Homeland Security and Terrorism in Selected European States

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ABSTRACT

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the responses to terrorism increased throughout the world. The face of Homeland Security is now heavily focused on the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery of terrorist attacks not only in the United States, but also amongst some of America’s oldest allies. This thesis studies the level of change in homeland security strategy of European NATO members after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The analysis of strategic components within each NATO member’s homeland security strategy (history, laws, counterterrorism agencies and budget support) shows significant change. The international community’s perspective and role in terrorism and homeland security strategy can be an important component toward the safety and security in the United States. Terrorism’s influence on homeland security programs abroad is evidence that its successful mitigation and defeat will be contingent upon international cooperation and strategy.
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The views expressed in this thesis are my own and not necessarily those of the Department of State or the United States Government.
I. INTRODUCTION

In a globalized world, the attacks of 9/11 not only had a profound influence on the United States but also on many other countries. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how America’s close allies—long time members of NATO—responded, what resolutions were adopted, what new laws were enacted, and if agencies reorganized indicating a greater influence of terrorism in strategic parts of the world.

“Terrorism” and “Homeland Security” are two terms that have found their way into the vocabulary of society as a result of the attacks on 9/11. Terrorism is often subjective and has different meanings to different governments. Some governments define certain tactics used by groups as terrorism, while others may see these tactics as a form of liberation or nationalism.1 Terrorism’s bias and negative nature inhibit it from having one all-encompassing definition. However, efforts are still being made to discover the commonalities in the term across the international community.

In many ways the term parallels the change in terrorism itself. In her article “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” Audrey Kurth-Cronin addresses the difficult issue of defining terrorism, stating, “the term has evolved and in part because it is associated with an activity that is designed to be subjective.”2 Cronin

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goes onto explain that while the actions of terrorism are in dispute, the following four characteristics are always present:

1. Terrorism always has a political nature.

2. Terrorism’s non-state character distinguishes terrorism, even when the terrorists receive support from state sources.

3. Terrorism deliberately targets the innocent, which also distinguishes it from state uses of force that inadvertently kill innocent bystanders.

4. Terrorists do not abide by international laws or norms and, to maximize the psychological effect of an attack, their activities have a deliberately unpredictable quality.\(^3\)

Throughout the decades, many attempts to give a concrete and accurate definition to the term “terrorism” have failed. The definition of terrorism is controversial because it is often confused between lawful and unlawful use of force by both state and non-state actors in certain situations. This confuses groups of people across the nations. For example, some countries may consider the bombing of Western targets an act of jihad, while others perceive it as terrorism. Islamic extremists who engage in violence abroad are sometimes considered “freedom fighters” in their home countries but labeled “terrorists” in other parts of the world.\(^4\) So many efforts have taken place to define terrorism that a study in 1998, a study by the United States Army found over 100 definitions of terrorism worldwide.\(^5\)

The term “terrorism” can also have several different meanings within a single


\(^5\) Ibid.
country. Several agencies tasked with counterterrorism efforts in the United States have their own definition of terrorism. For example, the FBI defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives,"\(^6\) while the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Code both define terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”\(^7\) Subtle differences tend to create disparity in interpretations in order to justify an organizational mission statement.

Numerous or unclear definitions of terrorism limit how nations can proceed with policy development toward combating the threat, including establishing international terrorism law regarding extradition, detainment, and punishment. International organizations have attempted to bridge the definitional gap through the passage of resolutions but fail due to lack of consensus. Thinking about terrorism in the context of international law includes the role of the United Nations (UN). After September 11, the UN constructed specific guidelines for dealing with terrorism through resolution 1373 but failed to formulate a clear definition for the term “terrorism.”\(^8\) Many nations adopted the requirements of the resolution but crafted their own definition of terrorism as seen from their perspective.

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\(^7\) United States Code. Definition of Terrorism. Title 22 Section 2656 f (d). http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=261492255298+0+0+0&WAISSaction=retrieve.

While terrorism is perceived differently, specific elements remain consistent in its meaning. According to Kurth-Cronin, identifying a clear definition for terrorism must exist. Until the international community sets a standardization of the definition, implementing an effective strategy to effectively mitigate terrorism will remain difficult.

The term Homeland Security has a short definitional history. Synonymous with homeland defense, in Europe the term is commonly referred to as “national security” or “civil defense.”

A. The NATO Alliance

Formed in 1949 after the end of World War II, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is considered the world’s most powerful military alliance. NATO’s purpose is to “safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.”

NATO has an open door policy; however, to join NATO a country must bring something to the table militarily, economically, and politically. To benefit from the alliance, an aspiring country must also benefit others. While NATO does not have counterterrorism strategy requirements, to become a member a country must have the means to secure and defend itself and play a role in the defense of others. For the first time in its history, NATO considered the events on 9/11 an attack on all members. By invoking Article 5 of its collective defense commitment, NATO sent a message to the rest of the world that terrorism would not be tolerated. The gist of Article

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5 states that an attack on one member is an attack on all. This decisive move by NATO showed international commitment toward protecting its members and untiringly standing against terrorism as one body.

The fourteen NATO countries at the end of the Cold War still constitute some of America’s most reliable global allies today. Europe is often considered a strategic location for international terrorism, and alliances such as NATO give counterterrorism efforts a distinct advantage in unity by making each country a crucial component for successful threat mitigation. However, the definition of terrorism does not have an identical meaning in each country, which affects how each state deals with terrorism, and constructs its counterterrorism strategy. Counterterrorism strategy must be clear and concise, giving little room for miscommunication between the agencies responsible for the safety and security of the citizens they are sworn to protect. Throughout the years of its existence, NATO’s military alliance has followed a policy emphasizing clarity and communication between its members.

The United States is not alone in the fight against international terrorism and increasing international cooperation will be a key component in successfully mitigating terrorism in the future. During a speech in November 2006, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated:

“When I said, after 9/11 that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with America, I said it because I believed it. But I also thought it was profoundly in Britain’s interests. I knew this attack wasn’t aimed at America per se; but at America as the leading representative of our values. Look round the world today; look even just within Europe. Britain is not the only country that faces a terrorist threat. We all do, allies and non-allies, anyone in fact that isn’t "them". I thought then and I think now that defeating this threat - whose roots are deep and have been a long time growing - was going to take a generation; and I knew then and know now that defeating it, was never going to be done without an America prepared to lead
as America, to its credit, has. And the truth is, for Britain, it is always right for us to keep our partnership with America strong. Post 9/11, there were no half-hearted allies of America. There were allies and others. We were allies then and that’s how we should stay; and the test of any alliance, I’m afraid, is not when it’s easy but when it’s tough.”

B. Focus of Study

The terrorism events of 9/11 proved to be a great influence on the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the United States and American policies dealing with counterterrorism. But did 9/11 change the world, and if so then in what ways did this change occur? One aspect of this issue relates to the changes in counterterrorism policy in other countries, especially those with close ties to the United States. The main focus of this study is to examine how the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 influenced Homeland Security programs of old NATO allies. Since cooperation between the United States and its allies is a key component of effective counterterrorism tactics, this research is important to show how the partnership strengthens its collective energy.

While international homeland and national security programs do not usually encompass an “all-hazards” approach taken by the United States, the threat of terrorism throughout a history of a country seems to be the main driver in the development of such programs. Therefore, countries whose national security programs have an emphasis on counterterrorism laws and tactics are presumably better allies for the United States in the fight against terrorism than those countries whose strategy does not emphasize counterterrorism. Additionally, by analyzing and understanding the programs of other

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countries, the United States has an opportunity to learn from and strengthen its own programs.

Terrorism seems to have brought the need for greater security to the forefront of the United States’ policy agenda. But a reorganization of security agencies was not initiated by natural disasters like hurricanes, floods and tornados but by the actions of nineteen Middle Eastern men with radical views of the world and a desire to punish the values represented by the US. In other parts of the world, Homeland Security is referred to as “national security.” In some cases, it is also termed “internal security.” The focus of this thesis is to identify and analyze the National/Homeland Security programs of the fourteen NATO member countries in the European region up to the end of the Cold War in 1990. How many had domestic-related counterterrorism/national security/Homeland Security organizations in place prior to 9/11? How many countries have since implemented programs and/or tougher laws and methods against terrorism since 9/11? Forging a collective effort against terrorism requires a better understanding of how each country perceives this evolving threat and established policies to confront it.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

To answer the question of how homeland security models in various nations have changed since the 9/11 attacks, the historical origins of countries’ counterterrorism strategies must first be identified.

The 1960s and 1970s were an especially challenging time for West European countries trying to combat terrorism. Terrorism equated itself with revolution. Groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Basque separatists in Spain known as ETA, exploited the revolutionary perception of terrorism to draw attention to their cause.\textsuperscript{12} Leaders like Yasir Arafat challenged the UN on their perception of a terrorist by stating, “The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights.”\textsuperscript{13} Through the passage of time, terrorism became more violent and calculated; giving rise to the view we have of the term today. The shifts in meaning throughout history may have ultimately hindered the effectiveness of how the international community deals with terrorism. International organizations like the UN, the EU, and NATO have realized the significance in establishing a true understanding of the tactic and the need to provide a proper definition to end historical shifts of this definitional dilemma.

Research for understanding why governments take certain actions and how is addressed in John Kingdon’s, \textit{Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies}. In it, Kingdon discusses the intricacies of the policy process and why some policies get placed on the

\textsuperscript{12} Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. (Columbia University Press, New York. 2006), 16.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 16.
agenda and others do not. According to Kingdon, there exist three separate agenda setting streams. These streams consist of problems, policies, and politics. Each stream flows independently of one another until a critical or focusing event causes all three streams to converge. At that point a “policy window” opens giving policy advocates a chance for their policies to gain attention and achieve enactment on the political agenda.

The problem stream relates to governmental decision makers dealing with wide varieties of problems on a daily basis. Only problems with special features capture their attention. According to Kingdon, indicators, focusing events, and crises often provide a problem with the push it needs to catch the attention of decision makers.

The second stream deals with policy. Policy problems and the attention they generate, begin to make up what Kingdon calls the “policy primeval soup.” The soup consists of ideas that float around inside political communities in the form of bills, speeches, and proposals. Advocates of the policies attempt to “soften up” or educate the policy communities on their ideas and proposals over a period of time prior to the opening of the policy window.

The final and most important stream Kingdon discusses is political. According to Kingdon, the political stream is made up of several factors: swings of national mood, changes of administration, election results, interest group pressure, and ideological

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15 Ibid
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 117.
19 Ibid.
changes in Congress. Politicians often feel they can detect these changes, which include a change in the national mood. How these politicians decipher this mood directly relates to what problems and policies they feel are important enough to present on the policy agenda.

Policy windows are a big part of the political stream, according to Kingdon. When a policy window opens, an opportunity for advocates to push their agendas on to the policy scene is presented. Focusing events, crises, and indicators can cause a policy window to open or close. However, change in the political stream is the most frequent reason a window opens up. A focusing event, national mood, or anything that would capture the attention of a governmental official can also cause this change in the political stream. An open policy window invites solutions to be coupled with problems.

Kingdon also considers the role of the media. Media outlets have great power to influence public perception on many issues. Ultimately, this translates to media control of the national mood. Kingdon states, “Governmental participants’ sense of the national mood serves to promote some items on their policy agendas and to restrain others from rising to prominence.” Kingdon believes that the national mood can have an impact on election results, party fortunes, and the receptivity of governmental decision makers to interest groups and lobbyists.

Kingdon concludes that the steps in this process do not always happen in order. Solutions, problems, policy, and politics can occur anytime and in any way. Kingdon

20 Ibid. 194.
21 Ibid, 194.
22 Ibid.
states that the elements in his theory should be given great flexibility in occurrence, as the steps he outlines do not always proceed orderly. Kingdon states that alternatives or solutions are not generated as a result of agenda setting.\textsuperscript{23} Rather, the alternatives float around and are promoted for a period of time until the agenda and alternatives are coupled at a critical point. Sometimes windows of opportunity open and a solution to a problem is not ready. Kingdon’s point and conclusion is that there exist certain dynamics that are specific to each stream and do not always lead to items being placed on the policy agenda.\textsuperscript{24} However, new case studies conducted in the United States since the release of his first edition show that Kingdon’s theory works quite well in predicting and understanding why certain things get placed on a political agenda.\textsuperscript{25}

When attempting to determine what counterterrorism elements are critical to understanding the level of influence terrorism has on a country’s strategy, it is clear there are several. Most strategy consists of laws, agencies who enforce those laws, and funds that enable the agencies to function. Creation of these agencies is often the result of a continuous problem throughout a country’s history. The agencies tasked to deal with this problem are considered a solution.

The legal structure of a country plays an important role in counterterrorism efforts. James Beckman in his study, “Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism” seeks to accomplish this understanding through the study of selected countries and the main features and attributes of their Homeland Security systems. Beckman

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
selects several countries he considers “matter” to the United States and its fight against terrorism: Israel, Germany, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The United States was also chosen for comparison purposes. All selected countries had past experience with terrorism and a significant amount of influence in world affairs. For each country studied, the following topics were examined: Constitutional Law issues; Anti-Terrorism Legislation in each country prior to 9/11; Specific Anti-Terrorism legislation in that country; Legislative responses to terrorism after 9/11; Unique issues in Homeland Security facing each country; and any recent cases dealing with terrorism and Homeland Security the author would consider relevant to that country study. Beckman also addresses some of the law enforcement structures and the agencies tasked with counterterrorism for each country. Since these agencies are responsible for the execution of any anti-terrorism law, Beckman considers them relevant to properly understand each country’s Homeland Security program.

Beckman’s analysis concludes that the United States, Russia, the UK and Israel have defined the approach to combating terrorism as a “war on terrorism.” This distinction gives these countries the option of using their military against terrorism abroad and also in collusion with strengthening domestic laws and processes. Conversely, Germany, Spain, and Japan have taken a more domestic or law enforcement approach toward combating terrorism by only concentrating on improving their domestic laws and processes without the military

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
Part of this strategy extends from the fact that Germany and Japan are restricted from using their military in other countries as a result of their constitutional provisions set up after World War II.

Beckman’s conclusions address many strategies used by other countries against terrorism that could benefit the United States. These strategies include implementing sunset or expiration clauses on some of the anti-terrorism legislation, administrative detainment periods, criminalization of pro-terrorism speech, and more transparency in laws that deal with counterterrorism efforts. Beckman realizes there are no easy answers when it comes to terrorism and ways to combat it effectively and encourages the reader to make up his/her own mind concerning the laws of their respective country. International cooperation is considered essential if terrorism is to be stopped and learning from other countries is a key component to winning. However, Beckman does not address exactly how to do this.

Developments in counterterrorism strategy around the world have changed significantly since 9/11. Legal reactions to the attacks have not only influenced the Homeland Security processes of individual countries but also that of international law. The swift passage of UN resolution 1373 after the 9/11 attacks is evidence of this international change in law. The strategy of combating terrorism by military and non-military action among other tactics represented a point of discussion for the Max-Planck-Institute on Comparative Public Law and International Law. The Institute organized a conference entitled “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” held in January

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
2003. Prior to the conference, legal, and national reports had been written analyzing specific countries’ counter-terrorist actions both before and after 9/11. The volume by Christian Walter, Silja Voneky, Volker Roben and Frank Schorkopf is a compilation of those reports prepared specifically for the conference.

The reports created for the conference discuss the sociological aspect of terrorism along with the problem of defining the term. The reports also detail the legal structures of Canada, Germany, the European Union, France, Great Britain, Israel, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the United States, examining the background of each country’s dealings with terrorism, participation in International Antiterrorism Conventions, preventative Measures taken by each country, repressive measures taken by each country and immigration and Counterterrorism Measures directed toward aliens of each country.34

The compilation discusses several arguments on many topics relating to international security in a world after 9/11. For example, Nico Krisch in his report entitled “The Rise and Fall of Collective Security” argues that the system of collective security is undergoing a major change in a direction that is not yet clear.35 While developing stronger tools to fight terrorism with the help of superpowers like the United States, Krisch believes collective security has also been marginalized through a hegemonic strategy.36

Additional essays included in the volume discuss the rules of the law and warfare, crime prevention, and the laws of war.37 The sum of the book presents several different arguments for counterterrorism strategy. This strategy is examined through international

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35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
institutions, country profiles, and convention articles that address the terrorist threat. The conclusion of this vast compilation of essays implies that counterterrorism strategy must be collective and long term.\textsuperscript{38} This can be accomplished through clearly defined international and domestic strategies. However, we don’t know how international organizations like NATO will play a role and what specifically stands in the way of an international strategy.

Counterterrorism strategy and policies surrounding this strategy are essential to a country’s successful fight with terrorism. Policy gives counterterrorism strategy its legitimacy and the effectiveness of the strategy in turn reinforces the strength of the policy. To learn what effective counterterrorism strategy looks like and what the components of effective strategy entail requires an examination of literature focused on specific counterterrorism strategies of certain countries. Author Yonah Alexander discusses the issues surrounding several countries and their counterterrorism strategies in two books \textit{Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries}, published 2002, and \textit{Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations}, published 2006. Both seek to determine the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies of several countries Alexander considers to be important. The studies focus mainly on the response of selected nations to terrorism, past counterterrorism strategies, and then provide some “best practices” lessons for future counterterrorism developments.\textsuperscript{39} The main question Yonah Alexander is attempting to answer is “what are the lessons to be learned in terms of developing more effective responses

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{39} Alexander, Yonah. Combating Terrorism. (University of Michigan Press, 2002).
\end{flushright}
in the future so that the threat of primitive, spectacular, super-, and cyber terrorism can be reduced and brought under manageable levels?"40

*Combating Terrorism* takes more of an historical perspective toward determining the goal of the book while *Counterterrorism Strategies* uses the 9/11 attacks as one of its main events that influenced the development of counterterrorism strategy. The ten countries studied in *Combating Terrorism* were the United States, Argentina, Peru, Columbia, Spain, United Kingdom, Israel, Turkey, India, and Japan.41 It is fairly clear that when “Combating Terrorism” was written, the lessons of 9/11 were not known as they are today. Alexander’s comparative studies focused on answering four questions:

1. “What are the governmental and public perceptions of the terrorist threat on the primitive, technologically advanced, and mass destruction levels?”

2. “How successful were the government’s policies and actions in combating both domestic and international terrorism?”

3. “What factors influence the government’s willingness and ability to cooperate with other nations in combating terrorism?”

4. “What does the counterterrorism performance record of the specific country look like?”42

Alexander concludes that in each of the ten countries studied, the counterterrorism strategies greatly differ from one another.43 However, the “best practices” lessons to be learned from the study dealt with improving intelligence, promoting a positive political environment, training military forces for counterterrorism operations, and promoting a close

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
relationship between domestic agencies responsible for counterterrorism.\textsuperscript{44} Alexander recommended an intense examination of the policies of governments and the political environment to show a commitment toward effectively combating terrorism.\textsuperscript{45} Overreaction and under reaction to terrorism can be especially detrimental to a country’s success, and not protecting infrastructure and unmet policy implications will also hinder the effective mitigation of terrorism.\textsuperscript{46}

Yonah Alexander’s second book \textit{Counterterrorism Strategies} focuses on the counterterrorism strategies in the countries of France, Germany, Italy, Egypt, Sri Lanka, and the United States. Selection of these countries and those included in “Combating Terrorism” were chosen by a group of academics, former government officials, journalists and terrorism experts in 1998 seeking to develop case studies that focused on the lessons of counterterrorism. The criterion for selection was that each country must possess a long history of dealing with terrorism indicating that a countries historical experience with terrorism is an important element in development of effective strategy.\textsuperscript{47} Maintaining a methodology for each country study was considered important for comparison purposes. However, the author recognized the fact that different perspectives of terrorism exist, and some studies would be slightly different than others.\textsuperscript{48} Nevertheless, researchers were given a number of factors to consider when conducting their study, which included focusing on governmental and public perceptions of terrorism, the effectiveness of government counterterrorism policy and practices, the governments’ willingness to work with other

\textsuperscript{44} Alexander, Yonah. \textit{Combating Terrorism}. (University of Michigan Press, 2002).
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
countries against terrorism, and, finally, a depiction of the country’s counterterrorism performance record.\textsuperscript{49} These factors will eventually feed into a comprehensive compilation of “best practices” strategies to be addressed in Alexander’s third book not as yet published.

Yonah Alexander’s examination of the six countries in “Counterterrorism Strategies” identified some major themes associated with the successes and failures of each country. Among the themes of successful counterterrorism strategies are the shifting of perspective from terrorism being a law enforcement only problem to the inclusion and addition of the military, funding, policy changes, increased security measures, freezing terrorist financing options, and international cooperation.\textsuperscript{50} Some major themes of counterterrorism strategy failures identified in the study are as follows; the preemptive strike option also known as “the Bush doctrine,” any set of laws that erode civil liberties, political rivalry between agencies tasked with counterterrorism responsibilities, lack of coordination between intelligence and law enforcement, overreaction and under-reaction toward terrorism, and failure to recognize the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in relation to terrorism. Alexander concludes that while these recommendations are not guaranteed to end the threat of terrorism forever, countries must be willing to learn from the past and apply those lessons to a long-term strategy throughout the international community.\textsuperscript{51}

World reactions after the attacks on September 11, 2001 were significant. The phrase “9/11 changed the world” is used quite often but sometimes without evidence to its claim. Andreas Wenger and Doron Zimmermann attempt to gauge just how much 9/11 changed the

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
world in their book “How States Fight Terrorism,” written in 2007. In it, the author’s focus a
two and a half year study on the reaction of Western countries’ efforts to combat a new form
of terrorism evidenced by the 9/11 attacks and others. The book is comprised of several
country case studies that examine the many security concerns, political debates, and military
considerations that terrorism has initiated. The study also gives great emphasis to the
Israeli counterterrorism strategy as the building block of an integrated approach toward
fighting groups like al Qaeda. The countries selected by the authors for their study are
Britain, Germany, Norway, Canada, Israel, and the United States, although the reasoning
behind the selection of these particular countries is not addressed.

Sections of the book cover the counterterrorism dynamics of European and North
American countries, as well as the need for an integrated approach across the board. When
examining each country’s case studies, the authors attempt to take a standardized approach to
the counterterrorism reactions by covering topics related to domestic response, policy
response, intelligence issues, budgeting changes, domestic and national debates on terrorism,
legal changes, and participation in international organizations like the UN and EU.

The section on the study of Israel’s counterterrorism strategy is fairly comprehensive
covering all the main periods critical to their fight against terrorism. The authors conclude in
this section that the attacks on 9/11 did not have much impact on Israeli counterterrorism

52 Zimmerman, Doron, and Andreas Wegner. How States Fight Terrorism. (Lynne Rinner Publishers,
2007).
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
strategy because they had taken the proper precautions all along.\textsuperscript{55} This had been learned through decades of developing strategy to bring terrorism under control.\textsuperscript{56}

Zimmermann and Wenger conclude that a comprehensive approach toward fighting terrorism must occur in both a military and non-military manner.\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, the authors believe that when dealing with Islamic extremist groups like al Qaeda, the battle for the “hearts and minds” is just as important as the physical one.\textsuperscript{58} The balance between the efficient means to fight terrorism and the efforts to gain public support against the terrorism movement is a main conclusion that must be met if future generations are to have a chance at winning against terrorism.

From the works cited above, we know that certain events have an influence on how and why governments act. Kingdon’s theory has been proven through many examples in the United States, but how it applies to foreign countries and governments is unknown. Kingdon’s policy, problem, and political streams may exist in many forms of government. However, the democratic form of government creates immense fluidity in terms of how things get done and the independent flow of the streams discussed throughout Kingdon’s book. A “focusing event” (i.e. 9/11) related to terrorism in democratic countries abroad could be conceived as having the same effect as it would in the United States. However, Kingdon’s theory is only portrayed in the context of the United States system. From works like Beckman and Walter et al. we know that 9/11 changed the legal system in many countries outside the United States. Laws were created and amended to combat the terrorist

\textsuperscript{55} Zimmerman, Doron, and Andreas Wegner. How States Fight Terrorism. (Lynne Rinner Publishers, 2007).
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
threat but only from an immediate knee jerk reaction in some cases. While Beckman’s piece is very detailed and well researched, he fails to incorporate key countries whose anti-terrorism efforts and programs are considered critical to United States security such as France, Turkey and Italy. Many countries excluded by Beckman’s study are members of NATO and have a lengthy historical relationship with the United States when it comes to security. A country’s historical relationship with terrorism and with others that are dedicated to fighting against it are important to note in order to obtain a proper understanding of terrorism’s influence on homeland security in Europe and elsewhere.

The history of terrorism can be of great value to a country’s future strategy. However, Beckman and Walter et al, do not take this factor, and others, into great consideration outside of their examination of the legal approaches to terrorism. One such consideration overlooked by the authors is how a country’s budget influences counterterrorism strategy and visa versa. Yonah Alexander examined the past and present counterterrorism strategy of several countries. From his studies we can conclude that strategy can be formulated from a close examination of the failure and success of countries that have a long history with terrorism. While the roles of law enforcement and the military and how each relates to counterterrorism strategy is addressed, the strategic shift from terrorism being a law enforcement only problem, to one that also includes the military, cannot be considered unless an examination of the world’s most powerful military alliance, NATO, is conducted. Yonah Alexander fails to consider the international significance of an organization like NATO in his recommendations and lessons learned.

Authors Zimmermann and Wenger also echo the sentiment of combining law enforcement and military forces together against terrorism, but they too fail to incorporate the
strategic advantage of NATO countries and how each relates to the security of the United States in terms of counterterrorism strategy.

In summary, the literature above identifies some of the major components important to international Homeland Security models. They include, legal, historical context, agency responsibility, political participation, and overall country strategy. However, the details of critical components like budgeting and international organizational influence are excluded. If collective counterterrorism efforts are the key to successful mitigation of terrorism as many of the authors suggest, an understanding of international Homeland Security models aligned militarily, and terrorism’s influence on the components of their counterterrorism strategy, must be conducted. This is accomplished in the following pages.
Examining NATO member countries and how they responded to terrorism after 9/11 will provide a deeper understanding of the international security layer that is so critical to the future safety of the United States. It will also bring together the law enforcement and military aspects of counterterrorism. America’s alliance with NATO is long and sustained. Since NATO considered the attacks of 9/11 an attack on all members, we can expect that member countries would adjust their laws and Homeland Security measures under the logic that they are only as strong as their weakest link. Collective security organizations like NATO are critical in combating terrorism effectively. Just how much has been done since 9/11 in the way of counterterrorism is what this project will attempt to show. The fourteen European countries of NATO up and to the end of the Cold War, and the countries that will be the focus of this study are as follows: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

We know that 9/11 affected NATO as evidenced by its declaration of Article 5 for the first time in history. Article 5 of the NATO charter states, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”^59 However, we do not know the extent of the steps taken by each country to challenge terrorism after 9/11. Examining the following components of counterterrorism strategy related to each of the fourteen NATO member countries forming the organization at the end of the Cold War will provide an understanding of the level of change in each country and how much influence terrorism, and in particular 9/11, had on its strategy. Specifically, the topics investigated for this research included: the history of terrorism (groups and incidents), counter terrorism agencies, laws, and budgetary support. These areas are described below.

A. History of Terrorism

What is the history of terrorism in each country? Discovering data about the history of terrorism in a particular NATO member country will focus on the following areas:

*Groups*--Knowing which groups are operating in the country will help explain what tactics the country’s counterterrorism forces adopt. Are the groups that threaten the country

http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm
domestic or internationally based? What are some of their motivations? This information is important because it can influence what types of laws are passed.

_Terrorist incidents_—Looking at both pre- and post- 9/11 periods concerning the history of terrorism in each country will provide a comparative viewpoint for further analysis. This information shows what terrorist groups are interested in. The incidents usually target a specific objective and give insight into the modus operandi of the groups. The frequency of incidents can also explain the efficiency of the country’s counterterrorism strategy. The source for all this information will come from Edward Mickolus’ comprehensive study of terrorism between 1996-2004. The Mickolus study is considered one of the most accurate and thorough studies on terrorist events in the world. Knowledge of terrorist incidents in each country is an indicator of a country’s experience level with terrorism. The agencies within those countries that have dealt with a large number of terrorism related incidents have a propensity for greater understanding and more effective approaches against terrorism than the agencies in countries that have not.

**B. Counterterrorism Agencies**

A country’s agencies and organizations tasked with counterterrorism and protecting national security are an important component of a Homeland Security strategy. Examining their change, development and reorganization can assist in the goal of gauging the influence of terrorism and terrorist events within a specific country. To begin, an effort of finding what agencies and ministries are responsible for the counterterrorism effort of each country is essential. Sometimes the mere existence of an agency or department within a country can

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indicate whether or not terrorism is considered a priority. Does the country being studied dedicate specific agencies, ministries, or departments to counterterrorism? If so, what are their responsibilities? Change in the addition or subtraction of counterterrorism related agencies and organizations in each country occurring both before and after the attacks on 9/11 can show just how much influence terrorism had on each country’s Homeland Security strategy. These questions are important to understanding the commitment made toward ending the threat of terrorism. Countries with specialized agencies and personnel assigned to combat terrorism will be assumed to benefit United States security abroad.

C. Laws

Law is often an essential element for a countries enforcement effort. Terrorism is often considered a challenge for law enforcement and in some cases the military. Laws that address the issues raised by the threat of terrorism can be an indicator of how a country perceives the threat. Knowledge about the creation and existence of anti-terrorism laws in each country is driven by terrorist events can indicate how much influence 9/11 had. Since terrorism has existed in Europe much longer than in the United States it is expected that many countries will have had laws dealing with the terrorist threat before 9/11. Knowledge of new laws added after 9/11 can also be an indicator of the influence that terrorist event had on a particular country. One of the questions this project will attempt to answer is; what changes in law and strategy have changed, or been introduced in each country since 9/11? The backbone of any society is its legal system. Examining the existence of laws both pre- and post- 9/11 will indicate the legislative response taken by each country as a result of
terrorism. Information will be gleaned from original sources of law from each country, barring any language barriers.

D. **Budgetary Support**

What are the budgetary considerations and changes in relation to defense and national security that have taken place since 9/11? An indicator of terrorism’s influence after 9/11 will be whether or not the country allocated money in its budget for future counterterrorism efforts. While this information may be hard to come by for international countries, it will clearly show the country’s dedication to combating this threat. Possible sources will be from Ministries of Finance and Interior budgeting sections. However, this information is not as transparent in foreign countries as it is in the United States. Often times the budgetary figures of certain programs are classified, especially ones dealing with national security and terrorism. The goal here is to see an increase or decrease before and after 9/11.

Gathering the data necessary to answer each of these questions requires an extensive amount of literature research. Collection of the data extends from as many original sources as possible. Consideration of country data presented in a foreign language is anticipated. In this case, any secondary sources in English can be substituted for the originals. Government-related websites are also considered a reliable source of information regarding the organizational structure of the agencies and ministries of each country and the duties and responsibilities associated with them. Finally, current information on the status of homeland security affairs can assist in the contrast between pre- and post- 9/11.

In conclusion, many factors may influence the development of, and changes to, foreign counterterrorism strategies. How much terrorism influences these strategies as
opposed to other threats against national security such as natural disasters and/or war, are the questions this project will attempt to answer. Many countries have a different definition of terrorism, but all agree that terrorism is a detriment for progress. Of the studied countries, those that possess a history of terrorism, agencies tasked with countering the terrorist threat, laws that effectively address terrorism, and a dedicated budget toward the mitigation of terrorism will be considered to be the most influenced by terrorism and, in turn, the best ally for United States Homeland Security.
IV. CASE STUDIES

The following case studies are of the fourteen original members of NATO including Turkey and Greece up until the end of the cold war in 1990. To determine the level of influence terrorism has on each country’s Homeland Security strategy before and after the 9/11 attacks, the following strategic areas were examined: History of terrorism; Counterterrorism Agencies; Counterterrorism Laws; and Budget. The historical experience with terrorism is considered a main factor when determining the maturity level of counterterrorism strategy. The countries are ordered according to a rough sense of the impact of terrorism in each state—from the greatest to the smallest effects—over a nine year period, January 1, 1996 through December 31, 2004, giving a picture of conditions both before and after the 9/11 terrorism events.

United Kingdom

Overview. Many countries across the world were affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, including the United Kingdom. Sixty-seven United Kingdom citizens lost their lives in the World Trade bombings that day. In order to fully understand what the United Kingdom is currently doing with counterterrorism we must know its history with terrorism both before and in the five years after the 9/11 attacks to fully grasp its strategy and reasoning. Understanding this history can provide a window into the structure of
national security strategy and the motivation behind the agencies tasked with counterterrorism.

*History of Terrorism.* Terrorism in the United Kingdom has occurred for many decades. Since the 1960s the threat of domestic terrorism from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) remained constant until it ended its armed campaign against UK forces on July 28, 2005. Over three and a half decades the political violence with the IRA accounted for the loss of thousands of lives in the United Kingdom. But as the threat from the IRA had subsided a new one began to emerge. Prior to 9/11 the IRA movement in Northern Ireland constituted the main impetus for counter-terrorist legislative measures throughout the decades. IRA bombings and political violence since 1969 amounted to the deaths of over 3,200 people, 100 of which occurred on the British homeland.\(^6^1\) The United Kingdom began to see a rise in Islamic terrorists not only across the globe but also in its own backyard. Even before 9/11 the United Kingdom security forces were used to dealing with third party foreign threats. The attacks against American targets abroad in the late 1990s and the rising Muslim community in the United Kingdom only heightened this awareness among British security forces. Quickly, the UK focus on the IRA shifted to international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Table 1 shows the details.

Table 1. Notable International Terrorist Events in the United Kingdom 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 9, 1996:</td>
<td>The IRA broke their cease-fire of August 31, 1994 when they detonated a 500-pound bomb in an underground parking garage in London’s largest office and apartment development. Two people were killed and 106 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 15, 1996:</td>
<td>IRA members at London’s Leicester Square set off a plastic explosive bomb in a phone booth during lunchtime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 18, 1996:</td>
<td>A bomb exploded in a double-decker bus in London killing one person and injuring eight others. The IRA claimed credit. Subsequent police raids yielded arrests and the seizure of explosives and bomb making equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 26, 1996:</td>
<td>The IRA threatened to attack the Royal Family causing an increase in security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 9, 1996:</td>
<td>The IRA was suspected of setting off a bomb in a recycling bin outside a Central London cemetery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 1996:</td>
<td>A bomb went off in a residential neighborhood in London causing no injuries. The IRA had phoned in a warning prior to the explosion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 24, 1996:</td>
<td>The detonator failed on a large Semtex bomb that had been planed on the Hammersmith Bridge by the IRA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15, 1996:</td>
<td>Police raided an IRA bomb factory in London seizing bomb-making materials and arresting several men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23, 1996:</td>
<td>Police conducted several raids on IRA hideouts seizing ten tons of explosives that were to be used in future bombings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 13, 1997:</td>
<td>One of four letter bombs exploded in the London office of Al-Hayat injuring two mail-security employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3, 1997:</td>
<td>The IRA coded telephone warnings to British police that led to the discovery of two bombs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 5, 1997:</td>
<td>The IRA claimed credit for two bomb threats that disrupted the Grand National steeplechase. 60,000 people had to be evacuated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18, 1997:</td>
<td>Two bombs went off near rail stations around London. The IRA was suspected in both incidents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 21, 1997: IRA callers threatened London rail, road, and air traffic with bomb attacks then detonated one in the Sinn Fein officer in Londonderry causing no injuries.


May 16, 1997: Newly elected British Prime Minister lifted the ban on official contact with Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA.

September 9, 1997: Sinn Fein announced that the IRA would be renouncing violence and commit itself to peaceful means of ending the conflict.

December 11, 1997: Sinn Fein and the British government met for the first time since 1921.

May 12, 1998: British, Belgium, and French security services arrest eight members of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group in London.

July 10, 1998: London police arrest seven Irish terrorists before they were able to detonate a bomb in central London. The men were believed to be IRA dissidents.

September 20, 1998: Khalid al Fauwaz the head of Al Qaeda in England is arrested for conspiracy of the East African bombings on United States Embassies.

September 23, 1998: Police arrest seven men on terrorist charges for their associations with Osama bin Laden and Advice and Consent a group dedicated to upending the Saudi monarchy.

April 18, 1999: A bomb packed with six-inch nails exploded in a south London street market injuring 48 people. The neo-Nazi group Combat 18 later claimed credit.

April 30, 1999: A nail bomb exploded in a crowded gay Pub in a well-known location in Soho. Two people were killed and over 60 injured. The White Wolves claimed credit for the bombing.

June 16, 1999: A member of the IRA Belfast Brigade shot and wounded a special branch agent in Tyneside.

June 30, 2000: A bomb exploded on the Dublin-Belfast rail line by a dissident group using a codeword.

July 19, 2000: Police discovered a bomb and safely diffused it in the underground Station in West London.

September 20, 2000: A small missile was fired at the MI-6 headquarters in Central London causing minimal damage. IRA dissident groups were suspected.

March 4, 2001: The Real IRA set off a 20-pound taxicab bomb outside a BBC television studio in West London. No injuries were reported.

April 14, 2001: Police suspected the Real IRA for setting off a bomb at a vacant postal center. No injuries reported.
August 2, 2001: The Real IRA set off a bomb in a Saab just outside a subway station in West London injuring seven people. Police received a vague warning earlier that night.

September 21, 2001: Scotland Yard arrested four people in connection with the WTC attack. Several British citizens died in the attack at the World Trade Center.

September 28, 2001: British police arrested a 36-year old man for terrorism charges headed to the United States.

October 2001: British authorities had arrested Sulayman Bilal Zain-ul Ibidin and Mohammed Jameel for their links to a service that trained Muslims for jihad.

November 2, 2001: A car bomb exploded in a busy intersection of Birmingham. The Real IRA was suspected.

November 15, 2001: Scotland Yard’s antiterrorism branch arrested six members of a dissident IRA group.

December 17, 2001: An 80-page al Qaeda manual was discovered by NPR radio containing plans to bomb the Moorgate subway center in London.

January 17, 2002: British police charge two men with planning and financing terrorist attacks for al Qaeda in Leicester.

February 2002: Scotland Yard arrests Shaykh Abdullah Ibrahim el Faisal for calling for the murder of non-believers, and instructing men on how to train for battle and use Kalashnikov assault rifles.

March 1, 2002: Poison letters mailed to Prime Minister Tony Blair by members from the Scottish National Liberation Army.

March 27, 2002: Abdel Bari-Atwan, editor of a London Arabic newspaper, receives email from Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda.

May 10, 2002: Timer detonated bomb explodes at Armenian Embassy. No casualties occurred from the explosion and suspects unknown.

October 2002: UK government adds Jemmaah Islamiah, Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and Asbat al-Ansar to the list of groups banned by the Terrorism Act of 2000.

October 23, 2002: Police arrest Omar Uthman Abu Omar a Palestinian Islamic cleric associated with the European operations of al Qaeda. Omar had been associated with shoe bomber Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui along with many others with ties to al Qaeda in other countries.

January 5, 2003: Anti-terrorist Police arrest four North African men after discovering traces of ricin in their apartment in North London. Four men were eventually charged with possession of articles for the “commission, preparation, or instigation of an act of terrorism,” and with “being concerned in the development or production of chemical weapons.”

January 14, 2003: Police raid linked to a January 5th ricin investigation yield two more suspects.


February 6, 2003: Several raids conducted on suspected Terrorists under the Terrorism Act of 2000. Six men and one woman arrested from the act that makes it illegal to belong to or support terrorist groups.

February 11, 2003: Intelligence alert issued after suspicion that Islamic extremists had smuggled SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles into the United Kingdom. Heathrow Airport is surrounded by 450 troops for protection.

February 13, 2003: Venezuelan man charged with possession of explosives under the Terrorism Act of 2000 after hand grenade found in luggage at airport.

March 7, 2003: Sentencing of 9 years of terrorist Abdullah al-Faisal for stirring up racial hatred and urging the killing of Hindus, Jews and Americans.

June 22, 2003: Saudi Arabia critic stabbed outside his home by two men indicating the attack was a message from the Saudi government.

August 16, 2003: Police arrest Abdurahman Alamoudi a Muslim leader who was carrying $340,000 in his suitcase. It was later determined the money was to be used to assassinate the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah by the Libyan government. Almoudi plead guilty to his involvement and illegally moving the cash.

September 30, 2003: 11 Algerian nationals arrested by UK Anti-terrorist branch in early morning raids.

November 27, 2003: Police arrest three men for suspicion to terrorism offenses and links to the shoe bomber Richard Reid.

November 29, 2003: Refugee status given to Chechen Rebel leader wanted in Russia.

December 2, 2003: Police arrest 14 people on terrorism charges. Their identities and nationalities were not released.

January 5, 2004: A letter bomb explodes in member of Labor Party’s Manchester office. An Italian anarchist group is suspected.

February 12, 2004: Flight cancelled from Heathrow to Washington Dulles over security concerns.
March 9, 2004: Five suspects deported from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Britain on suspicion of terrorism in supporting the Taliban.

March 30, 2004: 700 police officers and MI5 agents seize a half-ton of explosives from storage container near Heathrow Airport. 24 raids conducted yielded eight Pakistani men all British citizens.

April 6, 2004: United States and UK counterterrorism forces stop plot by al Qaeda group to obtain osmium tetroxide. Group possible planned to attack civilians in London.

April 19, 2004: Police arrest 10 terrorism suspects in Manchester and other parts of the UK who were under suspicion of plotting to blow up stadiums. Suspects released a week later determined to be only sports fans.

May 27, 2004: Anti-terrorist squads at the request of the United States, arrest Abu Hamza Masri a Muslim cleric for a mosque that as a focal point for Islamic radicals.

August 3, 2004: Police arrest 13 people linked to al Qaeda for planning and participating in surveillance of five U.S. financial services buildings just before 9/11. Among the arrestees was Eisa Hindi a key al Qaeda figure. Hindi posed as a student while conducting surveillance of targets.

August 5, 2004: Scotland Yard arrested Babar Ahmad on an extradition request from the United States for soliciting funds for terrorism via the Internet.

August 19, 2004: Police arrest a 19-year-old man under the 2000 Terrorism Act and two others on Immigration charges.

August 26, 2004: Police arrest Abu Hamza al Masri with 10 counts of soliciting others to murder non-believers.

September 21, 2004: Cat Stevens returned back to London after being denied entry to the United States on a no-fly list.

September 24, 2004: Three men were arrested by Anti-terrorism squad for being in contact with man seeking to purchase a dirty bomb.

November 22, 2004: Police prevent al Qaeda planes from hitting Heathrow Airport and skyscrapers in the London area.

December 9, 2004: UK counterterrorism forces foil planned attack in London similar to the train attacks in Madrid, Spain.

July 7, 2005: Suicide bombers hit underground trains and a double-decker bus in London killing 56 people in worst terrorist attack in UK history. Bombers were British nationals.

July 21, 2005: Four other would be suicide bombers attempt an identical attack on three trains and a bus. Bombs fail to go off. All suspects are British nationals.
August 10, 2006: British police foil a plot to blow up jetliners over Atlantic with liquid explosives. 25 suspects are taken into custody.


Between the years 1996 and 2004 the United Kingdom experienced over 70 incidents related to terrorism. Of the total 77 incidents, a large portion (33), were bombings. Bombings occupied the majority of incidents prior to September 11, 2001 and were carried out primarily by the IRA and related groups. Between the years 1996 and 2004 a total of 29 incidents were related to arrests of suspected terrorists. Of those incidents only four occurred before 9/11. After 9/11, arrests related to terrorism totaled 25 and consisted mainly of Middle Eastern subjects associated with Al Qaeda.

*Counterterrorism Agencies.* Due to its long history with terrorism, the United Kingdom has implemented several agencies tasked with the national security of the country. Terrorism is considered one of the main drivers of creation and structure for each agency and/or organization. No one single agency tasked with the sole responsibility of homeland security exists in the United Kingdom. Rather, several agencies make up the counterterrorism forces for the United Kingdom. A description of each agency with this responsibility is in Table 2.

Table 2. Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in the United Kingdom 1996-2004

United Kingdom Cabinet--Supreme decision-making body in the UK government.  
Cabinet Office--Supports the UK ministerial committee and brings together department ministers.  

Defense Intelligence Staff--Military intelligence council responsible for collection and analysis.

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)--Analysis center for military intelligence dealing with homeland security issues.

Security and Intelligence Coordinator--Responsible to the Prime Minister for counterterrorism and crisis management, sets and prioritizes budgets for the intelligence services, ensures the delivery of CONTEST strategy and chairs the Civil Contingencies Committee.63

Civil Contingencies Committee--Responsible for long-term emergency preparedness and response.64

Home Office--The central agency responsible for the response to the terrorism threat in the United Kingdom. Also known as the interior ministry, the Home Office is responsible for domestic security policies, planning for terrorism training exercises and counter methods for CBRN threats.65

Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism--Leads the work on counterterrorism in the UK, working very closely with the police, intelligence, and security services.66

Intelligence Agencies:

MI6--Security agency responsible for foreign secret intelligence (also known as SIS, or Secret Intelligence Service) 67

MI5--Domestic intelligence service responsible for defending the country against terrorism, espionage, and other serious crimes against the state (also known as U.K. Security Service).

Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC)--Intelligence analysis center for MI5 and law enforcement. Created in 2003 to improve communication between law enforcement and intelligence by bringing together one hundred officials from eleven government departments and agencies.68 This organization is the equivalent to the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) in the United States.

GCHQ--Collects foreign communication signals such as emails, wire transmissions, etc. Equivalent to the United States NSA.69

The Metropolitan Police (The MET)--The largest police force in London, the Met consists of 31,000 officers who cover 620 square miles and 7.2 million people.70

Specialist Operations of the Metropolitan Police (SO13, SO15, SO19)--Interrelated with MI5 as the law enforcement arm of the intelligence agency, this branch also deals with protection of politicians, embassies

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64 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
and royalty, investigation of terrorist crimes and with the support of other government agencies who are also responsible for counterterrorism efforts.71

Laws. The United Kingdom has taken a more aggressive approach toward combating terrorism since the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. Law enforcement and intelligence capabilities have targeted al Qaeda in a much more rigorous manner. A more proactive approach has encompassed the UK strategy, including rounding up more suspects for questioning, conducting raids on potential terrorist suspects, monitoring mosques, improving communication between agencies, combating the homegrown terrorist threat, and giving more consideration toward biological and chemical threats. In addition to increased enforcement, the UK government has also introduced several pieces of legislation focused on counterterrorism.

1. The Terrorism Act of 2000. Prior to 9/11 the parliament introduced one of the United Kingdom’s most successful pieces of counterterrorist legislation, the Terrorism Act of 2000. This Act remains the centerpiece of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorist legislation and was created to address the rising threat from international terrorism. The Terrorism Act of 2000 defines terrorism as the following:

“The use of threat of a specified action where the use to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The action is a specified action if it involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life, other than the person committing the action; creates a serious risk to the

health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”

The Terrorism Act of 2000 gave police greater stop and arrest powers and the power to detain suspects up to twenty-eight days; made it illegal for a list of terrorism groups to operate in the United Kingdom; and added new criminal offenses such as inciting terrorist acts, seeking and providing training for terrorist purposes including training in firearms, explosives or CBRN weapons. In addition to adding criminal offenses dealing with the operations of terrorism, the Terrorism Act of 2000 also targeted the financing of terrorism. Fund raising, use or possession of money for the purposes of terrorism, money laundering, and the promotion of funds to be used to finance terrorism were all added to the offense list under the Act.

2. The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001. The first legislative response in the UK to the attacks of 9/11 came in the form of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001 (ATCS). The ATCS built on measures already in place in the areas of WMD, financing activities, search and seizure, powers of arrest for police, asset-freezing powers, disclosure of information, immigration and asylum, race and religion, and nuclear security to name just a few. Section 4 of the Act dealt with Control Orders. Control Orders give officials authority to “impose conditions upon individuals ranging

from prohibitions on access to specific items or services (such as the Internet), and restrictions on association with named individuals, to the imposition of restrictions on movement or curfews.\textsuperscript{76} The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 later amended the ATCS.

3. The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005. Approximately six months before the attacks on the subway and bus systems in July of 2005, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 was introduced. The main focus of this legislation was to alleviate problems with the immigration detention provisions of the ATCS and address the issue of Control Orders.\textsuperscript{77} The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 allowed Control Orders to be made against any suspected terrorist, national or non-national, in any situation, domestic or international.\textsuperscript{78} These Control Orders are like restraining orders in the United States, thus restricting a person’s freedom as selected by the government.

4. The Terrorism Act of 2006.\textsuperscript{79} This new law created a number of new criminal offenses related to terrorism and amended existing legislation dealing with police powers of arrest and search and seizure. Some of the offenses added by the Act are as follows:

- Acts Preparatory to Terrorism-- This section aims to capture those who intend to assist others in committing acts of terrorism or plan events themselves.
• Terrorist training offenses--Anyone who gives or receives training in relation to terrorism will be prosecuted. Attendance at a place of terrorist training is also prosecutable.
• Making, using, or possessing radioactive devices or materials.
• The sale, loan, or other dissemination of terrorist publications.
• Encouragement of Terrorism--It is illegal to publish or glorify terrorism directly or indirectly or encourages others to commit acts of terrorism.

The act also amends existing legislation giving greater powers to police in the areas of search warrants, detention and stop powers, and increased flexibility of the proscription process. Additional changes in United Kingdom counterterrorism policy included a long-term plan by parliament to begin collecting biometric information on British citizens. This information would be used to develop hi-tech identification cards mandatory for each citizen. The UK also has been well known for its extensive use of CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) surveillance throughout Central London. Over 400 million pounds is spent per year on surveillance of the public.

**Budgetary Support.** With many new programs, agencies, and legislation introduced after the 9/11 attacks, the strain on the UK budget was enormous. Enhancing law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, improving transportation and border security, conducting preparedness and response exercises, and expanding CBRNE measures caused the budget to grow exponentially throughout the years after 2001. The

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82 Ibid.
UK spending on counterterrorism in 2001 amounted to just under $1.8 billion dollars per year. Comparatively, the 2008 budget request totaled $3.6 billion.\textsuperscript{83} Intelligence spending is also on the rise. Expenses of the three combined intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6, and GCHQ) will comprise 2.3 billion of the $50 plus billion dollars spent every year on security in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{84} It is clear that terrorism has influenced the security programs and strategy of the United Kingdom since the attack on September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001.

\textit{Conclusion.} The United Kingdom is clearly the biggest ally in Europe for the United States. The UK’s counterterrorism strategies are very comprehensive aggressively covering intelligence, enforcement, border control, military presence, detention, financial, and prosecutorial areas. The United Kingdom has the resources to adequately fund its counterterrorism strategy. Because the UK vigilante attitude toward international terrorism resulted from its experience with the IRA, UK government did not hesitate to make changes to its laws and agencies to support the United States in combating the threat from Islamic extremists. The UK government recognizes the links between the many different tactics that need to come together to effectively fight terrorism and uses technology and intelligence as the first line of defense. Dedicating its efforts to intelligence gathering assists the enforcement aspect of counterterrorism, making the UK’s efforts a force to be reckoned with. The attacks of 9/11 helped refocus

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
the UK’s legislation and strategy toward the international terrorist threat and away from the domestic one created by the IRA for many years.

Spain

_Overview._ Spain made some changes to its counterterrorism policy and strategy after 9/11. The Spanish support given to the United States before 2004 included military support in Afghanistan and Iraq. Spain also increased its dialogue with other countries and expanded the powers of their intelligence agencies.\(^{85}\) On March 11\(^{th}\), 2004 Spain experienced its own 9/11 at the hand of al Qaeda. This attack prompted a change in government strategy toward terrorism. Spain pulled out all troops from Iraq and caved to al Qaeda’s intimidation. But this action by the Spanish government does not make Spain a weak ally against terrorism. On the contrary, Spain continues to support global efforts to mitigate the terrorist threat, taking the lessons learned through many decades of terrorism and applying them to the new threat posed by Islamic extremists.

_History of Terrorism._ Spain has experienced several decades of domestic terrorism at the hands of the Basque Homeland and Liberty group or ETA. Spanish citizens did not consider the threat of international terrorism greater than that of the domestic one. Between the first in 1968 and the last in 2003, ETA attacks are responsible for a total of over 800 deaths in Spain.\(^{86}\) Domestic terrorism and the government effort in mitigating this threat is not a new concept for Spain. However, the threat from Islamic


terrorists and international terrorism is now considered of equal importance to the domestic threat if not more. In March of 2004, Spain experienced an attack from Al Qaeda in what they consider to be their own 9/11. Backpack bombs planted in the subway systems by Al Qaeda operatives killed over 200 people. The Al Qaeda attacks resulted in Spain’s pullout of all troops in Iraq and influenced a change in presidential leadership during the subsequent election. In 2006 the ETA ended their violent campaign much like the IRA did with the British government. While the domestic counterterrorism efforts in Spain are strong, the efforts against international terrorism since 9/11 and the attacks of March 3, 2004 (3/11) have required and increase in coordinated efforts among the centralized national security forces. A description of each agency with this responsibility is in Table 4.

Table 3: Notable International Terrorist Events in Spain 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 1996:</td>
<td>The Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA) claimed responsibility for four bombings at tourist locations around Spain. A bomb in the airport at Reus injured 39 people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26, 1996:</td>
<td>A Miami court convicted a Palestinian barber for hijacking a flight from Spain to Havana forcing it to land in the United States. The suspect assembled a fake bomb in the lavatory of the plane and forced his way into the cockpit using half of a pair of scissors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 7, 1997:</td>
<td>Two ETA members shot and killed a Spanish army Lieutenant Colonel as he exited his car to go into his house. Shortly after the attack a car bomb exploded in the same neighborhood indicating a common tactic by the ETA to dispose of evidence from the assassins.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

February 10, 1997: The ETA assassinated a Supreme Court judge outside his home and set off a car bomb in Grenada, killing an air base worker and wounding seven others.

October 13, 1997: Police and Basque separatists engaged in a gunfight that killed a police officer. Police later seized explosives at a farmhouse where terrorists were planning to attack a museum on opening day in Spain.

December 5, 1997: Basque separatists were blamed for shooting a politician’s bodyguard then blowing up their getaway car.

January 9, 1998: ETA members killed a Spain town councilman with a car bomb.

January 10, 1998: ETA sent a letter bomb to the home of a Spanish army officer that injured two women when it exploded.

March 19, 1998: In a raid against the ETA, police arrested ten people and seized 265 pounds of explosives.

May 6, 1998: The ETA assassinated a politician of the ruling Popular Party in Pampalona for opposing their campaign. The politician was shot twice in the head.

September 16, 1998: The Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA) issued a cease-fire agreement after 30 years of violence in Spain’s homeland. The ETA had killed 800 people during its campaign. The government requested the ETA disarm and disband.

March 10, 1999: Police arrested ten suspected ETA members.

June 7, 1999: Spanish bomb technicians diffused a letter bomb sent to an Italian diplomat by the Red Brigades.

November 28, 1999: The ETA announced it was ending its cease-fire because of attacks by Spain and France and the failure of nationalists to create a Basque state.

December 20, 1999: Police foiled a plot by the ETA to bomb the Picasso Tower in Madrid.

January 21, 2000: The ETA detonated two car bombs killing an army Colonel in Madrid.

January 27, 2000: Police suspected the ETA in an attack on a Citroen car dealership.

February 11, 2000: Four members of the ETA were suspected of setting fire to a Citroen car dealership in Amorebieta.

August 7, 2000: A car exploded carrying four ETA members on their way to a bombing killing all four occupants.

September 10, 2000: The ETA claimed responsibility for setting off a bomb at a disco in Deba. No injuries were reported.

September 13, 2000: Police arrested 19 people believed to be associated with EKIN, the ETA’s clandestine strategy unit, during predawn raids. Since the ETA withdrew their cease-fire 12 people had been killed in 2000 as a result.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 2000</td>
<td>Police located several grenades in launching tubes 600 yards from where the Prime Minister and German Chancellor would be meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 2000</td>
<td>A vehicle carrying explosives detonated but caused no injuries. No one claimed credit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 22, 2001</td>
<td>ETA members detonated a car bomb near a commuter station killing two men on their way to work. A councilman, who was the apparent target, was seriously injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6, 2001</td>
<td>Police suspected the ETA in the assassination of a ruling party senator and president of the Popular Party in Aragon. 9 mm shells were found at the scene, the preferred weapon of the ETA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 2001</td>
<td>A car bomb exploded in Madrid injuring 14 people. The ETA phoned in a warning to firefighters prior to the explosion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 24, 2001</td>
<td>Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA) shot and killed a CFO of a local newspaper owned by a news conglomerate that had criticized the ETA for decades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2001</td>
<td>The ETA was blamed for a parcel bomb that was remotely detonated in front of a Madrid bank. General Justo Orega Pedraza was seriously burned in the blast and 15 others injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 27, 2001</td>
<td>The ETA detonated a 110-pound bomb at the Madrid International Airport in the parking lot. ETA members issued a warning before the detonation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 12, 2002</td>
<td>The Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA) detonated 44 pounds of explosives hidden in a stolen vehicle in downtown Bilbao wounding two people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 21, 2002</td>
<td>Police arrest six ETA members and seize weapons and explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 2002</td>
<td>Police arrest a suspected financier for al Qaeda bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa in 1998. The suspect, an Algerian, also had possible ties to 9/11 hijacker, Mohamed Atta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20, 2002</td>
<td>A car bomb explodes belonging to the ETA. No known injuries or fatalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 23, 2002</td>
<td>Madrid police arrest a Syrian businessman for his help in financing Osama bin Laden’s operations that had already been dismantled. The suspect, Muhammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi, was also accused of sending money to Germany to Mohammed Atta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 2002</td>
<td>The ETA sets off two car bombs near a soccer stadium in Madrid injuring 17 people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
May 14, 2002: Police arrest two suspected ETA members with 440 pounds of explosives hidden in their apartment they planned to use to bomb the summit of European and Latin American leaders.

May 23, 2002: The ETA set off a car bomb near a university in Pamplona that injured two people and damaged several buildings. A warning was phoned in prior to the bombs detonation.

June 12, 2002: Police locate a large cache of explosives including 288 pounds of dynamite in a wooded area where two ETA members were detained only two days earlier. Tourist sites during a EU summit were suspected to be the intended targets.

June 21, 2002: A vehicle bomb exploded in the town of Fuengirola injuring six people. ETA members were suspected.

July 17, 2002: Police arrest Kamal Hadid Chaar, a Syrian born Spanish citizen on charges that he belonged to an al Qaeda cell that played a key role in the 9/11 attacks. Chaar was one of three Syrian born suspects arrested by Spanish authorities with suspected al Qaeda links.

August 4, 2002: A car bomb exploded outside the police barracks in Alicante killing two people that included a 14-year-old girl. The ETA was blamed.

January 24, 2003: Police arrest 16 al Qaeda suspects in multiple raids in Catalonia. Explosives, bomb making components, toxic material, fake documents, credit cards, and manuals on chemical warfare for 12 sites in Barcelona were seized.

March 2003: The Spanish Supreme Court banned the ETA’s political party, Batasuna.

May 30, 2003: The ETA is blamed for setting off a car bomb that killed two policemen and injured a third.

July 13, 2003: Police defused a bomb planted by the ETA after receiving a warning phoned in by the ETA.

July 22, 2003: Two ETA bombs explode just minutes apart on different locations. Several people injured including police officers. No fatalities since the bombers warned the authorities before hand.

July 27, 2003: ETA car bomb explodes in an airport parking lot after a warning call by the ETA. No injuries or casualties.

September 5, 2003: Spanish authorities arrest an al-Jazeera journalist who had interviewed bin Laden after 9/11. Accused of being a member of an armed group, Syrian-born Tayssir Alouni, was sentenced to jail and then later released due to heart problems.

September 8, 2003: A parcel bomb suspected of being planted by an anarchist group was diffused outside the Greek Consulate.
October 8, 2003:  A combined effort by French and Spanish police netted 33 ETA suspects arrested in both countries.


December 24, 2003:  Two ETA members with backpack bombs arrested when they tried to plan attacks on a train at a Madrid station.

February 23, 2004:  An Algerian forger was arrested for suspicion of supplying forged documents to the Hamburg, Germany al Qaeda cell.

February 29, 2004:  Civil Guard arrested two ETA members for carrying 1,100 pounds of bomb making chemicals in a small truck.

March 11, 2004:  Al Qaeda operatives detonate 10 backpack bombs on four commuter trains in three Madrid train stations during rush hour in the city. Over 200 people were killed and 2,000 injured. The attacks occurred just before nationwide elections making it the first time a terrorist group has influenced the outcome. Al Qaeda claimed the attacks were a result of Spain’s support of the United States’ war on Islam.

March 28, 2004:  The government intercepted three letter bombs addressed to Spanish news outlets resembling those used by anarchist groups.

April 2, 2004:  Police find bomb under the tracks of a bullet train consistent with those of the 3/11 attacks. The detonator for the device seemed to be not properly connected to the bomb.

April 5, 2004:  A handwritten letter by al Qaeda commander Abu Dujana al-Afgani was faxed to a newspaper in Madrid. The letter took credit for the 3/11 attacks and the bomb found on the bullet train tracks.

May 14, 2004:  Spanish counterterrorism forces arrest three Algerians and a Spaniard for their involvement with al Qaeda recruitment efforts.

August 7, 2004:  A bomb planted by ETA separatists exploded on the northern coast town of San Vicente de la Barquera. Unknown injuries reported.

August 12, 2004:  Explosions that injured two men rocked the coastal towns of Santander and Gijon. ETA was believed to be trying to hurt the tourist industry.

August 21, 2004:  ETA set off two bombs in small northwestern towns. No injuries.

August 28, 2004:  A bomb set by the ETA exploded in Santiago de Compostela, a Christian pilgrimage center. A second bomb in a neighboring town was found and diffused by police.

September 15, 2004:  Barcelona police arrest 10 Pakistani’s suspected of providing assistance to Muslim terrorists outside Spain.

October 3, 2004:  French and Spanish counterterrorism forces initiate a crackdown on ETA members arresting 21 members including Mikel Albisu Iriarte the chief of the ETA.
October 18, 2004: Police arrest eight suspected Islamic militants and foil a planned bombing on the National Court building in Madrid. The arrests lead to many more arrests with links to various terrorist cells.

November 13, 2004: Two bombs explode at an army post in Belagua. ETA is suspected.

December 3, 2004: Five small bombs explode at various gas stations. ETA telephoned in a warning.

December 6, 2004: On Spain’s anniversary of their constitution several bombs explode in several cities across the country. ETA phoned in the warnings. 18 people wounded.

December 12, 2004: Soccer stadium evacuated after bomb threat. ETA had made similar threats several days before.

December 22, 2004: A bomb exploded at the Civil Guard police barracks causing minor damage. ETA suspected.


Summary. Spain has been plagued by the domestic terrorist acts of the ETA for decades. While the majority of terrorism related incidents in Spain consist of ETA bombings and arrests, the country has also experienced contact with Muslim extremist groups. Between 1996 and 2004 Spain tallied 72 incidents related to terrorism. Of those incidents the majority (47) were bombings mostly by the ETA. Of the remaining 25 incidents 19 were categorized as of arrests of terrorist suspects. Of the 19 arrest scenarios seven were subjects associated with Al Qaeda. All seven of the Al Qaeda arrests took place after 9/11.

The agencies involved in Spain’s counterterrorism efforts remain under the control of the federal government on a national level. Although uncoordinated, efforts to unite the agencies on an informational and intelligence sharing level have greatly increased since the attacks on 9/11 and 3/11. The Prime Ministers office has supreme
power and control over each of the ministries involved in protecting national security.

Primarily the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior carry out counterterrorism strategy in Spain. A more detailed breakdown of the agencies responsible for counterterrorism and national security is as follows.

Table 4. Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Spain 1996-2004

Prime Ministers Office
Ministry of Defense:
CNI-National Center of Intelligence- -Focuses on foreign and domestic intelligence specifically counterterrorism intelligence within its borders.
   DIE-Division of Foreign Intelligence
   DII-Division of Domestic Intelligence
   DC-Counter Intelligence Division
State Security Secretariat:
Civil Guard (Guardia Civil)--Polices rural areas and controls borders and highways. It is also responsible for explosives, firearms, ports, airports, and several anti-terrorist specialized units listed below.
   GAR-Rural anti-terrorist Group
   GEO-Special Security Group--Counter-terrorist unit trained to deal with hostage rescue and terrorism situations.
   GES-Special Security Groups
   UEI-Special Intervention Unit
Foreign Intelligence Brigade
National Police (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía)--Responsible for policing metropolitan urban areas with populations over 20,000 people. Also specializes in investigatory work encompassing a wide variety of criminal offenses including terrorism.
Municipal Police (Policia Municipal)- -Polices minor offenses from city to city, conducts traffic control, protects buildings and supports the other law enforcement agencies. Also involved in counterterrorism investigations with the National Police.
General Directorate for Civil Protection--Responsible for emergency preparedness and response. Each local government develops its own emergency preparedness plans.88
National Centre for Antiterrorist Coordination (CNCA)--Agency set up to improve the cooperation between agencies tasked with counterterrorism and is responsible for the

Spain has remained a key player in the counterterrorism efforts throughout Europe. Due to its experience with the ETA and domestic terrorism, the Spanish government is constantly looking to increase its strategy in dealing with terrorism. The attacks in the United States on 9/11 also influenced Spain’s counterterrorism strategy. A greater cooperation with the United States was established and the Spanish military supported the effort to uproot the Taliban in Afghanistan. It was this very cooperation and alliance with the United States that led to the al Qaeda attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004. After these attacks, counterterrorism strategy increased even more. Immigration and border controls were stepped up, and improved communication amongst the intelligence agencies sought. Spain also partnered with France to ease the extradition treaties of ETA members between the two countries. The aftermath in both attacks has shown that Spain is actively engaged in the global fight against terrorism and, therefore, a strong ally of the United States’ effort against international terrorism.

Spain’s commitment toward mitigating the terrorist threat is evident in the government’s actions. After 9/11, Spanish troops and military bases were used to assist the United States in Afghanistan. At home, Spain revised its terrorism laws to more effectively address the problem with anti-government groups. However, no specific counterterrorism legislation exists in the country of Spain. Existing laws created before 9/11 have been modified and amended to include terrorism related offenses. Some of the changes in existing laws and strategy are as follows.

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1. Anti-Terrorism Prevention and Protection Plan. Implemented as a result of the attacks in Madrid on 3/11, this plan consists of three readiness levels. The readiness levels are very similar to the United States Homeland Security Advisory System established by HSPD-3. Level three alert is a mix of proactive and preventative countermeasures. This level is the highest readiness level and calls for protection of high population areas, surveillance of critical infrastructure, mobilized security forces, and protection of civilian targets such as malls and stadiums.\textsuperscript{90}

2. Batasuna Law. Batasuna is the political party for the ETA. Like most terrorist groups, the ETA is consistently trying to legitimize its organization in order to justify its violent actions. The Batasuna law allowed authorities to outlaw certain groups that the Spanish government deemed a threat to society. Any group that promoted political violence, hatred, or social confrontations were subject to their financial accounts being seized and frozen, as well as arrest and incarceration of those who refused to give up their allegiance to the ETA.\textsuperscript{91} On August 26, 2002, Batasuna was suspended for three years by a Spanish judge.\textsuperscript{92}

3. National Center of Intelligence (CNI). In October of 2001 the Spanish government gave power to the Higher Defense Intelligence Center (CESID), now known as the National Center of Intelligence or CNI, the right to intercept communications and

enter residences without prior judicial permission. The powers given to the CNI are closely related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the United States. A Spanish judge would be notified after the fact for his/her authorization for the intrusions. This law is thought to give Spanish counterterrorism forces more preemptive strike advantage.  

4. Spanish Criminal Code Article 571. After the 9/11 attacks, Spain revised this criminal to include a definition for terrorism. The new revision defines terrorism as “belonging, acting in the service of or collaborating with armed groups, organizations or groups whose objective is to subvert the constitutional order or seriously alter public peace.” This broad definition of terrorism gave Spanish authorities more flexibility in their future counterterrorism strategy.

4a. Article 573. Creates a new offense for possessing weapons or explosives for the use of terrorism.

4b. Article 576. States that it is illegal to collaborate or affiliate with known terrorist groups.

**Budgetary Support.** Until 2003, the budget for new counterterrorism efforts in Spain remained unchanged. The increases and reorganization of existing counterterrorism forces as a result of 9/11 were taken from the 2003 budget. Not until after the attacks in 2004 did funding for counterterrorism increase.

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94 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
Conclusion. Spain’s main terrorist concern prior to 9/11 were the domestic threats from groups like the ETA. For decades, Spain has dealt with the threat from domestic terrorism. Much of Spannish law is constructed and formed out of its experience with this homegrown threat. Therefore, the counterterrorism strategy in Spain is centered more on enforcement than defining the strategy in military terms. After 9/11 Spain increased its support and cooperation with the United States against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Agencies responsible for counterterrorism were given more power to conduct their terrorism investigations. Legally, the Spanish government addressed the definition of terrorism for the first time after 9/11. These changes and support for the United States against terrorism were the motivation for the attacks by al Qaeda in the subway systems on March 11, 2004. The 3/11 attacks spurred a significant change in counterterrorism strategy in Spain. New laws were adopted and support for the United States and their campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq significantly decreased. Nevertheless, both the 9/11 and 3/11 attacks had a collective influence in changing the Spanish perspective and response toward international terrorism.

Turkey

Overview. Terrorism has occurred over an extensive period of Turkey’s history. The battles between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), now known as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK), cost over
30,000 lives in a period of 15 years throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The separatist movement of the Kurds has given the Turkish counterterrorism forces vast experience with a domestic threat. As the only buffer between the Soviet Union and the Middle East, Turkey is an important country settled in a strategic location in the fight against terrorism. Although legislation against terrorism within Turkey has also been introduced throughout the years, Turkey has not addressed the threat from international terrorism until after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. Since then, Turkey has made a greater effort to cooperate with the international efforts of the UN, NATO, and the EU to eliminate terrorism. National security and counterterrorism efforts have been driven by the domestic threat from the PKK and other radical groups, but has also transformed, albeit slowly, in order to deal with the international groups like al Qaeda.

**History of Terrorism.** Turkey has experience with many waves of terrorism throughout the years. In the 1960s several Marxist groups wreaked havoc and mayhem until the military initiated a crackdown on their activities and many were arrested and killed. In the mid 1970s several terrorists were released from prison and immediately went back to causing violence and organizing more terrorist groups to fight for their cause. Some terrorist groups began fighting one another, making it even more difficult for the Turkish government to determine the motivation for the activities occurring throughout the decade. Turkish diplomats were also targeted and many became the victims of assassination from a group known as the Armenian Secret Army for the

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100 Ibid. 261.
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).\textsuperscript{101} The armed forces were heavily involved in fighting the domestic threat in Turkey. As a result, the military themselves also became targets. In the 1980s and 1990s Turkish government was successful in rounding up many leaders from the separatist and Marxist groups. The PKK probably posed the most detrimental threat to Turkey. Since the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK is currently undergoing a process of change.\textsuperscript{102} Turkey also experiences terrorism from many groups with Islamic fundamentalist ties. Groups like Hezbollah, the Islamic Great Raiders Front, and Al Qaeda, often work together in using Turkey as a transit point and base of planning.\textsuperscript{103} The support for terrorism in Turkey is considered very high as many groups are seen as revolutionary in nature. Terrorists enjoy political, moral, logistical, and financial support in Turkey.\textsuperscript{104} The Turkish government takes a more militaristic approach to combating terrorism and also relies on intelligence gathering and international cooperation. The effects of Turkish response to 9/11 remain to be seen. However, Turkey is consistently striving to increase its methods against both the international and the domestic terrorism that has plagued the country for so long.

Table 5: Notable International Terrorist Events in Turkey 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January-May 1996:</td>
<td>Government death squads from Iran were blamed for the killing of five Iranian exiles. Two died in Turkey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{101} Alexander, Yonah. Combating Terrorism. (University of Michigan Press, 2002), 261.  
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid, 262.  
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, 265.  
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 269.
January 16, 1996: Pro-Chechen gunmen took 200 passengers hostage on a ferryboat and threatened to sink it unless Russian troops stopped their attacks on Chechen hostage takers in Russia. The pirates surrendered on January 19 after releasing 12 hostages.

February 20, 1996: A member of the Iranian dissident national Council of Resistance in Paris, was shot outside Istanbul. No suspects found.

April 28, 1996: The Organization for Solidarity with the Chechen Resistance Fighters claimed credit for the bombing of an Aireoflot-Russian International Airlines office in Istanbul.

November 17, 1996: Seventeen people died in a fire at the Tozbey Hotel in Istanbul. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed it had started the fire but authorities stated it was faulty wiring and negligence.

October 13, 1997: Terrorists from the PKK kidnapped a Turkish engineer and two Bulgarian engineers from a coalmine. The Turk was found dead and the two Bulgarians were released three days later.

December 10, 1997: Turkish authorities diffused a large bomb set to go off at a Turkish facility adjoining the international ATAS oil refinery in Mersin, a joint venture of the Royal Dutch/Shell group and other western oil companies.

April 10, 1998: Two PKK bombers wounded nine people when they threw a bomb into a park in Istanbul. Police later captured the suspects.

June 3, 1998: Armed PKK terrorists kidnapped a German tourist and Turkish truck driver. The German was later found unharmed; the Turkish driver was still missing as of April 1999.

August 14, 1998: A homemade bomb wounded four people including a policeman outside the University of Istanbul know for its Islamic activism.

September 14, 1998: An Islamic militant armed with a toy gun hijacked a Turkish Airlines plane diverting it to a Black Sea port. The suspect released the hostages and surrendered.

October 29, 1998: Twenty-three Muslim militants were detained after authorities uncovered a plot to crash a plane filled with explosives on to the Ankara mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. A day later a lone hijacker took control of a Turkish Airlines flight forcing it to land in Switzerland. Turkish Special Forces stormed the plane and killed the hijacker.

December 24, 1998: A female suicide bomber blew herself up killing one, injuring 14 soldiers and 8 others outside army barracks in Van.

March 13, 1999: A firebomb went off in a crowded department store, killing 13 people. The radical Maoist group TIKKO, with ties to the PKK, took credit for the bombing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 15, 1999</td>
<td>A firebomb went off across the street from the EU office in Ankara injuring one person. The explosion came shortly after the PKK warned foreign tourists against visiting Turkey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 1, 2003: Police located a time bomb strapped under a table in a McDonalds in Istanbul and disarmed it. No one claimed credit.

February 22, 2003: Two unknown people threw a bomb into the office of British Airways that caused property damage but no injuries. No one claimed credit.

April 3, 2003: Several bombs exploded outside a branch of the United Parcel Service and British Consulate in Istanbul. The terrorist group Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLK-P) was suspected.

April 8, 2003: The American based Citibank branch and British Consulate were bombed with concussion grenades causing damage but no injuries. The MLK-P was suspected.

April 15, 2003: The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) took credit for three bombings in Istanbul of American and Turkish targets causing injuries.

May 2003: A female suicide bomber from the DHKP/C accidently detonated her bomb in Istanbul killing herself and injuring another.

May 4, 2003: An unknown group or individuals set off five sound bombs at a UPS office, Tommy Hilfiger store, a Turkish bank, the U.S. Consulate, and a Nationalist Turkish Political party headquarters causing damage but no injuries.

June 2003: The DHKP/C set off a bomb under a bus carrying Turkish prosecutors on Istanbul.

June 11, 2003: A Turkish man threw two grenades at a U.S. Consulate causing damage but no injuries in retaliation for a recent assassination attempt by Israel on a Hamas leader.

August 1, 2003: A bomb technician failed to diffuse a bomb in a crowded area resulting in several deaths. CNN captured footage of the explosion.

November 15, 2003: Two Turkish suicide bombers set off truck bombs at two Istanbul synagogues in the city’s historical district killing 25 people and injuring over 300. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the bombings and police subsequently arrested several accomplices with ties to al Qaeda.

November 20, 2003: Suicide bombers set off truck bombs at a British bank and the British Consulate killing 30 and wounding 450. Only three of the dead were not Turkish Muslims. Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups claimed credit for the attacks, specifically the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades. Turkey charged a total of 15 people in the attacks including a leader of al Qaeda in Turkey.

March 9, 2004: Two terrorists with the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades fired upon a Masonic lodge and then bombed the building killing one person. The Brigades claimed credit for the attack and also on March 11 for the Madrid train bombings.
March 16, 2004: Istanbul police arrested 18 people including three for planning suicide bombings.

April 1, 2004: Turkish authorities cooperated with Italy and Belgium in a crackdown against the Turkish Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army-Front (DHKP-C) arresting 37 suspects.

April 29, 2004: Police arrest 16 members of Ansar al-Islam, who have been linked to al Qaeda, with guns and remote detonating equipment and for planning to bomb the NATO summit in June.

May 2004: Small bombs explode outside the branches of a UK bank prior to the arrival of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. The Armed Forces of the Poor and Oppressed (FESK) claimed credit.

May 20, 2004: A bomb exploded outside a McDonalds in Istanbul damaging cars. No injuries.

June 12, 2004: Kurdish rebels detonate a bomb on a road while a military patrol passed by killing two Turkish soldiers and injuring a third.

June 14, 2004: Three security guards were suspected of being killed by Kurdish rebels in the south.

June 25, 2004: Police discovered more than 30 pounds of explosives hidden in a parking garage where the NATO summit was to be held. Police diffused the bomb two hours before Turkey’s Prime Minister was scheduled to arrive. The Armed Forces of the Poor and Oppressed claimed credit.

June 26, 2004: A bomb hanging from an overpass exploded without causing any injuries. No credit claimed.

June 27, 2004: A bomb exploded in a Turkish Airlines jet prior to the arrival of U.S. President George Bush at the same airport. The Armed Forces of the Poor and Oppressed claimed credit.

July 3, 2004: A car bomb killed six people in the van that carried the provincial governor. The governor was not injured. The PKK claimed credit.

August 8, 2004: A terrorist was killed in a Kurdish region of eastern Turkey while attempting to place a bomb when it went off prematurely.

August 9, 2004: Al Qaeda set off bombs at hotels and gas plants in Istanbul that killed two and injured seven.

September 19, 2004: A bomb exploded inside a police car outside a concert injuring 14 people. Two other suspicious packages were detonated in the city as well.

September 27, 2004: Four small bombs exploded throughout Turkey at branches of a British/Hong Kong bank and a Turkish-American cultural center injuring one person. No one claimed credit.
October 24, 2004: A bomb went off in a McDonalds in Trabzon wounding six people. No one claimed credit.


**Summary.** Turkey had a total of 58 incidents related to terrorism between 1996 and 2004. Of those incidents a large majority (41) were classified as bombings. The next largest category consisted of arrests. Nine (9) incidents were classified as arrest related and the majority of those incidents (5) had al Qaeda connections. All incidents of arrest occurred after 9/11. The remaining incidents consisted of hijackings and hostage taking situations.

Turkey does not have only one agency charged with the sole responsibility of counterterrorism. Along with the main intelligence gathering body and counterterrorism agency, the National Intelligence Organization or MIT, the Turkish military is also heavily involved in counterterrorism operations, often working hand-in-hand with law enforcement.

Table 6. Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Turkey 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Intelligence Organization (MIT)</td>
<td>Responsible for the collection of nationwide security intelligence regarding potential threats against Turkey’s citizens, independence and security, and all the elements that constitute the constitutional order. The MIT also meets with the leaders and agencies tasked with national security responsibilities in Turkey and shares information directly with these entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of the Interior: General Directorate of Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkish National Police (TNP)—Responsible for the municipal boundaries inside Turkey, this centralized police force is responsible for protecting the integrity of the state and preservation of constitutional order through the protection of people and property.\textsuperscript{107} The TNP is also responsible for any issues relating to terrorism in Turkey.

Special Operations Department—A force of over 6,000 officers inside the National Police trained by the military in conducting unconventional counterinsurgency operations and urban law enforcement tactics against groups like the PKK.\textsuperscript{108}

Gendarmerie—This entity is responsible for maintaining safety and public order through law enforcement of a military nature outside the municipal boundaries of the TNP jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{109} The organization of the Gendarmerie consists of the General Command, Security Units, Border Units, Schools and Training Units, and Administrative and Logistics Support Units.\textsuperscript{110}

Village Guard Militia—Recruited from the same pool of people the PKK targets, the Village Guard is a cadre of volunteer guards trained by the Turkish military to protect villages and pro-government families in Turkey.\textsuperscript{111} As of 2000, the Village Guard numbered in excess of 95,000 members and has played a critical role in the mitigation of terrorism in Turkey.

\textbf{Laws.} Turkish anti-terrorism law had already been established prior to 9/11 due to Turkey’s long history with the domestic and international terrorism. Implemented in 1991, Anti-Terrorism Law 3713 addressed several aspects of terrorism critical to the security of Turkey.

1. Anti-Terrorism Law 3713, Article I. Anti-Terrorism Law 3713 was established in 1991 and remains a key piece of legislation in Turkey’s evolving strategy. Combined with the New Turkish Criminal Code adopted in 2004, the law’s provisions against terrorism are vast.\textsuperscript{112} It is important to note that articles one through five are some of the

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, 274.
main provisions of the legislative foundation against terrorism. Turkey’s perception of
terrorism is very broad based and is defined as the following:

“Every action committed through the application of pressure, violence; through the
spreading of fear and horror; through the scaring into submission or through uttering
threats by one or several members of an organization, for the purpose of altering the
constitutionally determined traits of the Republic, as well as the political, legal, social,
economic and secular order; or aiming at the destruction of the indivisible union of state
authority; to eliminate basic rights and freedoms; or to disrupt the State’s interior and
external security, its public order or its public health.”113

2. Article II. This part of the Anti-Terrorist Law defines membership in a terrorist
organization. With Turkey’s many domestic terrorism groups operating inside its
borders, creating a provision in the terrorism law for accomplices was considered an
important element. According to this article, a member is defined as “a person belonging
to an organization which fulfils the conditions listed in Article 1….and persons who are
not members but have taken an active part in pursuing the group’s goals are also
considered to be perpetrators of terrorist acts.”114

3. Articles III and IV. These articles both deal with the specific offenses that
Turkey considers terrorist acts. After 9/11 the titles were changed from “offenses against

114 Council of Europe website. Profiles on Counter-Terrorism Capacity: Turkey. Committee of Experts on
the State,” to “offenses against national security.”115 The acts under each of the articles are deemed terrorist acts if they meet the criteria set out in Article 1.116

Since 9/11, Turkey has expanded on its already established laws on terrorism and has added new legislation that deals with some of the externalities that terrorist attacks create.

4. The Law on Compensation for Damage. This law was enacted in July 2004 addressing the rules and procedures on compensation for physical injuries and property damage resulting from a terrorist attack or caused in the efforts of the Turkish government to combat terrorism.117

5. The Rehabilitation Law. Enacted in 2003, this law assists terrorists who surrender peacefully and wish to reenter society to strengthen the efforts against terrorism in the future.118 Subjects who also cooperate with police in providing information about the terrorist organization of which they came from can be given a reduced sentence.119

6. Mobile Electronic Systems Integration (MOBESE). This strategy utilizes technology in the form of a network of cameras positioned at strategic locations around the city of Istanbul for surveillance purposes.120

No budget information available.

Conclusion. Since 9/11, Turkey has cooperated with international organizations against terrorism. The attacks on the United States caused Turkey to increase their

116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
counterterrorism measures against al Qaeda by cutting off terrorist funding and freezing the assets of any group associated with al Qaeda. Turkey also increased security at its borders, not allowing people to immigrate illegally into the country. In addition to the increased security measures after 9/11, Turkey continues to update its legislative strategy against terrorism and look for new ways to keep terrorists out of the country.

The ways in which a country defines terrorism says a lot about its strategy against terrorism. It is clear that Turkey has included most of the elements needed for the terrorism law to play an important part in protecting the lives of their citizens. However, it is also clear that the definition is also slanted toward the domestic terrorist threat, not international terrorism. The domestic threat from the numerous terrorist groups in Turkey can lead the government to understand what the United States and other European countries may be going through today. International cooperation is a key component to effectively combating the terrorist threat, and it is clear that those of a domestic nature in Turkey have been the main driver of its national security strategy.

**France**

*Overview.* France is one of the United States most reliable allies in Europe. France and the United States do not always see eye to eye on every issue, but the relationship forged against terrorism remains strong. France often plays a central role in coordinating the response of international organizations toward terrorism. The UN, EU and NATO are organizations that address terrorism with the input of several member states. France is often a leader in all of these organizations. With a long history of
battling the ETA and other domestic terrorist groups, France has a firm grasp on counterterrorism strategy. After 9/11, France concentrated their efforts against terrorism on stopping the financing of the Taliban, creating new legislation to give law enforcement more power, and helping to coordinate the new counterterrorism committee at the United Nations. While France has endured many terrorist-related incidents throughout the years, it continues to increase its security and strategy against terrorism.

**History of Terrorism.** France is no stranger to terrorism. Radical domestic terrorist groups have plagued the country since the 1960s. Groups like the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC) have forced France to implement stringent anti-terrorism strategy. Assassinations and bombings carried out by radical groups in France as a result of occupation by the French government in foreign countries have also sparked government counterterrorist action throughout the decades. The French occupation in Algeria in the 1950s and 60s contributed greatly to several acts of terrorism conducted against French forces and civilians. In the late 1970s French separatist organizations and ideological groups began to emerge and make their mark through the use of terrorism. The Liberation Front of Brittany (FLB), one of the first separatist groups to organize in France, focused on destroying symbols of the French colonial state. Another popular separatist group that targeted the French state was the Basque Homeland and Freedom Party (ETA). Since 1968 the ETA has killed more than 800 people, including 92 as a result of one attack in

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The 1980s were particularly violent in France. The Abu Nidal organization, a Palestinian terrorist group, focused on France for a good portion of the first half of the decade. Bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations occupied the efforts of French counterterrorism forces and military personnel. But not until the 1990s did France begin to see a rise in radical Islamic terrorism. The Algerian fundamentalist threat continued to constitute the main threat from international terrorism.

In the 1990s the “Group Islamique Arme” (GIA) killed several French nationals living in Algeria and then expanded their tactics against the French in other European countries. Islamic terrorism peaked in 1995 when Algerians detonated a gas cylinder in the St. Michel subway station that killed twelve people and wounded dozens more. In the French areas of Brittany and Corsica the terrorist threat reemerged in 1998 when the Perfect of Corsica, Claude Erignac, was assassinated by a small independent terrorist group. The nationalistic motivations from Algerian terrorist groups provided fuel for the numerous attacks over the decades. But now the fundamentalist groups of Islam have taken on a new face for French counterterrorism forces. Their innovative recruitment tactics and wide expansion of networks into other countries remain the greatest challenge for France.

In recent years Al Qaeda has targeted French forces abroad and has succeeded in becoming the biggest threat facing the country today. The recruitment of French citizens

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124 Ibid.  
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid.
into the al Qaeda and GIA terrorist groups also represents a serious threat to French forces.

Table 7. Notable International Terrorist Events in France 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 1996:</td>
<td>Police raided a Moroccan and Algerian hideout where suspected terrorists had committed a series of robberies to fund jihad. The suspects were associated with a mosque in Lille known for preaching radical theology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30, 1996:</td>
<td>A Hezbollah commander was arrested in Paris while preparing an attack against Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 17, 1996:</td>
<td>ETA separatists set off a bomb outside a McDonalds restaurant causing extensive structural damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 5, 1996:</td>
<td>Corsica separatists set off a bomb in the Bordeaux offices of the French Prime Minister causing structural damage but no casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 26, 1996:</td>
<td>An unknown gunman killed the international treasurer of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and a companion in Paris. The LTTE were suspected since the victim had used some of their money for personal reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3, 1996:</td>
<td>The Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was suspected of setting off a bomb in the Paris underground metro station killing four people and injuring 86 more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 24, 1996:</td>
<td>The Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) sent a letter to the French President threatening to destroy France if prisoners were not released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 7, 1997:</td>
<td>Members of the Church of Scientology diffused a bomb planted inside the church that was set to go off minutes later. It is unknown who planted the bomb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1997:</td>
<td>French police arrest two GIA members carrying forged Belgium passports and visa stamps. The suspects planned to extend their conflict to European targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 18, 1999:</td>
<td>French counterterrorism forces acting on a tip from the CIA arrested an associate of al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in a Paris rail station for “association with the aim of preparing for terrorist acts.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 1999:</td>
<td>Police raided a location associated with the ETA and seized 2,200 pounds of explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2000:</td>
<td>The Breton Resistance Army (ARB) claimed credit for the bombing of a McDonalds in Pornic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 19, 2000:</td>
<td>Police suspected the Breton Resistance Army (ARB) for the detonation of a bomb at a McDonalds in Quevert, Dinan that killed one person. The ARB denied responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 15, 2000:</td>
<td>Police arrest the leader of the ETA’s military wing and his girlfriend for their role in ordering the assassination attempt of Spain’s King Juan Carlos in 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 22, 2001:</td>
<td>French police arrested the ETA military chief Francisco Xabier Garcia Gaztelu at a café after he ordered a bombing that killed two men in Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 10, 2001:</td>
<td>Investigation opened on Djamel Beghal, the alleged leader of an al Qaeda plot to blow up United States interests in France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 22, 2001:</td>
<td>Shoe bomber Richard Reid indicted in Boston for attempting to blow up American Airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami. Reid and several accomplices conducted most of their planning in France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 4, 2002:</td>
<td>French Intelligence arrest three Islamic militants linked to al Qaeda plotting to attack a cathedral in France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 9, 2002:</td>
<td>Suspected ETA members firebomb police headquarters in Saint Jean De Luz, France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 20, 2002:</td>
<td>Police raid the Riviera home of Osama bin Laden’s half brother in connection with a money laundering investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1-7, 2002:</td>
<td>Jewish synagogues and cemeteries are firebombed on different occasions. Three Muslims from North Africa descent are detained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2002:</td>
<td>The Corsican National Liberation Front claimed credit for several bombings throughout France in early May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 2002:</td>
<td>Two ETA assassins arrested for their role in killing 20 people, which included judges and police officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 25, 2002:</td>
<td>French customs agents discover three and a half ounces of pentrite explosives with no detonator in passenger section of airplane that landed in France. Pentrite was the same substance used by shoe bomber Richard Reid in December 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16, 2002:</td>
<td>French counterterrorism agents arrest three Algerians and a Moroccan in Paris. The suspects had connections to Rabah Kadre, an individual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
December 24, 2002: Counterterrorism officials arrest four Islamic militants suspected of planning attacks in France. The four suspects were linked to the December 16 arrests and their leader, Menad Benchellali, to al Qaeda.


March 17, 2003: Police arrest two people with links to Chechen rebels who were planning chemical weapons attacks on Russian targets. The arrests were related to the nine people arrested in December 2002.

April 14, 2003: Terrorists set fire to a car outside a McDonalds in Sergy, France, partially destroying the restaurant. No one claimed credit.

June 1, 2003: Police arrest suspected terrorist arriving at airport from Germany. Suspect had possible ties to al Qaeda and was believed to be targeting a tourist complex on Reunion Island.

June 2, 2003: Police arrest al Qaeda recruiter and suspected accomplice in Tunisian synagogue bombing that killed 21 people.

June 17, 2003: Police raid Iranian compound and arrest 159 terrorists suspected of plotting terrorist attacks in France.


October 8, 2003: Police arrest 33 ETA members in multiple raids in both France and Spain.

November 4, 2003: Police arrest five French nationals for supporting the Real IRA. A cache of arms was also seized.

December 2003: French police arrest top leaders of the ETA military wing who were planning attacks to coincide with the Christmas season.

December 4, 2003: Police arrest ETA military commander who had escaped from custody a year earlier.

December 9, 2003: Police arrest another ETA military commander suspected of several bombings. Three others arrested during apprehension of commander.

December 24, 2004: Air France cancelled three flights from Paris to Los Angeles based on intelligence that planes were to be hijacked and crashed into targets in Las Vegas, New York, or Washington.

January 6, 2004: Six people arrested in Lyon France in connection with 2002 plot to attack Russian targets with chemical weapons.
February 2004: An unknown terrorist group going by the initials AZF, attempted to extort the French government of 4 million euros but was unsuccessful.

March 16, 2004: Islamic group, Mosvar Barayev Commando, sent a letter to the French government threatening to attack French interests.

March 17, 2004: Two French citizens and an Algerian who had connections to the March 11 Madrid bombing suspects, stood trial for their role in a continuing criminal enterprise.

March 24, 2004: French rail worker found a bomb with numerous detonators buried on the commuter line railway. Bomb was disarmed and determined not be related to AZF bomb found earlier in the year.

April 4, 2004: Police raided an ETA arms factory and seized a large quantity of weapons. Two ETA members arrested.

April 8, 2004: Paris train and subway stations evacuated after threat of terrorist attack. No attack took place.


September 29, 2005: Police foil terrorist plot to bomb the Paris metro, an airport, and police intelligence and counterterrorism headquarters.


Summary. Between the years 1996 and 2004 France experienced approximately 50 incidents related to terrorism. Of those incidents 20 were related to bombings and 23 to arrests made on suspects connected to terrorism. The majority of arrests (17) came after September 11, 2001 while the bombings remained somewhat consistent throughout the period examined. Of the total arrests between 1996 and 2004 (23) approximately 15 were related to Middle Eastern terrorist organizations and seven of those arrests solely to Al Qaeda. Of the seven arrests related to Al Qaeda only one of them came before September 11, 2001.

Counterterrorism Agencies. Counterterrorism in France is not limited to one agency like the Department of Homeland Security in the United States. Instead, the Ministries of Interior and Defense lead counterterrorism efforts through numerous
intelligence and investigative agencies within the police and federal government. The following agencies and departments are the main entities tasked with the national security of France.

Table 8. Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in France 1996-2004

Ministry of Interior:
CSI--Council for Internal Security-Created after 9/11, this council, led by the French president and staffed by each ministry’s director, determines policy and priority of counterterrorism measures.\(^{128}\)

DDSC-Directorate of Defense and Public Safety- Responsible for national response planning through intelligence gathering and cooperation with regional and local governments.\(^{129}\)

DGPN-Directorate of National Police- Responsible for action against terrorism and the primary enforcement agency for civil law in cities and towns.\(^{130}\)

DST-Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory- France’s domestic intelligence service.\(^{131}\)

DCPJ-The Central Police Directorate--Conducts criminal investigations throughout France including terrorism.\(^{132}\)

National Anti-Terrorist Division-- The terrorist division of the DCPJ, also conducts terrorist financial investigations.\(^{133}\)

UCLAT-Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit-- Centralizes information provided by the Ministries of Interior, Defense, Finance, and judicial authority.\(^{134}\)

Ministry of Defense:
Armed Forces--Can be called in and used domestically.

SGDN-National Defense General Secretariat

DGSE- General Directorate for External Surveillance--Responsible for collecting and sorting electronic and military intelligence, the foreign intelligence arm of France.


\(^{129}\) Ibid.

\(^{130}\) Ibid.

\(^{131}\) Ibid.

\(^{132}\) Ibid.

\(^{133}\) Ibid.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.
Gendarmerie Nationale--The military police force responsible for enforcing the law and protecting public safety in nonurban areas. France’s second national police force.

Ministries of Economics, Finance and Industry:
DNRED-National Directorate of Customs Information and Investigations--Collects and analyses customs information on the funding of terrorism and then circulates it to relevant agencies.

TRACFIN--Unit that processes, collects, and compares data on unlawful financial circuits and then forwards them to the courts.
Reserve police and firefighters can be called in during or after an emergency event or attack: 130,000 local police, 240,000 firefighters and rescue personnel, and 97,000 Gendarmes.135

Laws. Through trial and error the French strategy to mitigate the terrorist threat has evolved to accommodate French culture and societal norms. The methods and tactics of French counterterrorism differ greatly from those of the United States. However, due to their vast experience with terrorism much can be learned from the evolution of French methods and strategy. In order to analyze how much influence terrorism and the 9/11 attacks had on French counterterrorism strategy, it is important to understand what legislation was in place before September 11, 2001. Due to the long history of terrorism in France, the government was bound to address the problem through legislation and enforcement.

1. ACT No. 86-1020 of 9 September 1986. After being the target of numerous terrorist attacks in 1986, France introduced its first terrorist legislation in Act no. 86-1020 of 9 September 1986. The legislation established new agencies specifically to combat terrorism in the country. Intelligence agencies were also organized and police forces focused more intently on groups committing the terrorist acts. The 1986 law also centralized all judicial proceedings dealing with terrorism and created a list of specific

criminal offenses relating to terrorism. 136 Crimes related to terrorism were given greater penalties and subjected to harsher legal procedure.137 Finally, the act set up compensation for victims of terrorist incidents. This act has been amended and added to several times since its inception but remains a key part of the counterterrorism strategy in France. Since 9/11 the French government has implemented several additional laws addressing terrorism, which will be discussed below.

After the attacks in the United States on 9/11 the French government continued to pass counterterrorism legislation. The following four laws were introduced in the five years after the attack:

5. Act No. 2006-64 of 23 January 2006

The four laws broadened police powers to conduct searches of vehicles and buildings, addressed cyber-security with respects to the Internet and telecommunications, increased the government’s powers of surveillance, increased security at the airports and seaports, and strengthened the government’s methods in fighting the financing of terrorism.138 The 2006 law was primarily adopted in response to the attacks on London’s railway and bus systems. The law increased preliminary detention for terrorism suspects, set pre-trial detention up to four years for a suspect who presents an imminent threat to

the country, allowed for freezing of assets, video and telephone surveillance, and increased Internet monitoring.\footnote{2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, Europe and Eurasia Overview.} \footnote{http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103707.htm.}

6. VIGIPIRATE. The day after September 11, 2001, France initiated an existing law enforcement measure throughout the country. \textit{Vigipirate}, as it is known in French, is a system that is activated by the government in times of danger to the country. Vigipirate strives to prevent terrorist threats and provide a proper response to the attacks that do happen. Consisting of two levels, the Vigipirate Simple and the Vigipirate Reinforce, the system can be activated by the president whenever he/she deems necessary. During the Gulf War in 1991 the French government activated “Simple” level, which remained in effect until 9/11. On September 12, 2001 the second level of Vigipirate was initiated, calling for enhanced awareness among all public services and on the highways. Thousands of police and soldiers were dispatched to the streets all over France. “Reinforce” is the highest level of readiness for the French government. Also secured were controls around American and Israeli buildings and diplomatic premises. Fighter jets patrolled the air space over France and the military increased its security of nuclear plants and the nation’s most sensitive infrastructure. The “Reinforce” level of Vigipirate remained in effect until the end of 2003.

7. Bioterrorism. In 2002, the government began redirecting funds in the budget for a plan to secure antibiotics in the event of a biological attack in its homeland.\footnote{Archick, Kristin. "CRS Report for Congress: European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism." Congressional Research Service (July,24, 2006).} In addition to increasing antibiotics for a bio attack, the government has implemented a
“biotox” plan to secure all biological agents that could be used as weapons by terrorists in secure laboratories, assist medical personnel with supplies in the event of an attack, develop more vaccines, and provide secure transportation for the biological agents that are controlled by the government.141

**Budgetary Support.** The French budgetary system is unlike the United States in that itemized expenses cannot be attributed to specific areas. The total budget for public order and safety around 2001 totaled one percent of France GDP, or approximately $18 billion. After the attacks on 9/11, the French parliament passed legislation that would allocate $5.6 billion for added police and gendarmes across the country. It is evident that funding for Homeland Security in France increased significantly after the 9/11 attacks that occurred in the United States.

In 2003 France experienced a natural disaster during a heat wave that killed over 14,000 people.142 This tragic event resulted in France’s implementation of a disaster management plan called “Plan Canicule.” Using existing resources and agencies the government reorganized them to deal more effectively with a future man-made or natural disaster. The increase in budget for this plan did not come close to exceeding the increase in the budget for terrorism after 9/11, even though 14,000 French citizens were killed in the heat wave.

**Conclusion.** France has taken some major steps toward increasing its counterterrorism strategy after 9/11. The history of terrorism in France might suggest

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that it has already experienced almost every situation terrorism might present. However, 9/11 proved that even the most experienced countries could improve their counterterrorism strategy. France is no exception. Sending troops to Afghanistan, creating new legislation, dedicating agencies against the terrorist threat are all examples of post 9/11 responses by France that are critical to the security of other nations in Europe and to the United States. France is also preparing for biological and chemical terrorism by funding programs designed to mitigate this threat. The actions of the French toward counterterrorism show their reliability as a key ally of the United States in the fight against terrorism.

Italy

Overview. Before 9/11 Italy’s definition of terrorism only dealt with national terrorism within the borders and did not address the international threat. While Italy’s anti-terrorism laws were well established against domestic terrorism, the provisions were not changed to include international terrorism until after 9/11. The history of terrorism in Italy has been filled with left wing and anarchist groups conducting attacks on a regular basis inside the homeland. Security in dealing with these domestic threats has consisted of a preventative and repressive strategy. However, after 9/11 strategies were adapted to confront the international perspective of terrorism. Italy has also supported other countries, including the United States, in combating terrorism. Military support in

144 Ibid, 429.
Afghanistan, working with United States intelligence and law enforcement, and supporting international organizations like NATO and the UN, are some of the many steps Italy has recently taken after 9/11.

**History of Terrorism.** Both right wing and left-wing domestic terrorism has challenged the Italian counterterrorism strategy since the 1960’s. However, left-wing terrorism has slowly become the more worrisome threat for the Italian government. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism on a global level corresponds better with the left-wing terrorist groups of Italy. The Red Brigades posed a domestic threat against the Italian government for many decades. This anarchist group conducted many acts of political violence against Italy’s heads of state, judges, and businessmen.\(^{145}\) Italy has also been subjected to threats from international terrorist organizations such as Abu Nidal and, more recently, Al Qaeda.\(^{146}\) Italy also has experience dealing with Mafia groups within the country. This type of threat differed from those of international and anarchist groups, causing the Italian government to modify its counter-terrorism strategy. Two fundamental operational tactics were adopted: infiltrating terrorist groups through wide cooperation with other units and, also, turning captured terrorists into informants in order to weed out others.\(^{147}\)


Table 9: Notable Terrorist Events in Italy 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 11-12, 1996</td>
<td>Unknown attackers threw Molotov cocktails at the Yugoslav Consulate in Milan on two separate occasions within a 24-hour period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 3, 1996</td>
<td>The Mafia was suspected of hiding two bombs inside beach umbrellas on two separate coastal resorts in an attempt to scare off foreign tourists. One person was injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16, 1997</td>
<td>Italian security forces go on high alert after receiving threats of attack on the Pope from Islamic extremists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9, 1997</td>
<td>Venetian separatists seized the Venice bell tower to publicize their independence demands. Italian commandos stormed the tower and arrested six men without incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 12, 1998</td>
<td>Police in Rome arrested the founder and head of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on international warrants. Abdullah Ocalan had flown from Russia to Italy requesting political asylum. Turkey requested extradition of Ocalan, on trial for a campaign that killed 30,000 people. Ocalan was later released and fled to Greece.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 7, 1998</td>
<td>The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) sent rat poison to two branches of the Italian News Agency ANSA in protest of Nestle’s genetic manipulation of food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16, 1999</td>
<td>The Fighting Communist Party (NTA) claimed credit for two attacks against the Verona headquarters if the Italian Democrats of the Left. The NTA threatened future attacks on NATO and “the imperialist state.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20, 1999</td>
<td>The Red Brigades and two other domestic terrorist groups took credit for the killing of the Minister of the Interiors assistant outside his office in Rome. A lengthy letter from the Red Brigades explained the motive behind the hit by denouncing the U.S., NATO, and Italy’s change in traditional foundations. Politicians and labor leaders pledged a united front against terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>Italian authorities issued 11 warrants for members of a North African Muslim extremist group. The suspects had been forging documents and raising funds for expatriate Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 5, 2001</td>
<td>The U.S. Embassy in Rome was closed due to information that police were seeking three men with links to al Qaeda and recent terrorist alerts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 5, 2001</td>
<td>Police in Italy and Germany arrested six people suspected of membership with a group tied to al Qaeda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 10, 2001: A bomb exploded destroying a building housing the Italian-American institute. The Proletarian Revolutionary Initiative Units claimed credit.

October 10, 2001: German and Italian police arrest three al Qaeda operatives one in Munich and two in Italy.

February 2002: Eight men from Pakistan jumped off a freighter from Cairo, Egypt. The men were carrying false identification papers and large amounts of money given to them by al Qaeda.

February 5, 2002: Italian courts convicted the head of al Qaeda in Europe and three Tunisian men with providing false documents to terrorists and breaking immigration laws.

February 20, 2002: Italian police arrest four Moroccans in Rome after finding 10 pounds of cyanide and a plan to introduce it into the water supply. The suspects also had highlighted maps of the U.S. Embassy. The suspects along with four others were later acquitted of the charges.

February 22, 2002: A court in Milan convicted four Tunisians on terrorist charges making the verdict the first al Qaeda conviction since 9/11. Investigators had used wiretaps and bugs to infiltrate the cell in Milan.

February 26, 2002: A hidden bomb in a scooter parked on the street in Rome explodes. No one claimed credit for the incident.

March 1, 2002: Police arrest six men on suspicion of having ties to al Qaeda. Wiretaps of the men’s communication revealed discussions about a plot to kill President Bush, a cyanide compound, weapons used to train other terrorists in Afghanistan.

March 20, 2002: Members of the Red Brigades gunned down an Italian academic and part time professor from Dickenson College in Pennsylvania in front of his residence. The victim had been working on legislation that would change the labor laws in Italy.

March 27, 2002: The U.S. Embassy warned U.S. citizens in Italy that Middle Eastern terrorists possibly would attack U.S. civilian targets in the coming month. Italy did not agree.

May 2002: Police arrest five individuals in Milan suspected of providing monetary assistance to al Qaeda.

June 2002: Police in Palermo arrested 12 individuals after a raid and found that six Italian converts to Islam may have been involved in planning the bombing of a Greek theater in Sicily and the Milan subway. No arrests were made however.

July 11, 2002: Police arrest nine suspected al Qaeda terrorists from Morocco and discovered numerous false documents for stolen cars. Some of the arrestees had ties to Abu Saleh an Egyptian al Qaeda operative who was involved in the Luxor, Egypt bombing in 1997.
July 29, 2002: Bombs were found outside Fiat’s headquarters in Milan and also outside a Labor union building. No suspect information.

August 5, 2002: Italian intelligence SISMI acting on a U.S. naval intelligence tip arrested 15 Pakistani’s with al Qaeda ties. The suspects were on a ship headed to Italy and possessed encoded messages and Karachi-Casablanca airline tickets. A coded notation found on the ship related to one used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York.

August 19, 2002: Police in Bologna arrest four Moroccans and an Italian for planning to attack the building that holds a fresco painting of Muslim prophet Mohammed burning in hell. The men were videotaping the church and talking about an attack. The court later released the men on lack of evidence.

October 2002: A captain of a ship belonging to the Nova firm radioed Italian authorities for help with 15 Pakistani men causing trouble with his crew. American and Italian counterterrorism forces questioned the men who knew nothing about sailing and confiscated large amounts of money and false documents from them. Evidence pointed to the men having ties with al Qaeda.

October 10-11, 2002: Italian police arrest five North Africans in various cities around Italy for having ties to al Qaeda through the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat cell. Evidence showed the cell had made possible plans for an attack.

January 29, 2003: Police arrest 28 Pakistanis for terrorist offenses. Seized from their apartments were large amounts of explosives false documents, more than 100 cell phones, and numerous addresses of contacts from all over the world.

March 2, 2003: Police shot a member of the Red Brigades after he fired at them on a train. The suspect’s female companion, also a member of the Red Brigades, was arrested as well.


March 31, 2003: Police diffused bomb found by employees from the United States based IBM computer company. No group claimed credit.

April 1, 2003: Italian authorities arrest six men, which included an Imam for attempting to leave Iraq.

June 13, 2003: Rome Imam suspended after praising Palestinian suicide bombers at Friday prayers.

June 17, 2003: Evidence pointing to a terrorist group aligned with the ETA was suspected of detonating a bomb in front of a Spanish school in Rome.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2003:</td>
<td>Italy’s Minister of the Interior expelled seven suspected terrorists from the country for reasons related to national security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 28, 2003:</td>
<td>Rome police arrested two men for attempting to recruit individuals for suicide bombing missions. German counterterrorism officials arrested their leader in Hamburg, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 14, 2003:</td>
<td>Police close roads around the Vatican after receiving threats of a possible terrorist attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 21, 2003:</td>
<td>Bombs exploded in Bologna near the home of the president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi. The Informal Anarchic Federation (FAI) took credit for the attack. Prodi was not at home at the time of the explosions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 27, 2003:</td>
<td>A letter bomb exploded after European Commission president Romano Prodi opened a package that was addressed to his wife. The FAI claimed credit. Amazingly the president was not hurt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 28, 2004:</td>
<td>Rome police arrest a Moroccan man after finding computer files linking him to attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1, 2004:</td>
<td>Turkey, Italy, and Belgium authorities join together against the Turkish Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army-Front (DHKP-C). Italy detained 16 suspects with Belgium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 2004:</td>
<td>Italian police arrest four men for recruiting suicide bombers for Iraq operations. One of the men arrested was a suicide bomber himself with recent plans to go to Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20, 2004:</td>
<td>Firefighters in Rome diffused two bombs outside a McDonalds hidden behind banners of the Red Brigades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 7, 2004:</td>
<td>Milan police arrest two suspected al Qaeda members one of who was believed to be involved in the March 11 Madrid train bombings. Information obtained from the arrestees thwarted a chemical attack in the United States and an attack against a NATO base in Belgium.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Summary. Italy had a total of 48 incidents relating to terrorism between the years 1996 to 2004. Of those incidents a large majority (27) were classified as incidents relating to arrests of terrorism suspects. Thirteen (13) of those arrest incidents were
related to al Qaeda with 12 of them occurring after 9/11. Only four (4) total arrest
incidents occurred before 9/11 with the remaining 23 happening after. Out of the 48 total
terrorism incidents recorded during this time period 12 were classified as bombings. The
remaining 9 incidents were of a miscellaneous nature that included threats and political
actions related to terrorism in Italy.

Table 10: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Italy 1996-2004

Department of Civil Protection--Responsible for the coordination of responses to natural and man-made
disasters. Also heads prevention and preparedness of other governmental agencies.

CIIS-Inter-ministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security- Advises the Prime Minister in security and
intelligence policy decisions.

Ministry of the Interior:
Public Security Department- Leads and manages the national police force and directs public security
policy.

State Police (Polizia di Stato)- The national police force that is responsible for Homeland Security in Italy.
This task is accomplished through specialized forces that play a role in combating terrorism. Polizia di
Stato also controls the illegal immigrant issue, traffic problems, collection and analysis of intelligence
relating to terrorism; patrols the coasts and ports of entry.

SISDE-Democratic Intelligence and Security Service-- Italian Intelligence agency that is responsible for
security of the democratic state and its institutions. The agency also keeps the Minister of Interior
informed on all information and analysis of operations.148

CASA-Committee for Strategic Anti-Terrorism Analysis--Seeks to increase communication between
counterterrorism and law enforcement bodies of government.149

Ministry of Defense:
SISMI-Military Intelligence and Security Service-- Establishes regulations and is responsible for all
intelligence and security tasks for the Defense Minister, counterespionage and counterintelligence against
the country related to the military.150

148 The Italian Intelligence and Security Services Website.
http://www.serviziinformazionesicurezza.gov.it/pdcweb.nsf/pagine/ee_sisde
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
Laws. After the 9/11 attacks, drastic overall changes to Italy’s counterterrorism strategy did not occur as it did in the United States. Many in the country didn’t believe terrorism was as big of a threat to them as the United States was proposing. Italy did, however, support the United States in the fight against al Qaeda by contributing military forces to the international coalition. It wasn’t until October of 2001 that Italy improved its existing anti-mafia laws to include international terrorism. The amendments to Italy’s laws center around the subjects of conspiracy, financial support, and illegal immigration indicating each are major components for counterterrorism success.

1. Decree-Law 374/2001. The Italian government on October 18, 2001, by increasing measures to “prevent and suppress crimes committed for the purpose of international terrorism,” approved this Law.\(^{151}\) This law also decided that acts of violence against a foreign state, institution, or international organization would fall under the “acts of terrorism” categorization.\(^{152}\)

2. Decree-Law No. 438/2001. This law amended the criminal code making conspiracy in international terrorism a crime. Anyone who provides assistance to international terrorism is punishable by increased prison sentences.\(^{153}\)

3. Decree-Law No. 353/2001. Financial support is a major necessary component for international terrorism to be successful. Some consider cutting off the monetary supply line for terrorist groups to be the main strategy for success against terrorism. In late 2001, Italy put in place legislative penalties for financially supporting groups like the


\(^{152}\) Ibid.

\(^{153}\) Ibid.
Taliban. The law calls for the freezing of all capital and financial resources belonging to the source that provided the funding support as dictated by the UN sanctions committee.154

4. Law No. 144: Urgent Measures to Counter International Terrorism. Passed in July of 2005, this law deals with preventative detention for up to twenty-four hours without charges being brought against the defendant, suspends legal rights for suspects, and reinforces rules concerning criminal offenses related to terrorist offenses.155 This law also sought to combat the recruitment of terrorists by groups or individuals, making it illegal to use hate speech that leads to the motivation to join such groups.

5. Bossi-Fini Bill. The attacks of 9/11 also gave Italy an excuse to tighten its border controls and immigration problem.156 Anti-immigrant party leader Umberto Bossi partnered with the leader of the Northern Alliance Gianfranco Fini to propose a bill to control Italy’s immigration problem. The bill set up quotas for the number of immigrants from certain countries allowed into Italy. These are commonly referred to “Readmission Agreements.”157 The bill would also permit a work visa only for immigrants who had a job before coming into the country.

Revisions of Italy’s transportation security were examined and improved, especially after the 2005 London bombings. Italy has also been an active member in the EU framework concerning anti-terrorism strategy. Cooperating with countries within the

155 Ibid.
EU and NATO and working toward better communication has improved Italy’s national security measures and increased its ally’s security in the process.

_Budgetary Support._ The influence of terrorism has more effect on the government’s budget than any other issue. The same is the case for the Italian government. Public order and security spending consists of approximately $34 billion per year.\(^{158}\) The ministry responsible for the security of the country falls on the Interior. Of the $34 billion per year allocated by the Italian Parliament, the Ministry of the Interior receives $31 billion or 91 percent. Only $2 billion goes to the response and recovery agencies, proving that the terrorism threat drives spending more than any other.

_Conclusion._ Italy has dedicated many resources toward building an effective counterterrorism strategy. The 9/11 attacks affected Italy as they did every other country in Europe by opening its eyes to a new threat. Prior to 9/11 Italy only had a few incidents with al Qaeda and Muslim extremists. However, the Italian government and counterterrorism forces significantly increased their efforts after 9/11, cooperating with other European countries including the United States to capture several al Qaeda suspects. While laws were changed and enforcement increased throughout Italy, proving they are a strong ally in the fight against terrorism in the 9/11 world, Italy still does not consider terrorism as grave of a threat as the United States perceives it is.

Germany

Overview. The attacks of 9/11 showed the German government that the Islamic threat was more of a danger than it had perceived. After discovering that many of the 9/11 plotters had planned and coordinated their attacks on the United States from German cities, the German government increased its efforts both tactically and legislatively against the terrorist threat. Intelligence in Germany became a key component in locating and dismantling al Qaeda cells that may be planning additional attacks. Germany’s experience with right-wing terrorism throughout its history refocused its counterterrorism strategy upon the domestic threat. While Germany was aware of Islamist groups within its borders, their potential danger was unclear and did not fully come to light until after the 9/11 attacks occurred. Understanding the history of terrorism within Germany will help explain the methods and strategy the government has taken both before and after 9/11.

History of Terrorism. Much like the United Kingdom, Germany has struggled with the threat of domestic terrorism for several decades. As a result of the abuse of power by German military and government under Hitler and during World War II in the 1940’s, the government implemented an extremely strict counterterrorism strategy after the war. Civil liberties and tolerance took the front seat ahead of security. The protection of rights and liberty for all of Germany’s citizens after WWII were meant to avoid another instance of power abuse by the government. The 1960s, 70s and 80s were rich with domestic and left wing terrorist groups threatening West German forces on a consistent basis. The threat from the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Army Faction
(RAF) throughout the 1970’s-1990, forced the dedication of German government efforts toward improving domestic security. Groups such as the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) also carried out attacks against Turkish targets on German soil.\textsuperscript{159} Not until the 1990s did Germany begin to see a reemergence of Islamic fundamentalism. Since the 1972 Olympics in Munich, this threat hadn’t challenged German security as much as the domestic threat from RAF and other terrorist groups originating from within its borders.\textsuperscript{160} However, as this new form of terrorism began to reformulate, Germany found its counterterrorism strategy aggressive domestically but somewhat inadequate internationally. This inadequacy became transparent after 9/11 when Germany discovered that many of the 9/11 plotters had taken advantage of their “liberal asylum policies and low surveillance standards.”\textsuperscript{161}

Currently, Germany considers terrorism a very important issue and seeks to avoid attacks against its citizens through many counterterrorism strategies implemented after 9/11.

The incidents listed below clearly demonstrate the change in the German counterterrorism mindset before and after 9/11. Prior to September 2001, Germany dealt handily with domestic right-wing terrorist groups. After 9/11 the focus shifted to the Islamic extremist threat.

Table 11: Notable International Terrorist Events in Germany 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 22, 1996:</td>
<td>An assassination attempt was made against the leader of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 14, 1996:</td>
<td>Munich police increased security after Belgium police arrested two Iranian intelligence members transporting explosives and mortars on a ship headed to Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 1996:</td>
<td>The general secretary of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) threatened attacks on Germany if they continued to support the Turkish genocide of Kurds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 27, 1996:</td>
<td>Turkish leftists shot two members of a rival group killing one and injuring the other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 24, 1996:</td>
<td>A suspected suicide bomber attacked a Christmas Eve service in a Lutheran church in a Frankfurt suburb killing three women and wounding six others. The affiliation of the bomber was unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 21, 1997:</td>
<td>Members of the PKK set off an IED next to a Turkish fast food restaurant that injured one person and caused extensive damage to the building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1997:</td>
<td>Neo-Nazis were suspected of firebombing an asylum seeker’s home causing no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20, 1998:</td>
<td>The leftists Red Army Faction (RAF) officially disbanded themselves through an eight page letter stating they would no longer engage in terrorist activities and that the RAF was now history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6, 1998:</td>
<td>German government announced that racist and anti-Semitic attacks by right wing extremists had increased 27 percent in the past year. The right wing groups were suspected of numbering above 48,000 members and over 7,000 hardcore members capable of conducting extreme violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 1998:</td>
<td>On a tip from the United States, German police arrested a top financial accountant and weapons producer of al Qaeda who was in Germany visiting a friend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24, 1998:</td>
<td>German police received information of a threat against the United States Consulate in Hamburg with links to the African Embassy bombings the month before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4, 1998:</td>
<td>Police conduct several raids near Bonn, Germany after receiving information about a threat to the U.S. Embassy. No arrests were made.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
February 17, 1999: Several Turkish restaurants and a cultural center were firebombed during the night. No one took credit.

June 27, 1999: A bomb exploded outside a restaurant in Merseburg injuring over a dozen people. No one took credit for the bombing and no suspects were located.

July 3, 1999: The Turkish PKK was suspected of firebombing a Turkish mosque and two other offices in western Germany after a German court sentenced to death a PKK leader.

July 23, 1999: A travel agency was bombed injuring two people and causing damage in connection to the conviction of the PKK leader.

October 8, 1999: German police arrested five men believed to have ties with Neo-Nazis after they attacked five U.S. Army musicians.

April 29, 2000: A grenade exploded in a Hamburg disco injuring nine people. No one took credit for the bombing.

July 27, 2000: Nine immigrants were seriously injured when a shrapnel bomb exploded in a commuter rail station. Right-wing extremists were suspected.

October 2, 2000: Acting out of anger at the violence in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, two Arabs living in Germany firebombed a Dusseldorf synagogue. No injuries reported.

October 10, 2001: German Police arrest a Libyan in Munich with suspected links to al Qaeda.

April 23, 2002: Police detained 11 Muslim radicals with connections to a Palestinian terrorist group. The German government suspected the men of planning to attack several targets in Germany. The cell was involved in falsifying documents and smuggling fighters for their cause.

June 12, 2002: German intelligence received reports of an al Qaeda plan to shoot down civilian airliners in Germany through Middle Eastern “chatter” that had been intercepted by a civilian.

July 3, 2002: Early morning raids by police yielded seven suspects with ties to Mohamed Atta the leader of the September 11 hijackings.

August 16, 2002: Police executed search warrants on an al-Aqsa charity organization suspected of sending money to Hamas. Multiple computers and documents were taken from apartments and offices.

August 20, 2002: Iraqi dissidents took over the Iraqi Embassy in Berlin, taking six hostages, which included the senior-most Iraqi diplomat in Germany. German Special Forces raided the Embassy and arrested the hostage takers.

September 6, 2002: German police arrest a Turkish al Qaeda sympathizer, and his finance for planning to bomb the U.S. Army’s European headquarters in
Germany. Police found explosives in their apartment and the two were sentenced to prison terms not to exceed 18 months.

September 19, 2002: Police raided over 100 locations related to terrorist groups connected to a jailed Turkish militant. The group’s anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli views made the group a “breeding ground for terrorists,” according to the German Minister of the Interior.

September 30, 2002: Germany cooperated with the United States in blocking the assets of three subjects who were implicated in the 9/11 attacks a year earlier.

October 5, 2002: German counterterrorism forces conducted raids in three towns against Islamic militants planning attacks.

October 10, 2002: Police arrest Abdelghani Mzoudi, an electrical engineering student from Karrakech, Morocco for providing support to Mohamed Atta’s al Qaeda cell in Hamburg.

November 18, 2002: German media reported that the government removed and studied the brains of four Red Army Faction terrorists after their deaths in 1970. It is unknown what the results of the study.

December 22, 2002: Germany issued warnings to British, French, and U.S. consulates in Duesseldorf and Frankfurt after receiving a tip that al Qaeda cells were planning attacks on embassies, banks, and corporations.

January 10, 2003: Police arrest two Yemeni men working for an al Qaeda financier and Yemen Imam. The arrest was a result of a sting operation involving Germany and the United States. Sheik Mohammed Ali Hassan al Mouyad and his assistant, Moshen Yaya Zayed were eventually extradited to the United States and stood trial for financing al Qaeda operations.

January 15, 2003: The German government banned Hizb ut-Tahrir, a terrorist group for spreading anti-Semitism on university campuses and establishing contacts with other terrorist groups. Raids conducted on several locations yielded documents and the leader of the group’s computer. The group is also banned in several Arab countries.

February 6, 2003: Police arrest three men during raids on suspicion of planning attacks on U.S. interests in Germany and having ties to the Hamburg cell of al Qaeda.

March 20, 2003: Police detained five Islamic militants who were suspected of carrying out attacks when the war in Iraq began. The suspect claimed to have trained at an al Qaeda camp.

April 10, 2003: Police conducted early morning raids on 80 buildings across the country during a crackdown on the terrorist group Hizb ut-Tahrir for promoting anti-Jewish propaganda and actions.

April 10, 2003: Unknown extremist group set fire to a McDonalds restaurant and billboard in Hamburg.

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April 25, 2003: A Lebanese teenager hijacked a bus with a pistol and demanded the release of al Qaeda operatives held in U.S. custody. The hijacker led police on a 7-hour chase before being captured by police. The hijacker praised the 9/11 hijackers.

September 12, 2003: German police stopped a plot by a Nazi group to bomb Jewish targets in Munich.

November 28, 2003: Police arrest a Hamburg cell leader from Algeria for leading an effort to recruit suicide bombers against the coalition in Iraq.

December 2, 2003: Police in Munich arrest an Iraqi planning to send militants to Iraq for suicide bombing missions and smuggling Iraqi’s into Germany. The suspect was also linked to the al Qaeda group Ansar al-Islam.

December 30, 2003: German officials seal a military hospital treating injured U.S. soldiers after receiving intelligence that Ansar al-Islam was planning a car bomb attack.

December 3, 2004: Police arrest three Iraqi’s for planning an attack on Prime Minister Allawi who was in Germany for talks with German Chancellor Schroder. The suspects were believed to be members of Ansar al-Islam.


**Summary.** The incidents related to terrorism in Germany between 1996 and 2004 are more balanced than other countries presented in this study. Of the total incidents (45), the majority was split between bombings and arrests of suspects related to terrorism for a grand total of 33. Of those 33 incidents 16 were related to bombings and 17 related to arrests made by the German authorities. Only two arrest incidents were documented prior to September 11, 2001 while the remaining (15) occurred after. The majority of arrests (8) were related to Al Qaeda with only one of those occurring before 9/11. The majority of bombings also occurred before 9/11 mainly performed by groups related to domestic terrorism.
Table 12. Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Germany 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal Chancellery:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BND-Federal Intelligence Service</td>
<td>Responsible for the collection of intelligence issues regarding national security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Justice:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBA--Federal Public Prosecutor General</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLG--Higher Regional Courts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BGH--Federal Court of Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of the Interior:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKA--Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation</td>
<td>Federal Police--This agency has a vast amount of responsibility, from ensuring border security, protecting federal infrastructure and court security, providing specialized response forces for domestic security threats, and protecting the airlines and airports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG9--The counter-terrorism force of the Federal Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIU-Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>Financial intelligence unit under GSG9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Defense:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BfV-Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution</td>
<td>Tracks activities of extremist groups that seek to promote ideological and/or religious strife domestically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBK-Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response</td>
<td>Provides support to states through coordination and information sharing. Established under the new civil defense strategy after the 2002 floods and 9/11. This agency will only be used in a disaster when state and local governments request its assistance or the scope of the disaster clearly exceeds that of the local agencies. If the emergency grows to that of national proportions, the Ministry of the Interior will coordinate with thirteen other federal ministries for civil response and emergency planning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ministry of Defense is responsible for one intelligence agency regarding the military and its affairs when dealing with international terrorism. Any intelligence gathered concerning threats against the domestic homeland are coordinated and communicated to the Ministry of Interior.  

MAD—Military Counterintelligence Service—Coordinates with domestic intelligence agencies and is the main counterintelligence agency for the military.

Local and State Police agencies- responsible for the daily enforcement of German law and supporting federal agencies.

Law. After 9/11, Germany quickly offered its assistance to the United States. Overcoming a constitutional restriction that limited German military forces to become involved in foreign wars outside EU, UN and NATO missions, Germany dedicated troops to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Germany is heavily involved in the European Union and NATO strategies against terrorism. Cooperating with the EU strategy and looking for ways to improve its effectiveness is a role Germany is eager to take.

Counterterrorism packages implemented after 9/11 were geared to gradually increase measures to effectively fight terrorism in Germany. Because the Islamic threat posed the biggest problem to German counterterrorism strategy, the government implemented two security packages. The first package was introduced on September 19, 2001 and the second on November 7, 2001. Both packages were eventually accepted and approved by the German Parliament.

1. Security Package I. Also known as the “3 billion mark,” this security initiative aims at setting a goal of $3 billion budget for counterterrorism measures in Germany. The package increased personnel in many counterterrorism bureaus, targeted the roots of terrorism, gave aid to international programs, improved financial investigation strategies, and funded planning for future counterterrorism operations. The first security package also increased personnel assigned to counterterrorism positions by 2,320 people. Existing federal agencies received budget increases to deal with the terrorist threat. The federal agencies and their budget increases will be discussed more in section V.

2. Security Package II. This section of the strategy aims at establishing German law against terrorism. The new laws added address many areas, including border protection and identification procedures, information sharing between government agencies, security checks of employees in private industries critical to German national security, control of the activities of foreign extremist organizations, and also amendment to several existing national security acts and laws. Changes were made to the following laws:

- Act on the Protection of the Constitution
- Military Intelligence Service Act
- Federal Intelligence Service Act
- Federal Border Guard Act
- Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation Act
- Aliens Act
- Asylum Procedure Act
- Alien Central Registry Act
- Act on Security Clearance Checks

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174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
Both security packages were passed under extreme urgency after 9/11. The usual time it took to pass a law was cut in half wholly due to the terrorist threat. Terrorism and the fear of future attacks in almost every country in Europe constituted the main driver for the swift legislative changes made by Germany. Security Packages II and I increased the strength of Law Enforcement and granted new authorities to the German Intelligence agencies in ways that were not previously allowed.  

_Budgetary Support._ Funding for the security of Germany occurs through the Ministry of Finance. While Germany does not break down its budget for “Homeland Security,” it does allocate funds for each department responsible for the international and domestic security of the country. In 2005, the Ministry of Interior received over $5 billion for internal security functions. Only $214 million of that money was spent for civil defense and emergency response, the rest went to counterterrorism and intelligence functions.

The Security Packages call for a substantial increase of counterterrorism funds across the board. The packages aim for a $3 billion increase in government funding for

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178 Ibid.
terrorism indicating that terrorism that occurs outside Germany can still have significant influence on government actions. Part of the $3 billion increase has been allocated to the following agencies to increase personnel and establish new counterterrorism programs within its existing structures:179

- Federal Border Guard: $120 million
- Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation: $40 million
- Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution: $10 million
- Federal Bureau for Information Security: $15 million
- Riot Squads: $14 million
- Federal Administrative Bureau: $9 million

Security Package I only allotted $13 million for Civil Defense to use for emergencies and exploratory programs in the areas of nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks that might require decontamination.180 In 2002, in the United States, Germany spent 6.5 percent of GDP on Defense and 8.2 percent of GDP on Public Order and Safety.181

It is obvious that Germany, like many other countries after 9/11, placed significant weight on their counterterrorism programs. This is evidenced through their legislative and budgeting processes and is also seen in their commitment with the United States in Afghanistan.

Conclusion. The history of terrorism in Germany centered mainly on a domestic front before 9/11 opened the governments eyes to Islamic radicalism. This external threat prompted Germany to take a more stringent and substantial approach toward terrorism

180 Ibid.
within its borders. The Hamburg cell indicated that intelligence and enforcement needed to be overhauled and adjusted. While Germany has not been the victim of a terrorist attack to the level of 9/11, the fear of an attack of that magnitude motivated legislators to dedicate increases in budgets and the development of new legislation toward fighting the terrorist threat. Germany can be considered a great ally of the United States against terrorism and it is clear that the events of 9/11 had a significant effect on German security policy.

Greece

Overview. In past years the United States has considered Greece as one of the weakest allies against terrorism. Greece subscribes to the strategy of combating terrorism through the international organizations of which it belongs. Individual efforts internally are somewhat limited and non-aggressive. However, after the 9/11 attacks Greece did implement an anti-terrorism and organized-crime bill to increase counterterrorism efforts. Greece also maintains a fairly good relationship with the United States, although many of its strategies in the areas of detention and prosecutorial procedure do not coincide with U.S. philosophy against terrorism.

History of Terrorism. Throughout its history, Greece has experienced a large number of domestic terrorist groups. Both right and left wing groups in Greece have outnumbered similar groups in other European countries such as Italy, Germany, and the UK. The most dangerous group, the 17 November, killed over twenty people in its
nineteen years of activity.\textsuperscript{182} Considering what many other European countries had to deal with on a domestic front, such as the IRA in the UK and the ETA in Spain, these deaths were viewed as a small number. During Greece’s transition to a democratic state in the 1970s, the police became extremely aggressive toward its citizens, engaging in numerous instances of human rights violations.\textsuperscript{183} It was because of this aggressiveness that problems that limited their development of effective counterterrorism strategy. The public simply did not trust the government as a result of their abuse of power. In an attempt to limit police power, the tools necessary to fight terrorism like manpower and technology, were not given to the police by the Greek government. Greek citizens perceived pleas from the United States for Greece to strengthen its counterterrorism capacity as a threat to their sovereignty. This resistance significantly weakened its effectiveness in preventing terrorism. Groups like the Revolutionary Nuclei and 17 November emerged and took advantage of the police weakness by opposing the Greek government and its western allies through a series of bombing attacks. 17 November has continued to attack Greek and United States targets well into the new millennium. The turning point for Greek counterterrorism efforts occurred in the summer of 2000, resulting from the assassination of a British military attaché in Athens by the terrorist group 17 November.\textsuperscript{184} This attack, coupled with concern for the upcoming summer Olympics in 2004, prompted Greece to take a hard line against terrorism. Although Greece had taken a greater stance against terrorism, the terrorist group 17 November
continued to operate well into the new millennium until police captured one of its leaders after a bomb blew up in his hand. The capture prompted a series of arrests from the 17 November organization.

Table 13: Notable Terrorist Events in Greece 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 15, 1996:</td>
<td>The domestic terrorist group November 17 was believed to have fired a rocket propelled grenade at a security wall of the United States Embassy marking the beginning of a struggle against American and Turkish targets. No injuries were reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28, 1996:</td>
<td>A bomb exploded at the main office of IBM in Athens planted by the Fraxia Midheniston terrorist group. The explosion caused extensive structural damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 3, 1998:</td>
<td>Anarchists set off two bombs at McDonald’s restaurants in Athens in retaliation for the arrest of a guerilla leader from MAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 19, 1998:</td>
<td>A timed bomb exploded at a General Motors car dealership in Athens. No injuries were reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8, 1998:</td>
<td>November 17 group fired an anti-tank missile at a Citibank branch in Athens in attempts to protest American imperialism-nationalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 17, 1998:</td>
<td>In protest for the arrests made during a student march, unknown persons detonated a bomb at a Citibank branch in Athens causing major damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 8, 1999:</td>
<td>A domestic terrorist group named Support of Ocalan-The Hawks of Thrace claimed credit for the bombing of a Turkish Consulate in Komotini.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 1999:</td>
<td>Anarchists claimed credit for detonating two bombs at the Detroit Motors car dealership in Athens that caused a substantial amount of damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 27, 1999:</td>
<td>A bomb exploded at the Intercontinental Hotel killing one and injuring another. No group took credit and police did not have any suspects at the time of the bombing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16, 1999:</td>
<td>Police suspected the November 17 group for launching a rocket-propelled grenade at the residence of the German Ambassador similar to the attack against the Dutch Ambassador a week earlier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8, 2000:</td>
<td>Two gunmen from the November 17 group fired into the car of British defense attaché Stephen Saunders killing him. The hit was believed to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
August 16, 2000: The domestic terrorist group Mavaro Asteri (Black Star) took credit for the torching of a car belonging to an Italian Embassy official. No injuries reported.

November 12, 2000: Attacks occurred simultaneously against a British bank, a U.S. bank, and the studio and home of a Greek sculptor whose statue is displayed at the U.S. Embassy. The far-left group nationalist Revolutionary Nuclei took credit.

December 25, 2000: The Anarchists Attack Team took credit for a bombing at a Citibank ATM in Athens. The bombing was in support for dead prisoners in Turkey.

June 29, 2002: A member of the 17 November domestic terrorism group was arrested after he accidentally blew off his hand with an explosive device he was carrying. Police also charged him with several unsolved attacks in connection with 17 November through his fingerprints.

July 3, 2002: Police raid a main hideout belonging to 17 November and seize large amounts of weapons including dozens of antitank rockets stolen in the 1980s.

July 17, 2002: Police arrest the leader and possible founder of 17 November, Alexandros Giotopoulos charging him with the murder of thirteen people, which included two United States military officers in 1984.

July 21, 2002: Police arrest two more members of 17 November connected with the murders of the United States military servicemen and also a plot to attack a NATO convoy.

July 24, 2002: Police arrest the second in command of 17 November believed to be the messenger between the leader, Alexandros Giotopoulos, and the group’s hit squad.

July 26, 2002: Police arrest two suspected ideological founders of the domestic terrorist group 17 November.

August 2, 2002: Suspects of 17 November were believed to have tunneled through a wall and stolen a cache of weapons from a military armory on an island in the Aegean Sea.

August 4, 2002: Greece Antiterrorist police found a hand grenade, detonators, and dynamite buried on a hill above Olympic stadium.


March 20, 2003: Terrorists threatened a Citibank branch by placing four gas canisters outside the entrance. No one claimed credit.

March 22, 2003: A homemade incendiary device exploded outside a Citibank ATM in Koropi. No injuries or credit claimed.
March 29, 2003: An unknown suspect threw a homemade hand grenade into a McDonalds causing damage to the property. No one claimed credit for the attack.

June 12, 2003: Unknown persons set fire to a lobby and ATM at a Citibank branch in Thessalonika.

July 11, 2003: Police disarm a bomb at an American Life Insurance Company possibly planted by the Revolutionary Nuclei and Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA).

July 13, 2003: Unknown terrorists throw three Molotov cocktails at an office of Eurobank in Athens. No credit claimed.

November 11, 2003: Police suspect the Organization Khristos Kassimis for planting a bomb outside a Citibank branch in Athens. Police disarmed the bomb before it could go off.

February 26, 2004: The anti-Olympic groups of Phevos and Athena claimed credit for firebombing two environment ministry trucks in protest of a meeting between the International Olympic Committee and the Association of National Olympic Committees.

March 14, 2004: Police discover a bomb at a Citibank branch of Halandri and diffuse the device before it explodes. A small domestic terrorist group who calls itself Revolutionary Struggle claimed credit.

May 4, 2004: In an attempt to show the weakness of Greek security, the Revolutionary Struggle detonated three time bombs outside a police station in Athens warning westerners that their presence is unwelcomed at the Olympic games in August.

May 13, 2004: A small bomb damaged a Greek bank in Athens. No one claimed credit.

May 29, 2004: A bomb caused damage to a courthouse in Larissa causing minor damage. No one claimed credit.

August 4, 2004: A homemade bomb exploded in an Athens suburb causing damage but no injuries. No credit claimed.

September 28, 2004: An Olympic Airlines flight made an emergency landing after receiving a bomb threat. No bomb was found.

Summary. Between the years 1996 and 2004 Greece incurred a total of 37 incidents related to terrorism. The majority of the incidents consisted of bombings (22) carried out or associated with the domestic terrorism group 17 November. Six (6) incidents were arrest related and the remaining nine (9) were a combination of arson, shootings, and threats. All incidents dealing with arrests focused on the 17 November organization. No incidents reported were related to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. However, the attacks against American targets in Greece such as Citibank and McDonalds, extended from the pressure put on the Greeks by the United States to improve their terrorism efforts and from the United States’ past support of the military junta in the late 1960s and early 1970s.\(^{185}\)

Counterterrorism Agencies

Table 14: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Greece 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Public Order:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hellenic Police--Comprised of both regional and central divisions, the police are responsible for ensuring public order, preventing crime, and implementing state and public security policy.(^{186})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Special Anti-Terrorist Unit--This unit falls under the director of Special Services branch of the police and is responsible for all terrorism investigations.\(^{187}\) |

| Council for the Coordination of Analysis and Research--This six-member council of high ranking police officials study and analyze forms of organized crime and terrorism and provide police with tools, training, and authority to effectively solve the problems they face.\(^{188}\) |

| Intelligence Services: |


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Laws. Greece is greatly committed to international cooperation against terrorism. As a member of NATO, the UN, EU, and Council of Europe, Greece has taken steps to incorporate into its laws some of the strategies against terrorism imposed by these institutions. Greece has ratified all twelve conventions against terrorism from the United Nations, agreed with the EU arrest warrant provision, and ratified the anti-terrorist protocol set by the Council of Europe.\(^\text{190}\)

The events of 9/11 did not have as significant impact on Greek counterterrorism effort as did the terrorist attacks by 17 November. Greek law does not contain a specific law against terrorism but considers “terrorist actions” as offenses that are already addressed by the Criminal Code.\(^\text{191}\) The way in which the crimes are committed is what designates a crime as a terrorist act, such as the intent to harm a country or international organization while intimidating the general public.\(^\text{192}\) Intent is also classified as terrorism if it seeks to influence a public authority from performing or abstaining from performing a duty, and damage the political, economic, or constitutional structures of a country or international organization.\(^\text{193}\)
1. Articles 299 to 291 of the Greek Criminal Code cover all such actions from homicide to disruption of the safety of transportation services.\textsuperscript{194} Aiding and abetting a terrorist organization also carries severe penalties under Greek law, ranging from one year to life imprisonment.\textsuperscript{195}

2. Procedural Strategies Against Terrorism. When a crime is classified as terrorism, a set of special methods in regard to the collection of evidence takes effect. The areas in the investigation that warrant the use of the special methods deal with undercover operations by police to infiltrate the terrorist organization, the transport of the suspects, DNA analysis for identification purposes, and other investigative methods used to arrest the members of a terrorist organization.\textsuperscript{196}

3. Witness Protection and Compensation of Victims. Greek law also provides special treatment for witnesses against terrorist organizations to properly secure their identity. Protection measures are always taken with the consent of the witness and strive to keep their cooperation anonymous during court proceedings. Victims of terrorism in Greece are also given special rights. A state funded pension is set up for the victims and their families and they are also given better educational opportunities.\textsuperscript{197}

After 9/11 Greece pledged their support against terrorism that resulted in several initiated terrorism investigations.\textsuperscript{198} While nothing came of the “investigations,” Greece

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
continued to voice its involvement in the war on terrorism. In 2000 the U. S. State Department considered Greece a passive participant against terrorism.\textsuperscript{199} Greece has also been known to sympathize with the Turkish group the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK. The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.\textsuperscript{200} Greece continues to improve their efforts against terrorism but still remain one of the weakest NATO members in the international movement toward the mitigation of the terrorist threat.

\textit{Budgetary Support.} Greece considers their homeland defense an utmost priority. Due to its long history of terrorism and domestic conflict, Greece has invested heavily in their government efforts to protect its freedom and interests. In 2002, Greece spent 16.5\% of its GDP on Defense and 5.4\% on Public Order and Safety.\textsuperscript{201}

\textit{Conclusion.} Greece takes a somewhat different approach toward combating terrorism than other NATO countries. Using a more analytical approach to terrorism, Greece looks for ways to analyze problems first and then provide solutions later. This approach is the sole responsibility of the newly established Council for the Coordination of Analysis and Research at the Ministry of Public Order. While terrorism sits high on the agenda of Greek politics, internally, Greece exercises a more liberal strategy toward counterterrorism in terms of placing a significant focus on victim compensation and protection of witnesses. This strategy in turn has enabled many more informants to come

\begin{flushright}
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forward with information regarding terrorism in Greece. Investigations, intelligence and enforcement also play a role although after 9/11 these investigations yielded no productive information to the 9/11 investigation. It is clear though, that Greece has increased its internal security and counterterrorism strategy after 9/11, although not to the level of some of its NATO counterparts.

**Belgium**

*Overview.* Belgium is the headquarters of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As two of the most influential international organizations in the world, NATO and the EU represent easy targets for terrorists. Belgium has a great desire to protect these organizations and avoid any attack. However, the laws in Belgium are often very lax and give terrorists a sanctuary in which to operate. Terrorism operations in Belgium consist mainly of money laundering and passport fraud. The Belgium economy is one of the most open in Europe. Its regulations and standards are flexible and conducive to international business and terrorist financiers have been quick to recognize this advantage in the past. Belgium also has a large diamond and real estate industry making it susceptible to financial and money laundering schemes.

Belgium’s counterterrorism efforts are highly reactive due to liberal government laws and the lack of any international terrorist attacks in almost two decades. The federated system of government consisting of Brussels, Wallonia, and Flanders coupled with the three national languages of French, Dutch and German create communication problems between the different government agencies and significantly slow down
intelligence dissemination. Since 9/11 Belgium has taken a closer look at their laws against terrorism and the agencies tasked with enforcing them. However, only a small number of investigators and security personnel are assigned to counterterrorism investigations.

*History of Terrorism.* Belgium’s experience with terrorism has been very limited since the bombings from the Marxist-Leninist Fighting Communist Cells (FCC) in the mid 1980s. Belgium has also come under domestic attack by the Animal Liberation Front in the form of eco-terrorism, although these attacks have been very few and far between. The Belgium police have had encounters with international terrorist ties such as the Armed Islamic Group or GIA. The existence of the Islamic groups in Belgium during the 1990s caused the government to take a closer look at their security efforts, but they did not change policies until after 9/11. Belgium also does not have specific counterterrorism legislation or a definition for terrorism. Suspects who commit terrorism in Belgium are only charged with the standard crimes they perform as outlined by criminal law.

Table 15: Notable Terrorist Events in Belgium 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 14, 1996</td>
<td>Belgium police seize explosives and mortars on an Iranian freighter enroute to Germany. Police detained two Iranian Ministry of Intelligence employees on the freighter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

March 5, 1998: Police arrest seven Algerian nationals after a shootout and 12-hour standoff. The suspects were members of Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group.

August 29, 1998: A McDonalds restaurant was firebombed in Puurs, Belgium causing over a million dollars damage. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) claimed responsibility.

March 31, 1999: Hackers in Belgrade attacked a NATO web site by sending thousands of “pings” telling the computer to identify itself, and over 2500 emails overloading its ability to respond and freezing its email capabilities.

February 2000: Two members of a domestic terrorism group were paroled after serving 14 years for their bomb attacks on United States, NATO and Belgium interests in the mid 1980’s.

September 13, 2001: Police arrest a Moroccan and Tunisian with ties to al Qaeda and the September 9, 2001 assassination of Northern Alliance Ahmed Shah Massoud. The suspects had also been plotting to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Paris and other targets that included NATO and a Belgium Air Force Base. Belgium courts rendered convictions against the suspects.

September 22, 2001: Police arrest two men and seize chemicals that could be used to make a bomb as part of an Islamist terrorist plot.

December 2001: Police arrest Tarek Maaroufi, a Tunisian born Belgium citizen for his role in helping the assassins of Massoud with their forged Belgium passports. Italy also had charges on Maaroufi regarding his association with al Qaeda.

April 12, 2002: Police in Antwerp arrest Samih Osailly on illegal weapons and diamond smuggling charges accusing him of facilitating funds to al Qaeda through a family member in the diamond industry from Lebanon.

June 4, 2003: An Iraqi man was arrested and charged for sending ten envelopes containing phenarsazine chloride (adamsite), a chemical used in nerve gas, to several locations in Belgium. Several injuries resulted from exposure to the chemical.

January 5, 2004: A letter bomb exploded in the office of a member of the European Parliament. Other parcels were also found with the same Modus Operandi. An Italian domestic terrorism group was suspected.


April 1, 2004: Cooperating with Turkey and Italy, Belgium authorities arrest 16 members of the Turkish Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army-Front (DHKP-C) in several raids.
May 4, 2004: European officials run a simulated nuclear attack by al Qaeda outside the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

June 7-8, 2004: Police arrest 15 people with al Qaeda ties that may have been planning an attack on the Paris subway system.

July 10, 2004: Police arrest two Sudanese men with ties to al Qaeda at the Brussels Airport. The men were using false passports.


Summary. Belgium tallied a total of 16 incidents related to terrorism between 1996 and 2004. Of those incidents the majority (8) were related to arrests of terrorism suspects. Only one incident of arrest occurred before 9/11. The remaining (7) happened after 9/11 and the majority (5) was related to al Qaeda suspects. Four bombings occurred between 1996 and 2004 and the remaining four incidents were of a miscellaneous nature that included cyberterrorism, and simulated terrorism exercises.

Counterterrorism Agencies. Homeland Security in Belgium is often referred to as “internal security”. Prior to 9/11, Belgium had addressed the problem of terrorism through several parliamentary commissions to raise public awareness.204 The commissions found that a great deal of redundancy existed between agencies tasked with counterterrorism in Belgium. The agencies were revised and reorganized. As in most countries the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers are the primary authority over the government ministries and agencies. Belgium is no exception. The Ministry of Justice, Interior and Ministry of Defense are the main departments that oversee terrorism in

Belgium. The following agencies are the main bodies tasked with the responsibility of protecting Belgium from terrorism.

Table 16: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Belgium 1996-2004

Ministry of Justice:
Federal Direction of Public Security (FDOV)-- a permanent technical body with the responsibility of collection and analysis of information about public safety, evaluation of danger, and actions that would prevent such danger. (This position was created as a result of the 9/11 attacks).

State Security and General Intelligence Service--created by law in 1998, these agencies are responsible for collecting, processing and analyzing of intelligence, tracking of espionage, counterterrorism and organized crime. The service also provides security for foreign dignitaries during their visits to Belgium.

Ministry of National Defense:
General Information and Security Service (GISS)-- military intelligence service.

Ministry of the Interior:
Belgium has a very successful and well-outfitted civil defense and emergency response strategy. Created in 1988, the Governmental Coordination and Crisis Center (listed below) is significantly staffed and well funded. The 770 employees are placed in strategic locations throughout the country in the event of a natural disaster or terrorist attack. Great emphasis has been placed on emergency response and disaster recovery in Belgium. However, the proactive side of counterterrorism is significantly lacking personnel, funding, and coordination. The responsibility for terrorism is placed upon the shoulders of the Federal Police outside the context of a national strategy involving all agencies.

General Directorate of Civil Defense--lead agency for emergency response including nuclear radiation response and communications with the population of Belgium.

Governmental Coordination and Crisis Center-- agency provides continuous monitoring and operational readiness 24/7 and coordinates entities responding to an event.

Since 9/11 Belgium has taken steps to increase the effectiveness of their Federal Police force by creating one national unit. However, the separation between the Walloons and Flemish regions within the country makes it especially hard to have one police force in both areas as a result of nationalistic tension between the two groups.

Federal Police-national police force divided into five sections:

206 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
Judicial- -economic, organized crime, and forensics
Administrative-- border controls and transportation security
Operational-- SWAT, special units, Interpol contact
Human Resource-- personnel
Material-- supplies

The Department “Terrorism and Sects” of the Federal Police.\footnote{211}
Cell ‘Islam’--responsible for the Turkish-Kurd problem

Cell ‘Operations’--responsible for national and international forms of terrorism.

The Cell ‘Sects’

The Mixed Antiterrorist Group (AGG)-created in 1984, this agency collects and analyzes
information required for policy and legal measures.\footnote{212}

‘Terrorism and Public Order’ (TEROP) service of the Federal Police--decentralized service in Brussels
responsible for field investigation and intelligence gathering with the least amount of publicity as
possible.\footnote{213}

Central Bureau for Investigation- Created in 1997, this agency is responsible for coordination, support, and
control of terrorist activities that fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Police.\footnote{214}

While the government is attempting to centralize their police force, the agencies
responsible for counterterrorism remain segregated since 9/11. Since the police play a
key role in fighting terrorism, the Belgium government does not see a need to centralize
and create a specialty agency for counterterrorism.

\textit{Laws.} Belgium has not experienced the consistent terrorist attacks on their
homeland as some of its NATO counterparts have in the past. Prior to 9/11, the Belgium
government did not have anti-terrorist legislation or specific laws for terrorism.

Terrorists who were captured were tried under the offenses they committed as outlined in
Belgium criminal codes. Certain Islamic terrorist groups and individuals occasionally

\footnote{210} Archick, Kristin. "CRS Report for Congress: European Approaches to Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism." Congressional Research Service (July, 24, 2006).
\footnote{211} Van de Linde, Erik and O'Brian, Kevin. Quick Scan of Post 9/11 National Counter-Terrorism Policy
\footnote{212} Ibid.
\footnote{213} Ibid.
\footnote{214} Ibid.
committed acts that could be construed as terrorism, but the legal system does not treat them any differently from a common criminal regardless of their motivation.

After Belgium learned that the two suicide bombers who killed Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud just days before September 11, 2001 had used false Belgium passports, the government realized a need for greater security measures regarding their documents. Since then, Belgium has become the first EU and NATO country to issue biometric electronic passports.215

Belgium has addressed terrorism though its legal system prior to September 11, 2001.

1. The Law of 30 November 1998. This law outlined the responsibilities of State Security and provided an operational definition of terrorism: “the use of violence against persons or material interests for ideological or political reasons aimed at achieving goals through terror, intimidation or threats.”216 However, new laws in the Belgium Criminal Code began to form as a result of the new type of international terrorism emerging in the world. In June of 2002, the Council of European Union decided on a framework geared toward combating terrorism.

2. Terrorism Offenses Act. This framework was adopted by Belgium and put into law in December 2003.217 The Act included a new title with several articles (137-141)

against terrorism in Belgium. The details of each article address the terrorist threat in the following:

2a. Article 137. Defines terrorism as “an offence by its nature or context [that] may cause serious harm to a country or an international organization.”

2b. Article 138. Addresses the stipulations for the penalties applicable to the terrorist offenses covered by Article 137.

2c. Article 139. Defines terrorist groups as “an organized association of more than two people, established on a lasting basis and taking concerted action with a view to the commission of terrorist offenses covered by Article 137.” The Article goes on to state that any organization whose purpose is purely political, philosophical or religious or has any other legitimate aim will not be considered a terrorist group.

2d. Article 140. This section of the Criminal Code makes illegal any type of participation or assistance with a terrorist group applying increased penalties for such participation or assistance.

2e. Article 141. Two subsections fall under this Article both dealing with the scope of legislation listed above. This Article outlines how and to whom the terrorist legislation can be applied. The military and military action is excluded from being a terrorist group and protects the rights and basic freedoms of Belgium citizens.


\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
Wire-tapping, surreptitious searches, surveillance techniques, and special interrogation standards were added to the Articles in 2003. These amendments broadened the Belgium counterterrorist efforts that had been heavily criticized by the United States and other European countries as being too liberal.

In 2004, Belgium added the financing of terrorism to its list of anti-terrorism measures and legislation. The addition amended an Act passed in January of 1993 and obligated financial institutions to be more accountable when financing of terrorism was suspected. The Financial Information Processing Unit (CTIF) has jurisdiction in financial matters involving terrorism.\textsuperscript{224}

Belgium also gave attention to the threat of a chemical or biological attack by international terrorists. After 9/11 the government sought to increase the penalties for subjects convicted of crimes related to bioterrorism. Prison time was increased from eight to ninety days to five to ten years.\textsuperscript{225} Greater cooperation with other NATO and EU members have also been at the top of Belgium’s counterterrorism agenda, although some countries still think they are not doing all they can to make the world safer from the threat of terrorism. The attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 also raised Belgium’s terrorism awareness; however, terrorism is given the same priority as drug smuggling, human trafficking and other crimes.\textsuperscript{226}

\textsuperscript{226} Archick, Kristin. "CRS Report for Congress: European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism." Congressional Research Service (July 24, 2006.).
Budgetary Support. Belgium’s budget after 9/11 showed an increase in the area of counterterrorism and emergency response spending. On November 30, 2001 the Council of Ministers approved over $7 million Euros for biological and chemical counterterrorism efforts.\textsuperscript{227} In 2002, Belgium budgeted over $4.1 million Euros for public order and safety programs constituting a total of 1.6 percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{228} The increases in Belgium’s budget for counterterrorism clearly show the influence 9/11 had on the priority of terrorism as opposed to emergency preparedness and response.

Conclusion. Belgium does not have an extensive history with terrorism. Therefore, counterterrorism strategy does not dominate the attention of Belgium politics. However, due to an increasing Middle Eastern population in the country, ties to Islamic extremist organizations began to increase. As Belgium has ties to Islam and is the location of NATO and EU headquarters the country has become a potential target of terrorism. In realizing this, Belgium has taken steps to increase its internal security. Prior to 9/11 terrorism did not occupy the upper echelons of Belgium policy. However, 9/11 illuminated problems within the Belgium system particularly in the area of passport fraud and communication between agencies, and, since then, intelligence has improved and the government has taken steps to increase the cooperation between the agencies tasked with counterterrorism. Belgium has also implemented legislation that would increase Belgium’s ability to respond and investigate terrorism. Belgium’s budget also demonstrates its commitment toward increased internal security. Belgium remains an

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
important ally of the United States and is taking the proper steps to remain an integral part of NATO as well.

Netherlands

Overview. The Netherlands’ experience with terrorism has been very narrow throughout its history. Due to the fact there has been no terrorist attacks in the Netherlands since 1977, the Dutch are often perceived as being inexperienced in counterterrorism and anti-terrorism strategies. However, the Dutch have been successful in keeping their country safe and realizing the propensity their country has to terrorism. The Netherlands has seen a large increase in immigration due to the liberal openness of Dutch society. The Muslim population has grown significantly, increasing sympathetic views toward groups considered to be proponents of terrorism. This fact coupled with the geographical location of the country has made the Dutch sensitive to the terrorist threat. Having learned from their past mistakes with terrorism, the Dutch formed policies and laws addressing the threats to national security. As an active member in the EU, NATO, and the UN, the Netherlands supports the strategy that terrorism can only be fought with international cooperation.\textsuperscript{229} This is good news for the United States in that efforts in the Netherlands will greatly increase the security of Americans both abroad and at home.

History of Terrorism. The Netherlands does not have a long history with terrorism, as do other countries in the NATO membership. Incidents of hijackings and

hostage taking in the 1970s caused problems; however, this history of terrorism is not what drives the Netherlands’ response. The Dutch government is primarily concerned with terrorism due to the Netherlands role in hosting the international courts and UN organization for chemical weapons proliferation; their geographic location as a transit point for goods and services destined for the rest of Europe; the large numbers of refugees and immigrants with ties to terrorist groups; and, finally, their reputation for being an open and liberal society. The Netherlands considers the above reasons to be motivation for international terrorism to occur within their borders.

Table 17: Notable International Terrorist Events in the Netherlands 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 25, 1997:</td>
<td>Associates of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) set fire to a predominantly Turkish neighborhood in The Hague, killing a mother and her five children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13, 2001:</td>
<td>Police in Rotterdam arrested three Muslim militants on terrorism charges for planning to attack a U.S. military base in Belgium. The men were thought to have connections to al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah through a man arrested in Dubai in July 2001. The men were later acquitted of all charges relating to terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2002:</td>
<td>Dutch authorities arrest 24 suspected extremists accusing them of supporting terrorism and recruiting for jihad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 30, 2002:</td>
<td>Police arrest 12 suspected al Qaeda members for attempting to recruit young men for jihad. Dutch authorities accused the men of providing financial and logistical support to al Qaeda and possessing fake passports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13, 2002:</td>
<td>Police arrest a suspected leader of Islamic Ansar al-Islam as he was waiting to change planes. The leader, Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, was suspected by the United States of harboring al Qaeda fugitives in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

December 2, 2003: Dutch officials arrest an Iraqi male at the airport on a warrant issued by Germany for the man attempting to form a criminal organization. Germany requested extradition.

November 2, 2004: Police arrest a Muslim radical for the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh for the making of a short film about four women who were abused by their Muslim husbands.

November 8-9, 2004: Arsonists set fire to Protestant churches in Utrecht and Amersfoort and an Islamic school in Uden. Retaliation for the church fires and Van Gogh’s murder was suspected in the second arson.

November 10, 2004: SWAT teams raid and arrest two males in The Hague after a 14-hour standoff. The males were suspected of having trained at a terrorist camp and having suspected ties to a group influenced by al Qaeda.

November 12, 2004: 200 police officers raid several locations and arrest 38 people with suspected ties to the PKK in Turkey. The suspects were preparing for terrorist related attacks to be carried out in Turkey.

November 13, 2004: A mosque was destroyed by fire in retaliation for the Van Gogh murder.


Summary. Total incidents related to terrorism in the Netherlands between 1996 and 2004 totaled 11. Of those incidents, eight (8) were classified as arrest related. Of the eight arrest incidents, half (4) were related to al Qaeda. All arrest incidents occurred after 9/11. Arson constituted the remaining three (3) incidents of terrorism in the period of time studied.

Counterterrorism Agencies. The Netherlands does not have a centralized agency or organization that specifically deals with terrorism. The Ministries of Justice and Interior head the counterterrorism efforts in the Netherlands and focus mainly on
intelligence and prevention to effectively combat the terrorist threat.\textsuperscript{231} There are approximately twenty different agencies responsible for counterterrorism in the Netherlands. The Ministry of Justice has the main responsibility of dealing with any threat or attack that violates the law while the Ministry of the Interior deals mostly with non-criminal threats such as natural disasters and large accidents.\textsuperscript{232} The other government ministries serve as support agencies for the Ministries of Justice and Interior.

A brief profile of the agencies responsible for counterterrorism and Homeland Security in the Netherlands are listed in table 17 below.

Table 18: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in the Netherlands 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Justice/Ministry of the Interior:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb)--Established in 2005, this position falls under the authority of the Minister of Justice and seeks to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks by coordinating counterterrorism efforts and cooperation between the agencies deemed responsible for Netherlands national and homeland security.\textsuperscript{233}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Expertise and Analysis Department (DKA)--This department serves as an expertise department for the NCTb and is the national counterterrorism information center for the many intelligence agencies (AVID, MIVD, IND) and police, while also providing assessments on terrorist threats, advising other agencies with intelligence and information, and identifying new trends in counterterrorism strategy.\textsuperscript{234} |

| Policy and Strategy Department (DBS)--Develops national and international policy and strategy for the NCTb and is the lead agency for policy regarding counterterrorism strategy in international forums.\textsuperscript{235} |

| Coordination and Crisis Management Department (DR)--This department coordinates the cooperation between different agencies and parties in the counterterrorism areas of Internet and satellite channels, |

\textsuperscript{233} National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) website.  
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/mission.  
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid. Expertise and Analysis Department  
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/Expertise%5FAnalysis%5FDepartment/.  
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid. Policy and Strategy Department (DBS).  
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/Policy%5FStrategy%5FDepartment/.  
120
hotbeds of radicalization, system of special units, the Counterterrorism Alert System, and non-conventional weapons attacks.\textsuperscript{236}

Surveillance and Protection Department (EBB)--Responsible for protection and surveillance of people and property relating to the leaders of the Netherlands government.\textsuperscript{237} The EBB is somewhat similar to the United States Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service.

Civil Aviation Security Department (DBB)--Responsible for the security of civil aircraft and services against terrorism. Conducts baggage and passenger screening, training for airport security, air cargo inspections, and aircraft protection and surveillance.\textsuperscript{238}

Civil Aviation Security Inspectorate (IBB)--Responsible for the oversight of all civil aviation security, which includes the DBB and the Royal Military and Border Police (KMar).\textsuperscript{239}

Communication Section--Informs and trains the public and media about terrorism and counterterrorism efforts by the government.\textsuperscript{240}

General Affairs Section--This section supports the NCTb in the administrative areas necessary to support the mission of the office.\textsuperscript{241}

Program Office IT--This staff of two coordinates information supply related to counterterrorism and operational processes for the NCTb and the other agencies assigned to counterterrorism efforts within the government.\textsuperscript{242}

The National Police Services Agency (KLPD)--The Dutch police is made up of twenty-five regional police forces each lead by a regional police board and are each responsible for carrying out police functions, including counterterrorism activities, in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{243} The following divisions are part of the KLPD and have a role in Netherlands counterterrorism efforts.

International Police Services (DIN)--Maintains a relationship and contact with foreign investigative and police agencies.\textsuperscript{244}

Department for Specialist Criminal Investigation Applications (DSRT)--Provides technical support in terms of infiltration and interception for agencies tasked with preventing terrorism.\textsuperscript{245}

\textsuperscript{236}Ibid. Coordination and Crisis Management Department (DR).
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/Coordination%5FCrisis%5FManagement%5FDepartment/
\textsuperscript{237}Ibid. Surveillance and Protection Department (EBB).
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/Surveillance%5FProtection%5FDepartment.
\textsuperscript{238}Ibid. Civil Aviation Security Department (DBB).
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/Civil%5FAviation%5FSecurity%5FDepartment.
\textsuperscript{239}Ibid. Civil Aviation Security Inspectorate (IBB).
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/Civil%5FAviation%5FSecurity%5FInspectorate.
\textsuperscript{240}Ibid. Communications Section
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/Civil%5FAviation%5FSecurity%5FInspectorate.
\textsuperscript{241}Ibid. General Affairs Section.
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/General%5FAffairs%5FSection/.
\textsuperscript{242}Ibid. Program Office IT.
http://english.nctb.nl/About%5FNCTb/structure/Programme%5FOffice%5FIT/.
\textsuperscript{243}The National Police Services Agency (KLPD) website. <http://www.politie.nl/English/>.
\textsuperscript{244}Council of Europe website. Profiles on Counter-Terrorism Capacity: Netherlands. Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER). http://www.coe.int/gmt.
\textsuperscript{245}Ibid.
Counterterrorism and Activism Unit of the National Crime Squad- -This unit coordinates terrorism cases among the other units and also investigates leads on suspected terrorists in the country.246

Royalty and Diplomatic Protection Department (DKDB)--Responsible for the protection of dignitaries in Dutch society, including members of the royal family and politicians for the government.247

Special Investigations Service (DSI)- -Made up of members from the high levels of the police and military, this unit will be responsible for conducting counterterrorism actions.248

Railway, Traffic and Water Police--Protects the main infrastructure in the Netherlands.249

Operations Support and Coordination Department- -Supports the KLPD in maintaining public order and safety.250

Public Prosecution Service (OM)- -Works with the police to maintain legal order over investigations, criminal prosecutions, and court orders.251

Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND)--This agency is responsible for implementation and enforcement of the Netherlands immigration laws.252

Ministry of Defense:
Royal Military Constabulary (KMar)--Military police force responsible for aviation and border security through surveillance and other security measures.253

Ministry of Finance:
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)--International task force against money laundering.254

Intelligence Services:
The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)- -Intelligence agency under the Ministry of the Interior responsible for the collection of information on individuals and organizations that pose a terrorist threat to the country.255

Counterterrorism Information Center--Centralizes terrorism information gathered by the intelligence agencies and analyzes it for strategic recommendations.256

The Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)--Intelligence agency under the Ministry of Defense responsible for information that is of a militaristic nature in support of the country and international organizations like the EU and NATO.257

247 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
National Criminal Intelligence Department (DNRI)--Responsible for information coordination and investigation activities related to terrorism in the Netherlands.  

Laws.  The Dutch have taken a hard line against terrorism since the 9/11 attacks in the United States. As recent as 2007 the Dutch Cabinet continued to bolster their counterterrorism strategy by approving legislation making participation and cooperation in a terrorist training camp inside or outside the Netherlands a punishable offense. Additionally, the Parliament also approved a bill that would permit the Minister of the Interior to issue restraining orders prohibiting a terrorism suspect’s physical proximity to specific locations and/or persons as outlined by the order.

Terrorism is taken very seriously in the Netherlands and numerous pieces of legislation have been implemented since 9/11. Immediately after the attacks a Ministerial committee was formed from each ministry responsible for some portion of national security. The committee constructed an action plan for combating terrorism that continues to be updated on a regular basis. However, the government does not have a definition of terrorism, and terrorists are prosecuted as criminals. The intelligence community is also considered a key ingredient in the safety of Netherland’s citizens. Cooperation and communication were heavily emphasized among the domestic and international agencies after 9/11. International cooperation is a key component to the

257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
Dutch counterterrorism strategy. The Dutch also believe that general efforts to combat and prevent terrorism—such as the issuance of foreign aid— are not as effective as targeting specific causes of terrorism through increase of capacity, capabilities, and coordination of intelligence. Legislation is one of the ways the Netherlands specifically targets terrorism in hopes to prevent it. Some of the most key pieces of legislation are as follows:

1. Crimes of Terrorism Act. In 2004, the Crimes of Terrorism Act was put into place by the Netherlands government. The bill added several terrorism related actions to the Criminal Code. Some of these offenses are as follows:

- Terrorist Intent when committing other criminal offenses was given harsher penalties and visa versa.
- Jurisdiction over terrorism-related offenses was expanded.
- Membership in a terrorism organization outlawed and expanded.
- Conspiracy to commit terrorism added.
- Recruiting for terrorism and into terrorist groups considered a crime.

2. Authority to Demand Data Act. This law was added in January 2006 making it easier for investigators working terrorism cases to obtain information that can be considered evidence on a suspect from a third party organization, person, or firm.

As of June 2006 several bills were still being considered by the Parliament. The proposed legislation dealt with expanding the scope for terrorism investigations and prosecutions, regulating cross-examination procedures for protected witnesses, extending

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264 Ibid.
the ban on terrorist organizations under civil law, and a bill dealing with national security administrative issues.265

3. Legislation on Terrorist Financing. The Netherlands has also amended several Acts dealing with the financing of terrorism. In 2002, the Netherlands approved an Act implementing the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. This Act expanded violations for criminal preparation of terrorist acts and the financing of terrorism to the Dutch Criminal Code Article 46.266 The Act also authorized the freezing, seizure, and forfeiture of any assets or funds used for terrorism.267

4. Preventative and Repressive Measures against Radicalism and Radicalization. Preventing people from becoming radicalized by terrorists is one of the main goals of the Netherlands counterterrorism strategy. Several programs have been set up since 9/11 to keep people from joining terrorist forces in the Netherlands. The programs seek to educate young people on the knowledge of Islam, strengthen local infrastructure through a social network of community leaders, expand the labor market for youth, promote understanding among cultures, and strengthen social and professional ties with the Muslim community.268

The repressive programs are more aggressive and proactive. The government counterterrorism forces focus on hotbeds of radicalization and targets specific persons

267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
who pose a potential terrorist threat to the community.\textsuperscript{269} This is done through surveillance, interventions, financial restrictions, and a host of other strategies taken from the bulk of the counterterrorism resources.

\textit{Conclusion.} The counterterrorism strategy of the Netherlands is much more focused and specific than that of the United States and other European countries. The Dutch attack what they believe to be the specific causes and sources of terrorism in their country. They also put heavy emphasis on prevention over response and recovery mainly through intelligence and cooperation with international organizations and countries. The Netherlands represent an incredibly strong ally for the United States and continues to cooperate with other European countries against terrorism. While terrorism before 9/11 was taken seriously in the Netherlands it has been given more of a priority after the attacks in the United States. The political component toward counterterrorism is extremely positive, giving strength toward effective legislation being implemented after 9/11.

\textbf{Denmark}

\textit{Overview.} As an original NATO member since 1949, Denmark has been able to rely on the other NATO members, especially the United States, for its security, both internal and external. Terrorism in Denmark has not taken a toll on the country as it has in countries like the UK and Italy. However, as the percentage of the Muslim population in Denmark has consistently risen, the government has begun to pay close attention to the

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
possibility of Denmark becoming a “safe-haven” for terrorists. In 2005, a Danish newspaper printed cartoons of the prophet Mohammed in a degrading manner, according to many Muslim opinions. The cartoons sparked an international melee of riots and demonstrations that ended in over one hundred deaths across the world. Several Imams ordered the assassination of the Danish cartoonists. Because Denmark is a member of the EU and NATO, its security is most reliant on the policies and resources of those organizations. For example, Denmark is a member of Europol, the European police organization launched in 1999 by members of EU states.

Because of its alliance with the western world, Denmark is likely to be a target of international terrorist groups like al Qaeda. However, its strong ties with the EU and NATO give it adequate defense capability to mitigate terrorism and assist other NATO countries in doing the same.

*History of Terrorism.* Terrorism in Denmark has been minimal throughout history, including after 9/11. The Danish cartoon scandal in 2005 put Denmark in the sights of al Qaeda, but Danish cooperation with EU and NATO security provisions has kept the country mostly terrorist attack free. Some of the most notable attacks in Denmark’s history with terrorism are described below in detail.

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Table 19: Notable International Terrorist Events in Denmark 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 17, 1997</td>
<td>Danish police arrest seven Neo-Nazis planning to send letter bombs overseas. The group had links to other bombings in the United Kingdom. A policeman was shot by one of the members during his arrest after he had delivered the packages to a mailbox.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
May 7, 2002: Messages were found in two separate locations in Seattle threatening a passenger plane originating from Copenhagen to Seattle. The flight was diverted and passengers were placed on a different plane.

October 30, 2002: Danish government detained a Chechnya rebel leader involved in the seizure of a Moscow theater that left 128 people dead. Denmark rejected the extradition of the suspect to Russia.

2003: Danish government froze the assets of a Danish branch of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Counterterrorism forces also arrested a suspect from Morocco on weapon charges who also had ties to al Qaeda.

September 2005: Danish police arrest a Danish citizen from Morocco for distributing terrorist recruiting materials.


Summary. Denmark had a total of five (5) incidents related to terrorism between 1996 and 2004. Of these incidents four (4) were classified as arrests of terrorism suspects. One of the four arrests was related to al Qaeda after 9/11. All but one of the total terrorism related incidents occurred after 9/11.

Counterterrorism Agencies. EU and NATO forces heavily back the agencies and ministries for counterterrorism strategy in Denmark. The Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defense are the major governmental bodies in charge of Homeland Security. The Home Office under the Ministry of Defense is responsible for the military or civil defense of the country and charged more with defense than security against terrorism. The main entity in charge of counterterrorism and Homeland Security falls on the Ministry of Justice and the Security and Intelligence Service. A list of the agencies and departments in charge of combating terrorism in Denmark are listed below.
Table 20: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Denmark 1996-2004

Ministry of Justice:
National Police Force--The National Police force is divided into five areas throughout the country responsible for enforcement of Danish law and the prevention of crime.  

Department G--A special assignment division of the National Police Force responsible for terror-related investigations.  

Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET)--Denmark’s national security structure centers on the Danish Security and Intelligence Service or PET. The PET consists of 700 police officers and support personnel focused on prevention, investigation, and counter operation of threats against the national security of Denmark. PET is organized under Department G of the National Police Force and is Denmark’s primary counterterrorism force. PET defines terrorism as “serious crime or the threat of any such serious crime, which - usually with an allegedly political motive - is used as a means of enforcing claims on authorities or private individuals or to bring about disturbances of the public order.” 

Ministry of Defense:
Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS)--This service analyzes and collects intelligence, and disseminates information about international threats that are of importance to Denmark’s national security. Intelligence activities include collection through signal intelligence or SIGINT and international cooperation with other intelligence services in the areas of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, political, financial, and military matters that would be of interest to Denmark. 

Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)--This government agency is responsible for managing the National Rescue Preparedness Corps for all types of accidents and disasters that occur within Denmark.

270 "Denmark Ministry of Justice Website, the National Police Force." http://www.politi.dk/en/About_the_police/national_police/.
271 "Denmark Ministry of Justice Website, the National Police Force." http://www.politi.dk/en/About_the_police/national_police/.
273 Ibid.
276 "Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)," http://www.brs.dk/uk/.
Immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, Denmark aligned itself with the United States concerning the war on terrorism. Denmark contributed troops and resources for both the war in Afghanistan and the Iraq war. As a member of the United Nations Counterterrorism Committee, Denmark has made its commitment to counterterrorism well known throughout the international community. Denmark also began the process of creating new anti-terrorism legislation. Prior to 9/11, terrorism did not constitute a major concern for the Danish government. However, in an effort not to become a safe-haven for terrorists in the future, Denmark took necessary steps to confront the new threat. One of the key pieces of legislation against terrorism was a two-part anti-terrorism package.

1. Anti-Terrorism Package I. This legislation created the first insertion of a definition of terrorism into Denmark legislation. The legislation, passed in May of 2002, defined terrorism in section 114 of the Danish Criminal Code as “the intent seriously to intimidate a population or unlawfully to compel Danish or foreign public authorities or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act or to destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization, provided that the offense may inflict serious harm on a country or an international organization by virtue of its nature or the context in which it is committed.”[^277] The package also increased restrictions on the proliferation of WMD and raised the penalties for violations of these sections.[^278]

[^278]: Ibid.
Accompanying the act were several amendments that would change existing security law by strengthening the investigative powers of the police. These amendments also influenced and bolstered several Acts already in existence, such as the Danish Money Laundering Act, the Danish Customs Act, and the Aliens Act.\textsuperscript{279}

2. Anti-Terrorism Package II. The second round of counterterrorism legislation implemented by Denmark occurred on June 6, 2006 and included amendments to the Administration of Justice Act.\textsuperscript{280} The amendments to the Administration of Justice Act by the second anti-terrorism package included strengthening the information-sharing channels of the Danish intelligence agencies, increasing the investigative powers of the police even further than the first one did, and enabling intelligence agencies to obtain information about airline passengers.\textsuperscript{281} While these changes are only the highlights of the new counterterrorism powers, the legislation also increased surveillance powers of the PET, which included the interception of communications by the intelligence agency and police.

3. “Police Against Terrorism” Operation. In 2005, the Danish police launched a day-to-day enforcement operation aimed at preventing terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{282} Police personnel were assigned to spot any terrorist related activities throughout their day-to-day activities.

4. Operation Active Endeavor. Denmark also participated in a NATO response to terrorism after 9/11. Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) is a military program deploying

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[279] Ibid.
\item[280] Ibid.
\item[282] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
NATO Naval Forces to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to increase surveillance and protection against terrorists using the water to access European countries.\(^{283}\) OAE is still active today and encompasses several NATO members in its program and mission.

*Budgetary Support.* In the years 2002 and 2003, the Danish Defense and Public Order and Safety budgets remained unchanged at 5.9 percent and 3.4 percent of GDP, respectively.\(^{284}\) Funds for terrorism prevention and national security are often found in one or both of these budgeting areas. While the Defense and Public Order and Safety funding did not change, it appears some of the budget for the Ministries was reallocated.

*Conclusion.* Although Denmark has not experienced terrorist attacks, it continue to be a major advocate in combating the terrorist threat. Denmark has taken several steps to increase their efforts against terrorism after 9/11 in the areas of legislation, policy, and increasing law enforcement efforts. The agencies responsible for counterterrorism in Denmark focus on the areas necessary to maintain a secure nation. These areas include intelligence, investigations and enforcement, border control, and emergency preparedness and response. Denmark’s legal system also supports counterterrorism efforts through the passage of the security packages and by participation in the international programs that seek to mitigate the terrorist threat. The United States also believes that the political efforts in Denmark to cooperate with the war on terrorism are adequate, thus constituting an added layer of security for the United States.


Norway

Overview. Until the cold war ended in 1990, Norway relied heavily on the protection of NATO for its security. Norway has not been the subject of domestic and international terrorism. No fatalities have ever been attributed to an act of terrorism in Norway. When the international terrorist threat began to emerge in the 1990’s Norway made very few changes in its national security strategy to effectively deal with the new terrorism. Not until 1999 did the civil security divisions in Norway begin to expand homeland security from military defense to modern and civil society.\textsuperscript{285}

The Vulnerability Commission was formed in 1999 to address the problems and find solutions for an efficient civil security system.\textsuperscript{286} This was the first step toward the reformation of Norway’s homeland security system. The commission recommended establishing a ministry of homeland security with a large area of responsibility toward keeping Norway free from threats.\textsuperscript{287} The new ministry would make efforts to increase the communication and coordination between agencies responsible for national security. Norway and the United States have a strong relationship with one another that extends into the homeland security field. The Department of Homeland Security in the United States was formed as a result of the 9/11 attacks. However, Norway’s formation of such a department would be influenced by other factors with much greater power than the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the end, Norway merged several departments of civil defense and emergency planning under the Ministry of Justice, although not in the radical form

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid.
that was initially proposed by the Vulnerability Committee.\textsuperscript{288} The National Security Authority became the coordinating body for security issues in Norway.

\textit{History of Terrorism.} Norway’s experience with domestic and international terrorism is almost nonexistent. Set in a strategic location for a NATO member, Norway is often more concerned about its security from Russia than from the threat of terrorism. However, terrorism is considered important, and Norway has taken steps to affirm UN resolution 1373 against terrorism.

Table 21: Notable International Terrorist Events in Norway 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2002:</td>
<td>Norwegian authorities arrest two Somali men on money laundering and tax charges for sending funds to al Qaeda. The two men ran a banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>system that was responsible for sending $7.5 million in international money transfers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 20, 2003:</td>
<td>Police arrested a leader of Ansar al-Islam who had refugee status in Norway. The leader, Mullah Krekar, was suspected of being involved in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sheltering members of al Qaeda. An appeals court released him in April 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2, 2004:</td>
<td>Police re-arrest Mullah Krekar this time for attempted murder conspiracy, and inciting criminal activity for a plot to murder his rivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in northern Iraq. He was again released a month later because witnesses were forced to testify against him.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textit{Summary.} Norway had a total of three (3) incidents related to terrorism between 1996 and 2004. Of those three incidents (all arrest related) all three had ties to al Qaeda. The total incidents of arrest happened after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid.
Counterterrorism Agencies. Norway’s membership in the UN and NATO and its intense interest in becoming a member of the EU is evidence of the country’s desire for relevance in the world. Belief in the cooperative international effort against terrorism is widely shared in Norway. The Norwegian counterterrorism efforts are a way to increase the strength of the UN and NATO, improving the credibility of Norway in the process. Several agencies and ministries contribute toward this effort. An outline of some of key parts of the institutional framework is as follows.

Table 22: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Norway 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Justice:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security Authority (NSM)--Formed in 2003, this agency is the coordinating body for security information to “counter threats to the independence and security of the realm and other vital national security interests, primarily espionage, sabotage or acts of terrorism.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB)--Established in September 2003, the directorate “works to prevent loss of life and to protect health, the environment and essential public functions and material assets in connection with accidents, disasters and other undesired occurrences in times of peace, crisis and war.” |

| National Directorate of Police--The Norwegian police is organized into twenty-seven different police districts responsible for every aspect of ordinary police work, including criminal investigation and maintaining public order. |

| Norwegian Police Security Service (PST)--This agency is the main entity assigned the task of preventing and investigating crimes related to terrorism, espionage, and the proliferation of WMD. In addition to its terrorism duties, the PST is also responsible for the protection of the Norwegian Prime Minister and preventing and investigating the spread of politically motivated violence. The PST collaborates with the National Criminal Investigation Service and other specialized police agencies during their terrorism investigations. |

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291 Norwegian National Directorate of Police website. http://www.politi.no/portal/page/?_pageid=34,49023&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&articles7_mode=info&articles7_articleGroupName=Engelsk%20Versjon&articles4_mode=downloadinfo&articles4_articleGroupName=Engelsk%20Versjon&navigation1_parentItemId=3759&uicell=uicell08.
293 Ibid.
Intelligence Services and Agencies:
Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS)—The NIS is responsible for collecting, processing, and analyzing information relevant to Norwegian interests.294

The Coordinating and Advisory Committee for the Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Service (KRU)—A committee consisting of six members from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, Norwegian Intelligence Service, Norwegian National Security Authority, and the Norwegian Police Security Service tasked with ensuring the coordination between the secret services and the government.295

Laws. A Gallup International poll taken in Norway after the September 11 attacks showed that sixty percent of the Norwegian public supported military action against the Taliban. Norway contributed greatly to the wars in Afghanistan by providing troops and supplies to coalition forces. Although Norway is not a main target of terrorists, its involvement in international organizations like the UN and NATO obligate it to provide the best possible defense against terrorism. These actions include making changes to its legal system after the attacks on 9/11. Norway has strived to meet the commitments of the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism by adding laws dealing with terrorism to its legislation. For the first time in Norwegian history, terrorism was legally banned as a result of the 9/11 attacks. Norway’s Penal Code was amended in 2002 to include measures “against acts of terrorism and the financing of such acts.”296 Some of the most notable amendments to Norwegian law after 9/11 to deal with terrorism are as follows.

1. Section 147 of the General Civil Penal Code. The sections in this provision of the Penal Code were amended to include a definition of terrorism. The law states that

terrorism is an act committed with the intention of disrupting society or a function of society, be it legislative, executive, or judicial, or any attack on the infrastructure or key resources of the country; seriously intimidating a population; or unduly attempting to compel public authorities or intergovernmental organization to perform or abstain from performing an act of importance to the country or another country or intergovernmental organization.297 The acts outlined by the amendment are punishable by a term not exceeding twenty-on years and twelve years for conspirators.298 The act of recruiting is also covered under this section of the Code stating that recruiting others into a private organization of a military character whose aim is to disturb the social order and/or for the purpose of terrorism is highly illegal and punishable by a term not more than six years.

2. Section 140 of the General Civil Penal Code. This section makes it a criminal offense to publicly urge or instigate the commission of a criminal act, or to assist in the commission of such act with a penalty not exceeding eight years.299

3. Section 160 of the General Civil Penal Code. This section makes it illegal to publically give instruction in the use of explosives or poison as a means to commit felonies with a penalty of not more than 10 years. The section also notes that any person who provides such instruction for the purpose of a terrorist attack would be held liable for aiding and abetting a terrorist offense.300

299 Ibid.
300 Ibid.
4. Surveillance, Electronic Monitoring, and Detention. After the terrorist attacks in London of 2005, Norway implemented new laws and methods to prevent organized crime and terrorism through enhanced surveillance techniques. The surveillance techniques included secret communications monitoring or electronic wiretapping measures with court approval. Detention of suspects was expanded to a maximum of forty-eight hours under reasonable grounds that a suspect has or is going to carry out an attack.\textsuperscript{301}

The laws against terrorism in Norway have evolved since the attacks of 9/11 in the United States and the bombings in London in 2005. While some might argue that terrorism is not the main driver behind the implementation of Norway’s homeland security model, the evidence in the changes to Norway’s Penal Code paints another picture. Terrorism may not have solely influenced the HLS model in Norway. But it did influence the law by which that HLS program will operate, thus indicating that terrorism does have, in one way or another, significant influence in the development of national security in Norway.

\textit{Budgetary Support}. Norway experienced a slight decrease in defense spending between 2001 and 2002, from 9.2 percent to 9.1 percent. But it did see an increase in Public Order and Safety expenditures in 2002 from 4.3\% to 4.6\% of GDP.\textsuperscript{302}

Conclusion. Norway has a military perspective off terrorism that is proven by its firm membership in NATO and its cooperation with international organizational mandates. The lack of terrorism in Norway challenges the experience of the agencies tasked with its mitigation. However, Norway’s government has taken the initiative to form new laws dealing with terrorism as a result of the 9/11 aftermath. Enforcing this new law while balancing Norway’s military responsibilities against terrorism requires a delicate balance. Nevertheless, Norway is committed to the fight against terrorism along with its NATO allies and European counterparts, making it an important component of United States security abroad.

Iceland

Overview. Terrorism in Iceland has been virtually nonexistent. While most countries in Europe have dealt with some form of domestic and international terrorism, Iceland has remained exempt. Since 1968, Iceland has only experienced one terrorism related incident within its borders and no fatal statistics resulted from the incident.\(^{303}\) However, the increased growth of terrorism throughout the world has not discouraged Iceland from preparing laws and designating security agencies to deal with the threat. As a member of NATO and possibly a permanent member of the UN in the near future, Iceland subscribes to the counterterrorism strategies that are issued by these organizations. Still, the Icelandic government has taken its own steps to ensure that its 300,000 plus citizens are protected from the global spread of international terrorism.

Table 23: Notable International Terrorist Events in Iceland 1996-2004

None


Counterterrorism Agencies. Iceland does not have an agency equivalent to the United States Department of Homeland Security. The many functions associated with Homeland Security such as border control, airport security, and counterterrorism is divided among the police and other agencies. Since Iceland is a NATO original member, it has not established a need for national armed forces after World War II. NATO’s use of Iceland’s airport as an airbase puts the Keflavik Airport Police under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Table 24: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Iceland 1996-2004

Ministry of Justice:
National Commissioner--the head of the Icelandic police and administer of police affairs under the Minister of Justice’s authority, with the exception of the Airport police controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The National Commissioner is also the head of the police districts that are headed by district commissioners.

National Police--divided into twenty-five districts headed by district Commissioners, the national police are responsible for the enforcement of Icelandic law and protection of its citizens through investigating criminal offenses and serving the public.

National Security Unit--responsible for investigating treason, terrorism, organized crime, and other activities that may undermine the country of Iceland.\textsuperscript{307}

Iceland Intelligence Service (IIS)--Responsible for intelligence gathering and analysis.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Keflavik Airport Police--Military type personnel responsible for the police functions at Keflavik International Airport. The airport police do not have any function related to border or security control.\textsuperscript{308}

\textit{Laws.} Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, Iceland had a very limited counterterrorism strategy. Only a small number of laws addressed the terrorism threat with the main focus relating to the financing of terrorism. Then, in 2001 when the United Nations introduced Security Council Resolution No. 1373, Iceland amended its laws to include the terrorism provisions outlined by the UN. The amended laws are referred to Articles 100 (a), (b), and (c).

1. Article 100 (a). Under this article terrorism is considered a crime if it includes a modus operandi of the acts and must include one of the following:

   “To cause considerable fear among the public;”

   “To illegally force the Icelandic authorities, foreign authorities or international organizations to take action or remain passive.”

   “To weaken or cause harm to the constitutional, political, economic or social foundations of any state or international organization.”\textsuperscript{309}

These acts must also be related to a list of crimes that are outlined in the Icelandic General Penal Code:

--Manslaughter
--Assault
--Deprivation of liberties
--Any threat to traffic safety that would potentially damage property and threaten human life.
--Hijacking of aircraft or threatening people at the airport.
--Arson related offenses to include explosives.  

2. Article 100 (b). This change to the law makes the financing of an act of terrorism and/or terrorist groups, a crime under the Icelandic Penal Code. The Article follows the UN wording regarding the support, directly or indirectly, of any group of people aiming to commit acts of terrorism. It is also a crime to provide or collect money for such a group or further their activities monetarily in any way. The penalty for these crimes is a maximum of ten years in prison.

3. Article 100 (c). This article addresses any support other than monetarily in supporting terrorist groups. The law states that it is illegal to assist any terrorist group by words or actions, persuasion or motivation, or any other means to support any action defined by the other article sections.

Procedurally, Iceland law doesn’t restrict the rights of suspected terrorists based on their crime as opposed to other criminals. Terrorists are afforded all the protections under the law as other criminals are given. Any special tactics used by the police, such as

312 Ibid.
313 Ibid.

4. Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering (FATF). “An inter-governmental body whose purpose is for the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.”\footnote{315}{Financial Action Task Force website. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.}

No budget information available.

**Conclusion.** Information on terrorism is virtually nonexistent since no attacks have occurred there in some time. However, Iceland continues to be a strong ally against terrorism. The agencies and legal strategy dedicated to the mitigation of terrorism cover the many disciplines terrorism covers. The amendments to Icelandic law after 9/11 show the government’s dedication to stopping terrorism in the world and preventing it from blossoming in Iceland. Iceland’s adherence to the United Nation’s resolution 1373 relating to terrorism have also demonstrated its dedication to the the global fight against terrorism in a post-9/11 world.

**Luxembourg**

**Overview.** In the land-locked country of Luxembourg, terrorism has proven to be of no concern to the small country. With a population of just under 500,000, Luxembourg has not experienced the domestic and international threats from terrorist
groups like many of the countries that surround it. While immigration problems are of great concern to Luxembourg’s citizens, the fear of a terrorist attack is not.

As a founding member of the EU, NATO, and the UN, Luxembourg’s value to the European region is more of a financial one. Luxembourg hosts more than 200 banks within its borders.\textsuperscript{316} The secrecy laws of the banking industry in Luxembourg have been of great concern for many European states worried about the financing of terrorism spreading throughout the world. Luxembourg’s banking laws have been criticized for being too lax for an effective counterterrorism strategy. However, the United States has praised Luxembourg’s efforts in the financial fight against terrorism by releasing a statement in May of 2002 concluding that no arrests or prosecutions for money laundering have occurred in Luxembourg since January of 2001, indicating the banking secrecy laws are adequate.\textsuperscript{317} After 9/11 the United States provided Luxembourg with a list of 180 suspected names of people with financial accounts possibly tied to terrorism.\textsuperscript{318} The Luxembourg government cooperated with the United States’ request and after some investigation compiled a list of twenty-seven groups and individuals restricting them from banking transactions in the country.\textsuperscript{319}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Notable International Terrorist Events in Luxembourg 1996-2004}
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline
None \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid.
\end{flushright}

Counterterrorism Agencies

Table 26: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Luxembourg 1996-2004

Ministry of Justice:
National Police-- Also known as “Grand-Duchy,” the national police force of Luxembourg consists of several central and regional units responsible for the enforcement of Luxembourg law and protection of public safety. The police are divided into several specialized units, each responsible for a different element of public safety and national security. There is no unit solely responsible for counterterrorism.

Financial Intelligence Unit-- The State Prosecutor’s special unit responsible for the fight against terrorist financing and money laundering.321

Intelligence Services:
Luxembourg State Intelligence Service (Service de Renseignements de I Etat Luxembourgeois or SREL)-- Provides international intelligence and is responsible for Homeland Security, and counter-espionage.322

Ministry of State:
Service de Renseignements de l'Etat (SRDE)--Agency responsible for national intelligence matters.323

Haute Commissariat de la Securite Exterieure (HCSE)--Service specializing in foreign intelligence for the high commission.324

Ministry of Defense:
2ieme Bureau de l'Armee (French)--The military intelligence and security arm of Luxembourg.325

Laws. The laws against terrorism in Luxembourg have centered on the financial aspect of the threat. The Luxembourg government is aware of the propensity for terrorist

324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
groups to attempt methods of money laundering through their country’s banking system. Several anti-money laundering measures have been in place since the late 1980s as a result of drug trafficking investigations. However, not until after the 9/11 attacks did Luxembourg adopt legislation directly addressing the terrorist threat. The Law of 12 August 2003 follows recommendations from the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373 of 2001.

1. Luxembourg Terrorism Law of 12 August 2003. The Act defines terrorism as “any crime or misdemeanor which is punishable by a prison sentence for a maximum period of at least to three years…or any act with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling public authorities to perform or abstain from performing an act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country, an organization or international body.”

The law also makes it illegal to form a terrorist group and be associated with one, participating in carrying out any activity of the terrorist group, being a leader of a group, financing a terrorist group, and the penalties of each violation. The law is extremely comprehensive and covers many aspects of what Luxembourg perceives to be terrorism. Articles 135-1 to 135-6 of the Criminal Code are considered the terrorism statutes.

Luxembourg also has investigating judges, which have the power to not only review but also order searches and certain investigatory procedures. The Criminal

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327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
Code also addresses wiretapping communication devices. This Code is also known as “special surveillance measures” in the Code of Criminal Procedures.\textsuperscript{329} Luxembourg has at the present time ratified eight of the twelve anti-terrorism Conventions of the United Nations, thus proving its commitment toward cooperating with international organizations. This ratification shows that Luxembourg is a willing ally in the fight against terrorism, including being a valuable NATO member.

No budget information available.

\textit{Conclusion.} While terrorism does not plague the small country of Luxembourg like it does many of its neighbors, the country plays a significant role in controlling the financing of terrorism. Luxembourg has taken several steps to address its vulnerability to terrorist money laundering and financial fraud by implementing laws after 9/11 to deal with this threat. Luxembourg also adheres to the UN resolution 1373 and supports the NATO declaration of Article 5, both taking place after 9/11. The agencies and ministries dedicated to the mitigation of terrorism also seem adequate given the low propensity for a terrorist attack within Luxembourg’s borders.

\textbf{Portugal}

\textit{Overview.} Portugal has not dealt with domestic and international terrorism in the same manner as many other countries in Europe. While terrorism has occurred in the past, it has never posed a serious threat to national security. Prior to democratization in

1974, Portugal dealt with several resistance movements that carried out low intensity acts of violence. The Popular Action Force (PAF) and the Accao Revolutionary Armada (ARA) were two of the most active resistance groups in Portugal throughout the 60s and 70s. The deaths caused by terrorism from these groups have been minimal throughout Portugal’s history and failed to threaten its national security. However, Portugal’s commitment toward the mitigation of terrorism has remained one of its top priorities.

Democracy has greatly influenced the security of Portugal making it a country that is not targeted by terrorists. Today, Portugal is considered a transit country for Islamic extremists including members of al Qaeda. According to Portugal intelligence services, al Qaeda has committed crimes of fraud, theft, and production of false documents in Portugal. In 2003, the Directorate for Criminal Investigation found that members of the 9/11 attackers Hamburg Germany cell visited Portugal after the attacks in the United States. While terrorists have not targeted Portugal, members of terrorist groups enroute to attack Portugal’s allies in Europe and other parts of the world from time to time visit the small country. It is this fact that emphasizes the important role Portugal plays in the fight against terrorism within the European and NATO communities. Portugal has been a consistent ally of the United States, and the security measures taken to thwart the threat from Islamic fundamentalist groups increases that positive relationship and translates into better security for both countries.

330 Engene, Jan Oskar. Terrorism in Western Europe, (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Northampton, MA), 151.
Summary. Between 1996 and 2004 Portugal has not experienced any terrorist attacks on its homeland. However, Portugal has investigated approximately thirty-eight cases of suspected terrorism linked to Islamic fundamentalism. While the cases in Portugal deal mainly with groups associated with those in Spain, terrorism figures in Portugal are considered extremely low. In 2006, the statistical value of terrorism was so low the figures were classified as “statistical secrecy.” Portugal also responds to several reports of crimes suspected of being linked to terrorism. In 2006, Portugal’s law enforcement agencies responded to 1,400 incidents related to bomb alerts that turned out to be false alarms. Counterterrorism is prevalent in Portugal as a result of these investigations. The agencies involved in Portugal’s mission to preserve national security are discussed below.

333 LexisNexis Academic. Publico Portuguese newspaper. “Portugal Has Been Used by Islamic Terrorists.”
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
Counterterrorism Agencies

Table 28: Counterterrorism and Intelligence Agencies in Portugal 1996-2004

Prime Minister--The main authority of Portuguese government.

Ministry of Internal Administration/Ministry of the Interior:
Judicial Police--Federal police agency equivalent to the United States FBI with similar responsibilities.

Central Department for the Banditry Combat (DCCB)--Agency inside the Judicial Police with primary responsibility for the investigation and prevention of terrorism within Portugal.

Financial Information Unit (FIU)--Agency inside the Judicial Police responsible for preventing the financing of terrorism, coordinating information between other agencies within Portugal, working with other entities regarding terrorism-related crime and cooperating with FATF recommendations. 336

Public Security Police (national uniformed police)--Responsible for policing the large urban areas and airports of Portugal.

National Republican Guard (paramilitary police force)--Responsible for the surveillance of the border and enforcing law in the small towns and countryside as well as the airports. 337

Anti-Terrorism Coordination Unit--Created in 2003 by a decree from the Prime Minister, this agency is responsible for the coordination of all other counterterrorism units in Portugal.

Borders and Foreigners Service--Responsible for the security and surveillance of the border and the monitor of crossing points throughout the country. 338

Ministry of Defense:
Directorate General of Maritime Authority--Responsible for the security and the monitor of the sea border around Portugal. 339

Strategic Information Service--The intelligence agency for Portugal responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information relating to the national security of the country. 340

Laws. Portuguese legislation countering terrorism is based on the democratic rights and freedoms exhibited by their criminal laws. After the 9/11 attacks in America,

337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
340 Ibid.
Portugal implemented new laws in 2003 to effectively deal with the terrorist threat. Portugal is not accustomed to terrorist attacks, but they do regard terrorism as an important issue warranting a comprehensive approach. Some of the legislation passed by Portugal after 9/11 that deal with terrorism is as follows:

1. The Law on Sanctions Regime for the Failure to Fulfill the Community Regulations 11/2002.\(^{341}\) This law addresses the freezing of assets of any group or individual connected to terrorism.

2. The Terrorism Law 52/2003.\(^{342}\) The scope of the law involving terrorism was greatly enlarged by this law in 2003. The Law revoked several existing articles making crimes involving terrorism carry greater weight. First, the Terrorism Law criminalizes all acts of terrorism that aim to facilitate, directly or indirectly, the terrorist agenda whatever it may be. The Terrorism Law targets groups and terrorist organizations and associations from not only domestic groups but also international groups. Individual acts of terrorism are also covered. The law also restricts extradition of a terrorist suspect captured on Portuguese soil to a requesting EU member state under the EU arrest warrant.

3. The Law on Prevention and Repression of Money Laundering 11/2004.\(^{343}\) Closely related to the law on Sanctions Regime mentioned above, this law makes it illegal to launder assets of illicit origin and seeks to establish control mechanisms to prevent crimes associated with terrorism.

\(^{342}\) Ibid.
\(^{343}\) Ibid.
Portugal’s counterterrorism strategy also relies on its membership in several international organizations and participates in many international agreements against terrorism. In 2005, Portugal signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism agreement. The EU arrest warrant regimen, the law of International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, and UN Resolution 1373 are just some of the other international agreements Portugal has entered into for the sake of their national security. Portugal has also ratified twelve conventions and protocols against terrorism and signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

No budget information available.

Conclusion. Portugal’s commitment to fighting terrorism is considered very important, considering that terrorism has not been much of an issue within the country. While Portugal has had its share of domestic and political violence groups in the past, none have resorted to conducting a wave of terrorist activity like the ETA in its neighbor Spain. The agencies tasked with counterterrorism in Portugal share the components needed to be effective. These components are intelligence, border control, investigation, and enforcement. It is clear that Portugal takes more of a law enforcement approach to fighting terrorism as opposed to a militaristic one or both. Legislatively, Portugal has implemented new laws dealing with issues such as stopping the financing of terrorism and criminalizing terrorism within the country’s borders. Portugal is not necessarily an integral part of the fight against terrorism but neither should be considered a weak link.
V. ANALYSIS

To understand the amount of influence terrorism had on the selected NATO members after September 11, 2001 an in depth analysis of the change in each countries counterterrorism strategy is needed. The components of counterterrorism strategy studied in each country were terrorist incidents, anti-terrorism laws, agencies, and budgets. Each of these components were considered critical to understanding the amount of change each NATO member incurred as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

*Terrorist Incidents.* Examining the history of terrorism in each country can illuminate many factors as to why certain events occurred and the level of impact on areas of counterterrorism strategy. Examining the patterns created by historical reflection of terrorism incidents may help explain why change occurred and how a country responded. A period of eight years was selected to examine the history of each countries experience with terrorism. This study provided a reasonable amount of time to be considered both before and after 9/11. The incidents studied were not limited to only attacks by terrorists, but also actions taken by counterterrorism forces against terrorists and their operations. For instance, police arrests on suspected terrorists were counted as a terrorist incident. It should also be noted that the period of time examined both before and after 9/11 were not equal. This study examined all terrorism related incidents in each country for five and a half years before 9/11 but only three years after 9/11. Logic would indicate that a greater amount of time might equal a greater amount of incidents.
However, in this case the opposite is true. In every country where terrorism occurred, the amount of incidents in the three years after 9/11 was greater than in the five and a half years before. The following table shows the incidents relating to international and domestic terrorism in each of the selected NATO countries both before and after the 9/11 attacks.

**Table 29: Terrorist Related Incidents before and after 9/11.**
(Shown from greatest to least number of total incidents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>January 1, 1996-September 10, 2001</th>
<th>September 11, 2001-December 31, 2004</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each terrorist incident before and after 9/11 was examined, classified, and a summary given at the end of each country’s terrorism history section. Since 9/11, awareness, education, and prevention of Islamic extremism has grown on a global scale. The data shows not only that terrorism incidents increased in the majority of countries studied, but also that terrorism related incidents after 9/11 had a greater emphasis on Islamic extremist groups, and more specifically al Qaeda. For instance, prior to 9/11 Germany had only dealt with one incident of terrorism involving al Qaeda between the years of 1996 and 2001. After 9/11, the majority of terrorism incidents and arrests were
al Qaeda related. This shift occurred in all selected NATO countries who had dealings with terrorism prior to the 9/11 attacks. It is not uncommon for a group to be targeted on a global scale once they prove their capability to cause mass casualties and damage on a large scale. The events of 9/11 indicated that many of the incidents after 9/11 were related to the arrests of al Qaeda suspects and associates. The “focusing event” of 9/11 created the need for each government to respond to a possible threat of the same liking. To avoid this, arrests of al Qaeda members and their associates increased dramatically.

Bombings occupied a large majority of the historical incidents of terrorism in each country. It is clear from the data that bombings are the method of choice for terrorist groups in many of the NATO countries. Of the 433 total terrorist incidents for all 14 NATO countries in this study approximately 195 (45%) were classified as bombings. Arrests and miscellaneous incidents made up the remainder of the total historical record of terrorism from 1996 to 2004. The countries with active domestic terrorist groups tallied the most bombings. The IRA in the United Kingdom, the ETA in Spain and France and 17 November in Greece were some of the most active groups utilizing bombing tactics.

The historical data on terrorism incidents also indicates a higher total incident count in the more populated countries than in the smaller ones. The first seven NATO countries listed above are coincidentally the largest in population compared to the second seven. While each country’s ranking in the terrorist incident table above is based on numbers of incidents alone, the rankings are almost synonymous with population size as well. This data would indicate that greater populated countries experience more threats from terrorism than do smaller ones.
Weaknesses and vulnerabilities also emerge from the historical data. Terrorist incidents seemed to target the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of certain countries. Any weakness displayed by a country in regards to their security was exploited by terrorists attempting to gain an advantage through that weakness. For instance, planning terrorist attacks in Belgium was considered to be an advantage by terrorists due to the lack of border control and inadequate entry screening. In the years prior to 9/11, Belgium passports were among the most as being forged and stolen. 9/11 exploited the vulnerability of airline security. The 2004 bombings in Madrid exploited the lack of security in the train system and a lax intelligence community. This shows the reactive nature of governments due to the actions of terrorism. The historical record coupled with a change in laws, addition of agencies, and changes in budget are indicators of this reactivity.

Laws. The laws are an indicator of what a country considers to be important and how it should function. In the democratic form of government, changes in laws or the addition of new laws is indicative of the will of the people through elected lawmakers. The specific laws toward counterterrorism are a major part of an overall counterterrorism strategy. Several countries did not have specific terrorism laws prior to 9/11. The countries that did were limited to Germany, the United Kingdom, Turkey, France, and, Italy. These laws were the result of the rising threat of international terrorism, previous domestic terrorist threats, and a need for a legal definition of terrorism. However, after 9/11 legislation related to terrorism was introduced into the legal systems of every NATO country but one. Greece remains the only country after 9/11 to not introduce new laws regarding terrorism. Greece does not specifically target terrorism through their legal
structure but instead consider the specific acts of terrorism to fall under their criminal code.

On the other end of the spectrum lies the United Kingdom. As one of the United States biggest allies against terrorism Britain considers targeting terrorism through specific laws a big advantage. The experience with terrorism throughout the years has enabled the United Kingdom the opportunity to address domestic terrorism with legal tools. However, only one anti-terrorism law existed prior to 9/11. After 9/11, the United Kingdom implemented six new laws targeting many facets of the terrorist threat from financing to border protection. A closer look at the change in terrorism laws before and after 9/11 in each country is shown in the table below:

Table 30: Change in Counterterrorism Laws before and after 9/11
(Shown from greatest to least amount of change)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Laws Before 9/11</th>
<th>New Laws Added After 9/11</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the most active countries experiencing legal change was Germany. Germany took a very aggressive stance in the way of counterterrorism law. Amending 16 existing
laws and adding two new ones, show Germany’s commitment toward combating terrorism. 9/11 exposed many vulnerabilities in the legal systems of many countries especially in the United States. Legal structures adjusted in many countries were one way to counter the vulnerabilities exposed by the terrorists on 9/11. In each of the NATO countries studied, new legislation after 9/11 covered the areas of border control, intelligence sharing between agencies, surveillance tactics, and financial loopholes, all of which were exploited by al Qaeda. Examining the specifics of each law implemented after 9/11 can lend insight into what each country perceived as a weakness or vulnerability in their counterterrorism system as a result of the al Qaeda attacks.

Defining terrorism is also an important element in the legal framework of each country. While each country has a working definition of terrorism, the definitions vary among themselves. This is not uncommon, but it skews the data when it comes to comparing the efforts of one country against another.

Data from the table above also shows consistency in change of law of the countries with larger populations. This might also extend from each countries relationship with the country attacked which in this case was the United States. Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey and Spain are all highly populated and share a close relationship with the United States.

Organizational Change. The addition or reorganization of agencies tasked with counterterrorism efforts and national security is closely tied to change in the legal systems. Laws give the organizations the authority to carry out their responsibilities. In the United States, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the reorganization of several federal agencies. These agencies were critical to the safety of the American
people when it came to protecting against terrorism. We know change occurred in the United States in this area, but did it also occur in other parts of the NATO countries? According to the following table the answer is yes.

Table 31: Change in Counterterrorism Agencies
(Ranked from total change and then from most to least total number of agencies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>No. of Agencies Before 9/11</th>
<th>No. of Agencies After 9/11</th>
<th>NEW AGENCIES ADDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

While the counterterrorism agencies in some countries remained unchanged, the majority of the NATO members increased their counterterrorism efforts in the form of organizational change. The Netherlands experienced the most change while Luxembourg, Turkey, Iceland, Denmark, and Greece incurred no change in their organizational structure. Understanding why change occurred in some countries and not in others can be explained by many factors such as existing laws, relationship with other countries, budget and . While terrorism in the Netherlands is somewhat limited in occurrence it is obvious from the data that the government believes the potential of
terrorism is high. Additionally, the Netherlands is a close ally of the United States and believes that international cooperation is one of the most effective ways to combat terrorism. France, Spain, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Germany all have large amounts of personnel assigned to counterterrorism responsibilities and the budget to support their efforts. In addition, they also have a close relationship with the United States. The fact that organizational change did occur in these countries after having many resources and agencies already dedicated to counterterrorism shows the impact 9/11 had on well established countries. Agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities are not limited to prevention. Response and recovery are also important components to a proper strategy. Response to a large terrorist attack was highlighted by 9/11. The extreme damage to a large area in New York and Washington D.C. stretched response and recovery efforts to their maximum. This prompted several countries to examine their own response and recovery resources, a critical component to Homeland Security functions.

A close examination of the change in organizations in the case studies shows a parallel to some of the laws implemented. For instance, the financing of terrorism became a critical component to the success of al Qaeda on 9/11. Many countries adjusted their financial laws to freeze assets and accounts suspected of having links with terrorism. To do this, financial task forces and groups within the government dedicated to uncovering this type of crime were created.

9/11 gave many countries a wealth of information when it came to counterterrorism strategy. The NATO countries were able to learn from the mistakes made by the United States and remedy their own methods and abilities if needed. The
magnitude of the attacks in the United States placed a sense of urgency on these changes explaining why change was implemented by the NATO members in a rapid fashion.

*Budgetary Support.* Fiscal budgets are a good indicator of what a country considers to be important. Budgets are also the lifeblood to any program designed to safeguard a country’s citizens. Counterterrorism programs and agencies require an enormous amount of money to properly carry out their mission. Budget increases are often driven by politics. For a problem to make it onto the political agenda requires a serious push by a country’s citizens. Terrorism is a problem considered to be worthy of funding due to its propensity to harm innocent civilians. Currently the United States spends almost $50 billion a year on Homeland Security whereas before 9/11 the budget to protect the homeland was segregated by agency and significantly less. Budget allocation and spending for a program is a strong indicator of pressure to solve a problem. Increases in budget spending amongst the NATO countries indicated a change in national security measures brought by the events of 9/11. While the budgeting statistics were not available for all countries, many showed a significant increase in spending for this area after 2001. Several countries classified their counterterrorism budgets as secret and made specific statistics regarding their security spending impossible to ascertain for this study. However, the general increases in this area of spending were available for some countries and are listed on the next page.
Table 32: Budget Changes in the Immediate Years After 9/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>BUDGET CHANGE AFTER 9/11 (2001-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$5.6 billion increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$3 billion increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$2.8 billion increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>91% total increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>$11.1 billion increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>.2% increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The budgeting data is often the final piece to the counterterrorism strategy. It represents a level of commitment regarding counterterrorism efforts. Terrorism after 9/11 became a popular political issue in many democratic countries. Efforts by political leaders to protect their citizens from a similar attack in their own country called for increased funds. Funding prevention, preparation, response, recovery, and prevention of biological and nuclear threats are some of the main areas covered by the budget increases. The countries who rely more on their military to handle counterterrorism such as Turkey and Greece do not have to fund these efforts from a separate budget like the countries who take a more law enforcement approach.

After discovering who the perpetrators were that committed the terrorist atrocities in New York and Washington, the United States made a declaration of war against the terrorists. This allowed the U.S. to impart its military resources against the
Taliban and al Qaeda. Counterterrorism strategy often takes one of two forms. Military or Law Enforcement. Sometimes, if a country has the monetary means, they will employ both tactics. After 9/11, the United States clearly looked for allies that would join forces with them militarily against the Taliban. NATO is an obvious resource and after the declaration of Article 5, NATO forces from all members supported the United States. However, after the initial surge on the Taliban in Afghanistan subsided, the counterterrorism strategy of each NATO member country studied retook their individual characteristics. Some members like the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Germany are more Law Enforcement centered when it comes to counterterrorism. Countries like these focus their efforts on enforcement of laws against terrorism and shy away from making it a “war on terrorism.” Therefore, spending for this strategy must be separate from military efforts in counterterrorism and is much easier to track and record.

On the other side are countries whose strategy focuses on terrorism from a militaristic viewpoint. Countries like these have often experienced violent domestic attacks or whose government structure is built around the military capability of that particular country. Examples of countries in this category would be Turkey, and Norway. Norway has a military centered focus due to their close proximity to Russia. The government has been somewhat very reliant on the military for Norway’s security and therefore transfer this strength to fighting terrorism in the same way. Turkey has endured several instances of violent domestic terrorism at the hand of numerous Marxist and separatist terror groups. Turkey uses the military to supplement law enforcement efforts in arresting and locating terrorists in Turkey’s mountainous regions where they reside.
The spending and budget information of the military in many countries is highly classified and hard to itemize. Leaders and politics play an important role in what programs and efforts get implemented. The visual impact of 9/11 created a great deal of fear around the world and therefore influenced the way many leaders and governments perceived terrorism. As a result, changes were made in the areas of law, agencies and budgets. Not every NATO country made changes in all areas of counterterrorism strategy, but each country incurred change in at least one as a result of 9/11.
VI. CONCLUSION

The international changes brought about by the terrorism of 9/11 are significant. It is clear from the research of this study that 9/11, and therefore terrorism, had a significant influence on the national and homeland security strategy of the original NATO members. Terrorism is often considered the main impetus for national security policy and strategy. While some changes made by certain countries were greater than others, the fact still remains that change took place on a considerable scale. This change was by no means greater than that of the United States, but it is clear that great consideration among international states was given toward counterterrorism efforts as a result of the attacks. The cycle of terrorism, the motivation of each country to break this cycle, and the changes in strategy to combat terrorism on an international scale remains a gigantic undertaking.

The attacks of 9/11 were a classic example of what can be seen as a terrorism/counterterrorism cycle (C/CTC). This cycle incorporates each of the components of counterterrorism strategy discussed in this study and consistently occurred throughout the history of terrorism. History of terrorism, laws, agencies, and budget all play a role in the cycle. As historical records for each country indicate, terrorism targets the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each country. When a terrorist attack occurs, it is often a result of a chink in a country’s national security armor. Governments correct these weaknesses through the addition of new laws and policies carried out by agencies
capable to do so. This often requires budget increases and or reallocation forcing the
terrorists to reevaluate their strategy. Terrorists then shift their focus and adapt to
government reaction. The cycle starts over again and often begins with a new and
innovative attacks.

After 9/11 combating terrorism became the number one priority for many
countries including NATO members. Laws, organizations, incidents, and budgets all
reflected change in the selected NATO countries as a result of the attacks. Comparing
the counterterrorism strategies of particular countries to others can be challenging but
also naïve. Many motivations exist as to why a particular country responds to terrorism
and how. Motivators may include many of the ones addressed in the above case studies.
History, plays a huge role in why a government reacts the way it does. Relationship with
the attacked country, population, political pressure, problem perception, and funding are
all factors on how and why countries respond to terrorism. Terrorism though seems to be
the main driver of this response. Although France suffered 14,000 casualties in the heat
wave of 2003, it did not force the amount of change for the safety of its citizens like 9/11
did. Natural disasters do not have the power to force change when compared to
terrorism. However, the value of life and security for each countries citizens remains
consistent. The historical record of terrorism in a country also influences how each may
respond. Each country, some more than others, have taken steps to ensure its citizens are
safe from terrorism. Whether it be the police or a specialized unit, every country in this
study has taken some initiative toward homeland security.

Understanding how and why governments institute change began with a look at
change in policy when all three streams of the policy process converge into one. Often, this convergence is caused by a focusing event that opens a “policy window.” While Kingdon’s argument is significantly strengthened by several case studies taken from a United States perspective, this theory can also apply to foreign democracies. From the research conducted on the NATO countries, it was clear that terrorism posed a serious historical problem toward many countries. The United Kingdom battled the IRA, Spain fought the ETA, and Germany and France consistently clashed with left and right wing extremist groups. This indicated an existence of a “problem stream” of terrorism. Policy is often the solution to a problem. Throughout history, terrorism has forced governments around the world to implement ways to deal with the threat making it a very political issue. When an issue like terrorism reaches the top of the political agenda many changes take place. This was highly evident in many countries around the world after 9/11. Laws, policy, budgets and agencies changed in countries where terrorism was not considered a great threat. However, because of the extreme nature of the 9/11 attacks, no country wanted to become al Qaeda’s next victim. Therefore, many changes in counterterrorism policy and strategy occurred. Counterterrorism is considered the responsibility of the government. Every country relies on their government to keep its citizens safe and secure from threats. Terrorism often has great influence over the political stream which according to Kingdon, is the most important stream in determining what actions a government will take toward a certain issue. This theory is highly applicable to the government processes outside the United States. Most allies of the United States consist of democratic nations and therefore a democratic government process. The process of changing counterterrorism strategy in NATO countries are often
very similar to the democratic method in the United States. Some country’s have experienced their own version of 9/11 since 2001 forcing a similar change to that which America did in 2001. In 2004, the attacks in Madrid, Spain has similarly been labeled “3/11” in relation to America’s “9/11.” The United Kingdom also incurred recent attacks in the July 7, 2005 London bombings. Just as 9/11 did in the U.S., these events also had the power to influence change in strategy against terrorism abroad.

This study has shown that terrorism and the reaction to terrorism has no boundries. The effects of terrorism felt by NATO members after 9/11 were significant in some cases. While many country strategies differed from one another, all of the NATO member country strategies differed from those taken by the United States after the 9/11 attacks, specifically in regards to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The equivalent of DHS does not exist in any NATO country studied. While authors like John Kingdon have shown that policy is often the result of the convergence of many different streams of influence, this study has gone beyond only applying this theory in the United States to portrayal of its application abroad. The change incurred by NATO members after 9/11 can be explained through Kingdon’s theory of how and why governments take action. In addition to expanding the works of Kingdon, this study has also gone beyond the works of Beckman, Walter et al., Alexander and Zimmerman. By examining the historical data of terrorism, agency strategy, laws and budget support of several NATO members after 9/11 has shown a more comprehensive change caused by terrorism. The budget support, although somewhat limited by research barriers, is also a important topic critical to the success of counterterrorism strategy not covered by any of the above mentioned authors. The focus of counterterrorism strategy drastically shifted
the worlds focus toward al Qaeda and Islamic extremism. By looking at different aspects of counterterrorism strategy, this study has taken a more encompassing look at overall strategy change in the international community. Organizational growth in long standing United States allies is closely tied to what happens in America when it comes to national security. The actions taken after 9/11 by many countries both NATO and non-NATO prove that the reputation of the United States when it comes to defense and security is highly respected and remaining allies with the U.S. a top priority. Globalization has made non-state terrorists like al Qaeda a threat to all countries. Growth in international homeland security has become extremely collective after 9/11. The data in this study proves this when agency responsibility, laws and the change in focus toward terrorism is examined within each NATO country.

*Study Limitations.* Some of the sources used to establish change in the areas of budgeting and agencies responsible were limited due to translation barriers. The budgeting statistics hoped to be used in this research were not readily available due to classification by the home country or unavailability in the English language. Additionally, some of the original sources for laws and agencies responsible for enforcement of those laws were also not available in the English language. Only about half of the NATO countries studied in this project were budgeting statistics surrounding homeland security found. Also, the origination dates for many of the agencies were not available online or in hard copy for many of the countries. This information would be helpful in determining the exact date the agency was created as to coincide with the 9/11 attacks thus indicating more change in the counterterrorism strategy.
Areas for Further Research. Further research in the areas of budgeting statistics and fatalities within each country as a result of terrorism could be conducted to strengthen this project. Additionally, each topic area addressed in this study-budgeting, laws, history of terrorism, and agency responsibility- could be singled out and further examined on their own for a greater understanding of the effects 9/11 had on each country. NATO also has an interesting role in the future of counterterrorism. The strategies involving the coupling of law enforcement and military means to combat terrorism have been promoted by the United States. NATO has the unique opportunity to provide the bridge between this strategic gap. As a military alliance, NATO has the resources to support individual country efforts against terrorism on an increased level. Currently, NATO is involved in Afghanistan with American and coalition troops. Terrorism is considered an important topic in Europe and is one NATO can have a great impact on if they are to secure their world role in the future. Further study of NATO’s role as it relates to counterterrorism efforts would further enhance this study.
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