rare in Australia.

Table 2.12—Rootedness 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Independent Candidates</th>
<th>Average Number of Independent Candidates per District</th>
<th>Number of Independents Elected</th>
<th>Incumbent MPs reelected with new party</th>
<th>Elected MPs switching parties post-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mechanics**

Preferences were instrumental in the 2007 election, rising to levels of nearly unprecedented frequency. While only eight elections changed hands based on preference exchanges, the ability of leading parties to maintain their leads should not be assumed as a given or viewed as an inconsequential result. Just as in 2004, the Labor-Green alliance proved more effective than the incumbent Coalition. The Labor Party won all eight seats that changed hands from the leader after first preference counting, each at the expense of the Coalition. Without those eight seats, the Labor Party’s majority in the government would have been up for grabs and at the whim of the two victorious independent candidates.
Table 2.13—Use of Preferences 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outright Majority Wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Preference-required wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Average first preference percentage for victor</th>
<th>Winner initially in 2(^{nd}) or worse after first count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75/150 (50%)</td>
<td>75/150 (50%)</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>8/75 (10.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.14—Preference Success by Party 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Leads Maintained</th>
<th>Leads Lost</th>
<th>Gaps Overcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents (Lib-CLP-NPA)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challengers (ALP-Greens)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Allied Parties and Independents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2010 Election

The 2010 Australian federal election produced one of the closest results in the nation’s history and a hung parliament. Two new party leaders competed in the election: Julia Gillard for Labor and Tony Abbott for the Coalition. The Australian electorate viewed both with a measure of distrust, signifying a break from the John Howard and Kevin Rudd era of greater public support for party leaders. Experts have indicated that the two mainstay issues of health and the economy reigned supreme again in 2010, yet because each party claimed a dominant public perception in one but not the other, neither side gained a clear advantage (Bean and McAllister, 2012). Gillard and Labor were eventually able to form a government with the help of the single Green member and three independents.
For the first time, the Liberal-National alliance ran as a single party in one state, Queensland, making it impossible to clearly distinguish between the two parties’ vote and seat shares. For the purposes of this analysis, the two parties’ totals are cumulated under the title of the Liberal National Coalition. Despite earning above five percent more votes than Labor, the Coalition received only one more seat and was unable to form a government. Due to the preference voting system, the Green Party’s record 11.8% of the vote played a crucial pivot role in Labor’s victory, as well as securing the Green’s their first ever seat in the House. Other minor parties continued to lag behind.

Table 2.15—Results by Party 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of first-preference votes</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal National Coalition(^1)</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family First</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nation</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Democrats</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alliances

Depicting the alliances in the 2010 election is made extremely difficult due to the partial merger of the Liberal Party and the National Party in Queensland, coupled with the continued role of the Country Liberal Party in the Northern Territory. Additionally, in Western Australia, the National Party of Western Australia severed its formal

\(^{11}\) Cumulative scores for Liberal Party, National Party, Liberal National Party Queensland, Country Liberal Party, and National Party WA.
connections with the Liberal Party and acted independently of the larger National Party. In the majority of races, that is to say outside of Queensland and the Northern Territory, the Liberal Party and the National Party continued to exchange preferences when they each sponsored a candidate in the same district. Therefore, one alliance will be viewed as the Coalition bloc. On the other side, the Greens and Labor continued with their previously successful alliance. While some minor parties continued to make preference deals for Senate votes, there were no other formal deals for the lower house.

**Party System Institutionalization**

In 2010, the number of parties competing in the election rose slightly while the total number of candidates dropped. This was largely the result of the rapid decline of the Australian Democrats and the Citizens Electoral Council, who combined to field 130 fewer candidates than in 2007. Like the previous two elections in the sample, the vast majority of candidates came from the nationally competitive parties.

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12 Depending on the source, National WA Member of Parliament Tony Crook was initially listed as a member of the Coalition or a crossbencher. Because Crook has formally sat with the National Party room since 2012, and rarely voted or behaved outside of Coalition norms prior to that point, he and the National WA party are included as part of the Coalition in this study.
Table 2.16—Party and Candidate Data 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Parties</th>
<th>Average number of candidates per district</th>
<th>Parties Entering</th>
<th>Parties Exiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Volatility measurements remained consistently low. Once again, the addition and subtraction of a handful of parties had little impact on the election. No Exiting Party had won seats in 2007, and no Entering Parties won seats, provided one does not consider the Liberal National Queensland party to be new.
Table 2.17—Exiting Parties and Entering Parties 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Seats won in previous election by Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Number of Entering Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of Entering Parties in total number of parties</th>
<th>Seats won by Entering Parties(^\text{13})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in Table 2.18, the 2010 election again favored incumbents, with 78% winning reelection. The small Electoral Volatility of 6.2 indicates that the parties performed at a relatively stable level compared with 2007. The effective number of parliamentary parties using the Laakso-Taagepera Index varies based on how the Coalition’s parties are counted. At its smallest, the effective number of parliamentary parties for 2010 is 2.12. Separating the National Party from the Liberal Party is much more difficult because of the 21 seats won by the Liberal National Party of Queensland. If the non-Queensland National Party members are separated from the Liberal Party plus the Queensland members, than the effective number of parliamentary parties increases to 2.34.

Table 2.18—Volatility 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Number of Parliamentary parties</th>
<th>Incumbency Reelection Percentage</th>
<th>Electoral Volatility (Pedersen’s Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.12/2.34</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of independents contesting the 2010 election represented a decrease over previous years. Still, a high of four were elected, proving a crucial fulcrum in the formation of government following the hung parliament. Again, no members switched parties after being elected.

\(^{13}\) Because it was a merger, Liberal National Queensland is not counted as a new party.
Table 2.19—Rootedness 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Independent Candidates</th>
<th>Average Number of Independents per district</th>
<th>Independents Elected</th>
<th>Incumbent MPs reelected with new party</th>
<th>Elected MPs switching parties post-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mechanics

Despite the stability in electoral results, the use of preferences rose to unprecedented heights in the 2010 election. For only the second time, seats allocated through preferences outnumbered seats won outright. A total of eleven seats swung after preference counting, again countering the past claims that preference voting has no consequential impact on results. Again, this requires an impossible to prove counterfactual scenario where voters’ preferences do not change if the system were based on first past the post rules. Proportionally, this did not represent much of a change from the previous two elections under consideration. However, the ability of the Labor Party to overcome gaps in nine races while only losing two leads helped it catch up to the Coalition, which had a greater share of first preference votes on average.

Table 2.20—Use of Preferences 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outright Majority Wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Preference-required wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Average first preference percentage for victorious candidate</th>
<th>Winner initially in 2\textsuperscript{nd} or worse after first count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64/150 (42.7%)</td>
<td>86/150 (57.3%)</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>11/86 (12.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.21—Preference Success by Party 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Leads Maintained</th>
<th>Leads Lost</th>
<th>Gaps Overcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent (Labor-Green)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger (Lib-CLP-NPA-LibNatQld-NPWA)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Aligned Parties and Independents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

From the above data, it is clear that the Australian party system is highly institutionalized. The supply of parties is stable, with the main competitors displaying consistency in both their coverage and their performance. Perhaps one reason that the number of competing parties in Australia is high, typically in the twenties, is the ease with which a party can form. Formation does not suggest much in the way of support, as only 1% of Australians belong to any political party, much less the minor ones that contest less than 20% of districts (Sawer, Abjorensen, Larkin, 2009, 6). The Australian party system is not volatile. While not quite static, after all the three elections under consideration produced one dramatic victory for each of the two main parties and a hung parliament, the actual percentages of the votes oscillate very slightly. Intermittent entering and exiting parties have no discernible effect on the electoral results. Finally, the Australian party system veers heavily towards party-oriented behavior and away from personalistic elites. Politicians are rigidly connected to their parties, with no Members of
Parliament changing parties and very little floor crossing beyond symbolic gestures (Parliament of Australia, 2006).

Despite previous claims to the contrary, preference voting does matter in Australia. In each election, the Labor-Green alliance was able to win at least 8 seats that otherwise would have gone to the Coalition parties. In 2010, those seats made the difference in which party formed the government. In 2007, the drastic advantage Labor earned would have otherwise been slashed to the slimmest of margins. The frequency with which preference votes were needed to determine a winner continued to increase, far surpassing historic averages from the 1950s through the 1990s (Reilly, 1997B; Hughes, 1977, 292). Nevertheless, the actual percentage of seats going to candidates not initially in first place remains small, albeit potentially significant.

What can be determined about the frequency and strategy of Australian party preference alliances based on this information? As is clear, the basic two-party nature of the Australian lower house makes the Labor Party and the Coalition the biggest potential winners and losers in preference deals. The two parties seek significant minor party partners to trade second preferences. For the smaller parties, the rewards are reaped in the Senate elections, which are determined through a proportional preference process that massively increases the potential for gaining election for smaller parties. On occasion, as seen in 2010 with the Green Party, a minor party with a large enough initial vote share can benefit from preferences in the same manner as the two major parties. For Green MP Adam Bandt from Melbourne district, a slight deficit proved surmountable using preferences. Most small parties make preference deals for Senate seats, even if they do not have preference trades formalized for House elections. The comparative nature of this
project omits these Senate-only preference trades from consideration for two reasons: first, the Senate system uses Single Transferable Vote, and secondly, the other two countries in the sample are unicameral.

A word of caution is in order. Preference flows in Australia never reach unanimous levels between two allied parties. Australian voters ultimately control their ballots, and some do not mark the candidates in the manner suggested by their preferred parties’ How to Vote card. Still, since a majority of Australian voters report using the How to Vote cards, the alliances struck by parties are significant for serious study (Reilly, 1997B). There are also flows between parties that occur independently of formal deals or mutually beneficial pacts. Because voting in Australia is compulsory, and because preferences are used whether or not parties make alliances, preferences must be marked for all ballots. Some party supporters’ first preference ballots are therefore consistently directed towards ideologically similar second preference parties, even if no reciprocal directive has been issued. This could occur from individual voters ranking the parties or from the parties filling out How to Vote cards in ideologically consistent ways. Undocumented handshake deals between parties are also common, but have not been listed as alliances in this study.

Categorizing the Liberal-National partnership also necessitates second-guessing. The two parties compete against each other in only a small percentage of districts in each election within the sample. In the rest of the districts, one or the other fields a candidate. For that reason, it might seem unreasonable to list the partnership as an alliance, without the presence of another party such as Family First in 2004, because the exchange of preferences in House of Representative districts infrequently materializes. However, the
fact that some Liberal and National candidates do compete against each other is enough to list the alliance. Additionally, the alliance exists as a tangible fact, cemented even further by the parties’ cooperation in Senate elections and House government formation. The strategy enlisted by the two parties, to not compete against each other like Greens and Labor do, is testimony to the strength of the alliance, even if it seems to fly in the face of the original purposes of preference voting. Whether or not the strategy is particularly successful, or hindered by the lack of a viable additional minority partner in recent years, is up for debate.

To conclude, the Australian party system institutionalization appears to structure the frequency and type of formal preference alliances. Additionally, preference trades are both oft utilized and potentially rewarding, or destructive, to a party’s electoral chances. A stable party system, combined with preference voting rules, has made pre-election alliances between parties rational and vital. For these reasons, the recent Australian experience with Alternative Vote suggests that the system typically appears, at the parliamentary level, as exclusionary as first past the post models. However, the actual path to reach winning thresholds in some districts requires cooperative party behavior that includes minor party policies in the major party platforms. Furthermore, the 2010 example of the Green Party’s single seat serving as a crucial pivot in Labor’s eventual ability to form a coalition indicates that the potential for third parties to win a small number of seats could prove crucial towards government formation under certain circumstances. In this way, Lijphart’s views on the majoritarian nature of AV are perhaps too harsh. As will be seen in the remaining two cases, the stability and consistency of alliances do not exist in all preference voting contexts.
Chapter Three: Fiji

Rivalries of many kinds dot Fiji’s contentious political history: between islands, between hierarchical elites, and between ethnic groups. Democratic practices have served to refocus those rivalries onto political parties and formal institutions, rather than dissolving them in favor of ideological and policy debates. Frequent anti-democratic coups have challenged the legitimacy of elected officials and taken Fiji through turbulent patches of autocratic rule.

Much of the context for Fiji’s political turmoil dates to colonial practices from a century of British rule. British officials rigidified a formerly fluid stratified society, positioning compliant regional chiefs as unquestioned hereditary rulers over Fijian affairs. In an effort to boost economic production without disturbing traditional notions of Fijian life, the British government undertook a massive labor importation program. Beginning in 1879, indentured Indian workers arrived in Fiji to work on sugar plantations that were owned by Australian and British firms. Through the indenture system, economic production rapidly increased while over eighty percent of the land remained in Fijian control (Denoon, 1997).

When the British reformed their colonial policies after World War I to allow slightly more local input, indigenous Fijians and British colonial leaders advocated separate racial representation. The growing Indo-Fijian population sought a common roll. Even though indentured labor ended in 1916, the Indo-Fijian community had a higher growth rate than indigenous Fijians and quickly became a slight majority in the islands.
Throughout the colonial period, the Fijian-British alliance for racially based representation won out, as British leadership prioritized Fijian interest over Indian desires, despite, or perhaps because of, the economic and numerical superiority of the Indo-Fijians.

The decolonization process began in Fiji in 1960, in the midst of the massive wave of independence movements worldwide. Fiji’s independence constitution formalized a Westminster-style system and ethnic voting, allocating 12 reserved seats each in the House of Representatives for representatives chosen exclusively by Indo-Fijians and Fijians, and 3 to the General population.14 In addition to the 27 communal seats, 25 national seats were strictly allocated according to the ethnicity of candidates (10 Indo-Fijian, 10 Fijian, 5 General). In total, each individual voted four times—once for an ethnic representative and three for racially defined national seats (Macdonald, 1994).

Party politics in Fiji has largely revolved around race since independence. The two major political parties of the early post-independence period were “essentially race-based . . . in time, virtually every issue of public policy came to be viewed through racial lenses” (Lal, 2003, 336). Race maintained its institutional presence, incorporated openly in government programs and classification systems (Larson and Aminzade, 2009). Most importantly, the Fijian military is almost exclusively ethnic Fijian and the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs holds veto power over all legislation concerning Fijian affairs.

After two decades of relatively stable rule, mostly under the right wing Fijian Alliance led by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Fiji’s democracy rapidly crumbled in 1987. A

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14 General signifies the remainder of Fiji’s population, historically a mixture of Chinese, European, and Australian immigrants.
left wing Labour led government, composed primarily of Indian politicians but headed by the Fijian Timoci Bavadra, won free and fair elections but was rapidly toppled in a military coup. The coup’s leaders installed the Fijian Sitiveni Rabuka as the leader of an interim government charged by Fijian elites with protecting Fijian political interests. The coup capitalized on an undercurrent of doubt among a portion of the ethnic Fijian population in the ability of democracy to ensure fair ethnic treatment. Scholars suggest that this fear is ultimately rooted in Fijian desire to protect the status quo on land ownership and executive authority (Kumar and Prasad, 2004). Ironically, it was Rabuka’s vehemently Fijian government that paved the way for electoral reforms designed to bring the state’s two ethnic groups closer together.

**AV History and Responses in Fiji**

Sitiveni Rabuka’s government openly championed racial segregation, drawing the ire of the international community and Fiji’s most important external funding sources (Lal, 2002; Kumar and Prasad, 2004). The interim 1990 Constitution required all Fijians to vote once in an ethnically reserved district, virtually legislating a 37-27 Fijian political majority over their Indian counterparts (Fraenkel, 2000). Opposition parties grew more vocal as pressure mounted from outside Fiji, most prominently manifested in the Commonwealth’s decision to expel Fiji. In response, Rabuka initiated a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) to propose potential amendments to the 1990 Constitution.

The three-member CRC proposed a number of changes to Fiji’s political system. The Australian-influenced Alternative Vote was chosen for the electoral system in an effort to encourage multi-ethnic government, stable political parties, and incentivize moderation and cross-ethnic collaboration. The commission’s panel viewed AV as the
best way to reward pre-election conciliation and vote-pooling strategies (Lal, 2002, 281). Furthermore, the CRC recommended that voters be able to vote for candidates outside of their own ethnicity. To this end, the CRC suggested 45 seats from 15 three-member heterogeneous constituencies and 25 single-member communal constituencies.

Somewhat surprisingly, Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei Party (SVT) teamed with the Indian-backed National Federation Party (NFP) to champion the review process, while maintaining the power to edit the recommendations. Ultimately, the Fijian Parliament accepted the Alternative Vote reform but went against the CRC in mandating power sharing in the cabinet for all parties above a minimum seats threshold. The government furthermore edited the construction of constituencies, preserving 46 communal seats and adding 25 open ones, all with single-member magnitude (Stockwell, 2005).  

Geographic imbalance favors rural Fijians over their urban counterparts (Fraenkel, 2000, 90). The result is a preferential voting system with distinct ethnic restrictions.

Initial commentary on the Alternative Vote system in Fiji quickly acknowledged the significance preference transfers have played in determining the makeup of the government. Especially in the 1999 election, as will be discussed below, preferences were frequently used and often required multiple eliminations prior to a winning candidate reaching 50% of the vote (Fraenkel, 2001). Compared to Fiji’s previous FPTP system, the AV model has increased the role of small parties (Kumar and Prasad, 2004). Much of the early analysis looked at the nature of preference transfer flows. Parties

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15 The 46 Communal seats were allocated as follows: 23 Fijian, 19 Indian, 3 General, and 1 Rotuman Islander.
appeared to come to different conclusions on strategy—some sought ideological allies, others aimed to avoid splitting votes, and a distinct section chose to allocate their second and third preferences to long shots rather than major competition (Fraenkel, 2001).

Some experts launched vociferous critiques of the AV system after the initial election in 1999. The disproportionality of results under AV came under fire, as a party with less than a majority of the votes earned a clear majority of the seats. The ideology of that party, therefore, potentially loomed as a threat to any collaborative multiethnic process envisioned by the CRC reforms (Fraenkel, 2001, 19). Robert Stockwell has gone as far as to claim AV harmed moderation efforts through its disproportionality (Stockwell, 2005, 383). His analysis is based on the majority of preferences flowing from moderate to radical parties in the 1999 and 2001 elections.

Donald Horowitz, the foremost proponent of the Alternative Vote and a leading contributor to the CRC’s information-gathering efforts, vehemently counters many of these early criticisms. Horowitz sees the 1999 election as a vindication of the cross-ethnic collaborative incentives resulting from the Alternative Vote. As proof, he cites the more than 80% of second preference transfers in the 25 open seats that were interethnic (Horowitz, 2006, 656). He also disputes having made any claims that AV always fosters moderate results; instead contending that AV favors moderation without uniformity (Horowitz, 2006, 653). Horowitz still disputes the claim that the 1999 elections were a defeat for moderation. Rather than casting the winning parties as radical, he views the defeated incumbent SVT as the radical for its prominent role in the 1987 coup and 1990 Constitution. To Horowitz, Fijian parties responded strategically to the new incentives, and many saw something to gain from moderate cross-ethnic partnerships, thus
vindicating the AV system (Horowitz, 2006). Kumar and Prasad agree, suggesting that all parties can manipulate the system but the actual skill with which each party does so depends on the year. As parties’ initial vote share ebbs and flows, different strategic combinations hold more potential than others (Kumar and Prasad, 2004).

Turning now to the three elections held under the Alternative Vote model, a clearer picture emerges of how Fiji’s uncertain party system played a role in the nature and utility of preferences.

The 1999 Election

Results

Fiji’s first experience under the Alternative Vote model produced a significant upset. The Fijian Labour Party, whose stronghold lies predominantly in the rural Indian community, defeated the favored incumbents; the Fijian SVT and the Indian supported National Federation Party. The FLP turned less than one-third of first preference votes into an outright majority of seats in the Parliament. Conversely, the SVT earned one-fifth of the initial vote but won only eleven percent of the seats. Even more harshly, the NFP failed to win a seat despite nearly 15% of the vote, while the Fiji Association Party managed 10 seats off of less than 10% of the vote.
Table 3.1—Results by Party 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of first-preference votes</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Labour Party</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Association Party</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokosoko ni Vakuvalewa ni Taukei (SVT)</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of National Unity (PANU)</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Alliance (VLV)</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP)</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United General Party</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation Party</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The seemingly contradictory results have their roots in Fiji’s three principle electoral divisions. In the 19 Indian reserved districts, the FLP completely dominated an essentially two-party race against the NFP, winning all of the seats. In the 23 Fijian reserved districts, the FLP unsurprisingly failed to win a single seat. However, instead of an SVT landslide, a muddled picture emerged with five Fijian parties winning at least one seat, led by the FAP with 9 and the SVT with 5. FLP impressively dominated in the crowded Open districts, even in many that lacked an ethnic Indian majority. By winning 18 of the 25 Open seats, many from preferences, the FLP managed a shocking rout of the 1999 election.

Further explanation for the results lies in the SVT’s fall from near unanimous Fijian support. Regional disputes led to a surge in provincial ethnic Fijian parties that
eroded the SVT’s Fijian vote share. The FLP was able to successfully label their chief intra-ethnic rival, the NFP, as collaborators with the incumbent SVT regime, which had sought to limit Indian political and land-owning rights on a systematic level. By allying with the SVT, Jai Ram Reddy and the NFP partnered with the party that many Indians associated with the 1987 coup, an event that had overthrown a legitimately elected Indian-dominated government (Fraenkel, 2000).

**Alliances**

As mentioned above, the incumbent alliance between the SVT and the NFP was forged well prior to the 1999 election. Joining them was the United General Party, a minor party that competed in only six races and focused overwhelmingly on Fiji’s General voters who have three reserved seats. The Fijian Labour Party partnered with two ethnic Fijian parties, the Fijian Association Party and the Party of National Unity (PANU). Fraenkel suggests that the FLP-led alliance came together solely to defeat the SVT and lacked any ideological cohesion (Fraenkel, 2000, 104). However, Horowitz maintains there were moderate elements in the FLP and FAP leadership, while the PANU had a long history of cross-ethnic policies befitting its name (Horowitz, 2006, 657). The remaining parties, most prominently the Fijian-backed Christian Democratic Alliance (VLV) and Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTL) refused to partner with either the Indian FLP or their Fijian rival, the SVT.

**Party System Institutionalization**

No single party had the ability to realistically compete in each race in 1999. While there was nothing legally stopping the FLP or SVT, for example, from contesting seats in the opposing communal constituencies, the chances of success were slim. The Indian FLP
earned less than 2% of the vote in Fijian districts and ran in only four races. The SVT did not put up a single candidate in the Indian districts. The result is a party size spectrum that is empty at the universal end of the scale. The largest parties contested seats in their communal arena plus the open seats, while ten smaller parties focused specifically on individual islands or districts. Exiting Parties and Entering Parties, the other aspect to the stability dimension in determining party system institutionalization, will not be considered for the 1999 election. Because the preferential system was brand new, making comparisons between the 1994 election, conducted under the FPTP method, and the 1999 election obscures the monumental electoral and constitutional changes that occurred as a result of the 1997 Constitution.

Figure 3.1—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 1999

Table 3.2—Party and Candidate Data 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of parties</th>
<th>Average number of candidates per district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly to the measurements for Exiting Parties and Entering Parties, it is difficult to accurately assess the volatility of the 1999 results. Electoral Volatility, measured through Pedersen’s Index, is a much more accurate rating when voter participation is consistent. Fiji’s 1997 Constitution instituted compulsory voting, which bumped Fiji’s percentage of participating registered voters from 72.4% to 90.1% (Fraenkel, 2000, 89). The best measure of volatility is therefore the Laakso-Taagepera Index for the effective number of parliamentary parties. For 1999, the effective size of the Fijian system was 3.18, suggesting a grouping of lesser-represented parties beyond the dominant FLP.

For the first election under the Alternative Vote model, parties dominated in the ways envisioned by the Constitution’s advocates. Independent candidates ran in about one-third of the contests, and five were elected. Of those five, three were from the minority communal General and Rotuman districts, which do not have nearly the same support of either the FLP or SVT as the rest of Fiji’s constituencies. Party discipline also reigned supreme. No politicians switched parties in the aftermath of the 1999 election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Independent Candidates</th>
<th>Average Number of Independent Candidates per District</th>
<th>Number of Independents Elected</th>
<th>Elected MPs switching parties post-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mechanics

Viewing Table 3.4, it is obvious that preferences were of massive importance to the 1999 election. A majority of the elections used preferences to determine winners, and 61
a robust 17 out of 36 featured a come-from-behind victory. The ability to successfully strategize preference transfers proved key to the FLP’s victory.

Table 3.4—Use of Preferences 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outright Majority Wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Preference-required wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Average first preference percentage for victorious candidate</th>
<th>Winner initially in 2(^{nd}) or worse after first count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35/71 (49.3%)</td>
<td>36/71 (50.7%)</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>17/36 (47.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The FLP won 24 seats (19 Indian, 5 Open) outright. They held on to ten leads and overcame three deficits. Taking as a whole, the FLP-FAP-PANU alliance was able to maintain 15 out of 18 leads and overcome 10 deficits. On the other hand, the SVT-NFP-UGP alliance managed to maintain only 3 out of 16 leads and overcame only one deficit. Even non-allied parties faired better than the incumbent group, as several independents, VLV, and NVTLFP winners were initially trailing at the first count.

Table 3.5—Preference Success by Party 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Leads Maintained</th>
<th>Leads Lost</th>
<th>Gaps Overcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent’s Alliance (SVT-NFP-UGP)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Alliance (FLP-FAP-PANU)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Allied Parties and Independents</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Jon Fraenkel’s calculations, the FLP won 24 of its 37 seats without help from other parties. They won eight more solely on transfers from their partners,
either the FAP or PANU. The remaining five seats, valuable enough to push the FLP over the edge to a majority government, came partly from transfers from the non-allied Fijian parties, the VLV and NVTLP. These parties placed the FLP slightly ahead of the SVT, most likely due to a strong desire to root out their ethnic rivals from their position in government (Fraenkel, 2001, 20-22).

One of the SVT’s major strategic mistakes was their tactic to avoid running candidates in many of the same seats as the NFP. Partially as a result, the lowered popularity of both parties was certainly a factor as well, the incumbent alliance had little reliable transfer of preferences, as they had avoided having two closely allied parties together in the same constituency.

**2001 Election**

Despite its dominant performance in the 1999 election, the FLP lacked the ability to govern smoothly. The coalition of the FLP, FAP, and PANU steadily disintegrated as it became obvious that the FLP could govern without the Fijian parties’ help. The Fijian parties reevaluated their position in the wake of vocal criticism of their role in electing an Indian-dominated government. Old tensions between Fijian land-holding interests and democratic processes flared again. Most importantly, the FLP failed to gain any support from key Fijian institutions—the Great Council of Chiefs, the Fijian military, and the Fijian police (Kumar and Prasad, 2004). In 2000, George Speight, an ethno-nationalist Fijian, led an armed coup against the FLP and the government as a whole. Speight and his supporters actually held the government hostage in the Parliament building for about a month. After military intervention and a court decision to reinstate the 1997
Constitution condemned by Speight and his political allies, new elections were held in 2001.

**Results**

The 2001 election marked the rise of a new force in Fijian politics. The Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), led by Laisenia Qarase, displaced the SVT as the preeminent Fijian party. In general, the SDL represented former elements of the Christian Democratic Alliance and discontented former supporters of the SVT. Openly against the 1999 Constitution, the SDL balanced between rejection of Speight’s coup’s methods and support for its pro-Fijian principles. After receiving the endorsement of the Great Council of Chiefs, the party earned a thorough victory in heavily ethnic Fijian areas. As can be seen in Table 3.6, the SDL won the most seats despite trailing the FLP in the overall percentage of first preferences. With six seats, the new radical Matanitu Vanua (MV) headed a group of four parties winning small representation in the government. Rather shockingly, former coup leader and prisoner George Speight ran under the MV platform and was actually elected, showing the electoral support for radical pro-Fijian policies.
Table 3.6—Results by Party 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of first-preference votes</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL)</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Labour Party</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matanitu Vanua (MV)</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Labour Unity Party</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation Party</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United General Party</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soqosoqo ni Vakuvalewa ni Taukei (SVT)</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bai Kei Viti (BKV)</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of National Unity (PANU)</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijian Association Party</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP)</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SDL’s victory emerged from its dominance in the Fijian communal seats and its strong performance in the Open constituencies. SDL won 18 of the 23 Fijian seats, with the other 5 going to the MV. All 19 Indian seats went to the FLP, who maintained a fifty percent gap over the NFP. The race therefore diverged only in the Open seats, where the SDL won 13 of 25 compared to 8 for the FLP.\(^\text{16}\) All but one of the SDL’s Open seat victories required preference voting, indicating the importance of preference transfers in the final result. Unlike 1999, the majority of the preference transfers were intra-ethnic (Horowitz, 2007).

**Alliances**

Two alliances contested the 2001 election, while the winning SDL party relied on semi-frequent transfers from non-allied parties. The FLP partnered with PANU for a

\(^{16}\) The SDL also won 1 seat in a General constituency.
second time, but no longer could count on second preferences from the FAP. FAP joined the self-proclaimed Moderate’s Alliance, also consisting of the multiethnic triumvirate of NFP-SVT-UGP from the 1999 election, in addition to the National Labour Unity Party that had broken away from the FLP. The SDL forwent the formal alliance process.

**Party System Institutionalization**

Shifts in the Fijian party system underscored the 2001 election. The SDL emerged as the first national party, even contesting seats in 7 of the 19 Indian districts, despite predictably horrible results of less than a quarter of a percent of the Indian vote. The Indian-dominated FLP and the breakaway NLUP also tried to compete in the Fijian districts. A middle tier of parties, the NFP, MV, and SVT targeted select Open seats and a large portion of their communal ones. Ten provincial parties rounded out the group of 18. Despite the increase in the number of parties, the average number of candidates per district remained slightly below five. Rarely did all six of the larger parties contest a single seat.

**Figure 3.2—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 2001**

![Party Sponsorship of Candidates 2001](image)

**Fiji 2001: Party Sponsorship of Candidates**

- Parties with candidates in 80-100% of districts: 1 party
- Parties with candidates in 60-79% of districts: 2 parties
- Parties with candidates in 40-59% of districts: 3 parties
- Parties with candidates in 20-39% of districts: 2 parties
- Parties with candidates in 1-19% of districts: 10 parties
Table 3.7—Party and Candidate Data 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Parties</th>
<th>Average number of candidates per district</th>
<th>Number of Parties Entering</th>
<th>Number of Parties Exiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because 2001 was the second election under the Alternative Vote model, we can now examine the impact of new parties and the loss of old ones. The six Exiting Parties had no parliamentary power from 1999. Three of the eight new parties, the SDL, MV, and NLUP, won representation in 2001. Collectively, new parties counted for a majority of the seats in the 2001 Parliament.

Table 3.8—Exiting Parties and Entering Parties 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Seats won in previous election by Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Number of Entering Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of Entering Parties in total number of parties</th>
<th>Seats won by Entering Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the rapid rise of the SDL, it is unsurprising that the 2001 election was highly volatile in its results. A steep 46.1 rating in the Pedersen’s Index shows how much of the vote changed from 1999 to 2001. Incumbents also fared very poorly, with only 19.7% of the 2001 MPs having served in 1999. The decline of the SVT, the rise of the SDL, and the SDL’s ability to out-compete the FLP for preferences in the Open seats explains these numbers. The strong two-party nature of the results, with the FLP and the SDL accounting for 59 of the 71 seats is revealed in the effective number of political parties, which measures 2.81.
Table 3.9—Volatility 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Number of Parliamentary parties (Laakso-Taagepera Index)</th>
<th>Incumbency Reelection Percentage</th>
<th>Electoral Volatility (Pedersen’s Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personalistic elite behavior remained rare. Independent candidates had little effect on the 2001 election. Only 21 contested seats, and of those there were two winners, one in a General seat and the other in an Open seat. Three incumbent members of Parliament were reelected under a new party banner. In the aftermath of the election, zero MPs switched parties.

Table 3.10—Rootedness 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Independent Candidates</th>
<th>Average Number of Independent Candidates per District</th>
<th>Number of Independents Elected</th>
<th>Incumbent MPs reelected with new party</th>
<th>Elected MPs switching parties post-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mechanics**

Preferences were still significant in determining the 2001 results, although the overall frequency of preference use dropped to less than half of races. Similarly, 35.7% of the preference-using races saw a defeat of the initial leader, down from 1999 but nonetheless a major fulcrum in the election.
Table 3.11—Use of Preferences 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outright Majority Wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Preference-required wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Average first preference percentage for victor</th>
<th>Winner initially in 2\textsuperscript{nd} or worse after first count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43/71 (60.5%)</td>
<td>28/71 (39.5%)</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>10/28 (35.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 3.12, it is clear that the SDL (listed as a non-allied party) managed to gain a number of seats from preference exchanges. The FLP’s losses in preference races came primarily from the rankings of Fijian parties, who preferred the SDL slightly above the FLP. The Indian-dominated NFP also favored the SDL, crossing the ethnic line in an effort to help defeat their prime competitor (Horowitz, 2006). Contrary to many of the predictions about the Alternative Vote model, therefore, the non-allied SDL was able to benefit from the system without making inter-ethnic accommodations to its policies (Stockwell, 2005). The SDL received a steady flow of preferences from the Moderate’s Alliance when faced with a choice between the Fijian SDL and the Indian FLP. After the election, the SDL turned to the MV to form a coalition government of Fijian parties. The FLP took up ranks heading the opposition. Perhaps the single most important takeaway from the 2001 election was that a non-fractured Fijian party spectrum, buoyed by the dominant performance of the SDL on first preferences, could virtually guarantee Fijian control of the government.
Table 3.12—Preference Success by Party 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Leads Maintained</th>
<th>Leads Lost</th>
<th>Gaps Overcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent’s Alliance (FLP-PANU)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger Alliance (NFP-SVT-FAP-UGP-NLUP)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Allied Parties</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2006 Election

Results

After five years of SDL rule, Fiji returned to the polls in 2006. Once again, the SDL defeated the FLP by five seats. This time, however, the SDL combined its parliamentary victory with an electoral one as well, winning 5.4% more of the first-preference votes and full control over the government. Only the UPP, a re-branded version of the United General Party, and two independents joined the two major parties in office. The absorption of the MV into the SDL eliminated any sizable competition to the SDL in Fijian districts.
Table 3.13—Results by Party 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of first-preference votes</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDL</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Labor Party</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United People’s Party</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Federation Party</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance Party of Fiji</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP)</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVT</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of National Unity (PANU)</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2006 election featured a clear divide in party dominance based on communal identity. The SDL won all 23 Fijian seats and the FLP won all 19 Indian seats. The two parties dominated similarly in their respective strongholds (Lal, 2007). The FLP won 79.9% of the vote in the Indian seats with the SDL only one-tenth of a percent worse in the Fijian constituencies. Independents and the United People’s Party divided the General seats evenly. That left the 25 Open seats to decide the election. The SDL won 13 to the FLP’s 12, with 44.1% of the first preferences compared to 40.0%.

**Alliances**

Unlike 2001, the SDL entered into alliances for the 2006 election. Its partners were the NVTLP and the SVT. These two parties, combined, contested only twelve seats. In reality, the SDL went into the race without firm guarantees of second preferences in most races. On the opposing side, the FLP entered into alliance with four smaller parties:
the new National Alliance Party of Fiji (NAPF), the rebranded UPP, traditional allies PANU, and the single-candidate Justice and Freedom Party.

**Party System Institutionalization**

The stability of the Fijian system continued to evolve in 2006. Only four parties sponsored more than 11 candidates, but each of those four ran in at least 45 races. Previously mid-sized parties continued to shrink, with some disappearing entirely. The SVT had only one candidate, compared to 35 in 2001 and 46 in 1999. The average number of candidates remained similar to past years, 4.7, while the total number of parties shrank to 13. Two parties new to the scene in 2001, the MV and the NLUP, did not contest in 2006 despite winning seats in 2001. The MV merged into the SDL in early 2006 prior to the election. The small BKV regional party merged with PANU, while the NLUP, VLV, and FAP merged into the National Alliance Party of Fiji, a new party that contested 48 seats. If we adjust Table 3.14 to reflect mergers as distinct from Exiting Parties, than only three parties exited the system. Similarly, if we treat brand new parties as conceptually different from parties that existed prior to 2001 but did not contest the 2001 election, than three Entering Parties remain.\(^\text{17}\)

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\(^{17}\)The United People’s Party is not listed as an Entering Party, and neither is the United General Party listed as an Exiting Party, because the group only underwent a name change.
Table 3.14—Party and Candidate Data 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Parties</th>
<th>Average number of candidates per district</th>
<th>Number of Parties Entering</th>
<th>Number of Parties Exiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.15 shows the performance of the Entering Parties in 2006 and Exiting Parties in 2001. As explained above, the eight Exiting Party seats belonged to now-merged parties. The Entering Parties made little impact on the 2006 election.\(^\text{18}\) In fact, outside of the FLP and SDL, no other party won more than two seats. Combined, the two major parties won 67 of the 71 seats, reflected in the Laakso-Taagepera Index measurement of 2.23 effective political parties.

---

\(^{18}\) The NAPF is listed as a new party because its creation predated the incorporation of the VLV, FAP, and breakaway members of the SVT.
Table 3.15—Exiting and Entering Parties 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Exiting Parties 19 (number of parties merging)</th>
<th>Seats won in previous election by Exiting Parties (seats won by parties merging)</th>
<th>Number of Entering Parties 20</th>
<th>Percentage of Entering Parties in total number of parties</th>
<th>Seats won by Entering Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 (5)</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2006 election featured a dramatic reduction in volatility and an increase in the ability of incumbents to secure reelection. The Pedersen’s Index dropped severely to 14.5. This number includes the smaller of two merged parties, such as the MV for example, as part of the larger, the SDL in this case, for both elections. This is in keeping with the arguments of Allan Sikk on how to most accurately measure volatility (Sikk, 2005). Much of the remaining volatility came from the gains made by the SDL and the FLP at the expense of previously mid-sized parties.

Table 3.16—Volatility 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Number of Parliamentary parties (Laakso-Taagepera Index)</th>
<th>Incumbency Reelection Percentage</th>
<th>Electoral Volatility (Pedersen’s Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personalistic elite behavior became much more common in 2006. The number of independent candidates more than tripled, as 67 contested seats. Still, only two were actually victorious. As in 2001, three incumbent MPs won reelection under a new party

19 Includes the smaller party in a merger as an Exiting Party.
20 Includes parties previously existent, but dormant in 2001.
banner. All three switched to the SDL, two from the MV and one former independent. No politicians switched parties in the aftermath of the election, although this is a difficult variable to trust completely because a coup, discussed further below, overthrew the democratic system entirely less than a year after the election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Independent Candidates</th>
<th>Average Number of Independent Candidates per District</th>
<th>Number of Independents Elected</th>
<th>Incumbent MPs reelected with new party</th>
<th>Elected MPs switching parties post-election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mechanics**

Preference voting did not play nearly as large of a role in 2006 as it had in 1999 or even 2001. Only ten seats required using second preferences in the determination of a winner, and only two actually changed hands. Put in other words, 69 of Fiji’s 71 seats would have gone to the same candidate under a FPTP system, provided voters would not have recalculated their preferences. Looking at Table 3.18, victorious candidates earned an amazingly high 69.5% of the initial vote. From the results of the election it is apparent that the SDL and FLP won in landslides in the communal seats, leaving only the Open constituencies. 10 of the 25 Open seats required preferences, but the parties were, on the whole, able to hang on to the leads they built.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outright Majority Wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Preference-required wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Average first preference percentage for victorious candidate</th>
<th>Winner initially in 2nd or worse after first count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61/71 (85.9%)</td>
<td>10/71 (14.1%)</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>2/10 (20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.19—Preference Success by Party 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Leads Maintained</th>
<th>Leads Lost</th>
<th>Gaps Overcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent (SDL-NVTLP-SVT)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenger (FLP-NAPF-UPP-PANU-JFP)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-allied Parties and Independents</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scholarly commentary on the 2006 Election has been rare due to the importance of dramatic events occurring less than a year after the race was over. In December of 2006, a long-simmering feud between the SDL’s Laisenia Qarase and the head of the Fijian military, Commodore Frank Bainimarama exploded. Bainimarama and the armed forces overthrew the SDL and suspended the Fijian Parliament. Commodore Bainimarama refused to accept Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase’s policies on past coup actors (particularly lenient treatment of George Speight’s closest allies), indigenous land reform, and racial politics. At the core of the issue was a debate over who had higher authority, the democratically elected SDL, led by Qarase, or the Fijian military, led by Bainimarama. In rebuking the 2000 coup’s perpetrators, as well as the ethnically Fijian government, Bainimarama’s coup had the unprecedented effect of overthrowing Fijian elites and challenging pro-Fijian policies, despite Bainimarama and the military’s Fijian ethnicity. Fiji has not had democratic elections since 2006, and Bainimarama’s roadmap to democracy unabashedly pledges to end the Alternative Vote system and communal
voting because of their perceived role in institutionalizing racial tensions (Ramesh, 2010).

**Discussion**

Fiji’s political system evolved considerably over the course of the three preferential voting elections from 1999 to 2006. The trends were not unidirectional. The results should also be taken as general trends rather than hard and fast rules. With only three elections, the ability to draw clear conclusions from preference voting in Fiji is limited.

For the first dimension of party system institutionalization, Fiji saw an ultimate increase in the stability of its party supply, notwithstanding increased provincialism. Initially, the party supply looked to be growing increasingly unstable under the preference-voting model. Ultimately, however, party numbers decreased while the major parties fielded more and more candidates. However, much of the 2001 turmoil in terms of the success of new parties amounted to the replacement of the SVT by the SDL as the dominant force in Fijian politics. Rather than a split, the rise of the SDL signified a transition that actually coalesced the Fijian electorate.

Volatility is the most difficult of the dimensions to succinctly depict for Fiji. The arrival of the SDL and the downfall of the SVT caused major upheaval in incumbent reelection rates and measurements of Electoral Volatility between 1999 and 2001. However, the period between 2001 and 2006 was much less volatile, perhaps reflecting an entrenchment of the two main parties and greater consistency from the electorate in the face of more stable party supply. This is, of course, a guess. Without more elections, it is hard to draw clear conclusions from one shift in volatility. Importantly, the
introduction of compulsory voting simultaneous with the new preferential voting both increased and subsequently stabilized the number of registered voters (Fraenkel, 2000). This makes it more likely that the observed results reflect continuity in voter behavior rather than a sizable shift in who is voting.

By the 2006 election, two dominant parties had emerged as national forces. The SDL’s and FLP’s control over their communal constituencies was so dominant, winning over 79% of the Fijian and Indian vote respectively in 2006, that it is reasonable to conclude that Fiji was approaching a crystallized two party structure under the alternative vote. The remaining parties competed in two fashions: as a second choice in one communal group plus select open seats, or as a small regional party. Of the two groups, the small parties had greater success, especially those catering to the General and Rotuman Islander category of voters. Midsized and small parties faced a choice: merge with the dominant parties, form a large party among themselves, or cease operations. The steady drop in the Laakso-Taagepera Index, from 3.18 in 1999 down to 2.23 in 2006 indicates the eroding parliamentary presence of the midsized and minor parties.

While the supply stability dimension of Fiji’s party system shifted towards slightly higher degrees of institutionalization, the moderate increase in personalistic elite behavior indicates slightly less institutionalization along the rootedness dimension. The tripling of independent candidates, while the overall number of candidates held relatively steady, reveals a growing willingness of elites to seek office without party support. However, the success of those independent politicians did not change over the three-election sample. Furthermore, personalistic elite behavior measured by politicians switching parties was rare. Of the six MPs who won reelection with new parties, 2 had
previously run for parties that no longer existed at the next election. Overall, Fiji’s party system remained well rooted.

Preferential voting played an important role, albeit decreasingly, in determining the winners in the three Fijian elections. The 1999 election required preference exchanges in half the seats, and in half of those races the initial leader ended up losing the contest. In 2001, preferences were used in almost 40% of races with a little more than a third of those seats changing during the preference count. Finally, the 2006 election featured far more uncompetitive races. Preferences were only used ten times, and only twice did the eventual winner make up an initial deficit.

Parties in Fiji have a massive role in the exchange of preferences. Unlike Australia, which only allows parties to offer their followers How to Vote cards with suggested orderings, Fijian parties have direct control over preference flows. Fijian ballots have an Above the Line feature, which allows the voter to check their first choice party and simply turn in the ballot. In this case, the parties then dictate the flow of preferences according to rankings published prior to the election (Fraenkel, 2004). According to studies of the 1999 and 2001 elections, approximately 95% of voters chose the Above the Line option over ranking all the candidates by hand (Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 322).

Fiji’s communal voting restrictions create inconsistency in how vital preferences are. In the 19 Indian seats, preferential voting has not been needed a single time. Instead, an ostensibly two party race between the FLP and the NFP takes place through, in effect, first-past-the-post methods (Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 320). In the Fijian and Open seats, preferences have played a major role in determining winners. Kumar and Prasad’s
probabilistic analysis of the 1999 and 2001 races shows that the 1999 election was more “elastic,” in the sense that small changes in preference exchanges had larger implications for the results when compared to 2001 (Kumar and Prasad, 2004, 326). Countering the many arguments of Fraenkel, Grofman, and Stockwell, the authors demonstrate the important fact that preference sharing does not benefit any particular party and instead is dependent on the constellation of parties, their shares of the primary vote, and their ability to form viable alliances.

In 1999, the FLP succeeded in forging strategically viable alliances at the expense of the incumbent SVT. In making deals with ethnic Fijian parties in the western part of the nation, a region typically marginalized politically at the expense of the eastern areas, the FLP found valuable ways to pool its vote share. This deal between the FLP, PANU, and the FAP has been derisively called a “coalition of convenience,” but it still strategically made sense as a trio of parties each looking to outmaneuver the SVT (Fraenkel, 2001, 16). Conversely, the SVT struggled mightily in its attempts to capitalize on the preferential voting model. Already in parliamentary partnership with the NFP, the SVT-NFP-UGP grouping looked like a sure fire winner in 1999. However, the parties’ decision to not compete against each other in most of the Open seats essentially negated any of the benefits of vote pooling from AV. The NFP and SVT’s major vote strongholds in the Indian and Fijian areas were of no use to the other party, because they did not stand a chance in a cross-ethnic constituency. The differences between the FLP and SVT’s experiences in 1999 serve as prototypes for the notion that not all alliances are created equal.
In 2001, the SDL demonstrated that alliances are not actually necessary to win a preference-based election. The SDL added to its share of first preferences with transfers from fellow Fijian parties. New regional Fijian parties undercut the vote shares of the western Fijian parties that had experienced success in partnership with the FLP in 1999. The new western parties, in addition to other radical Fijian groups, gave the SDL their preferences above the FLP. This does not mean that the SDL received second preferences; often, the results in a district came down to which party was placed last versus second to last on the ballots. The potential detrimental effects for being the most disliked party also played a role in 1999, as the Fijian VLV placed the FLP slightly above the SVT (Fraenkel, 2001).

Three factors coalesced as the defining features of Fiji’s preferential voting experience. First, the party system stabilized from a multiparty amalgamation of midsized, provincial groups to a two party race. Second, racial politics continued to play a major role in how parties competed and identified. Finally, Fiji’s parties learned which strategic behaviors were most effective. Alliances allowed crucial vote-pooling and proved vital in multiethnic regions with several viable party options. Cooperation in this electoral arena was rewarded through the distribution of preferences, giving cooperative parties a greater chance of maintaining initial leads and overcoming deficits from the first count. However, without a strong initial share of the vote, or in the face of such conditions, preference deals were far less useful. Additionally, cooperation does not automatically equate with moderation, even in a multi-ethnic partnership. The experience of the FLP in 1999 demonstrates that cooperation can come from a variety of purposes, including a pure desire to oust the incumbent regardless of ethnic orientation. Finally,
without legitimate third parties, preferences will rarely be used at all. As the party system in Fiji became increasingly bipolar, the two major parties’ tactics converged to a virtual stalemate.
Chapter Four: Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea (PNG) is the largest of the Oceanic states both geographically and demographically. The approximately seven million citizens occupy the eastern half of the massive island of New Guinea in the southwest Pacific, in addition to several island chains off the coast. Papua New Guinea’s ethnic fragmentation is unparalleled. Over eight hundred languages are spoken; indeed, the island’s hundreds of linguistic and cultural niches have made national identity elusive, regionalism rare, and tribal or clan based structures the norm.

Colonialism arrived late to Papua New Guinea and established only shallow roots. The sheer variety in Papua New Guinea’s human population combined with the equally imposing geographic terrain to deter entrenched colonial rule. While the Dutch nominally controlled the western half of the island, now the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya, the British and Germans split the eastern side that would later become the Papua New Guinean state. Australians played a major role in the British presence and took over the German portion of the island after World War I. For all intents and purposes, the era of Australian control over Papua New Guinea began in the 1920s and continued until independence. For the Australians, economic development, and even that pursuit attempted only in coastal areas, trumped any notion of political evolution in Papua New Guinea (Bennett, 1994).
After World War II, Australia’s administration attempted to extend its control into the remote highlands and offshore islands regions. Australian policy discouraged native Papua New Guinean political development through a top-down bureaucratic structure that kept power in the hands of Australians in the capital and expatriate hub, Port Moresby (Wesley-Smith, 1994). Australian leaders remained set against Papua New Guinea’s independence until the late 1960s, when a wave of international criticism initiated a backlash against further colonial rule among the members of the Australian Labor Party. A rather rapid decolonization process began in 1971, after both Australian parties agreed on the need to transfer power. Papua New Guinea became fully independent in 1975 with a unicameral parliament. The Pangu Pati, headed by perhaps the most vocal champion of full independence, Michael Somare, won the most seats in the inaugural election (Wesley-Smith, 1994).

As of the 2012 election, Papua New Guinea’s parliament contains 111 seats. 22 of the seats are labeled Provincial, the equivalent of a governor. The remaining 89 seats are Open districts. Each Provincial district is subdivided into multiple Open constituencies, meaning that PNG voters vote in one Open seat and one larger Provincial seat.

Papua New Guinea’s democratic path has baffled many experts. The nation has sustained parliamentary democracy with relative ease while simultaneously proving remarkably unstable politically (Okole, 2005). Statistically, Papua New Guinean politics resembles countries that use proportional representation, despite having used only pluralist and majoritarian rules. Ben Reilly has summarized the conditions in the nation thusly: “a fragmented multi-party system, coalition governments, low levels of executive durability and high levels of participation in terms of both voter turnout and candidacy
levels” (Reilly, 1997A, 8). From 1975 to 2002, Prime Ministers averaged 29 months in office, with no-confidence votes frequent and often successful (Reilly, 2006A, 192). Harsh realities underscore the poor quality of PNG democracy. Electoral violence has been frequent, voting often occurs in tribal blocs, and corruption and fraud is common (Reilly, 1997A, 8).

Papua New Guinea’s political culture defies many famous theories. As Henry Okole has argued, Duverger’s Law simply does not apply to PNG. Despite a pluralist electoral system for much of its post-independence history, Papua New Guinea has never had anything remotely approaching a two-party system. In contrast to the ideas of Anthony Downs, Papua New Guinea voters do not appear to engage in widespread calculation to avoid wasted votes. Finally, Papua New Guinea’s parties do not identify on commonly accepted cleavages. Socio-economic, cultural-ethnic, and other distinctive cleavages do not divide parties ideologically or demographically (Okole, 2005).

More than anything else, PNG parties revolve around their individual leaders. Okole succinctly states, “an attractive personality is the ultimate qualification for party endorsement” (Okole, 2005, 371). Like most Melanesian cultures, Papua New Guinean clans are based on dominant, socially mobile individuals. One way to prove one’s worth is through achievements that benefit one’s group. In the wantok system, an entanglement of reciprocity and exchange links the people of an area together. Burgeoning elites, so-called “bigmen,” can prove their status by passing benefits to their clan. Naturally, this social custom transitions well to politicians running for office: bloc voting provides the politician with a benefit, which can be repaid through government services and kickbacks (Okole, 2005, 374).
Ideology is rare in Papua New Guinea politics. Parties serve as a loose umbrella over an assortment of candidates, without many overarching commitments to one style of governing or set of policies. Parties link with voters through individuals, not ideas or concepts (Okole, 2005). This is not to say that parties do not evolve or take stands on issues. Alphonse Gelu’s analysis of eight parties that chose to publicly outline their views prior to the 2007 election demonstrates a range of economic, agricultural, and foreign policy attitudes. That said, the vast majority of parties chose not to outline any policies (Gelu, 2011).

**LPV in Papua New Guinea**

Starting in the 1990s, Papua New Guinean ministers became increasingly concerned with the low levels of votes won by winning candidates. As candidate proliferation proceeded unabated, winning thresholds under PNG’s post-independence first past the post system (FPTP) frequently dipped below twenty percent (Standish, 2006, 197). As a result, under FPTP, candidates had little incentive to campaign outside of their clan. Attempts to do so frequently met with violence (Reilly, 1997A). Electoral competition threatened to descend to a simple two-part strategy of maximizing one’s clan vote while suppressing others. To fix these issues, Prime Minister Mekere Morauta (1999-2002) initiated the Constitutional Development Commission. The Commission’s report led to the adoption of the Limited Preferential Vote system.

Limited Preferential Voting is virtually identical to the Australian Alternative Vote. The only difference is that, under LPV, voters only rank their top three candidates. Voting occurs in single-member districts and a majority of the vote guarantees election. Under LPV, a majority of the total vote will not necessarily be achieved. Ballots that
have been redistributed twice, and therefore have no other candidate marked, are considered “exhausted”. This reduces the total number of votes necessary to win election. Winning candidates, therefore, earn a majority of the non-exhausted, or “live” ballots, which can change throughout the counting process. The LPV system went into effect following the 2002 election, won by Michael Somare, and has been used in two subsequent national elections.

Experts believed that LPV would have multiple beneficial consequences. First, winning candidates would enjoy broader popular support through the redistribution of ballots and the pursuit of preferences. Second, all candidates would benefit from second and third preferences earned outside of their own clan group, thereby encouraging campaigning outside of one’s home base. Finally, there were predictions of greater moderation and a decrease in violence; politicians would need to reciprocate with each other for preference transfers and would have less reason for engaging in or sponsoring hostilities (Reilly, 2006A, 188). These predictions were not purely speculative. Papua New Guinea had previously used preferential voting in its last pre-independence election in 1972 prior to the transfer of authority from Australian control. The brief experiment saw more accommodative behavior and less violence than subsequent elections under FPTP (Reilly, 1997A).

In 2001, the Constitutional Development Commission also instituted a law aimed at better controlling the behavior of PNG’s parties and elected politicians. The Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (commonly referred to as OLIPPAC) sought to reign in the proliferation of political parties by requiring parties to draft constitutions, hold internal competition for leadership, and sustain financial
accountability. In exchange, registered parties received national funding each year. The authors envisioned better functioning and more sustainable parties as a result.

OLIPPAC also targeted the behavior of individual politicians. Elected politicians faced restrictions after gaining office. MPs had to vote with their party during key votes, or face by-elections. It was expected that the OLIPPAC laws would both promote party cohesion and encourage independent candidates to join parties (Gelu, 2011). The goal was to combat the so-called “yo-yo” politics common in PNG, in which politicians changed parties frequently and seemingly without consequence.

Initial reactions to the reforms have been mixed. Despite the goal of decreasing parties through legal restrictions, OLIPPAC seems to have actually encouraged party formation through its financial rewards. A record 43 parties contested the election in 2002, the first under OLIPPAC (Okole, 2005, 369). Once the 2002 election concluded and the new LPV reforms went into place, it became difficult to separate the impact of the two reforms. Most analyses have looked at LPV and OLIPPAC as two parts of the same set of changes.

Ben Reilly and Bill Standish examined six by-elections that took place between 2003 and 2004. Reilly tentatively concluded that LPV had been successful in drastically improving winning vote shares. Furthermore, Reilly viewed OLIPPAC as responsible for a reduction in the number of registered parties, down to 15. He similarly credited OLIPPAC with the decision of a majority of victorious independents to join parties after the 2002 election (Reilly, 2006A). Standish was a little more hesitant in his evaluation of the by-elections. While the elections were peaceful, Standish cautioned that the economic input and international manpower directed towards security could not be replicated in a
general election (Standish, 2006). Additionally, Standish ascribed the reduction in candidates to the normal decrease in interest and lessened financial capacity for by-elections versus general ones (Standish, 2006, 201). Most strangely, very few politicians and parties in the 2003-2004 by-elections reported any change in their strategy or behavior under the new rules. These two evaluations were both made with a great deal of caution due to the miniscule sample size. More positively, Alphonse Gelu’s evaluation of the 2007 election, the first general vote under the LPV system, reported lowered campaign intensity, greater moderation, and more geographically widespread candidate traveling (Gelu, 2011, 115).

The 2007 Election

Results

Reigning Prime Minister Michael Somare entered the 2007 election on an unprecedented streak. His National Alliance Party had won the most seats, 19, in the 2002 election, which enabled him by law to be Prime Minister. Since forming government following the 2002 election, Somare had become the first Papua New Guinean to preside over a government that served its full term of five years.

Somare’s National Alliance Party sponsored the most candidates in the 2007 election, 91. The National Alliance’s main rivals were expected to be the Pangu Pati, Somare’s original post-independence organization, the New Generation Party, formed by cabinet minister Bart Philemon after his expulsion from the National Alliance following clashes with Somare in early 2007, the PNG Party, the People’s Party, the People’s Progress Party, and the People’s Labour Party.
In all, 21 parties won seats in the 109-member Parliament. The National Alliance dominated the other parties, winning 26, more than three times as many as the next highest seat-winner, the PNG Party. Pangu Pati and the New Generation Party won only five seats each. A full breakdown of the results is presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Results By Party 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Candidates</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Party</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Action Party</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangu Pati</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Resources Party</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic Movement</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Generation Party</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s National Congress Party</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Progress Party</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development Party</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Country Party</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Labour Party</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Party</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanesian Liberal Party</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Labour Party</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG National Party</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s First Party</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanesian Alliance</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Conservative Party</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Advance Party</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Alliances**

Formal alliances were lacking in 2007. Most publicly, the two prime rivals to the National Alliance, the PNG Party and the New Generation Party, announced their intention to form a coalition of like-minded parties. Similarly, the National Alliance and
its incumbent coalition partners made pledges to continue working together after the election (Gelu, 2011, 116). Importantly, there was little to no formal commitment to exchanging preferences in the election. Party cooperation focused on post-election arrangements, and while pre-election commonalities could theoretically be implied, there were no actual arrangements or efforts to systematically communicate to party supporters how to fill out their ballots. Therefore, in the sense of this analysis of pre-electoral alliances on preference transfers, there were no formal alliances in 2007.

**Party System Institutionalization**

The 2007 election featured an abundance of parties and independents. To measure stability in party supply, Table 4.2 divides the 34 parties that contested seats in 2007 by size. While 34 parties represented a decrease from the 43 parties in 2002, the total number of candidates reached a record high at over 2,700. No truly national parties, in the sense of uniform competition in all seats, existed. However, 6 parties contested at least 60% of the seats and 16 contested more than 40%.

![Figure 4.1—Party Sponsorship of Candidates 2007](image-url)
Table 4.2—Party and Candidate Data 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Parties</th>
<th>Average number of candidates per district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is difficult to assess volatility in Papua New Guinea. While incumbents were reelected in 37.6% of the seats, this figure should be viewed with caution because it requires comparing the results of the 2007 election under LPV with the 2002 election under FPTP. Furthermore, it is impossible to measure volatility for the election for two reasons: first, accurate data on each party’s percentage of the total vote is unavailable, and second, comparisons with the pre-LPV system lose equivalency. Again, 21 parties won representation in the Parliament. The extreme multiparty nature of Papua New Guinea is evident in the Laakso-Taagepera Index for effective number of political parties, 12.41 for 2007. Calculating the Laakso-Taagepera Index after accounting for the switches in parties leads to a severe decrease in the effective number of parliamentary parties, down to 6.59. This reflects the voting power of the National Alliance with 38 of the 109 members. Because the 2007 election took place under the LPV system for the first time, the number of Exiting Parties and Entering Parties, and their respective performances, has been omitted.

High degrees of personalistic elite behavior places Papua New Guinea at the extreme low end of the rootedness dimension. In 2007, over half of the candidates were independents. Twenty of those independents won office, representing 18.3% of the makeup of parliament. This is enough to make independents the second largest faction, obviously paradoxically, in the government. However, the OLIPPAC laws enable independents to join parties before the choosing of a Prime Minister. The National
Alliance engaged in a systematic attempt to acquire elected independents following the election. To increase their own power in government, the National Alliance offered positions to independents (Gelu, 2011, 124). 17 independents joined parties following the election, with 12 of those becoming members of the National Alliance. In total, 20 MPs switched parties within a year of the 2007 election.21

Table 4.3—Rootedness 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Independent Candidates</th>
<th>Average Number of Independent Candidates per District</th>
<th>Number of Independents Elected</th>
<th>Incumbents winning reelection with new party</th>
<th>MPs switching parties within one year of election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>13.56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mechanics

Unsurprisingly given the sheer number of candidates in each seat, ranging from 7 to 69 in single constituencies, outright majority victories were rare. The average first preference share of the vote for winning candidates was only 21.9%, in line with pre-LPV numbers (Reilly, 2006A). Through LPV’s distributive mechanics, winning vote shares increase through the preference process. There are two ways to measure this: through the percentage of votes the winners received in proportion to the live ballots (a denominator which decreases as ballots are exhausted), or to the percentage of votes the winners received in proportion to the total number of ballots (a fixed denominator)—including those that have been exhausted. For 2007, initial first preference rankings for the average victor were 21.9%. The percentage of votes, including transferred preferences, out of all

21 The other 3 switches came from party mergers: the PNG Country Party merged into the Pangu Pati (2 switches), and the National Advance Party merged into the People’s Action Party (1 switch).
ballots was 32.8%. The percentage of live ballots for winners at the time of declaration was 54.6%.\(^\text{22}\)

Only four constituencies declared immediate winners on first preference counts. The vast majority, 96.3%, required the counting of preferences at least once. In 25 of the races, the initial winner came from behind through the exchange of preferences. Table 4.5 examines the extent to which some of the major parties benefited, or suffered, from the LPV system. No party consistently outperformed the others through preference transfers. All of the major parties had a net change of 1 or 0 when considering the difference between Leads Lost and Gaps Overcome.

Table 4.4—Use of Preferences 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outright Majority Wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Preference-required wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Average first preference percentage for victor(^\text{23})</th>
<th>Winner initially in 2(^{\text{nd}}) or worse after first count(^\text{24})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/109 (3.7%)</td>
<td>105/109 (96.3%)</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>25/104 (24.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^\text{23}\) This number was calculated using only 104 constituencies due to lack of available data in 5.

\(^\text{24}\) One constituency’s information is unavailable, so the true number could be 25/105 (23.8%) or 26/105 (24.8%).
After the election, the National Alliance, now up to 38 members following the addition of the independents, formed a coalition government with thirteen other parties in support (Gelu, 2011, 124). Somare led the National Alliance and its partners relatively smoothly until July of 2010. At that point, twenty members of the National Alliance coalition, mostly members of the National Alliance itself, crossed the floor to join the opposition. This defection followed a Supreme Court ruling that struck down OLIPPAC’s laws preventing MPs from switching parties while in office. Somare avoided potential disaster by dismissing Parliament for several months, a tactic he had used previously (May, 2013).

Unable to muster the numbers to pass a no-confidence vote at the time, the opposition tried again in 2011. In August, Somare remained on an extended absence in preparation for heart surgery in Singapore. Further uprising against Somare, in absentia, culminated in the Parliament declaring the position of Prime Minister vacant. Peter

25 Full information not available for one of the NGP’s seats, therefore the ways in which the NGP won its 5 seats are presented as ranges.
O’Neill, the head of the People’s National Congress, became Prime Minister after a parliamentary vote. A subsequent Supreme Court decision annulled Parliament’s actions and legally reinstated Somare as Prime Minister. Despite this, much of the international community and the majority of Papua New Guinean institutions recognized O’Neill and his deputy, former NA member Belden Namah, as the leaders of the acting government. The events marked the only unconstitutional transfer of power in PNG’s history. Until the 2012 election, PNG had its own Great Schism, with two claimants to the Prime Minister’s position.

The 2012 Election

Results

The 2012 Election further cemented the decline of the National Alliance. The party won only eight seats, tied for third most in the elected government. The major winner was Peter O’Neill’s People’s National Congress Party, which increased its seats dramatically to 26.\(^26\) The new Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party won the second most seats with 12. In total, 21 parties won seats in the now 111-member Parliament. Incidents of bribery, fraud, and corruption were still reported, although by and large the elections were declared free and fair (May, 2013, 169).

\(^{26}\) The PNC Party’s victory in the Kairuku-Hiri Open seat was declared void after bribery allegations were confirmed. The seat remains open. Therefore, all relevant analysis uses 110 results rather than 111.
## Table 4.6—Results by Party 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Candidates</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s National Congress Party</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Party</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance Party</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Resources Party</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Progress Party</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s United Assembly Party</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanesian Liberal Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Generation Party</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Movement for Change Party</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition for Reform Party</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic Movement</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Country Party</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Constitutional Democratic Party</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Development Party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous People’s Party</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Party</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangu Pati</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stars Alliance Party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Alliances

Heading into the election period, it appeared as if O’Neill and Namah’s close work in removing Michael Somare from office would facilitate preference transfers...
between the People’s National Congress and the PNG Party. However, a feud between the two leaders over the timing of the election, the condition of the electoral rolls, and the presence of Australian advisers created a massive rift between the two parties. It is unclear if any preference transfers actually took place, and Namah ended up leading the opposition to O’Neill’s government after the election.

**Party System Institutionalization**

The spectrum of parties shifted again in 2012. 42 parties contested seats, a jump up from 2007 and a return to 2002’s record levels. The increase in parties was matched by an increase in overall candidates, with 3,443 registered candidates for the election. Table 3.8 separates the parties by size. Once again, no party contested more than 85% of the seats. The People’s National Congress and the PNG Party were the largest two parties, with 90 and 89 candidates respectively. The Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party and the National Alliance followed in size, with the middle tier including the declining Pangu Pati, the revived PNG Country Party, the People’s Movement for Change Party, the People’s Party, and the United Resources Party. Of the 43 parties, 33 contested in less than 40% of the districts. This represents a shift towards more small parties compared with 2007, when the parties were more evenly spread out by size.
Incoming parties were numerous and successful in 2012. Almost 40% of the parties in the election were new in 2012, with those parties able to secure 22 seats. The Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party, whose leader, Don Polye, had previously been a cabinet minister and member of the National Alliance, won more than half of the entering parties’ seats.

Table 4.8—Exiting Parties and Entering Parties 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Seats won in previous election by Exiting Parties</th>
<th>Number of Entering Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of total parties that were Entering Parties</th>
<th>Seats won by Entering Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>22/110 (20.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We can now consider some aspects of volatility in the PNG context because of sequential LPV elections. From 2007-2012, the incumbency reelection rate was 38.7%. We still cannot examine Pedersen’s Index of Electoral Volatility, however, because of a lack of data on the percentage of the overall vote earned by each party. The 21 parties in government produced a Laakso-Taagepera Index of 10.10 effective parties, which decreases to 6.85 if one considers post-electoral party switches.\(^{27}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Number of Parliamentary parties (Laakso-Taagepera Index)</th>
<th>Incumbency Reelection Percentage</th>
<th>Electoral Volatility (Pedersen’s Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personalistic elite behavior continued unabated in 2012. Candidacy numbers grew by close to 700. This growth rate can be attributed largely to independents, who represented 63.7% of the overall registered contestants. Fourteen of the independents won elections, more than all but the People’s National Congress Party. Following the shakeup in the National Alliance, many incumbents changed parties. 29 of these incumbents won reelection with their new parties, many with the People’s National Congress, Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party, and PNG Party.\(^{28}\) As of the time of

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\(^{27}\) To calculate the modified L-T index, I used the party list of June 2013, provided by the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission.

\(^{28}\) Of the 29 incumbents who changed parties, 12 were from the National Alliance, two each from New Generation Party, PNG Party, the defunct People’s Action Party, the United Resources Party, and former independents, one each from People’s Democratic Movement, the National Conservative Party, the United Party, People’s Progress Party, Rural Development Party, PNG Conservative Party, and Pangu Pati. The 29 gains are
this writing, approximately eleven months from the election of 2012, thirteen MPs have switched parties, including eight independents adding an affiliation.

Table 4.10—Rootedness 2012

| Number of Independent Candidates | Average Number of Independent Candidates per District | Number of Independents Elected | Incumbents winning reelection with new party | MPs switching parties within one year of election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>19.77</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mechanics

LPV again came into play in almost every constituency in 2012. Candidates won only four of the seats outright without preferences, leaving over 96% of the seats to be determined using preferences. Unfortunately, as of the time of writing, a breakdown of which races candidates initially in first won and which races candidates won after initially trailing is not available.

Table 4.11—Use of Preferences 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outright Majority Wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Preference-required wins (percentage)</th>
<th>Average first preference percentage for victorious candidate</th>
<th>Winner initially in 2nd or worse after first count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/111 (3.6%)</td>
<td>107/111 (96.4%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

summarized as follows: People’s National Congress Party 11, PNG Party 5, Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party 5, United Resources Party 2, Our Development Party 1, People’s United Assembly Party 1, National Alliance 1, People’s Party 1, Social Democratic Party 1, and 1 independent.

Source: Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission. 3 June 2013. Provided by Norm Kelly, Australian National University.
Following the election, Peter O’Neill’s People’s National Congress formed a coalition government with twelve other parties, particularly the second place finisher Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party. Michael Somare, amazingly, also joined the coalition of his previously bitter rival. The PNG Party, led by a now anti-O’Neill Namah, headed the opposition.

**Discussion**

The party system in Papua New Guinea is on the extreme low end of the spectrum of institutionalization. Party supply is unstable, personalistic elite behavior is rampant, and electoral results are volatile. According to Henry Okole, Papua New Guinea lacks the key components that produce institutionalized party systems: there is no tradition of cleavage-based parties and no history of political groups existing outside of the current Parliament. Additionally, high degrees of personalism negate party coherence (Okole 2005, 372-376). These features produced a highly fractionalized party system revolving around clan-based parties and the economic and social capital of elites. While Okole’s analysis pre-dates the introduction of the LPV system, it establishes the beginning point for tracing the trajectory of PNG’s party system over the course of the last decade.

Knowing that LPV and the OLIPPAC integrity laws were introduced specifically to boost Papua New Guinea’s party system, we can make initial observations on new trends and lingering legacies.

Overall, the institutional reforms of LPV and OLIPPAC have coincided with a slight decrease in the stability of the party supply at the parliamentary level. The number of candidates has not been brought down under the new rules. Between 2002 and 2007,
the number of registered candidates dipped very slightly from 2,878 to 2,759. That drop was short-lived, as the 2012 election saw a record 3,443 candidates despite only a two-member increase in the size of the legislature. Candidate numbers have not always been this high in post-independence Papua New Guinea. The two elections in the 1970s featured less than ten candidates per electorate on average, with the median only passing 15 in 1992 (Reilly 1997A, 11). The recent candidature totals follow the changes in party supply: 42 parties in 2002 and 2012, both under OLIPPAC laws but only the latter under LPV, with a dip to 34 in 2007. Alphonse Gelu points out that OLIPPAC has not prevented candidates from forming new parties, typically but not exclusively small ones, after being expelled from others (Gelu, 2011, 125). The plethora of parties is also a relatively recent phenomenon and is likely due to OLIPPAC’s funding for legally registered organizations. No election prior to 2002 had more than 14 parties.

The lack of detailed information makes assessments of volatility for the most recent elections difficult. In terms of parliamentary representation, the effective number of political parties has dropped each election: from an all-time high of 16.16 in 2002, to 12.41 in 2007, and finally to 10.10 in 2012.\footnote{2002 data from Henry Okole, 2005, 369.} However, we do know that incumbent reelection rates have increased from the last non-LPV election, when only 25% of MPs were reelected between 1997 and 2002. Between 2002 and 2007 the number rose to 37.6%, and increased slightly again to 38.7% in 2012. These numbers are closer to the reelection rates from the 1970s and 1980s, prior to the proliferation of parties at their current extreme levels (Okole, 2005, 370; Fraenkel, 2004, 122-123).
Parties continue to have only tentative links to small groups of supporters (Gelu, 2011). This leads to high vacillations between elections. If we measure the volatility for parties’ seat share between 2007 and 2012, the only two elections under LPV, we see that 54.3% of the seats in Parliament changed hands. Some of this volatility may theoretically be a result of different voters participating in the two elections. Recorded participation for 2012 was over 3.67 million voters, or 76.9% of registered voters. In Papua New Guinea, registration is compulsory but voting is not.

OLIPPAC reforms were intended to decrease the amount of personalistic elite behavior in Papua New Guinea. Financial rewards would theoretically encourage independents to seek party membership, while limits on MP behavior would keep elected officials from switching parties or voting against their party once elected. In the first election under OLIPPAC, but before LPV, 18 independents were elected. The number increased to 20 in 2007 under LPV, and subsequently dropped to 14 in the most recent contest. Large numbers of independents have joined parties after the recent elections. As a consequence, PNG experiences contrasting pulls in this dimension: fewer independent victors, after the election itself, but more party switching behavior (Reilly, 2006A).

Similarly, the number of actual parties in Parliament has decreased following consolidation of parties immediately after elections, decreasing the rootedness measurements dimension while also decreasing volatility.

To calculate this number, I took the sum of the difference in percentage of seats won for each party, then divided by two to reflect the fact that one party’s gain was another party’s loss. Independents were omitted. If one compares the 2012 election results to the post-switching period after 2007, the index decreases to 46.4.

It is clear that Papua New Guinea’s party system is low on any measurement of institutionalization. The second element of the elections under consideration was the role of preference transfers. Paradoxically, preference transfers are ubiquitous in Papua New Guinea, while preference trading alliances are rare, if extant at all. Bill Standish cautions that new party behavior requires a period of learning. Examining the first by-elections under LPV’s preference trading mechanisms, he reports that most candidates did not change their behavior from FPTP campaigns (Standish, 2006, 198). On the party scale, this failure to pursue formal alliances continued in the 2007 and 2012 elections. Instead, the major parties formed partnerships and waged battles on post-electoral lines.

This is not to insinuate there was no strategy under the LPV elections. Even prior to 2007’s national election, some candidates understood the benefits of using preferences to block rivals and favor local allies. Other candidates encouraged supporters to direct second preferences to candidates who stood little realistic shot of winning, basically wasting votes and lowering the overall percentage of live votes (Standish, 2006, 200-203). This tactic has little grounding in mathematical logic, as it theoretically only delays an inevitable showdown between major candidates. Nevertheless, candidates were responding to the new system.

The most collaborative decision made at the party level was to not contest the same seats as incumbent coalition partners. In 2007, the reigning Prime Minister, Michael Somare, ran in his home regional seat without any other candidates from the National Assembly’s ruling coalition (Gelu, 2011, 117). This is definitely a cooperative tactic, but does not utilize the features of LPV in any way. In fact, seat-sharing tactics resemble
FPTP incentives more than preferential voting strategies, which should theoretically encourage like-minded parties to compete against each other with little vote-splitting risk.

To conclude, Papua New Guinea has a noticeable lack of formalized preference trading, despite massive incentives for parties to gain small advantages. The party system in Papua New Guinea is not institutionalized. Instability, volatility, and personalistic elite behavior characterize the party dynamic. The final chapter will bring the results from all three countries together in an attempt to theorize why Papua New Guinea parties behave differently from their Fijian and Australian counterparts.
Chapter Five: Preference Dynamics--How Party System Institutionalization Affects Alliance Formation

The countries in the sample have selected preference voting for different purposes. Australia originally pursued the Alternative Vote as a way of providing for parties on the same side of the ideological spectrum to compete and function independently without harming their chances to win in a single-member district. Fijian legislators adopted the Alternative Vote to incentivize collaboration among non-extremist parties rooted in ethnic identities. In Papua New Guinea, preferential voting enhanced the linkages between voters and MPs by increasing the chances that a voter had selected a winning candidate in some fashion. Despite the differing motivations, the preferential voting distribution process rewards parties across the sample with forming partnerships and communicating those pre-election alliances to their supporters.

The evidence from the three case studies suggests that preference voting has had mixed rates of success at reaching its intended goals in the Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. Australia’s right-wing parties, the National Party and the Liberal Party, work together so closely that they essentially, and sometimes literally, function as a single unit. In this case, the Alternative Vote seems to have failed in preventing a two-party system. However, the National Party has a strong pull on Liberal policy, despite being the smaller of the partners. This suggests a programmatic constellation of more than two parties, especially when considering the ability of the left-wing Green Party to influence Labor decisions as well. In Fiji, multi-ethnic collaborations have not always proclaimed
moderate views as their dominant commonality. Especially in 1999, parties from
different ethnic backgrounds have worked together under the basic goal of ousting the
incumbents, rather than any larger policy coordination. Determining the effectiveness of
the Papua New Guinean effort to enhance ties between voters and candidates is currently
difficult without survey data. Nevertheless, the one common feature of all the preference-
voting cycles is that there are tangible benefits for parties that form pre-election alliances,
regardless of the reason for the ties that bind the parties together. Despite this reward,
Papua New Guinean parties have not formed formal alliances to date. The research
presented indicates that differences in party system institutionalization play a significant
role in blocking the pre-electoral cooperation process.

Assessing the level of institutionalization in the party systems of the eight-
election sample requires cross-national comparisons. In keeping with the dominant
discourse on system institutionalization, the analysis has covered three separate
dimensions. The final chapter will begin with a review of the results for each of the
countries across the three dimensions before summarizing the extent of party system
institutionalization in each system. The second section examines the electoral system
itself, to see if preferential voting functions at variance with plurality rules and if alliance
formation proved beneficial. The third section proposes a heuristic model to tie together
the results. In the cases under consideration, party behavior has differed despite similar
preference voting statistical distribution and, at first glance, similar incentives. Party
system institutionalization is a crucial intervening variable. Finally, the chapter concludes
with caveats to the explanatory power of the heuristic model.
Reviewing Party System Institutionalization

In the preceding chapters, three dimensions of party system institutionalization have been investigated: stability, volatility, and rootedness. Legitimacy, which refers to the strength of linkages between parties and voters, has not been considered because its indicators use survey research that is currently unavailable in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. An effort has been made to separate features of the electoral system, where all parties compete, versus the parliamentary system, where only winning parties can participate. The stability dimension refers to the party supply, with special attention paid to the sizes of parties and the frequency with which parties enter and exit the system. Secondly, volatility concerns the actual electoral results. At both the individual level and the party level, volatility indicators attempt to capture the consistency and predictability of electoral cycles. The final dimension, rootedness, reflects the degree to which politicians are tied to parties. Measurements evaluate the presence and success of independents as well as the frequency with which successful politicians change affiliations. The precise wording implied in the three dimensions is admittedly confusing. Table 5.1 provides a polarized typology for each of the dimensions. It is important to keep in mind that party system institutionalization exists across a spectrum and that these are extreme generalizations (Mainwaring, 1998).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of System</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
<th>Rootedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High P.S.I.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High (Party-driven)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(stable)</td>
<td>(placid/predictable)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low P.S.I.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low (Individual-driven)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(unstable)</td>
<td>(volatile/unpredictable)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stability

The beginning point for measuring stability is the actual number of parties in the system. Despite its reputation as a two-party system, Australia actually has more parties in each observation set than Fiji, but still considerably less than Papua New Guinea. A similar trend unfolds when we consider the average number of candidates per district. Papua New Guinea has between three and five times as many candidates on the average ballot as Australia, and between five and seven times as many as Fiji. These data points are considered together in Figure 5.1. Nevertheless, there are ways in which Australia distinguishes itself from the two Pacific states. If we consider the percentage of parties contesting 80% of the seats, in essence seeking to identify nationally competitive parties, Australia boasts the highest overall average over the course of the sample, with 16.3% of its parties contending nationally. Papua New Guinea is the lowest, with only about 5% of its parties meeting the admittedly arbitrary 80% threshold for national appeal. Fiji exists in the middle and shows great change over the 1999-2006 period. Beginning with no parties contesting nationwide, the Fijian system evolved to just below the Australian average. If the threshold is decreased to 60% of contests, Fiji actually has slightly more national parties than Australia.
Figure 5.1—Stability of Parties and Candidates

Figure 5.2—Number of Major Parties

The data for supply stability shows the value in considering both electoral and parliamentary power of political parties. At first glance, Papua New Guinea’s and Fiji’s
systems appear relatively comparable with Australia’s when we examine the changes in party supply from election to election. The percentage of parties exiting and entering the system is actually slightly lower in PNG than Australia or Fiji. Nevertheless, when we account for the success of Exiting Parties and Entering Parties, a different phenomenon emerges that will be discussed further in the volatility section.

Australia fits the notion of a stable party system. While there are an abundance of parties, the actual electoral competition revolves around a couple major contenders that have longevity. Papua New Guinea is on the unstable end of the spectrum with massive amounts of candidates competing. Few parties have truly national reach, and they do not dominate the election by default. Fiji is harder to categorize. Over the course of its experiments with AV, Fiji’s system became more and more of a two party contest between the Fijian SDL and the Indo-Fijian FLP. As those parties extended their reach as national parties, their prime ethnic rivals also increased in size while other parties dropped out entirely.

Volatility

Fiji and Papua New Guinea measure as considerably more volatile than Australia. In fact, Australia’s placid system is well deserving of its reputation for electoral consistency. Australia’s changes in supply have little influence on the results: literally zero seats have been won by Entering Parties and no Exiting Party has won seats in its ultimate election. Contrarily, Fiji’s 2001 election saw a majority of the seats won by Entering Parties, while no Entering Parties won seats in 2006. In Papua New Guinea, Entering Parties won 20% of the seats in the 2012 election. The numbers for Exiting Parties have been less severe.
These general observations are further confirmed through the Laakso-Taagepera Index of the effective number of parliamentary parties in office. Far more of the parties in Papua New Guinea are able to exercise an influence on the parliamentary system than in Fiji or Australia. At the parliamentary level, Fiji and Australia function throughout the sample as two or three party systems, despite far more parties competing in the elections. Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, is far more diverse and multiple in the amount of parties that have parliamentary power.
Australian incumbents were reelected in over two-thirds of the districts, at minimum, in the sample. Conversely, Papua New Guinean incumbents won reelection in slightly over one-third of the races considering the two electoral cycles under LPV, and similarly low rates previously under FPTP. In Fiji, the upheaval of the 2001 election following the George Speight coup, coupled with the rise of the SDL party as the dominant ethnic Fijian political force, distorted the findings. Despite the short turnaround between the 1999 and 2001 election, incumbency reelection rates for 2001 were below 20%, but bounced back to almost half the seats in 2006. Measurements for Electoral Volatility, the cumulative change in vote share for all parties, show similar patterns. Australia’s Electoral Volatility is miniscule, below 10 on the Pedersen Index, reflecting a less than 10% shift in the parties’ performance. Fiji’s is quite large for the dramatic 2001 election, but then below 15 for 2006. Papua New Guinea results by party are not available. An admittedly flawed substitute is to estimate volatility using the cumulative
change in percentage of seats won in Parliament. Under this measurement, more than half of the seats in PNG changed parties. These indicators fit the anecdotal evidence that elections in Papua New Guinea are exceedingly difficult to predict.

Figure 5.5—Incumbent Reelection Percentage

Figure 5.6—Electoral Volatility

33 See Chapter 4, note 31.
Rootedness

In terms of politician affiliation with parties, Papua New Guinea is completely distinct from Australia and Fiji. Less than one independent, on average, contests each district in Fiji and Australia, while the averages in PNG were 13.56 in 2007 and 19.77 in 2012. Independents, not surprisingly given those numbers, are more successful in Papua New Guinea as well. If we measure personalistic elite behavior using the attachment of politicians to their parties, Papua New Guinea again presents a different picture from Australia and Fiji. Incumbents changing parties, and than being reelected, were common in the PNG sample. Conversely, the same pattern happened only three times in each Fijian election and not a single time in Australia. Most noticeably, Papua New Guinean politicians switch parties after gaining office, highlighted by 20 “party hops” after 2007 and 13 after 2012, while this behavior is not present in Fiji or Australia.

Figure 5.7—Independent Frequency and Success
To conclude, we can now attempt to place each of the countries into a typology of party system institutionalization. Australia is at one extreme: a highly institutionalized system characterized by stability in parliamentary supply, albeit with electoral supply changes between cycles, virtually nonexistent elite behavior outside of party structures,
and low volatility. Fiji showed the markings of an evolving system. While the sample size is undoubtedly too small to make strong claims, the Fijian party system appeared to be trending towards more stability and less volatility after the 2001 race, while individualistic behavior remained rare. In most, but not all of the indicators considered, Fiji bares closer resemblance to Australia than Papua New Guinea. PNG is at the other extreme from Australia: supply is unstable in both electoral and parliamentary measures, personalistic elite behavior is the norm rather than the exception, and results appear volatile. Even in the aftermath of the OLIPPAC reforms, the Papua New Guinea party system is poorly institutionalized.

Table 5.2: Typology of Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Supply Stability</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
<th>Rootedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia (2004-2010)</td>
<td>High Consistently Stable</td>
<td>Low Placid</td>
<td>High Party Driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG (2007-2012)</td>
<td>Low Consistently Unstable</td>
<td>High Consistently Volatile</td>
<td>Low Personalistic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reviewing the Mechanics of Preferential Voting

The second major task in each of the case studies was to identify the relevance of preferential voting in determining the winners. In addition, the performance of particular parties and alliances was examined to determine if some patterns of behavior proved more successful than others in gaining seats when preferences were used.
Implicit in this approach has been the need to prove first, that preferential voting systems differ from first past the post elections, and second, that the behavior of parties can play a role in determining success or failure under preference voting. For each of the eight elections in the sample, the frequency of outright wins was compared to those requiring preference exchanges. In the case of a three-candidate contest in Fiji, this might be one exchange, or, on the other extreme, there could be over 60 exchanges of preferences in a Papua New Guinean constituency. Finally, taking only the sample of seats requiring preferences, the frequency with which winning candidates were able to overcome deficits was recorded. These occasions undoubtedly reflect the influence of preference voting, as the ultimate winner differed from a hypothetical equivalent race in a first past the post system. This is not to say that the races in which the initial leader wins the seat through preferences are unimportant. Parties should be just as motivated, if not more so, to hold on to leads rather than usurp them.

The three countries’ elections depended on preferences to widely varying degrees. The trend over the course of the Australian samples was towards more and more use of preferences in determining winners. In the most recent election in 2010, preferences played a role in close to 60% of races. Historically, preferences have never been more significant in Australia. This finding appears to go against the belief that the Alternative Vote is nothing more than a majoritarian system that omits minor parties. After all, the Green Party and the National Party, through their alliances with the Labor Party and the Liberal Party respectively, influence policy at the national level. Still, overcoming deficits is difficult. Initial leaders lost less than 13% of the seats determined through preferences in each of the three elections.
In contrast, Fiji’s reliance on preferences decreased across the sample. From an even split between preferences and outright wins in its first election under AV, Fiji ended its preferential voting experiment with only 14% of seats relying on transfers. Similarly, parties appeared to improve their ability to maintain initial leads. In 1999, nearly half of the preference transfer seats resulted in the initial leader losing. This number decreased to only twenty percent in 2006.

Papua New Guinea was the most reliant on preferences by a considerable margin. Over 95% of the constituencies relied on the transfer of preferences, as candidate proliferation contributed massively to a paucity of outright wins. In 2007, nearly a quarter of the seats changed hands over the course of the preference allocations. The equivalent number for 2012 is unfortunately unavailable at the time of writing.

Figure 5.10—Preference Use and Gaps Overcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency and Significance of Preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aus0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of districts requiring use of preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of races where winner trailed at first count</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Australia, party constellations proved telling in determining which parties benefited the most from preference transfers. The long-lasting partnership between the Liberal Party and the National Party is based on an electoral strategy of seat splitting. The
two parties, with Liberal the much larger of the two, rarely compete head to head in any
district. They therefore do not benefit much from the preference voting strategy, unless
they partner with another party from outside the Coalition. On the other hand, the Labor
Party has allied consistently with the Green Party over the course of the last decade.
While not as ideologically linked as the Coalition at the policy level in government, the
two left-leaning parties make terrific electoral partners. Each competes in all districts, and
the Greens have made enough of an impact on the national electorate to serve as a
consistently sizable third party transferring votes to Labor. In close contests, the Greens
share of the vote is typically enough to push Labor candidates to a majority, whether they
are initially ahead or not. In the three elections, 25 Coalition candidates lost leads despite
initially leading prior to preference transfers. Labor won 24 of those races and the Greens
another. Conversely, Labor candidates lost only two leads over the same cycle, and the
Coalition won only one of those seats. This is not to suggest that the Coalition’s strategy
is foolish. With the decline of the Australian Democrats and the rise of the Greens, the
Coalition lacks a clear external partner. As a result, its ability to win preferences has
diminished compared to the situation in the decades following World War II, when it was
the Labor Party that consistently lost leads (Butler, 1973).

In Fiji, evolving constellations revealed changing strategies. In 1999, the FLP
alliance with ethnic Fijian parties proved far more capable of utilizing preference
transfers successfully than the incumbent SVT-NFP alliance, which consistently
employed a seat-splitting strategy. The situation flipped in 2001, with the SDL taking on
the role of dominant ethnic Fijian party from the SVT. The FLP had won ten seats from
initially losing positions in 1999, but that reduced to zero in 2001. At the same time, the
FLP went from losing only three leads in 1999 to seven in 2001. Despite not being in an alliance, the SDL benefited from preference transfers from other ethnic Fijian parties, the opposite of what had happened to the SVT in 1999. Frequently placed just above the FLP, the SDL won eight seats that it initially trailed in while losing only three such races. In 2006, the dynamic appeared to stabilize as the nation became increasingly polarized between the FLP and SDL demographics. With few viable third parties to choose from, the FLP and SDL both entered into alliances with minor parties. Only two seats changed hands, both SDL leads initially. Success in Fiji does not seem any more or less contingent on moderation than any other rationale for cooperation. It is cooperation that benefits parties, not cooperation born from a particular motive.

Turning finally to Papua New Guinea, the process of evaluating gets much trickier. Most obviously, there were no formal alliances. Therefore, the performance of all parties during the 2007 election was considered. Viewed as an alternative to the strategies employed in Fiji and Australia, not forming alliances appears to have rendered Papua New Guinean parties equally capable of losing leads and overcoming gaps. All things being equal, it is hard to imagine how forming alliances would not have improved the ability of some of the major PNG parties to hold on to leads and overcome deficits. The next section offers a potential explanation for how poor party system institutionalization could have negated the seemingly beneficial incentives to pursue alliances in Papua New Guinea.

**A Heuristic for Party System Institutionalization and Preference Alliances**

In a highly institutionalized party system, forming alliances to transfer preferences makes perfect sense. Parties that are roughly equal in popularity envision a
symbiotic relationship. In a district where Party A has more supporters than Party B, it reliably acquires Party B votes as preferences are exchanged. Party B gets a reciprocal benefit in a district where it has a larger initial advantage. Taken cumulatively, both parties can increase their seat share in relation to parties that might have a slightly larger percentage of the initial vote while simultaneously maintaining leads against others that lag behind.

There are also benefits for parties of unequal popularity. The more popular party engages in the same logic as above: transfers from its alliance partner increase its vote share and help it earn more seats while keeping the ones it initially leads but does not hold an initial majority. For the less popular party, the benefits might be purely a matter of policy trades; helping its partner in the election can lead to concessions after the formation of government. However, there are also potential electoral benefits. If the less popular party has a stronghold in a particular constituency, for whatever demographic reason, than its ability to reliably transfer small amounts of the vote in other districts to its partner can lead to crucial reciprocation in the few districts where it has a larger initial vote share. This allows small parties a chance to gain office despite lacking a majority in any given seat.

These benefits are on display in Australia and, to a lesser extent, Fiji. In Australia, party supply among the major vote-winners is stable, results fluctuate only minimally, and parties exert strong control over their candidates. Preference alliances are repeated over the course of multiple electoral cycles. Given Australia’s extreme placidity in its results, it is actually not surprising that pre-election transfers tend to benefit only one
grouping. If the two major parties cannot earn an outright majority, the most powerful third party holds a decisive influence over the eventual outcome.

In Fiji, the general trend has been towards more party system institutionalization. Alliance packages transformed as the strategic goals of the medium to small parties changed, from ousting an incumbent to more racially and ideologically aligned solidarity. The solidification of a two-party system drastically lowered the use of preferences, which became viable only in ethnically heterogeneous Open seats. Still, the strongest of the minor parties, like in Australia, wields influence in those races.

Low party system institutionalization could interfere with parties’ ability to calculate incentives. Simply put, it’s not clear who has the power and what the potential benefits are of allying with specific partners. Furthermore, in poorly institutionalized systems with high levels of personalistic elite behavior, there are more contending independents that might not be enchanted with the same rationale of reciprocity that applies to parties.

Unstable party supply could make forming alliances more difficult by obscuring the parties that might make natural preference transfer partners. If the size of parties changes dramatically in each cycle, a party on the look out for a preference deal may have a harder time calculating who its most valuable potential partners are. Parties that may have been of value as partners in specific districts given the results of previous elections may opt not to pose candidates in those districts in subsequent cycles. Exiting Parties and Entering Parties can also complicate the matter. While the mere reality of parties coming and going is not, taken by itself, a difficult obstacle to account for, preference alliances become more complicated when successful parties leave the system.
and new parties have high potential for earning seats. Calculating the demographic strengths and weaknesses of new parties is naturally more difficult than for established ones, and a vacating party leaves an equally unclear vacuum. Cumulatively, the indicators of unstable party supply combine to create uncertainty and inconsistency for all parties, making pre-electoral alliance formation less obviously fortuitous.

Similarly, party systems characterized by volatile results might pose challenges for alliance formation. Parties that cannot safely estimate their own strengths and weaknesses from election to election are limited in their ability to calculate strategically viable partnerships. When incumbents are infrequently able to win reelection, parties cannot count on past areas of strength for either themselves or fellow parties that appear powerful in the moment. In many ways, unstable supply and high volatility work together to deter pre-election alliances. Both features boost the range of potential electoral outcomes to levels that may create risks in forming alliances that outweigh the potential benefits.

Frequent personalistic elite behavior further also could negate the advantages of alliance formation. When independents constitute a large and viable portion of the candidate list, the incentives of preference alliances likely dissipate. Independents should not make the multi-district calculations that are part of the logic of preference deals. For an unaffiliated candidate, the single member district is a zero-sum game. Obviously, independents would typically welcome preference deals from less popular parties or candidates in an effort to boost their percentage of the vote. However, they have nothing to offer outside of their constituency. Powerful independents cannot reciprocate with preferences in other districts, negating electoral benefits for their partner. Furthermore,
independents typically will struggle to provide policy rewards or enough voting power once in government at the same volume as a party. Conversely, an independent that makes a preference deal and ultimately helps another candidate win office cannot achieve any other parliamentary benefit. Their facilitation of the transfer of their own vote earns them little advantage.

Personalistic elite behavior, or an absence of rootedness, on the behalf of party members also could have consequences on alliance formation. When elites can operate freely outside the boundaries of party restrictions, changing parties frequently for example, parties have less control over the electoral process. In a system dominated by individuals rather than parties, district races can take on the zero-sum nature described above. When parties exist more in name than in function, the multi-district calculations of reciprocity could yield to individual impulses to view each race as zero-sum.

The potential hindrances posed by unstable supply, volatile results, and personalistic behavior are not chasms. Parties and independents may still seek to transfer votes due to ideological similarity, strong personal relations, or a common dislike of a particular opponent. But, the characteristics of a poorly institutionalized system should be expected to decrease the frequency and amount of pre-electoral alliances of a formal and national nature.

Papua New Guinea fits this model well. Preferences should benefit the dozens of parties that are competitive in LPV elections. Due to the inability of most candidates to win their races outright, preferences are used in almost all races. The proliferation of parties suggests initial gaps are small and could be surmounted with consistent transfers from a coalition of allied parties. The volatility and instability in PNG suggests that
dozens of parties could benefit electorally from these tactics, not just the major powers as in Fiji and Australia. Low party system institutionalization is perhaps the key factor in explaining the absence of pre-electoral alliances.

There is one other consideration at play in Papua New Guinea. As one of the indicators for personalistic elite behavior, this study considered the frequency with which MPs switch parties between cycles and immediately following elections. The so-called party hopping behavior, common to PNG historically and recently condoned once again, provides an alternative method for parties to gain many of the advantages presented in the preference voting system. Parties compete to increase their seat share through acquiring individuals that stand a good chance of being elected, or have been already. In this way, without needing to calculate alliance incentives, parties can increase their size in the parliament. From a strategic standpoint, party hopping is a less risky and less difficult proposition for parties. Table 5.3 demonstrates how party size in the government changes as a result of party hopping. The phenomenon helped the largest party the most, as it did for the NA in 2007, but is by no means exclusive.
Table 5.3—2012-2013 Party Hopping in PNG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats Won 2012</th>
<th>Seats Held June 2013</th>
<th>Change in Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s National Congress Party</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triumph Heritage Empowerment Party</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Alliance Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Resources Party</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Progress Party</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s United Assembly Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanesian Liberal Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Generation Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Movement for Change Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition for Reform Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Democratic Movement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Country Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNG Constitutional Democratic Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Development Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous People’s Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangu Pati</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stars Alliance Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission, “List of Members of Political Parties by Member in Parliament,” 3 June 2013, obtained via electronic communication with Norm Kelly on 7 August 2013. Calculation of the Change in Seats is my own.

35 Only 106 MPs are currently sitting in PNG’s Parliament due to four results being successfully challenged in court and 1 MP passing away after the election.
Possible Limitations to the Heuristic Model

It is important to emphasize that the last section proposed only a heuristic model for evaluating the likelihood and nature of preference alliances in different party systems. There are multiple reasons to be cautious with the interpretation of the evidence and the theoretical constructs developed thus far. These limitations include both potential measurement error and alternative interpretations of the sample cases.

From a measurement perspective, small sample size limits this study. As argued in the first chapter, this is a necessary byproduct of having only three countries in the world with equivalent systems. While preferential voting is common in elections for European executive offices, and gaining prominence at the local level throughout the democratic world, it is exceedingly rare for national legislative elections. To date, only Australia and Papua New Guinea use the system, with Fiji likely moving away from preferential voting in its upcoming election after a lengthy hiatus from democratic procedure.\(^{36}\) There were only three Fijian elections to examine, one more than Papua New Guinea has conducted under LPV to this point. The number of observations could have been drastically increased using Australian contests, but that threatened to tilt the relative balance of having a similar number of elections from each country.

Beyond sample size, there is always risk in presenting observations and measurements from multiple countries as strict truths ripe for comparison. Most noticeably in this study, data for measuring the volatility dimension of party system institutionalization is unavailable for Papua New Guinea. Without knowing what

\(^{36}\) Fiji has not held elections since 2006, but is scheduled to hold elections under a new constitution at some point in 2014.
percentage of the vote each party earned, any attempt to gauge Electoral Volatility is a
guessing game at best. Furthermore, for the 2012 PNG election, there is no available data
on which seats were won by candidates who were initially trailing. This hampers our
ability to confidently state that preference transfers altered the election results. Even
when data is available for Papua New Guinea, accusations of electoral fraud and voter
intimidation subject the results to a degree of variance likely greater than exists in
Australia and Fiji. When we also consider that Fiji and Australia have compulsory voting
while Papua New Guinea does not, there is ample reason to treat Papua New Guinea
results with caution.\textsuperscript{37} Suggesting that particular results stem solely from a vacillating
electorate or a dominant elite threatens to bury potentially influential improprieties.

Fiji presents its own series of issues. First, the majority of seats are allocated by
communal identity. The presence of exclusively Fijian and Indian districts, in
combination with the 25 Open seats, could alter the incentives for alliances in a variety of
ways. For example, the two major Indian parties, the NFP and the FLP, would greatly
benefit from sharing preferences in Open seats, but are the only direct competitors in the
Indian seats. It is hard to unpack the myriad of ways in which the institutionalization of
racial politics in Fiji could influence stability, volatility, and the structure of alliances.
Add to that the 2000 George Speight coup, which overthrew the elected FLP government
and indirectly led to new elections in 2001. This event shifted the power and identity of
the Fijian parties in ways that directly caused shifts in stability and volatility. After
consideration, it is my argument that this non-democratic event should be included in the

\textsuperscript{37} C. Bean argues that Australia’s short peaks and troughs in volatility result from its
compulsory voting measures (Bean, 1986, 59-60).
evaluation of Fiji’s democratic system. Non-democratic behavior, and its subsequent consequences, has meaningful contributions on party system institutionalization that should not be ignored.

Ethnic fragmentation and linguistic variation could possibly be the ultimate drivers of party system institutionalization. In this study, Australia represents a unipolar electorate divided on a single left-right cleavage of ideology. Fiji, with an omnipresent divide between the indigenous population and the Indo-Fijian one, has the additional cleavage of ethnicity, not to mention multiple languages in which to conduct political affairs. Papua New Guinea is perhaps the preeminent example of multipolarity in the universe of democracies. While it is likely that there is correlation between ethnic fragmentation and levels of party system institutionalization, suggestions of causation are premature and underdeveloped to date. In Papua New Guinea, for example, replacing fluidity with fragmentation overlooks the basic fact that parties do not typically coalesce on common ethnic or linguistic lines. In fact, Papua New Guinea is so fragmented that party behavior solely on ethnic lines is practically impossible. Similarly, solely relying on ethnic fragmentation to contrast Fiji and Australia ignores the fact that the indigenous Fijian party structure has typically appeared multipolar while the Indo-Fijian has consistently been bipolar. This is not to dismiss ethnic fragmentation as a legitimate driver of party system institutionalization measurements. On the surface, the correlation seems likely. However, given the scope of this research project, the degree to which ethnic fragmentation affects party system institutionalization must be viewed as a process prior to the formation of the independent variable.
The related possibility certainly exists that it is ethnic fragmentation and linguistic variation, rather than fluid party system institutionalization, which inhibits pre-election cooperation. While future large-N studies could show that this is generally true, the Fijian case indicates otherwise. Whatever causal mechanism would prevent multipolar societies from featuring cooperative preference-trading behavior would also appear to prevent bipolar societies from featuring multi-ethnic alliances. After all, an alliance at its core features two parties, which are either of the same predominant ethnic group or not, if organized along ethnic lines. Yet, in each electoral cycle in Fiji, the Indo-Fijian FLP was able to make alliances with predominantly Fijian ethnic parties. This analysis is difficult to extend to Papua New Guinea for the reason previously stated: parties in PNG do not usually feature a single ethnic group.

Throughout the course of the analysis, there has been an implicit assumption that preferential voting and party system institutionalization exist as separate phenomena. However, there might be reason to believe that the dynamic is more complicated. Farrell and McAllister suggest that the AV system increases party discipline in Australia (Farrell and McAllister, 2005). Nevertheless, the causal mechanism that would link preferential voting with enhanced party discipline is underdeveloped, if not nonexistent. The lack of even remotely comparable discipline, even after the addition of the OLIPPAC reforms, in Papua New Guinea under the closely related LPV suggests that the relationship might not exist at all. Additionally, Fraenkel provides evidence that the AV system will lead to an increase in small parties that are tangentially related to one of the major parties (Fraenkel, 2004, 126). However, the vast differences in the dimension measurements among the
three countries of the study suggest that party system institutionalization does not converge to a common level in preference voting cultures.

Three particularly intriguing caveats remain. The first relates to chronology, particularly in comparing the recent Australian elections with those from Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Australia’s 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections were the latest in an unbroken century-long preferential voting tradition. However, the Fijian and Papua New Guinean elections under examination represent nearly the entirety of the two nations’ preferential voting experience. It is likely that parties gradually learn ideal strategies for preferential voting systems and that behavior will change over time as a result. This learning process takes place through repeated democratic behavior, as suggested by Staffan Lindberg (Lindberg, 2006). In this sense, Australia’s parties represent a post-learning stage of preference voting whereas Papua New Guinea’s parties are still learning. Fiji appears to provide an ideal model for this theory, as the ethnic Fijian parties changed their strategies and gradually achieved the success suggested by their numerical superiority. Further study of the validity of this theory will have to wait for both more countries to adopt preferential voting and more elections to take place.

Second, it is possible that some of the variation in alliance strategy presented in this study is due primarily to ballot structure. In Australia, voters frequently take How To Vote cards into the polls with them. Provided by their party of choice, the HTV cards give a complete set of numbered preferences for a given district according to the wishes of that party. While voters do not have to follow these cards, they do give parties the

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38 Papua New Guinea used the Alternative Vote in its pre-independence national council elections in the early 1970s.
ability to influence their supporters in the direction of preferences in an indirect manner. In Fiji, the Above the Line voting method gives parties direct control over preference transfers. According to an order published before the actual election date, parties redistribute Above the Line ballots to other parties once their own candidate is eliminated. The vast majority of Fijian voters choose this method, giving Fijian parties near total power to direct preference flows. Conversely, Papua New Guinea has no such measures. Parties and candidates, if they have clear preference strategies, have to communicate those to voters in less formalized ways. It is certainly plausible that the introduction of How to Vote cards or Above the Line voting would increase the amount of alliances in Papua New Guinea. However, it is my conjecture that the low system institutionalization would still present major obstacles for a cross-nationally comparable number of parties to enter into alliances.

Finally, this analysis has employed a strict definition of pre-election alliances. I have counted as pre-election alliances only those formalized through public declarations. In Australia and Fiji, the formal alliances have produced higher transfers of votes to corresponding partners than other, not formalized, ideologically or strategically compatible sets of parties. Keeping in mind that all voters transfer preferences in the AV and LPV systems, votes shift in non-random ways regardless of alliance formation. From the available evidence out of Australia and Fiji, there appears to be a clear difference in the performance of the most successful alliances versus non-allied parties. However, further mathematical studies could add to the field by comparing the actual shift in votes towards allied parties versus non-allied parties.
Conclusion

This study has examined pre-electoral party behavior in preferential voting systems. Two nations, Australia and Fiji, have major parties that consistently seek alliances with other parties in the build up to elections. A third, Papua New Guinea, has parties that form alliances, but only towards post-election goals. Socio-cultural explanations do not fit well. Fiji and Papua New Guinea have far more in common ethnically, demographically, economically, and historically with each other than either has with Australia.

There is no mathematical reason for Papua New Guinean parties to avoid pre-election alliances. In fact, there is considerable evidence that preference alliances would be more impactful in Papua New Guinea than the other two nations due to frequency of use and closeness of margins. Assuming that Papua New Guinean parties have looked to preference voting results in Australia and Fiji, it is obvious that coordinated pre-election alliances can yield greater seat shares than would otherwise be the case.

The most convincing explanation for the discrepancy in party behavior lies in the institutionalization of the party systems. Australia’s highly institutionalized party system is reflected in consistent alliances and a relative equilibrium between the two major parties. Changes in which third party is most proficient can tilt the effectiveness of partnerships, but those shifts are rare. As a result, the alliances and the benefits are constant across the sample. Fiji’s party system underwent tremendous change during the sample. Changing Fijian parties and a military coup helped polarize the electorate behind two powerful parties. Polarization caused an immediate increase in volatility, but results stabilized after a further cycle. Fiji’s party system became grew increasingly
institutionalized over the course of the sample. Alliances were formed and had influence in each of the elections, with decreasing likelihood of seismic shifts as the two dominant parties emerged. Finally, Papua New Guinea’s party system is poorly institutionalized. The heuristic developed in this work suggests that unstable supply and high volatility restricts parties from accurately predicting, and therefore making, viable pre-electoral alliances. Vast quantities of independents contest and gain office, adding a major element to the electoral contest that does not operate under the same alliance-making incentives as parties would. Independents and party MPs consistently change affiliations, exposing PNG parties to changes in seats without complex and unpredictable calculations of alliance partnerships. The institutionalization of the party system serves as a potentially powerful looming intervening variable between the electoral system and party behavior.
Reference List


