Ethical Elitism: A Burkean Analysis of the Rhetorical Construction of a Moral Persona in the First Term of President George W. Bush

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ETHICAL ELITISM: A BURKEAN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL
CONSTRUCTION OF A MORAL PERSONA IN THE FIRST TERM OF PRESIDENT
GEORGE W. BUSH

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A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of Arts and Humanities
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

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by
Veronica Lynn Koehn
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Advisor: Dr. Christina Foust
ABSTRACT

On November 4, 2004, President George W. Bush won re-election. According to exit polls, a majority of people who voted for Bush over his opponent, Senator John Kerry, did so because they believed that Bush was the “moral values” candidate. In this dissertation, I assess the moral persona that the President rhetorically constructed during his first term in office. To do so, I utilize Kenneth Burke’s cluster and pentad tools to analyze Bush’s statements on embryonic stem cell research, 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror, and same-sex marriage, three issues that the elite press explicitly identified as being “moral values” during Bush’s first term.

The analyses reveal that Bush’s rhetoric frames the ethical struggle as being between himself and an elite/powerful few others. The majority of Americans are thus stripped of their agent status and the corresponding ability to act and left to feel the effects of a “moral” decision that is made in their absence yet affects their very being. I term this sort of ethics “elitist ethics” as ethics and morality are made to seem like a power struggle between an elite few. In the conclusion I assess the effects of elitist ethics in the public sphere.
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CHAPTER 1
CULTURE WAR VICTORY?: CONTEXTUALIZING BUSH’S WIN IN TERMS OF CULTURE WAR THEORY AND BURKEAN METHOD

“[M]any voters picked President Bush because of ‘moral values.’ . . . [E]vangelical voters who supported Bush were concerned with traditional values in matters such as marriage” (Barlow, 2004).

Introduction

President George W. Bush’s 2004 win over his challenger, Democratic Senator John Kerry, was surprising not because Kerry lost, but because of the way that Bush won. According to exit polls taken after the November 4, 2004, United States presidential election, in which incumbent George W. Bush secured a second term, the primary issue on which the majority of the people voted was “moral values” (www.cnn.com/election/2004). Twenty-two percent of those polled said that the main factor that led them to vote for Bush and against Democrat John Kerry was “moral values” (noticeably absent was any sort of elaboration on what constituted “moral” or “values”). Indeed, “moral values” was more influential than the economy (20% of the people voted based on the economy, and Kerry won on the issue), terrorism (19% of people voted based on terrorism, and Bush won on the issue), or Iraq (15% of the people voted based on the war in Iraq, and Kerry won on the issue).1

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1 In the previous election, between Bush and then-Vice President Al Gore, the most salient issue was the economy (18% of people voted based on the economy, and Democrat Al Gore won it), and the second most important issue was education (15% of people voted based on education, and Gore won it). Looking over the exit polls themselves (see Edison Media Research, 2004; Voter News Service, 2000), it is worth noting that “moral values” was not even one of the choices in the 2000 exit polls, but, as noted above, it was not only present on the 2004 exit polls, but became known as the most salient issue.
Bush’s fight for re-election and his ultimate win was, arguably, another battle in what Hunter (1991) has termed the “Culture Wars” in American public life. However, as I show throughout this dissertation, Bush’s rhetoric, in many ways, negated many key orthodox/conservative principles that helped to construct the orthodox/conservative moral community that fought in the culture wars throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. To better understand how this negation occurred, I begin this introduction by discussing the culture wars as they were explained by Hunter (1991) and those influenced by his work. I also assess how the culture wars in the 1980s and 1990s, while fought mainly by elites, created a space in which lay people could act or foster a moral community.

For Hunter (1991) and his those influenced by his work (e.g., Bolce & DeMaio [1999]; Evans [1997]; Hopson & Smith [1999]; Jensen [1995]; Layman & Green [2001]; McConkey [2001]), American political struggles over issues like abortion, rights for same-sex couples, war, and (for the purpose of this dissertation, to a lesser extent) education, child-rearing, and the arts, illustrate that there are two major competing moral worldviews in the United States. Those with an orthodox worldview believe that there is a transcendent Truth, shared with Americans through holy texts (Hunter, 1991). For those with an orthodox worldview, one only need to consult a holy text to know the “right” view to have on abortion and same-sex rights. The holy text (mainly the Bible) says that life begins at conception, so abortion is wrong (Hunter, 1991). Likewise, the holy text says that sex should be reserved for marriage, and marriage is only between one man and one woman, so same-sex relationships are morally wrong (Hunter, 1991).
Conversely, for progressives, there are many versions of truth, for truth is found primarily in lived experience (Hunter, 1991). Unlike the orthodox, who turn to religious texts for help in making moral decisions, progressives often turn to science. Progressives assert that "personhood begins at or close to the moment of birth, at least until science can prove otherwise" (Hunter, 1991, p. 126), so, until there is evidence of being at an earlier point, abortion is morally permissible, and the choice to have an abortion should be left up to the woman. Similarly, for progressives, science has only shown that people have a biological need for sex. There is no proof that this biological need is only for someone of the opposite sex, so same-sex relationships are viewed as a morally acceptable way of fulfilling a biological need (Hunter, 1991).

Hunter (1991) asserts that these two worldviews cross traditional religious boundaries. In the orthodox camp, there are evangelical Christians working alongside conservative Catholics and Jews (and, though Hunter [1991] never accounts for how, a few secular conservatives are also orthodox). Those in the orthodox camp share the belief that there is Truth about moral issues, and they believe that God wants them to protect his Truth. In the progressive camp, there are secularists working alongside liberal Christians, Catholics, and Jews. Those in the progressive camp share the belief that lived experience constitutes morality and that truth is based on experiences and thus varies from person to person.

The people on both sides are able to enact their morality by taking part in grassroots campaigns. Jensen (1995) explains how the lay members of the Christian Coalition campaigned for Republicans on the grassroots level in 1994, taking the
campaign for “morality” to their own neighborhoods. And Diamond (1995) asserts that “only after the Christian Right passed through its phase of collaboration with the U.S. military and foreign policymakers and grew into a grassroots movement focused on domestic policy issues did the liberal establishment see a threat from a ‘radical right’” (p. 306). It was the grassroots movements focused on domestic issues like same-sex rights and abortion that really fueled the Republican Congressional victories in 1994 (Diamond, 1995; Jensen, 1995; Lakoff, 1996). 2 The grassroots movements allowed lay people to work on behalf of their beliefs, to do their part to have their own morality recognized as legitimate on a broader scale. Importantly (at least in the context of this dissertation), grassroots efforts allowed lay people to actively change the situation in America.

For Hunter (1991), the ultimate goal of both sides is to control the electorate, or, in his words, “define America.” Since each side believes that it is right and the other is not only wrong, but so wrong that it is threatening the future of America, each side wants their people controlling the government. This need for control helps to explain why Diamond (1995), Lakoff (1996), and Jensen (1995) claim that the mid-term Congressional elections in 1994 are important to understand for anyone interested in studying morality in America. In November 1994, Republicans, led by Representative Newt Gingrich, promoter of “family values” and “morality,” (Jensen, 1995), won majorities in both houses of Congress. Jensen (1995) hypothesizes that the win may have come as a result of the rise of political correctness and the Right’s assertion that political

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2 During this same time, of course, progressives were active on the grassroots level. Hunter (1991) provides the example of same-sex rights rallies and pro-choice rallies aimed at ensuring the election of progressive/liberal candidates who will protect choice and same-sex rights. However, since the orthodox conservatives are the focus of this project, I focus mainly on them from this point forward.
Correctness was the newest way to legitimize same-sex relationships, single motherhood, and abortion. For the Right, the 1994 victories signaled a win in the fight to restore morality in America.

However, even with major wins in both houses of Congress, those with an orthodox worldview never accomplished their goal of getting an orthodox “pro-morality” president in the White House. This, arguably, changed in 2000 with the election of President George W. Bush. As press accounts illustrate, Bush was a conservative man who identified himself as pro-life (Fox, 2001; Toner, 2001), opposed to same-sex marriage (Bush, 2004a), and an outspoken Christian (Buruma, 2004; Steinfels, 2006). And so it seemed that, with the election of President George W. Bush, the orthodox conservatives got everything that they wanted, everything that they had fought for. Or had they?

In this dissertation, I assess the moral persona that President Bush constructed during his first term in office. To assess this moral persona, I address the following questions:

1) What was it about President Bush and/or his policies that fostered an identification between himself and the orthodox/conservative Right, especially conservative Christians?

2) What sort of moral/ethical persona does the President construct through his rhetoric?

3) Does President Bush constitute a moral community to follow him?
Throughout this dissertation, I explain the ways in which President Bush constitutes a new sort of moral persona, an ethical elitist in which moral/ethical issues are reduced to a power struggle between an elite few. Through his elitism, the President really does not constitute a moral community to follow him. This lack of active participation on the part of the American citizenry makes the fact that the so many on the Right felt consubstantial with the President worthy of study. As I will show, the people were literally left with very little ability to act. When viewed in the context of the culture wars, in which a space was created for all people to act morally according to their worldview, Bush was the opposite of what the early value pioneers had envisioned, for he stripped everyone, progressive and orthodox alike, of their ability to act. And yet those same protectors of traditional morality helped him to become the “moral values” candidate in 2004.

Text Selection

In order to understand how voters came to view Bush as the “moral values” candidate, that is, how Bush rhetorically constructs his moral persona, I chose to analyze speeches and statements delivered by Bush himself in his first term. I chose to focus on those issues that have clearly been tied to “moral values” in either the elite press (i.e., the Boston Globe, the New York Times, and the Washington Post) or in academic accounts. This resulted in three areas of study, which, in the interest of organization, I address chronologically. I discuss each one in turn.

The first area of study deals with Bush’s controversial August 2001 mandate regarding the future of federal funding of embryonic stem cell research: “I have concluded that we should allow federal funds to be used for research on these existing
[embryonic] stem cell lines, where the life and death decision has already been made” (Bush, 2001d). The President permitted research on 64 lines of embryonic stem cells that, due to the research process, could never become a life, but he banned any further research. The President offered a public speech (“President Discusses Stem Cell Research”) on the issue and a corresponding op-ed in the New York Times (“Stem Cell Research and the Preservation of Life”). These two statements from Bush himself comprise my primary texts. In both of these texts, the President focuses the majority of his justification on the claim that the embryos being used in the research are human lives, and his definition of the embryos as lives was a major reason that so many people were so angry with his decision (Goodstein, 2001). In addition, I rely upon news accounts from the elite press (Boston Globe, New York Times, Washington Post) to establish the background information needed to fully understand the symbolic action in the texts (i.e., what embryonic stem cells are, why the President made his statements at the time that he did, and how the orthodox conservative community felt about the decision).

The second area of study deals with the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing War on Terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq. I begin by analyzing the rhetoric that the President gave from the Oval Office on the evening of September 11, 2001. These early statements introduce the attacks as terrorist in nature and begin to build the case for a War on Terror. To better contextualize the narrative that the President constructed about the events of September 11th, the second speech analyzed is Bush’s September 12, 2001, briefing about the attacks following his meeting with his national security team. The third speech is Bush’s September 13, 2001, press release
about the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance. Bush’s September 14, 2001, speech on the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance rounded out my September 11th texts. I also looked at two addresses that Bush gave to commemorate the events of September 11, 2001: Bush’s “Remarks to the Nation One Year Later,” which was delivered on September 11, 2002, and Bush’s September 11, 2004, Radio Address. These texts allow me to describe the narrative that the President constructed about the events of September 11th. This narrative, I argue, is critical for understanding the President’s statements about the War on Terror, which I split into Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, I rely upon two speeches that Bush gave about the war in Afghanistan, his “Address to the Nation on Initial Military Operations in Afghanistan,” delivered October 7, 2001, and his “War on Terrorism” speech from November 8, 2001. In both of these speeches, the President focuses on how the Taliban regime is hiding terrorists who helped to plan the 9/11 attacks and is torturing the citizens of Afghanistan. The war with Afghanistan is thus framed as having the single goal of eradicating the Taliban regime, which will have the dual benefit of finding terrorists bent on destroying the United States and ending the suffering of the citizens of Afghanistan. To understand the moral persona put for in the Iraq speeches, I also rely upon Bush’s “Remarks on Iraq,” which was delivered on October 7, 2002, and outlined the President’s case for going to war with Iraq, mainly by showing that the country was a nuclear threat. I also utilize Bush’s “Address to the Nation on Initial Military Operations in Iraq,” which was delivered on March 19, 2003. In these speeches, the President builds on an idea similar to one expressed in the Afghanistan speeches. He explains how a corrupt leader is destroying the people living in the country while
simultaneously offering a continued threat to the United States. Thus, I analyze four War on Terror speeches, two addressing the war with Afghanistan and two addressing the war with Iraq. These analyses are supplemented with press accounts from the Boston Globe, the New York Times, and the Washington Post, which are used to establish the background information needed to fully understand the symbolic action in the texts (i.e., the public response to both wars).

The third and final area of study deals with Bush’s call for a Constitutional amendment defining marriage as being between one man and one woman. Specifically, I analyze the President’s earliest statements about how marriage should be limited to one man and one woman, which were offered in February 2004 (“President discusses Mass/San Francisco Marriage Issues in Remarks with Tunisian President” and “President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage”). I also analyze Bush’s speeches from summer 2004 in which the President calls for a Constitutional Amendment defining marriage as being between one man and one woman for the purpose of preserving society (“President’s Remarks via Satellite to the Southern Baptist Convention,” “President’s Remarks on the Sanctity of Marriage Vote,” “Radio address” [July 10, 2004], “Statement of Administration Policy on S.J. Res.1—Marriage Protection Amendment,” and “Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3313—Marriage Protection Act of 2004”). Once again, press accounts from the Boston Globe, the New York Times, and the Washington Post are used to explain the background of same-sex marriage in the United States that led to the President’s proclamation, the outcome of the
Senate vote on the Marriage Protection Amendment, and the conservative/orthodox response to the Senate vote.

Theoretical Framework

The first research question deals directly with identification. Press accounts (e.g., Barlow, 2004; Mooney & Mishra, 2004) explain how conservative Christians turned out in large numbers to vote for President Bush in 2004. When asked why they were so in favor of Bush, conservative Christians reported that they supported Bush because, like them, he is a Christian (Barlow, 2004; Mooney & Mishra, 2004). In other words, conservative Christians identified with President Bush. Burke (1969b) wrote extensively about identification. In fact, as I will explain shortly, it is a guiding principle throughout his work. Burke (1969b) is thus clearly an appropriate choice for analyzing how and why conservative Christians identified with Bush.

With regards to the second research question, most any discussion of a moral persona fits squarely under Burke’s (1969a) agent, which refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed the act” (p. xv).³ An agent focus is different from an act focus, however, as the analysis centers on the person committing the act rather than the act itself. In the case of “moral character,” the person himself (in this case) is believed to be moral because of intrinsic characteristics. These intrinsic characteristics are then transformed into overt action, but it is traits of the individual that lead to an agent focus. I believe that since I am discussing the rhetorical construction of a moral persona, Burke’s (1969a) agent must be taken into account. However, agent is more fully

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³ The act and the agent will be explained more in-depth later in the introduction when I discuss Burke’s pentad. For now, it is only important to know that the agent is an actor, someone who does something.
understood when examined in conjunction with scene, act, agency, and purpose, as, for Burke (1969a), emphasizing one over the other helps the critic to better understand the symbolic action in the text. The analysis of agents other than Bush, when taken in combination with the other parts of the pentad, helps to answer the third research question regarding whether the President constitutes a moral community to follow him. Thus, Burke’s (1969a) analytical tools are also appropriate for answering the second and third research questions.

To help explicate Burke’s theoretical assumptions that relate directly to his theoretical tools that I employ in this dissertation, I would like to focus on Burke’s (1966) definition of the human being:

Being bodies that learn language, thereby becoming worldlings, humans are the symbol-making, symbol-using, symbol misusing animal, inventor of the negative, separated from our natural condition by instruments of our own making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy, acquiring foreknowledge of death, and rotten with perfection. (p. 16)

From the above definition, some overarching assumptions become apparent. First and foremost, morality is not absolute. Morality is the result of language, for it is defined and learned through language. Definitions of right and wrong (with “wrong” being the negative of right4) are linguistic, definitions created and used by the “symbol-using, symbol-misusing animal” (Burke, 1966, p. 16). The importance placed upon morality in the political sphere can be attributed to the drive for perfection as the appeals to morality show that morality is considered a good to which all should strive, a good for which all should vote.

4 Foss, Foss, and Trapp (2002) add, as a parenthetical to Burke’s definition of human being, that they equate “inventor of the negative” with “moralized by the negative” (p. 212), once again underscoring the relevance of Burke to the study of “moral values.”
In the following theoretical framework, I will rely upon Burke’s definition of the human being as I briefly outline some of Burke’s key assumptions that are important to my proposed project.

*Humans are the Symbol-Making, Symbol-Using, Symbol-Misusing Animal*

One of Burke’s key distinctions is that which he draws between action and motion. For Burke (1984), “human conduct, being in the realm of action and end (as contrasted with the physicist’s realm of motion and position) is most directly discussible in dramatistic terms. By ‘dramatistic’ terms are meant those that begin in theories of action” (p. 274). For Burke people use language to act, and language itself is an act (Burke, 1969a; 1984). Language, as both an act and a reason to act, is uniquely human. Through language/symbols, people have a way to act and a way to describe the need to act. Thus, the underlying theory in Burke’s work is that people act.

The act is contrasted with motion, with a realm in which humans are acted upon by outside forces with little or no control over those forces. Later Burkean scholars (for instance, Ling [1970]; Tonn, Endress, & Diamond [2005]) discuss the act as being *contemplative*. Whilst objects in motion are not thinking as they are only being acted upon, actors, in deciding how to act, are contemplating the act. In the case of action, human actors are cognizant of their behaviors and, hence, responsible for them. Conversely, in the case of motion, outside forces are acting upon the individual, leaving the individual with no control over her/his actions.
Inventor of the Negative

The majority of Burke’s writings on the negative, especially the negative as it pertains to morality, come from a series of articles he wrote for *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* in 1952 and 1953. In these three articles, Burke (1952a) begins with the assumption that “language adds the peculiar possibility of the Negative” (p. 252) and that the “thou-shalt-nots” become the “essence of the negative” (p. 253). It is the negative that is closely linked to notions of what is right and what is wrong, as the “thou-shalt-not” of the negative (i.e., the wrong) contains within it a sense of what “thou-shalt” (i.e., the right).

Burke (1952a; 1952b) then begins to tie the negative to the act and to morality. With regards to the act, Burke (1952a) points out that “the Tribal No basically resides in the realm not of sensory image, but of super-sensory idea [and] . . . idea is the realm of action” (p. 260). Burke (1952b) continues by explaining that “the negative is . . . in the verbal sense, an act” (p. 447). With regards to morality, the negative gives us “the ability to distinguish between right and wrong” (Burke, 1952a, p. 261). The right is moral, the wrong is immoral.

Burke (1952b) goes on to posit that “the thou-shalt-not’s of moral law retreat behind the positive accents of a noble righteousness” (p. 450). In other words, the negative, the thou-shalt-not-act-a-certain-way imperative, is often hid behind a positive, behind an explanation of how one should act. After all, in telling people how they should rightly act, there is a hidden admonition of how they should not act. Thus, for Burke
(1952b), “moral law is ‘negative’” (p. 451), and it always contains an implicit assertion of what people should not do (see also Burke, 1973).

Burke’s (1953) third article on the negative takes the analysis of the negative one step further. Here, Burke (1953) argues that “Death itself, as the privation of life, is the Great Negative. . . . [T]he idea of death can lead solemnity and authority to other motives, or can provide an ideal seriousness that dwarfs other motives by comparison” (p. 80). Burke (1953) shows that the negative grounds most action in some way. Furthermore, Burke (1953) ties the negative to one of his other main interests, the act. The negative, which emerges from language, is distinguishable from motion as it is created by people to serve a certain end (living being one such end, as the above quotation illustrates). For Burke (1953), “no” is an act word. It is telling people what they cannot do and/or what they can do. Hence, it guides action. The negative is intricately tied to Burke’s notions of hierarchy and identification.

_Goaded by the Spirit of Hierarchy . . . and Rotten with Perfection_

One of Burke’s (1969b) overarching ideas is that of entelechy (borrowed from Aristotle), “which classifies a thing by conceiving of its kind according to the perfection (that is, finishedness) of which that kind is capable” (p. 14). One sort of entelechy, described by Burke (1973) in his essay “Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle,” is that of inborn dignity: “In both religious and humanistic patterns of thought, a ‘natural born’ dignity of man [or woman] is stressed. And this categorical dignity is considered to be an attribute of all men [or women], if they will but avail themselves of it, by right thinking and right
living” (p. 202). From the quotation, we can deduce that, depending upon how rightly one thinks and how rightly one lives, some people will be more dignified than others.

Burke (1969b) discusses “the entelechial tendency, the treatment of the ‘top’ or culminating stage as the ‘image’ that best represents the entire ‘idea’” (p. 141), which shows that entelechy is tied to hierarchy, another overarching theme in Burke’s work. Burke (1969b) claims that hierarchy is “inevitable” and “indigenous to all well-rounded human thinking” (p. 141). For Burke (1969a), hierarchy results in feelings of “ill will,” elsewhere called guilt, which, in turn, “leads to the scapegoat (the use of dyslogistic terms for one’s own traits as manifested in an ‘alien’ class” (p. 142). The use of the scapegoat, or victimage, is one of two ways that a person can alleviate his or her guilt and find symbolic rebirth. I tie this to symbolic action because placement on a hierarchy depends upon language, as do the purification rituals that people use when they feel guilty about their place on the hierarchy. The purification ritual may begin through rhetoric.

For Burke (1969b), rhetoric cannot be separated from identification because “you persuade a man [or woman] only insofar as you can talk his [or her] language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, [or] idea, identifying your ways with his [or hers]” (p. 55). Thus, rhetoric cannot succeed if the speaker is unable to find some sort of common ground with his/her listeners. This common ground is the basis of identification. Burke (1969b) begins his description of identification by positing that “A is not identical with his [or her] colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he [or she] may identify himself [or herself] with B even when
their interests are not joined, if he [or she] assumes that they are or is persuaded to believe so” (p. 20). As this explanation shows, identification can occur in two ways.

First of all, two people/groups could have a common interest. On the other hand, they may not, but a powerful rhetor convinces the person/group that they do share an interest with the rhetor. At any rate, “to identify A with B is to make A ‘consubstantial’ with B . . . in acting together, men [or women] have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial” (Burke, 1969b, p. 21). To tie this in with hierarchy, it would seem that consubstantial individuals have similar interests that lead to their perceived placement on a linguistically-constructed hierarchy.

Indeed, consubstantiality is extended to groups in Burke’s (1969b) Rhetoric of Motives. As Burke (1969b) explains,

The Rhetoric deals with the possibilities of classification in its partisan aspects; it considers the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at odds with one another . . . [because] ‘identification’ is, by the same token, through roundabout, to confront the implications of division. (p. 22)

By identifying with one person, an agent is necessarily identifying against that person’s enemy. Thus, the power of the negative evidences itself in Burke’s (1969b) discussion of identification as identification partly involves identifying against what one is not. And, like the negative, this construction of what is good, what we should strive for, what we should identify with, is constructed in and through language. It is symbolic action.

The main power of identification for Burke (1969b) comes from those uses of identification that go unnoticed. Burke’s (1972) “prime example is the word ‘we’, as when the statement that ‘we’ are at war includes under the same head soldiers who are
getting killed and spectators who hope to make a killing in war stocks” (p. 28). Thus, for Burke (1972), identification is often subtly imbedded in inclusive language choices. In keeping with the idea that with every symbol of identification there is a simultaneous symbol of division, it would seem that there is also a sort of identification at work when a speaker refers to “them.” If the “we” is an oft-unnoticed way of encouraging identification, it stands to reason that the “they” may be an oft-unnoticed way of creating an other, the one that the “we” opposes. Indeed, the “we” can be said to be setting up a hierarchy via identification and negation as the “we” is placing itself in a superior position to the “they.”

Burke’s interrelated concepts of the negative, hierarchy, and identification are important in my study. For instance, Bush relies a great deal on the negative in order to explain the actions of others and to justify his own actions. I believe that one of the most prominent examples of the negative and identification against can be seen in Bush’s 9/11 and War on Terror rhetoric.

Bush’s War on Terror rhetoric repeatedly draws upon the national identity shared by most of the listeners in the speech that he gave on the evening of September 11, 2001: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks . . . terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America” (Bush, 2001a). In the face of the threat of terror, “Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace” (Bush, 2001a). In these early references, Bush

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5 Leaders using “we” to refer to themselves and the populace that they represent has elsewhere been called the “royal we” (see, for instance, Franklin, 2007).
is identifying with his listeners. All Americans, “from every walk of life” (Bush, 2001a), were affected by the attacks. The attacks were an assault against all Americans. All Americans should identify with the President, who, like the rest of the people living in the United States, was affected by the attacks on “our freedom, our very way of life” (Bush, 2001a). Americans are all united “in the middle hour of our grief” (Bush, 2001e). These references to our exemplify Burkean (1969b) identification.

As I show throughout the dissertation, however, there are many places in which the President fosters an identification between himself and the populace, and many places where he does not. Identification is key to understanding how Bush does (or does not) constitute a moral community to follow him. In many cases, this identification takes the form of identifying against someone or something.

In summary, Burke is useful for understanding human beings. Through the above synopsis, I have shown that human beings are, most importantly, the symbol-using animal. People use (and misuse) language to achieve a variety of ends, including identification (or disidentification) with various people and/or institutions. It is because of language that human beings have linguistically-constructed hierarchies on which they place themselves, and it because of symbol usage that people are “rotten with perfection,” always striving to be better than possible, which results in feelings of failure. To better understand the process through which symbols come to do these things, that is, to better comprehend the way in which symbols act, Burke has provided rhetorical critics with a series of tools for analysis. In this dissertation I use two such tools, pentadic analysis and
cluster analysis, and I now turn to an in-depth discussion of each of these tools and how they have been used by other critics.

Burkean Tools

As the above discussion illustrates, Burke is useful for rhetorical critics because his tools allow the critic to trace the symbolic action in a text. Two Burkean tools that are particularly useful for tracing symbolic action are clusters and the pentad. These two tools are particularly well-suited to my project as Burke himself links them with some of the key ideas I am interested in. My first research question deals with identification. Burke’s (1969b) writings on identification and rhetoric deal specifically with the rhetorics of good and evil, with the ways in which some people identify with some rhetors and distance themselves from others. Cluster analyses allow the critic to better understand identification as it is cluster and agon terms that build the narratives of good and evil with which people identify (or, in the case of the agon, identify against).

Identification, moreover, involves one agent becoming consubstantial with another agent. The agent is one part of Burke’s (1969a) pentad. To fully understand how one agent is consubstantial with another, then, the critic also needs to conduct a pentad analysis.

In one of his earliest works, Attitudes Towards History, Burke (1961) introduced his notion of clusters as, “what images b, c, d the poet introduces whenever he [or she] talks with engrossment of subject a . . . by charting clusters, we get our cues as to the important ingredients subsumed in ‘symbolic mergers’” (p. 232). Symbolic mergers allow the critic to see, in a rhetorical narrative, what terms are being rhetorically linked to other terms, and it is a joining of the terms that creates dramatic suspense (Burke, 1973).
Hence, for Burke, cluster analysis consists of tracking which terms seem to correspond with one another as doing so can help the critic to better understand historical events (see, for instance, Conrad [1982]). Burke (1961) himself discusses how terms can cluster together and show how one is or is not suitable for the presidency (for a similar analysis on the application of Burke to presidential rhetoric, see Berthold [1976]).

Burke’s description of cluster analysis was expanded upon in the lengthy essay “Philosophy of Literary Form,” where Burke (1973) claims that “the work of every writer contains a set of implicit equations. He [or she] uses ‘associational clusters’... And you may, by examining his [or her] work, find ‘what goes with what’ in these clusters—what kind of acts and images and personalities and situations go with his [or her] notions of heroism, villainy, consolation, despair, etc.” (p. 20). Hence, every work contains words that equate with other words, and the words in them can be used interchangeably as they equate with one another. Burke (1973) points out the importance of these equal terms for a critic, “by inspecting his [or her] work ‘statistically’, we or he [or she] may disclose by objective citation the structure of motivation operating here. There is no need to ‘supply’ motives. The interrelationships themselves are his [or her] motives. For they are his situation, and situation is but another word for motive” (p. 20).

The words in a given cluster can be used interchangeably. As Burke (1973) explains, “the part is used for the whole, the whole for the part, the container for the thing contained, the cause for the effect, the effect for the cause” (pp. 25-26). Being all clustered together allows the terms to stand in completely for one another. Of particular relevance to a study combining the cluster and pentad analysis tools, events can comprise
the cluster and be used interchangeably: “If event 2, for instance, follows from event
1 and leads into event 3, each of these events may synecdochically represent the others”
(Burke, 1973, p. 28). In other words, acts can become linked in a cluster. A focus on
action takes the overview of clusters one step further, as Burke (1973) argues that such a
focus leads to “not only the matter of ‘what equals what,’ but also the matter of ‘from
what to what’” (p. 38). Every act leads somewhere, and a cluster can help to show the
critic where a particular action leads. A cluster analysis can illuminate the symbolic
action in a text. Important to my study, a cluster analysis can reveal the “good” side of
the rhetorical narrative/drama that is being constructed in the rhetoric, revealing the
“good” actions, motivations, and characters in a rhetorical narrative. For Burke (1973), a
cluster/agon analysis has its “emphasis upon the act” (p. 90).

For Burke (1973), there is always an “opposing cluster” (p. 34). This is part of
his “total drama as the agon [cluster] is analytically subdivided into competing principles
of protagonist and antagonist” (Burke, 1973, p. 76). In other words, the analysis of
clusters is two-fold. The critic must first analyze what terms are clustering about the
protagonist, and then what terms are clustering around the antagonist. Through studying
the cluster and the agon, Burke (1973) argues that “we should watch for ‘critical points’
within the work, as well as at the beginnings and endings. There are often ‘watershed
moments,’ changes of slope, where some new quality enters” (p. 78).

Following Burke (1973), cluster and agons work together to create rhetorical
drama with which people can identify. To extend this to my study, there are four critical
moments in Bush’s first term in office, the embryonic stem cell research funding
decision, the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the resulting War on Terror, and the vow to ban same-sex marriage if given the chance. I believe that September 11th is particularly illustrative of clusters and agons, and how they work together to build a dramatic narrative. Burke (1984) claims that clusters and agons offer “new ways of putting the character of events together [as] an attempt to convert people. . . . [and] to alter the nature of our responses” (pp. 86-87). The way in which Bush discusses the attacks and those (allegedly) responsible for the attacks creates an “evil terrorist” agon based on violence and war. The cluster terms, consequently, focus on “good American” attributes like caring and peace. The American audience identifies with the “good” construction, for they see themselves as caring and peaceful, very unlike the violent, war-mongering terrorist others. The narrative created through clusters and agons reaches a commonsensical resolution for the audience (see Burke, 1973; 1984). In the case of 9/11, the commonsensical solution seems to be identifying with the rhetorical heroes and villains in the 9/11 drama and, ultimately, identifying with the proposed War on Terror.

At any given time, any one term in the cluster is “temporarily featured” (Burke, 1973, p. 27). This featured term is the called the god-term (see, for instance, Rueckert, 1982). This term is the one that comes to the fore, the term around which all of the others cluster. Since, for Burke (1973), every cluster has a corresponding agon, the feature term in the agon is called the devil-term. Analyses of these terms (see, for instance, Berthold,

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6 The idea of clusters is also explored in Grammar of Motives, where Burke (1969a) points out that “whenever in philosophy I see two terms of equal importance being merged into a third term that will somehow contain the nature of both, I always ask myself: ‘Which of the two terms was foremost?’ For I will expect the genius of this term to weight the third term” (p. 140; for a very similar statement, see Burke, 1973, p. 59). This is an interesting addendum to the writing on cluster analysis (a term that Burke [1969a] does not use in this passage) as it may be that there is an intervening term between the cluster and the agon, and understanding this term may result in a stronger analysis of the cluster and the agon.
1976) have tended to call the god-term that which appears the most in the cluster and the devil-term that which appears the most in the agon cluster. If no term quantitatively dominates, scholars tend to look for the term that is used in tandem with other cluster terms with the most frequency.

Moreover, cluster analyses reveal the underlying rhetorical narrative with which the audience can identify, and the pentad reveals how those who identify with the narrative are treated as active agents (or are not treated as active agents) in the texts. I now turn to the theoretical assumptions and applications of Burke’s (1969a) pentad method.

In *Grammar of Motives*, Burke (1969a) suggests that clusters should also be present as equations intrinsic to the structure of any act. That is, as motives behind the structure of either an aesthetic or practical act, there must be an implicit set of equations: assumptions as to what kind of act equals heroism, what kind equals villainy, what kind contains the likelihood of reward, punishment, etc. (p. 108)

For Burke (1969a), then, the act draws upon a cluster of terms, and the cluster of terms determines the appropriateness of the act. The focus on the act is really what links cluster analysis and pentad analysis in my study. The pentad is focused on the act as the act is the central term of the pentad for Burke (1969a). In my study, I analyze the way in which the cluster/agon drama creates a rhetorical narrative with which people can identify, and then I conduct the pentad analysis to assess how the rhetoric creates a space in which the people can act and thus become agents in Burke’s (1969a) sense, or how the rhetoric strips the people of the right to act, making them less than agents. When people no longer have the ability to act, they become part of the background, part of what is being
acted upon or acted upon behalf of. Thus, the two methods combined are appropriate for analyzing the rhetoric in my study.

Burke (1969a) laid out his most-utilized theoretical tool, the pentad, in his book *A Grammar of Motives*. For Burke (1969a),

In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the *act* (names what took place in thought or deed), and another that names the *scene* (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (*agent*) performed the act, what means or instruments he [or she] used (*agency*) and the *purpose*. (p. xv)

These five terms form Burke’s dramatistic pentad. In using the pentad for analysis, Burke (1969a) suggests that, while all five of the terms will always be present, most fade to the background. Most often, motives can be understood by analyzing the ratio between two of the pentadic terms. For Burke (1969a), ratio refers to “a formula indicating a transition from one term to another [where] such a relation necessarily possesses the ambiguities of the potential, in that the second terms is a medium different from the first” (p. 262). As I explain the five terms, keep in mind that one or two are generally featured in any rhetorical text.

For Burke (1969a), scene refers to “the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred” (p. xv). The scene is the context in which an act occurs, and, although it may not be featured, it is always present (see Burke, 1973). Important for later studies, scene relates to motion in Burke’s (1969a; 1984) action/motion dichotomy. A focus on scene takes the focus off of the actor and the action, resulting in the use of motion-laden terms. As Ling (1970) and later Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (2005) found, a focus on scene can absolve an agent of guilt by reducing action to motion. A scenic focus makes
what is happening to the actor the result of outside forces over which the person has no control. S/he is simply being acted upon, and there is nothing that she or he can do about it. This simultaneously revokes the actor status of the individual as she or he is no longer acting at all.

The next part of the pentad, the act, is the term to which Burke (1969a) pays the most attention. Briefly defined, the act refers to “what took place in thought or deed” (Burke, 1969a, p. xv). Contemplation is considered part of the act, as are observable actions. It may be because the act is so encompassing for understanding motives that it is Burke’s (1969a) most featured term. For Burke (1969a), the act, arguably the most important pentadic term, is “creative or generative” (p. 249).

Importantly, the act ties most closely to one of Burke’s most fundamental assumptions, the distinction between action and motion. In discussing the act, Burke (1969a) posits that the “dramatist stress upon act suggest an origin in verbs” (p. 249). Grammatically, verbs are action words, but they are only fully understood as such when placed in relation to a subject (i.e., an agent who is conducting the action) and possibly where the action is taking place (the scene), both of which are nouns, which exist, but, without verbs, do nothing. This brings the discussion back to Burke’s (1969a) action/motion dichotomy. Without doing anything, a subject/agent is just existing, and anything that happens to him or her can be attributable to outside forces, much like I discussed with American civilians during the Iraq war in the scene discussion above.

The act, then grammatically keeps the focus on action, on verbs, on what is being done or has been done. Burke (1969a), however, takes his discussion of the act one step
further, arguing that “it says in effect not simply that the future will be but that it is, since it is implicit in the structure of the future” (p. 258). In other words, present actions set the scene for future actions as every present act contains within it an implicit structure of future actions. Here, Burke (1969a) can be read as once again showing the interplay between act and scene as a present action sets the scene for future actions. Every present act contains within it an implicit structure of future actions. Importantly, it is in the act that we have “dramatic ‘suspense’” that comes from “formally relating all incidents to one organizing principles that prevails through the diversity of detail” (Burke, 1969a, p. 259).

Keep in mind that a key assumption underlying Burke’s work is that people act. Thus for Burke (1969a), agent refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed the act” (p. xv). An agent focus is different from an act focus, however, as the analysis centers on the person committing the act rather than the act itself. For Burke (1969a), words like “mind, spirit, soul, or myself,” and words like “ideas” (p. 179) all point to an agent focus. After all, it is human beings who have minds, spirits, souls, a conception of individual identity, thoughts, and ideas; notice the way in which the last three of these (identity, thoughts, and ideas) all rely upon language, which reinforces the linguistic focus of a Burkean analysis.

For Burke (1969a) technological advances (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, the capacity for embryonic stem cell research) have expanded the scope of the agent. Burke (1969a) suggests that “technology, as applied science, invites us to put the major stress upon knowledge. And the problem of knowledge . . . falls directly under the head of
agent” (p. 176), and “one is well-advised to look for scientistic stress in any terminology that has its start in modern idealism” (p. 223). Furthermore, the link between knowledge and the agent is problematic for the act-centered Burke (1969a) because “insofar as [ideas] are expressed scientistically, in terms of knowledge rather than in terms of action, dramatism admonishes us that they are to be discounted” (p. 226). And, Burke (1969a) claims that it is through language that humans have such a thing as cause and effect. For Burke (1969a), “we can say that people interpret natural sequences in terms of cause and effect not because of something in the natural scene requiring this interpretation, but because they are the sort of agents that see things in terms of necessary relations” (p. 187). Burke (1969a) places the ability for such critical thinking skills solely on the symbol-using, symbol-misusing animal, the human agent.

Burke (1969a) posits that idealist philosophies tend to center on the agent. To illustrate the link between idealism and a focus on the agent, and to further differentiate the act from the agent, Burke (1969a) uses the United States Constitution as an example. For Burke (1969a), the United States is a very idealistic society, and the idealistic perspective is further accentuated, in the United States, by the fiction that the will of the people today is consubstantial with the will of the founding fathers. Those who established the Constitution are co-agents with those who perpetuate it—and the document itself, considered as a structure of motivations, is a creature of the human will. Hence, though it is a ground of act, its essential feature is its derivation from the attitudes of human agents. (p. 175)

Here, the focus is on the people, not on the actions that they are continuing. What is striking about Burke’s (1969a) example is that it serves to illustrate the link between identification and agent. With identification, one agent is becoming consubstantial with
another, or one group of agents is becoming consubstantial with another group (see Burke, 1969b).

The idea that identification is agent-centered is key to understanding the analyses in all three of my body chapters as I focus on the ways in which the President attempts to constitute a moral community to follow him, or, in Burkean terms, how the people identify with the President as a moral person and with his “moral” agenda.

Agency refers to “the means or instruments” (Burke, 1969a, p. xv) used to carry out an act. As an instrument, means have “no intrinsic interests” (Burke, 1969a, p. 279) in what they are being used for. After all, interest would fit under the definition of agent, and agent implies a symbol-using being. Agencies are (generally) non-human objects/entities used as ways to achieve an end. Burke (1969a) comes to equate agency with motion: “Since agents act through the medium of motion, the reduction of action to motion can be treated as Agency” (p. 286). Hence, it would seem that, given his focus on symbolic action and the action focus of dramatism, Burke (1984) would not approve of an agency-driven rhetoric as it would take the focus off of the action. Indeed, as Burke (1969a) points out,

once Agency has been brought to the fore, the other terms readily accommodate themselves to its rule. Scenic materials become the means which the organism employs in the process of growth and adaptation. The organism itself is a confluence of means, each part being at the service of the other parts. (p. 287)

Of particular relevance here is the complete absence of actors. Losing his normal focus upon the actions of human agents, Burke (1969a) rhetorically justifies his statements

7 In my project, the use of humans as agency is one way in which the elitism of Bush and others is reinforced, so while it is not discussed by Burke (1969a), it is possible for humans to be so stripped of their agent status that they become nothing more than agency for more powerful others.
about agency as he begins illustrating its effects using strictly biological terms. A focus on agency takes out the action and, by extension, the actor. Throughout the dissertation, I will show a commonality between scene and agency as a focus on either one serves to diminish the active status of the agent.

In the introduction to *A Grammar of Motives*, Burke (1969a) defines purpose as the reason why a particular action is undertaken. Burke (1969a) expands upon this definition in the purpose chapter of *A Grammar of Motives*. There, Burke appears to link purpose to ideology. Burke (1969a) likens purpose to mysticism in that both, “uni[fy] the individual with some cosmic or universal purpose . . . for it develops an ideal of passive contemplation in which the distinctions of individuality disappear” (p. 287-288; italics in original). People, in other words, act according to an overarching purpose that unites a large number of people. As an example, Burke (1984) discusses how, after Freud, many focused on sex as a motive/purpose for action, though this sort of unifying focus would have been unthinkable in the time of Saint Augustine as his society was unified around religion. The people in each time were thus unified around an overarching idea about *being* (Burke, 1969a; 1984). Ideology is nothing more than an implicitly agreed-upon idea about the way things are, so, basically, purpose is linked to ideology.

This link between purpose and ideology is more explicitly developed by Charland (1987). For Charland (1987) the audience is actively constituted through the rhetoric. Through the constitutive rhetoric, the people form a collective identity. This constitution of a collective identity (or ideology) can be read as a purpose of the rhetoric. Consequently, in this dissertation the most purposive texts are those which are clearly
furthering a particular ideology, the embryonic stem cell research texts (which espouse a pro-life ideology) and the anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric (which espouses a conservative ideology).

In this section, I have explained Burke’s cluster/agon analysis tool and his pentad analysis tool more in-depth. In my project, I use the two analytical tools in tandem to better understand possible reasons that so many members of the Christian Right identified with President George W. Bush. Throughout the dissertation analysis chapters, I begin my analysis by conducting a cluster/agon analysis. From this analysis, I am able to see the good versus evil narrative that is built through the cluster/agon terms. I argue that the cluster and agon terms create both a hero with which the people can identify, and an enemy that the people can identify against, though these identifications are not absolute. For instance, both the embryonic stem cell research rhetoric and the anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric very closely follow the conservative pro-life rhetoric and the conservative anti-same-sex relationship rhetoric that preceded it (meaning that many progressives did not agree with the rhetoric). In many cases, the god-term in the cluster is an agent (or agents), which ties the cluster analysis to the pentad analysis. I posit that the agent is crucial for understanding both how the Christian Right came to identify so closely with President Bush and how President Bush constructed his moral persona. The agent, when taken in combination with the act, is crucial for understanding how the President does (or does not) constitute a moral community to follow him. Basically, the cluster analysis combined with the pentad analysis allows me to answer my three research questions.
Outline of Dissertation Chapters

To answer my research questions, I divide the remainder of this dissertation into the following chapters:

1) In Chapter two, I attempt to assess the reasons for the public’s disunity with Bush following his decision to use tax money to support further research on the embryonic stem cell lines already in existence but to ban federal funds being used for any additional embryonic stem cell research. The cluster/agon analysis reveals the good versus evil narrative in the rhetoric. Bush is the rhetorically-constructed hero who is working tirelessly to protect valuable human lives from being destroyed by “callous” scientists who are creating and destroying life simply to further their own research agendas. After explaining the narrative in the texts, I then conduct a pentad analysis to better understand the ethical/moral persona the President rhetorically constructs, and I assess whether or not the President constituted a moral community to follow him. The pentad analysis reveals that the President’s rhetoric creates a disempowering scene/agent ratio in which the embryos are accorded more agent status than those who could, potentially, benefit from the stem cells research in question. I argue that, in denying people the right to make their own decision about their healthcare, the President creates an elitist moral persona. The right to make decisions is taken away from those directly affected by the issues and left in the hands of an elite few. Because so few unified behind the narrative, I suggest that the President failed to constitute a moral community to follow him.
2) In Chapter three, I analyze the President’s earliest responses to the attacks of September 11th, his announcement regarding the war with Afghanistan, and his build-up to and announcement of the war with Iraq in an attempt to determine why the President lost unity with the populous between the Afghanistan war and the Iraq war. In the cluster analysis, I assert that the President’s rhetoric identifies the President with the rest of Americans. Like the rest of the people living in the United States, the President felt the effects of the September 11th attacks. Like the rest of the people living in the United States, the President wanted to help the country rebuild. This idea of a consubstantial populous working together to help rebuild America and avoid future attacks continues throughout the war in Afghanistan speeches, where American civilians are able to help with the war effort in the United States while the American military is fighting abroad. The pentad analysis thus reveals that there is a strong agent-act focus in both the 9/11 rhetoric and the war in Afghanistan speeches. However, there is a dramatic shift in the war in Iraq speeches. The Iraq rhetoric renders American agents part of the still-vulnerable scene, and they are left with little opportunity to help with the war effort. In other words, the entire terrorism narrative, a narrative that emerged on September 11th and continued through the war in Afghanistan, is altered. I argue that in the 9/11 and Afghanistan war speeches the people are part of a utilitarian moral community in which each person can work to better the United States, but that in the War on Terror the President does not really constitute a moral
community to follow him as the people are not really constituted as agents at all but as merely part of the still-vulnerable US homeland scene.

3) In Chapter four, I assess the moral persona that Bush develops in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric and whether or not the President constitutes a moral community to follow him. As I show through both the cluster analysis and the pentad analysis, the President’s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric is markedly different than the orthodox anti-same-sex marriage that flourished during the culture wars of the 1980s and the 1990s. Through the cluster-agon analysis, I assess the dramatic narrative in the rhetoric and how it fosters an identification with the populace. In a vein similar to the culture wars anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, the rhetorical narrative fosters an identification with members of society who fear the changes that same-sex marriage will bring to American society. After understanding the good/evil narrative in the texts, I conduct a pentad analysis. This second analysis reveals that, unlike the culture wars rhetoric, Bush’s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric focuses on different agonistic agents. Bush’s rhetorically constructed nemeses, the nemeses who, if left unchecked, will ruin American society as Americans currently know it, are not the gays and lesbians seeking to marry but the judges who are allowing them to do so. The rhetoric creates a disempowering scene-act ratio in which the decision to marry is moved to the legislative sphere and the only people allowed to act are those occupying bureaucratic positions. I argue that, in denying people the right to make their own decision about their own marriages, the President creates an elitist
moral persona. The right to make decisions is taken away from those directly affected by the issues and left in the hands of an elite few. Because the rhetoric leaves no space for those either in favor of or those opposed to same-sex marriage to act, I argue that the President does not constitute a moral community to follow him.

4) In the conclusion, I consider the ways in which traditional ethical theories are inadequate for assessing the rhetoric of President George W. Bush, which re-affirms the importance of viewing Bush’s rhetoric through the lens of elitist ethics. To illustrate why this study has implications for those interested in the study of rhetorical ethics, I offer suggestions and very preliminary sample analyses of other rhetorics that may be interesting to examine in terms of elitist ethics, two case examples from conservative rhetoric and one case example from progressive rhetoric. I conclude by assessing the ways in which this study is of particular interest to those interested in rhetorical scholarship and the work of Burke as this study draws out Burke’s discussion of the links between the act, the agent, and morality, which has not received a great deal of attention in the literature.
CHAPTER 2

CONTRADICTORY ETHICAL DEFINITIONS: POSSIBLE REAONS THAT MANY PRO-LIFERS DID NOT IDENTIFY WITH BUSH’S EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH POLICIES

“Some of the hardest ethical decisions pit good against good” (Bush, 2001g).

Introduction

On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush, well-known as a pro-life president (see Fox, 2001; Toner, 2001), addressed the nation to announce that he had made a decision about federal funding of embryonic stem cell research: “I have concluded that we should allow federal funds to be used for research on these existing [embryonic] stem cell lines, where the life and death decision has already been made” (Bush, 2001d). The President permitted research on 64 lines of embryonic stem cells that, due to the research process, could never become a life, but he banned any further federal funding for the research. As Spielvogel (2005) explains, Bush’s decision to partially ban/partially fund embryonic stem cell research was the first “moral values” issue that the President faced in his first term.8

As Wade (2001b) explains, embryonic stem cells are unique. They are the building blocks of the human body and are responsible for beginning the generation of every cell in the human body. Scientists believe that they are “a sort of magic clay that can be shaped into organs and tissues” (Wade, 2001b, p. F1), that can thus, in theory,

8 Same-marriage, which is the focus of chapter 4 of the dissertation, was the other overtly “moral values” issue (Spielvogel, 2005).
provide possible treatment for degenerative illnesses like Alzheimer’s and traumatic spinal cord injuries by regenerating the damaged tissue. The majority of the embryonic stem cells are derived from fertility clinics, where women have opted not to have them implanted and the embryos are “destined to be destroyed” (Weiss, 2001, p. A1). The President’s decision to limit any future research to the 64 lines already in existence was met with criticism from the scientific community. Scientists argued that more lines would be needed in order to fully research the potential of embryonic stem cells and that the President’s limit was severely impeding the research process because the stem cells are more likely to mutate (and thus become less useful) the longer that they stay in laboratory dishes (Stolberg, 2001; Weiss, 2001).

By Bush’s (2001d) own acknowledgement, “scientists . . . believe that rapid progress in this area will only come with federal funds. Federal funds help attract the best and brightest scientists. They ensure new discoveries are widely shared at the largest number of research facilities and that the research is directed toward the greatest public good.” In other words, Bush (2001d; 2001g) knew the importance of embryonic stem cell research and the potential that it held for alleviating a vast array of debilitating conditions, and he knew the importance of federal funding for this research. Indeed, because there is no definitive proof that embryonic stem cells will provide cures, many private agencies do not fund the research due to the fact that they could be funding a fruitless endeavor, so Bush’s decision to limit federal funding, in effect, limited embryonic stem cell research overall (Weiss, 2001).
Given the potential embryonic stem cells hold, it may not come as a surprise that the masses did not identify with the President following his decision. As Goldstein (2001) and Wade (2001d) explain, the President not only upset the vast majority of Democrats, but even many Republicans, specifically pro-life Republicans, did not agree with the ruling. As a conservative, Bush was generally consubstantial with the pro-lifers. However, Bush’s embryonic stem cell research mandate split the conservative pro-life movement into three distinct groups. The first group, which was represented by the National Right to Life Committee, the Moral Majority, and the Christian Coalition, agreed with the decision on the grounds that, as the President pointed out, with the 64 existing lines, the life and death decision had already been made. In Burkean (1969b) terms, this first group identified with the President and his policies, for they could see the issue from same perspective as the President. The second group, which was represented by the Catholic Church, smaller Christian Right organizations, and smaller anti-abortion groups, disagreed with the decision to fund any of the research on the grounds that “stem cell research is the equivalent of killing a human being” (Wade, 2001b). In Burkean (1969b) terms, they could not unify with the President’s (alleged) sanctioning of experimenting on “lives,” and this caused them to disagree with the decision. A third group, represented by Nancy Reagan, pro-life Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, and, most recently, former Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, who is also pro-life (Connelly, 2005), felt that the President should not have put a ban on funding subsequent

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9 For more on the link between being pro-life and espousing a conservative ideology, see Lakoff (1996) and Diamond (1995).
10 Nancy Reagan explicitly identified herself as “pro-life” during her husband’s Presidential campaign in 1984 (see “Nancy Reagan,” 1984).
embryonic stem cell research. In Burkean (1969b) terms, this third group did not identify with the President or his decision not to fund research that could, plausibly, help millions of people suffering from debilitating illnesses.

In other words, the President’s embryonic stem cell research funding decision caused disunity in the orthodox/conservative pro-life base. In this chapter, I assess some possible reasons for this disunity. Moreover, to tie this chapter to the dissertation, I address two additional questions in the conclusion: 1) What moral persona does President Bush construct in his embryonic stem cell research addresses; and 2) Does he constitute a moral community to follow him?

To answer these questions, I analyze the two statements that Bush gave to explain his decision regarding the funding of embryonic stem cell research. On August 9, 2001, President Bush offered his statements to the nation about his decision to partially ban/partially fund embryonic stem cell research. On August 12, 2001, Bush wrote an op-ed piece in the New York Times in which he further explained the rationale for the decision that he announced on August 9th. In both of these texts, the President focuses the majority of his justification on the claim that the embryos being used in the research are human lives, and his definition of the embryos as lives was a major reason that so many people were so angry with his decision (Goodstein, 2001).

Justification of Burkean Tools

As may be apparent from the above background information, the focus of this chapter is on the public’s lack of identification with the President. For Burke (1969b), rhetoric cannot be separated from identification, because “you persuade a man
woman] only insofar as you can talk his [or her] language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his [or hers]” (p. 55). Thus, rhetoric cannot succeed if the speaker is unable to find some sort of common ground with his/her listeners. This common ground is the basis of identification. Burke (1969b) begins his description of identification by positing that “A is not identical with his [her] colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he [she] may identify himself [herself] with B even when their interests are not joined, if he [she] assumes that they are or is persuaded to believe so” (p. 20). As this explanation shows, identification can occur in several ways. First of all, two people/groups could have a common interest. On the other hand, they may not, but a powerful rhetor convinces the person/group that they do share an interest with the rhetor. At any rate, “to identify A with B is to make A ‘consubstantial’ with B . . . in acting together, men [women] have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial” (Burke, 1969b, p. 21). As evidenced by the press accounts discussed above, much of the populace did not identify with the President and his embryonic stem cell research policies. The fact that so many orthodox conservatives did not unify behind the President and his stem cell policy is particular surprising. After all, Bush was the “moral values” candidate, the President who, in theory, gave the orthodox/conservatives the orthodox, “moral values” President they had wanted for years. Yet, on his very first “moral” mandate, the President’s rhetoric resulted in disunity among the orthodox conservatives.

To better understand why the President’s embryonic stem cell research policy failed to promote unity among the orthodox conservatives, I begin by analyzing the
cluster and agon terms in the rhetoric, as these terms form the narrative with which the audience can identify or not identify (Charland, 1987). The cluster and agon analysis, however, only reveals one possible reason that so much of the populace, including many orthodox conservatives, did not identify with the President following his embryonic stem cell research funding announcement. To better understand other possible reasons that the public, and the orthodox conservatives in particular, were not united with the President, I then analyze how the cluster terms function pentadically in the rhetoric, and the pentad analysis reveals fissures in the narrative that, ultimately, result in a loss of identification with Bush and his policies. I conclude this chapter by addressing the ethic that the President is using in the embryonic stem cell research speeches and how this ethic may have contributed to the disunity in the orthodox/conservative base. Finally, to tie this chapter to the dissertation, I assess whether or not the President constituted a moral community to follow him.

Cluster Analysis

Bush’s embryonic stem cell research addresses contain in them both a cluster set of terms and an agon set of terms. For Burke (1973), the use of a cluster and a corresponding agon builds rhetorical drama by constructing a story centering around “good” (represented by the terms in the cluster) and “evil” (represented by the terms in the agon) (see also Berthold, 1976). Per both Burke (1973) and Berthold (1976), I will first discuss the cluster, which in this case deals with the terms surrounding Bush’s use of “human life,” and then I will discuss the agon, which in this case deals with the terms surrounding the President’s description of the scientists as the destroyers of human life.
Cluster: The Ethical Imperative of Protecting Valuable Human Lives

In order to justify his embryonic stem cell research decision, Bush (2001d; 2001g) needs to show how the embryo is a life. Bush (2001g) explains that “life, including early life, is biologically human, genetically distinct and valuable.” The embryos are “the seeds of the next generation” (Bush, 2001d). Bush thus explains that life begins at conception, so the embryos being used in the process are human lives. And, as human lives, each of the embryos is a unique individual: “Like a snowflake, each of these embryos is unique, with the unique genetic potential of an individual human being” (Bush, 2001g).

Having set up the embryos as human lives, Bush then moves on to showing how, as human lives, the embryos have inherent value. In a statement that links his own position with that of the Christian God (the importance of which I will explain momentarily and throughout subsequent chapters in the dissertation), Bush (2001d) claims, “I believe that human life is a sacred gift from our Creator. I worry about a culture that devalues life and, as your President I have an important obligation to foster and encourage respect of life in America and throughout the world.” Having already set up the embryos as human lives, Bush’s statements about such lives being “a sacred gift from our Creator” show that Bush believes that such lives have value, a value bestowed upon them by the God that created them. All people, regardless of age, are a creation of the Christian God, and, as such, all people, regardless of age, have inherent and sacred value given to them by their creator, the Christian God. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is worth noting that Bush’s statements about the value of human life
underscore his religious beliefs, which here seem to be functioning rhetorically to encourage identification with the President on the part of those who share his faith.

Having established the embryos as human lives with inherent sacred value, Bush (2001d; 2001g) moves on to explaining the moral/ethical imperative of protecting these valuable and sacred human lives. Bush (2001d) states that,

Many people are finding out that the more they know about stem cell research, the less certain they are about the right ethical and moral conclusions. . . . One the first issue, are these embryos human life—one researcher told me that he believes that this five-day-old cluster of cells is not an embryo, not yet an individual, but a pre-embryo. He argued that it has the potential for life, but it is not a life because it cannot develop on its own. An ethicist dismissed that as a callous attempt at rationalization. “Make no mistake,” he told me, “that cluster of cells is the same way that you and I, and all the rest of us, started our lives.”

From this quotation, it is clear that Bush sides with the ethicist. Like the President, the ethicist believes that the embryos are human lives, and, as human lives, unique individuals. However, unlike the ethicist, who phrases his discussion of the issue scientifically (through focusing on the process by which “you and I, and all the rest of us, started our lives”), Bush justifies his decision religiously (as shown above, Bush claims the embryos are a gift from “our Creator,” the Christian God). Given the rest of the cluster information, that Bush establishes the embryo as a “human life” with “value,” the use of “ethicist” is functioning rhetorically to unite the President with those who do not necessarily share his religious beliefs and, hence, do not necessarily believe his religious justification.

In this statement about the ethicist, Bush is very subtly telling “less certain” (Bush, 2001d) or confused people the “ethical” choice to make regarding embryonic stem cell research. The “less certain” people seem to be those who do not share the
President’s faith in the Christian God, faith that led the President (and those who identify with him on religious grounds) to claim that the embryos are lives. Bush’s use of an ethicist, a secular figure, serves as a way to reach out to those who do not share the President’s Christian faith to show them that stopping federal funding of embryonic stem cell research is the right and ethical decision.

The ethicist and the Christian God are both placed in strong opposition to the scientists conducting the research. Bush rhetorically constructs the scientist in the quote as cold, as someone who offers a “callous attempt at rationalization” (Bush, 2001d), and the President dismisses the scientist’s argument by pointing out the “ethical” viewpoint, that the embryos are “human lives,” and, as such have inherent “value.” Given this ethical viewpoint, the moral imperative is to not allow research on these lives. It is not until much later in the speech that Bush announces that he will not allow further research on embryonic stem cells that have not already been destroyed, but he is already setting that up as the moral choice, making his end mandate seem like the common sense, “moral” one to make, the one that values and protects human life.

Combined, these cluster terms, moral, value, and human life, create a narrative with which the audience could identify. The people could identify with the President and what he vows to do, perform the moral action of protecting the sanctity of human life. The rhetorical narrative set up by these terms is as follows: Bush is a good Christian man who values life as a gift from the Christian God. If the audience members identify with Bush and vow to protect these sacred, God-given lives, then they are acting morally and in accordance with the Christian God. However, for those who are not united with Bush
in his rhetorically constructed quest to save valuable human lives, they are disagreeing with the Christian God and allowing for the destruction of his creation.

Alternatively, for those who do not share the President’s faith, Bush is a good man who consulted an ethicist before rendering his embryonic stem cell research decision, and, with the ethicist, realized that the embryos are human lives that deserve to be protected. In this case, if the listener identifies with Bush and vows to engage in the moral action of protecting these valuable human lives, then the listener is acting morally and working to “preserve our humanity” (Bush, 2001d). However, if the listener does not identify with Bush and the ethicist, then the listener is identifying with the scientists and sanctioning the destruction of human lives in the name of scientific advancement. Thus, regardless of the listener’s beliefs, identifying with the President and his policies is made to seem like the right/moral/ethical thing to do. If the listener has identified with Bush and his narrative, the listener will understand that the embryo is a life and, as such, has a moral right to be valued and protected.

However, the use of the ethicist may be one of the reasons that the President’s embryonic stem cell research rhetoric resulted in disunity among the orthodox/conservative base. As Hunter (1991) explains in *Culture Wars*, orthodox morality is a direct result of an absolute/unchanging reading of holy texts. Orthodox conservatives are pro-life because, following their holy text (mainly the Bible), life is sacred because God created it. The President’s use of the secular ethicist, however, takes the focus off of the claim that is so central to his orthodox base, namely, that God created
the human lives in question. By taking the focus off of God, the President’s argument may have lost strength in the eyes of his conservative Christian base.

Agon: Immoral Researchers Cloning and Selling (non)Human Lives

As I explained in the cluster, for Bush, the embryos are lives because life begins at conception. For the scientists in the agon, then, life begins at a later phase: “[O]ne researcher told me that he believes this five-day-old cluster of cells is not an embryo, not yet an individual . . . He argued that it has the potential for life but is not a life because it cannot develop on its own” (Bush, 2001d). The agon is constructed around the idea that life begins at some point after conception.

Interestingly, Bush’s own definitions may help to explain why so much of the populace did not identify with him and his embryonic stem cell research policies. Recall from the cluster analysis that Bush believes that life begins at conception, that the embryos in question (which are, based on Bush’s [2001d, 2001g] statements, are about five days past fertilization), are human lives. However, the President’s narrative does not clearly address when the scientists believe that life begins. This allows for anyone who believes that life begins at any point later than five days past fertilization to identify with the scientists, whose work is merely based on the idea that life begins at some undefined point later than five days after fertilization.

Because, in the agon narrative, the embryos are not human lives, they are not unique individuals. Bush further explicates the “callous” behavior of the researchers by showing how they could use embryonic stem cell research to engage in cloning, a
practice to which most Americans are opposed (see, for instance, Milligan, 2001; Stohlberg, 2001). As Bush (2001d) explains:

The initial stem cell researcher was at first reluctant to begin his research, fearing it might be used for human cloning. Scientists have already cloned a sheep. Researchers are telling us that the next step could be to clone human beings, to create individual designer stem cells, essentially to grow another you to be available in case you need another heart or lung or liver. I strongly oppose human cloning, as do most Americans. We recoil at the idea of growing human beings for spare body part or creating human life for our own convenience.

Bush’s (2001d) discussion of scientists and their plans for cloning stands in stark contrast to his discussion of his own goal of protecting the individuals embodied in the tiny embryos. The President’s discussion of cloning and its possible ties to embryonic stem cell research strengthens the callousness of the other in the agon and, as a result, strengthens the good characterization built through the cluster terms. With cloning, Bush (2001d) explains how researchers could “grow another you,” which would strip the cloned individual (and the clone for that matter) of its individuality. Keep in mind that, for Bush (2001d; 2001g), each human life is an individual, endowed with sacred value by the creator. Cloning is thus reprehensible because it is stripping people of their sacred individuality, sacred individuality bestowed upon them by the creator, sacred individuality that gives them value. When Bush (2001d; 2001g) links cloning to embryonic stem cell research, he gives the audience the chance to identify against the more disturbing practice. The audience may follow the rhetoric and use common sense to link cloning to embryonic stem cell research.

Following the narrative, not only could embryonic stem cell research lead to cloning, but it could also create a market for embryos and clones, a place where scientists
are “growing human beings for spare body parts . . . creating life for our convenience” (Bush, 2001b). The scientists are rhetorically constructed as acting in the interest of consumers who have so devalued human life that they are shopping for body parts, and the embryos in question provide one way to create the body parts for which people are shopping. The embryos can be used “to create another you” (Bush, 2001d), and the other “you” would have, in theory, everything that the individual could possibly need.

Interestingly, it is not only the callous scientists who are creating a market for the embryos. In what may prove a narrative inconsistency, Bush (2001d) explains how,

A large number of these embryos already exist. They are the product of a process called in vitro fertilization, which helps so many couples conceive children. When doctors match sperm and egg to create life outside of the womb . . . Once a couple successfully has children, or if they are unsuccessful, the additional embryos remain frozen in laboratories . . . and a few have been implanted in an adoptive mother and born, and are today healthy children.

As this quotation shows, “couples” (which, when read in context, seems to imply heterosexual couples) are also in the market for embryos. They are using the embryos to help them “conceive children.” Following Bush’s narrative, it seems acceptable to shop for embryos from “doctors” (see above quote) but not from scientists who are using them “to create spare body parts.” The President critiques the scientists for using embryos for consumerism, but then explains, in a nearly positive way, how “doctors” are doing the same thing to help “couples” conceive children. In other words, the President’s near critique of creating a market for embryos falls apart as he uses a heteronormative discourse to justify the same idea of making and selling embryos. Apparently, following the rhetoric, it is acceptable to sell embryos to aid in procreation, but it is not acceptable to sell them in order to possibly help people suffering from debilitating illnesses.
Pentad Analysis

From the analysis of the cluster and the agon terms in the rhetoric, I have shown that there is a strong tension between two sets of agents, Bush and the scientists, and each set of agents is defining *life* in a way that legitimizes their respective viewpoints. However, to this point I have only shown two possible reasons that the orthodox/conservatives did not unify together with Bush and his embryonic stem cell research policies, namely that the scientists’ unclear definition of when life begins allows for anyone who believes that life begins anywhere past five days of fertilization to identify with them over the President, and the unclear consumerism narrative that underscores the rhetoric. Neither of these findings, however, clearly explicates the moral persona that Bush rhetorically constructs or how he does (or does not) constitute a moral community to follow him. To better understand the ethical and moral issues constructed in the texts, I use Burke’s (1969a) pentad to analyze Bush’s embryonic stem cell research rhetoric. I argue that the President’s focus on only two sets of agents creates a disempowering scene-act ratio that leaves much of the population, except for the President and the scientists, unable to act at all in the texts, and this disempowerment of the masses helps me to explain the elitist moral persona that the President rhetorically constructs in these texts. In this section, I begin by analyzing the scene, then turn to the act, agency, agent, and purpose. I conclude by assessing the moral persona that the President constructs and the ways in which he does (or does not) constitute a moral community to follow him.
Scene

For Burke (1969a), scene refers to “the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred” (p. xv). In keeping with Burke’s (1973) cluster/agon drama, there are two contrasting scenes in Bush’s embryonic stem cell research addresses, and the two gain strength from being juxtaposed against one another.

Bush’s Scene: The Womb

Bush’s (2001d) address on embryonic stem cell research and his corresponding op-ed piece on the issue (2001g) rely upon appeals to the womb as the natural scene for the embryos, and the inconsistency of these scenic appeals may help to explain why so many Americans did not identify with the President and his decision. Bush (2001d) spends considerable time discussing his belief that embryonic stem cells belong in the womb: “doctors match sperm and egg to create life outside the womb . . . embryos are planted in the mother . . . a few have been implanted in an adoptive mother and born, and are today healthy children.” In all of these accounts, it seems that there is a natural place for the embryos, a woman’s womb. The scenic focus becomes apparent through the “planted in” and “implanted” references. The womb is the vessel, the place where, following Bush’s (2001d) rhetoric, the embryos belong. Embryos do not belong in laboratories, they are meant to be “planted in the mother” so that they can be “born.”

Scientists’ Scene: The Laboratory

The scientists carry out their work in their laboratory. The scientists’ scene is thus the laboratory in which life is created and discarded in the name of science, a place where “scientists have created human beings in test tubes solely to experiment on them”
Following Bush’s (2001d) rhetoric, the embryos belong in the womb, a place where they can “grow [into] healthy children.” The womb is thus nurturing, a place where the embryos are able to progress naturally. The laboratory, in contrast, is the setting in which lives are created and ended. The laboratory thus replaces the womb as the receptacle for the embryos, a place in which the embryos are denied the right to progress through the natural cycle and become “children.” Following the rhetoric, the embryos will either be housed in a womb or in a laboratory, and one choice leads to life, the other to death.

Interestingly, both the womb-as-scene and the laboratory-as-scene illustrate Burke’s (1972) concept of entelechy. Entelechy refers to a perfect end point. In the case of Bush’s embryonic stem cell research rhetoric, the embryos, regardless of how they are used, reach a very clear scenic end point. In the case of the womb, the end result is an individual. However, in the case of the research embryos, the end point is medical waste (as the embryos die and not all parts are used in the research process). The scenic entelechy of each side thus helps to bolster the good versus evil narrative that the President constructs in his embryonic stem cell research rhetoric. The embryos can become a life or become trash. For those who identify with the President’s life definition, the common sense response is clear and reinforced; the embryos should end up becoming babies.

Act

For Burke (1969a) the act refers to “what took place in thought or deed” (p. xv). In keeping with Burke’s (1973) cluster/agon drama, there are three sets of acts in these
addresses: the Christian God and his act of creating, the heroic acts of President Bush, and the atrocious acts of the scientists.

*God’s Act: Create Life*

The President’s entire rhetorical drama centers on the idea that “human life is a sacred gift from our creator” (Bush, 2001d). The first act, the act that underscores every subsequent act that Bush undertakes (to be described shortly), is undertaken by the Christian God. The Christian God is the one who creates life, the one who endows every human life with sacred value. Moreover, Bush (2001d) continues the above quote by claiming that “as your President I have an important obligation to foster and encourage respect for life in America and throughout the world.” The President thus very nearly puts himself into the role of being the one who was put into office at this point in time to protect God’s valuable creations. If this is some sort of God-given role, then God’s second, and closely related act, would be putting Bush in place in order to protect the lives that God created.

*Bush’s Act: Protect Life*

As I explained in the cluster section of this paper, Bush (2001d; 2001g) defines life as beginning at conception and, based on this definition, believes that the embryos in question are human lives. Having defined the embryos as lives, Bush (2001d) offers the following statements:

As a result of private research, more than 60 genetically diverse stem cell lines already exist. They were created from embryos that have been destroyed, and they have the ability to regenerate themselves indefinitely, creating ongoing opportunities for research. I have concluded that we should allow federal funds to be used for research on these existing stem cell lines, where the life and death decision has already been made. . . . This allows us to explore the promise and
potential of stem cell research without crossing a fundamental moral line by providing tax payer funding that would sanction or encourage the further destructions of embryos that have at least the potential for life.

Thus, Bush’s most overt act in this set of text consists of partially banning/partially funding embryonic stem cell research. Bush (2001d; 2001g) vows to allow federal money to be used to fund additional research on the sixty existing embryonic stem cell lines. However, with this act comes another. Bush is using his executive authority to forbid any taxpayer funding of additional embryonic stem cell research. Once the sixty lines are gone, so is the federal funding.¹¹

Through only allowing federal funds to be used for research on the existing 60 stem cell lines, lines that, due to the research process can never become lives, the President is also rhetorically constructed as undertaking the act of protecting human lives. As I discussed in the introduction section of this paper, while Bush technically only banned federal funding of embryonic stem cell research, his mandate severely affected all embryonic stem cell research as private agencies are less willing to fund a scientific endeavor that may or may not work. In other words, Bush’s funding decision made it much more difficult for scientists to have their work funded, which means that they were not able to “destroy” as many embryos due to a lack of funding. Since, for Bush (2001d; 2001g), the embryos are “lives,” by making it more difficult to conduct research on them, the President is protecting lives.

Furthermore, the decision to allow federal funds to be used only for research on the existing 60 stem cell lines ties in with the next action that the President undertakes.

¹¹ As Stohlberg (2001) and Weiss (2001) explain, the sixty line limit in itself drew criticism from the scientific community and from those in favor of embryonic stem cell research as the longer the lines stayed in storage, the more likely they were to mutate and become useless for usage in humans.
In order to assure that “ethical research standards are observed by all recipients of federal funding” (Bush, 2001g), the President “appoint[ed] a Presidential Council on Bioethics, chaired by Dr. Leon Kass, to advise [the] administration on moral and scientific questions raised by biomedical research” (Bush, 2001g). The President set up a council of hand-picked members to ensure that the small amount of embryonic stem cell research that is funded is conducted ethically, that research is only conducted on the embryonic stem cells that can “never become a life” (Bush, 2001d). Rhetorically, this may have been an effort to avoid some of the criticism that Bush knew he may face from the pro-life Right who opposed any and all embryonic stem cell research, for Bush’s panel is designed to ensure that no other potential lives (embryos) are destroyed in the name of science.

Interestingly, Bush’s action of creating the panel and choosing its leaders serves another function, that of reinforcing Bush’s rhetorically constructed role as the guardian of morality in the United States. It is Bush who, following the rhetoric, knows the “right” ethical decision to make regarding embryonic stem cell research. And, from this knowledge, it is Bush who is in a position to put together a panel to ensure that the research is conducted ethically, which shows that, ultimately, the President not only knows the ethical decision to make, but he knows which other people are ethical enough to oversee the research (i.e., Dr. Kass), and the President uses his official position to build the ethical panel.

*Scientists’ Act: Destroy Life*

As explained in the cluster/agon section of this chapter, the scientists do not believe that life begins at the moment of conception. Thus, their act of destroying
“lives,” is, following the rhetoric, somewhat of a morally ambiguous act, though the President uses his rhetoric to emphasize the heartlessness of his researcher nemeses. Bush (2001d) describes how the scientists “have created human embryos in test tubes solely to experiment on them . . . growing human beings for spare body parts.” According to Bush (2001g), these scientists are involved in “fetal farming [and] cloning to provide spare human body parts.” The scientists’ main act thus involves using their scientific knowledge to create and destroy lives.

Following Bush’s (2001d; 2001g) rhetoric, all life is sacred, so the scientists’ act of creating and destroying life is thus simultaneously an act of devaluing a unique creation of the Christian God. For Bush (2001g), who believes that the embryos are human lives, “life, including early life, is biologically human, genetically distinct, and valuable.” These lives are valuable, as I have shown previously, because they are a creation of the Christian God. When the scientists destroy these lives or, if one believes the President’s rhetoric, are using them as a stepping-stone to cloning (Bush, 2001d; 2001g), then the scientists are stripping the lives that the Christian God created of their sacred individuality and inherent value.

Agency

According to Burke (1969a), agency refers to “the means or instruments” (p. xv) used to carry out and act. In keeping with the dramatic good versus evil narrative, Bush creates a dual agency in his stem cell research addresses. On the one hand, Bush relies upon the agency of official authority and prayer to the Christian God to justify his decision, though, interestingly, there is a shift in the rhetoric where Bush rhetorically
constructs himself as the agency for the Christian God. On the other hand, the scientists’
agency consists of science itself as the means by which American society will cease to
value all life.

_Bush’s Agency: Official Authority and Prayer to the Christian God_

Bush relies upon two tools in his attempt to justify his embryonic stem cell
research funding decision. First of all, as reporters (Goldstein, 2001; Kornblut &
Leonard, 2001; Seelye & Bruni, 2001) have noted, the President entered the Oval Office
with the knowledge that he would be called upon, as President of the United States, to
make a formal decision on the future funding of embryonic stem cell research. Bush
(2001d) explains the impending decision by stating that “My administration must decide
whether to allow federal funds, your tax dollars, to be used for scientific research on stem
cells derived from human embryos.” After offering his decision, the President notes that
“my administration has adopted the following policy: Federal funding for research on
existing stem cell lines will move forward; federal funding that sanctions or encourages
the destruction of additional embryos will not” (Bush, 2001g). Thus, the President’s first
agency, and in many ways his first denial of any wrongdoing in his decision, comes from
his appeal to his office/administration. While it is ultimately Bush’s choice, he uses the
generic term of “administration” to absolve himself of personal responsibility for the
decision that he is announcing. “Administration” thus becomes a mean to the President’s
end of absolution, so it is functioning as agency.

Bush also uses prayer to the Christian God as a form of agency in his speeches.
The President does not make his decision based on science or on knowledge, but on
prayer to the Christian God and the Christian values that accompany that belief. Interestingly, the President’s concession that he only reached the decision after praying simultaneously turns the President into a form of agency. Bush (2001d) claims that “human life is a sacred gift from our Creator . . . as your President I have an important obligation to foster and encourage respect for life in America and throughout the world.” The President’s rhetoric thus turns Bush himself into agency here. Bush becomes the means by which the Christian God is protecting life in the United States and throughout the world. God’s goal is protecting the sacred lives that he has created, and Bush is one vessel that God uses to do so.

*Scientists’ Agency: Lax Oversight*

Bush dedicates considerable time to explaining how he is using his official authority to create a President’s council to monitor embryonic stem cell research, a council that has the stated goal of ensuring that future embryonic stem cell research is conducted in an ethical manner. The President’s rhetoric leaves the impression that, prior to his decision to appoint the special council on ethics, there was no ethical oversight. Prior to 2001, the scientists were left to conduct their destructive work unchecked. The lack of ethical oversight has allowed “fetal farming” (Bush, 2001g). Without oversight, “scientists have already cloned a sheep” (Bush, 2001d), and, had Bush not stepped in, “the next step could be to clone human beings to create individual designer stem cells, essentially to grow another you, to be available in case you need another heart or lung or liver” (Bush, 2001d). The lack of ethical oversight becomes the means by which the scientists were able to experiment on “lives” for so long. It was the agency that allowed
their “callous” research to thrive. In keeping with the hero construction discussed in the cluster/agon analysis, Bush, as the hero, undertakes the act of stripping the scientists of the lax oversight, the agency that has allowed them to conduct so much of their “callous” research.

Agent

Burke (1969a) describes agent as the “person or kind of person [who] performed the act” (p. xv). In keeping with Burke’s cluster/agon drama, there are two competing agents in these speeches. As is apparent from the cluster/agon analysis, the two main agents in the rhetoric are Bush and the scientists, and the rhetoric serves to illustrate the good of the former and the callousness of the latter. While I will explain each one momentarily, I would like to call attention to the fact that those who could benefit from embryonic stem cell research, people suffering from a variety of debilitating illnesses, are not accorded agent status in the rhetoric, the implications of which I will address in the conclusion of this chapter. For now, I will mainly focus on Bush as agent, the scientists as agents, and the embryos as potential agents.

Bush as Agent

As the cluster/agon analysis revealed, Bush (2001d; 2001g) sets himself up as the hero in his embryonic stem cell research narrative, and sacred lives are at stake. The President constructs himself as the ultimate good, as the one who is working “to protect life in all its phases” (Bush, 2001d). Bush characterizes himself as the savior of millions of innocent, sacred lives that will be ended by “callous” research if the President does not step in. The President will do everything in his power to ensure that scientists no longer
“create human embryos in test tubes solely to experiment on them” (Bush, 2001d), a move that, following Bush’s (2001g) rhetoric, will “preserve our humanity” by ensuring that all future research is conducted ethically. The President is rhetorically constructed as working against “callous” scientists who, as will be shown momentarily, want to destroy lives for their own research purposes.

Scientists as Agents

In the cluster/agon analysis, I discussed how the scientists are set up as the callous other in Bush’s embryonic stem cell research rhetoric. While Bush (2001d) is crusading to “protect life in all its phases,” the scientists are “creat[ing] human embryos in test tubes solely to experiment on them . . . [and] the next step could be to clone human beings to create individual designer stem cells . . . growing human beings for spare body parts, creating life for our convenience.” Following Bush’s rhetoric, the scientists are cold individuals who are creating and destroying human lives in order to further their own research. Interestingly, the good work that the scientists are doing, that of working to help people with horrible diseases, is obscured by Bush’s rhetoric. It is not only their work that is made to seem evil, but the scientists as well, for they have failed to “preserve our humanity” (Bush, 2001g).

Embryos as (Almost) Agents

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the rhetoric comes from the fact that Bush comes close to according agent status to the embryos. On their own in their present state, the embryos cannot act, so, following Burke (1969a), they are not agents. However, Bush (2001d) discusses how “extracting the stem cell destroys the embryo, and thus
destroys its potential for life. Like a snowflake, each of these embryos is unique, with the unique genetic potential of an individual human being” and how “a few [of these embryos] have been implanted in an adoptive mother and born, and are today health children.” In other words, the President discusses how the embryos, if left in their natural environment (i.e., the womb), would become agents, for children are agents due to their ability to act. In Bush’s (2001d; 2001g) rhetoric, the embryos are basically agents-in-waiting, just waiting for the chance to be born and attain their full agent status. The possible ramifications of the agent status of the embryos (and the lack of agent status for the people with illnesses waiting for treatment) are discussed in the conclusion section of this chapter.

Purpose

For Burke (1969a), purpose refers to why an action is undertaken. Charland (1987) expanded upon Burke’s definition of purpose. For Charland (1987), the audience is actively constituted through the rhetoric, and through the constitutive rhetoric, the people form a collective identity. This constitution of a collective identity (or ideology) can be read as a purpose of the rhetoric. Basically, purpose is linked to ideology. In the case of embryonic stem cell research, the purpose of each side is, in many ways, offering a new name to the same culture wars debate that has been going on for decades (see Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991): When does life begin? However, with embryonic stem cell research, the ramifications are, arguably, broader than they are in the on-going abortion debates as there are literally millions of people who could potentially benefit from embryonic stem cell research.
Bush’s Purpose: Reaffirm the Conservative Pro-Life Position that Life Begins at Conception

The President is interested in “the protection of developing life” based on his belief that “life, including early life, is biologically human, genetically distinct, and valuable” (Bush, 2001g). Bush’s (2001d, 2001g) purpose is thus to reaffirm the conservative pro-life position that life begins at conception. Embryonic stem cell research, like abortion before it, raises the question of when human life begins. Bush’s rhetoric, which focuses on how the embryos are valuable lives, sacred creations of the Christian God, shows that the President espouses the pro-life ideology that life begins at conception. Following this ideology, the embryos are lives and, as such, deserve to be protected.

The irony, of course, is that Bush’s (2001d, 2001g) embryonic stem cell research addresses split the orthodox pro-life base. For Charland (1987), new constitutive rhetorics can offer opportunities for new collective identities to form. It may be that part of the failure of Bush’s embryonic stem cell research addresses stemmed from the fact that even the pro-life movement does not completely agree with when life begins, and the lapse in definition that remained hidden and helped to constitute the collective identity of the pro-life movement in the 1960s and 1970s became apparent in Bush’s statements on embryonic stem cell research. For those who believed that the President should have funded research beyond the existing 60 lines, the pro-life narrative’s lapse comes from steadfastly holding to the idea that all life begins at conception. For these people, the embryos are not yet lives, but the pro-life narrative does not address this possibility. For
those who believed that the President should not have funded research on the existing 60 lines, the pro-life narrative’s lapse comes from the fact that the embryos in question were lives. For these people, the embryos, regardless of whether they have been destroyed or not, are still sacred creations and, as sacred creations, should not be experimented on.

*Scientists’ Purpose: Assert that Life Begins After Conception*

The scientists represent the ideological opposite to the pro-lifers. Following the rhetoric, the scientists believe that “this five-day-old cluster of cells is not an embryo, not yet an individual, but a pre-embryo. . . . [I]t has the potential for life, but it is not a life because it cannot develop on its own” (Bush, 2001d). Basically, the scientists’ purpose is to assert the pro-choice position that life begins after conception, that the embryos in question are not lives that can survive on their own accord. Following the ideology that life begins after conception, research on the embryos is justifiable because it involves using not-yet-lives to help people who are unquestionably alive.

Interestingly, the above quote represents the only statement that Bush clearly makes regarding the scientists’ perception of when life begins, and it is a limited statement at that. Following the rhetoric, those who identify with the scientists could constitute a large group. The President’s rhetoric makes a clear demarcation of when life begins, at conception, and the only counter presented is that the embryos in question, which are only five days past fertilization, are, from the scientists’ perspective, not yet lives. Anyone who believes that life begins past the five-day point can thus identify with the narrative put forth by the scientists, that the not-yet-lives embryos are being used to hopefully help unquestionably living people who are suffering. Thus, another possible
reason that much of the populace did not identify with the President and his embryonic stem cell research policy could be due to the fact that his rhetoric allows for many people to identify with the rhetorically constructed nemeses.

Conclusion

In this chapter I analyzed Bush’s embryonic stem cell research statements, statements that caused disunity, even among the President’s strong pro-life base (Goodstein, 2001; Wade, 2001d). Throughout this chapter, I have addressed a few possible reasons that the majority of Americans could not identify with Bush and his embryonic stem cell research funding decision. The first possible reason for the President’s failure to unify the conservative pro-life base comes from Bush’s inconsistent use of “life.” Following the President’s rhetoric, life is a creation of the Christian God and thus has inherent sacred value. This is the line of reasoning that the President uses throughout the majority of his speech. However, there is a noticeable shift in this definition as the President explains the work of the scientists, as the lives that are being destroyed are nothing more than creations of the scientists (represented by Bush’s [2001d] claim that “In recent weeks we learned that scientists have created human embryos in test tubes solely to experiment on them”). If it is because they are creations of the Christian God that most embryos have sacred value, then when the President focuses on the fact that many of the embryos in question are not created by God but by scientists, the President’s argument loses some of its strength. This inconsistency may have caused disunity among the Christian Right pro-life base who believes that all life is created by God (Diamond, 1995).
In other words, the pentad analysis revealed issues with the act that could help to explain why Bush’s constituents did not identify with the President and his embryonic stem cell research decision, thus helping to answer the main question guiding this chapter. In the introduction I asked two additional questions to tie this chapter to the rest of the dissertation: 1) What sort of moral persona does the President construct in his embryonic stem cell research addresses? 2) Does he constitute a moral community to follow him? To answer the first question, I will return to the interesting agent statuses that I discussed earlier in this chapter. Recall that the rhetoric mainly centers on two agents, the President and the scientists. These two agent constructions drive most of the pentad and form the cluster and agon, respectively. The President is rhetorically constructed as the hero, as the one working tirelessly to ensure that the embryos are protected from “callous” researchers who are creating life just to destroy it. The agent characterizations thus form the traditional “good versus evil” framework. Alone, these agent characterizations, while simplistic, do not fully explain neither why Bush failed nor what sort of moral persona he puts forth in the rhetoric.

In order to fully understand both the reason that so many did not identify with the President and the moral persona that the President constructs in the embryonic stem cell research texts, I more fully explore one other agent construction in the texts and a group that is not accorded agent status in the rhetoric. As I explained in the agent analysis, the President comes very close to granting agent status to the embryos through his focus on their “potential for life” (Bush, 2001d). The President then devotes considerable time to explaining how many embryos have been born and have grown into kids. The embryos’
“potential for life” and their potential to be active children shows how the President couches his discussion of the embryos in their potential to act, making them (potential) agents.

However, those afflicted with degenerative diseases, that is, those who could potentially personally benefit from embryonic stem cell research, are not accorded agent status in the rhetoric. Bush (2001d) mentions them once in the speech; “scientists believe that further research using stem cells offers great promise that could help improve the lives of those who suffer from many terrible diseases—from juvenile diabetes to Alzheimer’s, from Parkinson’s to spinal cord injuries.” And these people are not mentioned at all in the op-ed piece.

By Bush’s (2001d) own statements, the 60 existing lines could be replicated numerous times, meaning that one stem cell could possible save several lives, though the 60 are certainly not enough to help everyone in need. Ethically, Bush is not even in the realm of utilitarianism (see Mill, 2009) in his decision to protect the lives of the embryos at the expense of those who could possibly be aided by the scientific advancements that could be made if embryonic stem cell research were allowed to continue. From a utilitarian perspective, allowing embryonic stem cell research is the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Clearly, Bush does not rhetorically construct a utilitarian moral persona in his rhetoric.

So what sort of moral persona does the President construct? As the cluster/agon analysis shows, the moral conflict is set up as being between Bush and the scientists, and all involved in the conflict are elites. It seems that Bush is just, in the name of
“morality,” appealing to the same elite group that has traditionally held most of the power in the United States. Those who could potentially benefit from the procedure are not afforded the opportunity to make their own medical decisions. Ethics is reduced to a power struggle between competing groups of educated people who hold more authority than those in mainstream society.

I have termed this sort of morality “elitist ethics” as ethics and morality are reduced to a power struggle between the affluent/elite few. At the end of the struggle, those who are not in the elite few are left without the right to make their own decisions. I believe that an elitist moral persona is created in Bush’s embryonic stem cell research rhetoric. By essentially banning future embryonic stem cell research, the President is not allowing people to make choices about their own health care. It is as though the President does not trust the afflicted to do what he believes is “right” (i.e., not be part of research that destroys sacred human lives), so he makes sure that they are not able to participate in the wrong, and he uses his official authority to do so. Along with this elitist moral persona is a protective moral persona. The President’s rhetoric frames Bush himself as being the one capable of doing right, and, in this case, the right thing to do is to protect the embryos/lives.

So, what sort of moral community does the President constitute to follow his elitist/protector moral persona? Throughout this chapter, I have shown how no one, conservative/orthodox or liberal/progressive, was really satisfied with Bush’s embryonic stem cell research funding decision. In fact, through failing to unify even his pro-life orthodox base, the President really does not constitute a moral community to follow him.
Throughout the rhetoric, the President seems to be trying to reach a compromise that will appease his orthodox pro-life base. As I have shown throughout this chapter, he fails.

To foster a moral community, members of that community have to unify around the rhetorical narrative being put forth by their moral leader. Bush’s rhetoric, however, does not create a narrative with which all of the orthodox conservatives can identify. In the narrative, the scientists are described as “callous,” (Bush, 2001d), as creating and destroying life in the name of scientific advancement. However, this characterization does not take into account the fact that the scientists are conducting their research with the goal of helping those who are living in agony. Since, for some orthodox conservatives, the “evil” characters in the President’s narrative are not really evil, it is really hard to rally behind the “good” and moral President who is working to stop the “callous” research from progressing. As a result, it is very hard to create and sustain a moral community.

In the next chapter I explore how Bush’s rhetoric temporarily unifies the populace, orthodox and progressive alike, in the days and weeks following the September 11th attacks, but how this unity dissolves as the war in Iraq escalates. As I will show, in the 9/11 and War on Terror speeches, the President relies upon a protective moral persona and, at times, an elitist one. However, in Chapter 4, I argue that Bush relies upon the same elitist ethics in his statements on same-sex marriage as his rhetoric serves to disempower the gays and lesbians who are directly affected by the President’s rhetoric and the decision that he is espousing, though the constitution of moral community differs in both Chapters 3 and 4.
CHAPTER 3

SHIFTING IDENTIFICATIONS AND MOVING FROM ACT TO SCENE: POSSIBLE REASONS BUSH LOST UNITY FROM AFGHANISTAN TO IRAQ

“The deliberate and deadly attacks . . . against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (Bush, 2001c).

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I showed how President Bush upset the vast majority of the country by placing more importance on the lives of embryos than on the lives of people suffering from debilitating illnesses. While people who identified as pro-choice were, by and large, angered by the way in which the President chose to protect embryos at the expense of people who were already living, the orthodox pro-life base was split into three distinct groups, with only one of the three actually agreeing with the President’s decision to partially-ban, partially fund embryonic stem cell research. The embryonic stem cell research decision, one of the biggest failures of Bush’s first term, was in August 2001. Just one month later, Bush would, following poll numbers, rebound astronomically, making speeches that, by press accounts, were a remarkable success. The theme of the President’s message was similar to the one delivered in August: life needs to be protected. This time, however, nearly the entire country agreed with the President’s definition of life and shared his disgust for the senseless slaughter of innocents.
However, as the months dragged on, large numbers of citizens would cease to identify with the President, and I examine Bush’s waning support in this chapter.

Background

The day after the September 11th attacks, reporters across the country called September 11, 2001, “the defining day of Bush’s presidency” (Balz, 2001b, p. A2), “the greatest test of the Bush presidency” (Milbank & Allen, 2001, p. A3), and “a turn in Bush’s presidency that immediately tested his capabilities as a leader and a healer” (Kranish, 2001, p. A6). Reporters noted that “George W. Bush’s presidency changed indelibly in the hour that it took for terrorists to demolish the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and devastate the seemingly impregnable Pentagon Building in Washington” (Balz, 2001b, p. A2).

If September 11, 2001, was in fact a test of Bush’s presidency, and if public unity behind the President is one way of grading said test, then Bush’s first actions/statements following the attacks can be read as a remarkable success. As the President encouraged Americans to come together, Americans showed their unity with the President and with one another through buying and displaying American flags,12 adopting the slogan “United we stand,” and striving to “become a September the 11th volunteer” (Bush, 2001d) through community involvement.

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12 CNN.com (2001) explains the magnitude of Americans buying flags and the slogan “United We Stand”: Sales of the American flag have spiked dramatically at some stores in the wake of Tuesday’s [9/11/01] attacks. Wal-Mart says it sold 450,000 American flags between Tuesday [9/11/01] and Thursday [9/13/01], after selling only 26,000 during the same period last year. Kmart says it has sold 200,000 flags since last Tuesday and that many of its stores are out of stock. . . . Both retailers claim that red, white, and blue items are hot sellers. Bluelight.com, Kmart’s web site, says its top-selling item is one introduced only last night: a T-shirt featuring the American flag with the words “United We Stand.”
The public’s identification with the President continued as the War on Terror commenced with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. September 11th mastermind Osama bin Laden was believed to be hiding in Afghanistan (Kornblut, 2001c), and Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan with the goal of “evicting Saudi exile Osama bin Laden and his hosts, the Taliban regime” (Allen & Sipress, 2001, p. A14). Al Qaeda was believed to be working to find nuclear and chemical weapons, which they and Osama bin Laden could use to “mount another devastating attack” (Kronblut, 2001b, p. A15; see also DeYoung, 2001) against the United States or other coalition nations. Indeed, as Kornblut (2001c) explains, the United States was “still anxious in the wake of the September 11th attacks” (p. A1). In other words, following press accounts, the people were unified behind President Bush as the war in Afghanistan began. Like the President, American citizens were still very worried about the continued threat of terrorism. The populace was unified in their fear of terrorism.

As the conflict in Afghanistan began, the President wanted to be clear that “the United States is a friend to the Afghan people” (Bush, 2001b). The conflict was thus framed not as being with Afghanistan per se, but rather with the Taliban regime believed to be hiding Osama bin Laden. As a show of the United States’ camaraderie with the Afghan populace, the President donated over $320 million in food and supplies to the people (Allen & DeYoung, 2001; Senger & Perlez, 2001). Thus, through focusing his rhetoric solely on terrorism and a murderous regime that hid terrorists, the President was able to frame the conflict with Afghanistan as being more a humanitarian mission than a
war with the entire country. The President was “widely praised” (DeYoung, 2001) both nationally and abroad for his treatment of the situation in Afghanistan.

However, as the War on Terror entered into the Iraq war phase, the President faced decreased identification with the American public. Bush alleged that there were strong ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, and he was worried that Saddam Hussein would give his weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups so that they could attack the United States (DeYoung, 2002). Bush claimed that in order to disarm Iraq and protect the United States from another terrorist attack, Saddam Hussein had to be removed from power (Sanger, 2002).

When President Bush began discussing war in Iraq, many countries who had supported the war in Afghanistan voiced their disagreement with going to war in Iraq. For example, the President lost public support from the leaders of France, Jordan, Egypt, Russia, China, and Japan (Sciolino, 2002). Likewise, in the United States, the populace, formerly unified in their fear of terrorism, split as the proposed war with Iraq became more of a possibility. As Milbank (2002) explains, “A Gallup poll released [in October 2002] found a bare majority of Americans—53 percent—favored a ground invasion of Iraq, down from 61 percent in June [2001] and 74 percent last November [November 2001]” (p. A21). In other words, the President was losing some of the consubstantiality that he had shared with the public since the attacks of September 11th. In this chapter, I attempt to account for some of the reasons that some Americans ceased to identify with the President and his Iraq policies.
The President’s loss of unity with the American populace between the Afghanistan and Iraq wars leads to my main question guiding this chapter of the dissertation: What in Bush’s War on Terror rhetoric accounts for the public’s faltering identification with the President and his policies between the Afghanistan war and the Iraq war? To tie this question into the broader dissertation issue of the rhetorical construction of Bush as the moral values candidate, I also address the following two questions in the chapter conclusion: What moral persona does Bush construct in his War on Terror addresses? Does he constitute a moral community to follow him?

Justification of Burkean Tools

As may be apparent from the above background information, identification with the President and his policies is key to understanding both the President’s consubstantiality with the populace as the war in Afghanistan began, and his faltering identification with them as the war in Iraq neared. For Burke (1969b), rhetoric cannot be separated from identification, because “you persuade a man [or woman] only insofar as you can talk his [or her] language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his [or hers]” (p. 55). Thus, rhetoric cannot succeed if the speaker is unable to find some sort of common ground with his/her listeners. This common ground is the basis of identification. Burke (1969b) begins his description of identification by positing that “A is not identical with his [her] colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he [she] may identify himself [herself] with B even when their interests are not joined, if he [she] assumes that they are or is persuaded to believe so” (p. 20). As this explanation shows, identification can occur
in several ways. First of all, two people/groups could have a common interest. On the other hand, they may not, but a powerful rhetor convinces the person/group that they do share an interest with the rhetor. At any rate, “to identify A with B is to make A ‘consubstantial’ with B . . . in acting together, men [women] have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial” (Burke, 1969b, p. 21).

As evidenced by the public’s unity behind Bush from September 11, 2001 through the Afghanistan war, people identified with the President through their shared fear of terrorism. However, the President lost some consubstantiality with the populace as the war in Iraq approached, which shows that the community created in the days following the 9/11 attacks suffered disunity as the narrative that led to the community’s creation changed (Charland, 1987).

Furthermore, most any discussion of a moral persona fits squarely under Burke’s (1969a) agent, which refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed the act” (p. xv). An agent focus is different from an act focus, however, as the analysis centers on the person committing the act rather than the act itself. In the case of “moral character,” the person himself is believed to be moral because of intrinsic characteristics. These intrinsic characteristics are then transformed into overt action, but it is traits of the individual that lead to an agent focus.

In order to answer the chapter’s guiding questions, I begin by using Bush’s 9/11 rhetoric to illustrate the background narrative that the President developed “when we knew it was a terrorist attack” (Bush, 2001d), a narrative that started on September 11,
2001. To better understand and explicate this narrative, I use Burke’s (1973) cluster/agon analytical tool. The first speech analyzed is the one that Bush gave on September 11, 2001, which was the one delivered from the Oval Office (there were two previous address on that day, from a Florida Elementary School and a Louisiana Air Force Base, respectively, but the Oval Office address covers the information in those speeches and offers more as it was delivered at the end of the day, after the attacks). The second speech analyzed is Bush’s September 12, 2001, briefing about the attacks following his meeting with his national security team. The third text is Bush’s September 13, 2001, press release about the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance. Bush’s September 14, 2001, speech on the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance rounded out my September 11th texts. I also looked at two addresses that Bush gave to commemorate the events of September 11, 2001: Bush’s “Remarks to the Nation One Year Later,” which was delivered on September 11, 2002, and Bush’s September 11, 2004, Radio Address.

In order to ascertain possible reasons that some members of the populace ceased to identify with the President and his policies during the war in Iraq, I turn to Burke’s (1969a) pentad, and I apply it to Bush’s War on Terror speeches. Specifically, I rely upon two speeches that Bush gave about the war in Afghanistan, his “Address to the Nation on Initial Military Operations in Afghanistan,” delivered October 7, 2001, and his “War on Terrorism” speech from November 8, 2001. In both of these speeches, the President focuses his rhetoric on how the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is hiding terrorists who helped to plan the 9/11 attacks and is torturing the citizens of Afghanistan. The war with Afghanistan is thus framed as having the single goal of eradicating the
Taliban regime, which will have the dual benefit of finding terrorists bent on destroying the United States and ending the suffering of the citizens of Afghanistan.

I also rely upon Bush’s “Remarks on Iraq,” which was delivered on October 7, 2002, and outlined the President’s case for going to war with Iraq, mainly by showing that the country was a nuclear threat. I also utilize Bush’s “Address to the Nation on Initial Military Operations in Iraq,” which was delivered on March 19, 2003. In these speeches, the President builds on an idea similar to one expressed in the Afghanistan speeches. He explains how a corrupt leader is destroying the people living in the country while simultaneously presenting a continued threat to the United States. Thus, I analyze four War on Terror speeches, two addressing the war with Afghanistan and two addressing the war with Iraq. As my brief description of each shows, at first glance the speeches draw on a similar narrative: A foreign power is supporting terrorism against the United States and sanctioning mistreatment of the country’s own people. The ways in which these narratives diverge, and Bush’s resulting loss of identification between the Afghanistan speeches and the Iraq speeches, is the focus of this chapter.

To understand why his audience identifies more with him in and his policies in the Afghanistan rhetoric, I will analyze the rhetoric more in-depth. In the remainder of this chapter, I begin by analyzing the cluster terms and the agon terms that the President uses to build his War on Terror narrative, which was formed in the hours and days following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The vast majority of people identify with the President’s narrative as he continued to use it in the Afghanistan addresses, but many fail to identify with the narrative in the Iraq addresses. To further understand the
faltering identification with the President and his policies, I then use Burke’s pentad to understand how the narrative built in the cluster begins to show fissures that ultimately decrease the audience’s unity with Bush. I conclude by assessing the ethic that the President is using in each set of the War on Terror speeches and how these tie to the broader issue of the rhetorical construction of a moral persona in Bush’s first term in office.

Cluster Analysis

Bush’s 9/11 rhetoric contains both a cluster and an agon. For Burke (1973), the use of a cluster and a corresponding agon builds a rhetorical drama by constructing a story of “good” (represented by the terms in the cluster) versus “evil” (represented by the terms in the agon) (see also Berthold, 1976). Per both Burke (1973) and Berthold (1976), I will discuss the cluster first and then the agon, showing how the two rely upon each other for narrative strength.

Cluster: Peaceful, Freedom-Loving, Americans of Character

Bush’s rhetoric repeatedly draws upon the national identity shared by most of the listeners in the speech that he gave on the evening of September 11, 2001: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks . . . terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America” (Bush, 2001a). In the face of the threat of terror, “Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace” (Bush, 2001a). In these early references, Bush is identifying with his listeners. All Americans, “from every walk of life” (Bush, 2001a), were affected by
the attacks. The attacks were an assault against all Americans. Americans should be united behind the President’s plan to find terrorists and to punish them, a move that, following the rhetoric, will ensure peace for the United States. These references to our exemplify Burkean (1969b) identification.

Burke expanded upon his concept of identification in *Dramatism and Development* (1972). There, Burke (1972) notes that identification often occurs via language choices that go unnoticed by the masses, and the “prime example is the word ‘we’, as when the statement that ‘we’ are at war includes under the same head soldiers who are getting killed and spectators who hope to make a killing in war stocks” (p. 28). Bush’s references to the collective “we,” to the national identity shared by all Americans, continue in his later 9/11 addresses. However, after September 11, 2001, as early as September 12, 2001, Bush began juxtaposing the collective “we” and the more generalized “Americans,” against the “other,” terrorists. For instance, Bush (2001e) discusses how “the American people need to know [that] we’re facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. . . . The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy.” Because of their shared enemy, all Americans are involved in a war to secure their country: “We know that there is still a danger to America. So we will not relent until the terrorists who plot murder against our people are found and dealt with” (Bush, 2004f). Burke (1969b) asserts that “‘identification’ is, by the same token, through roundabout, to confront the implications of division” (p. 22). By identifying with someone, an agent is necessarily identifying against that person’s enemy. Thus, using “we,” lumping all Americans together, and showing how all Americans were affected by
the attacks of September 11th functions rhetorically to allow Bush to justify continued
war with those perceived to be plotting against Americans as all Americans are
rhetorically constructed as being at-risk.

Since all Americans were affected by the attacks, all should “respond with the
best of America” (Bush, 2001a). Some Americans already are. As Bush (2001h)
explains:

We see our national character in rescuers working past exhaustion, in long lines of
blood donors, in thousands of citizens who have asked to work and serve in any
way possible. And we have seen our national character in eloquent acts of
sacrifice. . . . In these actions and many others, Americans showed a deep sense of
commitment to one another and an abiding love for our country.

Bush (2001h) wants all Americans, all of those in the unified “we,” to sacrifice. For
Bush, “character” equates with a person sacrificing for the benefit of other Americans.

Bush wants all Americans who felt the pain of the attacks (which, as shown previously,
via the use of the collective “we,” encompasses all people who identify as Americans) to
be willing to sacrifice themselves for the betterment of the country. Rhetorically, the call
to sacrifice in the name of character may be Bush’s way of inducing the populace to
accept a loss of personal liberties for the purpose of protecting the country from terrorism
(for more on the sacrifice of liberties after 9/11, see Balz [2001a], Balz [2001b], Berke
and Elder [2001]). Americans of character should be willing to sacrifice personal
freedoms in the name of keeping other Americans safe and secure. Good Americans,
Americans of character, sacrifice their own convenience for the betterment of other
Americans, and initially, in the days following the attack, the vast majority of Americans
were willing to make this sacrifice (Balz, 2001a; Balz, 2001b; Berke & Elder, 2001).
As people of character, Americans love peace. In his September 11, 2001, address from the Oval Office, delivered only hours after the attacks, Bush (2001a) notes that, “This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace.” Once again, Bush is using the collective “Americans” (and the collective “we”) to show how all Americans share a desire for peace. Even in the face of violence, Bush is encouraging peace and unity among the populace, at least at first. Peace rhetorically becomes, somewhat ironically, one of the justifications for war. On September 14, 2001, in his speech commemorating the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, Bush (2001h) notes, “this nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others; it will end in a way and at an hour of our choosing.” The following year, as Bush was justifying his desire to go to war with Iraq, Bush (2002b) explained that the armed conflicts following the 9/11 attacks were “guarded by peace.” Indeed, according to Bush (2004f), the goal of the wars was to “bring the peace and security we all want.”

Of course, as Bush’s (2001a) above quote about peace illustrates, the President’s rhetoric links peace to justice. For the President, justice involves retribution, going to war against those responsible for the attacks. The retaliatory attack, if successful, would disempower the groups responsible for the September 11th attacks. In doing so, the retaliatory strikes would also return peace to the United States as the people once again would be able to live free from fear, in a state of peace.

In addition to being peaceful, “we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world” (Bush, 2001a). According to Bush (2001h), the terrorists
“attacked America because we are freedom’s home and defender,” and “we will not allow this enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or restricting our freedoms” (Bush, 2001f). The attacks are thus framed not only as being against all Americans, but against all America stands for. Indeed, “freedom and democracy are under attack” (Bush, 2001f). Americans, those in the unified “we,” value freedom. Americans exist as free people. Thus, even those who were not directly in the attacks suffered as the attacks tore at Americans’ sense of freedom, at Americans’ identity. Rhetorically, this identification with freedom is one of the biggest justifications that Bush offers for the War on Terror. The terrorists are working to destroy not only the lives of Americans, but Americans’ sense of freedom, their very identity as Americans. The collective “we” is intertwined with freedom, for without freedom and democracy, Americans are not themselves.

Agon: Deliberate and Evil Killings by Terrorist Enemies Committing Acts of War

Bush relies upon the generalized term “American” to refer to the collective we, which consists of all people living in the United States. According to Bush’s 9/11 rhetoric, the people living in the United States are peaceful people of character, and their very identity is intertwined with the notion of freedom. Key to each of these cluster terms is the way that they work together to build a sense of absolute good as all Americans are rhetorically constructed as having been attacked for their desire to ensure that others have the right to live their lives as they please. This characterization of absolute good Americans is juxtaposed against the terrorists, who Bush rhetorically constructs as being absolute evil, an other who killed Americans without reason or remorse.
While Americans are characterized as “civilized people” (Bush, 2001f), the terrorists are labeled as “evil” twelve times in the speeches. According to Bush (2001f), “civilized people around the world denounce the evildoers who devised and executed these terrible attacks,” and “this will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail” (Bush, 2001f). Rhetorically, the juxtaposition of good and evil helps to justify the War on Terror. The collective “we” does not want to see such evil in the future, so Americans (i.e., the collective “we”), as good and civilized people, need to take action in order to maintain civility. Important for developing a dramatic narrative, the use of labels like good and evil clearly demarcate an us/them split.

Besides labeling the attackers as “evil terrorists,” Bush develops the idea that they are evil by choosing to focus on how calculated and deliberate the attacks were. On the evening of September 11, 2001, Bush (2001a) explains that, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks.” Keeping in mind the collective “we” from the cluster analysis, through this statement Bush (2001a) is showing how all Americans and “our way of life” were attacked, and that these acts of murder were acts of “deliberate and massive cruelty” (Bush, 2001h). The evil of the terrorists in the agon is thus developed by showing a cold, calculating enemy who plots to destroy as much of the collective “we” as possible.

Rhetorically, through labeling the attacks “acts of war,” Bush (2001f) serves to reinforce the notion of the United States as a peaceful nation, a construction that I examined in the cluster analysis of this chapter. Through explaining the deliberate and evil actions of the terrorists as “acts of war,” the president puts the United States into the
role of defender/responder. The “war” is made to be entirely the fault of the attackers. The people of the United States are merely defending themselves against future evil. “They” started it, and “they,” following the rhetoric, left “us” with little choice in how to respond. In the next portion of this chapter, I use Burke’s (1969a) pentad to explore the ways in which the agent constructions change between the war in Afghanistan (where the narrative closely mirrors that of the September 11th rhetoric) and the war in Iraq (where the narrative undergoes a noticeable shift) in an effort to understand why the President lost unity with the populace.

Pentad Analysis

Beginning on September 11, 2001, Bush constructed a dramatic narrative centering on the idea that good Americans were attacked by evil others, and good Americans needed to support the proposed War on Terror in order to avoid being attacked again. As press accounts show, a large number of people identified with the President and with his rhetorical construction of the events of September 11, 2001. Moreover, a large number of Americans also identified with the President as he entered the US into a war in Afghanistan. However, in order to better understand both why much of the populace was unified with the President during the Afghanistan war and why many people failed to identify with the President in the Iraq war, I offer a closer comparative analysis of the narratives of the Afghanistan war rhetoric and the Iraq war rhetoric, focusing on the shifting roles of American agents and the unchanging role of the enemy others. Any discussion of agent will be enhanced by Burke’s (1969a) pentad. I discuss the pentad in the following order: Act/Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose. I conclude by
offering some remarks on the President’s construction of a moral persona and how he constitutes (or fails to constitute) a moral community in his War on Terror rhetoric.

Scene and Act: A Shifting Relationship

For Burke (1969a), scene refers to “the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred” (p. xv). The scene is the context in which an act occurs, and, although it may not be featured in the rhetoric, it is always present (Burke, 1973). For Burke (1969a), the act refers to “what took place in thought or deed” (Burke, 1969a, p. xv). Burke (1969a, 1984) discussed the interplay between scene and act through his action/motion dichotomy. Basically, agents can either act (“action”) or be acted upon (“motion”).

The action/motion dichotomy and its relationship to scene and act has been explored by Burkean scholars. As Ling (1970) and Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (2005) found, a focus on scene can absolve an agent of guilt by reducing action to motion. A scenic focus makes what is happening to the actor the result of outside forces over which the person has no control. He/she is simply being acted upon, and there is nothing that she or he can do about it.

The relationship between a scenic focus and an act focus discussed by Ling (1970) and Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (2005) is particularly clear in Bush’s War on Terror speeches. I have placed the act and the scene together in order to illustrate a possible reason that Bush lost the public’s support as he entered the country into a war with Iraq. In keeping with the rhetorical drama, there are two sets of acts and two scenes
discussed, one for the American side and one for the rhetorically constructed enemy side. I discuss each in turn.

*The American Homeland: A Place to Preserve, A Place to Inhabit*

Since all Americans in the collective “we” were affected by the September 11th attacks, every person in the collective “we” is an active agent who can help to rebuild the country. As I will show throughout the remainder of this chapter, American civilians are only active agents in the Afghanistan speeches, so the actions that the people can undertake are only discussed in the Afghanistan texts. In the Afghanistan speeches, the President explains how American civilians can help to rebuild the United States:

> All of us can become a September the 11th volunteer by making a commitment to service in our own communities. So you can serve your country by tutoring or mentoring a child, comforting the afflicted, housing those in need of shelter and a home. You can participate in your Neighborhood Watch or Crime Stoppers. You can become a volunteer in a hospital, emergency medical, fire or rescue unit. . . . Americans have a lot to offer, so I’ve created a task force to develop additional ways people can get directly involved in this war effort, by making our homes and neighborhoods and schools and workplaces safer. And I call on all Americans to serve by bettering our communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists. (Bush, 2001e)

Rhetorically, the President’s rhetoric builds the idea that through small actions like “tutoring or mentoring a child” (Bush, 2001e), the people are helping to rebuild the United States and are doing their part to help with the war effort. Through being consubstantial with the President, the people, like their leader, are doing everything possible to help rebuild the country. In the President’s Afghanistan war narrative, every person can take an active part in restoring America to what it was on September 10, 2001. Through their “compassion” (Bush, 2001e), American civilians are given a way to join the fight for their country. While the military is over in Afghanistan engaging in combat
to preserve freedom, people in the United States are “renewing and reclaiming our strong American values” (Bush, 2001e) through their selfless acts, which shows that sacrificing of oneself for the betterment of the country is, for Bush, an American value. Since all American agents were affected by the attacks, all American agents can take part in the effort to rebuild the country after the attacks. Through their selfless actions, the people are able to regain some of the feelings of confidence and control that they lost on September 11th.

While the President encourages all Americans to “become a September the 11th volunteer” (Bush, 2001e) in the Afghanistan speeches, American citizens are hardly given any overt opportunity to act in the Iraq speeches. In fact, the people as active agents are only mentioned in a couple of places, and only in the first of the two addresses. Bush (2002a) points out how, “Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about the nature of the threat; about the urgency of action—why be concerned now; about the link between Iraq developing weapons of terror, and the wider war on terror. . . . Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to confront it now?” In other words, the only action ascribed to civilian Americans is that of asking the President why war is necessary. Through phrasing opposition as questions, the President is able to be positioned as the all-knowing agent, as it is the President who can provide the answers. Obviously, if the people are rhetorically constructed as being ignorant and the President is rhetorically constructed as having the answers that the populace does not, there is a loss of consubstantiality between Bush and the people.
In keeping with the consubstantiality shift explained above, the President and the military with which he is consubstantial in the Iraq war speeches are quite active in the rhetoric, so active in fact that the President and the military act on behalf of American civilians who are not given opportunities to act on their own accord. Bush (2002a) and the US military “will act with allies at our side, and we will prevail. . . . We will secure our nation, protect our freedom, and help others to find freedom of their own. . . . [Both are] committed to defending the international security that protects the lives of both our citizens and theirs.” Bush and the US military are thus rhetorically constructed as being the only ones who can keep the United States safe from another 9/11 attack. Moreover, Bush (2003) is the ultimate active/powerful agent. For though the military is working to keep America safe, Bush (2003) explains how it is “On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war.” Bush ultimately controls the military, the same military that is singlehandedly keeping America safe. Contrary to the Afghanistan speeches, the American people are not ascribed any sort of action that they can undertake to help rebuild and secure the United States.

In fact, American civilians are reduced merely to part of the American scene. The President dedicates his Iraq speeches to explaining how Iraq is a continued threat to the safety and security of the United States:

We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy—the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. . . . And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could
allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints. (Bush, 2002a)

Importantly, the focus is on the United States’ land, not necessarily on the people who inhabit that land. The President mentions “the terrorist attacks on America,” how “the Iraqi regime [could] attack America” (Bush, 2003 [italics added]). These references do not focus on Americans, but rather on America. In other words, the focus is on the scene of American land rather than on American people/agents. It may be because of this scenic focus that the people of the United States are not given the chance to act on their own behalf. Rather, they are part of the American scene that was attacked on September 11th, and they are a part of the American scene that is vulnerable to future attack if Saddam Hussein is not stopped. The people can only wait to either be attacked or to have the US military act on their behalf.

The loss of the ability to act could definitely account for why so many people were not unified with the President in the Iraq war speeches. The people are stripped of their ability to heal their 9/11 wounds through taking an active part in the rebuilding and protecting effort, reduced to a vulnerable scene that would most certainly suffer another attack if not for the actions of the military and the President with whom the military is rhetorically consubstantial.

*The Enemy Bases: A Place of Plotting and Planning*

While Bush’s descriptions of America and Americans shifts from an act focus in the Afghanistan speeches to a scenic focus in the Iraq speeches, the rhetoric for the enemy others has a strong act focus throughout. Bush (2002a) explains how the terrorists in Afghanistan are working to “train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans” to “kill
all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians” and to “destroy our freedom and impose its views.” Common to all of these descriptions of the enemy other in Afghanistan is the idea of actively plotting to attack the United States. The very activeness of the evil other, in fact, is what is driving the President to make the most dramatic act of the speeches, that of going to war. Following the rhetoric, the other in Afghanistan is actively working to destroy the United States, so the United States needs to act in response.

Like the terrorists-harboring Taliban in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein is rhetorically constructed as being actively working to destroy the United States. Following Bush (2002a), “Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon. . . . Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists,” which should be easy, given that “Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction” (Bush, 2002a). Saddam Hussein is thus rhetorically constructed to be actively stockpiling weapons of mass destruction to give to terrorists, terrorists who would then use them to destroy the United States. Much like with the discussion of the terrorists in Afghanistan, the rhetoric about Saddam Hussein focuses on an actively plotting agent. The focus is on the act and on the potential to act. And, once again, the rhetoric unfolds by showing that the possibility of the enemy’s act necessitates that the United States undertaking the dramatic act of going to war.
In keeping with Burke’s (1969a) pentad, the enemy others’ scene is present, though, importantly, it is not featured in any of the rhetoric about the enemy other. The scene of the other is merely the backdrop for the actions described above, evidenced by the fact that, in Bush’s (2001e) claim that “This is a different war from any our nation has ever faced, a war on many fronts, against terrorists who operate in more than 60 different countries.” The focus in all of the speeches remains on the acts that the others have done and are planning, not on the places in which they are planning. The President chooses to focus on only two of the “60 different countries” because the focus is not on the countries per se but rather on the terrorist activities going on inside of them.

The President’s shifting focus as he discusses the United States does not have a corresponding shift as he explains the enemy others and their scene. And this shift may help to account for why so many Americans who identified with Bush in the Afghanistan conflict no longer felt consubstantial with the President during the Iraq conflict. Recall that the people of the United States go from being agents who can act by “becom[ing] a September the 11th volunteer” (Bush, 2001e) in the Afghanistan speeches to the victim-in-waiting in need of military protection in the Iraq speeches. In Burkean terms, they are reduced from active agents to part of the scene. However, the enemy agents are not rhetorically constructed as experiencing a similar loss in their ability to act. In both the Afghanistan speeches and the Iraq speeches, the enemy others are rhetorically constructed to be actively plotting another attack on the United States. And yet, American civilians in the Iraq speeches are not left with a way to work towards ensuring
the future survival of themselves and their country, which could account for part of the reason that Bush lost consubstantiality with his populace.

Agent

For Burke (1969a), agent refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed the act” (p. xv). In keeping with Burke’s (1973) requirements for a rhetorical drama, there are two sets of agents in these speeches, American agents and enemy agents, and I discuss each one in turn. However, unlike the other chapters in this dissertation, the status of Bush-as-agent shifts dramatically. In the Afghanistan speeches, the President is consubstantial with the populace, but in the Iraq speeches the President is consubstantial with the military. This shift is addressed as it relates to the President’s faltering identification with the populace and as it relates to the agent status of the enemy other.

Bush’s Shifting Agent Status and the Resulting (Dis)Identification with the American Public

Bush’s Afghanistan rhetoric makes the President consubstantial with Americans. The President explains how “as we have learned, so suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror” (Bush, 2001b), for “We have endured the shock of watching so many innocent lives ended in acts of unimaginable horror. We have endured the sadness of so many funerals” (Bush, 2001e). Like the rest of the people living in the United States, the President was directly affected by the attacks of September 11th. The President is thus consubstantial with Americans, and the consubstantiality is built through the references to the 9/11 attacks. The President’s identification with the American populace is reinforced through the President’s
references to the collective “we.” From the above quotes, it is clear that “we” suffered a terror attack, that “we” saw many innocent people die, that “we” had to go to many funerals for terror victims. The collective “we” rhetorically shows that the President is identifying with all Americans, for all Americans, Bush included, comprise the collective “we.”

Keep in mind that, for Burke (1969a), agent also encompasses the “kind of person [who] performed the act” (p. xv). All of the collective “we,” Bush included, are rhetorically constructed as being people of “character.” Bush (2001c) explains how after the 9/11 attacks, Americans became “awakened to service, and citizenship, and compassion.” For example,

Financial donations to the victims’ families have reached more than a billion dollars. Countless Americans gave blood in the aftermath of the attacks. New Yorkers opened their homes to evacuated neighbors. . . . Children across America have organized lemonade and cookie sales for children in Afghanistan. . . . Our children have sent in more than $1 million for the children of Afghanistan. (Bush, 2001e)

The American populace is thus comprised of good, caring people, people who are sacrificing their money, their time, even their blood to help the United States rebound from the attacks. Everyone in the United States can do something to help America rebuild. Like the citizens described above, members of the military are also developed as sacrificing of themselves to better the country: “We ask a lot of those who wear our uniform. We ask them to leave their loved ones, to travel great distances, to risk injury, even to be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives” (Bush, 2001b).

Importantly, this idea of good and innocent Americans working together to rebuild the country continues the narrative that the President constructed in the days following the
9/11 attacks. Good Americans were victimized, but they are going to work together, with their President, to overcome the adversity that was thrust at them by the enemy.

While Bush is consubstantial with all Americans in the Afghanistan speeches, there is a dramatic shift in Bush’s agent status in the Iraq speeches. The President focuses his rhetoric on the United States military as the active agent. Bush (2002a) explains, “Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are different faces of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both. And the United States military is capable of confronting both.” In other words, while the country is still, in keeping with the narrative, in great danger from “terror cells,” the ability to deal with the threat is now isolated to the US military. In fact, the American public, so important in the earlier War on Terror narrative, is nearly absent in the Iraq war rhetoric. It is the military that is in “the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger” (Bush, 2003). In other words, military agents are protecting the country from “terrorism” and helping to continue the rebuilding effort.

Furthermore, in the Iraq war rhetoric, the President is consubstantial with the US military. Bush (2002a) discusses how “We will plan carefully; we will act with the full power of the United States military; we will act with allies at our side, and we will prevail.” We does not refer to all Americans, but to the we that is undertaking the military action in Iraq, that is, American and coalition military forces and the President who authorized the military action. While Bush is still part of a consubstantial “we,” the “we” now refers to the military. Via the “we will act with allies at our side” (Bush,
2002a), Bush rhetorically constructs himself as being a part of the military action. Importantly, both the US military and the President are rhetorically constructed as the good and powerful agents who are working to ensure that the country remains safe from terrorism. The members of the military are people of “skill and bravery” who are of “honorable and decent spirit” (Bush, 2003). By virtue of being consubstantial with them, the President rhetorically becomes brave and decent and willing to sacrifice as well. Moreover, the military (and, by extension, the President who is consubstantial with it), is constructed as the absolute good, as the one who “the peace of a troubled world and the hopes of an oppressed people now depend on” (Bush, 2003).

However, the citizens of the United States, the same citizens who were made consubstantial with the President and his effort to rebuild the US in the Afghanistan speeches, are excluded as active agents from the rhetoric. In fact, the only time that the civilian citizens of the United States are addressed is when the President (2003) explains how “I want Americans and all the world to know” about the threat and the military effort in Iraq (Bush, 2002a). The American populace is thus nearly put into the role of the ignorant agent, the agent that needs to be informed by a wiser, more powerful agent. The people of the United States are given no other task than to listen to the President to learn what is really going on in Iraq.

Bush, without being consubstantial with any other agent, sets himself into the role of the knowledgeable and powerful agent. At times Bush breaks away from his consubstantiality with the military and rhetorically places himself as the most powerful agent, for it is “On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of
military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war” (Bush, 2003). Following the rhetoric, while the military is considered to be good and willing to sacrifice for the betterment of the country, it is President Bush who is ultimately in charge of the military as he is the only one who can order them to war.

Through shifting from being consubstantial with the masses to being consubstantial with (and even in charge of) the military, the President changes the entire narrative of the War on Terror. The collective “we” created in the dramatic narrative Bush spoke in the days following 9/11 and carried through the Afghanistan manifestation of the War on Terror emphasized that every person living in the United States was affected by the 9/11 attacks, so everyone can (and should) do something to help with the rebuilding effort, as helping is what “compassionate” Americans of “character” do (Bush, 2001e). Through focusing on the shared pain that all Americans felt and the shared ability that all Americans have to rebuild the country, the President’s narrative creates a community that is vulnerable to terrorism yet resilient in the face of a continued threat, a narrative that empowers Americans to continue enacting American values of sacrifice and character. This narrative of empowerment begins in the days following the attacks and continues throughout the Afghanistan war. However, the narrative shifts with the commencement of the war in Iraq. Through focusing on the military and his role as Commander-in-Chief, the President changes the agent roles in his narrative. The people of the United States are no longer included as active agents in the rhetoric. This shift in agent status alone may help to account for why Bush lost support between Iraq and
Afghanistan, but, through an examination of the unwavering other/enemy agent status, the loss of agent status experienced by most Americans becomes even more profound.

*Dangerous Others’ Unchanging Agent Status*

While the agent status of American citizens changes from the Afghanistan speeches to the Iraq ones, the President’s description of the enemy agents does not change. In discussing the Taliban in Afghanistan, the President explains how the terrorists in Afghanistan “have threatened other acts of terror” (Bush, 2001b). Similarly, in explaining Saddam Hussein, Bush states “Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism. . . . Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints” (Bush, 2002a). In both sets of texts, then, the enemy agents are rhetorically constructed to be dangerous, and if they are not stopped, they will engage in “other acts of terror” (Bush, 2001b), possibly through the use of “a biological or chemical weapon” (Bush, 2002a). In all four speeches, the enemy agents are rhetorically constructed as having killed Americans and as plotting to kill many more.

Moreover, the enemy others are rhetorically constructed as, to use Bush’s (2001e, 2002a, 2003) word, “evil.” To illustrate the evil of the enemy others, the President explains how they disregard and destroy not only the lives of Americans, but also the lives of people living in their own country. Under Taliban rule, there are “starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan” (Bush, 2001b) who live in constant fear of leaders who “target innocent civilians,” leaders “who celebrate the
murder of innocent men, women, and children” (Bush, 2001e). The Afghan leaders are rhetorically constructed as barbarians who gleam joy from torturing children and cause suffering for most people living in the country. Likewise, in Iraq, “On Saddam Hussein's orders, opponents have been decapitated, wives and mothers of political opponents have been systematically raped as a method of intimidation, and political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured” (Bush, 2002a), and Saddam Hussein has “attempt[ed] to use innocent men, women and children as shields for his own military” (Bush, 2003). Like the Afghanistan leaders, Saddam Hussein is rhetorically constructed as a callous leader who tortures and murders innocent children to assert his own dominance. In both the Afghanistan and Iraq speeches, then, the enemy others are rhetorically constructed as evil others who torture and kill their own people even as they plan how to torture and kill Americans. They have, in Bush’s (2001e) terms, no respect for life.

In discussing the tortured others, Bush makes American citizens rhetorically consubstantial with the Afghani and Iraqi citizens. Like the citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq, the people of the United States have suffered extreme loss at the hands of the uncivilized leaders and their weapons of violence. Basically, in a war built on the idea of protecting the United States from future attack, the people within those countries are made to be victims much like the people living in the United States. The consubstantiality with the people of Afghanistan and Iraq reinforces the President’s claim that “The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and we are the friends of almost a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001b), and,
specifically, “America is a friend to the people of Iraq” (Bush, 2002a). The war is not against the people in the country, and they are not the active agents in the texts. They are, as was explained in the previous section, part of the scene on which the war is being fought. Importantly, as was discussed in the scene section of this paper, in the Iraqi texts, the American people are, like their consubstantial Iraqi counterparts, reduced to being part of the scene. American citizens, Afghanistan citizens, and Iraqi citizens have all suffered at the hands of the enemy others, and war is the only way that any of them can avoid attack from the enemy others in the future.

What is particularly striking about the nemeses’ agent status is that it does not change at all from the Afghanistan speeches to the Iraq ones, even as the American people’s agent status shifts dramatically. As I showed, the American people were rendered less active agents in the Iraq speeches. Consequently, the narrative should show a similar shift in the nemeses’ agent status. As it stands, the rhetoric leaves the masses in the United States with very little ability to act (and thus very little agent status), but the rhetorically constructed evil others are still as powerful and as cunning as they were on September 11, 2001. Lay citizens of the United States are thus still rhetorically constructed as being at risk from the “evil” others, but the citizens can do very little to ensure their own safety. This rhetorical shift, from active agent protecting the US to passive citizen protected by the military, could account for one reason that Bush lost unity with the American populace between the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
Agency

According to Burke (1969a), agency refers to “the means or instruments” (Burke, 1969a, p. xv) used to carry out an act. In keeping with Burke’s (1973) requirements for a rhetorical drama, Bush and the enemy others both rely upon agency, though the fact that the enemy others’ agency does not change could account for some of the public’s waning identification with the President and his policies. To better explain how, I begin by describing Bush’s agency and the US populace’s agency, and then I detail the unchanging agency ascribed to the enemy others.

*Bush’s Agency: Official Authority and American Values*

In order to justify his decision to go to war in Afghanistan, the President relies upon his official authority. In the first sentence of his “Address to the Nation on Initial Military Operations in Afghanistan,” Bush (2001b) tells his American audience, “On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.” It is only on order from the President that the military is able to act. In other words, the President relies upon his official authority to declare and justify the war. Bush (2001b) continues, “At my request, many governors have activated the National Guard to strengthen airport security.” The President’s authority allows him to tell the governors how states can work to keep the country safe. Bush’s official authority is really what gives him the ability to act and the right to be heeded by state governments and the US military. Moreover, Bush’s official authority allows him to serve as a leader to the people at a time when they all need to come together. It is Bush (2001e), via his position as President, who is able to
“create a task force to develop additional ways people can get directly involved in this war effort, by making our homes and neighborhoods and schools and workplaces safer.”

The President’s official authority allows him to create outlets to bond Americans together in the common cause of defeating terrorism in the days following the 9/11 attacks through the war in Afghanistan.

The people are empowered through the President and his official authority in the Afghanistan speeches. As active agents in their own right, American civilians also have agency in the Afghanistan rhetoric. Specifically, Bush (2001e) tells Americans:

One way to defeat terrorism is to show the world the true values of America through the gathering momentum of a million acts of responsibility and decency and service. . . . And I call on all Americans to serve by bettering our communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists. Our great nation—national challenge is to hunt down the terrorists and strengthen our protection against future attacks. Our great national opportunity is to preserve forever the good that has resulted. Through this tragedy, we are renewing and reclaiming our strong American values.

Thus, Americans can work to overcome terrorism through enacting American values, making values the agency by which every American can do his/her part to beat the terrorists. It is through “American values” that Americans can undertake the acts of volunteerism and sacrifice described in the act section above.

Bush’s agency does not change in the Iraq war speeches. It is still “On my orders” that “coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war” (Bush, 2003a). Much like in the Afghanistan speeches, Bush’s official authority, granted to him through his position of President of the United States, is the means by which he is able to order a military action
against Iraq. Moreover, it is because of his position as President that Bush is able to inform the American populace that

I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace, and America’s determination to lead the world in confronting that threat. The threat comes from Iraq. . . . Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about the nature of the threat; about the urgency of action—why be concerned now; about the link between Iraq developing weapons of terror, and the wider war on terror. These are all issues we’ve discussed broadly and fully within my administration. And tonight, I want to share those discussions with you. (Bush, 2002a)

Through his office, the President is able to be more knowledgeable about the situation in Iraq than lay citizens. It is through his position as President that Bush is able to not only know the “truth” about what is going on in Iraq, but also why he is in a position to enlighten American civilians about the threat and his chosen course of action. Without his official role, Bush would not be privy to such information or be in a position to share his knowledge with the masses. Bush’s official authority is thus the means by which the President knows about the threat and shares it with the masses, making it a form of agency.

Interestingly, the focus on American values as a way to combat terrorism does not appear in the Iraq speeches, so the only agency left to American civilians is taken away. Of course, since the people are reduced to part of the scene and stripped of their right to act in the Iraq speeches (discussed in the act/scene section above), the absence of an agency for them makes sense. After all, for Burke (1969a), agency refers to the means used to carry out an act. Thus, lacking an ability to act, the people simultaneously lose any agency.
While Bush’s authority is legitimate, granted to him by the people of the United States, the enemies are rhetorically constructed as not having legitimate authority in their countries. In discussing the Taliban in Afghanistan, Bush (2001b) asserts that,

I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific demands: Close terrorist training camps. Hand over leaders of the Al Qaeda network. And return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your country. None of these demands was met. And now, the Taliban will pay a price. By destroying camps and disrupting communications, we will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans.

The Taliban in Afghanistan is not given any sort of recognition as a legitimate authority. Rather, the President discusses the Taliban as merely a part of the “Al Qaeda network” that presumably attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. The ruling group in Afghanistan is rhetorically constructed as an illegitimate leader, one that is offering no contribution to the world stage, serving instead as a training ground for terrorists who want to plan and carry out another terrorist attack against sovereign nations. The Taliban is discussed as more of a terrorism-enabler than a legitimate governing authority. It is through this illegitimate authority that the Taliban is able to provide “terrorist training camps” on which the terrorists are (allegedly) planning future attacks (acts discussed in the act/scene section of this chapter).

Similarly, Bush (2002a) discusses how Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein “has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world.” Unlike the U.N. and the “civilized world” that it

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13 Perhaps because of the events of September 11th, the 2000 election fiasco was no longer in the headlines. Some may claim that Bush was falsely relying upon legitimate authority, but Bush builds his rhetoric around the idea that, unlike his adversaries, his authority is legitimate and official.
recognizes, Saddam Hussein is rhetorically constructed as a leader who is not recognized by a legitimate authority like the U.N.\textsuperscript{14} Lacking such recognition puts Saddam Hussein’s Iraq into a category opposite that of the “civilized world,” a compilation of nations where the leaders meet with the U.N. to decide how to proceed rather than meeting with “Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he [Saddam Hussein] calls his ‘nuclear mujahedeen’ -- his nuclear holy warriors” (Bush, 2002a). Basically, unlike Bush and the rest of the “civilized world,” which rely upon U.N. sanctions and recognized channels for dealing with conflict, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein relies upon a group that, to the masses in the US who do not speak any Arabic, sounds very similar to the name of the terrorist-linked “jihad.” Of course, as a rhetorically constructed illegitimate authority, Saddam Hussein really does not have any recognizable group from which to seek assistance as the recognizable groups, like the U.N. and other bodies representing the “civilized world,” have turned their backs on him.

Both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq are using their (rhetorically constructed) illegitimate authority to torture and murder their own people and to threaten the United States. Because of the Taliban, the masses in Afghanistan are “starving and suffering . . . oppressed” (Bush, 2001b) by leaders who have instituted policy that makes “free expression grounds for execution” (Bush, 2001e). Likewise, in Iraq, “On Saddam Hussein’s orders, opponents have been decapitated . . . political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured” (Bush, 2002a).

\textsuperscript{14}Ironically, Bush himself went against U.N. suggestions when he decided to enter into a war with Iraq. The U.N. wanted to try additional sanctions against the country before entering into an armed conflict (Bruni, 2002). In other words, Bush’s construction of events begins to unravel even as he utters them, for Bush himself is operating without the sort of legitimating U.N. approval that he chastises Saddam Hussein for lacking.
And the enemy others who are using torture in their own countries to maintain their power have now focused their aggression on the United States. As Bush (2002a) explains, “Our enemies have threatened other acts of terror” (Bush, 2001e), and, more specifically, “Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction.” Through continuing threats of torture and murder, the enemy others are trying “to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat” (Bush, 2001a).

Torture and murder, or “evil,” thus become the means by which the enemy others remain a constant threat to the United States and keep the masses in line in their own countries, thus making torture and murder their agency. In keeping with the dramatic narrative, the rhetorically constructed evil of the enemy others, others who use torture and murder to accomplish their goal of dominating their own people and the world, stands in stark contrast to the rhetorically constructed good of the Americans, who are using their “American” values of sacrifice and character to combat terror.

Overall, Bush’s discussion of the Taliban regime does follow his 9/11 narrative. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a murderous regime that actively supported terrorism (Frank & Rehman, 2003; Neamatollah, 2002). The Taliban was not an officially recognized governing body, for it was not granted formal recognition on the world stage (Frank & Rehman, 2003; Neamatollah, 2002), and no one perceived the Taliban to be a legitimate governing body. The President’s War on Terror narrative thus began by constructing an enemy who had no autonomous connection to any country. It is possible that people really identified with the idea of an isolated other, an enemy that
does not have a government agency to fall back on, an enemy totally disengaged from society. The other constructed in the 9/11 rhetoric and the Afghanistan rhetoric was an unstable and illegitimate other who did not have any formal authority in the countries that it was inhabiting (like Afghanistan) or trying to destroy (like the United States).

The idea of an enemy who is gaining control through illicit means, without any sort of formal authority, thus grounds the President’s War on Terror narrative. However, the narrative may have shown a fissure as the War on Iraq neared. While Saddam Hussein was certainly not the leader most Americans (or probably most Iraqis for that matter) would choose, he was, by Iraqi standards and by the Arab League’s standards (Arab League, 2009), a legitimate leader. Saddam Hussein was widely regarded as the leader of Iraq, and he had held such a post for 24 years (MacFarhquar, 2006). Hence, another possible reason for the loss of public identification with the President as the Iraq war neared could have come from the fact that the narrative centering around a controlling enemy who lacked official authority, a narrative that began in the days following the September 11th attacks, simply did not hold up in the case of Iraq.

Purpose

For Burke (1969a), purpose refers to why an action is undertaken, and for Charland (1987), the audience is actively constituted through the rhetoric, and through the constitutive rhetoric the people form a collective identity. This constitution of a collective identity (or furtherance of a certain ideology) can be read as a purpose of the rhetoric. In Bush’s War on Terror rhetoric, the purpose of the rhetoric shifts from the
Afghanistan addresses to the Iraq addresses, but the purpose of the enemy agents does not change.

_Bush’s Shifting Purpose: From Empowering the Masses to Furthering a Militaristic Conservative Ideology_

As explained in the cluster portion of this chapter, Bush’s rhetoric shows how all Americans were affected by the 9/11 attacks. Consequently, as I explained in the agent and act portions of this chapter, since all were affected, all can help with the rebuilding of America and the fight against terrorism. Bush (2001e) explains how, “I call on all Americans to serve by bettering our communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists. . . . All of us can become a September the 11th volunteer by making a commitment to service in our own communities.” In giving the people a way to help with the War on Terror, the President empowers the people. American citizens are given the chance to help with a war effort that is rhetorically constructed as being the only way that Americans can once again experience “the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear” (Bush, 2001e). In other words, every American can do something to ensure that s/he is not the victim of another terrorist attack. The ability to live “free from fear” was stripped away from Americans on the morning of September 11, 2001, but in the Afghanistan speeches, the President provides a way for the people to regain their sense of safety through helping with the War on Terror. Empowering the masses to become more involved in their communities and to work together to overcome the tragedy of September 11, 2001 is the purpose of the Afghanistan war rhetoric.
The empowerment of the masses is not the purpose of the Iraq addresses. As explained in the scene and agent portions of this chapter, American civilians are not granted agent status as they are not given the ability to act. Rather, they are reduced to part of the vulnerable scene. The rhetorically constructed vulnerability of the American scene is crucial to understanding Bush’s purpose in the Iraq war speeches. Bush (2003) wants “military operations to disarm Iraq.” Basically, Bush does not want Saddam Hussein to have the ability to build weapons that could in turn be used against the United States. The President’s purpose in the Iraq war speeches can thus be interpreted as promoting a militaristic conservative ideology. As Diamond (1995) explains, conservatives have, historically, relied upon a show of military force to combat perceived threats to national security and to assert the correctness of their own way of life. Conservatives believe that armed conflict can keep the country safe from those perceived to be a threat (the most prevalent example prior to Bush’s administration was the communism threat, against which America troops were sent into countries to fight those whose political framework did not align with the USA). To tie this ideology back to the war with Iraq, Iraq was not responsible for September 11th. However, following the rhetoric, the country did present a threat to the United States. This “they could attack us so let’s attack them first” logic has been a hallmark of militaristic conservatism (Diamond, 1995). By using the same sort of framework to justify the US-led invasion of Iraq, Bush is reinforcing and furthering the ideology. Importantly, in a militaristic conservative ideological narrative, the masses are left out of the decision making process, acted on behalf of rather than acting on their own accord (which again puts Bush right in
line with the militaristic conservative ideology, for, as I explained in the agent and scene section above, American civilians are stripped of their right to overtly act and, as a result, their agent status).

Thus, if people identified with the President and his original War on Terror narrative, then the overall shift in the purpose of the Iraq war rhetoric could have led to disunity between American civilians and the President. The idea that the War on Terror is a community effort, something with which all Americans can help, and, in the process of helping, regain some of the security lost on the morning of September 11, 2001, is completely negated in the Iraq war speeches as American civilians are reduced to ignorant non-agents who merely need to be informed by the all-knowing President and agree with his war.

The decision to attack an autonomous country (see previous section) who had not attacked the United States first completely disrupts the initial War on Terror narrative that the President constructed in the days following the 9/11 attacks. While the initial narrative focused on a retaliatory strike “against terrorists who operate in more than 60 different countries” (Bush, 2001b), the President’s Iraq war narrative focuses instead on attacking one country who may attack the United States at some point. In other words, the narrative undergoes a dramatic shift that puts the United States into the role of the aggressor rather than the defender. It may be that many Americans who had identified with the defender role simply could not identify with the aggressor role that the new Iraq war narrative brought with it.
Enemy Other’s Unchanging Purpose: Assert Ideological Superiority through Violence

In discussing both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the rhetorically constructed purpose of the enemy other is the same. Bush (2001b) explains how in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan,

the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care, or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution. We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims.

Likewise, “Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. . . . [Now] Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. . . . [and] that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America” (Bush, 2002a). In each of these enemy agent constructions, the purpose of the enemy other is the same. Each wants to assert the ideological superiority of their own belief system, and each of the enemy others is willing to “kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians” (Bush, 2001e) to further their ideology worldwide. And the violence for noncompliance is not limited to the United States and US allies. The Taliban in Afghanistan are leaving the people “oppressed” (Bush, 2001b). Likewise, in Iraq, “opponents have been decapitated” (Bush, 2002a). People everywhere, both in the enemy other countries and abroad, are expected to adhere to the regulations put in place by the Taliban and by Saddam Hussein or face the deadly consequences. The enemy other believes that their ideology is so superior that it is worth killing for.

What is perhaps the most shocking about Bush’s shift to a militaristic conservative ideology is that it nearly mirrors the rhetorically-constructed purpose of the
enemy others. Bush’s rhetoric develops the idea that the enemies’ purpose is to establish the superiority of their own beliefs. However, upon analysis, it becomes clear that Bush’s purpose in Iraq is very similar. Bush (2003) is sending troops into Iraq “to disarm Saddam” and to “help Iraqis achieve a united, stable, and free country,” similar to the rhetorically constructed freedom that people living in the United States enjoy, democracy. In other words, Bush’s form of government (democracy) is so superior that he is relying upon war /violence in order to establish it in Iraq. And, as discussed above, the President, much like the enemy others, does not care if the masses do not agree with his decision. Thus, the narrative that Bush builds in the days following September 11th and continues through the Afghanistan addresses crumbles so badly towards the end of the Iraq addresses that the rhetorically constructed hero and the rhetorically constructed villain are depicted as being involved in the same act of plotting against an autonomous country, and they are doing so with the same goal of asserting the superiority of their own belief system. This dramatic change in the narrative, and the unflattering light in which it casts President George W. Bush, could help to account why much of populace no longer identified with the President.

Conclusion

In the days and months following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the majority of the people in the United States identified with the President and his policies. This identification may come from the narrative that Bush created on the evening of September 11, 2001. In that narrative, all Americans were affected by the attacks, and all were doing their respective part to help the country rebuild. Americans were
rhetorically constructed as being dramatically different from the attackers. While the attackers’ hate fueled their violent acts that resulted in “thousands of lives [being] suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror” (Bush, 2001a), Americans “responded with the best of America. With the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could” (Bush, 2001a). Basically, Americans responded to the terror attacks by enacting the American value of compassion for others. The initial 9/11 narrative thus focused on how all Americans could enact American values to defeat terrorism.

The narrative of American civilians enacting American values to defeat terrorism continued as the President discussed the war in Afghanistan. The President’s rhetorical narrative maintained that all Americans were affected by the attacks, and all could do something to help with the rebuilding effort, all could “become a September the 11th volunteer” (Bush, 2001b). Thus, in Burkean (1969a) terms, every American was an agent with the ability to act. In fact, it was through overt acts that the people could, following the rhetoric, help with the war effort and regain some of the feelings of safety that were threatened on September 11th. The fact that the war in Afghanistan narrative so closely mirrors the September 11th narrative cannot be overlooked, for in both of these sets of texts, the people identified with the President and his policies.

The President’s faltering identification with the public as the Iraq war began was the focus of this chapter. The people are not accorded the ability to overtly act in either of the Iraq war speeches. As a result, they are stripped of their agent status. The President places American civilians into the role of the ignorant other, the other that the
President needs to enlighten about the situation in Iraq. American civilians merely become part of the scene that is vulnerable to attack from Saddam Hussein and others consubstantial with terrorism. This dramatic shift in the narrative, a shift that serves to disempower the masses, leaves the people with no way to actively pursue their own continued survival, and could help to explain why fewer people identified with the President during the war with Iraq. The people are rhetorically constructed as being entirely reliant upon Bush and the US military, and there is nothing that they can do at home to help with the ongoing war effort. There is no discussion of a role for the former “September the 11th volunteers” (Bush, 2001b).

Thus, in response to the main question guiding this chapter, I believe that Bush’s shifting discussion of Americans as active agents helps to account for why so many people who identified with the President during the Afghanistan war failed to identify with him during the Iraq war. The terrorists had already left the masses feeling disempowered and vulnerable, and in the Iraq war, Bush reaffirmed this position. The people are vulnerable and there is nothing that they can do about it but rely upon the military. It is not terribly surprising that the masses no longer identified with a leader who was rhetorically placing them in the same position that they had been in on the morning of September 11, 2001.

I asked two other questions designed to help tie this chapter to the dissertation: What moral persona does Bush construct in his War on Terror addresses? Does he constitute a moral community to follow him? As may be apparent by this point, the answers to those questions vary from the Afghanistan speeches to the Iraq ones. In
Afghanistan, Bush’s moral persona is more utilitarian (see Mill, 2009). Following the rhetoric, not only will the war in Afghanistan help to ensure the future safety of Americans, it will also give much needed food, monetary aid, and medical assistance to the people of Afghanistan. The terrorists and the Taliban who harbor them will, if the war effort is successful, die or be permanently detained, but innocent people in the United States, in other coalition countries, and in Afghanistan will benefit. Following the rhetoric, the masses will be able to live a life free from the fear of terror, even if terrorists have to die in the process. The war is thus rhetorically constructed as being good for the vast majority of people, and in utilitarian ethics, an ethical act is one that ensures the greatest good for the greatest number of people (Mill, 2009).

The President’s framing of the war in Afghanistan as a communal effort allows him to construct a moral community to follow him. Following the utilitarian moral persona that Bush develops (discussed above), American citizens are some of the people who will reap the greater good if the war is successful. Moreover, Americans can help with the war effort, which means that they can help to ensure that themselves and others reap the greater good. All Americans can enact the American value of sacrificing for the greater good of the country. In this case, the President explains how Americans can sacrifice time and money to help with the war effort and to send aid to Afghanistan. It is through recognizing Americans as agents and giving them overt acts to help with the moral effort that the President constructs a moral community to follow him into the Afghanistan war. The people are united with the President as all Americans are rhetorically constructed as working together for the common, greater good. Together, the
President and the American populace can combat terrorism through showing their generous character and their willingness to help others in need.

Interestingly, the President simultaneously constitutes a moral community that is united around the idea of fear. While Bush mainly focuses his rhetoric on what Americans can do at home to help with the war effort abroad, there are parts in the speeches that highlight the fact that the only reason the President is able to constitute a moral community in response to September 11th is September 11th. As I have shown, throughout the War on Terror rhetoric the people are united through, and in many ways acting as a response to, their fear of another terrorist attack.

Conversely, in Iraq, the President relies more on what I have termed “elitist ethics.” Recall the ways in which American civilians are reduced to part of the scene, stripped of their agent status and the ability to overtly act that accompanies agent status. The main agents in the texts are President George W. Bush and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (the US military is also an agent, though it is only acting on the President’s orders, making the President the most active agent). The ethical struggle is thus between two world leaders, made elite by their official positions, the money that accompanies their official positions, and the authority and power that accompanies their official positions.

Framing the ethical struggle as being between himself and Saddam Hussein does not allow the President to constitute a moral community to follow him. Morality fits squarely under Burke’s (1969a) agent, as agent refers not only to the person who performed the act, but the type of person who performed the act, in this case a moral
person. When Bush reduces the people from active agents to part of the scene, he robs them of their right to actively constitute a moral community, for communities are made up of people, and the people in the community actively work to ensure its continuity. The people are still rhetorically constructed as being part of a community gripped by fear, but, in the case of Iraq, there is nothing that they can do to deal with that fear. They are not given a space in which to act, which makes it impossible to act morally (or immorally). The people, a community formerly unified around sacrificing of themselves for the greater good of both Americans and Afghanis, are reduced to the powerless role of the ignorant scene-filler.

In the next chapter, I analyze the moral persona that Bush develops in his same-sex marriage addresses, addresses where the President ultimately relies upon elitist ethics as he frames the issue of same-sex marriage as being a battle between himself and “activist judges” who are ruling that gays and lesbians have a constitutional right to marry. In the process of focusing mainly on himself and the activist judges in the rhetoric, the President serves to disempower the people actually affected by the decision, gays and lesbians living in the United States.
CHAPTER 4

ETHICAL DEFINITIONS?: PURPOSIVE APPEALS TO ACT AND AGENT AS THE DENIAL OF ETHICAL CHOICE IN BUSH’S SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ADDRESSES

“I strongly believe that marriage should be defined as between a man and a woman. I am troubled by activist judges who are defining marriage” (Bush, 2004a).

Introduction

In chapter 2, I analyzed the moral persona that Bush developed in his embryonic stem cell research addresses, addresses with which the majority of Americans, including many in the pro-life base, could not identify. The embryonic stem cell research rhetoric was interesting not only because of the way that it led to many people feeling less identification with the President, but also because it was one of the issues that people would expressly identify as a “moral values” issue in Bush’s first term.

In May 2004, the first legally-recognized same-sex marriages were performed in the state of Massachusetts. The state’s Supreme Court had ruled that the state’s prohibition of same-sex marriage was unconstitutional according to the state’s constitution (Kranish & Johnson, 2004). In July 2004, just four months before the presidential election, President Bush (2004c) made one of his most controversial first-term announcements: “The Administration strongly supports Senate passage of the Marriage Protection Amendment.” Democrats called the President’s proclamation an election-year ploy aimed at ensuring votes from conservative Christians, for the Democrats knew that the proposed same-sex marriage ban was all but guaranteed to fall...
short of the necessary votes in Congress and in the Senate, meaning that the measure would never pass on a federal level (Kaufman & Allen, 2004; Kirkpatrick, 2004). The President nonetheless openly encouraged both houses of Congress to pass a Constitutional Amendment defining marriage as being between one man and one woman, and he vowed to do everything in his power to “protect” marriage in America.

Ultimately, “the Republican-controlled Senate blocked a proposed constitutional amendment to bar same-sex marriage” (Dewar, 2004). In other words, even with his own party controlling the Senate, Bush “couldn’t muster the 67 votes necessary to approve a constitutional amendment” (Milligan, 2004, p. A1). Bush’s vow was thus legally a failure, and, in the eyes of some journalists a loss that was “handing President Bush a big election-year defeat” (Dewar, 2004, p. A3). However, symbolically, Bush’s adamant stand behind a Constitutional Amendment that most agree he knew would ultimately fail helped the President construct a rhetorical narrative that created consubstantiality between the President and a majority of the populace. In this chapter, I assess the ways in which the President’s same-sex marriage narrative fostered identification between himself and many Americans. In addition, to tie this chapter to the dissertation, I address two additional questions in the conclusion: 1) What moral persona does President Bush create in his same-sex marriage rhetoric? 2) Does he constitute a moral community to follow him?

*Text Selection*

On February 28, 2004, following the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling regarding same-sex marriage, President Bush offered comments to the press and to the
president of Tunisia about the issue of same-sex marriage. At that time, Bush (2004a) said, “I strongly believe that marriage should be defined as between a man and a woman,” and discussed his views about same-sex marriage. President Bush was discussing the issue more in-depth in the United States. That same week, on February 24, 2004, the President stated that “our nation must enact a constitutional amendment to protect marriage in America. . . [because] some activist judges and local officials have made an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage” (Bush, 2004b). This was the earliest statement where Bush discusses “activist judges” as being responsible for the redefinition of marriage, a characterization that, as I show in this chapter, is important for understanding the rhetorical narrative being put forth in the texts. In June 2004, Bush addressed the Southern Baptist Convention, a group who was consubstantial with the President because of their shared Christian beliefs. In speaking to this group, Bush (2004c) noted that, “My administration is defending the sanctity of marriage against activist courts and local officials who want to redefine marriage forever.” As I explain throughout this chapter, even when addressing a conservative Christian audience, the President still discusses the activist judges as the main culprits in the same-sex marriage debate, which is surprising, given that, especially with this particular group, the President could have re-stated the position taken by the Christian Right in the Culture Wars, that being gay is a sin (see Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991). The rhetorical implications of this omission are explored in the pentadic analysis. In his July 10, 2004, radio address, the President summarized how the Massachusetts Supreme Court was changing the definition of marriage and how the only way to stop such a shift in the meaning of marriage was to
amend the U.S. Constitution by adding, “an amendment that defines marriage in the United States as a union of a man and woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004e).

Finally, the President publicly stated his support for the Marriage Protection Amendment in his “Statement[s] of Administration Policy,” one of which was directed to the House of Representatives, the other of which was directed to the Senate.

Justification of Burkean Tools

If press accounts are right, and Bush’s vow to work to ban same-sex marriage was more a symbolic gesture of conservatism than a promise of action, then Kenneth Burke’s theories are particularly apt for studying Bush’s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric. Keep in mind that identification was a key idea in Burke’s work. Burke (1969b) was interested in the ways in which audiences identified with a rhetor and his/her rhetoric. This idea was further developed by Charland (1987), who posited that audiences are actively constituted through the rhetoric, for it is through rhetoric that collective identities/ideologies form.

In Bush’s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, Burke’s (1973) cluster/agon method allows for a better understanding of the narrative that Bush constructs in explaining the need for the Marriage Protection Amendment, a narrative that puts Bush in opposition to the activist judges who are “redefining the fundamental institution of marriage” (Bush, 2004g). While the cluster/agon analysis helps to reveal the narrative that helps to constitute collective identities (Charland, 1987), in order to more fully understand the moral persona that the President creates in his rhetoric, and to assess whether or not he constitutes a moral community to follow him, I rely upon Burke’s (1969a) pentad tool to better understand how (or if) lay citizens in the United States are being constituted as
agents and given the right to act in a way that would allow them to constitute a moral community.

Cluster Analysis

Bush’s same-sex marriage addresses contain in them both a cluster and an agon. For Burke (1973), the use of a cluster and a corresponding agon build a rhetorical drama by constructing a story centering around “good” (represented by the terms in the cluster) and “evil” (represented by the terms in the agon) (see also Berthold, 1976). Per both Burke (1973) and Berthold (1976), I will discuss the cluster first and then the agon, showing how the two rely upon one another for strength.

Both the cluster and the agon are clustering their terms around the idea of defining marriage, though how each side does so differs dramatically. The definitional differences between the two drive the elements of the pentad and, upon analysis, reveal the deeper meaning of the rhetoric.

Cluster: Marriage is a Sacred Union Between a Man and a Woman to Form Families that are Fundamental to Society

For Bush, marriage is, first and foremost, “a union between a man and a woman” (Bush, 2004a). In his remarks with the Tunisian president, Bush (2004a) explains that, “I strongly believe that marriage should be defined as between a man and a woman. . . . I’ll support a law to protect marriage between a man and a woman.” This statement already shows that Bush intends to “protect” what he takes as the traditional definition of marriage. The word “protect” is rhetorically powerful in this case as it sets the stage for the rhetorical drama (to be discussed shortly) that Bush’s later anti-same-sex marriage
rhetoric creates. “Protect” develops the idea that there is more at stake than mere
definition, for a mere word/definition does not warrant extreme measures being taken to
protect it. Indeed, “protect” functions rhetorically to build the President’s narrative that
the attempted re-definition of marriage is putting all of society at risk. The President and
those who identify with him need to protect traditional marriage in order to protect
society.

The reason that Bush works to hard to protect his definition is aptly summarized
in his radio address:

The union of a man and a woman in marriage is the most enduring and important
human institution . . . the most fundamental institution of civilization . . . and the
law can teach respect or disrespect for that institution. If our laws teach that
marriage is the sacred commitment of a man and a woman, the basis of an orderly
society, and the defining promise of a life, that strengthens the institution of
marriage. . . . Marriage [has strong] cultural, religious, and natural roots. . . . For
ages, in every culture, human beings have understood that traditional marriage is
critical to the well-being of families. And because families pass along values and
shape character, traditional marriage is also critical to the health of society. . . .
And changing the definition of traditional marriage will undermine the family
structure. (Bush, 2004e)

Basically, Bush believes that retaining his definition of marriage, by defining marriage as
only being between one man and one woman, is fundamental to the continuance of
American society.

For the President, marriage between one man and one woman forms the basis of
families, and without this sort of family structure, America will crumble as it is families
that pass along moral values to the next generation.\textsuperscript{15} Following the logic of Bush’s
narrative, with a change in the meaning of marriage, Americans will experience a change

\textsuperscript{15} While moral values may come from sources other than the family, the President does not address this
possibility in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, nor does he address the fact that same-sex couples can
and do raise morally upstanding children.
in the meaning of family as well, and this shift in meaning will result in a loss of character. Of particular interest, given the persona that Bush constructs throughout the entirety of his first term, is the way in which society becomes inextricably linked to the Christian God here. In Bush’s (2004c) own words, “The union of a man and woman is the most enduring human institution, honored and encouraged . . . by religious faiths.” In other words, marriage is rhetorically tied to religion, and, as I have shown throughout the dissertation, Bush identifies religion with the Christian God. The President thus rhetorically constructs himself as working to uphold a definition of marriage that aligns with the definition of marriage put forth by the Christian God, a definition that is fundamental to society. Following the rhetorical narrative the President constructs, by working to protect the institution of marriage, Bush is working to protect all of American society from losing its stability and structure.

The ways in which the President will protect the institution of marriage become clear in the addresses that he makes in the following months. In his July 10, 2004, radio address, Bush (2004e) expands upon how he will protect marriage between one man and one woman. He begins by explaining that “in 1996, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Defense of Marriage Act, and President Clinton signed it into law. That legislation defines marriage, for the purpose of federal law, as a union between a man and a woman” (Bush, 2004e). However, as the President explains, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling allowing same-sex marriage shows that the Defense of Marriage Act is simply not doing enough to protect marriage: “Four judges on the [MA] state’s highest courts have ordered the issuance of marriage licenses to applicants of the same gender” (Bush,
Consequently, because marriage “should be defined as between a man and a woman” (Bush, 2004a), President Bush (2004e) explains that “I urge members of the House and Senate to pass, and send to the states for ratification, an amendment that defines marriage in the United States as a union of a man and a woman as husband and wife.” The President thus continues to build his rhetorical narrative in a way that identifies himself, his policies, and his supporters with conservative ideology.

Conservatives, especially Christian conservatives, have been fighting against rights for same-sex couples for years (Diamond, 1995). Moreover, the President’s rhetoric reinforces the conservative Christian narrative that liberals are infiltrating the courts to eliminate Christianity and its institutions (like “traditional” marriage) (Hunter, 1991). Following Christian conservative ideology, good Christians need to identify with their God-given leaders (like Bush), in order to protect God and his plan for America.

Taken together, the cluster terms reinforce a Christian conservative ideology in which marriage between a man and a woman is a creation of the Christian God, and, as such, maintaining it in its current form is fundamental to the functioning of the society that God created. If the listener identifies with this narrative and with the President who is telling it, then the listener may feel compelled to stand by Bush in his quest to protect this God-given institution, work to ban same-sex marriage, and, following the rhetoric, act morally and in accordance with the will of the Christian God. However, if the listener does not identify with Bush’s narrative and his plan to ban same-sex marriage, then the listener is, following the narrative, acting immorally and against the will of the Christian God. At first reading, then, Bush’s rhetoric fosters an identification with conservative
Christians as it furthers narratives that have been building the conservative Christian ideology for years. However, Bush’s narrative also fosters an identification with those who do not share his religious views, mainly because Bush’s narrative reaches those who fear experiencing a strong and detrimental change in society. Allowing same-sex marriage will, following Bush’s rhetorical narrative, lead to the downfall of society as Americans know it, and Americans will find themselves living in an America where there is no stability, no real family, no tradition. Hence, the President’s builds his narrative in such a way that identifying with it is made to seem like the commonsensical course of action, for failure to identify with the President will result in the downfall of American morality and, ultimately, American society.

Agon: Marriage is the Evolving Paradigm of a Legal Contract that is Devoid of Tradition

For the “activist judges,” Bush’s nemeses in this rhetorical drama, marriage is “a legal contract” (Bush, 2004e) between two people, regardless of their gender, which, according to Bush, shows how the judges view marriage to be “an evolving paradigm” (Bush, 2004e). Keep in mind that, for Burke (1973), cluster terms and agon terms stand in opposition to one another, and this fact is particularly clear here. Recall from the cluster analysis that Bush’s rhetoric focuses on the ways in which opposite-sex marriage is fundamental to the continuation of society as we know it. Consequently, in the agon, the President’s rhetorical narrative shows how the activist judges are working to change society. If the President is working to keep what has worked for centuries the same, then his nemeses are working to change it, largely by viewing society as malleable, or, in the words of the President, as “an evolving paradigm” (Bush, 2004e).
In the cluster, the President’s rhetorical narrative showed the importance of traditional marriage, a union between a man and a woman that is stable and enduring. In the agon, where the judges are working to redefine marriage as a legal contract between two people, Bush (2004e) discusses how, “an activist court that strikes down traditional marriage would have little problem striking down the Defense of Marriage Act. Overreaching judges could declare that all marriages recognized in Massachusetts or San Francisco be recognized as marriages everywhere else.” The President’s narrative shows how society is already beginning to change as federal and state laws could be overturned by “overreaching judges.” With the change in the definition of marriage, society begins to change, which is exactly the fear that is being set up in the cluster portion of the drama.

Of particular note for showing the contrasts between the two groups in the rhetoric, for Bush and those who identify with him, opposite-sex marriage is considered to be a union, but for the activist judges and those who identify with them, same-sex marriage is considered to be a legal contract. This difference in terms serves to de-legitimize same-sex couples and their unions. “Union” implies that the people are joined together completely. “Legal contract,” by contrast, makes those involved in the contract seem distanced, in this case reducing a marriage to nothing more than a legally-binding agreement rather than a complete joining together of two people. Interestingly, by focusing on legality versus morality, the President’s rhetoric builds the idea that legal rulings have no tie to morality. Law itself very nearly becomes the agonistic term to morality. Either people are moral (like the President and those who are consubstantial
with him), or they are legalistic (like the “activist judges” and those who are consubstantial with them).

Because for the activist judges marriage is nothing more than a legal contract, it is “cut off from its cultural, religious, and natural roots, [and] the meaning of marriage is lost, and the institution is weakened” (Bush, 2004e), which “sends a message to the next generation that marriage has no enduring meaning, and ages of moral teaching and human experience have nothing to teach us about this institution” (Bush, 2004e). For Bush, the activist judges in the agon are stripping marriage of all of its traditional meaning, which becomes important because of the ways in which Bush identifies traditional marriage as being fundamental to society. Recall that in the cluster analysis, I showed how Bush wants to protect so-called traditional marriage because such marriage is rhetorically constructed as being fundamental to society, as being pertinent to teaching traditional moral values and family values to the next generation. Consequently, in the agon, Bush (2004e) shows how the redefinition of marriage as a legally-binding contract between two people will serve to strip marriage of all of its tradition, which will prove detrimental to American society. Following Bush’s rhetorical narrative, stripping marriage of tradition, like the activist judges are doing, will result in “redefining the fundamental institution of marriage” (Bush, 2004g), which will change society for the worse.

Rhetorically, Bush’s agon terms serve to make identifying with him and his narrative seem like the commonsensical course of action. The activist judges are trying to destroy the basis of American society by changing “the most fundamental institution of
civilization” (Bush, 2004e), heterosexual marriage, which has taught people moral values for centuries. Following the rhetorical narrative, changing the definition of marriage will strip the next generation of moral teaching, and if the listener identifies with this narrative and the conservative ideology therein, then the listener should desire to ban same-sex marriage to protect traditional morality.

Dramatic Tension

As Burke (1973) explains, rhetors who employ the cluster/agon framework have simultaneously told a story of good versus evil that creates a dramatic tension. Bush constructs a dramatic narrative in his statements, and he does so by relying upon the classic good versus evil framework. As may be apparent from this analysis of the cluster and agon constructions in Bush’s statements on same-sex marriage, the President constructs a rhetorical drama where Bush is the hero and the activist judges are the villains.

Bush does not mention judges who do not support same-sex marriage at all in his rhetoric. At first glance, then, it almost seems as though the President is labeling all judges as “activist,” but upon closer reading of the rhetoric, it becomes apparent that the President is only considering those judges who do not share his views to be “activist,” and it may be that only the “activist” judges are mentioned in the rhetoric because they are the rhetorically-constructed villains.

For Bush, the villains are the “activist judges” who are “redefining the fundamental institution of marriage” (Bush, 2004g). The so-called “overreaching judges” (Bush, 2004e) are abusing their official position to fundamentally change society by
stripping marriage of its ties to religion and culture (see Bush, 2004e). The judges “have taken it on themselves to change the meaning of marriage” (Bush, 2004e), a change that will, following the President’s rhetoric, have detrimental effects on society, including the demise of families, morality, and religious tradition. Thus, the President constructs the judges as having too much power already, for “American democracy, not court orders, should decide the future of marriage in America” (Bush, 2004e), but the judges’ overreaching power is allowing them to bypass the public’s will and change the meaning of society’s “most fundamental institution” (Bush, 2004g). Furthermore, it seems that the judges want to exercise their power to the greatest possible extent, for they will not be satisfied until “the Defense of Marriage Act [is] struck down by activist courts” (Bush, 2004b). These power-hungry judges are working to ruin America by destroying families and robbing the next generation of moral fiber. Subtly, and in keeping with Burke (1969b), Bush’s narrative is identifying with mainstream Americans here. The listeners, lay citizens of the United States, are the ones who are at risk of losing their moral fiber, of having their society fundamentally changed, of having their family structure altered, irrevocably for the worse. The appeals to society-at-large could rhetorically serve to draw the listener in. While the President (oddly) abstains from inclusive language, the attempt at identification is present nonetheless. Everyone who lives in society could face a much different nation if the activist judges are not stopped.

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16 Burke (1969b) discusses the importance of words like “our” and “we” in identification attempts as these sorts of terms are the attempts at identification that are most likely to go unnoticed. In the anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, Bush relies mainly upon his own authority and a doomsday narrative that constitutes Americans as being on the verge of losing their very way of life. The importance of Bush’s reliance upon his own authority will be explored more in-depth in the pentad analysis portion of this chapter.
Having established the villains in his narrative, the President then juxtaposes himself against the villains in the drama, setting himself up as the rhetorically-constructed hero. Following Bush’s narrative, the villainous activist judges are working to destroy American society by changing the definition of marriage, which will alter the family structure, which will result in the children of the next generation having no basis to form moral values or character as these are developed through traditional nuclear families. Consequently, Bush, as the hero, is working to protect society from overreaching judges by advocating for the passage of a Constitutional Amendment, for “when judges insist on imposing their arbitrary will on the people, the only alternative left to the people is an amendment to the Constitution—the only law a court cannot overturn” (Bush, 2004g).

The President’s narrative builds the idea that the populace is being stripped of their power, for the judges are using their judicial authority to change society through redefining its “most fundamental institution” (Bush, 2004e), and they are doing so without justification or cause, as is shown through the word “arbitrary.” Through the use of the word “arbitrary,” the judges’ decision is made to seem illogical, as though it is not based on case law or constitutionality at all. Rather, the ruling is rhetorically constructed to be made on the whim of a few judges. American citizens, on the other hand, are left with little recourse for acting on their own accord, as the activist judges are “imposing their arbitrary will on the people” (Bush, 2004e), “and unless action is taken, we can expect more arbitrary court decisions” (Bush, 2004b). The people are being acted upon, and, in Burke’s (1969a, 1984) terms, are rhetorically constructed as being reduced from
action to motion at the hands of the judges. Consequently, in his rhetorical narrative, Bush (2004a) explains how “marriage ought to be defined by the people.” The hero wants to protect society and give Americans the right to define “the most fundamental institution” (Bush, 2004e) in their society.

Bush advocates taking a drastic step like amending the Constitution in order to “defend marriage” (Bush, 2004e) and the traditional families that come with it, traditional families that “pass along values and shape character,” making “traditional marriage critical to the health of society” (Bush, 2004e). Following the narrative, the hero is doing everything in his power to stop the villains from destroying society as the collective we knows it. Once again, identification is key to the success of the rhetorical narrative. The President needs for his listeners to feel concerned over the threat to their long-term wellbeing so that they will stand behind him, adopt his moral values, and support the proposed Amendment if given the chance to do so.

Pentad Analysis

From an analysis of the cluster terms and the agon terms, I have shown that there is a strong tension between two sets of agents, Bush and the “activist judges,” both of which are trying to define marriage (which will be discussed shortly as an act). Each side is trying to redefine marriage to, following the narrative, alter society, which is purposive. In other words, through an analysis of the cluster and agon terms in Bush’s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, a cursory pentadic analysis becomes evident, though it needs to be examined more in-depth to fully understand the moral persona that the President constructs for himself in the rhetoric and to assess whether or not he constitutes
a moral community to follow him. Thus, I now examine Bush’s antisame-sex marriage via Burke’s (1969a) pentad. I show how Bush’s rhetoric leaves the debate over same-sex marriage in the hands of an elite few, and, importantly, completely out of the hands of those directly affected by it, gays and lesbians living in the United States. To better explain how this disempowerment occurs, I begin by explaining the scene, then I discuss the act and the agents. To complete the pentad analysis, I analyze the agencies employed for each side and the ideologically-driven purpose of each side. I conclude by assessing the moral persona that the President constructs and assessing whether or not he constitutes a moral community to follow him.

Scene

Recall that, for Burke (1969a), scene refers to “the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred” (p. xv). In keeping with the cluster/agon drama, in Bush’s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, there are two scenes, one for Bush and one for the judges, and they stand in stark opposition to one another.

Bush’s Scene: The Legislature

Bush (2004b) begins by discussing how “Eight years ago, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage for purposes of federal law as the legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife. The Act passed the House of Representative by a vote of 342 to 67, and the Senate by a vote of 85 to 14.” In other words, in 1996, the U.S. legislature formally defined marriage in the United States as being between one man and one woman. Now, in 2004, following the rhetoric, “the Administration urges both houses to pass the
Marriage Protection Amendment” (Bush, 2004g), which “defines marriage in the United States as a union of a man and woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004e). In both 1996 and 2004, both houses of the United States Congress and the President’s office are the places in which marriage is defined. Thus, the legislature is rhetorically constructed as the place where the meaning of marriage is legitimated for all of American society.

Activist Judges’ Scene: The Courtroom’s Judicial Bench

Following the rhetorical narrative, there is now a competing place where marriage is being defined in the United States. As Bush (2001b) explains, “some activist judges and local officials have made an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage. In Massachusetts, four judges on the highest court have indicated they will order the issuance of marriage licenses to applicants of the same gender in May of this year.” In other words, the courtroom’s judicial bench is becoming another place in which marriage is defined. For Bush (2004e) the courtroom scene is simply not the place in which marriage should be defined, and the judges are “overreaching” with the actions that they are undertaking in their judicial scene.

What is striking about both of these scenes is that they are completely removed from mainstream American society. Recall in the cluster/agon analysis, I discussed on how, following Bush’s narrative, a change in the meaning of marriage will result in changes throughout all of society. However, society is only mentioned in passing. The places where the action occurs, the scene in Burke’s (1969b) sense of the word, are bureaucratic locations where only an elite few can have their say and really make a difference in society. The rest of society is merely stuck with the decision that is reached
in these locations. Bush’s scenic descriptions thus serve to reduce mainstream Americans from active agents to passive motion. Either Americans are affected by what is decided in the legislature, or they are affected by what is decided in the courtroom. Either way, they are not left with very much opportunity to act on their own accord. The ramifications of this disempowerment are discussed more in the act section and in the conclusion of this chapter.

**Act**

For Burke (1969a), the act refers to “what took place in thought or deed” (p. xv). In keeping with Burke’s (1973) cluster/agon drama, there are two sets of acts in these addresses, the good acts and the evil acts. And, in keeping with the requirement for a rhetorical drama, the two acts are working against each other.

*Bush’s Act: Define Marriage to Protect Society and Preserve Democracy*

Following the narrative developed in the cluster/agon analysis, Bush’s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric is very act-driven, but only for a handful of people. Bush makes two dramatic acts in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric. The first and most obvious is clearly stated in his July 10, 2004, radio address: “The process has now begun in Congress. I urge members of the House and Senate to pass, and to send to the states for ratification, and amendment that defines marriage in the United States as a union of a man and a woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004e). The President is “support[ing] a law to protect marriage between a man and a woman” (Bush, 2004a). Bush’s first overt

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17 What is strikingly absent from Bush’s rhetoric is any discussion of representative democracy, the means by which, traditionally, American citizens are given a voice, or, in Burkean (1969a) terms, an ability to act. By focusing only on bureaucratic locations, the President’s rhetoric is, arguably, more elitist, and I examine the repercussions of this elitism in the concluding portion of this chapter.
act is thus to publicly voice his support for a Constitutional Amendment defining marriage as being between one man and one woman. And, as I showed in the cluster/agon analysis, Bush’s support for such an Amendment carries with it an implicit act of protecting society by protecting “traditional marriage” (Bush, 2004e), as marriage between a man and a woman is “critical to the well-being of families . . . [that] pass along values and shape character” (Bush, 2004e). Bush’s act of supporting a Constitutional Amendment banning same-sex marriage is thus rhetorically constructed as a simultaneous defense of American society, which is itself an act.

The rhetorically constructed process required to pass a Constitutional Amendment illustrates Bush’s second act. Bush (2004e) justifies the Constitutional Amendment by explaining that “all people deserve to have their voices heard. And that is exactly the purpose behind the constitutional amendment process. American democracy, not court orders, should decide the future of marriage in America,” for “marriage ought to be defined by the people, not by the courts” (Bush, 2004a). The President expresses his desire for the people to have a say in what happens in their country (which, given the overarching narrative about how all of society stands to be negatively affected if same-sex marriage were allowed, makes sense). And for Bush, the best way for the people to get a say in how marriage is defined in the United States is through a Constitutional Amendment process, which, following Bush’s narrative, will give the people the right to vote on the issue. Following the rhetoric, Bush wants to give the people the chance to decide how to proceed through the democratic process of passing a Constitutional Amendment, a right that the activist judges are taking away from the people. In his
rhetorical narrative, Bush explains how he is working to preserve democracy and to give the people a voice by standing up to the activist judges. Thus, Bush’s second act can be read as preserving democracy by ensuring that the people have the right to vote on an issue that is fundamental to their society.

However, by focusing only on the legislature as the way to retain the traditional definition of marriage (see scenic discussion above), the President really does not give lay citizens an obvious opportunity for overt action. In fact, the closest that any of the people come to having their voices heard deals with their ability to reach their elected representatives through phone, email, or letters. And even this ability is very limited as many congressional representatives will, ultimately, vote according to their conscience. For example, in 2004, at the time of the proposed Marriage Protection Amendment’s congressional vote, I lived in Colorado. The House bill was written by Marilyn Musgrave (Bush, 2004h), a Republican Congresswoman representing the fourth district (govtrack.us, 2009). Musgrave did not represent my district, so I had no reason to tell her to support or oppose the bill. My representative, Mark Udall, had no intention of supporting the Federal Marriage Amendment, and he made this quite clear, so I really had no need to contact him either. The author of the Senate bill was Colorado Senator Wayne Allard, a Republican (Bush, 2004g). While Colorado voters could have contacted him, they already knew how he felt (he did help to draft the Marriage Protection Amendment after all), so it would have been futile. Basically, many of the elected representatives already had their minds made up, so Bush’s claim that this process would give the people a voice seems specious, at best.
Activist Judges’ Act: Define Marriage to Fundamentally Alter Society and Undermine Democracy

The activist judges are rhetorically constructed to make two dramatic acts. Much like with Bush, and in keeping very true to Burke’s (1973) notion of dramatic tension, the activist judges’ most overt act stands in direct contrast to Bush’s most overt act as they are defining marriage in the way that they see fit. As Bush (2004a) explains, “activist judges . . . are defining marriage,” and this redefinition serves to “strike down traditional marriage” (Bush, 2004e). The first act of the activist judges, then, is very similar to the first act taken by Bush as the judges are, like the President, voicing their belief of what constitutes a marriage. And, much like Bush’s vocal act, the judges’ vocalization of what constitutes a marriage comes with implications for society. As was discussed in the agon analysis above, the judges’ redefinition of marriage will have dire repercussions as America will become a society in which the next generation [will believe] that marriage has no enduring meaning, and that ages of moral teaching and human experience have nothing to teach us . . . human beings have understood that traditional marriage is critical to the well-being of families. And because families pass along values and shape character, traditional marriage is also critical to the health of society. (Bush, 2004e)

Basically, the activist judges’ redefinition of marriage could create a society in which children are raised without traditional families, without religion, and without values and character. The judges are thus taking the action of fundamentally altering society by destroying “traditional marriage” and the social benefits that accompany it.

And, in continuing to stand in stark contrast to the rhetorically-constructed hero, the activist judges’ second act is to deny Americans their basic voting rights, rights that
Bush’s narrative appears to grant to the people, as was discussed in the analysis of Bush’s act earlier in this section. Following the rhetoric, “the future of marriage in America should be decided through the democratic constitutional amendment process, rather than by the court orders of a few” (Bush, 2004g). The judges’ act of defining marriage is simultaneously an act stripping the people of their right to vote for how they would like society to progress. And, given that voting is fundamental to democracy, the judges’ act thus becomes rhetorically constructed as circumventing democracy, quite a horrid act to undertake in a supposedly-democratic society. The activist judges are taking away the people’s right to voice their opinion through voting. Bush’s (unsubstantiated) vow to give the people a voice through the Constitutional Amendment process, then, makes sense when considered as being part of a larger dramatic narrative. The act of giving people a voice is yet another way in which Bush makes himself the hero for American society as he is fighting villainous, power-hungry judges who want to bypass the people and use their own power to change society.

What is striking about both of these sets of acts is exactly who has the right to define at all. Regardless of how one feels about same-sex marriage, the vast majority of the country is excluded from the very process being explained in the texts. Bush (2004a) explains how “activist judges are defining marriage” through their rulings that have granted marital rights to same-sex couples. The President disagrees with activist judges who define marriage and impose this definition upon all of society. He explains how the judges have violated the basic rules of American democracy by leaving the masses out of the process, for “marriage ought to be defined by the people” (Bush, 2004a). However,
the President similarly takes it upon himself to unilaterally define marriage: “I urge members of the House and Senate to pass . . . an amendment that defines marriage in the United States as a union of one man and one woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004e). The President devotes nearly all of his July 10 radio address to explicating the ills that will befall society if his definition of marriage is not accepted as the legal definition of marriage in all 50 states. Bush himself wants to formally define marriage and have his definition accepted nationally, which is the same sort of disempowering act that he accuses the “activist judges” of undertaking. In the following agent analysis, I will more thoroughly examine the agent roles not only of Bush and the “activist judges” but also the rest of the people living in the United States, those who, as was just shown, are denied the right to define marriage.

Agent

For Burke (1969a), agent refers to the “person or kind of person [who] performed the act” (p. xv). In keeping with Burke’s (1973) cluster/agon drama, there are competing agents in these texts. As is apparent from the cluster/agon analysis, the two main agents in the rhetoric are Bush and the “activist judges.” While I will explain each one momentarily, I would like to call attention to the fact that mainstream Americans, including gays and lesbians and heterosexuals, are not accorded agent status at all in the texts. This exclusion of agent status for gays and lesbians reveals the elitist ethics in the rhetoric, an implication that I examine in the conclusion portion of this chapter.
Bush as Agent

Importantly, as I showed in the cluster and agon analysis, there are really only two sets of agents in these speeches. The first agent is President George W. Bush. As I explained in the cluster/agon analysis, Bush sets himself up as the hero in his good versus evil drama, and the future of American families are at stake. Bush constructs himself as the ultimate good, as the one who is working tirelessly to make sure that “traditional marriage [which] is critical to the well-being of families [that] pass along values and shape character” (Bush, 2004e), will not be “fundamentally redefined” (Bush, 2004e). Bush rhetorically constructs himself as a savior of society as Americans know it. The President will do everything in his power to ensure that future generations have the moral backing that comes from traditional marriage. He is working against the judges who, as will be shown momentarily, want to destroy society as Americans know it.

Activist Judges as Agents

In the cluster/agon analysis, I discussed how the activist judges are rhetorically constructed as the evil other in Bush’s same-sex marriage rhetoric. The judges are causing “the meaning of marriage [to be] lost, and the institution [to be] weakened” (Bush, 2004e). Following Bush’s narrative, the judges’ ruling will result in the breakdown of traditional families, and since families are critical in teaching the next generation about values, culture, and religion, society as a whole will be “fundamentally redefined” (Bush, 2004g). The judges are thus rhetorically constructed as “overreaching their power” (Bush, 2004e), and one way in which the judges can tangibly observe the effects of their ever-increasing power is through changes in families and in society.
Following the rhetoric, then, the activist judges are power-hungry and destructive agents who place more importance on their own careers than on the betterment of society.

*The Rest of Americans as Non-Agents*

While Bush and the “activist judges” are clearly constructed as agents in Bush’s anti-same-sex marriage addresses, the vast majority of the American populace is not accorded agent status in the rhetoric. Following Bush’s rhetoric, the President serves as a mouthpiece for the majority of the American population, as the one advocating that “marriage ought to be defined by the people” (Bush, 2004a). But the American population is left with only a vague promise of the ability to act: “All people deserve to have their voices heard. And that is exactly the purpose behind the constitutional amendment. . . . I urge members of the House and Senate to pass, and send to the states for ratification, an amendment that defines marriage in the United States as a union of one man and one woman as husband and wife” (Bush, 2004d). Plausibly, the people in the states could have the chance to ratify the Marriage Protection Amendment, and, in Bush’s (2004e) words, “have their voices heard.” However, as I explained in the act portion of this chapter, the very process for passing the amendment fails to fully constitute the people as agents as the most that they can do is contact elected representatives who have, in most cases, already made up their minds.

Even more telling is the fact that the people who are directly affected by the rhetoric, that is, gays and lesbians living in the United States, are completely excluded as agents in the rhetoric. Rather, they are referred to in passing: “In Massachusetts, four judges on the state’s highest court have ordered the issuance of marriage licenses to
applicants of the same gender. In San Francisco, city officials issued thousands of marriage licenses to people of the same gender” (Bush, 2004e). Upon close analysis, it becomes apparent that gays and lesbians are not given the ability to act at all, for the descriptions of the marriage licenses leave all of the action up to the judges who “ordered” and the officials who “issued.” Gays and lesbians are first acted upon by the activist judges who are issuing licenses to them (no mention in the rhetoric of how the gays and lesbians will be given the right to act with the licenses), and then they are acted upon by Bush who wants to take away said licenses. In Burke’s (1969a) terms, they are reduced from action to motion, stripped of the ability to act on their own accord, and, as will be explained shortly, reduced to agency for the activist judges.

Interestingly, in all seven of the same-sex marriage texts (Bush, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 2004g, 2004h), the only active agents are the President and the activist judges. As I explained in the scenic portion of this chapter, both the President and the judges are conducting their actions in the bureaucratic sphere. Through not focusing on the people involved in the actual marriages, the President’s rhetoric takes an intimate act and reduces it to a bureaucratic struggle, which simultaneously differentiates the President’s anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric from the anti-same-sex relationship rhetoric put forth by conservatives, especially those in the Christian Right.

As Diamond (1995) and Hunter (1991) explain, conservative Christian Right activists interested in protecting morality in the United States have traditionally opposed same-sex marriage because they believe that same-sex relations are a sin, and any society that condones the marriage of two people of the same gender are condoning their sin. In
other words, prior to Bush’s anti-same-sex marriage statements in 2004, anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric focused on the individuals involved in the proposed marriages, and, in doing, so, they kept the focus on traditional morality (i.e., these individuals are not, following Christian beliefs, acting “right”). Through focusing on the activist judges who are allowing the marriages, the President takes the focus off of the (im)morality of gays and lesbians seeking to marry, focusing instead on the few judges who have the right to allow said marriages. This completely changes the anti-gay-rights narrative that really began to take form in the 1960s and 1970s. The effects of focusing on bureaucrats who pass laws rather than people who want to marry will be addressed more thoroughly in the conclusion of this chapter when I assess the moral persona that Bush develops in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric.

Agency

According to Burke (1969a), agency refers to “the means or instruments” (Burke, 1969a, p. xv) used to carry out an act. In keeping with the dramatic narrative, both Bush and the activist judges are rhetorically constructed as having means for protecting and expanding their definition of marriage throughout society. Bush relies upon dramatic processes and appeals to tradition whilst the activist judges rely upon their official authority and same-sex couples.

*Bush’s Agency: The Democratic Process and Fear of Change*

Following Bush’s rhetorical narrative, “marriage ought to be defined by the people,” and the best way to ensure that the people have a say is to have “both houses pass the Marriage Protection Amendment and submit it to the states for ratification”
The Constitutional Amendment process allows “American democracy, not court orders, [to] decide the future of marriage in America (Bush, 2004e). American democracy thus becomes the means by which American citizens are allowed to have some say in the future of their own society. It is the agency.

In addition, Bush’s anti-same-sex rhetorical narrative utilizes fear of change, which allows those who are afraid of a major change in society to identify with the rhetorical narrative and the conservative ideology that it perpetuates. At the time of the Bush’s speeches, same-sex couples in Massachusetts were just being given the right to marry, and they were the first ones in the entire country, yet Bush (2001f) claims that “traditional marriage is critical to the well-being of families... [T]raditional marriage is also critical to the health of society.” However, because of the fact that such marriages had never been allowed in the United States, the President simply did not have concrete proof that same-sex marriage would prove as detrimental to the United States as his narrative alleges it would. Lacking any proof, the rhetorical narrative relies instead upon fostering an identification with people based on a shared fear of how things might change. No one wants to live in a society in which looser definitions of marriage could “weaken the good influence of society” (Bush, 2004b) by “undermin[ing] the family structure” (Bush, 2004e), and, ultimately, threatening “the stability of society” (Bush, 2004b). The narrative gains force through appealing to the fear of a change in society, a change that is rhetorically constructed as being nearly inevitable if same-sex marriages are allowed to continue. These fear appeals allow people to feel consubstantial with the President who is, following his narrative, working to ensure that same-sex marriage is not
allowed so that society does not change for the worse. The fear of change thus becomes the means by which logic and proof are circumvented in the narrative and yet identification with the narrative and the conservative ideology it perpetuates is still possible. The appeals are functioning as agency.

Activist Judges’ Agency: Overreaching Official Authority

As I showed in the cluster/agon analysis, the “activist judges” are rhetorically constructed as redefining marriage to the detriment of society. Bush (2004e) explains how “activist judges . . . have taken it upon themselves to change the meaning of marriage,” and, in the process, these judges have “struck down traditional marriage . . . imposing their arbitrary will on the people.” It is only because of their official authority to grant court orders, granted to them by the Governor of Massachusetts (Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Ch.2, Section1, Article IX), that the judges are able to redefine marriage. The activist judges’ main agency is thus their official authority, authority that they are rhetorically constructed to be increasing for their own power-hungry benefit. Bush (2004b) explains how “some activist judges and local officials have made an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage. . . . [And] attempts to redefine marriage in a single state or city could have serious consequences throughout the country.” In other words, following the rhetoric, the activist judges who are redefining marriage through their official authority are in a position to affect the entire country. The judges’ official authority is thus the means by which they are fundamentally changing American society, and they are using said authority to strip America of its families,
traditions, and values, with the added benefit of personally increasing their own judicial reach.

Purpose

For Burke (1969a), purpose refers to why an action is undertaken. Charland (1987) expanded upon Burke’s definition of purpose. For Charland (1987), the audience is actively constituted through the rhetoric, and through the constitutive rhetoric, the people form a collective identity. This constitution of a collective identity (or ideology) can be read as a purpose of the rhetoric. Basically, purpose is linked to ideology. In the case of same-sex marriage, the purpose of both sides is to reaffirm distinct positions in one of the key culture war debates that has been going on for decades (see Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991): What rights should same-sex couples have?

_Bush’s Purpose: Reaffirm the Conservative View of the Sanctity of Marriage_

The President is interested in “defending the sanctity of marriage against activist courts and local officials who want to redefine marriage forever . . . [because] the union of a man and woman is the most enduring human institution, honored and encouraged . . . by religious faith” (Bush, 2004c). The President’s purpose is thus to reaffirm the conservative Christian view that marriage is a sacred, religious commitment between a man and a woman. This is part of the same ideology that conservative groups, especially conservative Christian groups, have been espousing for years. Same-sex marriage is simply not acceptable because, following the Christian religion, marriage is to be reserved for “one man and one woman” (Bush, 2004a).
Conservative ideology believes that same-sex relationships are detrimental to American morality and, as a result, American society (Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991). Following this same ideology, Bush believes that if America’s families are being restructured via a redefinition of marriage, it could leave “the next generation [believing] that marriage has no enduring meaning, and that ages of moral teaching and human experience have nothing to teach us about this institution” (Bush, 2004e). American society is rhetorically constructed as being on the verge of a fundamental change in which the most basic meanings of family and morality will change, and as family changes, society will change for the worse. This threat of a fundamental change in the America is what leads Bush (2004e) to make his declaration:

Senators are considering a constitutional amendment to protect the most fundamental institution of civilization, and to prevent it from being fundamentally redefined. . . . I urge members of the House and Senate to pass, and send to the states for ratification, an amendment that defines marriage in the United States as a union of a man and a woman as husband and wife.

Through purpose, the President’s rhetoric aligns with the conservative/orthodox ideology in the culture wars, in which rights for same-sex couples run contrary to mandates from the Christian God.

*Activist Judges’ Purpose: Assert that Same-Sex Couples Deserve Equal Rights*

The activist judges represent the ideological opposite to the President and those who identify with his anti-same-sex marriage narrative. The “activist judges” want to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples, which is something that, prior to 2004, had never been done in the United States. Bush rhetorically constructs the judges as asserting the progressive ideology that same-sex couples deserve the same rights as heterosexual
couples. As people, gays and lesbians have fundamental rights, including the right to marry the people that they love. The activist judges thus reinforce the liberal/progressive ideology that same-sex couples deserve the same civil rights as heterosexual couples. Of course, in keeping with the good versus evil narrative, the President shows how the liberal ideology could cripple the country if allowed to continue.

Conclusion

In July 2004, Bush delivered the last overtly-moral speeches of his first term (Kornblut & Milligan, 2004; Speilvogel, 2004). In these texts, the President publicly encouraged both Houses of Congress to ratify the Federal Marriage Amendment, an amendment that would ban same-sex marriage in the United States. Bush uses his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric to thoroughly develop a hero/villain rhetorical drama, where Bush the hero is working to save American society from being forever changed by a few activist judges looking to redefine marriage in order to increase their own power.

In other words, to come back to the issue guiding this chapter, the way in which the President constructed a narrative with which many Americans could identify comes back to the fear-based narrative that the President constructs. Bush’s narrative develops the idea that if same-sex marriages are allowed, American families could crumble, which will result in dramatic shifts in every aspect of American culture. The fear of losing stability in the American family and social structure allows many Americans, conservative or otherwise, to identify with the President’s narrative and the rhetorically constructed hero role that Bush himself plays in that narrative. Conservatives can identify because they, like the President, are staunchly opposed to same-sex marriage on
religious grounds (Diamond, 1995; Hunter, 1991). Less conservative Americans can identify with the President’s narrative because they do not want their society to change for the worse.

In addition to the guiding issue discussed above, I asked two questions designed to tie this chapter to the rest of the dissertation. The first question involves assessing what sort of moral persona the President constructs in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric. Following the rhetorical narrative, activist judges are redefining marriage, which will destroy the moral fiber of America and grant the judges more power. Bush, the hero, argues on behalf of retaining the traditional definition of marriage. In other words, only Bush and the activist judges are afforded the ability to act at all, and the rest of the people become tools (agency) in the power struggle, with gays and lesbians becoming the means for the activist judges to exert their judicial authority, and the rest of the American populace becoming the means by which Bush furthers a conservative ideology. The moral conflict is thus set up as being between Bush and the “activist judges” that he demonizes throughout the texts.

The battle over same-sex marriage is thus left in the hands of an elite few, Bush and the “activist judges,” all of whom hold a lot of power in society. Gays and lesbians (those who are directly affected by the issue), are denied the right to make their own moral choice about whether or not to marry. Bush wants to make the decision for them. Those who actually feel the effects of the “moral” decision in their daily lives are denied their right to make their own decisions. I have termed this sort of “morality” elitist ethics as ethics and morality are reduced to a power struggle between an elite few. I believe
that Bush, the “moral values” president, constructs an elitist moral persona in his anti-
same-sex marriage rhetoric. By trying to ban same-sex marriage, Bush is not allowing
people to make choices about their own lives. It is as though he does not trust gays and
lesbians to do what he believes is “right” (i.e., enter into a “traditional” marriage), so he
makes sure that they are not able to participate in the wrong, and he uses his official
power to do so.

Ethics and morality are made to seem non-existent to the judges, who are
portrayed as increasing their own power through destroying traditional morality. The
only person, following the rhetoric, who is absolutely moral is Bush himself. He is
working to preserve traditional marriage and the morality that comes with it, even if he
has to take away other people’s rights to make their own decisions.

The way that Bush frames the ethical struggle as being only between himself and
the activist judges helps to answer the second question that I posited in the introduction
regarding whether or not the President constitutes a moral community to follow him.
Instead of appealing to traditional morality, to the orthodox claim that it is morally wrong
for two people of the same sex to be married, the President builds his rhetorical narrative
around the idea of power-hungry judges who are expanding their reach through changing
the definition of marriage.

Throughout the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s, those who identified as
conservative/orthodox rallied against civil rights for same-sex couples on the grounds
that same-sex couples were acting immorally and against the will of God (Diamond,
1995; Hunter, 1991). The orthodox narrative of the 1980s and 1990s thus created a space
in which those who identified with the narrative could act. People who identified with
the moral claims of the orthodox conservatives could act morally by not having sex with
someone of the same gender and, if they were so inclined, by taking an active role in
grassroots initiatives aimed at limiting civil rights for same-sex couples (for more on
these initiatives, see Diamond, 1995).

Bush’s rhetoric takes away this space for action. As I explained in this chapter,
the President focuses on the activist judges who are granting the marriage licenses rather
than the gays and the lesbians who are applying for and using said licenses. This change
in the enemy agent changes the narrative with which the conservative base had identified
for years. Simultaneously, it removed the conservative base’s ability to act. While not
having sex with or marrying someone of the same gender was one way that the orthodox
base could enact their morality and build their own moral community during the culture
wars, there is nothing that they can really do about the “activist judges” the President is
describing (save, support the elite’s efforts to take away the activist judges’ power). The
people are reduced to part of the contested scene, left to powerlessly suffer the effects
that the President claims will result from same-sex marriage. I consider the implications
of this reduction of agent-status and the resulting elitist moral persona more in the final
chapter.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

In November 2004, President George W. Bush won re-election as the “moral values” candidate, according to exit polls taken on election day (www.cnn.com/election/2004). In this dissertation, I have attempted to assess the moral persona that the President developed during his first term in office. In order to assess this moral persona, I used Burke’s cluster and pentad to critically examine three incidents in Bush’s first term that the elite press (i.e., Boston Globe, New York Times, Washington Post) identified as being explicit “moral values” issues: namely, the President’s decision to partially ban/partially fund embryonic stem cell research, 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror, and the President’s adamant stand behind a proposed Constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage.

A cursory view of the three issues shows that they align with the orthodox position described by James Hunter (1991). As Hunter (1991) and later Diamond (1995) explain, those with an orthodox viewpoint believe that morality is fixed, an absolute unchanging right (and corresponding wrong), written by a higher being and codified in religious texts (mainly the Bible). Hunter (1991) traces the orthodox movement as having begun in response to some of the most pressing issues of the 1960s and 1970s, most notably the continued threat of communism, the rise of feminism, and the increase
in support for same-sex rights. For those in the orthodox community, all three issues were contrary to the will of the Christian God, against the holy texts, and thus immoral.

The orthodox organized together to help ensure that pro-life, anti-gay, pro-God leaders would be elected to all levels of government. As Diamond (1995) explains, they were more successful in local elections than in national ones. In other words, while orthodox voters were able to help pro-life state representatives get elected, they never really achieved their ultimate goal, that of putting a pro-life, pro-God, anti-gay man\(^{18}\) in the White House. While Reagan seemed to match their beliefs, his presidency did not result in the reversal of \textit{Roe v. Wade} or a decrease in the rights granted to same-sex couples (Hunter, 1991).

When George W. Bush was declared the winner of the 2000 election, it seemed to many in the orthodox camp that they had finally gotten the President that they had wanted for years. Bush was a conservative man who identified himself as pro-life (Fox, 2001; Toner, 2001), opposed to same-sex marriage (Bush, 2004a), and an outspoken Christian (Buruma, 2004; Steinfels, 2006), all of which are key values for Christian conservatives.

Throughout this dissertation, I have shown how Bush, in many ways, negates some of the key principles upon which the orthodox movement was founded. While, as Hunter (1991) explains, the majority of the work in the orthodox movement is carried out by elites in academia and the clergy, lay people are still given agency, a space in which to act. For instance, while the elites were the face of the orthodox movement, it was

\footnote{I intentionally use the word “man” here as the vast majority of those with an orthodox viewpoint believe that men occupy a God-given space that is above that of women. Since men are supposed to reign over women, orthodox moralists would, more than likely, not support a woman President.}
grassroots activism on the part of mainstream conservatives that led to the 1994 Republican takeover of both houses of Congress. Moreover, the rhetoric of the orthodox movement, I contend, creates a space in which people can act. While it is the elites who are claiming that it is wrong to have an abortion or to be gay, their rhetoric contains within it the opportunity to act, or agency. Those who align with the movement are given the task of reading the holy texts for themselves and acting accordingly (Hunter, 1991). This gives the people agency.

However, as I have shown throughout this dissertation, Bush, whose rhetoric constructs what I have termed an “elitist” moral persona, strips the people of this space to act in three of his most overtly “moral” issues. In the embryonic stem cell research addresses, the President frames the rhetoric as being between himself and the scientists conducting the research. The people who would actually be seeking the treatments, that is, people living with debilitating ailments that could, potentially, benefit from stem cell procedures, are not mentioned in the rhetoric as active agents but as part of the scene that the scientists and Bush are fighting to control. The rest of the populace is similarly reduced to being part of the contested scene. Following the rhetoric, the only people granted the right to act are Bush and the scientists.

In the 9/11 and War on Terror rhetoric, the President shifts away from his elitist moral persona momentarily. He focuses the 9/11 and Afghanistan war rhetoric on how all Americans, elite and commoner alike, were affected by the September 11th attacks, and, as a result of their shared victimhood, all Americans can help America to rebuild through enacting the American value of sacrificing for the country. However, as time
wears on and the President begins discussing the Iraq war, the President shifts his moral persona back to that of an ethical elitist. The war is framed as being between Bush and Saddam Hussein, and American civilians are once again relegated to the role of inactive scene-occupiers, waiting to have others act on their behalf. Once again, the space for overt action is taken away as the President and Saddam Hussein are the only completely active agents in the rhetoric.

Finally, in the anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric, the President relies upon an elitist moral persona very similar to the one that he uses in the embryonic stem cell research addresses. The President once again frames the moral conflict as being between himself and a few elite individuals, in this case “activist judges.” Gays and lesbians, the people actually affected by the rhetoric, are not treated as active agents in their own right. They become merely the means by which the activist judges are exerting their own authority and fundamentally altering the meaning of the American family. Heterosexual Americans are not mentioned as active agents in the rhetoric either. Rather, heterosexual Americans are the ones who are living in a society on the verge of a fundamental change, and to avoid a devastating change, the only thing that they are asked to do is to support their President.

The findings of this dissertation have implications for orthodox conservatives. Those who identified with Bush on the grounds that he was the “moral values” candidate may need to re-think what constitutes a “moral values” candidate. As I have shown, in the case of George W. Bush, “moral values” had less to do with individual moral choice and more to do with widespread restrictions, restrictions that took away the people’s
rights to make personal, private, and, yes, moral decisions about their own healthcare and their own domestic living situation. “Moral values” became less about personal morality and more about constraining others. If “moral values” really entails people being equipped with the “truth” to help them make the right decisions, then a leader who blocks the need to make the moral decision is not furthering the cause of orthodox morality.

Moreover, the findings of this dissertation have implications for those interested in the study of rhetorical ethics. I have argued throughout this project that Bush’s moral persona does not clearly align with any sort of moral persona discussed in ethical theory. To illustrate, Johannesen (2002) asserts that “dominant traditional ethical theories [consist] of categorical imperatives, prima facie duties, justice as fairness, and utilitarianism” (p. i). Each of these traditional theories, as I will show, fails to explain the moral persona developed in President Bush’s first term rhetoric.

Mill’s (2009) utilitarianism begins with the assumption that the consequences of an action determine whether the action is moral or not. An action that results in positive consequences is moral while an action that results in negative consequences is immoral. A moral action is one that maximizes the positive and minimizes the negative, or, more simply, a moral action is one that results in the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Bush falls short of constructing a utilitarian moral persona most clearly in his embryonic stem cell research addresses. Bush (2001d) himself claims that the existing 60 stem cell lines could be replicated numerous times. In other words, one embryonic stem cell could, plausibly, save several lives. However, the President opposes embryonic stem cell research on the grounds that it destroys a (potential) human life. That one (potential)
human life could aid many who are already living. Thus, allowing and funding embryonic stem cell research would have been the greatest good for the greatest number of people, so utilitarianism fails to explain Bush’s moral persona.

In response to and in disagreement with utilitarianism, Kant (2009) discussed both duty and categorical imperatives. For Kant (2009), the morality of an act is not in the act itself but rather in the intention behind the act. If people are acting according to their duty to do right, then the act is moral. As rational beings, humans impose duty on themselves. If the requirements to act morally are coming from an outside source, then the person following the outside rules is not really acting morally as the inclination to act is a result of external rather than internal forces. This requirement of internal inclination is quite absent in the first term rhetoric of President George W. Bush. Through taking away the right of people to make their own moral decisions, Bush legislatively limits the rights of people to act according to their own internal inclinations. While Bush may or may not be acting according to his own internal drives, by limiting the rights of others to do the same, it becomes obvious that Bush’s moral persona is not fully explained through a duty-based moral model.

For Kant (2009), there are certain rules that always must be obeyed in a moral world. Kant (2009) called these rules categorical imperatives. Kant’s universality categorical imperative asserts that there are universal laws of humanity. His respect categorical imperative claims that people should never be used as a means to an end but rather as ends in and of themselves. Obviously, categorical imperatives do not fully explain the moral persona the Bush constructs in his rhetoric. As I illustrated in the
same-sex marriage chapter, Bush’s rhetoric reduces gays and lesbians to agency (or means), rendering them nothing more than tools in a power struggle between Bush and the “activist” judges in their quest to define marriage and levy their respective definition on all of American society.

Rawls (2009) discusses justice and fairness. Rawls (2009) asserts that the only way to know what is just is to consider all points of view. In deciding what is fair, an individual needs to understand that there are various positions in society, and no one knows for sure which position he or she will assume. From this unknown position, it is in every person’s best interest to ensure that individual liberties are not infringed for any reason, even if the denial of one individual’s rights would benefit society as a whole. This first principle is called the principle of equal liberty. With the difference principle, Rawls (2009) claims that inequality is permissible if both the advantaged and the disadvantage will both benefit from the inequality. The principle of fair equality and opportunity asserts that it is just for all to have the opportunity to achieve an advantaged position. Under this principle, all forms of discrimination are wrong as discrimination denies some people the chance to reach their full potential. Obviously, the justice and fairness doctrine fail to explain Bush’s moral persona in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric as gays and lesbians are not given the same rights as heterosexual people.

There is a reason that the major ethical theories identified by Johannesen (2002) fail to fully explain the moral persona constructed in Bush’s rhetoric. Each of these theories has its focus on the individual. All of these ethical theories start with the assumption that the individual is going to face the ethical dilemma and act as a result.
Elitist ethics, however, does not focus on the individual at an ethical crossroads. The elitist overseeing those at the ethical crossroads struggles with other elites, and those at the ethical crossroads are only left to feel the effects of an “ethical” decision being made by the elite few. The individual at the ethical crossroads is not given the chance to act morally or immorally at all. In other words, an elitist ethical lens takes the focus off of the individual.

Because the focus is removed from individual actors, elitist ethics are inherently disempowering and undemocratic. Through focusing on an ethical conflict as only being between a select group of people, even if the conflict affects millions more, the ethical elitist takes away the people’s right to act. In doing so, the masses are invalidated, their individual experiences muted in favor of the version of events constructed by the ethical elitist. An ethical elitist takes debate and deliberation out of the public sphere, severely limiting the counterarguments and other viewpoints to which the masses are exposed, and this is contrary to the ideals of deliberative democracy.

Bush is not the only ethical elitist. In fact, in a future project I would like to explore other ethical elitists, people or groups who occupy a rhetorical space that they believe is so superior to other alternatives that they silence or severely limit the voices of others. As one possible research idea, when I presented an early draft of the embryonic stem cell research chapter at NCA, one of the anonymous reviewers thought that ethical elitism may be an interesting lens through which to analyze all pro-life rhetoric. As Diamond (1995) explains, Operation Rescue and other Right to Life groups have the ultimate goal of overturning Roe v. Wade, which, following the group’s logic, will
dramatically decrease the number of abortions in the United States. In other words, members of Right to Life groups want to re-criminalize abortion. The elitist ethics become apparent upon a closer examination of what re-criminalizing abortion would mean for women. Those who wish to re-criminalize abortion are basically assuming that women cannot be trusted to make the “right” decision (i.e., not have an abortion), and so the ethical elites want to take this right away. In the case of abortion, they want to use the law to do so, which draws a personal moral decision back into the bureaucratic sphere, a move that I asserted Bush made in his anti-same-sex marriage rhetoric.

As another example (and another possible project), Hunter (1991) discusses how some members of the orthodox community have fought to remove art that is too erotic (conservatives label it “pornographic”) or that promotes homosexuality. To tie these efforts back to elitist ethics, those who wish to remove the art may believe that the masses simply cannot be trusted to make the “right” decision and not view such “offensive” and “immoral” material, so the ethical elitists would like to take away the right to view the art. The ethical elites have tried to use legislation to do so (which draws the issue back into the elite courtroom and out of the hands of the masses). It would be interesting to trace the relationship between orthodoxy and elitist ethics. It may be that the belief in absolute Truth leads to the infringement of others’ rights.

However, while harder to find, there are examples of liberals/progressives who construct an elitist moral persona. As an example, in 1984 lawyer Catherine MacKinnon

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19 A multi-year international study (Peiro et. al, 2001) shows that this logic may be flawed. The study compared abortion rates in Spain and other European nations both before and after abortion was decriminalized in Spain. The authors failed to find a statistically significant change in the number of women having abortions after the practice was decriminalized. Before the decriminalization, women would either have illegal abortions or go to another country to obtain a legal one.
and academic Andrea Dworkin argued that pornography, defined as material that graphically showed the sexually explicit subordination of women, men, and children, was harmful to women in society. They drafted legislation in Indianapolis to give those harmed by pornography, either in the making and trafficking of it or as a result of violence inflicted by men after watching it, the right to seek civil damages (Durkin, 1999). While the legislation was promptly overturned on First Amendment grounds, the actions of the two women could be interesting to analyze through an elitist ethical lens. The women were both in positions of authority, and they inserted themselves into a legislative battle with First Amendment scholars. The ethical struggle was thus between an elite few. The effects of the ethical struggle, however, were forced upon the people of Indianapolis. It was as though the two women could not trust porn viewers to control themselves, and so they wanted to take away the viewers’ right to watch pornography, and the two used their authoritative positions to limit people’s rights to view it. In other words, it could be argued, in the name of progressive feminism, Dworkin and MacKinnon assumed an elitist moral persona.

Finally, this project has implications for rhetorical scholars. First of all, it shows that Burke’s cluster and pentad analytical tools complement one another and allow a rhetorical critic to better understand how featured terms (discovered in the cluster analysis) function pentadically in the rhetoric. In surveying the literature, I only found two other studies where the two tools were used together to analyze rhetoric (Bobbitt, 2004; Peterson, 1988). This project serves as another example that the two methods in tandem can help to reveal the deeper meaning of the rhetoric.
Moreover, the pentad analysis itself adds to the corpus of literature that discusses how active agents can be reduced to part of the scene. Blankenship, Fine, and Davis (1983), for instance, posit that in his 1980 Presidential win, Ronald Reagan was transformed from an agent in the 1980 Republican primary campaign to part of the scene of the campaign itself. However, as the authors assert, Reagan moved himself to the foreground and made himself part of the scene (Blankenship, Fine, and Davis, 1983). In other words, while a study has acknowledged that agents can become part of the scene, the focus of that study dealt with how the agent chose to become part of the scene to increase his agency. Conversely, in my study, the populous is turned into the scene and, as a result, loses their choice and their agency.

Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (2005) and Ling (1970) both discuss how reducing a culpable agent to part of the scene can absolve the agent of guilt for his or her wrongdoing. However, in both of these studies, the agent being reduced from agent to scene is guilty of wrongdoing and thus benefits from being stripped of their active agent status. On the other hand, in my study, I show how people are denied their agent status before they have the opportunity to engage in any rhetorically-constructed wrongdoing. As I show throughout the dissertation, especially in the embryonic stem cell research chapter and the same-sex marriage chapter, those directly affected by the issue may suffer as a result of their reduction from active agent to passive scene. In other words, my study shows how reducing people to part of the scene can have very negative effects for those involved.
Understanding how people become reduced to scene and agency is particularly important for understanding Burke’s notion of morality, a notion that has not fully been explored in the literature. In *Grammar of Motives*, Burke (1969a) asserts that “when one talks of the will, one is necessarily in the field of the moral; and the field of the moral is, by definition, the field of action” (p. 136). Morality is further tied to the act in Burke’s (1969a) discussion of personal action as moral freedom in which morals are possible only to the extent that people are free to act. This linkage between the act and morality is also discussed in the appendix to *Permanence and Change*. In his discussion of behavior and action as being opposed to motion, Burke (1984) makes the following footnote: “human behavior [is] in the realm of morals” (p. 274). Behavior is an act. Here, as in other places, Burke blatantly links morality with the act. The two are closely related, and, given that this appendix was written some 40 years after the first appearance of *Grammar of Motives*, it seems that this is one of the key linkages that Burke, with his focus on the act, retains throughout his career. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, Burke’s (limited) claims about the links between the act and morality can be reinforced through critical examination of rhetorical texts. For instance, in the rhetorical texts I analyzed, through taking away the right of the people to act, Bush simultaneously takes away their right to act morally (or immorally).

If, as Burke first proposed in 1969, the act is tied to morality, then George W. Bush may have been the “moral values” candidate. Morality, it would seem, lies in the individual’s ability to act. Moral theorists would posit that morality addresses what an individual ought to do (see, for instance, Kant, 2009). However, throughout this
dissertation I have used the term “elitist ethics.” Ethics, as Rawls (2009) shows, lies with how the individual ought to act when the act is going to affect others. When Bush’s personal morality was forced upon the rest of the country, his views ceased to be about morality and entered into the realm of ethics—elitist ethics. Elitist ethics reduce the citizenry to passive pawns in a power-struggle between the elite few and are thus contrary to the ideals of deliberative democracy. For this reason, voters should be cautious of prohibitions enacted by those in authority who claim to be limiting freedom in the name of morality.
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