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Negotiating with Separatist Terrorists

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Negotiating with Separatist Terrorists

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
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Advisor: Dr. Karen Feste
ABSTRACT

It is in the interest of this thesis to investigate why governments negotiate with separatist terrorists, and why those negotiations succeed or fail. The four cases analyzed in this thesis include: Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, (1983-2009); Russia and the Chechen Republic, (1994-2009); Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, (1993-1994); and Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army, (1985-2009). In this study, four basic questions are addressed: When and why do governments agree to negotiate with separatist terrorists? Is negotiation a viable solution to ending historic ethnic conflicts? Are certain peace agreements and negotiation strategies more successful than others? And why, after having secured a settlement, do tensions erupt and violations occur?

My research indicated that governments negotiate with separatist terrorists when faced with a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually perceived solution. However, the postponement of a final status solution undermined the stability of these ripe moments, for ripe moments are susceptible to resurgent violence. Furthermore, my findings illustrated that negotiation is a viable solution to ending ethnic conflict. However, it is more likely to be successful if insurgent groups are perceived to have rational leadership and finite objectives. My findings demonstrated that imposed settlements are more successful than negotiated settlements in terminating conflicts, as only one of the four negotiated settlements analyzed in this study can be considered a success. Lastly, my
research illustrated that negotiations do not fail exclusively because they involve terrorist actors. Rather, negotiations fail when both parties’ leadership is inflexible and extremist or when a final status solution is delayed. They fail when absolute claims for self-determination and independence clash with inflexible positions on territorial integrity or when neither side is willing to comply with the terms of the agreement. And they fail without broad support or without the presence of a powerful, objective third party mediator.

Ultimately, my findings illustrate that negotiation readiness, rather than conflict ripeness, is more important to achieving successful negotiation between states and separatist groups. All of the cases experienced conflict ripeness. Only the IRA/UK study, however, demonstrated complete negotiation readiness: the conflict was perceived as risky, yet spoiler violence was missing; a neutral and coercive third party mediator was present; and lengthy back-channel communication was used. My findings further illustrate that the absence of spoilers and spoiler-induced violence, combined with the guidance of a forceful mediator, most significantly contributed to a successful negotiation. Certainly, ripe environments foster negotiation. It is complete negotiation readiness, however, that cultivates a successful peace agreement.
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Introduction

Although conventional wisdom suggests that states should never negotiate with terrorists, a prevailing lack of success in recent counterinsurgency campaigns suggests otherwise. Separatist movements have repeatedly threatened state sovereignty by employing terrorism, yet counterterror policies have struggled to successfully combat and nullify the resultant insurgent threat. As military force and coercive action have often evoked retaliatory attacks, the effectiveness of these policies comes into question. If we consider terrorism as one tactic available to an opposition group engaged in a political struggle, we push the question of response back into the political context where it belongs. Negotiation – rather than complete eradication of the enemy at the hands of a superior military force – resumes its place among reasonable policy options. However, the question remains: can negotiation prove to be a viable and successful tool in combating separatist terrorism?

Ethnic conflicts are widely considered intractable affairs (Crocker, Hampson, Aall, 2004: 3). But violence need not continue indefinitely. Solutions can be found, and mutual gain can be achieved. Given a ripe moment and favorable conditions, governments have proven willing to negotiate with insurgent groups, but the perception of rationality is integral to such a decision. Separatist terror actors are not apocalyptic ideologues; instead, they have finite objectives and cite explicit grievances. These grievances often represent the opinions and criticisms of an entire constituency, providing representative insurgent groups with legitimacy and extensive support. Resultantly, it is
often in the state’s interest to acknowledge these actors, address their concerns, and begin to ameliorate the underlying roots of the conflict.

Still, achieving the peace has proven much more difficult than merely crafting an agreement. Just as identity-based wars are usually provoked by accrued grievances and the failure of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on successful state reperception or reconstruction (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). The state has one of two options: manage the conflict and convince the entire citizenry, regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation, of their equality and security; or allow the creation of an autonomous government that provides self-determination for the aggrieved party. Peace therefore requires the elimination, management, or control of spoilers and war entrepreneurs. Moreover, peace requires an end to those underlying grievances that initially incited the ethnic conflict: cultural, linguistic, or religious divisions; the perception that one’s governing structure is incapable of addressing his/her basic needs, et al. To achieve a lasting peace, it is not enough to extinguish all rebel forces or solely implement a military solution. Historic animosities, as well as both real and perceived sensations of inequality, must be tackled.

In this study, four basic questions are addressed: When and why do governments agree to negotiate with separatist terrorists? Is negotiation a viable solution to ending historic ethnic conflicts? Are certain peace agreements and negotiation strategies more successful than others? And why, after having secured a settlement, do tensions erupt and violations occur? The scholarly literature will be reviewed to determine what is known and what remains speculative in the field. Then, the case studies will be outlined, detailed, and compared.
Why are negotiations with separatist terrorists instigated? Governments often proclaim unilaterally that they reject negotiating with terrorists, arguing that negotiations will only empower insurgents and encourage them to make further demands. This study analyzes four cases of negotiation efforts between governments and terrorist groups: Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 1983-2009; Russia and the Chechen Republic, 1994-2009; Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 1993-1994; and Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), 1985-2009. Negotiation efforts in these cases had mixed outcomes: in three cases, it was failure, yet in every case negotiation has been seen at some time as a worthwhile option.

The reality of securing the peace in ethnic conflicts remains stark. Even after an agreement has been signed and a ceasefire has been implemented, violations occur, and peace agreements may fail. Thus, we must ask: what can be done to ameliorate conflicts after peacemaking has collapsed and violence has escalated with renewed fervor? How does one reduce the terrorist incentive to derail negotiation efforts? The case of Northern Ireland provides good counsel. Those who employ terrorism do so because they perceive few other avenues available to them in which they can change the status quo. However, once the IRA believed that electoral participation could offer them power, they renounced violence and embraced mainstream politics. Such a tactical change did not occur overnight; a negative response from the IRA’s political constituency was needed to delegitimize their use for violence, and the movement needed to be convinced that dialogue rather than violence could instigate change. Yet the IRA’s acceptance of electoral politics and its renunciation of violence offer an optimistic example of the ways in which separatist insurgencies can moderate their tactics.
Another objective of this study is to examine when governments agree to negotiate with separatist terrorists, and why, at that given moment, those insurgent groups consent. Here it is necessary to delineate the difference between separatist groups and separatist-terror groups. Separatism refers to the advocacy of a state of cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, or racial separation from a larger group, often with demands for greater political autonomy or even complete political independence. All four separatist groups analyzed in this research, however, utilize terror tactics to achieve their objectives. I chose to examine these specific cases because they illustrate that governments negotiate with terrorists. Certainly, there are countless cases from which to select examples of negotiation efforts between governments and separatist groups. The latter half of the twentieth century is filled with ethnic conflicts waged by minorities insurgent groups against the state. From the struggle to control East Timor in Indonesia to the festering conflicts in the Punjabi and Kashmiri states of India, ethnic violence has become an increasingly common trend across the international landscape. Disparate nations including China, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nigeria, Spain, and the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union have been affected by ethnically inspired violence. However, the cases chosen in this research have some common features: a deeply rooted ethnic animosity that has prompted the minority group to utilize the tools of violence – whether suicide bombings or indiscriminate attacks on both civilians and the armed forces – in order to reverse decades of discriminatory policies, horizontal inequalities, and perceived injustices; a social recruitment base and constituency of support that is nationally, ethnically, linguistically, or religiously defined; a history of failed negotiation efforts that have been foiled by spoilers and mistrust; and an inarguable use of terrorism to achieve
their separatist objectives. The four cases of Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Chechnya, and the Palestinian Territories pose difficult negotiation challenges due to the power asymmetries between parties, as well as the general belief of state governments that such issues should be solved through the normal political process. Initially, it may be in the stronger party’s interest to reject the idea of talks, as they expect to prevail through a military campaign. Yet after years of intractable fighting, parties often decide to negotiate once the distribution of power is moving towards parity, or when they approach a situation of an inexorable stalemate. Once their capacities for imposing costs on each other have become more uniform, parties move towards cooperation and compromise. Still, despite these motivations for negotiation, the recurrence of conflict is widespread.

After analyzing the four cases, I will search for similarities and divergences between them, and end with prescriptive recommendations of how negotiation could be conducted differently in such cases. The empirical evidence suggests that imposed settlements are more effective in preventing recurrent violence than negotiated settlements (Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). The theoretical argument holds that dispute winners who impose settlements on the losing party are likely to be satisfied with the post-settlement outcome, and thus, are unlikely to challenge this new status quo with another dispute (Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). Furthermore, power-sharing is unlikely under this new agreement. The victor will take the necessary steps to ensure that the losing party is unable, or at least limited in its ability, to renew the conflict. Following a decisive outcome, unilateral deterrence ensues. The 1987 and 2002 negotiation efforts between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers were negotiated settlements, as was the 1996 Khasavyurt Accord between Russia and Chechnya, and the 1993 Oslo
Accords between Israel and the PLO. Each agreement collapsed. Of these four case studies, only the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement – a negotiated settlement between the IRA and the British government – has lasted, yet even then tensions have arisen, giving credence to the notion that amongst ethnic conflicts there is an unequivocal need for post-settlement ‘settlements’.

It is not difficult to posit scenarios in which imposed agreements could broker lasting peace amongst identity-based conflicts. As the four case studies will illustrate, the presence of strong, effective mediators, supported by the leadership of each conflicting party and broad coalitions, is needed for peace agreements to succeed. Moreover, a successful negotiation strategy – whether it is a comprehensive or partial agreement – depends not only on repressing violence but also the sincere political and social incorporation of all parties involved. Yet in a post-Cold War environment, the resolution of ethno-nationalist conflicts is not so simple as wielding overwhelming force to expunge an insurgent group. Latent grievances must be addressed and mutual distrust must be ameliorated if peace is to ensue. Grievances matter in explaining violence, and addressing and redressing grievances is not the same thing as surrendering to terrorism.

Ultimately, the value of comparison is plain and compelling, if not a sufficient point for departure for policy advice. In some respects, each insurgent organization and conflict is unique. But comparisons help both scholars and policy analysts see beyond the most transparent aspects of a particular case, to reexamine relationships, histories, and possibilities in a new light. As ethnic conflicts will permeate societies and scar nations for the foreseeable future, it is crucial that cross-national case comparisons be made to determine when and why negotiations occur between governments and separatist terror
organizations. Likewise, determining which negotiation strategies are more effective in preventing recurrent violence, and why others fail, is a decisive means of terminating ethnic conflict. In this light, negotiating war termination will no longer be considered conceding to terrorism, but rather the resolution of a once intractable conflict.
Chapter One: Literature Review

Following the Cold War, there has been a considerable shift in the way in which wars end. First, the number of global conflicts entered a marked decline. Since the conclusion of World War II, there have been a total of 231 armed conflicts in 151 locations throughout the world. Following the Cold War, the corresponding numbers are 121 conflicts in 81 locations. In 2005, there were 31 ongoing armed conflicts in 22 locations, compared with 51 active conflicts between 1991 and 1992. Thus, the overall trend since the early 1990s has been that of a noticeable decline (Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen, 2006: 617).

Second, the manner in which intrastate wars are ending has changed. Historically, civil wars were fought to the finish, where the complete and utter military defeat of the losing side was the only acceptable cessation of violence. Today’s civil wars, however, are usually considered “unwinnable”, insofar as achieving military victory is concerned. Why? Because the presumably inferior rebel force has a myriad of tools to help it prolong war, including: access to valuable natural resources, fiscal or material support from a loyal diaspora or third party, and an arsenal of asymmetrical tactics, such as terrorism, meant to weaken the state and whittle away its popular support. Such realities change the ways a state can achieve peace and end war; in the 1990s, a number of civil conflicts ended in negotiated settlements. Not surprisingly, the spread of negotiated settlements parallels the spread of the norms associated with democratization. But unlike the norms of democracy, the standard of negotiated settlement has been spread in large part through
the mechanisms of the United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping operations, and UN-sponsored conflict meditation and negotiation (Howard, 2004).

Third, events of September 11 provoked a sea change of thought. Rather than assess the grievances, objectives, and ideological foundations of homegrown insurgent movements, state governments hastened to institutionalize the mantra that one does not negotiate with those who utilize terror tactics. This bellicose attitude reshaped state counterterror measures, and under the auspices of a U.S.-led Global War on Terror, it has helped to influence the belief that state-led negotiation efforts are both futile and cowardly.

Why Governments Negotiate with Insurgent Groups

Despite their lofty rhetoric, states frequently negotiate with insurgent groups that employ terrorism. Why? William Zartman (1991) defines such a moment as ripe. This ripeness theory contends that policy makers will be receptive to negotiation when faced with both a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually perceived solution. A ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ is a costly deadlock that cannot be terminated by escalating the conflict. Such a stalemate is especially motivating if augmented by a recent or impending catastrophe, and, as it affects both parties, such a stalemate provides a strong incentive for conflict de-escalation. A ‘mutually perceived solution’ is rooted in the shared belief that a solution can be found which is satisfactory and amenable to both parties. The usefulness of this theory is illustrated by the 1993 Oslo negotiations, which led to the creation of the self-governing Palestinian Authority. As Israel attempted to contain and lessen the costs of the First Intifada, Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) sat economically and politically weakened in Tunis following international condemnation of their support for Iraq during the Gulf War. From their respective seats, both parties foresaw the continuation of an inexorable stalemate and welcomed negotiation efforts after back-channel meetings offered optimism for a solution. Resultantly, the main reasons for the failure of the Oslo talks should be sought in the structural and personal characteristics of the negotiating parties themselves, rather than in the extent of their willingness to find a solution.

Building upon Zartman’s ripeness theory is Dean G. Pruitt’s readiness theory (Pruitt, 2007), a recast premise of when and why intractable conflicts lead to negotiation. The readiness theory holds that the parties to a heavy conflict are motivated to seek communication when they begin to see the combat as hopeless or too costly or risky, or when they are pressed to end the conflict by powerful third parties. However, in such circumstances, they will only move toward negotiation if they are optimistic that communication will yield an acceptable agreement (Pruitt, 2008). Once both parties are ready to begin negotiations, secret back-channel communication is often employed to explore the feasibility of front-channel negotiation. Its value lies largely in the flexibility and future orientation that it brings to talks. In the pre-negotiation phrase, it also provides political cover, is cost-effective, does not require formal recognition of the adversary, and allows communication with adversaries who do not meet the preconditions for negotiation, such as a cease-fire (Pruitt, 2008). Of course, heavy reliance on back-channel communication can produce flimsy agreements that are too narrowly based or fail to deal with major issues. This problem can be avoided, however, if enough time is spent assembling a broad central coalition.
Two case studies can be contrasted, both of which made extensive use of back-channel communication (Pruitt, 2008: 51). The Northern Ireland peace process, enacted between 1986 and 1998, is widely considered to be a success; the Oslo Accords of 1993 are a notable failure. With Northern Ireland, back-channel communication was used to assemble a broad array of parties, who then reached an agreement on most of the critical issues in front-channel negotiation. In the Oslo case, the negotiations were entirely conducted in back-channel talks. Subsequently, several critical issues were not addressed and many groups were excluded from the final decision, including armed militants on both sides. Ostracized and embittered, these groups become opponents of the agreement and eventually helped to undermine it. Furthermore, the amount of time and effort that was spent developing a solution – ten years in the Northern Ireland case and ten months in the Oslo case – are significant distinctions. The considerable gestation period in Northern Ireland allowed most of the politically significant groups on both sides, including the armed militants, to deduce that the conflict was counterproductive. Additionally, as a result of considerable back-channel activity by intermediaries, both the British government and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) fashioned similar outlooks regarding the cessation of violence. First, considerable concessions would need to be made to escape the conflict; second, it was in fact possible to deal with many of the disagreeable actors on either side; and lastly, the other party was also ready to make compromises for peace. On the other hand, the narrow time constraints and the absence of a broad coalition of actors in the Oslo Accords served to produce a premature agreement that would not last.
Perceived rationality, ripeness, and readiness account for three theories on when and why governments will negotiate with unsavory characters whose demands were previously considered non-negotiable. It is in this context that an analysis into state negotiation with separatist terrorists should be conducted.

Negotiating with Separatist Terrorists: A Viable Solution to Conflict

Although globalization and its economic, social, and political ramifications have arguably affected the historic notion of the nation-state, separatist terrorist groups continue to challenge state sovereignty, despite the new transnational identities imposed upon traditional states (Lefebvre, 2003). Today, ethnic conflicts continue to simmer in Georgia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Russia, among other nations. Counterinsurgency policies ranging from economic sanctions to military coercion have been employed, yet ethno-nationalist movements persist as one of the preeminent threats to the stability and security of the world system. Given terrorism’s resilience, questions and concerns regarding the efficacy of counterterror policies have arisen. As ethnic conflicts continue unabated, the effectiveness of negotiation as a counterterror policy in combating long-standing separatist terror campaigns must be assessed.

Judgments about an appropriate response to terrorism often reflect two criteria: acceptability and effectiveness. Superficially, both principles appear to reinforce one another. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that acceptable responses might not be effective in reducing the threat, just as effective responses might not be acceptable to one’s democratic sensibilities. Such a reality has led to efforts to streamline
counterterror policy, as evidenced by the United States’ actions following September 11, 2001. In that environment, diplomatic engagement was abandoned in favor of an overwhelming military response. Such an unquestioning attachment to a particular line of counterterror response, however, actually obscured the range of policies available to combat insurgent violence. These policy options, which range from severe repression to systematic conciliation, arise not from a definite single theory of counterterrorism so much as reactions to different situations and opportunities (Sederberg, 1995). As terrorism is a tactic wielded by diverse actors, it should warrant similar diversity when it comes to the policies used to combat it.

Negotiation is a multifaceted strategy. It includes any number of the following approaches: diplomatic efforts to improve relations with terrorist groups; engaging in dialogue with the leadership of terrorists groups; group discussions with terrorists to find areas of agreement; or a mutually binding mediated resolution (Pronin, Kennedy, and Butsch, 2006). Critics are quick to condemn such policies as likely to lead to further terrorism. However, the vast ideological divide that separates terrorism motivated by ethnicity and terrorism motivated by religious ideology must be acknowledged when discussing conciliation. Traditionally, perceptions of terrorist rationality have influenced a government’s willingness to negotiate. When terrorism is employed as a means of achieving political autonomy or independence, it is arguably more acceptable than the messianic and apocalyptic ideologies of religiously inspired terror groups. Thus, as the premise of rationality is rooted in clearly defined objectives and comprehensible goals, non-ideological terrorists are more easily perceived as rational beings whose views are
responsive to objective reasoning. In this context, negotiation resumes its place among reasonable policy options in combating separatist terrorism.

The pervasive belief that negotiation is a futile counterterror policy is deeply rooted in the literature. The argument against negotiating with terrorists is straightforward: conciliatory policies set a dangerous precedent that few governments care to follow. In negotiating, terrorist grievances are acknowledged, and the terrorist group’s resort to violence is rewarded. Likewise, international efforts to demonize terror tactics on a global scale are undermined, and the fundamental ideals of democratic governments – freedom, liberty, and justice – are often threatened. Yet in practice, democratic governments often negotiate with terrorists. Such efforts have frequently been conducted through secret back channels or third party mediators, thereby offering governments political cover and the ability to eschew formal recognition of the adversary. Subsequently, the idealistic maxim ‘We do not negotiate with terrorists’ morphs into something more akin to the tenets of Realpolitik: ‘We negotiate with terrorists when state power and interests are concerned.’

This thesis bases many of its premises on the fundamental differences between ethnically motivated and religiously motivated terrorists, specifically the supposition that the separatist terror group’s agenda differs radically from the religiously oriented terror group’s agenda. The divergent ideological underpinnings of political/secular and ideological/religious terror groups have long been established (Fine, 2008). Groups immersed in the rhetoric of separation and autonomy target governing officials and military personnel. They seek to control time: hostage-taking and voicing demands against a deadline in order to lead state governments to the negotiating table. Their
objectives are finite, whether they desire the creation of an independent state or the formation of self-government within an autonomous region.

That being said, non-ideological insurgent groups have increasingly begun to use tactics that were once considered unique to their ideologically driven brethren. In pursuit of the creation of an autonomous Tamil homeland, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have used an assorted arsenal of tactics: assassination, extortion, kidnapping, and the conscription of children as soldiers. More significant is the fact that the LTTE is considered to have pioneered the use of suicide bombing as a means to achieve territorial sovereignty and political independence from the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). Partly for this reason, they have succeeded in both dominating ethnic-Tamil politics and prolonging a separatist conflict that has raged across Sri Lanka for 26 years. Likewise, suicide bombing and the remote detonation of bombs in heavily populated civilian centers have dramatically increased since the commencement of a separatist campaign in Chechnya. To persist in believing that only religiously motivated terror groups – in particular, Islamic insurgents – utilize suicide bombing to achieve their objectives is erroneous. As separatist terrorism and guerrilla action are weapons of the politically and militarily weak, an effective array of tactics must be established in order nullify gross power inequalities. Thus, it should come as little surprise that suicide bombings and indiscriminate attacks on civilians have solidified their rightful position in the arsenal of both separatist and religiously motivated terror groups.

Still, significant differences between separatist terrorists and religious extremists remain. Most historical terrorist groups that have substantially moderated their demands, as did the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
have been ethno-nationalist terrorists rather than religious ideologists (Pruitt, 2006). Despite their irreprehensible tactics, such groups demonstrate a degree of rationality, rooted in explicit objectives, which state governments can address.

In his research, Peter Sederberg (1995) advocates the use of conciliation methods (concessions, tactical factors, etc.) to ameliorate and end the terrorist threat. Governments would thereby avoid the longevity and costs of a war that is as much a witch-hunt as it is a conventional battle. However, following September 11, a new question arises: do rational terrorists remain? Sederberg wrote his article in 1995, an era in which governments were conducting negotiations with the IRA, PLO, and African National Congress (ANC): groups whose leaders fused diplomacy with brutality. The political savvy of Gerry Adams, Yasir Arafat, and Nelson Mandela was inflected with rational thinking and explicit objectives. These men embodied the premise of calculating rational actors with whom states can envision negotiating. Unfortunately, the rise of Osama bin Laden and the proliferation of ideological Islamist terrorism have unequivocally altered the perception of such avenues of thought. Dependent upon the context and the actors, conciliatory counterterror policies remain pertinent in a post-September 11 world. It is crucial to right this misconception.

This research is premised upon two models of counterterror response that evoke negotiation: the war model and the rational actor model. The view that terrorism is an act of war leads its proponents to favor repressive responses. In such a context, the state uses war as a limited instrument to achieved limited goals: eradicate the enemy, nullify its popularity, and solidify the authority of the state. Both the Sri Lankan and Russian governments are currently enacting this policy. However, the concept of limited war
involves two distinct but interrelated problems: how to resolve the conflict while limiting its impact; and how to limit the impact of the conflict while working to resolve it (Sederberg, 1995: 301). In a post-Cold War environment, the resolution of ethno-nationalist conflicts is not so simple as wielding overwhelming force to expunge an insurgent group. As the case studies will illustrate, latent grievances must be addressed for a relative peace to ensue. Despite this, the rhetoric of the war model often characterizes ethnic conflicts in unlimited terms: the opposition presumably seeks the total destruction of the state, and the state seeks the complete elimination of its enemy. This rhetoric, however, often undermines reality. Most ethnic groups, whether Tamil, Chechen, Irish Catholics, or Palestinian, have finite rather than infinite objectives. Once both parties in a war acknowledge that they fight for limited objectives with limited means, they also tacitly accept that the conflict will end via a political process involving some form of accommodation (Sederberg, 1995: 301-02). Mutual recognition of the other’s legitimacy ensues, as limited war ultimately leads to an implicit interdependence between the two parties. Of course, it is this element of official recognition that so often impedes a state’s desire to negotiate.

On the other hand, the rational actor model (Sederberg, 1995) implies that an insurgent group can be deterred by the state prior to the onset of a limited war. Successful deterrence, of course, depends on both the severity of the threat and its credibility. When terror groups are faced with both the rewards of inaction and the resultant costs of an attack, the alternative of negotiation becomes increasingly more attractive. If we assume that terrorists are rational, we must also accept that their short-term gains can be offset by an increase in expected short-term costs. If nonviolent channels appear more promising,
then rational opposition groups might forgo terrorism in its entirety to seek a negotiated settlement (Sederberg, 1995: 305).

Thus, it is the perception of terrorist rationality that helps to instigate so many negotiation processes between state governments and insurgent groups. When terrorists are deemed to be irrational actors, counterterror efforts emphasize military action rather than diplomacy (Pronin, Kennedy, and Butsch, 2006). This perception is influenced by an intrinsic skepticism of the terrorists’ capacity for reason rather than by their affective responses to policy changes. It is when terrorists are perceived as rational combatants, fighting for a specific cause with specific goals in mind, that states will be inclined to resolve their differences with terrorists via diplomacy. In their study, Pronin, Kennedy, and Butsch research the consequences of bias perceptions on counterterror policies. Of course, it is inevitable that people will disagree with the worldviews and actions of those who commit terror attacks against them. However, their research indicates that it is not disagreement alone that fuels the preference for repressive counterterror measures (Pronin, Kennedy, and Butsch, 2006: 391). According to these findings, the degree of perceived rationality matters just as much as the level of retaliatory anger when endorsing unilateral military responses. Thus, diplomatic efforts to resolve long-standing terror campaigns are enacted when states view terrorists as rational and objective.

Moreover, recent studies have increasingly attempted to disprove the fixed stereotype of the terrorist as irrational and in pursuit of illogical objectives. Investigation into the Chechen separatists’ motivations for instigating the Moscow theatre and Beslen school hostage crises (Dolnik and Fitzgerald, 2007), as well as insight into the aims of LTTE and Hamas suicide terrorists (Pape, 2005), supports the increasingly popular
premise that terrorists are calculating actors with specific objectives. Political change and self-determination, rather than apocalyptic madness, often motivates these individuals. Resultantly, now that it has been illustrated that governments, including democracies, do indeed engage in negotiations with groups that have employed terrorism to achieve their objectives, this thesis will explore which negotiation strategies are considered more successful than countervailing options.

*When Agreements and Negotiation Strategies Work*

When one speaks of peace agreements, one often makes the mistake of assuming that a relative peace has already transpired. Reality is much more austere: political violence remains a powerful element of peace talks. Today, war termination involves fewer outright military victories and more inconclusive settlements. Ceasefires, interim settlements, and de-escalation without a settlement permeate the negotiation picture. Of these, many are often volatile agreements that fail to ever evolve into comprehensive peace settlements between parties.

In their research, Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen (2006) distinguish between three types of agreements. The most precise is a full agreement, where both parties agree to settle their incompatibility in its entirety. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, signed between the IRA and the British government, best illustrates this type of settlement. This comprehensive settlement addresses security concerns, as well as includes provisions for resolving the underlying incongruities that led to the outbreak of conflict. The second type is a partial agreement, where both parties agree to settle part of their underlying incompatibility. Here the conflict may end with an interim agreement. These talks may
fail to progress to a comprehensive agreement, as in the Oslo Accords of 1993 and the Khasavyurt Accord of 1996, or they might set the stage for subsequent negotiations that will establish a comprehensive settlement. The third type of agreement is a partial peace agreement, where both parties agree to \textit{initiate a process} to settle the incompatibility. The Sri Lankan peace talks of 2002-2006 best illustrate this form of settlement. Such an agreement would have a detailed agenda for talks but rarely would the parties move beyond the initiation of negotiations on substantial issues.

In truth, what occurs at the negotiation table is only one facet of the peace process. What happens beyond the table – continued military engagements, suicide bombings, assassinations – is equally, if not more, important to determining the outcome of negotiation efforts. For this reason, identity-based conflicts can seem quite impervious to negotiation. Yet when offered a positive alternative to violence, such as power-sharing or territorial autonomy, insurgent groups have proven willing to change their ways. At the heart of understanding an insurgent group’s continuation of violent tactics during a ceasefire agreement is the asymmetrical nature of the conflict. As violence is one of the few means that an armed opposition group seeking to change the status quo has at hand, rebel groups have a propensity to continue to use violence as peace talks begin and agreements are being drafted (Hogland and Svensson, 2008). Thus, a successful negotiation strategy – whether it is a full or partial agreement – depends not only on repressing violence but also the opportunity for real incorporation.

Research on settlements, outcomes, and the recurrence of conflict has illustrated that certain settlement types are more successful in preventing recurrent conflict than others (Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). In their research, Quackenbush and
Venteicher divide settlements into three types: imposed, negotiated, and no settlement. A negotiated settlement is identified as ‘the successful attempt to confer, bargain, or discussed an unresolved issue with a view towards reaching a mutually acceptable settlement.’ An imposed settlement is identified as ‘an agreement that has been forced upon another party by means of overwhelming authority and without invitation.’ A situation that results in no settlement, commonly referred to as a stalemate, denotes ‘the lack of any formal or informal effort which successfully resolves or terminates the original dispute’ (Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008: 724).

Of these, imposed settlements tend to yield longer periods of stability than formal negotiated settlements, which are associated with mutual concessions. Why? The theoretical argument holds that dispute winners who impose settlements on the losing party are likely to be satisfied with the post-settlement outcome, and thus, are unlikely to challenge this new status quo with another dispute. Furthermore, power-sharing is unlikely under this new agreement. The victor will take the necessary steps to ensure that the losing party is unable, or at least limited in its ability, to renew the conflict. Following a decisive outcome, unilateral deterrence ensues.

Unlike imposed settlements, a negotiated settlement requires mutual concessions and mutual deterrence. Because each party has a stake in the final outcome of the negotiation process, each state also has an incentive to challenge the terms of the settlement. Thus, the argument maintains that negotiated settlements leave everyone dissatisfied, as both parties had to sacrifice some of their objectives to reach a comprise. As a result, mutual deterrence is infinitely more difficult to maintain following conflict cessation, especially when the warring parties have been fighting over ethnic enmity.
Lastly, a stalemate between parties is especially prone to war breakdown and war recurrence. In many instances, parties reach a ceasefire but do not agree to the terms of a settlement. This stasis can be maintained for only so long. As stalemates result in no meaningful changes to the status quo, both parties remain aggrieved and retain their original incentives for seeking conflict. Thus, this research concludes that imposed settlements would be followed by longer periods of peace than negotiated settlements and that negotiated settlements would produce more lengthy periods of peace than disputes characterized by a lack of settlement (Quackenbush and Senese, 2003; Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008).

Of course, peacemakers must confront a stark reality when engaged in negotiation efforts: political violence is an inherent element of peace talks, employed by states and rebel forces alike. In today’s peace processes to end ethnic conflicts, political violence, as well as the threat of violence, is a recurrent feature of negotiations: violence is not wielded as an alternative to the talks, but as an integral element meant to steer negotiation outcomes. Thus, when we talk of negotiated or imposed settlements, it is crucial to remember that peace is still an illusory concept. The environment in which such settlements are conducted is often rife with conflict. In light of this reality, this thesis will explore why tensions erupt both during and following negotiation efforts.

Why Tensions Erupt During Peace Processes

To understand why violations occur during peace processes and why negotiated settlements succumb to tension and subsequently fall apart, one must first understand the multi-tiered animosity and latent grievances inherent in ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflicts
are dissimilar from other conflicts: they are fused with emotion, perceived grievances, and historic injustices; they are often considered intractable; and they are rife with elements of conflict vulnerability. The term itself may used to describe a wide array of internal conflicts, whether religious or secessionist. For a conflict to be portrayed as ethnic, however, the parties involved need to have a sense of collective and separate identity, a shared culture and history, and an attachment to a specific piece of territory. Cultural, linguistic, or religious divisions play a vital role in shaping the parties’ perceptions of themselves and others, as well. But above all, ethnic conflicts arise when groups within the same polity, but with a distinct sense of identity, perceive their governing structure to be incapable of addressing their basic needs (Bercovitch and Derouen, Jr., 2005). Furthermore, deep-seated social structures often give rise to group grievances, as a majority-led government will frequently impose elements of horizontal inequality on its minority groups. Horizontal inequality is the overlap between identity and economic opportunity, wherein one’s group affiliation can limit their employment, education, and housing prospects. This decline of relative group worth has been observed in Sri Lanka, Chechnya, the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and Northern Ireland, as state-enforced discriminatory policies have limited individual advancement.

Thus, the struggle of the minority group is personal and deeply rooted in a sense of deprivation or inferiority, and for this reason, ethnic conflicts are rarely linear events. Instead, they ebb and flow, rising when triggered by a particular catalyst and falling when smothered by superior military might and/or state-induced conflict suppression. For previously mentioned reasons, notably the use of asymmetric tactics as well as fiscal and material support from outside parties, these conflicts are becoming considerably more
difficult to defeat on the battlefield. Of course, those parties involved in ethnic civil wars often have little interest in engaging in peace processes; instead they prefer to utilize varying methods of coercion, both physical and psychological, to direct their conflict. Long wars, however, often result in stalemates, rising costs, and an increasing parity of power. In this light, peace processes and negotiation efforts become the exit strategies to today’s intrastate wars.

The avenues for state response to ethnic conflict are further mired in a sea of options. When a minority group asserts its right of self-determination and sets a territorial conflict into motion, two obvious options are open to that state. The first option is to negotiate with the insurgent group, seeking a peaceful resolution that meets the interests of both parties. This can include negotiations over secession or over autonomy within the state (e.g. Russia in Tatarstan). The second option is to refuse to negotiate, based on a refusal to acknowledge the claims as legitimate (e.g. Russia in Chechnya). If the state chooses this latter approach, the minority group often escalates the conflict to force the government to accede to their demands and/or to elicit sympathy and support from outside actors. This latter course can lead to one side prevailing over the other, or, more commonly, to a stalemate (e.g. Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland). An intractable conflict frequently ensues. Such conflicts seem irresolvable, even when the “shape of a solution” emerges (e.g. two state solution in Israel/Palestine), and outside parties are trying to help the combatants reach that solution (Babbitt, 2006). Resultantly, separatist movements can be characterized by their lack of a linear progression, as stalemates and recurrent conflict are seemingly more prevalent than a seamless progression from militancy to armed conflict to negotiation to settlement (Hewitt, Wilkenfield, and Gurr, 2008).
The quest of national and indigenous people for self-governance is not a novel concept, although it has reshaped the political landscape across many nations with a renewed fervor in recent decades. Initially articulated in the wake of the First World War, self-determination is enshrined in Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter: one of the purposes of the UN is said to be “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace” (UN Charter, Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles). Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 22:

“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.”

Groups claiming self-determination often perceive such statements as their inarguable right to secession, one protected by international human rights covenants and affirmed by the dissolution of such states as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

Yet a notable contradiction exists. While international law is open to the notion of national self-determination, it is restrictive towards secession (Bowker, 2004). After all, governance would be rendered impossible if minorities were constantly threatening secession if a particular vote went against them, or if they suddenly decried all of the historical abuses levied upon them. States cannot be so small as to prohibit them from carrying out their most basic functions - the defense, security, and welfare of their people. The United Nations itself, in its 1970 Declaration of Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, declares quite explicitly that the “territorial integrity and political
independence of every state is indivisible.” Such a reality often restricts the separatist claim. Although separatist groups often seek complete territorial independence, the empirical evidence illustrates that such objectives are rarely achieved. When and if a state chooses to negotiate, the most common solution in intrastate conflicts over territory has been to grant a disputed region local governance or autonomy. Within full peace agreements, the most common provision has been to grant extended cultural group rights or offer the separatists the right to local governance (Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen, 2006: 624-25). However, those instances constitute the success stories. It is much more likely for a state to seek to preserve its territorial integrity than allow the creation of autonomous regions within its boundaries.

Even after having signed partial or comprehensive peace agreements, states often renege on their earlier concessions when the situation has changed from acceptable to unpredictable. As with its desire to maintain territorial integrity, a state will render comprehensive or partial peace agreements null and void if a ceasefire ends and insurgent violence resumes. The collapse of the quasi-independent Chechen state in 1999 best exemplifies this motivation for negotiation annulment.

Moscow’s desire to keep Chechnya within the confines of the greater Russian Federation is well warranted. First, Chechnya had no right under Russian domestic law to claim independence, as it did in 1991 following the swift and furious dissolution of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, even if Moscow had granted Chechnya a comprehensive independence when the two parties signed the Khasavyurt Accord in 1996, thereby concluding the First Chechen War, peace and stability would not have been created. Three years of relative Chechen autonomy, from 1996 to 1999, witnessed the region’s
rapid devolution into an anarchic bandit state. Despite its quasi-autonomous status, the Chechen government could not resist its own factional pressures levied by Islamic extremists and separatist moderates. Russian military intervention and de facto rule of Chechnya resumed in August 1999, after deadly incursions by Islamic extremists from Chechnya into neighboring Dagestan prompted Moscow to act. The large-scale resumption of fighting has continued ever since, razing cities, shattering the economy, and displacing thousands of citizens. Subsequently, from the perspective of the international community, the current state of affairs in Chechnya is reason enough for prohibiting it from gaining independence in the foreseeable future.

Still, the separatist desires of the Chechen people have not been stifled. Although Moscow had a right to defend its territorial integrity, its conduct in the war has proven counterproductive. It has polarized public opinion in Chechnya and made any solution to the crisis more difficult to achieve. On paper, Moscow’s longstanding proposal of political autonomy in Chechnya appears to be the best way forward. Such an agreement was negotiated with Tatarstan following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, such conciliatory tactics are unlikely to satisfy either the Chechen nationalists or the Islamic fundamentalists who have more expansionist aims at the present time. Moreover, it is even a more difficult stretch of the imagination to conjecture a situation that would compel Vladimir Putin to negotiate with Chechen insurgents. So long as Putin wields authority in Russia, those three short years of quasi-political autonomy might be the closest thing to independence that the Chechens will experience.

The challenges of securing a comprehensive peace settlement with an insurgent group are numerous. As previously stated, violence is one of the few means that an armed
opposition group seeking to change the status quo has at hand. Therefore, it should come as little surprise that most insurgent groups continue to wreak havoc on the state, its army, and innocent civilians while negotiations are underway. Moreover, as a conflict persists, a political economy of war develops: entrepreneurs earn fortunes off of small-arms sales; politicians retain their offices on the promise of eradicating the rebel threat; and insurgent leaders bask in their newfound infamy. For these individuals, the cessation of violence equates to money lost, positions revoked, and the threat of a severe judiciary response. Thus, this political economy of war concurrently operates in a pathology of fear. Counterintuitive though it might sound, after years of incessant fighting, there’s a certain safety to a stalemate or the continuation of the status quo, as opposed to the inherent risk of power-sharing.

Such perceptions surely dominated the mindset of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) elite as they abruptly pulled out of Norwegian-led negotiation efforts in 2003. The 2002 ceasefire agreement was negotiated at a time when the LTTE had shown considerable strength on the battlefield, prompting concern within the Sri Lankan government (GoSL) of future parity status between the two parties. In the agreement, the LTTE and the GoSL agreed to refrain from any ‘offensive military operations’, and buffer zones were created to separate their areas of control. In addition, those Tamil paramilitary groups who had acted in support of the government had to disarm. The main aim of the ceasefire was to facilitate a negotiated settlement to the conflict, which, as the aforementioned research suggests, is more susceptible to conflict recurrence than an imposed settlement. It has been determined that during the period of 2002-2005, the LTTE committed 96% of the ceasefire violations, notably continued child recruitment
and the abduction of adults to serve in its ranks (Hogland and Svensson, 2008). Why, when faced with the opportunity to finally achieve internal self-determination, would the LTTE abruptly pull out of the peace process and return to the battlefield? Such an action seems illogical given the Tigers’ stated objectives. Yet there is a widespread feeling that the peace process doubled as an opportunity for the LTTE to build up stocks of arms and ammunition, amass financial resources, and develop and put in place a new strategy centered upon retaining Tamil territory in the north (Smith, 2007). In addition, LTTE efforts to build a state within a state have forged ahead since the ceasefire agreement was signed, and civic society in Kilinochchi – the self-professed capital of the Tamil homeland – is all but in place. Such efforts to create incontestable Tamil autonomy threaten the Sri Lankan state in a subtle but powerful way. Yet this strategic move has come at a steep price, for the Tigers’ decision to manipulate the previous ceasefire environment has tainted their reputation as rational actors and undermined the likelihood of any future negotiated settlement. Rather, if peace is to be obtained, it will likely be at the behest of the Sri Lankan government via an imposed settlement.

The model form of a peace agreement is a comprehensive settlement: an agreement that addresses both parties’ security concerns and includes the provisions for resolving the underlying incompatibility, whether it is over territory or the control of government. More often, however, negotiating parties achieve only a partial settlement or an interim agreement. There they create timetables for future negotiations, which will ideally resolve the underlying conflicting issues after a series of benchmarks have been met. Such was the case with the Oslo Accords of 1993, negotiated between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The central issue of the accord,
and in the conflict itself, is the mutual recognition of national rights. Naturally, recognition proved to be a key problem in nearly every aspect of the talks. Following Oslo, both the Israeli government and the PLO failed to secure the public support that was critical for a final-status agreement. Radical factions on both sides were disillusioned by the concessions made at Oslo: Israeli settlers did not want to dismantle their homes and leave the West Bank, just as Hamas refused to recognize Israel unconditionally in its present borders. The mere discussion of these terms incited great anger amongst the Israeli and Palestinian people and would offer incentives for spoilers to engage in greater violence.

The pre-negotiation and the negotiation phases of the Oslo talks took place in secret. The fact that the entire process was conducted under a veil of secrecy was partially responsible for the narrowness of the central coalition that produced the final agreement, as well as for the resulting failure of this agreement. As noted in Zartman’s ripeness literature, a negotiation strategy depends not only on suppressing violence, but also on offering both parties an alternative avenue of expression. Whatever their past, the converted users of violence have to be given real possibilities of incorporation. Such strategies often involve a two-handed policy of reward and repression: by providing payoffs for moderation while concurrently controlling the spoiler wing, and increasing the disincentives for continued violence (Zartman, 2006: 269). The 1993 Oslo Accords failed to achieve this equilibrium. Powerful and well-armed parties on either side of the political spectrum – the Israeli settlers, Hamas, and others – rejected the agreement and thus felt no loyalty to it. As a result, they became spoilers, launching attacks, such as the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and the well-publicized bombings of Israeli buses,
which would help to undermine the peace process (Pruitt, 2006: 383). Thus, despite the retrospective appearance of inevitability, an Israel-PLO accord was not necessarily foreordained: ripe conditions for negotiation do not necessarily yield an agreement that will survive.

**Conclusion**

Peace processes have all of the general characteristics of any bargaining problem: parties can potentially minimize their costs and increase their benefits by adopting an accommodative strategy; mutual interaction and conciliation is required to produce an agreement; and many options for a mutually beneficial outcome exist, depending on the strategies and tactics adopted during the course of the negotiations (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). Ethnic conflicts, fueled by grievances and a sense of separate identity, complicate this negotiation process tenfold, for peace processes are multidimensional efforts that require the shift from violence to accepted, non-violent interaction on numerous planes. Both elites who engage in formulating official positions on behalf of states and insurgent groups must renounce violence, as must the rank-and-file government soldier and the citizen who houses and feeds the insurgent fighter. Thus, peace processes occur at a number of levels simultaneously. It should come as little surprise that violations occur after signatories have penned their names on an official document, or that peace agreements have unraveled years after the first negotiations occurred.

As long as the insurgent party sees its goals as attainable through violence or unattainable through politics, it will have no incentive to approach the bargaining table.
Likewise, as long as a state believes it can defeat its opponent on the battlefield, it will shun all international efforts to instigate negotiation. But ripe moments have occurred and conflicting parties have approached the negotiation table together: war-weariness, the onset of a mutually hurting stalemate, and a sensation of parity has each played its role.

As previously stated, this study seeks to answer four basic questions: When and why do governments agree to negotiate with separatist terrorists? Is negotiation a viable solution to ending historic ethnic conflicts? Are certain peace agreements and negotiation strategies more successful than others? And why, after having secured a settlement, do tensions erupt and violations occur? The literature is rife with theories, some of which are sustained by empirical evidence and others of which are rooted in speculation. Thus, it is important to create an overarching theoretical framework to distinguish what has been proven and what remains unknown in the realm of state/separatist terror group negotiations.

In addressing the first question, the literature reveals that the manner in which intrastate wars end has changed since the conclusion of the Cold War. In the 1990s, a considerable number of civil conflicts ended in negotiated settlements. Not surprisingly, the spread of negotiated settlements parallels the spread of the norms associated with democratization. Thus, negotiation, rather than an absolute military victory, has become an acceptable method of conflict termination (Harbom, Högladh, and Wallensteen, 2006). Governments choose to engage in negotiation efforts when faced with both a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually perceived solution (Zartman, 1991). Years of conflict, military parity, and a perceived inexorable stalemate often force both sides to the negotiation table. However, both Zartman (1991) and Pruitt (2007) argue that the moment
must be ripe for negotiation to transpire. Both parties must be genuinely interested in the success of the process, as well as possess realistic appraisals of what the other negotiators can concede. The readiness theory (Pruitt, 2007) holds that the parties to a heavy conflict are motivated to seek communication when they begin to see the combat as hopeless or too costly or risky, or when they are pressed to end the combat by powerful third parties. However, in such circumstances, they will only move toward negotiation if they are optimistic that communication will yield an acceptable agreement. Thus, perceived rationality, ripeness, and readiness account for three theories on when and why governments will negotiate with unsavory characters whose demands were previously considered non-negotiable.

However, the literature is lacking when addressing the second question: Is negotiation a viable solution to ending historic ethnic conflicts? Certainly, negotiation is a multifaceted strategy, and the literature details the myriad of avenues for negotiation that exist, including: diplomatic efforts to improve relations with terrorist groups; engaging in dialogue with the leadership of terrorists groups; group discussions with terrorists to find areas of agreement; or a mutually binding mediated resolution. Additionally, the literature illustrates that governments are more willing to negotiate with terror groups when their objectives are finite and their goals are perceived to be rational (Pronin, Kennedy, and Butsch, 2006). Most often, such rationality is perceived among political/secular terror groups. Competent and cogent leadership also plays a determining factor in fostering a government’s willingness to negotiate. This stands in direct contrast to the assumed irrationality of ideological/religious terror groups, whose apocalyptic and dogmatic objectives can neither be moderated nor negotiated. When terrorists are deemed
to be irrational actors, counterterror efforts emphasize military action rather than diplomacy (Pronin, Kennedy, and Butsch, 2006). Thus, it is the perception of terrorist rationality that helps to instigate so many negotiation efforts between state governments and insurgent groups. This perception is influenced by an intrinsic skepticism of the terrorists' capacity for reason rather than by their affective responses to policy changes (Sederberg, 1995). Yet while theories abound on why governments do in fact negotiate with political/secular terrorists, there is little empirical evidence that delineates when their efforts are successful and which factors contribute to this success. This deficiency in the literature prompts a comparative analysis of the success of certain peace agreements and the failure of others, which will then be applied to the cases to determine both their merits and their shortcomings.

Research on settlements, outcomes, and the recurrence of conflict has illustrated that certain settlement types are more successful in preventing recurrent conflict than others (Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). In their research, Quackenbush and Venteicher divide settlements into three types: imposed, negotiated, and no settlement. Their research concludes that imposed settlements would be followed by longer periods of peace than negotiated settlements and that negotiated settlements would produce more lengthy periods of peace than disputes characterized by a lack of settlement (Quackenbush and Senese, 2003; Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). Thus, according to the literature, imposed settlements, rather than negotiated agreements, should prove more successful in ending ethnic conflict. Yet is this true when attempting to end ethnic conflicts and when dealing with separatist terrorists? This theory will be applied to the
case studies in order to determine if such a supposition is correct when pertaining to state/separatist terror group negotiations.

Of course, securing a peace agreement is not the same thing as securing peace. Such a stark reality prompts the fourth basic question of analysis in this thesis: Why, after having secured a settlement, do tensions erupt and violations occur? When analyzing ethnic conflicts between autonomous state governments and separatist insurgent groups, the reasons for recurrent violence are many, including: the nature of self-determination declarations and the prevailing notion of a sovereign state; the failure of the newly created autonomous state/region; the manipulation of negotiations and ceasefire agreements; and both parties’ refusal to comply with the terms of the settlement. The more extremist factions of any government or insurgent group can act as spoilers to foil a peace agreement driven by the more moderate factions of both parties. Examples of failed settlements prompt many to assert that negotiating with separatist terrorists is not only impossible, but also an inarguable emasculation of the state. Such assertions are erroneous. Successful negotiation is possible, but it requires both parties to be genuinely interested in the success of the process, as well as have realistic assessments of what the other negotiators can concede. This moderation of practice and thought poses the greatest challenge in settling ethnic conflicts.

The focus of this thesis is to compare the failed negotiation efforts of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, Russian and the Chechen insurgents, and Israel and the PLO against the unexpected success of the IRA and United Kingdom’s Good Friday Agreement, exploring if the path to that agreement, including the IRA and British government’s evolution from extremist to moderate thought, can be transposed onto the other case
studies. No two cases are exactly alike: motivation for negotiation varies, as do the respective outcomes. Therefore, the incentives that prompted the adoption of conciliatory policies will be assessed. Likewise, respective negotiation strategies and peace agreements will be contrasted. In doing so, it is hoped that a working framework of when and why negotiations succeed or fail between state governments and separatist terror groups can be established.
Chapter Two: Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 1983-2009

History of the Conflict
Of all of the world’s ongoing conflicts, Sri Lanka ranks among the most violent and intractable. Since 1983, fighting in Sri Lanka has claimed over 70,000 lives. The optimism of the 2002 ceasefire agreement and subsequent negotiations between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has elapsed. Violence has resumed, and human rights abuses and brutal tactics are now common on both sides of the battlefield. Currently, the LTTE seeks internal self-determination while the Sri Lankan government longs to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation. But after 26 years of conflict, many are left wondering if these two objectives are even compatible.

A recent Sri Lankan government military offensive – previously unequaled in size and strength – appears to have confined the LTTE force to a 230-square-mile wedge just below the Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka. LTTE fighting strength is estimated to be at 1,600 or so remaining combatants, compared with approximately 15,000 in 2006 when the peace talks collapsed (Wonacott, 2009). Many within Sri Lanka’s own government now conclude that the LTTE will soon be eliminated. Unfortunately, these predictions may prove to be unrealistic. Conventional battles might end with the loss of significant LTTE territory, but suicide bombings and other indiscriminate attacks are almost certain to continue. The 26-year-old insurgency will not evaporate without a settlement on Tamil internal self-determination that current strategies are not on track to produce.
Ethnic conflict has marred Sri Lanka’s history since the country gained independence in 1948. The fighting in Sri Lanka pits government forces in a country dominated by the Sinhalese ethnic group against rebels from the Tamil minority. Of Sri Lanka’s inhabitants, 74% are Buddhist Sinhalese, 9% are Hindu Tamils, 7% are Muslim Tamils, and 10% are Tamils of Indian origin (Zissis, 2006). While religious differences certainly distinguish these groups, ethnic cleavages account for the preponderance of animosity. More significant is the fact that the Sri Lankan Tamils, after years of societal and political marginalization, see themselves as inherently different from the Sinhalese and desire to express their separate identities via internal self-determination.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are fighting for the creation of Tamil political autonomy, citing innumerable grievances inflicted by the Sinhalese. The Tamils’ accusations – of discrimination, denial of the right to self-determination, abrogated agreements, and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to genocide by successive Sri Lankan governments – are supported by specific evidence given by international human rights non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, the democratic parliamentary efforts and the non-violent resistance struggle of the Tamil people prior to the outbreak of war are traced over several decades (McConnell, 2008). But in the face of continued discrimination, the Tamil people have turned to violent means in order to achieve their objectives.

To the LTTE, the cause of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict is rooted in a bitter historical memory. The Sinhalese-Buddhist community’s unwillingness to share power with the Tamil minorities and the state’s deliberate discrimination against the Tamils over language (Sinhalese was introduced as the official language in 1956), university
admission, and citizenship rights have sowed the seeds of deep distrust and contempt for the Sri Lankan government. Following Sri Lankan independence, Tamil relative group worth declined at an exponential pace. Political exclusion and social discrimination worked to instill a feeling of state-enforced inferiority. Resultantly, politicized Tamil youth started to form militant groups, the most prominent being the LTTE.

Tamil militants were marginal actors until a 1983 ambush killed thirteen GoSL soldiers in the northern town of Jaffna, provoking Sinhalese nationalists to unleash pogroms in Colombo and other Sinhalese majority areas. Over 1,000 Tamils were killed and tens of thousands fled their homes; the Sri Lankan state failed to stop violence. Support for the LTTE flourished and thousands of Tamils emigrated in following few years, creating an international support network for Tamil militancy that continues today. A main reason for the Tigers’ success is their support base: a loyal and prosperous Tamil diaspora in America, Canada, Great Britain, and Australia. Around 70,000 refugees from the current conflict are among them (The Economist, 2007), and they supply the LTTE with much needed funding. Moreover, the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, home to over 60 million Tamils, helped to house, finance, train, and arm the Tigers during the nascent years of the insurgency.

Since 1983, the LTTE has adhered to the orthodoxy of revolutionary war, using guerrilla tactics, assassination, and suicide bombers to torment the GoSL and attract international attention to its plight. Following in the footsteps of Mao and Giap, the LTTE sought political mobilization – the lengthy, painstaking process of recruiting and organizing popular support while building a dedicated and disciplined cadre. During this first phase, only the most limited and selective use of violence was permissible; overt
military action was better avoided altogether because it risked bringing armed repression down on an unready Tamil insurgency. Thus, the ostracized Tamil community in northeast Sri Lanka banded together through communal cooperation and solidarity, fueled by the nationalistic fervor of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. Once it accumulated a cadre of Tamil fighters, the LTTE began a protracted campaign of successful hit-and-run attacks and suicide bombings, most notably the assassination that killed Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. With the commencement of guerrilla war and a bombing campaign against central government targets, the LTTE began to capture considerable territory in its self-professed ‘Tamil homeland’.

Rather than assure the Tamil population of its good faith and security-building capabilities, the GoSL responded in kind. Brutal tactics became commonplace on both sides of the battlefield: LTTE rebels assassinated moderate leaders, enlisted combatants for suicide bombings, and recruited child soldiers, while the GoSL summarily executed rebels and forced the “disappearances” of thousands of Tamil insurgents and civilians. The state demonstrated an astonishing inability – or refusal – to address the Tamil incentives for violence. By responding to a nascent ethno-nationalist movement with brute force, wielded not only against insurgents but the greater Tamil population as well, the GoSL gave credence to the Tamil hatred of the state. Thus, it can be posited that the rapid escalation of the Sri Lankan civil war is a direct result of the government’s inability to mitigate regional conflict. Rather than assuage ethnic tensions, the state enflamed them. An unequivocal dirty war, which knows no limits to human rights abuses, enveloped the island and continues to this day.
Negotiation Efforts

Peace agreements can commence without peace. Such a statement might seem counterintuitive, but one need look no further than the 26-year-old conflict in Sri Lanka to understand the merits of this claim. Since the start of the conflict in 1983, the GoSL and the LTTE have undergone several attempts to negotiate a settlement to their identity-based conflict. Moments of vulnerability have produced environments ripe for conflict devolution, and the sense of a mutually hurting stalemate compelled both parties to sign a ceasefire agreement (CFA) in 2002. Yet rather than facilitate a negotiated settlement to the conflict, the CFA and subsequent peace talks were mired in incessant violence, sidelined by both parties’ refusal to discuss substantive political issues, and monitored by an ineffective body of international actors.

The narrowness of the peace talks would account for the first misstep in these negotiation efforts. The 2002-2006 peace process was exclusively focused on two parties: the GoSL, then led by Ramil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP), and the LTTE. President Chandrika Kumaratunga and other key southern Sinhalese political elites were largely excluded from the process. Among Tamils, non-LTTE parties had no role, nor did the important Muslim Tamil community, which accounts for 7 percent of the population. As much of the dynamic of this conflict is based within ethnic communities, the failure of the Norwegian-led peace process to involve all ethnicities made a lasting peace unlikely. Moreover, neither side had a clear idea of what the endgame might look like. Although the GoSL promised an interim administration in the northeast, run by the LTTE, this did not take into account the nature of the insurgent group, which continued to utilize political violence as the talks progressed. Tamil opponents were silenced and
killed; child soldiers were recruited; and the abduction of adults continued unabated. Furthermore, although it had reached the bargaining table, the LTTE was also unable to articulate its ultimate objectives. Its dream of an independent Eelam homeland remains unacceptable to the Sinhalese, as well as the major regional power, India, who carefully monitors its own Tamil minority.

Thus, substantive political issues were ignored, and human rights abuses persisted throughout the span of the ceasefire agreement. More importantly, the failure of the latest negotiation process solidified the perception among both the GoSL and the LTTE political elites that a military solution is the only feasible exit strategy to this conflict. However, it isn’t difficult to imagine a solution to this conflict. Tamil internal self-determination under a federal structure has been discussed, and the people of Sri Lanka have expressed a strong desire to end the war. Yet until mutual distrust is ameliorated and moderate political elites within both the Tamil and Sinhalese polities ascend to power, negotiation attempts will prove futile and indiscriminate violence will persist.

The first attempt to secure peace in the Sri Lankan civil war came at the behest of India in 1987. Under pressure from its own Tamil minority, India signed an agreement with the Sri Lankan government that dispatched a peacekeeping force (IPKF) to the northern and eastern provinces of the island, as well as initiated constitutional amendments promising Tamil autonomy. The main provisions of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord included: Tamil and English, in addition to Sinhalese, were to be official state languages; temporary union of northern and eastern provinces; ceasefire under supervision of Indian peacekeeping troops; and protection of India’s regional security (Jensen, 1997). However, this agreement, as was the case with earlier agreements
between India and Sri Lanka, focused narrowly on issues of Tamil citizenship and the repatriation of Tamil settlers to India, doing little to settle Tamil grievances. Moreover, Tamil input was never sought nor considered in the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

However, the IPKF soon became embroiled in intense fighting with the LTTE. Anti-Indian nationalist sentiment spread throughout the island. In 1990, Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, hoping to pave the way for a negotiated settlement, ordered the IPKF to leave and opened negotiations with the Tamil Tigers. Thus, although India was able to mediate an agreement between the GoSL and the LTTE in 1987, it soon found itself under attack from the very Tigers that it had brought into the agreement. In what would soon become a LTTE trend, the Tigers broke from the negotiations, captured additional territory, and increased violent attacks, including the augmented use of suicide bombings. The assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 and President Premadasa in May 1993 would open a significant window of state vulnerability, and extensive fighting would prevail throughout the following decade.

The second significant attempt to secure peace via talks came at the behest of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, elected in 1994. With Kumaratunga’s ascension came the renewed hope for a peace settlement, for her United People’s Freedom Alliance party (UPFA) defeated the UNP, which had governed Sri Lanka for 17 years. Talks began with the LTTE but soon collapsed: the rebels proved unwilling to discuss a political settlement until a series of untenable conditions were met. Further diplomatic efforts proved vain after the LTTE sank two navy gunboats in April 1995. Resultantly, Kumaratunga shifted state policies from a pro-peace agenda to a self-proclaimed ‘war for peace’ strategy, in which military action was meant to dislodge the Tigers from their strongholds in the
northeast while a political solution was offered to the Tamil people. The Tigers did not take the bait; instead, they increased the frequency and severity of their terror campaign, striking such targets as the international airport in Colombo and military bases across the island. The failure of the ‘war for peace’ concept was complete, but it would take an additional round of negotiation efforts before the GoSL abandoned conciliatory policies in full.

The third attempt to secure peace, a Norwegian-led ceasefire agreement in 2002, was negotiated at a time when the LTTE had shown considerable strength on the battlefield. As the relative parity between the GoSL and the LTTE increased, Colombo agreed to negotiate. In the agreement, the LTTE and the GoSL committed themselves to cease violent actions, take measures to restore normalcy, and initiate a political dialogue focused on finding a solution to the armed conflict. Further provisions included: a mutual agreement to refrain from any offensive military operations; the creation of buffer zones to separate GoSL and LTTE areas of control; and the disarmament of Tamil paramilitary groups who had acted in support of the government. The main aim of the ceasefire was stated to be the facilitation of a negotiated settlement to the conflict; subsequently, prospects for peace hinged on the hope that a future comprehensive settlement would occur. Such optimism proved vain.

The Tamil Tigers withdrew from the peace talks in 2003 and broke loose from the ceasefire agreement in the closing weeks of 2005. As the LTTE withdrawal from the CFA illustrated, a majority within the movement believed that the tactical use of armed struggle continued to be both valid and necessary as a means of pressing for Tamil objectives. During the period of 2002-2005, the LTTE committed 96% of the ceasefire
violations, including: the illegal transport of arms, movement in the buffer zone, and hostile acts against the civilian population (Höglund and Svensson, 2008). Despite this, the main reasons for the failure of the peace process should be sought in the structural and personal characteristics of the main parties themselves: the LTTE insisted that formal recognition of the Tamil homeland be a prerequisite to a comprehensive settlement while the GoSL balked. Feeling marginalized, the LTTE continued its violent tactics during the ceasefire, undermining popular support of the Sri Lankan president whose conciliatory measures were proving ineffective. The 2004 general election would witness the exit of President Ranil Wickremesinghe, the key architect of the peace process, and the ascension of Mahina Rajapakse, a known hardliner who supported a military solution to the civil war. By ensuring Rajapakse’s victory, the Tigers guaranteed a comprehensive renegotiation of the entire peace process, away from federalism and clearly against the political interests of the LTTE.

Yet the Tigers – or perhaps more specifically LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran – had their reasoning to foil the peace process. Within the GoSL, there is a widespread feeling that the peace process doubled as an opportunity for the LTTE to build up stocks of arms and ammunition, amass financial resources, and develop and put in place a new strategy centered upon the retention of its territory in the north (Smith, 2007: 79). Once the GoSL forces shouldered their weapons, LTTE efforts to build a state within a state increased considerably, and their arsenal of violent tactics proved more potent and diverse. Resultantly, the GoSL now believes that a military offensive is the only viable solution to this conflict.
In their research, Höglund and Svensson (2008) suggest that part of the failure of the ceasefire rests in the Norwegians’ inability to be seen as a neutral third party actor. The inherent asymmetries between the GoSL and the LTTE – in capabilities, status, and behavior – posed particular challenges to the Nordic mission. The manner in which the Nordic Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) addressed sea incidents between the LTTE Sea Tigers and the Sri Lankan navy, as well as contention over the buffer zones, led to heated debate over the unbiased nature of the purported peace-enforcers. The SLMM held the position that the ceasefire relied on a balance of forces between the two parties (Höglund and Svensson, 2008: 358). Thus, when the SLMM tried to address the asymmetry between forces at sea, it was perceived as being biased towards the LTTE. Likewise, when the SLMM rebuffed the Tigers’ claim that the government should withdraw its forces from strategically important locations in the Tamil homeland, the monitors came under criticism, but this time from the opposite end. The importance of preserving the balance of forces was paramount to the Nordic mission; however, in responding to crises over asymmetries, the third party was accused of siding with one party or another.

Ultimately, it is only when the terrorists are worn out and have become fully isolated from a population alienated by their tactics that they become amenable to a return to civil politics and the conflict becomes susceptible to mediation (Zartman, 2006: 268). Likewise, powerful conflicts need powerful peacemakers, capable of wielding coercive diplomacy and properly balancing the distribution of sanctions and incentives. Neither India nor Norway filled such a role in Sri Lanka. No one has ever claimed that
the role of the third party mediator in an intrastate dispute would be easy, but peace agreements require heavy-handed arbitrators if they are to be implemented.

**Negotiation Outcomes**

Perhaps the most significant impediment to peace existed neither within the ceasefire violations nor the nuisances of the terms offered, but rather within the ethnic communities themselves. The 2002 peace process consisted of discussions abroad between two parties to the conflict: the GoSL and the LTTE. Certainly, these parties are the principal actors in this conflict, and without their participation peace will remain an impossibility. Yet the Norwegian-led peace process offered little transparency and no place for the other affected communities, most notably the Muslim Tamils, non-LTTE Hindu Tamils, other Sinhalese political parties. This inability – or refusal – to forge a broad coalition of supporters would offer ample room for spoilers to maneuver and work to undermine the peace process.

Moreover, following the failed negotiation attempt, the LTTE gave credence to the belief that it had used the ceasefire as a means to rearm and implement a new strategy aimed at militarily securing its self-professed Tamil homeland, for the insurgency emerged from the failed peace talks stronger than it had been when they began. An oddity of this ethnic conflict is the proven ability of 10,000 self-trained guerrillas to defeat the government’s 150,000 armed forces in conventional battles. A shimmering example of this is the Tigers’ latest weapons system: a fleet of ten light aircraft, imported in pieces during the ceasefire and unveiled in two bombing raids on Colombo in 2007 (*The Economist*, 2007). Thus, not only does the LTTE attack its enemy in unconventional
incursions, but it also presents a formidable opposition in more traditional assaults. A nighttime air strike over Colombo recently plunged the city into darkness, demonstrating that the rebels can strike even while a GoSL army offensive pushed deep into Tamil territory. Likewise, the LTTE repeatedly attacked Sri Lankan naval, army, and aerial bases, as well as rendered crucial government supply depots, such as Colombo’s oil storage facilities, inoperable. Not even Colombo’s International Airport is safe from these guerrilla forces, as evidenced by the aerial assault that destroyed half of the Sri Lankan Airways fleet (Ganguly, 2004).

Furthermore, Sri Lanka’s civil war has created a political-territorial division between the GoSL and the LTTE, where the LTTE is engaged in a process of state building within the areas they control. In these areas, the LTTE runs a de facto state administration, which includes revenue collection, a police force, and a judiciary, as well as public services and economic development initiatives. Traveling between government-controlled areas to LTTE-controlled areas resembles a border crossing between two nations, with well guarded border control posts where travelers are required to show identity cards, goods are inspected, and custom fees are collected (Stokke, 2006).

Additionally, LTTE aid to civil response in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami disaster was thought to be exemplary, lending credibility to the claim that they have established an autonomous government in the north (Smith, 2007: 71). Such efforts to build a state within a state have garnered the attention of international non-governmental organizations, threatening the Sri Lankan state in a subtle but powerful way.

LTTE efforts to build a state within a state have forged ahead since the ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002. The LTTE’s state building activities are closely linked to
their political project of representing the Tamil nation and delivering self-determination for it. Their success is contingent upon the framing of the LTTE as the sole representative of Tamil nationalism, as well as an established military capacity to confront the Sri Lankan government and provide a degree of external security to the Tamil people. However, the success of recent GoSL military offensives, including the capture of the professed Tamil capital of Kilinochchi, has signaled a potential sea change in intrastate violence. After much speculation and considerable doubt, a GoSL military victory appears imminent, and the LTTE decision to rebuff earlier negotiation efforts appears imprudent. Yet LTTE strategy consistently employs the doctrine of asymmetric warfare with confidence and success, and it must continue to do so if it wishes to achieve its long-desired goal of an autonomous Tamil homeland. Likewise, the GoSL must enhance its capacity to provide security for its citizens, particularly in the capital of Colombo, lest it lose its political support.

In recent years, factionalism and mass defections have significantly undermined the LTTE objective of internal self-determination. Such defections give credence to the belief that Tamil support and patience are ebbing away. Certainly, after 20 years of grinding poverty imposed by the conflict, unconditional popular support has eroded. In particular, the recent defection of Colonel Karuna, commander of the LTTE in the east, a central strategic thinker of the movement, and a close confidant of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, along with an estimated 2,000 cadres, has weakened Tiger unity. Once he defected, Karuna made common cause with the GoSL and state security forces. This provided important sources of tactical and strategic intelligence and, to all intents and purposes, henceforth denied the mainstream LTTE control over the east, a territorial
setback from which the LTTE are never likely to recover (Smith, 2007: 70). But even with infighting, the LTTE has amazing staying power. For more than two decades, the GoSL army, a well-trained force currently 150,000 strong, has failed to put down an insurgency consistently numbering fewer than 10,000 fighters and with a large number of child soldiers.

Still, the likelihood of an independent Tamil state remains slim. The primary demographic problem with an independent Tamil state is that one fifth of Tamil Eelam is occupied by Muslim Tamils, few of whom view the notion of living in an independent Tamil state with enthusiasm. Hindu Tamils have engaged in repeated discriminatory policies against Muslim Tamils, and although the two share a linguistic background, religious cleavages undermine a sense of loyalty. Nor is it likely that the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka would accept the secession of the Hindu Tamils on the basis of the boundaries issued in the self-professed Tamil homeland, for it would allow 9.7 percent of the country’s population to assume control over 28.7 percent of the land and 60 percent of the coastline (Jensen, 1997: 32).

In an environment of ethnic polarization and political uncertainty, one cannot be at all optimistic that either the Sri Lankan government or the LTTE will be willing to make the kind of political compromises necessary for peace. A fundamental difficulty of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict is the deep distrust and contempt with which the government and the LTTE view each other. Such latent animosity will not be ameliorated through a military victory alone. Therefore, future peacebuilding efforts should concentrate on promoting confidence-building and security-building institutions. The Sri Lankan government must advance Tamil and Sinhalese equality with regards to employment,
education, and regional infrastructure. Furthermore, despite recent territorial losses and the depletion of their fighting force, the LTTE still wields considerable support within the Tamil homeland. An overwhelming military victory will help amass power and authority in Colombo’s hands once more, but it will do little to assuage deeply felt grievances and offset the threat of recurrent violence unless a political solution is established as well.

Analysis

Signs of Conflict Ripeness for Resolution

The 2002 ceasefire agreement, which would lay the foundation for the 2002-2006 Norwegian-led peace talks, was negotiated at a time when the LTTE had shown considerable strength on the battlefield. The LTTE could be considered to have established strategic military parity vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan state. Not only had the insurgent group captured a considerable tract of land in which it had established a civil administration, but it had also defeated the GoSL military in more conventional battles. An outright military victory appeared increasingly less likely for either side, and as the relative parity between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE increased, Colombo agreed to negotiate.

It was not just the military defeats that spurred politicians to seek a way to end the war. The costs of the conflict – military, financially, and politically – for continuing the war had drastically increased for both parties. The economy was in crisis, as the constant drain of military expenditure undermined financial stability. Moreover, there was widespread war weariness in the country. Both sides were ready for a new approach: the LTTE wanted time to regroup and attempt to gain political recognition; the government
wanted a relative peace in which to reinvigorate the economy. The result of such a mutually hurting stalemate was a ceasefire agreement that led to the longest period of peace in Sri Lanka since the 1980s.

Thus, both parties envisioned a mutually perceived solution through Tamil self-autonomy; however, as the peace talks progressed, it would become apparent that no immediate solution could be achieved that would prove amenable to both sides.

**Signs of Negotiation Readiness**

At the time of the ceasefire agreement, both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government perceived further combat as risky and costly. High costs associated with the war provoked widespread opposition to its continuance. Moreover, the longer that the conflict was prolonged, the riskier it became. Ethnic enmity would become further entrenched, giving rise to extremism and spoiler-related violence. Furthermore, the international community called for the cessation of violence, as non-governmental organizations and human rights monitors cited egregious humanitarian abuses within the war-torn northeast.

Yet perhaps the most important facet to instigating negotiation readiness were the pre-negotiation efforts, begun by Ranil Wickremesinghe in the months leading up to the December 2001 parliamentary elections. These nascent talks with the LTTE helped to establish a rapport that would ease the transition to official negotiations. Thus, with the involvement of the international community and the special approach to the peace process by the newly elected Wickremasinghe government, the perceived risks involved in a peaceful settlement decreased. These parallel developments in the incentives
structures of war and peace explain the readiness of both primary parties to engage in serious efforts to solve the protracted conflict.

**Type of Negotiated Agreement**

Sri Lanka has recently experienced two cases of negotiation: first, a comprehensive ceasefire agreement signed on February 22, 2002 between the LTTE and the GoSL; and second, recurrent peace talks held between both parties from 2002 to 2006. The ceasefire agreement was a negotiated settlement, and its main aim was stated to be the facilitation of a comprehensive peace to end the conflict. The peace talks that began in late 2002, however, were resultantly turbulent and largely unproductive, as neither side wanted to discuss substantive political issues. In essence, the peace talks did not produce a settlement, as the LTTE withdrew from negotiations in April 2003. Despite the breakdown in direct talks, however, the peace process itself continued through Norwegian shuttle diplomacy, with the central focus shifting from federal power structures (i.e. a permanent solution) to discussions on interim agreements. Yet no negotiated agreement would ever be established from these talks. Resultantly, the LTTE broke loose from the ceasefire agreement in the closing weeks of 2005, with the GoSL following suit in early 2008.

**Causes of Negotiation Outcome Failure**

There are numerous reasons as to why the ceasefire agreement and peace talks collapsed. First, an integral misstep was the inability of either side to develop a mutually perceived solution. Neither party had a clear idea of what the endgame might look like. Although the government promised an interim administration in the northeast, run by the LTTE, this did not take into account the nature of the rebel movement, which ran the
areas it controlled like a totalitarian regime. Moreover, the LTTE was also unable to articulate a clear vision of its future. Its dream of a separate state is unacceptable to the Sinhalese majority and to the major regional power, India. This inability to strategize the integral components of a permanent peace would greatly impede the peace talks.

A second reason for the failure of the peace process should be sought in the structural and personal characteristics of the main parties themselves: the LTTE demonstrated little moderation, whether of ideology or leadership, and its continued use of violence throughout the ceasefire agreement discredited its image as a partner capable of negotiation.

Third, the well-intentioned Norwegian intermediary proved ineffective. The SLMM, who possessed overall responsibility for the facilitation and mediation of the CFA, had no mechanism to enforce obedience or monitor credibility between the GoSL and the LTTE. A coercive third party is needed if a negotiated agreement is to terminate an ethnic conflict.

A fourth impediment to peace existed neither within the nuisances of the terms offered nor the ceasefire violations, but rather within the ethnic communities themselves. Among Tamils, non-LTTE parties had no role in the peace talks; nor did the important Muslim community. The absence of Track 2 diplomacy ensured that ground level communal reconciliation was overlooked, and ethnic enmity was certain to persist. As much of the dynamic of the conflict is centered among ethnic rivalries, the failure of the peace process to address this made a lasting peace unlikely.

Fifth, spoiler violence and repeated LTTE ceasefire agreement violations contributed to the failure of the peace talks, as well. In continuing to utilize violence
during the ceasefire, the LTTE undermined its credibility as a rational actor and reduced the likelihood of engaging in future peace talks with the Sri Lankan government.
Chapter Three: Russia and The Chechen Republic, 1994-2009

*History of the Conflict*

The ethnic conflict that exists between Russia and Chechnya is akin to a pendulum swinging back and forth between two polar extremes: at times, the allowance of an autonomous Chechen region seems possible; this sentiment is then overcome by the Russian government’s brutal repression of all self-determinist claims. As a small cultural, linguistic, and religious enclave within the immense Russian Federation, Chechnya would have long ago been forgotten were it not for its strategic and economic importance to Moscow. Chechen territory extends across vital trade routes and oil pipelines, and Chechnya has the potential to boast its own oil fields and oil processing plants. Thus, its economic potential has long given the republic an importance to Moscow far beyond its size. For this fundamental reason, as well as Vladimir Putin’s timely declaration that Chechnya constitutes a key front in the Global War on Terror, Russia continues to exercise its fervent desire to keep Chechnya within the confines of its territorial sovereignty through brute force and conflict suppression.

The Chechen quest for autonomy can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, during which time impassioned fighters fought for the creation of an Islamic nation. Although the militarily superior Russian state would quickly quash this movement, it would later bestow considerable autonomy upon Chechnya with the creation of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1934. Still, despite such concessions, ethnic Chechens have been given ample reason to distrust and resent the central authorities in Russia, for the Chechen people have experienced a long
history of persecution at the hands of the Tsarist and Soviet states. The most recent and most brutal act of discrimination occurred in February 1944, during the Stalinist period, when almost 500,000 Chechens and Ingush were herded into cattle trucks and deported to Central Asia for their alleged support of the Nazis (Bowker, 2004: 466). Akin to the linguistic and cultural discrimination of Tamils in Sri Lanka, Russification policies were pursued in Chechnya, with Russian language proficiency required for advancement in the Soviet system. A distinct sense of identity, inconsolable with a greater Russian affiliation, was amplified throughout Chechnya.

The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed a cascade of self-determinist thought within the greater Soviet empire. A 1991 declaration of Chechen independence and the adoption of a Chechen constitution, in which the republic was declared an independent, secular state, would prompt Boris Yeltsin to send troops into Chechnya. Three years of war would be followed by three years of quasi-self governance in Grozny. However, the ineptitude of the nascent Chechen government, as well as the ascendance of Islamist leaders within the Chechen insurgency, would prompt the return of Russian soldiers. A second Chechen war began in 1999, and it continues to this day.

The destructive level and sustained nature of the conflict in Chechnya make it the most protracted and violent of all of the post-Soviet conflicts (Hughes, 2001: 11). Throughout the conflict, atrocities have been committed by both sides, usually at the expense of civilians. Russian troops have engaged in systematic human rights abuses, including: torture, rape, forced disappearances, mass arrest operations, kidnappings, and summary executions. Likewise, Chechen guerrillas have repeatedly retaliated with hit-and-run attacks and suicide bombings, levied against both Russian troops and innocent
civilians in such distant cities as Moscow. A long history of enmity, combined with cultural, linguistic, and religious distinctions, continue to fuel separatist sentiment. Thus, although the damage caused by years of fighting has reduced the appeal of the separatist cause amongst the Chechen people, the disproportionate Russian response has ensured that most ethnic Chechens resent the concept of living within a Russian state. Violence will not dissipate unless a mutually acceptable political solution is found, yet the amplified religious rhetoric of this latest generation of Chechen insurgents greatly undermines the opportunity for a negotiated settlement.

The Russian decision to intervene following Chechnya’s declaration of independence can be viewed from two perspectives: nationalist and interventionist. From the nationalist perspective, it was critical that Russia reassert its national prestige and bolster its hegemonic supremacy in the Caucasus and Caspian regions. For the interventionists, the aggressive advocacy of Chechen independence threatened the integrity of the Russian Federation and had to be quashed, lest it spill over into other recalcitrant Russian republics (Hughes, 2001). Yet despite its numerical superiority and its extensive arsenal of supplies, Russia, for all practical purposes, lost the First Chechen War.

From the start, the lack of coordination among combat and logistical units from different ministries proved to be one of the foremost factors responsible for Russia’s dismal performance. An even greater obstacle to Russia’s counterinsurgency operations, however, was the low morale of Russian troops. Channeling their 1980s occupation of Afghanistan, Russian troops succumbed to alcohol abuse and lethargy. Equipment shortages proved problematic. Likewise, shortages of ammunition, fuel, spare parts,
combat gear, medical supplies, food, and fresh water left Russian troops feeling unprepared and abandoned on the Chechen front (Bowker, 2004: 225). Faced with an impaired Russian army, the Chechen insurgents thrived.

Guerrilla warfare suited the Chechens, who were a highly motivated, well organized, and well-armed insurgent group. Additionally, they were fighting on their own terrain and received ample support from the local populace. In classic guerrilla style, the Chechen rebels repeatedly carried out hit-and-run attacks against Russian forces. From the beginning of the armed conflict in late 1994, Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev encouraged suicide attacks. Yet it was the Budennovsk raid of 1995, which started as a military raid to deflect the Russian presence in Chechnya but soon denigrated into the hostage taking of women and children at a maternity hospital, that delivered a massive psychological blow to Yeltsin’s claim of winning the war. An already discontent Russian public, which never overtly supported the intervention, greatly affected Yeltsin’s decision-making, as the Russian presidential elections were only months away.

Resultantly, the Russian military offensive was stopped in its tracks, and a ceasefire agreement was signed shortly thereafter.

**Negotiation Efforts**

The First Chechen War, from December 1994 to August 1996, officially ended when Russian and Chechen officials signed a peace agreement at Khasavyurt in the neighboring republic of Dagestan. The Khasavyurt Accord, which led to the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Chechen territory and three years of quasi-independence for the republic, stipulated that the two parties would resolve the final status of Chechnya by
the end of 2001. Unfortunately, recurrent violence prevented any final-status decision from being achieved.

First, it must be asked: why would Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, sign a peace accord with a rebel insurgent group that employed terror tactics and threatened to upset Russian territorial sovereignty? Public discontent and widespread demoralization of Russian forces certainly provided an incentive. Likewise, new Chechen leadership, under President Zemlikhan Yandarbiyev, proved more open to the possibility of a negotiated agreement. Yet perhaps most important, Yeltsin too was desperate to end the unpopular war in the North Caucasus as the date of the presidential election approached. Politics, therefore, triumphed over nationalist rhetoric. The interim agreement, however, would be short-lived.

Once again, reaching a peace deal proved to be a far cry from reaching peace. The failure of the quasi-autonomous Chechen state in the intra-war years would demonstrate this claim. The three years of quasi-independence in Chechnya, from September 1996 to September 1999, were marred by warlordism, rampant criminality, hostage takings, chaotic violence, grisly attacks on foreign aid workers, and general lawlessness. Elected in 1997, Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov was unable to clamp down on the more extremist element of the Chechen insurgency, led by Shamil Basayev. Subsequently, the power of warlords, criminal gangs and Islamic extremist groups – including some foreign terrorists – increased. These Islamists set up terrorist training camps in Chechnya and recruited aspiring jihadists from all over southern Russia, as well as the Middle East and South Asia, giving them military training in addition to political and religious indoctrination. Under growing pressure from Islamic radicals, Maskhadov imposed strict
sharia law throughout Chechnya in February 1999, a move that was widely unpopular amongst ethnic Chechens. The tone of the insurgency was beginning to change from one of separatism to one of radical Islamism.

Not surprisingly, the Russian authorities were deeply suspicious of and hostile to Maskhadov, and they avoided taking any steps that would ease his task of governance (Bowker, 2004: 212). With his authority largely discredited, Maskhadov could only watch as a series of events beginning with deadly incursions by Islamic extremists from Chechnya into Dagestan in August 1999 culminated in a large-scale resumption of fighting between Russian federal forces and Chechen guerrillas – fighting that has continued ever since (Kramer, 2005: 209). No doubt Maskhadov and the ethnic Chechen nationalists wished to prevent the outbreak of further violence, for with its onset, Chechnya could bid its hope for complete political autonomy farewell. Resultantly, negotiations on the final-status of Chechen independence were never held, as the ceasefire collapsed and a failed Chechen state prompted Russia to renege on its prior peace agreement.

**Negotiation Outcomes**

Initially, it seemed that the Second Chechen War had been better planned than the first, and a Russian military victory would be imminent. Moscow deployed approximately 90,000 troops, more than double the number deployed during the first war, and troops captured Grozny in February 2000. Chechen independence had run its course. Counterinsurgency improvements were also notable: Russian soldiers maintained a tighter hold on the Chechen capital of Grozny and avoided repeating some of their earlier
mistakes, especially with regards to urban warfare. Moreover, the Russian people, unlike in 1994, supported this decision to invade Chechnya, having grown tired of indiscriminate bombings in Moscow. Nevertheless, some major weaknesses in Russian counterinsurgency policy have been revealed as the Second Chechen War persists. Large numbers of Russian troops are still being killed by Chechen guerrillas who rely on ambushes, landmines, and suicide bombings to offset their numerical inferiority; soft civilian targets continue to be attacked; Putin’s attempt at ‘Chechenisation’, the devolution of power to local pro-Russian authorities, has been thrown into disarray; and far from diminishing, the intensity of the war has increased. Thus, in a military sense, an end to the conflict appears as elusive as ever (Kramer, 2005: 254).

The evolution of Chechen tactics is in large part to blame. While hit-and-run tactics continue to demoralize Russian forces, it has been the decision to wage large-scale terror attacks that has proven most successful in prolonging the insurgency. When targeting civilians in Moscow and other major Russian cities, Chechen fighters usually have resorted to three types of terrorist action: suicide bombings, remote detonation of bombs, and seizure of hostages. Key transport systems, government buildings, and civilian soft targets have also proven vulnerable. The influx of radical Islamist ideologies, however, is most responsible for the evolution of tactics. This separatist movement is no longer simply an ethno-nationalist insurgency. Rather, greater Islamic fundamentalist causes have entered the rhetoric of Chechen guerrilla leaders. Historically, the majority of Chechens have belonged to the Sufi branch of Islam, but the increasingly desperate situation in the 1990s has led a significant number of war-weary individuals to embrace a more radical and ascetic Wahhabist tradition. Resultantly, the commitment to
demonstrative spectacular attacks, as the Dubrovka Theatre and Beslan hostage crises of 2002 and 2004 indicate, signals a sharp escalation of the Chechens’ earlier attempts to bring the war to Moscow’s doorstep.

However, far from compelling the Russian authorities to agree to peace negotiations, the terrorist attacks of 2002 and 2004 reinforced Vladimir Putin’s resolve to eradicate the terrorist threat once and for all. At the same time, the Chechens’ adoption of amplified rhetoric and tactics, notably suicide bombings that have long been the hallmark of terrorists linked with al Qaeda, has made it far easier for Putin to depict the war in Chechnya as an integral part of the Global War on Terror. Such pronouncements have garnered considerable support from the United States; resultantly, the Bush Administration has turned a blind eye to disproportionate Russian responses and human rights abuses inflicted upon on the Chechen people.

Although Putin has prosecuted the current war with greater resolve than his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, did in the mid-1990s, his prospects for achieving a more durable solution appear dim. The abject cruelty of Russia’s counterinsurgency operations has helped radicalize the insurgents and has permanently alienated many ordinary Chechens who might otherwise have been willing to accept a compromise with the federal authorities that would bring an end to the fighting. Certainly, there can be no moral justification for the Chechen use of terror to achieve its objectives. It must be noted, however, that the Chechens have historical grounds to fear a threat of physical genocide from Russia, given the genocidal deportation of 1944 and the mass bombings of Grozny in late 1994, early 1995, and late 1999.
Nearly a decade after their incursion, Russian troops still remain in Chechnya. The proliferation of insurgent violence and the escalation of terror tactics, notably the mass hostage-takings of the Dubrovka Theater and the Beslan School in 2002 and 2004 respectively, have shocked the Russian public. Rather than concede, sign another peace accord, and place its faith in a ceasefire, the Russian government maintains its position to never negotiate with terrorists. But in the absence of such talks, the situation seems unlikely to improve in any meaningful way: Russian troops in the North Caucasus will continue to be threatened by Chechen guerrillas, and Russian and Chechen civilians alike will remain susceptible to indiscriminate terror attacks.

Ultimately, the conflict in Chechnya can be understood as a shift from imperial disengagement to the rediscovery of imperial nerve in Russia (Hughes, 2001: 14). With a pro-Russian government firmly entrenched in Grozny, as well as tens of thousands of Russian troops stationed throughout the area, Russia has once again asserted its regional hegemony. Yeltsin might have faltered, but Putin refuses to do so. One has to wonder whether this is simply an exercise in Putin’s obstinacy, for Moscow had shown itself willing to negotiate separate bilateral deals according further autonomy to certain regions, notably Tatarstan. Moreover, extensive rights for ethnic republics are enshrined in the Russian Constitution and the Federation Treaty. Perhaps a similar agreement was in the works, but Chechnya failed to prove its capacity for self-government during its short-lived independence. Regardless, a comprehensive settlement will remain unlikely until talk of Islamist terrorism subsides, and the insurgency once again asserts its separatist roots.
Still, despite their losses, the Chechen insurgents remain motivated. As with the LTTE of Sri Lanka, Chechen rebels currently number around 1,600-1,800 troops (Kramer, 2005: 213), yet they have continued to defy and demoralize approximately 90,000 Russian troops stationed throughout the region. Hence, even though the Russian military will likely be able to retain Chechnya within the Russian Federation for the duration of this inexorable insurgency, that is a dubious accomplishment at best. At a minimum, the Russian government will have to maintain a large-scale military presence in the region indefinitely. Guerrilla tactics and suicide bombings are almost certain to continue, depleting the morale of Russian troops and furthering the sense that one is simply enduring a relentless stalemate rather than working to achieve a military victory.

Although Islamists have hijacked the Chechen cause as their own and infiltrated key leadership positions within the insurgency, the quest for political autonomy is still most salient in the minds of the Chechen people. Very few, if any, Chechens want to live in a Taliban-style Islamic state, and many therefore are inclined to support alternatives to a seemingly endless guerrilla war. On the other hand, the insurgents’ embrace of radical Islamic dogma has sharply reduced the potential for any compromise between them and the Russian authorities. The death of Shamil Basayev in 2006, however, opened a unique window of vulnerability. As the mastermind of both the Dubrovka and Beslan attacks, his death has created a power vacuum in the leadership of the insurgency. Moreover, as Basayev was a staunch Islamist, his opposition to the policies of the Maskhadov government certainly undermined stability in the intra-war period. Yet Putin has remained true to his word: negotiation is no longer an option. The ripe moment had
passed, and with it went the politicians who believed in the benefits of making conciliatory gestures.

But even if Putin had wavered, a settlement would still have been hard to generate, for the conduct of Russian forces has made a political settlement increasingly difficult to achieve. The Chechen people may be war-weary, but it has become harder than ever for most ethnic Chechens to contemplate living within a Russian state. Systematic human rights abuses, including torture, rape, forced disappearances, mass arrest operations, kidnappings, and summary executions, continue to occur across Chechnya. So long as these gross abuses incur a blind eye from Moscow, ethnic cleavages and enmity will remain unalterable. Yet independence for Chechnya, at least in any meaningful sense of the term, looks impossible for the foreseeable future. Chechnya has been destroyed. Cities have been razed to the ground; the economy is shattered; and many thousands of people have died or fled the republic. Since the commencement of the First Chechen War, the Chechen population has shrunk from 1.2 million to approximately 700,000. Approximately 40,000 to 45,000 civilians have been killed, while 50,000 are living as internally displaced persons and tens of thousands are external refugees scattered across the Northern Caucasus region. In this bleak environment, Islamist war entrepreneurs have hijacked the Chechen separatist cause as their own. Resultantly, the hope for a negotiated settlement with Moscow has paled, for the bellicose rhetoric of a post-September 11 world ensures Putin’s dogged pursuit of conflict suppression via a strong military presence.
Analysis

Signs of Conflict Ripeness for Resolution
In 1996, public discontent and the widespread demoralization of Russian forces provided an impetus for negotiation. Effective guerrilla war tactics had successfully assaulted Russian troops, inflicting thousands of casualties and effectively creating a military impasse. Although Russian forces greatly outnumbered Chechen insurgents, both parties appeared to be approaching military parity. Resultantly, a general malaise befell the Russian people. This military stalemate would directly effect Boris Yeltsin’s decision-making, as the unpopularity of the war threatened his reelection bid. With the date of the presidential election on the horizon, Yeltsin relented to popular opposition and withdrew Russian forces from Chechnya.

Moreover, the election of new Chechen leadership, led by President Zemlikhan Yandarbiyev, proved more open to the possibility of a mutually perceived solution. Internal self-autonomy was not an anathema to the Russian Federation, as evidenced by the political autonomy given to Tatarstan. Thus, war intractability and new political leadership spurred the prospects for conflict resolution.

Signs of Negotiation Readiness
The economic and political costs of the war had taken their toll on Boris Yeltsin. Not only would war intractability popularize a nascent Islamist movement, whose origins did not exist within the Chechen separatist agenda, but it would also continue to drain Russian finances. Thus, Yeltsin’s willingness to experiment with Chechen self-governance stimulated negotiation readiness. As the First Chechen War dragged on without a discernible victory, Chechen autonomy appeared acceptable, and the removal
of Russian forces from Chechen soil was met with widespread support among both the Russian and Chechen people.

Moreover, both Chechen and Russian leadership were optimistic that communication would yield an acceptable agreement. The successful example of Tatarstan illustrated that negotiations over secession or over relative autonomy within the Russia state could prove successful.

**Type of Negotiated Agreement**

The Khasavyurt Accord was a negotiated settlement, wherein a sustainable peace necessitated both mutual deterrence to prevent recurrent violence and mutual conformity to the terms of the agreement. Moreover, the Khasavyurt Accord of 1996 was a partial peace agreement, wherein Chechnya was given substantial autonomy but not full independence. The two parties were to resolve the final status of Chechnya by the end of 2001, yet final status talks were never held.

**Causes of Negotiation Outcome Failure**

First, the inability of the Chechen leadership to manage an ascendant warlord society led to an anarchic scenario, prompting the return of Russian military forces. Although democratic elections had occurred during the short-lived Chechen self-rule, the appeal of electoral politics would diminish in light of recurrent atrocities and human rights abuses committed by Russian military forces.

Second, new elections would oust moderate leadership and appoint new political actors who would prove either inflexible or inept in their positions. A newly elected Russian president, Vladimir Putin, would not help the newly elected Chechen president, Aslan Maskhadov, combat warlordism and organized crime. Rather, Putin would cite this
instability as a direct threat to Russia and intervene in defense of territorial sovereignty and stability.

Third, the lack of any third party involvement greatly hampered prospects for a sustainable peace, as there was no neutral force to monitor the ceasefire or enforce the terms of the agreement.

Fourth, Russia failed to invest in Chechnya’s reconstruction, ensuring that Chechens remained staunchly anti-Russian, impoverished, and highly susceptible to militant Islamist ideology. As there was no Track 2 diplomacy employed during the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases, ethnic antagonism and suspicion were not alleviated at the ground level.

Fifth, the postponement of a final status solution would seal the fate of the Khasavyurt Accord. The failure to establish a comprehensive peace would allow spoilers the opportunity to challenge the partial agreement. The vacuum of Chechen political authority would allow a militant Islamist ideology to hijack the separatist cause as its own. Violence would not only resume, but it would also augment in severity and the number of casualties inflicted. Thus, ripeness rapidly devolved into an impasse, illustrating a foremost lesson of negotiating peace: ripe conditions for negotiation do not necessarily yield an agreement that will survive.
History of the Conflict

When one thinks of ethnic conflict and all that it implies – mutual hatred, indiscriminate violence against civilians, intractable fighting, and an elusive peace – one thinks of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. As previously mentioned, the notion of an identity-based conflict revolves around disparate ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics. These tend to be ascribed status characteristics, regarded as determined by parentage and hence immutable (Kriesberg, 2001). From here, collective identities are assumed, and stereotypes become immutable features of group identification. At its most base level, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a struggle between two peoples, Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinians, over their claims to the same land. Yet after years of violence, this conflict has evolved into a microcosm of all the ethnic discord that exists between religion and ethnicity in the Middle East.

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict has two dimensions: on one hand, it is an interstate conflict between Israel and its neighboring Arab states; on the other hand, it is a clash between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism. Both national movements, Jewish and Palestinian, denied the other the right to self-determination. Their history is one of mutual denial and mutual rejection. Yet mutual denial has now paved the path for mutual recognition. The handshake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat on the south lawn of the White House on September 13, 1993 was a powerful symbol of the historic reconciliation between the two nations. Israel not only recognized the Palestinians as a
people with political rights, but also formally recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as its representative. Likewise, Arafat confirmed the PLO’s commitment to recognize Israel’s right to live in peace and security, to accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, to renounce the use of terrorism and other violent means, and to change those parts of the Palestinian National Charter that are inconsistent with these commitments (Shlaim, 1994).

The mutual recognition of the PLO and the government of Israel was a major step on the long road to peace, one that constituted an irrevocable move towards a mutual accommodation. Both parties made concessions, and the sense that peace would be achieved by the turn of the century was pervasive. Still, the Oslo Accords collapsed. It is in this chapter’s interest to understand how two historic enemies could finally make such a pact, and why, in the wake of its initial success, the Oslo peace process collapsed.

The road to Oslo was littered with secrecy and back-channel communication. These attributes are concurrently the reason for its success and the explanation for its ultimate failure. The secret talks began in January 1993: fourteen sessions of talks were held over an eight-month period, all behind a thick wall of secrecy. Away from the glare of publicity and media coverage, two Israeli negotiators and one Palestinian mediator, all acting under the auspices of Norwegian guidance, worked imaginatively to establish the framework for an Israeli-PLO accord. Both Zartman’s ripeness theory and Pruitt’s readiness theory offer sound reasoning as to why these negotiations came to fruition.

For the PLO, the negotiations were the means to gain domestic and international legitimacy. Their support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War had significantly undermined their international stature, and Arafat was ready to take a considerable step,
laden with concessions, to rectify the PLO’s standing amongst the global community. For Israeli leaders, an attempt to settle the conflict reflected positively on their country’s standing internationally. Likewise, to establish a seemingly unattainable peace agreement with the Palestinians would certainly enhance both Rabin and the Labor Party’s domestic stature. The Labor party, under the leadership of Rabin, fought the June 1992 general election on a platform of moving beyond peace talks to peacemaking. During the election campaign, Rabin promised that, if elected, he would try to reach agreement on Palestinian autonomy within six to nine months (Shlaim, 1994: 27-28). Such promises helped him earn a decisive victory. Yet Rabin’s platform was glaringly political, as he shunned the PLO and considered Arafat his archenemy. His initial peace talks were aimed at solidifying an agreement with local Palestinian authorities, rather than the exiled PLO that waited anxiously in Tunis.

During this period, there was an alarming growth in the popular following of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The security situation throughout Israel and the territories deteriorated rapidly, forcing Rabin to order the deportation of 400 Islamist activists to Lebanon. With the peace talks going nowhere, it became apparent that Rabin would have to talk to the PLO if the situation were to change. A mutually hurting stalemate became apparent to both parties, and resultantly both the PLO and the Israeli government were motivated to commence communication once combat appeared too costly or risky (Pruitt, 2008: 39).

To achieve a comprehensive peace settlement with the Palestinians, Israeli politicians knew that they would have to pay a high price: a return to the pre-June 1967 borders with only minor modifications, an independent Palestinian state, the dismantling
of Jewish settlements, and the granting of functional control over East Jerusalem to the Palestinians (Shlaim, 1994: 29). Thus, rather than address these major issues, an interim agreement seemed most attractive. For Israel, the Oslo Accords involved a deal with the PLO on interim self-government for a period of five years entailing only limited territorial withdrawal and no dismantling of Jewish settlements. Given all of the publicity and talk of peace that Oslo incited, the agreement itself required very few concessions on behalf of the Israeli government.

Negotiation Efforts
The Oslo Accords have two parts, both of which were the product of secret diplomacy. The first part was mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. It took the form of two letters, on plain paper and without letterheads, but signed by Chairman Yasir Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin respectively. The second part, the Declaration of Principles, set an agenda for negotiations on Palestinian self-government in the Occupied Territories, beginning with Gaza and Jericho. Nearly all of the publicity focused on the signing of the DOP, but without the prior agreement on mutual recognition there could have been no mutual agreement on Palestinian self-government (Shlaim, 1994: 24-25).

The Declaration of Principles was essentially an agenda for negotiations governed by a series of timetables, rather than a comprehensive peace agreement. Within four months of the signing ceremony, the Israeli military would be fully withdrawn from Gaza and Jericho. Within nine months, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were to hold elections for a Palestinian Council to take office and assume responsibility for the
preponderance of government functions, except defense and foreign affairs. Additionally, Israel and the PLO agreed to commence negotiations on the final status of the territories within two years, and at the end of five years, a permanent settlement was to come into place.

Thus, it is important to delineate the details and nuances of the Oslo Accords, for many mistakenly believe that it was a comprehensive peace agreement, infallible in creation and owing its failure to poor execution. There is considerable merit to the latter part of this claim, but Oslo was an interim agreement that never intended to tackle the gravest disputes between parties. It is the result of ten months of hasty back-channel negotiations; it was conceived out of the public eye; and as a result, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians were able to earn the support of a broad central coalition. The process that led to Oslo transformed the attitudes of certain elite members of government but failed to persuade others. Perhaps most detrimental was the mutual failure to win the support of the general public, which continued to perceive the other side as its enemy and view the conflict as a zero-sum game. Wolsfeld (2001: 31) cites that only 51-55% of Israel’s legislature and 32-44% of its public supported the Oslo process, compared to 75% and 56-73% respectively in Northern Ireland (Barak, 2005: 732). Without grassroots support, ethnic conflicts will not be ameliorated, no matter the publicity and acclaim that a peace agreement might garner.

Negotiation Outcomes

There are numerous explanations as to why the Oslo Accords collapsed. The constraints on the respective leaders, Rabin and Arafat, were significant: their support
was held together by a fragile consensus, and vocal opposition limited room for maneuver. Furthermore, the fact that the initial agreement was negotiated in complete secrecy helps to account for the narrowness of the central coalition that produced the final agreement, as well as for its ultimate failure. On both sides, the deal provoked strong opposition on the part of the hard-liners. Israeli settlers refused to leave their homesteads; the PLO was split between those traditional nationalists who accused Arafat of abandoning the Palestinian cause in an attempt to grab power, and those who supported the advancement of bilateral relations. Outside the PLO, the Oslo Accords incited the wrath of militant resistance movements, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who refused to recognize the state of Israel on all counts. All of these individuals had an incentive for the agreement to fail. It goes without being said that in conflicts in which ethnic groups are engaged, rank-and-file involvement is particularly significant. Mediation between members of the opposing sides at the sub-elite and the public at large levels can help in preparing adversaries for taking de-escalating steps, making agreements, and implementing them. The absence of such ground-level efforts undermined the Oslo Accords from their inception.

Other scholars argue that the failure of the Oslo Accords can be attributed to the personalities of the leaders themselves. Ron Pundak (2001: 73) explains the collapse of the Oslo Accords as the failure of the parties’ leaders to seize the opportunity for peace. Yezid Sayigh (2001: 47) argues that it was Arafat who lacked a clear strategy and allowed his political management to be guided by a high degree of short-termism. However, Arafat alone cannot be held responsible. Rabin viewed Arafat as his archenemy, and as soon as Oslo had set a peace process into motion, he reverted to his
customary tactics of divide and rule of the Palestinian people: a wholly insensitive strategy when attempting to wage peace.

Yet perhaps the greatest detriment to the success of the Oslo Accords was the accord itself. Apart from the domestic constraints, there were the inherent defects within the document. The peace agreement is filled with ambiguities, ensuring that all parties will have differing interpretations of its meanings. For the PLO, the Oslo Accords served as the first step toward full statehood. In Israel’s eyes, this accord was merely an interim agreement; it provided the steps for a comprehensive peace, but nothing would be finalized for years to come. As the agreement postponed the discussion of the most difficult issues in the two parties’ relationship to the final-status negotiations five years hence, it allowed significant room for setbacks. Resultantly, an important issue comes to the foreground: is it appropriate to defer final-status negotiations? Certainly the contentious issues of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, the Jewish settlements in the territories, and the Palestinian state and its borders present significant dilemmas. Their resolution will not occur overnight. Yet the ripe moment that conceived negotiation efforts between the Israelis and Palestinians was certain to pass. By deferring final-status talks, both the Israelis and Palestinians were taking a sizeable risk in possibly allowing spoilers to upset the interim agreement. This decision proved imprudent.

Dean Pruitt (2008), in his analysis of back-channel negotiation efforts, offers a further theory on why the Oslo Accords collapsed. Contrasted against the secret negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the Oslo Accords appear juvenile in comparison: nine years of back-channel activity and one year of public negotiations fostered the Good Friday Agreement; the Oslo Accords, on the
other hand, were born out of ten months of discussion. Pruitt explains the benefits of a lengthy gestation period as such: in Northern Ireland, most of the politically significant groups on both sides, including the armed militants, concluded that the conflict was counterproductive. Ten years of negotiations had paralleled ten years of a mutually hurting stalemate. All involved could see that neither violence nor obstinacy was achieving their respective objectives. Moreover, as a result of a great deal of back-channel activity by devoted third parties, these groups become convinced of three things: first, considerable concessions must be made to end the conflict; second, ethnic presumptions and stereotypes aside, it was in fact possible to deal with most of the unsavory characters on the other side; and third, the ‘enemy’ was also ready to make significant concessions. The Oslo talks were much narrower in scope and produced an interim agreement that did not last (Pruitt, 2008: 51). Principal issues were left unaddressed, and fringe groups were excluded from the final decision on the basis of their extremist views. Their omission would go to great lengths to derail the progression of the agreement towards a comprehensive peace.

In their analysis of peace processes impaired by extremist violence, Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter’s research (2002) elucidates two intriguing patterns in extremist violence. First, most extremist violence is not indiscriminate or irrational as many people have assumed. In fact, terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland and the Middle East over the last ten years show a clear and recurring pattern, where violence is timed to coincide with major events in a peace process. Second, extremists are surprisingly successful in bringing down peace processes if they so desire. Between 1988 and 1998, fourteen peace agreements were signed between combatants engaged in civil war. If terrorist violence
occurred during these negotiations, just one in four treaties was put into effect. However, if terrorist violence did not occur, six out of ten treaties were implemented (Kydd and Walters, 2002: 363-264). Thus, Kydd and Walter argue that extremists succeed in destroying peace settlements if they are able to foster mistrust between more moderate groups that must implement the deal. Whereas, they fail if the moderate groups retain an adequate level of mutual trust in each other’s willingness to fulfill the deal. Their purpose is to exacerbate doubts among those on the targeted side that the moderate opposition groups can be trusted to implement the peace deal and will not renege on it later.

Thus, Hamas’ strategic use of terror following the signing of the Oslo Accords was not coincidental. When applying their theoretical model of extremist-induced violence to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Kydd and Walter (2002) observe that Hamas acted quite strategically from 1993 to 2001, timing its violence to coincide either with the signing of a peace treaty or with elections. For example, Hamas launched its first series of attacks on Israel in October 1993, only three weeks after the Declaration of Principles was signed. Additionally, Hamas’ terrorist acts were especially effective after Yasir Arafat’s 1996 electoral victory, which served to inform Israelis of Arafat’s true strength within the Palestinian community.

Moreover, the November 1995 assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the multiple suicide bombings of buses in Israel resulted in a change of government in Tel Aviv. However, it is worth noting that Rabin’s assassination was not inflicted by a Hamas member or a radicalized Palestinian; on the contrary, a radical right-wing Orthodox Jew who opposed the signing of the Oslo Accords murdered the begrudging peacemaker. Resultantly, Israeli politics endured a significant ideological shift, as Benjamin
Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister and a Likud-led government coalition was formed in 1996, greatly slowing the pace of the peace process (Kriesberg, 2001: 377). Thus, the Oslo Accords were the victim of polarized extremists. Having been denied the opportunity to voice their opposition to the settlement, these individuals and groups worked to undo the settlement, and despite lavish media attention and praise, the shots they fired were sufficient to overturn nearly all that had been accomplished. Perhaps Oslo could have progressed further had the respective Palestinian and Israeli coalitions been more united, but the signatories’ decision to defer final-status talks was the principal reason for its collapse.

Analysis

Signs of Conflict Ripeness for Resolution

The ripe environment that prompted efforts to resolve the Israeli/Palestinian conflict can be accredited to a mix of factors, including: public war-weariness, political ambitions, and a changed world order. The optimism of the post-Cold War period appealed to Israel. Both Israelis and Palestinians had long tired of the constant violence of the First Intifada, and many were willing to take risks for peace. Moreover, the Gulf War did much to persuade Israel that the defensive value of territory had been overstated. A negotiated peace with the Palestinians would do more for Israeli security than any amount of military expenditures.

Political considerations contributed to a ripe moment, as well. To establish a seemingly unattainable peace agreement with the Palestinians would certainly enhance both Prime Minister Rabin and the Labor Party’s domestic stature. Moreover, because
Yasir Arafat took a pro-Iraqi stand during the war, the Arab Gulf states cut off financial assistance to the PLO, and the PLO was not invited to the Madrid Conference of 1991 at which Israel discussed peace with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and non-PLO Palestinian groups. Realizing that the use of political violence would result in further marginalization rather than advance PLO objectives, Arafat turned to negotiation, believing that negotiation was the greatest means of gaining domestic and international legitimacy.

**Signs of Negotiation Readiness**

As the First Intifada dragged on and sporadic violence continued unabated, both the Israeli government and the PLO perceived further combat as risky and costly. On one hand, the Rabin government had been elected on a peace platform, and war-weary Israeli citizens prodded their government to hastily begin negotiation efforts. On the other hand, Arafat and the PLO warily eyed Hamas’ ascension in popularity. Wishing to maintain their status as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO needed international support. To achieve such support, Arafat embraced negotiations.

Moreover, significant third party involvement, first by Norwegian intermediaries who would facilitate ten months of secret talks, and later by the United States who would host the historic meeting between Rabin and Arafat that would solidify their mutual recognition, secured negotiation readiness. While the back-channel talks were short, only lasting ten months before the agreement was signed, they helped to familiarize both parties with one another’s objectives, securing a sense of understanding and recognition that had not previously existed.
Type of Negotiated Agreement

The Oslo Accords were a negotiated settlement involving two distinct but interrelated parts: first, both parties mutually agreed to recognize one another; second, an agenda was determined for negotiations to establish Palestinian self-government in the Occupied Territories. Interim self-government was to be granted by Israel in phases.

This partial peace agreement was to last for a five-year interim period, at the end of which a permanent agreement would be established after a series of benchmarks had been met. Permanent issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security, and borders were deliberately left to be decided at a later stage.

Causes of Negotiation Outcome Failure

There are numerous explanations as to why the Oslo Accords collapsed. First, the constraints on the respective leaders, Rabin and Arafat, were significant: their support was held together by a fragile consensus, and vocal opposition limited room for maneuver. Although the PLO had greatly moderated its ideology from an ethos of violence to one that supports electoral politics, Hamas’ extremist and uncompromising rhetoric attracted many who believed that the PLO had abandoned its initial platform. Likewise, extremists existed amongst Israelis. In particular, incensed Israeli settlers interpreted Rabin’s efforts to secure peace as submission and surrender to Palestinian objectives.

Second, the fact that the initial agreement was negotiated in complete secrecy helps to account for the narrowness of the central coalition that produced the agreement. Fringe groups were excluded from the final decision on the basis of their extremist views. Moreover, one cannot underestimate the speed at which negotiation efforts were
conducted. The accords were the product of ten months of secret talks, and this limited gestation period meant that principle issues remained unaddressed. Their resolution depended on five years of successful interim government before a final status solution was to be sought.

Third, the absence of a coercive third party mediator further debilitated the peace process. Although Norway oversaw the initial back-channel communication, it did little to shepherd both parties to peace once the accords had been signed. Such an intermediary could have guided the negotiation by setting a realistic timetable for incremental progress and holding both parties accountable to the terms of the agreement.

Once again, the postponement of a final status solution would undermine the stability of the ripe moment. A comprehensive peace agreement, drafted and ratified in the relative calm of a ripe moment, would have helped to prevent the emergence of those spoilers and radicals who incited the violence that ultimately undercut the Oslo Accords. In the end, recurrent violence would undermine public support for conciliation, and the partial peace agreement would unravel.
Chapter Five: Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army, 1985-2009

History of the Conflict
The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, signed by the British and Irish governments, as well as all of the major parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland – constitutional parties as well as the various military groups represented by their political wings – is often considered the model example of a negotiated peace between a state and a separatist insurgent group. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the preeminent Catholic-nationalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland and known terror organization, abandoned its ethos of violence and embraced electoral politics to achieve its objectives. A power-sharing government was conceived; optimism was pervasive. But post-agreement violations have increasingly occurred, and tensions are on the rise, prompting a necessary analysis of the discord.

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, also referred to as the Belfast Agreement, formed the basis of a negotiated settlement for the future of Northern Ireland after decades of internecine ethnic conflict. Since that time the level of violence in Northern Ireland has been reduced, yet many problematic issues related to governance, sectarianism, and community relations remain on the political agenda, resultantly destabilizing the post-peace accord environment. While the paramilitary ceasefires have remained intact and certain aspects of life in Northern Ireland have been transformed, the road to peace has been hindered both by political and psychological intransigence (Mac Ginty, Muldoon and Ferguson, 2007: 1). Northern Ireland’s peace is of a fragile quality. Years after the Good Friday Agreement was signed, the region remains mired in low
levels of violence, sporadic civil disturbances, political intransigence, and public
disaffection. Similar patterns of inconclusive peacemaking can be observed elsewhere, as
in the aforementioned case studies of Sri Lanka and Chechnya, but the threat of recurrent
violence in Northern Ireland represents a different sort of peril. As politicians and
academics alike have looked to the Good Friday Agreement as the preeminent example
of a successful comprehensive peace agreement, its failure would do more than merely
reignite historic animosities across Northern Ireland. Such a collapse would call into
question the entire premise of negotiated agreements and whether or not they can resolve
separatist conflicts.

Compared to other ethnic conflicts, the violence and subsequent death toll in
Northern Ireland has been relatively minor: fewer than 3,500 people were killed between
1969 and 1998 (Mac Ginty, Muldoon, and Ferguson, 2007: 4). However, given Northern
Ireland’s geographical size and small population, the relative impact of the conflict has
been significant. The animosity has largely been viewed through a religio-sectarian
prism, where Catholics are squared off against Protestants. In fact, the conflict has
revolved around the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, where one group, the
nationalists (mainly Catholics), wanted Northern Ireland to unify with the rest of Ireland
to form a united state. Whereas the other group, the unionists (mainly Protestants),
wanted Northern Ireland to maintain its constitutional position within the United
Kingdom. However, as Northern Ireland is comprised of a Protestant-unionist majority,
the Catholic-nationalist community has long felt marginalized. Relative group worth
declined throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as the best employment opportunities and
control of the police force fell into unionist hands. Resultantly, Northern Ireland was
carved up into distinct communities, where Protestant and Catholic children attended separate schools and lived in increasingly inequitable neighborhoods.

An escalation of inter-communal violence in the late 1960s helped to radicalize IRA ideology. The overt use of violence became sanctioned, as the IRA’s professed objective was to create an impression of chaos and ungovernability, which would reinforce the British government’s perception of Northern Ireland as a political and economic liability. Under this premise, the British forces would withdraw, leaving Northern Ireland to unite with the Irish Republic. However, such objectives proved vain. Despite an escalation in violent IRA tactics, the British government preferred to view the conflict as a ‘security problem’, one that could be contained with additional forces. No matter what they did or who they killed, the IRA could not force the withdrawal of British troops. It is said that this frontal assault on Britain’s sense of duty to Ulster’s Protestant community failed because the IRA’s campaign of political intimidation could not outweigh Britain’s fear of a disastrous loyalist backlash in the event of an abandonment of the Protestant-unionists (Mulholland, 2007: 414). Subsequently, the atrocities committed by both sides continued unabated well into the 1980s.

**Negotiation Efforts**

Northern Ireland is an example of where negotiation has induced the permanent cessation of violence on the part of the leading insurgent organization, the IRA. Initial efforts at negotiations between the British government and the IRA, however, failed. In 1972 and 1974/1975, the British government and the IRA entered into negotiations. Both efforts failed; the first because the IRA greatly overestimated the strength of its position
and insisted on unrealistic demands; the second because negotiations were not taken
seriously by the British government, who rather chose to use the talks to disorganize and
undermine the IRA (Heiberg, O’Leary, and Tirman, 2008). The result of this second
experience was to create a new IRA leadership that, for twenty years, would prove
reluctant to commit to future negotiations.

The winds of change began to shift in 1986, when the British government signed
the Anglo-Irish Agreement with the Government of the Irish Republic. Through this
agreement, London recognized the constitutional aspirations of the Catholic-nationalists
and acknowledged that the Irish government could be a partner in mitigating this conflict.
An institutionalized relationship between the two governments was born, and it would
later underpin the peace process in the 1990s. Of course, the negotiation of the 1986
treaty failed to involve the primary parties themselves. Although the Republic of Ireland
had consulted the moderate Catholics in Northern Ireland, the failure of the British
government to include the Protestant-unionists in the process in part explains their
immediate rejection of the agreement. The Unionists refused to take part in a pact in
which they had no voice (Jensen, 1997: 36), highlighting the importance of including all
parties when negotiating a settlement, lest they become spoilers.

In 1990, secret negotiations opened between the IRA and the British government.
The IRA’s leaders had become aware of the limits of what they could achieve through
violence, and thus they were considerably less arrogant than they were during prior
negotiation efforts in 1972. Moreover, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1986 offered a
substantial foundation for further negotiation. The Republican leaders feared progressive
political marginalization, and the UK government proved more interested in a genuine
negotiation process. With increased interest and more realistic expectations, the renewed negotiation process began in secret and lasted for the better part of the decade.

The Good Friday Agreement called for the establishment of a power-sharing Assembly in Northern Ireland with an executive drawn from the four main political parties, a North-South Ministerial Council so that Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland could address functional issues of common concern, and a British-Irish Council so that issues across the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland could be tackled. Through the Agreement, both the British and Irish governments recognized that Northern Ireland’s constitutional status could only be altered if a majority of the population wanted change. Furthermore, Northern Ireland’s population was given the right to claim Irish, British, or both citizenships (Mac Ginty, Muldoon, and Ferguson, 2007: 6-7). Thus, the Good Friday Agreement embodied the integral tenets of a comprehensive peace agreement as identified by Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen (2006). Not only did the major parties agree to settle their incompatibility in its entirety, but the Good Friday Agreement also addressed their respective security concerns, as well as included provisions for resolving the underlying incongruities that led to the outbreak of conflict.

Of course, it is also worth noting that the IRA did not fight for power-sharing in a Stormont parliament, nor did it design those institutions, nor did it initially endorse the Good Friday Agreement. But its existence, and the skilled exchange of its capacities for political concessions, obliged others to create comprehensive power-sharing institutions across Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Great Britain, all of which are consistent with the core tenet of Irish national self-determination. In that idea, the “Irish” include both Irish nationalists and Irish unionists who have long identified with Great Britain. In this
respect, self-determination may take a concurrent as well as a unitary form (Heiberg, O’Leary, and Tirman, 2008: 225).

Yet despite this idyllic vision of peace, problems arose. The IRA’s failure to immediately disarm undermined many unionists’ faith in the accord. Moreover, the collapse of the Northern Ireland provincial government, which occurred at the behest of the unionists, highlighted the persistence of chronic mistrust between unionists and nationalists. The result was a return to British rule, which persists to this day. Still, on-the-ground conditions have improved dramatically as a result of the peace process: the local economy grew, security restrictions lessened, and public optimism increased. Optimists might note that a peace agreement in Northern Ireland suffered years of setbacks before at last taking hold, but latent tensions between Protestants and Catholics remain a cause for concern.

**Negotiation Outcomes**

Despite the sense of closure that the Good Friday Agreement instilled, the overall level of conflict-related violence in Northern Ireland has not significantly decreased since 1998. Bombings and shootings have remained an almost daily occurrence. Furthermore, ‘punishment attacks’, or more specifically beatings or shootings carried out by military groups in control of certain areas, have reached the highest level in the history of the conflict. Although the statistics show that the Protestant militants have outdone their counterparts on the Catholic side for some years, the largest paramilitary group on the Catholic side, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), continues to be involved in all of the activities cited above. IRA-attributed deaths number 1,801 between the years
1968-2001, representing 51% of all conflict-related deaths (Neumann, 2005: 80). Thus, despite the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, widely considered to be the historical conclusion of the conflict, the question remains: is the IRA still a threat to peace in Northern Ireland?

In essence, the ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland can be characterized as a dispute between two mutually exclusive sets of nationalism. For all of its commendable statutes, the Good Friday Agreement avoided some of the most sensitive human rights concerns of each community: economic equity for the Catholics, and preservation of cultural identity and security for the Protestants. Thus, the linguistic and religious schism that characterizes the cultural infrastructure of both the Protestant and Catholic communities persists, as does a lack of empathy and understanding. Despite formal political progress, ethnic perceptions and cleavages have remained. It will take years for such long-standing grievances and psychological perceptions to dissipate. Thus, despite all of its political overtures, the Good Friday Agreement has failed to have a significant impact on the inter-communal identities that underlie the conflict. The salient animosity that remains prompts the question: can peace agreements succeed if they are implemented from the top-down?

Still, commendable successes have occurred, and the significant role that third party actors played in securing a comprehensive settlement deserves analysis. Amidst deep mistrust, former U.S. Senator George Mitchell found ways to act as the normative intermediary. He proposed principles that guided the negotiation process, thereby creating a set of criteria by which parties were either included or excluded from discussions based on their actions and good faith efforts at coexistence (Babbitt, 2006:
In a stark contrast to the efforts of Nordic peacemakers in Sri Lanka, Mitchell maintained his appearance as an impartial mediator. At this state in the conflict, as Northern Ireland continues to combat considerable sectarian divisions, another normative intermediary could be a valuable commodity. Such an individual could interject these issues into renewed negotiations, allowing both sides to tackle the root causes of the violence. Until such a dialogue is opened, the threat of recurrent violence will loom large.

Another prominent element featured in the Northern Ireland peace process, one which the mediators of other ethnic conflicts would be wise to note, is how influential Track 2 processes have proven. Over the last 20 years, many local and international non-official efforts have been instituted to foster contact between the Protestant and Catholic communities, in hopes of breaking down stereotypes and mistrust. In some ways, they have been successful, as most of the North is quiet and non-violent, and the referendum to support the Good Friday Agreement passed with 74 percent of the vote (Babbitt, 2006: 192). However, previously highlighted tensions continue at the interface areas, illuminating an ethnic animosity that remains unabated.

The decision to include terrorists, both those who have renounced violence and those who continue to condone it, into the political realm constitutes a principal debate in contemporary politics. Will electoral participation moderate those who only recently used violence as a means to achieve their objectives? Or will these individuals change the nature of democratic institutions from peaceful to bellicose political structures? Given that numerous terrorist groups and insurgents already participate in electoral politics, such questions seem to raise foregone conclusions. However, the IRA’s willingness to curb its rhetoric of armed struggle and force is notable. It is important to understand the
reasoning behind such a decision; for similar situations might arise in other separatist conflicts, and the ripe moment in which one can compel an insurgent group to renounce violence should not go unnoticed.

In his research, Peter Neumann (2005) concludes that electoral participation helped to facilitate the IRA’s strategic transformation from armed struggle towards reliance on exclusively peaceful means. The two outstanding mechanisms through which this transformation took place were the movement’s inclusion into a systematic process of dialogue, and the negative response from one’s political constituency that delegitimized the use for violence (Neumann, 2005: 971). A mutually hurting stalemate became perceptible in the early 1990s, and all actors involved began to recognize a change of the fundamental parameters within which the conflict was taking place: a power-sharing government could be realized, and public opinion was beginning to eschew the use of indiscriminate violence. The potentially harmful effect that violent military operations might have on the electoral successes of Sinn Fein, the IRA’s political arm, had long been understood. However, it was not until the IRA realized that they could achieve legitimate political power in an altered political set-up that they renounced their armed struggle.

Political inclusion will not be relevant in every conflict involving a separatist terror group. Insurgent movements will fade; states will exercise their military might and eradicate such groups and their adherents. But in some cases, the political involvement of insurgent groups promises an altered future, one that offers great hope and optimism amidst a violent and torrid past. The political wing of the Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) has taken part in elections since Spain became a
democracy; Hezbollah has become a potent political force in Lebanon; and even Hamas has participated in elections, winning popular support amongst the legislative councils in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Although the formal integration of extremist groups into politics is problematic and worrisome, the example of the IRA instills confidence that, given the ripe moment, a terror group might be willing to renounce violence for a non-violent method of change.

Certainly, the road to peace in Northern Ireland has not been without its challenges. A decade has passed since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, yet ethnic tensions still linger, and inequity delineates many Catholic communities from their Protestant counterparts. The recent murder of two British soldiers and one police constable in the spate of two days in March 2009 has left Northern Ireland reeling. The killings were claimed by dissident IRA groups who believe that the mainstream movement sold out its republican heritage in agreeing to a peace settlement with the unionists and the British (The Economist, 2009). Resultantly, it must be asked: is this the fading embers of a waning conflict or a new one flaring up? The striking thing is not that uniformed men once again lie dead in the streets of Northern Ireland, though the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 supposedly ended the impetus for political violence. It is that the people of the province, not least the leaders of its main parties, have united to condemn the killings. Politicians of all persuasions joined forces to demonstrate their commitment to peace and to continuing down the path to power-sharing that began with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The importance of such gestures is hard to overestimate, as they constitute a big advance for a power-sharing administration hobbled by deep mistrust.
Grievances in Northern Ireland run centuries-deep, and the moderation of Sinn Fein leaders does not inherently remove all strains of militant republicanism. Yet there are reasons to remain optimistic that the Good Friday Agreement will persevere: violence is shunned by all in Northern Ireland, save a small faction of extremists; and the power-sharing government, long hindered by mistrust and ethnic rivalry, appears to be reinvigorated by the recent violence. So long as the people of Northern Ireland rally around a united government, any attempts that dissident republican terrorists make to stoke the fires of ethnic conflict will be met with condemnation and resultantly foiled. However, this process still remains an elite-driven, top-down movement for peace; considerable work on the ground needs to be done. So long as Protestants and Catholics remain physically separated by community and lifestyle, empathy and a sense of mutual respect will be slow to develop. Thus, although a comprehensive peace agreement exists, reconciliation and equity have proven more arduous to attain.

Analysis

Signs of Conflict Ripeness for Resolution

The factors that contributed to the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement created the ripest of all negotiation environments observed in the four cases. The IRA had become well aware of the limits of what they could achieve through violence. This decades-long conflict had given neither the republicans independence nor the unionists security, and the British government’s dogged refusal to let indiscriminate violence deter their military presence in Northern Ireland repelled the desired result of terror attacks. A mutually hurting stalemate became palpable.
Additionally, public opinion reflected a growing disapproval with IRA tactics, resultanty delegitimizing the use of violence. Gerry Adams’ embrace of mainstream politics shifted IRA tactics from violence to cooperation, thereby convincing the British government that a solution to the conflict could be attained which would be satisfactory to both parties.

**Signs of Negotiation Readiness**

After decades of intermittent violence and inflexible positioning, both parties had begun to see the conflict as hopeless and too costly. Moreover, nearly a decade of back-channel talks helped to familiarize both parties with the other’s objectives, securing a sense of familiarity between the actors. Both the unionists and republicans of Northern Ireland, in addition to the British and Irish governments, approached the new negotiations with increased interest and more realistic expectations than they had in prior attempts. Mutual trust and shared optimism would lay the foundation for an environment ready for conciliation, and coercive third party involvement, spearheaded by George Mitchell, would hold both parties accountable by either including or excluding them from discussions based on their actions.

**Type of Negotiated Agreement**

The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was a negotiated agreement between the IRA and the British government. However, unlike the previous three case studies, the Good Friday Agreement embodied the integral tenets of a comprehensive peace agreement: the major parties agreed to settle their incompatibility in its entirety; the terms of the agreement addressed the majority and minority’s respective security concerns; and the peace settlement included provisions for resolving the underlying incongruities that
led to the outbreak of conflict. A final status solution on citizenship and political representation in Northern Ireland was established in full with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.

**Causes of Negotiation Outcome Success**

Why was the Good Friday Agreement a success when the other three negotiated agreements analyzed in this thesis ended in failure? First, the IRA’s inclusion into a systematic process of dialogue offered its leaders an impetus to participate in elections and pursue change through conventional political means. This diametric shift in IRA ideology, from violence to traditional politics, ensured that veritable solutions could be achieved.

Second, the IRA’s ideological shift stressed the ascendance of moderate leadership within the insurgent group. Gerry Adams could now be considered a rational thinker with finite objectives, one with whom the British government could negotiate. Resultantly, the notion of a power-sharing assembly, with an executive drawn from the four main political parties in Northern Ireland, evolved into a mutually perceived solution.

Third, George Mitchell offered a standard for successful third party mediation. By setting a series of timetables for progress and holding both parties accountable for their actions, Mitchell was able to create a set of criteria by which parties were either included or excluded from discussions based on their actions and good faith efforts at coexistence.

Fourth, a history of prior failed negotiation attempts helped to ensure that when both parties approached the negotiation table again, they would do so not under duress but rather with a shared interest in the success of the process.
Fifth, ten years of back-channel activity helped to familiarize both parties with the other’s objectives, securing a sense of awareness between the actors.

Sixth, because the citizens of Northern Ireland, unionists and republicans alike, condemned violence, the threat of spoilers and renegade extremist violence was mitigated.

Seventh, the influence of Track 2 processes cannot be discounted. The local and international non-official efforts to foster contact between the Protestant and Catholic communities played a significant role in ameliorating mistrust and disproving stereotypes, thereby building peaceful relations from the ground up.

Yet of these reasons for success, it was the urgent pursuit of a final status solution that most significantly contributed to the triumph of negotiation efforts. Rather than implement a partial peace agreement, George Mitchell and the British and Irish governments pushed for a comprehensive agreement that would settle the conflict in its entirety. This dogged pursuit of a final status solution addressed the majority and minority parties’ respective security concerns at the outset of the negotiations, thereby preventing the ascendance of spoilers and the recurrent violence that might otherwise have unraveled the fragile partial peace agreement.
Chapter Six: Cross-National Case Comparisons

Conditions of Negotiation Start-up
As illustrated by the case studies, each insurgent organization and ethnic conflict is unique. Notable dissimilarities in the history of these cases make their respective roads towards establishing peace distinctive. Yet trends exist, and comparisons must be made in order to ascertain if an overarching framework for successful negotiation between states and separatist terror groups exists.

The literature contends that the principle impetus for negotiation is a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman, 1991). This assertion proves true in all four cases, although the longevity and severity of the perceived stalemate varied among them. In Sri Lanka, perceived military parity and the LTTE’s considerable territorial gains in the north and east of Sri Lanka forced Colombo to engage in peace talks with the Tamil Tigers, a separatist group that repeatedly used suicide bombings and other forms of terror attacks against the state and its civilian population. Whereas, the realization that political violence would not further its objectives prompted both the IRA and the PLO to engage in negotiations. Impending political elections coerced Boris Yeltsin to settle with the Chechen insurgents and allow Chechnya a degree of self-autonomy. Of course, of all of these cases, only the IRA and the British government were successful in forging a settlement that still stands today, as they both perceived a similar solution to the conflict and established a final status solution before resurgent violence could derail the peace process. Thus, a cross-comparison of the levels of ripeness and readiness that helped to incite negotiations in each of the four cases is warranted. In Table 1, all of the conditions
of conflict resolution ripeness and negotiation readiness are listed for each of the cases, noting whether they were fully present, partially present, or not present at all.

Table 1. Resolution Ripeness and Negotiation Readiness Preceding Four Separatist Terrorist Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LTTE/Sri Lanka</th>
<th>Chechnya/Russia</th>
<th>PLO/Israel</th>
<th>IRA/United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**RIPENESS FACTORS**

1. Mutual Hurting Stalemate
   - Parties approaching fighting parity: X Yes X --- ---
   - Government economic crisis: X --- --- ---
   - Warfare unpopular: X X X X

2. Mutually Perceived Solution
   - Autonomy acceptable: Δ X X ---
   - Troop withdrawal acceptable: X X Δ X
   - Moderate leadership: --- X X X

**READINESS FACTORS**

1. Combat Perceived as Risky
   - High costs associated with war: X X X X
   - Existence of Spoilers: --- X X ---

2. Outside Mediator
   - Third party involvement: X --- X X
   - Third party perceived as neutral: --- --- X X
   - Coercive third party: --- --- --- X

3. Back-channel Communication
   - Pre-negotiation talks: X --- X X

Code:  X = Yes, Δ = Partial, --- = No

The information arrayed in Table 1 shows that while all of the parties in conflict experienced a mutually hurting stalemate, the form was different. LTTE and Chechen insurgents approached military parity with the state prior to their negotiations, but this
was not true in the other two cases. Moreover, only the Sri Lankan economy has been affected by its prolonged civil war to the degree that it contributes to a hurting stalemate. Lastly, public condemnation of war has contributed to a mutually hurting stalemate in all four cases, as the intractability of ethnic conflict has dampened the spirits of even the most ardent of supporters. Of course, small segments of each society remain committed to resolving these conflicts through military offensives, but the increasing disapproval of violence has incited a hurting stalemate in each study.

Likewise, the information arrayed in Table 1 shows that while all of the parties in conflict experienced a mutually perceived solution, the form was different. In the Chechen and Palestinian cases, the Russian and Israeli states accepted the separatist objective of self-governance. The Sri Lankan government, on the other hand, agreed to investigate options of Tamil internal self-determination, but this offer would not satisfy the LTTE aim of complete independence. Although the British government accepted the inclusion of the IRA in electoral politics and granted Northern Ireland elements of self-governance, it would not grant the republicans their desire that Northern Ireland unite with Ireland. Additionally, the assurance of troop withdrawal contributed to the creation of a mutually perceived solution in all cases. The presence of moderate leadership induced negotiations in every case, excluding Sri Lanka, for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, despite his initial concession to negotiate, remains an extremist committed to achieving LTTE objectives through violent means.

Moreover, the information arrayed in Table 1 illustrates the importance of negotiation readiness. All of the cases experienced conflict ripeness. Only the IRA/UK study, however, demonstrated complete negotiation readiness: the conflict was perceived
as risky, yet spoiler violence was missing; a neutral and coercive third party mediator was present; and lengthy back-channel communication was used. The PLO/Israeli case is comparable in many respects. However, the Oslo Accords lacked a coercive third party mediator and were hindered by spoiler-induced violence: two crucial factors that greatly explain its failure. The Sri Lankan peace talks, on the other hand, suffered from spoiler-induced violence as well as the LTTE’s inflexible belief that war was neither too costly nor risky, but rather the means to achieving its objective of complete independence. Moreover, the Sri Lankan peace talks faltered due to the absence of a coercive, neutral mediator. Although an international mission was present on the island to monitor ceasefire violations, the widespread perception of its bias greatly hampered its effectiveness. Of the four cases, it was the Khasavyurt Accord that most significantly lacked negotiation readiness. A third party actor was not present; spoilers and recurrent violence was widespread; and back-channel communication had never been utilized. Thus, the information arrayed in Table 1 illustrates that negotiation readiness, rather than conflict ripeness, is more important to achieving successful negotiation between states and separatist groups.

The literature maintains that imposed settlements bring longer periods of peace than either negotiated settlements or stalemates (Quackenbush and Senese, 2003; Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). While the four peace agreements studied in this thesis were negotiated settlements, Quackenbush and Venteicher’s theory is substantiated by my research, as only the Good Friday Agreement was a successfully negotiated settlement among the case studies. The other three attempts at securing a negotiated agreement – the Oslo Accords, the Khasavyurt Accord, and the Sri Lankan ceasefire
agreement and subsequent peace talks – collapsed in failure. Thus, it must asked: why was the Good Friday Agreement successful? For it had long been thought that there were no moderates in the IRA, and after failed negotiation attempts in 1972 and 1974, the conflict was widely perceived to be an intractable affair. In Table 2, all of the conditions of negotiation readiness that made the Good Friday Agreement a success are listed. Then they are compared against the three failed peace agreements, noting whether those conditions were fully present, partially present, or not present at all.

As the information in Table 2 illustrates, the road to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement stands in stark contrast to the negotiation efforts of the other three cases. A decade of back-channel talks helped to familiarize both the IRA and the British government with the other’s objectives, securing a sense of familiarity between the actors. Although both the Sri Lankan and Palestinian cases employed back-channel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Conditions of Negotiation Outcome Success in IRA/United Kingdom Conflict</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Existing Conditions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promised electoral participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coercive third party involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous negotiation attempts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Back-channel activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of spoiler violence reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 2 Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-official involvement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground level conciliation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Code: X = Yes, Δ = Partial, --- = No
communication, their duration paled in comparison to the ten years of secret talks held between the IRA and the British government.

Additionally, the influence of Track 2 processes must also be acknowledged. The local and international non-official efforts to foster contact between the Protestant and Catholic communities played a significant role in ameliorating mistrust and disproving stereotypes in Northern Ireland. If the animosity between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka or Chechens and ethnics Russians is to dissipate, it must begin at the ground level with education and exposure to the perceived enemy. Moreover, a history of prior failed negotiation attempts helped to ensure that when both the IRA and the British government approached the negotiation table again, they would do so not under duress but rather with a shared interest in the success of the process. The fact that the Khasavyurt Accord and the Oslo Accords were the first sincere negotiations between warring parties no doubt contributed to their failure to secure peace.

Another factor that contributed to the success of the Good Friday Agreement was the moderation of both parties’ ideology and leadership that occurred prior to negotiation. Unlike the LTTE or the Chechen insurgents, the IRA leadership experienced a growing realization that political violence would not help achieve its objectives. Once the IRA believed that electoral participation could offer them power, they renounced violence and embraced mainstream politics. Moderate leadership, however, is often rendered ineffective by spoilers and spoiler-induced violence, as evidenced by the Chechen and Palestinian cases.

Lastly, the role that George Mitchell played as a coercive third party actor cannot be understated. Of all of the international mediation witnessed in these cases, his efforts
were most successful in shepherding a peace between antagonistic parties. These reasons, and others which will be further illuminated in subsequent paragraphs, helped to ensure the success of a negotiated settlement for Northern Ireland.

Negotiation Outcomes

Just as the literature posits, there are a myriad of reasons why tensions erupt during negotiation efforts and why violence recurs after peace settlements have been enacted. In Sri Lanka, the ceasefire agreement was manipulated by the LTTE insurgency, which used the period of relative stability to rearm and regain momentum. In Chechnya, Russia’s desire to preserve territorial integrity was heightened as the autonomous Chechen government failed to provide security and stability throughout the region. Once Islamist extremists hijacked the Chechen objective of political autonomy, an argument for Chechen self-rule could no longer be articulated in the same fashion that it was for Tatarstan. The infusion of a religiously inspired ideology made the Chechens’ separatist argument appear increasingly non-negotiable. The Oslo Accords, on the other hand, were ultimately undermined by both Israeli and Palestinian refusal to comply with the complete terms of the agreement. Likewise, the narrowness of the coalitions involved and the failure to attain a final status agreement allowed spoilers to derail the settlement. In Northern Ireland, the 1972 and 1974/75 attempts to negotiate a peace failed because both sides were only partially committed. Success would be achieved in 1998 as the result of nearly a decade of back-channel activity and a considerable moderation of ideology and thought within both the IRA and the British government.
Such diversity of negotiation efforts and failures illustrates not only the difficulty of securing a comprehensive peace settlement to end an ethnic conflict, but also reaffirms the reality that states do attempt to negotiate with those insurgencies that employ terror tactics. But perhaps most important, through these case studies one realizes that terrorism, while an integral factor in comparing these separatist insurgencies, was not to blame for the failure of these negotiations. Rather, the delay of a final status solution served to undermine the stability of the Sri Lankan peace talks, the Khasavyurt Accord, and the Oslo Accords. As demonstrated by these three cases, impartial agreements are unlikely to succeed. They rely on the constancy of too many variables over too long a period of time, and as evidenced by the cases, ethnic conflicts incite fluid and volatile climates. In this light, a comprehensive agreement, one that addresses the root causes of conflict and is established promptly after peace talks commence, is most likely to end ethnic conflict.

Analysis
A thorough cross-analysis of the cases reveals notable commonalities. First, negotiations can work only when both parties are genuinely interested in the success of the process and have realistic appraisals of what the other negotiators can concede. As the Tigers’ dream of a separate state is unacceptable to both the Sinhalese majority of Sri Lanka and to the major regional power, India, the LTTE will have to moderate its objectives if it is to ever secure the political autonomy it desires. Likewise, once it became apparent that a young Chechen government could not manage the warlordism and violence within its own borders, all prior negotiation efforts were shelved.
Second, when the objectives of a terror group are considered rational and finite, governments prove more willing to negotiate. The LTTE’s desire for an autonomous Tamil homeland was substantiated by evidence of the Tigers’ capacity to successfully govern its territory. The Chechen desire for an autonomous republic proved more reasonable in light of Russia’s inability to achieve a conclusive victory over a numerically and materially inferior insurgent group. The PLO’s quest for international recognition and self-governance over a limited Palestinian territory became increasingly acceptable as the violence of the First Intifada weakened Israeli nationalist fervor. The IRA’s transition from a proponent of violence to an advocate of electoral politics demonstrated their rationality.

Third, once negotiations commence, the resurgence and/or continuance of political violence plays a crucial role in hampering progress towards a comprehensive settlement. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE’s continued use of violence throughout the peace talks undermined its image as a rational actor. In Chechnya, resurgent violence compelled Moscow to redeploy Russian military forces to quell what had become an unruly Chechen republic. Moreover, the Chechen government’s inability to control and/or mitigate radical Islamist sentiment convinced Russia that the young republic was incapable of self-governance. In Israel, the assassination of Yitzak Rabin, coupled with renewed terror attacks against Israeli soldiers and citizens, shelved all efforts to establish a comprehensive peace.

Fourth, the realization of a settlement or peace process depends on public trust and participation. Without broad coalitions of support, spoilers can derail the entire negotiation effort. Only the Good Friday Agreement was able to appease all major actors,
thereby limiting the number of spoilers who might obtain support to contest the peace agreement. Sri Lanka’s inability to include the Muslim Tamils or curb the Tiger extremists, Russia’s inability to lessen the appeal of Islamist radicals, and the PLO’s inability to silence Hamas or assure Israeli settlers of their good intentions all served to undermine their fragile partial peace agreements.

Fifth, peace talks require coercive diplomacy and a combination of sanctions and incentives. George Mitchell provided the blueprint for how a normative mediator should work to end an ethnic conflict. By proposing principles to guide the negotiation process, Mitchell a set of criteria by which parties were either included or excluded from discussions based on their actions and good faith efforts at coexistence. His efforts were coercive, and his stance was considered unbiased: a far cry from the Nordic mission to monitor Sri Lanka’s ceasefire agreement.

Sixth, when absolute claims for self-determination and independence clash with inflexible positions on territorial integrity, there is little room for compromise on basic principles. Sri Lanka’s dream of a separate state is unacceptable to both the Sinhalese majority and to India. Likewise, Russia’s desire to keep Chechnya within the confines of the greater Russian Federation is well warranted after having witnessed Chechnya’s rapid devolution into an anarchic republic after having attained its autonomy.

Seventh, the postponement of a final status solution for a comprehensive peace agreement allows considerable time and space for spoilers and political violence to undermine and/or derail the initial settlement. Recurrent violence prevented the Sri Lankan peace talks, the Khasavyurt Accord, and the Oslo Accords from obtaining a final status solution. Only Northern Ireland’s ethnic conflict would be mitigated as a result of
negotiation efforts, for those third party actors involved in its negotiations refused to settle for anything less than an outright final status solution.

Eighth, a disproportionate state retaliation to insurgent violence often serves as a justification for future asymmetric attacks and increases support for the insurgent group among the targeted population base.

Of course, such truisms might not apply to all negotiation efforts to end separatist insurgencies, but they certainly pertain to the Sri Lankan, Chechen, Palestinian, and Northern Ireland cases.

In order to further analyze commonalities and divergences, the four cases can be grouped as two similar dyads and subsequently juxtaposed as the Chechen insurgents and the LTTE versus the IRA and the PLO. In particular, the Sri Lankan and Chechen cases share distinct similarities. When absolute claims for self-determination and independence clash with inflexible positions on territorial integrity, as in Russia/Chechnya and Sri Lanka/LTTE, there is little room for compromise on basic principles. For this reason and as a result of how the previous negotiations ended, one should expect any future settlement in these two cases to be imposed. Both the Sri Lankan and Russian states have demonstrated superior military strength in their latest military offensives, quelling all talk of parity between the insurgency and the state. As a result, Colombo and Moscow seek to suppress and/or terminate both insurgencies via decisive military victories, rather than re-engage in negotiation. If the literature is correct, such imposed settlements might actually succeed in pacifying the Tamil and Chechen insurgencies, as unilateral deterrence and the presence of a strong actor state will work to prevent recurrent violence. However, as the Sri Lankan and Chechen cases demonstrate, the use of disproportionate force to pacify an
ethnic minority often provokes the undesired response. Rather than snuff out the separatist insurgency, such overwhelming violence often ensures that most ethnic minorities, whether Tamil or Chechen, will resist the concept of living within such an oppressive state.

Of course, the reasons behind the failure of the 2002-2006 Sri Lankan peace talks and the 1996 Khasavyurt Accord differ. The narrowness of the Sri Lankan talks would account for the first misstep in these negotiation efforts, disregarding both non-LTTE parties and the important Muslim Tamil community. As much of the dynamic of this conflict is based within ethnic communities, the failure of the Norwegian-led peace process to involve all ethnicities made a lasting peace unlikely. Moreover, neither side had a clear idea of what the endgame might look like. This inability to strategize the integral components of a permanent peace, coupled with the Tigers purported manipulation of the ceasefire agreement as a time to rearm and regroup and the weak presence of the Norwegian intermediary, would derail all future talks. Whereas, the Khasavyurt Accord unraveled as a result of the newly autonomous Chechen government’s inability to manage a functioning state. Violence escalated, and the region became a breeding ground for Islamist extremism. Islamists would quickly hijack the insurgency’s objective of political autonomy and remodel the Chechen separatist aim into something substantially more ideological. The resultant Russian military victory and subsequent depletion of the Chechen leadership would substantially weaken the insurgency. Currently, the Sri Lankan government’s successful military offensive against the LTTE, coupled with the recent defections and deaths of prominent Tiger leadership,
spells an ominous end to the LTTE’s conventional fighting power. In both cases, an imposed settlement appears to be the only foreseeable termination of conflict.

The IRA and PLO cases, on the other hand, differ greatly from the Chechen and Sri Lankan separatist insurgencies. Both the IRA and PLO scenarios exemplify the powerful role that international attention and media scrutiny can play. Whereas Sri Lanka and Chechnya are more peripheral conflicts, where international involvement is prevented by the presence of strong regional actors as India and Russia, separatist insurgencies in Western Europe and Israel cannot be disregarded or downplayed in quite the same fashion. Yet the greatest lessons of the Oslo Accords and the Good Friday Agreement can be derived from their differences, rather than their similarities. Contrasted against the secret negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the Oslo Accords appear juvenile in comparison: nine years of back-channel activity and one year of public negotiations fostered the Good Friday Agreement, whereas the Oslo Accords were born out of ten months of discussion. In Northern Ireland, most of the politically significant groups on both sides, including the armed militants, concluded that the conflict was counterproductive. The Oslo talks, however, were much narrower in scope and produced an interim agreement that delayed final status talk, thereby allowing spoilers to derail the negotiation process. Principal issues were left unaddressed, and fringe groups were excluded from the final decision on the basis of their extremist views. Their omission, as in the case of Sri Lanka, would go to great lengths to derail the progression of the agreement towards a comprehensive peace. Given Northern Ireland’s success, it is easy to posit that a coercive international mediator plays a crucial role in securing a negotiated peace agreement. Perhaps George Mitchell will be able to navigate
the tenuous waters of Israeli/Palestinian relations in much the same fashion as he did between nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland. If so, a negotiated agreement to determine a final status solution on the creation of a Palestinian state is not unimaginable.

In an era where most governments insist that they would never negotiate with terrorists, these four case studies stand in direct contrast to such assertions. Certainly, their attempts at negotiating a comprehensive settlement to end ethnic conflict are desirous of change and improvement, as only one in four could be considered a success. But when these case studies are applied to the literature, several patterns and fits emerge. The information arrayed in Table 1 illustrates that negotiation readiness, rather than conflict ripeness, is more important to achieving successful negotiation between states and separatist groups. All of the cases experienced conflict ripeness. Only the IRA/UK study, however, demonstrated complete negotiation readiness: the conflict was perceived as risky, yet spoiler violence was absent; a neutral and coercive third party mediator was present; and lengthy back-channel communication was used. The PLO/Israel case is comparable in most respects, excluding the presence of spoilers and the absence of a coercive third party mediator. Thus, Table 1 further indicates that the absence of spoilers and spoiler-induced violence, combined with the guidance of a forceful mediator, most significantly contributed to a successful negotiation.

The information arrayed in Table 2 further substantiates the claim that complete negotiation readiness is most important to securing a successful peace agreement between a state and separatist terrorists. Although the Oslo Accords were negotiated in a ripe and ready environment, the brevity of back-channel communication, the absence of a coercive mediator, the presence of spoilers and spoiler-induced violence, and the paucity
of previous negotiation attempts ensured that the accords would face substantial challenges before a final status solution could be resolved. Certainly, ripe environments foster negotiation. It is complete negotiation readiness, however, that cultivates a successful peace agreement.
Conclusion

When and why do governments agree to negotiate with separatist terrorists? The previous research illustrates that governments negotiate with terrorists when they perceive the moment to be ripe (Zartman, 1991). This ripeness theory contends that policy makers will be receptive to negotiation when faced with both a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually perceived solution. Building upon Zartman’s ripeness theory is Dean Pruitt’s readiness theory (Pruitt, 2007), which contends that the parties to a heavy conflict are motivated to seek communication when they begin to see the combat as hopeless or too costly, or when they are pressed to end the conflict by powerful third parties. A mutually acceptable agreement and a shared sense of optimism are both integral components of the readiness theory.

My research corresponds with the literature, but the four cases analyzed in this thesis delineate that there are various shades of ripeness and readiness. Certainly, a ripe moment allowed the Israeli government and the PLO to mutually recognize one another and begin discussions of a substantive two state solution. Likewise, a mutually hurting stalemate compelled both the Russian and Sri Lankan governments to terminate their conflicts with the Chechen insurgents and the LTTE, respectively. However, in each of these three cases, the postponement of a final status solution would undermine the stability of the ripe moment. A comprehensive peace agreement, drafted and ratified in the relative calm of a ripe moment, would have helped to prevent the emergence of those spoilers and radicals who incited the violence that ultimately undercut the Sri Lankan
peace talks, the Khasavyurt Accord, and the Oslo Accords. Thus, the cases illustrate that ripe moments are susceptible to resurgent violence. While political violence often continues once negotiation efforts have begun, assassinations, renewed military offensives, and ceasefire violations greatly destabilized the aforementioned attempts to secure peace. Moreover, my research illustrates that ripe moments are short-lived. If the warring parties fail to establish a mutually acceptable comprehensive peace agreement within the initial months of negotiation efforts, the momentum of moderation and shared optimism will surely dissipate.

Is negotiation a viable solution to ending historic ethnic conflicts? One need look no further than the successful negotiation efforts conducted in both Northern Ireland and South Africa to end decades-long conflicts to substantiate this claim. The previous research shows that governments agree to negotiate with terrorists when they are considered rational actors who are capable of reform and moderation (Pronin, Kennedy, and Butsch, 2006). This degree of perceived rationality is an integral component in inducing states to negotiate with terrorist actors, as it shifts the onus of counterterror efforts from military action to diplomacy. Moreover, the previous research examined advocates the use of conciliation to ameliorate and end the terrorist threat (Sederberg, 1995), noting the wide range of options available to negotiation.

My research fit with the previous literature, illustrating that negotiation is more likely to occur between states and non-state actors when those insurgent groups are perceived to have rational leadership and finite objectives. Gerry Adams’ embrace of mainstream politics shifted IRA tactics from violence to cooperation, thereby convincing the British government of the IRA leadership’s level-headedness despite its history of
having conducted indiscriminate violence against police officers and civilians. Likewise, the PLO had undergone considerable moderation since its nascent days as a terror organization. Once Arafat indicated that the PLO would recognize Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, the Israeli government’s perception of Arafat as a man with whom negotiations could be conducted successfully increased. Yet the room for error is considerable. Constructive negotiations are favored when they seem feasible, but they reduce optimism and increase hostility when they fail. The failure of both the 2002-2006 Sri Lankan peace talks and the 1996 Khasavyurt Accord resulted in the perceived irrationality of both the LTTE and the Chechen insurgents. Such a result will no doubt impede future negotiation efforts between these parties. Moreover, comprehensive negotiations between states and impassioned separatist groups necessitate moderate leadership if they are to succeed. Resultantly, until the Chechen insurgency can reclaim its separatist objective and reduce the appeal of Islamist militancy, hope for a settlement is unlikely. The Russians’ military defeat of the Chechens is conflict suppression and management, rather than an abject victory. Chechen grievances will once again give rise to violence, and further attempts to settle this separatist conflict will necessitate renewed dialogue between the warring parties.

Are certain peace agreements and negotiation strategies more viable? The previous research shows that imposed settlements are more successful than negotiated settlements in terminating conflicts (Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). Quackenbush and Venteicher’s theoretical argument holds that dispute winners who impose settlements on the losing party are likely to be satisfied with the post-settlement outcome, and thus, are unlikely to challenge this new status quo with another dispute. Furthermore, power-
sharing is unlikely under this new agreement. The victor will take the necessary steps to ensure that the losing party is unable, or at least limited in its ability, to renew the conflict. Following a decisive outcome, unilateral deterrence ensues.

My research would concur with this statement, as only one of the four negotiated settlements analyzed appears to have successfully ended the conflict. In each of the three cases in which negotiations failed, spoilers played a substantial role in renewing the conflict. The Sri Lankan, Russian, and Israeli governments were unable to contain or deter radical factions from spoiling the agreements, as mutual deterrence was required for the settlement to succeed. And today, amid resurgent violence in Northern Ireland, questions as to whether or not the Good Friday Agreement will outlast the renewed ethnic violence are increasing. Resultantly, this thesis contends that imposed settlements are more likely to be successful in ameliorating ethnic conflict.

Negotiations can have a positive influence on conflicts, but these cases have illustrated that both sides have to be seriously interested and realistic regarding the progress that can be achieved and the goals that can be obtained if they are to succeed. Certainly, imposed settlements are more likely to resolve conflicts when one party is considerably stronger than the other, thereby ensuring a unilateral deterrence of recurrent violence. But a negotiated settlement, as illustrated by the Good Friday Agreement, has the potential to bring a lasting peace if substantial back-channel discussion and moderation of hostility and ideology has occurred. As the literature suggests, international actors can have a positive influence on negotiations. Third parties can increase the room for maneuver between warring sides. They can act as a go-between, reward progress, and inflict sanctions if negotiations fail. A mediator with more muscle is
more likely to be successful than one without, but a mediator with muscle is more likely to be biased.

Why do negotiations with separatist terrorists fail? Negotiations fail when both parties’ leadership is inflexible and extremist. They fail when a final status solution is delayed; they fail when absolute claims for self-determination and independence clash with inflexible positions on territorial integrity; they fail without broad support and public trust; they fail without the presence of a powerful, objective third party mediator; and they fail when neither side is willing to comply with the terms of the agreement (Babbitt, 2006).

My research illustrates that negotiations do not fail exclusively because they involve terrorist actors. Likewise, negotiations between states and separatist terrorists do not inherently imply that the state is surrendering or capitulating to terrorist objectives. On the contrary, the Sri Lankan, Russian, Israeli and British governments have retained their power, autonomy, and capacity to govern in an effective, if not austere, manner. Yet the four cases confirm the claims of previous literature that a myriad of possibilities exist which could undermine ongoing negotiation efforts and fragile peace agreements. My research highlights the subjectivity of state/separatist terror group negotiations. As each insurgency possesses distinct grievances, each government must be sensitive to the root causes of conflict when suggesting conciliation. The same can be said of third party actors. Ethnic conflicts are fused with emotion and subject to immense conflict vulnerability. One year of back-channel activity will rarely ameliorate the deep-seated tensions and perceived injustices that have fueled decades of violence; rather, international mediators and third party actors must encourage years of back-channel talks.
and secret negotiations between parties to lay the groundwork for familiarity, trust, and
the mutual understanding of one another’s needs and wants. In this light, it is little
surprise that the Good Friday Agreement succeeded where the other cases failed.

Having assessed the failure of the Sri Lankan peace talks, the Khasavyurt Accord,
and the Oslo Accords, this thesis contends that imposed settlements, rather than
negotiated settlements, are more likely to end ethnic conflict. Mutual deterrence, an
element inherent to negotiated settlements, was unable to prevent the LTTE’s resumption
of violence, the Chechen’s adoption of radical Islamist dogma, and the ascendance of
both Israeli and Palestinian spoilers. To offset this violence, an imposed settlement
wielded by a strong state over a weaker insurgent group is needed. That being said, the
state must concurrently address the latent grievances of the insurgency if it is to prevent
recurrent violence.

Despite their principled rhetoric, states do negotiate with separatist terrorists.
After years of immovable conflict, burdened by high economic and political costs, and
influenced by a public opinion that rejects further warfare, governments and terrorists
often gather at the negotiation table when the moment for conciliation is ripe. Here
negotiation is spurred by a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually perceived solution.
At the commencement of negotiation efforts, both parties exude a shared optimism that
communication will yield an acceptable agreement. This negotiation readiness is induced
by the sensation that conflict has grown too costly and risky, by the involvement of third
party actors, and by back-channel communication used to lay the foundation of mutual
understanding and familiarity. My research upholds these theories. Negotiation efforts in
each of the four cases were induced by a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually
perceived solution. Moreover, each case exhibited two of the three elements delineating negotiation readiness. Of course, only one of the four negotiated agreements studied in this thesis can be considered a success. This is not a reflection of the applicability of the ripeness and readiness theories but rather a testament to the fickleness of individual sentiment and the obduracy of ethnic conflict. In separatist conflicts, mutually perceived solutions will give way to inflexible positioning; one group will balk at the terms of the agreement and violate its statues; and recurrent violence will shatter the solace of a ripe moment. For these reasons, an imposed settlement is more likely to resolve an ethnic conflict than a negotiated agreement.

At the outset of this study, I expected to find that negotiation, if diligently pursued and supported by both warring parties, would succeed in terminating ethnic conflict. Such expectations proved naïve. There is no single blueprint to establishing successful negotiations between states and separatist terrorists, yet there is a formula to knowing when those negotiations might best occur. A thorough analysis of the variables needed to channel ripe moments into successful negotiations is warranted. This study illustrates that ripe moments do occur, and the recognition of a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually perceived solution is integral to establishing negotiations between warring parties. Deeming when a political environment is ready for negotiation is certainly subjective, as every ethnic conflict is unique. Yet the cases analyzed in this study unequivocally illustrate that the elements of ripeness and readiness, when attained by both parties, lead to a mutual willingness to negotiate. Further research into the shared qualities and actions of successful third party mediators is needed. Likewise, additional research into the success that Track 2 diplomacy has had in resolving ethnic conflict is
warranted. Lastly, an analysis of the preventative techniques used to dissuade spoilers from committing violent acts is needed in order to better incorporate these extremists into a post-conflict environment. With this additional research, perhaps an over-arching blueprint of the integral elements of ripeness and readiness needed to secure a sustainable peace can be acquired.

As this thesis analyzed the merits and shortcomings of four negotiated settlements, further research should be conducted on the success imposed settlements have had in ending ethnic conflicts. Moreover, a collection of empirical evidence citing the relative success of unilateral deterrence would help substantiate the claim that it is superior to mutual deterrence. If the empirical evidence illustrates otherwise, perhaps negotiated agreements are not the hazard that the previous literature claims them to be (Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008). Until then, however, my research substantiates the claim that negotiated agreements result in mutual dissatisfaction, as each party has an incentive to challenge the terms of the settlement since it was involved in the final outcome of the negotiation process. Innovative approaches are needed to end ethnic conflict in the twenty-first century. Addressing and redressing grievances, as one does when engaged in dialogue and negotiation, is not the same thing as surrendering to terrorism. Rather, it is a means to the end of a once intractable ethnic conflict.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


