AFRICOM's Impact on International and Human Security: A Case Study of Tanzania

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AFRICOM’s Impact on International and Human Security: A Case Study of Tanzania

A Thesis

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Mikenna Maroney

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Abstract

The expansion of U.S. military engagement in Africa is based on American national security interests. The objective of this research was to add to existing evaluations of the U.S. Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) by taking an in-depth look at its impact through a case study of Tanzania and sought to answer three questions: What is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public? To answer these questions this assessment utilized secondary source materials, content analysis of Tanzanian newspapers and an online discussion forum, and interviews with U.S. officials.

This analysis found that AFRICOM is more of a traditional combatant command than the whole of government command articulated at its inception, and primarily emphasizes military-to-military partner capacity building. The evidence shows that AFRICOM has a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, but fails to address human security matters, and the Tanzanian public has a largely negative view of the U.S. military organization. These findings suggest a closer look at policy implications for American relations with other states in the region.
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Chapter One
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Introduction

Traditionally U.S. foreign policy goals have centered on national interest and realism, economic development, and more recently the responsibility to protect. Though a change began in the late 1990’s, in the aftermath of September 11th U.S. foreign and security policy underwent a paradigm shift wherein weak and failing states were seen as posing threats equal, and indeed more chronic, to those of the militaries of strong states to international and U.S. national security. As detailed by Patrick (2011) this shift in threat perceptions in the U.S. and the broader international community are based on two propositions. First, traditional conceptions of security should be expanded to include cross border threats driven by non-state actors, activities, or forces (such as pandemics or environmental degradation). Second, that these cross border threats largely originate and emanate from weak and failing states in the developing world.

In his seminal book on the topic, Patrick (2011) challenged this newly emerged consensus through an empirical analysis of the connection between state failure and transnational threats, examining the threats of terrorism, transnational crime, WMDs, pandemic diseases, and energy insecurity. His analysis finds that that a paradigm wherein weak states are the locus from which international security threats emanate is not
corroborated empirically and that, as a whole, these states do not pose significant threats to the United States. Patrick (2011) also posits that, in addition to being cognizant of the tenuous links between state fragility and transnational security threats, the U.S. needs to be more strategic in its approach towards fragile states; focusing on preventing governance deterioration, reevaluating its development policy, and avoiding an over militarization of relations with fragile states.

After the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990's, the U.S. struggled with defining Africa's security and strategic significance. Having been viewed primarily in humanitarian terms, the bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam Tanzania, in August 1998, led to a reevaluation among analysts and policy makers of the strategic importance of the region.

The reconceptualization of threats to transnational and U.S. national security and strategic interests, as detailed by Patrick (2011), brought America’s long-standing strategic disinterest in the African continent into sharp relief. Through the lens of weak and failing states as a threat to U.S. security, Africa could no longer be viewed as a peripheral, humanitarian concern (Whelan, 2007). The 2002 United States National Security Strategy devoted a page and a half to Africa in the regional overview section, substantially more than any other region. And the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy page 37 stated, “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration.”
Within the defense community there was a growing belief that the separation of responsibilities for Africa among three combatant commands (Pacific Command, Central Command, and European Command) and the uncoordinated and peripheral attention resulting from the arrangement, was unsustainable. This view largely stemmed from the fact that Africa had steadily begun consuming more time and attention of the three commands which were responsible for it. For example, former EUCOM Commander General James L. Jones, said in 2006 EUCOM’s staff were spending at least half their time on African issues (Ploch, 2011). Yet it was not until policymakers viewed African security threats as congruent with overall global threats to U.S. security and strategic interests, that this reorganization and new focus was considered necessary.

On February 7, 2007 President Bush announced the creation of the U.S. combatant command for Africa, known as USAFRICOM, stating

“This new Command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa” (White House News, 2007).

The creation of AFRICOM, and the reasons articulated for its creation, signaled a clear shift in the security consciousness of the U.S. in the wake of September 11th. The growing view that “Extreme poverty, ethno-religious divisions, corrupt and weak governance, failed states, and large tracts of ‘ungoverned space’ combine to offer what many experts believe to be fertile breeding grounds for transnational Islamist terror”
(Berschinski, 2007, p. 5), reconfigured Africa’s strategic importance to U.S. national security.

The U.S. Africa Command was touted by officials as being unlike any other combatant command. It was articulated as a “combatant command plus” which, according to Lauren Ploch (2011, p.4),

“…implies that the Command has all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional geographic combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead military operations, but also includes a broader “soft power” mandate aimed at building a stable security environment and incorporates a larger civilian component from other U.S. government agencies to address those challenges…In the view of AFRICOM’s architects and proponents, if U.S. agencies, both military and civilian, are able to coordinate more efficiently and effectively both among themselves as well as with their African partners and other international actors, they might be more successful at averting more complex emergencies on the continent.”

In short, the creation of AFRICOM was in response to complex security environments, which analysts and policymakers believed required institutionalizing a “whole of government” approach. The command’s “whole of government” emphasis was premised on the view that interagency interoperability would create a more holistic security policy, fostering broader security, and enhancing governance capacity and development throughout African countries. This would, in turn, mitigate threats from the region, primarily through ameliorating the underlying socio-economic conditions from which many security threats stemmed. This approach was also seen as a means to establish stronger strategic relationships between the U.S. and African states. If AFRICOM succeeded in these efforts, it would be a significant evolution in U.S. military engagement abroad representing a shift to one “…mindful of the complicated,
interconnected relationships among security, governance, and development” (Berschinski, 2007, p. 1).

Prior to AFRICOM’s creation, U.S. Africa policy had settled somewhere in-between the previous two post-Cold War policy phases: pursuing both humanitarian and strategic objectives connected to the larger Global War on Terror (Lawson, 2007). Though some Africans were apprehensive about U.S. counter-terror policies, President George W. Bush’s emphasis on combating HIV/AIDS and increasing U.S. development assistance helped maintain a high level of public approval of the U.S. throughout Africa. The U.S. had positive relations with many West African states, especially with Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, and Senegal. Its partners in the Sahel region included Chad, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. Since the mid-1990’s all of the East African states, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania, had become close U.S. allies in Africa. All of Southern Africa, with the exception of Zimbabwe, had become U.S. allies (Lawson, 2007).

In the half-decade since AFRICOM’s creation, the U.S. has utilized the command in an attempt to cultivate stronger bilateral and security cooperation ties with African states. AFRICOM’s prominence in U.S. foreign policy grew through its involvement in executing the Libyan intervention in 2011 and Malian intervention in 2013, and its expanding role in combating the spread of violent extremism in West Africa. In terms of the impact on U.S. relations, LeVan (2010) notes that reactions to the announcement of the command in Kenya, South Africa, and Botswana, among others, expressed serious concerns that the increased U.S. military presence would result in increased terrorist
attacks in the region, and erode the sovereignty of African states. Some of the continents regional organizations also quickly developed unified positions against AFRICOM. For example, the fourteen country South African Development Community (SADC) issued a statement which stated that, “sister countries of the region should not agree to host AFRICOM and in particular, armed forces, since they would have a negative effect” (“Notes following International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster media briefing,” 2007).

However, according to a Washington Post investigative article by Whitlock, since 2007 approximately a dozen air bases, primarily used for surveillance, have been established throughout Africa including Burkina Faso, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Seychelles (2012). In addition, a status of forces agreement between the U.S. and Niger was signed in January 2013 (Harris & Hirsch, 2013), further expanding the network of U.S. surveillance bases throughout the continent. In 2008, despite its initially outspoken opposition, South Africa permitted the USS Roosevelt into its waters, the first time a U.S. carrier had been allowed to do so since the end of apartheid (Ploch, 2011). These examples seem to suggest that African governments have gradually become more receptive to AFRICOM, and the resources it can leverage for regional security challenges.

How effective is AFRICOM? Harbeson (2011, p. 151) has argued existing assessments on AFRICOM are deeply problematic from both an academic and policy perspective. He states,
“Centrally important in fashioning the terms of partnership with African countries will be attention to the distinctive political, socioeconomic, cultural, and geographical contours of each country and those of the regions of which they are a part...These general characteristics of most Sub-Saharan African countries coalesce to shape country-specific contours that must be recognized and addressed if US foreign policy in general, and AFRICOM involvement in particular, is to be effective...Moreover, it will become apparent that proper characterization of these factors and their interface to establish country-specific contours entails some wrestling with conceptual issues as well as empirical fact gathering to an extent beyond what is often recognized in the literature at best implicitly, if at all”.

A 2010 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) review made a similar critique of AFRICOM’s own efforts to assess its impact, noting that “AFRICOM is generally not measuring long-term effects of activities” and argued that, “without assessing activities, AFRICOM lacks information to evaluate their effectiveness, make informed future planning decisions, and allocate resources” (Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 2). The same review found that AFRICOM, due to personnel and structural issues, lacked institutional knowledge of African states.

Approach

The objective of this research is to add to existing evaluations of AFRICOM by taking a narrow, in-depth look at its impact. As one of the most significant contemporary iterations in U.S. Africa policy, evaluations of AFRICOM’s impact will be critical to ensuring U.S. policy towards Africa is responsive to regional dynamics and challenges. By evaluating the command in one country, a case study affords a more comprehensive picture of the command and its impact.
Tanzania was chosen as the case to examine the role of AFRICOM for several important reasons. First, it is currently not involved in a military campaign either at home or abroad that could potentially skew any findings on AFRICOM’s involvement with the country. Second, Tanzania is a U.S. ally but not one of the U.S.’s first-tier priority countries in Africa. This affords an opportunity to assess how AFRICOM is engaging with African states that are not of immediate strategic concern but are, nonetheless, U.S. allies and important regional actors. With an allied state it is easier to identify points of long-standing mutual interest and cooperation, points of friction in the bilateral relations, and changes, either positive or negative, in the bilateral relationship. Together these aspects establish a richer foundation from which to evaluate AFRICOM’s impact.

Tanzania’s long-standing stability, history of mediating regional conflicts, hosting large refugee populations, contributions to peacekeeping missions, and hosting of regional and international organization such as the East African Community (EAC) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), make it an important actor in the often volatile East Africa region. Tanzania is also challenged by many of the transnational threats its neighbors face including illicit narcotic trafficking, piracy, and terrorism. As one of the world’s poorest countries, economic development has failed to reach the majority of Tanzanians who also suffer from the effects of poor health and education systems, as well as the world’s 12th highest HIV/AIDS infection rate, leading to pervasive and chronic threats to human security. A strategic U.S.-Tanzanian relationship is critical for countering the threats Tanzania faces, and bolstering the
country’s capacity to continue its role in addressing ongoing regional conflicts and humanitarian crises.

Historically, the U.S. did not have strong bilateral ties to Tanzania while China, Cuba, and Russia had strong diplomatic ties and a heavy presence in the country. Indeed, the strength of Tanzania’s ties to these countries, and its historic role as a non-aligned and socialist state have often placed it at odds with the U.S., with especially negative impacts on U.S. Tanzanian military relations (Meredith, 2011). Despite these historic strains, security cooperation with Tanzania has become an important aspect of contemporary bilateral relations. U.S. interest in this arena stems from the 1998 terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam, the discovery of several Tanzanians being members of Al-Qaeda, and the growth of Al-Shabaab and its capabilities in nearby Somalia and Kenya (Dagne, 2010).

U.S. officials regularly cite Tanzania as an example of a positively developing country, one that demonstrates good democratic governance and respect for human rights. Though security cooperation and assistance have increased, humanitarian and economic development support and assistance constitute the cornerstone of contemporary U.S.-Tanzanian relations. According to the OECD, using 2010-11 data, the U.S. tops the list of donors of gross official development assistance (ODA) to Tanzania (“Tanzania,” 2013). Total U.S. assistance has steadily increased in recent years, from $370.2 million in FY 2008 to $571.892 million in FY 2012 request (Dagne, 2010).
Tanzania is one of fifteen focus countries in the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). It was granted $1.76 billion FY 2009 to FY 2011, making it the largest recipient of the program (“Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Tanzania”). In February 2008 the country was granted the largest Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact to date, worth $698 million, which sought “…to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth by increasing household incomes through targeted investments in transportation, energy, and water” (“Tanzania Compact”). In 2010 Tanzania was named one of twenty countries in the U.S. Feed the Future (FtF) Initiative, administered by USAID. Feed the Future is the U.S. government’s global hunger and food security program whose primary objectives are “…accelerating inclusive agriculture sector growth and improving nutritional status in specific countries” (Ho & Hanrahan, 2011). Feed the Future seeks to achieve its objectives in Tanzania by the year 2015.

This study seeks to answer three questions: What is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public?

To get the Tanzanian perspective, the best way to answer these research questions would be to interview high-level military, diplomatic, and development officials from the Tanzanian government. The purpose of these interviews would be to gather views on AFRICOM and its impact on security in Tanzania and U.S.-Tanzanian relations, from a Tanzanian viewpoint. The best way to gauge the Tanzanian public’s perception of the
command would be to conduct extensive survey work throughout the country, combining those findings with a comprehensive content analysis of all the country’s newspapers. Similarly, talking to numerous U.S. officials from AFRICOM and the interagency organizations that work with the command in Tanzania would be the best way to establish a well-rounded perspective of AFRICOM, from a U.S. vantage point. Talking to officials from both countries, and across these sectors, would provide information critical to answering the research questions pertaining to AFRICOM’s execution of U.S. national security policy, and any impacts on human security.

While these methods would constitute the ideal research design, some compromises had to be made to this project’s methodology due to issues of access to information and personnel. This evaluation employs a qualitative mixed methods case study methodology, and consisted of field research, content analysis of a sample of Tanzanian newspapers and a Tanzanian internet discussion forum, and interviews with U.S. personnel. In general, issues pertaining to security and defense are less publicly available in Tanzania than in the U.S., and personnel in these sectors are difficult to access.¹ Research by Tanzanian academics on this and related topics is also lacking, due to the more restricted nature of research on security issues in the country, further compounding the difficulty of constructing a Tanzanian perspective on AFRICOM and

¹ Several attempts were made to contact Tanzanian officials working on issues related to this research project, as well as a couple of Tanzanian journalists who write on issues of security in Tanzania, in an effort to discuss this research project with Tanzanians. None of these requests were granted. One official gave an initial response asking what country the author was from, when told the author was from the United States the official cut off all contact.
its impacts. As a result of these limitations, this research had to rely on interviews with U.S. officials, publicly available information in the U.S. on what activities AFRICOM is undertaking in Tanzania, and that country’s top newspapers and online discussion forum to assess public opinion, and the dynamics of the media’s role in shaping public opinion.

The research for this study was conducted in Tanzania from September 2012 until June 2013. The fieldwork included four parts: intensive language instruction, educational coursework on Tanzanian news media, interviews, and living with a native Swahili speaking host family. Field research is defined by Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 257) as “the study of people acting in the natural course of their daily lives. The fieldworker ventures into the worlds of others to learn firsthand about how they live, how they talk and behave, and what captivates and distresses them.” Learning Swahili served as a critical field research component. While Tanzanians learn English in school, the vast majority of the population does not possess the requisite proficiency to discuss political topics easily. And as a whole, Tanzanians were willing and eager to engage in in-depth discussions about their country. Another advantage of becoming proficient in Swahili was the ability to listen to conversations between Tanzanians, an unobtrusive means to gather attitudinal information and viewpoints.

Similar to the field research, Swahili language knowledge and proficiency was vital to accurately conducting this project’s content analysis component. The Swahili language is highly contextual. Often words have several meanings and many words, if literally translated, do not connote the same meaning or inference in English as in
Swahili. Indeed, although an entire paragraph may seemingly be neutral, the use of a particular form of the word “why?” makes the connotation negative. In addition, Swahili has a very large and constantly evolving slang vocabulary, which even Tanzanians have trouble keeping up with. Advanced language skills and extended time living in Tanzania mitigated these complex translation issues and enabled the content analysis to accurately assess and code using attitudinal metrics.

Functioning as a participant-as-observer, field research for this project consisted of observing the everyday lives of Tanzanians, including living with a Tanzanian family, and engaging with Tanzanians. Field research gave this analysis an understanding of the daily lives of Tanzanians; including what political, economic, and social issues are of greatest concern, what role they want their government to play, how do they acquire news and information, and how they view the U.S. Currently, Tanzanian’s are deeply concerned about the political rights of Christians vis a vis Muslims, equal economic development, and Tanzania’s status in the East African region. At present there is also a distinct sense, within the country, that Tanzania is at a crossroads. Many feel that it is ready for a developmental take-off. Others believe that the country’s potential will be stunted by a system which, they believe, only serves the needs of the elite. Overall, a local perspective was adapted into and influenced this research; specifically the daily and broader security concerns of the average Tanzanian.

A second level of analysis was the Tanzanian media. The approximately 350 currently registered newspapers are a central source of information for Tanzanians. Many
stores display the most popular newspapers each day and groups of people stand outside the store throughout the day, reading and discussing the news. Given that newspapers play an important role in shaping public opinion, this research utilizes a content analysis of Tanzanian English and Swahili language newspapers and an internet news discussion forum. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 296), content analysis is “any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages”.

This analysis followed the application of content analysis, as described by Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), by describing the attributes of the content, make inferences regarding Tanzanian public opinion of the command, and the influence the contents of these newspapers have on public opinion. This content analysis employed a theme unit of analysis, qualitatively coding content as either thematically “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral.” The method of recording for the content analysis was a frequency system, according to Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 299), this is a system in which “every occurrence of a given attribute is recorded”. Content analysis was useful for the purposes of this research because it allows for a large sample size, with minimal intrusiveness. Through content analysis, this research sought to construct opinions of the command throughout the wider Tanzanian public by gathering what information about AFRICOM is available in the Tanzanian print media, how that information is presented (are there any biases), and through content analysis of an online discussion forum.
Although *The Daily News* is a leading newspaper and owned by the Tanzanian government, the majority of the country’s newspapers are private. While there are not explicit constraints on the freedom of the press and the media is not controlled by the Tanzanian government, the law stipulates that there is freedom of the press to the extent deemed necessary for the public good (“Tanzania: Freedom of the Press,” 2012). The wording of the law makes it possible for the Tanzania government to act with wide discretion in terms of what it considers “public good.” In recent year’s media watchdog organizations have become concerned about growing intimidation and violence against journalists. A Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index (2013) cited Tanzania as undergoing one of the biggest declines for the year 2012, falling thirty-six places from the prior year’s index. An August, 2013 report by the Committee to Protect Journalists cited, “…a notable jump over historical trends…” (Rhodes, p. 3) in anti-press threats and attacks. The report continues by citing several prominent journalists and editors who stated that, due to personal safety concerns and fear of a publication being shut down by the government, self-censorship was widespread in the Tanzanian press. Freedom House (2012) corroborates these findings, citing many Tanzanian journalists admitting to self-censoring because of ongoing arrests, threats, and assaults of journalists.

Though the media is not controlled by the Tanzanian government, current laws still allow the authorities broad discretion to restrict media for reasons of national security or public interests (“Tanzania: Freedom of the Press,” 2012). As a result of the loosely regulated, often capricious, and retaliatory application of the country’s press and
freedom of speech laws, security issues are, largely, not a matter of public knowledge or debate. These factors make it difficult to assess the country’s security issues and policies. The widespread exclusion of security issues from the news and public discourse also makes it difficult to assess public opinion on the issues related to this research topic.

Despite these issues, an examination of local newspapers from private and government sources, and in different languages, lends important insights into existing publically available information and the dynamics of how Tanzanian newspapers both reflect and shape public opinion of AFRICOM. To provide a wider scope and construct a more comprehensive picture of public opinion, a content analysis was also done of the online discussion forum Jamii Forum. Though the Tanzanian government exerts some control over the country’s news media, internet discussion forums grant Tanzanians a greater freedom from government curtailment of media and free speech, and allow a broader segment of the population to voice their opinions.

Focused interviews were conducted with three current and former high-level U.S. officials, including two former Ambassador’s to East African states and a current AFRICOM employee. Interviews consisted of one in-person interview, a phone interviews, and one in which the respondent answered to the questions through email. The interviews consisted of the following questions: How does Tanzania figure in the U.S. strategic vision of the East African region? What are the challenges and what are the advantages of operating in Tanzania? How, if at all, do AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania differ from other states in the region? Have Tanzanians articulated any concerns
about AFRICOM? If so, what concerns? Using a broad definition, what issues does the U.S. view as the most pressing security concerns in Tanzania? Do you feel AFRICOM had enhanced, hindered, or had no impact on U.S.-Tanzanian bilateral relations?

Responses served to answer the three central research questions in several ways. By comparing information on AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania and interview responses on what the U.S. views as the most pressing security issues in Tanzania, how the country aligns in the U.S. strategic vision of the East Africa region, and what impact has the command had on bilateral relations etc. it is possible to answer the questions: what is the impact of AFRICOM in executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? and how and to what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity?

If the command’s in-country activities and the responses to those questions do not align, then there is a mismatch in the execution of U.S. national security policy in Tanzania. If they align, the reverse is true. Moreover, responses to these questions help illustrate whether or not human security issues constitute a core concern of AFRICOM. Field research and content analysis were the primary means to answer the question; does AFRICOM foster a positive public perception within Tanzania? Nonetheless, responses to the questions about Tanzanians expressing concerns about AFRICOM and what type of impact the command has had on bilateral relations, add further insight and are indicative of to what extent U.S. and Tanzanian officials are cognizant of wider Tanzanian public opinion. Though interviewees had diverse experiences and knowledge
regarding AFRICOM and this specific bi-lateral relationship, their interview responses were most relevant to, and predominantly used for, the analysis in chapters three and four. To encourage openness interviewees were granted anonymity. These interviews proved to be vital supplements to the lack of literature on U.S. Tanzanian relations and Tanzanian security issues.

Summary

Through a mixed qualitative methods approach, this analysis was able to develop a well-rounded picture of AFRICOM in Tanzania, gaining a strong sense of the nature of the command’s in-country activities and the Tanzanian public’s perceptions of the command. Field research, enhanced by local language skills, took this research beyond secondary sources and shaped an empathetic and in-depth knowledge of the security challenges Tanzanians and their country face. A comparison of secondary-source information and field research observations with interview responses helped identify continuity and inconsistencies in U.S. policies and in-country activities. These methods also helped to illustrate whether U.S. policies and activities were congruent with the security threats Tanzania faces. A mixed qualitative methods approach strengthened this research, providing a multi-faceted and in-depth look at the security challenges in a single African state, accessing the extent to which AFRICOM addresses those challenges, and measuring if the command is positively impacting U.S. bilateral relations by fostering
good public perceptions. Through the use of these methods, this analysis contributes depth and specificity to the literature on AFRICOM.

The following chapters cover these topics: U.S. Combatant Commands and the creation of AFRICOM, a review of the policy perspectives on AFRICOM, and the most salient traditional and human security challenges in Tanzania. Chapter three assesses AFRICOM’s impact from the U.S. perspective. Chapter four presents the Tanzanian perspective of AFRICOM’s impact, primarily through an analysis of Tanzanian public opinion on AFRICOM. Chapter five draws together the main findings and conclusions of the analysis, and offers some policy suggestions.
Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe (1) U.S. combatant commands: the impetus for their creation, their functions, and their place within the U.S. military chain of command, including the creation of AFRICOM to illustrate the role combatant commands play in U.S. national security policy; (2) the policy perspectives and debates surrounding the purpose and creation of AFRICOM; and (3) U.S.-Tanzanian relations, with a focus on the history of diplomatic and military relations.

U.S. Combatant Commands

Department of Defense Unified Geographic Commands, more commonly known as combatant commands, form an integral part of the U.S. national security establishment. Following the experience of fighting in World War II, and as America prepared to confront the Soviet Union in possibly another multi-theater war, an “Outline Command Plan” was developed in 1946 (Hodge, 2011). The 1946 command plan established seven commands: Pacific, Far East, Northeast, Alaskan, Caribbean, European, and the Atlantic Fleet (Hodge, 2011). The development of the command plan was a continuation of efforts which began during World War II to achieve better planning.
and coordination throughout the military. The unified combatant command system was an acknowledgement that the U.S. now had interests, responsibilities, and power that spanned the globe, requiring its armed forces to have standing tasks (Watson). The command plan proposed dividing the world into various geographic areas of responsibility (AOR) for the U.S. military, which would each be overseen by a unified command. Each command would be responsible for protecting U.S. interests and executing U.S. military activities in its respective AOR.

The establishment of combatant commands was officially authorized through the 1947 National Security Act under Title X of the U.S. Code, Section161 through Section 168. The critical aspects of the code state (a) Unified and Specified Combatant commands. With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall (1) establish unified combatant commands and specified combatant commands to perform military missions; and (2) prescribe the force structure of those commands. (Watson, 2011, p. 3) According to Watson (2011, p.13) this system of unified commands are defined as each having (1) forces from at least two military services (2) a continuing, broad mission, and (3) either a functional or geographic responsibility.

Each command is overseen by a four star Admiral or General who is known as a Combatant Commander. As part of the U.S. military chain of command, Combatant Commanders report to the President and Secretary of Defense and receive extensive oversight from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff has no command authority over the Combatant Commanders, it plays an important oversight and intra-bureaucracy communication role. According to U.S. Code X section 163 the Chairman shall (a) confer with and obtain information from the commanders of the combatant commands with respect to the requirements of their commands; (b) evaluate and integrate such information; (c) advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the requirements of the combatant commands, individually and collectively; and (d) communicate, as appropriate, the requirements of the combatant commands to other elements of the Department of Defense (Watson, 2011).

The Unified Command Plan and the delineation of the respective AOR’s are regularly reviewed and updated. Over time the commands in the Unified Command Plan have changed, been absorbed into other commands, or had their respective AOR’s changed according to U.S. security concerns, and shifts in the international strategic landscape. Nonetheless, the geographic approach has remained the primary means by which their respective AOR’s have been established. The main mission of commands is to embody and execute U.S. military policy, domestically and abroad, along with the operational instruction and command and control of U.S. armed forces (Feickert, 2013). Combatant commands, therefore, play a central role in U.S. foreign policy.

Today’s Unified Command Plan is comprised of nine total commands. Six commands are geographic: U.S. Africa Command(USAFRICOM), U.S. Central Command(USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command(USEUCOM), U.S. Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Southern Command (USOUTHCOM). The remaining three are functional commands: U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) (Watson, 2011).

Combatant commands follow what is known as a Joint Staff structure, which consists of the following “J-codes”: J-1 Directorate of Manpower and Personnel, J-2 Directorate of Intelligence, J-3 Directorate of Operations, J-4 Directorate of Logistics, J-5 Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy, J-6 Directorate of Command, Control, Communication, and Computer; J-7 Directorate of Operational Planning and Joint Force Development, J-8 Directorate of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, and J-9 Directorate of Interagency Partnering (Feickert, 2013). Although there are some variations across commands to accommodate unique missions in their AOR’s.

AFRICOM’s creation in 2007 was in response to complex security environments, which analysts and policymakers believed required a more thoroughly institutionalized joint, whole of government approach. Stemming from the experience of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this view posited that interagency cooperation and interoperability would foster greater security, governance capacity, development and overall human security. The nature of the security environment in Africa lent itself to the development and application of this post-September 11th security paradigm. AFRICOM’s whole of government modus operandi centered on cooperation and support to the efforts of the State Department and USAID throughout Africa. This would, it was argued, create
stronger strategic relationships between the U.S. and African states and serve U.S. national security interests by ameliorating threats to human security and the underlying conditions from which traditional security threats developed. If AFRICOM succeeded in these efforts it would be a significant evolution in U.S. military engagement abroad, one “…mindful of the complicated, interconnected relationships among security, governance, and development” (Berschinski, 2007, p. 1).

A structural deviation, a first for the U.S. military, and presented as a representation of how AFRICOM would truly be an interagency command, was the designation of the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) as a civilian position, a post equivalent to that of a deputy commander (Ploch, 2011). Other career senior diplomats from State and USAID were slated to fill the positions of director of outreach, senior development advisor, and director of programs for USAID (Buss et al., 2011). Planners cited the designation of these positions for civilians as indicative that the Command’s staff would be a model of the joint interagency approach. The Department of Defense envisioned upwards of a quarter of AFRICOM’s total staff, roughly 125 billets, would be from other government agencies (Bachmann, 2010). The novelty of AFRICOM would be the inclusion of interagency personnel throughout the command. It was argued that integrating State and USAID personnel into all levels of the command, as opposed to just placing all interagency personnel in the J-9 like other commands, would help AFRICOM plan and coordinate activities which achieved the objectives of all three organizations, comprehensively addressing the root causes of
conflict and instability. This approach was considered the hallmark of AFRICOM, what differentiated it from other regional combatant commands, and a forward looking model for combatant commands.

AFRICOM’s Strategic Objectives and Mission Statement

Two further points of analysis are the command’s strategic objectives and mission statement. Table 2.1 contains AFRICOM’s strategic objective for 2008-2013

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<th>Table 2.1 Strategic Objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM’s theater strategy will support broader national efforts, in coordination with other USG agencies, to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Confront transnational threats to security</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Counter the threats posed by WMD’s, illegal arms, and narcotics</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Mitigate violent conflicts</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Promote Stability, Security, and Reconstruction efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Turn the tide on HIV/AIDS and Malaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Strengthen democratic principles by fostering respect for the Rule of Law, civilian control of the military, and budget transparency;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Foster the conditions that lead to a peaceful, stable, and economically strong Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ultimately, AFRICOM will focus its effort on promoting the following theater objectives:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ African countries and organizations can provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ African governments and regional security organizations possess the capability to mitigate the threat of violent extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ African countries maintain professional militaries responsive to civilian authorities and that respect the Rule of Law and international human rights norms.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2009</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its associated networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Ensure peace operation capacity exists to respond to emerging crises, and continental peace support operations are effectively fulfilling mission requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Cooperate with identified African states in the creation of an environment inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of WMD capabilities and expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Improve security sector governance and increased stability through military support to comprehensive, holistic, and enduring USG efforts in designated states;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Protect populations from deadly contagions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The primary purposes of our activities can be categorized as follows:

- Building the capacity of partner conventional forces
- Supporting capacity building of partner security forces
- Building the capacity of partner enabling forces
- Fostering strong strategic relationships
- Conducting defense sector reform
- Fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness, and interoperability
- Countering transnational and extremist threats
- Contributing to stability in current zones of conflict
- Addressing conditions that contribute to instability

Ensure that the al-Qaeda networks and associated violent extremists do not attack the United States

Maintain assured access and freedom of movement throughout our AOR

Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the will, capability, and capacity to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and the illicit trafficking of weapons, people and narcotics

Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the capacity to execute effective continental peace operations and to respond to crises

Encourage African militaries to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law, abide by international human rights norms, and contribute to stability in their respective states

Countering terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)

Countering Piracy and Illicit Trafficking

Partnering to Strengthen Defense Capabilities

Preparing and Responding to Crisis

Fiscal Responsibility

Countering Violent Extremist Organizations

Strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking

Strengthening defense capabilities

Maintaining strategic posture

Preparing for and responding to crises


From the table it is evident that the command’s strategic objectives have undergone significant changes, with the scope of AFRICOM’s objectives being progressively narrowed over time. The 2008 posture statement heavily emphasized interagency cooperation and a broad set of strategic objectives, including post conflict reconstruction and efforts to address human security issues. By 2009 the scope of AFRICOM’s objectives had already narrowed. Support to reconstruction efforts was removed and, in general, the strategic objectives had a more military focus. 2010’s
strategic objectives seemingly attempted to bridge the gap between 2008 and 2009.

Although the agenda was slightly expanded from 2009, for the first time interagency cooperation was not mentioned. Traditional security threats were the dominant focus in 2011, although they retained some breadth in terms of describing how the command would work to achieve its objectives. The strategic objectives for 2012-13 were further narrowed, placing a clear emphasis on traditional and international security issues. It is important to note that since 2009, interagency cooperation has not been a strategic objective for AFRICOM.

Another area of relevance is the command’s mission statement. The mission statement for AFRICOM helps to guide the command’s activities, and like the strategic objectives in the posture statements, set parameters for its activities. AFRICOM’s mission statement has undergone several iterations since the formation of the command in 2007. The draft statement read,


In contrast, the 2012-present statement reads,

“United States Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a
security environment conducive to good governance and development.” (Ham, 2013, p. 2)

Similar to the commands strategic objectives, over time the mission statement has undergone substantial evolutions. Like the early posture statements in 2008-09 the draft mission statement places significant emphasis on an interagency approach but lacks specificity regarding what activities would be undertaken by AFRICOM. The 2011 mission statement, as was the case with the strategic objectives that year, completely departs from an interagency approach and instead focuses heavily on military activities. Indeed, the draft statement and the 2011 statement illustrate a dramatic swing in the conceptualization of how AFRICOM would function.

It is apparent that by 2011 AFRICOM had evolved into a more traditional combatant command, in terms of its mission and strategic objectives. The changes in the command’s strategic objectives and mission statements together with details of AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania reveal that the command’s activities and objectives lack the whole of government approach envisioned when AFRICOM was established, and in its initial operating phases. For some observers these changes in AFRICOM’s mission statement and strategic objectives has reaffirmed their skepticism of the command’s intentions and capabilities and, in particular, its whole of government approach. Steve McDonald (2011) has charged that AFRICOM has been a “chameleon” changing and shifting in response to criticisms it has encountered.
Policy Perspectives on AFRICOM

Following the announcement of AFRICOM’s creation, some analysts and observers feared U.S. Africa policy was undergoing militarization and its development and diplomatic efforts and the region were being securitized (Nathan, 2009). Critics also contended an increased U.S. military presence would exacerbate security threats, namely terrorism, by furnishing more targets for anti-American terrorist groups from around the world (Buss et al., 2011). Proponents (Isike, Uzodike, & Gilbert, 2008; Pham, 2007a) viewed the creation of AFRICOM as a positive development for U.S. Africa policy, arguing that AFRICOM corrected a long-standing problem in DoD’s bureaucratic organization, and enabled the U.S. to give a more consistent focus to the region and foster better relations. Together, these policy perspectives raise serious questions regarding the role of the U.S. military in Africa, the balance amongst America’s diplomacy, development, and defense capabilities, and the meaning of security in Africa.

To date these two perspectives dominate the literature on AFRICOM. Two works of note in the literature are the edited volumes African Security and the African Command: Viewpoints on the U.S. Role in Africa (Buss et al., 2011) and U.S. Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security Challenges (Francis, 2010). These volumes include both the aforementioned positive and negative arguments about the command. Another widely used source is Robert G. Berschinski’s (2007) AFRICOM’s Dilemma: “The Global War on Terrorism”, “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa. This nuanced and balanced assessment includes
many prescient views on the potential problems AFRICOM would face if more
traditional hard power security operations overshadowed its soft power work. Berschinski
also contributes valuable process and policy recommendations regarding the command’s
focus on terrorism in Africa. Another scholar of note is J. Peter Pham who has written
extensively about AFRICOM, noting that the command brings greater U.S. resources and
focus to Africa. The arguments and analysis in these works constitute much of the
following outline of the merits and detractions of AFRICOM.

One of the two dominant perspectives in the literature is that AFRICOM is a
necessary bureaucratic reorganization, and a new vision for addressing Africa’s and 21st
century security challenges. The other major point of contention this perspective holds, is
that AFRICOM represents a positive development because it reflects a recognition within
the U.S. government of Africa’s growing strategic significance; something that has been
long neglected. This view posits this recognition is important for U.S Africa policy;
positively influencing U.S. African cooperation, while also enhancing the capacity of
African states to address regional security issues.

Amongst those who support the establishment of AFRICOM is J. Peter Pham
(2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). According to Pham “…AFRICOM’s existence is the
recognition that the United States does have significant national interests in Africa…”
and AFRICOM will enable more sustained regional engagement; critical for both U.S.
strategic interests and effectively addressing African security challenges (Buss et al.,
2011, p. 58). For Pham (2008) and other proponents, AFRICOM is not the militarization
of development and diplomacy or the re-appropriation of those aspects of U.S. foreign policy to the Defense Department. Rather AFRICOM steps away from the military’s traditional way of reacting to threats and instead focuses on conflict prevention, or phase 0 operations, creating a security environment in which development can take place. Others have supported this view and argued that, “…AFRICOM could serve as an instrument to create a truly secure African environment where development can thrive” (Isike et al., 2008, p. 32). In short, for proponents AFRICOM both utilizes and institutionalizes the lessons learned from U.S. state building efforts since the end of the Cold War, and is the manifestation of the security-development nexus approach in policy practice (Pham, 2010).

The vast majority of the programs which AFRICOM assumed responsibility for were already existing security cooperation programs, previously conducted through CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM (“U.S. Africa Command,” 2007, p. 5). Pham (2010, 2011) notes that AFRICOM is therefore more of a continuation of U.S. Africa policy than is widely acknowledged, challenging the claim of opponents that AFRICOM represents the sudden and radical militarization of U.S.-Africa relations. Pham also argues the creation of AFRICOM addressed the bureaucratic gaps in U.S.-Africa policy by replacing “…an antiquated structural framework inherited from times when the continent was barely factored into the United States’ strategic calculus”(Buss et al., 2011, p. 62).

Overall, proponents of AFRICOM highlight the fact that the command affords the region significantly more attention, than it had under the prior configuration, when it was
divided between three commands. They argue this division discouraged developing and institutionalizing expertise on Africa and resulted in policy seams, negatively impacting the development of relations with African states and regional organizations. Among those who share this view are Herbst and Mills (2007), who posit AFRICOM will sharpen DoD’s focus on Africa and encourage and institutionalize expertise about Africa. Berouk Mesfin (2009) of the Institute for Security Studies adds that a more in-depth knowledge of Africa will lead to better informed planning for the U.S. military, and advice in the event of crises. In addition to redressing this long-standing bureaucratic gap, proponents claim that AFRICOM will be better able to coordinate U.S. Africa policy between Defense, State, and USAID. This is critical for the effectiveness of their respective mandates in Africa, as well as the complexity of the security environment in African states (Forest & Crispin, 2009).

Proponents generally acknowledge that there were problems with the way AFRICOM was announced and initially planned, but often argue that adjustments in U.S. public relations regarding AFRICOM, and after seeing the command in action, African apprehensions and objections to the command have been significantly allayed. Opponents are not as convinced, viewing lingering skepticism and opposition as being fundamentally about deeply-seeded African opposition to any form of imperialism, which they view as epitomized by the creation of AFRICOM (Fah, 2010; Nathan, 2009; Otieno, 2010). A Carl LeVan (2010) has put forth an alternative hypothesis to the pervasive view that AFRICOM’s announcement, roll-out, and subsequent African opposition were the
result of a public relations blunder. LeVan’s research gives compelling evidence that opposition or support of AFRICOM was based on African states foreign aid dependence, specifically aid from the U.S. LeVan found those states with lower aid dependence being more critical of AFRICOM, and hypothesized these states had more freedom to criticize U.S. policy since they were less dependent on U.S. foreign aid.

The literature in opposition to AFRICOM centers on the view that the command represents a militarization of U.S Africa policy, and a securitization of development and diplomacy. This opposition has been succinctly summarized by Isike, Uzodike, and Gilbert(2008, p. 34) as constituting the following,

“A significant step towards a US-driven militarisation and destabilisation of an already conflict-prone continent…there is also concern that AFRICOM signals a growing US securitisation of aid and development…the likelihood that AFRICOM’s presence might actually undermine the ability of African institutions…to address regional problems and challenges from within”.

Tynes (2006, p. 111) argues “Overall, the essential aspects of US foreign policy can be characterised as the re-militarising of African states, the initiating of repressive legislation, and the presence of military troops and execution of military exercises on the African continent.” For opponents, AFRICOM demonstrates a narrow and self-serving conception of security, one predominantly focused on terrorism, oil, and countering China’s geostrategic ambitions in Africa (Berschinski, 2007). The focus on terrorism and counter-terrorism is particularly troubling for some analysts (Keenan, 2010; Tynes, 2006), who contend that U.S. counter-terror efforts thwart the process of democratization
and the growth of robust civil society in African states. And ultimately undermine the process of development critical for stemming security threats in weak states.

The opposition viewpoint also posits that AFRICOM’s interagency approach has been overwhelmed by the Department of Defense due to its resource superiority vis a vis the State Department and USAID. Equally troubling for opponents is the possibility that not only could DoD’s resources overwhelm those of State and USAID, but that this will undercut existing U.S. economic, governance, education, health care, and humanitarian programs in Africa, eroding the soft power aspects of U.S. Africa policy (Piombo, 2012). Others, such as Collin Thomas-Jensen (2008), believe AFRICOM could play a positive role in U.S. Africa policy, but addressing the shortages in U.S. civilian capacity should be done first, in order for civilian agencies to stand on more even footing with DoD as interagency representatives in AFRICOM. He argues the absence of comprehensively addressing America’s civilian deficiencies, a joint whole of government approach will never be fully realized, and a de-facto militarization will occur.

In contrast to proponents who assert that AFRICOM seeks to address a broad range of security issues, critics charge that AFRICOM fails to recognize that human security issues are the most vital in African states. Indeed many have based their skepticism of AFRICOM on the belief that U.S. security interests will dominate and marginalize the security concerns of African states. As one skeptic argued, “The crucial point is not that the US wants to advance its interests, but that these interests do not coincide with those of Africa and, more importantly, that the US has the means and the
disposition to pursue its interests at the expense of African interests” (Nathan, 2009, p. 60). That the U.S. planned and announced AFRICOM largely without consulting African leaders, is cited as evidence that the command is merely another instrument of the U.S. Global War on Terror (GWOT), and intended to secure America’s energy, namely oil, interests on the continent, and to check China’s rising influence in the region (Ganzle, 2011). According to Volman (2010) it is disingenuous for U.S. policymakers to suggest that AFRICOM was not founded based on the U.S. objectives to fight terrorism, secure energy resources, and counter China’s rise on the continent.

Gilber, Uzodike, and Isike (2009, p. 277) support this view and argue that if human security and development issues were a core concern of the U.S. then the creation of a military organization is not a logical option. Rather, “…AFRICOM was unilaterally created for the furtherance and consolidation of US strategic state-centric security interests but packaged in human security paraphernalia for the twin purposes of credibility and acceptability by African statesmen”. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ojakorotu (2010, p. 99) take this point further and argue that addressing terrorism and its connections to state fragility is not, fundamentally, about the security of African states. They state, “The main weakness of the argument that connects weak states with global terrorism is that the security of Africa itself is not emphasised. What is emphasised is the security of the Western and American nations.”

In short, for the majority of opponents, African security is fundamentally about human security. For these opponents U.S. and African security interests cannot converge
through the establishment of AFRICOM because it is a military organization. As a military organization, AFRICOM signifies a fundamental “...dissonance between US strategic security concerns on the continent and the issues that constitute the African security predicament” (Isike et al., 2008, p. 22). Salih (2010, p. 91) urges analysts to looks beyond the benefits AFRICOM would bring to the militaries of African states and regional organizations, and instead focus on human security stating, “…human rather than military security is what would deliver peace and security to Africa”. These analysts believe U.S and African security interests can converge, if they are each based on the need to enhance human security,

“…by furthering mutually articulated partnerships aimed at deepening democracy and building capacity for good governance as well as increasing aid and foreign direct investment, writing off debts, halting environmental despoliation and finding a cure for HIV/AIDS” (Isike et al., 2008, p. 24).

Tanzanian Security Issues

Despite chronic poverty, since independence Tanzania has played a leading diplomatic and political role in East Africa. In contrast to neighboring Kenya, Tanzania’s independence in 1961 from Great Britain was achieved through a largely peaceful political process, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. Since independence Tanzania has held the distinction of being generally stable and capable of maintaining an impressive degree of social harmony and cohesion, even though it has roughly one hundred and twenty-five different ethnic groups (Dagne, 2010). Its stability and consistency in following a morally based foreign policy have won respect from the
international community and allowed Tanzania to make “…important non-economic contributions to the international system out of proportion to its economic muscle” (Waters, 2006, p. 46).

Soon after independence Tanzania assumed an active foreign policy and presence in the international community. Nyerere positioned Tanzania as a non-aligned state in Cold War politics (CIA, 2011), through his founding role in the non-aligned movement. The country was an early and ardent supporter of the anti-apartheid movement and, at the expense of its own economic interests, it led an economic boycott against South Africa, and offered strong support to other independence movements in the region (Waters, 2006). Nyerere’s stature as a statesmen and the vision he articulated for Tanzania, and Africa as a whole, made Tanzania a central member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). His leadership was instrumental in developing these dynamics in Tanzania’s foreign policy, dynamics which have persisted until today.

While Nyerere’s principled style of leadership and foreign policy garnered international praise and admiration, under his leadership Tanzania suffered disastrous economic decline. At the time of independence in 1961 Tanzania was poor, but its economic prospects were promising and the country’s leadership decided to continue with the capitalist economic model instituted during colonialism (Ngowi, 2009). Between 1963 and 1983 Tanzania became the “darling” of the international aid community and was one of the world’s largest recipients of aid (Edwards, 2012). Central to Tanzania’s receipt of international aid was widespread international praise and attention of the
honest, idealistic, and humble leadership of Nyerere. Edwards (2012, p. 20) notes that admiration for Nyerere and the impact it had on the World Bank’s unquestioning support and supply of aid was dubbed “the cult of Tanzaphilia”.

However Nyerere’s announcement of the Arusha Declaration in February 1967 had instituted sweeping changes in the country’s economic philosophy and policies. The Arusha Declaration stated that Tanzania would pursue an indigenous African socialism he termed, ujamaa (Meredith, 2011). Moreover the capitalist, market oriented economic model inherited from colonization would be transformed into a centrally planned and state owned model (Ngowi, 2009). The Arusha Declaration stemmed from Nyerere’s concern that Tanzania’s reliance on foreign aid and perpetuation of a capitalist economic system was leading to the erosion of traditional and communal values and incentives for promoting development.

Ultimately the economic policies of the Arusha Declaration proved to be a disaster for the country’s economic growth and development. The hostile policies towards the private sector, which stemmed from the Arusha Declaration, led to its virtual demise, leaving the public sector almost wholly responsible for the country’s economy (Ngowi, 2009). The economic consequences were stark. By the end of the 1970’s Tanzania’s trade deficit was continually rising. In 1975 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had to rescue the government from financial collapse. Agriculture, the lynchpin of Tanzania’s economy, dropped by 10% from 1979-1982, and
between 1977 and 1982 the national output as a whole declined by one-third, as the population’s standard of living dropped by 50% (Meredith, 2011).

In 1981 Nyerere conceded, “We are poorer now than we were in 1972” (Meredith, 2011, p. 258). Tanzania’s shocking economic decline represents one of the most dramatic declines in a country that has not experienced major war or internal conflict. By 1991 Tanzania was the second poorest country in the world, dramatically falling from its previous position of twenty-five in 1976 (Edwards, 2012). Reluctantly Nyerere acknowledged the failure of his economic policies, and began to institute reforms with the assistance and support of the IMF and the World Bank. Successive Tanzanian leaders have taken steps, although often haltingly, to institute capitalist and market-oriented economic reforms and liberalize the economy as a whole (CIA, 2011).

Although it suffered severe economic decline throughout the 1970’s and ‘80’s Tanzania maintained an active foreign policy agenda. In addition to actively supporting independence movements in the region and staunchly opposing South Africa’s apartheid regime, it played a leading role in attempts to address growing conflict and instability in African Great Lakes states and became a safe haven for refugees in the region. In 1978-79 the country single-handedly repelled an invasion by Uganda’s Idi Amin and, with a force of 45,000 troops, ousted his brutal and repressive regime (Meredith, 2011).

Tanzania’s international reputation was bolstered in the 1990’s when it hosted the world’s largest refugee population and played a leading mediation and negotiating role to disputes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. After the
Rwandan genocide Arusha, Tanzania was chosen as the location for the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Because it has been the site of numerous regional mediation efforts the city of Arusha is often called the “Geneva of Africa”(Waters, 2006). Today Tanzania continues to have good relations throughout the region and to demonstrate its commitment to regional integration and cooperation. It is the only state which is a member of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Through participation in these organizations Tanzania has worked towards regional development, economic and trade cooperation, and security policy coordination.

Participation in the EAC and SADC, combined with a disciplined fiscal policy, has yielded stable economic gains that displayed resilience in the midst of the global economic downturn. From 2009-2012 the country experienced GDP growth rates averaging above 6.5% and is projected to hit growth rates of 7.1% in 2013 (African Development Bank Group, 2012). Increased gold mining production, and the recent discovery of natural gas deposits that could as much as triple Tanzania’s estimated reserves, have led to speculation that Tanzania is poised to become a major regional economic force (Sanders & Moseley, 2012). Yet Tanzania’s macroeconomic gains have largely failed to change the economic conditions for the majority of the country’s population which still has an overall poverty rate of 34%, with the absolute number of people classified as poor rising by 1.3 million from 2001-2007 (African Development Bank Group, 2012).
Traditional Security Concerns

Though it has enjoyed overall internal peace and stability, Tanzania faces significant threats to transnational and human security. In terms of transnational security threats, Tanzania faces terrorism, piracy, and increasingly pervasive illicit narcotics trafficking. The continuation of these security issues will have an increasingly destabilizing impact on Tanzania, jeopardizing the country’s stability and development gains, with deleterious implications for East African, and U.S. security interests.

Terrorism

The 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi turned the U.S. government’s attention to the presence and lethality of the terrorist, specifically Al-Qaeda, threat in Africa. Following the September 11th attacks the Eastern and Horn of Africa regions gained further prominence. Concerns were heightened when Kenya was again targeted by terrorists in 2002. Furthermore, the realization of the scope of the threat posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its linkage to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula pushed the U.S. to focus a significant portion of U.S. counter-terror policy on the East and Horn of Africa regions (Ploch, 2010).

Kenya has become the U.S.’s dominant partner in its Horn and East Africa regional counter-terror strategy. Tanzania has become a tier-two focus country, as the U.S. seeks to prevent the spread of terrorism, while simultaneously working to support and encourage the country’s economic and political stability (Vittori & Bremer, 2009).
The Tanzanian government has, to a great degree, cooperated with U.S. counter-terror efforts in the region. The government implemented the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002. In 2006 it passed the Prevention of Money Laundering Act which created new banking and anti-corruption laws. The Tanzanian police have created a Counter-terrorism Unit, and in 2007 the government established a National Counterterrorism Centre (Whitaker, 2010). Tanzania also participates in the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) through which it has received computers at border entry points, a forensics laboratory, and a new laser technology passport system (Whitaker, 2010).

While Tanzania enhanced its counter-terror efforts, the current extent of the terrorist threat in Tanzania is somewhat ambiguous. Since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy Tanzania has not experienced another high casualty terrorism incident. The 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy was a mutually eye-opening experience for Tanzanians. Their long-held sense of security and freedom from the violence in neighboring states was sharply questioned. Although the Tanzanian government has demonstrated a significant degree of cooperation with counter-terror efforts in the region, the absence of terrorism incidents has seemingly, over time, diminished the government’s perception of a terrorist threat. Research by Elise Whitaker (2010) has shown the Tanzanian government’s lack of implementation and compliance with the provisions of various U.S. and international counter terror efforts highlight both the diminished threat perception and other domestic political issues. Indeed, during his 2005 presidential
campaign and throughout his presidency Kikwete has rarely mentioned the issue of terrorism (Whitaker, 2010).

Nonetheless, the country is still viewed by the U.S. as susceptible and vulnerable to terrorism. The U.S. State Department’s 2011 Terrorism Report on Tanzania acknowledges that the country has not experienced any major terrorist incidents, but continues by saying “Inter-agency representatives of Tanzania’s National Counterterrorism Center…still consider diplomatic missions, foreign investment projects, and tourist areas targets for terrorist attacks” (United States Department of State, 2012a, p. 33). U.S. fears of terrorism in Tanzania are largely due to its geographic proximity to states that experience significant terrorist activity, namely Kenya and Somalia, and its internal conditions which the U.S. views as conducive to terrorism. These include: porous borders, poor security service capacity, corruption, availability of technology and weapons, and significant numbers of Western targets. William Rosenau (2005, p. 1) has argued that the pervasive nature of these conditions in Tanzania make it “…ideal for conducting terrorist operations”.

However, field research done by Rosenau (2005) indicates that the adoption of Salafist or Wahabbi Islamic ideology has not taken root in a substantial portion of the country’s Muslim population which, as a whole, has been resistant to radicalization. Although Tanzania’s lack of state capacity is a critical component to terrorist activity and recruitment, the population seemingly lacks that political orientation and mobilizing ideology necessary for recruitment and participation in terrorist groups.
While existing research is skeptical about the recruitment capacity for terrorist organizations, Rosenau (2005, p. 6) notes that, “Heavy-handed government attacks on Muslim communities, the lack of economic opportunity, and growing political frustration may in the future prove to be more fertile material for exploitation by terrorist recruiters”. Conversations with Muslims in Zanzibar and the Tanzanian mainland revealed that all of the aspects Rosenau highlights as being conducive to recruitment into terrorist organizations are acutely felt by Tanzania’s Muslims. Many Muslims, despite the fact that the country’s President and most of the top leadership are Muslims, feel they are politically excluded and economically disadvantaged vis a vis Christians. At present it appears as though there are rising tensions between Muslims and Christians. Indeed the February, 2013 assassination of a Catholic priest in Zanzibar, the May, 2013 bombing of a Catholic church in Arusha serve as the most recent prominent examples that religious tensions are on the rise throughout Tanzania.

As the preceding analysis revealed, concerns over mainland Tanzania’s links to the global jihadist network, potential to become a safe haven, recruiting ground, and target for radical Islamic terrorism are tenuous. However the issue of terrorism in Zanzibar differs from mainland Tanzania (Ousman, 2004). The threat of terrorism in Zanzibar is connected to the broader issue of a growing separatist ideology for separation from Tanzania, breaking the union (“muungano” in Swahili) established in 1964, which merged Tanganyika with Zanzibar.
Since the era of German colonialization until today, Zanzibar’s close economic, cultural, and ethnic ties to Arab states has led to an isolationism that is both externally and self-imposed. There is a deeply entrenched sense and clearly perceptible view amongst Zanzibari’s and mainland Tanzanians that the “Arab” Zanzibari’s are separate from the “Africans” of mainland Tanzania. The islands inhabitants still maintain strong links to Arab states and welcome their investments and influence. Since the 1980’s wealthy individual donors from Gulf States have funded mosques, madrassas, health clinics, secondary schools, teachers training colleges, and universities in Zanzibar (Turner, 2009). Saudi Arabia is also estimated to contribute close to $1 million a year to the building of new mosques and madrassas (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). They have also funded scholarships for study abroad trips for young Zanzibari men to Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Two of the three universities in Zanzibar are Islamic and funded by Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian donors with faculty from Sudan and Pakistan (Turner, 2009). In 1992 Zanzibar announced that it was joining the Organization of Islamic States (OIS), despite the fact that the Tanzanian government was not a member of the organization. The resultant uproar over the announcement induced the Zanzibari government to withdraw its application (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). The Zanzibar government’s solidarity with Arab states, and willingness to counter the political stance of the mainland to do so, is indicative of its divergent political views and agenda.

Any discussion about politics with Zanzibari’s will quickly turn into an indictment of mainland Tanzania’s government, and how it intentionally and
systematically marginalizes Zanzibar politically and economically. Conversations with Zanzibari’s also reveal deep-seeded antagonism towards mainland Tanzania, much of which stem from Zanzibar’s history as a prosperous slave trading island. It is not uncommon to hear Zanzibari’s remark about how they are superior to the “African” mainland Tanzanians and to support their claim of superiority by pointing out how they once sold the “Africans” as slaves. Zanzibari’s also utilize language as a means to denote a separation with the mainland. Despite being a semi-autonomous region Zanzibari’s refer to Zanzibar as an “nchi” (“country” in Swahili) and are perturbed if it is pointed out to them that, in fact, Zanzibar is not a country but part of Tanzania. One American expatriate whom has been living in Zanzibar for over three years remarked to the author that the desire of Zanzibari’s to break the “muungano” has dramatically grown since she arrived.

Combined these historical and cultural narratives, language syntax, and views on contemporary politics have created a pervasive underlying narrative throughout Zanzibar’s population and society. This narrative essentially states; Zanzibar is historically and culturally superior so the mainland works to suppresses Zanzibar and its economic development. If Zanzibar was free of the mainland it would regain the prosperity it enjoyed during the days of the slave trade. The combination of this narrative of disenfranchisement, the grievances regarding Zanzibar’s economic development status, and the desire to break the union with mainland Tanzania and create strong links
with Arab states, form a potentially troubling confluence of factors for future stability and security.

In 2001 a non-governmental Islamic charity organization commonly known as UAMSHO (“awakening” in Swahili) was officially registered with the Zanzibar government as a non-governmental organization, claiming to advocate for Muslim rights and unity (Turner, 2009). However over the last couple of years the organization has progressively evolved into an Islamist political party, and seemingly is seeking to cultivate a broader political movement. UAMSHO’s rise as a political force can be attributed to the opposition political party Civic United Front (CUF) agreeing to a power sharing agreement with the dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and forming a Government of National Unity (GNU) following the 2010 general election. The power sharing agreement was intended to mitigate the electoral violence that had characterized Zanzibar’s elections since the islands first multiparty elections in 1995. Persistent electoral violence had reached the point of threatening the island’s political and economic stability (Kagaruki, 2013).

In its new political role UAMSHO has called for the dissolution of the union with mainland Tanzania, restrictions on alcohol sales and consumption, the imposition of a dress code for foreign tourists, and uses rhetoric which feeds resentments towards mainland Tanzanians and the government (“Contagion of discontent; the Swahili coast,” 2012). As UAMSHO has assumed a more political role increasing violence has been associated with the organization. In October 2012 Zanzibar was wracked by the third
incident of violent protests connected to UAMSHO in 2012 when three days of violence broke out after a leader of UAMSHO went missing. Supporters alleged that he was kidnapped and detained by government security forces. Zanzibar’s security forces denied that they were at all connected with his disappearance.

Discussions with Zanzibari’s about UAMSHO reveal there is widespread support for the group’s political views, insistence on maintaining the island’s conservative culture, and willingness to challenge the government. Although there was distaste for the group’s participation in violence, it didn’t appear to diminish support for the group’s overall goals and ideology. These events and the support for the group point to UAMSHO and the views it espouses as a growing force to be reckoned with in Zanzibar’s politics and society, and could ported the use of violent tactics in the future.

Of particular concern to both the U.S. and Tanzanian governments is the potential use of terrorist violence. Zanzibar does have prior connections to terrorist activity. Three suspected bombers involved in the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were from Zanzibar (Brents & Mshigeni, 2004). In 2001 a U.S. court convicted Khalfan Khamis Mohamed of participating in the attack and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani has been indicted and included on the FBI’s most wanted list (Brents & Mshigeni, 2004). There is some controversy over to what extent Zanzibari’s have participated in terrorist activity either domestically and internationally post 9-11. After 9-11 there were some reports that leaflets were being distributed in Mosques throughout Zanzibar seeking volunteers to join Al-Qaeda. Zanzibar authorities said they investigated
locals traveling abroad to see if they had plans to travel to Afghanistan and they reportedly found no Al-Qaeda recruits (Lacey, 2002). These claims by local authorities are somewhat dubious given that some Al-Qaeda terrorists in Yemen have been identified as Zanzibari’s (Vittori & Bremer, 2009).

At present the evidence does not support that a radical Islamic ideology is widespread in Zanzibar. Nonetheless the deeply ingrained sense of marginalization and relative deprivation grievances vis a vis mainland Tanzania felt by the majority of Zanzibaris, and the growing sentiment of the need to break the union with the Tanzanian mainland, provide potential fertile ground for radical ideology to take root and for the use of terrorist tactics to precipitate. Should radical ideologies take root Zanzibar’s status as a Western tourist destination would ensure any potential terrorist activity would have ample targets and opportunities at its disposal.

**Drug Trafficking**

Drug trafficking through Tanzania and the East African region is a newly emerged security threat. The United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has noted a startling upward trend in the flow of drug trafficking in East Africa, most notably heroin, from South and Southeast Asia (UNODC, 2009). An intra-regional trafficking also exists among Tanzania, Madagascar, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and the Comoros. Tanzania is a vital transit state in these trafficking routes and its population is increasingly becoming consumers of these drugs. Tanzania’s geography plays a central role in this
problem. As a result of sharing borders with eight other states, a 1,424 kilometer Eastern coastline, and highly porous borders, Tanzanian authorities are struggling to combat the trafficking of narcotics in and out of the country (United States Department of State, 2012) Large shipments of heroin from Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and cocaine from Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru are increasingly being reported and seized in Tanzania (United States Department of State, 2012b). In one major seizure in Tanzania in December, 2010 authorities captured fifty kg of heroin (Basar, 2012).

There are also troubling signs the drug trade in Tanzania is becoming internationalized, with Tanzanians increasingly being seized in other countries in connection with drug trafficking. Two Pakistanis were arrested as a result of a seizure in February, 2012. Of fifty-five individuals charged in Tanzania with serious drug offenses in 2012, nearly a third were foreign nationals (United States Department of State, 2012).

The transnational aspect of this problem is not simply foreign nationals coming to Tanzania. Many Tanzanians are now being caught abroad in connection with drug trafficking. In early 2004 the Chinese Xinhua News Agency reported thirty-two Tanzanian nationals were caught in connection with the illegal drug trade in nine countries; including 13 in Pakistan and others in Kenya, Germany, India, Ethiopia, Britain, Uganda, Mauritius, and the UAE (Xinhua News Jan 7, 2005). UNODC data on the nationalities of those arrested in Pakistan for drug trafficking shows Tanzanians represent the third highest nationality of those arrested, preceded by Pakistanis and Nigerians (Basar, 2012).
The impact of drug trafficking in Tanzania is, perhaps, most troubling in Zanzibar. Zanzibar’s connections to producer states and European consumer states have made it an attractive transit point into the broader trafficking routes. The tiny airport in Zanzibar has direct flights to Oman and other Gulf States as well as Italy. This allows drugs to be fed directly from producer states into the Western drug consumption chain (Butcher, 2000). The fact that Zanzibar’s airport was privatized in 1998 has added to these fears, and many believe privatizing has made drug trafficking easier (Butcher, 2000) and recent police busts of drug trafficking activities support concerns regarding the airports role. In March, 2013 police discovered a network of drug dealers using the airport, including four airport employees. A Greek national in transit to Italy was arrested in connection to the syndicate and 5 kg of narcotics were seized with a value over $200 million (“Zanzibar officials in drug traffic network face music,” 2013). From January to March, 2013 six individuals, three of which were foreign nationals, were arrested at Zanzibar’s airport in connection with drug trafficking (“Police ‘bust’ Zanzibar drug dealers’ network,” 2013). In addition to modern transportation connections to drug producing states, security at official ports is almost non-existent and corruption at these ports is rampant (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). Zanzibar’s State Minister in the First Vice-President’s office has stated that the illegal ports along the coast are proving to be problematic for stemming drug trafficking (“USA Donates Two Boats to Tanzania Anti-drugs Fight,” 2012).
When looking to the current impact of drug trafficking in West Africa, particularly Guinea-Bissau, it is readily apparent that a poor state such as Tanzania can be severely undermined by this illicit activity. Already there are significant structural weaknesses which impede the Tanzanian state’s capacity to comprehensively address this growing threat. The corruption that comes hand in hand with drug trafficking is eroding fragile state structures (Basar, 2012). Tanzania’s stability is critical for this volatile region. The undermining of the already fragile Tanzanian state has obvious implications for security that extend to the East Africa region as a whole.

**Piracy**

Beginning in 2004 an escalation in pirate activity off the Horn of Africa and originating from Somalia alarmed observers. The explosion of pirate activity in 2008-09 made piracy a dominant international security issue. Piracy’s impact on international security centers on economic and energy security, with piracy in the Horn and East Africa regions directly impacting world shipping markets (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). Sea borne trade is vital to the global economy having quadrupled over the past 40 years, with 90% of international trade and two-thirds of petroleum dependent on sea transport (“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” 2007). As of 2008, “Twenty thousand ships transit the Gulf of Aden annually…carrying 12 percent of the world’s daily oil supply…” (Kraska & Wilson, 2009, p. 55). The proximity of the Gulf of Aden to the Horn of Africa states makes it a tempting target.
While international attention focuses on contemporary piracy being a phenomenon of the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden, it has also significantly impacted East African states. In 2008 out of the two-hundred and ninety-three reported pirate attacks or attempts worldwide, one-hundred and twenty-five took place in East Africa (UNODC, 2009). Tanzania, in particular, has suffered from the threat of piracy. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) between 2001 and 2008 recorded 58 pirate attacks in Tanzania, with 34 of those attacks taking place between 2006-2008 (Nincic, 2009, p. 4). During these years Tanzania incurred the third highest number of piracy attacks in Africa (Nincic, 2009, p. 2). That the vast majority of attacks in Tanzania have been perpetrated by Somali pirates demonstrates the reach of the threat.

Since 2008 through 2012 the IMB (2013) has recorded only eight pirate attacks in Tanzania with no incidents reported in 2011. The IMB attributes this impressive drop in pirate attacks to increased regional naval patrols, the widespread adoption of best practices throughout East Africa, and political will to mitigate the threat of piracy. As a member of SADC Tanzania has benefitted from naval assistance from South Africa which has committed naval assets to patrol throughout Tanzanian waters as well as in the Mozambique Channel (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2013). Despite these important steps the director of the IMB has warned that unless these deterrent and best practice measures continue, piracy attacks in Tanzania could re-escalate and Tanzania is still vulnerable to piracy and its extensive negative impacts on the state’s security (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2013).
Human Security Issues

Terrorism, illicit trafficking, and piracy pose significant threats to Tanzania and transnational security. However threats to human security in those and other issue areas pose serious, and even more pervasive and chronic security challenges for Tanzania. The UNDP’s Human Development Index, which measures various indices of standards of living, access to education, and health, ranks Tanzania in the low human development category placing it at 152 out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2011). As one of the world’s poorest countries, Tanzanians face threats to their human security on a daily basis, creating path dependencies which threaten the country’s overall security and stability. Though the human security paradigm can incorporate many issues, this analysis will focus on the economic and health aspects of human security in Tanzania.

Drug trafficking. From a human security viewpoint the impact of drug trafficking through Zanzibar on the islands population is striking. Recent figures place Zanzibar’s population as having amongst the highest per capita heroin addiction rates in the world, with an estimated 9,000 addicts on the small island (“Zanzibar Plagued by Growing Heroin Addiction,” 2012). Particularly hard hit is the young adult population. The infiltration of drugs is also tearing at the social fabric of Zanzibar’s predominantly Muslim population, and many older Zanzibari’s fear Zanzibar’s traditional Muslim beliefs and culture in Zanzibar are being eroded. Though drug use is on the rise throughout Tanzania, it is readily apparent in Zanzibar. As Zanzibar’s development languishes behind mainland Tanzania’s, the loss of the health and productivity of a vital
segment of the population bodes poorly for future growth and development. Leaders on both the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar have openly acknowledged the growing domestic illegal drug consumption rates are troubling for future growth and development ("Tanzania; Prayers for Kikwete’s Anti-Drugs War," 2006). Yet Tanzania has significant structural and political impediments to comprehensively addressing this growing problem. Foremost among these issues is police capacity (United States Department of State, 2012).

Piracy. Less noted as a security threat stemming from piracy are the threats to human security. The ripple effects from these impacts have far-reaching implications for Tanzania’s already fragile economy, including the economic security of Tanzanians who incur higher costs of living. The UNODC (2009) also notes piracy’s intersection with other criminal activities which threaten human security including arms trafficking and human trafficking. For states like Somalia whose populations rely heavily on international humanitarian aid, piracy can disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid and supplies. The disruption of these supplies is not only an economic loss to providing states, but exacerbates humanitarian emergencies. The impact on an already tenuous, at best, human security environment is immediately felt.

Economic Security

As detailed in the background of Tanzania, the country’s post-independence economic policies had a disastrous effect on the country’s economy and development.
Through extensive reform efforts which began in the mid-1990’s Tanzania has steadily reversed the negative consequences of Nyerere’s African Socialism economic policies, and has achieved economic growth. Yet the economy remains highly donor dependent, which accounts for 30% of the country’s budget (CIA, 2011). The economy also lacks overall global competitiveness with a ranking of 120 out of 144 by the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness index (World Economic Forum, 2012).

Aside from a feeble national economy the vast majority of the population still faces chronic economic insecurity, particularly in rural areas. A comparison of Tanzania’s GDP (PPP) per capita to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa reveals that Tanzania’s, at $553, is significantly below the composite regional average (World Economic Forum, 2012). The country’s overall poverty rate remains high, with the most recent household budget survey finding the current rate at around 34% and the percentage of people who suffer from hunger at 16% (African Development Bank Group, 2012). In addition to persistent poverty and economic insecurity there is also a sizeable economic inequality gap in Tanzania. A common measurement used to gauge a country’s inequality in wealth or income is the GINI coefficient which utilizes a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 expressing perfect equality and 100 showing maximum inequality. In 2007 the World Bank’s development indicators placed Tanzania’s GINI coefficient at 37.6 (“GINI Index,” n.d.).

Much of the economic insecurity experienced by Tanzanians is a result of the country’s weak education system. At first glance it would seem Tanzania’s education
system is impressive for a poor state, it has high primary education enrollment rates reaching 95.9% on the mainland and 83.6% in Zanzibar with near gender parity (“UNDP: Tanzania Millennium Development Goals,” 2010). The recent gains in primary education have moved Tanzania into the twenty-seventh position in the world for enrollment rate (World Economic Forum, 2012). Yet these high primary education enrollment rates have not translated into progressive gains in secondary and university education rates.

According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (2012) the quality of primary education in Tanzania’s is poor, ranked 114th in the world, and secondary and university education enrollment rates are among the lowest in the world, each ranked at 137th. The passage rates for the national secondary education examinations are abysmal. In 2012, 65% of students failed the exam (Mwakyusa, 2013). The education system is failing Tanzanians, stunting their ability to ensure their economic security and create a stronger and more dynamic national economy.

Health Security

Another major human security issue in Tanzania is health security. Overall life expectancy at birth remains low at 57 years (UNDP, 2011). According to World Health Organization (WHO) statistics in most categories Tanzania has worse health outcomes than the regional averages (World Health Organization, 2006). The most recent statistics show malaria infection rates at roughly 26,000 per 100,000 in the population and tuberculosis cases 177 per 100,000 (World Economic Forum, 2012). Threats to maternal
and child health are particularly troubling in Tanzania. The infant mortality rate is 78 per 1,000 live births, maternal mortality ratio 1,500 per 100,000 live births, and an under-five mortality rate of 126 out of 1,000 (World Health Organization, 2006). Data indicates the percentage of births attended by a skilled physician on the mainland is only around 50% (African Development Bank Group, 2012).


One of the primary concerns for Tanzania’s health security is HIV/AIDS. With the 12th highest infection rate globally, Tanzania is one of the countries most affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Declared as a national disaster by the government in 2000, by 2003 the infection rate was placed at around 8.3%, translating to 1.6 to 2 million infected persons (Dagne, 2010). Due to the government’s adoption of a national policy on HIV/AIDS in 2001 and aggressive action by the international community, Tanzania’s HIV/AIDS infection rates have stabilized and slightly decreased. Nonetheless, UNAIDS places the current number of Tanzanians living with HIV/AIDS at 1.6 million, the prevalence rate at 5.8%, and the number of orphans due to HIV/AIDS aged 0 to 17 between 1.2 to 1.4 million (“United Republic of Tanzania,” 2011).
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has serious implications for human security in Tanzania. Research has demonstrated that HIV/AIDS drops life expectancies, and hollows out the professional class and the most economically productive segments of a population, resulting in potentially destabilizing youth bulges. High HIV/AIDS rates also contract GDP growth, impacts household incomes and livelihoods worsening poverty, eroding communities and their social fabric, with disproportionately negative impacts on women and girls (Cuddington, 1993). In poor states like Tanzania, these factors place extreme pressure and strain on already fragile health and social security systems and services (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006; Cuddington, 1993).

Summary

Combatant commands play a central and vital role in the execution of U.S. national security policy in their respective AOR’s. AFRICOM’s creation signaled a significant shift in the conceptualization of Africa’s strategic significance to the U.S. and its joint, whole of government modus operandi represented a concurrent shift in the conceptualization of U.S. national security policy. The views of both proponents and opponents of AFRICOM have validity. The purpose of this assessment will be to examine if either proponents or opponents are correct about AFRICOM in the context of Tanzania.

In the case of Tanzania there are various benefits and limits to how the command can address Tanzania’s security issues. The Tanzanian government faces a chronic
shortage of resources, which has a serious impact on its ability to address these complex security challenges. In this regard AFRICOM is beneficial for addressing Tanzanian security issues because of the resources it can bring. Indeed, training and logistics are crucial components to addressing the country’s traditional security issues and these are important resource contributions AFRICOM can make. The limits of AFRICOM’s ability to address Tanzania’s security issues stem from the fact that it is a military organization. As a military organization AFRICOM lacks the institutional culture, knowledge, and mandate to holistically address human security issues. Though this was intended to be remedied through the integration of interagency personnel, shortcomings in this regard significantly limit the commands ability to address human insecurity.

Likewise, there are benefits and limits to how AFRICOM will be able to address U.S. security interests in Tanzania. One important potential benefit for U.S. security interests will be that AFRICOM can help develop better institutional understanding of the country’s security dynamics. An important benefit for both the U.S. and Tanzania is the single point of contact a combatant command provides, mitigating the communication complexities and policy execution seams that were a factor in the regions prior trifurcation amongst combatant commands. Another benefit of AFRICOM for both Tanzania and the U.S. is that it corrects a bureaucratic imbalance. And given that Africa has traditionally occupied the back waters of U.S. strategic concerns, the allocation of more resources and policy attention could create better strategic engagement with Tanzania, serving both U.S. and Tanzanian security interests.
Because of the continuity of AFRICOM’s strategic objectives and mission statement over the course of the last couple of years, it is unlikely that the style or substance of AFRICOM’s engagement with Tanzania will be significantly altered for the foreseeable future. In his final testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee former AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham (2013, p. 2) singled out the command’s relationship with Tanzania stating, “We are deepening our relationship with the Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly bear on regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes region”. This statement indicates AFRICOM is satisfied with its current form of engagement with Tanzania, and the outcomes to date. This assessment will determine whether or not the terms of engagement are, in fact, beneficial for both U.S. and Tanzanian security interests.
Chapter Three
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The U.S. Perspective on the Impact of AFRICOM

Introduction

This assessment has three central research questions: what is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public? The aim of this chapter is to address the questions regarding impacts on U.S. national security and human insecurity. To do so, this chapter will give an overview of the commands current activities in Tanzania, and a brief analysis of how those activities impact human security challenges.

The Impact of AFRICOM on U.S. National Security Policy in Tanzania

In his 2008 Senate testimony AFRICOM’s first Commander Gen. Ward stated, “From inception, AFRICOM was intended to be a different kind of command designed to address the changing security challenges confronting the U.S. in the 21st century” (Ward, 2008). When AFRICOM was announced it was presented as a new and innovative “combatant command plus.” Officials stated that it would depart from the traditional personnel structure for combatant commands. This departure would include the
integration of high level civilian officials, in addition to a greater proportion of interagency personnel distributed throughout the command, working side by side with military planners, logisticians, and operations personnel. These structural changes were intended to be a reflection of how AFRICOM would be a combatant command which embraced the concepts of “new jointness” and “whole of government.” As chapter one detailed, the shift to joint, whole of government operations was a direct result of U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hodge (2011, p. 212) has argued that “Africa was the new laboratory for ‘getting it right,’” to demonstrate the lessons learned from those conflicts, and be the poster child for the next generation of DoD theatre engagement.

Former AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham’s March 2013 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (2013, p. 2) highlighted U.S. AFRICOM’s engagement with Tanzania, and the country’s role in regional security. He stated, “We are deepening our relationship with the Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly bear on regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes region.” Currently Tanzania is eligible to participate in twelve of AFRICOM’s security cooperation programs and exercises, and participates in ten. Table 3.1 lists these programs and exercises, those it participates in, and descriptions of each.

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<tr>
<th>Table 3.1 Tanzania Participation in AFRICOM Programs and Exercises</th>
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<td><strong>Security Cooperation Programs and Exercises</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Africa Partnership Station</td>
<td>The focus of APS is to build maritime safety and security by increasing maritime awareness, response capabilities and infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>The Medical Civil Action Program enhances partner nation health care capacity and reduces the threat of disease by collaborating with local medical professionals, interagency partners and local authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMLEP</td>
<td>The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) program enables African partner nations to build maritime security capacity and improve management of their maritime environment through combined law enforcement operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides funds for international personnel to attend U.S. military professional training programs. The IMET program exposes foreign students to U.S. professional military organizations and procedures and the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Military HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>The objective of PMHAP is to support capacity building and development of HIV/AIDS policy within African militaries and to assist African partner military’s leadership with reducing the yearly incidence of HIV in their militaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandemic Response Program</td>
<td>In partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Pandemic Response Program (PRP) assists African militaries to develop influenza pandemic response plans that are integrated into their country’s overall national response plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard State Partnership Program</td>
<td>The State Partnership Program is a key U.S. security cooperation tool that facilitates cooperation across all aspects of international civil-military affairs and encourages people-to-people ties at the state level, building relationships that enhance global security, understanding and cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VETCAP</td>
<td>VETCAP, the Veterinary Civil Action Program, delivers veterinary programs in support of strategic military objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>ACOTA provides a full range of peacekeeping training and instruction tailored to match a country’s needs and capabilities. The program focuses on sub-Saharan African soldiers from partner nations who are scheduled to participate in a peace support operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cutlass Express</td>
<td>Exercise Cutlass Express focuses on addressing piracy through information sharing and coordinated operations among international navies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Accord</td>
<td>Eastern Accord is a military exercise focusing on humanitarian aid/disaster response with East African nations and designed to help participants improve their capability to</td>
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This table proves illustrative regarding U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, as well as to what extent the Tanzanian government’s security concerns converge with those of the U.S. Regarding the command’s impact on U.S. national security policy, that AFRICOM has been able to maintain a high degree of cooperation from Tanzania in the programs and exercises for which it eligible, is indicative that it is successively executing U.S. national security policy. Indeed, if the primary objective of U.S. national security policy in Africa is building partner capacity in order for African states to assume the primary responsibility for regional security (Warner, 2013), high levels of participation in the programs and exercises offered by the U.S. is critical to the degree of impact and success of U.S. policy. The evidence from this table indicates AFRICOM is having a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania.

The high degree of cooperation in the programs and exercises for which it is eligible also signals a convergence of U.S. and Tanzanian security interests. This is important from both a U.S. policy and Tanzanian security perspective. It is important for U.S. policy to be reflective and responsive to the security challenges African states face, in order for the U.S. to build strong strategic partnerships and mitigate security threats.

Tanzania’s high degree of participation signals that AFRICOM is not only executing U.S.

| Natural Fire | The objective of Natural Fire is to prepare Eastern African countries and U.S. forces for combined peace support, humanitarian civic assistance, and disaster relief type operations. | X |

Source: (“United States Africa Command,” n.d.)
national security policy, but that U.S. policy is addressing threats which are of
importance to the Tanzanian government.

Focused interviews were conducted with three current and former high-level U.S.
officials, including two former Ambassador’s to East African states and a current
AFRICOM employee. The interviews consisted of the following questions: How does
Tanzania figure in the U.S. strategic vision of the East African region? What are the
challenges and what are the advantages of operating in Tanzania? How, if at all, do
AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania differ from other states in the region? Have
Tanzanians articulated any concerns about AFRICOM? If so, what concerns? Using a
broad definition, what issues does the U.S. view as the most pressing security concerns in
Tanzania? Do you feel AFRICOM had enhanced, hindered, or had no impact on U.S.-
Tanzanian bilateral relations?

Interviews with U.S. personnel revealed a generally positive perception of the
command’s impact in Tanzania, both in executing U.S. national security policy and
ameliorating the country’s security challenges. In general, interviewees attributed
AFRICOM’s successes in Tanzania to the overall strengthening of U.S.-Tanzanian
bilateral ties, which has occurred throughout the past two U.S. and Tanzanian
administrations. One former Ambassador to Tanzania noted that, beginning with
President Mkapa and continuing with President Kikwete, Tanzania has been receptive
and pursued a closer bilateral relationship with the U.S. He felt the two countries
currently enjoy a generally positive relationship with one another, due to Mkapa and
Kikwete’s pro-American stances and increased development aid, security cooperation, diplomatic exchanges, and high-level symbolic gestures from the U.S.

Recent U.S. diplomatic gestures from include President Bush’s visit to Tanzania in 2007, making him the first U.S. President to visit Tanzania. Later, the first African head of state to meet with President Obama was President Kikwete of Tanzania. The significance of these gestures was not lost on Tanzanians. A former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania felt these moves went a long way to solidifying recent gains in bilateral relations. In his view, Tanzania is now one of U.S.’s closest partners in Africa. A current AFRICOM employee working in the region also noted that Obama’s subsequent three country tour of Africa in 2013, and the inclusion of Tanzania on the itinerary, is further indication of the stature the U.S. accords the country and the growth in bilateral relations. Another former ambassador to a neighboring country noted these diplomatic overtures, emphasizing U.S. interest in Tanzania as tied to its geostrategic significance to the regional economy.

The former Ambassador to Tanzania also felt the country’s recent pro-American pivot had also been reflected in the country’s military relations. The former Ambassador recalled that, soon after becoming president, Kikwete expressed a desire for Tanzania to play a more active role in regional peacekeeping missions. As a result, he sought to build the capacity of the country’s military, and moved fairly quickly to enhance military ties and promote those in the military with links to the U.S. Historically, Tanzania’s military
ties had been with the Soviet Union and China. This created culture institution problems for Kikwete’s attempts to strengthen military ties to the U.S.

In explaining the difficulties these historic ties created in U.S.-Tanzania military-to-military relations, he cited one example of a former commander of the Tanzanian military, the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force (TPDF). This commander had received his military education and training from the former Soviet Union. Consequently he was hostile to the idea of the U.S. and Tanzanian militaries having a significant degree of cooperation, not even allowing U.S. military vessels in Tanzanian ports. Efforts to enhance military ties with the U.S. were, for a time, delayed by this commander. After his retirement Kikwete immediately filled the position with someone who was pro-American.

According to the former U.S. Ambassador, U.S. military and diplomatic personnel were shocked by the overnight positive change this effected in U.S.-Tanzanian military relations. While this may have had a positive impact of military-military relations, the AFRICOM employee cast doubts on whether this had led to a drastic change in the degree of engagement between the two militaries. Indeed this person felt that AFRICOM has had a positive impact on bilateral relations, especially because recent U.S. counter-piracy efforts have been important for protecting the commercial viability of the Dar es Salaam port. But when asked to characterize the nature of AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania, the response was “expanding, but not robust.”
According to the former U.S. Ambassador, during his tenure Tanzania’s leadership became gradually more aware of how AFRICOM and U.S. security cooperation and assistance could aid their efforts to become more active in regional security issues. He recalled the African Union’s 2008 intervention in Comoros as a critical point for AFRICOM in Tanzania. According to this official, during the Comoros intervention he and other high-level U.S. officials in Tanzania pointed out to their counterparts how AFRICOM played a beneficial role to Tanzania during the intervention; stressing that a command for Africa demonstrates respect. In his experience, Kikwete seemed receptive to AFRICOM, and receptivity to the command was slowly growing in the military and government by the end of his tenure. This interviewee also recalled how U.S. officials became fully aware of the positive role AFRICOM could play, in terms of serving as a single point of contact for coordination and assistance for African states and regional organizations. Nonetheless, when the AFRICOM employee was asked the question, “Using a broad definition, what issues does the U.S. view as the most pressing security concerns in Tanzania?” he singled out counter-piracy and stopping the spread of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab further into Tanzania, signaling that the command’s primary emphasis is on traditional security concerns.

Both the table illustrating Tanzanian cooperation in AFRICOM programs and exercises and the interviews point to AFRICOM having a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania. Tanzanian participation in most of AFRICOM’s activities means the command is successfully fulfilling its role in executing U.S. security
policy. The evidence also suggests that since it is now a single point of contact, the command has made it easier for military and diplomatic personal to both coordinate and leverage the resources of the U.S. military in U.S.-Tanzanian relations. Moreover, interview responses indicating President Kikwete’s growing receptivity to AFRICOM indicate that AFRICOM could not only be positively impacting U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, but also regionally. As President Kikwete seeks for Tanzania to play a greater role in East African security, his receptivity to AFRICOM bodes well for the command’s impact that the policies it seeks to execute.

The Impact of AFRICOM on Human Security in Tanzania

Three of the ten programs and exercises Tanzania participates in (Cutlass Express, Eastern Accord, and the Africa Partnership Station) focus on more traditional security issues, namely terrorism and maritime security. While the focus of these programs is predominantly on terrorism and maritime security they utilize a capacity building approach with a traditional focus on military training, professionalization, and logistics training. Five of the security cooperation programs, focus on issues that are not strictly military. These programs (MEDCAP, Partner Military HIV/AIDS, Pandemic Response, and VETCAP) span a diverse range of issues including veterinary medicine and public health issues, including influenza pandemics and HIV/AIDS. The exercise Natural Fire focuses on humanitarian civic assistance and disaster relief. These programs and exercises illustrate that AFRICOM is engaging with issues related to human security. In
terms of interagency cooperation, three of the programs Tanzania participates in are interagency; ACOTA and IMET (Department of State), and Pandemic Response (USAID).

While security programs and exercises constitute the core of AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania, the literature and interviews also periodically brought up AFRICOM’s involvement in school and well building projects in Tanzania. There is no evidence that these are a consistent or an integral aspect of the command’s activities. Typically these activities were conducted by civilian affairs teams from the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Moreover a 2010 review of CJTF-HOA civilian affairs teams and their work in East Africa found that there was a lack of socio-cultural and language training for these teams, a poor understanding of how their work fit within the larger whole of government approach, and remarkable discrepancies in how the personnel in civilian affairs teams understood the mission of their work (Farrell & Lee, 2010).

Nonetheless, both the former ambassador to Tanzania and AFRICOM employee emphasized traditional transnational threats as the locus of the command’s objectives and activities. Though the ambassador mentioned a couple instances of humanitarian related work in Tanzania, such as a vaccination drives, both he and the AFRICOM employee heavily emphasized the commands role in preventing the spread of violent extremism and maritime security.
AFRICOM’s integration of interagency personnel and its funding sources provide another key insight into the command’s impact on human insecurity in Tanzania. Without interagency personnel pushing for the command to address human insecurity and the command lacking the personnel expertise and funding necessary to leverage human security as a priority, the command will focus predominantly on traditional security issues. Though the Defense Department originally envisioned having upwards of a quarter of AFRICOM’s staff comprised of interagency personnel, roughly 125 billets, meeting this target has proven to be difficult (Ploch, 2011). According to a former AFRICOM official, of the Command’s approximately 1,500 personnel only forty are interagency and of those fifteen are from the intelligence community, therefore only twenty-five are true interagency personnel (anonymous, personal communication). These low numbers of interagency personnel are supported by a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review (2010) of AFRICOM. That review compared interagency personnel numbers in 2008 and 2010 and found that the total in 2010 had increased to twenty-seven from thirteen in 2008, but overall the percentage of interagency personnel was still only at 2%, far short of the original goal of 25%. It was argued that AFRICOM’s ability to address and mitigate human insecurity would stem from the integration of significant numbers of interagency personnel throughout the command.

Indeed, a former AFRICOM official felt that the lack of interagency personnel resulted in the command formulating plans which were not truly whole of government (anonymous, personal communication). GAO interviews with interagency personnel
found that AFRICOM is not always involving other federal agencies in the formative stages of activity planning, and does not fully leverage expertise of interagency personnel embedded at AFRICOM. Some stated they have to work to insert themselves into meetings at the command and ask what they can do to contribute, rather than being actively and eagerly utilized by command leadership and personnel (Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 35). These observations from former personnel and official statistics demonstrate that AFRICOM’s integration of significant numbers of interagency personnel remains unfulfilled. That this integration has not occurred provides insight on the command’s ability to impact human security. Without interagency personnel, AFRICOM lacks the requisite expertise and the institutional momentum required to prioritize human insecurity in its activities.

Another factor complicating the ability for the command to address human insecurity in Tanzania is its funding sources, which directly steer AFRICOM towards addressing traditional security issues. The command has to juggle twenty-two different funding sources, many of which have varying time horizons and restrictions on the terms of their use (Warner, 2013). Further compounding the coordination of AFRICOM’s funding sources, according to AFRICOM’s director of strategy, plans, and programs Major General Charles Hooper at a March, 2013 roundtable on Civil Affairs at George Mason University, is the fact that many of these funding sources are designated for counterterrorism. Major General Hooper stated that coordinating and managing these diverse funding sources is incredibly complex due to the need to identify what funds can
go to what programs and what countries. As Warner (2013) notes the complicated nature of AFRICOM’s funding sources makes it difficult for the command to engage in long-term planning interagency planning, and to align its activities with the priorities of partner African states. Without funding that is specifically designated with a whole of government approach in mind the command is hampered in its ability to plan and integrate activities that address human security.

AFRICOM could do more to impact both U.S. national security policy and human security in Tanzania if it engaged in security sector reform. According to Major General Charles Hooper, the director of AFRICOM’s strategy, plans, and programs, Africa’s size and the diversity of its threats have led to the command developing four subordinate regional campaign plans, rather than the standard single theatre campaign plan used by other combatant commands. The East Africa campaign plan entails combating violent extremist organizations (VEO’s) through bi-lateral and multinational efforts and security sector reform once Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda are defeated.

The sequencing in the East African campaign plan is flawed. Combatting and, ultimately, defeating violent extremist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al Shabaab in East Africa is dependent on an effective security sector, particularly a well-trained police force. On this point this researches findings diverge from current literature, positing that AFRICOM needs to engage with the security sector in Tanzania, specifically the police, which is in desperate need of training, education, and reform. Similar to most African states, Tanzania’s police are poorly trained, equipped, and insufficiently resourced.
Weaknesses in the country’s security sector exacerbate both traditional and human security threats.

Research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) found, on average, Tanzanian police officers receive only six months of training and the Tanzanian Police Force (TPF) suffers from a lack of effective record keeping, and a slow moving legal system which hampers police work. ISS also found poor public opinion of the TPF largely due to extreme delays in investigations and the TPF’s dismissive attitude towards sexual and gender based violence. Lacking special services and training the police generally tell victims of sexual and gender based crimes they should be handled as a family matter (Robins, 2009). Afrobarometer’s survey results in Tanzania help further illustrate the low degree of public trust in the country’s police. When asked about how much they trust the police 13% said “not at all,” 25% “just a little,” and 35% “somewhat.” When asked about how many police were involved in corruption only 5% said “none,” while 48% “some,” and 27% “most of them” (AFROBAROMETER, 2008).

The deficiencies of the TPF have wide ranging and every day implications for security of Tanzanians. Currently, AFRICOM is not allowed to train foreign law enforcement personnel under Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Under current rules AFRICOM would need to be given a special waiver. Despite AFRICOM having stepped back from the “Combatant Command plus” model, an exception allowing the command to engage in police training and professionalization would directly impact development outcomes and the overall status of human security in Tanzania.
Better community policing is critical for addressing terrorism and drug trafficking, transnational treats which heavily rely on local law enforcement solutions. As Warner (2013, p. 12) notes, “Left unaddressed, U.S. restrictions on funding police reform will be a gaping hole in U.S. interagency efforts to build partner security capacity in Africa”. Reform of the TPF will help mitigate threats to Tanzania’s stability and security and, by extension, U.S. interests. Without SSR security capacity building efforts in Tanzania are incomplete. A better trained and professionalized police force also helps human security, especially gender based and sexual violence which are also vectors for the spread of HIV/AIDS and cause other health risks. Moreover, better trained and resourced police forces improve overall community security and prevent the establishment of extra-judicial, mob justice practices and institutions.

Conclusion

AFRICOM is having a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, signified by the generally high degree of engagement the command has cultivated with Tanzania. The country’s high degree of participation in the command’s security cooperation trainings and exercises means U.S. security policy is being executed. Interviews also highlighted the positive impact the consistent focus and single point of contact AFRICOM affords U.S.-Tanzanian bilateral relations

Regarding the question of the command’s focus on human security issues, the details of AFRICOM’s in-country activities in Tanzania reveal that, in practice,
AFRICOM’s concentration on human security and development issues falls far short of the scope and degree articulated by officials during, and immediately following, the creation of AFRICOM. Additional evidence regarding the command’s minimal impact on human security in Tanzania can be found in the low number of interagency personnel AFRICOM has integrated, and direction in which the command’s funding drives its activities. This evidence supports the views of opponents. This is not to say AFRICOM does not at all engage in these types of activities in Tanzania. Several of its security cooperation programs and exercises do focus on humanitarian and public health issues, and civilian affairs teams periodically perform development related work. It can also be argued cooperation and engagement with the Tanzanian military and civilian affairs teams interacting and working with local populations are a form of diplomatic functions, which help cultivate stronger bilateral ties. Indeed, interviewees all indicated that they felt the command had helped create stronger bilateral ties with Tanzania.

Yet it is important to note how all of the programs and exercises which focus on non-traditional and are interagency are focused on the military. For example, the HIV/AIDS program works on prevention and treatment of the disease within the Tanzanian military. Therefore, although there is topical breadth and interagency cooperation, the target of AFRICOM’s focus remains on the Tanzanian military and traditional security issues. While not diminishing the importance of these efforts, the available information on AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania and interview responses shows a clear emphasis on a more traditional conception of security, rather than human
security. This evidence of AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania call into question the command’s whole of government approach and, overall, supports the views of opponents of AFRICOM.

The truth AFRICOM has faced is that the U.S. does not have the personnel necessary to meet the demands and mandates of civilian agencies, let alone divert significant numbers to a new military combatant command. Hodge (2011) notes that AFRICOM’s interagency structure and whole of government modus operandi was premised on an assumption that it would be able to command the requisite military, diplomatic, and conflict prevention resources. One of the officials interviewed by Hodge (2011, p. 227) even stated,

“The supposition that we are making here is that the whole-of-government interagency planning and framework has been cured, there have been the proper structures built in terms of a special coordinator for reconstruction and stability…the requisite expertise in terms of Civilian Response Corps—additional subject matter experts that are almost like an interagency reserve force—have come online”.

AFRICOM was created with a vision of what U.S. government security and state building capabilities would be like as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet these new resources and bureaucratic reconfigurations were not a reality for AFRICOM to incorporate and utilize.
Chapter Four
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The Tanzanian Perspective on the Impact of AFRICOM

Introduction

To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public? This projects chief research questions focus on the impact of AFRICOM on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, to what extent the command is addressing threats to human security in Tanzania, and the Tanzanian public’s perception of the command. To help answer these questions, this chapter details the most salient security threats in Tanzania, and the results of a content analysis of the country’s most prominent newspapers and an online discussion forum. The aim of this chapter is to present evidence from the Tanzanian perspective that will be central in answering these research questions.

Public Perceptions about AFRICOM among Tanzanians

When AFRICOM was announced it generated sudden, often visceral, reactions from leadership within African states, and their citizens. Some African countries, notably South Africa and Nigeria, had their newspapers filled with angry assertions that the U.S. was seeking to put its military in African states and that AFRICOM was but the final iteration of U.S. neo-colonialism. Ultimately the ability for AFRICOM to execute U.S.
military and foreign policy in Africa is dependent upon the acceptance of African heads of states. If public opinion in African states is adamantly opposed to AFRICOM, leaders are less likely cooperate and engage with the command and U.S. Africa policy will languish. For this reason, in-depth knowledge of public opinion in African states is critical for the command; ideally shaping the command’s priorities, approach, and outreach efforts.

Assessing public opinions also lends important insights into whether Africans view AFRICOM as serving their security or merely U.S. security interests, helping to highlight areas where the U.S. can adjust and alter its Africa policy. With these issues in mind this analysis compares and contrasts perceptions of AFRICOM in popular newspapers and social media sources in Tanzania to gain a better understanding of how the Tanzanian public views AFRICOM, and the manner in which news sources are informing those views.

For this assessment five of the most popular newspapers in Tanzania were chosen. The two English language publications chosen were the Citizen and Daily News. The remaining three, Mwananchi, Tanzania Daima, and An-nuur (an Islamic newspaper) are Swahili language publications. Each publication’s website, with the exception of An-nuur, was searched to find articles about AFRICOM. AllAfrica.com, a website which compiles and archives articles from African publications, and Lexis Nexis were also searched to see if there were additional articles that did not appear in a search of the publications’ websites. An-nuur’s articles on AFRICOM were pulled from a Lexis Nexis
search of the BBC’s Global Monitoring Service. In these searches three opinion pieces written by Tanzanians, but not published in the five selected publications were also found. These three opinion pieces were included and coded because they represented Tanzanian views on AFRICOM and the restrictions on freedom of speech may have made it impossible for them to be published in Tanzanian newspapers.

The search resulted in sixty-five articles. Articles were then qualitatively evaluated and coded as either being positive, negative, or neutral. To be coded as positive an article generally had to positively remark about AFRICOM’s engagement and activities or how it was impacting U.S. Africa relations. An example of phrasing that led to an article being coded as positive is,

“a recent symposium to engage academic professionals held in Dar es Salaam whose expertise includes history, political science, security studies, civil-military relations and conflict management, demonstrated the role of Africom in a non-militaristic approach to resolve some of the chronic problems facing the continent, notwithstanding the state of anarchism in Somalia” (Mjasiri, 2012)

To be coded as negative an article negatively remarked about AFRICOM and its activities, priorities, and its impact on U.S. Africa relations. Examples of the kind of phrasing that led to an article being coded as negative are:

“there in America, newspapers publish maps of the ten places in the world in which the military currently is. These areas indeed show that America goes where it can get what it needs, like oil and minerals. This, indeed, is the geography of imperialism (trans)” (Visram, 2012)

“We do not have to wait for the prophet to come down and tell us that welcoming the United States Army to set up an Africom base in Africa is opening the doors to colonialism (trans)” (“President Karume should leave office in peace without selling off Pemba,” 2010)
Neutral meant either the article was a news report or no bias could be detected. An example of phrasing that led to an article being coded as neutral is, “The US Africa Command (Africom) has assured that there are no immediate plans to establish its headquarters on the continent and has instead called for improvement in regional cooperation among African armies” (Mtambalike, 2012). Roughly 64% of the sixty-two articles were coded as being negative, 34% as neutral, and 1% positive.

A closer look at the distribution and origins of the coding results provides interesting insights into origination points of Tanzanian opinions of AFRICOM. Daily News is an English language newspaper owned by the Tanzanian government. None of the nine results from Daily News were coded as negative, one was positive and the remaining eight were coded as neutral. By comparison the Citizen, a privately owned English language publication, four of the fifteen articles were negative, eleven were neutral, and none were positive. The search of Tanzania Daima resulted in only two articles, one negative and one neutral. The eleven Mwananchi articles on AFRICOM were all coded as negative. Mwananchi is owned by the same company as the Citizen but published in Swahili. Similarly the Islamic Swahili language newspaper An-nuur had twenty-two of its twenty-five results categorized as negative with the remaining three being neutral.

An even clearer picture emerges when these results are disaggregated. Articles from the government owned Daily News were fewer in quantity than other sources, overwhelmingly neutral about AFRICOM, and contained the only positive article. The
privately owned *Citizen* had more articles and was more likely to be negative. Importantly, criticism of AFRICOM was overwhelming more likely to be in Swahili language publications. In English language publications 16% of the articles were negative, if the three opinion pieces by Tanzanians from other publications are included that percentage increases to 25.9%. By contrast, in Swahili language publications 89% of the articles were negative. Excluding the Islamic *An-nuur*, that percentage remains high at 92%. *Mwananchi* illustrates the English/Swahili dynamics well. Although owned by the same company, *Mwananchi*’s articles were 100% negative whereas the English language *Citizen* had 26% negative coverage.

The second resource used to assess Tanzanian perceptions and opinions of AFRICOM was *Jamii Forums*, a Tanzanian discussion forum website. It is a widely known website among Tanzanians and has over 100,000 registered members. The tagline of *Jamii Forums* is “Where we dare to talk openly.” Because of Tanzania’s freedom of press limitations, and the small number of people who participate in newspaper publications, collecting data from this large news and discussion forum affords a more comprehensive picture of Tanzanian perceptions and attitudes about AFRICOM.

To collect data from *Jamii Forums* a search for the word “AFRICOM” was done, pulling up all discussion threads containing “AFRICOM” in their content. Each thread was then read or, if there were hundreds of responses, searched for the words “AFRICOM,” “Marekani,” and “jeshi” (“America” and “military” in Swahili and English). Any comments which specifically referred to AFRICOM or activities for which
it is responsible (such as military exercises) were collected and coded. The code used was the same as that used for the newspaper data; positive, negative, neutral.

An example of a response that was coded as positive is,

“I always appreciate usa for their suportive nature, we use alot of chinese inequality products with no any human support from them, for a long period joseph cony in uganda killing our sisters and brothers no any arabic nation or china say anything right now usa get in charge you start blaming usa. [sic]” (“Wamarekani wanazidi kujikita kijeshi barani Africa,” 2011).

An example of a response that was coded as negative is,

“It has nothing to do with Al Shabaab. It has to do with AFRICOM, chase away China and India, control, grab resources, recolonize Africa or better say enslave Africans as they are used to it. Kill them, starve them and control them so they fall in line with US-Western countries interests” (“Wamarekani wanazidi kujikita kijeshi barani Africa,” 2011).

An example of a response that was coded as neutral is, (speaking about different military structures) “they protect their border and inside their own country, it is also different because they have commanders for AFRICOM in Africa” (trans) (“Makomandoo wa Bongo,” 2011). For this data assessing neutrality was more of a challenge than in newspapers, but was predominantly coded when a respondent asked a clarifying question.

In initial discussions with Tanzanian professors about knowledge and perceptions of AFRICOM in the general Tanzanian public, the author was told the general public would have little knowledge and few opinions about AFRICOM. The number of responses and their content on Jamii Forums strongly contradict these assertions. Respondents on Jamii Forums generally demonstrated a strong interest in this topic and
engaged in vigorous debates with one another over U.S. military and/or AFRICOM involvement in Tanzania, and Africa in general.

A total of two hundred and thirty-five responses were collected and coded. Positive responses constituted 10% of total responses, neutral 41%, and negative 49%. Another aspect of this assessment was to record what was referenced by respondents in their posts; either AFRICOM in Tanzania, another African state, or a general comment. The purpose of tracking what respondents referenced was to see with what frequency Tanzanians are concerned with the command vis a vis Tanzania specifically. The results reinforce that the Tanzanian public is engaged with the topic of AFRICOM as it directly relates to Tanzania, 36% of posts were about AFRICOM in Tanzania. Of the remaining posts 12% referenced AFRICOM in another African state, predominantly focusing on other East African states and the U.S. intervention in Libya. And 52% of posts were general in nature, lacking a reference to a specific country, and focused on the theoretical policy implications of the command.

Overall, the responses on Jamii Forums showed a greater balance between the negative and neutral perspectives than newspaper coverage and there were also a higher percentage of positive responses than in newspaper coverage. It is difficult to know definitively why Jamii Forum respondents had a more balanced, and overall more positive, view of AFRICOM. One possibility is the fact that the Tanzanian public has a generally favorable view of the U.S. Research by the Pew Global Attitudes project in 2007 found 46% of Tanzanians had a favorable view of the U.S. and 49% favorability of
U.S consideration for other countries interests. That percentage had increased to 65% by 2008 (“Tanzania: Opinion of the United States,” n.d.). Another factor could be Tanzanian news source choices. Since it is common knowledge the Tanzanian government restricts information regarding security issues it is possible many Tanzanians rely on outside, primarily internet, news sources for information on U.S. and Tanzanian security policies, potentially reducing negative perceptions of AFRICOM. Another possibility is respondents on Jamii Forums represent the more educated and engaged policy elites in Tanzania since participation on Jamii Forums would require access to a computer, technology skills, and a more sophisticated knowledge of foreign and security policy.

**Conclusion**

“Tanzania is a peaceful country but there are many things below the surface and, with the right spark, there could be chaos.” This remark a Tanzanian made to the author highlights that the challenge for AFRICOM’s engagement in Tanzania is correctly identifying, and subsequently addressing, those security issues which could either spark or fuel instability. Tanzania has a wide array of security, including human security, challenges with which to contend. The transnational issues of violent extremism, drug trafficking, and piracy pose real threats to stability and security and cannot be overlooked. Yet focusing on these issues alone ignores the everyday insecurity Tanzanians face which, over time, compound into transnational threats and fuel internal instabilities. Human insecurity constitutes the foundation of these transnational
challenges, is the most prevalent in the lives of Tanzanians, and are indeed those which most concern them.

The results of this analysis pertain specifically to research question three. As a whole, AFRICOM does not foster a positive public perception of itself in Tanzania. The results of the content analysis have several implications for AFRICOM. First, these results show AFRICOM’s activities are, by and large, not resonating with the Tanzanian population. As a whole, the views expressed also indicate there is skepticism that U.S. security policy in Tanzania is really intended to benefit Tanzania or include it as an equal partner. Therefore, the predominantly negative view in newspapers and somewhat ambiguous view of AFRICOM on Jamii Forums suggests there is significant work to be done in terms of the command’s public outreach and relations. The content analysis results of the newspaper An-Nuur show this is particularly true in Tanzania’s Muslim communities.

While some of the views expressed in either newspapers or Jamii Forums indicate fundamental, and likely unalterable, philosophical opposition to the U.S. military, many of the negative or ambivalent views were based off misinformation or a lack thereof. The overwhelmingly negative view of AFRICOM in Swahili publications is also instructive and is perhaps indicative that the command would benefit from doing more outreach through Swahili language mediums. Although a stronger public outreach effort to the Tanzanian public is unlikely to result in a sea change of public opinion,
improving the command’s in-country communication strategy serves U.S. interests by reducing the mistrust and suspicion created by a lack of information.
Chapter Five
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Summary and Conclusion

This research fills a gap in the existing literature by contributing an in-depth evaluation of AFRICOM in a single African state. This case study of Tanzania sought to answer three questions: what is the impact of AFRICOM in executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? How and to what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity? And does AFRICOM foster a positive public perception in Tanzania?

What is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania?

To answer the first question this research utilized interviews with U.S. officials and personnel, publically available information about the command’s activities in Tanzania, and detailed the most immediate human and tradition security challenges in Tanzania. The fact that Tanzania willingly participates in almost all of the AFRICOM security cooperation training programs and exercises for which it is eligible shows that the command is effectively executing U.S. national security policy. Tanzania’s high level of participation also signals a convergence in U.S. and Tanzanian threat perceptions, reflecting that U.S. security policy actually does address security issues which the
Tanzanian government finds important. In addition, the evidence from the interviews indicates that AFRICOM is having a positive impact on bilateral relations because Tanzania has seen the resources and attention it can leverage, and the merits of having a single point of contact for the U.S. military. Cultivating strong bilateral ties is important for both the current and future execution and success of U.S. national security policy. Both of these have positive implications for U.S. security and strategic interests and support the views of proponents of AFRICOM that it brings improved focus, coordination, and resources to U.S. Africa policy.

To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania?

To answer the second question this research analyzed the command’s training exercise activities in Tanzania and interview responses in relation to the background analysis on the country’s security challenges. This analysis indicates that AFRICOM is addressing human security issues, but these efforts and impacts are confined to the Tanzanian military. AFRICOM’s primary means of engagement are through partner security cooperation training and exercises with the Tanzanian military, and there was some breadth to the command’s engagement, including training and exercises on humanitarian crises, pandemics etc. Nonetheless, the table of AFRICOM’s training and exercises with AFRICOM and interviews with officials familiar with the command’s engagement with Tanzania revealed that the primary locus of concern for AFRICOM in
its execution of U.S. security policy is more traditional security challenges. While partner military capacity building is necessary, recent events in Mali underscore that it is insufficient to ensuring stability, security, and preventing conflict.

Security in Tanzania is fundamentally about human security. The daily concerns of ordinary Tanzanians are the country’s chronic poverty, education, and health systems and the Tanzanian government has placed these issues at the top of its agendas. AFRICOM’s current activities in Tanzania have minimal focus and impact on Tanzania’s human security, the primary threats the country faces. Given that AFRICOM’s ultimate objective is centered on conflict prevention, a broader approach will be essential if U.S. national security policy is to successfully prevent instability and conflict.

**What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public?**

To answer the third question this research conducted a content analysis of Swahili and English language newspapers and an online discussion forum in Tanzania, coding articles and responses about AFRICOM based on attitudinal measures. The results of this content analysis show that there is a high degree of engagement with the topic of AFRICOM amongst the Tanzanian public. Overall public opinion of the command leans negative, and is decidedly negative in Swahili language mediums.

The content analysis revealed that, overall, the Tanzanian public views AFRICOM with suspicion. Their belief that AFRICOM, at best, is narrowly focused on terrorism and, at worst, is using security as a guise for its neo-imperial ambitions shows
that the command faces serious challenges regarding its activities and public image. A highly plausible explanation for these views is misperception, stemming from both the U.S. and Tanzania. From the Tanzanian side, the public’s misperception stems from a lack of information regarding U.S. foreign policy, the means by which those policies are executed, and their overall intent. Misperception on the part of the U.S. stems from a lack of understanding the historic and contemporary undercurrents of Tanzania which shape its public’s perceptions of insecurity and national interest, and then failing to configure and execute U.S. policy in Tanzania accordingly. The prevalence of these negative views highlights how crucial it is from both a security and diplomatic standpoint that Tanzania’s human security threats remain a top priority for U.S. government efforts. Indeed a former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania stated, in reference to Tanzania, “Development is the driving force of our diplomatic strength, but also who we are and what we’re known for” (personal communication).

Conclusion

The evidence from this case study suggests that in Tanzania AFRICOM has largely failed to achieve the articulated vision of a “combatant command plus.” This can be attributed to a complex confluence of factors: interagency buy-in and capacity, institutional culture, and the inherent limits of being a military organization. In the end, AFRICOM is a military organization, inherently its functions are military in nature and its primary counterpart will be another country’s military. The original articulations about
the command and their emphasis on jointness and whole of government approaches are not, in themselves, inherently problematic or incompatible within the constructs of a military organization. Rather, this vision for AFRICOM stretched the command beyond what the bounds of a military-military relationship allow. Not achieving the original vision for the command also stems from more complicated realities surrounding civilian capacity in the U.S. government, interagency incorporation into the command, and the sources of AFRICOM’s funding. All of these factors directly impact AFRICOM’s ability to carry out its whole of government modus operandi, engage in long term planning, and calibrate its activities according to the needs of individual African states.

Critics of AFRICOM charge the command represents the militarization of U.S. Africa policy. Indeed it is important for the U.S. military to be mindful of avoiding an overreach in Africa, and to work in cooperation with African states; not simply pursuing a one-dimensional concept of U.S. strategic interests. However, this criticism misses two crucial points. First, this critique fails to acknowledge the fact that all aspects of U.S. engagement in Africa have been on the rise, including humanitarian and development aid. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) represent a more extensive investment of U.S. resources than AFRICOM. The MCC currently has fifteen compacts with African states, totaling $5.8 billion and its ten threshold program grants in Africa total $160 million (“Africa,” n.d.). In its first four years (FY2004-FY2008) the Bush Administration
spent $18.1 billion dollars in PEPFAR funds, making it the largest bi-lateral health initiative in the world (Salaam-Blyther, 2012, p. 2).

By comparison, AFRICOM’s start-up budget in FY 2007 was $51 million and its FY 2008 first year operating budget was approximately $154 million. Its FY2013 request of $285 million represents the highest amount of funding to date (Ploch, 2011). The funding of only two U.S. bi-lateral assistance programs (MCC and PEPFAR) eclipses AFRICOM’s funding. Militarization would require a level of funding which exceeds and overwhelms all other aspects of bi-lateral assistance. In the case of Tanzania, development and health assistance constituted $506 million of the total $549 million of U.S. bi-lateral assistance to Tanzania in FY 2011, with military and security related funding receiving only $43 million (Dagne, 2010). Arguing AFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. Africa policy ignores the concurrent significant rise in funding for U.S. humanitarian and development assistance programs for Africa.

Second, by arguing the U.S. is militarizing its Africa policy, critics posit a reductionist view of the agency of African leaders to pursue the geo-strategic interests of their states. Insisting U.S. Africa policy retain an ostensibly humanitarian and development focus perpetuates a paternalistic view of Africa vis a vis the U.S. The U.S. military is a central part of its foreign policy apparatus, and is a status quo aspect of U.S. foreign relations. Engaging African states in broader strategic terms is an important step in the normalization and maturation of U.S. relations in the region, as well as the rise of African states in international politics. It is disingenuous to insist that African states stop
being treated as humanitarian basket cases, then criticize evolutions which add dynamism and broader forms of engagement to U.S. Africa policy.

Nonetheless, by failing to incorporate a more substantial whole of government approach and to broaden its vision of security threats, AFRICOM’s execution of U.S. national security policy in Tanzania falls short. The U.S. military cannot and should not be expected to assume the responsibility for U.S. development and diplomacy in Tanzania. But an exclusive focus on the Tanzanian military narrows the command’s focus to the point where it has neglected to engage in other areas which have significant bearing on security. Grappling with the whole of government approach and its dilemma’s and tensions requires ongoing policy evaluation, informed by assessments of in-country conditions. The challenge, then, for the U.S. military and interagency is to bridge this divide; expanding the military’s capacity and scope while also ensuring that AFRICOM is working within its purview in the wider U.S. government system. Broadening AFRICOM’s scope of engagement beyond the counterpart country’s military demands ongoing deliberative processes.

The analysis of AFRICOM’s in-country activities in Tanzania, including programs and exercises, indicate that AFRICOM is more of a traditional combatant command than articulated at its inception. As a more traditional combatant command, AFRICOM emphasizes military-to-military partner capacity building and engagement as a means to address security threats. This is in contrast to the founding vision of AFRICOM as a revolutionary new interagency command, one which pursued
development and human security objectives, and embodied the state building lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.

AFRICOM’s engagement with Tanzania is valuable and germane for state and regional security and stability. Tanzania’s contribution of troops to the recently authorized UN offensive combat force in Eastern Congo and a Tanzanian General being named as the head of this regional offensive force illustrates the important, and growing, peace and security role Tanzania plays in the region. Partner capacity building in states not experiencing instability or conflict is critical to mitigating those issues when they arise, both in the state and regionally, and preventing conflict recurrence. Tanzania’s role in the UN offensive combat force is just one example of the necessity of its military having the capacity to fulfill this role, and demonstrates the regional security dividends from AFRICOM’s engagement and programs.

Ultimately this analysis found a disconnect between U.S. policy priorities and the reality of the security threats on-the-ground. Though AFRICOM’s partner capacity building with the Tanzanian military is important for state and regional security and is in accordance with the wishes of the country’s leadership, many of Tanzania’s security issues remain unaddressed by AFRICOM. More is required than building the military’s capacity and focusing on the macro-level aspects of these threats. U.S. concerns over piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking etc. should not be set aside but rather, left unaddressed, the micro-level of these threats are persistent human insecurity. While interagency personnel issues, funding, and restraints on the purview of the U.S. military mean it is
unlikely that AFRICOM will become a whole of government combatant command, it
does need to have a greater emphasis on human security in Tanzania. Engaging in
security sector reform, specifically policy training, would be a means by which
AFRICOM could have a greater impact on human security while also addressing
transnational threats affecting U.S. interests, and stay in its institutional lane.

The selection of a case study approach for this research naturally leads to
questions of the merits and generalizability of such an approach and its conclusions. In
terms of merits, a probing case study afforded a more in-depth look at AFRICOM’s
impacts as well as a more thorough assessment of an African state in which the U.S. has
growing security and strategic interests than in the current literature. While it is both
difficult and ill advised to generalize the findings of this case study to all African states,
this research provides valuable insights regarding states similar to Tanzania. Therefore,
the generalizability of this case study’s findings most directly apply to tier-two countries
in Africa that the U.S. is working to cultivate stronger ties with and which have a
relatively good level of stability. Another area in which this research can be more broadly
generalized is in terms of AFRICOM’s public relations and outreach, the extent to which
those efforts impact public opinion. Perhaps the most important generalizable finding
from this case study is that the command, and U.S. policy in general, need to be
cognizant of the role local context and culture play when it comes to public opinion of
AFRICOM and the U.S. military.
Limitations

There are some limitations to this assessment. The first relates to the content analysis content reliability and the generalizability of the assessment. In regards to content reliability, searches may not have resulted in every article from each newspaper publication being found, potentially reducing the assessments accuracy. Many of the newspaper articles were published within a fairly recent timeframe, usually only stretching back to 2009. The second limitation is that this data comes from a small sampling of Tanzanian newspapers, limiting the ability to assemble a comprehensive picture of Tanzanian attitudes and make generalizations for the entire population of Tanzania. However the fact that there are over three-hundred and fifty registered news publications in Tanzania would make the time needed to go through each of them prohibitively long.

Limitations of the social media content analysis mostly stem from the fact that most of the responses were in Swahili which needed to be translated before being coded. A native Swahili speaker was consulted when translation difficulties or questions arose to minimize mistranslation and coding mistakes. Another limitation was knowing whether or not a respondent was a Tanzanian. Though that information was unavailable, to mitigate this issue coded responses were again coded regarding whether or not they referred to Tanzania or other African states.

A second limitation relates to the ability to generalize about the impact of AFRICOM on U.S. national security policy due to the fact that no Tanzanian government
officials were interviewed. Tanzania has a much more closed approach to government and security issues. Efforts were made to contact Tanzanian government officials, and even a couple journalists, were unsuccessful and no one would grant an interview. Therefore, interviews with U.S. officials were the only means to acquire attitudinal information on the Tanzanian government’s views of AFRICOM, and the command’s impact.

Further Research

The content analysis revealed a high degree of negativity towards AFRICOM in the Tanzanian public. Islamic publications demonstrated even more extreme antagonisms towards the command. Stemming from the results of this research, a point for further research regarding AFRICOM in Tanzania would be an in-depth assessment of the command’s public outreach strategy and efforts, particularly to Muslim communities since they seemingly feel targeted by U.S. counter terror efforts. While these views may not be alterable, it would be instructive to assess current U.S. outreach efforts to the Tanzanian public and whether or not public outreach is considered an important component for U.S. national security policy, its current impacts, and potential impact if any aspects were to be altered. This research would require extensive interview work throughout AFRICOM and various communities in Tanzania, particularly Muslim communities. Further research into this area would be beneficial for understanding
whether or not U.S. policy is shaped by and responsive to the opinions of the Tanzanian public.
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