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Becoming Good Europeans? Globality, the EU and the Potential to Realize Nietzsche's Idea of Europe

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Becoming Good Europeans? Globality, the EU and the Potential to Realize Nietzsche’s Idea of Europe

A Dissertation Presented to

The Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

By

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Advisor: Jack Donnelly
ABSTRACT

This dissertation takes up Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’ and his related idea of Europe to show how the former disposition may be cultivated to achieve the latter—a reinvigorated culture on the continent. It does so by applying his vitalist politics and power ontology (will to power hypothesis and theory of decadence) to critique European integration in the broader context of globalization. The analysis enables me to theorize how “healthy” individuals might exploit opportunities in the present to become 'good Europeans', with the aim of realizing Nietzsche’s quasi-cosmopolitan idea of Europe. It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of Europe’s ailment remains relevant, as does his strategy, via a radically Dionysian affirmation of life, for overcoming the international order it has spawned.

In doing so I utilize Nietzsche’s related perspectivalist epistemological stance and hermeneutical framework to build on Nietzsche's genealogy of morality. This shows the West’s present “slave moral” regime to be a further intensified development of secularized Christian–Platonic values. It arose through the fusing of liberal-optimism (belief in equality, emancipation, enfranchisement, etc.) with modernity’s doctrines of universalism, humanism, secularism, progressivism and rationalism. It also coextends with the positivistic orientation of scientism to transmit a secular faith in truth, and unparadoxically an injurious relativism and cynical worldview. It is through Nietzsche’s
vitalist perspectivalism that I understand the psychological-historical origins and current operation of the axiomatic narratives promulgated via the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.

The same critical framework is applied to a doxagraphical survey of theories of European integration. These theories are understood as differing perspectives conceived within and informed by the same values matrix, and critiqued in chronological order of their appearance to reflect the evolution of the field. Problems of evaluation, indeterminacy and bias, and the form of reasoning privileged by the positivistic orientation conferred by scientism are examined in terms of how they inform the conduct of social science and conceptualizations and uses of fact. Acts of theorizing are understood as indicative of a will-to-truth which can positively augment life or negatively hamper it. I consider how the mainstream of the field has tended to reiterate the ideological presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity. Notable exceptions include recent constructivist approaches and discourse analysis critiques. These critical perspectives are productively broadening and potentially subverting the dominant conventions of the field. This raises the possibility that good Europeans may influence the future development of the EU as counter-theorizers of it.

The EU is understood as a crucial locus of the globalization complex, a primarily reactive power constellation comprised of myriad institutions, processes and forces. A ressentiment-driven project, the globalization complex functions as an ideological juggernaut to universalize ultra-liberal-modern values. It affectively implements a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power which culminates in a hyper-decadent
condition typified by resignation to its prerogatives. Its values are politically instantiated throughout the world via democratization and hegemonic capital process.

I examine the spectacularized existential meanings and simulated ontological purpose provided by the globalization complex. These engage and automatize the masses by means of commercially generated, media promoted desires and an ethos of consumerism. These sustain a philistinic culture of conformity by means of which its ideological proponents, ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, justify and naturalize their authority. Their influence extends a spirit of revenge against life’s radical contingency and temporality. It privileges homogenizing and ossifying modes of being to inhibit authentic becoming.

However, the globalization complex cannot contain all the affective capacities its shrinking and simultaneous acceleration of the world generates. The increased interconnectivity between people that it facilitates and the reactive values matrix it imposes give rise to a changed mentality or consciousness. Life in within the globalization complex provides a few with a philosophical education that endows them with a broadened perspective on the differences between human types. They gain a profound appreciation of the need for the divergent worldviews that distinguish disparate cultures—forms of life imperiled by conventional globalization. This nurtures a reflective, historical consciousness and an acceptance of difference (entwined with their love of fate) that augments their emerging sense of globality and occasionally manifests itself in ways that escape capture. Among a few, globality fosters the skeptical-ironic disposition toward truth claims and craftiness characteristic of ‘good Europeans’. Such iconoclastic individuals may creatively challenge the legitimacy of ultra-liberal-modern
values, their distinctive striving symptomatic of a positive will to creative destruction as generative power and authentic becoming-other.

To foster the development of the skeptical-ironic disposition, or *Weltironie*, of good Europeanism I suggest a six-fold skeptical praxis. This is based on the classical Pyrrhonean skeptical notions of *akatalepsia* (recognition of the impossibility of certain knowledge), *epoche* (the suspension of belief due to the contingency of truth), *ataraxia* (the ancient skeptic and stoic doctrine of disciplined withdrawal toward becoming what one is), *apangelia* (an avowal not involving a commitment to truth or falsity), *adoxastos* (the disciplined effort to avoid forming convictions and feigning agreement with prevailing value standards when necessary, which corresponds with the strategic use of masks), and finally, from the ancient cynics, the concept of *parrhesia* (fearless speech in mocking ascetic values). These practices support the necessary perspectivalist stance toward all truth claims to radically affirm the chaos of becoming. The adherents of such an anti-essentialist discipline revel in the fundamental contingency of life.

According to Nietzsche’s vision, I consider how ‘good Europeans’ might achieve their aims in light of the prevailing values of our globalizing world. Acting as comedians of ascetic ideals they engage in kynical acts that may utilize the new technologies and enhanced communications provided by science and industry (key components of the globalization complex), to lampoon the anti-human decadence and nihilism of our age. Their inherently political mockery of the prevailing social discourses arouses the passion of other healthy types. They are spurred to similarly creative experiments and life-affirming acts of defiance, and the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’ gradually spreads, thereby. Through their striving such ‘good Europeans’ (who, in our globalizing age, may
appear in any geographical locale) become capable of recognizing and exploiting unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality.

Afflicted with the decadence of our age, they are not the Übermenschen Nietzsche anticipated, but prevenient to them. More likely to be perceived as buffoons than as great leaders, they are neither conventional revolutionaries nor “improvers of humankind”; they endeavor to discredit the ultra-liberal-modern order instantiated through the globalization complex. By prompting it to reactively assert its prerogatives and intensify itself, they make its contradictoriness, antagonistic impetus and hostility to difference more apparent. However gradually, this will erode its legitimacy, as good Europeans exploit its vulnerabilities.

According to Nietzsche’s vision, I consider the ways in which ‘good Europeans’ would likely employ the democratic, egalitarian and populist sensibilities of the globalized masses, and how the EU could be hijacked to augment their aim. This could include the crafty use of human rights, artificial intelligence and bio-engineering to hasten our enervated epoch to its expiration. Efforts to challenge the reigning ascetic-consumerist ideals are conditioning the possibility for the appearance of Übermenschlich individuals to (nomothetically) legislate an agonistic socio-political milieu predicated on a natural rank order of types. It is the hope of ‘good Europeans’ that such Übermenschen will one day inaugurate a transhuman future and create a higher culture for the flourishing of greatness that secondarily edifies the multitude with the meaning and purpose great works provide.

I conclude that if humankind succeeds in transfiguring itself through the going-down of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch (the most pervasive and decadent socio-political
order in recorded history) these Übermenschen, the progeny of contemporary ‘good Europeans’, will focus on the rehabilitation of the environment and preservation of the earth.
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BOOK ONE

Nietzsche’s Diagnosis of Liberal-Modernity and its Ineliminable Decadence

Introduction

Nietzsche's vitalist politics and corresponding power ontology provides a critical lens through which the values driving both contemporary European integration and globalization may be examined afresh. In this work I apply Nietzsche’s diagnostic method for appraising the role and utility of values for life to an assessment of Europe’s ongoing unification in the broader context of globalization. I theorize how Nietzsche’s good Europeans can exploit abstract potentials of globality to become who it is they are and transfigure the decadence of our epoch.1 This suggests how their creative experiments and attempts at self-overcoming could revalue the nihilistic values enervating humankind to realize a Nietzschean idea of Europe – and remake the world accordingly.

I contend that the originally Western, ideologized ultra-liberal-modern values that prevail in our global age are propagated through axiomatic socio-political narratives that combine liberal-optimism with the modern doctrines of universalism, humanism, secularism, progressivism and rationalism.2 This meta-discourse co-extends with and supplements the positivistic orientation conferred by scientism, the customs, practices and duties of which comprises a secular-faith. The anti-natural value-standards, or “slave morality of decadence”, subtending this hegemonic power-knowledge regime are
implemented universally through a multiplicity of reactive institutions, forces and processes comprising the conventional globalization complex. A ressentiment-driven project, the globalization complex comprises an authoritarian power constellation that is unprecedented in human history.

Out of the analysis that follows I advance a strategy for attaining a transhuman condition through the exploitation of these contemporary developments. The aim is to illuminate how contemporary European institutions, particularly the European Union (EU) and the norms and practices it sustains, coextend with and promulgate the aforementioned norms of the globalization complex. I show how, despite being a locus of that complex, the same values and the modes of existence the EU maintains are giving rise to abstract potentials of globality that hold the promise, when realized, of transmuting them the reactive forces of globalization and its increasingly hegemonic socio-political and economic management of humankind.

I then explore how, via a set of “Nietzschean” tactics, European society and its supranational institutions might be so elementally transfigured by superlative individuals through a revaluation of the values subtending the reactive forces and leveling processes of globalization. It is my contention that the sort of ‘good Europeans’ to whom Nietzsche appealed and hoped to spur into action are being enabled, through the abstract, positive potentials of globality, to realize (an approximation of) his idea of Europe. This involves revaluing the decadent values of the present—our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern age—to initiate the development of a higher culture (Bildung) through which new political identities may be created that confer salubrious meanings to individuals and provide the societies they comprise with a sense of purpose in communal existence.
In becoming ‘good Europeans’ and working to achieve that distinctive idea through disciplinary regimes of self-creation, such individuals reinvent humankind’s future, enhance its vitality and enlarge the opportunities available to and varieties of becoming conceivable for the species. Concerned with the question of ultimate political significance, “what ought humankind to become?” their self-creation—as nomothetic legislation—hastens the development or arrival of over-human types, the Übermensch Nietzsche famously designated “as embodying the perfection, rather that the transcendence, of humankind.”5 Conway states that “the Übermensch is any human being who actually advances the frontier of human perfectibility.” This is intertwined with “the central task of politics,” which “is to produce (as a matter of design) those individuals who stand, ‘in relation to humankind as a whole,’ as exemplary human beings.”6 Nietzsche conceived these superlative individuals as those capable of simultaneously assisting humankind in its going-down and acting as mid-wives at the birth of “a successor age to modernity”; a future, post-human condition.7

Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology are indispensable to his general theory of decadence. Daniel Conway provides a concise definition of Nietzsche’s conception of decadence, as:

a degenerative physiological condition, which characteristically manifests itself as: a growing disparity between the cognitive and volitional resources at one’s disposal; a yawning chasm that divorces intention from accomplishment; the widening gulf that separates what one wants from what one needs; and, most succinctly, an irreversible weakness of will.8

Nietzsche employed this notion of decadence within a broader critical framework for evaluating political institutions, cultural vitality and the health of a people / society.
Conway further notes, “the enduring value of Nietzsche’s confrontation with modernity”, which symbiotically developed with his theory of decadence, “is strictly heuristic”, but as such it provides a persuasive, alternative set of interpretive tools for assessing the efficaciousness of dominant socio-economic, political and cultural institutions within the governing post-Enlightenment liberal framework that produced and continues to validate them.9

Central to Nietzsche’s philosophical project is the quite radical argument that cause–effect relations are illusory and that consequently traditional Western philosophical assumptions about them have badly misled us.10 According to Nietzsche will to power—a dynamic array of anorganic forces—constitutes all that is, and becomes. Related to the Greek philosophical concept of *dynamis* (active and passive capacity, hence power and potentiality11), will to power describes the elemental nature of the world in terms as anti-foundationalist as any founding notion that has yet been conceived.12 The veritable Higgs-Boson of Nietzsche’s (and perhaps much of contemporary) philosophy, it must be acknowledged that there is in fact no less empirical evidence to support or independently verify Nietzsche’s notion of will to power and by extension his general theory of decadence than there is for substantiating the philosophical tenets of liberal-modernity.13 This is in part due to the fact that the prevailing notion of cause and effect relations is erroneous, “an arbitrary division and dismemberment” of “a continuum out of which we isolate a couple of pieces... in [any one] moment of [which] there is an infinite number of processes that elude us.”14 After citing this passage, Williams further explains:

Cause and effect are orders imposed on becoming by the human mind; they do not exist in the world. ...Will to power, then, does not lurk behind affects, causing affects. Will to power consists of the affects themselves. It is the event by which
becoming and affects are recognizable. Yet our language leaves us little alternative for expressing Nietzsche’s position other than [to reference] ‘affects of will to power’.\textsuperscript{15}

Nietzsche asserts that both the conventional notion (that is, metaphysical fiction) of mechanistic causation and will to power are perspectives with important consequence for life. His symptomatological method of understanding—or “diagnosing”—those consequences prompted him to develop ‘will to power’ into an innovative (quasi-cosmological) theory of the affects, and by extension the political, co-extending with a highly unconventional ontology.

Nietzsche is primarily concerned with health and strength as symptomatized by ascending life, and how it may be generated from and/or augmented by culturally situated values facilitated by corresponding forms of socio-political organization. However, whilst his theory recognizes and engages this subjectivity, liberalism attempts to ground itself in reason and universalize a corresponding interpretation of human experience and the ideals that its construal of reality brings into being.\textsuperscript{16} Nietzsche gives us a compelling, genealogical explanation of how the slave moral (contemporary liberal-modern) paradigm arose and similar account of its self-justificatory discursive mechanisms and perpetuation up through the aforementioned, presently hegemonic institutions. Donnelly observes that:

For the liberal, the individual is not merely separable from the community and social roles, but specially valued precisely as a distinctive, discrete individual—which is why each person must be treated with equal concern and respect.\textsuperscript{17}

Nietzsche rejected the liberal-modern notion of the individual. He also doubted the theoretical viability of extricating her from her community and warned against the practical effect of doing so.\textsuperscript{18}
Although neither Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence nor the long dominant, post-Enlightenment liberal-modern paradigm it elucidates can convince him of their “objective” superiority independent of the reality they comprehend, Nietzsche’s anti-liberal theory arguably provides us with a more comprehensive and, by extension, valid perspective on the motives of human activity. This includes the values, norms and practices that arise to enable, perpetuate and justify it. It does not suggest an answer to the question of whether or not Nietzsche’s alternative would be more desirable than the status quo to most individuals. Toward the end of this work I address this question and advance a hypothesis that attempts to account for the core ideals of Nietzsche’s political vision.

A central contention in this work is that through the perspectivist epistemological stance inbuilt to his general theory of decadence, Nietzsche provides a more expansive hermeneutical framework for evaluating ethico-political principles than does the liberal-modern paradigm it challenges. As a plausible alternative to liberal-modernism it warrants being taken seriously on its own terms; the insights it provides when applied as a critical lens for appraising and comprehending the world also warrant serious consideration by extension. At the very least it can be confidently asserted that the critique of liberal-modernity Nietzsche’s theory essays prompted many of the most influential philosophical developments in Anglo-American and continental European thought during the 20th century, and to judge from the plethora of Nietzsche-indebted work presently being done across the social sciences and humanities, it clearly continues to inspire, goad and persuade.
Nietzsche anticipated that many would cite his theory’s lack of empirical grounds as a pretext for dismissing out-of-hand its veracity (even while they continued to unselfconsciously embrace its equally unproven by metaphysically gratifying antipodes), so he appealed to Europe’s historical experience via his genealogical methodology to stand as a foundation for and quasi-empirical corroboration of his analysis.\(^\text{19}\) His own skeptical critique of the Western philosophical tradition – its customary (if currently syncretic mixture of elemental Platonist, Cartesian, Kantian, etc.) notions of causality, epistemology, ontology, teleology and metaphysics – combined with both his subversively incisive redeployment of its own rationalist methodologies and his psychological account of human action to bolster his theory’s experiential claims.\(^\text{20}\)

Nietzsche’s theory of decadence co-extends with his vitalist politics and power ontology in important ways that will be made clear below. It is enlisted throughout this work as a heuristic device for analyzing and evaluating European integration, the EU, the conventional globalization complex and the liberal philosophical presuppositions subtending each of these interrelated subjects. As a thought experiment, it provides valuable perspectives on and insight into the ultra-liberal-modern values subtending these contemporary European developments and suggests how they may be utilized, via a considered ‘good Europeanism’, as a basis for formulating a practical strategy by which to hasten, if not achieve, the re-naturalization of political life in a post-liberal Europe.

In addition to being of general interest to Nietzsche scholars there is a substantive reason for putting Nietzsche’s vitalism to such use. His will to power and theory of decadence are immanent to his perspectivalist hermeneutics and epistemology, as well as his genealogical illumination of how the anorganic forces comprising all existents find
socio-psychological expression via involuntary drives and impulses. Together they also elucidate the role that instinct (the product of generations of breeding) plays in organizing those drives and impulses—both at the level of the so-called “individual” (the micro-political sphere) and at the level of society (the macro-political sphere)—to foster the cultural life of peoples and civilizations. Its analytical payoff lies precisely in the unique insight it provides into the dependent and conditional process of value creation and truth legitimation.21

Central to my project is an attempt to explicate how the EU might be exploited by untimely ‘good Europeans’. I argue that through unanticipated abstract potentials of globality such thymotic ‘free spirits’ (Freigeist) may become who it is they are and overcome the reactive forces generated by the hegemonic, ultra-liberal-modern ideals dissipating life in our hyper-decadent age. Bergmann notes that “Nietzsche saw the free spirit’s ultimate ‘mission in removing all the barriers that stand in the way of the fusion

Readers needn’t believe in the actuality of Nietzsche’s vitalist premises or necessarily subscribe to the hypotheses they turn out in order to take seriously their distinctive insights into the generation of reality. According to his theory of truth, or the affects, their apodicticity and veridicality is not diminished thereby. Indeed, a reader would misunderstand his work—and the aim of this book—entirely if they took it as advancing any thesis with dogmatic certainty. Rather they ought to permit Nietzsche’s many dares to stimulate an appreciation of contingency and to cultivate within themselves the intellectual stance of Weltironie. The incomparable challenges his vitalist politics and power ontology pose to the Western philosophical tradition provide us with a set of perspectives / understandings that cannot be arrived at from another angle.

Central to my project is an attempt to explicate how the EU might be exploited by untimely ‘good Europeans’. I argue that through unanticipated abstract potentials of globality such thymotic ‘free spirits’ (Freigeist) may become who it is they are and overcome the reactive forces generated by the hegemonic, ultra-liberal-modern ideals dissipating life in our hyper-decadent age. Bergmann notes that “Nietzsche saw the free spirit’s ultimate ‘mission in removing all the barriers that stand in the way of the fusion
of mankind: religion; states; monarchical instincts; illusions of wealth and poverty; 
prejudices of health and race—etc.”22 Toward such an end—which is prevenient to the 
conditions necessary for the development of authentic culture—I theorize how the anti-
natural, homogenizing objectives of the globalization complex may be hijacked and 
redeployed to hasten the eventual realization of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe.23

These coherent explanatory propositions—informed by contemporary 
developments—should elucidate how their pursuit of natural aims consisting with a 
master morality of breeding and the philosophical education it advances is likely to 
transfigure Western civilization by establishing a new basis for culture (Bildung) from its 
ruins. According to Nietzsche, the institutionalization of a naturalized pathos of distance 
between types (an authentic embrace of difference) to augment and the fullest flourishing 
of those capable (the healthiest and highest exemplars of humankind) will multiply the 
varieties and supplement the development of elevated forms of life.

In contending with criticisms of Nietzsche’s program, Conway concedes that 
“[b]linded perhaps by his [Nietzsche’s] romantic attachments to bygone epochs, he 
underestimates the political alternatives available to agents in late modernity”.24 By way 
of putting some of those alternatives to use—and Nietzschean ends—I suggest a number 
of strategies for exploiting the existing, and really ineliminable resources available for 
countering the deleterious effects of our age’s ultra-liberal-modern values. In addition I 
propose ways in which Nietzsche’s good Europeanism can enable diverse modes of 
existence for Europeans and, by extension, all humankind.

The project of unifying Europe was, unsurprisingly, conceived in terms of the 
prevailing statist logic that serves as the basis for international politics and society. The
ongoing unification process of formally sovereign European nations obviously has its origins in perceptible Euro-centric philosophical presuppositions and corresponding cultural biases. However, it may become a transcultural and syncretic one, as good Europeans, individually or acting cooperatively in sub-subaltern groups, creatively revalue the ascetic Anglo-European values and anti-culture of the conventional globalization complex through ever-transmogrifying potentials of globality. This prospect and capability may serve to enhance the becoming of free spirited individuals everywhere. Through abstract potentials of globality that arise within the conceptual spandrels of conventional globalization—the myriad fields of interaction and junctures between the institutions, processes and forces comprising the complex—and are exploited at the margins of those neglected spaces and/or non-spaces, exceptionally strong social mavericks may overcome themselves and revalue the nihilistic values of our hyper-decadent era.

Central to this endeavor is a doxagraphical–historical critique of the power constellation comprised by the discipline of European integration theory understood as a will to truth symptomatic of an underlying will to power. I examine each of the major schools of thought within it from its early emergence to the present according to the critical framework Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology and his corresponding perspectivalist epistemological stance provides. I do so with a view toward the way each represents the anti-natural ultra-liberal-modern values (ethical/moral prejudices) informing its theoretical assumptions and symptomatizes the will to power of its major theorizers and co-extends with a broader, partisan political agenda, for determining the integration of Europe. Of particular concern is how these theoretical approaches
themselves constitute power constellations that (ant-)agonistically and involuntarily strive to realize and make dominant a perspective (will to truth and will to power) on Europe’s integration and the extent to which that perspective serves a declining or ascending form of life.

Who should care about such a project and why? Firstly, anyone interested in the history of the idea of Europe, as it conditioned the possibility and prepared the ground for the contemporary project of European unification, which has profound affective power and manifold, measurable effects on the lives of Europeans, will value the significant role that Nietzsche played in fortifying it. A towering figure in the history of European philosophy and thought on Europe, Nietzsche articulated the existential challenges facing the continent during his lifetime and beyond it (the challenges he described were even then setting the stage for the crises, setbacks and developments of the 20th century) and defining an ideal for it as a life-affirming cultural realm with unique potential to enhance the positive growth of all humankind. The development and expansion of the EU, as an effort to perfect and universalize the “quantitative total state” has, by extension, affected everyone in the world to varying degrees; Nietzsche’s thought helps us envisage ways by which the project may be perfected and thereby overcome.

Secondly, the extent to which key aspects of the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’ (as Nietzsche described it) are relevant and realizable universally should also interest all those conscious of the pervasive social malaise in our post-industrialized, overexcited and technologized age of “Empire” who desire its positive transmutation. The possibility of cultivating new modes of being conducive to the emergence of authentic free spirits capable of extraordinary creation and philosophers of the future able to enforce a new
disciplinary regime based on naturalized (and re-grounded) values concerns all those interested in augmenting the positive growth of humankind.

As a theoretical framework for disclosing the promise in existent opportunities for such developments, among other things, international politics and European integration theorists are likely to be surprised by the utility a Nietzschean critique can provide their conceptual apparati. A number of twice-removed heirs of Nietzsche’s intellectual legacy have already impacted both of these fields through anti-foundationalist post-structural and “post-modern” assessments of major debates within the mainstream discourse.29

Thirdly, Nietzsche gives us a conceptual framework for understanding the signature tensions and contradictions of our age, to which I attach the moniker ‘ultra-liberal-modernity’ to connote the intensification of the same decadent, all-too-human trends Nietzsche identified in the late 19th century. This said, the challenge of becoming ‘good Europeans’ should be of interest to Nietzsche scholars as well as anyone who takes his thought seriously, as Nietzsche earnestly meant for his readers to do so. Furthermore, the task of doing so requires utilizing all the tools in Nietzsche’s theoretical box, compelling me to examine some of the recurring themes in his oeuvre and engage many of the ongoing debates in the literature.

Integral to Nietzsche’s naturalist power ontology,30 his vitalist politics provides a (perspectivally contingent) conceptual framework to effectively evaluate the globalization complex and abstract potentials of an emerging globality. It is my contention that an awareness of globality promotes a unique intellectual disposition toward truth and human potential. It does so by prompting the sort of conscience-vivisection Nietzsche thought necessary for the cultivation of an awareness of “how the
illusion of being” gives rise to reactive “value judgments [and] all world defamation”. This stance—a self-undertaken effort to attain the understanding provided by multiple perspectives about one’s enlightenment, that is the quest for knowledge itself—indicates a conative disposition or (in Heideggerian terms) anticipatory resoluteness which originates in the understanding that “Becoming does not aim at a final state, does not flow into ‘being’”, and is indispensable to the development of good Europeanism. The broadened perspective on life (enlightenment) conferred by this distinctive propensity is at once opposite to and emergent from the philistinist culture of conformity enforced by the conventional globalization complex. By enabling vigorous individuals to become good Europeans, it stands to incrementally facilitating the realization of Nietzsche's idea of Europe.

Expressions of the reactive forces, process and institutions of globalization as well as the positive prospects of globality can be identified in every area of contemporary human endeavor. Reflective of the interconnectedness of all the spheres of human activity, this fact makes Nietzsche’s assessment of the realms of conventional politics (which he abhorred—and his ‘good Europeans’ would subvert) and the sickening “culture” (a thoroughly decadent symptom of his declining epoch) seem difficult to square with our shared experience of everyday life. This is because we ourselves are thoroughly decadent and increasingly exhausted, despite the prevailing liberal-optimistic representation of the world. Nietzsche’s hope was for the generation of an authentically life-affirming, transformative culture (Bildung) for the eventual overcoming of humankind.
Though Nietzsche privileged culture over politics he recognized the significance of the political for organizing a social framework conducive to the growth of higher culture. To dismiss the import of the political in favor of concerns for culture in Nietzsche’s thought (as some scholars have done) is at odds with his identification of the complexity of European man and the crisis of nihilism in our hyper-decadent age. In his notebooks he wrote of the irrecoverable crisis of modernity that had plunged humankind into an abyss of seeming meaninglessness:

What has happened, at bottom? The feeling of valuelessness was reached with the realization that the overall character of existence may not be interpreted by means of the concept of “aim,” the concept of “unity,” or the concept of “truth.” Existence has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity in the plurality of events is lacking: the character of existence is not “true,” is false. One simply lacks any reason for convincing oneself that there is a true world. Briefly: the categories “aim,” “unity,” “being” which we used to project some value into the world—we pull out again; so the world looks valueless.

This feeling of valuelessness (pathos) is taken, falsely in Nietzsche’s view, as hopelessness by those too sick to affirm life. The realization that all former meanings and purposes of life were illusory (be they beliefs in various notions of an other-worldly, super-sensible beyond or in the transcendentally universal truths of reason and empirical science) induces paralysis in most people. Humankind’s terrible new awareness—one to end the age of Christian-Platonic values—when taken as hopelessness, leads to nihilism, a condition of resignation that inhibits the creation of new values. This indifference, in turn, compounds the problem of decadence.

The prevalence of nihilism as a characteristic feature of contemporary Western anti-culture and the globalization complex that universalizes it constitutes a fundamental assumption of this work. As a primary symptom of decadence, the apodicity of nihilism
as a lived condition informs my critical diagnosis of the current social malaise originating from the West’s anti-culture. It is my primary contention that globalization (and the EU understood as an institutional loci and agent of the values constituting it) is disseminating ultra-liberal-modern values throughout the world and with them the existential ennui and sense of purposelessness that fosters passive resignation among the weak. This acquiescence is a foremost symptom of the intensified or hyper-decadence that has come to epitomize our age.

The problem of decadence and its intensification via the duration and spread of nihilism is comprehensive, for decadence as Nietzsche recognized, infects every aspect of life in a degenerating epoch, such as ours. By extension, Nietzsche’s diagnosis of it as a problem and his prescribed cure are also inextricably imbricated in the decadence of our age. The degeneration typifying this apathetic condition is, according to Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence, produced by the waning instinctual organization of the drives and impulses at both the level of the political microsphere (that of the individual) and the political macrosphere (the inter-personal and communal). It is from these mutually constituting dimensions of human life that the socio-political and cultural aspects of our existence arise.

Contrary to Nietzsche, or going further than he would have likely allowed, I shall argue below that these two realms of social activity, the political and the cultural, are inextricably enmeshed in one another. Nietzsche’s (somewhat romantic and nostalgic) affirmation of and emphasis upon culture and frequently contemptuous dismissal of the political (particularly in its conventional forms and appearances) represents a sort of lacuna in his self-understanding as a meta-political thinker. His analysis, which on many
levels is otherwise extremely compelling, distorted his view to conceiving pragmatic strategies for overcoming the crisis of late-modernity which he identified.

His diagnosis inhibits the conceptualization of “solutions” in the conventional sense; a way out that might be generated within the spectrum of life-affirming human activity, even in a period in which resurgent (albeit secularized) slave-moral values had castrated a once feracious culture. It is also somewhat at odds with some other important aspects of his thought, namely his recognition and celebration of the involuntary \( \text{eros} \) and expressive \( \text{arête} \) characteristic of a vital culture (\( \text{Bildung} \)) and natural politics and that each impels in the other. The political and cultural are always already cross-germinating dimensions of humankind’s social existence, a feature of these interrelated phenomena about which Nietzsche occasionally signals an explicit awareness.

Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeanism’ is one of the shorthand terms he uses, \textit{unironically}, throughout his middle and late periods, to designate the disposition he wished to inspire among his readers. It refers to the cultivated mentality embodied in uncommon, free spirited experimenters capable of recognizing the value that each of the continents’ self-designated peoples could, through the perfection of their respective cultures, bring to the project of perfecting European man and, by extension, humankind. Undeniably Eurocentric, the notion iterates Nietzsche’s own habituated prejudices—a particular chauvinism privileging European civilization that was characteristic of his time.

This idea of good Europeanism recommends an ethos markedly less imperialistic than Kant’s cosmopolitanism, however. Such a project consisted with Nietzsche’s overarching vitalist objective of naturalizing everyday life by having the healthiest
individuals fulfill their role as physicians of culture and revaluing all values in that capacity. As Conway observes, Nietzsche:

…locates the sole justification of human existence in the continued perfectibility of the species as a whole, as evidenced by the pioneering accomplishments of its highest exemplars.  

This ongoing effort to perfect the species would encompass, over a long period, the overcoming of nationalism and associated all-too-human prejudices such as ethnic chauvinism, xenophobia, racism, etc., characteristic of the 19th and 20th centuries.

This desire—the irrepressible creative volition of the type he designates ‘good Europeans’—necessitates the uniting of the continent via the diffusion of a radically inclusive, perspectively expansive identity that takes the highest account of difference, possibly—but not necessarily—through the mutually agreed abolition of formal political divisions along national lines, so that “humankind [might ultimately] create the favorable conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into existence” in a deliberate and systematic process of political perfectionism organized by the best “against the indifference of nature”.

Nicholas Martin contends that “[w]e are on safer ground when treating Nietzsche’s notions of ‘Europeanism’ and the ‘Good Europeans’ as foils to the Europe of the nineteenth century than as blueprints for the Europe of the twentieth.” I concur in part with this, insofar as Nietzsche’s good Europeanism is a quasi-ideal and the artist-philosophers who personify its characteristics, are correspondingly rare, but I maintain that Nietzsche thought of them as realizable types in the necessary, longer process of the self-overcoming and perfection of European man. While his good Europeanism certainly does not constitute a “blueprint” for Europe’s becoming, it does suggests an effective
trajectory for a few, exceptionally healthy specimens embodying humankind’s potential greatness. By extension it suggests that such cosmopolitan and iconoclastic individuals could, against the so-called “higher men” who enforce the slave-morality of the herd, condition the possibility for the eventual appearance of authentic Übermenschen—those futural individuals capable of revaluing the decadent values diminishing humankind, to initiate the overcoming of the species man and inauguration of a post-human era.

I theorize how this development may be encouraged in the present through the conventional, primarily reactive institutions central to the globalization complex (by which I refer to the assemblages of forces, emerging networks, practical norms and social processes developing under the rubric of globalization) toward their ultimate destruction in creative affirmation of authentic becoming. In what may initially strike many Nietzsche scholars as counter-intuitive I shall argue that Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ would actively encourage certain ongoing processes of globalization so that the state of globality and the transhuman condition it is likely to facilitate might be realized as the successor epoch to modernity.

Another objective in undertaking this study is to provide an unique, “Nietzschean” analysis that will appeal to advocates and critics of globalization, and both the so-called “Europhiles” and “Europhobes” with regard to the European Union’s ongoing integration and expansion, by demonstrating how each of their respective diverse views capture a critical component of reality. In addition, it ought to appeal as well to scholars of East and Central European and post-Communist studies and those with concerned with controversial issues of democratization and human rights in the dawning post-liberal era.41
In book two I extend this Nietzschean critique to an examination of multiple theoretical perspectives on the process of European integration and the EU’s expansion, the actual variety of which are shown to describe a relatively narrow ideological spectrum. While symptomatic of the will-to-truth in the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and its proponents’ enfeeblement, all but the most recent schools of thought miss the mark as to what the EU is actually doing in terms of values.\textsuperscript{42}

European integration theorists are (like all descriptive theorists) motivated by an all-too-human will-to-truth, however partisan or biased their objectives or to whatever extent they are of a programmatic, practical or prescriptive variety, or some combination thereof. The perspectival limitations and hermeneutical deficiencies that follow from each theory demonstrate this, in addition to underscoring the impossibility of adequately capturing the enormous dynamic complexity at work in Europe’s unification process and their individual author’s will-to-truth (as a will-to-power). As with all inquirers, theorists of European integration all too often fail to identify theoretical opacities their efforts at illumination overlook. This inherent constraint – the predicament of all inquiry and critique – inclines theorists to make generalizations that lack nuance. They may focus too intently on the specifics of particular institutions, their bureaucratic organization and animating politics so that they miss general trends. Or in attempting to demonstrate the veracity of an abstraction (e.g.: anarchy, sovereignty, etc.) they may diminish the significance of contradictory details.

However they cut into the matter, none of the conventional theories of European integration individually seems to fully comprehend what taken collectively they have the potential to reveal, though (Nietzsche indebted) ‘discourse analysis’ and ‘post-modern
approaches’ have made great strides toward “unpacking” some of the theoretical conceits taken for granted in the discipline, as opposed to the bland inventory taking that serves only to repack them in the similarly unexamined baggage once more. A Nietzschean examination of the field of European integration theory illuminates dimensions of the discipline previously neglected, for the etiological action theory comprised by his vitalist politics and power ontology enable a different way of comprehending the functionality of key concepts in theories of European integration and International studies more broadly. This study should therefore be of value to those involved in Europe’s contemporary politics and integration process and assist them in augmenting its becoming.

In book three I turn to globalization itself, taking the EU as a crucial instantiation of globalizing institutions at the level of the political macro-sphere, and its transformative processes. I understand the EU to be one of the principle engines of globalizing values. Drawing from major theories of globalization I explicate how the forces, institutions and processes of that leveling and homogenizing phenomenon are inadvertently giving rise to abstract potentials of globality.

Of interest to international politics and political theorists alike will be the way in which a Nietzschean analytical framework illuminates the function of the underlying liberal–modern ideology within mainstream theories of globalization and European integration. It also exposes their considerable role in rationalizing the transformation of East and Central Europe in the post-Communist era, in addition to the possibly counter-intuitive results for human freedom and becoming. The ramifications of its conclusions for human societies and the scope of possibilities for action for individuals within them are especially salient to contemporary concerns of political theorists, particularly those
receptive to critiques of the present that aspire to the post-liberal. Left post-moderns may find the conclusions as provocatively “conservative” or “reactionary” as statist thinkers find them unimaginably radical and “leftist”.

If successful, the analysis should contribute to each of the aforementioned fields and interest areas by demonstrating, in Nietzschean fashion, the simultaneous validity of seemingly contradictory “truths” contained in various, disparate perspectives on European integration and globalization, characterized by neo-liberal, post-industrial capital process and its corresponding democratic state form. It shall also show how the qualitatively positive aspects of these ultra-liberal-modern trends may be combined to fundamentally alter our expectations of the former processes as well as the manner in which we may effectively contend with the oft-alleged ubiquity of reactionary power to contend with the unprecedented totalitarian potential of contemporary institutions. This paper thereby seeks to point toward how we may become what we are individually while radically affirming life so as to enhance the growth and vitality of humankind as it transitions into a post-liberal, transhuman future.

I begin by applying Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of the political to an analysis of historical (genealogical) European unification, the EU and its eastward expansion, in the context of globalization. In so doing I will demonstrate the extent to which Nietzsche’s idea of Europe is being indeliberately realized through European unification. I explicate how, in such a theoretical context, globalization may be understood, counter-intuitively perhaps, as contributing to the vigor of European society and the extent to which individuals may become ‘good Europeans’ both within and outside of the EU. From the standpoint of a coextending post-modern anarchist politics I also examine how largely
reactive globalizing institutions, forces and processes may be augmented to hasten the emergence of abstract potentials of globality. I then suggest how the latter, positive potentials, which exist in nascent form, may be exploited by “godless anti-metaphysicians” through a Nietzschean technique of the self based on six classic skeptical doctrines for living. The analysis utilizes disparate (“post-modern”) critiques of contemporary life in the post-industrialized West and largely rejects pessimistic conclusions about the future to posit a Nietzschean prescriptive formula toward the realization of a radically emancipatory politics conducive to the greatest multiplicity of becomings.

Through this work I seek to dispel the notion that Nietzsche was an “anti-political philosopher” as Walter Kaufmann famously maintained. Kauffman made this claim as part of his career-long endeavor to rehabilitate Nietzsche’s reputation in America. The legacy of Kaufmann’s well-intentioned assertion is waning, but Nietzsche’s status as a political philosopher remains controversial among some scholars. Nevertheless, I understand Nietzsche to be a truly meta-political philosopher.

Despite his frequent eruptions against conventional politics, it must be recognized that Nietzsche steadfastly believed in the necessity of the rule of law and certain essential functions of community for the perfection of the species man. Unlike conventional political philosophers, his chief political concerns are with the desire and corresponding health indicated by the organizational form a community gives rise to, how that form facilitates the community’s durability, as well as the instincts it facilitates and to what ends they are directed. All of this is considered in terms of how effectively it generates a great and elevating culture (Bildung). However, he frequently remarked on customary
political concerns, such as forms of governance (monarchy, democracy, socialism, etc.,) the legitimation of authority, sovereignty, nationalism, international conflict, imperialism and foreign trade, among others. Nevertheless, it consists with Nietzsche’s own arguments that we comprehend the political as broadly co-extending with both the socio-cultural and economic realms of human activity / expression; for he insists that the imposition of a “natural” (political) order on the many is a prerequisite for a creative society and the flourishing of a higher culture.

Nietzsche thought culture would be impeded from fulfilling its proper role if not kept distinct from the state, and that the health of a polity—as opposed to the modern nation-state—would suffer if the mundane affairs of state and its pragmatic concerns were privileged over culture:

If you invest all your energy in economics, world commerce, parliamentarianism, military engagements, power and power politics, – if you take the quantum of intelligence, seriousness, will and self-overcoming that you embody and expend it all in this one direction, then there won’t be any left for the other direction. Culture and the state – let us be honest with ourselves here – these are adversaries: ‘Kultur-Staat’ is just another modern idea. The one lives off the other, the one flourishes at the expense of the other. All the great ages of culture have been ages of political decline: anything great in the cultural sense is apolitical, even anti-political.

The established “Bismarckian” notion in Wilhelmine Germany that a strong governing state apparatus is necessary for prosperity and a robust culture, is criticized here and taken as supporting Nietzsche’s broader critique of the decadence of modernity. While he suggests that great cultural achievements are possibly anti-political, this rhetorical provocation could not accurately be construed in such a way as to define him as an anti-political philosopher.
Secondary Literature

Each of the four books comprising this work includes an internal literature review salient to its broad themes. In terms of the secondary literature on Nietzsche my analysis is significantly indebted to Daniel Conway’s lucid explications of Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence, or vitalist politics and power ontology. Additionally, it draws on many other critical interpretations of Nietzsche’s politics, including those provided by Ansell-Pearson on the machinic becoming of man in the age of globality toward a transhuman future; Appel on Nietzsche’s affirmation of the ineliminable and highly nuanced role of cruelty in the world and discipline in Nietzsche’s ethico-political thought; Shaw on ‘Nietzsche’s political skepticism’, Call on the philosophically anarchistic implications / dimensions of Nietzsche’s politics.

I make considerable use of Deleuze’s take on Nietzsche’s notions of force and becoming; draw on Detwiler’s understanding of the political implications of the death of God and the compulsion to revalue all values in its wake to cultivate future Übermensch. I cull important insights from Elbe’s works on Nietzsche’s idea of Europe; Hatab’s innovative contemplation of the possible Nietzschean uses of agonistic democracy; Heilke on Nietzsche’s response to the conundrum of life and the role of education for contending with the tragic dimensions of the political and Hunt on Nietzsche’s related notions of justice and immoralism and the role of his experimentalism for achieving a natural social order.

I utilize David Owen’s reflections on Nietzsche’s critique of liberalism and the political tradition it spawned; Richardson’s views on the ‘Will-to-power’ as an ontological theory of becoming; Smith’s work on the combined role of Nietzsche and
Heidegger in transitioning Western civilization to a truly postmodern era and Thiele’s thought on Nietzsche’s celebration of heroic individualism and its consequences for understanding the political. I also cite other classics of the secondary literature by (alphabetically) Berkowitz, Heidegger, Hollingdale, Kaufmann, Lampert, May, Nehamas, Strong, Taylor, and Wilcox.

Many other works of contemporary philosophy are cited throughout this work, including major texts by Heidegger, MacIntyre, Deleuze, Arendt, Rorty, Baudrillard, Sloterdijk, Debord, Virilio, Derrida and Foucault. It should be noted that my application of Nietzsche’s thought comprises an amalgam of Heideggerian and Deleuzean interpretation, which will be readily apparent to Nietzsche scholars.

In book two I draw upon recent works on European history and seminal critiques of integration theory, including those by Chryssochoou, Rosamund, Wiener and Diez and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, among others. I also utilize many of the field’s primary texts in approximately chronological order of their production to make a doxagraphical survey toward a genealogical critique of the field itself. In book three I make use of a gambit of globalization literature, including particularly influential works by Shaw, Robertson, Beck, Albrow and Khan, among many others. Books two through four are heavily informed by a plethora of contemporary international relations theory including works by Booth, Campbell, Wendt and Connelly. I also employ the human rights theories of Donnelly and Benhabib. Book four also draws from the secondary literature on Classical skepticism and transhumanist studies.
Methodology

Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of the political, power ontology and perspectivalist epistemology and hermeneutical stance serves as philosophical framework for this analysis. It provides a unique interpretive standpoint for effective discursive and textual critique as well as historical analysis, the primary methodological tools applied in this study. From this standpoint and by these means I engage in some axiological process tracing (value formation and development) and empirical research into theories of European integration and EU institutions to discern the former’s historical development, and the latter’s institutional design and function.

This critical Nietzschean lens provides a means of evaluating how Europe’s unifying political institutions serve to edify life on the continent and transform international order. These theoretical tools also provide insights into how the EU’s institutions function within the constitutive matrixes of the globalization complex. While relevant EU treaties and documents provide abundant evidence of the “all too human” characteristics of institutionally instantiated forms of the bad-conscience and ressentiment Nietzsche identified in the human condition, they also substantiate the thesis that Europe is ineluctably moving toward the opposite of this, that is, in positive directions from a “Nietzschean” perspective. Differing strains of recent globalization literature corroborate this conclusion in their theorization of globality.

Through a Nietzschean critique of theories of European integration and the EU in the broader context of globalization, I demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Nietzsche’s critique of liberal modernity and show how that critique extends the tradition of skepticism and invigorates its significance to life and the political. By extension I
show how Nietzsche’s critical understanding of the political, (an assessment over one hundred years old but only now beginning to be taken seriously), has real significance to any genuine effort at a comprehensive understanding of the formative institutions and defining norms of our era. Finally, the synthesis shall demonstrate the salience of Nietzsche’s objective in our own age, which is the practical necessity of and prospects for exceptional, pluripotent individuals to become ‘good Europeans’.

A unique method, Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutics and genealogy of morality provides an unconventional evaluative stance to elucidate important dynamics of these interrelated phenomena that standard assessments of European unification and globalization miss. I argue that a vitalist examination of the European idea pronounced by Nietzsche coextends with an authentically radical, ‘post-modern mode of “becoming-anarchist”’ to paraphrase—and give a Deleuzean twist to—the way Lewis Call persuasively puts it. This idea paradoxically entails the co-determination of morality and politics as expressed by certain elemental globalizing forces in the present.

In book three I postulate globality as the preeminent (type of) conceptual and normative paradigm of the dawning post-modern age – one antithetical to the hegemonic liberalism manifest in the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity; a plethora of institutions, processes and forces under the rubric of globalization. Each of the aforementioned developments in European unification is therefore seen as indicative of globalizing processes in themselves that aim to fulfill a reactive cooptation of cultural diversity and homogenization of ideational and identic difference. However, within each of globalization’s multivariate phenomena largely unrecognized, abstract and positive potentials of globality arise which present opportunities for authentically agonistic
becomings. The abstract potentials of globality destabilize and disrupt the conventional globalization complex, the ideological prerogatives of which inform and direct the continuum of activities and events constituting European unification.

Furthermore, this inquiry critically assesses the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism and the ideologically corresponding democratic state form that characterizes the dominant institutions and processes of globalization. Taken in summa these myriad, overlapping and mutually supporting institutions, processes and forces comprise a globalization complex, the loci of which lie within and simultaneously exceed the US and EU (among other places). In complicated ways this globalization complex transforms human life and (arguably) enhances human capacities to enable the realization of globality’s abstract potentials. This occurs largely despite the formers’ ubiquitous, hyper-statist conventional politics, its bestowal of uncritical complacency via its ever-subtler and more refined governmentality.48

Consistent with the spirit of Nietzschean critique, this analysis comprehends European unification, EU expansion and the multivalent phenomena of globalization generally as products of the dominant, originally Western, ideological metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. It theorizes their simultaneous, “schizophrenic” development from it, their utilization and intensification of it as opening possibilities onto, or providing an impetus for a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe), toward a naturalized politics and/or the enhancement of culture (Bildung).

To achieve this my analysis also draws in part upon the Gramscian concept of mass-consent by interpolated subjects to hegemonic values that are universalized through ever-modified, rather than “post”, neo-imperialist doctrines. In the present these consist
of Euro-centric “Western” ideological that, originally Anglo-European, have been significantly influenced by American practices in the last century. Furthermore, an Althusserian notion of the affective power of ideology, and its dissemination, naturalization and enforcement through the myriad (superstructural and structural) institutions, forces and processes comprising the globalization complex, comprises a background assumption throughout my work.49

Nietzsche’s ‘epistemic framework and critical method’ affords a distinctive and astute perspective on the ways in which reaction and decadence contributed to the collective nightmare that Europe—and humankind by extension—suffered in the first half of the twentieth century.50 The valuable insights provided by Nietzsche’s vitalist thought extend to the globally transformative reorganization of international society that followed the catastrophes of the world wars, as well as Europe’s present condition, its future prospects and those of the human species. They do so by providing us with a compelling set of intellectual tools and psychological insights with which we may examine the nature of human desire, the diverse meanings ascribed to it, and the multitudinous forms of existence to which it gives rise. The issue of being fair to Nietzsche aside, however, it is the challenges his thought presents those who would accept it that are most formidable, as Conway asserts:

Since we have never before witnessed the death of an epoch from the inside, we have no empirical means of confirming or disputing the jeremiad he so forcefully advances. Those who endorse his critique of modernity must consequently make it their own, concocting additional theoretical support if possible and compensating for his decadent influence in any event.51

Compensating for Nietzsche’s own decadence – which according to his analysis was expressive of the dissolution characteristic of his age – does not, in my view, present a
difficult challenge. For, although Nietzsche’s account laments the state of European man’s declining vitality in modernity and prophesied the period’s consequent doom, it also entails an exceedingly hopeful notion of what mankind might become through the transfiguration of its all-too-human decadence. The transfiguration he envisages, in which good Europeans – as free spirits – gradually realize their (Nietzschean) idea of Europe, will necessarily require the creative destruction of modernity’s injurious assumptions about human nature.

The ambition motivating this project forces me to directly contend with the tensions, *prima facie* paradoxes and complexities that inhere to considerations of how the sort of life-affirming, natural order that Nietzsche advocated may be realized (as an always-realizing). This aim must be understood in the context of his broader concern with reinvigorating an authentic European culture (*Bildung*) for the type of great health it would generate for humankind.

However improbable it is that Nietzsche’s ideal form of political order may be realized any time in the foreseeable future, it, and the historical / psychological / axiological analysis that generated it, is worth taking seriously. It is helpful insofar as it forces us to notice the deficiency of our present socio-cultural situation, the inauthentic modes of being it authorizes and the operation of the deleterious values that sustain them. I therefore attempt a careful explication of how a Nietzschean “political” program ought to be understood so to remain consistent with the ethos of Nietzsche’s naturalistic values, constantly aware of the extreme dangers facing those capable of (re: strong enough for) adopting it, who would reasonably dare to apply it only through the strategic cultivation of a sophisticated disposition and corresponding use of masks.
Nietzsche thought (re)establishing a healthy ethical basis for socio-political organization was the greatest task confronting mankind and thus could only be properly undertaken by the “strongest,” who are so by virtue of possessing the most positive affective will. This futural dimension of his thought is at once crucial to Nietzsche’s system and constitutes what might be taken as the prescriptive facet of it. As aforementioned, the strength to actively will and to endure the suffering that invariably results confers a nobility of spirit upon them that serves as the natural basis of their right to act as determiners of the “good.” Nietzsche effectively stipulates the conditions for overcoming the decadence of modernity in order to realize the maximal prosperity of mankind’s foremost exemplars.

The analysis is also fundamentally concerned, as was Nietzsche, with considerations of agency and freedom (or liberty), albeit not from the traditional liberal sense that approaches these issue with an interest in asserting / demonstrating the inalienable rights and innate equality of individuals per se, but in terms of how human activity may be directed to cultivate favorable circumstances for the improvement of the exceptionally strong, healthy individuals whose maximal development is likeliest to advance mankind as a species. Ultimately, this does reaffirm certain Liberal assumptions about the necessity of meritocracy, access to opportunity and protection from undue subjugation or interference, if for radically different reasons and objectives. But the crucial difference is the reason (and reasoning) by which one might arrive at such conclusions.

Among the most profound concern of political philosophers is negotiating the dilemma between the(ir) desire to realize the greatest liberty possible (defined ever more
broadly and inclusively to the present, as Hegel recognized) while regulating society to realize that desire; order social life to such an (culturally and historically relative) end – a paradoxical task that, in recorded history at least, has required some form of governance and methods of coercion. The existence of institutionalized governance and the necessity of its legitimation (about which Nietzsche was a thorough-going skeptic) constitutes a general acceptance of the need—at whatever level—for cruelty; the necessity of making and enforcing distinctions as well as managing their effects.

Nietzsche’s recognition of this fact and its ineliminable necessity is often misrepresented by his opponents as a thoughtless endorsement of gratuitous cruelty and/or violence. It is not. Rather it sought to expose a well veiled characteristic of Western liberal democracies, that being their somewhat incoherent dream of abolishing all suffering—including it would seem, the striving required for their continuation. The excessive consumption (re: “wealth”) typifying Western life entails tremendous exploitation and cruelty hidden from view by the machinations of capital process. Yet, as I attempt to show below, the inherent contradictions of the ultra-liberal-modern ideological apparatus (promulgated by the globalization complex) give rise to vulnerabilities that ‘good Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can exploit. In doing so they may hasten the demise of the prevailing hyper-decadent order to initiate a successor era to modernity and a transhuman future.

Nietzsche, whose views on the necessity of law and the mis/uses of punishment are complicated, accepts the inherent cruelty of the exclusions law entails, acknowledging that governance, in both its masterly / breeding and slavish / taming forms, involves a conceit, namely that some governing authority may “legitimately”
intervene upon and compel people to comply with its bidding.\textsuperscript{52} Government is invariably usurpation. The entire tradition of Western political philosophy has been engaged in expounding pre- and pro-scriptions for this arrogation of right.\textsuperscript{53} Yet despite two and a half millennia of often violent debate, the constitution of authority and means of its legitimation is no more resolved today than in the city-states of classical Greece. The operation of establishing and justifying authority, both the effect and putative end of doing so, is a complex issue to which Nietzsche gave a unique response: government is most illegitimate when it is imposed by the congenitally botched on a society’s highest exemplars. If not a traditional political theorist, Nietzsche left us with conceptual tools for considering the political, and the dilemmas inherent to it, anew.

**Contending interpretations of Nietzsche and his project**

So-called “left” Nietzscheans, such as Foucault and Deleuze, more or less concluded that, as Nietzsche believed, every prerogative taken from an individual is a usurpation of some quanta of their innate autonomy and sovereignty; that by extension, all (conventional) power is usurpation. Through ultra-liberal-modern lenses this line of reason logically leads to radical anarchist conclusions about the nature of power and the objective for individuals in society.\textsuperscript{54} But that would have been anathema to Nietzsche, who also believed that most individuals were not strong enough physically, spiritually or intellectually, to command themselves much less lead others.

Rather, he insists that those who are so capable, rare individuals of unusual vigor, or \textit{übermenschlich} (over-manly) types, would instinctively create values for their communities consistent with its highest potentials; their actions comprising nomothetic
legislations generative of socio-political frameworks that reorder the macro-sphere of communal life. In so doing the limited capabilities of weaker individuals could be made to effectively contribute to the betterment of the whole, re-naturalized social organism, rather than dissipating it.

According to this notion as the society’s members (even its weaker ones) are invigorated the increasingly conscious objective of the community is the production of an ever greater vitality—a society in which extraordinary individuals engage in an authentic agon and their cultural achievements could thrive. A somewhat romanticized notion of Classical Athens served as Nietzsche’s model for this ideal, along with Renaissance Italy, which he cites as a consummate example of flourishing culture.

Recent continental philosophers (such as Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze) do contend with Nietzsche’s “conservative” implications, as it were, for instance in the “positive” sense of Foucault’s recognition that we are constituted by disciplinary power / knowledge regimes and may develop through “techniques of the self”; likewise the Deleuzean notions of the fold, nomadism and lines of flight account for the positive, transformative potential in even the most “reactive” conditions. Many contemporary scholars following in the tradition of such “left Nietzscheans” do not effectively contend with the “conservative Nietzsche,” eliding important aspects of his thought because they disturb sacrosanct assumptions about human nature. To effectively contend with them means having to square Nietzsche’s anti-liberalism with their own ultra-liberal-modern aspirations.

Accepting the explicit usurpation of prerogatives that constitutes power, Nietzsche is concerned with the attainment of a more natural political order that will
enhance the becoming of mankind and, ultimately, all of its members. There is not one precise type of *Übermensch* in Nietzsche’s view. Who may legitimately arrogate the conceits of “authority” to themselves?: those with the greatest vitality, which is broadly indicative of the strongest health, the best intellectual ability, the highest degree of nerve or daring, the deepest sensitivity and heritable talents, all of which are determined through creative acts in a genuinely agonistic socio-political setting. The predominant values of society must – if they are to maintain its health, the authentic *telos* of values in Nietzsche’s view – nurture and privilege such individuals, but the legacy of Enlightenment liberalism, which provided the philosophical basis and ideological objective for most of our world’s governing (globalizing) institutions, leveled all individuals through its mutually reinforcing discourses of rights and equality, stymieing the exceptions.

Nietzsche identifies such ideologies with *ochlocratic* forms of rule and the herd mentality. The mindless conformity to which the phrase “herd mentality” refers arises from his psychological critique of weakness among those individuals comprising the vast majority. This mentality compels resignation to the status quo, reinforcing established codes of behavior through norms, mores and taboos; disciplinary regimes that generate insecurity and fearfulness within communities. These exclusionary practices comprise a “thou shalt” that implies the threat of social ostracism or marginalization by othering, to ensure the compliance of the masses with the will of those deemed arbiters of norms, whose authority empowers them to constitute themselves and leaders and their values (prejudices against or toleration of forms of difference) as mainstream.
Nietzsche’s ‘Genealogy of Morality’ explicates the process by which the majority in a society, the vast preponderance of whom in ancient societies were often slaves (the designation Nietzsche provocatively employs) who are initially just the losers in the war for dominance at the establishment of a society, come to constitute a type that, lacking a sense of its own agency, values out of ressentiment and a spirit of revenge. The slaves empower themselves by inverting the values of the masters, labeling them as evil while re-designating their own meekness as merit and their oppression by the strong as injustice. When successful over long periods, such as the Christian era, these slave values foster the forgetting of their ignoble origins and come to serve as rhetorical and conceptual devises for flattering their advocates as the arbiters of genuinely righteous virtues.

The violences that characterized the former masters are excoriated and criminalized. Enactments of such natural behavior are tabooized and punished. A self-described altruistic and selfless disposition is rewarded as the highest ideal; even today, the secular saint is revered above all others. The ascetic ideal she personifies (and the collective desire for subterranean revenge she fulfills), covers up its own means of coerced compliance. Ultimately that ideal itself is the culmination of ressentiment and mendacity; a celebrated model of “group think” that compels conformity and punishes difference to ensure mediocrity.

The EU and its transfiguration of the nation-state

A central aim of this project is that of illuminating the ways in which Europe’s political integration and the EU’s expansion – as a globalizing power constellation – are
simultaneously enabling and impeding the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe. It considers the efficacy of his “political,” vitalist objectives and the capacity of extraordinary individuals to contribute to an evolutionary revaluation of values that may fundamentally transform human societies by organizing them for the perfection of the species’ strongest members. Through an anti-dogmatic strategy based on six classical skeptical tenants I allege that healthy individuals can attain a perspectivalist ethos—the “freedom from any kind of conviction” and delight in contingency—necessary for becoming a good European. It is individuals such as these who are most likely to hasten our achievement of those objectives; goals for humankind that Nietzsche thought could only be realized following the major wars over ideology and nationalism he predicted for the 20th century—conflicts that, contra Fukuyama, are not in fact resolved.

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was originally conceived in large part as a protectionist response to certain economic practices that would become characteristic features of globalization. Despite this, the organization would serve as a precursor to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the Treaty of Rome (1957). This group of communities (customs union and Euratom) antecedent to the EU, would evolve and expand significantly over the next five decades. In so doing what arguably were protectionist stratagems for Europe’s industrial and economic independence developed into a crucial locus of the globalization complex, and perhaps the most multifaceted power constellation in the world.

In its present capacity the EU enforces the values of ultra-liberal-modernity as it geographically extends itself across the continent. It provides Europe’s citizen-constituents with simulacrums of existential meaning and ontological purpose by
simulating both the democratic state form’s representative legitimacy and hierarchical authority. 60 Through the EU’s pseudo-meritocratic promotion of neo-liberal capital process and its massification of desire (a nullification of authenticity), it augments the circulation of spectacularized modes being-in-the-world / forms of life that continually generate need and corresponding means to satisfy it. In so doing it tantalizes the masses with illusions of gratification and deflects them from their state of inauthenticity. Its enticements are offered to distract, occupy and sate their nihilistic will to consume—momentarily fulfilling in material terms both corporeal necessity and socio-political imperatives fostered by the aforementioned simulacrum.s.61

This suggests how the numerous simulacrum.s of an emerging, globalized spectacular society produce and sustain a highly reactive simulation of the healthy--authentically agonistic—social and political order necessary for the eventual overcoming of the human type. An ultimately undesirable, albeit necessary, modern veil of Isis that obscures its own ideological basis and ends, it is nevertheless conditioning the possibility of its own transfiguration by generating myriad opportunities for the incremental transvaluation of the slave-moral-unto-anti-natural percepts it is predicated upon.

Situated in the broader context of the globalization complex, the EU’s institutions and practices are seen to ramify numerous features of the former. Ideologically supervenient to one another, they comprise differing degrees of institutionally instantiated forces and processes within the same dissipative ultra-liberal-modern value matrix, an ideological regime usefully understood to be propagating “Empire”. These are experienced variously—according to the type of individual and her vitality—as qualia. The is evidenced by the imposition of international order via the nation-state as
privileged form of polity, followed by its systematic democratization, as well as the enforced adoption of the precepts of neo-liberal capital processes and conformity with the hegemonic regulatory mechanisms to which it has given rise. The globalization complex is typified by technological rationality coupled with a methodical and comprehensive massification of everyday life; its overarching functions and objectives compel fallen-ness and inauthenticity in the social relations of individuals and lives of communities it transforms. It always already entails the superficially significant but ultimately transitory partisan debates that absorb the attention of the majority and deflect them from the deeper and invisible currents imperceptibly transforming their existences.

According to this critical analytical framework, contemporary social and political life in the West and its globalized penumbra are understood as a product of innumerable expressions of a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power manifested disparately through reactive force. These anti-natural impulses are legitimated through a hermeneutic of desire via disciplinary regimes of truth and responsibility that are in turn rationalized by ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. The preponderating reactive forces of the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity are symptomatized in Europe’s ongoing unification, via the EU. It is a project dominated but not exclusively directed by ascetic-consumerist priests according to the secularized slave-moral values and reified rationalism they enforce.

As such Europe’s ongoing integration via the EU, in collaboration with other major IGOs such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (COE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is fulfilling the largely dissipative ambition of European and international elites, all last-
man types, alike. Yet contrary to this dark actuality Nietzsche suggests, in accordance with his vitalist conception of the political and corresponding idea of Europe, that an opposite desire for uniting Europe connects the continent’s representative exemplars across healthy ages – those periods of great cultural production between decadent, declining epochs.

Highly contemptuous of the populist trends of his time for the increased danger they presented to the higher spiritualization of mankind and its exemplars, Nietzsche dedicated a great deal of thought to the consequences of post-Enlightenment democratization and the rise of socialism in the 19th century, coming to some prescient conclusions (published in 1880):

The practical outcome of this spreading democratization will first of all be a European league of nations within which each individual nation, delimited according to geographical fitness, will possess the status and rights of a canton: in this process the historical recollections of the former nations will be of little account, since the sense of reverence for such things will gradually be totally uprooted by the domination of the democratic principle, which thirsts for innovations and is greedy for experiments.63

This passage suggests the trajectory the democratic impulse would set for the politics of the European continent, and it must be acknowledged that the EU is innovating political authority and accountability and arguably experimenting with supranational governance at once in conjunction with and over its increasingly canton-like member-states.

Although he could not fully anticipate the disorientation and corresponding increase in individual adaptability wrought by the political and technological revolution that characterized the twentieth century, he clearly identified the ethos that presupposed the innovations and experiments that produce it. The premonition was largely correct and could plausibly be said to characterize one of the primary objectives of European
unification in the present, namely its furtive efforts to eliminate the former reverence of the nation among its member-states, whose identities it would subsume into a synthetic personality based on ultra-liberal-modern principles correlated to post-Enlightenment notions of representative democracy.

In an oft cited section from the first volume of the same book, entitled ‘A Glance at the State,’ he endorses just this inevitability, having understood nationalism as an effort to stem what, as a consequence of these complicated changes in European society, brought “a weakening and finally an abolition of nations, at least the European,” and “of a continual crossing a mixed race, that of European man, [which] must come into being out of them.” In the same passage he concludes, “once one has recognized this fact, one should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a ‘good European’ and actively to work for the amalgamation of nations”.64 It is notable that Nietzsche—who disdained populism and democracy—advocated the amalgamation of European nations over the brand of shrill, vituperative nationalism that arose in reaction against that possibility. Such was his contempt of and anxiety over the ethnocentric, chauvinist nationalism that was gaining momentum across the continent in his day, and which the forces of populist democracy were exacerbating.

From “Human, All Too Human,” the text marking the beginning of his middle period, until the end of his productive career, Nietzsche identified “‘good Europeans’” with a “supranational and nomadic type of man which, physiologically speaking, possesses as its typical distinction a maximum of the art and power of adaptation.”65
They are proto-types of the philosophers of the future:

[T]hose rare and rarely contented men who are too comprehensive to find their satisfaction in any kind of patriotism and know how to love the south in the north and the north in the south – the born midlanders, the “good Europeans”. 66

Such superlative individuals are compelled by their overflowing desire (desire understood as a complex assemblage of forces) to seek the unfamiliar and develop themselves, combine qualities and perspectives characteristic of Europe’s various regions in order to appreciate in personal and pan-European terms.

This indicates an unconscious conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness that corresponds with the physiological condition of exceptional strength or vitality; the preconditions necessary for fostering and enhancing individual and social development via acceptance of difference in otherness. Across the continent he perceived, to varying extents and in different guises:

[T]he process of the assimilation of all Europeans, their growing detachment from the conditions under which races dependent on climate and class originate, their increasing independence of any definite milieu, as a unique “process of becoming European.” 67

In our own era ‘the assimilation of all Europeans’ into a malleable instrument is being achieved in large part through continual cross-cultural exchange, instantaneous communication, the mega-media representations of desire, the merchandizing of ideas, values and products (massification and homogenization) and legal mechanisms born of treaty agreements that have profoundly transformed economic, political and social norms and practices. The machinic and technological aspects of this assimilation via integration efforts will be considered by means of Ansell-Pearson’s consideration of viroid life and possibilities of a future, transhuman condition.
Nietzsche concluded that an unavoidable process of assimilation would lead to the economic unification of the continent. He declared, “Europe wants to become one,” on the basis of forces personified in those rare, far-ranging types he dubbed ‘good Europeans’, those who, as “rich heirs of millennia of European spirit,” were most capable of recognizing the beautiful and infinite in what was foreign and unfamiliar (i.e., everything, as certain knowledge and “Truth” are unattainable since our limited understanding is always a perspective situated in a particular context). However, their shared objective for the continent’s socio-political integration differed radically from that consistently articulated by arbiters of the liberal-modernist project, in terms of both its premises and its objectives. Antithetical to the popular democratic aim of attaining the greatest liberty for all—a condition which would make rulers of the rabble and amplify the decadence weakening society—the ambition of Nietzsche’s good Europeans was (and remains) to cultivate a well-ordered and compliant instrument of the people upon which the strongest might freely create edifying works and perfect themselves through agonistic contests.

This is indeed what has come to pass. However, there is a relatively broad spectrum of opinion on how far the authority of the EU should extend over Europe today. Despite their many differences with regard to what Europe should become, most of the EU’s present supporters (Europhiles) and opponents (Europhobes) agree that its development as giving rise to a super-state. Although it clearly is a physical enlargement, and some would argue an ideational expansion of the classic state form, I argue that it is doing more than this, that while unifying Europe the present EU “super-state” indicates just one (early) phase in the radical overcoming of the state form itself.
As regards the nation-state, Nietzsche was always suspicious and frequently contemptuous, mainly seeing the modern state as deforming human development. The socio-political dimensions of our hyper-decadent era have been produced by the consolidation of the democratic nation-state and the rights of the individual over the course of the last half-century. With regard to the nation-state—the quintessentially European and thoroughly universalized form of internationally sanctioned polity—and the international setting within which it exists, this has been naturalized through an array of legal institutions for the normalization of its sovereign authority and legitimacy.

The universalization of this formalized structure constituted an effort to abolish anarchy in the macro-political realm (that of the nation-state and international society), and has been thoroughly diffused into the micro-political realm (the level of the individual), which evinces similar transformations as those the nation-state has undergone and continues to undergo. It does so, to use Foucaultian terms, through corresponding technologies of the self—the largely simulated and disciplinary, ultra-liberal-modern principles of free will and agency, the basis for which lies in our notions of the intrinsic and equal worth of persons, the inviolable rights that inhere to every individual, and—within the limits defined by common law—their undeniable capacity for self-determination. The legitimacy of the nation-state is now popularly understood as residing in its ability to ensure the dignity and rights of the individuals—or citizens—it serves.

In the Western world the state form has undergone significant modifications over the past century. Among myriad other things, this includes the intersubjective adaptation of its powers to demands placed on it by ultra-liberal-modern values, which have arisen
as a result of forces both within the nation-state and outside of it. Since Nietzsche’s lifetime the nation-state has become the indisputably dominant organizing force for the political and social life of humankind—imposed universally by Anglo-European powers throughout the course of the 20th century.

Nietzsche opposed the preeminence of nation-states. Zarathustra’s identification of the simulated veracity of this “new idol” remains prescient, as the state form—whose perfection is widely held to be the democratic variety of it—has been geographically, notionally and legally extended to encompass every polity around the world. Today the democratic state form is reified in numerous ways, from multiple legal institutions to reactive expressions of populist patriotism. In a subtler way, the EU re-invokes identic affiliations based on historical tradition and sentimental nostalgia through its simulations of political enfranchisement and simulacrum of community. In the absence of unproblematic identic roles, it has come to act as an identic surrogate, personified, albeit somewhat ambiguously, by a neo-cosmopolitan “European” identity that takes the banalization of difference as a basis for belonging and the aim of its form of citizenship. This contrivance depends on ambiguity in order to sustain what diluted meaning it is able to generate.

As a new “super-idol” the EU seeks to supply the “all-too-human” psychological need of its subjects (or “citizen-constituents”) for legitimate authority while gradually supplanting the waning power of its member states (as Europhobes throughout the community have long known):

State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies too; and this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” That is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they
served life. It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them “state”: they hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them.71

The EU’s architects, managers and bureaucratic functionaries are sophisticated descendents of those who in Nietzsche’s lifetime set the traps called the state, are (involuntarily) enacting their reactive roles, ones necessary for Europe’s future life-affirming development.

I maintain a position likely to strike both apologists for Europe’s ongoing integration process and Nietzscheans as counter-intuitive: that integration is indeliberately producing conditions of possibility for the emergence of a comprehensively transformative, positive will to creative destruction as generative power, thereby. The EU will very likely enable certain exceptionally strong individuals of future generations to “look beyond the state”72, and drape a new faith and love over their contemporaries, those whose predecessors passively received the EU as a super-state and willingly accepted their incorporation within it as citizen-subject-constituents in our own era.

Identifying what Nietzsche desired for Europe is simpler than describing how he thought it could be—let alone would be—achieved. “Nietzsche wished to foster the reconstruction of Europe as a cultural entity, led by a new aristocracy, shaped by indigenous artists and poets, which could assume global leadership in the age of great politics that he predicted.”73 Having seemingly created another, enlarged personification of “the people” in the EU, its “long-eared and short-sighted” designers venerate the cold monster—as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra dubs the modern state—revering it while remaining
oblivious of the ways in which their endeavor promises to foster the conditions necessary for the recrudescence of genuine free spirits with the strength to slay it.

Nietzsche conceives these daring experimenters—artist–philosophers capable of revaluing our decadent values—as simultaneously witting and unwitting annihilators. Impelled to obey life-affirming regimes of self-imposed discipline (askesis) for the task of self-creation (auto-poiesis) through involuntary enactments of their native volition, they gradually bring new modes of being into existence—a salubrious aesthetic-political production of life-forms that destroys decrepit, petrified orders (in our own case the ethno-nationally based bureaucratic state with which Nietzsche was quite familiar). By doing so their valuations re-habilitate a social preference for the instinctual organization of drives and impulses characteristic of vigorous individuals. This re-invigorates the macro-political life of their communities while preserving disciplinary measures for the “all-too-many”, those being the majority who, congenitally weak and terminally sickened by decadent values, are incapable of being aroused by the erotic passions of their highest exemplars.

As the actual and figurative descendants of the late 19th century’s “international homeless financial recluses” the all-too-many lose themselves in vulgar hedonism and crass consumerism. However a few, whom I name ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, rapaciously exploit the order generated by the globalization complex, to profitably utilize its institutions, forces and processes to stimulate the herd’s multitudinous appetites and manipulate its perceptions. These are the leaders and apologists for the ruling order, who maintain the reactive values hegemonic throughout the globalization complex today, and include politicians and pundits, government
officials and bureaucrats (civilian and military), business executives, corporate managers, the mainstream media, “white-collar” workers, labor leaders, educators, etc.

There is a hierarchy too among these administrators of status-quo ascetic-consumerist values. As the “managers” of our dissipative social order a few of these individuals stand completely outside the order they enforce. At the highest levels are found the genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment referenced above, which include CEOs, high-ranking politicians, etc. Beneath them a variety of hebetated automatons function to ensure the continuation of social-order and the labor of the all-too-many. These veritably zombified consumers occupy a place at once within and at some distance from the majority, a group which includes investment bankers, lobbyists, executives, administrators, professors, etc. These highly paid professionals tend to enjoy a materially comfortable life and get an extra paragraph of two in their obituaries at the end of it.

Most managers and executive are indistinguishable from the all-too-many, lost in myopic concerns through which they expend themselves. Their feeble energies and passions are absorbed in the supervision of everyday labor—the toil that the masses are engaged to perform as modern wage-slaves. The striving of these low-ranking ideologues consists of mimetic performances always-already in adherence with the dominant matrix of anti-natural values. Their enactments’ are motivated by a desire for security and the promise of prosperity. Comfort is the reward that prompts them to unwittingly ape the accepted norms of “professionalism”; their compensation that of conventional safety and “success”.

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Executives, managers and wage-slaves, white and blue collar workers alike, labor—however consciously—to ensure that the slave-moral order functions to ameliorate and/or co-opt any threat to it. They serve a critical function as ideological soldiers who implement the doctrines of equality and rights that sustain the prevailing slave-moral order and herd mentality. There are of course, exceedingly rare exceptions within the hierarchized order of these automatons. However, they are likely to be self-censoring and dissipated by the necessity of masking their differences to maintain their position and abide accepted conventions of the reigning culture of conformity, dissent from which—always understood as a default on their existential debt to, and a betrayal of the community that provided for them—is harshly punished. There are generally no exceptions among those populating the higher levels of the conventional power structures that order contemporary Western society. These well-vetted and credentialed ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment must on some level comprehend their function and zealously embody their role as the “enforcers” of anti-natural ideals.

Yet as any sense of obligation to and the perceived veracity of the state dissipates, the “all-too-many” remain “trapped” by the conventions of a secularized slave morality that demands devotion to the dying monster’s “confusion of tongues of good and evil: the sign of the state.” As those for whom “the state was invented,” comprehend no alternatives to the semiotic conceits upon which the conceptual snares in which they are caught arose, they are fated to go down with it. Just as their “leaders” fail to recognize the ways in which they destroy the state as they seek to expand—or “supranationalize”—it, the masses do not comprehend that their idol, the state, is in fact dying: “just as news of the death of God takes a long time to reach us, so too does news of the death of the
The eminent death—or the conspicuous decrepitude unto dying—of the state, was palpable to Nietzsche by the late 1870s.

The EU’s arbiters and the political functionaries, technocrats and bureaucratic who enact their will are, collectively, the inheritors of Europe’s historic great power states. In the shadow of US hegemony since World War Two, these ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment have been happy to allow the US to hold their sword while dedicating themselves to the pursuit of economic greatness and the cultivation of the “restless affairism of doing” wherein every person is required to give an accounting of themselves in terms of how busy they are against the classic notion of leisure toward the ersatz virtue of workaholism (the liberal form of secular piety). The corporate-military leadership of the US, as the singular “super-state” manically pursuing military might largely for the benefit of its and its international allies’ plutocratic elites, has been happy to oblige.

Europe’s representative exemplars over the past half century have performed the limited role of social engineers (as opposed to great nomothetic legislators) and made substantial contributions to the project of unifying Europe. In less significant ways countless others, from entrepreneurs to bureaucrats and anonymous workers, have also incrementally transformed Europe according to its ultra-liberal-modern model. Yet from the outset of their self-described “grand” project to establish a new political order by unifying the continent, the instigators of a noble, federalist vision for the unification of the continent, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Altiero Spinelli, Mario Albertini, who had themselves risen from among the ranks of “the superfluous” that “steal the works of the inventors and the treasures of the sages for themselves,” but whose vision arguably
elevated them above the base allegiances of more common types, and who had to manage that vision so that it would not be turned into total “sickness and misfortune”. Yet, however noble certain elements of the federalist vision may have seemed, they consisted with the signature prejudices of their age, and were already infected with liberal-modern values which they would invariably serve as a means of perfecting. The founders of what would become the EU were not nomothetic legislators, but “plucky bricoleurs”, who gathered the waning energies of an exhausted people to extend the duration of a declining era by briefly stabilizing it.77

Not paradoxically, “superfluous individuals”, as Nietzsche provocatively labeled the masses, would be essential to the achievement of Europe’s economic and political integration. In his view they included the bureaucrats, technocrats and exemplars in state philosophers, prime ministers and presidents, etc. As conformists to prevailing convention these passive nihilists had previously contributed to the murderous excesses of some of the most degenerate state forms ever known. In the aftermath of World War Two, such individuals were therefore rather easily persuaded to collaborate in the recuperative liberal-modern project of realizing a pan-European scheme for the amalgamation of the continent’s peoples and nations.

The aim of post-War Europe’s institutional designers was the transfiguration of the continent’s disparate, territorially defined nation-states and their relations (understood at once in spatio-temporal terms) through the practical application of a conceptually refined philosophical and legal complex developed upon the traditions of liberal-modernity. The ultra-liberal-modern value norms that resulted were an instantiated, widely-shared set of now-familiar attitudes and beliefs. A central contention in this work
is that in ideological form, these beliefs have been sublimated so thoroughly via moralizations of decadence that they operate on a largely unconscious level, informing popular conceptions of justice and fairness, panoplies of “inalienable” rights and corresponding expectations of the constitution of legitimate authority and the responsibilities of those in / with “power”.

Today this essentially decadent ultra-liberal-modern ideology informs all aspects of everyday life, including the positivistic mind-set, materialist expectations, quantitative economic standardization of value and the creation of co-extending and ultimately unified civil institutions and laws to contend with common security concerns. As Lampert writes in considering Descartes’ skeptical analysis of the law, “Belief often occurs without knowledge of belief. Belief is itself a form of obedience entailing submission to the believed; knowing what one believes liberates from that submission and from the actions it dictates.”78 Nietzsche’s skeptical, good Europeans, understand ultra-liberal-modern values to serve as the ideological basis for the hegemonic moral framework of our age, and the first such set of value-standards and principles to be successfully extended globally.

Against the arbiters of the globalization complex, good Europeans seek—through conscience-vivisection—to examine the psychological and philosophical impetus for these beliefs and expose their dissipative affects. Therefore they are spiritual and intellectual opponents of the ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment who, since the Second World War, have universalized their secularized Christian–Platonic, anti-natural and anti-cultural beliefs through the extension of capital process, technological rationality and the systematic massification of desire. Good Europeans—those with a supra-
European, authentically affirmative view of the earth—instinctively seek to overthrow their enfeebling, ultra-liberal-modern regime and reverse its diminution of humankind.

A thorough revaluation of values, including a deconstruction of the privileging of the nation-state as the preeminent political form and basic unit of the international system, will be required if the resulting political entity is to be more than the sort of “super-state” toward which Europe seems headed.\textsuperscript{79} For this revaluation to occur, “the superfluous,” whom Zarathustra described as “impotent paupers and swift, clambering monkeys,” need to be preoccupied.\textsuperscript{80} As they are ineluctably enticed by the conventional power ongoing reactive developments offer, this poses no challenge. By engrossing the attention of the ambitious, the transformation of the nation-state via integration may fortuitously serve ‘good Europeans’ as a means of acquiring the space and time they require to instigate such a revaluation.

From the chaos and destruction of two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century the originators of European unification reconceived, albeit in ultra-liberal-modern terms, the political order needed to temporarily invigorate humanity according to a deepened sublimation of conventional slave-morality. Eschewing overtly revolutionary programs that would automatically be opposed by “idolators of the state” and its “preachers of death,” (characteristics that they had once unconsciously personified, but now strove to discredit in careful expressions of disdain for the failed values of the past, such as bellicose nationalism) they sought to gradually evolve political life by re-establishing it on older traditions while maintaining a semblance of the all-too-familiar order, so to amalgamate the nations of Europe into one over a long span, rather than
dispensing with the state itself, which would jar an already distressed continent and surely prove counter-productive.

In pursuing their ambition, they recognized (after Nietzsche) that a wider sense of cohesion would have to be cultivated, at least between the respective nations of Western Europe. A mutual sense of belonging between former enemies would need to create in order for the new polity they envisaged to function effectively. The process would require more than formal treaty agreements to foster the changed mentality this idea of Europe required. With little more to go on but historical enmities and the wounds of war, these conditions would have to serve as a starting point for a future, integrated European community.

The ineffectuality of the League of Nations and shared suffering at the hands of the Nazis in the first half of the 20th century fostered the common desire to rebuild a destroyed continent. In addition to the desire to regenerate bankrupt economies, guarantee free trade and stimulate competition a corresponding awareness of the need for radically deepened cooperation toward achieving that aim was evident. New legal institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods accords were codifying a new international order to assure a broad measure of security and thereby provide conditions for the European project of economic and political integration.

The pre-existing web of practical illusions grounding notions of truth and justice that arbiters of integration could exploit due to Europe’s experience of grief and tremendous desire for renewal would provide the catalyst and ready-made justifications, when needed, for the slow but sure fulfillment of their aspiration. The ambition to achieve European unification necessitated much productive and fruitful meditation on the
dynamics of cooperation and compromise in various spheres of inter-personal belonging and identity, including local affiliation, regional autonomy and national sovereignty, etc., including the need for a fundamental revaluation of the efficaciousness of the nation-state system for human life. The latter in particular would be especially long in coming, and arguably has yet to happen. But measurable progress toward the alleviation of immediate physical misery in post-War Europe would enable arbiters of integration to seriously entertain such potentially dangerous revaluations and prevail over skeptical naysayers, nationalists and other advocates of the status quo European state system who opposed it.

With hindsight across the twentieth century we can see opportunities for deepened integration both seized and lost as those “whose conscience bears the weight of the overall development of humanity, [...]made] use of the prevailing political and economic situation.” But the long-term endeavor of those with a shared comprehension of Nietzsche’s noble idea of Europe has steadily paid dividends, and as their ambition increased and the momentum accelerated for realizing the continent’s unification via populist democratic means, that ambition gained broader acceptance. As opposed to atavistic statesmen promoting ‘great politics’ of the sort that culminated in the twentieth century’s world wars (and whose presence is still felt in the politics of nations), the arbiters of European integration—whom Nietzsche would likely have derided as “‘improvers’ of mankind”—have by a number of matrixes economic, institutional and cultural, succeeded in profoundly altering life for their fellow Europeans and by extension for individuals globally.

Through Nietzsche’s vitalist notion of the political, we understand that the post-war instigators of European integration were involuntarily pursuing something that was,
in part at least, very positive. I refer to their desire to overcome certain suicidal tendencies from which European culture, and humankind, had barely survived. Tragically, their proposed solution fell back on the logic that had generated the original problem, leading them to create institutions that were bound to develop over the following decades into another, albeit less-homicidal monstrosity. The EU we study today replicates some of the worst aspects of the old state form which it, at least in part, strove to overcome. However, it has also come to present potentials upon which a ‘good European’ might productively build.

It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s meta-political concerns, his diagnosis of Europe’s cultural (re: existential) sickness and his proposed “cure”, comprise a strategy that remains relevant, via a radically Dionysian affirmation of life, for overcoming the irrecuperably decadent nation-state that typifies the hegemonic form of social organization imposed by the globalization complex in our hyper-decadent age of ultra-liberal-modernity. The major institutions of the globalization complex, particularly the EU, already embody certain (ascetic) ideals that a ‘good European’ might reverse and/or exploit to hasten the eventual attainment of an authentically natural agon and revivified culture (Bildung) for the maximal flourishing of salutary individuals.

It is important to state that Nietzsche’s works tell us next to nothing about how, precisely, the formal political institutions of Europe, which he largely reviled, ought to be re-organized. We may confidently infer that he envisaged a system of rule organized through a natural hierarchy of types. This would be a form of governance capable of sustaining a maximally agonistic state of affairs while preserving a flexibly adaptable, authentically aristocratic order. Some analysts have drawn close comparisons between
Plato’s Republic and the sort of order Nietzsche’s works would suggest he prefers. He adamantly rejected revolutionary programs in favor of more gradual, fundamentally recuperative change, when the sort of traditions (and institutions) that ensure the duration of a life-affirming polity governed by its preeminent specimens can no longer be sustained.

According to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of European society such was the case in his lifetime, and would determine Europe’s foreseeable future. This prompted him to dedicate much thought to contemplating what conditions conduce to the production of the best (healthiest) individuals and communities and thereby maximize human flourishing, namely the facilitation of the highest potentials of humankind’s healthiest exemplars. Appel writes that at the very least:

Nietzsche deserves his place in the canon of political philosophy not because he provides a detailed institutional account of the optimal type of polity, but rather because his sweeping denunciation of liberalism, democracy, socialism, feminism, and other offshoots of modernity leads him to formulate (albeit in a sketchy and unsystematic manner) an alternative, radically aristocratic model of politics that bears serious examination.82

Anglo-American political philosophers nevertheless largely dismissed Nietzsche until the 1960s due chiefly to the legacy of systematic, instrumental abuse of his works first at the hands of his sister and then by the Nazis. Misunderstanding of his thought was compounded among his sleepier readers by his (often purposefully ad hominem) polemics. The latter, as Conway explains, “are best understood as occasions for galvanizing an internal resistance to the moralists, priests, dogmatists, and decadents who inhabit[ed] his own polycentric soul.”83 There was a utility to his polemics that served an important role in Nietzsche’s becoming, that is, in the self-overcomings crucial to the
development of his own micropolitical, corporeal politics and to his evolution as a philosopher.

Nietzsche’s political advocacy (bodied forth in persistent admonitions and advice as well as the practical implications for life of his thought) suggests a strategy by which his favored polity might be attained over-against nihilistic alternatives spawned by liberal-modernity. As Hutter notes:

Nietzsche’s entire effort at philosophical legislation, besides radically denying the myth of progress, is oriented very much to a present potentially filled with joy and ecstatic self-experience.\(^8^4\)

That experience corresponds with (among other things) an ironic or skeptical disposition toward all truth claims, for in Nietzsche’s view “the need for faith, for anything unconditional… is a proof of weakness”.\(^8^5\)

Legislators of the future comprehend “all knowledge [as] …only a means for creation. They gain an awareness of the contingency of their ubiety or emplacement in a world increasingly (futurally) determined by globality as a foundation for all authentic identic conceptions. Joyous experimentation and ecstatic self-creation are essential elements in the skeptical practices of good Europeanism. They reciprocally fortify the will to affirm all of life which is also a will to avert the diminution to mediocrity promoted by liberal optimism under the guise of prosperity. The specifically political dimension of this, although counter-intuitive to conventional political scientists, consists of a productive agonism that realizes a Dionysian or tragic-aesthetic worldview (Weltanschauung).

His chief hope, that “philosophers of the future” might contribute to a revitalized, re-naturalized order predicated on their revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller
Werthe), directly corresponds with (and is demonstrated by) a central concern that runs throughout his works: the future of European man, culture and civilization. As Conway observes,

Nietzsche’s political thinking centers around a simple, yet powerful thesis: human existence is justified only by the presence of those exemplary individuals who re-define the horizons of human perfectibility.86

The perfectibility and overcoming of the human species as an objective must be understood in the specific, unavoidably political sense in which Nietzsche meant it.

The task of legislating a morality of breeding, propaedeutic to that undertaking requires truly great politicians, charismatic leaders in Weber’s sense, a megalopsychoi as Aristotle understood the term, who are first of all mythopoeists capable of revaluing all values and (re-)establishing a convincing basis for communal society, so as to nomothetically create a viable new order thereafter. I elaborate on this throughout the material below.

In his middle and late works Nietzsche would come to identify those aforementioned individuals as ‘good Europeans’ and their efforts at perfection with a noble idea of Europe. My interest lies in employing Nietzsche’s thought to critique present developments in the institutional politics of Europe in a practical, meaningful way, and to demonstrate how the EU may unintentionally foster such a type and idea. From this I extrapolate means by which his objectives might more methodically be achieved. I seek to do so by demonstrating the salience of Nietzsche’s thought to the EU project in the broader context of globalization. I understand the functioning of the globalization complex, as a form of Empire.87
On the contrary, the contemporary globalization complex has clearly identifiably power centers and is much less “postcolonialist and postimperialist” than they assert it is. The primary mistake of their analysis is to conflate the ideologically driven aims of the conventional globalization complex with what it aims at or has in reality achieved. I would agree that their description of Empire quite aptly portrays the reactive ideals and objectives of the globalization complex, but they have by no means been reached, even, arguably, in the centers of the complex itself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that they ever will or could be attained. Out of this awareness my life-affirming, Nietzschean analysis identifies actual possibilities for the realization of truly radical sorts of freedom and the corresponding emergence of new modes of invigorated life. Freedom should be counted among Nietzsche’s central concerns, contrary to the impression popularized in the late-20th century by the Continental philosophers and the ‘new Nietzsche’. As Mandalios makes clear:

Against radical denunciation of freedom proffered by Derrida and Deleuze—freedom as essentially a bourgeois humanist illusion… Nietzsche offer[s] an alternative (post-liberal) conception… Rather than eschewing freedom in reference to the modern world… Nietzsche can be understood as a serious thinker of human freedom and its political moment vis-à-vis his complex conception of will, power and freedom [sic] and their necessary entwinement ultimately with responsibility.

Not surprisingly, Nietzsche’s particular notion of freedom contrasts with the prevailing, popular conceptions of it, as freedom from obligation or responsibility, in so far as his concern centers on potentiality and the possibilities of becoming. The question that occupies his politics therefore is individual ‘freedom for what?’ freedom to do something, as opposed to the ultra-liberal-modern anxiety with freedom as the abolition
of restraints and obsessive concern with freedom from what?’ understood merely in terms of resistance to something.

Nietzsche’s idea of freedom is inextricably enmeshed in the agonal process of becoming what one is, as well as the ethos of his good Europeanism. This sort of free spirit is capable of revaluing the anti-natural values that preponderate in the present to actualize their (Nietzschean) idea of Europe: a socio-political environment promoting cultural greatness. Its potential realization entails providing skeptical, axiological critiques of our hyper-decadent age (as I attempt to provide below regarding European integration and efforts to theorize it), to spur action and thought toward the development of a morality of breeding. The values conferred by the moral education this would entail would cultivate the pathos of distance necessary for a natural hierarchy of types and corresponding socio-political order.

This also requires the actual hybridization of European man (a process that, I shall argue below, the EU is facilitating) to produce a much-turned, wily type (polytropoi) willing to don multiple costumes and masks. Strengthened by attempts at self-perfection, cheeky good Europeans, inflamed by the hypocrisy and violence of prevailing values, laughingly deride the life-denying conventions enforced by reactive moralities of taming, out of awareness conferred by their hard-earned sense of world-historical irony. Their moral pluralism (quasi-cosmopolitan acceptance of the difference fostered by becoming) conditions the possibility of philosophers of the future who may hasten humankind’s going-down and the simultaneous ascendancy of the Übermensch at the dawn of a post-human future. 90
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of decadence: the political problem of our age

In our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern age of dissipating instincts the pursuit of military and economic greatness, rather than indicating a noble impulse largely expresses the reified ressentiment of the comprehensive war-machine manifested by the hegemonic democratic state and neo-liberal economy. It represents the diversion of needed energy from the noble pursuit of a genuinely life-affirming higher culture. Post-industrial militarism and the exaltation of speed, consumption and wealth has come to serve as surrogates for all that had previously counted as meaningful cultural activity, as well as comprising the essential ingredients of the poison-mixers, who concoct pretexts to reinforce the prerogatives of their destructive apparatus to regulate life on the planet. The ersatz, philistinic culture they fabricate is effectively vacuous, and directly augments reactive force by commending ressentiment of authentic health, strength and beauty. Its sophisticated will to nothingness infuses spectacular forms of desire to distract and entertain the crowd, thereby inducing amnesia and paralysis.

According to Nietzsche the national (now ultra-liberal-modern, globalized) state depends upon, naturalizes and simultaneously exalts a crass materialism that corresponds with a misleading notion of individualism. Together these place the highest social value on monetary wealth. This “wealth” becomes synonymous with conventional success and personal validation, both of which cover-up a nihilistic (death) drive. Lampert remarks on Zarathustra’s contempt of the forces such proponents of the state, and its philosophical initiators, made (and continue to make) use of:

Zarathustra implicitly criticizes Locke and other teachers of the modern commercial state by condemning the emancipation of acquisitiveness, or of the desire for more than one needs, that such teachers counseled as the basis of a new
The modern state also appeals to might, and while Zarathustra has just roused the martial spirits of his listeners, he judges ignoble the appeal to might in the modern state, because it is in the service of either mere appetites or justice as equality.\textsuperscript{94}

However, super-states such as the US and EU, whose existence is a symptom of the dissipative force of hyper-decadence of the present age, rather than merely encouraging acquisitiveness like their late-modern imperialist predecessors, are increasingly amenable to redirection by artist–philosophers with the verve to surreptitiously subvert their sustaining values in plain sight.

These courageous individuals promote potential co-optations of shallow acquisitiveness—the crass consumerism that realizes the spectacular existential meanings and simulated ontological purposes circulated by the globalization complex—to liberate active potentials from, or reverse, its reactive control over bare life. This is to say they strive to destabilize the reigning anti-natural order that compels instinctual organization of drives and impulses; the now basic (albeit value-constructed) urges the prevailing (acquisitive) disposition of herd society in the globalized world indicates. The intensely all-too-human war-machines or super-states of the present age could, in Nietzsche’s optimistic view, be transfigured to direct human activity at authentically generative aims.

In Nietzsche’s view human societies result from the gradual amalgamation of small herds into larger ones through diverse processes of peaceful amalgamation and violent conquest gives rise to larger communities occupying a geographical territory, with a shared language, worldview (\textit{Weltanschauung}) and defining sets of customary norms. From a people, extraordinary exceptions, or genuine individuals emerges only rarely, and they are likely to endure persecution or ostracism for being unusual; they may be
dismissed as eccentric or locked away as insane and even suffer death for the differences that set them apart from their herd, or community. It is only very recently in the historical development of human societies that a single person could prosper, let alone survive for very long outside his community.

The post-Enlightenment notion of the individual was an innovation on the concept of personhood and the situatedness of the self that was in turn exaggerated in the Romantic era of the early and mid-19th century. Nietzsche recognized that the late-modern notion of individualism prevalent in his own day was a recent and somewhat overstated idea of what was practically achievable, much less desirable, for the vast majority. For the masses, whose utility and highest function was that ordained for them as a socially-constituted self, self-creation and self-governance were impossible to conceive.

On Nietzsche’s notion of ‘the herd’, Danto observed that:

The herd would have been made up of individuals, but they could not have been aware of themselves as such, and deviations from the norm would simply have perished, cast out like alien bodies, through inability to express their wants. Within each herd there would be a profound and virtually irresistible force making for homogeneity …there could have been differences between herds, because each would have worked out its language against the conditions that made for its survival; and as these vary, so do herds.95

The herd mentality lends itself to and ramifies the naturalization of slave morality because people cannot legislate for themselves individually and come to resent anyone with the strength to do so.

In most societies and epochs some form of the herd mentality and variant of slave morality (as an intensity relative to the cultural terms with which it corresponds) is likely to prevail. This is because the mediocre are able, by virtue of their sheer numbers as the overwhelming majority, to impose an inversion of natural values upon the strongest, the
natural masters. From these (here very abbreviated) premises Nietzsche provided the first really radical, genealogical critique of the inter-related phenomena of Judaeo-Christian morality\(^96\), Western rationalism,\(^97\) the metaphysical semiotics of truth\(^98\) and discourses of modernity\(^99\).

According to Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of the political, institutions in decadent epochs are organized to stifle the vicissitudinary nature of the human organism, considered at the individual, micro-level of the political or the communal, macro-level of political life. The law itself, conceived to facilitate a set of anti-natural ideals, serves this perverse aim. The function of effective political organization in periods of decline becomes managing decrepit capacitors whose efficient discharge of the amoral force or agency of life as will-to-power that involuntarily flows through them falters and gradually break them down.\(^100\)

In healthy ages political institutions serve to augment an instinctual arrangement (for which the law provides naturalizing grounds) that facilitates the increase of will-to-power in capacitors (organisms) at all levels, effectively facilitating change in culturally specific and therefore salubrious contexts.\(^101\) As a political institution cobbled together from the wreckage of a thoroughly exhausted era, the EU (though still a molar aggregate) may be utilized to transition Europe and mankind to a higher form of polity – made an instrument of machinic heterogenesis through / for rhizomatic becomings that reconfigure ontology and segue us from a human to a transhuman condition.\(^102\)
Fulfilling Nietzsche’s all-too-human desire for a comprehensive revaluation of values toward the overcoming of humankind: my conjecture

As a primarily reactive, stultifying development of the political drives, arbiters of conventional state authority in our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern age may unwittingly contribute to the transmutation of the reactive values they enforce through the realization of their vulgar desires. For in doing so they thereby create opportunities for their antipodes to initiate naturalizing, salubrious revaluations of prevailing herd-values to enhance human naturalness toward the development of genuinely post-modern, post-liberal forms of political community. If the healthiest individuals – burgeoning übermenschlich types of the present day – can more freely exert themselves and inadvertently enhance each others’ disparate efforts at self-perfection to the greatest extent possible thereby, they may redeploy and weaken guises of modernity’s envy, greed and egocentricity. By masking the radical implications of their aims, they can approximate the decadent arbiters of spectacular desire to overwork the acutely liberal disciplinarity of the slave moral matrix that constitutes and sustains conventional authority, and ultimately exhaust it. Advantageous chances to create the authentically healthy values necessary for a future, transhuman condition might then be seized upon.

Nietzsche’s notion of the Übermensch should not be (mis)understood according to the crude and reductive popular stereotypes of it that abound. According to Ansell-Pearson it was in fact partially conceived against what it was Nietzsche falsely understood to be the social dimensions of Darwinism:

Nietzsche construes the experimental creation of the Übermensch not in ‘Darwinian’ terms as a superior type evolving through natural selection; rather, he configures it in terms of a notion of emergent cultural complexity and
deterritorialization, laying particular stress on the hybridic emergence of diversity and difference within the order of things.\textsuperscript{103}

Übermenschlich types may come about quite randomly in the midst of broad institutional change. Übermenschlich characteristics in strong individuals spur the passions of the more exceptional, who undertake more rigorous regimens of self-discipline to re-create themselves. Their emergence occurs in a complex socio-cultural and corresponding political context. In the right circumstances this generates an authentically agonistic milieu that stimulates a rupture with the forms of life that preceded (and enabled) it. This social event provokes others, invigorating some individuals. Their experiments impel innovative expressions of difference, modify language, and incite the development of new meanings and change the cultural setting in which they act. This alters the political environment for further transformations of and experiments on life by the strong.

Eschewing overtly “revolutionary” pseudo-solutions to decadence, exemplary individuals accept the need to maintain, even develop, familiar economic structures that partially satisfy the herd’s crude appetites without entirely sating them, thus disseminating and intensifying the values of neo-liberal capital processes, including its mutually reinforcing notions of debt, guilt and accountability, and supporting concepts of (simulated) free-will and responsibility / culpability. They seek to exploit the state’s sublimated might by redirecting the martial spirit it rouses into activities of commerce and trade, along with the ressentiment that molds the herd into \textit{homo economicus}. The ultra-liberal-modern simulation of freedom as an uninhibited ability to consume is likened to equal access to products, goods and services which \textit{presence} reductive notions of both justice as fairness and equality of opportunity among the all-too-many. This
perfectly co-extends with representative democracy, which is also consumed by the multitude.\textsuperscript{104}

With the attentions of the herd (innumerable, willfully docile subjects of consensus) absorbed by such endeavors, their preoccupation and surplus production might afford rare exceptions – who will emerge unexpectedly without respect to social class or pedigree – a chance to open windows of thought from inside their communities. The drafts of fresh air let into societies largely enfeebled by a toxic miasma of anti-natural values will serve to refresh other, similar types. Once relieved of the oppressive, disciplinary ressentiment of the herd, which remains distracted by the “need” to consume, they can do so without suffocating in its poisonous air.

The sort of opportunities Nietzsche believed his philosophers of the future would involuntarily create for revaluing the hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern age are being made possible through unanticipated abstract potentials of globality. These possibilities are continuously generated from the cycle of responses and/or oppositions to the prerogatives and hegemony of the conventional globalization complex. Both as unwitting and quite conscious comedians of the reigning ascetic-consumerist ideals, these \textit{kynical} ironists engage in imaginative subversions, deflections and creative incorporations of the globalization complex. They undermine its ongoing effort to re-interpolate all that defies or escapes it and all those it reduces to citizen-constituents, the subjects of its dissipative order.\textsuperscript{105}

It would not be inaccurate to state that Nietzsche’s “oppositional ethics” (or agonistic method of valuating) may be rendered into a very complex and thoroughly unconventional—or authentically agonistic—adversarial politics (if only because
morality, a symptom of desire, always subtends the political), but the term oppositional must be understood in a particular Nietzschean sense. This will become clear in the affective practices (*praxis*) it suggests, which will strike many fervent, ultra-liberal-modern crusaders as counter-intuitive. Based on a skeptical, ephetic drive, it does not correspond to the usual methods or aims of “revolutionary” programs (i.e.: it does not advocate the immediate overthrow or destruction of prevailing hierarchies for the liberation of the masses). This paper therefore constitutes an examination of how Nietzsche’s oppositional morality could serve as a basis for transforming contemporary political life via the action of good Europeans.

However, in utilizing his critical framework I do not rigorously interrogate the presuppositions of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, within which his theory of will-to-power, decadence, force, self-overcoming, etc., figure importantly. To do so would replicate work others have done better than I could and divert me from my aims. Yet I acknowledge that, as Conway observes, Nietzsche’s critique of his age is an immanent one and no empirical evidence can convincingly substantiate the grounds he gives us for his appraisal or persuade us to accept his universalization of the philosophical explanations or conclusions he develops from it. It failed to resonate more broadly in Nietzsche’s own lifetime largely because it did not adequately capture the complex dynamics of the (very real) sweeping changes he saw occurring throughout Europe and the world. This is mainly because his appraisal (for reasons arguably similar to the theoretical weaknesses that plagued Marx’s analysis of the transformative forces of his age) did not adequately appreciate the political significance of perceived enhancements in
the material conditions of life for millions of human beings throughout Europe in
Nietzsche’s own day.

These ostensible improvements were an apparent result of technological /
scientific innovation, advances partially attributable to the post-Enlightenment ethos of
liberal-modernity. Whatever the actual relation, ultra-liberal-modern ideologues claimed
as “advancement” each transformation of everyday life that scientific progress, technological innovations and industrialization produced. They were less willing to
attribute the homicidal / suicidal excesses of that same technology—typified by the
Holocaust and Hiroshima—as similarly resulting from the liberal-modern ethos,
however.¹⁰⁶

Less an analytical failure than evidence of his consistent incredulity toward
“progress”, Nietzsche’s unique analysis leads to interesting and not entirely unpersuasive results. Nor, when applied with specificity, are its conclusion merely ex post facto
confirmations of its premises. It even seems to have provided Nietzsche with some
measure of predictive power, as he presciently anticipated some of the turmoil that
marked the last century of European history. I maintain that the apodicity and veridicality
of Nietzsche’s system (including the will to power hypothesis, corresponding theory of
decadence and eternal return of the same) is no more vulnerable to positivistic critique
than any of the major philosophical systems in Western intellectual history.¹⁰⁷ However,
Nietzsche’s provides a distinctly effective means—via his perspectivalist epistemology
and hermeneutics—for critiquing the metaphysical presuppositions of positivistic scientism.
Aesthetic politics, the problem of decadence and Nietzsche’s philosophers of the future

Nietzsche’s conception of the political is highly aesthetic, which strikes many conventional political scientists as counter-intuitive, if not absurd. He understands the political as the organization and maintenance of a communal life. As such it is a specific form of aesthetic or cultural practice concerning the creation of superlative individuals. He maintained “beauty is for the few” (*pulchrum est paucorum hominem*), a phrase he employs sporadically throughout his works,¹⁰⁸ and it is clear that he may be accurately understood as an aristocratic radical in the sense that the healthy / decadent continuum of his vitalist politics describes a spectrum ranging from higher to lower ordering among the disparate forms of human life. These correspond with the differing capacities and instinctual organizations of types of people without regard to their ethnic, racial or cultural origin. The health of the human organism is his chief concern and the basis of his vitalist politics and power ontology. He contends that healthy and sick types occur within and among all human groups, but certain cultural forms enhance the health (strength) or exacerbate the sickness (decadence) of the society from which they arise. The goal of politics—understood as the intrinsically *creative* endeavor of organizing human communities—ought to be the cultivation of those most capable of flourishing (the strongest, healthiest types). This is dependent on the systematic enhancement of a salubrious culture (*Bildung*) toward the elevation of the species.

Nietzsche hierarchy of values and related rank order of types (*Rangordnung*) was conceived to reflect the natural qualities and dissimilarities between individuals; therefore he cannot be construed as an elitist in the ordinary sense. This aspect of his vitalism
constitutes a key part of his politics, and if one can accept its premises it is arguably the most inclusive sort of partiality. It is a notion that can be traced back in origin through the Western philosophical tradition, specifically in the works of Machiavelli, Aristotle and Plato, each of whom provided similar conceptions of the proper aim of a polity: the enhancement of the natural talents and best features of their populaces, especially the health of the community’s strongest members.

From such a perspective, Nietzsche saw the intensifying decadence of European life in the late 19th century as symptomatic of the diminishing significance of these essential collective meanings. This was confirmed by the erosion of traditional authority, the rise of socialism, anarchism and a nihilistic relativism that actively rejected all meaning. Nietzsche perceived an ominous portent in developments, asserting that they augured trouble for Europe’s immediate future. He presciently foresaw that the dissipation of shared beliefs and unifying meanings would, in “the next century, bring the struggle for the domination of the earth” between the most dangerous factions. This would produce “the compulsion to great politics” in the best individuals as well, namely those strong enough to resist the spreading infirmity of the age. It was in this latter, hopeful possibility that his optimism was sustained.

Nietzsche believed the prevailing condition of decadence was bound to lead to wars the like of which the world had never known. Consistent with the ultra-liberal-modernist project’s reactive will-to-truth, alternative visions of the future—as possibilities for becoming—were to be preemptively eliminated. In the most extreme cases, such as that of the National Socialist takeover of Germany, the logic of abolishing
all difference cultivated an association of every sort of otherness, however insignificant, with an existential threat to society itself.

The cliché *Difference engendre haine* arises from recognition that the dissimilar frightens and unfamiliar customs or beliefs often provoked conflicts between peoples. But hatred of difference itself (whatever its origin or identification) functioned to intensify them throughout the early twentieth century. This negative compulsion to great politics first arose in different strains of nationalism and socialism vying with (equally reactive) free-market capitalism for hegemony over the continent. Proponents of differing forms of the liberal-modernist ideology vied to eliminate their liberal-modernist “opponents”. Through this ultimate war on difference, waged in the latter half of the century by non-lethal means, the liberal-modernist project has succeeded in unifying Europe through the systematic, ongoing standardization and mediocrization of much of what was/is distinctive and differentiating; the banalization of precisely those qualities which by their nature formerly provoked regenerative competition on the continent.109

Yet, as this “disease of will” hastens Europe’s cultural degeneration, a newly invigorated and unified will to defy enforced massification and homogenization of difference has developed in spite of and in distinction to it.110 The simultaneous improvement of the type man through the creative acts of courageous exceptions is being effectuated by those ‘good Europeans’ of our age.111 However, the reactive momentum of globalization (understood as a plane of consistency that inhibits lines of flight), is symptomatic of a negative will to impose a universal normative order.

The aim of this order is the containment of becoming-other through the worldwide extension of uniform desire to co-opt and interpolate difference. Globalization
ramifies the hyper-decadence of European cultural realm’s declining age and, culminating in a nihilistic form of Empire, suggests the wars of the twentieth century may have been a minor prelude of the all-too-human paroxysms such nihilism may yet spawn. That a state-driven process of European integration has occurred largely through the work of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment and culminated in the EU and Europe’s other chief supranational institutions (the OSCE and COE) does not, of course, mean that Nietzsche’s idea of Europe is in any way attained. It does suggest however, that opportunities for the over-coming of the state form are being generated—if unwittingly—by the aforementioned arbiters of integration (a potential that is examined below). In contrast to the motives for integration espoused by conventional Europeanists, Nietzsche’s:

…vision of what it means to be a “good European” is intellectually more persuasive in a secular context because it allows for an experimental questioning of the will-to-truth; that is supremely affirmative of an understanding of existence that does not try to vest all of its creative efforts in ascetic ideals; that demonstrates immense spiritual vitality and courage in understanding this experiment; and that is also more optimistic than the pessimistic reaction found in much of the literature on the crisis of the European idea.112

Such an experimental questioning (via Nietzsche’s own vitalist politics) of the motivating will-to-truth behind both defunct and current ideas of Europe expressed in their differing visions of the continent’s future, serves as a basis for devising and implementing the means of attaining a supremely affirmative idea of Europe rooted in the most life-affirming or inclusive will-to-truth conceivable. Of particular interest here is that reactive statist will-to-truth epitomized by the institutionalized aims of the EU, against which Nietzsche’s idea of Europe emphasizes the multiplicity of types, wealth of difference and
correspondingly tremendous diversity of possible becomings Europe and its broader cultural realm contains, all of which his ‘good Europeans’ seek to radically enhance.

The EU, despite being the product of a primarily molar state-form, provides mechanisms through the ultra-liberal-modernist norms and ideals it naturalizes that ‘good Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can utilize to achieve their objectives. These objectives include instantiating an “order” conducive to the continuous enhancement and utmost thriving of humankind’s highest exemplars through a comprehensive revaluation of the now ubiquitous ascetic-consumerist values that construct and delimit possibilities for desiring in contemporary life. Corresponding with the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness that may be fortified by globality in our era of globalization, it is probable that an increasing number of exceptional individuals—European or other persons globally—are becoming amenable to and capable of undertaking such a radical revaluing of the values characteristic of globalization.

However, these are largely latent potentials; positive becomings continually struggling to overcome the inhibiting forces of our media dominated era of mass-consumerism, which squanders much potential through myriad diversions and entertainments while making a veritable religion of labor/work through the reification of productivity. Nietzsche deduced that Europe’s deteriorating culture would gestate potentials for renewed authenticity, condemning Europe’s burgeoning “commercial culture” which deleteriously inhibits strong instincts “at the expense of manifesting human presence”. The “fundamental idea of a commercial culture” concerned a negative type of appraisal, the act of evaluating the worth of a thing, be it material goods,
a work of art or ideas themselves, according to a coarse supply and demand calculus that distorts and prejudices all values.  \(^{115}\)

This type of assessment, based upon the mass appeal of a thing, panders to the lowest common denominator and achieves hegemony as the reified mode of appraisal over all other modes of valuing as a commercial culture develops. It is also dependent – as Marx famously expounded – upon a new form of wage-labor; a degrading form of servitude that alienates its subjects from themselves and the product of their toil while it evacuates all “spirit” from the dehumanized culture it perpetuates. Nietzsche saw this development as one coextending with the democratic ethos or leveling tendency of his day. Nietzsche fully expected its effects to be intensified and thoroughly naturalized in the 20\(^{th}\) century; a form of character perversion “imprinted in every will and every faculty: it is this of which …men of the coming century will be proud if the profits of the commercial class are right to give it into your possession!”  \(^{116}\)

This reactive becoming-same (or “molarity”) has resulted in a highly sublimated form of (self-)glorified slavery, as young men who might otherwise cultivate their nobler character or talent or the industry innate to themselves are systematically employed instead: “purloined from themselves, trained to being worn out daily and taught to regard this as a matter of duty.” These “poor beasts of burden”, the vast majority, are, in a commercial culture, methodically habituated to perceiving labor for others as an intrinsic good in their own self-interest. “[T]hey cannot do without it and would not have it otherwise.”  \(^{117}\)

While the herd occupies itself, working to earn its living and partake of frivolous entertainments, certain anomalous or untimely individuals are likely to be “freed” by the
surplus of its toil to dedicate themselves to nobler aesthetic creation. In becoming ‘good Europeans’ they come to recognize and diagnose the affliction of decadence sustained and perpetuated by the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Thenceforth their struggle is one of limiting and ultimately reversing the infirmity it spreads: democratization and its concomitant leveling tendency via an absurdly egalitarian populist ethos and its cultivation of an obedient “type prepared for slavery in the most subtle sense.” Their “cure” requires the therapeutic exploitation of the vast potential of this circumstance. Turning the disease of liberal values against itself, ‘good Europeans’ subvert the debilitating hegemonic order from within and gradually establish a natural political arrangement predicated on a rank order of perspectives. The hierarchic order they strive after would allow the existing “wealth of types” to prosper and even sanction its expansion so to maximally facilitate becoming. Such a natural order would abet the enlargement of greatness and enhance the dignity and capabilities of every sort of person, allowing the fullest expression of Dasein.

Toward attaining the fullest realization of this, ‘good Europeans’ intuitively recognize the paradoxical value of reactivity and the intensified decadence of our age: technological innovation has diversified the variety of forms creative impulses may take. Properly directed, the fruits of the negative will are not (and cannot correctly be understood as) limited to the passive resignation or frenzied consumption of the contented and blinking last man, for the state of affairs that sustains the herd’s pathetic condition may counter-intuitively inspire the odd great work of visual art, drama, literature or music.
Rather, a multitude of possible contributions, the like of which Nietzsche could not have anticipated have (in the form of broadly delivered basic education, astonishing feats of engineering and advanced communication; certain applications of technology to food production—the so-called “green revolution”; radical innovations in medicine and health care, etc.) provided a sense of ersatz “spiritualization,” that is, a palliative sense of meaning that is not altogether valueless. It is sufficient for the herd, whose members are incapable of the sort of freedom expressed in the strength symptomatic of the extraordinary conation\textsuperscript{124}, and ananke\textsuperscript{125}, characteristic of the will-to-power enacted by best types, pluripotent exceptions. The majority’s indifference—or at least, ignorance—of those higher types’ struggle for self-perfection is useful for insulating the latter, who are hardly imputrescible, from the debasing influence of the bourgeois vulgarians who define “good taste”, determine “propriety” and dominate “culture” in a declining age such as our own. The apathy of the mediocre majority vis-à-vis their own genuine becoming leads to the state of fallenness and their eventual ruinance, (Heidegger’s notion for of a in which they no longer have time to care about their own lives). Although this condition inspires the freest spirits with dread, the weak settle into a passive acceptance of it and find a perverse form of contentment thereby. Their dread spurs them into oppositional stance toward this condition of hyper-decadence and the arbiters of such extremely nihilistic values that come to be taken by the all-too-many as commonplace.

Nietzsche saw the historic role of ascetic priests of ressentiment as that of promoting all-too-human notions of equality and the fatuous ideals of a fictive social-justice to inhibit and/or corrupt those would-be exceptions. Ascetic priest are the great despisers of life who foster values of self-denial and proclaim the inferiority of this world
in part as a means of defusing the potential greatness of rare exceptions who are otherwise likely to undermine their authority. They sought, as Nietzsche puts it, to “level mountain and valley”, to weaken the strong in order to protect themselves and gain power over others, namely their betters.

However, I will argue below that the obliviousness of the many to the daunting potential of the very exceptional few, and even their opposition to the idea of greatness as it undermines their belief in the intrinsic equality of all, can actually be cultivated by insuring the former’s relative comfort through a steady rise in their levels of consumption. This is conventionally understood by contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment as their ‘standard of living’ and re-presented to the all-too-many as an “objective” indicator of “improvement” in the lives more generally. In complex ways it corresponds with current conceptions of “empowerment”, ideals of prosperity and jejune and narcissistic notions of happiness.

It also corresponds—in the opposite direction—with (residually Christian) moralistic efforts to deflect attention away from puerile and vain efforts at self-affirmation that conflict with the values of humility and the celebrated rejection of the corporeal. In this direction the striving for meaning and purpose is conducted toward raising the material prosperity of those who are comparatively poor. The pity of the rich is deliberately focused on the needs of the “destitute”, particularly those inhabiting exotic locales. The value systems of these underdeveloped societies are systematically discredited and subverted so that they may come to perceive and believe themselves to be disadvantaged. Their “deprivation” is them given various causes so that blame for it can be ascribed and effort more coherently made to ameliorate their plight and correct their
deficiency. On the macro-economic level billions of dollars in aid is lent to the governments of poor countries, which over decades produced even greater pretexts for pity among the citizens of rich, developed nations, as a new class of highly indebted poor countries arose in which misery and suffering seemed more pronounced and urgent than ever.  

Nietzsche’s meta-politics is concerned precisely with the production of conditions of possibility for versatile “freer” spirits, rather than the elimination of suffering. Among those with the strength to encourage, intensify and exploit the perverse conditions of contemporary life to their own ends (self-overcoming in the pursuit of excellence) the aim sought is the fruition of a more profound and willful suffering. The active generation of a vital culture seeks to elevate and ultimately, develop mankind. In the future it may do so by extricating the strongest from our miasmic condition of hyper-decadence in globalization, pulling them back from a nihilistic abyss of meaninglessness in which the rest will willingly and perhaps “happily” remain, according to their own all-too-human, perverse standard.

Throughout his career-long critique of late-modernity Nietzsche maintained that “democracy has ever been the form of decline in organizing power,” and he characterized “modern democracy, along with its hybrids such as the “German Reich” as the form of decline of the state.” He maintained that the “solitary personality”:

…can maintain and develop itself most easily in a democratic society: namely, when the coarser means of defense are no longer necessary and habits of order, honesty, justice and trust are part of the usual conditions.

This fascinating note betrays Nietzsche’s awareness of the practical and strategic use that the highest affirmers of life could make of conventional morality and ochlocratic
(literally mob-power) forms of political organization—such as democracy—that it spawned.

In precisely this context I assert that the nomothetic acts of ‘good Europeans’, by legislating the emerging, deterritorializing global age, will assist the perfection of the EU in ways likely to transform it beyond recognition. In so doing they will overcome its present reactive form so that their heirs may eventually dispense with the exhausted and repressive state form entirely, as well as the inhibition of human potential it comprises. This is to speak of what is required to bring to parturition the age of globality—a transhuman future—that now gestates within a few.

David Owen has constructively expanded on the appearance of such individuals. He understands Nietzsche to be advocating the instantiation of an authentic rank order of values (*Rangordnung*) corresponding with the natural hierarchy of perspectives and types to cultivate exemplars (e.g., ‘good Europeans’) whose great cultural achievements will hasten the ultimate overcoming of the ascetic ideals that inhibit the improvement (and overcoming) of the species man.\(^{131}\) This objective would require the intensification of every dimension of our all-too-human existence, and does not suggest a leaping over man but his metamorphosis. Nietzsche hoped to accelerate the elimination of the conceptual–physiological constraints on becoming introduced by the false Christian-Platonic binaries that differentiated a true, noumenal world from the apparent (and therefore “inferior”) phenomenal world. In so doing ‘good Europeans’ like himself would reestablish the primacy of a tragic view of the self over the disabling moral view of the self.

The tragic idea of the self corresponds with the prevailing Greek notion prior to the Socratic reification of reason over passion. In this natural “tragic” view, agents are
inseparable from their actions, which are articulated through fate and express a good conscience. The moral idea of the self privileges “truth” over *er*ο*ς* to postulate the notion of accountability; by falsely separating an agent from his acts it provides a basis for the concept of guilt, allowing the assignation of culpability and punishment, practices symptomatic of bad-conscience. In broader, macro-level political terms pertaining to Nietzsche’s own notion of liberation, Ansell–Pearson cites ‘Of old and new law-tables” from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, writing that the passage:

…makes clear that liberation consists in freeing ourselves from the metaphysics of morality and the morality of metaphysics; compulsion, dogma or statute, and the metaphysical categories (necessity and purpose, good and evil, etc.). In short, the innocence of becoming, of time as such, is to be restored, and where time qua transience is conceived as the moment that both gathers and splits up the past and future.

Such innocence of becoming occurs to varying degrees among the range of types separated by the pathos of distance. Only once modernity’s illusory notion of metaphysical freedom is forgotten—after the long period of decadence which we are in ends—will rare, genuine free spirits be able to stand above humankind and revel in the innocence of their becoming.

Smith states that, “philosophers of the future”, for lacking the necessary native volition, will remain “locked in a Spirit of Revenge” never to experience the autonomy of the good Europeans Nietzsche anticipates. However, they “can, properly trained, be the Free-Spirit’s ‘well trained hounds’ and ‘servants’,” who will be “implicated as priests in [the] new religiosity” that affirms *Dasein* through a conscious engagement with the abysmal ground of our *Being-unto-death*, experienced as ecstatic Dionysian insight into No-thingness that stimulates renewed (Apollonian) orderings and creation. Though the
philosophers of the future might recognize the contingency of all values and truths, they are compelled to create values and enforce them dogmatically by the requirement of impressing forms upon and providing stable meanings to those who cannot survive without them (the vast majority).

The project for philosophical laborers on the noble model of Kant and Hegel is to establish some large class of given values... and press it into formulas, whether in the realm of logic or politics (morality) or art. It is up to these researchers to make everything that has happened or been valued so far look clear, obvious, comprehensible, and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time” itself, and to overwhelm the entire past.\textsuperscript{135}

The all-too-many, who “need to have form impressed upon them from without”, must eventually be made to forget the counter-productive chimera of metaphysical freedom through new values whose grounds seem naturally indisputable.\textsuperscript{136} This is necessary in order to create a base upon which both the cultivation of humankind through philosophical education and breeding can be sustained, and the leisure required by “genuine, revenge-free ‘free Spirits’” who are the only ones capable of authentic philosophic individuality and spiritual liberation can be supported.\textsuperscript{137} Such an “aristocratic ethos” is inclusive insofar as it promotes the attainment of a diverse and natural rank ordering of types that serves as a moral backdrop for all. It constitutes a moral code that has nothing to do with the (modern) drive to transform morality into a science, which it will have overcome.\textsuperscript{138}

This recognition of varying degrees of (un)freedom corresponding to the quanta of force one may expend as will-to-power and the grouping of types for social expediency pertaining thereto has interesting implications vis-à-vis the perceived need for a re-authenticated ‘idea of Europe,’ to serve as a ground for the project of European
unification in our ultra-liberal-modern, hyper-decadent age of sublimated nihilism. Elbe usefully observes that since the death of god imbuing Europe with a meaningful idea of itself—the task of philosophers of the future—would prove difficult.

In Nietzsche’s account the demand for a more meaningful idea of Europe would persist not only because of the pragmatic necessities of European policy-makers, but also because Europeans have traditionally been accustomed to having the balm of metaphysics and ‘true’ worlds to fall back upon in their quest to find the deeper meaning of existence.\(^\text{139}\)

Elbe correctly concludes (in the same section) that this would invariably be experienced “as a profound loss of spiritual vitality”, and would likely give rise to nostalgia for defunct notions of Europe and reactive ideals of what constitutes “European-ness”.

Indeed, such reaction presently plagues efforts to define what characteristics warrant full, formal inclusion—via various sorts of codified legal enfranchisements and citizenship, etc.—in the emerging EU polity, as well as its arbiters’ attempts to construct a new European identity and corresponding ethos. The latter’s ever more uniformly (mimetically) articulated expression of the EU’s will-to-truth across its disparate member states, as well as a simultaneous profusion of dissenting wills emanating from various corners of the continent are all symptomatic of the anxiety over identity-as-belonging that the project itself has generated. A truly Nietzschean idea of Europe would likely seem \textit{incomprehensible} to many citizens of the Union across the political spectrum, including both those who support the project and those advocating their nation’s withdrawal from it, according to the impulse, whatever its manifestation, to systematically exclude others from each based upon their national origins, cultural heritage, ethnicity or race.\(^\text{140}\)

The ideals of inclusion and efforts at protecting diversity upon which the EU’s social, political and cultural statutes are predicated are putatively antithetical to such
chauvinisms, which arise in opposition to the attributes of individuals that stand to enrich European-ness and life on the continent.\textsuperscript{141} The aspiration of forging a unity out of the continent’s diverse panoply of peoples and types reflects the EU’s origin in an account-giving endeavor motivated in part by a spirit of revenge against time and Europe’s collective past, particularly the horrors of World War Two. It also indicates an aversion to certain kinds of radical difference and a corresponding effort to homogenize the most (conflicting) opposite values and variations within its domain.

EU human rights statutes and civil laws guaranteeing regional autonomy, cultural protections, universal enfranchisement and legal equality comprise the primary and arguably most positive expression of its attempts to preserve authentic diversity whilst forging a new and expanded unity, albeit not for the conventional slave-moral ethos upon which they are predicated. Such efforts usually breed reaction, as they constrain maximal freedom and becoming in various and complex ways in order to protect and nurture the weak. They also replicate identic essentialisms privileged by the EU’s newly instituted order while discrediting and condemning those deemed unfavorable to it.\textsuperscript{142} This disciplinary mechanism compounds the grief inflicted upon a growing number by their shared awareness “that we can no longer believe those dogmas of religion and metaphysics” that formerly provided us with comforting essentialisms and secure grounds for living.\textsuperscript{143}

The spectrum of these reactions (both positive and negative in conventional liberal terms) epitomize the profound naturalization of the spirit of revenge, as it corresponds with the deepening crisis of nihilism characteristic of contemporary life both within the Anglo-European cultural realms and outside of them in the age of
globalization. The universal dissemination of Europe’s hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern values means that its predicament of nihilism and meaninglessness is being experienced in some form or other nearly everywhere in the world.

The slave-moral pessimistic disposition toward the human condition, which is typified by a rejection of Dionysian reverie and its embrace of the tragic, in favor of the mitigation of all suffering, is being gradually universalized by the globalization complex. This should not be surprising however, nor is it entirely lamentable as “Nietzsche predicted that only large empires would be capable of acting politically in the age of global politics at the culmination of modernity.”144 The global spread of the European form of decadence promotes a brand of pessimism which inhibits recognition of the “supranational, nomadic cosmopolitan type” that is developing out of its decay, which – as Nietzsche hoped – is realizing the possibility of “a united European people capable of the task of global mastery,” for which the multiple, mutually reinforcing spectacles of globalization are prevenient.145

The “mastery” of which Nietzsche spoke – and fervently advocated – should not be misconstrued in terms of a frightening imposition of power-over-others in the tradition of conventional tyranny or antagonistic and coercive power relations. Rather, it referred to the crucial project of self-mastery toward radical self-affirmation by which the healthiest become who it is they are, and to their mastery over the world via the nomothetic acts they spontaneously perform that provoke (the eros of) others, spurring their emulation in the socio-political realm.146 These are plainly taking form in our world via the realization of abstract potentials of globality which are evident in myriad aspects of contemporary life in nearly all regions of the world.
This ‘global mastery’ involves the recognition and acceptance of diversity and purposeful enrichment of disparate types, each fortified by their respectful acknowledgement of the other. The task facing good Europeans—“atheists and immoralists”—is to increase that mastery and direct it to life-affirming projects. This would come to involve the highest exemplars of every European people and enhance the development of an advanced, supra-European awareness (Bildung).\textsuperscript{147} It would serve to strengthen those capable of flourishing and edify the \textit{hoi polloi} with meaning and purpose. I argue below that such developments are being actualized in the present through the \textit{vis creativa} inherent to emergent abstract potentials of globality.

Among Nietzsche’s primary objectives was that of inspiring his readers to “become ‘good Europeans’”.\textsuperscript{148} He hoped to arouse astute iconoclasts, spurring them to dispense with anti-natural moral conventions and intellectual prejudices. Their passionate works, as kynical ironists would productively lampoon the decadent values of our age. This would provide a palliative to the nihilism that dissipates the volitional resources of Europe’s peoples, especially those who would other-wise emerge as its highest exemplars. Moreover, it would facilitate the realization of an idea of Europe corresponding with the ambition of Nietzsche’s aristocratically radical political philosophy and his recognition “that Europe wants to become one”.\textsuperscript{149}

In advocating the notion of ‘good Europeanism’ Nietzsche sought to recuperate elements of a mainly defunct set of ideals and persuade future free spirits to dedicate themselves to creating a new Europe (and world) in which the best and healthiest would legislate with the aim of improving humankind physically, intellectually and “spiritually”. This idea of Europe would be the culmination of his project of translating
man back into nature to overcome the nihilism of the present. He expected it to prompt Europeans to “transcend narrow nationalism and accomplish a mingling of many old races and stocks”, a process that would ultimately culminate in a “new European culture.”
BOOK TWO
Toward What End Does Europe Want to Become One? Polity Making and the Theorization of European Integration

Section One
Nietzsche’s perspectivalist epistemology and corresponding critique of science: the political as world-creation and interpretation

Introduction
In this book I critique theories of European integration and the purposes they serve through the perspectival lenses of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology. Such a thought experiment, and the unconventional analysis is provides, strives to deduce the function of values informing conceptualizations of Europe’s integration and the organization of the EU itself, as well as the motives for those values. It illuminates “the preponderating power of the moral prejudices” that underlies the project of integrating Europe and unconsciously informs rationales for it. This provides insights into the maintenance of established understanding (perspectives) of Europe and their incremental transformation within the dominant ultra-liberal-modern ideological matrix.

Through this assessment I seek to furnish a Nietzschean understanding of the recent construction and evolving role of European identity/ies. ‘Popular culture’ is also considered as a force advancing ascetic-consumerist ideals in the economic integration and socio-political amalgamation of the continent. A doxographical survey toward genealogical critique, this appraisal of mainstream scholarly theorizing of European
integration from the end of World War Two to the present sets up my exposition of how the good Europeans Nietzsche anticipated might cheerfully engage in the task of remaking the continent and the world.

The books following this one specify the aim of good Europeans in doing so, that chiefly being to revalue the reactive values out of which the EU developed in accordance with their quasi-cosmopolitan, active values. They thereby seek to inaugurate a new, revitalized era predicated on a genuinely agonistic socio-political milieu for the generation of an authentic culture. Against the sickening nihilism of our hyper-decadent age which good Europeans seek to end, such a life-affirming environment would augment the flourishing of those with the health necessary to truly prosper. Nietzsche envisaged that in doing so these Übermenschlich, if preparatory exceptions would elevate the human species and hasten its eventual overcoming. He considered this objective of culture the greatest of all conceivable ‘political’ endeavors.

Recalling Laplace’s dictum, “[t]he weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness”, I must acknowledge that Nietzsche’s arguments pose weighty challenges to the precepts of ordinary social science and democratic political theory. This includes explicating how such theories indicate variations on the prevailing, anti-natural will to truth, assessing their value for certain forms of life or modes of being-in-the-world, and prospects for their eventual transmutation into life-affirming practices through a revaluation of our hyper-decadent values. The assessment is supported by discursive critique and empirical analysis, as well analysis of the mutually-constitutive role ideology plays in the generation and legitimation of such theories and how the mainstream of the field they comprise has recently been challenged in ways that
suggest how conventional understandings about European integration may be overcome to transform Europe in authentically life-affirming ways.

In sections one and two of this book I examine Nietzsche’s anti-dogmatic perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance and coextending vitalism in terms of how such a critical framework may be utilized to glean an understanding of contemporary theories of European integration. I draw on Nietzsche’s texts and on seminal assessments of his critique of science, utilizing his critique of the metaphysical presuppositions of certain, persistent notions within Western philosophy, such as free will and the autonomy of the putatively agentic individual. I also employ his related critiques of the univocality of reason and the corresponding (empiricist) prejudices of science to show how its knowledge creation for ‘Truth’ legitimation inhibits the conditions necessary for authentic culture, which Nietzsche’s new philosophy, or gay science, would be tasked with providing.\textsuperscript{155}

Nietzsche deduced that empirical science cannot, despite popular misconceptions of it, be self-grounding. His desire (itself implicated in the same Christian–Platonic will to truth that generated science\textsuperscript{156}) to establish a more plausible or naturalistic basis for knowledge prompted a critical endeavor to push scientific reason to its furthest logical consequences. In so doing he illuminated the metaphysical faith in reason perpetuated by the cultural framework it had spawned. He thereby recognized, as Ansell Pearson notes, that “[s]cience suffers from the fact that it lacks independence, that it is always placed in the service of a value-creating power, never creating values.” However, rather than reject science for seeming to provide itself with an axiomatic starting point, Nietzsche re-conceived it in aesthetic terms, as a form of artistic production, with art understood as an
instinctive interpretative/creative endeavor impelled by the anorganic force conducted by and involuntarily discharged (given expression) through life. By doing so he sought “to give articulation to a gay science” capable of overcoming a “science [that] unconsciously performs its own kind of revenge on man by arriving at results that serve to belittle him.”

The privileging of scientific reason over all other means of knowledge creation via the contemporary discourse of scientism originates in a will to truth that coextends with (and was arguably formative of) the ideologically hegemonic metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. The reactive interests of the modern state, which seeks to realize the ideals of ultra-liberal-modernity and employs the discourses of scientism to rationalize this operation, are served as well, thereby. Through its ultimately linguistic (artistic) depiction of the ‘real’—an institutional instantiation of a will to nothingness that culminates in hyper-decadence—the metaphoricity of scientific reason, particularly as manifested in contemporary political science and theories of European integration, has momentous epistemological implications for the self-understanding of individuals and communities. Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of art and the perspectivalist hermeneutic to which it gives rise provides the critical disposition and corresponding methodology of the doxographical survey and genealogical analysis of the major theories of European integration that follows.

Nietzsche was quite enthusiastic about the potential of science and its uses for the elevation of humankind. However, while engaged in the major debates of his day—particularly biologism and evolution (both of which significantly influenced his own thought) he was very critical of the fetishization it was undergoing. These mid- and late
19th century developments were formative of many contemporary popular conceptions of science. They led to the reification entailed in the privileging of scientific methodologies as a means for ascertaining ‘truth’ to “sustain, legitimate and reinvigorate the values of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, [and reconstruct] religious orthodoxies in a secular, scientific form” in the wake of the death of God. Nietzsche recognized the dangers this presented of a new, metaphysical dogmatism, particularly as science was systematically deployed to discredit other forms of knowledge creation.

Throughout this book I aim to show that however effectively Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance questioned some of the principle conceits of Western philosophy (and by extension, science) he ultimately does not—and did not intend to—wholly reject analytical science. Nietzsche meant only to situate science as one method of accessing the world; one particularly effective theoretical approach within the encompassing framework of his meta-theoretical perspectivalism, “which shifts the basis of the problem of science from science to art and then beyond the question of art to the question of life”. Therefore his actual position on this complex subject—as well as many others—is at odds with the popular caricature of his thought as comprising an unnuanced form of relativism.

Holding Nietzsche’s critique to be successful on its own terms, I argue that it offers significant insights into the limitations of science, particularly as applied to the study of the social realm with specific relevance to the examination of political processes undertaken by theories of European integration. In so doing it conversely illuminates the proper place and acknowledges the benefits of mainstream positivistic, analytic, objectivist scientific practice. Similarly, Nietzsche would have approved of today’s
normative social science as a legitimate form of knowledge generation, but objected to its underlying values, or ideological motivations. He would have understood it—and its “reality-falsifying simplifications”—as a ressentiment-driven project symptomatic of our hyper-decadent, cynical age.  

The third section of this book consists of the aforementioned doxographical survey of the major schools of integration theory within a broadly genealogical evaluative framework. It comprises the bulk of this book, and aims to point toward an understanding of how the discipline—as a knowledge–power regime in the Foucaultian sense—has developed. The evolution of the field (considered in terms of a disciplinary power–knowledge regime) is understood first in terms of the development and maturation of an epistemic community, and second as comprising a veritable research tradition. Third, and lastly, I survey some of the ways this mainstream has recently been challenged in productive ways by post-Nietzschean critical methodologies that have illuminated some of the field’s strengths and weaknesses. The section also aims to demonstrate how the power–knowledge regime it comprises corresponds with the hegemonic values (metadiscourse) of ultra-liberal-modernity and its coercive project of universalizing a secularized form of slave-morality, the decadence of which Nietzsche saw as the European sickness.  

In the books that follow this one, contemporary Europe is shown to be a catalyst for augmenting both life-affirming and life-denying developments, the balance of which will be critical to the future of humankind. In book three, Europe, under the aegis of the EU, is situated in and shown to comprise a major organ—or power constellation—of the broader globalization complex. The decadently nihilistic ethos of globalization is
contrasted with the positive abstract potentials of globality to which it gives rise and which good Europeans might exploit both to become who they are and to effect a revaluation of values. Finally, in book four, I explain how the EU can be hijacked, exploited and redirected by good Europeans, as I contend it can be throughout the work. As comedians of the ascetic ideals upon which the EU was founded, good Europeans may condition the possibility for the emergence of Übermenschlich types capable of revaluing the dissipative values of ultra-liberal-modernity to realize a Nietzschean idea of Europe.

**Part One: A Brief Review of Nietzsche’s Vitalist Critique and its Utility to an Analysis of European Unification**

Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of modernity and associated call for a revaluation of all values (*Umwerthung aller Werthe*) – a rejection of and challenge to the entire Christian–Platonic “slave moral” tradition – was intended to resonate among healthy individuals and incite them to “become ‘good Europeans’”. In proffering this critique he was principally concerned with explicating how human life may degenerate or be invigorated by values through the forms of socio-political organization they produce. The socio-political organization of a healthy society functions as a basis for the development of a higher culture and is secondary, and subordinate to it. The political is essential for ensuring the natural rank order of types necessary for an authentically agonistic milieu in which the strongest exemplars, or geniuses, may flourish.

Nietzsche sought to explain how healthy, “masterly” values facilitate the flourishing of those capable of it by giving rise to an authentically agonistic higher culture, while anti-natural moralities of taming (specifically the Christian–Platonic
tradition) were motivated by slave ressentiment and realized by appeal to common desires so as to impede humankind’s greatest potential. He opposed slave moralities of taming because they originate in ressentiment and seek to enforce an unnatural equality between types by leveling disparate forms of life to eliminate difference. It is important to recall that Nietzsche:

[O]ffers no plan for restoring decadent souls to a more robust standard of vitality. He is interested neither in prescribing a recuperative system of instincts nor in rallying the anemic and infirm to unlikely feats of heroism and nobility. Decadent souls can do nothing by enact their constitutive chaos, expressing themselves creatively in their own self-destruction.

Values themselves are symptoms of the health—or instinctual organization—of individuals, at the political microsphere, and the health of a culture, via its socio-political organization, at the political macrosphere.

In the work that follows I am specifically interested in how healthy individuals might involuntarily challenge the hyper-decadent values of the prevailing ultra-liberal-modern, “free-market” democratic state form and its globalization complex, through kynical engagement—prankish acts that mock and spoof reigning ascetic ideals. Though doomed to fail, in part because they are invariably affected by the decadence of their abject epoch, they hasten its exhaustion and eventual transfiguration by prospective Übermenschlich types, whose success in instigating a transhuman future their naturalizing acts foreshadow and incrementally facilitate. I focus specifically on the EU as a crucial locus and driving force of the globalization complex.

The empirical evidence Nietzsche musters to substantiate his unsettling contentions seemed to him readily apparent to anyone with the strength to see it. Despite the observed facts he draws upon from late 19th century Europe to support his
case (e.g.: democratization and enfranchisement, the rise of a middle class bourgeoisie, growing nationalism and anti-Semitism, etc.), his characterizations do not in themselves prove the existence of the decadence he identifies. This raises the issue of what substantiating empirical support Nietzsche musters in making his arguments about differing value systems and their correspondence to human types, social forms and levels of culture. What factual corroboration could be cited to sustain such a critique and verify its conclusions? It must be acknowledged that there is little in the world by way of material support to validate his conclusions. As Conway remarks,

His diagnosis of modernity may strike us as scintillating, provocative, even persuasive at times, but we have no epistemic warrant to following him in pronouncing it true.168

Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of human behavior and communal life (politics) informed his axiological assessment of his and Europe’s historical situation. He sought to fortify his thesis through a genealogy of morality, in which he would trace the historical origins and development of opposing moral trends. It was developed most famously in On the Genealogy of Morality, a work whose themes elaborate previously developed philosophical investigations and analyses.

Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance—which can be understood as a skeptical, though not relativistic, heuristic device— together with his power ontology, by means of which he radically challenged the Western tradition of ontology, provides his critical technique of evaluation and the conclusions arrived at thereby with a distinctive analytical facility. As with every philosopher preceding him, and perhaps every philosopher since, his grounds for asserting the “truth” of his theory may be challenged. However, Nietzsche’s understanding of “truth” (and all related
concepts such as ‘certainty’, ‘fact’, ‘reality’, etc.) distinguishes his thought from the tradition that preceded it, and much of Western thought since has in some way or other constituted a response to it.

In a famous passage from the aforementioned work, he states his case for perspectivalism thusly:

From now on, my philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of the dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge’, let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, ‘knowledge as such’: -- here we are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretive powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded. There is only perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; the more affects we allow to speak about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our objectivity.169

Conway helpfully remarks on this passage, noting that Nietzsche’s perspectivalism rejects the “traditional interpretation of Objectivity as disinterested contemplation.” He further states that the passage demonstrates how, through perspectivalism, Nietzsche:

[A]ttempts to account for those affective ingredients and determinants of knowledge that traditionally have been ignored or discounted by orthodox epistemologists. His reconstituted notion of objectivity (consistently noted by his use of quotation marks) suggests that knowledge is a function of the embodied expression of our affective investment in the world. His perspectivism thus presupposes an account of knowing subjects as radically situated in the world and in their bodies. …Second…his perspectivism is strategically designed to recuperate the metaphors of vision that have dominated (and perverted) representational epistemology. …[T]he pursuit of Nietzschean objectivity requires us to deconstruct…binary oppositions and integrate the supposedly antagonistic terms within each.170

The authority of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist and co-extending vitalist theses (will to power), even in the absence of a “dynamometer” or some other method of quantitatively demonstrating it, is supported by philosophical critique, directly observed evidence, long
reflection on the psychological motivations of human behavior from myriad firsthand experience, and historical/genealogical evidence.\textsuperscript{171}

Nietzsche himself realized that the factual bases of his theory, like all such ‘truth’ claims, was contingently perspectival and remained open to dispute.\textsuperscript{172} Nevertheless, he thought it provided superior insights into the presuppositions of conventional notions of truth and what has counted for knowledge and so remains an excellent framework for critical analyses as well as discerning the operation of metaphysical fictions.\textsuperscript{173} By contrast to conventional philosophies of analytical science, Babich asserts that “[a] properly Nietzschean…perspectivalism…offers knowledge an infinite domain, but…offers knowledge seekers no such infinite and no sure method and no truth.”\textsuperscript{174} For obvious reasons this will frustrate dogmatists of truth. However, Nietzsche’s insights have been echoed by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Paul Feyerabend, whose aim was theorizing how knowledge is best attained against the privileging of reason and conventional methodology.\textsuperscript{175}

Babich contrasts Nietzschean perspectivalism with the casual relativism with which it is often, and incorrectly, conflated by those unwilling to admit its implications or possibly unable to comprehend them. Such a conception of relativism is actually equivalent in its absolutism to analytical science, which is likely why it resonates with conventional thinkers.

She observes that:

\textbf{[T]he sophisticated fallibilism exemplified by today’s scientists and endorsed by the public conception of “objectivity,”} features the same turn to absolutism that characterizes relativism. Hence, through ever-more-accurate approximations, science and its philosophy claim absolute knowledge or truth via an indirection, a feint concealing the aim that fosters the project at hand. If the method of science
does not “yet” yield truth, the point of this disingenuous “yet” affirms that science is on its way to no other goal. 176

Babich’s recognition of the link between how scientists conceive of what it is they do and what they ought (rightly) to aim to achieve, and public (mis-)conceptions of same, points to the deeper operation of ultra-liberal-modernity’s metanarratives via its primary discourses of rationalism, universalism, secularism, progressivism and humanism. The post-Enlightenment faith in truth (and positivistic or “scientistic” confidence in the ability of science to discover, represent and convey it via knowledge, predicated as it is on the aforementioned discourses), comprises a central tenet in the ideological scheme of the globalization complex and the EU as one of its dominant and integrative organs.

Nietzsche’s indictment of the decadence of late-19th century European life was fraught with self-implicating. However, this did not pass unnoticed, nor go unremarked upon, by him. As Conway notes, Nietzsche’s identification of the great nascent potential and distinctive brand of turmoil characteristic of his age is itself a symptom of his own besetting decadence, a “fact” he recognized. 177 Nevertheless his struggle to overcome it provides a positive example for transforming political life. The values he endorses are ultimate affirmations of life and supply desirable objectives for humankind’s exemplars. Although likely disturbing to ultra-liberal-modern sensibilities, his perfectionist aims body forth a radical, authentically optimistic vision of human becoming against the prevalence of passive nihilism. Nietzsche envisaged a fundamental transformation of society and its political institutions through the utilization of our revitalized powers and energies.
Disputes over his theory’s “objective” validity occur in the context of scientism’s authority to define the terms of debate, so it is unlikely to get a fair hearing among those convinced that their methods, etc., are superior to any alternative. Its practical applicability will continue to be doubted too, as long as science is dominated by a “plebeian empiricism” and linear, analytical method, and so long as the majority clings to metaphysical fictions of objective “Truth” that seek to disclose reality as such; an absolutist notion corresponding with the anti-natural, tyrannizing ethos of the secularized slave morality of taming that righteously demands the “Truth”. Nietzsche was concerned with illuminating the irreversible decadence characteristic of European life in his era, the age of late-modernity, and the nihilistic forces which he predicted would intensify until they culminated in a worldwide calamity in the coming centuries.\textsuperscript{178} He believed his particular nuanced variety of vitalism was capable of illuminating these phenomena and providing as objective a basis as could be conceived for a fundamental revaluation of values. According to his vitalism—and corresponding politics—the virtues of an era indicate its ascending or declining life and the condition of its health:

> In its measure of strength every age also possesses a measure for what virtues are permitted and forbidden to it. Either it has the virtues of ascending life: then it will resist from the profoundest depths the virtues of declining life. Or the age itself represents declining life: then it also requires the virtues of decline, then it hates everything that justifies itself solely out of abundance, out of the overflowing riches of strength.\textsuperscript{179}

By these criteria he determines the health of modernity, a brief overview of his critique of which is necessary to establish primary points of his conception of the political and its applicability to EU expansion in the context of globalization.

Again, the core of this philosophical framework can be found in his genealogical critique of morality, which developed in part from a psychological theory of the
unconscious instincts and drives, their correspondence to human strengths and weaknesses, and role in generating the ressentiment and bad-conscience which largely characterize the socio-political organization of contemporary Western civilization. Genealogy reveals the “essence” of the values constituting a system of morality, and their evolutionary cycle: in what contexts and from what conditions they are created, how efficaciously they serve the ends of culture, why they get overthrown and what they indicate about the relative health of the society that spawned them. If we accept his total rejection of the possibility of “universal values” and “transcendent truths,” ancient idols whose hollowness he demonstrates by striking with the hammer of life-affirming skeptical criticism, the salience of his genealogical methodology to any serious inquiry into values becomes clear. A comprehension of how and for what reasons certain values evolved, including the interests they serve, is less crucial to aducing their objective “truth” per se, than for determine their significance for life.

Nietzsche’s desired revaluation of values (which would reinstate healthy virtues of the sort usurped in the West by decadent Judaeo-Christian morality and Platonic metaphysics) and explication of the slave-moral inversion of good and bad, from which European anti-naturalism arose, corresponds with the genealogy of morality that produced the famous distinction of master and slave moralities that later evolved into a healthy / decadent dichotomy. Nietzsche advocated reversing the Christian order to restore the natural hierarchy between individuals and the hierarchy of moralities it had eliminated. He grasped the opposition this objective would encounter due to the entrenched decadence of slave morality in modern Western society and recognized the violences achieving it would require.
In ‘On the thousand and one goals’, Zarathustra asserts the link between
esteeming the world, an indispensable human action that imbues existence with meaning,
and the simultaneous creation of values. Furthermore he elaborates on the violence
invariably entailed by changes of values:

Only man placed values in things to preserve himself – he alone created meaning
for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself ‘man,’ which means: the
esteemer. To esteem is to create: hear this you creators! …Through esteeming
alone is there value. Change of values – that is a change of creators. Whoever
must be a creator always annihilates.\textsuperscript{180}

Zarathustra would overturn the prevailing moral order to emancipate individuals from
their subjugation to the morality of the weak, confer upon the ego its rightful good
conscience and put it to productive use:

The delight in the herd is more ancient than the delight in the ego; and as long as
the good conscience is identified with the herd, only the bad-conscience says: I.\textsuperscript{181}

Such facultative individuals would “go under” to create virtues in which “the fire of love
and the fire of wrath” would glow, thereby setting a goal for humanity to provide it
purpose. From Nietzsche’s meta-ethical theory of morality his critique of modernity
emerges. According to Nietzsche the last spiritually edifying, culturally generative epoch
in Europe was the Renaissance, exemplified by the proliferation of arts he takes as
symptomatic of the invigorated human spirit characteristic of the period. Nietzsche
contrasts this with the reactive, anti-natural forces that produced the Reformation and
conditioned European culture for the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{182}

Nietzsche identified modernity as an epoch characterized by increasing decadence
and decline; hence everyone born into the era was, to varying degrees, certain to exhibit
symptoms of these unhealthy defining characteristics. No one could completely escape
modernity’s degenerative effects, and Nietzsche recognized his own contamination by
Nietzsche famously explicated slave morality’s role in naturalizing ressentiment as the “spirit of revenge”, and the bad-conscience operationalized through guilt, its cultivation of herd instincts, subjugation of humanity and means of taming or forcibly excluding the strongest individuals in society from governing institutions. On the development of herd instincts in men and the simultaneous growth and role within communities of an essential morality for the maintenance of order and continued prosperity, Nietzsche observed:

By morality the individual is taught to become a function of the herd, and to ascribe to himself value only as a function. As the conditions for the maintenance of one community have been very different from those of another community, there have been very different moralities; and in respect to the future essential transformations of herds and communities, states and societies, one can prophesy that there will still be very divergent moralities. Morality is the herd-instinct in the individual.

This herd instinct is not necessarily slavish in its character. It does tend to lend itself to the emergence of such a morality when the mediocre majority adopts anti-natural ascetic ideals and corresponding world-defaming values and seeks to universalize them.

When the majority succeeds in imposing its dissipative values on its betters – healthy creators – slave morality comes to prevail. Every morality describes a set of (disciplinary) values particular to a people (and integral with its culture) and delimits social relations among its members accordingly:

Wherever we meet with a morality we find a valuation and order of rank of the human impulses and activities. These valuations and orders of rank are always the expression of the needs of a community or herd: that which is in the first place to its advantage – and in the second place and third place – is also the authoritative standard for the worth of every individual.

Among the factors determining the health of any system of morality is who, the strong or the weak, its valuations and orders of rank serve by design to enhance.
Autochthonous moralities, the *ethos* and *nomos* native to a social organism, (as opposed to those imposed from outside) symptomatize a mode of life felicitous to the greatest becoming of each within a natural rank order of types (*Rangordnung*). These moralities develop out of the instinctual arrangement of impulses and drives at the macro-level of the community. By instantiating a rank order of values a morality gives expression to the shared native volition that, so affirmed, unites individuals in community. It also ensures that future members of the community feel an inborn duty to preserve the morality that serves to justify it, the basis of their identity and belonging.

From this vitalist perspective the adherence of a community’s members to its/their traditional or prevailing moral strictures serves to indicate the health of the society, apart from socio-cultural practices sustained by the values it enforces. At the micropolitical or individual level, an autochthonous morality determines the worth of a person according to how effectively she can conform to its behavioral strictures and carry out its regulations (here Nietzsche anticipates what Foucault would label disciplinary regimes). “[D]epending on the agents in question, all ascetic techniques are potentially both coercive and empowering.”¹¹⁷ In a naturally ordered polis an agent’s performative enactment of his community’s morality code determines his success within it and, to a certain extent, the likelihood of his attaining his own moral perfection. Collectively, a culturally cohesive populace strives for political perfection through performative enforcements of its dominant morality. The sociogenic perpetuation of a community’s instinctual organization naturalizes certain social drives and impulses that come to be privileged and understood as typifying it, or constituting its self-identity. These are
frequently expressed via exclusionary ascetic ideals that valorize the community’s political preferences.\textsuperscript{188}

These conclusions were enunciated throughout Nietzsche’s condemnation of post-Enlightenment, liberal modern values that emphasized equality and rights. He took the disposition underlying such values for the secular rationalization of a creeping slave morality (anti-natural ascetic herd values) designed to ingratiate the ressentiment of the many, and beyond this to recognize the futility of the “redemptive measures designed to cure the ills of modernity” he had previously prescribed. Conway states that in his post-Zarathustran writings Nietzsche,

“…acknowledges that the institutions of modern Europe are simply too corrupt to serve in the macropolitical capacity he had mistakenly reserved for them [in his earlier works] …that, independent of the macropolitical resources at his disposal, he is in no position to orchestrate the redemption of modernity.”\textsuperscript{189}

Europe’s contemporary institution are no less corrupt, but may nevertheless be subverted by the macropolitical capacities conferred by abstract potentials of globality.

Nietzsche did not distinguish between varieties of liberalism, which strikes some contemporary political scientists as problematically unnuanced. However, it should be understood that he generalized about liberalism not to elide the existence of differences between various factions of liberals in his own era (the range and diversity of which has only increased in the century following his death), but to speak of those broad traits he identified as characteristic of all varieties of liberalism and its unifying ethos. Nietzsche believed modernity’s dissipative affects would compel the most decadent and socialistic consequences of the liberal ideology and diminish the life of future Europeans thereby.
Nietzsche anticipated the further degeneration of socio-political life in the West, which he believed would have to completely exhaust itself before a new regenerative order might be founded. As Albrow summarizes, “He recognized the crisis of the modern and foretold what has become the postmodern.” Nietzsche’s prognosis for Europe, based on his diagnosis of the destructive course the nihilism of his age had set mankind upon, bode an ominous portent for the continent, and by extension the world, in the centuries to come. Yet it also hinted at the ongoing struggle that could evolve more of the robust ‘good Europeans’ he envisaged, even if in the meantime, their efforts at self-overcoming remained confined to the micropolitical, or individual level. As Conway notes:

In a strong age overflowing with vital energy, externalized in the institutions and festivals of a healthy people, lawgivers would have neither the need nor the inclination to restrict their legislations to the political microsphere. But in a decadent age unable to sustain the vitality of a people’s signature institutions, lawgivers have no choice but to legislate from within the political microsphere.

In the case of the EU, which might aptly be characterized in Weberian terms as a remodeled “iron cage of bureaucracy”, it is certainly not the case that the sort of nomothetic lawgivers Nietzsche envisages legislate. In our hyper-decadent age the EU—a kakistocratic ochlocracy—is governed by sickly idealists out of a spirit of revenge to preserve ascetic-consumerist values.

Struggling to legislate to the greatest extent possible the inner, instinctual ordering of their impulses and drives through regimens of self-overcoming (willfully self-prescribed askesis), their experiments, kynical challenges and prankish acts may serve to augment the overcoming of the decadence of their age even as they only strive to perfect themselves. “In some extraordinary cases ascetic disciplines will have a fortifying,
fructifying effect on agents, inadvertently endowing them with unanticipated freedoms and affording them greater political latitude.” These strong exceptions abide by the instinctual ordering of the drives and impulses comprising their native volitions (and expand the pathos of distance within themselves and between themselves and others) to preserve and enliven what is noble in themselves and their community as well as their progeny (literal or otherwise).

**Part Two: The intensification and universalization of European decadence during the 20th century**

According to Nietzsche, the intensifying decadence of European life in the late 19th century was symptomatic of the diminishing significance of the essential shared meanings (traditions) necessary to sustain vital communities. This was confirmed by the erosion of established authority, the rise of socialism, anarchism and a nihilistic relativism that actively rejected all customary meaning. Nietzsche perceived an ominous portent in developments, asserting that they augured trouble for Europe’s immediate future. He presciently foresaw that the dissipation of shared beliefs and unifying meanings would, in “the next century, bring the struggle for the domination of the earth” between the most dangerous factions. This would produce “the compulsion to great politics” in the best individuals as well, namely those strong enough to resist the spreading infirmity of the age. It was in this latter, hopeful possibility that his optimism was sustained.

In the late-modern era a reactive will to preserve outmoded teachings on the meaning and purpose of existence qua tradition arose in different strains of nationalism
and socialism, which vied with (equally reactive) “free-market” capitalism for hegemony over the European continent and the world. Proponents of differing forms of ultra-liberal-modernist ideology vied to eliminate their liberal-modernist “opponents”, and continue to do so. Through a war on particularizing notions of difference and their reification via identity waged in the latter half of the twentieth century by commercial means, the liberal-modernist project has succeeded in unifying Europe. The materialist ethos of consumer culture now permits corporations to co-opt and re-present or spectacularize identities of every sort for mass-consumption; the danger of reified identity has been eliminated through its systematic banalization.

It has done so through a process of ongoing standardization and mediocritization of much of what was/is distinctive and differentiating between groups, and by transforming perceptions and desires in ways that eliminate some of the need for reliance upon traditional cultural identifiers and weaken the appeal of their corresponding prejudices. Yet liberal-modernity has banalized precisely those qualities (communal meanings and worldviews) which by their nature formerly provoked regenerative competition on the European continent. The price of integration and peace attained by adherence to liberal-modern precepts has been the diminution of certain forms of life; the attainment of Europe’s new security comes at the cost of difference.

Yet, as this “disease of will” hastens Europe’s cultural degeneration, a newly invigorated and unified will to defy enforced massification and homogenization of difference has developed in spite of and in distinction to it. The simultaneous improvement of the type man through the creative acts of courageous exceptions is being effectuated by those ‘good Europeans’ of our age. However, the reactive momentum of
globalization (understood as a plane of consistency that inhibits lines of flight), is symptomatic of a negative will to impose a universal normative order.

The aim of this order is first the containment and then the management of becoming-other through the worldwide extension of ultra-liberal-modernity’s metadiscourse of economic optimism and the univocality of reason, the leveling action of which functions to co-opt and interpolate difference, leaving only semblances of former (autochthonous) meanings in their wake. Globalization disseminates new technologies (improved scientific and medical discoveries, ever quickening methods communication and efficient ways of conducting business) and transforms expectations, but it ramifies the hyper-decadence of the West European cultural realm’s decline and pathogenically universalizes its values as it does so, culminating in a nihilistic form of ‘Empire’.

The reasons for the apparent “success” of the ideological discourses of ultra-liberal-modernity are complex. Quantifiable improvements in the material conditions of life in most parts of the world cannot be discounted, for they provide powerfully persuasive evidence in favor of practices which developed out of the disposition and ideas of modernity. Yet the dominance of the discourses and the value-constellation or world-view they sustain contributes to their validation. Taken in summa, the meta-discourse succeeds by propagating anti-natural ideals that confer an enlightened false consciousness that deludes its uncritical adherents so thoroughly that they are rendered incapable of identifying their best interests.\textsuperscript{198}

In actuality both its positive and negative effects undercut the efficacy of autochthonous cultural practices and compel the renegotiation of identic categories, the purpose and proper function of community and, by extension, the basis of belonging and
security. This risks fomenting moral panic as old ontologically reified differences reemerge in intensified and vicious new forms, in response to perceived challenges to moral normativity.\(^{199}\) The repetition of such reaction and the conflicts they cause, and the ongoing generation of the conditions prevenient to them suggests that the horrible wars of the twentieth century may have been a minor prelude to the depressingly all-too-human paroxysms the nihilism of ultra-liberal-modernity may yet spawn.\(^{200}\)

The post-War statist logic and international order enabling the process of European integration has occurred largely through the work of contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, frequently evangelizing devotees of the metaphysical faith in progress determined to convert humankind (forcibly if necessary) into free agents of ultra-liberal-modern values—the secular age’s salvific canon and algodicy.\(^{201}\) It has culminated in the EU as well as Europe’s other chief supranational institutions (the OSCE and COE), and a whole host of international institutions including the UN, WTO, World Bank, etc., the dominance of which means, of course, that Nietzsche’s idea of Europe is in no way attained. The radical extremes of that logic counter-intuitively does suggest however, that opportunities for the over-coming of the state form are being generated—if unwittingly—by the aforementioned arbiters of integration (a potential that is examined below).\(^{202}\)

In contrast to the motives for integration espoused by conventional Europeanists, and with regard to the crisis of meaning that has arisen lately in the EU itself, Elbe asserts that Nietzsche’s:

…vision of what it means to be a “good European” is intellectually more persuasive in a secular context because it allows for an experimental questioning of the will-to-truth; that is supremely affirmative of an understanding of existence
that does not try to vest all of its creative efforts in ascetic ideals; that demonstrates immense spiritual vitality and courage in understanding this experiment; and that is also more optimistic than the pessimistic reaction found in much of the literature on the crisis of the European idea.203

Such an experimental questioning (via Nietzsche’s own vitalist politics) of the motivating will-to-truth behind both defunct and current ideas of Europe—as expressed in their differing visions of the continent’s future—serves as a basis for conceiving and implementing a supremely affirmative idea of Europe. Of particular interest here is that will-to-truth exemplified in the prerogatives and modus operandi of the EU, against which Nietzsche’s idea of Europe emphasizes the multiplicity of types, wealth of difference and correspondingly tremendous diversity of possible becomings Europe and its broader cultural realm contains, all of which his ‘good Europeans’ seek to radically enhance.

The EU, despite being the product of a primarily molar state-form, provides mechanisms through the ultra-liberal-modernist norms and ideals it naturalizes that ‘good Europeans’ of the Nietzschean variety can utilize to achieve their objectives. These objectives include instantiating an “order” conducive to the continuous enhancement and utmost thriving of humankind’s highest exemplars through a comprehensive revaluation of the now ubiquitous ascetic-consumerist values that construct and delimit possibilities for desiring in contemporary life. Corresponding with the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness made possible by globality (a stance enabled by but not identical to the prevailing ethos of globalization), it is probable that an increasing number of exceptional individuals—European or otherwise—are becoming amenable to and
capable of undertaking such a radical revaluing of the values characteristic of ultra-
liberal-modern globalization.

However, these are largely latent potentials; positive becoming continually
struggling to overcome the inhibiting forces of our media dominated era of mass-
consumerism, which squanders much potential through myriad diversions and
entertainments while making a veritable religion of labor/work through the fetishization
of productivity.\textsuperscript{204} Like Marx, whose work he did not know, Nietzsche foresaw this
emerging as a dominant feature of Europe’s deteriorating culture. In the latter half of the
19\textsuperscript{th} century, Nietzsche condemned Europe’s burgeoning commercial and Bourgeois
culture for its deleterious consequences \textit{vis-à-vis} authentic becoming. He observes that
the “fundamental idea of a commercial culture” concerned a negative type of appraisal,
the act of evaluating the worth of a thing, be it material goods, a work of art or ideas
themselves, according to a coarse supply and demand calculus that distorts all values and
reduces all esteeming to pecuniary considerations.\textsuperscript{205}

This type of assessment, based upon the mass appeal of an object, panders to the
lowest common denominator and achieves hegemony as a commercial society usurps the
proper role of culture. It is also dependent – as Marx famously expounded – upon a new
form of wage-labor; a degrading form of servitude that alienates its subjects from
themselves and the product of their toil (robbing them of passion for those activities in
which they engage), as it evacuates all “spirit” from the dehumanized culture it
perpetuates. Unlike Marx however, Nietzsche saw this development in terms of “ascetic
psychology”, one that explained both the Bourgeoisification of industrializing Europe
and its democratic ethos, as well as the “revolutionary” reaction against its abusive
excesses, which (re)asserted the slave moral anti-naturalism exemplified by the leveling
tendency of his day. Nietzsche fully expected its effects to be intensified and
thoroughly naturalized in the 20th century; a form of character perversion “imprinted in
every will and every faculty: it is this of which …men of the coming century will be
proud if the profits of the commercial class are right to give it into your possession!”

This reactive or molar becoming-same has resulted in a highly sublimated form of
(self-)glorified slavery, as young men who might otherwise cultivate their nobler
character and innate talents are instead employed in a matrix of machinic economic
relations: “purloined from themselves, trained to being worn out daily and taught to
regard this as a matter of duty.” These “poor beasts of burden”—the vast majority—are,
in a commercial culture, methodically habituated to perceiving labor for others as an
intrinsic good in their own self-interest. “[T]hey cannot do without it and would not have
it otherwise.”

It was Nietzsche’s view that as these work-slaves exhausted themselves with
earning a living and diverting themselves from their predicament through frivolous
entertainments, the surplus of their toil is likely to free certain anomalous or untimely
individuals to dedicate themselves to nobler aesthetic creation. In our hyper-decadent
age it is also probable that workers will transfigure their work into a means for self-
realization, and just as probable that those freed from the burden of working will
succumb to the temptations of passive nihilism propagated by our popular culture.

However, in becoming ‘good Europeans’ a few lucky strikes may come to
recognize and diagnose the affliction of ultra-liberal-modernity and the infirmity it
spreads: democratization and its concomitant leveling tendency has cultivated an
obedient “type prepared for slavery in the most subtle sense.” Their “cure” requires the therapeutic exploitation of the vast potential of this circumstance. Turning the disease of liberal values against itself, ‘good Europeans’ subvert the debilitating hegemonic order from within and gradually establish a natural political arrangement predicated on a rank order of perspectives. The hierarchic order they strive after would allow the existing “wealth of types” to prosper and even sanction its expansion so to maximally facilitate becoming. Such a natural order would abet the enlargement of greatness and enhance the dignity and capabilities of every sort of person, allowing the fullest expression of Dasein.

Toward attaining the fullest realization of this, ‘good Europeans’ intuitively recognize the paradoxical value of reactivity and the intensified decadence of our age: technological innovation has diversified the variety of forms creative impulses may take. Properly directed, the fruits of the negative will are not (and cannot correctly be understood as) limited to the passive resignation or frenzied consumption of the all-contented and blinking last man, for the state of affairs that sustains the herd’s obtunded condition may counter-intuitively inspire the odd great work of visual art, drama, literature or music.

Rather, a multitude of possible contributions, the like of which Nietzsche could not have anticipated have (in the form of broadly delivered basic education, astonishing feats of engineering and advanced communication; certain applications of technology to food production—the so-called “green revolution”; radical innovations in medicine and health care, etc.) provided a sense of ersatz “spiritualization,” that is, a palliative sense of meaning that is not altogether valueless. It is sufficient for the herd, whose members are
incapable of the sort of freedom expressed in the strength symptomatic of the extraordinary conation\textsuperscript{215}, or \textit{ananke}\textsuperscript{216}, characteristic of the will to power enacted by best types.

The majority’s indifference—or at least, ignorance—of those higher types’ struggle for self-perfection is useful for insulating the latter, who are hardly imputrescible, from the debasing influence of the bourgeois vulgarians who define “good taste”, determine “propriety” and dominate “culture” in a declining age such as our own. The apathy of the mediocre majority vis-à-vis their own genuine becoming leads to the state of fallenness and their eventual \textit{ruinance}, (Heidegger’s notion for of a in which they no longer have time to care about their own lives). Although this condition inspires the freest spirits with dread, the weak settle into a passive acceptance of it and find a perverse form of contentment thereby. Their dread spurs them into oppositional stance toward this condition of hyper-decadence and the arbiters of such extremely nihilistic values that come to be taken by the all-too-many as commonplace.

Nietzsche saw the historic role of ascetic priests of ressentiment (initiated by the Jewish revolt in and denaturalizing inversion of values) as that of promoting anti-natural notions of equality and ideals of a fictive social-justice to inhibit and/or corrupt would-be exceptions. Ascetic priests are the great despisers of life who foster values of self-denial and proclaim the inferiority of this world in part as a means of dissipating human spirit and the potential magnitude of extraordinary, pluripotent individuals who would likely undermine their authority if permitted to excel. Through ideological legerdemain they sought, as Nietzsche puts it, to “level mountain and valley”. By weakening the strong
they could protect themselves and perpetuate their power _over_ others, particularly their betters.

The newspaper culture and corresponding emergence of public education epitomized their methods of indoctrination and systematic weakening in his era; in our own the beliefs subtending that nascent economic optimism have morphed into an anti-intellectual _volksgeist_ characterized by uncritical faith in consumer driven populism inextricably bound up in an entrepreneurial form of market democracy. Supposedly fostering creativity opportunities and “synergizing” potentialities (according to the messianic proponents in the “New Economy’s” self-described “creative class”), it is actually nihilistic and intrinsically _philistinice_ (opposed to the aesthetic in all its “elitist” forms) “culture of abjection”.217 The enfranchised herds of the Western world slavishly embrace and defend their democratically legitimated subjugation, rightly convinced that fulfillment of their coarse aspirations— _to consume in safety_—lies in the preservation and extension of social structures that condition their desires in Pavlovian fashion, according to the quasi-religious doctrine of unregulated free-market capitalism.218

I argue below that this long-conditioned hostility of the many to the awesome potential of great exceptions could be exploited for life-affirming ends. By continuing to ensure the herd’s relative comfort—and facilitating its terminally nihilistic tendencies thereby—authentic creators might re-naturalize dissipative values and instantiating an authentic socio-cultural agon. Such means of mass-manipulation are already well understood by contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment who encourage the crowd’s opposition to the idea of individual greatness which undermines their belief in the intrinsic equality of all. They employ conventional matrices of prosperity that focus
on ‘standard of living’ to estimate the ability of individuals and societies to consume. These include per capita income, rates of home ownership, inflation, etc., all of which are re-presented to the all-too-many as “objective” indicators of the conditions of life and—it is hoped—evidence of its “improvement”, more generally.

This corresponds with the economic optimism of ultra-liberal-modern discourses and their mutually reinforcing narratives of “empowerment”, which transmit jejune ideals of prosperity and solipsistic notions of happiness. It also affirms Sloterdijk’s thesis about the prevalence of a cynical, albeit enlightened false consciousness in the de-industrializing advanced economies of the West and other loci of globalization. By extension it also corresponds – in the opposite direction – with (residually Christian) moralistic efforts to deflect attention away from this-worldly efforts at self-affirmation that conflict with the values of humility and the rejection of the corporeal. The desire for meaning and purpose is conducted in this direction by way of a secular extension of the notion that the growth of material prosperity or amelioration of poverty, relatively considered, indicates God’s grace. This reaffirms the logic of the ultra-liberal-modern ideology among the religiously devout and secular materialists, alike. Where the moral authority of churches or secular, Christian–Platonic institutions (the division between which is increasingly blurred in Western societies) no longer succeeds in focusing the pity of the rich on philanthropically attending the needs of the “destitute”, secular reason persuades by way of the aforementioned economic optimism—with a recent emphasis on assisting those inhabiting exotic locales.219

In accordance with the univocality of reason assumed by the arbiters of globalization, the value systems of these underdeveloped societies are systematically
discredited and subverted so that their members may come to perceive themselves as disadvantaged. Their “deprivation” is attributed to various structural causes corresponding with the mantra of promoting and perfecting “free-market” democracy (the solution), so that blame for their poverty can be ascribed and effort more coherently made to ameliorate their plight and correct the systemic deficiency. On the macro-economic level billions of dollars in aid is granted to the governments of poor countries, which over decades produced even greater pretexts for pity among the citizens of rich, developed nations, as a new class of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) arose in which misery and suffering seemed more pronounced and urgent than ever.²²⁰

Nietzsche’s meta-politics is concerned precisely with producing conditions of possibility for versatile, “freer” spirits, rather than the elimination of suffering, per se. Those with the strength to encourage, intensify and exploit the perverse conditions of contemporary life to their own ends (a project of self-overcoming in the pursuit of excellence) attain a more profound understanding and acceptance of suffering, one informed by an awareness of the benefits of existential pain and the introspection and higher-knowledge it prompts. The active generation of a vital culture seeks to elevate and enhance humankind.²²¹ In the miasmic state of hyper-decadence our age of globalization fosters, the strongest must be aroused to extricate themselves to the extent they can, for in doing so they will likely invigorate the culture and hasten the future overcoming of the species man²²². Among the witnesses to their going-down in passionate self-expenditure through creative acts or kynical squandering, other would-be free spirits are lured back from the abysmal meaninglessness and cynical resignation to which the majority readily
succumb. They are inspired to reject the dismal temptations of the world-weary and their longing for contentment.\textsuperscript{223}

In critiquing liberal-modernity’s preferred political form, Nietzsche maintained that “democracy has ever been the form of decline in organizing power,” and characterized “modern democracy, along with its hybrids such as the “German Reich” as the form of decline of the state.”\textsuperscript{224} Yet he also recognized that the “solitary personality”:

…can maintain and develop itself most easily in a democratic society: namely, when the coarser means of defense are no longer necessary and habits of order, honesty, justice and trust are part of the usual conditions.\textsuperscript{225}

This fascinating note betrays Nietzsche’s awareness of the practical and strategic use that the highest affirmers of life could make of conventional morality and ochlocratic forms of political organization—such as democracy—that it spawned.

In precisely this context I assert that the nomothetic acts of ‘good Europeans’, by legislating the emerging, deterritorializing global age, will assist the perfection of the EU in ways likely to transform it beyond recognition. In so doing they will overcome its present reactive form so that their heirs may eventually dispense with the exhausted and repressive state form entirely, as well as the inhibition of human potential it comprises. This is to speak of what is required for the conception of a new epoch in humankind’s evolution—to imagine the parturition of a new age, that of globality—and how it may be made to gestate within a few.

David Owen has constructively expanded on the appearance of such individuals. He understands Nietzsche to be advocating the instantiation of an authentic rank order of values (\textit{Rangordnung}) corresponding with the natural hierarchy of perspectives and types to cultivate exemplars (e.g.: ‘good Europeans’) whose striving and self-overcoming will
hasten the ultimate transfiguration of the type man. This objective would require (and so his aforementioned advocacy entailed) the intensification of every dimension of all-too-human existence, and does not suggest a leaping over man but his metamorphosis. Nietzsche hoped to contribute to this in so far as he could accelerate the elimination of conceptual–physiological constraints on becoming introduced by the false Christian-Platonic binaries that differentiated a “true”, noumenal world from the “apparent”, (and therefore “inferior”) phenomenal world. In so doing ‘good Europeans’ like himself would reestablish the primacy of a tragic view of the natural self over the disabling moral view of the self as metaphysical subject.

The tragic idea of the self corresponds with the prevailing Greek notion prior to the Socratic reification of reason (logos) and its privileging over passion (eros). In this natural, “tragic” view, agents are inseparable from their actions, which are articulated through fate, the acceptance of which expresses a good conscience. The moral idea of the self coextends with the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power that privileges objective “truth” in order to postulate corresponding notions of guilt and accountability. By falsely separating an agent from his act it provides a basis for assignations of blame: the identification of responsible parties, designations of fault and the imposition of punishments; practices symptomatic of a prevailing bad-conscience at the macro-political level.226 With regard to the means by which Nietzsche conceived possibilities of emancipation from life-calumniating values, Ansell–Pearson cites ‘Of old and new law-tables” from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, writing that the passage:

…makes clear that liberation consists in freeing ourselves from the metaphysics of morality and the morality of metaphysics; compulsion, dogma or statute, and the metaphysical categories (necessity and purpose, good and evil, etc.). In short,
the innocence of becoming, of time as such, is to be restored, and where time qua transience is conceived as the moment that both gathers and splits up the past and future.227

In culturally specific ways such an innocence of becoming occurs at the macro-political level when the naturally existing range of human types is reflected in a corresponding pathos of distance. Only when released from modernity’s illusory notions of metaphysical freedom through active forgetting will the born commanders be able to revel in the innocence of their becoming without undo restraint.

Smith asserts that, “philosophers of the future”, for their lack of the necessary native volition, are likely to remain “locked in a Spirit of Revenge”, never to experience the freedom of the free spirits Nietzsche anticipates. However, they “can, properly trained, be the Free-Spirit’s ‘well trained hounds’ and ‘servants’,” who will be “implicated as priests in [the] new religiosity” that affirms Dasein through a conscious engagement with the abysmal ground of our Being-unto-death, experienced as ecstatic Dionysian insight into No-thingness that stimulates renewed (Apollonian) orderings and creation.228 Though the philosophers of the future might recognize the contingency of all values and truths, they are compelled to create values and enforce them dogmatically by the requirement of impressing forms upon and providing stable meanings to those who cannot survive without them (the vast majority).

The project for philosophical laborers on the noble model of Kant and Hegel is to establish some large class of given values… and press it into formulas, whether in the realm of logic or politics (morality) or art. It is up to these researchers to make everything that has happened or been valued so far look clear, obvious, comprehensible, and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time” itself, and to overwhelm the entire past.229

By contrast, Nietzschean philosophers would legislate from the stance of Weltironie.
The all-too-many must eventually be made to forget the counter-productive chimera of metaphysical freedom through new values whose grounds seem naturally indisputable. This is necessary in order to cultivate mankind through education and breeding for the support the leisure required by “genuine, revenge-free ‘free Spirits’” who alone are capable of authentic philosophic individuality and by extension, such liberation.\(^{230}\) Such an “aristocratic ethos” is inclusive insofar as it promotes the attainment of a diverse and natural rank ordering of types that serves as a moral backdrop for all. It constitutes a moral code that has nothing to do with the (modern) drive to transform morality into a science, which it will have overcome.\(^ {231}\)

This recognition of varying degrees of (un)freedom corresponding to the quanta of force one may expend as will to power and the grouping of types for social expediency pertaining thereto has interesting implications vis-à-vis the perceived need for a re-authenticated ‘idea of Europe,’ to serve as a ground for the project of European unification in our ultra-liberal-modern, hyper-decadent age of sublimated nihilism. Elbe usefully observes that since the death of god imbuing Europe with a meaningful idea of itself—the task of philosophers of the future—would prove difficult.

In Nietzsche’s account the demand for a more meaningful idea of Europe would persist not only because of the pragmatic necessities of European policy-makers, but also because Europeans have traditionally been accustomed to having the balm of metaphysics and ‘true’ worlds to fall back upon in their quest to find the deeper meaning of existence.\(^ {232}\)

Elbe concludes that this would invariably be experienced “as a profound loss of spiritual vitality”, and would likely give rise to nostalgia for defunct notions of Europe and reactive ideals of what constitutes “European-ness”.\(^ {233}\)
Indeed, such reaction presently plagues efforts to define what characteristics warrant full, formal inclusion—via various sorts of codified rights, enfranchisement and citizenship, etc.—in the emerging EU polity, as well as its arbiters’ attempts to construct a new European identity and corresponding ethos. The latter’s ever more uniformly (mimetically) articulated expression of the EU’s will-to-truth across its disparate member states, as well as a simultaneous profusion of dissenting wills emanating from various corners of the continent, are all symptomatic of the anxiety over identity-as-belonging that the project itself has generated. A truly Nietzschean idea of Europe would likely seem in comprehensible to many citizens of the Union. Across the political spectrum, both those who support the project and those advocating their nation’s withdrawal from it, according to the impulse, whatever its manifestation, to systematically (re)define collective identity based upon ideals pertaining to factors such as national origin, cultural heritage, ethnicity or race.²³⁴

The ideals of inclusion and the tolerance of diversity are not necessarily at odds with efforts to protect identity, however. The EU’s social, political and cultural statutes are putatively antithetical to xenophobic and racist chauvinisms, which arise in opposition to attributes deemed enriching to European-ness and life on the continent.²³⁵ While progressive from a liberal stance, the aspiration of forging a unity out of the continent’s diverse panoply of peoples and types also reflects the EU’s origin in an account-giving endeavor that was motivated in part by a spirit of revenge against the burdensome and un-dischargeable debt imposed by Europe’s shared past, particularly the horrors of World War Two. On a deeper level it also indicates an aversion to certain kinds of radical difference, notably religious, conservative and nationalistic viewpoints. It
corresponds with the liberal effort to homogenize the most opposite (conflicting) values within its domain.

EU human rights statutes and civil laws guaranteeing regional autonomy, cultural protections, universal enfranchisement and legal equality comprise the primary and arguably most positive expression of its attempts to preserve authentic diversity whilst forging a new and expanded unity. However, they do not transcend the conventional slave-moral ethos upon which they are predicated but increase the mindless contentment of the last man through psychological weakness. While it is possible to comprehend human rights and economic liberalization in terms of culture-creation, such efforts usually breed reaction, as they constrain maximal freedom and becoming in various and complex ways in order to protect and nurture the weak. In their conventional institutional instantiations they have also tended to fortify identic essentialisms privileged by the EU’s newly instituted order while discrediting and condemning those deemed unfavorable to it.236

This disciplinary mechanism compounds the grief inflicted upon a growing number who share an awareness “that we can no longer believe those dogmas of religion and metaphysics” that formerly provided us with comforting essentialisms and secure grounds for living.237 The spectrum of these reactions (both positive and negative in conventional liberal terms) epitomize the profound sublimation of the Spirit of Revenge corresponding with the deepening crisis of nihilism characteristic of contemporary life both within the Anglo-European cultural realms and outside of them in the age of globalization. The universal dissemination of Europe’s hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern values means that its predicament of nihilism and meaninglessness—the culture
of abjection and conformity typified by a ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’—is being experienced in some form or other nearly everywhere in the world.\(^{238}\)

The slave-moral pessimistic disposition on the human condition, which is typified by a rejection of both Dionysian reverie and the embrace of the tragic in favor of the mitigation of all suffering, is being gradually universalized by the power constellations comprising the globalization complex (which Hardt and Negri have—in an idealistic and sanctimonious reaction—dubbed “Empire”). This should not be surprising however, nor is it entirely lamentable, as “Nietzsche predicted that only large empires would be capable of acting politically in the age of global politics at the culmination of modernity.”\(^{239}\) The global spread of the European form of decadence promotes a brand of pessimism which inhibits recognition of the “supranational, nomadic cosmopolitan type” that is developing out of its decay, which Nietzsche hoped, might realize the possibility of “a united European people capable of the task of global mastery”. However paradoxical or counter-intuitive, the multiple, mutually reinforcing tenets subtending the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and corresponding spectacles of globalization are prolegomenous to the appearance of the creative experimenters required for this task.\(^{240}\)

The “mastery” which Nietzsche fervently advocated referred to the crucial project of self-mastery and the process of radical self-affirmation by which the healthiest become who it is they are, and to their mastery over the world via the nomothetic acts they spontaneously perform that provoke (the \textit{eros} of) others, spurring their emulation in the socio-political realm.\(^{241}\) These are plainly taking form in our world via the realization of abstract potentials of globality which are evident in myriad aspects of contemporary life
in nearly all regions of the world. This ‘global mastery’ involves the recognition and acceptance of diversity and purposeful enrichment of disparate types, each fortified by their respectful acknowledgement of the other. The struggle facing ‘good Europeans’ in the present is to increase that mastery and direct it to life-affirming projects that involve the highest exemplars of every European people so as to cultivate an efflorescent, supra-European culture and fortify its best members. I argue below that the real potential for such developments is being actualized through the vis creativa inherent to emergent, abstract potentials of globality.

Among Nietzsche’s primary objectives was that of inspiring his perceptive readers to “become ‘good Europeans’”.242 His appeal was directed at strong (i.e.: healthy) individuals, whom he hoped might dispense with anti-natural moral conventions and intellectual prejudices to attain this goal. It aimed to provide a palliative to the nihilism that dissipated the volitional resources of the continent’s peoples, especially its representative exemplars, and to facilitate the realization of an idea of Europe that corresponded with the ambition of Nietzsche’s aristocratically radical political philosophy and his recognition “that Europe wants to become one”.243

In advocating ‘good Europeanism’ Nietzsche sought to recuperate elements of a mainly defunct set of ideals and persuade future free spirits to dedicate themselves to creating a new Europe (and world) in which the best and healthiest would legislate with the aim of improving mankind physically, intellectually and “spiritually”. This project of translating man back into nature so as to overcome the nihilism of the present (BGE: 230) would culminate in the transformed–consciousness symptomatic of the sociogenic realization of his idea of Europe. An associated concern was the socio-cultural becoming
of Europeans who would, he hoped “transcend narrow nationalism and accomplish a mingling of many old races and stocks” to forge a “new European culture [in which] the Jews were to be amalgamated into Europe and the Russians were to [serve as] Europe’s great “Other”. This ambition had important temporal and teleological dimensions that illustrate the practical importance of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, power ontology, and perspectivalist epistemology that will be examined in depth below.

**Part Three: The EU and its transfiguration of the nation-state**

A central concern of this project is that of examining the ways in which Europe’s political integration and the EU’s expansion – as globalizing institutions and processes – are simultaneously enabling and impeding the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe, his “political,” vitalist objectives and the capacity of unusually powerful individuals to contribute to an stirring revaluation of all values (*Umwerthung aller Werthe*) that may fundamentally transform human societies by organizing them for the perfection of the species’ strongest members. In the final book of this work I shall also outline a non-dogmatic strategy based on six classical skeptical tenants, through which such persons may hasten our achievement of those objectives; goals for mankind that Nietzsche thought could only be realized following the major wars of nationalism and ideology he correctly predicted for the 20th century.

The EU, as an institutional instantiation of post-Enlightenment, ultra-liberal-modern values coextending with the globalization complex (even if conceived in large part as a response against the economic dimensions of globalization), provides the continent’s herds (its disparate, if increasingly homogenized citizen-constituents) with
simulated existential meaning and ontological purpose, by simulating political legitimacy in the guise of the democratic state form’s egalitarianism and representative authority. In the post-industrial, advanced capitalist societies of the West, the radical extension of the franchise, steadily rising levels of consumption and social security have obdumbed the senses of the masses, while serving as anodynes to relieve the nausea that would otherwise result from the absurdity of contemporary life, despite and also because of the bad faith it propagates.

The EU does so while simultaneously fostering the spectacles of prosperity, which are continually generated by neo-liberal capital process’s circulation of commodified desire to tantalize the masses with illusions of ultimate gratification; enticements offering to sate their nihilistic will to consume. This makes clear how an over-arching simulacrum of an emerging, thoroughly spectacularized global society can produce and sustain a highly reactive simulation of the agonistic social and political order, which in a radically authentic form is necessary for the eventual overcoming of the human type. An ultimately undesirable, albeit presently indispensable “post-modern” veil of Isis that obscures its own ideological basis and ends, it is conditioning the possibility of its own transfiguration by generating myriad opportunities for the incremental transvaluation of the slave-moral anti-natural ideals upon which it is predicated.

Situated in the broader context of the globalization complex, the EU’s institutions and practices are seen to ramify numerous features of the former. Ideologically supervenient to one another, they comprise differing degrees of instantiated institutions, forces and processes within the same ultra-liberal-modern value matrix, an ideological regime usefully understood to be propagating Empire. The is evidenced by the imposition
of international order via the imposed universalization of the nation-state as privileged form of polity. That order, to whatever degree effective in its numerous national and sub-national instantiations, tends to be followed by some measure of liberalization, or systematic democratization, as well as the enforced adoption of the precepts of neoliberal capital process. This compels a corresponding level of conformity with the hegemonic political and socio-economic regulatory mechanisms of the democratic free market ‘New Economy’ consensus, the prerogatives of which the international order serves to universalize.\textsuperscript{248}

The EU, as an extensive organizational aggregate of smaller, diverse power constellations, functions within the even larger globalization complex. It is typified by technological rationality and aims at the methodical, comprehensive massification of everyday life; its overarching imperatives compel fallen-ness and inauthenticity in the social relations of individuals and lives of communities it transforms. It always already entails the superficially significant but ultimately transitory partisan debates that absorb the attention of the majority and deflect them from deeper, invisible currents imperceptibly transforming their existences.

Contemporary social and political life in the West, and to a lesser extent its globalizing penumbra, are understood according to Nietzsche’s vitalist politics as a product of a homogenizing negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power manifested via disparate expressions of reactive force. The anti-natural impulses subtending contemporary ultra-liberal-modern nation-state’s ideologized values are legitimated through a hermeneutic of desire via disciplinary regimes of truth and responsibility that are in turn rationalized by ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. The
preponderating reactive forces of ultra-liberal-modernity are symptomatized in Europe’s present unification, via the EU. It is a project dominated but not exclusively directed by ascetic-consumerist priests according to the secularized slave-moral values and reified rationalism they put into practice. As such Europe’s ongoing integration via the EU (in collaboration with the continent’s other major IGOs, including the OSCE, CoE, WEU and NATO) is fulfilling the largely dissipative ambition of European and international elites who personify the last-man type Nietzsche abhorred. Yet contrary to this dark actuality Nietzsche suggests, in accordance with his vitalist conception of the political and corresponding idea of Europe, that an opposite desire for uniting Europe connects the continent’s representative exemplars across healthy ages – those periods of great cultural production between decadent, declining epochs.

Highly contemptuous of the populist trends of his time for the increased danger they presented to the higher spiritualization of mankind and its exemplars, Nietzsche dedicated a great deal of thought to the consequences of post-Enlightenment democratization and the rise of socialism in the 19th century, coming to some prescient conclusions (published in 1880):

The practical outcome of this spreading democratization will first of all be a European league of nations within which each individual nation, delimited according to geographical fitness, will possess the status and rights of a canton: in this process the historical recollections of the former nations will be of little account, since the sense of reverence for such things will gradually be totally uprooted by the domination of the democratic principle, which thirsts for innovations and is greedy for experiments.

Although he could not fully anticipate the disorientation and corresponding increase in individual adaptability wrought by the political and technological revolutions that occurred in the twentieth century, he clearly identified the ethos that presupposed the
innovations and experiments that produce it. The premonition was largely correct and could plausibly be said to characterize one of the primary objectives of European unification in the present, namely its furtive efforts to eliminate the former reverence of the nation among its member-states, whose identities it would subsume into a synthetic personality based on ultra-liberal-modern principles correlated to post-Enlightenment notions of representative democracy.

In an oft cited section from the first volume of the same book entitled ‘A Glance at the State,’ he endorses just this inevitability, having understood nationalism as an effort to stem what, as a consequence of these complicated changes in European society, brought “a weakening and finally an abolition of nations, at least the European,” and “of a continual crossing a mixed race, that of European man, [which] must come into being out of them.” In the same passage he concludes, “once one has recognized this fact, one should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a ‘good European’ and actively to work for the amalgamation of nations”.251 It is especially notable that Nietzsche – who disdained populist democracy intensely – should choose the democratic amalgamation of European nations over the shrill, vituperative nationalism that arose in reaction to it. Such was his contempt for and anxiety over the ethnocentric, chauvinist nationalism that was gaining momentum in his day.

From “Human, All Too Human,” the text marking the beginning of his middle period, until the end of his productive career, Nietzsche identified “‘good Europeans’” with a “supranational and nomadic type of man which, physiologically speaking possesses as its typical distinction a maximum of the art and power of adaptation.”252
They are proto-types of the philosophers of the future:

…[T]hose rare and rarely contented men who are too comprehensive to find their satisfaction in any kind of patriotism and know how to love the south in the north and the north in the south – the born midlanders, the “‘good Europeans’.“  

Such superlative individuals are compelled by their overflowing desire (desire understood as a complex assemblage of forces) to seek the unfamiliar and develop themselves, combine qualities and perspectives characteristic of Europe’s various regions in order to appreciate in personal and pan-European terms.

This indicates a conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness corresponding with a physiological condition of exceptional strength or vitality; the preconditions necessary for fostering and enhancing individual and social development via acceptance of difference in otherness. Across the continent he perceived, to varying extents and in different guises:

…the process of the assimilation of all Europeans, their growing detachment from the conditions under which races dependent on climate and class originate, their increasing independence of any definite milieu, as a unique “process of becoming European.”

In our own era ‘the assimilation of all Europeans’ into a malleable instrument is being achieved in large part through continual cross-cultural exchange, instantaneous communication, the mega-media representations of desire, the merchandizing of ideas, values and products (massification and homogenization) and legal mechanisms born of treaty agreements that have profoundly transformed economic, political and social norms and practices. The machinic and technological aspects of this assimilation via integration efforts will be considered by means of Ansell-Pearson’s consideration of viroid life and possibilities of a future, transhuman condition.
Such complexifying assimilation, Nietzsche concluded, would of necessity lead to the economic unification of the continent. Nietzsche declared, “Europe wants to become one,” on the basis of forces personified in those rare, far-ranging types he dubbed ‘good Europeans’, those who, as “rich heirs of millennia of European spirit,” were most capable of recognizing the beautiful and infinite in what was foreign and unfamiliar (i.e., by which he means everything, as certain knowledge and “Truth” are unattainable since our limited understanding is always a perspective situated in a particular context). However, their shared objective for the continent’s socio-political integration differed radically from that consistently articulated by arbiters of the liberal-modernist project, in terms of both its premise and its objectives. Their aim is to cultivate a well-ordered and compliant instrument of the people upon which the strongest may freely create edifying works and perfect themselves through agonistic contests.

Despite their many differences with regard to what Europe should become, most of the EU’s supporters (Europhiles) and opponents (Europhobes) agree that its development as giving rise to a super-state. Although it clearly is a physical enlargement, and some would argue an ideational expansion of the classic state form, I argue that it is doing more than this, that while unifying Europe the present EU “super-state” indicates just one (early) phase in the radical overcoming of the state form itself. As regards the nation-state, Nietzsche was always suspicious and frequently contemptuous, mainly seeing the modern state as deforming human development.

The socio-political dimensions of our hyper-decadent era, typified by a ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’, have been produced by the consolidation of the democratic nation-state and the rights of the individual over the course of the last half-
Despite significant modifications of its powers over the past century and its adaptation to more recent demands placed on it by ultra-liberal-modern discourses, the state indisputably remains the dominant organizing force for the political and social life of humankind. Zarathustra’s identification of the simulated veracity of this “new idol” remains prescient, as the state form—which perfection is widely held to be the democratic variety of it—has been geographically, notionally and legally extended to
encompass every polity around the world. Today the democratic state form is reified in numerous ways, from multiple, mutually ramifying legal institutions to reactive expressions of patriotism (such as the daily recitation of the pledge of allegiance in American school rooms) and occasional paroxysms of nationalism (as occurred throughout the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s). In a subtler way, the EU re-invokes identic affiliations based on historical tradition and sentimental nostalgia through its simulations of political enfranchisement and belonging. These increasingly validate the over-arching simulacrum of community it represents.

In the absence of unproblematic identic roles, it has come to act as an identic surrogate, personified, albeit somewhat ambiguously, by a neo-cosmopolitan “European” identity that takes the banalization of difference as a basis for belonging and the aim of its form of citizenship. This contrivance depends on ambiguity in order to sustain what diluted meaning it is able to generate. As a new “super-idol” the EU seeks to supply the “all-too-human” psychological need of its subjects (or “citizen-constituents”) for legitimate authority while gradually supplanting the waning power of its member states (as Europhobes throughout the community have long known):

State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies too; and this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” That is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life. It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them “state”: they hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them.259

The EU’s architects, sophisticated descendents of those who in Nietzsche’s lifetime set the traps called the state, are (involuntarily) enacting their reactive roles, ones necessary for Europe’s future life-affirming development.
These idealistic ideologues are indeliberately producing conditions of possibility for the emergence of a comprehensively transformative, positive will to creative destruction as generative power, thereby. They will thus enable certain of future generations to “look beyond the state”, and hang a new faith and love over their contemporaries, those whose predecessors passively received the EU as a super-state and willingly accepted their incorporation within it as citizen-subject-constituents in our own era.260

Identifying what Nietzsche desired for Europe is simpler than describing how he thought it could be—let alone would be—achieved. “Nietzsche wished to foster the reconstruction of Europe as a cultural entity, led by a new aristocracy, shaped by indigenous artists and poets, which could assume global leadership in the age of great politics that he predicted.”261 Having seemingly created another, enlarged personification of “the people” in the EU, its “long-eared and short-sighted” designers venerate the cold monster—as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra dubs the modern state—revering it in an expanded, supranational form, while remaining oblivious of the ways in which their endeavor promises to foster the conditions necessary for the recrudescence of thymotic iconoclasts with the strength to slay it.

Nietzsche conceives these daring experimenters—artist-philosophers capable of revaluing our decadent values—as simultaneously witting and unwitting annihilators. Impelled to obey life-affirming regimes of self-imposed discipline (askesis) for the task of self-creation (auto-poiesis) through involuntary enactments of their native volition, they gradually bring new modes of being into existence—a salubrious aesthetic-political production of life-forms that destroys decrepit, petrified orders (in our own case the
ethno-nationally based bureaucratic state with which Nietzsche was quite familiar). By doing so their valuations re-habilitate a social preference for the instinctual organization of drives and impulses characteristic of dynamic iconoclasts. This re-invigorates the macro-political life of their communities while preserving disciplinary measures for the “all-too-many”, those being the majority who, congenitally weak and terminally sickened by decadent values, are incapable of being aroused by the erotic passions of their highest exemplars.

As the actual and figurative descendants of the late 19th century’s “international homeless financial recluses” the all-too-many loose themselves in vulgar hedonism and crass consumerism. However a few, whom I name ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, rapaciously exploit the order generated by the globalization complex, to profitably utilize its institutions, forces and processes to stimulate the herd’s multitudinous appetites and manipulate its perceptions. These are the leaders and apologists for the ruling order, who maintain the reactive values hegemonic throughout the globalization complex today, and include politicians and pundits, government officials and bureaucrats (civilian and military), business executives, corporate managers, the mainstream media, “white-collar” workers, labor leaders, educators, etc.

There is a hierarchy too among these administrators of status-quo ascetic-consumerist values. As the “managers” of our dissipative social order a few of these individuals stand completely outside the order they enforce. At the highest lever are found the genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment referenced above, which include CEOs, high-ranking politicians, etc. Beneath them a variety of hebetated automatons function to ensure the continuation of social-order and the labor of the all-
too-many. Effectively zombified, these people occupy a place at once within and at some distance from the majority, a group which includes investment bankers, lobbyists, executives, administrators, professors, etc. These highly paid professionals tend to enjoy a materially comfortable life that culminates in an extra paragraph of two in their obituaries at the end of it. However, they are in the main indistinguishable from the all-too-many and most notable for the extent to which they choose to lose—i.e.: expend—themselves in the myopic pursuit of conventional success.

These are the supervisors of mundane labor, the potentially soul-destroying sort of toil for healthy types that absorbs the energy and dissipates the passions of the masses who are engaged to do it as modern wage-slaves. The endeavors of these low-ranking, false-consciousness afflicted ideologues comprise an endless series of mimetic performances always-already in adherence with the dominant matrix of anti-natural values; their largely mindless enactments’ are motivated by the promise of a reward prompting them to unwittingly ape the accepted norms of “professionalism”; their compensation that of conventional security and “success”.

All of them, however (un)consciously, work to ensure that the slave-moral order functions sufficiently well to ameliorate and co-opt any threat to it. They serve a critical function as ideological soldiers who implement the discourses of equality and rights that sustain the prevailing slave-moral order and herd mentality. There are of course, exceptions within each rank-order of automaton. However, these exceptions are exceedingly rare and must mask their differences to maintain their position; the punishments are harsh for betrayal. There are generally no exceptions among those at the
higher level of genuine ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, for they comprehend
their function and zealously embody their role as enforcers of anti-natural ideals.

Yet as any sense of obligation to and the perceived veracity of the state dissipates,
the “all-too-many” remain “trapped” by the conventions of a secularized slave morality
that demands devotion to the dying monster’s “confusion of tongues of good and evil: the
sign of the state.” As those for whom “the state was invented,” comprehend no
alternatives to the semiotic conceits upon which the conceptual snares in which they are
cought arose, they are fated to go down with it. Just as their “leaders” fail to recognize the
ways in which they destroy the state as they seek to expand—or “supranationalize”—it,
the masses do not comprehend that their idol, the state, is in fact dying: “just as news of
the death of God takes a long time to reach us, so too does news of the death of the
state.” The eminent death—or the conspicuous decrepitude unto dying—of the state, was
palpable to Nietzsche by the late 1870s.

The EU’s arbiters and the political functionaries, technocrats and bureaucratic
managers who enact and or serve its will—as well, on a more abstract level, as the
citizen-constituents of the polity it comprises—are, collectively, the inheritors of
Europe’s historic great power states. In the shadow of US hegemony since World War
Two, these ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment have been happy to allow the US
to hold their sword while dedicating themselves to the pursuit of economic greatness and
the cultivation of the “restless affairism of doing” wherein every person is required to
give an accounting of themselves in terms of how busy they are against the classic notion
of leisure toward the ersatz virtue of workaholism (the liberal form of secular piety).

The corporate-military leadership of the US, as the singular “super-state” manically

pursuing military might largely for the benefit of its and its international allies’ plutocratic elites, has been happy to oblige. Hardt and Negri’s thesis on “Empire” – however problematical in other aspects – usefully explicates certain of these phenomena.

While failing to qualify as Europe’s representative exemplars in the Nietzschean sense, a few more conventional visionaries, performing the limited role of social engineers (as opposed to great nomothetic legislators) have made considerable contributions to the project of unifying Europe. In less significant ways countless others, from entrepreneurs, to bureaucrats and anonymous workers, have also transformed Europe in their wake. Yet from the outset of their self-described “grand” project (conceived as a “new” political order through the political unification of the continent) the instigators of a noble, federalist vision for the unification of the continent, Monnet, Schuman, Spinelli, Albertini, who themselves had risen from among the ranks of “the superfluous” that “steal the works of the inventors and the treasures of the sages for themselves,” but whose vision arguably elevated them above the base allegiances of more common types, and who had to manage that vision so that it would not be turned into total “sickness and misfortune”.

The objective of Europe’s post-War designers was the transfiguration of the continent’s disparate, territorially defined nation-states and their relations (understood at once in spatio-temporal terms) through the practical application of a conceptually refined philosophical and legal complex developed upon the traditions of liberal-modernity. The ultra-liberal-modern norms that resulted were an instantiated, widely-shared set of now-familiar attitudes and beliefs. These included a positivistic mind-set, materialist expectations, eventual economic standardization and the creation of co-extending and
ultimately unified civil institutions and laws to contend with common security concerns. A thorough revaluation of values, vis-à-vis the nation-state as the preeminent political form (including its founding, essential characteristics such as sovereign independence and territorial integrity, in addition to its absolute power to determine and confer formal communal identity and political belonging through citizenship) would be required if the resulting entity was to be more than a mere “super-state”. For this, “the superfluous,” who Zarathustra describes as “impotent paupers and swift, clambering monkeys,” had to be persuaded to strive after the conventional power it appeared to promise.265

From the chaos and destruction of two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century the originators of European unification reconceived, albeit in ultra-liberal terms, the political order needed to temporarily invigorate humanity according to a deepened sublimation of conventional slave-morality. Eschewing overtly revolutionary programs that would automatically be opposed by “idolators of the state” and its “preachers of death,” (characteristics that they had once unconsciously personified, but now strove to discredit in careful expressions of disdain for the failed values of the past, such as bellicose nationalism) they sought to gradually evolve political life by re-establishing it on older traditions while maintaining a semblance of the all-too-familiar order, so to amalgamate the nations of Europe into one over a long span, rather than dispensing with the state itself, which would jar an already distressed continent and surely prove counter-productive.

In pursuing their ambition, they recognized (after Nietzsche) that a wider sense of cohesion would have to be cultivated, at least between the respective nations of Western Europe. A mutual sense of belonging between former enemies would need to create in
order for the new polity they envisaged to function effectively. The process would require more than formal treaty agreements to foster the changed mentality this idea of Europe required. With little more to go on but historical enmities and the wounds of war, these conditions would have to serve as a starting point for a future, integrated European community. The ineffectuality of the League of Nations and shared suffering at the hands of the Nazis in the first half of the 20th century provided a basis for reciprocal empathy and fostered the common desire to rebuild a destroyed continent. In addition to the desire to regenerate bankrupt economies, guarantee free trade and stimulate competition a corresponding awareness of the need for radically deepened cooperation toward achieving that aim was evident. New legal institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods accords were codifying a new international order to assure a broad measure of security and thereby provide conditions for the European project of economic and political integration.

The web of practical illusions grounding notions of truth and justice that arbiters of integration could create from out of Europe’s experience of grief and desire for renewal would provide the catalyst and justification for the slow but sure fulfillment of their aspiration. The ambition to achieve European unification necessitated much productive and fruitful meditation on the dynamics of cooperation and compromise in various spheres of inter-personal belonging and identity, including local affiliation, regional autonomy and national sovereignty, etc., including the need for a fundamental revaluation of the efficaciousness of the nation-state system for human life. The latter in particular would be especially long in coming, and arguably has yet to happen. But measurable progress toward the alleviation of immediate physical misery in post-War
Europe would enable arbiters of integration to seriously entertain such potentially dangerous revaluations and prevail over skeptical naysayers, nationalists and other advocates of the status quo European state system who opposed it.

With hindsight across the twentieth century we can see opportunities for deepened integration both seized and lost as those “whose conscience bears the weight of the overall development of humanity, […]made] use of the prevailing political and economic situation.266 But the long-term endeavor of those with a shared comprehension of Nietzsche’s noble idea of Europe—or some related variation on it—has steadily paid dividends, and as their ambition increased and the momentum accelerated for realizing the continent’s unification via populist democratic means, that ambition gained broader acceptance. As opposed to atavistic statesmen promoting ‘great politics’ of the sort that culminated in the twentieth century’s world wars (and whose presence is still felt in the politics of nations), the arbiters of European integration—whom Nietzsche would likely have derided as “‘improvers’ of mankind”—have by a number of matrixes economic, institutional and cultural, succeeded in profoundly altering life for their fellow Europeans and by extension for individuals globally.

Despite being dedicated soldiers of the liberal-modern values that foster the hyper-decadence of our age, the post-war instigators of Europe’s integration initiated a transformation of the governing order that would be very positive for the overcoming of certain suicidal tendencies from which European culture, and humankind, had barely survived. If imperfect and bound to develop over the following decades into a monstrosity that would replicate some of the worst aspects of the old state form which it,
at least in part, strove to overcome, the EU would *also* come to presents potentials upon which a ‘good European’ of the Nietzschean variety might productively build.

It is my primary contention that Nietzsche’s diagnosis of Europe’s (cultural) ailment remains relevant and his proposed “cure”, via a radically Dionysian affirmation of life, comprises a strategy for overcoming the irrecoverably decadent nation-state—the hegemonic form of social organization—and the international order it imposed throughout the world. The contemporary globalization complex enforces the anti-natural will to truth motivating this order. It is a ressentiment-driven project for the enslavement of humankind by means of ascetic-consumerist ideals naturalized by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Among the complex assemblages comprising the globalization complex, a troika of like European institutions—the EU, OSCE and COE—best exemplify its ascetic ideals. The technological rationality and liberal optimism at their core, along with the inevitable hypocrisy that arises in the gap between their righteous principles and more pragmatic practices, give rise to a cynical ethos that ‘good European’ would subvert, reverse and/or exploit to attain an authentically natural agon. Such a genuinely salubrious socio-political milieu, being conducive to the creative becoming of rare, profligate geniuses, would condition the possibility for a revivification of culture for the maximal flourishing of salutary individuals.

It is important to state that Nietzsche’s works tell us next to nothing about how, precisely, the formal political institutions of Europe, which he largely reviled in his time, ought to be re-organized. We may however, confidently assume that he envisaged a system of rule governed through a natural hierarchy of types that would sustain a maximally agonistic state of affairs while preserving a flexibly adaptable, authentically
aristocratic order. Some analysts have drawn close comparisons between Plato’s Republic and the sort of order Nietzsche’s works would suggest he prefers. He adamantly rejected revolutionary programs in favor of more gradual, fundamentally recuperative change, when the sort of traditions (and institutions) that ensure the duration of a life-affirming polity governed by its preeminent specimens can no longer be sustained.

Such was the case – according to Nietzsche’s diagnosis – of European society in his lifetime. He dedicated much of his energy and thought to contemplating what conditions conduce to the production of the best (healthiest) individuals and communities and thereby maximize human potential, namely the facilitation of the highest potentials of humankind’s healthiest exemplars. At the very least, as Appel writes:

Nietzsche deserves his place in the canon of political philosophy not because he provides a detailed institutional account of the optimal type of polity, but rather because his sweeping denunciation of liberalism, democracy, socialism, feminism, and other offshoots of modernity leads him to formulate (albeit in a sketchy and unsystematic manner) an alternative, radically aristocratic model of politics that bears serious examination.\(^{267}\)

Anglo-American political philosophers nevertheless largely dismissed Nietzsche until the 1960s due chiefly to the legacy of systematic, instrumental abuse of his works first at the hands of his sister and then by the Nazis. Misunderstanding of his thought was compounded among his sleepier readers by his (often purposefully ad hominem) polemics. The latter, as Conway explains, “are best understood as occasions for galvanizing an internal resistance to the moralists, priests, dogmatists, and decadents who inhabit[ed] his own polycentric soul.”\(^{268}\) There was a utility to his polemics that served an important role in Nietzsche’s becoming, that is, in the self-overcomings crucial to the
development of his own micropolitical, corporeal politics and to his evolution as a philosopher.

Nietzsche’s political advocacy (bodied forth in persistent admonitions and advice as well as the practical implications for life of his thought) suggests a strategy by which his favored polity might be attained over-against nihilistic alternatives spawned by liberal-modernity. As Hutter notes:

Nietzsche’s entire effort at philosophical legislation, besides radically denying the myth of progress, is oriented very much to a present potentially filled with joy and ecstatic self-experience.\(^{269}\)

As I will show below, that experience corresponds with (among other things) an ironic or skeptical disposition toward all truth claims, an awareness of one’s ubiety or emplacement in a world increasingly determined by the futural implications of globality as a foundation for all authentic identic conceptions (ontology), and the ethos of good Europeanism that results and reciprocally fortifies the will to affirmation of life. The specifically political dimension of this, although \textit{prima facie} counter-intuitive to conventional political scientists, consists of a productive agonism that realizes a Dionysian, or tragically aesthetic worldview (\textit{Weltanschauung}).

His chief hope, that “philosophers of the future” might contribute to a revitalized, re-naturalized order predicated in part on their attempts at a revaluation of all values (\textit{Umwerthung aller Werthe}), directly corresponds with (and is demonstrated by) a central concern that runs throughout his works: the future of European man, culture and civilization. As Conway observes, “Nietzsche’s political thinking centers around a simple, yet powerful thesis: human existence is justified only by the presence of those exemplary individuals who re-define the horizons of human perfectibility.”\(^{270}\)
The perfectibility of genuine individuals toward the overcoming of the human species as a goal (the involuntary “aim” evinced in disparate ways as a positive will to creative destruction as generative power via their becoming) must be understood in the specific, unavoidably (and ultimately political) sense in which Nietzsche meant it. The task of legislating a morality of breeding prevenient to that undertaking requires truly great politicians, charismatic leaders in Weber’s sense, a *megalopsychoi* as Aristotle understood the term, who are first of all mythopoeists capable of revaluing all values and (re-)establishing a convincing basis for communal society, so as to nomothetically create a viable new order thereafter. I elaborate on this throughout the material below.

In his middle and late works Nietzsche would come to identify those aforementioned individuals as ‘good Europeans’ and their efforts at perfection with a noble idea of Europe. My interest lies in employing Nietzsche’s thought to critique present developments in the institutional politics of Europe in a practical, meaningful way, and to demonstrate how the EU may unintentionally foster such a type and idea. From this I extrapolate means by which his objectives might more methodically be achieved. I seek to do so by demonstrating the salience of Nietzsche’s thought to the EU project in the broader context of globalization. I understand the functioning of the globalization complex, as a form of Empire.271

On the contrary, the contemporary globalization complex has clearly identifiably power centers and is much less “postcolonialist and postimperialist” than they assert it is.272 The primary mistake of their analysis is to conflate the ideologically basis of the conventional globalization complex with its dystopic aims or it has in reality achieved. While their description of Empire accurately explicates the reactive ideals and objectives
of the globalization complex, they have by no means been reached—contrary to Hardt and Negri’s assertions—even, arguably, in the primary organs or loci of the complex itself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that they ever will or could be attained. Out of this awareness my life-affirming, Nietzschean analysis identifies actual possibilities for the realization of truly radical sorts of freedom and the corresponding emergence of new modes of invigorated life. Freedom should be counted among Nietzsche’s central concerns, contrary to the impression popularized in the late-20th century by the Continental philosophers and the ‘new Nietzsche’. As Mandalios makes clear:

Against radical denunciation of freedom proffered by Derrida and Deleuze—freedom as essentially a bourgeois humanist illusion… Nietzsche offer[s] an alternative (post-liberal) conception… Rather than eschewing freedom in reference to the modern world… Nietzsche can be understood as a serious thinker of human freedom and its political moment vis-à-vis his complex conception of will, power and freedom [sic] and their necessary entwinement ultimately with responsibility.273

Not surprisingly, Nietzsche’s particular notion of freedom contrasts with the prevailing, popular conceptions of it, as freedom from obligation or responsibility, in so far as his concern centers on potentiality and the possibilities of becoming. The question that occupies his politics therefore is individual ‘freedom for what?’ freedom to do something, as opposed to the ultra-liberal-modern anxiety with freedom as the abolition of restraints and obsessive concern with freedom from what?’ understood merely in terms of resistance to something.

A Nietzschean idea of Europe is inextricably enmeshed in an agonal process of authentic becoming; a task requiring rare courage possessed only by a few exceptions. In striving to realize their passions with a mocking wit and inclination to prankishness, good Europeans—kynical ironists—revalue the anti-natural values that preponderate in our
present, abject condition. In so doing they provoke others and may thereby gradually actualize Nietzsche’s ideal pan-European hope for the overcoming of the human and fidelity to the earth. Its potential realization impels perspectivalist critiques of the dominant prejudices in our hyper-decadent, cynical age (as I attempt to provide below regarding European integration and efforts to theorize it), to spur action and thought. Toward this end I employ doubly ironizing language in the course of my analysis to underscore how

the distortion, elision and falsification that are for Nietzsche the defining characteristics of language abstract from the concrete individuality of experience and construe it in terms of universal qualities and properties, imposing an order which makes the world (or what we understand as the ‘world’) thinkable and communicable.”

This spotlights how the accepted rhetorical tropes and central concepts of European integration theory, as well as debate about them, rather than comprising a mere descriptive idiom separate from the phenomena of its investigation, constitute a dynamic notional figuration of the EU that actually works upon and shapes its physical organization and institutional functioning.

Unappreciative of their role (a will to power as a will to truth) in this creative / performative act, the major theorizers of integration theory perpetuate the metaphysical fiction that they are examining ‘reality’ as such, and expressing literal meanings about “discrete, self-identical entities in the world”. The simultaneously deliberate and unwitting dogmatism of this tendency and its disciplinary role in always already reinforcing the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity is also examined.

However, the primary aim is to demonstrate how such a critical perspective on theories of European integration, as generative of the EU within the broader context of
globalization (all understood as mutually re-enforcing and self-immunizing power constellations), might provide one means of naturalizing (Nietzschean) moral education to revalue the anti-natural values of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch. This is necessary for the generation of a natural pathos of distance, hierarchical rank order of types and corresponding socio-political order.

For my purposes that latter objective (a Nietzschean moral education) requires showing how the hybridization of European man (a process that, I shall argue below, the EU is facilitating) is producing a much-turned type (*polytropoi*) willing to don multiple costumes and masks to become who it is they are. Strengthened by attempts at self-perfection, the *kynical* good Europeans Nietzsche described (and hoped to impassion through his works) laugh at and mock the life-denying conventions enforced by reactive moralities of taming, out of awareness conferred by their hard-earned sense of world-historical irony. Their moral pluralism (quasi-cosmopolitan tolerance of difference and becoming) conditions the emergence of radical affirmers who may hasten humankind’s going-down—the final collapse of our decadent age—and the simultaneous ascendency of Übermenschlich individuals at the dawn of a post- or transhuman future.\textsuperscript{276}
Section Two
Theorizing European Integration: the Will to Truth in the Service of Life?

Part One: Conceptualizing the Ongoing Formation of an Emerging Polity

Twenty-three centuries before the advent of the European Union, Aristotle noted that “all men by nature are actuated with the desire of knowledge.” Concerns with this desire to know, the passion (*eros*) generated by the search for truth and the limitations to our knowledge are central to Nietzsche’s perspectivalism. This makes it, along with the vitalist theory of the political and power ontology it informs, quite appropriate as a critical apparatus for analyzing theories of European integration.

According to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the instincts, drives and impulses prevailing at the macro-level of the political sphere of life and determining European man in his decadent era, Nietzsche diagnosed the decline of European culture and anticipated further degeneration in the centuries to come. He hoped that the diminution of Europeans that this would advance could be utilized to raise a higher type of individual capable of nomothetically revaluing Europe’s—and the West’s—liberal-modern values:

> The homogenizing of European man is the great process that cannot be obstructed: one should even hasten it. The necessity to create a gulf, distance, order of rank, is given *eo ipso* [through or by that very fact or quality]—*not* the necessity to retard the process.\(^{278}\)

The European Union would likely strike Nietzsche as a step toward achieving this aim, even if the creation of the sort of pathos of distance he had in mind is furthest from the EU’s purpose and objectives.
In this section I aim to problematize conceptualizations of European integration, understood as disparate ideas of Europe, from the 1940s to the present. I seek thereby to demonstrate two important points, those being how the ultra-liberal-modern discourses subtending the present-day EU became hegemonic and how theories of European integration effectively construct understandings of the project and concurrently imbue it with meaning. Integral to this is a lengthy, chronologically ordered, doxographical examination of the major schools of thought theorizing these complex and dynamic socio-political processes. European integration is considered as a field within the broader academic discipline of International Studies, which from a loosely historical perspective further illuminates how most of its major contributors have, wittingly or not, functioned as apologists for its hyper-modern ideological assumptions.

In a political distillation of the ethos of our age’s predominant ultra-liberal-modernity ideology in the early 1970, Rawls (“the first philosopher of the last man” as Allan Bloom aptly described him) asserts that:

Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override… Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.έο

It goes without saying that Nietzsche would have responded to such a contention with great laughter. Recalling LaPlace’s dictum (“The weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness”), Rawls’ first assertion seems very bold, particularly given its utter lack of demonstrability or any sort of corroborating evidence to validate it from the text or elsewhere (i.e.: nature). On the contrary, the entire course of
recorded human history persuades us otherwise. The second statement exemplifies the
dogmatism subtending the established, anti-natural liberal order.

Like all polities in the contemporary West, the EU has developed according to the
liberal-modern ideological premises Rawls limned and refined. It continues to develop at
the intersection of the real and the imaginary, or aspirational, and to overlap both of these
realms (as, one might argue, like all human activity). This is to say the EU is at once a
notional phenomena and a concrete set of existing institutions and functioning practices. It
strives to accord with a set of as yet imperfectly realized—and some would contend,
unattainable—ideals; ideals that play a significant part in determining its design.

Where there is ambiguity over the EU’s actuality (the efficaciousness and/or
influence of its institutions) or its unrealized ideals (that to which it aspires) it exists in the
minds of many of its citizens in/as a hyper-real state. A plethora of factors – media
depictions, government propaganda, statements by its officials, academic studies of it, etc.
– contribute to the conscious reception of it among its citizen-constituents. It is
experienced and perceived as representative of many things, but it is arguably the first
post-modern polity: a seemingly beneficent, albeit ersatz, copy of democracy,
enfranchisement, accountability and liberal equality.

Classical notions of political power are problematic in the European context, since
there is no ‘A’ who has such power over any ‘B’ that s/he can get this ‘B’ to do
something that ‘B’ would not otherwise do. Within the EU system, ‘power’ seems
to work as a circulating medium, analogous to money, within what is called the
political system. Van Ham notes that in addition to ambiguities in its exercise of power, its character as a
government and the gap between its democratic ideals and the provisions it makes to
realize them, it provides only a representation of belonging that lacks any autochthonous origin or certain reality.

In the postmodern condition European democracy has become hyperreal. It has become a functioning, legitimate and moderately effective way of governance now looking for ‘its’ Volk, ‘its’ demos, which is slowly crumbling under its searching hands.281

In so far as it occupies the realm of the hyperreal – as a governing entity that arguably lacks a broad or certain constituency – the EU constitutes the largest and most compelling example of a hyperreal polity ever to have existed.

The EU is the mainly reactive albeit dynamic product of abstract considerations as a making of events and the agonistic generation of schemes to resolve disputes which disparate conceptualizations and understandings of those events spawned, but with enormous and increasing bureaucratic and legislative authority. Its reality is augmented in part by its existence as a virtual entity with enormous affective power, simulating the values upon which it was and continues to be predicated to realize (i.e.: institutionally instantiate) its idea; on many levels its actuality is only knowable abstractly, even as it is lived / performatively enacted.

This ambiguousness has implications for EU studies. From a Nietzschean perspective, the fields of EU studies and European integration theory strive to do more than make the EU comprehensible. In the first place their investigations constitute a form of pale reflecting; they take themselves to be refracting the discernable light of superficial appearances through critical lenses to reveal innumerable – and otherwise invisible – aspects of an (all-too-)human creation, which they then call knowledge. The practitioners of this knowledge are generally scientific satyrs who, as mandukagati, think the way
frogs walk, clinging to logocentric discourses such as the reification of cause–effect relations by which responsibility is imputed to individuals as such, of state sovereignty, of the equality of all persons before the law, of free will, of inalienable rights (and the moral indignation they illicit), etc., among other sacrosanct metaphysical fictions.282

They are partisan advocates of our era’s dominant ultra-liberal-modern metanarrative, and ideologists, witting or otherwise, who are intent upon persuading their academic audiences and the Western public within whose universities and colleges they generally work, of its necessity and of the EU’s co-extending duty to realize it. The authors of these manifold representations of Europe and its integration carefully simulate—and arguably achieve some relative measure of—objectivity, from a concern with “Truth” that culminates in a fixation with methodological issues, quantitative analysis, data sets, etc., as in much social–scientific inquiry. However, as the very same philosophical presuppositions generate both the interpretive framework for analysis and the subject of inquiry, they risk becoming caught in argumentative circularity.283

As ultimately creative acts and implements, the theories—each a variation on the same ultra-liberal-modern will to truth (a metanarrative realized via the aforementioned ideological discourses)—cannot be said to constitute an unbiased study of the EU’s economic, political or social integration of the continent. Those theorizing and practicing European integration simultaneously create the entity many of them presume to dispassionately analyze. Therefore the scientific pretensions of theories of European integration, qua science, are always-already somewhat dubious (or ought to be), according to Nietzsche. This is, importantly, not to say—nor to imply—that Nietzsche would have maintained that they do not usefully explain the EU’s political and economic
processes, or that they do not consider genuine matters of knowledge. Rather, it is to argue that they create a particular kind of knowledge which reciprocally serves to verify a certain understanding of the world that corresponds with the theorists’ desires; it legitimates the expectations and/or stakes its practitioners have in the results it produces.

Unlike physicists, biologists or geologists, there is a very real sense in which conventional theorists of European integration create the object of their inquiry as they analyze it. This occurs through an ongoing intercourse between scholars that to varying degrees accounts for or is informed by the views, beliefs and judgments of elected officials, policy makers, media and public opinion-makers, myriad political factions representing the multitude, and socio-cultural trends. Together this cacophony of voices generates a feedback loop in which those scholars synthesize events and pronounce estimations of them in analyses always already informed by disciplinary prejudices that correspond with broader ideological aims and frequently validate certain partisan policy objectives. While of little to no interest to the European public(s), their scholarship influences some leaders and policy makers, affecting their understanding of the project in which they are engaged. By a trickle-down effect these theories may ultimately exercise some influence on public perceptions, but ascertaining the extent to which they do would be nearly impossible.

Theorists of European integration are engaged in a circular reproduction – and mimetic performance – of the very values, norms and practices from which the EU developed and takes its legitimacy. This in part helps explain why they so often remain unconscious of the ought implicit in their own seemingly detached analysis, as they rather feebly ape “hard science” standards of "objectivity". However, contemporary theorizing
is radically transforming the field—and the social sciences more broadly—by exposing the operation of underlying ideological assumptions, interrogating reified, metaphysical assumptions (e.g: sovereignty, anarchy, etc.) and problematizing the field's tendency toward argumentative circularity.

To better use the artist analogy, conventional integration theorists may be likened to individual artists who, painting from palettes of limited hues, have collectively worked on a mural over many decades, a mural whose contested scenes are frequently painted over and whose margins remain ambiguous. What the mural depicts is largely due to ongoing and highly contested attempts to perfect what had been done at the center of the rendering. Only recently has an effort been made to rethink these received notions of theme and method that has limited it, and to innovate or even dispense with them by reconceiving the aim of the work and its subject.

In this analogy the post-structuralist, deconstructivist and post-modern thinkers now coming into the field (and who are all intellectually indebted to Nietzsche) are comparable to cubists, expressionists and even montage artists, for they employ the painterly equivalent of riotous colors and alternative perspectives to illuminate richer detail in a more vivid depiction of the subject under scrutiny. Their innovative theoretical challenges make up a conceptual pastiche that casts doubt on the long use of monochromatic shades and tones their less daring predecessors employed to achieve the conventional images that formerly constituted the whole picture. In so doing they have also painted far beyond the unduly inhibiting borders of the old portrait to demonstrate the indeterminate limits of the wall it occupies.
The main theories of European integration operate within the same analytical – ideological paradigm (interpretation being valuation), and comprise a complex power constellation. They take themselves as constituting a progressive research project that seeks to explain the dynamic processes of Europe’s political, economic and social integration appraise its role in international society and anticipate its future development and prospects through examination of the institutions of the European Union. These theories are animated by ongoing debates over terms and merits of competing perspectives in lively conceptual and methodological debates that make it intellectually fertile. They are primarily concerned with relations between EU member-states and the institutions to which their increased cooperation has given rise. These theoretical analyses (interrelated and competing perspectives) examine socio-political phenomena and their transformation – matters that also fall under the purview of international relations theorists, insofar as they concern relations between sovereign states in a system of anarchy, etc. As a field EU studies also examines the creation and functioning of treaties and institutions created to administer these policy and procedural changes, in addition to the tensions generated by the new sort of quasi-domestic European sphere to which they have arguably given rise.

Efforts to theorize European integration initially arose in response to the theoretical questions generated by the formal, intergovernmental cooperation and new institutional arrangements conceived in the aftermath of World War Two. These historical, transformative measures included the creation of three primary intergovernmental institutions to direct Western Europe’s redevelopment following the war. These included the COE, the European Coal and Steel Community and
EURATOM—predecessors to the contemporary EU—and the OSCE, which had its origins in the Helsinki Accords and developed out of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which those accords produced in 1975. The broad and deep interconnectedness of Europe’s primary intergovernmental organizations—as related power constellations—is significant. It serves as evidence for (and establishes the apodictic of) the ideological equipollence enforced by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.

The CoE is a key European organization from which many of the EU’s non-economic policy rules have taken their queue. The CoE has enhanced the EU’s credibility as a global arbiter of human rights and democratic values. It can plausibly be said to serve as a sort of institutional vestibule for applicant countries to the EU itself, as countries seeking admittance to the EU modify their domestic laws and foreign policy postures to comply with CoE requirements. Within the auspices of the CoE the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was created in 1950 and entered into force in September 1953; the institutional bodies tasked with implementing it was the European Commission of Human Rights, created in 1954, and the European Court of Human Rights, created in 1959. The laws set forth and oversight provided by the former and the binding rulings of the latter oblige EU member states in ways that both determine and transform its regulatory authority and practical governance in both economic and non-economic areas of its purview. The decisions of these CoE institutions also effect the dissemination of human rights norms internationally, encouraging their enforcement and discouraging would-be abusers, particularly those
autocratic governments whose economic reliance on trade with Europe motivates them to remain in good standing with the EU.

Further institutional overlap occurs through the authority of the OSCE, which is a much broader organization whose membership includes 56 nations, including the US and Canada, as well as ‘Partners for Co-operation’ as diverse as Japan and Thailand, Morocco and Egypt. The organization focuses on numerous aspects of regional security and stability (ensuring and perfecting the status-quo), promoting democratization and a broad range of norms from media freedom to anti-trafficking and gender equality. It has also taken up the need for environmental regulation and a centralized authority in the ecological impact of human activity and its socio-political and economic consequences, understood in terms of security. In troubled and developing regions of the world it acts to safeguard political transparency through elections monitoring and assistance. It strives to manage and mitigate potential sources of conflict, encourages negotiation toward domestic and international dispute resolution, seeks to provide aid in humanitarian crises and engages in post-conflict assistance and reconstruction. Each of these organizations functions to promote and implement democratic norms and compel adherence to human rights law, which directly enhances the objectives (both economic and non-economic) and raison d'être of the EU. The overlapping aims and purposes of the CoE, the OSCE and the EU (among others, which include a broad range of intergovernmental institutions such as the EBRD, NATO and the United Nations) is to effectively promote and universalize the ultra-liberal-modern values that subtend the globalization complex in all its dimensions.
From a Nietzschean perspective the major theories of European integration in function as facets of a hegemonic outlook and methodology that aims to maintain privileged ontological assumptions and achieve a corresponding human good. It is a social science that seeks to preserve certain forms of life and privileged modes of being through a discernable disciplinarity. The on-going consolidation and refinement of Europe’s institutional processes and its continuing expansion – as well as scholarly explanations of these phenomena – are invariably imbricated in the privileged ideas and values inhering to them. By recognizing this ‘good Europeans’ may better understand how the coercive, hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch cultivate ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’, and how the practices arising through its discourses can be combated.284

Furthermore, according to Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutical and epistemological stance, we may grasp how the EU—as described, authorized and reinforced in the world by those theorizing it in veritable enacts of its ideals—represents the diminution of man through the commendation of a mediocrity legislated through an economic–juridical order, the perfection of which aims at enforcing universal humaneness (!) while exciting the acquisitive desires of the spiritually botched and enabling their fulfillment. I refer once again to both the ethos (mindset) and praxis (practical effects or consuetude) sustained by ultra-liberal-modernity, which equates everyone according to basest physical necessity for economistic utilitarian ends so as to rationalize reducing us to “subtly ‘adapted’ gears [that] represent minimal forces” as a part of its machinery. This process is motivated and sustained by the instinctual drives and impulses of weakness, that take “satisfaction in the dwarfing of [hu]mankind”, and
are typified by precisely the sort of “economic optimism” Nietzsche combated. As such European integration is shown to be fulfilling Nietzsche’s predictions about the systematic weakening of Europeans and by extension humankind, a fact that bolsters both his psychological theory of the affects (will to power) and his proposed solution. After analyzing the complex ways in which theories of European integration theory body-forth a neo-liberal will to truth, I explicate how the EU and co-extending globalization complex might be exploited, in Nietzschean fashion, by good Europeans.

It is important to understand why, from a Nietzschean perspective, theorizing about European integration has to date barely attained a modicum of the impartiality it presumes as an objective scientific study and how most of its proponents are blind to and/or unconcerned with this fact. It is largely due to the preponderating influence of (now customary slave-moral) values – the individual attitudes and/or group prejudices that act upon specialists theorizing it. Of great significance to Nietzsche, this matter is little noted by theorists of European integration. As Babich keenly observes:

Science, in its natural and social research expressions, perpetuates its own loyalty to its absolute by the same expedient Nietzsche shows always to have been employed in the service of the ascetic ideal: that is, one renounces the appearance of one’s ideal. Thus, science renounces metaphysics as it renounces any claim of its own to an absolute status. But in this, it searches for a knowledge that cannot be called “knowledge” in the traditional (metaphysical) sense, and it delights in the exploration of the limits of this knowledge—this is its metaphysical sense—so transgressing its own boundaries.

The self-deception of science’s putative un-metaphysical objectivity as an epistemological issue occupied Nietzsche from early in his career and prompted him to argue that even through the best science we still “discover” only the limited and conditional nature of our logic—a revelation of our fractional perspectives on the subject
of inquiry that suggests the need for a tragic culture over the prevailing Socratic optimism.

Deeply skeptical of the will-to-truth they symptomatize, Nietzsche was familiar with the positivistic orientation conferred by discourses of scientism that were nascent in his era. In accordance with the post-Enlightenment, modernist ethos of scientific methodology, which privileged empirical evidence or observed facts, data sampling, hypothesis testing, reproducibility, etc., these discourses gradually reified reason and fetishized mechanistic causality. As their powerful impetus revealed natural law and transformed the material conditions of life throughout the Occidental (Western) world by way of technological advances, their demonstrated potential to increase the power of humankind over nature was irresistible to those interested in social phenomena, the organization of human communities and their dynamic relations.

This movement spurred a concerted effort to transform the study of social processes into putative sciences even as Nietzsche wrote. While scientific methodology was appropriate for the natural sciences such as chemistry, physics, biology, etc., where it had developed, its application to the study of social life significantly altered what had long been the concern of philosophers and a part of the activity of philosophizing. The discourses of scientism changed the character of these subjects of inquiry, particularly in their academic manifestations, transforming them into the distinct disciplinary fields of political science, sociology and economics, etc., whose purview would be determined and supervised by experts. It is quite likely that Nietzsche would have had little patience for the emerging social sciences or its narrow specialists. He would surely have thought their philosophical (and methodological) foundations fatuous and redundant in terms of
their ideological origins. Furthermore he would have been highly suspicious of the character of the knowledge (via quantitative research) they generated.290

Rather, EU studies and the various strains of European integration theorizing collectively reiterate ideological rationales for achieving the objectives of the EU’s conventional – reactive – arbiters (the aforementioned contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment), while giving the slave values justifying those objectives the appearance of a good-conscience. As individual scholars engaged in theorizing European integration are thoroughly imbued with the philosophical and ideological prejudices that inspired and sustain the very integration processes they study, they will unconsciously do so. If they wish to attain conventional success within the academic discipline of EU studies that has arisen to legitimate Europe’s integration, they will actively seek to become even better ideologues than their peers.

European integration theory, also referred to as EU studies, constitutes a sub-field within international politics studies, which themselves occupy places within the broader academic discipline of Political Science. The field constitutes the activity of one area of theorizing, and the ongoing scholarly debates it informs. This refers to a set of works describing processes of political, economic and social integration in addition to the specific unfolding of thought traceable over the previous six decades. While I examine the largely similar, if not identical assumptions and intentions shared by the respective authors discussed herein, the field does not equate with an independent reality or suggest a possibly un-Nietzschean construction of a non-existent thing. It refers to an intellectual development: the various interrelated and interdependent analyses of European integration. The complicated ways in which academic disciplines (and the knowledges
they generate) are institutionally reified and the extent to which they are self-reifying is a matter not directly taken up in this work.

Utilizing Nietzschean perspectivalism\textsuperscript{291} as a hermeneutical apparatus, the main debates within and between the various schools comprising the field of European integration theory—specifically the major contributions of functionalism, transactionalism, neo-functionalism\textsuperscript{292}, and concordance systems theory, as well as the important theoretical approaches of liberal intergovernmentalism\textsuperscript{293} and supranational institutionalism\textsuperscript{294}—are understood in Nietzschean terms as collectively comprising a set of philosophically redundant, if varied expressions of a shared will-to-truth in the context of which they appear practically analogous and in the service of similarly reactive ends.\textsuperscript{295}

In this section I focus specifically on the theoretical explanations of the EU’s development or evolution through the theoretical lenses of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist epistemological and hermeneutical stance, according to the evaluative framework provided by his vitalist politics and power ontology. Specifically, I examine how the major theoretical schools of European integration have developed according to the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and positivistic social-science, then attend some of the exciting challenges to these conventional—largely statist—ways of understanding the integration project. By doing so I intend to essay an untimely historical comprehension of the EU, and to shed light on where Western civilization presently is, and where it may be directed to go.

This entails (re-)considering the specific ways each school challenged what was then considered to be the prevailing wisdom within the mainstream discipline. I do so by
reflecting on the work of a particular thinker considered representative of each school in terms of the theoretical problems each identified. I examine how their respective critiques of certain, then prevalent, points of received wisdom within the field ramified the ultra-liberal-modern values Europe’s integration symptomatized, specifically its will-to-truth (a reactive will to power) and seek to show how their striving to give a better account of integration processes further naturalized ressentiment even as it seemed to advance, or perfect, the field. Each thinker/school is genealogically situated in the context of the thought that preceded it toward understanding why the need to posit a new, ostensibly enriching perspective on the project of Europe’s integration, arose, how well it fulfilled this need and generated new questions or needs for scholars to contemplate or resolve.

I examine what the major strands of EU studies took to be their innovative contribution, how the respective challenges they each presented were received within the field and how they each contributed to a broader comprehension of the integration process. As Rosamund asserts,

EU studies should not just be accumulating a cache of information about the EU. Rather, it should receive a further conceptual injection from conventional political science, the message being that the EU raises issues of concern to pluralists, systems theorists, students of public policy-making, analysis of party systems, and scholars of political cleavage formation.296

Going beyond this privileging of concern specific to the discipline of political science however, I attempt to situate each “school” historically, both in a meta-political context and in terms of how it contended with the hegemonic ideological thrust of the integration project. The latter point pertains to both the disciplining affects of prevailing discourses and conventional power relations and to Nietzsche’s critique of their origins and functions.
As a matter of promulgating the ascetic-consumerist values characteristic of our ultra-liberal-modern era (and European integration in particular), I examine the role theories of European integration play in intellectually validating the economistic logic of the ideological apparatus it serves to actualize, via its (re-)privileging of reason and the ethos of scientism (i.e.: rational choice theory and the positivistic orientation) it confers on mainstream social studies. Additionally, I analyze how this inextricably coextends with and further ramifies the hegemonic discourses empowering the globalization complex. Lastly, all of these considerations are weighed in order to assess how each school furthered a distinctive vision of Europe’s becoming and/or augmented the growth of a hegemonic power-knowledge regime and the admittance of post-Nietzschean (Foucaultian and Derridian “post-modern” perspectives) have recently transformed the field at its margins. This includes a critical assessment of some of the functions each school performed in enlarging the field’s diversity of thought as well as the ideological variance permitted by the latter and how each stands in a particular relation—as potentiality—to Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’.

In critiquing the assorted schools of thought comprising the field of European integration theory, I strive to provide a Nietzschean assessment of the discourse of scientism and the state-centric thinking that co-extends with the ideological discourses that motivate them and which they simultaneously rationalize. In the case of the former, I endeavor to explicate the way in which reified principles of science, in conjunction with the privileging of reason and empiricism to ensure the appearance of rigor, has long imposed a positivist orientation on mainstream EU studies. Among my primary aims is to
deconstruct—or suggest a way of deconstructing—the argumentative circularity that often informs the theories.

Innovative recent works employing alternative methodological approaches have begun to broaden the field’s range, but the inroads these have made have sometimes been impeded by a certain reticence among the discipline’s practitioners. However this is gradually being overcome by exciting theoretical innovations, including certain strands of institutionalism, multi-level governance theory, post-modern IR theory, discourse analysis and meta-theoretical perspectives.

It remains the case that conventional realism, rational choice analysis, game theory and statistical modeling of trends or phenomena all exemplify a persistent feature of the discipline: the desire to uncover objective reality, or “Truth”, in a fashion after the so-called “hard” natural (or physical) sciences. It is one that constrains what the study of the political, conceived as a science, may do by enforcing conformity with a set of norms that effectively standardizes all academically “legitimate” inquiry. Discourses of scholarly legitimacy, their function, transformation and the historical context in which they arise and change are particularly relevant to the genealogy of European integration theory and its production of knowledge.297

With regard to the dominance of state-centric thinking, I argue that it comprises a reactive will-to-truth that perpetuates an ideological view to reinforce and naturalize the hegemony of conventional norms of sovereignty, legitimacy and power—the very sort of power politics Nietzsche rejected as characteristic of the German Reich. Furthermore it systematically inhibits the development of alternative perspectives on Europe and is therefore likely to blind students of Europe to the radical, dynamic potential for
becoming-other which Europe’s formal integration presents and which good-Europeans might exploit through the abstract potentials of globality. I attempt to show how some recent developments in European integration theory, such as constructivism, discourse analysis and post-modern critiques represent a turn within the field and by extension the discipline of political science that is highly indebted to Nietzsche, a fruitful, alternative perspective from which Europe’s integration may be differently, and perhaps more productively understood.

A number of serious challenges confront one in making such a Nietzschean critique of EU studies effective. First, in what ways is a Nietzschean analysis potentially useful to those engaged in such theorizing? It should serve to de-familiarize those doing it of some essentialisms and performative operations in their conceptualization of the processes under study. At the same time it runs the risk of being overly-reductive and promptly dismissed as glib and/or superficial as a consequence. Second, although Nietzsche’s view of the impetus behind European integration theory is not implausibly suggested by his thorough-going skepticism—one inextricably related to his critique of Western science—it may be asked how effectively the critical-analytical framework provided by Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology function as a standard for evaluating the particular theoretical approaches and aims of European integration theorists.

This is of particular concern given that such a Nietzschean assessment is primarily based on his assessment of the psychological–historical development of morality, and the cultural world created through our valuations. Nietzsche’s theory is an appropriate hermeneutical framework for such a critical examination, for as it must be acknowledged,
the EU, in all its myriad aspects, is ultimately reducible to the observable consequences of human behavior, taken at any number of levels of analysis, from the acts of individuals to group, institution and community interactions. This is to acknowledge that many different methodological approaches yield useful insights into social life, and the privileging of one (such as positivism) is unduly constraining.

Yet, from Nietzsche’s critical perspective, physics envy—the pothos of social scientists to theorize with the empirical power of those in the physical sciences, with independently replicable accounts for phenomena through time and verifiable means of predictive power—is a form of desiring that fosters the illusion we can step outside ourselves to see the world as it is. In fact all we can produce is self-referential kinds of knowledge, always already imbricated in the (study of the) world. Nietzsche’s view is that knowledge is objective only insofar as it relates to its own presuppositions. In the realm of the social sciences in particular, the sphere of human activity, we can never arrive at independent facts about the world which are separate from or unpolluted by human experience. This is the essential dilemma of (social) scientific methodology, that any question or analytical approach admits certain criteria while invariably excluding others from consideration. To attain a satisfactory degree of certainty the scientist contends with known factors (however well understood) that frame the questions that can be asked, while others are downplayed or neglected out of ignorance.

Inquiry itself, which consists of investigating some unknown to expand human comprehension, is inherently impeded by our inability to identify certain unknowns necessary to the explanation sought after (an epistemological paradox). Recognition of this (arguably sophistical) problem, and the futility it might seem to suggest, prompts
some to succumb to nihilistic resignation via acceptance of fanciful, wholly imaginary accounts of reality. We immediately realize that the driving impulse of inquiry, the desire to know (the volitional impulse motivating all will-to-truth) is very similar, if not identical with the impelling conative force of life, or Will to power. We are involuntarily disposed to act. And we always act in a relative condition of ignorance, moving through a world far more complicated that we can conceive. In summa all scientific investigation can at best result in failure to account for dynamic processes in order to reach a result of doubtful sureness. We are “successful” when our results generate hope by presenting further lines of possible inquiry. Nietzsche recognized this element of Dionysian tragedy in the human quest for knowledge and truth and, although a thorough-going skeptic, kept questioning and even daring to posit some answers. Babich states that according to Nietzsche, “the pursuit of truth is always rooted in error, precisely because error is the condition of life.”

She quotes an unpublished note by Nietzsche’s from his notebooks of 1881:

I recognize something [as] true only in opposition to an actual living untruth. Thus truth comes into the world as a concept completely lacking power and first acquires power by inmixture with living errors. And for this reason, one must permit errors to flourish and acknowledge their dominion.

As a thoroughgoing skeptic, Nietzsche simultaneously saw all knowledge claims as false and as essential operations for generating and sustaining the meanings necessary for life, even if they are inevitably self-deceiving. The ineliminable human desire for truth exemplifies both our highest (noblest) and lowest (basest) impulses.

The Apollonian urge for meaning and order gets debased in a decadent age through the reactive force which gives it expression in a negative will to nothingness a
nihilistic power, an inclination characteristic of the prevailing will-to-truth in the ethos of scientism. In a position analogous to Nietzsche’s own with regard to the incontrovertible “truth” of any theoretical perspective (the apodictical efficacy of which is usually taken for granted by its proponents), theorists of European integration study highly complex activities and dynamic relations retrospectively, applying close textual analysis, critical interrogation and empirically-based data, among other means, to posit explanatory hypotheses and theorems. In all fairness then it must be admitted that Nietzsche’s psychological theory of the affects (i.e.: his vitalist politics and power ontology) and philosophical critique of morality is equal in its aptness as a method for accessing theoretical attempts to explain socio-psychological phenomena such as European integration as well as to the act of theorizing: all the empirical observations, critical reflections and philosophical extrapolations there from.

What of special significance can an examination of EU studies through Nietzschean lenses persuade those engaged in such work? It is hoped that the critique will demonstrate how differing sorts of unconscious desire (active/positive or reactive/negative) symptomatize an involuntary volition consisting of instincts, drives and impulses that spur the development of (forms of) knowledge. The dispositions entailed in a certain body of knowledge, inclines toward a corresponding life form—or perspectives that are simultaneously realizing and realized by a *Dasein*. These inculcate differing orientations among those in their presence (shared or public knowing) and generate correspondingly interrelated worlds. What is known is, from this perspective, always indicative of the vitality of an organism (taken on multiple levels from the individual to the community, etc.). Those engaged in EU studies may thereby comprehend the ways in
which a form of knowledge may serve to preserve unhealthy, declining forms of life or augment healthy modes of existence, and reevaluate their own views and work accordingly.

Another issue concerns how it is Nietzsche’s thought (and my presentation of it, in particular) avoids seeming, or actually being, as dogmatic in its “conviction” of possessing a superior perspective on the world as those EU scholars tend to be via their respective understandings of Europe. Lastly, consideration is given to the extent that the EU (as portrayed by the various schools of European integration theory) and the conventional globalization complex may be conditioning the possibility for the realization of Nietzschean objectives, namely the fostering of ‘good Europeanism’ toward the realization of his idea of Europe, and if not how they might be made to do so via a revaluation of values.

This analysis will show how various schools of European integration theory have sought to explain, critically analyze and sometimes even to predict the integration process, and how their precepts originate in philosophical prejudices that condition their inquiry according to a corresponding native volition. Through the lenses of Nietzsche’s vital politics and power ontology the field is seen as mainly dissipative and conservative, an attempt to explain events – or mask reaction – with theoretical *explanans* of polity, policy or political analysis that more or less accord with the precepts of the hegemonic discourses of scientism. That is they foster an appearance of endeavoring to comprehend, explain and even forecast Europe’s transformation by theorizing in objective and replicable ways.
However, what mainstream theorizing on European integration makes apparent is that its insights and developments often serve to refine and sublimate the ideological pretexts for integration in terms that announce the project’s continuation via the preservation of a harmful form of order.\textsuperscript{301} The discipline’s primary schools of thought, from about the mid-1960s through the early 1990s could be characterized as having fed in cannibalistic fashion on each others and their own respective hypotheses to re-assert nuanced New perspectives developed through the critical application of insights are then presented as “new” directions in the field about every decade or so. Until about the mid-1990s the dominant philosophical schism in the fields overarching discourse was between state-centric and supranational institutional perspectives. These roughly comprised a dyad, one side of which occupied by supporters of those who believed Europe’s integration process to be better explained through the interactions of individual, sovereign states and those convinced that it was better understood through the supranational institution that had arisen between them. Although it should be said that the degree to which the latter view was discernable less “state-centric” in a broader philosophical sense than its liberal opposite is debatable.

Since the early-1990s the field has opened up considerably, admitting a number of innovative critical approaches. The durability of the aforementioned debate, which still fervently persists, as well as the discipline’s resistance to radical challenges to its traditional assumptions, is indicative of the role that the academy and scholarly convention has and continues to play in shaping the study’s development. As European integration theorists always have multiple treaties, functioning institutions and dynamically interacting individuals to examine there has seemed to be little interest in
delving too deeply into and/or examining the philosophical principles presumed by the project itself. It seems there are—or have been, at any rate—strong incentives not to interrogate those highly revered values informing its privileged narratives.

Given its generally positive and flattering disposition toward its subject of inquiry, the discipline not only functions in self-validating ways that perpetuate its own legitimacy, but upholds a worldview (*Weltanschauung*) supportive of the status quo. It need not directly advocate the preservation of the social structures, institutions and modes of being under its consideration, but ideologically secures them against challenges. Consequently it often amounts to something more analogous to sympathetic reportage than to critical theorizing. In truth however, it is a mixture, as all social studies invariably are. A performative enactment of a widely shared will to truth, those theorizing Europe’s integration make strong claims to objective comprehension of reality in “truth as correspondence” terms, even if they do not seek predictive power for their hypotheses. It is not that they fail to glean truths about the world, but that they create them. This is not problematic so long as their intellectual punditry is recognized as constituting a ‘not-showing’ (obfuscation) that announces the legitimacy of the tenets propagated by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. The authority its axiomatic narratives confer serves to justify the EU’s imposed (“ascetic-consumerist priest” dominated and driven) re-organization of European life and its ascendancy over all other political forms on the continent.

EU scholars often disagree over how to define central concepts and develop / employ different frames of reference, a fact which provides the field its spectrum of (relatively) diverse, contending views. This inhibits the development of a commonly
agreed upon explanation of EU institutions, their structure and functioning—permitting a “chaos” that is arguably productive and has the potential to be radically so.\textsuperscript{303} However, the mainstream of the field does naturalize a decadent value system—the ideological juggernaut of ultra-liberal-modernity—consciously or not. A Nietzschean critique should therefore be of interest on multiple levels, if only for illuminating certain problems intrinsic to efforts to theorize European integration.

The analysis suggests that most such theorizing is symptomatic of a misguided striving that culminates in acts of ‘becoming-same’. This amounts to a falling back into the average everyday-ness of conventional EU studies scholarship only occasionally and then accidentally approximates the values of ‘good Europeanism’. Disciplinary strictures prevents those working in the field from conceiving viable alternatives to its ultra-liberal-modern mainstream; possibilities for Europe’s authentic becoming-other. Nevertheless recent critical challenges are invigorating the field and provide hope that it can break out of these strictures.

While those in the field need not agree about definitions of foundational concepts such as sovereignty, interdependence, etc., this does significantly complicate their ability to assert / claim shared truths. Theories of European integration arguably benefit from the plethora of views this disagreement generates, but it often has an antagonistic effects, rather than sustaining genuinely positive agonisms within the field.\textsuperscript{304} The mainstream field’s limited diversity is not attributable to an intellectually honest Nietzschean perspectivalism, but rather the opposite: strident dogmatisms buttressed by the positivistic orientation conferred by the discourse of scientism and its privileging of reason and “empirical data”.

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Diez and Wiener observe that, “theories serve different purposes.” Yet while differences of understanding, however insignificant, over foundational concepts underscore the differences in the purposes theories may serve, by design or otherwise, they do not indicate meaningful ideological conflicts. With regard to the aim of theoretical perspectives on European integration and the purposes they serve, Diez and Wiener assert that “what they all share …is that they are not primarily concerned with the development of particular policies, but with abstract reflection on European integration.” While this is the case, that reflection has tended not to give much scrutiny to the ideological presuppositions informing integration and its theorization.

The broader historical context of the EU’s development and concurrent emergence of regional integration theory is important for understanding each. Systematic scholarly efforts to explicate processes of regional integration roughly coincided with the outset of the Cold War in the early 1950s and the emergence of European federalism. Scholars initially strove to provide explanations for as well as predictive power about the factors required for or inconducive to the integration of disparate nation-states occupying a common area of the world. Yet as recognition increased of the uniqueness of the European project and the conditions enabling it, scholars recognized that the insights developed from studies into Europe’s integration would be largely inapplicable to other regions. As it became clear by the early 1960s that similar developments were not in evidence elsewhere the primary subject of their attention was Western Europe, where significant progress toward the creation of common institutions was occurring.

As an academic sub-field it was situated within international relations theory and its branch of international organizations theory (which emerged in the aftermath of World
War Two). In this academic context a set of interrelated theoretical perspectives and corresponding debates on Europe’s integration have evolved. In so far as they collectively comprise a field, it has been broadened by insights from the fields of comparative politics and international political economy. More recently specifically post-Nietzschean perspectives have been brought to bear on it in the form of post-modern and discourse analysis approaches. These have arguably opened the field up in significant and exciting ways.

Rosamund suggests that in attempting to explain dynamic processes of inter-state and supranational institution building in (initially the Western half of) Europe over the past half-century, many scholars have not been “reflective” enough “about …the theoretical roots of their work”. He attempts to productively defamiliarizes our habituated experience and received understandings. A difficulty that is unlikely to ever be adequately resolved for those attempting to scientifically ground their analysis on precise empirical facts was identified by Haas:

[T]he task of selecting and justifying variables and explaining their hypothesized interdependence cannot be accomplished without an agreement as to possible conditions to which the process is expected to lead. In short, we need a dependent variable.

Yet there is a very real sense in which such agreement already exists, if unconsciously. The critical lens of Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutic provides tools conventional political science (and EU studies) lack, a device that facilitates the identification of the underlying axiomatic narratives that inform commonly shared attitudes and automatic beliefs. These value prejudices condition the choice of factors identified as relevant to a veridical explanatory account of reality. Ignorance of their operation in conditioning the
act of theorizing leads to exaggerated accounts of the actual differences between
conventional theoretical stances.

The variables upon which any given analysis is conducted would be disputed even
if they shared a common aim or produced results possessing discernable predictive
power, because the objective veracity of the particular choices they represented –
themselves indicative, again, of a hermeneutic of desire expressed via a will-to-truth –
can not be known with unassailable certainty. I refer to the choices / judgments informing
a designation of dependence among possible variables. For instance, in the debate
between neofunctionalists and federalists, attempts to reconcile the principles of
autonomy (state sovereignty and legal prerogatives) within a system of mutual
governance prompted strong disagreement. This arose because of:

…the challenge [of capturing] the dynamics of two complementary objectives:
strengthening the political viability of separate but not entirely autonomous (as
opposed to idealized notions of the Westphalian nation-state system) domestic
orders through the institutionalization of the principle of joint sovereignty and the
practice of political co-determination.308

A real-world dilemma (maintaining [or conceding] a degree of national autonomy within
the emerging framework of collective authority) generated this theoretical dispute. The
notional disagreements it produced ultimately spurred the EU and its member states to
negotiate a specified degree of autonomy for its nation-state constituents within the EU’s
inter-governmentally determined, overarching supranational framework.

Balancing the changing expectations of evolving notion of national sovereignty
with the demands of new, supranational institutions of the EU has prompted promises of
democratic accountability (which never satisfy advocates of democratic accountability), as
well as soft, institutional coercion via rule enforcement (which consists with agreed upon
democratic processes) and “harder” sorts coercion, which come in economic, diplomatic and other forms, as when Jorg Haider’s victory in Austria resulted in that country’s suspension from certain institutions of the Union.

Few if any theorists of European integration argue that the philosophical presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity are controversial or invalid. The EU and the values subtending it are taken for granted as desirable – exemplifying a rational, progressive, secular, humanist, and democratic endeavor. These sublimated ideological stances are not merely encouraged by the institutional culture its numerous agencies foster but are enforced comprehensively through socio-political mechanisms of control such as education, civic participation and legal duties, as well as through a complex array of bio-power relations it implements. Its advocates are enthralled with the EU as a “project” and eager to participate in the universal extension of its values and norms, which they, naturally, share.

Even those individuals, groups and parties less enthused about the EU likely accept its principle values. Whether they do or not they are compelled by its ascendancy to continuously deal with its prerogatives. They may struggle to modify or oppose EU initiatives, but only through institutional procedures the EU, with its member-states, determines. Today the social, cultural and political dimensions of life on the continent are thoroughly dominated by the EU and the values it disseminates and enforces. Those ultra-liberal-modern values are, wittingly or not, always already affirmed by the mainstream theories of European integration, the interrelated concerns of which (sovereignty and self-determination, the jurisdictional reach of institutions, individual rights, etc.) take those values, as their ground, for granted. This risks the self-reification of the field of EU
studies. In so far as the field claims authority to debate and explain European integration and EU politics, it abets the EU’s reification of certain notional-onto-ideological aspects of itself, as well.

More recently some critics in the social constructivist and discourse analysis schools of European integration have examined the values, ideals and identic forms linked through rights based notions of equality, perceptions of legitimacy and political enfranchisement (the EU’s project of developing a new, highly responsible citizen so adept at promise-keeping as to be self-policing) to gain deeper insight into the motivations driving Europe’s integration. But the exercise of theorizing the EU’s changing institutional dynamics (politics of policy making, policy implementation, and the emerging community as a polity – reflections on the EU’s ever evolving and qualified facticity) absorbs the intellectual energies of most integration theorists. As opposed to critically deconstructing the philosophical presuppositions of ultra-liberal-modernity, the overarching rationality it serves and form of life the EU as an institutional manifestation of these particular values symptomatizes—and which I argue their analyses largely support—they examine the EU according to the meta-discourse it universalizes.

Theorists of European integration analyze its operational functions and contemplate the challenges they pose to the discourses of sovereignty and the nation-state. This is undertaken with an eye to its effects both within the community and to the macro-political entity, which obtains a semblance of sovereign authority in its own right, its determination of community social and regulatory policies, initiation of reform, mediation of competing interests among its members, and its proper role and degree of influence in the international community. Controversy ensues over the proper criteria for determining
where emphases should “correctly” be placed for understanding the EU’s various systems, the implications of their operations, over how to verify hypotheses alleged to possess predictive power, over agreement about dependent variables (the problem of confirming that an outcome was in fact determined by the factors supposed to be responsible for the anticipated result) and myriad other disagreements have all fueled argument. However, as liberal, ideologic nomologists, few (if any) seriously questions, much less casts doubt upon, the intrinsic merit of the ideological presuppositions validating the EU project. A perusal of the literature reveals that little of broader practical or philosophical significance is ultimately to be known by it, and that academic debate over what is known arguably makes even less difference to the status quo (i.e.: foreign policy formulation, development practices, the applicability or enforcement of international law, etc).310

This said there is arguably a broad range of perspectives conveyed by theories of European integration within the relatively narrow liberal paradigm in which such scholarship operates. These range from the somewhat atavistic to what in its own terms might be called surprisingly avant-garde. However, as in every social science discipline the scholarship contends with some fundamental concepts that are notoriously polysemous (e.g.: sovereignty, legitimacy, anarchy, etc.) and their various interpretations of meaning can be taken as partially responsible for some degree of the range of that thought as well as much of the disagreement between the various schools.

Many of these analysts and averagely myopic social scientists disagree even on the grounds for defining less philosophically broad terms (e.g.: interests), and the appropriate parameters of their application, which can be expected in a debate over the traits and
character of an institutional apparatus or the development of broader, associated trends.

[C]ompeting theoretical approaches tend to disagree on background conditions and process variables, where power lies in the general system, the need for more or less integration, the impact of formal or informal structures, the feasibility or desirability of ascribing a political telos to the process and so on.\(^{311}\)

Yet despite disagreements between rival theoretical approaches to theorizing European integration, the aforementioned major strains comprising the corpus of the field express perspectival variations symptomatic of the same reactive will-to-truth.

According to Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology the majority of scholarly theorizing on the subject has served to reinforce a traditional statist view of the world and, wittingly or not, constitutes an apologia for a corresponding reactive idea of Europe. Contrary to Nietzsche’s quasi-cosmopolitan idea of Europe, the statist notion—the notable variations of which describe the different schools of European integration theory—functions to further normalize conventional power whilst periodically repackaging itself in neoteric forms. While the Nietzsche’s critical theoretical frameworks arose from deliberation on and genealogical critique of the axiological origins (the source and/or foundation of values) of the contemporary European condition, with normative ramifications for political organization and institutional practice, the mainstream schools of European integration theory take the ultra-liberal-modern values subtending their subject of inquiry for granted.\(^{312}\) The field has arisen via predominantly praxiological concerns (the basis for and efficacy of practices) with (predominantly Western) European modes of intergovernmental cooperation, economic and political integration and the emerging supranational institutional framework to which such collaboration has given rise.
In the Nietzschean view they comprise involuntary expressions of desire; almost automatic enactments of will to power that realize value judgments (their origin in esteeming) that underlying the aim or objective they strive to reach or develop (their telos). Corresponding with this, an emphasis on praxiological (to the veritable neglect of the axiological dimension) aspects of the integration processes was characteristic of integration theory from the appearance of neofunctionalism in the early ’60s—federalist and functionalist approaches being early, qualified exceptions: they did focus more attention of the axiological dimension. This persisted at least until the late 1980s, when social constructivism and discourse analysis entered upon the scene and began to challenge more traditional approaches to (and definition of) theory, that, as Diez and Wiener state, is “understood as a causal argument of universal, transhistorical validity and nomothetic quality, which can be tested through the falsification of a series of hypothesis.”

These latter approaches deconstructed meanings in radical (specifically post-Nietzschean) ways, interrogated the conditionality and reification of identic categories and examined the situatedness and dependency of all meaning and truth upon the discourses, the values (through an axiological exposition), and the practices that naturalize them. Given the many purposes that the spectrum of integration theories and approaches serve, Diez and Wiener go on to assert that:

European integration theory is thus the field of systematic reflection on the process of intensifying political cooperation in Europe and the development of common political institutions, as well as on its outcome. It also includes the theorization of changing constructions of identities and interests of social actors in the context of this process.313

Through the three major historical phases of integration interest in outcomes has changed
from one of seeking to provide predictive tools to that of adducing how efficacious EU institutions are at achieving the outcomes they desire across myriad policy areas and among diverse constituencies, as well as how integration is forcing a re-determination of concepts of belonging, identity and legitimacy vis-à-vis evolving notions of community, region, state, nation and Europe itself.

Insofar as Nietzsche’s oeuvre can be taken as a serious, if systematically unsystematic series of reflections on the forces keeping Europe from developing common political institutions, the changing constructions of its disparate identities and the interests of its myriad social actors in the context of these processes, he was indisputably a proto-integration theorist. Through his vitalist politics and power ontology Nietzsche *directly and conscientiously theorized* the forces that would likely stimulate the future unification of Europe.

If each distinct school of European integration theory evokes different nuances of the same discursive set of political desires, nuances that conflict with the emphases of other theoretical viewpoints, these varied perspectives (competing desires) can each be said to enact features of a much larger discursive power-knowledge regime. The variety of thought the field seems to encompass serves a *transparently* dissimulative function, deterring us from its overarching ideological aim, axiological foundation and its praxiological function. The latter aspect of mainstream theorizing about Europe’s integration serves to articulate and lend validity to the EU’s employment of the guilt and ressentiment formative of the bad-conscience of the European public whom it directs. Whether the EU is better understood (re: interpreted) in terms of its state-centric intergovernmental aspects or with an emphasis on those features that seem to qualify it as
a supranational community, does not detract from its broader ultra-liberal-modern presuppositions and meanings. Even the discourse analyses and social constructivist approaches, while innovative and largely indebted to a Nietzschean view to the contingency of all epistemological meanings and ontological purpose the EU may be said to generate, provide just a little deeper insight into the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of the few who, by cultivating a new natural desire (i.e.: nature) among those capable of the required self-discipline, may drive European unification, in the more significant, supra-institutional sense, “forward”.

Partisan-cum-academic positions and the debates that follow between them dominate the field of European integration theory and absorb the energies of its practitioners, students and interested novices, so that few, if any of them recognize the over-arching political agenda they abet. They provide outward signs of the spreading chaos among the all-too-many (i.e.: the relativity of values, the laissez-aller and lack of reverence for anything) that must eventuate in a more fundamental revaluation of values premised upon authentic new grounds led by the aforementioned few: thymotic philosophers of the future, becoming, according to their native volition, good Europeans.

Though the EU is chiefly concerned with taming Europe’s masses and refining the institutional apparati for doing so along familiar (reactive) ultra-liberal-modern lines, it is serving an essential function in realizing Nietzsche’s idea of Europe and therefore its significance should not be minimized by Nietzscheans who are off-put by the necessary dirt of conventional politics. It would benefit good Europeans to comprehend the affective dynamism of the EU as a complex of multifarious power constellations, which includes the disparate theoretical understandings / rationalizations of it (the various schools of
European integration theory examined below), if they are to subvert it and put it to use as an instrument for realizing a genuinely noble idea of Europe.

This is not to suggest that scholars working in the field are not aware of the difficulty (or impossibility) of comprehensively theorizing Europe’s integration. It is unlikely that any of those working in the discipline fail to appreciate the complexity of the subject. Working within the hegemonic ultra-liberal-modern ideological paradigm Schmitter reflects upon the immense difficulty of theorizing something as multifaceted as the EU, concluding:

…no single theory will be capable of explaining its [the EU’s] dynamics and predicting its outcome. The EU is already the most complex polity ever created by human artifice and it is going to become even more so before it reaches its end state—whatever that will be. Efforts to select out specific events, policies, or institutions and subject them to simplified assumptions may produce momentary ‘confirmations’ of a specific theory, but often at the expense of contrary evidence and countervailing trends.315

But of course selecting out is exactly what theorists of European integration are forced to do to produce the sort of analysis – complete with dependent and “independent” variables to bolster the validity of its ultimately arbitrary choices and corresponding claims – that resonates with the discipline. Theorizing Europe’s integration might be even more complicated than it now seems to most scholars working the field if they were capable of interrogating the values subtending it—not to mention the disciplinary conceits that normalize them—in a serious and sustained way.

As Europe’s, and the EU’s, leaders, politicians and bureaucrats clamber to achieve their respective partisan objectives and re-present their various agendas to their respective publics (the citizen-constituents whose putative imprimatur ostensibly validates or legitimizes their authority), a somewhat parallel academic disputation adds to the din.316
Their combined chatter is distilled by media (whose operations consist with its values), from scholarly articles to respected mainstream journals to the popular tabloid press, to (in)form a spectrum of public opinion and arbitrate between disparate conventional views. Fused in complex ways with differing historical understandings, cultural and ethnic sensibilities and received according to varying socio-economic cleavages, this spectrum of ideologically conditioned opinions develops into convoluted national and supranational public discourses. These in turn always already serve the ‘superstructural’ framework provided by the ultra-liberal-modern paradigm by immunizing it against effective—re: threatening—critical scrutiny. These discourses continually tempt any would-be dissenter to fall back into the inauthentic Publicness of the They and rejoin the all-contented herd. The member-state governments and the EU itself attempt to manage these discourses to their best advantage, further compounding their inauthenticity and deflecting demands from their citizen-constituents for genuine accountability by seeming to provide an account of themselves. None of this is a function of conscious collusion; rather it is a result of the ideological operation of ultra-liberal-modernity, specifically the distortions of the political (a becoming-inauthentic) caused by the desire it fosters for ease and the elimination of all suffering.

Through concerted and ongoing public relations efforts the EU represents itself as an authentically agonistic and democratic, ever-expanding green pasture to the human herds (or, in its own jargon, the “constituent publics”) it manages. This is done through numerous means, a telling example of which includes the “Europa” website itself. The official website of the EU, Europa subtly promotes the agenda of integration whilst seemingly amenable to public debate about, as if European integration—its raison
d’être—is that open to question or negotiable. It generates a simulation of its ideal, posturing as a free and participatory endeavor to ingratiate the ethos arising from radical notions of enfranchisement and popular democracy.

In this instance (among others) the EU promotes a simulacrum of itself that hides arguably less democratic methods of its operation and its elite driven agenda, even as it reveals crucial paradoxes central to questions about its legitimacy.\textsuperscript{318} As if motivated by some concern over or doubt about its authority or some sense that it needs to appear so concerned, the Europa website expressly invites European citizens to submit their inputs as to the future direction and character of the EU.\textsuperscript{319} Yet this debate—and the egalitarian impression it is meant to foster—is delimited by a broad notion of identity carefully created and systematically instantiated into law by the EU itself—even if most European citizens are ignorant of it. Most Europeans have difficulty defining what it means to be European, and what characteristics (political, social or cultural, etc.) are distinctly associated with ‘Europe’. That, it seems, is what the EU takes itself—in large part at least—as being for; a conceit which begs a whole host of questions about the coherence of the values upon which it is predicated.

These complexities notwithstanding, concerted efforts have recently been made to devise ‘A European Strategy for Culture’, with the stated aims of, “promot[ing] cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, [utilizing] culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and employment, and [advancing] culture as a vital aspect of the EU's international relations.” These goals were expressed in the European Commission's first-ever Communication on culture in May of 2007 and adopted by European Ministers of Culture in November 2007.\textsuperscript{320} In relevant sections below I
address each of these objectives, focusing on the first aim in terms of the paradox raised by the official promotion diversity, which effectively neuters it; the second as it pertains to the systematic effort to advance the prerogatives of free–market fundamentalism and the ‘New Economy’; and the third point in the context of globalization’s role in universalizing European norms and the sickness of its nihilistic, ultra-liberal-modern ethos.

Political opposition that cannot be accommodated within the EU’s agenda is systematically co-opted and/or suppressed. Broadly inclusive identic and cultural definitions of the ‘European’ and belonging are similarly imposed—compelling a multicultural civic ethos on presumed citizens, a form of particularism that excludes alternative forms of otherness and presumes a far-reaching degree of political authority. While publicly working to alleviate any (perception of a) democratic deficit, entrenched representative interests’ ensure that a unified European polity emerges that conduces to their notion of the good: hyper-decadent ascetic ideals that foster a ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’, and calumniate life. These enfeebling ideals are extolled by the so-called “higher men,” who presume to act in the interests of their less conventionally “successful” but similarly congenitally botched fellows—the weakly majority of people—by leveling mountain and valley. They thereby subdue and frustrate the best and perpetuate the fantasy of an inherent equality and corresponding dignity between all persons, making society poorer overall.

From this attenuation of self-centered concerns a transformed disposition results, both among individuals and within communities. The changes it confers are fairly comprehensive, affecting the expectations individuals have of each other as fellow citizens and toward their society and its politics. A similar change occurs within the
attitudes of larger communities toward one another. This may perhaps lead to more peaceful relations between states, as obviously seems the case in Europe, but this is in some part due to the emasculation of individuals and corresponding spiritual neutering of their communities or nation-states. Risse observes that as both a result of this, and an indication of the EU’s conventional success:

…attachment to ‘Europe’ is [now] strongly correlated with support for the EU and willingness to cede authority and sovereignty to EU institutions in various policy domains.323

This underscores the fact that reactive powers personified in the contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment (bureaucrats, technocrats, corporate and business interests, the marketing and advertising industries, the mega-media, etc.) have prevailed in defining Europe and European-ness in the context of the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.

The imperative to yield aspects of domestic control over certain economic, political and social policies to the supra-national institutions of the EU correlates with globalization’s narratives of free trade and accountability for the sake of greater consumption and prosperity. These narratives resonate by mollifying the comfort and security seeking masses. Yet interesting and similar internal conflicts have emerged within every state aspiring to EU membership. For, as eager as they tend to be to benefit from EU membership, they are often reluctant to accept certain of the conditions imposed by accession, and often push back against them, demanding concessions from Brussels. This process was especially evident in the long period of accession negotiations between the former Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU, as they strove to preserve as much autonomy as possible. With regard to the EU’s Eastern enlargement
Tsoukalis noted that “membership of the Union is perceived as a highly political choice linked to the consolidation of democracy, the preservation of peace and security, and full participation in common European institutions.” He went on to acknowledge that “EU membership [is] unavoidably linked to the process of modernization and Europeanization”. That has indeed been the case as the waves of accession in 2004 and 2007 produced uneven effects throughout the new (formerly Communist) member-states.324

Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology may be construed as loosely corresponding with the cosmopolitan–communitarian divide in international politics studies, insofar as his ‘good Europeanism’ cultivates a qualified cosmopolitanism for the healthiest that is based upon a pathos of distance that maintains a natural hierarchy and corresponding rank order of types. Through their erotic regimes of self-creation and discipline, the best, as genuinely (and relatively) autonomous individuals, are capable of cosmopolitan valuing and engaging in contests over values in an authentic agon with similarly healthy types. The vast majority, however, take their heteronymous existential meaning and ontological purpose from their participation in communitarian practices, through enactments of received traditions and conformity to customary beliefs.325 The latter is demonstrated by the contemporary European consumers, who take satisfaction in easy assurances of their equality and rights, indifferently acquiesce to being represented in the realm of organized, official politics and almost uncritically adopt one or more of the readymade identic typologies which describe the narrow spectrum of “normal”. Their socialized selfhood is constructed for them and adopted—not without some degree of coercion—according to processes of indoctrination through which they come to recognize
themselves and “others”.326 In the loci of globalization identic categories, affiliations and modes of life are marketed via the culture industry and veritably “consumed” like products, in a process of (in)authentic self-branding by their “client–adherents”.327

The EU deploys strategies of socio-political massification to normalize a social imaginary consistent with a set of socio-economic and increasingly political ends and secularized ascetic values combined with a consumption-oriented notion of success. In light of the EU’s thoroughly ideological aims, Nietzsche would perceive conventional efforts to theorize it (i.e.: European integration)—efforts that originate in the same ultra-liberal-modern milieu that gave rise to the EU—as consisting mostly of pseudo-philosophical, essentially partisan debate. Setting aside its obvious role in manifesting a particular set of discourses, it would strike him as “a confusion of idealist dogmatism and knowledge”, an elevated extension of the ‘newspaper culture’ he despised whose common sources are crass populism and the reactive tenets of our age’s ultra-liberal-modernity.328

The most distinguishing and possibly life-affirming features of the field’s chief schools of thought lie at the margins of that broader anti-natural philosophical program; the unwitting dogmatism of many integration theorists’ exposes their respective agenda (for some this could be simply put in terms of their being either “for” or “against” the maintenance of the “traditional” nation-state), differences in their views point at ideological presuppositions left un—or under—examined and at the obvious, albeit incomplete, nature of the empirical claims they make.329 All effort at such empirically grounded social “science” is in (its) “truth” an engagement in the observation of events, elaboration of subjective impressions of effects (symptoms) and supposition about affective capacities that cannot be measured in any precise or efficacious way. This is not
to say that descriptive theorizing is entirely without value, and Nietzsche himself certainly would have recognized that fact.

To expand on a point made in the introduction to this chapter, an ineliminable dilemma in the social sciences, particularly those concerning political phenomena, is the choice of “independent variables”, upon which a respective inquiry or take on social reality is based. Nietzsche insists that in order to maintain a good-conscience, we must be constantly mindful of the fact that the act of choosing always already entails excluding certain considerations, potentially even as much of relevance as a theoretical endeavor may endeavor to account for; the conceit that any putative “independence” has been, or ever can be attained in the determination of variables veils an effort to cultivate the illusion of methodological and/or pedagogical rigor for the sake of objectivity, to imbue the perspective it aims to promulgate (i.e.: the conclusion it settles upon) with authority and sustain the illusion of its unconditional “truth”.

What is concealed is that all such variables are always wholly dependent and situated in a temporal—that is, ever changing—context. The resultant, always-already subjective viewpoint conditions perceptions that validate belief in and habituate us to its veracity, until their arbitrary determinants and possibly figmental origins are forgotten. Thereafter the truth of the viewpoint is taken for granted until such a time as conditions may indisputably contradict—and thereby de-habituate—us of the presumptions that long sustained it as true.

Although theorists of European integration agree on much, for much of the EU’s facticity (in the Heideggerian sense of that term) is not productively disputed, their aim of disclosing the truth about the EU’s institutions and their functioning raises a problem
similar to the paradox of knowability. Namely, when they argue in the course of theorizing that certain truths about the EU are knowable their initial understanding of the truth of what is known is destabilized by the process of attempting to demonstrate it.\footnote{330}

This paradox of knowability is complicated by the presentation of evidence to the contrary presented by other theorists: one theorist asserts that unification is driven by states and provides evidence demonstrating this hypothesis while another asserts that it is motivated by supranational institutions and provides evidence to validate that proposition. To paraphrase Dewey, the operation of knowing conditions what can be known; as Nietzsche recognized a half-century earlier, “the true and valid object of knowledge” cannot be understood independent of our consideration of it, which makes the truth of what is known problematic.\footnote{331}

Furthermore, there are undoubtedly facts about the EU that are true but unknown; however, the way theorists of European integration are conditioned to see blinds quite probably them to the existence of certain of them. Given the way in which mainstream European integration theorizing has evolved—according to the conceptual constraints of International Relations theory paradigms and the narrow statist logic with which it largely deals, in conformity with the positivistic orientation conferred by the discourses of scientism—alternative perspectives originating outside the political science discipline are needed to illuminate presently unappreciated or even unknown “truths”. It is my contention—explicated at the end of this chapter—that recent theoretical approaches indebted to Nietzsche’s critique of traditional Western metaphysics and epistemology are doing so.
Examples of such aforementioned empirical matters include the historical record, the organization’s key, defining events, the actual treaties that established and govern it, the design, role and function of its five primary institutions, as well as the committees, programs, and multi-layered bureaucratic apparatus that makes it all work. All of this constitutes the pragmatic ground without which more profound debate could not coherently occur. That shared pragmatic ground provides a basis upon which assumptions about what is un-problematically known form, but which also cultivates a disposition toward inquiry and to what ought to be theorized. From there a wide range of divergent perspectives arise from which theoretical standpoints develop. What is fundamentally disputed between them is the correctness of characterizations given the evidence mustered to justify their differing suppositions. The depiction or characterization of facts given in the course of interpreting them, and the significance those facts are thereby accorded comprise, in considerable part, the principal antecedent, motive state or reason for asserting the reasonableness of a set of claims. Their persuasiveness endows the theory they comprise with credibility, by extension. These proto-theoretical choices, themselves psycho-political in their essence, inform the act of rationalizing a theoretical proposition on the basis of a largely subjective causal account.

We cannot know—unless straightforwardly told, and we may even then have compelling reasons to doubt—how directly ideological inclinations affect the perception of facts that gives rise to the characterizations out of which theoretical positions arise. Individual theorists of European integration, as authors, are themselves riven by multiple motivational and interest cleavages, much as the subject they study. Nietzsche’s vitalist politics is concerned with analyzing the psychological motives for the portrayals that
effectively assess the relative value of myriad facts and determine their proper place in an explanatory conjecture. As unconscious memoirs on the parts of their respective authors, the accounts of European integration underlying theoretical explanations of it are of primary interest here.

The value of ordinary theoretical advances depends of course upon their “correctness”, but that is in part determined according to how effectively the explanatory work they do relates to an established theory or “legitimate” discourse by solving some problem associated with it. In the course of doing this, it persuasively augments and/or reaffirms the prevailing theoretical perspective. Thus a sort of feedback loop arises that largely validates the received wisdom of the governing view. Occasionally, however, a set of radical insights produces an extraordinary theory that overturns a long dominant knowledge paradigm, as Thomas Kuhn explicated in his influential work ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (1962).

Of greater interest here, however, is the sociogenic dimension to the aforementioned feedback loop in the maintenance of a scientific paradigm or power–knowledge regime. The apodicity of a perspective-become-theory and its ability to causally account for some aspect of our world underlies its ability to compel, determining its prospective authority. But it is made credible via a mimetic process of repetition (in education, popular media, etc.) and by application to technological innovations, economic processes and socially transformative practices—all of which contribute to its dominance.

Our knowledge of the world is more efficacious when the sociogenic dimension of its origins is understood. Namely, that it does not merely arise from an ever-increasing understanding of empirically demonstrable facts, but at least equally through our
interpretation of facts according to a will to truth. Social-science therefore serves us well as an essential tool for the life sustaining endeavor of creating necessary illusions of truth, a point Nietzsche consistently affirmed, but the empirical apodictic of a perspective, that is the correspondence of its truth claims to the world, is not necessarily related to its utility for social life or the maximal flourishing of intrepid iconoclasts.

Nietzsche is not advocating an anti-realist stance, however; so long as a perspective originates in life-affirming strength—a positive will to creative destruction as generative power—what ultimately matters from Nietzsche’s standpoint is not its putative truth (or, the reliability of its vagueness) but how it can be sustained long enough, via tradition, to augment the development of a higher culture. Through the invigorating effects of an elevated culture humankind’s preeminent exemplars may be enabled to do so. Part two examines how theories of European integration are or are not achieving that with regard to the European Union, arguably the most progressive, innovative and dynamic polity in the world today.

Part Two: European Integration Theory: a Doxographical Survey toward Genealogical Critique

From Federalism to Functionalism

Theorizing European integration naturally came into its own after World War Two, with the creation of intergovernmental institutions on the continent (i.e.: the OEEC [now the OECD] and ECSC), though precedents predated that conflict. The theoretical stances of federalism and functionalism were both established by the mid-1940s within the nascent discipline of international studies. With the reorganization of occupied and—
by 1949—divided Europe, many key developments to future economic and political integration occurred simultaneously.

Federalist visions of a united Europe have been articulated in various guises going back through the thought of 19th century progressive figures such as Giuseppe Mazzini, and to 18th century thinkers, including Immanuel Kant whose cosmopolitan notion (in *Perpetual Peace*, 1795) entailed qualified federalist ideals, and antecedents such as the United States’ Articles of Confederation (1775) and Constitution (1787). Examples of quasi-federal approaches to political comity in Europe included the union of Swiss cantons, and to a lesser degree the 19th century unification of Italy and Germany and the early 20th century establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics. In Western Europe, federalist ideas gestated in the minds of progressive European reformers for two centuries. Then, in late 1946, the Union of European Federalists was founded in Basel to promote the unity of the continent along corresponding lines.332

Federalism is distinguished by scholars from both federation and confederation as discrete forms of political organization. While a confederation is a joining together of formally autonomous states along narrowly specified lines, a federation is a formally unified political body comprised of formerly sovereign states. Scholars generally agree on this definitional distinction. The relationship between federalism and federation is more complex however, for as Burgess observes, “federalism informs federation and vice versa,” but their internal “diversity notwithstanding, all federations are composite states that constitute a single people.”333
The motivations for and practical utility of the federal model of political organization are many. As Michael Burgess notes:

Past federations have been founded upon distinct territorial identities and interests as well as upon minority cultures, sub-state nationalisms, religious differences, and a range of socio-economic factors that served to underline societal cleavages having political salience. The unity of federations therefore has traditionally been based upon the preservation and promotion of certain federal values that together allow these differences and diversities to breathe and flourish.334

Although the EU is an outgrowth of cooperation conceived to ensure greater economic security, it has come to encompass all the factors Burgess mentions. The federal values, which exemplify ultra-liberal-modern, neo-liberal concerns, is explicated in the Acquis Communataire and the new (and recently revised) constitution.

The EU, a neoteric sympolity, is (contemporary neo-liberals would argue) the fortuitous result of an agonistic process that has realized many of the aims pursued by earlier advocates of European unification. It is an achievement that rests on the crucial appreciation that “Europe” is a polysemic notion. This awareness has become a maxim of its development, and enables it to account for and accommodate diverse perspectives—or feign doing so. Its *raison d’être* contains echoes of many previous thinkers’ ideas on the subject, including the principles of *civitas gentium* (an international union of peoples) and *foedus pacificum* (avoidance of war) in Kant’s *Toward Perpetual Peace*. It shares Nietzsche’s concern for what European man is to become, if wholly incapable of consciously pursuing his goals; even less so his promotion of the abolition of nations.335

*Quand même*, I argue below that the EU is enabling good Europeans to seriously contemplate just such a radical future transformation of the political organization of communal life. The EU has certainly fulfilled one of his predictions, which originated in
opposition to the prevailing nationalism of his age and asserted that “the economic unification of Europe is coming of necessity”.  

Similarly compelling reasons for unifying the continent as those which Nietzsche observed started to gain traction among progressive elites and small segments of European publics following the First World War. The pan-European movement entered popular consciousness during the early 1920s. Their cause continued to gain momentum throughout the inter-war period, some even merging with the anti-fascist movement by the mid-1930s. At that time the federalist ideas for a future unified Europe competed with alternate visions including Julien Brenda’s rationalist universalism and the International Paneuropean Union founded by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. While the EU is not (yet) a formal federation, the principles of federalism were favored among key arbiters of Europe’s unification (the “father’s of Europe”). They were preferred in large part for their practical viability in reaching agreements between sovereign states and arguably played a significant role in the development of the EU’s primary institutions. Rosamund states that:

[F]ederalism most commonly describes political systems in which there is a division of authority between central and regional or state government. Federal systems are usually understood as resting on historic compromises involving the permanent compact between territorial units… [whereby they place themselves under] common, centralized institutions… [while] retaining at least a measure of autonomy.

In many parts of the world, and Europe as well, the federal model enables multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nation-states to exist (Belgium being a case in point); holding distinct units together in a political unity over centrifugal forces of identic particularism that would otherwise pull them apart.
Burgess asserts that “the core of the federal idea… is based upon the notion of a voluntary union of states and peoples—the result of a bargain, treaty, contract, or covenant freely entered into—that is binding upon its members and rooted in mutual respect, recognition, reciprocity, tolerance consent, and equality.” These organizing principles are clearly operative at many levels of institutional governance among many nation-states in the world today, including some that are not formal federations, such as Spain and the UK, Nigeria and Kenya. Moreover, these principles describe just as aptly key aspects of the EU which lead many to believe that federalism lies at the heart of the logic integrating Europe. Indeed, among EU member-states today Germany, Austria, and Belgium are formal federations. Although the EU appears to embody key principles of federalism, the extent to which it actually does so is a contentious issue among theorists of European integration. Scholars have debated the degree to which the EU operates along federalist lines since the Treaty of Rome (1957). This issue will be examined in the context of each of the sections below.

Burgess argues that although “the EU is not intended to become either the USA or a Switzerland writ large… a complex interaction between economic and politics…by the member states of the EU…has resulted in a new kind of federal union the like of which has never been seen.” He believes this demonstrates that the influence of federalism in post-war Europe was not “merely transitory” as critics have alleged, but has “in reality… displayed a strong continuity [on the] thought and practice [of unifying Europe] throughout the subsequent half-century.”

Chryssochoou affirms this when he asserts that “there may well be different but equally federal sets of principles and structures composing a federal polity, which
nevertheless need to be seen in a wider symbiotic perspective.” In other words, federal systems may differ from one another, taking their unique significance and inner-regularity from the respective entities that comprise them, while still remaining federal arrangements. Despite “considerable variation in purposes, identities, cultural traditions, financial resources, political and constitutional symmetry, organizational logic, conflict-resolution mechanisms, constitutional amendment procedures, power-sharing arrangements,” Chrysochoou identifies “the democratic representation of all participating units… as a common defining property” of all federalist arrangements.

Burgess thinks the structural organization and functioning of Europe’s major intergovernmental institutions reflect federalist notions of collaborative governance. In the election of representatives to the European Parliament, the overriding powers of the Court of Justice (ECJ), the principle of Qualified Majority Voting, the independence of the European Commission from member-state governments, and the accession process for EU membership he sees manifestations of federalist principles operative in the EU. Regarding the evident character and functioning of the contemporary EU he writes that the principles of federalism have undeniably transformed the continent, whether or not that fact is readily and fully acknowledged as such:

Europeans [now] have to recognize and deal with the emerging federal reality that is staring them in the face. Together the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties have combined to build upon Monnet’s Europe by accelerating and accentuating its federal direction. [C]onsiderable institutional and policy evidence has accumulated to substantiate the claim that the EU already constitutes a federal Europe.

That the constitution of 2005 is presently being promulgated into law by a treaty process strengthens Burgess’ claim.
By the early to mid-1950s scholars theorizing international politics were turning their attention to the exciting prospect of political and economic integration among sovereign nation-states. Formal integration was increasingly seen as a serious potential solution to the traditional rivalries and ructions that spawned the cataclysmic conflicts that had devastated the European continent twice in a span of little more than three decades. Working in the field of political science, which was itself relatively new as an academic discipline, early integration theorists attempted to articulate a cogent, parsimonious model of Europe’s integration process that could serve both to explain it and provide predictive power.

Those practical objectives of the nascent integration which had been attained by the mid-50s, while largely effective for the state actors involved in their respective areas of cooperation (ECSC and EURATOM—which merged in 1967— cooperation was largely limited to the realm of energy technologies in atomic power and raw materials allocation within the strategically significant coal and steel sectors), had given rise to the need for more centralized authority structures. In the course of the study’s unfolding new theoretical responses arose as novel challenges presented themselves and unforeseen needs created by integration processes arose. Innovation also occurred whenever the prevailing theoretical paradigm came to seem inadequate. Efforts to explain any number of evident facts or important dynamics compelled academic advances. But the federalist impulse was not universally shared, and examples of failed efforts at federalism abounded. A useful alternative and convincing challenge to the post-war federalist approach was functionalism, a theoretical perspective that had arisen from the Europe’s
tumultuous inter-war experience of the 1930s. It emerged on the scene in the mid-1940s and resonated widely for over a decade.

Rosamund writes that “like federalism, functionalism was a branch of the broad movement that sought to theorize the conditions for ending human conflict and which found intellectual space in the turbulent political climate of the 1940s.” Functionalism, as the theoretical perspective came to be known, was initiated by David Mitrany as a theoretical response to multiple crises, particularly the organized mass conflict of the twentieth century’s world wars, and unresolved threats to international peace and life on the European continent. It was an inter-war theoretical effort conceived to meet the challenge of alleviating the underlying sources of conflict in the international state system. In his seminal 1943 work *A Working Peace System*, David Mitrany had idealistically asserted “peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it.”

Mitrany’s functionalist analysis was meant to suggest a practical way out of what he perceived to be inherent limitations to the nation-state and the failed international system it had given rise to. He postulated that cooperation between states in specific, functionally linked activities would (and had, albeit in nascent form, proven to) be more effective than unilateral state action:

The essential principle is that activities would be selected specifically and organized separately, each according to its nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment. It would allow, therefore, all freedom for practical variation in the organization of the several functions, as well as in the working of a particular function as needs and conditions alter.

This approach would account for the fact that “not all interests are common to all, and that the common interests do not concern all countries in the same degree.” Therefore,
Mitranian functionalism was conceived as an alternative to the discredited political unions of the past, which had bound “together some interests which are not of common concern to the group, while cut[ting] asunder some interests of common concern to the group and those outside it.”  

Among his central aims was to conceive a viable means of productively utilizing the very competitive incentives that often produced counter-productive conflict between territorially defined nation-states to ramify mutually beneficial assistance. He did so by emphasizing the common benefits attained through self-interested mutual aid in accomplishing certain specified functions. He suggested that this joint effort in defined areas of activity could be accomplished by shifting the source of state legitimacy and the basis of the international system away from territorially defined unions, to the efficient, cooperative performance of necessary functions toward the fulfillment of each nation’s respective needs. This would give rise to “collective rational thinking” toward problem solving and possibly conflict resolution. He thought of functional cooperation as an unexpectedly simple way of fixing what was fundamental broken with the international system:

Instead of breaking up government mechanically into a pyramid of subordinate territorial areas, we need for our new ends rather to dissect its tasks and relevant authorities on lines that correspond to and fit those tasks. Instead of keeping up the old and barren attempt to establish a formal and fixed division of sovereignty and power, a division which changing conditions continually puts out of joint, we could with a little insight and boldness distribute power in accordance with the practical requirements of every function and object.  

Mitrany saw such a strategy as a workable way of mitigating the structural rigidities built into international politics that hindered cooperation between states and complicated the
settlement of conflicts thereby. However, with regard to certain tensions this produced, Chrysochoou states that:

[T]he ‘functional imperative’, as the basic law governing the evolution of the European integration process, rejected the inevitability of constitutional requirements and fixed divisions of functional and political authority, and instead focused on problems which… cannot be solved separately by each government acting alone.

The intuitive reasonableness of the method is apparent. Yet for its striking simplicity it was no less revolutionary as a means of reorganizing the basis for relations between nation-states to promote more effective cooperation between human societies.

Another positive consequence of functionalism was that it would potentially enable the development of supra-national authorities without impinging on the autonomy of states. According to Henig’s general observation,

...postulates, and makes a virtue of, integrated decision-making structures operating within defined sectors, such as coal or agriculture. Within those sectors there [would develop] ‘supra-national’ institutions but elsewhere governments and states [would] retain their traditional authority. ...A degree of functional integration may [therefore] be compatible with a broadly inter-governmental approach [to integration].

Yet as Henig also observes, “early proponents [namely Mitrany] of integration argued that successful operation of supra-national structures [produced by functional cooperation]… would generate a demand for more.”

Qualified by technical expertise, specialists in various issue areas would comprise assemblies to determine policy and political action, a style dubbed “management committee government” that Mitrany believed would naturally assume democratic characteristics. Such cooperative decision-making among experts would lead to greater efficiency in the administration of services by functional agencies. This would create
felicitous conditions out of which, he presumed, such committees of experts, whose authority would be legitimated by their knowledge, would constitute pressure groups whose shared sense of responsibility would prevail over any partisan affiliation or ideological doctrine.

Mitrany believed such mutual cooperation would gradually lead to integration as national governments and citizens recognized the benefits of deepening material assistance between states. The logic of functional integration would enhance the freedoms of all participants, providing strong disincentives to any act potentially disruptive of the process. Therefore it held practical advantages over more idealistic alternatives for integration, such as a potentially fractious and exclusionary “union of peoples” based on a tenuous “promise of peace” as proposed by Kalergi’s Pan-European movement. Elements of the sort of technocratic expertise in government and mutual cooperation between states advanced by Mitrany are quite evident today at various levels of international society. Among IGOs, the EU in particular functions through organized working committees, independent investigations and commissioned studies.

Mitrany, via these positivistic notions of human reason and progress (the faith of scientism), was responding to the problems generated by the historic shift in European governance that concluded World War One, which saw many of the continent’s imperial monarchies dissolved or transformed into mere figureheads of state. Thus he was motivated to provide a critique of certain intrinsic impediments to federalist attempts at integration, “the common defects of sectional unions”, including what he dubbed continental and ideological unions. He also developed his functionalist alternative in contrast to the failed League of Nations system.
An early opponent of a qualified state centrism who precociously emphasized the “material interdependence” of states, Mitrany’s contribution was to explicate how a functionalist notion of authoritative legitimacy toward cooperative, incremental integration could transform traditional, representative voting democracies.\(^{356}\) The latter were inferior precisely because any segment of the mob could raise a candidate to power within a declining (kakistocratic) form of “government by politicians”. In the age of late-modernity secular and “democratic” political authority—the dominion of charismatic ascetic-consumerist priests—had replaced former, de-legitimated sources of institutional power, but had not yet established effective means of administrative control. This created a volatile situation in which the tenuous authority of states was easily contested by opposing democratic forces. In the best scenario it lead to the mismanagement of societies and their conflicts, and increased the possibility of widespread disorder. While still advocating similarly democratic institutional means, Mitrany sought to reverse accepted wisdom concerning the division of sovereignty and power, asserting that:

instead …of asking *by whom* should sovereignty and power be exercised, we should rather ask *upon what* objects they should be exercised; …in other words, the real question is not ‘who are the rightful authorities,’ but rather ‘what are the rightful ends – and what the proper means for them?’

He suggested that the basis of authority itself be transformed so as to “derive from the performance of a common task” rather than “the possession of a separate ‘right’.\(^ {357}\)

Functionalism would enable “the application of carefully examined, but not necessarily politically structured, strategies for transcending (national) territorial boundaries in tackling issues of a technical nature,” that would ineluctably build international institutions.\(^ {358}\) These in turn would induce a normative transformation to
mitigate conflict in the world by stimulating a shift of popular loyalty from the nation-state to un-dogmatic international institutions created to perform specified tasks in the common human interest. Recognizing that:

Empire and League having failed to find a way to an active international unity, because outstripped in different ways by the growth of social life, some reformers would now try federation; yet the very number and variety of the schemes proposed, limited territorially or ideologically, show that a scheme that might bring all peoples together cannot even be through of,

Mitrany believed a functionalist approach to international integration would create “a peace that would bring [nations] actively together”. What was required above all for a peaceful existence between increasingly co-dependent states was “[t]he growth of new administrative devices, and especially of planned public action… in the international sphere.”

However optimistic his approach, Mitrany took the category of “expertise” for granted, reifying power / knowledge regimes and the technocratic rationality they reproduced as a just and desirable basis of a new method of social administration and normatively transformed international order.

Nietzsche would have been immediately suspicious of such a rationalistic method for the governance of human communities and would certainly have thought it all-too-human. Yet given the widespread decadence of the age he likely would have supported it, as a means of eroding the authority (and popular veneration) of the state. Such an administration of affairs seems to echo utilitarian concerns and is bound to reproduce many of the distortions that inhibit the becoming of the best. While attempting to contend with the tendency of “nation-states to uphold certain sorts of dogma which distract policy from the maximization of public welfare,” and which when regarded “as a given, …
impose an unnecessary inflexibility [upon] thinking about how the requirements of
human beings could be served.\textsuperscript{360} The functionalist solution shares the primary
assumptions about the ends of human community of liberal-modern idealists. It also
replicates in quasi-utopian terms the view, that at the inter- or supranational level the
highest purpose of political community lies in its acting to effectively ameliorate the
banal, commonplace struggle individuals experience in meeting their mundane, if
essential needs; an objective that had already been adopted by that coldest of cold
monsters, the nation-state (at least in the industrialized world, where it was most
thoroughly instantiated).

The base impulse to rule over others for its own sake in a negative will to
nothingness as nihilistic power was unconsciously reiterated – if in an inverted manner –
in functionalism’s reduction of human life to sets of material requirements that could
most effectively be met by rational means. Though Nietzsche’s experience of the Franco-
Prussian war was traumatic, and he viewed the war and its outcome as abhorrent, it did
not fundamentally alter his view on the value of conflict for society. Peace, in and for
itself, was he believed a reactive value motivated by the slave’s desire for a insipid
comfort and rejection of the natural rank order of types (\textit{Rangordnung}). However
repulsive and cynical the official justifications for organized warfare may have seemed to
him after his traumatic experiences behind the front lines, campaigning against conflict
seemed equally repugnant to him. Nietzsche’s rejection of the pacifist trends of his time
is complicated: despite having later come to see the manifold dangers in unified
Germany’s growing power and its imperial ambitions as one of the disastrous
consequences of the Franco-Prussian war, condemning warfare generally and advocating
its ban from the realm of possible human activities was a life-denying strategy more likely to compound the original problem than to progress mankind into a utopian future.

Though Nietzsche viewed the wars between modern European nation-states as wholly reactive, futilely destructive and symptomatic of his—and by extension, our—epoch’s decadence, they were also for those very reasons, unfortunately necessary; a continent wide peace, if attained, would be plausibly more harmful. Moreover such a peace would be doomed anyway, for by preserving a toxic status-quo it could overcome neither the unnatural desire for radical equality through the annihilation of authentic difference nor the ressentiment born of weakness and rationalized via slave-morality that motivated such a desire. The all-too-human contradictions generated by modernity’s anti-natural ideals would exacerbate the underlying sources of conflict throughout European society, a notion Mitrany corroborates.

Rather than crudely conceiving the organization of political community as a means to abolish suffering and conflict through the mutual attainment of common needs, Nietzsche thought it should structure a culturally specific and salubrious agon within which each might attain the highest of which they are capable for the greater enrichment of culture – and its infrequent efflorescence – and the thriving of the exceptional geniuses it may eventually produce. Nietzsche’s view on the peace of our time (the motivation for which he anticipated and extensively critiqued) has important implications for the understanding his philosophical oeuvre imparts vis-à-vis the tenets and aspirations of an ultra-liberal-modern project such as the formal unification of Europe and the institutional apparatus of the European Union.
Again, the functionalist thesis of European integration envisioned a world of technocratic experts supervising the creation and administration of a newly prosperous Europe. Its institutions would be designed to produce a civilization constituting the most effective feeding trough at which its constituent masses would ever have gorged. It would maximize efficiency across numerous areas of production and administration, resulting in a peaceful sort of well-managed “utopia”; an appealing pasture to provide as much contentment as devisable, one in which the herd would happily stay – having found their place and being too fearful of jeopardizing their material security (re: comfort) to undertake dangerous ventures or risk even a necessary conflict. To underscore this critical perspective on the theory’s concern with maximizing public welfare, Rosamond reminds us that “Ernst Haas alluded to the idea that functionalism bears some resemblance to the Marxist-Leninist aspiration of replacing the ‘government of men’ [whose primary concern is that of preserving their power] with the ‘administration of things [in pursuit of the common good through the management of political economy]’”.

Furthermore, Mitrany himself acknowledged the prevalence of irrationality in prevailing methods of political organization and conflict (mis)management, yet proclaimed his faith in man’s ‘social nature.’ Functionalism failed to contend with the likely unwillingness of the masses to relinquish the “enfranchisement” they enjoyed via representative institutions within the nation-state framework in any practical way. Even in Nietzsche’s productive period, the increasingly enfranchised and impudent crowd would never willingly relinquish the democratic processes they had “won”, having become accustomed to expressing their putative collective agency through them. Nor
would they have stood by as those newly acquired “rights” were supplanted by issue specific supranational assemblies comprised of reputed experts. The growing prominence of the state as a “new idol,” which, with or without popular support defends its own prerogatives and cultivates fervent and insidiously reactive forms of nationalism and patriotism to sustain the loyalty of its subjects, would not be so easily challenged. Bismarck’s Reich had demonstrated this to Nietzsche less than a century earlier.

With delusions of ideological neutrality (a common conceit among the apostles of scientism) premising his favored program for Europe’s integration, Mitrany’s supposedly dogma free functionalist approach advanced a sophisticated replication of herd values and failed to effectively contend with the fundamental source of the reactive power it sought to alleviate. I refer to the corruption that the spirit of revenge (conceived in Christian–Platonic form as an opposition to difference and becoming—“the injustices”—of life), symptomatized in a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power, introduces to the bodies and the behavior of intrinsically weak individuals. It initiates a harmful deformation of instincts prevenient to the production of “rational” experts.

Against federalism Mitrany argued that “the organization of a federal group would have to be rigid, arid so therefore will be its relations with other similar units.” This led him to identify a paradox he thought inherent to federalism and problematic for any genuinely viable international system of states:

In so far as successful it would engender a group patriotism, thus in the end reproducing in all political essentials the relationship which has existed between states and the League [of Nations] rather than that between a state and its local bodies, or that of a federation to its members. The center of gravity of the new
international life, that is, would again be misplaced, unless the scope and authority of the smaller units were to be correspondingly lesser that those of the wider grouping – and in that case they could not be close federations.\textsuperscript{364}

Yet despite recognizing some of the problems of federalism with regard to his aim of realizing a new international society through coordinated, functional action, his functionalist alternative did not seem to recognize that the solution it provided fused ideals developed on the basis of existing trends of cooperation. His alternative hints at the obsolescence of states, and possibility of overcoming the nation-state system in favor of “a union of peoples”, whose “functional representation [could be managed] somewhat on the lines of the governing organs of the ILO”.\textsuperscript{365} In its affirmation of liberalism and democracy Mitrany’s alternative was already conditioned by the values and forms of political life which, at the state or macro-political level, he seemingly opposed. There is a sense in which his vision of a functional organization unconsciously symptomatized many problems of creating / maintaining effective order in an increasingly complex international society organized around the nation-state which, however defective or harmful constituted the most (only?) practical unions of peoples in the mid-1940s.

Rosamund observes four general sorts of critical responses to functionalism. According to his summary, functionalism assumes “that the determination of needs is an objective and technocratic exercise”, making it “difficult to see how functionalist logic would work in the normal conditions of a market economy”. Indeed, making the determination of needs “an objective and technocratic exercise” would create the danger of constraining the very articulation of need in society, unnaturally formalizing its expression by sanctioning only those expressed according to the dictates of the bureaucratic organization(s) that would emerge (the disastrous five-year plans of state
controlled economies such as the former Soviet Union, with the shortages of basic goods and the stubbing out of innovation and experimentation that resulted, immediately springs to mind).

Second, Mitranian functionalism entails a naïve faith “in the ability of human beings and governments to move in rational directions”. This objection refers in part to the likelihood that groupthink, or a myopic form of accepted wisdom would arise within such groups of experts’ empanelled to determine solutions to socio-political problems. That is, their own inherently limited perspectives or worldview (*Weltanschauung*) would come to inhibit their ability to consider viable possibilities outside the disciplinary epistemic regime that would simultaneously constitute the technocratic authority of their knowledge and describe its limit – a limit they would be unlikely to perceive.

Third, as Haas later observed, functionalism “has a poor record of prediction,” although, Rosamond states, this could be argued to be invalid, as functionalism is taken by some to be “about advocacy rather than prediction”. Yet it is difficult to see how such a putatively positivist advocacy can be efficacious if it completely lacks any predictive power; moreover, can advocacy be strictly separated from a desire for some specific future outcome, which necessarily involves a thought experiment in which values and implicit, if not explicit predictions (if only weak ones) are involved? Forth, functionalism is perceived by many to lack scientific rigor. But this has been attributed to the possibility that, having emerged out of (methodologically imprecise) idealist debates of the inter-war period, “Mitrany’s …intended audience was not always an academic one.”

While being a fairly consistent advocate and defender of science, Nietzsche would have been skeptical of 20th century efforts to “fortify” the social studies with the
imprimatur of science and probably seen it as a symptom of bad-conscience. And the
aforementioned areas of criticism still do not attend the problem of what sort of will-to-truth the Functionalist model sought to develop and institutionalize, reifying as it did
some of the most reactive aspects of status-quo knowledge-authority structures, the state system that legitimated them and the anti-natural forms of hierarchical power that resulted in a naturalized spirit of revenge.

The school of functionalism has been an influential strain of European integration theory throughout the past fifty years, both as the intellectual precursor to neo-functional integration theory and for having significant influence on other, more recent schools of thought, such as interdependence and regime theory. Functionalism’s relevance persists because its approach to collective problem solving continues to be so widely applied at all levels of national and international society. This is to say, it continues to satisfy important dimensions of the prevailing pathos of truth.

Populist objections that EU methods are anti-democratic are easily overcome (i.e.: made irrelevant) via functionalist techniques of bureaucratic organization. According to the disciplining authority of the prevailing power / knowledge regime that reifies its own self-serving rationality, when popularly elected representatives of the herd empanel specialist committees or appoint experts to governmental and intergovernmental agencies tasked with recommending a policy course via studied consideration, negotiating settlements and agreements or making determinations of fact, a popular (or “democratic”) imprimatur is conferred on their decisions by extension, and their will may be said to have been realized democratically. In our dominant, post-Weberian culture of
technocratic rationality, any objections to the privileging of bureaucratic expertise are likely to be dismissed as unreasonable, if not insane.

The bureaucratic organization of governmental and civil authorities according to a technological rationality which ramifies the prerogatives of a hegemonic epistemic community divides competencies into various areas of expertise that must, in the macro-political spheres of life, be recognized as a defining characteristic of European modernism. The Western (i.e.: European/Anglo-American) habit of systematizing knowledge, in tandem with a corresponding legal culture for the management of human resources and institutions has developed as an effective mechanism for the enforcement of accountability according to a particular will-to-truth. This strict standardization of conduct and apportionment of responsibility represents another unifying feature of European-ness, a characteristic feature of European Gemeinschaft. Together these organizational features, as modes of being, are symptomatic of the underlying ethos of seemingly disparate European cultures. Conventional globalization is in no small part the exportation of this methodological framework for organization in myriad applications and disparate forms to polities outside the Western world where it developed autochthonously. Thus the globalization complex exhibits key elements – albeit largely reactive ones – of the unifying ethos at the core of the prevailing idea of Europe where it is imposed (as in the colonial era) and/or adopted (as in our post-colonial period) beyond Europe’s cultural frontier.

Despite being, to varying degrees, mimetic manifestations of ‘Europeanization’, the imposition/ adoption of this unifying ethos outside of Europe through globalizing institutions, processes and forces (throughout the colonial and our post-colonial era) is
multiplying its core (exclusionary) concept(s) of organization in frameworks for socio-political inclusivity. These frameworks, as institutional instantiations of a particular mode of life, actively interpolate (annex) the other and hybridize belonging in a particular setting or milieu, through the interpretive screens that are the autochthonous cultures that they encounter. The European ethos central to the globalization complex thereby gives rise to new forms of becoming that are wildly diverse and which contain at their core a seed from which protean expressions of an elemental ‘good Europeanism’ might germinate. This ethos—however problematic in ideological terms its imposition or adaptation outside of Europe may be—has had quantitatively and qualitatively discernable benefits. It continues to develop in unexpected, positive and active ways, through the realization of abstract potentials of globality.

Specific to Europe, a primary concern of integrationists over the last seven decades has been the contentious issue of what sort of institutional apparatus is most conducive to the unification of the continent, and how it might be perfected. It must be said that the bureaucratic method of building and managing common institutions through a technological rationality is, in all its dimensions, an essential element and expression of the prevailing idea of Europe, and has proven adaptable enough to persist through various transmutations of institutionalization. It is therefore to be celebrated as demonstrative of the agreement of elites among [European] peoples in their common acceptance of diversity facilitated by institutions at once flexible and efficacious enough to preserve a higher order through its preservation of a miscellany of types.

As such the EU’s hierarchic, bureaucratically organized and technocratically executed method of integration counter-intuitively exemplifies important concerns of
Nietzsche’s own idea of Europe. For, although imperfectly, it does in some part account for his interest in and support of the abolition of divisive nationalisms and instrumental utilization of the best aspects each people, cultural realm (e.g.: Romantic, Germanic, Slavic, etc.) and religious tradition (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, etc.) has to offer the continent as a whole, to comprise an ethos for its elevation. Nietzsche’s ideal for Europe—‘good Europeanism’—is implicit in his idea of it. Its highest potential was to be realized via a radically life-affirming anti-essentialist overcoming of the slave moral values that had straight-jacketed individuals, communities and entire peoples over much of the preceding fifteen hundred years.

The identic categories that developed in that time comprised the primary basis for belonging within the respective communities they delimited, inherently limiting possibilities for becomings therein. A naturalization of ethnic and national prejudices, exclusionary notions of community conditioned perspectives among groups and nations across the continent in largely counter-productive ways. Conversely, Nietzsche’s idea of Europe presents a vision of a Europe that accounts for and affirms difference whilst defusing the hatred and suspicion spawned by deleterious stereotypes so that the greatest number may thrive relatively unconstrained by the irrational chauvinisms of the past. Although chords of this high-mindedness may be heard in the shallow political correctness so prevalent in the spectacles of our day, Nietzsche’s vision was far more deliberate and (according to the tenets of his vitalist notion of the political and power ontology) conscientiously grounded in reality – that is man’s authentic nature. His sights were set on a farther horizon, Europe’s eventual unification, the need for which
coextended with the distant aim of overcoming the debilitating political organization of life inflicted upon the healthiest through the values of liberal modernity.

A genealogical critique of the major theories of European integration requires consideration of their historical context; the generation and response of its institutions to dynamic events of which it was a part. In examining the unfolding of Europe’s late-20th century process of political cooperation, social integration and more formal economic unification (all of which Nietzsche anticipated), as well as the activity of theorizing these activities, it should be noted that the character of Europe’s common institutions both resulted from and influenced events at the level of individuals, parties, regions, member-states, and non-members within and outside of Europe. Beyond indicating a particular outcome of contending wills to power and the trajectory that has set Europe on, or the psychological setting within which those wills arose or the relative degree of health it symptomatizes among Europe’s constituent peoples, it is the result of the whole of occurrences in the world leading up to it and happenings throughout the duration of its existence to the present, which are obviously far too complex to adequately summarize here. Nevertheless, an attempt to provide an overview is necessary to comprehend the context of these transformative occurrences.

As the benefits of cooperation achieved through the EC became evident by the 1960s, closer economic cooperation was pursued and political integration began to seem to many both inevitable and predictable. In 1965, the Treaty of Brussels (effective in 1967) provided a common institutional framework for the “three Communities,” namely the ECSC, EEC and Euratom. Previously each of the communities had a separate Council and Commission (or High Authority in the case of the ECSC), but the Brussels Treaty
combined their powers into a single Council of Ministers (after 1994 the Council of the European Union) and a single Commission. Thus the present institutional character and shape of the future EU had begun to emerge. The organization was then known simply as the EEC, and its closer integration intensified philosophical and partisan political debate within and between each member state over whether the community’s mandate should eventually supersede its members’ national sovereignty or whether it should emphasize a more inter-governmental character of cooperation between politically distinct but closely associated states.

The Luxembourg compromise followed a brief crisis instigated by French President De Gaulle’s veto of EEC’s effort at budgetary reform on the basis that it was too supranational.³⁶⁹ This compromise established the recognized right of member states to veto any legislation that a national government believed impinged on critical areas of national sovereignty or vital security interests. De Gaulle’s veto was a reassertion of the prerogatives of national self-determination, which seemed at the time to put a brake on the potential depth of Europe’s functional integration.

This establishes the backdrop for the next major theoretical perspective to emerge on European integration, and it is among the most influential to date.

**Neo-functionalism**

Neo-functionalism became the dominant theory in integration studies in the early 1960s, in part to account for inadequacies in the functionalist school of thought. But it also occurred in response to the behavioralist challenge across the social sciences. In an effort to answer basic questions such as why integration processes might occur, and how
might they be made desirable or encouraged, neo-functionalism took the development of common institutions in Europe as the focal point of its examination. With their attention on Europe, scholars in this theoretical school strove to explain certain integration outcomes. This begged certain questions however, such as how exactly any conclusions the neo-functionalist perspective reached could be universally applicable, even in the abstract, outside the European cultural realm (broadly construed) and its particular, if internally varied, historical and social contexts.

Neo-functionalism also drew upon the behavioralist trend in social science research to offer a provocative and seemingly useful explanatory thesis for the Community’s integration dynamic. This entailed an intensification of faith in scientism, through:

the growing impulse to render the study of social phenomena more ‘scientific’. This meant that theories were devices for generating testable hypotheses and that theoretical evaluation would be bound up with the extent to which research driven by the theory in question produced a depiction of ‘reality’ that confirmed or denied the hypothesis.370

The behavioralist trend transformed notions of academic legitimacy in the social sciences and the form of its inquiry. Disciplinary authority became dependent upon the parsimoniousness definition of a problem and the application of rigorous scientific standards and statistical methods in research to produce quantitative results. Proponents of the approach believed that it defined the terms of a successful demonstration of the “accuracy” of a theoretical approach. From a Nietzschean perspective, it was a sophisticated if philosophically problematic performative enactment of an ideal of scholarly objectivity: the mimicking of the positivistic orientation compelled by the discourses of scientism.
In brief, neo-functionalism, much like its functionalist predecessor, emphasized the interactions of diverse actors pursuing a variety of interests and stressed processes over outcomes. It asserted that technical cooperation in specific areas of shared concern would have a spillover effects, or positive ramifications for further mutual aid in other sectors and activities. This would generate a cooperative momentum that would affect numerous areas of economic and social governance as well as political authority, leading to closer cooperation and transparency, mutual trust and ever-deepening integration.371 Ernst B. Haas and Leon N. Lindberg were the major figures of the neo-functionalist school from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. In attempting to provide a Nietzschean analysis of the neo-functionalist development in theorizing European integration I will focus primarily on the former (Haas), utilizing his works and contemporary critical assessments of them.

Ernst B. Haas’s The Uniting of Europe, which first appeared in 1958, became a landmark text on Europe’s integration process and a starting point for his influential neo-functionalist view. The theory that emerged held that as disparate and competitive nation-state actors collaborated in various policy realms, whether functional or otherwise, new and relatively independent transnational competences would arise between them. At this early stage in Europe’s integration Haas observed that the process was occurring primarily along economic lines. However, he acknowledged even then that “economic integration, however defined, may be based on political motives and frequently begets political consequences. The existence of political motives [for economic integration]...in Western Europe is clearly established.”372 Cooperation leading to political integration was likely to occur more gradually.
Through a “process of bureaucratic interpenetration, usually referred to in the literature as engrenage,” the converging demands of states would necessitate the establishment of central authorities to manage cooperation.\textsuperscript{373} This would incrementally build trust to create a basis for greater loyalty between rival political entities, fostering the prospect of ‘good-Europeanism’. The mitigation of nationalist chauvinisms and xenophobic prejudices would ultimately alleviate any basis for conflicts between states, which would lead to the rational prioritization of mutually beneficial cooperation over narrow, national self-interests to maintain the beneficial dynamic of ever-greater exchange (understood in terms of mutual aid) across ever-expanding domains of activity.

The anticipated result was a mutual reinforcement of expanding shared interests, one that has, arguably, been incrementally realized throughout the process of European unification. Such collaboration would lead to changed perceptions and expectations as well as a transformation of identity within each community involved (re: nation-states acting as sovereign actors), as they came to recognize and enjoy the practical benefits of cooperation. Following classic economistic reasoning this increase in material prosperity and existential security would continually generate the rational desire for further integration, necessitating additional cooperation and providing a renewed impetus for integration, ad infinitum.

As Rosamund puts it, “neo-functionalism’s appearance coincided with the development of pluralism in political science [and] in many ways …can be read as a pluralist theory.”\textsuperscript{374} Indeed, Haas himself had written “it is the thesis of this study that the processes implied in integration are merely a special expression of the logic of pluralism …which tends to lead toward the formation of countervailing aggregates of economic
interest, freedom of organization and bargaining in western Europe.” On the premise that “functional integration requires pluralism” it was the neo-functionalist’s view that such pluralism was initiated by elite socialization, in which high-ranking officials seek the cooperation of their peers in neighboring states in order to resolve problems or reach agreement in issue areas of mutual concern. Working together to manage international problems, these elites would create an impetus for mutual management that would take form in agencies combining the knowledge, perspectives and talents of each states’ most influential members.

Prior to 1944–1945, the impulse for such cooperation extends back to early modern Europe in a developmental process punctuated by (at least) three transformative events, the peace of Westphalia (1648), the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Treaty of Versailles (1919). But the neofunctionalists asserted that a far more profound degree of trans-national cooperation was occurring following the second World War, one that was gradually subordinating the nation-state itself to the prerogatives of an emergent, supranational economic community and ultimately a unified polity as well. Chryssochoou observes, “An essential part of the neo-functionalist strategy was the identification of the Community method as the new modus operandi of the general system.” This method, he explains:

…consisted, *inter alia*, of high levels of elite socialization, joint lobbying activities by organized interests, the Commission’s right of legislative initiative, the involvement of national governments in complex negotiations at the European level and a certain culture on the part of the Commission for upgrading the wider Community interest.

Old forms of discipline (in the Foucaultian sense of a constructive and interactive dynamic process of power-knowledge relations) took new guises to moderate norms and
expectations as an incrementally transformed power–knowledge regime, one dynamically symptomatic and productive of the changed jurisdictions and institutional character of the authority it mediated.

To restate: as mutual policy formulation and collaboration generated its own momentum, the neofunctionalists perspective was fortified by an observable increase in the need for cooperation as spillover between issue-areas occurred. Moreover, as elite interests converged upon a generally agreed upon understanding of the project of integration, it became easier to transform the attitudes of the masses – to bring them onboard as it were, as well. Voter sentiments across member states were gradually transformed in favor of the EU as it increasingly sought their imprimatur. This occurred not only through an increase in direct voter involvement in determining the future course of the union via referenda and the election of parliamentary representatives but also through the extensive marketing (spectacularization) of putatively common Europe-wide objectives. This was plainly evident in the late 1980s and 90s.

To legitimate their agenda, EU elites and other arbiters of integration consistently promoted the prerogatives and interests of EU institutions, e.g.: their continued development and the eastward expansion of the Union. Validating their intuition that the beneficial affects of elite socialization – the optimism of the post-war Western European ethos, which was crucial to developments that would culminate in the EU – the media willingly perpetuated the desire to make the EU a reality. It did so through mass-media support of the view that optimism would be catching as the benefits of regional cooperation were realized, and this would transform the attitudes of average European citizens.
The aforementioned new European ethos was gradually legitimated and mainstreamed among publics of the EU’s member- and aspirant-states. To gain broad acceptance an democratic idea of Europe, one amenable to the all-too-many, was promoted. By appealing to the timorous and the spiritual dwarfs through populist values, the highly sublimated ressentiment of ascetic-consumerist priests—whose primary objective was a unified European market—exploited the herd’s susceptibility to crass consumption. This was a secularized, slave-moral compensation for the absence of any greater metaphysical grounding for existence in the wake of World War Two and the Holocaust, let alone the death of God.

As the neofunctionalists identified, the primary aim of conventional advocates of European integration, has been to maximize profits by facilitating economic flows through centralized (quasi-federal) supra-governmental institutions. From the perspective of these “flies of the marketplace” greater coherence and efficiency in the management of a trading bloc or region and the broader global system of which each is a part is intrinsically rational and desirable. Such ideals are asserted via the cacophonous and bedazzling spectacle that masks the inauthenticity generated by the artificial and exaggerated desires it cultivates. These originally Christian–Platonic ideals, sublated through secularization, provide existential meanings and ontological purposes to passive nihilists in a hyper-decadent age typified by a ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’. According to the dictates of the New Economy ‘free market fundamentalism’ every human need is fulfilled by consumption, and every period of life is defined by it: childhood, education, work, marriage and family, and death.
As a means of perfecting this set of ultra-liberal-modern, anti-natural ideals, Europe’s conventional economic and political integration enhances activities and forms of life that systematically deflect those endowed with healthy instincts and strong drives from their authentic selves and opportunities for radical self-overcoming (acts of becoming-other). However, as I try to show below, Europe’s integration and the broader forces of globalization also generate unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality that may enable the healthiest free spirits to become who it is they are. These transformative conditions for becoming are also shown to be the invariable result of the achievement and extension of the objectives of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment.  

The neo-functionalist premise that the procedural sorts of consensus building characteristic of national parliamentary political systems would be expanded to the supranational level and thereby displace the international state system’s power based relations was attacked as naively idealistic. Against the neo-functionalist thesis it was argued that the relevance of states and their long-established sovereign power in a largely anarchic international system would not be diminished by the limited consensus occurring between states in Western Europe, which would itself eventually breakdown and thereby demonstrate once more the efficacy of the nation-state as the best tool for cultivating and maximizing liberal values and freedoms.  

Regarding Haas’ late (2004) defense of neo-functionalism and his assertion that it was no longer obsolescent, Rosamund remarked that:

The recovery of neofunctionalism from its reputation as a failed academic experiment is rather more than an exercise in academic excavation. The fact that it was buried in the first place is indicative of a tendency within the present scholarly community to produce narratives of the field’s history that draw robust boundaries between past errors and present rigor. In the wrong hands this can induce all
manner of closures and the establishment of claims that effectively outlaw particular kinds of work. Beyond its (recovered) analytical salience, neofunctionalism was/is a remarkably open-minded intellectual project that drew sustenance from across the spectrum of the social sciences.\textsuperscript{383}

This states a limitation of the field that originates in the prevailing conception of truth and the best means of deducing it. The straight-jacketing of possible trajectories for theoretical investigation can only impair the field further.

**Transactionalism**

Through the 1950s and early 1960s an alternative theory to the then dominant functionalist and neo-functionalist schools of international integration was being developed by Karl Deutsch and his peers. Dubbed “transactionalism” for what he identified as a key dimension in processes of international integration, it became influential within the field in the mid-1960s. The behavioralist emphasis on “testing theoretical conjectures against empirical data” that intensified the discourses of scientism and the positivist orientation it conferred on and the social studies. Nonetheless this very much appealed to Deutsch, whose works, “assembled and analyzed a large amount of statistical data on population movements, language assimilation and the flow of international transactions such as trade and mail.”\textsuperscript{384}

In three of his major works, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953, reissued in 1966), and *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (1957), *Communication Theory and Political Integration* (1964), Deutsch examined nationalism, and its complex relationship to social learning, more broadly. He did so in order to explicate it as a determining factor in integrative developments between sovereign
communities. Key to the largely positive communal ethos created by nationalism was a more or less shared mental state reinforced by we-feelings and intentions at once productive of and naturalized by a shared language and worldview (Weltanschauung).

Enhancing the frequency and effectiveness of communication between states was critical for Deutsch. “The guiding hypothesis of transactionalist work on integration was that a sense of community among states would be a function of the level of communication between states.”385 The ways in which nationalism was formative of the bonds unifying a community and how such a powerful force could be constructively managed so as to facilitate—rather than inhibit—the formation of multi-national polities to mitigate the chances of warfare between countries were motivating concerns for Deutsch. Therefore one of his primary concerns was explicating NATO in terms of how it, along with other institutions and geo-political dynamics was giving rise to a “transatlantic ‘security community’ rather than on European integration, per se.”386

According to Deutsch the character of security communities differed according to two major types: the pluralistic and amalgamated. The former he considered to have arisen from formal agreements between states short of creating any supranational institutional authority “to produce a ‘sense of security’ among the relevant populations, whereby the resolution of conflicts through violent means would be replaced by mutually acceptable methods for their peaceful settlement.”387 According to Rosamund:

Pluralistic communities required only three conditions to exist: compatibility of major values among the units, a capacity for politically relevant groups to respond to each other’s stimuli without violence and a ‘mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another’s political, economic and social behavior’.388

As all of these conditions were present throughout the hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-
-modern, transatlantic region in the post-war era, such a pluralistic community—however cynically rationalized and/or maintained—was imminently attainable.

In addition to theorizing how the generation and fulfillment of expectations between diverse communities corresponded with the regularization of value norms and functional practices Deutsch attempted to demonstrate how, via such reciprocal affectivity, this would create the predictability and trust necessary for the development of an actual ‘sociopsychological community’. One positive and predictable result of increasing transactions of a certain sort would be a palpable change in the disposition among the respective publics of the communities toward one another. Deutsch called this “social learning” and considered it crucial in the formation of a larger people—a propaedeutic stage conditioning the possibility of a multi-cultural, transnational society or pluralistic community. Over a long period fundamental changes in popular attitudes and prejudices would occur through gradual social learning to foster, over generations, increasingly friendly relations between former rival states.

The creation of common frameworks for institutional cooperation (like NATO) between separate nation-states was a necessary condition for the sorts of interaction Deutsch thought productive of greater comity between peoples. Preliminary to this “a process of social integration [which] lead[s] to the formation of ‘pluralistic’ security communities,” must occur, which upon further development via a “community of social communication” leads “to amalgamation.” As Chryssochoou states, “community feelings, and the emergence over time of a ‘community of values’ at the larger level of aggregation, were seen [by Deutsch] as the result, rather than the cause, of closer links among participating units.”
Deutsch cites fourteen conditions of varying importance for both pluralistic and amalgamated security communities. The essential factors as he lists them are: “compatibility of major values” and “mutual responsiveness” between prospectively amalgamating units. Non-essential factors include: a distinctive way of life, a complementarity between “core areas and their capabilities”, at least one core area of which needed to exhibit “superior economic growth”, and between whose members there exist “expectation[s] of joint economic reward”. In this general setting Deutsch would expect to find (in no particular order) a “wide[ning] range of mutual transactions” facilitated by “unbroken links of social communication” fostering the “greater mobility of persons” and resulting in a discernable “broadening of elites”. Furthermore, Deutsch believes it helpful but nonessential that states forming such communities become “reluctant to wage ‘fratricidal’ war”, a condition he thought natural to the increased civility between them. The presence of an “outside military threat” could provide a strong incentive for forging a security community, as could pre-existing “strong economic ties” and “ethnic and linguistic assimilation”, but these latter conditions weren’t necessary for integrative processes to occur (as the recent break up Serbia and Montenegro into separate states served to demonstrate).

Deutsch asserted that the greater amity arising between peoples in security communities would increase reasonableness in problem solving by fostering an instinctive preference for mutually agreeable outcomes between them. In the beneficial conditions encouraged by improved and regularized transactions within a security community, social challenges and political problems (potential sources of conflict) would automatically be
dealt with in a calmer manner.

“The resolution of conflicts through violent means would be replaced by mutually
acceptable methods for their peaceful settlement. [T]he particular attitudes of the
actors involved… would create a certain culture of cooperation which, through the
forging of further and closer communicative links among them, would make resort
to war highly unlikely.”395

Within the expanded, neoteric community, the mentality of its constituent peoples toward
the utility of violence as a means for problem-solving and the uses of force more
generally, would themselves be transformed. An effectively functioning security
community would pacify its public, making it largely averse to inter-communal
fighting.396 Views from within the community toward nations outside of it are a different
matter.

Yet another effect of transformed expectations due to social learning among the
member-states of pluralistic security communities is the modification of the norms and
practices of states outside the community. As the disposition of nations within a pluralistic
community undergoes transformation, their methods of engagement with states on the
outside of their community change as well. A transference of values gradually occurs
thereby that infect and ways of interacting, conditioning the possibility for future inclusion
of new members within the community and greater pluralism. This communication of
norms and practices takes passive and active forms. On a social level it happens passively,

through human mimesis resulting through myriad forms of contact. In the economic arena
it occurs actively through the regularization of trade and standardization of production. So
too its transmission is active in the political realm, as transformed expectations concerning
the conduct of international affairs change the behavior of states. The communicable sense
of mutual sympathy and trust arising from pluralistic security communities spreads
between peoples as nations “inoculate” themselves with the attitudes of their neighbors through ever closer contact. This “contagious” effect is plainly evident from the EU’s recent expansions and palpable among the societies at its penumbra today.397

In a logic related to that of Mitrany’s functionalist thesis, Deutsch believed that, “once pluralistic community formation [had] taken place, political elites [might] opt to build common supranational institutions, thereby producing ‘amalgamated security communities’ (essentially federal unions)”.398 This sort of formal integration shared all the necessary sociopsychological features of a pluralistic security community. But the amalgamated security community represented a much deeper degree of integration. As such it was dependent:

in considerable part upon the relationship of two rates of change: the growing rate of claims and burdens upon central governments as against the growing—in some instances, the insufficiently growing—level of capabilities of the governmental institutions of the amalgamated political community.399

As such, “amalgamated communities were vulnerable to a number of potential destabilizing factors.”

Rosamund notes Deutsch’s identification of six, those being “increased military burdens, …rapid increases in social mobilization and political participation within the component units, …shifts in social differentiation, a decline in administrative capabilities, a closure of political elites and a dissonance between government action and societal expectations.”400 In other words, Deutsch anticipated that the efficaciousness of an amalgamating community could be undermined by the inability of the existing institutions of a component unit to adequately respond to or contend with rapid changes in the
prevailing attitudes and behavioral expectations of a component unit’s (member-state’s) constituents.

In the view of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, an important distinction needs to be made with relevance to Deutsch’s idea of the “more advanced form” of polity attained through the creation of a “living and organic collective entity… whose ‘norms of order’ are based upon ‘concord’” and the “rational coming together of ends that remain individual.” This qualitatively distinguishes the amalgamated security community from its weaker counterpart—the form of society attained in a pluralistic security community. The amalgamated form is better understood via the notion of a Gemeinschaft, a sociopsychological community comprising a “stable form of association… that rests on the concept of ‘one people’”. Conversely, the pluralistic security community is more easily achievable, as it consists of the co-existence of formally separate units—or states—in limited society with one another. As a Gesellschaft, or conventionally agreed society it “rests on the concept of contract.”

Whereas Gemeinschaft results from mutual convictions that unite people, Gesellschaft comes about in order to fulfill instrumental aims.

As Gesellschaft was simpler to attain, and increased familiarity between cooperating units, it was also likely to increase trust over time. As trust increased the “network of mutual transactions” occurring between the units involved would grow commensurately. Rosamund observes that “Deutsch was interested in Gemeinschaft as a condition of integration. The end point of integration, from this perspective, is a sense of community – a qualitative leap from pacts, treaties and alliances among states.” For that leap to occur however, interactions would have to foster a high degree of responsiveness
corresponding with the respective capabilities of the units. As noted above, as transactions increase, attitudes and behavioral expectations are transformed as actors become comfortable with one another. The ‘we-feelings’ and we-intentions of their merging mindsets can accelerate demands that outpace the capabilities of the units – that is, exceed their responsiveness – and potentially frustrate the integration progress thereby. In order for an authentic Gemeinschaft to succeed these crucial “cognitive shifts” would have to be managed so as not to exceed the capacity of amalgamating units—states—to cope with them.403

Aware of the possible utility of functionalist methods of integration toward the ultimate attainment of an amalgamated security community, Deutsch observes that:

Functionalism, it appears, is a device that has been widely used both in successful and in unsuccessful movements toward amalgamation, somewhat a functional devolution and decentralization have been used in successful and in unsuccessful attempts at secession. The outcome in all such situations seems mostly to have been the result of other conditions and other processes—depending largely on whether functionalism mainly was associated with experiences of joint rewards or of joint deprivations— with functionalism in itself doing little to help or to harm.404 He concludes with some ambivalence that functionalism would neither hinder nor necessarily facilitate the development of more comprehensive amalgamation between states. Because conditions and circumstances vary so widely between units (states) and across time, Deutsch largely avoids specific prescriptive criteria for the institutionalized integration of communities.

Chryssochoou observes that, “Deutsch was not particularly concerned with the institutional configuration that the integration process would bring about, or for that matter with processes of formal institutional change.”405 More important than the sort of formal arrangements that engendered necessary trust, was the actual development of a
shared sense of security between peoples toward a similar mindset that would, in turn, foster common interests and analogous we-feelings and intentions between them to aid the desired integration of their communities. Deutsch’s “emphasis is on a different level of analysis: the development of a sense of community at the popular level.”

Out of his ostensible faith in science however, Deutsch maintained the dubious belief that the particular degree of integration between states could be determined by measuring “the volume, context, and scope of international transactions over multiple ranges of social, economic, cultural and political areas.” Moreover, he thought the rate of communication between units in these broad areas could be used via a “statistical tool called the ‘index of relative acceptance’,” to measure:

the ratio of extra-regional relative to intra-regional communication and transactions. Integration is indicated by a higher volume and range of communications between community members than between members and outsiders. The more varied and numerous the transactions among a group of states, the more pronounced and solid the international community is likely to be.

Of course all criteria for adducing such ratios would of necessity be determined arbitrarily and any meaning attached to them would be the subjective product of those decisions. Additionally, the impossibility of ever attaining an intrinsically objective stance on the matter in question, through some measure in the ratios of “communication and transactions” must be acknowledged and regarded as dubious—even to the extent they result in truth-apt claims about the world. As all estimations of the affective power of the communications and transactions in question, their respective ratios to one another and their resulting effectiveness are ultimately a product of the observer’s imagination, they would produce inherently relativistic, or intrinsically biased, results. It is highly likely that no scientifically neutral perspective on the activity in question is possible.
This critique stems from Nietzsche’s (Heraclitean) view that there are no static phenomena in the world. The dynamism of human activity and the continually propagating nature of communication make its effects enormously difficult to accurately quantify, to derive complete data from or generate firm conclusions about. One might draw general conclusions about past occurrences, but attempts to extrapolate on the basis of such a broad survey for predictive purposes would be in vain, for one could not confidently assert anything on such a contestable foundation.

Yet, with regard to ascertaining truths about reality—the world as it actually is—that vanity symptomatizes the conceits propagated by the conventional discourses of scientism, which are loathe to admit that the fetish they make of science (in the Western Socratic tradition emphasizing the attainment of knowledge) is a strategy to deny that what they create—every result they produce—is art. In creating their world, be it an integrated Europe or some other socio-political arrangement on the continent, they get no closer to possessing any intrinsically objective truth.408

**Concordance Systems Analysis**

In the early 1970s Donald Puchala presented a critique of the emerging narrative of integration via a new perspective on the problem of theorizing it. Dubbed the ‘concordance systems’ model of analysis, Puchala proposed it both to account for the deficiencies he identified in the theoretical approaches that had preceded it, and to account for the best insights of each. He strove to do so in a way that synthesized some key aspects of contradictory viewpoints on the “different parts, dimensions or manifestations of the
phenomenon” according to an innovative perspective. In explaining his motivations he observed that:

More than fifteen years of defining, redefining, refining, modeling and theorizing have failed to generate satisfactory conceptualizations of exactly what it is we are talking about when we refer to ‘international integration’ and exactly what it is we are trying to learn when we study this phenomenon.409

Puchala proposed a theoretical stance to mitigate the conceptual confusion he believed to be plaguing the field. By doing so he hoped to provide a definition of the integration process itself as well as the task of examining international integration.

Toward that “new conceptualization” he adopted a pluralist, quasi-perspectivalist, critical stance in tackling this objective, arguing that:

…conventional frameworks have clouded more than they have illuminated our understanding of international integration. No model describes the integration phenomena with complete accuracy because all the models present images of what integration could be or should be rather than what it is [or what is occurring] here and now.410

Of course, “theorizing” what is, meaning present discernable existents, or the transitory being of an entity or phenomenon’s becoming, is impossible to do in isolation from broader contexts in which it exists, i.e.: what actually happens in the world. This underscores the fact that dynamic social processes are, arguably, impossible to reduce to a parsimonious explanatory model. Nevertheless, Puchala endeavored to provide a simple, if conceptually rich and pioneering model.

Concerned with whether theorist’s European integration were merely entertaining themselves with intellectual fashions or attaining substantive knowledge of their subject of inquiry, Puchala endeavored to advance an explanatory theoretical framework for better comprehending Europe’s integration. His ‘concordance system’ approach comprised a
sort of analytical pastiche, which conceived the developing community in terms of a new kind of political arrangement in which political activity was best understood as occurring at various levels of society specific to the spatial-temporal relevance of diverse issue areas affecting each particular level. This occurred in accordance with the differing degrees of involvement among respective actors at and/or between those levels and depended upon the continually varying influence capability of actors at any one level within “a particular kind of attitudinal environment”. These levels were defined along state-centric lines, in terms of their activity in relation to the nation-state. His notion thereby underscored the continuing primacy of the nation-state in the complex entity emerging through the “concordance system”. The main levels of activity Puchala identified were the sub-national, national, transnational and supranational, wherein modes of cooperation enabled positive-sum interactions between actors toward pragmatic policy convergence and authentic consensus between states and peoples.

The reality of the nation-state’s predominance in the existing international system and its primary role in bringing into being anything new (such as a supranational community in Europe) constrains what can be conceived with regard to what political or economic integration is producing in either normative or theoretical / conceptual terms. The desire to keep his analysis to the normative dimension and largely eschew the theoretical (which he believed had muddied previous analyses) clearly limited Puchala’s willingness to extrapolate about how changes in the interdependence of autonomous states would alter notions of state-sovereignty, territorial integrity and understandings of citizenship, belonging and community, as well as concepts of self and otherness, the
justice (or just-ness) of these conventional forms of inclusion and exclusion, and what changes such altered views might generate. Recognizing that integration theorists had to:

…but testing the present in terms of progress toward or regression from hypothetical futures, since [there is] no way of knowing where or how contemporary international integration is going to end up,

Puchala went a long way in suggesting the positive explanatory potential of the concordance system he had theorized, asserting that the ‘distinctive attitudinal environment’ cultivated by a long period of growth in mutual understanding among the members of a concordance system working for same shared desires so as to enjoy communal rewards was bound to have transformative effects on the nation-state itself.413

This implied an inexorable process of change to the primacy of nation-states in the concordance system and by extension its conceptualization and understanding of international politics. Though he doubted that integration via increased interdependence would result in the radical assimilation of diverse peoples as many of his contemporaries hoped, he did anticipate that significant changes would occur in the relationship between peoples and their governments. Among these, the semi-autonomous and interdependent actors at various levels were seen to employ bargaining techniques predicated on full disclosure of pertinent information to attain mutually reinforcing outcomes, either between peoples and their governments or between nations.

Puchala’s theory provides a pragmatic framework for conflict resolution and problem solving, as he maintains that the exclusion of coercion or unilateral demands between actors describes the pattern of customary behavior that concordance systems engender. That ‘exclusion of coercion’ would seem to edge toward the idealistic if it were not narrowly referring to the threatened use of instruments of war; otherwise it does not
ignore the real differences in power between states that structure their relations, especially their interdependence and cooperation. For instance, France and Germany will always, and, many would argue, rightly should have more influence upon EU affairs than microstates such as Malta or Cyprus.

It is obvious however that the former great powers do dictate to and/or coerce the latter members of the community through diplomatic means, manipulation of institutional arrangements and the disproportionate force of their influence over the community; they regularly do employ tactics to achieve their desired objectives. Nevertheless, the populous, powerful states must compromise to varying degrees with their weaker co-members in the Union and have structured the democratic, agonistic process of legislative approval on qualified majority voting as well as establishing other institutional checks and balances to ensure continued concordance. Less powerful member-states are thereby assured of not being overrun or ignored by larger states when the stakes are especially high. The insights of ‘concordance system’ theory therefore continue to provide powerful analytic tools for comprehending the activities and development of the EU.

Puchala’s somewhat strange adherence/devotion to the primacy of the nation-state (as a desire to preserve?) raises interesting questions about the theory and his agenda in positing it: namely, why does the prospect of nations of people assimilating in certain conceptual realms and the nation-states’ increasing obsolescence trouble him so? As Chryssochoou observes, Puchala refuses to allow that the consequences of his own theory might be “the negation of the nation-state.”

Rather [Puchala states], ‘nation-states can be preserved as distinct entities only through the international pooling of resources to confront problems that challenge
their separate existence.’ Likewise, Puchala explicitly states that ‘mass populations within the concordance system need not be assimilated into a supranationality’.414

But it is unclear either that states can only be preserved in this way or that populations need not be assimilated. Neither possibility is necessarily so, and the latter could be desirable.

Puchala’s partisan, ideologically driven prejudice for preserving the state is evident here – as with nearly every theorist of European integration – and reveals certain fears of change that hint at reaction: Puchala does not want the process of integration, which he has persuasively explicated and thinks mainly positive, to run away with itself and become threatening to his perception of the best sort of (status quo) political organization or the ontological features of the nation-state upon which he feels existentially dependent.

Such a privileging of the nation-state form and the global community of sovereign nations its universal imposition from the early 16th to the mid-20th centuries brought about, has normalized a thoroughly entrenched international system of theoretically autonomous and equal states that holds its own standardized practices and legal norms as intrinsically good. Through a self-justifying logic it systematically excludes and/or forcibly homogenizes difference and (consistent with its tradition) seeks power over others in the name of security. In so doing it simultaneously validates and enforces the perception that the nation-state is the highest, most legitimate and most desirable formalized institutional structure for the organization, maintenance and preservation of community that a people can aspire to attain. This perception reveals the pre-ontological foundations of the contemporary (European) nation-state system. By extension it also
illuminates certain causes of the existential angst that arises among its most ardent ideological proponents in response to the problem of failed states as well as the frequently disastrous consequences that result when a state breaks up in a disorderly, contested fashion, as in the former Yugoslavia, among other places.415

The rigidity of attitudes and reactive dispositions generated by identic affiliation with the nation-state (through discourses of patriotism, etc.) compel by necessity the defense of the reactive principles subtending the nation-state. This is analogous to Deleuze’s notion of dual capture, in which the state form re-territorializes (i.e.: coercively interpolates to repress) all acts of becoming-other; confining and dissipating active forces for which its own complex incongruities are always-already conditioning the possibility. When effective these homogenizing reactive forces operate so automatically that desiring is contained within the acceptable parameters of a stultifying condition of becoming same.

This majoritarian form of desiring is sustained by a will to truth symptomatized by the hegemonic statist logic that has been universalized over the previous century via the nationalization of the world. This European cultural form (the nation-state) produces conflicting conceptions of selfhood and group belonging via modes of exclusion that result in violence. The reactive need to define oneself and ones’ community against an outside other ossifies antagonistic stances between groups, both within and between disparate polities. This is the primary challenge to be overcome in the present stage of the political development of humankind—one Nietzsche associated with the aim of great culture—and the most constructive and hopeful aspects of the European unification process and its potential. Good Europeans are advanced in their achievement of this aim
by their recognition that, “There is no unified essence in the light of which we might be
tempted or prompted to sum people up, close the books on them or presume to measure
them in any fundamental way.”

Examples of this include occasions when a sub-national minority group within a
multi-ethnic, multi-national state demands greater political autonomy or outright
independence. Such factional challenges call into question the territorial-based political
legitimacy (sovereignty) of the state, according to the very same statist logic that
maintains it. This brings the existential basis of the state into dispute. In so far as the
disgruntled faction defies the privileged prerogatives of the state’s sovereign legal
authority, it is not by any means a necessarily authentic or innovative minoritarian
movement characterized by active force in a positive will to creative destruction as
generative power.

Rather, it is nearly always the opposite: a desire originating in ressentiment and
expressed through reactive forces that re-affirm the statist logic with which it coheres.
This is to say that such pseudo-revolutionary secessionist movements occur according to
the same logic of particularistic ethno-national idenic affiliation that serves to legitimate
the territorially defined nation-state form, and its notionally coextending sovereignty as
recognized in international law. Therefore almost without exception, autonomy seeking
separatist movements always already replicate the very forces which they believe to be
“oppressing” them.

The EU itself exemplifies the contradictions ineluctably generated by statist logic.
It attempts to diffuse the worst potential consequences of this in advance through a
number of mechanisms. For example, it has systematically created a legally binding
citizenship status for all individuals rightfully residing within the community that provides
them with guaranteed political, social, economic and cultural rights and strives to foster
“affectio societatis—a feeling of identification with the Union as a whole rather than
simply with the member states”. Notably, it does so while simultaneously, and somewhat
schizophrenically, trying to ensure the inviolable sovereignty of its member-states.417

Despite the implicit suggestion that EU citizenship subordinates or makes redundant the
conventional citizenship conferred upon its member-states’ residents by their respective
national governments, the EU continues to guarantee specific protections for regional and
cultural minorities within those sovereign nations, again replicating the logic of
particularism and suggesting that national citizenship is in certain instances problematic
for certain classes or groups of individuals. The most efficacious and prosperous nation-
states (the preeminent polity) in the world today are those capable of co-opting the
disparate interests of their constituent peoples or minority factions. The EU does so
consistently, if haltingly; in Deleuze’s helpfully innovative language, by generating
another set of striations across the varied social spaces of Europe that function to delimit
and re-capture differences capable of endangering the project and homogenize the
increasingly quiescent area it describes.

It is the authentic overcoming of the debilitating, exclusionary logic of the nation-
state form through creative experimentation and disruptions that corresponds with
Nietzsche’s praise of thymotic non-conformism and associated ‘good Europeanism’. The
experiments of Nietzschean attempters are most likely to succeed when they disrupt the
ability of the state to interpolate, or make majoritarian, all desiring or potential becoming-
other. The authentic transmutation of reactive values through metamorphosing active
forces, in its genuinely de-centering radicality, goes unrecognized as a challenge to the established order and its reigning ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. This is because the latter comprehends power only in terms of overt domination over others and coercive means of control, as ways of limiting the irrepressible growth of human life. It cannot countenance an effective exteriorizing of a smooth, heterogeneous space conducive to free play and becoming-other across a genuinely dynamic social field.

Despite Puchala’s insight into the relatively dynamic functioning of conventional states and the inter-relating of actors within concordance systems, his concern for preserving the nation-state, expressed in the form of an objection to other possibilities, is resonant with archaic, essentialist reifications of identity rooted in geographic, historical, linguistic, ethnic, nationalist, religious, particularism that almost invariably has all-too-human affects. It privileges what is out of a fear of the unsettling change necessary to create a natural and life-affirming polity. Though Nietzsche recognized each of these common identifiers as important to, even constitutive of, individuals and communities, he saw that they must be understood (that is affirmed) in their proper context and ultimately overcome as the defining attributes of a wholly formed person, or higher type. The statist logic of the concordance of the system Puchala describes belies his acquiescence to it.

Puchala’s reiteration of the primacy of the state tells of the anxiety that integration processes were then generating (as they continue to do), anxiety aroused by change potentially challenging to established traditions including that of the nation-state as the preeminent form of political community. The tradition of nation-state supremacy in the international political life of humankind was reinforced by the regime’s ability to
ontologically presence the values of liberal modernity and coherently ground the autonomous rationality enabled thereby.

Like other theorists of European integration who “fall back” on the comforts provided by the existent state system, Puchala was unable to identify a similarly rational basis for political authority in the hypothetical absence of the state, or in the empirical facts integration was producing on the ground (which pointed to the ultimate obsolescence of the state) reactively diverted attention from the potentially nobler objective of integrating the continent according to a meaningful, overarching idea of Europe based on the rarer noble traits, shared aspirations and willingness of its exemplars. These include the accommodation of authentic difference within the context of a naturalistic, materialist ethos that increases the pathos of difference within themselves and between types.

Later, “Puchala conceived of the EC as a ‘multi-layered political system’, which governs the behavior of political actors across local, national and regional levels.” The success of it as a system depended upon agreement on those levels and the mandate of higher political authorities. The community’s effective functioning required “joint decision-making at the regional level but also on the subsequent ability of national governments to implement those decisions in the face of resistance from domestic polities and societies.” Puchala identified the significance of contrasting methods of persuasion and accord to the expansion, deepening and viability of that process.

As a developing political system originating in mutual compromises between sovereign states, the EC comprised a set of supranational institutions with very limited autonomy. Yet although based on intergovernmental cooperation, their logic suggested to many that they would continue to develop along increasingly supranational lines. The
debate between over this issue eventually took the form of opposing disciplinary camps and became a central issue within the field in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and continues to the present. Puchala’s conception of the EC as a concordance system wherein interactions are comprised at various levels by distinct measures of autonomy and overlap tended toward the latter. His conception of the EC as a system of governance anticipated important comparativists and governance approaches to integration in the middle and late 1990s.

The horizon of possibilities for conceptualizing European integration was revealed by Puchala’s work to be more expansive than it had previously been thought by arbiters of integration. His ‘concordance system’ analysis arguably disclosed the complex multilevel activities occurring through and constitutive of integration processes. His framework also anticipated many theoretical insights to come, particularly those interdependence and multi-level governance theories. Perhaps most indicative of its wide influence, it would be used by partisan exponents of both state-centric approaches and advocates of supranationalism.

An early intergovernmentalist perspective

Stanley Hoffmann was among the first to offer a sustained critique of the neo-functionalist thesis through a neo-realist theory of high and low politics comprising an intergovernmentalist perspective. His was another of the critical voices to effectively cast doubt on the depth and extent to which integration would really transform the fundamental ways in which European states interacted. Responding in part to the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ of 1966, which brought France back to full participation in Community
affairs after a period of calculated distance instigated by De Gaulle’s reinvigoration of French nationalism, Hoffmann interrogated neofunctionalist arguments that understood cooperative processes to gradually foster greater trust, collaboration and unity.

Hoffmann was pessimistic regarding the prospects for political integration twenty years after the end of World War Two, observing:

The nation-state is still here, and the new Jerusalem has been postponed because the nations in Western Europe have not been able to stop time and to fragment space. Political unification could have succeeded if, on the one hand, these nations had not been caught in the whirlpool of different concerns, as a result both of profoundly different internal circumstances and of outside legacies, and if, on the other hand, they had been able or obliged to concentrate on ‘community-building’ to the exclusion of all problems situated either outside their area or within each one of them.420

This set of observed facts was largely accurate when published in 1966, but it would require some modification just twenty years later, when the Single Europe Act was being negotiated. The ineluctability of time that European nations’ could not stop would itself prove aspects of Hoffmann’s pessimistic observation faulty. For while states must obviously contend with the prevailing circumstances of the present (time) and their situatedness in space, the impossibility of stopping time or escaping “the whirlpool of different concerns” does not totally inhibit them from engaging in some degree of community-building, either.

Hoffmann went on to show how the more sanguine neo-functionalists neglected crucial historical context that just as plausibly demonstrated the opposite, concluding that “post-war Western Europe was grappling with the contradictory logics of integration and diversity.” The principle of national self-determination, it seemed to Hoffmann, would inhibit the depth of unity any member state of the community could tolerate. By
“repudiating the central idea of a continuum from economics to politics,” the “teleological confidence” of neofunctionalism appeared to overlook the primacy of particular domestic interests (understood according to politics traditionally conceived rather than in technocratic terms) in forming the impetus for integration.421

His recognition of the extent to which domestic and global pressures contribute to centrifugal tendencies rather than encourage a convergence of interests led to his ‘logic of diversity’ thesis, which stressed the international system’s tendency to produce diversity rather than synthesis among its units. International cooperation expanded the range of diversity and complicated the interests of actors, hindering the synthesis of policy and impeding integration. Hoffmann sought to explain why in certain areas integration could occur without much controversy whilst in other issue areas integration threatened the autonomy of governments and would be determinedly resisted.

The suggestion that efforts toward greater cooperation between states would produce additional obstacles to the integration of the continent challenged the presumption that functional spillover would automatically occur between the institutional entities and bureaucratic divisions of disparate state governments. Hoffmann’s analysis of these inherent tensions led to his distinction between “high” and “low” politics, for which his work of the 1960s was notable. By ‘high politics’ he referred to the areas of foreign policy and strategically important trade policy determinations sacrosanct to national elites. In the realm of ‘high politics’ progress on policy reforms (political cooperation, trade liberalization, etc.) were likely to be difficult and decision-making protracted as states would be unwilling to make concessions or to compromise where preserving the status quo served the power and prosperity of a society’s ruling class.
‘Low politics’ by contrast referred to those areas of policy wherein compromise was more easily achievable. For instance, in the sphere of trade liberalization the easing of tariffs and lifting of other protectionist barriers could be accommodated in ways (e.g.: by eliminating import quotas and deregulating sectors of production, etc.) that opened markets without jeopardizing elite perceptions of theirs or the nation’s vital interests. The realm of “low politics” was where Hoffmann believed change was most likely to occur, “because it was a way of retaining control over areas where intersocietal (as opposed to interstate) transaction was becoming the norm.”\(^422\)

Rosamund states that it was, at least in part, against the neofunctionalist’s assertion that supranational institutions would transform the consciousnesses of peoples and thereby generate enthusiasm for integration on an ever greater or expanding scale so as to displace historical national allegiances. In so far as Hoffman’s logic of diversity is concerned, he argues that:

[T]he Monnett-Haas logic would only work where integration could guarantee perpetual positive sum outcomes or, to use neofunctionalist terminology, where interests could be upgraded in common for perpetuity. Permanent gains over losses might work in the arena of economic integration, but Hoffmann maintained that it could never prevail for political integration.\(^423\)

Hoffman, as Rosamund observes, recognized that national elites, operating according to long-established norms governing both the interstate and intersocietal dimensions of European society, would encourage only limited transaction—or degrees of incremental integration.

Put differently, Hoffman identified the instinctive spirit of revenge, or instrumental reason, operative among the ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment who, having arrogated to themselves the power to rule, would authorize the implementation of such
change. Each hesitant step toward integration would come via and simultaneously indicate a subtle transformation in the bio-power-knowledge regime, whose function is the disciplining of the community’s economic life.

Conceived through the narrow rationality of perpetual positive sum gains (which likely guaranteed little else but continued insecurity and fear of the other), the logic of integration paradoxically inhibited its extent. These arbiters of the status quo imposed strict constraints on the process of change so that any changes would be gradual, lest they stimulate becomings that could not be contained by the molar, governing complex they oversaw. That sort of loss of control would not be a positive sum outcome. At the level of “low politics” some policy adjustment for increased openness was desirable, as it enabled national elites to maintain and (I would argue, following the premise of Hardt and Negri’s thesis of Empire developed more than three decades later) to strengthen their control over areas of life where international cooperation was increasing.

Hoffmann’s prolific contributions on Europe’s integration evolved perceptible over the next three and a half decades. In views published with Robert Keohane in 1990, his conception of the European community was that of a developing confederation (a proper sympolity), as exhibited in the intergovernmental character of its institutions whose emphasis, they in part argued, ought to be placed upon the creation of a common framework for cooperation rather than community-wide regulations. On Hoffmann’s part this constituted an acknowledgement of Europe’s transformed condition that maintained much of the spirit of his mid-1960s skepticism on the prospects for genuine supranational community. At that time he had pessimistically observed an intrinsic dilemma in the crucial process of legitimating such a new, unifying polity; that between
the impossibility of forcibly imposing new political arrangements and the inevitable disagreements that would arise over conflicting self-assessments of national interest:

The “New Europe” dreamed of by the Europeans could not be established by force. Left to the wills and calculations of its members, the new formula did not jell because Europeans could not agree on their role in the world. The failure of an experiment made under apparently ideal conditions tells us a great deal for it shows that a unification movement can fail not only when a surge of nationalism occurs in one important part but also when differences in how the national interest is assessed rule out agreement on the shape and propose of the new supranational whole.425

However correct his identification of the difficulties entailed by efforts to meld the disparate conceptions of national interest among European states and simultaneously manage the dangers of nationalism to political unification between sovereign nation-states, it prematurely declared a decisive end (“failure”) to the project (“experiment”). It also wrongly assumed that disagreement over “the shape and purpose of [a] new supranational whole” could not be overcome through decades of collaboration and incremental compromise, or at least subordinated to greater national self-interests.

Yet the (then) EC’s uncertain if persistent integration prompted Hoffmann to assert its increasing resemblance to an imperfect confederation between “bruised nations, [who] have traded visible and distinctive power for diffuse collective influence”. By the early 1990s the EC’s development, as a set of economic and bureaucratic arrangements, convinced him that “the policy of European integration will [not] be abandoned: there is no turning back.”426

The incremental and limited sort of integration to which the EU’s members have been willing to agree, as Hoffmann and Keohane identified, given rise to a school of European integration theory dubbed the confederalist model, which as included notable
scholars such as D. J. Elazar. Elazar dubs his own notion a theory of “postmodern confederation”. Chryssochoou finds Elazar’s notion of confederation, “a new style confederation of old states” particularly apropos on some levels.\(^{427}\) However, it is difficult to disregard the curious prefix ‘postmodern’ as the EU is an apodictically modern affair, but given the enormous complexity of the EU this phrase would provide a largely accurate and concise characterization of the organization’s possible trajectory. Yet Elazar’s conception of ‘postmodern confederalism’ was not hypothetical or futural.\(^{428}\) The term “postmodern” in this context is unlikely to persuade those who understand the EU—accurately I think—to be comprehensively modern, or that anything more than a super-state can deliberately result from the EU’s current trajectory, as it does not transmute either the modern presuppositions of the nation-state model or its privileging within the existing (state-centric) international system. If anything it ramifies the (un-Nietzschean) reification of identic particularisms upon which the state idol is based.\(^{429}\) Nevertheless, the innovative contributions of post-modern scholars to integration theory are taken up below.

In all probability there is no way to neatly define the integration process. As noted above, the problematic nature of conceiving parsimonious definitions of Europe or differing aspects of its complex integration processes is not merely conceptually problematic, but symptomatic of a reactive desire (will-to-truth) expressed via the (ant)agonistic endeavor to assert a unified comprehension of the EU—to achieve (i.e. impose) agreement around one common understanding. (The desire for parsimony in defining as complex entity as Europe is at odds with Nietzsche’s general perspectivalist epistemological stance as well as his quasi-cosmopolitan idea of Europe, which is inclusive of the continent’s diversity and the inherent difficulty of defining it.)
Since Hoffmann and Keohane advanced their confederal thesis (well before the Treaty on European Union in 1992), the regulatory provisions of EU law, via the Acquis, have grown exponentially. This has occurred in response to an identified need for greater codification of rules and norms, to specify consistent Union-wide procedures and to nuance policy implementation, but it has grown unwieldy according to many critics. Despite recent popular opposition to the Constitution (an unfortunate product of precisely the sort of populist misapprehension to which I refer above), it now appears that something more supranational in character than a confederacy is developing in Europe, even if classical realism better captures aspects of the power politics that continue to determine its integration than either the neofunctionalist or supranational-institutionalist theses have done.

**Haas’ Theoretical Reassessment of the mid-1970s;**

A particularly important development in the unfolding of European integration theory—and one with great salience to my argument—was Haas’s mid-70s recognition of ‘the obsolescence of integration theory’. In his article of the same name Haas recognized the limitations of neofunctionalism, particularly with regard to its limited applicability to cases outside Europe, which as a culturally and historically related agglomeration of highly developed industrial societies had certain unique features distinguishing it from other regions and cultural realms. These include its intellectual, scientific and legal traditions, its capitalist, socialist and communist economic systems, democratic traditions and its emerging cosmopolitan, pluralistic ethos. More importantly for theorizing generally, Haas cited the inability of European integration theorists to specify a dependent
variable and by extension to ascertain what an accurate prediction might be, as the
terminal conditions advanced by scholars of European integration could at best be
speculative ideal types.

As Rosamund elaborates, they were attempting “to explain something that did not
yet exist and whose existence could only be postulated.” This was not to assert the
irrelevance of integration studies or to dismiss the explanatory power of some of its
various schools’ core theoretical concepts, but was meant to signal “a turning point in the
way [such] phenomena should be conceptualized.” Haas’s awareness of emergent, guiding
logics to the EC’s development compelled a transformed understanding of the complex
political system it comprised within a developing global order that it was dynamically
affecting. Actual events in the world had continually undermined confidence in theorized,
putatively “deliberate attempt[s] to bring about regional economic (and thus political)
enmeshment among a group of West European countries.”

This revelation on the part of one of the most influential and brilliant international
politics theorists constituted a profound acknowledgement of the limitations of such
theorizing that was extraordinarily brave in an academic field devoted to the project that
activity comprised and which the project in turn legitimated. It also represented a quite
significant hermeneutical shift as well, in so far as it recognized the ultimately subjective
position from which all such perspectives on the truth of the matter (European integration)
originated, not just Haas’s own neofunctionalism per se, but the very endeavor of
abstractly theorizing integration according to a universal, final form in general. The
perspective Haas advanced by way of this critique provided a disconcerting and untimely
heuristic device with which his contemporaries would thereafter have to contend.
Intentionally or not, it exposed a danger inherent to the desire for truth, which is that the underlying will it symptomatizes is often so strong—a commitment to it at any price—that it blinds its seekers to the complexly situated contingency of their pursuit of it. Noting the innate drive to grow in power through discovery, Babich asserts that “Science, as the embodiment of the Will to Truth at all costs is itself an expression of the Will to Life at any price. As such it opposes what is changeable in life in its search for the ultimate truth of thing.” This insight is particularly applicable to the social sciences, especially when they are dominated by the objectivist stance of positivism, which forgets its own starting point in an unconscious striving “to gain power over nature… and the ‘wild animal’” man.

Salient to a critical understanding of theories of European integration as well as to the work of Haas is a conclusion of Nietzsche’s, aptly summarized by Babich: “truth is an error—or better, a species of errors—and knowledge a fictionalization of the world.” If the goal of his earlier neo-functionalism and the project of theorizing of European integration more generally had been to postulate a parsimonious theoretical explanation of why sovereign states within a certain region integrate their economies and political institutions, Haas now saw this intellectual aim as unattainable in objective terms, be they defining the motivations for it (i.e.: shared security interests, geographical features or cultural traits), or the ultimate aim of the integrative process. Although Haas likely would not have taken his own conclusions so far, they point toward Nietzsche’s sense that “science cannot tell us why scientific knowledge is worth knowing; the activity of science presupposes the value of truth.” And what truth, or truths, per se, do theorists of
European integration affirm and/or strive to illuminate? It is quite likely that ideology more effectively explains this than any objective scientific inquiry.

In some way underscoring the difficulties inherent to the inquiry, Haas later asserted that the phenomenon of social complexity generates what he dubbed \textit{turbulence}. This refers to the instability and uncertainty which occurs among actors in compound networks wherein competition and interdependency in various ratios confuse actors’ pursuits of objectives, and muddle the sort of discussion and negotiation that facilitate mutually desired cooperation. It is fairly easy to see how such a notion of turbulence could by extended to aptly describe the problematic activity of theorizing European integration itself. The assumptions of social-science theorists never quite capture the dynamic processes under their consideration, and with every modification to their precepts “reality” as they have created it, is revealed to be insufficient explanatorily.

There is an element Dionysian tragedy in their inevitable failure to discover any ‘Truth’ to vindicate their passion; an inquisitive desire to know the world as it is prompts them to continually start again, as it were, and reformulate their principles in order to make another attempt. The most Dionysian among them know all the while that dynamic human activity proceeds of it own accord and the world moves on, compounding a complexity always already beyond the horizon of our comprehension, which it is their hope to expand so as to see into a barely imaginable distance.

Haas’s “commitment to truthfulness” enables him to act, wittingly or not, as an “agent of the self-overcoming of the ascetic ideal” that underlies many of the aims and purposes of European integration theory.\textsuperscript{435} His mid-career critique of the inquiry and his own former stance constitutes a positive will to creative destruction as generative power,
the active force in which distinguishes him from many of his colleagues. As Rosamund
observes, just as the EC could be depicted as a ‘coping strategy’ for contending with
different levels of turbulence (inter-governmental, etc.), Haas’s expanded perspective and
the heuristic capacity it supplied (by aiding the discovery of truths about our interpretive
activity – the hermeneutics of desire – and the actual problem solving that enables or
impedes) functioned as a coping strategy for those theorists seeking truths about the
complicated phenomena of integration.436

Crucial aspects of conventional theorizing were then and still remain inherently
reactive, constituting an all-too-human attempt to limit the emergence of existents – that
is, to restrict what can be, either in thought or practice – by, in the case of theories of
European integration, (re-)fitting the continuously evolving reality of integration to a
preconceived notion of “what it is”, or how or what it ought to be, regardless of whether it
in fact was or is so. This by extension problematizes whether or to what degree actual
events can ever be said to be outcomes predicted by a particular theory. The difficulty lies
in how, if at all, the “success” of a prediction can be adduced with any certainty given the
inevitable disputes that arise over fundamental matters such as concept formation and
historical analysis, as well as more mundane dilemmas such as the methodological basis
and veracity of particular data sets, their relevancy and/or applicability to a certain
problem or issue, and a researcher or theorists’ choice of independent and dependent
variables, all of which bear upon our estimation of the predictive power of a theoretical
approach.

Social and political processes are ultimately too dynamic to be comprehensively
described by the theories upon which we rely; major schools of thought such as those
examined here succeed in being persuasive by providing a story or explanation of the world that seems to correspond with what we identify as reality. They achieve legitimacy by arising through and continually re-situating themselves within a web of discourses—“the literature”—that attains authoritative hegemony. Qua academic discipline a collective constraint largely determines the development of the knowledge to which its respective schools are devoted thereafter. An obvious paradox to this is that it is the desire (of political scientists and international relations scholars) to illuminate (in this case social) reality that constitutes their sustaining passion (eros) and spurs their inquiry. The conceit common to all of the sciences lies in the presumption of their arbiters to present a true picture of the processes they analyze.

Moreover, such conventional theorizing can be said to be reactive in terms of what it “allows” for, or does not, as the case may be. This related concern regards what kinds of knowledge a theoretical perspective, and the discipline of which it is a part, permits and in the case of theories of European integration, what sort of socio-cultural and political forms of life it takes Europe’s integration to be, and to rightly be capable of, producing. This is to recognize the conceptual blinders on any perspective and problematize the way it (a theory) unwittingly describes its own notional limits of permissibility. In the case of theories of European integration it is in the multiplicity of types, the plurality of communities and forms of governance to which integration could give rise, over and/or between member-states, their national institutions and their respective populaces, that was/is ultimately unpredictable (as it was/is an incomplete and constantly complexifying process).
Many of these problems are inherent to any effort at theorizing, particularly in the social sciences, as what is studied is never static and therefore never entirely predictable. But by the mid-70s it had become evident that too many facts integration contradicted the theories, which were themselves discovered to be symptomatic of the ambition to contain becoming and limit – in the guise of authoritative, ostensibly “predictive” modeling – the possible futures of integration thereby. The familiarity, security and seeming rationality provided by traditional nation-state politics, understood conventionally as contending power relationships along conceptual binaries such as self and other, the inside (one’s community) and the outside (the foreign or other), etc., conditioned ways of interpreting; they also structured the variety of hermeneutically “viable” stances – the desire for certain forms of integration – one could entertain, describing EIT’s horizon of legitimacy. But this self-imposed conceptual frontier put the authority of European integration theory (as a nascent power-knowledge regime) and, by extension, the arbiters of integration itself somewhat outside of what was really happening. At the numerous levels of integration, the mentality of citizens toward their community and the collective attitudes of diverging and converging communities toward the political organization that sought to reorganize their economic and political management were becoming thoroughly transformed in unanticipated and unmanageable ways.

Also in the mid-1970s, as Haas was arguing that integration processes should be properly understood in the broader context of regional and international politics, *interdependence* emerged as an important theory of within the field. Earlier behavioralistic portrayals of Europe’s integration as a predictable process were gradually modified to admit of relations within the international system that fomented change to it
and compelled adaptation among myriad political actors to those transformations. There was a growing awareness that the functionalist and neofunctionalist linear images of integration couldn’t account for some of the challenges the European process Europe faced. These compelled modifications of the dominant discourse through which the process was retrospectively comprehended, presently understood and futurally conceived.

**A note on Interdependence Theory**

Two of the primary exponents of the interdependency concept were Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who sought through three collaborative works across the decade, “to challenge the dominant state-centric image of realism by presenting a picture of a diffuse global order characterized by multiple actors among whom states were important, but not alone.”

The phenomena of interdependence could be discerned between all political actors and at every level of political life and its theorists tried to understand the dynamical complexity of myriad competing interests in the global political economy. Specifically, they wanted to adduce the ways in which interdependence facilitated or hindered integration. The term itself conveyed the perception “that ‘integration’ had lost its meaning as a guiding concept” and suggested an effort to set new priorities for solving collective-action problems. By not taking for granted any particular telos or end for integrative developments the emerging school of Interdependence theory drew comparativists of other regions and integration processes. It shifted “the emphasis from questions of formal institution-building and constitutional engineering to those concerning the management of pressing realities as a response to the rapidly changing conditions of
market forces and the global economy. Unlike neofunctionalism, “which had been too tightly associated with the Community model and method,” interdependence theory had no normative link with any international institution that might have distorted the perspective of intergovernmental exchange it presented.

In *Power and Interdependence* Keohane and Nye assert that state’s would have to continually redefine their national interest due to increasing interdependence between them and that this, combined with the influence of international institutions already facilitating greater cooperation, would encourage the growth of common regimes and formal institutions between nations. This is aptly summarized as “the practice of mutualism in the management of complex relations that result in a policy mix.” That this observation struck students of integration as insightful may seem curious now, but it indicates the intellectual rigidity in mainstream thinking about the issues of states’ determination and pursuit of their (so-called and highly problematic) national interests within political science generally, preceding the early 1970s. Yet by examining ‘the multi-actor complexity of the system’ interdependency theory bodied forth a much needed critique of realism, challenging the latter’s pathological emphases on crude power and force toward the achievement of security in an international environment whose ineliminable political context is anarchy.

Interdependence does not ignore the importance of the principle of national sovereignty or resulting practices of autonomy between national political authorities, but comprehends them in terms of how structural or systemic properties of the international arena condition the sort of interactions states have as well as the kinds of cooperation that may arise through their lively and varied relations (supranational, transnational, etc.).
Chryssochoou states that although interdependence theory “claims to offer a pragmatic, ideologically free alternative to the study of the politics and economy of the Community regime,” it has received “a fair amount of criticism” centered on its depiction of ‘the basic political properties of the Community system’. Specifically, this included its emphasis on the role and influence of supranational institutions, which would prompt much debate and controversy in so far as it arguably (as was argued) serves certain ideological tenets and / or objectives of the advocates of the particular form of political integration now occurring.

The Contemporary Debate

Since the early 1990s two major strains of thought concerning European integration have been persuasively reinterpreted. Drawing upon Stanley Hoffmann’s logic of diversity with the ethos of the school of realism in international politics theory, Andrew Moravcsik has created a niche for himself and become a major figure in his own right as the most prominent (and some allege, only) arbiter of the liberal intergovernmentalist approach within the sub-discipline of European integration theory. Moravcsik is primarily concerned with developing causal explanations of national preference formation and inter-state bargaining objectives. Thus his objectives, as with those of all the major theorists covered in this section, entail an interesting embrace and employment of the faith in science (which I maintain becomes particularly dubious when methodologically translated into “empirical” analyses of a subject by the social sciences) that Nietzsche found hermeneutically problematical and epistemologically naïve. As will become clear, Moravcsik’s major works body forth a will-to-truth symptomatic of a will to power that however consciously, elides the heuristic objections that might be raised against it.
The second strain of thought to which I referred above is the school of supranational institutionalism, led in part through the collaborative efforts and individual works of Alec Stonesweet and Wayne Sandholz. Together these scholars attempt to demonstrate the empirical veracity of their thesis that liberal intergovernmental compromise and cooperation are crucial but preliminary processes in the EU’s development. What they believe to be more significant to and fundamentally altering of the political landscape of the continent is the emergence of a supranational layer of authority in Brussels and Strasbourg to which the governments of the sovereign nation-state members are duty bound and subordinate. They contend that the formally institutionalized power structures of the continent are changing authorial relations between national governments and their citizen-constituents, between European states and between Europe vis-à-vis the EU, and the rest of the world in ways that challenge traditional notions of sovereignty and possibly even nation-statehood.

A debate about the nature of the EU’s development, outward expansion and inner-consolidation; the character, functioning and authority of its institutions and of various tensions underlying the project animates many of the differences between these two schools of thought. I begin first with an overview and critique of Moravcsik’s analysis of European unification as best characterized as a liberal, intergovernmental process. As Schimmelfennig observes, liberal intergovernmentalism “is a ‘grand theory’ seeking to explain the ‘major steps toward European integration’ in a multi-causal,” and parsimonious theoretical framework.444 As such it reinforces the positivist orientation conferred by the discourses of scientism on the study of social processes, furthering the will-to-truth that reifies reason and excessive explanatory economy in an effort to make

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the “truth plain” and the world (in this case, of human activity) appear more orderly and neat than it is.

In ‘The Choice for Europe’ Andrew Moravcsik set forth a clear articulation of an analytical approach to European integration. He theorizes that integration is occurring primarily through intergovernmental cooperation and compromise, a gradual pooling of sovereignty that has given rise to the EU in its contemporary form. According to this view, integration is a state-driven process, in which the resulting supranational institutions are wholly dependent on the sanction of member-states for their existence and efficacy. The constituent member-states of any such body may, according to his theory, reverse their imprimatur at any time and withdraw themselves from the organization. The nation-state retains its primacy (approaching the status of a fetish) despite the appearance of an ever more integrated and integrating world.

Rosamund notes that “Moravcsik sees himself working in the liberal tradition”, on “three core assumptions” about international politics. These, paraphrasing Moravcsik, include the existence of self-interested, risk-averse rational actors (autonomous individuals or groups); governments comprised of subsets of domestic interest groups agonistically striving to achieve different aims, which constrains the abilities of states internationally; and the behavior of states (their patterns of conflict and cooperation) reflect their interests. This is apt, as these three assumptions express dominant concepts within international politics theory more generally, as they convey key tenets of the liberal notions from which they arose.

Moravcsik’s analysis shares important features with the realist school of international politics, including an emphasis on state actors and their putative rationality.
It relies on the influential two-level game model developed by Robert Putnam to describe the relationship between domestic politics, or national preference formation and relations between states at the regional level, or strategic bargaining. In the tradition of rationalist-institutionalism, it employs bargaining theory and a functionalist account “to explain the establishment and design of international institutions,” in terms of how they manage and overcome the first- and second-order problems of international cooperation.

Liberal intergovernmentalism attempts to clarify both the link connecting national preference formation, inter-state bargaining and the cooperative conduct that results and the relations between states and the international organizations of which they are a part. Toward that end the framework Moravcsik developed allows him to examine dynamic practices and integrative outcomes in terms of a supply and demand process. As Rosamund summarizes it, the supply side refers to the domain of interstate bargaining while the demand side consists of national preferences for interstate cooperation. This perspective on dynamic inter-state cooperation has interesting implications for the liberal intergovernmentalist critique (or minimization) of the role supranational institutions play. Specific to the European scene, Rosamund asserts that:

[L]iberal intergovernmentalism… assign[s] an important role to institutions as facilitators of positive sum bargaining. States benefit from and use the institutional environment of the EU for purposes of domestic legitimation and the pursuit of preferences. This seemingly applies to supranational institutions such as the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice … [which] tend to operate within the boundaries set by member-state preferences, although the exploitation of differences between member-states provides a definite opportunity for entrepreneurial supranational activity.

The subtle exploitation of differences between member-states is one way supranational
institutions might act beyond the designated mandate of their member-states, such as when an institutional body’s rules compel certain initiatives or build a certain logic that gradually conducts the preference formation and policy-agendas of the member-states. The three EU institutions Rosamund cites above are prime examples of where this has occurred both as forces for the centrifugal building of the community and a cohesion policy to make that effective. Indeed, the Commission, Parliament and Court have transformed the way EU member-states interact (the international or multi-national level of governance within the community) and the way they separately conduct their domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{450}

Moravcsik expanded on the classic intergovernmentalist view that “national interest[s arise] in the context of [a] sovereign state’s relative position in the states system”, to emphasize the agonistic give and take at the domestic level, between state and disparate elements of society, through which the national interest is actually generated.\textsuperscript{451} “Liberal intergovernmentalism treat[s] the state as a unitary actor according to the IR tradition because it assumes that national governments develop a consistent preference order as a result of domestic political bargaining and that domestic actors do not play a significant independent role in negotiations beyond the state.”\textsuperscript{452} However, in the case of the EU particularly, the cultural, social and civil rights’ protections guaranteed to autonomous regions, distinct minority groups and individual citizens provide any group or private person so defined legal recourse through the Court of Justice against his or her government. This is just one factor casting the traditional treatment of the state as a unitary actor in doubt.
Chryssochoou argues that the liberal intergovernmentalist vision differs from earlier state-centric accounts of European integration by virtue of the fact that it “enlarges the range of intellectual opportunities for going beyond ‘unicausal theorizing’ by integrating… [elements of] regime analysis, negotiation theory and intergovernmentalism.”453 It combined central concepts of these schools of thought to establish that the process through which the national interest of a state actor comes to be identified is more complicated than had been previously recognized, demonstrating the significance of competition between disparate interest groups, political parties, and various constituencies at the domestic level. It is this knotty process that provides the background of each state actor’s respective strategic interactions with other states in the regional community. He states:

The underlying demand for cooperation, not the entrepreneurial supply of information, imposes a binding constraint on [inter-state] negotiations. Efficiency is relatively unproblematic because interested governments are able to act as their own political entrepreneurs. Instead negotiators focus primarily on the distribution of [anticipated domestic] benefits [between the respective bargaining states], which are decisively shaped by the relative power of national governments, understood in terms of asymmetrical policy interdependence.454

In other words individual governments and their leaders cannot, at the “supranational” level of the international organization, effectively pressure other state actors or “impose binding constraints on negotiations” between them.455

Naturally the respective interests subtending the individual aims and agendas of each state actor and sub-state actors within them, in the complex process of inter-state bargaining differ. The presentation of their interests (the exposure of differences) is moderated by the larger intergovernmental framework that restrains agonistic engagement in the interests of cooperation, as well as self-interest in such an institutional setting which
compels them to posture and bargain according to how they estimate of the strength of
their positions as compared to that of their respective negotiating partners.

While cooperation is the common objective among members of a regional
community, the definition of a successful outcome and the means of achieving it depend
on state actors’ relative influence and dependency therein. So too, the decision process
over whether to air a difference and how to do so is largely determined by complex
decision-making procedures A range of factors determines whether that divergent agenda
may become an issue. In addition, the form of presentation a differing or contrary
perspective takes partially determines the character of the debate that follows, as well as
the durability of it as such: be it a long-term source of contention (such as the CAP), a
briefly bracketed matter that a state actor may return to at a more propitious moment, or
one that evaporates from the memory of the state that sets it aside. The point is that the
autonomy of states in regional communities with supranational institutions is often
constrained by the supervening authority of those institutions. This can be constructive or
frustrating depending on the agenda pursued.

However, this truism is somewhat at odds with an aforementioned principle tenet
of liberal intergovernmentalism. As Moravcsik asserts:

Strong supranational institutions are often seen as the antithesis of
intergovernmentalism. Wrongly so. …In the intergovernmentalist view, the unique
institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only insofar
as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs,
permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable.456

This underscores the intergovernmentalist account of the existence of supranational
institutions, even in light of the enhanced mechanisms for subsidiarity between the
national parliaments and the EU as provided by the Lisbon Treaty.
Yet, in Heideggerian terms, Moravcsik here takes an appearance (the purported acceptance of national governments which announces itself without authentically showing itself) for apodictical fact (reality). While it is true that national governments would be loathe accepting institutional structures certain to weaken their control, the EU clearly does ultimately have precisely that effect, whether as a result of rulings by the Court or legislation passed by the Commission. In many ways the EU *seems* (in the Heideggerian sense) to accommodate itself to its member-state’s governments. However, the suggestion that membership may only strengthen a state’s national authority ignores a wealth of contradictory indications.457 It also, perplexingly, implies that aspirant states do not recognize that important aspects of their national sovereignty will be subordinated to EU institutions upon their accession—or that current member-states do not. The requirement of meeting the Copenhagen criteria and prerequisite preparations for implementing the dictates of the Acquis (upon accession) effectively compels a degree of compliance and subordination of national prerogative.

An analogy to intergovernmentalism can be drawn to the establishment of sovereign political institutions in the US. Intergovernmentalism is what the US envisaged for itself through the Articles of Confederation, which proved dysfunctional and were replaced by the federal Constitution in 1787, which affirmed the federal government’s supreme authority over the laws of all the republics’ constituent states. Supranational institutions such as those comprising the EU differ in a significant sense, from intergovernmental ones. Yet the EU acts as a supranational authority over its member-states in much the same way as the federal government of the US does over the states – which also enjoy equal status, representation and a degree of autonomy within the union.
The fact remains that once a state accedes to community membership it cannot remain unaffected by community decisions thereafter. Its choice of adopting community provisions, which many states neighboring the union have done of necessity, particularly with regard to trade policy (e.g.: Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Croatia, Turkey, etc.) is effectively eliminated. Member-states are legally obliged to accept the decisions and rulings of the community’s institutions; neighboring states are compelled by self-interest to accommodate them. Although any member of the EU could in theory withdraw from the community, no formal mechanism yet exists to accommodate such a move.⁴⁵⁸

Intergovernmentalists downplay the significance of supranational institutions and forces to assign them a more limited performative role than most integration theorists or schools of European integration theory believe they actually play. In so doing Moravcsik emphasizes the “link between domestic and regional politics… [that connects] intergovernmental theory with domestic sources of legitimacy.”⁴⁵⁹ As an actor of his own ideals whose stage, as it were, is scholarship, Moravcsik’s well argued views probably help to legitimate the EU among some “Euroskeptics” within the community. They may also serve to facilitate its expansion by easing the reluctance of those who oppose it on nationalistic grounds.

Moravcsik contends that this enhances ability of national governments (state actors) to satisfy domestic demands through intergovernmental (inter-state) bargaining. He explains how member-nations in a loosely confederated or cooperative unions—namely the EU—conceive, pursue and attain their goals. Relative differences of power between state actors across various matrixes of common concern constitute a key affective determinant of their relevant interests. The vectors (relative magnitudes and directions) of
their compound interests and the conventional power they may expend to attain policy goals are loosely coordinated by broad frameworks for compromise and cooperation. Asymmetrical interdependence is the central structural dynamic within the EU, conditioning the institutional environment. Key features and means for managing asymmetrical interdependence include:

- treaty-amending negotiations [that] take place within a noncoercive system, transaction costs of generating information and ideas are low relative to the benefits of interstate cooperation [and] the distribution of benefits reflects relative bargaining power [so that] the power of each government is inversely proportional to the relative value that it places on an agreement compared to the outcome of its best alternative policy—its ‘preference intensity’. 

He maintains that on this basis negotiated outcomes are:

- likely to reflect three specific factors: (1) the value of unilateral policy alternatives relative to the status quo, which underlies credible threats to veto; (2) the value of alternative coalitions, which underlies credible threats to exclude; and (3) the opportunities for issue linkage of side-payments, which underlie ‘package deals’. 

As long as member-states benefit from cooperation, according to logic of intergovernmentalism, actors will accept occasional setbacks to their prerogatives and forego solutions outside the institutional framework comprising their interdependent condition. It also suggests however, that states will entertain unilateral policy alternatives, alternative coalitions and package deals to achieve their aims if the stakes are high enough to them or they are persistently blocked due to asymmetries of power that frustrate their ability to attain desired outcomes.

Differences of power between actors are a significant determinant of outcomes in inter-state bargaining within a highly regulated cooperative institutional framework such as the EU, and this, somewhat paradoxically suggests that self-generated institutional
constraints (anticipated or otherwise) inhibit defections, radical change to the existing framework that compels acceptance of the instrumentality and ultra-liberal-modern reification of reason that co-extends with the statist logic of the intergovernmentalist perspective.

Intergovernmentalists (assuming there is more than one) recognize that membership in regionally integrating bodies and/or international organizations results in quantifiable benefits that actually increase domestic perceptions of legitimacy within states and internationally as members of those regional communities and organizations to which they belong.\(^{463}\) This is a persuasive argument that Moravcsik supports with compelling evidence from specific cases in which smaller, poorer countries within the EU negotiated their policy preferences against more powerful member-states.\(^{464}\) That associations such as (or particularly) the EU strengthen their members relative to the position they would hold outside of the integrating regional community entails a logic of reliance at odds with certain intergovernmentalist claims, however. For it is an acknowledgement that makes his opposition to the contentions of the supranational institutionalist perspective somewhat curious, as over time the obligations of membership come to supersede a state-actors’ full autonomy, as innumerable examples from the contemporary EU and its 60 year history demonstrate.

However, Rosamund notes that there is “a deeper issue concern[ing] the normative status of intergovernmentalism or state-centric forms of analysis. Theories can be construed as rather more than heuristic constructions through which academics order the world. They can also be seen [understood] as forces in the world that they describe.”\(^{465}\) This—as I have maintained throughout—is a common danger to European integration
theorizing (and in the social sciences more generally), one in which the advocates of a theoretical perspective believed to possess objective empirical veridicality unwittingly act as its ideological proponents. Rosamund affirms this central contention of my Nietzschean critique when he asserts, in the context of intergovernmentalism, that theories come to reflect “a political preference held by a range of actors within the EU… [and develop into] a set of propositions that help to provide rationalizations for what particular actors do.”

This corroborates my contention that theorists of European integration are neither objective about the empirical facts they bring together to substantiate their arguments nor intellectually dispassionate in making their respective analyses. The dominant positivist orientation of the political science discipline prevents many of them from recognizing the virtual impossibility of doing so. Additionally, their lack of detachment from the subject of analysis further jeopardizes their claims of approaching it in an objectively neutral spirit of scientific inquiry. These conundrums inhibit their recognition of the complex ways in which their own political views are implicated in the perspectives they adopt and the positions they advocate. Their ideological indoctrination within the very same (or discursively synonymous) socio-political milieu they study and their personal investment and/or stakes in the knowledge–power regime in which they participate as scholars makes them apt to act—if only unconsciously—as partisan devotees of a particular, highly disciplinary will to truth that closely corresponds with the metanarrative and corresponding value structure of the EU.

This is an actuality Nietzsche identified when he noted what “every great philosophy so far has been: a confession of faith on the part of its author, and a type of involuntary and unself-conscious memoir”, suggesting that there is no objective
perspective on the world capable of capturing the capital “T” truth, only the drive for knowledge craving mastery over its subject. The precise nature of Europe’s integration, its institutional development, the functioning and character of those bodies, the tremendously complex roles of member state governments, regional and local authorities, etc., is best discerned through a broad survey of numerous perspectives on the topic, a critical examination of their shared background assumptions (e.g.: the tenets comprising the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity) toward a view of the will to truth they advance and a careful combination of their finest insights.

**Supranational institutionalism**

Moravcsik’s intergovernmentalist theory persuaded many that the neo-functionalist analysis was beset by theoretical weaknesses, but it also prompted a response, in part intended to defend and bolster the veracity of certain neo-functionalist insights and to account for perceived flaws in Moravcsik’s own theory. Known informally as the “supranational institutionalist” theory of European integration, the approach is indebted to the fields’ neo-functionalist predecessors.

In assessing the importance of supranational institutions to Europe’s present order under the aegis of the EU and its integration processes, Chryssochoou observes that they have had a discernable:

an impact on the behavior of national governing elites and domestic policy actors, while at the same time becoming important venues for the resolution of conflicts… [they] can play a meaningful autonomous role in the European policy process, albeit periodically, in furthering the scope of the common functional arrangements and imposing constraints on rule-based state behavior… [and] they possess
agenda-setting powers that limit the capacity of states to exercise formal political control, collectively or individually, over integration outcomes.\textsuperscript{469}

In addition, the history of the Commission, and arguably the European Parliament (with the eventual ratification of the Lisbon Treaty), demonstrate that supranational institutions accrue authority as the integrating community that produced them (in this case the EU) expands.

Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholz are perhaps the most prominent exemplars of this perspective. Together they published an article in 1997 challenging the veracity of Moravcsik’s ‘liberal inter-governmental’ thesis entitled \textit{European integration and supranational governance} in the \textit{Journal of European Public Policy}. It is important to note that they are not uncritical of neofunctionalist approaches either, which lends additional force to their arguments. They “problematize the notion, strongly implied by neo-functionalist theories, that integration is the process by which the EC gradually but comprehensively replaces the nation state in all its functions.” In so doing they also sought to “reject the comparative statics of intergovernmentalists as a mode of analysis incapable of capturing crucial temporal elements of European integration.”\textsuperscript{470} Their broad critical framework allows them to synthesize various insights from different perspectives and to posit thereby a more nuanced explanation of integrative processes. Among their primary concerns however, is that “the exclusive focus on grand intergovernmental bargains can lead to serious distortions of the historical record,” citing examples of how “integration always proceeded… despite the Luxembourg compromise [or] the divergence of state preferences.”\textsuperscript{471}
Chrysochoou asserts that “the post-SEA era [has been] marked by renewed institutional dynamism, [which has] prompt[ed] contemporary scholarship to cast doubt on realist state-centric claims for viewing institutions as ‘passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules’ designed to facilitate intergovernmental bargains.” Confirming this, Rosamund notes how “[Stone Sweet and Sandholtz] pitch their framework as a less state-centric and more supranational alternative …deploy[ing] the image of demand and supply sides to integration.” Rather than disputing the significance of transaction costs they argue that “the role of transnational exchange is central to generating demands for regulation and governance capacity at the European level. Supranational institutions work to supply those things.”

Against Moravcsik’s challenge to the neo-functionalist school, they do not think “intergovernmentalism displaces neo-functionalism, but rather relies on a causal argument developed by the neo-functionalists.” They argue persuasively that “empirical research supports the transactions-driven theory of European integration” they propose, one in which “the term ‘intergovernmental’ is useful as a description of a specific mode of decision-making within the EC policy process…[b]ut which does not require [them] to adopt or accept of ‘intergovernmentalism-as-theory’.”

Transactions become institutionalized according to how “demands generated in the transnational domain stimulate a response from the decision-making institutions.” As the degree and kind of transactions occurring differs between sectors of activity and disparate national economies, determines how they will be coordinated. “Variability in levels of transborder transaction and intra-EU exchange,” understood through Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s supranational perspective, as a “transaction-based theory”,

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coherently explains why “integration proceeds faster and farther in some policy areas that in others.”

Moreover, they state that their theory “also explain[s] the general direction of integration in the common market, [and] account[s] for the decisively neoliberal (pro-market) character of recent events like the 1992 program and the Maastricht provisions on economic and monetary union.” According to Rosamund they reread “Haasian functionalism… as a form of institutionalist analysis.” In the analysis, “institutions acquire legitimacy through both their own efforts to promote supranational norms and the lobbying activities of interests that seek access to public officials in pursuit of their goals.”

The central argument of Sandholtz and Stone Sweet’s thesis was that “once movement toward the supranational pole [along the continuum they describe between intergovernmental bargaining and the emergence of supranational institutions] begins, European rules generate a dynamic of their own, which we call institutionalization.”

The transformation undergone by institutions through processes of intergovernmental bargaining are central to their understanding of the emergence of supranational dynamics that condition states’ desires for deeper cooperation, and further supranationally driven integration. They acknowledge that “actors behave in self-interested ways”, but take as given that “both the interests and the behaviors [of state actors] take form in a social setting defined by rules”. This is not to deny the agonistic way in which institutions as systems of rules arise, however, for they recognize that “new kinds of transactions or behaviors, disagree[ment] as to what rules require, and dispute resolution processes compel their “constant evolution”.
It is this on-going process of institutionalization at a level at once between and above state actors that compels and deepens involvement. Thus it is in part through “institutionalization [that] EC policy domains can become more supranational without some, or at times a majority of, governments wanting it or being able to reverse it.” This logic of institutionalization is, they assert, “crucial to understanding integration as a process …for as European rules emerge and are clarified and as European organizations become arenas for politics, what is specifically supranational shapes the context for subsequent interactions.” This presents a major challenge to the intergovernmentalists’ logic, which has difficulty accounting for the dynamic process by which state interests are conditioned by the politics generated within the supranational institutions of which they are a part.

Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider the role of treaty-based policy domains in terms of how they advance supranational governance, asserting that they originate with the “advantage of [having] a legal basis in the Union’s fundamental rules”. But integration processes outside formal policy domains also increase the authority of Europe’s supranational institutions, as their impetus stimulates the latter to expand their formal spheres of influence. In fact, the EU continually re-negotiates aspects of its treaty-based policy domains to deepen and refine the political striations of its homogenizing space. In doing so it seeks to anticipate, capture and channel differing forces in a relatively uniform, specified direction. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz refer to article 236, which authorizes the EU to “establish supranational governance to achieve the general objectives of the Community.”
In other words the EU not only generates affects that always-already concur with and advance its aims, but its creators explicitly sanctioned the interpolation of forces, potential events of becoming-other, that differed from the plain objectives of the community. This indicates the ways in which the EU was, by over-lapping institutional and legal means, created to normalize developments. It normalizes both conceptual and corporeal developments, limiting them (in the name of enhancing diversity!) to a becoming-same inside its territorially defined area, which is comprised of a conceptually delimiting sovereignty that physically defines belonging in accordance with the geographical limits of its member-states. In addition it conditions culturally enforced values and corresponding idealized subjectivities—compelling conformity—outside of its borders. The latter entails a systematic interiorization of the EU’s outside (particularly those nations geographically abutting it) that has been crucial to conditioning the possibility of the EU’s formal expansion.\textsuperscript{486} It does so according to the quasi-imperialist statist logic and legal mechanisms of which it may credibly be understood as the highest realization.\textsuperscript{487}

Rule following and treaty compliance constrain member-state governments, which exert limited influence over their production—influence declining as the union expands its membership.\textsuperscript{488} The Commission and the Court (ECJ) can make decisions that member-states are obliged to implement. “National courts, guided by ECJ decisions, can compel their governments to comply with EC rules they have opposed… [and this] rule-centered logic of institutionalization …suggests why it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, for governments to reverse shifts toward supranational governance that have occurred.”\textsuperscript{489} According to the theory these shifts \textit{inevitably} occur as a product of intergovernmental
bargaining and cooperation (transactions) where the formal integration of key economic and political functions is systematically pursued. Rosamund further affirms this point by stating, “transnational activity is the generator of spillovers because the growth of supranational rules and the increased responsiveness of central institutions of governance reduces the costs of transactions. Moreover, the existence of particular patterns of rules and rule-making creates a strong institutional logic for persistence of those patterns.”

Interestingly, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider the relevance of two “languages” that captures how “new transactions entrench interests”. The first of these is the notion of path dependency, which helps explain part of the dynamic behind institutional change. On this they concur with Paul Pierson, who argues that institutional change is a “path-dependent” process, explaining that,

> Once institutional and policy changes are in place, social actors adapt to those changes, frequently making substantial investments in the process. A policy turnabout [thereafter] would entail the loss of these sunk costs, thus raising the costs for governments seeking to unwind supranational governance.

The very process of adaptation entails a transformation of norms and practices that gradually gain the acceptance of their practitioners. Reversing this transformation of attitudes and expectations is equally significant to the costs of administrative changes.

> These transformations gradually strengthen supranational institutions.

Chryssochoou writes that

> European integration has often led to unintended consequences’ regarding the growth, influence, and competence acquisition of supranational agencies, largely at the expense of national executives which can no longer act as gatekeepers.

However, the extent of such unintended consequences is not limited to supranational agencies or national governments, but induces affective changes throughout integrating
societies. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider this dynamic in even more abstract terms, observing that “the process of adaptation to change in complex social settings also produces unintended consequences that are difficult to unwind. Thus institutional and policy outcomes become ‘locked in,’ channeling politics down specific paths and closing previously plausible alternatives.”

The perceived erosion of national authority – which in many domestic political milieus is translated into the frequently incoherent rhetoric of “diminished state sovereignty” – generates a great deal of anxiety in certain (mainly conservative and/or nationalist) circles. While it is true that “[t]he European policy-making arena increasingly relies on a distinctive set of collective policy norms and everyday regulatory practices”, the member-states—particularly those twelve who joined the EC before the SEA (1986)—have been intimately involved in the construction of that area. Member-states who joined in 1995, 2004 and 2007 willingly undertook the domestic institutional reforms required to accede to the union and accepted any consequent erosion of their state sovereignty in so doing. With a few exceptions in some policy areas, the previous member-states had already made concessions to EU precedence via treaty agreements. So while it is the case that a highly complex transference of authority has and is occurring between the member-state governments and the EU institutions (said by many to comprise a supranational level), it has been conducted through consultative processes or occurred as a consequence of such processes. For the foreseeable future the controversy may be irresolvable, as it is not merely an empirical question, but lies in determining which direction the transfer has tended to go, and whether and to what extent it constitutes a transformation of the nation-state system in Europe.
Critics have noted that gaps in the control exercised by state authorities over EU bodies could be problematic both for the member-states’ and the EU’s perceived legitimacy. In his historical institutionalist critique Pierson “focuses on factors that are likely to create considerable gaps in member-state control [over European institutions]. Four are of fundamental importance: the autonomous actions of European institutional actors, the restricted time horizons of decision makers, the large potential for unintended consequences, and the likelihood of changes in COG [Chiefs of Government] preferences over time.” However, each of these aspects of change in institutional competence and preference ordering is very likely to give rise to negotiated responses and political action in an agonistic process that frequently succeeds in modifying their more undesired effects. Although this usually amounts to buffing down the rough edges as it were, given the adaptations that growth in the influence of EU institutions compels, myopically nationalistic or state-centric thinkers still resent the allegedly “foreign” imposition of change on their communities.

The second “language” Stone Sweet and Sandholtz consider in assessing how member-states may contend with the power of supranational authorities, is the principle-agent metaphor employed by Mark Pollack, which shows how “the administrative and oversight mechanisms [that] principals (member governments) use to rein in agents (the Commission) can be costly and of limited effectiveness. Furthermore, agents can exploit divergent preferences among multiple principles, especially under more demanding decision rules, like unanimity.” Stone Sweet and Sandholtz assert that “the path-dependence and principle-agent logics reinforce [their] argument that institutionalization in the EC is not reducible to the preferences of, or bargaining among, member
governments. The expansion of transnational society pushes for supranational governance, which is exercised to facilitate and regulate that society. Once in place, supranational rules alter the context for subsequent transactions and policy-making. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz’s thesis also provides an interesting means of comprehending dynamical aspects of globalization, particularly as it relates to institutional cooperation, overlap and collaboration.

New Institutionalism and Multi-Level Governance

From the late-1980s to the present decade a number of theoretical challenges to the received understandings of the dynamic processes of European integration have been postulated by scholars dissatisfied by the dominant discourse. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni notes, “[t]he dispute between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists over the role and impact of regional institutions is no longer the only fault line in European integration debates. During the past 15 years, a number of rival perspectives have emerged which challenge established integration theories.” These schools have sought to challenge all the presuppositions of conventional integration theories, going so far as to expose as bogus the metaphysical fictions that serve as their bases. They have largely drawn upon philosophical methods developed outside of the disciplinary confines of political science.

Among the more influential schools of thought within this unconventional camp are a group of perspectives generally placed together under the heading new institutionalism. Although linked through some essentially similar concerns they consist of quite diverse historical, rational-choice and sociological strands. Chryssochoou
summarizes the divisions of theorizing within the influential new institutionalist movement succinctly:

Historical institutionalism treats institutions as instances of both formal and informal interaction and as ‘systems of norms, including conventions, codes of behavior and standard constraints upon behavior’; rational choice institutionalism tends to define institutions as formal legalistic entities and sets of decision rules that impose obligations upon self-interested actors; sociological institutionalism emphasizes the cognitive properties of institutions, that is, the way in which institutions influence behavior, whilst stressing, the mutual constitution of institutions and actors.501

A general emphasis on the role and significance of institutions for shaping the developments of polities is the unifying theme between them. However, given their “diverse disciplinary starting points,” Rosamund thinks it may be somewhat disingenuous to speak of new institutionalism as a as a distinct movement, and notes that each subdivision provides a quite different explanation for how institutions matter.502

In evaluating and working within the broader context of new-institutionalism, Mark A. Pollack has done work on important issues. Among these the principle-agent issue, as discussed above, and the subject of comitology as it pertains to new institutionalist approaches, are prominent.503 The former concerns the problem of escalating institutional authority and autonomy, and generates controversy according to how intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists understand the motives driving integration and the often expanding role of the institutions it creates.504 The latter, comitology, he says it “emerges as a key area in which rationalist and constructivist theorists provide competing accounts and hypotheses on a common empirical terrain, which offers the unusual prospect of direct, competitive empirical testing… [that] requires
researches to deal with serious methodological challenges” of both definition and measurement.505

Another recent theoretical approach is that of Multi-level governance (MLG). This examines the function of authority as it has been dispersed through the numerous institutions comprising the EU. It is concerned with how power operates “between levels of governance and amongst actors and where there are significant sectoral variations in governance patterns [European, national, regional and local].”506 Multi-level governance emphasizes the emergence of a complex Euro-polity in which diverse political agonisms in a cooperative framework determine policy outcomes.

A central text in this strand of integration theory is Hooghe and Marks’ *Multi-level Governance and European Integration* (2001), in which they define their objective as adducing the significance of the immense increase in both “the scope and depth of policy making at the EU level”, for “the political architecture of Europe”. They are particularly interested in the kind of political order that this trend is creating and whether it will foster a consolidation of member-states or ultimately weaken them.507 Hooghe and Marks challenge state-centric understandings of integration, asserting that “the core presumption of state-centric governance is that European integration does not challenge the autonomy of national states.” They pose the “alternative view that European integration is a polity-creating process in which authoritative and policy making influences are shared across multiple levels of government—subnational, national and supranational.”

Without rejecting the importance of national governments they contend that no one form of political entity “monopolizes European-level policy making or the aggregation of domestic interests”.508 With a distinctive perspective on the interactions taking place
between European institutions and actors they envisage a unique polity taking shape on
the continent. Hooghe and Marks recognize that “while national governments are
formidable participants in EU policy making, control has slipped away from them to
supranational institutions… Individual state sovereignty is diluted in the EU by collective
decision making among national governments and by the autonomous role of [the EU’s
primary institutions].”509

Paraphrasing an assertion by Hooghe and Marks, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch
write that “the intellectual challenge of the multi-level governance model is that it does
not describe the dispersion of authoritative competence across territorial levels but draws
attention to the interconnection of multiple political arenas in the process of
governing.”510 Authoritative competence is a manifold, emergent product of numerous
spheres of political activity interrelating with one another with relative autonomy,
irrespective of their formal divisions or hierarchic standings within their respective
member-state polities or the EU. Chryssochoou writes that:

Although it is not claimed that supranational institutions will eventually supersede
the member state executives, or that national governance arenas will be rendered
obsolete by a process of “transnational interest mobilization” …multi-level
governance amounts to a multi-layered polity, where there is no center of
accumulated authority, but where changing combinations of government[al] level
engage in collaboration. 511

From the perspective of multi-level governance analysis, the EU is evolving into an
potentially authentic ‘post-sovereign’ or post-modern polity in which rather than a new
level of authority atop a modern hierarchical order usurping the authority of the state and
roles of various governance structures within it, each level—from what conventionally
would have been considered “lowest” to “highest”—interact separately. Conceptual and
formal political boundaries that previously defined relations of power are crossed and inter-penetrated in a process that diffuses political authority. Rosamund asserts that “MLG is about fluidity, the permanence of uncertainty and multiple modalities of authority – suggesting an association with postmodernity.”

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni observes the close similarities between the MLG “depiction of the task specific, overlapping and intersecting institutional jurisdictions” for contending with policy problems overarching policy networks with Mitrany’s functionalism, the goal of which “was to diffuse political power through delegation to non-majoritarian, single-issue authorities or agencies, which would rely heavily upon technocratic expertise and in which ‘functional problem-solving rather than political bargaining would dominate.” She also offers an interesting criticism, asserting that MLG “suffers from many of the same weaknesses [that beset Mitrany’s functionalist approach].” In her estimation these problems include “administrative feasibility [due to] high transaction costs”; problems of “democratic legitimation [among institutions where] regulatory efficiency and functional problem solving capacity” are emphasized above all else.

These may be quite valid concerns but I believe that by better contending with the complexity of the multifarious political processes generated through European unification the multi-level governance approach more effectively captures the character and dynamism of integrative processes than its rivals. It strikes me as a promising way forward that seems less colored by ideological advocacy than many of its competitor schools and therefore avoids much of the theoretical circulatory that has plagued much of European studies and theories of European integration as a field.
Consociationalism

Chryssochoou (whose critical review of European integration theory I have utilized as a primary source in this work) is himself a prominent proponent of a strand of theory known as consociationalism, a conceptualization of political relations within and between states that has been employed to analyze the nature of group autonomy in terms of political rule-making, consent and legitimacy within multi-constituent or pluralistic democratic polities since the 1960s. Nugent describes it as a “variation of the core state-centric model” of integration theory.514 “The idea of consociation grew out of political scientists’ concerns with how deeply divided societies could achieve governing stability.”515 The approach has recently been reinvigorated through its application to the institutional operation and political nature of the EU.

Chryssochoou traces the term (consociatio, Latin for “associating together”) and concept back to the late 16th century in the works of Althusius and Bodin who debated in their works the principles of sovereignty and the proper organization of public life.516 “Originally developed – notably by Arend Lijphart – to throw light on how some democratic states which are sharply divided internally are able to function in a relatively smooth and stable manner… consociational states are [typically] portrayed as feature[ing] societal segmentation …[with the segments] represented in decision-making forums on a proportional basis …[wherein] political elites dominate decision-making processes …[that are] taken on the basis of compromise and consensus… the rationale [of which] is the preservation of segmented autonomy within a cooperative system.” This set of assumptions is said to “provide valuable insights into central features of the functioning of the EU” by its proponents.”517
Chryssochoou defines consociationalism “as a strategy of cooperative conflict resolution, whereby the elites transcend intergroup fragmentation through negotiated agreements or settlements based on a politics of accommodation.” The framework takes elite decisions as primary and as the end of politics, and relegates citizen participation to a secondary consideration. Democracy is important for the legitimation of elite decisions, but in an effective consociational system it is strictly representative by design. The public’s enfranchisement and democratic processes cannot be permitted beyond a certain point, to obstruct the attainment of mutually beneficial outcomes. In a consociational system stability and enhanced collaboration between actors is a consequence of experts negotiating the details of agreements for further cooperation. Taylor sees the consociational model as useful for “explain[ing] the nature of the balance between fragmentation and cooperation/integration in the EU, the mutual dependence between the member states and the collectivity, and the ability – which does not imply inevitability – of the system as a whole both to advance and maintain stability.”

Against neofunctionalist assertions about the erosion of the nation-state by a the power of broader, community-wide prerogatives, Chryssochoou describes the EU as a “confederal consociation, by which he means a system in which there is ‘the merging of distinct politically organized states in some form of union to further common ends without losing either national identity or resigning individual sovereignty.’” Chryssochoou himself explains that “[C]onsociational arrangements …require neither a ‘sense of community’, nor a popular affirmation of shared values, much less the existence of a single and undifferentiated demos united by the overarching power of a higher civic ‘we-ness’.”
“Lijphart’s model of consociational decision-making anticipate[d] government by ‘grand coalition’ (rather than by majority) and the existence of veto powers for each of the constituent elites.” The four primary features of a consociational democracy he identified are the grand coalition, the mutual veto or ‘concurrent majority’ rule, ‘proportionality as the principle standard of majority rule and segmental autonomy in a federalist framework.\(^{522}\) He thought that for a consociational form of democracy and by extension, presumably, a consociated group of democratic states to function effectively, the political “society [they comprise] has to be divided, with minimal communication between separate segments.”\(^{523}\) Communication would therefore run vertically between the citizens of states and their respective elites along formalized hierarchical lines, and horizontally between the respective elites of the consociated units. Ultimately then “[t]he development of attitudes and values among the ‘decision-receivers’ [or citizen-constituents of a polity] is of lesser importance compared with developments at the level of the ‘decision-makers’.\(^{524}\) Chryssochoou illuminates the statist logic inherent to the consociational approach, in addition to its expansion of its hierarchical ethos. His perspective evinces the way in which the ultra-liberal-modern state form continuously machinates to protect its prerogatives by intensifying the authority of the power-knowledge regime constituting it and actualized through a coextending regime of violence regularized through an ever-broadening and subtle array of affective forces.

His theory of confederal–consociationalism can therefore be understood as an attempt to account for aspects of both the intergovernmental and, to a lesser extent, the supranational institutional takes on integration. It underscores the fact that states are far from disappearing as a result of their limited integration and increasing synonymy within
the EU. However, Europe’s economic and political assimilation, under the aegis of the EU, clearly indicates an expanded form of statism that replicates on a much larger territorial / geographic scale, the metaphysical presuppositions of the state, as well as its anti-human identic and existential dualisms.\textsuperscript{525} This is not to assert that difference has disappeared entirely, but to say that the elements of authenticity constituting traditional differences are being systematically interpolated and diminished according to the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Its over-riding metanarrative—predicated on the logocentric imperative of \textit{radical equality}—continues amalgamating the desires of ever-less-disparate Europeans until all that remains of the continent’s traditional diversity of types are slightly varying simulacrums of difference mediated by the spectacles of consumerism which the EU arose in part to serve.\textsuperscript{526} The EU can be expected to succeed so long as its over-arching simulacrum of meaning and purpose, sustained by the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, continues to allay the existential ennui and nausea inducing bad faith that would otherwise attend the intensified nihilism of our hyper-decadent epoch.

Importantly for its application to the EU, particularly given the efforts by EU institutions since the early 1990s to foster a common European identity, is the fact that “the process of macro-level loyalty building’ should not be associated with the integration or amalgamation of the component publics into a common political form that overrides citizens’ ‘fixed primary loyalties’.\textsuperscript{527} In other words, while the EU strives to generate the appearance of novel, shared characteristics between and a corresponding sense of belonging among the 500 million citizens in its 27 member states, it does so according to
the metanarrative of ultra-liberal-modernity, continually invoking its discourses to appeals to the vast majority of the population who have long been indoctrinated with its tenets.

In doing so the EU re-describes the respective national histories and traditions of its member-states to portray them as always having corresponded with its ultra-liberal-modern creed. It seeks thereby to incrementally replace such immutable conceptual edifices and the myopic worldviews they sustain with what the EU promotes as a more plastic and cosmopolitan notion of selfhood. This includes translating liberal ideals and modern expectations into practical norms by expanding notional awareness of the other, increasing the scope of responsibility and enhancing possibilities for becoming. The faith of Europhiles is that this will allow the cultural differences of disparate groups to flourish and even permit them a significant degree of self-rule via semi-autonomous authority structures, such as ethically distinct regions within multi-cultural nations such as Belgium or Spain. The federal dimensions of the confederal consociation provide a broader rubric of norms, rules and institutions within which a partially elected, partially elite coalition of representatives from every members-state can jointly govern the union as a whole.

“What is absolutely essential to the functionality and policy responsiveness of the plural polity is a priori acceptance of the need for cooperative shared rule among the group leaders.” For many critical theorists this “essential” condition fails to allay problems over the just legitimation of rule and the accountability of the decision-makers – the slave-moral impulse to assign blame rhetorically beautified as responsibility. This is particularly problematic when statist logic and ultra-liberal-modern values come to seem contradictory, in cases where the self-determination of a people is at odds with the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation. However, some argue in response to such concerns that in a consociational system, “the faith of democracy lies more in a belief in the principle of compromise itself than in the principles of open and responsible government.”\(^{531}\) Such a belief has ameliorated political conflicts between disparate groups within multi-ethnic states, and between neighboring states with trans-national minority constituencies (e.g.: ethnic Albanians in Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia [Kosovo]), so long as it was maintained.

Yet many examples from recent history, including the breakup multi-ethnic nation-states such as the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, (as well as ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Pakistan, India, etc.,) demonstrate that the confidence such a belief requires is difficult to instill in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural polity, and nearly impossible to enforce once factionalism dominates.\(^{532}\) The multi-ethnic ideal is often an ideological fiction promoted to justify the dominance of a hegemonic group whose leaders who aim to maintain the prevailing statist order. And it is often challenged by opposing leaders pursuing the same statist logic, with conflict and gratuitous human misery, resulting. However, membership in the EU does not alter the formal sovereignty of its member-states, who remain formally independent and largely autonomous in the conduct of their domestic affairs so long as the domestic legislations of member-state governments consist with EU norms. The EU has multiple institutional means of guaranteeing the rights, prerogatives and legal recourse of minority groups and individuals who believe their member-state government is abusing them.\(^{533}\)

Such a view would resonate well with Nietzsche’s own political sentiments if he could be certain that the best, whose “freedom is a freedom for creative work and not
simply an unbridled satisfaction of desires”, were actually able to rule according to their eros.\textsuperscript{534} However, according to his vitalist politics he would perceive the contemporary political reality in the Western world, as conceived by consociationalists particularly, as another slightly innovative justification of existing anti-natural liberal democratic arrangements. The motivation for the consociationalist thesis would be to nuance rationales for modes of being / forms of life that already consist with the dominant ultra-liberal-modern ideological apparatus.

Nietzsche would have decisively rejected the prevailing hyper-decadent order and its ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’—in which ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment arrogate to themselves the conceit that they are best qualified to rule—as antithetical to the aim of fostering the higher culture necessary for authentic human becoming and greatness.\textsuperscript{535} The reign of ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment always already consists with the ethos of slave psychology—providing a moral rationalization to the herd’s leveling of mountain and valley across the natural landscape of human types. The diversity of the species is diminished and its potential attenuated to achieve an ideological and political goal consistent with a morality of taming designed to emasculate would-be profligate geniuses likely to oppose such anti-natural aims. Historically, rulers have deemed some degree of social leveling necessary for the administration and governance of human masses, across diverse cultures and widely separated epochs. But in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the bureaucratic management of human societies has taken this apparently basic inclination to new levels of sophistication and given rise to correspondingly novel means of transgression. The defiance of stultifying socio-cultural norms and ossified political authority is urgently needed in a hyper-decadent age.
As a nuanced means of organizing social life and contending with the proliferating challenges of complexifying communities, “Consociationalism,” writes Chryssochoou, “is best captured by the term ‘consensus elite government’ – in systems of common management and joint decision-making operating within a multi-level political order as currently represented by the Union.” The “elite” to whom Chryssochoou refers, are of course, philistine economic optimists whose accord originates in their preoccupation with security and the prosperity of the crowd. According to the precepts of certain democratic theories the legitimacy of these sallow managers derives from the putative “justness” of the institutions they administer and their ability to respond to the multitude’s banausic demands and reduce its suffering (understood as “fairness”).

In so far as the prevailing system of governance in the central organs of the globalization complex could be characterized as a confederal consociation of subtly differing but substantively similar (ideologically analogous) democracies, it would strike Nietzsche as among the very worst sorts of political organization for the realization of a natural socio-political order. He would see it as one that diminishes human potential by enforcing an enfeebling ideal of (ersatz) security to enable more consumption. This striving after security, the necessity to create a sense of shared wellbeing that never succeeds in overcoming (re: eliminating) authentic sources of insecurity, such as the conventional illusion between self and other and the metaphysical fictions perpetuated by the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, sustains counter-productive sources of insecurity and accords with the simulated existential meaning and ontological purpose it circulates to naturalize its ultra-liberal-modern ideals. The anti-naturalism inherent in our
contemporary, dissipative values immiserates not only the healthy, but also needlessly exacerbates the suffering of the weak and botched—though they cannot know it.

The depiction of European integration that develops out of the consociationalist perspective has it that the EU “is not about the subordination of the component states to a higher central authority, let alone a new regional state, but rather it is about the preservation of those state qualities that allow the subunits to survive as distinct collectivities, while engaging themselves in mutually rewarding interactions.”\textsuperscript{538} Furthermore, it “claims to offer a linkage between the elite-led nature of European integration and the EU’s manifest lack of democratic character. The institutional and decision-making architecture of the EU has manipulated the integration process so that states continue to manage the processes of community building.”\textsuperscript{539} This is to say the consociational perspective, understood as advocacy, maintains something of the status-quo \textit{vis} state sovereignty, validates certain key insights of the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective on integration and naturalizes its—and the broader discipline’s—mania for rationalism. It illuminates dimensions of European integration that are antithetical to the ethos of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeanism’, as “the pro-activity of [the EU’s] elites seriously inhibit the capacities of integration from below that could help create a European demos.”\textsuperscript{540}

To the extent that this is true, it is clear from a Nietzschean perspective that the wrong elites are running the show. Moreover, consistent with Nietzsche’s intense aversion to liberal-modern democratic populism, these conventional elites are the so-called “higher men”, the self-described \textit{“libres penseurs”} (free thinkers), who “to a man... still believe in the ‘ideal’”, like those whom he was so contemptuous of in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{541} They
dominate politics in Europe today—as they have at least since the end of World War Two—out of a striving for conventional power that originates in a schizophrenic variety of ressentiment that exacerbates secularized slave-moral indignation. They believe in the democratic legitimation, by “appeal to the egoism of the masses”, of a technocratic bureaucracy that directs all the functional operations of everyday life toward the automatization of the human herds they manage, to serve (as Nietzsche put it in an early essay) the interests “of a self-seeking, stateless money aristocracy”, to whom he later referred as ascetic priests of ressentiment.

With 27 member-states the partisan divisions within the EU polity are exceedingly varied. A plethora of political parties vie to achieve their aims, from strictly national parties, to transnational ones that form coalitions to affect politics at both the national and supra-national levels of the Union. The so-called “Euroskeptics” and “Europhobes” come in many varieties and represent myriad factions within the continent’s disparate communities and cultures. But to generalize, they tend to perceive the EU as little more than an institutional and legal framework for the operation of an influential cartel of ruling elites (relatively defined) that legitimates its own machinations through its policies and dominance of EU institutions.

They may for religious reasons oppose what they perceive to be the EU’s secularizing effects, or, if xenophobic nationalists, for its liberal social and immigration policies; if socialists, its advocacy of trade liberalization; if neo-liberal economists, the farm subsidies provided by its Common Agricultural Policy, etc. The extent to which any of these groups’ respective assessments of the EU are accurate is debatable. As the views motivating much of this opposition tends to be a product of reaction (on top of the
reaction that spurred the creation of the EU itself) that ramifies cynicism, the defensibility of their agendas as authentically agonistic life-affirming expressions of a positive will to creative destruction as generative power, is doubtful.

However, it is true that its officials are subjected to ever-greater scrutiny as a result of demands for increased accountability among its constituent publics. The EU’s legislators and bureaucrats are governed by institutional rules and accountability procedures established by the EU’s Fraud Prevention Office as well as numerous management and regulatory committees, and agreed by treaty between member-state governments. Proposed changes to European institutions—particularly more recent efforts to increase democratic accountability and institute more direct citizen rule—threaten the elite-managed consociational order. In view of this it is unclear that the consociationalist view will persist in offering a compelling explanation for integration processes as this happens, as current trends suggest a normative momentum driving it toward making the EU more transparent and answerable for greater European civic responsibilities.

**Three recent theoretical approaches: Social Constructivism, Discourse Analysis and Post-modernism**

Lastly, I will mention three important and innovative perspectives that have emerged on the stage of European integration theory largely in the last two decades. These warrant attention because they have provided critical insights that have, with much-debated efficacy, intervened upon the sequential accretion of knowledge resulting from and symptomatizing the will to truth distinctive of the mainstream field (as explicated above). In so doing they have disturbed the striated space of the epistemic community
comprising European Union studies and the major(itarian) theories of European integration, posing new challenges to its status as a normalizing research tradition. While not necessarily creating the smooth, heteronymous space across the territorialized social field most conducive to authentic becoming-other, these theoretical perspectives are shredding the veil that long shrouded the essentializing conceits of the mainstream while strongly resisting re-capture by conventional statist discourses of Europeanization. As a result they are arguably moving the field in exciting directions, making possible a deeper interrogation of the fundamental precepts of the discipline itself, its conceptual strengths and weaknesses and the ideological presuppositions of the EU project.

The inter-related approaches of social constructivism, discourse analysis and postmodernism developed in response to concerns raised by philosophers who were in part inspired by Nietzsche and/or responding to the critical tradition he instigated. These philosophers include Jacque Derrida, who deconstructed the function of language and the ineliminable metaphysical logos at its center; and Michel Foucault, who applied a Nietzschean notion of genealogy to the socio-political construction of the subject through disciplinary regimes of power and knowledge. Foucault’s work has been very influential, due largely to his overt concern with the nature of the political, which makes it more palatable to conventional political scientists (who still resist taking it seriously), whereas Derrida’s more philosophically challenging—and unsettling—insights have yet to make a similarly deep or broad impact on the field.

The social constructivism school of integration theory, as Thomas Risse has noted, has been influenced by Foucault. He describes “constructivism as based on a social ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social
environment and its collectively shared system of meanings (‘culture’ in a broad sense).”

He goes on to assert that “social constructivism occupies a—sometimes uneasy—ontological middleground between individualism and structuralism by claiming that there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be collapsed into each other.”

While “the prevailing theories of European integration—whether neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, or ‘multi-level governance’—are firmly committed to a rationalist ontology which is agency-centered by definition,” social constructivists examine how the illusion of such agency (which Nietzsche recognized as resting on metaphysical fictions) is sustained through the occluding of the material conditions of its own possibility.

The constructivist perspective “emphasiz[es] the interests of actors [which] cannot be treated as exogenously given or inferred from a given material structure. Rather, political culture, discourse and the social construction of interests and preferences matter.”

Risse argues that social constructivist model provides insights and nuance to our understanding of the EU and integration processes, particularly with regard to the materialization and precise character of a European identity and the place of national identities in the context of an emerging ‘Europeanness’. He says:

First, accepting the mutual constitutive-ness of agency and structure allows for a much deeper understanding of Europeanization including its impact on statehood in Europe. Second and related, emphasizing the constitutive effects of European law, rules and policies enables us to study how European integration shapes social identities and interests of actors. Third, focusing on communicative practices permits us to examine more closely how Europe and the EU a constructed discursively and how actors try to come to grips with the meaning of European integration.

Risse goes on to consider the role of culture and ideology in the development of social
identities as a basis for political community as well as their historical contingency and malleability, in ways quite analogous to what I have done here, albeit from a Nietzschean perspective. This leads Risse to take seriously the potential in disparate national cultures for a pan-European collective identity and he provides compelling examples to show that they exist.\textsuperscript{551}

Discourse analysis is another recent and especially promising development in integration studies. Ole Wæver is a notable proponent of this theoretical approach to the EU. It is primarily concerned with how discourses circulate, legitimate and naturalize meanings. This has to do with understanding how sets of fundamental value assumptions about the world, the transmission of which often occurs through acculturation and are implicitly understood and shared, are effectively realized through formal and informal institutions. Discourse normalizes individuals and enforces itself through systematic socio-political procedures to persecute and exclude difference. This can occur in a formal sense through legislation, and informally through the perpetuation of mores and taboos.

The power of the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity—the action of which has been the subject of critique throughout this work—is augmented socio-politically through the resonance of its egalitarian ethos with slave moral ressentiment. The ideological instantiation of its anti-natural ideals compels and simultaneously covers-up a culture of abjection and conformity that impairs genuine becoming (becoming–other). In hegemonic ideological form it has synthesized the post-Enlightenment and modern discourses of universalism, liberalism, secularism, progressivism, and rationalism, and serves to naturalize scientism’s privileging of mechanistic causality and the positivistic orientation it confers.
Wæver states, “discourse analysis looks for structures of meaning. ‘Things’ do not have meaning in and of themselves, they only become meaningful in discourse. As a consequence, it is problematic to ground one’s analysis in ‘given’ subjects or objects because both are constituted discursively, and one should therefore study this process of constitution first.”\textsuperscript{552} This insight productively problematizes conventional notions of agency. However, Wæver is careful not to reify discourse, noting that “discourses exist and are reproduced and transformed through practice”, they do “not stand apart from ‘reality’, [but are] embedded in reality in the sense of actions, materiality, and institutions.”\textsuperscript{553}

Wæver recognizes the philosophical origins of discourse analysis in political theory as lying in the incomparable thought of Nietzsche via Derrida’s post-structuralism.\textsuperscript{554} It was Derrida (after Nietzsche, who demonstrated the self-referentiality of all so-called grounds) who recognized that in the course of structure, sign and play, the closure of meaning is ultimately impossible.” As Derrida recognized in his groundbreaking work ‘Of Grammatology’, this is because systems of meaning are always already incomplete and unstable, for one sign refers to another until we, the examiners, reach an aporia that compels recognition of the absence of any foundation or logos is evident. This is quite analogous to Nietzsche’s (and Zarathustra’s) most abysmal thought concerning truth, an idea that prompted his radical examination of how truths, which are ultimately all subjective, function to create and sustain meanings that cover-up their own lack of foundations and the absence of any grounds for positing non-tautological truths.

The play of signs is a process of an eternal referring back to still other signs. It is an asking “what does that mean”, ad infinitum. Derrida, following Nietzsche’s
unpublished 1872 essay ‘On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral Sense’, (which he cites) reveals the ultimate absence of a grounding referent, with profound implications for epistemology, hermeneutics and ontology, among other things.

The inherent limitations of language, and through its development, discourses, for creating meaning, leave interpretive gaps and conceptual spaces in which possibilities for transformation may occur. It is the function of discourse to sustain meanings, in disciplinary fashion, that inclines it to become ideologically coercive, but even at its most coercive it is intrinsically vulnerable. As Wæver notes, “partial fixations of political meaning are constantly attempted and make up much of the dynamics of politics, but any such attempt always has a loose end, an opening for a possible re-articulation.” He uses the concept of democracy as an example of the way in which “a surplus of meaning enables a competing articulation of democracy through a neo-liberal discourse.” The same applies however, for sacrosanct notions in international relations theory such as anarchy, sovereignty and self-determination.

Discourse analysis is a powerful means of cutting into the ideological conceits of integration theory and deconstructing certain foreground assumptions of conventional political science. The implications of this are potentially radical in terms of the creative and productive challenges they make possible. It is the task of ‘good Europeans’ to exploit these gaps and openings, to develop the loose ends and surplus meanings as they realize their life-affirming idea of Europe.

Post-modern perspectives combine the insights of social constructivism and discourse analysis with a critical deconstruction “of meaning and the ontological constitution of selfhood”, alterity and otherness. Post-modern critics are, after Jean-
François Lyotard (a critic of modernity and advocate of postmodern conditions of knowledge\footnote{557}), incredulous toward meta-narratives (particularly hegemonic ones), such as the belief in emancipation via the democratic state form and prosperity through neo-liberal capital process; a story legitimated by the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. Van Ham asserts that “postmodernism is both a condition of knowledge and the self-conscious stage in the evolution of modernity.”\footnote{558}

Postmodernism, such as it is, problematizes the epistemological assumptions and methodological practices of scholarship by “bid[ding] farewell to the notion of comprehensive rational knowledge and continuous progress which formed the basis of the Enlightenment. …It is at dis-ease with the assumption that history is an unending and logical process toward industrialization, urbanization, rationalization, bureaucratization and the growth of individualism within the context of state formation [and rejects] the notion of history as a unitary process with the ‘West’ at the political center of gravity.”\footnote{559}

Significantly, postmodernity challenges the conceits of scientism that dominate the generation and legitimation of cynical knowledge in our hyper-decadent era. “Postmodern science is postpositivist”, and anti-essentialist as it “heralds the death of foundationalism and instead proposes” relativism as a more accurate stance from which to evaluate culturally specific concepts, practices and desires, as well as with regard to efforts to understand morality and truth claims, i.e.: values.\footnote{560}

A century before “postmodernism” erupted onto the scene, Nietzsche had asserted that all truth is perspectivally contingent and historically situated, which is to say that truths are never objectively independent except from a subjective point of view. “Postmodernism” would likely have amused him, for even as many of his insights have
been applied to disparate aspects of the social world through it, its proponents often miss the crucial point that truths are essential for life. That said, it is in the main consistent with his over-arching skeptical endeavor; postmodernism does not seek to “advance” knowledge, per se, for as Nietzsche observed, “in the end one experiences only oneself (Z: III-1).” It seeks rather to better comprehend how knowledge arises and functions, without belief in any claims to transcendent truth. Nietzsche believed only the strongest could tolerate this terrible “truth”, and that the disposition it would likely foster among the weak would be especially ruinous, concurring with a thoroughly nihilistic worldview. Given the ethos of passive nihilism in this negative will-to-truth, our so-called postmodernism would likely have struck Nietzsche as epitomizing an age too dissipated and weak to posit values. He would have taken it as evidence of the ersatz enlightenment, or “happy false consciousness” typifying our hyper-decadent age.561

The resignation of the hebetated automatons comprising the masses in the contemporary West belies the ever-quickening pace of life and irrational exuberance produced by the liberatory promise of science and economistic optimism. The insights of post-modernity have augmented alienation through massification and the devaluation of all values, intensifying the negative effects of modernity, rather than providing any practical means to move beyond it. From a critical Nietzschean standpoint, the alleged move to the postmodern is a misnomer and would have been more accurately described as an intensification of liberal-modern values, generating a “super-modern” condition.

This condition—not to mention its likely political implications—would have struck Nietzsche as especially perilous, as the relativism it promotes further exposes the meaninglessness of existence to an already dissipated populace who need meaning
provided for them to avoid suicidal (or homicidal) annihilation. Even if it is always already heteronymous and inauthentic in nature, the meaning and purpose provided by the media–consumer spectacles, simulated prosperity and simulacrum of equality of opportunity and enfranchisement provide a semblance of (hyper-decadent) stability. When the relativism generate by post-modernism “trickles down” into the collective consciousness of the all-too-many, it poses the danger of compounding the absurdity of the everyday, intensifying alienation and despondency. Nevertheless this cannot diminish existing resources (either individual or social) for authentic becoming, just make them inaccessible to the vast majority.562

Many political theorists are now writing on international relations and Europe and its formal integration from a postmodern stance. Authors who have made significant contributions from this theoretical stance—or something approximating it—including William Connolly, James Der Derian, Zygmunt Bauman and Slavoj Žižek, to name a few. John Ruggie, who first conceived the notion of embedded liberalism as an explanatory framework for the post World War II Western-led capitalist economic system and democratic state order, has asserted that “the EU may constitute nothing less than the emergence of the first truly postmodern international political form.”563 Although not a dedicated postmodern himself, Ruggie has contributed some parallel insights and contributed to the engagement of international relations theory with postmodern thought. For instance he has observed, in Nietzschean fashion, that the EU is a “multi-perspectival polity”.564

R.B.J. Walker is among those theorists who have more explicitly affiliated his work with postmodernism. He has written about the metaphysical background
assumptions that unconsciously inform much of contemporary integration theory, asserting:

[W]e have difficulty imagining politics in other terms than those given by Hobbes, by a metaphysics of horizontal and vertical lines, by the assumptions of a sovereignty we may all be ready to dismiss but which still authorizes our account of what and where politics must be. The very existence of a theory of international relations, as of the political theory to which it is counter-posed, depends precisely on this for its authorization. Europe presents a situation in which neither side of this spatial divide has very much to say, except to repeat the stories that have kept them apart. Theories of European integration are an effect of this divide. Many people still struggle to force Europe into the apolitical categories these theories have produced. This is an effect of an idealization of political life rooted in a misplaced claim to know where Europe is.565

The facts of Europe’s integration, particularly when taken in the broader context of globalization, confront us with the difficulty of comprehending a politics that has moved us beyond the classic metaphysical assumptions of political science (in the works of Hobbes, et. al.). We are, rather quixotically, already living in its midst yet unable to sufficiently image it. We do not yet adequately comprehend the new conditions of our social world—that is, our language is insufficient to explain it.

Since the early 1990s it has been the case that more of the work done in theorizing European integration has had to contend with the insights and problems of postmodernism than the conventional, “mainstream” of the field would be pleased to admit. This suggests that the anti-foundationalist trend challenging the received wisdom of political science, specifically its dominant model for theoretical explanation consisting of “clear and testable distinctions between dependent and independent variables”, will continue to develop. As it does it will invariably continue to erode the grounds upon which confidence in impartial and unbiased “Truth” has rested by uncovering the lack of any fixed meaning to those grounds and their (somewhat fictive) stature. This has and will continue to
profoundly alter the discipline, including European integration theory.\textsuperscript{566} This
development will compel a new shared awareness, or we-consciousness, about the
reactive nature of the will to truth that formerly motivated the discovery and
rationalization of political facts in knowledge discourses, as well as the task scholars
ought, in the future, to perform.\textsuperscript{567}

\textbf{Part Three: Conclusions}

The mainstream theorists of European integration, whose principal ideas are
briefly summarized and critiqued above, are not accurately understood as performing
customary science or philosophy. Rather, these scholars engage in knowledge creation of
an important sort that “occurs” somewhere in-between the two and \textit{rarely} avoids
replicating the ideological precepts of the context in which it is generated. They should be
considered a hybrid type; a scholarly sort of whom Nietzsche would have been distrustful
and perceived as symptomatic of our ultra-liberal-modern epoch.\textsuperscript{568}

The persistence with which theorists of European integration try to explain and
understand the EU is itself noteworthy. The determination to elucidate the complex and
dynamical social, political and economic processes of European integration is itself
symptomatic of a will-to-truth that enlists truth in the service of political ends and/or the
advancement of a privileged ideology. It appeals to the authority of moral values operative
within the macro-sphere of the political—the assumptions of ‘truthlikeness’ constitutive
of the epistemic community and corresponding consciousness, of which their various
schools are a part.\textsuperscript{569}
Appeals to reason and objectivity in determining and evaluating evidentiary support enlisted to substantiate or prove theoretical claims often serve to mask other phenomena, such as the social–scientific setting in which truths are produced and what or whose interests they serve. Socially constructed knowledge is often self-replicating and redundant as “institutions influence behavior by providing cognitive scripts, categories and models that are indispensable for action, not least because without them the world and the behavior of others cannot be interpreted.⁵⁷⁰ Existing practices and the consciousness they both reflect and transform—which comprise a broader sociogenic framework—raise questions that supporters of those practices answer by reference to the corresponding ideological presuppositions. The desire for answers that conform to and corroborate their consciousness (more often than not) results in explanans that function to perpetuate the practices (explicandum), etc.

Significantly (for anyone concerned with the possibility for veracity and objectivity in the social sciences) this makes it easy to overlook all the subtle ways in which a dominant paradigm or set of discourses serves to validate an ensemble of perspectives that similarly legitimate the same fundamentals—beliefs about the highest human goods, the best form of political organization, the rights of individuals, etc. The need for pragmatic agreement for the sake of regulating the social life of complex communities notwithstanding, it does so by determining in advance what counts as legitimate evidence and how the facts should be (correctly) interpreted in making the case it has itself framed.⁵⁷¹ That doesn’t mean theorists engaged in examining the social world are unobjective per se, just that conscientious social scientists ought to remain cognizant that “institutions become the mechanisms through which the world is rendered meaningful
to social actors”; in other words what is ‘objectively' comprehensible is always-already institutionally conditioned, their insights included. 572

The problematic nature of claims to veracity and objectivity (statements of truth) in evaluation is underappreciated in the social sciences. In fairness it would be difficult—given the practical aim of understanding social phenomena—to proceed otherwise. Nevertheless, doing so often leaves explanatory lacunae, whether as a result of the use of empirical data or inadequate accounts of concept formation. This is, in part, where the problem of and/or need for establishing a specified, shared framework for analysis arises. 573 Unacknowledged differences in linguistic usage (definitional disparities) and dissimilar heuristic frameworks (evidentiary criteria, the determination and interpretation of facts, etc.) may explain certain arguments between disparate theories of European integration. It is possible that many of the field’s ongoing arguments have resulted from contrasting methods of analysis, rather than empirical deficiencies, per se. Given the ready access every theorist has to empirical data, this possibility is compelling. However, “empirical data” can easily be challenged as well.

Critical insights of this sort—the contingency of a perspective for knowledge (and life)—are not new in international relations or theories of European integration, but they vie for attention with the privileged empiricist prejudices of the ‘rational choice’ mainstream. Nietzsche made parallel—and still relevant—insights over a century ago:

Our new "infinite."— How far the perspectival character of existence extends, or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without "sense," does not become "nonsense," whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially an interpreting existence—that cannot, as would be fair, be decided even by the most industrious and scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis, the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectival
forms, and solely in these. We cannot look around our own corner… But I think that today we are at least far away from the ridiculous immodesty of decreeing from our angle that perspectives are permitted only from this angle. Rather, the world has once again become "infinite" to us: insofar as we cannot reject the possibility that it includes infinite interpretations.\textsuperscript{574}

Mainstream political science (the highly influential aforementioned ‘rational choice’ school and that ilk) would have made Nietzsche less optimistic, however, as its proponents generally strive to demonstrate the apodicity of the ‘Truth’ they discern through the application of quantitative methodologies they often defend with dogmatic zeal. This brand of doctrinaire scientism inherently opposes Nietzsche’s insight that the world may include infinite interpretations in favor of a rigid and ossifying notion of ‘Truth’. However, contemporary developments in the social sciences, including theoretical insights provided by ‘outliers’ to the political science discipline would, as noted at section two above, give him reason to hope that the knowledge creation in which the social sciences are engaged is developing in potentially life-enhancing ways.\textsuperscript{575}

The un-waning desire to fully explicate the EU simultaneously risks limiting Europe’s becoming via the will-to-truth motivating it. Such a desire always-already corresponds with and so risks augmenting, what is. It may unintentionally reproduce institutional constraints on what the EU may (otherwise) become. This tendency is deflected, or covered-up, in integration theory via its self-serving presentation as objective scholarship and its self-justifying rhetoric of detached inquiry. Its largely positivistic orientation and correspondence with the discourse of scientism convinces many of the veracity of their work and perpetuates the discipline and expertise.

The perceived efficacy of mainstream theories of European integration has much to do with the authority of the discipline itself and its reception in that context. Its
theoretical approaches persuade by conceptually narrowing perspectives on a given
subject so as to obfuscate certain implications of their contingent (subjective) veracity, as
well as the tautologous nature of their assertions of empirical fact. In the specific context
of integration theory this would mean the facticity of the EU.\footnote{576} Despite the evident
deepening of the field that has occurred over the past six decades (as the genealogical
doxography above critically explicated), developments in the mainstream schools of the
field indicate a growing awareness of and discomfort with the uncertainty of its theoretical
and heuristic precepts.\footnote{577}

The genealogy of the major theories of European integration demonstrates the
progressive emergence of dis-ease among its proponents, whose efforts to limn all aspects
of integration lead further into self-referentiality and conceptual lacunae. This is evinced
most clearly in the frequent suspicion they voice over their own inability to formulate
comprehensive and / or predictive explanations of the dynamical processes of integration
or to account for them in the positivistic terms set forth by their shared theoretical
presuppositions.\footnote{578}

However, Nietzsche’s vitalist politics provides us with a unique perspective on the
ongoing frustration, or dissatisfaction, among those at the leading edge of European
integration theory. The problem, which is epistemological (in terms of how we interpret
and understand the EU) and ontological (in so far as we confer certain sorts and degrees of
agency on its institutions) and in large part a product of the inability of conventional
theorists to effectively contend with the limitations imposed by state-centric concepts that
have dominated traditional IP and mainstream European integration theory. These long-
privileged notions, which include sovereignty and anarchy, rights and duties, and self-
determination, etc., are institutionally instantiated juridical concepts that through centuries of use have become realities of contemporary political life, the quasi-metaphysical “truth” of which is forgotten or ignored.

Many conventional theorists fail to recognize these notional truths as part of the soil in which their interest in explaining and understanding the EU grows. As such they take the interpretive elements of transcendental truth associated with them for granted. The transcendental truth of these notions serves to naturalize and edify our collective notion of political legitimacy and in part as a result of this has come to be believed in dogmatic fashion by the ideological adherents of the state-centric worldview (Weltanschauung), which aptly applies to most mainstream political scientists. This faith that things are the way they are because there is a natural and as such inherently just basis for their being as they are – the state of the world as it seems to be – compels some form or degree of academic reiteration among them, and as it largely corresponds with political reality – the nature of organized political life – these iterations serve to re-legitimate reified discourses.

This faith in the natural basis for and justice of the fundamental precepts of the international nation-state system (and supra-national communities of states such as the EU) gives rise to acceptance of it. By extension, most conventional integration theorizing unconsciously symptomatizes its author’s – and the field’s – decadence, as it advances representations of the phenomenon that always-already correspond with an ideologically privileged interpretation / explanation of it. Multiple, mutually validating simulacrum arise that reveal their own inability and/or unwillingness to think outside the theoretical (ideological) presuppositions that dominate the field. Among conventional theorists it also
suggests their related inability to recognize the forces (volitional desire expressed in a will to power) they reactively contend with and involuntarily embody, making them complicit in the ongoing effort to (re-)naturalize hegemonic ascetic-consumerist ideals. This is reflected in the frequent insufficiency of the empirical evidence invoked to ground their theoretical contentions, which is anyway cited to buttress arguments that rationalize and perpetuate deeper (quasi-metaphysical) confusions of cause and effect.

The philosophical equipollence of views—the *thesius cum antithesi*—produced by competing debates within the mainstream discourse of European integration, would prompt a thorough-going skeptic (or ‘good European’) to refrain from arguing for the superiority (i.e.: greater explanatory veracity or truthfulness) of any one among them. Such a stance is prerequisite to adopting and deploying the diagnostic method (perspectival framework) bodied forth by Nietzsche’s vitalist politics. A ‘good European’ would rank the perspectives that have emerged through the evolution of European integration theory, along with all alternatives – liberal or otherwise – according to their affective power and its enablement of an active being-towards authentic Dasein, that is to say, the salubriousness of the values the perspectives respectively symptomatize. They would adopt a critical stance from which to adduce the maximum utility of each perspective and selectively fuse the most efficacious features of them into an instrumentally practical appropriation according to how social conditions and historical circumstance may be exploited according to the affective power it contained / enabled. Their aim in so doing would be to utilize the effectiveness of such an amalgamation of perspectives as a tool for managing the masses and supplementing the forces of ascending life that it fostered for the best.
Like fun-house mirror images theories exaggerate certain features of the process while minimizing others, reflecting distortions of understanding in their analyses of European integration. In so far as they constitute a broader account-giving endeavor they alter perceptions of unification. The perspective they provide inevitably accords to a particular set of desires, and the dominant discourse—or will to truth—supplements the affective reactive force expressed in its negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power. ‘Good Europeans’ would deem the whole range of mainstream scholarship theorizing European integration an ideational expression of Europe’s decrepit instinctual organization at the macro-level of the political, the compensatory action of which is the amalgamation of Europe’s nation-states and peoples. Both the EU’s establishment and the current moment in its development of internal consolidation and enlargement (deepening and widening) represent a reactive institutional instantiation of this more fundamental development in the politically-driven becoming-same of the species man.

This reaction (supervised by contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment according to secularized slave-moral values) is not entirely negative or unproductive, as it serves to stimulate myriad informal under- or unregulated forms of integration some of which are likely to be uncontainable and actively transform the mentalities of certain exceptional Europeans in ways the EU’s formally laicized juridical, institutional and organizational value frameworks cannot hinder. It is in this changed mentality – and the creative, form-giving conative disposition it generates – that such rare individuals are becoming able to exploit abstract potentials of globality, providing them the resources to effectively cast doubt upon customary confidence in and reliance upon the traditional nation-state form of sovereign domestic authority, and other central tenets of
the hegemonic international order. It is through such changed ways of thinking that the reactive bases for (underlying metaphysical fictions of) the existing international order is likely to be overcome.

When the dominant schools of integration theory are examined through Nietzsche’s perspectivalist hermeneutic (the means by which his vitalist politics and power ontology attain practical applicability), each of their respective theoretical postures are understood by ‘good Europeans’ as coextending with some partisan segment of, or sub-agenda within, the “standard” ultra-liberal-modern meta-narrative concerning the democratic state form vis the possibility of institutional integration. The Deconstructivist and Post-modern This preponderating discourse (and all the various iterations and complexifications of it echoed in European integration theories since the 1950s) has for six decades guided the incremental economic, political and social integration of Europe’s institutions to decide and make sense of priorities, define the terms of the integration debate, confer and enforce its legitimacy, and establish the ideological framework around which the EU’s institutions have arisen, all the while habituating the European herd to the continent’s integration. Within this ultra-liberal-modern meta-narrative, hyper-decadent political discourse (which gives voice to a ‘cynical, enlightened false-consciousness’), the spectrum of difference between unabashed support for integration and strident opposition to it has been deliberately exaggerated to maintain the simulated political agon crucial to the spectacle of the project’s democratic legitimacy.

Organized political opposition to integration is systematically discredited across the continent by the EU itself. Some opponents to the EU, or advocates of enhanced national sovereignty, are marginalized as nationalistic throwbacks of a forgotten era.
and/or outright xenophobic bigots. In fairness, some of them are anti-immigrant xenophobes and racist bigots, and irrational fears about the integration of the continent and the inclusion of peoples from outside their countries in an expanded European society seem threatening. Examples of this abound and the cases such as the nationalist parties of the UK (BNP), France’s National Front (FN), Holland’s Party for Freedom (PVV) and Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) exemplify reaction on the far-right. However, more mainstream opposition to the expansion of EU powers is evident in the plebiscitary dramas of Denmark’s passage of Maastricht, Ireland’s ratification of Nice and Lisbon, and the French and Dutch rejection of the constitution in 2005 referenda, as noted above.

The EU and sympathetic member-state political elites have so far managed to rebound following each “defeat”, usually by re-holding the referendum until they achieve the outcome they desire. Yet the forces opposing the quasi-federalist dream of a politically unified Europe continually adjust and find sustenance in an ability to exploit popular reaction to perceived threats emanating from as well as beyond the bureaucratic behemoth in Brussels. These include fundamentalist Islam, the supposed resistance of some immigrant communities to fully assimilate, the putative threat posed by non-European immigrants to European traditions and culture, the demographic risk of declining birth rates and anticipated dearth of workers posed to the future prosperity and security of the continent, etc. All of these are however fairly transparent pretexts for galvanizing support for strategies of reactive exclusions which rely upon and foster irrationality. Nevertheless they resonate with an increasing number of the parochial European herd for whom the benefits of the EU project seem too abstract and/or threatening.
At the level of the political micro-sphere, theories of European integration are mimetic performances of their scholar advocates’ desires and ambitions. These desires originate in and edify far-ranging political forces at the level of the macro-sphere and strengthen their facility to interpolate become all modes of being (a becoming-comprehensive). In the specifically European context, this drive, expressed via abstract theorizing, is essential to realizing the “involuntary” aim (as a macro-level volitional urge), of the EU’s economic and now political and social integration of the continent. In addition, from an impartial perspective it can be said that to some extent – the degree of conscious complicity or willingness varying between individuals – those theorizing European integration have contributed to the anti-natural leveling of various human types. Their liberal ideals (like those subtending the EU) emphasize equality over difference so as to homogenize diverse modes of life and becoming, insofar as their work reinforces the logic of the project. The primary rationale for this is conflict avoidance (conflict being conceived as wholly negative) for the mitigation of suffering (a desired benefit). However, recent theorists have challenged the staid dichotomous interpretive framework contained in the overarching ideological discourse that had largely limited debate to the statist concepts within which the EU was conceived. This enables some transcendence of questions that long animated conventional argument about the veracity of contending accounts of the EU and debates over integration (e.g.: neo-functionalist versus realist, or intergovernmentalist versus supranationalist).

Whether the project can transmute its ultra-liberal-modern original impulses and become a genuine and perhaps original example of post-modern nomothetic legislation, remains to be seen. By re-examining and re-conceiving key objectives and central identic
issue of the project of unifying the European continent some present researchers and
future scholarly theorists may transform the epic political experiment in which their
contemporary peers (or more conventional predecessors, as the case may be) served as
ideological apologists.

The EU is by any measure an impressive collaboration to determine the future of
the continent and by extension, humankind. A compound power constellation, or
polymeric community, its increasing power and influence is felt everywhere today. It
functions as a specter in much of the world, its aura haunting the consciences of tyrants
and stirring oppressed peoples yearning for greater freedom. It is beginning to be
perceived as a paragon of rational governance to be emulated and is a desired destination
of the subjugated and displaced – in much the same way as the US has been for the past
two centuries. Recently it has challenged the US to uphold human rights throughout the
world and to match it in its social welfare provisions. As the meta-discourse of ultra-
liberal-modernity is universalized via the globalization complex, the EU represents itself
as a bastion of tolerance, cooperation and prosperity, as well as a counter-part to or
substitute ideal for America. Yet this describes the reception of its sophisticated simulacra
on its outside, its mystique. It is animated by entrenched forces of reaction attempting to
perfect and disseminate neo-liberal capitalist process and a democratic political order.
Whether it continues to be dominated by these anti-natural ideals and their arbiters or can
be transformed from within to serve the development of authentic cultural forms and the
aspirations of more cheerful and courageous individuals in Europe and throughout the
world depends on good Europeans to revalue the decadent values on which it is based.
Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and general theory of decadence grew out of a deliberation over how we ought to live together. It should be relevant to anyone earnestly interested in adding to their perspective on the political, the project of political integration and the EU. Against those who would assert that it lacks the apodicticity provided by an empirical foundation, I maintain that there is no more “objective” a reason to take the tenets of ultra-liberal-modernity as more credible or an apodictically truer depiction of reality than Nietzsche’s vitalist notion of the political. And if one accepts Nietzsche’s critique of liberal-modernity and its moralization of life / construction of reality (as much of continental and American thought implicitly does), then a refusal to seriously consider the implications of his vitalist politics and power ontology would be, at the very least, anti-intellectual. Nietzsche’s perspectivalism would have inclined him to support the EU—despite its ineliminable decadence—in terms of its potential to unify Europe, whatever flaws or however reactive and all-too-human the EU may currently be. The EU too can be overcome but serve in the meantime as a stepping-stone to the post- or transhuman future.

To return to the subject of how good Europeans might subvert and hijack the project to steer it toward their noble aims, Elbe remarks that the reactive will-to-truth bodied forth by the EU and codified in its *Acquis Communitaire*, according to its founders’ and contemporary arbiters’ designs, “would have to be firmly resisted” by ‘good Europeans’, as:

…the functionalist wager on European integration has culminated in a European Union that can no longer be seen as the embodiment of ‘good Europeanism’ in the way Nietzsche understood it.582

However, I think it implausible to assert (and do not believe) that “the functionalist wager
on European integration” ever embodied Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good Europeanism’. Rather, it employed similarly noble sounding rhetoric, which by the mid-1940s had become a part of the popular consciousness of a trans-national educated class of bourgeois Europeans (rightly) horrified by the destruction of the continent wrought by two major wars in little more than three decades.

Such rhetoric and the “high-minded” ideals it was thereby meant to suggest, contrary to Nietzsche’s understanding, perfectly fit an ultra-liberal-modern agenda of promulgating a slavish project predicated on perfecting and universalizing a set of norms originating in a combination of post-Enlightenment, liberal Anglo–American and continental political traditions. These standards validate themselves through an ersatz discourse of inclusivity that functions to gradually homogenize and ultimately annihilate genuine difference. It has entailed creating a hegemonic “modern”, pseudo-cosmopolitan identity conducive to neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy as practiced in the West (not, obviously the Soviet Union) before the war.

But the EU, from its inception onward, has been something Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ would instrumentally support as a vehicle for reaching their long-term objective of overcoming it. ‘Good Europeans’ would strive to perfect and refine the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and the ongoing project of European integration which ideologically instantiates it, knowing that some future inheritors of their legacy would strive just as passionately to transfigure (re: creatively destroy) it in order to realize their own, even nobler idea of Europe. Each such development, the inventive annihilation of a declining order and establishment of a new, more vital political arrangement, exemplifies successive generations’ desire to realize their own self-perfection and thereby
augment the perfection of the species. No such achievement (or failure, as it inevitably shall be) ever completely embodies the highest ideals or creative capacity of superlative individuals, but this does not diminish the brilliance of their exploits. They would not naively expect the consummately cynical ascetic-consumerist priests of resentment typical of our hyper-decadent era to conceive a project to their sincere liking.

Only recently has the EU come to resemble anything Nietzsche might have considered worthy of being reservedly hopeful about and then only for the direction its latest development suggests as a ‘molar aggregate’ (a superfluity of singular multiplicities: its citizens, local communities, regions, member-states, and all their varied activities, organizations and departments) striving to contain ‘virtual and diverse relations of alterity’ whose ‘machinic interfaces are engendering disparity’ that inevitably burst the parameters of its authority and subvert its mechanisms of control. In its negotiated assertion of prerogative and precedence over above the member-states and their sovereign national right to exercise control over its organs, it is unwittingly cultivating a transformation of conscience and of the prevailing ethos among its multiple units, in addition to the sorts of resistances it is producing or may yet enable through the abstract potentials of globality.

Understood as a formatively critical instantiation of broader globalizing forces, EU expansion is an integral feature in the process of extending the geo-political imperatives of molar globalization through the deeper integration of territories and social unity of peoples – furthering unto perfection the agenda / logic of its liberal presuppositions. More conventionally, that the EU is frequently and somewhat accurately derided as “fortress Europe” to connote its original and ongoing efforts to protect its internal markets from
outside competition (as for example through the Common Agricultural Policy, among other subsidies and import tariffs) does not conflict with but rather ramifies this thesis.

The highly regulated inauthentic agonism fostered by the world-wide capitalist market\textsuperscript{584}, as a fascist concretion, functions to automatically capture and interpolate any deviation from or defiance of its values and re-stratify every becoming-other according to its constitutive grid, thereby immunizing its ideological presuppositions from challenge. However, with the exponentially increased potentials for self-creation generated by globality the effectiveness of its operation is eroded, giving rise to escapes and corresponding possibilities that the best might exploit for their own (and humankind’s) perfection and going down. It may happen that their occasional successes will create new socio-political power-constellations that force the capitalist system to adapt itself to their creative acts, which gradually transform it if only by compelling it to interpolate a broadened spectrum of difference\textsuperscript{585}.

This futural being-towards a transhuman condition—an ongoing process of becoming who it is they are—mediates between what they have been, what they can potentially be and what it is they envisage. The disposition it entails is elemental to good Europeanism. Its proponents simultaneously affirm their native volition (with varying degrees of authenticity correlating to their fearlessness) and attempt to direct some quanta of the force they discharge (with varying degrees of efficacy depending on their strength) in accordance with—and to a lesser extent, to realize—their passion. Only a few extraordinary exceptions or lucky strikes will ever seriously challenge the status quo. The passion of most healthy exemplars—arising within the predetermined terms of ultra-
liberal-modernity’s broad ideological matrix—is likely to wane as they succumb to interpolation by reactive forces.

Plucky individuals of great health may exploit the economic reality these ‘flies of the marketplace’ have created to profit monetarily in order to pursue higher purposes, feigning conformity to the prevailing ascetic ideals, and admiration of its nummamorous personifications.586 Opportunities to exploit the weaknesses of the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity increase when those obsessed with earning and hoarding money through pecuniary mechanisms take the universality of their own nihilistic desires for granted. Those who succeed in infiltrating dominant institutions are more likely to subvert them. When the economic system falters, as in the economic bubbles of the past decade and the ongoing global financial crisis they produced—dissenters are empowered to exert influence for change.587

Whether these courageous comedians of the ascetic ideals achieve conventional success or monetary wealth—the “financial independence” that comprises the highest ideal of freedom among contemporary slaves—or not, their radical experiments with and kynical mockery of the injurious norms, mores and conventions that dominate the contemporary life of their communities toward their own perfection are likely to stimulate others. As their eros (passion) and askesis (discipline) spurs others to undertake acts of self-creation, they legislate nomothetically. In affirming “the grand economy of life as it is, without subtraction or addition”, these “artists of the future” may overcome the anti-natural moral order that under the false agon of the conventional globalization complex which obtunds the instinct for strength.588 As Conway observes,

Hence the central paradox of Nietzsche’s perfectionism: the enhancement of
humanity and the enrichment of ethical life are dependent upon the exploits of “immoral” exemplars who hold no conscious or intentional stake in the lives of those whom they succor and renew. In fact, he insists, these exotic specimens must be allowed (and indeed encouraged) to free themselves from the chains of conventional morality if they are to contribute to the permanent enhancement of humankind.589

The EU, as a complex set of institutional arrangements and rules (a macro-political molar aggregate) that produce a tangible way of life with corporeal effects, may be usefully manipulated to comprise the broad cultural product of an aesthetic pursuit by a (relatively) small number, including activists, artists, philosophers, social-science theorists, other norm-entrepreneurs and perhaps even the odd statesmen, whose own self-perfection was and / or is dependent upon its realization.

As the EU’s evolving social practices form and simultaneously symptomatize an emerging mode of life (however dissipative and exhausted), a few exceptions may realize new methods of human perfectibility through their play with and violations of the EU’s conceptual and customary boundaries and “remind some others of the powers and perfections resident within themselves” by so doing. (Nietzsche anticipated this, as the citation from HH: II–2, 292 above demonstrates.)590

“The philosopher,” as Conway elaborates, referring to Nietzsche’s highly qualified sense of the term, “involuntarily generates an excess of expendable affect … transgressing any conventional boundary between public and private domains.” But (the struggle involved in) self-overcoming for moral perfection “remains essentially ‘private,’ its sumptuary residue enters the public sphere as an invitation and temptation to others”, that “may eventually contribute to the founding of the positive law of a community, but only in the event that the recipients of this invitation endorse it as such.”591 There is a very real
sense in which this is what social-science theorists do within the conceptual confines of their academic disciplines. Theorists of European integration actively contribute to the creation and development of the EU as they interrogate and give articulation to the process of European unification. As ideologically biased soothsayers, “scribbling slaves of the democratic spirit and its modern ideas”, they are at once historical and scientific fictionalists whose interpretations of events simultaneously affect our comprehension of the past, our emplacement in the present (ubiqity) and are formative of reality to come. They are militant ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment.

For example, Moravcsik’s highly influential work ‘The Choice for Europe’ may have provided compelling evidence to take seriously his use of the liberal intergovernmentalist approach “to explain the ‘grand bargains’ that have punctuated the EU’s evolution”. Yet despite utilizing a non-comparativist method of analysis, Moravcsik arguably entrenched long-operative understandings of Europe’s integration process, in an attempt to rely “on the Community’s past to predict the Union’s future”.

Such an objective begs many questions about the priorities of the theorist, such as why an “objective” analysis wouldn’t first attempt to unpack the agreement concerning the community’s past or interrogate the ideological assumptions subtending it. Nietzsche’s perspectivalist stance would suggest that such a task would require an unimaginably complex formula. Any genuinely comprehensive attempt would quickly become too freighted with variables and known unknowns to be considered practically complete. It is no apocalyptic insight that social science, like its “hard science” cousin, always deals in vagueness and truthlikeness. For a “thorough” understanding of the political what are needed are unconventional artist–philosophers capable of genealogically
examining the subject, such as the good Europeans Nietzsche hailed. Given their indoctrination into the cult of scientism, mainstream theorists of European integration are quite unlikely to become good Europeans in the Nietzschean sense.

Given the ideological prejudices that prevail within the academic discipline of political science, international relations and European studies (and which correspond with and actualize the assumptions of ultra-liberal modernity) and the normal form of academic incest characteristic of the average-everyday activities of those fields, progress is likely to be very slow. Against the strong resistance of the prevailing statist, liberal ideology and corresponding mindset of conventional practitioners, it is probable that salubrious theoretical innovations capable of generating significantly transformative concepts and practices will result in the not-so-distant future. The Nietzsche-indebted “post-modern” approaches explicated above suggest as much. Such a development is arguably more likely than it was twenty years ago.

Due to their propensity to adhere to professional convention and to fall back into the inauthenticity of easy dogmatism, Nietzsche did not think scholars imbricated in an academic culture of conformity would be likely to transform the world in salubrious ways.\textsuperscript{595} He thought they were particularly incapable of overcoming the decadence within themselves, a necessary precondition to revaluing the reigning ascetic-consumerist ideals of our day. As Conway notes (citing GM: III – 23):

‘Men of science’ are not the free spirits [Nietzsche] seeks, for their signature faith in truth bears witness to their underlying belief that truth alone can redeem the human condition. This belief in turn betrays the conviction that the human condition stands in need of redemption, a conviction symptomatic of decadence.
…A genuine alternative to the ascetic ideal must neither promise nor anticipate the redemption of the human condition.\textsuperscript{596}

The desire to realize abstract potentials of globality in order to augment the fullest flourishing of humankind’s healthiest specimens is not making such a redemptive promise but arises as a consequence of the effort to cultivate the proper conative disposition necessary for the ultimate attainment of a higher (re: more natural) condition of culture for the authentic—non-linear—becoming of every individual.

However, I maintain that the discourse analysis and constructivist critiques of integration theory and European unification suggest that their authors might become good Europeans, that is kynical ironists. They are subverting the mainstream hegemony of the rational institutionalism and may well emerge as schismatic dissenters from the doctrines of ultra-liberal-modernity in time. Whether the academics currently working at the edge of the field do or not, their exciting insights point the way toward future challenges to the relative ideological uniformity that has characterized much of the mainstream discipline. A nervy theorist of European integration—or handful of them—may someday soon succeed in ablating certain conceptual conceits that presently dominate its conventional discourses.\textsuperscript{597}

Authentic becoming, as a process of self-emancipation from “inhibitory metabeliefs” is a practical aspiration actively pursued by the strongest, as opposed to a salvific program of “liberation” in which the all-too-many may participate, for it is dependent upon the necessary sort of striving enabled by the correct—if rare—instinctual organization of drives and impulses enjoyed by the healthiest individuals.\textsuperscript{598} It is the comprehensive decadence of the weak majority inclines their “leaders” to propose
redemptive ideals, prompts the herd to have faith in such anti-natural promises and simultaneously prevents all of them from ever being so “redeemed,” as it were.

With regard to the question of “whether Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good European’ simply take[s] us back to a metaphysics of immanence”, albeit one opposed to the post-Enlightenment liberal-modern metaphysical realism predicating the statist logic of Europe’s integration, Elbe observes that:

Although Nietzsche does not offer his readers a new ‘meaning’ of the European idea along traditional lines, he does provide them with a vision of the ‘good European’ that generates its meaning by experimentally putting the will to truth into question.599 That will to truth is realized via an ideologically enforced univocality of reason that prioritizes economistic concerns represented as emancipatory and programmatically fixated on the aim of ever-increasing material prosperity (re: consumption). Nietzsche’s idea enables us to deconstruct the current project of European unification and envisage alternative, genuinely life-affirming priorities. According to the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of good Europeans those alternatives naturally concern enhancing the agonistic project of self-overcoming and self-perfection; the becoming-authentic through yes-saying to life with a good conscience (which entails Dionysian acceptance of suffering and the cruelty inherent to valuing).

At the macro-political level this endeavor, undertaken by the strong, seeks to create values and institutional mechanisms (norms and practices) that bestow meaning upon existence by enhancing our limited autonomy while binding us to a community. By extension, our sense of purpose is enhanced as such sociogenically coherent political arrangements enable greater authenticity. A profusion of types results from broadened
opportunities for becoming. This in turn maximizes the elevation of the best—those capable of truly prospering.

This political schema differs radically from the false-emancipation promised by ultra-liberal-modern discourses of freedom (the free-willing, independent, self-ruling subject) and egalitarianism (predicated on the notion of universal equality), which tempt the all-too-many to passively succumb to decadence and serve as lures to self-zombification. Nietzsche doesn’t desire the complete elimination of avenues for resignation unto self-destruction of the botched and the failures, just the creation of additional socio-political means by which the healthy may thrive.

However, in our superficially prosperous yet increasingly abject, hyper-decadent age, it is the multi-party, putatively representative, constitutional democracies ensconced in the neoliberal, “free-market” capitalist order (i.e.: Empire) that collectively constitutes the hegemonic globalization-complex, and the EU as a major instantiation and arbiter of its prerogatives. It is this supremely cynical regime which kynical good Europeans—as healthy individuals—seek to transmute. In doing so they may attain their highest potential while re-naturalizing the political by making it authentically agonistic. Inevitably unpopular among the ironically impaired and the all-too-many apologists for the status quo, they are unlikely to attain high office. Yet this aim—and their buffoonery—corresponds with their own and their community’s becoming–authentic, and by extension, their and its moral and political perfection.
BOOK THREE
A Nietzschean Perspective on Globalization and Globality

Introduction: The utility of Nietzsche’s vitalist critique to an analysis of globalization

Nietzsche’s critique of liberal-modernity provides a framework for deconstructing the axiomatic narratives of our era. Applying it thusly reveals the overt and subtle ways in which the technology, trade and communication driven action of contemporary globalization systematically universalizes the nihilistic values of ultra-liberal-modernity, the hegemonic meta-discourse of our age. “Globalization” is a general—even vague—term for a broad array of affective forces and interrelated power assemblages that defy parsimonious explanation. Hence there is much—and from a Nietzschean perspective often redundant—debate about what precisely it is. Throughout this work I specify and analyze the ideological basis for its governing precepts. The phenomenon of globalization refers to a polycentric power constellation comprised of diverse institutions, processes and forces that emerged from and extend Western practices. In its operations it appeals to Western rationalism for validation, and is presencing the West’s decadence around the world.603 I therefore refer not to globalization, but to ‘the globalization complex’, so as to avoid essentializing one dimension of it or reifying the phenomenon.

In this book I examine its specific manifestations and affects on life, then explicate globality—the changed consciousness or mentality to which globalization has given rise—and its transformative potential. What the various, though similarly reactive,
forces of globalization fundamentally have in common is a shared will-to-power originating in a slave-moral axiomatic. It has advanced a certain mode of capital process (the neo-liberal variety favored by the ‘Washington Consensus’), privileging free-market democracy, and transmits Western attitudes and modes of being. The globalization complex initially accrued disproportionate material wealth and benefits to the West—affluent developed nations of the industrialized and post-industrialized north—whence it originated. However, its effects now threaten the economic “prosperity” of the West itself through deindustrialization and structurally generated insecurity in the financial and banking sectors of the global market.

In transmitting decadent (secularized Christian–Platonic) Western values, often by coercive means, the globalization complex generates various political effects across multiple dimensions of socio-political life. Its institutions, forces and processes value in ways that invariably disrupt the practices and subvert the moral standards of autochthonous cultures in non-Western regions of the world. As indigenous knowledges are disturbed the forms of life they sustain are irrecoverably altered and made susceptible to annihilation. However, its valuations also inhibit the creative becoming of individuals already living in its primary loci (the West), while representing their operation as providing the most effective means for the attainment and maximization of individual freedom. Its sublimated violences preclude the possibility of effectively challenging the ultra-liberal-modern axiomatic subtending it. This puts certain of its main practices at odds with the axiomatic from which they derive validation, a contradiction always-already overcome by (primarily material) enticements to nihilistic
resignation—a passive acquiescence that over time develops into craven complacency and stupefying contentment with the status-quo.608

The globalization complex ideologically interpolates any resistance to its prerogatives in fulfilling its purpose: the lucripetous quest for lucre. However, through its worldwide propagation of the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, uneven intensification of its leveling ethos and halting transformation (exclusionary othering) of traditional forms of life, the institutions, processes and forces of globalization continuously give rise to unanticipated abstract potentials of globality. These are possibilities for the creative destruction of stultifying and politically disempowering normalization which is achieved through social indoctrination (public education, churches, the military, etc.) via narratives of equality and opportunity (which cover-up the cronyism and privilege that keeps the worst mob factions in charge of government), simulated enfranchisement and spectacles of ersatz-freedom through consumption that are circulated by the globalization complex.

A principle aim of Nietzsche’s philosophical project was that of illuminating the way in which values facilitate or impede life’s flourishing. His chief political concern was that of the fundamental question of “what ought humankind to become?”609 Responding to the diminution of culture and life in Wilhelmine Germany—and Europe more generally—he considered how authentically agonistic forms of socio-political organization may invigorate life for the attainment of an ennobling culture.610 Toward this end he sought to inspire his readers to become good Europeans. As such they would be better able to contend with the degeneration of life brought about by the anti-natural
values of our hyper-decadent age. This task required a complete revaluation of the liberal-modern values that were debilitating Europe.\textsuperscript{611}

The subversive capacities emergent in globality—a result of socio-political enhancements to the native volition or powers of loftier types—prompts imaginative forms of dissention from conventionality. Globality’s unlimited potentiality invariably complements the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of humankind’s healthiest exemplars, providing a means for their authentic self-expression, re: the discharge of their vital force. It spurs inventive resistances realized in yes-saying kynical acts of radical self-creation through which the values rationalizing conventional globalization may be productively destabilized. Globality supplies a way for would-be comedians of the ruling ascetic-consumerist ideals of our age to become who it is they are.

Consistent with Nietzsche’s vitalist critique is his radical philosophical assessment of traditional Western notions of subjectivity and agency, particularly as these notions are informed by conventional assumptions about mechanistic causality. Nietzsche savages the metaphysical fictions that had been conceived to rationalize causality and reify agents as such.\textsuperscript{612} Nietzsche maintains the cause of an action is added after its occurrence, “a self-deception of vanity after the event”,\textsuperscript{613} and settles instead on the naturalistic view that “Individual human ‘agents’ are simply the embodied media through which the will to power amorally propagates itself.”\textsuperscript{614} What factual evidence could be cited as motivate for or sustain such a critique? As with all the great Western philosophers who posited an ultimate referent or logos before him, be it Plato’s forms, Leibniz’s monads or incomparable insight, Kant’s transcendental ego, Hegel’s world
spirit, etc., Nietzsche can provide no empirical proof of his thesis. Conway acknowledges that,

His diagnosis of modernity may strike us as scintillating, provocative, even persuasive at times, but we have no epistemic warrant to following him in pronouncing it true.\textsuperscript{615}

It was his persuasive and arguably accurate assessment of his and Europe’s historical situation which provides his wary judgment and corresponding technique of evaluation with credibility.

Nietzsche’s identification of the great potential and distinctive brand of turmoil typical of his age are themselves symptoms of his own besetting decadence, as Conway also observes. However, they provide a useful framework for thinking about political life that ultimately affirms largely desirable objectives for humankind, whatever the self-implicating paradoxes its flawed author indeliberately bodied forth by them. This is particularly salient in the present age of globalization, both for evaluating and transforming the affective force of the decadent Western (European) values the globalization complex disseminates universally.

Nietzsche’s theory attains a perspectively credible “objectivity” inside the critical philosophical framework in which it arose, and which explains why the aforementioned metaphysical fictions are less efficacious for comprehending the world than is his vitalist understanding (symptomatology) of the affects. Nietzsche was concerned with illuminating how “a moral judgment is illusory insofar as it erroneously identifies individual ‘subjects’ as the source or cause of the agency they involuntarily propagate.”\textsuperscript{616} By extension he sought to establish the irreversibility of the decadence particular to European life in his lifetime, the era of late-modernity, a fact attributable to
the affective power of the nihilistic forces dominant then and which he predicted would intensify until they culminated in a worldwide calamity in the next (twentieth) century.

This aim had the practical utility of conveying the urgency of a comprehensive revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) and spurring those capable of implementing it into action. Nietzsche believed his particular nuanced variety of vitalism was capable of illuminating these phenomena and providing as objective a basis as could be conceived for a fundamental revaluation of our epoch’s dominant, anti-natural values. According to his vitalism—and corresponding politics—the virtues of an era indicate its ascending or declining life and the condition of its health:

In its measure of strength every age also possesses a measure for what virtues are permitted and forbidden to it. Either it has the virtues of ascending life: then it will resist from the profoundest depths the virtues of declining life. Or the age itself represents declining life: then it also requires the virtues of decline, then it hates everything that justifies itself solely out of abundance, out of the overflowing riches of strength.617

By these criteria he determines the health of modernity, a brief overview of his critique of which is necessary to establish primary points of his conception of the political and its applicability to EU expansion in the context of globalization.

The core of this philosophical framework lies in his genealogical critique of morality, originating in a psychological theory of the unconscious instincts and drives, their correspondence to human strengths and weaknesses, and role in generating the ressentiment and bad-conscience which largely characterize the politics of Western civilization. The highly original effort he provided in his mature work toward a genealogy of morality captures the “essence” of his view of moral systems: that they are created, evolve, get overthrown and indicate the relative health of the society that spawned them. If we accept his total rejection of all “universal values” and “transcendent
truths,” ancient idols he demonstrates the hollowness of by striking with a hammer of skeptical criticism, then the salience of genealogy to any serious inquiry into values is clear. A comprehension of how and for what reasons certain values evolved, including the interests they serve, is crucial to adducing their significance for life.

The revaluation he desired (which would reinstate healthy quasi-pagan virtues usurped in the West by decadent Judeo-Christian morality and Platonist metaphysics) and explication of the Judeo-Christian inversion of good and bad, from which Europe’s present anti-natural state arose, produced the famous distinction of master and slave moralities that later evolved into a healthy / decadent dichotomy. Nietzsche advocated reversing the Christian–Platonic order (which in secularized form served as the ideological basis of globalization) to restore the natural hierarchy between individuals and the hierarchy of moralities it had eliminated. He grasped the opposition this objective or counter-ideal would encounter due to the entrenched decadence and slave morality of modern Western society. Furthermore he recognized the violence of thought as action, against the “conscience-vivisection” that contributed to the decrepitude of our age, achieving it would require.618

In ‘On the thousand and one goals’, Zarathustra asserts the link between esteeming the world, an indispensable human action that imbues existence with meaning, and the simultaneous creation of values. Furthermore he elaborates on the violence invariably entailed by changes of values:

Only man placed values in things to preserve himself – he alone created meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself ‘man,’ which means: the esteemer. To esteem is to create: hear this you creators! …Through esteeming
alone is there value. Change of values – that is a change of creators. Whoever must be a creator always annihilates. Zarathustra would overturn the prevailing moral order to emancipate individuals from their subjugation to the morality of the weak, confer upon the ego its rightful good conscience and put it to productive use:

The delight in the herd is more ancient than the delight in the ego; and as long as the good conscience is identified with the herd, only the bad-conscience says: I. Such facultative individuals would “go under” to create virtues in which “the fire of love and the fire of wrath” would glow, thereby setting a goal for humanity to provide it purpose. From Nietzsche’s meta-ethical theory of morality his critique of modernity emerges. According to Nietzsche the last spiritually healthy, culturally generative epoch in Europe was the Renaissance, exemplified by the proliferation of arts he takes as symptomatic of the invigorated human spirit characteristic of the period. Nietzsche contrasts this with the reactive, anti-natural forces that produced Luther and the Reformation and conditioned European culture for the Enlightenment.

Nietzsche identified modernity as an epoch characterized by increasing decadence and decline; hence everyone born into the era was, to some varying degree, certain to exhibit symptoms of these unhealthy defining characteristics. No one could completely escape modernity’s degenerative effects, and Nietzsche recognized his own contamination by them, a dynamic Conway documents and interrogates in his work *Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game*. Liberal-modernity is in large part a product of the slave moral revolution in values against masterly instincts. Nietzsche famously explicated slave morality’s role in naturalizing ressentiment (as the “spirit of revenge”) and the bad-
conscience (through guilt), its cultivation of herd instincts, subjugation of humanity and exclusion of the strongest individuals in society from governing institutions.\(^{622}\)

On the development of herd instincts in men and the simultaneous growth and role within communities of an essential morality for the maintenance of order and continued prosperity, Nietzsche observed:

> By morality the individual is taught to become a function of the herd, and to ascribe to himself value only as a function. As the conditions for the maintenance of one community have been very different from those of another community, there have been very different moralities; and in respect to the future essential transformations of herds and communities, states and societies, one can prophesy that there will still be very divergent moralities. Morality is the herd-instinct in the individual.\(^{623}\)

The herd instinct is not necessarily slavish in its character, however, but lends itself to the emergence of such a morality when the mediocre majority adopts anti-natural ascetic ideals and corresponding values and succeeds in imposing them on its betters.

Every morality describes a set of (disciplinary) values particular to a people (and integral with its culture) and delimits social relations among its members accordingly:

> Wherever we meet with a morality we find a valuation and order of rank of the human impulses and activities. These valuations and orders of rank are always the expression of the needs of a community or herd: that which is in the first place to its advantage - and in the second place and third place - is also the authoritative standard for the worth of every individual.\(^{624}\)

Autochthonous moralities, the *ethos* and *nomos* native to a social organism, (as opposed to those imposed from outside) symptomatize a mode of life felicitous to the greatest becoming of each within the natural rank order of types (*Rangordnung*) a moral system generates. That culturally specific rank order of types enforces and thereby legitimates the moral order necessary for a coherent social entity.
Moral systems develop out of the instinctual arrangement of impulses and drives at the macro-level of the community. By instantiating a rank order of values a morality gives expression to the shared native volition that, so affirmed, unites individuals in community. It also ensures that future members of the community feel an inborn duty to preserve the morality that serves as its basis.

The moral systems of indigenous peoples everywhere outside the Anglo-European “West” are threatened by the narratives propagated by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity via the institutions, forces and processes of the globalization complex, which coerces the adoption of its principles. That reactive power-constellation—predicated on anti-natural and quasi-imperialistic, decadent Western values of secularized Christian-Platonic morality—make its tenets axiomatic by interpolating the norms and subverting the mores of autochthonous cultures.625

From this vitalist perspective the willful adherence of a community’s members to its/their prevailing moral strictures serves to indicate the health of the society more generally. At the micropolitical or individual level, an autochthonous morality determines the worth of a person according to how effectively he can conform to its behavioral strictures and carry out its regulations (here Nietzsche anticipates what Foucault would label disciplinary regimes). “[D]epending on the agents in question, all ascetic techniques are potentially both coercive and empowering.”626 In a naturally ordered polis an agent’s performative enactment of his community’s morality code determines his success within it and, to a certain extent, the likelihood of his attaining his own moral perfection. Collectively, a culturally cohesive populace strives for political perfection through its performative enforcement of its morality’s instinctual organization of social drives and
impulses. These are expressed via (exclusionary) ascetic ideals that valorize the community’s political preferences. 627

These conclusions were enunciated throughout Nietzsche’s condemnation of liberal Enlightenment values that emphasized equality and rights. He took the disposition underlying such values for the secular rationalization of a creeping slave morality designed to ingratiate the ressentiment of the many, and beyond this to recognize the futility of the “redemptive measures designed to cure the ills of modernity” he had previously prescribed. Conway states that in his post-Zarathustran writings Nietzsche “…acknowledges that the institutions of modern Europe are simply too corrupt to serve in the macropolitical capacity he had mistakenly reserved for them [in his earlier works] …that, independent of the macropolitical resources at his disposal, he is in no position to orchestrate the redemption of modernity.” 628

Nietzsche did not distinguish between varieties of liberalism, which strikes some contemporary political scientists as problematically unnuanced. However, it should be understood that he generalized about liberalism not to elide the existence of differences between various factions of liberals in his own era (the range and diversity of which has only increased in the century following his death), but to speak of those broad traits he identified as characteristic of all varieties of liberalism and its particular, unifying ethos. Nietzsche believed modernity’s dissipative affects would compel the most decadent (or radical) socialistic consequences of the liberal ideology and diminish future European life thereby.

Nietzsche anticipated the further degeneration of socio-political life in the West, which he believed would have to completely exhaust itself before a new regenerative
order might be founded. Albrow acknowledges that, “He recognized the crisis of the modern and foretold what has become the postmodern.” His thought, a diagnosis of the destructive course the nihilism of his age had set mankind upon, bode ominous portent in the prognosis Nietzsche described for Europe in the centuries to come. But it also hinted at the ongoing struggle that could evolve more of the strong, ‘good Europeans’ he envisaged. Their efforts at self-overcoming would remain at the micropolitical, or individual level. Conway states:

In a strong age overflowing with vital energy, externalized in the institutions and festivals of a healthy people, lawgivers would have neither the need nor the inclination to restrict their legislations to the political microsphere. But in a decadent age unable to sustain the vitality of a people’s signature institutions, lawgivers have no choice but to legislate from within the political microsphere.

Struggling to legislate to the greatest extent possible the inner, instinctual ordering of their impulses and drives through regimens of self-overcoming (willfully self-prescribed askesis), their experiments and prankish acts may serve to augment the overcoming of the decadence of their age even as they only strive to perfect themselves. “In some extraordinary cases ascetic disciplines will have a fortifying, fructifying effect on agents, inadvertently endowing them with unanticipated freedoms and affording them greater political latitude.” These strong exceptions abide by the instinctual ordering of the drives and impulses comprising their native volitions (and expand the pathos of distance within themselves and between themselves and others) to preserve and enliven what is noble in themselves and their community as well as their progeny (literal or otherwise).
Part One: Globalization and Its Unanticipated Production of Globality

Globalization is a widely, and some would argue loosely, applied term. The significance and historical distinctiveness of the set of inter-related economic, social and political developments comprising the phenomenon to which the word is applied have been much-debated. It remains contested and difficult to succinctly define, for there is little agreement about the precise character of the norms, practices and trends it describes or—if they even exist—the extent of their influence. Definitional disagreement is particularly evident between disciplines concerned with the phenomenon, especially the fields of economics, political science and sociology. So while most political scientists, economists, sociologist, government officials, business leaders, investors and technophiles acknowledge that it is occurring there are diverging conceptions of what it is and explanations for what drives it. What globalization means, how it should be defined and how accurately the term, so defined, can be applied in a particular context are questions of interest across academic disciplines. What they broadly share, despite their diversity, is a set of assumptions that point to the operation of certain hegemonic discourses and power-knowledge regimes informed by the ultra-liberal-modern metanarrative of our hyper-decadent epoch.

As defining globalization is such a complex and controversial task, I combine multiple perspectives here to describe the phenomena from a Nietzschean stance, while striving to avoid reductionist, economistic explanations. I think the dangers of such generalizing are likely to be less problematic than those of more conventional attempts to precisely define the “truth” of this exceptionally complex phenomenon which refers to our continually changing, increasingly dynamic and inter-connected world. Van Ham asserts
that “there is an analytical parallel to be drawn between the processes of globalization and European integration, each following the fundamental, unwritten but clearly understood laws of late capitalism.” He further argues that Europeanization can in part be understood as a response to globalization, “that the process of European integration is to be understood as globalization on a regional scale, as well as a defensive response to the world-wide trend of growing economic interdependence”. I argue here that the latter (European integration) augments the forces, processes and institutional development of the former (“world-wide” globalization), bearing in mind that “[t]urning globalism into the *deus ex machina* for European integration would be too shallow and naïve an analysis”.

The correspondence between varying interpretations, explanations, and definitions of globalization broadly lies in their common recognition of a cognitive transformation among individuals within those societies where the related phenomena are occurring. The history of Western economic expansion and commensurately increasing global trade is often, and correctly, taken as a starting point for analyzing the phenomena. Haider Khan, writing from a critical political-economist’s standpoint, considers the dynamic processes encompassing globalization and the variety of forms they take in disparate national contexts to be generating new instabilities within developing—and by extension—developed—economies. In a fairly lengthy remark worth citing in full, Khan recognizes the problematic nature of defining the phenomenon in a way that adequately situates it in its proper historical context, asserting that:

> It is because of such complexities that the term ‘globalization’, which is so much in vogue today, has to be used with caution. When viewed historically, it appears that globalization is a contradictory process of international economic integration
that was severely interrupted by the First World War, the interwar depression, and the Second World War. The emergence of the Bretton Woods framework can be seen as a way to integrate the world with respect to trade while controlling with flow of private capital. The demise of Breton Woods has set in motion forces of capital account liberalization that are often the most visible aspects of ‘globalization’. However, even this process is fraught with new instabilities […] as evidenced by the Mexican and – more recently and even more dramatically – by the Asian financial crisis.635

Capital account liberalization, which typifies the economic dimension of globalization, has been a mixed-blessing for developing economies and has for the past twenty years at least, challenged the ability of the major international economic institutions to contend with its effects.636

Khan refers to two major financial crises of the 1990s that resulted from growing instabilities generated by increased capital flows. Similar predicaments arising from certain contradictions and inherent vulnerabilities exacerbated by processes of liberalization (in the form of debt securitization and other financial instruments) now threaten to undo some of the practices driving economic globalization itself. The risk of economic turmoil resulting from liberalized practices in international finance led to the ongoing US sub-prime mortgage and global financial crisis, as dubious home loans were bundled together by the thousands, rated as relatively secure, and passed up through the international banking system, causing turmoil, in Europe particularly, when they proved to be under-capitalized as their holders defaulted en masse.

Globalization has empirically demonstrable effects on institutional practices ranging from trade and finance to political cooperation and conflict where its influences are readily seen and commonly scrutinized. The liberalizing processes it signifies affectively condition the expectations of governments, corporations and individuals, from
investors to consumers, as they ramify the ideological meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and its associated narratives. Furthermore, a plethora of evidence substantiates its ramifications on social order, cultural transformation and group and individual identity. At some discernable level this now includes nearly every human community.637

Although the meaning of globalization is contentious it is generally agreed to be a set of phenomena originally instigated by European exploration of the world and perpetuated by the forces, institutions and processes this intercourse spawned. Following Khan, I take its current manifestation as having originated in Anglo-European imperial colonization, the prerogatives of which were gradually sublimated and formally transformed via the creation of a post-war international order at Bretton Woods, San Francisco and Potsdam.

The character of contemporary globalization was further modified by de-colonization, a process in which direct control over the domestic affairs of numerous African and Asian peoples was previously exerted by Europeans was ceded to newly independent authorities of sovereign states. However, these new nations remained heavily reliant in most cases on their former imperial overlords, and this relationship of relative dependency also colored the forces, institutions and processes of globalization. Many former European colonies have remained on the periphery of the globalization complex, as mere cites of resource extraction. This has left many of the nation-states created in the wake of de-colonization in deeper poverty than they endured under European rule and persistent political instability that casts doubt on the West’s commitment to the ultra-liberal-modern values it espouses and its advocacy of universal human rights.
Khan is critical of overly enthusiastic portrayals of globalization. And it is certainly true that the Western media disseminate a generally unnuanced and valorized impression of the phenomena, ideological function of which I address below. As Khan noted in the citation above, the economic dimensions of globalization have produced some contradictory effects with self-defeating built-in potential. He explains that:

It is necessary to treat the rhetoric of globalization with caution. At best, we are experiencing a ‘fractured’ globalization. Integration of financial markets, for example, can lead to great benefits for all in a truly liberal world of equal actors. However, in a world of unevenness the evolutionary paths may lead to crisis unless institutions are designed properly. Leaving everything to the markets may produce the supreme irony of ultimately leading to crises which prevent some very important capital and commodity markets from functioning.638

This notion of a “fractured globalization” is quite apt, both with regard to the unintended consequences of unrestrained market logic and to the effects of globalization on developing – non-Western – societies.

While the reception of globalizing institutions, forces and processes is certainly not uniform between the nations and cultures it transforms, the economic impetus of globalization in summa aims for homogenization in production and uniformity in market openness. This, as I will argue further below, has the effect of fracturing autochthonous communities by introducing foreign values and practices.639 Significantly, this includes the rupturing of the authentic relation between individuals and their cultural practices (and its indigenously mediated evolution) by interposing new spectacularized forms of ultra-liberal-modern desire that circulate and validate simulacrums of existential meaning and simulations of ontological purpose.

What is less controversial about globalization is that it entails the forced adoption of certain economic and political practices toward their universal hegemony, and the
imposition of a corresponding socio-cultural form of life that profoundly alters autochthonous values and knowledge. Forced may at first seem too strong a word, but the incentives to comply virtually compel states wanting to engage in international trade and exchange to tow the line, as it were. This adoption of Anglo-European practices tends to commence rather informally, with the hybridization of cultural forms and organization. By the estimates of some this amounts to “undeveloped” poor nations conceding much of their power of self-determination to the aforementioned hegemonic economic and political forms, a process which culminates in the significant transformation of indigenous cultural norms and even the annihilation of distinctive national characteristics.

This occurs through a multitude of seemingly innocuous and even banal everyday activities, the variety and frequency of which are constantly increasing. Some obvious examples include international travel, borderless communication, liberalized financial and monetary flows, increasingly freer trade and commerce, and the commensurately increasing global commonality – one might even assert, *ubiquity* – of corresponding Anglo-European nihilism. The very reactive forms of desire and inauthentic modes of being that gave rise to the forces, institutions and processes comprising the contemporary globalization complex disseminate the ethos of Western decadence worldwide.

The affective forces of globalization vary and its effects are uneven across cultures. On close examination it is clear that a wide variety of responses to the prerogatives of globalization distinguishes its reception in disparate places and at different times. Also varying widely are the culturally specific means of their implementation which are determined by locale, climate, level of existing infrastructure and numerous other factors. Yet as a city, region or nation become more “globalized”, or thoroughly
integrated into the conventional globalization complex, its peoples’ desires, expectations and ways and means of fulfilling them come to resemble those of peoples in every other place so integrated. Hence, despite its enormous complexity globalization is a powerful force for standardization in the world. Part of the reason it is such a contentious issue and faces organized opposition is that it systematically homogenizes practices and expectations in a development that invariably eliminates differences and annihilates meanings, reducing many aspects of human experience to a cold cash nexus (to borrow the apt Marxian phrase) and advancing one-dimensionality. Through the adoption of ultra-liberal-modern values globalization cultivates the baneful, hyper-decadent ethos that is diminishing the West.

Globalization is frequently misconstrued as “Americanization” due to the considerable role the US plays in the dissemination of its ultra-liberal-modern values. The US has also enjoyed its place at the center of the complex (the aforementioned constellation of institutions, processes and forces) and has arguably been the key nation in propagating it commensurate with its active support of greater European integration. The conflation of America with globalization originates in a dual sense of envy and desire for things American, especially its culture of affluence, individual freedom, and readily available consumables. The seemingly pervasive influence and presence of the US following World War Two and its perceived hubris as the world’s only super-power following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war, produced a great deal of reaction and antipathy towards it and its values, as well. Globalization it is frequently and correctly equated with and/or indicated by relative degrees of “Westernization”, but it is always far more complex than this oversimplification conveys. What is meant here is
that any adequate understanding of the phenomenon must account for its molar development as an integrative process, one that has an array of effects on the lives of individuals, communities, international politics and nascent global society. Furthermore, as individuals and communities undergo the adaptations it necessitates unexpected possibilities, means of subversion and rhizomatic opportunities for becoming-other arise in what I have introduced above as the abstract potentials of globality.

The initial impetus prompting globalization was synchronically emergent from the hierarchically relational nation-state order and the formally distinct, competing socio-cultural milieux comprising it. The intra-ordinal nature of the nation-state system and character of its development had largely determined the general disposition of the future globalization complex (i.e.: its forces, processes and institutions), long before they were realized in their present form. Globalization, therefore, should not be conceived of as a transordinally determined unfolding of a diachronic set of relations, as it is not generating the higher-level properties distinct from those upon which it is based, which one would expect of such a process. In so far as it indicates a horizontal development across time, its conventional growth primarily consists of innovation to generate greater momentum toward the fulfillment of its overarching aims (laissez faire free-trade and democratization) and to enhance the efficiency of processes already long underway.

These practical innovations, their operations and their admittedly interesting history should not distract us from their place in the larger historical narrative; their common feature is their utility in augmenting the prerogatives of globalization, namely the dissemination of ultra-liberal-modern values. From a macro-level perspective therefore, globalization exemplifies the amplification of a technological rationality that
operationalizes the fetishized liberal state, putting into practice—disparately and badly—the philosophical ideals of emancipatory metaphysical realism that ground it. The ideological juggernaut of globalization fosters the “becoming-same” of individuals and societies, banalizing alterity and encouraging the passive acceptance of semblance through (paradoxically) frenetic activity (i.e.: economic production). Its central aim is to perpetually increase levels of consumption, a reactive drive symptomatic of underlying forces implemented via the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power of the dominant ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. In Freudian terms it is an obvious, if no less remarkably feverish enactment of Thanatos, the death instinct, and realizes a self-destructive form of wish-fulfillment; in Heideggerian terms it is an enhancement of and further temptation to fallenness and inauthenticity.

Insofar as globalization represents the enforcement of convention and the continual standardization of all material production in accordance with the herd value of leveling (which it extends and compels universally), it develops through specified international treaties and contracts that determine with a high degree of specification the permissibility of acts. These agreed conventions also provide for regulatory norms that compel self-scrutiny through negative incentives in addition to formal policing. Therefore the conventional globalization complex represents the vertical, molar expansion (the perfection, if you will) of an existing system of order. Events within and between its numerous formal and informal entities are related through an intra-ordinal regulatory framework, which connects various aggregates (international organizations such as the UN, OSCE, and WTO), supranational polities such as the EU and traditional nation-states) of socio-political aggregates (nation-states, sub-national regions and localities), and
economic and business units (TNCs and MNCs, etc.) that seeks to instantiate a universal order through legal regimes established on the foundational precepts of international law such as sovereignty.\textsuperscript{640}

The EU is synchronically homologous and intraordinarily supervenient to the globalization complex that aforementioned impetus produced, all of whose subsidiary elements and parts are conditioned by axiomatically related laws, norms, customs and international institutions.\textsuperscript{641} In short, despite a fair degree of relative variation among its disparate features, the EU, like the institutions, forces and processes of globalization with which it consists, corresponds with the ultra-liberal-modern impetus that subtends them all. To correctly identify the nature of the globalization complex and the character of its innumerable machinations is to recognize the diversity of interactions among multiplicities of multiplicities of multiplicities, which give rise to transordinal potentials of globality.

The globalization complex itself is \textit{primarily} comprised of (and entirely driven by) nation-state actors, international organizations, transnational and multinational corporations, regulatory agencies and a plethora of corresponding social norms, customs, law and institutional regimes, all of which originated in the ultra-liberal-modern values of the West. It seems to enhance human activity by facilitating certain kinds of technical expertise and practical capacities that contribute to particular actions and enhance its prerogatives, actions mechanistically performed in unison, choreographing human activity into a machinic dance which it rewards. This seeming is a simulation of the enhancement of the type man through the veneration of the herd animal’s ever-increasing labor, a “progressive” focus on material (pecuniary) wealth that enforces anti-natural ideals
consistent with a rejection of suffering and cruelty and the illusion of an other-worldly supersonsibility beyond that denies the tragic, Dionysian dimension of life. Globalization’s simulation of empowerment via increased activity understood as production which it compels by inculcating desire and proportionally increasing his activity is thus self-validating. It rewards the productivity it praises, but its empowerment is bogus. It is the ersatz freedom of falling back into the Publicness (the tranquilization, idleness and inauthenticity) of ‘the They’.

The conventional globalization complex is the most comprehensive and far-reaching instantiation of the slave-moral leveling impulse yet. It is (re-)making the world-structure of lived experience, the distinct elements of which—irrespective of various differences of place, time or culture where they are superimposed—hang-together with seeming coherence. Through the intertwined ideological discourses of modernity and liberalism—its primary components—it seeks to universalize equality (through the enforcement of legal rights, property, civil and human, and the elimination of disparities—reconceived as inequities—of wealth) and the abolition of suffering (emancipation from oppression, etc.), all from pity (development discourses, etc.).

As a radical extension of the average-everydayness of the Western herd-man it is the historicality of ‘the They’, universalized. The freedoms its spectacular appearances make ready-to-hand (capacities it enhances or enables) paradoxically announce the hidden-ness of that which its discourses cover-up, i.e.: modes of being and forms of life that have been buried either through active suppression or their own obscurity. Its putative freedoms consist with the technological rationality (a mimicking of mathematical logic) it reifies; the appearance of which announces that authentic freedom is precisely what is
lacking. The absence of genuine freedom is the main impulsion or incitement to the simulacrum it generates and which are crucial to its preservation—the continual validation and extension of the values upon which it developed. In summa, it constitutes a macro-level intraordinal and synchronic framework that effectively constrains individual, micro-level, becomings.

However, it is (un-paradoxically) also this very set of relatively repressive conditions which stoke the form giving fire expressed in that inventive and defiant disposition characteristic of the positive will to creative destruction as generative power enacted by the strongest. It is indeliberately giving rise to re-conceptualizations of the agon by the healthiest exemplars of our age that are likely to challenge, co-opt and redirect it in unforeseeable and authentically life-affirming ways. This is where potential for a genuinely transordinal condition lies; it is the real possibility of generating diachronic, abstract potentials of globality, the realization of which will transmute the hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern, manic age. It is this prospect for self-overcoming to become what one is, an ongoing process of becoming-other, or authentic Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, that I will examine later.

Three primary aspects of globalization may be distinguished which together comprise a complex. These have profound ramifications for economic, political and cultural life wherever globalization’s numerous and superficially incongruent but deeply unified and mutually reinforcing discourses extend their reach. In so doing I generally, albeit critically, adhere to aspects of both the post-modern and strong globalization theses. Globalization is therefore understood as both symptomatic of the perverse desire for a universal containment of becoming-other (an anti-natural restriction of Being-in-the-world
for a Dasein) and its enactment through the worldwide extension of a set of bracketing
categories that delimit norms of sameness and construct and codify the familiar through
reactive co-optations of difference, interpolations upon / into alterity and the enclosure of
all otherness that could hypothetically threaten the predominance of its (globalization’s)
hermeneutic of desire.

First among these are globalizing processes. These include innovations in science,
communication, transport and technology that transform human life in varied from myriad
and occasionally profound ways ranging from the instantaneous exchange and
dissemination of ideas (ideology) through the “global media”,642 to the transformation of
proximities and corresponding banalization of distance brought about by the advent of
mass international travel,643 and the ability to observe events in near real time from
anywhere in the world. The emergence and proliferation of webcams and digital and
wireless networks and the resulting realm of cyberspace is significantly altering human
relations, comprising an additional conceptual and experiential dimension of
globalization. This includes our growing comprehension of human physiology and health
needs, the global environment and efforts toward its regulation / preservation,644 and the
even extends to the cosmos we inhabit via satellite surveillance and the militarization of
outer space. Significantly, all of these characteristic processes of globalization change
individual expectations of the future, the way people conceive of themselves, their
opportunities (for education, employment, accumulation, etc.) and their place in the
world.645

An emergent global culture is seen by many to be transforming local, regional and
national identities where peoples both adapt to and resist transformations in global
Importantly, *processes of globalization* include evolving informal norms and practices generated in response to global connectivity as well as opposition to the perceived threats it presents. Bleiker refers optimistically to the “discursive dimension of social change”, occurring “in the fusion of the local and the global” (in assessing the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of communism), however, the ultra-liberal-modern globalization complex more frequently instigates the fragmentation of traditional community, homogenization of cultures and the intensifying hegemony of a quasi-imperialistic Western order, operations it hides both by its narrative of liberation and its shameless triumphalism.

*Globalizing institutions* refer specifically to formal organizations and actors in the international realm such as the UN, etc., and less formal norms and practices. Subsets of such institutions include those directly establishing and/or policing international governance and order, such as the UN, its agencies and the controversial ICC. Regional security organizations whose ideological thrust coextends with the globalization complex and human rights regime include NATO, the WEU and SEATO. These link the defenses of their member states in formal alliances. In addition to binding them in reciprocal obligations they (deliberately or not) make coherent aspects of their foreign policies to increase reliance and assure security. Direct military cooperation occurs through joint strategic planning, regular combined training exercises and deployments to conflict zones or interventions.

Various IGOs such as the OSCE, the Commonwealth and the COE are equally overt globalizing institutions, and play an important role as they coerce adherence to democratic values, enforce human rights norms and impose (substantive and/or moral)
punitive sanctions for violations of them. They thus perform the role of ordering socio-cultural, economic and political norms to increase familiarity and deepen mutual confidence. Importantly, these include human rights, which are often said to provide a moral warrant for the imposition of Western values, in addition to providing an additional layer of authority to the developing international system and future basis for expanded and deepened supra-national governance. There is great overlap between these globalizing processes and institutions. This is particularly evident in the simultaneous (and largely unpredictable) ways they affect everyday-life of individuals through the changes and innovations they propagate globally.

Forces of globalization refer to the less certain consequences of the latter two in combination with one another, and the effects generated by them as a distinct phenomena. This includes transformed normative practices and informal cultural trends, taboos, mores and conceptions of justice, etc., and especially refers to the complex ways they indicate an altered consciousness which itself becomes a dynamic of globalization.649 Forces of globalization also illustrate (and the term should convey) that these collective phenomena produce a momentum that may accelerate, moderate, or occasionally obstruct the prerogatives of more “formal” globalizing institutions and processes. These forces, indicative of the ongoing, if largely molar growth of human consciousness, are mainly reactive, concentrating the prerogatives of liberalism. Against this trend, “globality restores the boundlessness of culture and promotes the endless renewability and diversification of cultural expression rather than homogenization or hybridization.650 By enabling perceptive individuals to occasionally illuminate previously unnoticed adjacent possibilities, abstract potentials of globality indirectly produce opportunities for active
becomings. Thus forces of globalization inadvertently give rise to new and unimagined possibilities and potentials for human becoming, the nisus of globality, and ultimately transform the institutions and processes that originally produced them.

The aforementioned aspects of globalization primarily result from human action (whether deliberate or otherwise) understood as originating in the fear, guilt and pity advanced by reactive forces that retard human life and more broadly characterize our distorted contemporary agon. As it exemplifies the unifying institutions of contemporary Europe, in some measure the EU suggests the negative potential of the burgeoning supranational state form to become an ultra-powerful “new idol.” In part a consequence of the general inability to value decisively or effectively, the decadence and resignation of globalization’s relativism simultaneously rouses and hastens both standardization and unification without regard for political borders or geographic location. Though this gives rise to numerous resistances, the majority of are reactive and ultimately futile in the larger scheme of change the globalization complex compels.651

The globalizing process creates fleeting mirages of diversification and fragmentation which incline some scholars to see in globalization itself plainly positive potentials, but such naïve (or nefarious) optimism furthers ideological ruses that serve to abolish authentic diversity. The globalization complex validates itself by reference to the notions of equality and fairness that are central to the narratives comprising the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. These narratives serve to placate indigenous populations whose traditional forms of life and autochthonous culture are imperiled by globalization. Rationalizing an anti-natural axiomatique, the precepts of ultra-liberal-modernity immunize the globalization complex fairly well from accountability for its
deleterious effects, by extension. Though as the liberal-modern ethos which it spreads deepens within a population, the complex must work harder to maintain its state of exception.652

In examining the “political foundations of the global [human rights] regime”, Donnelly observes that it is “composed of widely accepted substantive norms, largely internationalized standard-setting procedures, and some general promotional activity, but very limited international implementation, which rarely goes beyond information exchange and voluntary accepted international assistance for the national implementation of international norms.” He attributes the lack of international enforcement to “conscious political decisions.” These decisions preserve the statist logic of the international system, ensuring that the global human rights regime is characterized by “normative strength and procedural weakness”.653 The substantive norms comprising the regime instantiate post-Enlightenment ideals (“a conception of human beings viewed as free, autonomous persons entitled to equal concern and respect”), and the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.654

The emerging global human rights regime described by Donnelly has powerfully transformed (and continues to alter) the expectations and attitudes of peoples outside the Anglo-European cultural realm. Sometimes in contention with other, non-Western conceptions of rights, it has raised demands for rights and/or easing the reception of economic and political reforms in ways that do not always consist with the conventional prerogatives of the institutions, processes and forces of the globalization complex. Yet it is, as Donnelly accepts, liberal-modernity and the technological society to which it gave
rise that simultaneously generated the “need” for human rights, as such.

[P]rior to the creation of capitalist market economies and modern nation states, the problems that human rights seek to address, the particular violations of human dignity that they seek to prevent, either did not exist or were not widely perceived to be central social problems.655

Somewhat ironically, markets and states are today the primary violators of human dignity, the contemporary notion of which developed in large part as a response to the political excesses, gratuitous violence and caprice of European monarchical regimes that preceded the nation-state as the dominant form of polity in Europe.

The quintessentially modern concept of “inalienable rights” emerged almost simultaneously with the precepts of the secular democratic state as an alternative to erratic monarchical rule, beginning in the 17th century.656 Today the global human rights regime and the globalization complex are effectively indistinguishable in some important ways, as the former serves as a philosophical foundation and justificatory basis for certain practices of the latter (e.g.: the promised prosperity of economic liberalization and enhanced freedom of formal political enfranchisement, democratization, etc.).

Donnelly acknowledges that the notions of “equality, autonomy, and equal concern and respect” which the global human rights regime seeks to fulfill and preserve “are very abstract values that can be realized in a great variety of ways”. As noted above, they arose in response to the “major perceived threats to human dignity”, and have transformed our understanding of human dignity as they have evolved. To good Europeans the developments that gave rise to the need for dignity and corresponding rights to preserve it indicate the irreparable decadence of the presently unifying European civilization(s). This was also indicated by the inability of European traditions to sustain
themselves, as the Enlightenment and proto-modern revolutions in America and France demonstrated. However, as contemporary “human rights emerge[d] out of the political struggle for human dignity and indicate the principle directions of [that] struggle,” which “is but one more side of the interaction between moral ideal and political reality that lies at the heart of the practice of human rights,” there is no reason to think that a free spirited good European couldn’t adopt these ideas to their own project of revaluing the ultra-liberal-modern values of which they are presently a part.\(^{657}\)

While uncomfortable with the presumption of these related concepts of dignity and rights—the putative basis for each of which implicitly casts doubt on the basis and/or viability of the other—they nevertheless must contend with their powerful effects on contemporary reality.\(^{658}\)

This “new type of philosopher and commander” could employ a minimal threshold of duties understood as comprising a new Apollonian ideal, a restorative, post-modern mythos for our nihilistic age. This could be predicated on a popular recognition of the qualia distinctive of human-being; characteristics inhering to every person considered—however fictively—as an individual, irrespective of how noble or base, healthy or ill. Authentically agonistic socio-political institutions and economic processes could then be evolved to instantiate genuinely meritocratic results—in which the best attain the highest rank—through more or less democratic practices.\(^{659}\)

This might serve as a means of “teaching humanity its future as its will,” one “dependent on a human will, to prepare [humankind] for the great risk and wholesale attempt at breeding and cultivation”, prevenient to the overcoming of the species man.\(^{660}\)

There is no reason that such a conception should forever continue leveling mountain and valley, i.e.: eliminating the natural hierarchy of types, or subordinating the greatness of the
rarest, noblest blooms of human potential to the herd’s “deadly hatred against suffering in
general,” a hatred that shows itself “in their faith in the morality of communal pity.”

In accordance with the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and the related,
positivistic orientation conferred by scientism with which they ideologically correspond,
the globalization complex and human rights regime have, apodictically, eliminated much
of the material deprivation and scarcity that has inhibited human development and
flourishing throughout the course of recorded human history. The paradox of this
development, which I have cited throughout this work, is that it has—as morality—
occurred through a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power; the native volition of
“the weaker, more delicate, intermediate existences [who] need to take sides against that
gloriousness of life and strength”, that results in diminution of the type man.

Nevertheless, this spiritual dwarfing of humankind via the elimination of authentic
difference – or molarization of becoming-same – and the loss of meaningfulness bestowed
by suffering through relative economic prosperity provides a space for the exceptional
type, who may come to recognize that “the continued existence of the [anti-natural,
dissipative] rule is the precondition for the value of the exception [re: themselves].”

International institutions and globalization

The EU, an IGO conceived as single-market economic bloc, has evolved into a
multi-level supra-national organization for the socio-political unification of its member
nation-states through the broadening and deepening of ultra-liberal-modern ideals.
Regional blocs with similar origins and parallel aspirations, such as the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are now striving to develop in a similar direction,
despite a reluctance to fully embrace “Western” standards of democratization and human rights. From a liberal-optimist perspective this provides further evidence that a fundamental transformation of the nation-state and international relations via regional integration stimulated by the forces of globalization, as “part of the dialectic of historical transformation” is underway.

Inter-governmental organizations such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1961, played an important role in the reconstruction of post-war Western Europe by supervising the distribution and management of Marshall Aid Funds. This established the basis of Western Europe’s economic prosperity. Other IGOs to play major roles in Europe’s post-war development and the concurrent emergence of the late-20th century’s globalizing processes and forces were the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO which oversees the workings of the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These institutions have dominated post-war attempts to compose and stabilize the European continent and the

Another major, regionally oriented IGO, The Organization of American States (OAS), has faced the challenge of combining the disparate wills of quite weak nation-states in a group inherently dominated by the “hyper-power” of the United States, wherein a residue of the Monroe doctrine continues to prejudice the policy views of the organization’s most powerful member toward the rest of the region. The recently established African Union (AU) is attempting similar economic policy coordination between its member-states and even envisages the distant possibility of the beleaguered and chronically impoverished continent’s political integration.

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world economy, by promoting free trade and encouraging particular forms of development. The association of globalization with the U.S. arises from the neo-liberal model imposed worldwide via the so-called “Washington consensus”. This refers to the agreement among a group of influential Western exponents of conventional economic liberalization strategies and development policy. It is associated with “market fundamentalists”, the ideologists of neo-liberal economic theory.667

Following the Second World War, globalizing institutions and the processes they promoted and supervised systematically transformed the diverse yet interconnected realms of international finance, trade, production, and labor and development practices. In Europe, where post-war reconstruction in the West had, with American encouragement driven cooperation and, arguably, integration, the European Monetary System was created in 1979 to further enhance the coordination of economic policy and augment the EC’s self-determination. Such cooperative inter-governmental institutions proliferated throughout the world in the decades following the Second World War.

The period saw the creation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, which morphed into the AU in 2002; the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional body of Persian / Arabian Gulf emirates and states launched in 1981, NAFTA (1993), the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in 1997, and FTAA (ongoing), the G-8, G-10 and G-20, among others. Each of these attempt more or less effectively, to spur and coordinate free-market growth by agreeing on and implementing frameworks for regional and multi-lateral cooperation and legislatting multilateral economic rules on a plethora of issues that, their advocates have it, foster greater and fairer exchange. Increasing
familiarity and transparency make for more regular and calm political dialogue, which it is argued, improves trust and increases security.

Worldwide economic growth—which among many of the globalizing processes occurring in the world today is the principle dimension these institutions were conceived to advance and manage—occurred so rapidly in the decades following the war that many of the aforementioned institutions have been challenged to adapt to the pace of development and the increasingly sophisticated instruments of finance and exchange, sets of interrelated processes which they were conceived to regulate and further but which have become somewhat inscrutable due to the instantaneity of exchange in contemporary trading. The accelerating speed of activity in international trade and finance and the changes generated there from increased exponentially in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with unprecedented economic growth occurring simultaneously in the developing nations of South-East Asia.

The overheated, poorly regulated and relatively corrupt economies of South-East Asia, dubbed “tigers” by the international media, were, by the late 1990s, due for a correction. This came in the unfortunate form of a severe financial crisis that dented the region’s developing economies. It was brought on by currency speculation and the panicked outflow of foreign capital from markets in Jakarta, Bangkok as well as through trading on the Singapore bourse, beginning in mid-1997. Its effects would last until approximately 2002. This crisis, whose cause was complex and truly global in origin, was a serious setback for the economies of Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, forcing them to turn to international creditors and among the IGOs mentioned above, the IMF, to assist their recovery. This meant submitting to the terms and conditions demanded by the IMF, a
source of contention in the domestic politics of each state that compounded the serious political turmoil across the region. As anger intensified, coming to border on open revolution in Indonesia, the Asian masses demonstrated almost as vehemently against the economic stipulations of the IMF, which were perceived by critics and many on the street as callous and laden with risk—namely the potential to deepen the region’s financial hardships.

In Malaysia the government under then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad responded by deliberately ignoring the advise of the IGOs and “Washington consensus”. Rather, he introduced a controversial program designed by his finance minister that imposed strict capital controls on Malaysia’s markets and trading of its currency (the Ringgit) as it pegged the nation’s exchange rate to the US dollar. Though condemned by free market partisans, this action successfully shielded Malaysia’s domestic economy from further pressures from foreign exchange markets, the volatility of which would likely have inhibited economic recovery or even aggravated Malaysia’s woes by raising its interest rates (Hashim). The measures—which went against the orthodox recommendations for managing fiscal crises and the IMF’s own conditions for assistance to nation’s in debt default—were based on the very principles of Keynesian economic theory that, in part, served as a foundation for the initial post-war international economic order. Such a strategy is now seen by some as a plausible alternative to the conventional advice dispensed by bureaucrats of the IMF (Khor).

This international economic crisis of the late 1990s would lead to currency devaluations and the specter of debt default in Russia and Brazil, as well. In the early part of this decade (2001) Argentina, among other nations, would experience similar shocks
due to debt default. The hyper-inflation that resulted fomented a dramatic increase in poverty that led to social unrest and political turmoil. The IMF responded as it always had in such crises, by offering more loans which were the original cause of the problem, and correctly or not came to be blamed both by the leaderships and publics of the affected countries. A result of these tumultuous events the aforementioned IGOs, particularly the IMF, faced intense criticism on many fronts. To longtime critics of its structural adjustment programs in the development field and those who thought its lending practices to nations in financial trouble counter-productive a consensus emerged. As a result the prestige, effectiveness and relevance of both the IMF and Washington consensus have arguably been diminished. The skepticism originates in a perception that they are largely ineffectual both at anticipating crises and dealing with the exigencies of them when they do occur.669

Opposition to the thrust and hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism and myriad other prerogatives of globalization has coalesced in non-governmental organizations such as the World Trade Forum, first convened in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2001. The disruptive ramifications of free trade, unregulated portfolio investment and other foreign direct investment (FDI) practices for fiscal stability and monetary policy, as unpredictable fluctuations in exchange values and interest rates prompted by speculation in currencies and/or derivatives threaten economies, social cohesion and political stability have intensified contemporary controversies over the (in)justice of unbridled markets as globalization—and the anti-essentialist mindset generated by globality—initiates what may be a new stage of capitalism.670 In response, some critics suggest and/or refer to possible alternatives to the “dominant paradigm that theoretically and ideologically
underpins contemporary globalization.” From the perspective of Nietzsche’s vitalist critique of the political and power ontology, these trends, debates and proposed policy alternatives are shown to be deflections from how they actually compound and amplify decadence, adding to the problems that they mis-identify.

Myriad rules, norms and agreements overlap the competencies and jurisdictions of the major globalizing institutions and interconnect through universalized legal regimes (free capital flows, air transport, shipping, etc.), free trade agreements like NAFTA, protocols of international diplomacy, and the widely perceived need for international cooperation. Other globalizing institutions determining the course of planetary transformation include MNCs and TNCs. Corporations operating internationally exploit processes of globalization (such as technological innovation, advancements in communication, legal regimes and disparate national health care and labor standards, etc.), to disseminate and standardize practices and norms wherever they engage in business. Moreover, they surreptitiously conduct surveillance on their employees to enforce compliance. The largest TNCs have the power to influence significant concessions from the governments of states in which they do business. They can even pressurize political change in heavily indebted poor counties due to the latter’s corresponding vulnerability and desperation, yet most capital investment continues to be directed toward highly industrialized economies as global hierarchies of production materialize.

Global media and communication transforms world politics, increasing some of the most reactive affects of globalization by introducing the values associated with Western notions of rights, enfranchisement and consumption. Increased contact and trade is facilitated by formal treaty negotiations between states at the international level.
(e.g.: NAFTA, the G-8, WTO, etc.) and between private corporations, producing mergers, etc. Governments (singly and in cooperation with one another), international organizations, global corporations and the coextending culture industry continuously engage in numerous forms of propaganda or marketing to universalize their moribund values which they mask with ideologically interpolating, molar discourses of productivity and growth. Their campaigns serve both to inculcate perceptions of need and reify values that challenge indigenous belief and exchange systems, anesthetize any alternative senses of significance and eliminate autochthonous wisdom. This entails the “dissolution” of traditional identities in a process of “cultural fragmentation” that even threatens political allegiances—particularly to the nation-state—within the primary loci of the globalization complex.676

Globalizing institutions and related processes enforce a “culture ideology of consumerism” that disseminates, through “imperialist media” (advertising and popular culture mediums such as music, film and fashion), homogenizing forms of desire, beauty and conceptions of the good across cultures.677 It simultaneously dominates information flows (and thus attitude formation) through ideologically corresponding and virtually uniform television news broadcasts that present selective representations of political dialogue and violence.678 Alternative perspectives struggle to effectively challenge hegemonic views and attitudes, though efforts are made.679

As an expansion of the nation-state, as “coldest of all cold monsters,” globalization is “essentially” a difference eliminating machine. Its complexity (an infinite, fractal micro-dialectics sustained by and sustaining a decadent order) at once intensifies simulacrums of genuinely agonistic relations while compelling collaboration in its project
and general acquiescence to its prerogatives. While problematically describing it as “Empire”, Hardt and Negri have correctly observed that the globalization complex strives to be totalizing. But the active collaboration and acquiescence it demands of ordinary individuals becomes more difficult to achieve as its own complexity (and by extension the actual rather than simulated conflict it generates) increases. The becomings it compels, however dissipative and reactive it may be, then give rise to a dilemma wherein malaise and nostalgia for status quo being (such as the ideals of liberal modernity) intensify nihilistic resignation, a circumstance induced by the contradiction between the globalization complex’s false appearances and reality.

The globalization complex gets ensnared in its own affective cultivation of Publicness and the absorption of individuals in ‘the They’, alienating those conscious enough to perceive Being-in-itself (understood as Being towards ones ownmost potentiality for being) as presently there. Although most resignedly accept, that is fall back into their reduced condition, a few rebel. Among these latter few are ‘good Europeans’, whose very skeptical, inquiring disposition inclines them to rouse against uncritical group think. Through the totality of their involvements in the globalization complex they gain awareness of their ‘Being towards’ the thing that has itself been uncovered thereby: their own subversive capacity vis-à-vis the juggernaut of hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern values that is imposed universally by the globalization complex. This significantly, entails the means (which were always ready to hand) for acting on it, via their realization of abstract potentials of globality: affirmations of difference through the cultivation of change. Enactments of globality require ones’
particular temporal engagement as a Dasein in the world by way of futural projections of the possibilities one finds present and to which this engagement gives rise.

As Nietzsche anticipated, such extreme nihilism could lead to the self-destruction of humankind if forceful iconoclasts do not transfigure globalization’s ultra-liberal-modern meta-discourse to initiate a new, anti-dialectical epoch of authentically agonistic “grand politics”.  

Part Two: The systematic universalization of European decadence via the globalization complex

In order to better comprehend the salience of Nietzsche’s vitalist conception of the political to an analysis of the EU in the broader context of globalization and the potentials for individuals within and outside the EU to become ‘good Europeans’ through the abstract potentials of globality, it is necessary to examine the ways in which Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence and of its expression in late-modern Europe illuminate the dynamics of dissipation in our age of ultra-liberal-modernity and the subtle ways in which it anticipated the all-too-human intensification of nihilism by conventional globalization.

Nietzsche variously supported aspects of 19th century European colonialism and criticized imperialist quests for booty. In the latter case he perceived colonial competition as a nationalistic strategy devised by ascetic priests as a means of distracting an enervated herd and to “profit” on the increasing malaise weakening European society. Democratization represented a relinquishing of master’s prerogatives and a pandering to ever more impudent masses across the continent. It was symptomatic of the
same “sickness of will distributed over Europe” that found different expression in military adventures abroad. The 19th century bane of decadence invariably led to a nihilism that would require:

“not only wars in India and Asian involvements to relieve Europe of the greatest danger facing it, but also internal eruptions, the explosion of empires into small fragments, and above all the introduction of the parliamentary imbecility, including the obligation upon everyone to read his newspaper at breakfast.”

In this passage Nietzsche is at once serious and sarcastic, suggesting the course such terrible shepherds unwittingly pursue and its inevitable “resolution” in destruction. Undisciplined by the strongest, who are also afflicted with the herd’s decadence and thus prevented from fully actuating their strength, their solutions only compound their problems before the crises they cause are relieved by cathartic catastrophes. Ambitions of national greatness utilized the herd’s addiction to ressentiment and bad-conscience to bolster the authority of ascetic-priests by inducing in them euphoric hallucinations of emancipation through the increased (conventional) power and wealth to be gained from Empire. Nietzsche himself acknowledged a propensity to such reactive sentiments among the best:

We “good Europeans”: we too have our hours when we permit ourselves a warm-hearted patriotism, a lapse and regression into old loves and narrownesses – I have just given an example of it – hours of national ebullition, of patriotic palpitations and floods of various outmoded feelings.

It cannot be entirely surprising that national identity will continue to play an occasionally, sentimentally significant part in the lives of ‘good Europeans’. They would not, however, fail to understand these emotions outside their correct, encompassing context: that of the shared ethos and nomostic cultural traditions (law, custom, norm and habit) that undeniably connect them to their fellow Europeans.
Similar relapses into counter-productive foreign policy objectives afflict states both weak and strong in our post-modern era, but globalization’s simulation of natural competition results in a hyper-real simulacrum of agonistic order that has succeeded in attenuating the most deleterious consequence, namely global conflagrations. Leaders of the herd\textsuperscript{685} corrupt the social domain of struggle and rivalry that would naturally reveal superior individuals, but the active forces globality generates exploit their machinations, deluding them as well. Inherently weak and only capable of inferior (reactive-contingent) freedom, the herd is provided an anti-natural, hyper-decadent simulation of existential meaning and ontological purpose that re-presents their slavery as “freedom”.

On freedom and equality, it must be recalled that Nietzsche rejects the liberal principle of the innate equality of human beings as an example of secular slave morality’s tendency to “level mountain and valley”, but promoted a nuanced variety of elitism contingent on the merit of individuals. On freedom he asserts, “each considers himself most free where his feeling of living is greatest; in passion, in duty, in knowledge, in mischievousness respectively. The theory of freedom of will is an invention of ruling classes” (our contemporary ascetic—consumerist priests and herd leaders).\textsuperscript{686} This contempt of ruling classes includes the “elites” of his own era – Europe’s pusillanimous monarchs and contented bourgeois; utterly vapid and incurably decadent pseudo-leaders. The mob (rich and poor alike) wants itself considered equal to the best, as Nietzsche observes in criticizing Utilitarian ethics:

They would like with all their might to strive after happiness, I mean after comfort and fashion (and, at the highest level, for a seat in Parliament), which is at the same time the true path of [their] virtue. Not one of all these ponderous herd animals with their uneasy conscience (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as the cause of the general welfare – ) wants to know or scent that the
‘general welfare’ is not an ideal, or a goal, or a concept that can be grasped at all, but only an emetic – that what is right for one cannot by any means therefore by right for another, that the demand for one morality for all is detrimental to precisely the higher men, in short that there exists an order of rank between man and man, consequently also between morality and morality.”

The order of rank that separates man from man had itself come to seem unnatural to the libertine European elites of “la belle époque”, as a thoroughly romantic notion of the general welfare had come to provide a malignant preoccupation with and raison d’être for the perilous revolutionary politics of the day.

In his rejection of the “general welfare” Nietzsche none-too-subtly impugns the theoretical contrivance central to the works of Rousseau, for whom he occasionally expresses contempt. Nevertheless, according to Nietzsche’s (possible mis-)understanding, he held that notion to be spurious, inextricably linked as it was with a so-called “general will” the consistent enactment of which Rousseau did allege was essential to the former condition’s maintenance, responsible for inflaming the radicalism that had proven ruinous to Europe after Napoleon’s defeat. It also alludes to the contempt Nietzsche had for the later utilitarianism of J.S. Mill, who shared with Rousseau a strong interest in eliminating suffering as equated in the slave moral sense with intolerable injustice.

Predisposed to decadence by their innate weakness, the masses oppose any natural order of rank from instinctual ressentiment and a corresponding, culturally naturalized bad-conscience, which they strive to institutionally instantiate into law. They pursue this objective to reverse nature’s hierarchy to overwhelm and keep themselves in command of the strong, healthy individuals to whom they are otherwise vulnerable and forcibly subordinated. Furthermore they seek to codify equal rights into law, a program to which
they confer the imprimatur of modern science so as to bolster and ensure its injunctions. Their goal can only be accomplished when decline has sufficiently weakened the strong:

Our virtues are conditional on, are provoked by, our weaknesses. “Equality,” as a certain factual increase in similarity, which merely finds expression in the theory of “equal rights,” is an essential feature of decline.

The notion of equality and discourse of equal rights is expressive of declining vitality because it can only emerge in an age when the strongest are so dissipated that they can no longer impose their prerogatives to maintain a natural rank order of types (Rangordnung).

The same forces determine the character of the political realm:

All our political theories and constitutions – and the “German Reich” is by no means an exception – are consequences, necessary consequences, of decline; the unconscious effect of decadence has assumed mastery even over the ideals of some of the sciences. … The decline of life, the decrease in the power to organize, that is, to separate, tear open clefts, subordinate and super-ordinate – all this has been formulated as the ideal in contemporary sociology. Our socialists are decadents, but Mr. Herbert Spencer is a decadent too: he considers the triumph of altruism desirable.

Nietzsche’s contempt for the secularized Christian virtue of altruism (which comprised a central feature of Spencer’s ethics) was consistent with his vitalist analysis of the political and power ontology. He saw altruism as constituting a long perfected mask or strategy of re-presenting the slave’s spirit of revenge and desire for equality, a sentiment in vogue in England in the mid- and late 19th century.

Until the slave revolt in morals overturned the natural order (which was largely effectuated in the West when Rome officially adopted Christianity in c. e. 312) the most independent ruled over society. Lacking the instinct for self-determination, the herd was forcibly made obedient by “the artful hammer blows of conquerors”. In considering the
violent origins of the state Nietzsche asserts that it was masters organized for war who
unhesitatingly lay their “terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in
numbers but still formless and nomad.” Long after these civilization-founding acts, the
slaves usurped authority, taking the decline in instincts that enabled their victory as a
rational and/or divine basis for their rule that reflected social progress toward an
improved moral order:

The decrease in instincts which are hostile and arouse mistrust – and that is all our
“progress” amounts to – represents but one of the consequences attending the
general decrease in vitality: it requires a hundred times more trouble and caution
to make so conditional and late an existence prevail. Hence each helps the other;
hence everyone is to a certain extent sick, and everyone is a nurse for the sick.
And that is called “virtue.” Among men who still knew life differently – it would
have been called by another name: “cowardice” perhaps, “wretchedness,” old
ladies’ morality. 692

Here Nietzsche articulates his despair via contempt for the general pacification of man
that accompanied the democratization of society and politics. The consequent malaise
that had overtaken European society was an expression of the enervating values that
naturalized the atrophy of healthy instincts. The strength of will and independence of
hardy individuals’, demonstrated through their instinct for freedom, was diminished and
repressed, incarcerated within them until it was only able to discharge itself inwardly,
that is, upon itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad conscience is in its beginnings. 693

Despite his romantic hyperbole, Nietzsche fierce rejection of pacifism, much like
Machiavelli’s, rejects gratuitous violence but entails a cognizance of the utility of limited
violence through strategic application. 694 Occurrences of violence are primarily
considered in terms of the spirit from which they arise:

*The evil of the strong.* – The act of violence as a consequence of the passion, of
anger for example, is to be understood physiologically as an attempt to prevent a
threatening attack of suffocation. Countless acts of arrogance vented on other people have been diversions of a sudden rush of blood through a vigorous action of the muscles: and perhaps the whole phenomena of the ‘evil of the strong’ belongs in this domain. (The evil of the strong harms others without giving thought to it—it has to discharge itself; the evil of the weak wants to harm others and to see the signs of the suffering it has caused.)

Although Machiavelli’s Prince would deliberately employ violence to achieve a desired end (the pacification of a principality, for instance) the suffering it causes is not done so for its own sake but to achieve a higher end. According to Nietzsche, the truly effective Prince would discharge his will involuntarily. One in possession of the instincts subtending such a native volition would have no need of a guide book such as Machiavelli’s! And as for those who would benefit from such advice? They would likely fall into the category of the weakling who harms others to see what suffering he can cause.

The notion of an unconscious discharge of strength would seem to be at odds with a “strategic application” of violence; in healthy society’s the strong unconsciously focus their strength into endeavors that increase their power, but in decadent societies they must consciously direct this will into acts that achieve this via a strategic utilization of predominant reactive milieu. They strive to make their actions active by overcoming that which marks them with the degenerative qualities characteristic of their era. Nietzsche’s politics emphasizes that order must be imposed to prevent anarchy and to structure a society from a formless mass.

The only curtailment of “freedom” this entails occurs among those who naturally possess a strong will when they are prevented from exercising it. Nearly two millennia of
herd (mis)rule had thoroughly naturalized this state of affairs by Nietzsche’s lifetime:

A morality of the (naturally qualified) rulers is, however, most alien and painful to contemporary taste in the severity of its principle that one has duties only towards one’s equals; that towards beings of a lower rank, towards everything alien, one may act as one wishes or ‘as the heart dictates’ and in any case ‘beyond good and evil – : it is here that pity and the like can have a place.\textsuperscript{697}

The inculcation of desire for “freedom” among the herd only produces slave dreams of liberty.

The prerogative of determining the social order “justly”—which is to say, naturally—belongs to the healthiest, because they have the will (strength for freedom; not the “freedom” per se) to do so, and because their instinct for self-determination entails a comprehension of the ultimate significance and desirability for mankind \textit{in} their doing so. It is this latter understanding (which resonates with oft chided patriarchal and hierarchical forms of authority) which is absent from the herd’s misguided desire for freedom: as it lacks any awareness of its own disposition, the herd’s desire for freedom leads to debilitating chaos and explains their coexisting need for subjugation and demand for leaders to rule them.

Contemporary European society (to include, via a geographically extended cultural realm, Anglo-European North-America, Australia and New Zealand, etc.), in which ascetic-consumerist priests rule out of the spirit of revenge, are the cumulative product of the reversal of values that privileged slave morality over natural order. This gradually induced the schizophrenic “recognition” of the desirability for the best to command and simultaneous disdain for any hierarchizing authority, with the result that the worst govern a coarsening society characterized by an ever increasingly boorish culture that panders to the lowest common denominator (an ochlocratic kakistocracy, that
is: rule by the worst mob factions). The analogy of mental illness is appropriate. In our ultra-liberal-modern era the unmitigated simulacrum is a hallucination symptomatic of collective psychosis. While striving to overcome themselves to become who it is they are, the objective of healthier, more fortunate specimens in globality must be to medicate the herd with a modified variation of the simulacrum to counterbalance dangerous swings between delusive mania and paralyzing depression that squander society’s energies and prevent its effective ordering.

Nietzsche considered efforts to raise the mob’s awareness of its own wretchedness or to “expose” them to the reality of their miserable (and allegedly repressed) condition at once counterproductively cruel and stupid. He therefore despised formulators of fictive, dialectically self-validating emancipatory programs that incited the masses to rebel against their putative “oppressors”. Nietzsche describes as “cursed seducers” and “scholarly oxen,” those such as (Plato’s) Socrates, St. Paul, Martin Luther, Kant, Mill, as well as all 19th century dialecticians and socialists, as having galvanized the herd’s spirit of revenge through work’s that resonated as expressions of the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power, and thereby validated the impulse to ressentiment and / or (re-)dedicated the masses to slave-morality.

In a natural order the strongest provide the masses outlets for the expression of positive forces in ennobling cultural projects through which they may emulate their highest exemplars. Through a sublimation and contortion of entropic reactive forces in our ultra-liberal-modern era multiple simulacrums normalize perceptions of happiness through acts of consumption, so that the herd finds pleasure in striving for material rewards. Numerous, overlapping and ever-intensifying neo-liberal practices distract,
absorb and counter-intuitively enable them, across socio-economic and class divisions, to satisfy desires originating in and circulated by increasingly more sophisticated spectacles of desire.\textsuperscript{698} Established on a foundational narrative consisting of principles of legal equality and inalienable, universal human rights, the hegemonic simulacrum of capital process decrease the instinctual fear and timidity of the herd to provide them with an ersatz, albeit productive, sense of power as well as a schizophrenic sense of anxiety (to keep them working) coupled with a narcotic feeling of security\textsuperscript{699}. As a result even those with the healthiest constitutions, the strongest individuals, presently succumb to prevailing slave-moral herd values that are antithetical to their native volitions. These would-be exceptions are left wracked with a bad-conscience in the midst of the crowd which coerces conformity with its values. But it also makes them timid and unthreatening, perceptions that can be used, given the right conditions and opportunities, to mask their innate power.

Nietzsche’s futural vitalist politics aims to cultivate conditions for maximal functioning of a pan-European society through the ethos of ‘good Europeanism’, which must be understood as both a psychological temperament and corporeal abode hospitable to the development of the noblest faculties of every authentic individual—the ethos propaedeutic to ‘good Europeanism’. He likens the ideal conditions for the breeding of free spirits to “a tropical region” or a hothouse conducive to the development of “strange and choice plants”.\textsuperscript{700} The necessary environment for their flourishing would in a real sense arise spontaneously wherever the Übermenschen happened to meet. Recognizing one another’s “free conscience in those things that today are most undervalued and prohibited,” they spur one another to greater feats of self-perfection in brief instants and
chance encounters. Or they might break their solitude to seek longer moments of mutually fortifying companionship in prearranged meetings or even communal arrangements of more extended duration. In whatever form they develop communities “with [their] own sphere of life”. 701

Whatever the interval of their enlivening encounters, the event of their meeting would always conduce—in ways however unexpected or seemingly insignificant—with the eventual emergence of an authentic philosophical camaraderie capable of sustaining a higher culture for the fullest flourishing of humankind’s most vigorous specimens. These are the “masters of the earth” of whom Nietzsche speaks (and about whose character and purpose Hitler and the National Socialists fundamentally misunderstood / misconstrued), as Dionysian artists and philosophers; a “race” to whom all free spirits belong, defined as a type by the similar instinctual organization of their drives and impulses symptomatized by their individual, native volitions—the distinctive and rare conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness that confers “an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the highest peak of the spirit” and enables them to go “beyond good and evil”. 702

This would (as Nietzsche suggests and Heidegger, in a different albeit related context makes explicit), require the creation of a particular mode of dwelling in the world—a spiritually mature consciousness of their distinctive emplacement and shared experience of ubiety as ‘good Europeans’—that would foster the lived-environment and care-structure necessary for overcoming the hegemonic, all-too-human discourses enforced by the globalization complex—the unnatural ascetic values of our day. 703
As artist-warriors who battle apathy and resignation—the resistance they need to overcome to become who it is they are—they have the will to take responsibility for themselves, and in so doing they attract like types whilst repelling the weak, to create an environment for the breeding of a higher species man. The war they wage is what teaches them to be free (to paraphrase Nietzsche: TI: IX-38). It is through the struggle of that combat that their inherent, covalent bonds ineluctably, magnetically, draw them, the rarest exceptions, together. Through their recognition and development of the qualities and proximal conditions most conducive to the formation of the healthiest types, they attain value by exploiting those they are able to dominate and honoring the victor.

Becoming indifferent to hardship, cruelty, deprivation, even to life… The peoples with any value at all became valuable, and not through liberal institutions: great danger made them into something deserving of respect, the danger that first made us know our resources, or virtue, our arms and weapons, our spirit, – the danger that forces us to be strong … First principle: you must need to be strong, or else you will never become it.704

In our era it is from the universal imposition of a European cultural residue, the decadent anti-natural slave-morality that sustains the herd’s ressentiment and bad-conscience that those whose native volition imbue them with healthy instincts find themselves needful of strength. The strength they must develop by actualizing the full complement of their instinct, drives and impulses, is ultimately the will to resist—to gird themselves against—the liberal institutions that impair culture’s proper life-affirming function and squander the potentials of nascent, more authentic modes of life.

In the ideal community envisaged by ‘good Europeans’, one in which the independence of each is guaranteed by the shared and respected need for an authentically agonistic setting for the egoistic maximization of self by all, the best might realize their
extraordinary potential relatively unmolested by ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment so as to emerge from their practicum invulnerable; capable of resisting and simultaneously defusing the dangers posed to their nascent greatness by the leveling conformity imposed by the herd.\textsuperscript{705}

As aforementioned, Nietzsche maintains that since the Christian-Platonic (slave-moral) inversion of classical Greek, pagan virtues, widespread decadence has handicapped the rare, healthy exceptions that do occur, whether within or outside of the mob. The class structures of the contemporary world that have resulted from the anti-natural values perpetuated by the Christian-Platonic will-to-truth continually deprive those endowed by nature with a superior instinctual organization of productive outlets for expending their force. Quite opposite the caste distinctions required in the Law of Manu, which Nietzsche praised for their hygienic discipline and cultivation of particular cultural forms of life, our modern categories of class comprehensively corrupt and/or retard the becoming of the best types; whether poor or rich, provided a top-flight, mediocre or inadequate education, or whatever level of income attained, our modern class categories thwart the potential greatness of would-be free spirits.

Class distinctions in our ultra-liberal-modern world ramify its pervasive decadence, frustrating the best individuals’ will to power and condemning them to the predilections of the mediocrity-loving herd. The inversion of the natural order of rank (that otherwise might have enabled them to reach a healthy, authentically agonistic society’s top echelons) stymies the dynamism these individuals, turning their strength in on themselves. Incapable of resignation and uninterested in the crowd’s approval they are
especially vulnerable to being afflicted with ennui. They may despair or rage, become anti-social, be condemned as criminal or deemed insane.

Unironically, these outcomes intensify decadence throughout society and amplify its reactive force in myriad expressions of negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power, furthering the perverse ultra-liberal-modern “cause” of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment. This all-too-human agenda endeavors to realize the radical equality of all human beings, or the elimination of meaningful differences, through technological rationality and the standardization of all desire. This also entails a selective equivocation of rank and natural distinctions, a process operationalized and perpetuated through a web of popular discourses, which combine to exercise discernable affects on the political organization and functioning of Anglo-European societies, as Nietzsche notes:

‘Equality’ (a certain factual increase in similarity that the theory of ‘equal rights’ only gives expression to) essentially belongs to decline: the rift between peoples, between classes, the myriad number of types, the will to be yourself, to stand out, what I call the pathos of distance, is characteristic of every strong age. The tension, the expanse between the extremes is getting smaller and smaller these days – the extremes themselves are ultimately being blurred into similarity … All of our political theories and constitutions (very much including the ‘Reich’) are consequences, necessary results of the decline; the unconscious effects of decadence have even come to dominate the ideals of some of the sciences.

Nietzsche goes on to volunteer a scathing criticism of the discipline of sociology, socialists and Herbert Spencer himself for the uses they respectively made of their own instincts of decay. The social sciences, as they would come to be known, were emergent in late-19th century academe and exemplified the nihilistic will-to-truth already evident to Nietzsche through discourses of scientism (what today might be referred to as physics-envy), with its emphasis on empiricism, its conference of a positivistic disposition on scholars and its initially distinctive statist logic (a logic that arguably persists in the
disciplines of political science and international studies). Nietzsche thought harmful this will-to-truth, especially when enforced through broader sets of norms, or universalized as a foundation for sociological value judgments. Furthermore, the statist logic that came to prevail globally through the (post-1945) San Francisco – Bretton Woods international system was counter-productive to the development of the quasi-cosmopolitan ethos characteristic of his ‘good Europeanism’.

Nietzsche repeatedly suggests that whenever a society degenerates sufficiently a very real danger exists that strong individuals with damaged instinctual urges validated by a culture of decadence might succeed in gaining power. Familiar with the rabid anti-Semitic proto-fascists of his day, this is likely how Nietzsche would have understood the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany. In circumstances such as those present in a dissipated post-war Germany, where bitterness arose over the crippling terms of peace imposed by the Versailles treaty, tyrants may exercise their strength nefariously, intensifying a nihilistic order by focusing the volitional resources of the herd on enemies either within or outside of their society. Nietzsche anticipated the dangers posed to the future of Europe from the symptoms of decadence in his era:

Today, when the herd animal alone obtains and bestows honors in Europe, when ‘equality of rights’ could all too easily change into equality in wrongdoing: I mean into a general war on everything rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, creative fullness of power and mastery…

The extremism of the Nazi annihilating will-to-level equaled that of the Soviets, though toward putatively differing ends. Scholars of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno recognized these two contending ideological movements as not entirely antithetical extremes of the same liberal project, but, also after
Nietzsche, saw that the advanced capitalist, post-industrial societies of the West, and in particular the United States (a realm that now includes the European Union and the highly developed economies of the Asian Pacific rim and which comprises the centers of the globalization complex), though an arguably more moderate instantiation of the same liberal-modern phenomenon, posed a potentially equal danger to the noblest potential of mankind precisely through its facades of self-imposed, institutionalized restraint.

Nietzsche realized that the preeminence of the herd’s negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power, as symptomatized in widespread social decadence, has historically preceded paroxysms of violence in which a corrupt slave-leader can become capable of taking over, and inevitably in such cases, of driving the lemming society he commands over a cliff edge of self-destruction (as in Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia). Although Nietzsche recognized that the conquering exploits of an ascendant people enjoying superlative health can be productive and salubrious (even, counter-intuitively, for those over whom they triumph), these spasms of suicidal violence are nearly always ruinous to the higher culture sustained by the society which they destroy from within. In the spirit of the anti-essentialist, quasi-cosmopolitan ‘good Europeanism’ he envisaged for the future of mankind, Nietzsche stridently opposed the most pernicious chauvinisms of his era, asserting:

We who are homeless [i.e.: ‘we who belong to no particular nation’] are too manifold and mixed racially and in our descent, being “modern men” and consequently do not feel tempted to participate in the mendacious racial self-admiration and racial indecency that parades in Germany today as a sign of a German way of thinking and that is doubly false and obscene among the people of the “historical sense”. We are – and let this be our word of honor – ‘good
Europeans’, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly obligated heirs of thousands of years of European spirit. After discrediting the irrational prejudices subtending the conventional values of the disparate herds of Europe, such ‘good Europeans’ resolve to live with conditions of uncertainty (which is to say that they recognize that there is no other choice, if they are to live authentically) and posit a non-essentialist, anti-reductionistic account of human existence that is not specifically attributable to any conventional state of being, but which must be cultivated through disciplinary regimes of self creation and experimentation (auto-poiesis) that facilitate the maximal passion (eros) of every individual toward their ultimate, individual excellence (arête). Itinerant wanderers who freely traverse unfamiliar locales, cross socio-political frontiers and transit conceptual borders to chart surprising physical, psychological and conceptual topographies of their own creation, Nietzsche hoped that his intrepid ‘good Europeans’ would thereby disseminate their continually interrogated values in opposition to moralizations of life that tend to petrify into dissipative convictions.

The obligations of such free spirits include maintaining the values and ideals of their noble idea of Europe—an idea more broadly comprehensible as a view to the possible future of mankind—through its continual, agonistically achieved reinvigoration, so to perpetuate it into the future and ensure its perduration. As orchestrators of contestation and revealers of latent human potentials as well as undiscovered avenues to possible perfections they exert a will to power capable of radically altering familiar political concepts and the geographies which they entrench, generating new sovereign spaces and socio-political realities. Their willing produces an aesthetic perspective on life and corresponding disposition that challenges enfeebling, media-generated simulacrms.
of the present via new re-presentations—novel political myths—to rejuvenate authentic health and affirm difference (becoming-other). They enhance their own type and condition the possibility of a sustained higher culture from which emergent geniuses capable of augmenting the maximal thriving of the species man might draw succor and cultivate an agonistic milieu for its best (strongest) members.

‘Good Europeans’ thus become artists who envisage the future and act to realize it through their creative labors. Through the abstract potentials of globality they develop a shared sense of confraternity (Verbruderung), with like-minded individuals who they come to recognize and appreciate. They may or may not share their own particular ubiety with all these individuals, but are affirmed by the differences they discover as a revelation of the variety of alternate possibilities for existence. These are interrelated aspects of a mentality actualized through their corporealization (embodiment) of the higher culture they seek to personify; itself the spiritualization of a broader societal acculturation initiated by their transformed corporeality.711

According to the values of ‘good Europeanism’, the juridical state of exception would disappear as those who sought to universalize their own tyrannical will-to-truth were made to persuade their peers of its preeminent worthiness. At the highest levels of society, where a radical skepticism toward all truth claims would intuitively prevail, they would invariably fail. None would be afflicted with ressentiment in the sense in which the all-too-many are today. Therefore none would seriously advocate anti-natural hierarchies or employ a corrupt state apparatus to advance their own narrow, egoistic agenda while insulating it from challenges, holding outside agonistic engagement through a systematic exclusion of healthier challenges—brought by their would-be betters. By
applying some (presently impracticable?) variety of the state of exception consisting of
the exclusion of any exclusionary practice likely to inhibit salubrious and authentic
becoming-other, no individual would be unrecognized by or held outside the law, per se.

Those who would corrupt the authentic agonistic order by imposing an unnatural,
notional foundation for truth would simply be powerless and likely be deemed delusional.
Those moved to argue that such exclusionary practices paradoxically entail their own
forms of cruelty and constitute a “tyrannical” will-to-truth (the intrinsic dilemma of all
forms of political organization that strive to maximize liberty), would always be welcome
to advocate alternatives, consistent with the agonistic ethos of the invigorated polity. In
this way Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism can be seen to conduce with a thoroughly
agonistic political organization (such as a radical democracy), as Hatab so brilliantly
elaborated.

In the futural politics of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ the state of exception
applies equally to those who employ irrational chauvinisms to define themselves in
opposition to others in purely negative, exclusionary terms, as it does to those who take a
wholly ironic stance toward themselves. The former fall under the state of exception
because they embrace the cruelty of valuing unproductively, in that their valuations do
not serve the purpose of self-examination and are therefore nihilistic; the latter for
threatening the condition of possibility for positing values of any sort (often out of an
unwillingness to be so cruel).

The persecution of difference (the political problem of otherness), as the most
intractable vestige of reactive force expressed via a negative will to nothingness as
nihilistic power, is at last to be overcome at both the micropolitical (individual) and

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macropolitical (community) levels through broadly inclusive and constructive principles whose shared aim is the combination of the best traits exhibited in myriad personifications of difference that evolve through continual agonistic challenges. Nietzsche’s *European spirit* identifies such a pluralistic objective and translates it back into philosophically materialist and naturalistic terms that reject anti-natural liberal ideals.

Globality, a product of reaction to the imperatives of globalization, generates active forces and potentials that globalizing institutions and processes seek to co-opt, and whose demands they act to fulfill, if lately and imperfectly. As globalization’s institutions, processes and forces are compelled to enact and exemplify the liberal values with which they represent and insinuate themselves and from which they derive their legitimacy, they are continually retranslated through numerous mimetic acts. In this way the globalization complex’s regulative values, methods of production and means of self-legitimation may be co-opted through their own process of transmission and applied to unexpected innovations and uses. A positive perspective suggests that the at once easily universalized and subtly coercive organizing principles of globalization may be made inclusive of every racial, ethnic and cultural realm and may produce truly great individuals from any of them. The simulacra they sustain coercively direct the attention and energies of the herd into productive activities that create positive means and opportunities for empowerment that the strongest may exploit. Thus the healthiest may actively realize their potential even as all boats, as it were, rise. As the generative power of the EU, a locus of globalization’s forces, naturalizes the ressentiment and bad conscience of the multitude, it simultaneously enables the possibility for self-overcoming
by the fiercest individuals. But from a negative perspective, the abstract potentials of
globality may also be put to nefarious uses, such as terrorist acts and other forms of
violence that are then seized upon as legitimating pretexts for the reinforcement of
globalization’s most all-too-human reactive prerogatives and the expansion of an
Orwellian “big-brother” society of hyper-surveillance and control.

Thus globalization’s profusion of simulacra provides a crucial template to account
for the anti-natural liberal expectations of the herd (the ideological remainder of post-
enlightenment humanism) and empower the best to overcome and adjust its simulation of
reality. In the post-modern age of globality the healthiest may thus become norm-
entrepreneurs capable of nomothetic (custom making) acts, of advancing culture as
“artist-philosopher militants”712 and of breeding an invigorated species man to spur
humanity to new heights as “warrior-genealogists”713. Conversely, the most reactive and
nihilistic may also be empowered to commit heinous acts of indiscriminate barbarity.
Section Two: Globality and the Revaluation of Declining Values

Part One: Globality

An unanticipated product of globalization is the aforementioned condition of globality, a largely abstract phenomenon with concrete manifestations theorized by many prominent international relations and globalization scholars, including Martin Albrow, Roland Robertson, Ulrich Beck, Marc Augé and Martin Shaw, among others. I fuse significant elements of the most compelling definitions of globality in the context of Nietzsche’s analytical framework detailed above to demonstrate how his good Europeans might identify and exploit the abstract potentials it presents and transmute the reactive forces of the conventional globalization complex thereby. Their aim is to hasten mankind’s self-overcoming toward a transhuman future, and globality, I seek to show, may be used as a means to achieve that.

Also combined in my definition of globality is an appurtenance of certain of Gilles Deleuze’s (Nietzschean) conceptual innovations, specifically the event, the haecceity and multiplicity. Not a simple paraphrase of discarded base / superstructure arguments such as those advanced by structuralist critical theorists of political economy, the distinction I describe between globalization (and the complex of forces, institutions and processes sustaining and perpetuating it) and the abstract potentials comprising the condition of globality is a thoroughly Nietzschean one.
In this section I review prominent conceptions of globality to situate my own amalgamated notion of it and demonstrate its relevance as a means for subverting conventional globalization and its salience to the project, broadly conceived, that Nietzsche set for future wanderers and spiritual nomads. I do so to establish how the dynamic potential of globality should be understood from a Nietzschean perspective (according to his vitalist politics and power ontology) as ramifying the active forces expressed through a positive will to creative destruction as generative power by present-day good Europeans. I shall then explicate how Nietzsche’s good Europeans—where ever they happen to be physically located in the world—might identify and exploit those potentials through regimes of self-discipline (\textit{askesis}) that spur others, according to their disparate capacities and enthusiasms (\textit{eros}), to engage in similar nomothetic acts of self-creation (\textit{auto-poiesis}).

To reiterate, globality is the unanticipated potential arising as a consequence of globalization’s organization of human bodies and their myriad activities in and as they are constructive of a hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern world. Globality can in part be conceived of as consisting of spaces created inadvertently through conventional globalization, the latent capabilities of which go largely unrecognized. These unutilized spaces or capacities are the spandrels of globalization’s architecture, a byproduct of its construction of international life.

On a global scale traces of it are evident in multiple, dynamic interactions spurred by the ideals and corresponding form of life the globalization complex universally imposes. It consists of subtle and overt resistances, creative appropriations, subversive inversions and the adoption of camouflage to defy the prerogatives of globalization. It is
symptomatized by a positive, radically life-affirming world-view (or Weltanschauung) typified by active celebration and encouragement of difference. It is detectable if looked for, but requires certain conceptual corrections of what passes for “reality” in order to be properly understood, like dark matter, the presence of which can only be discerned by its bending of the light of distant objects that passes through it.

The growing relevance of globality and its affective power as an emerging disposition of new modes of being in the world is confirmed by Albrow, who writes that globality,

brings human endeavors into relation with the extent and materiality of the globe as a whole. Political and economic activity calculate on global scope and consequence, which the global forces released by the aggregate impact of human activity on the environment react back on that very activity. Globalism becomes a main aspect of the meaning of human life.  

Globality arises via interactive, concernful engagements with difference and the becoming-other that is making possible new meanings, kinds of play and forms of expression as power. It, as well as the global age whose advent it signals, is largely analogous to the creative self-overcoming pursued by Nietzsche’s free spirits or ‘good Europeans’. Albrow himself goes on to acknowledge Nietzsche’s anticipation of critical aspects of its prevailing ethos, stating:

Nietzsche had intimations of it [the Global Age] in speaking of an ‘age of comparison’ where various views of the world, customs and cultures can be compared and experienced simultaneously [Albrow refers here to HH: I-23]. He suggested moreover that there would be no need for everyone to think alike in the manner of Kant’s universal morality. He seemed to intimate that both the nation-state and universal order, point counterpoint of modernity, would be surpassed.  

By referencing Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s categorical imperative and desire to philosophize for a future ‘beyond good and evil’, Albrow hints at the even deeper
significance of globality as the prevailing—and distinctly Nietzschean—ethos of an emerging global age. Amenableness to difference and an apposite ability to productively contend with the challenges it poses conditions the particular temperament necessary to recognize and exploit abstract potentials of globality. By extension, the outlook conferred by it aptly captures the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of good Europeanism—the greatest hope of our age.

Further connections to Nietzsche’s prescient anticipation of what are arguably the most radical features and emancipatory potentials of contemporary life under the dissipative, hegemonic globalization complex, are explicated by Ulrich Beck. Beck writes of Nietzsche’s identification of it as an intrinsically agonistic, historically incremental process, a development of natural capacities through the broadening and amassment of human experience. He states, “the globality that Nietzsche sees before his eyes does not suddenly arise all at once, but includes centuries of living with and against one another.”

The ethos of contemporary globality, according to Beck, is indicated by Nietzsche’s project of destroying the prevailing decadent values of late-modernity via their comprehensive revaluation. Beck therefore asserts that:

[F]or Nietzsche, the destruction of values is evidently not an end in itself; it is supposed to create the space for rejoicing and laughing together [Mit-Lachen] in a process of cross-cultural (and ‘cross-truth’) dialogue – through others whose masks one has pulled on, through the masks one has oneself become and sees with the eyes of others… so that there is space for a simultaneous reduction and expansion of moral standards and demands… tolerance radically reconceived and practiced in two directions at once: reduction of one’s own sovereign moral territory in order to seek cross-cultural dialogue with others and others’ truths… opens up the opportunity for a global morality of tolerance. For Nietzsche… that
contact with the certainties of others can take place in an experimental sphere of experience and action. That experimental sphere correlates directly, in Beck’s estimation, with the ever-diversifying abstract potentials of globality.

It is a realm in which Nietzsche’s free spirits, wherever located, become who it is there are. This requires them to inhabit an originally European conceptual framework, for which the manifold discourses operationalized by the globalization complex serves as point of entry. It is one descended from that within which Nietzsche’s critique of liberalism and late-modernity, the Christian–Platonic will to truth and European decadence occurred. From this conceptual vantage point healthy ‘spiritual nomads’ may interrogate, assimilate, disrupt and subvert those essentialist discourses whilst simultaneously challenging the dominance of the globalization complex’s institutions, forces and processes. They thereby subject it to hybridic alterations through myriad engagements with difference, productively othering—or destroying—it in multiple, transcultural and ultimately life-affirming ways. Across disparate settings such individuals produce new forms of life through the creative destruction of their former values (values discredited by the globalization complex), as well as those Euro-centric, universalizing values imposed from the outside.

On the positive side of the evaluative ledger suggested by Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, the aforementioned creative co-optations by the strong instill a new appreciation of difference (if even primarily of their own), corresponding with the ethos of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeanism’. On the negative side it may generate reactive responses that exclude the other by way of an intensification of globalization’s conferral of European nihilism.
This Falling back into the Publicness of the They (to put it in Heideggerian parlance), is symptomatic of weakness—the ill-constituted instinctual organization common to declining forms of life (typified by human herds and their slave moral values systems, e.g.: the Abrahamic and Buddhist traditions), and results in the petrification of types according to essentializing (and always-already anti-natural) ideals. Such responses risk fomenting ideological extremism and hostility to all difference as evidenced by formerly common and arguably still latent Euro-centric colonialist prejudices of superiority and the agendas of some contemporary terrorist groups.

However, the positive, life-affirming response to the reactive pathos of the globalization complex requires exceptional health, the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness involuntarily expressed in the native volition of free spirits. It is only possible through rigorous self-examination, exceptionally broad experience of the world (experience that may be brought to the most isolated places through globalization) and an inter-active appraisal of and engagement with it. The unpredictable, syncretic fusing and/or disruption of disparate traditions and worldviews constitute actualizations of the abstract potentials of globality, which are latent in the encounters between the Euro-centric globalization complex and its outside.

Beck further suggests that Nietzsche believed productive cross-cultural criticism to be essential because “[o]nly self-legislation and self-questioning can together open us up and strengthen us for the challenges of international life.”\textsuperscript{718} Nietzsche, who lived and worked between four European countries, certainly appreciated the expanded and enriched perspective on the world and humankind’s diverse condition attained through the living of an international life. His vitalist politics and perspectivalist epistemology
developed directly out of this broad experience and enabled him to partially foresee the dynamic *Bildung* and corresponding openness of the *Weltanschauung* characteristic of contemporary globality.

Martin Shaw defines globality similarly, but with a more specific concern with globalization’s *creation* of the global, a futural condition that he sees actively transforming everyday socio-economic and political life in quantifiable and qualitatively demonstrable ways.

New relations of politics, economics and society, as well as of the national and international aspects of all these relations … [have] begun to be seen as a new principle or structure of social relations, increasingly actual as well as practical. Globality… is the condition or state in which things are global. The idea of globality represents the global as something increasingly achieved, real and manifest, globality represents not just certain trends within the modern world, but a new condition or age in which the latter is brought into question. Globality represents a sufficiently fundamental shift in the very principles on which modern social organization is built for us to question the continuation of modernity. Globality does not just dissolve, but supplants the classic modern framework. Globality is not merely a late – or disintegrative – form of modernity but a new structure of society and thought.⁷¹⁹

Although globality may have the potential to supplant the classic modern framework and arguably is doing so, it undeniably has a very long way to go. This is largely because it evolved out of the ultra-liberal-modern tenets of globalization, and each innovation and transmutation of reactive globalizing forces and processes is gradually re-territorialized or co-opted by the institutional framework describing the globalization matrix.

The amalgamic notion of globality I employ substantially draws from Beck’s, Albrow’s and Shaw’s conceptions respectively, but takes it as a continuously changing set of hybridizing, manifold potentials and creative opportunities that give rise to a transformed conative and cognitive disposition. The new condition Shaw describes is
developing as a set of qualia transforming attitudes around the world. It is empirically
demonstrable through some of its effects, but outward signs of changed expectations over
the last few decades do not entirely corroborate the claims of a thoroughly transformed
mentality postulated by certain over-excited exponents of technological innovation and
ever-increasing speed. The most “globalized” citizens of the world are likely to be
automaton herd creatures of bad-conscience emulating the ascetic-consumerist priests of
ressentiment they idolize. They are afflicted with a “dishonest mendacity” vis-à-vis the
values they enact; they are the good people whose success justifies what they do, and so
they are wholly uninterested in shifting “the very principles on which modern social
organization is built.”

It is usually the case that in order to achieve conventional success within the
machinations of the globalization complex its guiding principles have to be uncritically
towed. Questioning the foundational tenets of the discourse is the first step to ostracism
and “failure” in the conventional sense. Rejecting the value-terms of globalization
automatically disqualifies one for participation; “team-players” are what are needed in
the global marketplace. Individuals are made into cogs in a much bigger machine, which
for the all-too-many is a sufficient basis for the one-dimensional meaning and purpose
they require. However, for the more sensitive exceptions, free spirits and good
Europeans, it is likely ruinous. In our thoroughly democratic, ultra-liberal-modern age the
globalized citizen-zombies would likely support any measures, however anti-natural, to
preserve their comfortable, if insensitive, existence.

In considering the notion of the “globalized locality,” Martin Albrow sees
globality as a condition in which:

Images, information and commodities from any part of the earth may be available anywhere and anytime for ever-increasing numbers of people world-wide, while the consequences of world-wide forces and events impinge on local lives at any time (‘globality’).\textsuperscript{721}

While “Albrow is skeptical of postmodern deconstructions of the social change wrought by globalization,” he considers the role it has played in replacing modernity with a new supranational, or “universal” discourse. This seems curious as universalism is one of the five principle doctrines (along with modernism) of post-Enlightenment liberalism.

Eade, et. al., describe exciting phenomena that would seem at odds with classical modernity and its significance, but as the last decade and a half have demonstrated, largely reassert those meanings in little altered form. In that globalization is ushering in a truly ‘global age’ they assert it entails:

The deterritorialization of traditional concepts, their disaggregation and resynthesis, their extension ‘to embrace new realities’ and their global operationalization as well as ‘the generalization of local concepts to the level of global relations and their assimilation into a transnational discourse.’\textsuperscript{722}

Of course, conventional globalization perfectly consists with the Enlightenment tenet of universalism, which typifies and constitutes a fundamental aspect of the ideology of liberal modernity.

The reactive impetus of globalization processes—which symptomizes the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power of the ascetic- consumerist priests of ressentiment—does lead to deterritorialization of autochthonous cultures and traditions and their resynthesis with ‘Western’ modes of production and consumption. Although this has quantifiably disruptive effects and fosters qualitatively measurable reaction, it also intensifies agonism in those cultures and encourages redefining identic categories
and notions of selfhood in both positive and negative ways. In the long term this externally imposed negotiation of values should prove fructifying. But what the positive, futural dimension of this in fact describes is the abstract potentials of globality not a significant transformation of the all-too-modern globalization complex. Similarly, for Ulrich Beck, “[g]lobality means that we [are] living …in a world society in the sense that the notion of closed spaces has become illusory. No country or group can shut itself off from others. Various economic, cultural and political forms therefore collide with one another, and thing that used to be taken for granted (including in the Western model) will have to be justified anew.”

Roland Robertson focuses on how globality deepens “the scope and depth of consciousness of the world as a single place,” which is positively demonstrated by greater physical connectivity and communication that shrinks geographical proximity, spatial relations and time differences between persons, groups and events. It also inverts and/or (re)combines traditionally global, regional and local realms to diversify the socio-cultural-political roles individuals may inhabit. The case for globality is fortified at the subjective level by evidence of parallel transformations of attitudes toward the “foreign,” enlarged contexts for understanding difference and the variety of responses to cultural forces each reciprocally generates within the other. “Globality …is modernity on a global scale”, the discourse of which “consists largely in the shifting and contested terms in which the world as a whole is defined.”

Robertson theorizes the production of “glocalities.” These arise from converging ‘flows of information and ideas’ that create transformative possibilities through conceptual innovations of the practical dimensions of life. Proof of the cognitive change
that results exists in the growth of collective consciousnesses that link/familiarize individuals from disparate regions of the world in innumerably diverse assemblages of shared ambitions, desires and concerns. Such changes in knowledge/awareness lead to further changes in consciousness, and potentially, expansions of the possible.

‘Glocalization,’ is the term Robertson employs to describe the relationship between the macro and micro levels of human community in globalization, taken as the “simultaneity and the interpenetration of what are conventionally called the global and the local, or – in more abstract vein – the universal and the particular.” 725 Robertson considers how the interpenetrating forces of globalization encourage a “universalization of the particular and particularization of universalism,” that transforms the politics of culture, especially in terms of contentious debates over globalization’s cultural homogenization.726 These issues are of particular importance to my Nietzschean analysis. Difference, or the elimination of it, leading to what as a result of globalization and globality, is the crucial question here. As the culture of globalization diffuses particularisms, identities are destabilized. Individuals discombobulated by the shattering of their illusions of identic permanence then seek compensation for their sense of ennui and nausea in spectacles of meaning and simulated purpose. These are readily provided in the form of mediated desires fulfilled through the consumption of products. A renewed sense of security—and ersatz identity—can be found in the corresponding cultural of conformity supplied by the very capital processes imposed by the globalization complex.

The shared presuppositions that inform such a “transnational discourse” or notion of “world society” lie in (and are symptomatic of) the reactive (ultra-liberal) ideology of globalization, which it extends universally and imposes across cultures, rather than in
globality, per se. A thoroughly post-modern conception, globality is “concretely” understood as a phenomenological transmutation of the cognitive capacity developed through Enlightenment liberalism in the era of ultra-liberal-modernity (culminating in globalization discourse), and as such is an ideologically neutral conceptual paradigm and opportunity for becoming-other that multiplies comprehension(s) of our varied, “shared” realities. Distinguished by its plasticity (an affirmation of the relativity of all “truth” that enables the fruitful suspension of certainty and conviction; an eruption of consciousnesses; mutating understandings of the fragmentariness of “subjective” identity; creative exploitations of the compression / “transcendence” of spatio-temporal relations), it rejects any semblance of “progress,” allowing instead more definite opportunities for growth than the injurious values of our epoch’s ultra-liberal-modernity.

Globality is a new condition for and great stimulus to life. Among the conceptual characteristics salient to its transformative affectivity, globality changes individual experiences of haecceity. In a related context Deleuze invokes the notion of the haecceity, which he in part derived from Duns Scotus’ notion referring to the “this-ness” or unique quality of an entity or object that distinguished it from others of a type. Deleuze’s idea bears upon the way in which latent globality inheres to conventional processes and forces of globalization, specifically the subjective ways in which they are experienced by individuals. Through it we may understand that in striving to realize a Nietzschean idea of Europe (an “order” conducive to transitioning humankind to a post-human future), good Europeans must first achieve an enhanced awareness of the dynamic ways in which they are acted upon by globality (via the notion of haecceity or event) through their emplacement in the world, or ubiety, and the significance of it as constructive of
their identity, worldview (Weltanschauung) and prospects for becoming. “However much
Nietzsche acknowledges the power of physical geography, he does not endorse any form
of geographical reductionism or determinism.”727 In asserting that globality constitutes an
emerging form of shared consciousness, I do not mean to argue that it is a reified form of
nous (mind), but that it exists through an increasingly dynamical shared awareness
manifested in enactments of the potentialities to which it gives rise.728

Globality’s development corresponds with the experience of untimeliness in
Nietzsche’s thought – the abstract potentials of globality describes a haecceity of certain
spontaneous transfiguring cognitive and emotive capacities that arise within globalizing
practices, and are realized and acted upon in / as moments of untimeliness. Deleuze’s re-
conceptualization of haecceity helps elucidate globality’s somewhat intangible basis and
character. It should be understood as “a mode of individuation distinct from that of a
thing or subject,” synonymous with both “a plane of content and a plane of
expression.”729 Globality (as a complex haecceity) facilitates productive networks of
forces that in turn give rise to events – affective capacities, incorporeal and bodily effects,
actions, instants of becoming, etc. – that is, the exercise of will to power in its totality. It
comprises a framework for the metamorphosis of things and subjects, allowing for
“diverse assemblages” of active forces that proliferate “multiplicities” and abet
becoming. As globality enables the transmutation of globalization’s deleterious
(enslaving, subjugating) complexes, the latter’s ability to control becomings and
constrain difference is diminished.

This evolving culture and aesthetic of globality amplifies the nisus (native
volition or striving of an entity to expend its force and become other) of that which – and
some of those whom – globalization’s tyrannical signifying and ordering inhibits, limits and weakens. In the contemporary European context this energizes the creative pursuit of change and augments the generation of ‘qualitatively new emergents’. It develops the sense of “world-historical irony” essential for would-be comedians of the prevailing ascetic-consumer ideals to prankishly lampoon and seriously challenge the negative characteristics of conventional European integration and EU expansion as instantiations of the reactive globalization complex.\(^ {730} \) As an exponentially enhanced set of capacities for becoming, the abstract potentials of globality symptomatize the \textit{nisus} of free spiritedness characteristic of good Europeanism.\(^ {731} \)

Against the perception that Nietzsche was uncritical of the ethnocentric biases informing the imperialistic European worldview which prevailed during his lifetime, Shapiro asserts that Nietzsche:

\[ \text{[Q]uestions the primacy of the European historical approach, with its ethnocentric emphasis on development (made into explicit philosophical method in Hegelian thought): the latter is a recipe for failing to understand the multiplicity of peoples, the diversity of philosophies and the art and culture of the globe.}^{732} \]

Not to be misconstrued as a meta-narrative replacement for modernity, globality’s abstract potentials are at once a catalyst for and means of overcoming it, to be realized by individuals whose enhanced affective capacity can transform and/or rearrange and/or destroy the processes, institutions and forces of globalization.

Globality creates opportunities for the most inexorable individuals (those capable of making innovative use of globalization’s justificatory metanarratives) to restore humankind to great health. Experimenting with its potential they may realize unforeseeable expansions of diversity, interconnections between people, and surprising

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combinations of active forces. However, the probability that the positive effects of
globality will be seized upon and realized more broadly to bring about new civic duties,
responsibilities and cultural norms as a basis for the reorganization of macro-political
community is always already partially contingent upon the quanta of force other less-
healthy individuals are capable of expending, both for the resistance they may exert to
block change as well as their inability to effectively contend with (discharge) the new
forces generated by the actions of innovators. The very existence of the weak – as
inefficient capacitors – is endangered by the force of dramatic social change.

The prospects that such commanders of new values may successfully transfigure
our era’s suicidal nihilism improve in proportion to the increased cognizance of globality
their creative acts and greater force of will produce, which gradually enables the weak to
discharge their vitality positively. While it is the objective of mankind’s exemplars to
actively combat ascetic priests of ressentiment (who are instinctively threatened by
globality), passivity, impotence and resignation make the herd-masses they lead largely
irrelevant in a number of regards. As, according to Nietzsche’s understanding, the most
salubrious developments are involuntarily performed and transmitted by erotic
individuals, who thereby stimulate and encourage other exceptionally robust types, a few
generations will be required for the re-ordering of life required to instigate an age of
“great politics.” In the present globality is energizing the most resilient, unsubdued types,
providing them with a contextual setting in which they may effectually utilize their
immense volitional resources to create new values and inspire others to join them.

While globalization propagates societal infirmity, debilitating even the hardiest
human specimens, it counter-intuitively gives rise to globality and enables, as a
consequence of chance, the nimblest geniuses to transfigure our global cultural crisis and the individual malady globalization signifies. Over time the self-overcoming / becoming (value creation) of these pioneers will stir (the meager eros of) less healthy individuals as well, those more incapacitated, timid types whose vitality is more effectively frustrated by the hyper-decadence of globalization. The personal, local, national, international and global struggles of brave “cultural physicians” comprise the foundational acts of a new harmonious culture. As weaker types are inspired to follow, the “fight” against decadence is ramified and grows in strength.

The community resulting from the legislations of great artist-philosophers will, as its power grows, transition mankind into a dynamic future era upon which we are at the cusp. In the meantime, the efficient self-regulation and surveillance of disciplinary regimes and punitive methods of carceral control exercised by existing institutions, combined with simulated political enfranchisement and simulacrums of existential and ontological fulfillment (all symptomatic of the ressentiment and bad-conscience of our hyper-decadent epoch the exemplars described above combat), will suffice to subdue and satisfy the vast, dissipative “majority.” This is necessary to avoid dangerous revolutionary excesses in the present, so that the herd, by whose own self-directed violences (indifference, delusions of contentment, resignation, etc.) might implode in suicidal paroxysms of unrestrained self-loathing, if prematurely challenged by the best.

The transfiguration of the herd’s sustaining meanings and its illusory horizon must include the illusion of their preservation, which is the maintenance of the status-quo until the point that the multitude accepts the instigation of a system of natural instincts and drives corresponding to a set of customs and norms generated by the new cultural
realm. The feckless masses may then fulfill their function: to work (if unwittingly) at bettering the species by collectively contributing to the production of geniuses.

Albrow, Robertson and Shaw’s related notions of globality provide a means of conceptualizing the ethos of our transitioning, ultra-liberal-modern era. Refracted through the lens of Nietzsche’s vitalism, it is abstract potential characterized by an ascending trajectory of dynamic forces expressed as positive will to power. Globality is synonymous with the unbounded nisus of human becoming, the volitional resources in human capabilities and re-cognition of how they may be actualized. It finds expression in Nietzsche’s own prescribed ascetic practices (solitude; agonistic friendships; writing and reading the self; attention to one’s environment and nutrition; and dancing, as expounded by Hutter) – techniques that enable acts of self-creation (auto-poiesis) which are inherently defiant of slave-moral ascetic-consumerist values as positive becomings that enhance Being-toward-ones-ownmost-self. Practices that conduce with realizing globality’s transformational potentials, they also comprise a technique for comically mocking and thereby discrediting the anti-natural ideals of globalization.

Though it is impossible to anticipate the affective force of ones’ speech or actions, or to precisely calculate the effects they may have in the world, the driving eros of creative acts invariably arouses the passion of others, ramifying the volitional resources required for the founding of a new epoch. Our evolving estimations, which in periods of great cultural vitality derive from the acts of esteeming that arise from that mode of being toward ones very ownness adopted by the strongest, are ultimately a consequence of their epiphantastic experiences (such as realizations of globality’s abstract potentials in our own era). Their estimations generate and confer values and meanings.
These estimations convey the struggle (or suffering) and inequality (pathos of distance) inherent to the effort of becoming authentically beautiful (the maximization of vitalizing force that emanate from healthy life-forms spontaneously), – that which corresponds with the dynamic passions, augments the positive will to creative destruction as generative power, and by extension the “agency”, as it were, of courageous iconoclasts to whom weaker types are instinctively drawn. Our esteeming of the beautiful—an effort to vivify existence against the constraints imposed on becoming by the ascetic-consumerist herd values that are enforced by the globalization complex—constitutes the formative basis of self-creation in what ‘good Europeans’ of the present hope is the dawning age of globality.

These dynamics appear via the impetus to self-overcoming and the pathos of distance within extraordinary individuals (the political microsphere) through their distinguishing conative disposition and society (the political macrosphere) via the transformed ethos, shared expectations and mentality that follows. The momentum ‘good Europeanism’ and its consequent globality generates through its spreading conative disposition describes an emergent mode of being and new aim for the political: the ongoing, agonistic striving to become-authentic as one’s ownmost self, that is (a Heideggerian echo of Nietzsche’s call to) an increasing desire among the best to become who it is they are.

Such an ennobling effort is distinctly opposed to resigned acceptance of ones average-everydayness in the dissipative, difference annihilating environment of globalization. It is through the continuous renewal of eros and awestruck wonder with the
world by “adventurous Gewaltmenschen” that the transversally graspable ethos of ‘good Europeanism’ as globality—as a futural condition of humankind—arises.\

The empirically demonstrable results of globality (in innumerable micro-level acts of creation, defiance and subversion that reciprocally condition the changing ethos and opportunity structure at the macro-level) lead me to optimistically posit a pragmatic strategy for overcoming and transmuting globalization’s destructive (all-too-human) effects. This comprises a Nietzschean praxis that utilizes classical skeptic philosophical thought and Foucault’s Nietzschean notion of ‘techniques of the self.’

Nietzsche resuscitates and engages arguments on being and non-being, that in textual form date back at least as far as Plato’s dialogue ‘The Sophist’, to challenge the more recent Western concept of the “individual” in ways that assist a nuanced comprehension of the role he sees single persons (as complex and conflicted unities) playing at the micro-political level of (social) life. No person is wholly sovereign or “individual,” rather we are each a “dividuum,” that is, a multifarious and complex entity. It would be more accurate and truthful to write individual to connote a Nietzschean comprehension of the composite entity of a person.

Our reduction to a “self” and others to like singularities confounds our appreciation and comprehension of the complexity each of us contains. This exposes another cruelty of existence: we are compelled to generalize about ourselves according to dominant characteristics and traits, which thereby inflict an identity that ignores the diversity comprising every person. At the macro-political level of (communal) life the same over-simplification applies in essentializations based on ethnicity, gender or cultural characteristics or political party affiliation or the reification of the nation-state.
Analogous to the illusion of the individual in possession of a distinct identity or “soul” culminating in anthropomorphizations of nations (as a personification of collective will which Hegel argued had evolved to such a stage through different modes over millennia via the zeitgeist or “world-spirit”) and the similarly reactive effort to forge a new common identity of a “European.”

This effort is seen by contemporary ascetic-priests as advantageous to the promulgation of the bureaucratic, commercial and popular culture being devised to create new bonds capable of supplanting the respective national identities of the EU’s member states that, it is argued, have long impeded the integration and unification of the continent. Following Richardson, vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s conception of “persons and societies as synthetic wills,” I assert that just as individuals struggle to master their own disparate wills (to “unify” the drives and impulses through a regulatory instinctual framework,) by developing them into a synthetic will at the micro-political level, a striving at the macro-political level occurs as communities struggle to achieve a synthetic will of their individual members, giving rise to politics and political life.

In the case of the EU, the ways in which its advocates contend with the tension between wanting the EU’s “citizen–constituents” to internalize a reductively “unifying” identity across national borders and its concurrent institutional effort to devise mechanisms of inclusion to account for the broad spectrum of difference throughout the EU’s member states often mirrors the dilemma with which (so-called) “individuals” in Europe must contend in reconciling themselves to their own reductive, imposed forms of being. It also exposes a fundamental paradox – or hypocrisy – of liberalism, which sustains the faulty philosophical presuppositions and logic “grounding” these
existentially reductive and divisive notions of selfhood and agency while maintaining the putative equality of all. The tenets of liberal modernism prevent persons, conceived as individuals, from giving a coherent account of themselves as members of disparate communities; they also, arguably, prevent persons from authentically experiencing themselves by cultivating a lived denial of their own intrinsic complexity as well as that of others.

The bad-conscience and ressentiment this inauthenticity aggravates is exponentially magnified at the level of EU institutions (as a multifarious, albeit molar, macro-political organism) inducing schizophrenic behavior at numerous levels of the micro- and macro-political spheres of life within the emergent European polity. These must be alleviated through a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) instigated by vigorous good Europeans who, empowered by globality are capable of instantiating a naturalized political order for the highest flourishing of culture.

The good Europeans envisaged by Nietzsche could only achieve this by exploiting the simulated existential meanings and ontological purposes the EU provides its citizen-constituents through spectacles of prosperity that seemingly validate the foundational ideals intrinsic to its legitimacy. Its institutions—bureaucratic instantiations of instrumentalized reactive force sustaining a spirit of revenge symptomatic of decline—function as macro-generators of ressentiment and bad-conscience. The conventional globalization complex, as a myriad of institutions, processes and forces disseminating, naturalizing and enforcing hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern values, is typified by such characteristics. Yet, although it is an essentially all-too-human process, it also gives rise to opposite, form-creating potentials that, properly seized upon, encourage
transmutations of globalization’s deleterious effects. A radical result of the critical engagement with and the rethinking of Empire (by those with the strength for it) is a cognitive transformation that stimulates experimentation to produce qualitatively new emergents, globality’s life-affirming amplification of striving, impetus and desire suggests an optimistic “Nietzschean” strategy for overcoming the enervation of ascetic-consumerist values in our era.

As aforementioned, globalization is widely deployed term that comprises a set of inter-related phenomenon. There is much disagreement over the nature of the distinct aspects of it, its separately complex economic, political and social dimensions, and these are collectively even more difficult to define. Minimally agreeing that it names a discernable and ongoing worldwide happening at least, it is necessary to conceive it in general and particular terms corresponding with its features and there effects at the global, regional, national and local levels, respectively. Processes of globalization occur and globalizing institutions operate without regard for political, geographic, cultural or temporal boundaries. Myriad competing power constellations strive to realize themselves and their motivating ideal with little regard for traditional socio-political structures. These agglomerations of interests (transnational movements, corporations, non-governmental organizations, citizen activists, professional societies, etc.) vie for dominance within and outside of sovereign nation-states simultaneously. They are giving rise to new, largely unmapped and unregulated spaces for becoming thereby.

According to Nietzsche’s vitalism, globalization is properly understood as a complex (abstract body) of socio-cultural events generated and maintained by the dissipative instinctual system that governs the weakened drives and impulses of our
hyper-decadent age. As Appadurai asserts, its varied phenomena consist of ideologically reinforcing institutions, processes and forces that in innumerable combinations stimulate and comprise emerging planetary ideoscapes, ethnoscapes and technoscapes.\textsuperscript{734} These constitute flows that overrun former conduits of power and channel their force into new forms of life. These emerging global social, political and cultural phenomena challenge existing forms of order, which struggle to interpolate and systematize them. But with their capacity for ordering exceeded by new practices, the existing conventional power structures fail to adequately contend with or impede their transformation of reality (a gamut of sometimes interrelated and sometimes disparate realities).

Complicating things further, the varied prerogatives of these continually evolving power constellations may concurrently reinforce, contradict and conflict with one another.\textsuperscript{735} The major globalizing institutions have compelled a transformation in relations between states through their facilitation of cooperation across a diverse range of issues.\textsuperscript{736} Yet the ethos of their practices remains very much the same. In the areas of business, trade and finance, the interests of myriad international, national and nongovernmental organizations including MNCs and TNCs have promulgated a universal post-Fordist/Taylorist, or late neo-liberal economic model.\textsuperscript{737} The prerogatives of this regime shaped trading rules and policy to determine the course of economic globalization – the imposition and hegemony of ultra-liberal-modern values.

Expressed through both institutions and processes of globalization are international regimes, constituted by normalizing practices instantiated through formal treaties and informal agreements. These include air, postal and shipping conventions that establish regimes of conduct to normalize universal standards.\textsuperscript{738} Specific to processes of
globalization are technological developments such as the internet, mass air travel and communication capabilities that dramatically reduce geographical distance and temporal space. A ubiquitous mass media disseminates interconnected narratives that privilege and reinforce Western values.

Global social, environmental and dissident movements are also identified as globalizing processes—if of an alternative “counter-hegemonic” variety. Finally, forces of globalization describe the values and ideals, expectations, norms and attitudes aroused by the aforementioned institutions and processes of globalization. These correspond with numerous spectacles of identity, freedom and empowerment through representation, mimesis and consumption, the decadent means by which Empire provides simulacrums of existential meaning and simulated ontological purpose to the masses.\textsuperscript{739}

Globalization in its present form is the culmination of an exponentially accelerating development over the past four centuries. It has occurred in conjunction with an aggregation of the macro-level drives and impulses characteristic of post-Enlightenment liberal-modernity that universalized the state form.\textsuperscript{740} Originating in diverse components of the Western European cultural realm, the assemblage of forces that would engender in the forces, processes and institutions of globalization ineluctably extended into and transformed all areas and regions of human life. Much of the increased velocity of change propelled by globalization has occurred across the past two centuries. This has had the noted effect of compressing time, both as it is subjectively experienced and as it objectively reduces production time, distribution time, and the wait for information. The dramatic shrinking of geographical distances and the conceptual space
separating people through innovations in transportation and communications coincided with and ramified these developments.

These developments constitute measurable improvements in the everyday material conditions of human life, including advances across numerous indices measuring aspects of human welfare. In Nietzschean terms the institutions, processes and forces of globalization are logical extensions of the enlightenment pathos for rationalism and “certainty” expressed via a will-to-truth. The consequences of this will-to-truth have not been entirely negative, but through disciplinary regimes for organizing life—and sophisticated forms of *akrasia* that naturalize inauthenticity—they exercise a bio-power over individuals by sublimating the ressentiment and bad-conscience their subjects performatively enact. From this perspective, globalization is an assemblage of interrelated, fundamentally negative developments that continuously naturalize and spread dissipative nihilism via the doctrine of neo-liberal consumerism. Similarly ingravescent conditions hastened the decline of Europe’s vitality through the early twentieth century, as signs of the same dissipation appeared outside the continent and its cultural realm.\(^74\) In our own age the globalization complex (or “Empire”) represents the latest mutation/intensification of the syndrome, a diversely symptomatized infection that now afflicts disparate cultural traditions outside Europe and debilitates ascending forms of life with the contagion of (essentially European) decadence.

However, an unanticipated development from out of experiences with globalization (innumerable continuous negotiations, resistances and modifications of the norms, practices and understandings of everyday life) is the abstract potentials of globality. Irrespective of national origin or location, those who may enact and expend the
superior forces necessary to maintain a tragic, Dionysian worldview (tragic *Weltanschauung*), may (consciously or not) realize abstract, positive potentials of globality through their experience of immersion in the decadent environment of globalization. As both a new perspective on contemporary life and a practical strategy for contending with globalization’s deleterious consequences, globality arises not in dialectical tension with the globalization complex, but rather as a conceptual entry point to a new, successor epoch to modernity.\(^{742}\) It is symptomatized by a transformed consciousness produced through recognition of the accelerating interconnectedness of contemporary life (and its concurrent transfiguration of Empire).

Awareness of this altered/altering consciousness has prompted political scientists to distinguish between globality as a phenomenon related to but different from globalization. As aforementioned, Shaw defines globality in the context of globalization’s creation of the “global,” in which an altered mentality generated by “new relations of politics, economics and society,” gives rise to changed—and potentially enhanced affective capacities. Shaw’s notion of transformed structures of social relations and relations across diverse realms of human activity suggests the abstract potentials, changed mentalities and enhanced *conative disposition* or *anticipatory resoluteness* to which (and as I have asserted) the state of globality gives rise. It is a condition actively transforming social life in the present.\(^{743}\) Among the capable few, globality confers a comprehension of the how a fundamental shift in the dominant principles of and constitution of the world may be affected. These individuals may enact those potentials to ultimately produce new social forms and modes of being that foster creative conceptions of becoming that are either active or reactive.
Examples of the former, instances of reactive force expressed in a positive will to creative destruction as generative power, might include the application of information technologies to subvert conventional power structures by undermining confidence in them, or to organize and enhance education, alternative forms of trade circumventing regulated capital process and to disseminate ideas. Conversely, globality’s abstract potential may be seized upon to intensify reaction. Examples abound of globality’s escalation of the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power among diseased types. It is exemplified in the manner religious and political militants manipulate the same networks and information technologies to carry out terrorist attacks. Still others appropriate it to engage in computer hacking and identity theft – activity which the very networks that give rise to globality enable and which is not dependent on the social position or geographic location of the individual, as it is to a far more significant degree in the organization of conventional (reactive) globalization.

However they utilize the potentials of globality that they identify, they are not limited to their specific emplacement in the world, but can transcend their ubiety and in a digitized sense, actually become ubiquitous—exercising their power everywhere simultaneously. In explicating his related notion of the “globalized locality,” Martin Albrow asserts that globality:

- involves a new kind of connectedness, where events can have simultaneous effects anywhere on the globe, in which immediate response to a message can be given and obtained irrespective of distance, in which products and services are the outcome of a global division of labor, where identical products and services may be obtained anywhere in the world, or where images and icons receive recognition worldwide.

This remark acknowledges the materialist conception of economic connectedness in the
world that is essentialized as the objective of globality, particularly by neo-liberal
ascetic—consumerist priests of ressentiment who reify the expanded marketplace as the
font of all that is positive in the recent development of mankind.

However, such an exponential and on-going increase in the global exchange of
goods and services, while positive from the standpoint of consumption and corresponding
improvement in living standards through the fulfillment of human nutritional
requirements, etc. is but a precondition for the actualization of globality’s transformative
potential. The awareness of increased connectedness Albrow sites is significant as such a
precondition and ramifies the identic transformation achieved by increased familiarity
with foreign cultures, customs and perspectives. At the most rudimentary level, what an
individual with the native vitality to imagine alternative becomings for him or herself
may glean from such superficially mundane or even trite experiences as an exotic
restaurant meal or a television news report from an obscure corner of the world cannot be
anticipated. The usually unrecognized task is to extract the eudemonic significance
inherent in ordinary experiences so to construct meaning and purpose for ones’ life from
them.

Even if, following Baudrillard’s thesis in *Simulacra and Simulation*, the “reality”
we are presented with is an intensely mediated series of representations, or copies of
copies, and our understanding of it and sense of ourselves in relation to it is hyperreal, for
better or worse a certain enrichment of life, *nolens volens*, also occurs despite whatever
dissatisfactions many will read into such a state of affairs. The ideas and
understandings that might arise from the act of reading a fictional story set abroad or the
experience of befriending an exchange student in ones’ community or traveling abroad
are entirely contingent and ultimately unpredictable, but the likelihood that novel alternative becomings might emerge from out of such experiences among healthy individuals (whose health is indicated in part by both their eagerness for such diversifying experiences and their receptivity to them) is decidedly greater as a result of the possibility for increased perspective provided by such latently broadening experiences.

The hyperreal representation of reality also multiplies by many times our opportunities for (re)conceiving the world; and even if at many removes from its source in life, there is no obviously greater reason to fear we know less about “reality” as such because our impressions of may be grounded on representation, as reality is always already a partly unique and partly shared product of our individual and collective interpretive engagement with the world. These experiences, moreover, in both their number and variety, are indisputably facilitated by greater material exchange. They are, one can quite easily argue, positive effects of neo-liberal capitalism, or conventional globalization and its recently hegemonic, yet evolving, political rationality for the organization of life—the ‘bio-power’ of the globalization complex.

Albrow references the massification (a social phenomenon first theorized by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School) that has simultaneously subverted opportunities for authentic individuality and banalized difference, as well as the normalization achieved by imposed universal standards and the regularity of production and consumption that equates the desires and, by extension, experiences of people in disparate parts of the world. Though the deleterious effects of such transformative events may be exaggerated by critics whose alarm is heightened by romanticized views of indigenous cultures and a
desire to preserve certain lifestyles that the inhabitants of said cultures will not or cannot maintain, the modus operandi of neo-liberal processes (as with its historical precedents) is impulsive and inconsiderate of that which may impede it in pursuing its objective, namely monetary profit.

Against the myriad damaging effects of neo-liberal capitalism,
 whose simulated existential meanings and ontological purposes desensitize individuals to their authentic desires and divert them from acting according to their genuine instincts and potentials for becoming, and which inculcate the majority with the coarse ascetic/materialist herd values of Empire, opportunities for realizing globality’s potential are presented when an experience of difference runs across, or intersects with the anticipated line of our becoming’s trajectory, that is, the expectations we have for ourselves in a given moment. This provokes a transversal engagement within the individual with that experience of otherness that imparts something unique and prompts change within and outside her. However, the significance of the specific outcome of such an encounter – if one could conceive of any finality to such engagements – cannot, in most instances, be quantitatively or qualitatively measured or evaluated in an objective sense. Occasionally the result of such an engagement, of what may be envisaged as a result of it, and what might be achieved or realized out of it will be stupendous – a truly transformative event with ramifications for the macro-political, or global, level.

An example of identic transformation cultivated by the EU lies in the multiple and varied sense of identity many Europeans (“good” in the Nietzschean sense or otherwise) feel vis-à-vis the political project of Europe. They have, in large numbers (larger than ever before), come to recognize themselves as at once being citizens of a local...
community (say Edinburgh), a region (Scotland), a nation (the United Kingdom), and a civilizational / supranational polity (Europe) in the broader world (globality). It is the capacity to cognitively occupy each of the roles these identities confers simultaneously, without essentializing oneself according to any one among them that distinguishes the ‘good European’ from the average member of the crowd, whose xenophobic chauvinisms and patriotic affiliations impede the fullest realization of potential becomings these identic categories enable. The latter are even less able to transcend these identic categories in their narrower sense, and overcome themselves thereby, which is the objective of ‘good Europeans’ via the means provided in the abstract potentials of globality.

Albrow theorizes globality as a new supranational, pluralistic discourse that incorporates the beneficial results of globalization while dis- and/or re-placing modernity to segue the world into a new epoch. The advent of the “global age” he discerns is prompted by rethinking the most significant questions to communal life:

The recurrence of ideas like ‘society’, ‘state’, ‘community’, welfare’, ‘justice’ suggests that they are not merely modern fixes, because they never acquire a final meaning. It is a mark of epochal change that they are called in for fundamental reappraisal. He considers the role globality has played in replacing modernity as a break with the past. In that globalization (as a complex of processes) suggests just another stage of modern history, globality, as a transformed conceptual framework, takes the globe as its reference point to engender a corresponding phenomenological understanding that simultaneously closes the modern epoch and ushers mankind into a ‘global age’.
Albrow also thinks “we are on much safer ground with [the notion of] ‘globality’ since it carries no connotation of necessary outcomes, for by “putting an end to totalizing discourses,” globality allows for a broader spectrum of difference and affirms alterity while remaining indeterminate with regard to the direction of mankind’s future development. Through globality the dawning ‘global age’ “involves the supplanting of modernity with globality,” a state in which ‘world society’ is better understood as a ‘multiplicity without unity.’ This is symptomatized—to paraphrase John Eade (full citation above at pp 70)—by the ‘deterritorialization of traditional concepts’, which are rhizomatically disaggregated from their indigenous contexts and ‘resynthesized’ in unanticipated ways that make them globally efficacious among types of people and groups with certain shared interests. For Ulrich Beck:

‘Globality’ refers to awareness of the fact that we are increasingly living in a ‘world society’ in the sense that the notion of closed spaces has become illusory …from now on nothing which happens on our planet is only a limited or local event.

The simultaneous and unlimited extension, revision and combining of disparate modes of thought (or perspectives) to embrace new affective realities are a manifestly Nietzschean activity. ‘good Europeans’ of the early twenty-first century, spurred by their good-conscience, recognize the dependence of human communities upon regulative ideals, so engage in globally transformative creative acts of self-overcoming for the naturalization of mankind as ethical improvement.

The change they seek to compel is of the sort that fosters productive agonisms. Through an authentic agon that fortifies challenges, which themselves build on and evolve the (presently pseudo-) competitive ethos of capital process, they may cultivate an
acceptance of suffering that strengthens man. As the affective power of local concepts and forms of life impact global relations and the global is ever more relevant to everyday life at the (increasingly relevant) ‘local’ level, the conceptual dyad disappears, deepening knowledge expands human capacities exponentially, and the assimilative dynamic contributes to new complexes constitutive of the transnational potentials of globality.

From a similar perspective, Roland Robertson has theorized “glocalization” as a new framework for comprehending how place is reconceived and physically transformed in globality. Robertson focuses on how globality deepens “the scope and depth of consciousness of the world as a single place,” which is “objectively demonstrated by greater physical connectivity and communication that shrinks geographical proximity, spatial relations and time differences between persons, groups and events.” By drawing eclectically from each of these related perspectives and synthesizing aspects of their respective understandings we may arrive at a syncretic and quite Nietzschean notion of globality. Shaw’s further contention that the relations and forms comprising globality body forth a unique framework from “the global as a common consciousness of human society on a world scale: an increasing awareness of the totality of human social relations as the largest constitutive framework of all relations,” may be expanded upon by combining his notions of the global (as an ongoing conceptual transformation) and globality (as a cognitive framework for re-conceiving our integrating world).

An inadvertent product of globalization itself, globality suggests a new practical, perspectivalist rationality for our caring engagement with the world. As an altered state of consciousness that may enable a transmutation of the hegemonic reactive values enforced by Empire, it evinces a new mentality among those whose perceptive and cognitive
faculties have been similarly altered by their active, critical engagement with the emerging global reality. It can be more abstractly, although no less usefully, understood as symptomatic of an interassemblage haecceity (mood or atmosphere of the speeds and affects generated) of the dawning epoch. The disposition generated by globality announces the Dasein (as unity in the becoming of their being in the world) of contemporary Übermensch, and anticipates future forms of man, the becoming-other of the species, about whose possibilities—and probable appearance—we are increasingly aware.

Globality conditions the possibility for myriad salubrious, authenticating developments and affirmative acts. These occur, like those who enact them, largely by chance, as unanticipated affective capacities that propagate active forces and enhance their flow (expenditure) can only in the most limited sense, and only by extraordinary individuals, be directed. But the disposition conferred by globality incites those capable of aggressively exploiting its abstract potential to further pursue higher (nobler) goods such as the interrogation of all received opinion as well as the basis in reality of those evaluations that emanate from themselves. This includes revaluing the common privileging of parochial national identities and territorial borders that naturalize the state form’s illusory sense of static being in the political realm at both the domestic and international levels, both within Europe and outside it.

Globality galvanizes stalwart iconoclasts to demonstrate the contingency of all values and corresponding identities, in order to sensitize others to the anti-natural order enforced by the prevailing system of ascetic-consumerist values. This decadent order is predicated on and reinforced internationally by the state form, that “coldest of all cold
monsters." Recognition of the contingency of all values via globality orients us to the ineluctability of the state-form’s demise as the globalization complex is undermined. With their prodigious energies augmented by realizations of globality’s abstract potentials, ‘good Europeans’ are transmuting the nihilistic values of our age via dangerous experiments aimed at making a shibboleth of ultra-liberal-modernity.

Believing “neither in the ‘ideals’ nor in the ‘realities’ of their decaying time,” they are especially well suited for this task and the exploitation of globality that enables it. For they count themselves “[a]mong the Europeans of today… who have the right to call themselves homeless in a distinctive sense… for their lot is hard, their hope uncertain.” Nietzsche recognizes the enormous complexity of the challenge facing them, but also that it is at once generated and met by their unique existence, “we children of the future, how can we be home in this present?” They find themselves:

…ill at ease in an age which loves to busy itself with honor and consider itself to be the most humane, mild, and righteous age that the sun has ever seen. It is bad enough that just these beautiful words inspire us with the ugliest thoughts, that in them we see only the expression of deep enfeeblement, of fatigue, of age of decreasing energy.

A revivifying effect of their creative (and inherently defiant) acts is a stimulated desire for the sort of political education advocated by Nietzsche, among weaker individuals, who may improve themselves thereby. By tuning people in to their traditions and orienting them to their historicity, globality enables a few, irrespective of culture or locale, to become other within the expanded (perspectivalist-hermeneutical) horizon of possibility it provides.

Nietzsche anticipated the potential for transvaluations of secular slave-morality by the enhanced perspective likely to result from an increasingly broad experience of
difference and culture (global life) from the beginning of his middle period. He may not have appreciated that these acts (exemplified in the comparisons he describes in the passage cited below) would occur within and describe a continued period of steep “decline” and worsening crisis. Integral to undoing the millennial domination of Europe by ascetic and materialist priests of ressentiment, the major developments of the twentieth century \(^{761}\) were essential acts in the long, historical agonistic process of overcoming the ‘human-all-too-human’. The kind of experiences and values sought by ‘good Europeans’ were facilitated by the proto-globalization occurring in the age of late-modernity; those befitting both their task, the pathos it requires, and their involuntary pursuit of it, is suggested in a 1878 passage:

> Age of Comparison. The less men are bound by tradition, the greater is the fermentation of motivations within them, and the greater in consequence their outward restlessness, their mingling together with one another, the polyphony of their endeavors. Who is there who now still feels a strong compulsion to attach himself and his posterity to a particular place? Who is there who still feels any strong attachment at all? Just as in the arts all the genres are imitated side-by-side, so are all the stages and genres of morality, custom, culture. – Such an age acquires its significance through the fact that in it the various different philosophies of life, customs, cultures can be compared and experienced side by side; which in earlier ages, when, just as all artistic genres were attached to a particular place and time, so every culture still enjoyed only a localized domination, was not possible.\(^{762}\)

Although not explicit, Nietzsche here observes in a positive light the enhanced opportunities many had acquired by the late 19\(^{th}\) century for traveling, studying and experiencing foreign values originating outside the geographical confines of their birthplace, nation and even continent.

The mingling of peoples and ideas and the tendency of this to foster dis-attachment to place (their transformed ubiety or sense of “where-ness”) via a compulsion
to compare all aspects of life with varieties of living and viewing the world outside one's own native communities is here suggested to be a defining characteristic of the age in which Nietzsche lived. It was one of proto-globalization, which he took as positively enhancing the prospect of a revaluation of values signaling the dawn of a new age. The passage continues:

Now an enhanced aesthetic sensibility will come to a definitive decision between all these forms offering themselves for comparison: most of them—namely all those rejected by this sensibility—it will allow them to die out. There is likewise now taking place a selecting out among the forms and customs of higher morality whose objective can only be the elimination of lower moralities. This is the age of comparison! It is the source of its pride—but, as is only reasonable, also of its suffering. Let us not be afraid of this suffering! Let us rather confront the task which the age sets us as boldly as we can: and then posterity will bless us for it—a posterity that will know itself to be as much beyond the self-enclosed original national cultures as it is beyond the culture of comparison, but will look back upon both species of culture as upon venerable antiquities.763

This important passage conveys Nietzsche’s recognition that the task of the age is a hybridizing and re-synthesis of the best traits and features among disparate cultural forms and value systems toward unforeseeable ways of valuing and organizing social life. This Nietzschean variety of hybridization occurs as an outcome of contending forces in which the healthier one prevails, incorporating the most salubrious aspects of the weaker one into the stronger, thereby increasing its vitality. In the early 21st century it is the abstract, positive potentials of globality latent in the reactive institutions, processes and forces of globalization, which are likely to achieve this noble successor age beyond the one of comparison that we still inhabit. The only futural certainty ‘good Europeans’ can have is that steadily transforming the world will involve untold suffering – suffering that must be joyfully embraced by those capable of bearing it and hastening us toward a transhuman condition.
The passage suggests that broad inter-cultural comparison is cognitively transforming. The act of it inherently compels a personal interrogation of the ways tradition “grounds” individuals and by extension the societies of which they are a part through its generation of a putatively autonomous rationality that serves as a basis for naturalistic action. Such comparison de-naturalizes customary action and leads to the cognitive dis-attachment from and overcoming of one’s original place (the conceptual transformation of one’s ubiety); at least among those individuals capable of arriving at the conclusions it induces. Upon further self-scrutiny, and in light of their expanded sense of awareness, it compels a questioning unto the abandonment of convictions and values that their native rationality previously legitimated. Being grounded in tradition is inherently limiting, hence the positive yet dangerous dimension of value comparison. Nietzsche, a child of the age of comparison, clearly anticipated the demise of the prevailing Western tradition, modernity being an incoherent pastiche of disparate elements drawn from various earlier traditions which Nietzsche – anticipating some of MacIntyre’s insights – was among the first to scrutinize, and the sort of radical – and, to many, frightening – possibilities this would present for basing an invigorated future European culture upon.764

The passage also proclaims the positive effects such comparison spawns, intimating the abstract potentials enabled by enlarged perspectives, the beneficial result of critical reflection on and challenges to ones’ entrenched beliefs (the conventional Christian-Platonic will-to-truth’s moralizations of reality) that encounters with difference enables – all of which are amplified in our age of globalization by increased international contact, communications and awareness. Even if the goal of the intensified level of
comparison in our age of globalization is the reactive banalization of difference, trite encounters with difference are still more potentially productive than none at all; hence the inherent value of trying to educate the progeny of even the coarsest vulgarians – their individual responses to such opportunities are what may crucially distinguish them from the herd and single them out as potential or nascent exemplars. Nietzsche hints at the limitless possibilities such experience would create for further “selecting out,” and acts of world-transformation they had yet to inflame.


Predicated on the tenets of multi-party democracy and a competitive free market, the nations of Western Europe arose phoenix-like from the rubble of war through multiple frameworks for cooperation. Within Europe itself, multiple elite driven collaborative initiatives in the realm of economics served the purpose of creating mutual reliance and an enhanced position vis-à-vis international trade. This included a customs union and common tariff between the Benelux countries as early as 1947. Further schemes were implemented via the Brussels Treaty of 1948 (between the Benelux states, France and the UK), which facilitated cooperation in economic matters and a broad range of related affairs as well as specifically advancing its members’ common defense.

Sixteen European states agreed shortly thereafter to found the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), an institution that fostered intra-European trade and assisted in the implementation of the European Recovery Program. This augmented Washington’s effort to distribute assistance through its Marshall Plan aid program, which the OEEC facilitated through its efforts to ease distribution of aid to its
intended beneficiaries, alleviate problems in the exchange of the various currencies in circulation and work toward an eventual customs union. The American role in the initial steps toward European integration was significant. The Bretton-Woods accords established a firm basis for a new global economic system and the Marshall Plan’s centralized bureaucracy for aid distribution imposed cooperative orientation toward its end of furthering Europe’s formal integration. Later twelve nations would link themselves defensively through the NATO treaty in Washington.

The ethos of these moves, if not mainly American in origin (it arguably was) was largely supplemented through American support—crucial backing that would condition the possibility for and culminate in the EU. Europe’s economic vitality was important to the US, which needed stable trading partners. Therefore the elimination of certain trade barriers and tariffs between European states served its own self-interests. The establishment of the ECSC and EURATOM (predecessors as noted above) conduced with this objective. Intra-European trade was liberalized at a fairly steadily pace for the next few decades, notably with the Treaty of Rome, which set up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the separate European Free Trade Association (EFTA), established in 1960. Economic cooperation provided a relatively easy way of agreeing to integrative policies between sovereign European states by appealing to the self-interests of each, political cooperation was an immediate and direct consequence.

Although some countries were more reluctant than others (France under de Gaulle being a familiar example for the impasse he created in mid-1965) to concede features of their political autonomy to overarching supranational authorities arising through economic cooperation, the momentum and logic of cooperation veritably compelled it. In
specific issue areas concessions made according to each nation’s self-interest created spill-over, which frequently necessitated future concessions in others. Broader political and social integration was therefore an unavoidable consequence of increasing economic cooperation. Without denying the considerable difficulty—if not improbability—of the integration process (it was never certain or by any means ineluctable) it can be fairly asserted that however taboo a subject it may have been, the integration of the continent was underway well before many member state government officials or bureaucrats in Brussels were comfortable admitting it.

The effects of the Luxemburg Compromise notwithstanding, developments toward ever-closer union continued apace (as evinced by the steady accession of new members, the expansion and deepening of oversight authorities across broad issue areas and certain developmental landmarks such as the Paris summit of 1974, the Single Europe Act of 1986, and the Treaty on European Union—Maastricht—of 1993, to name a few), even if the rhetoric of national sovereignty is occasionally rehearsed among domestic constituencies for partisan domestic political consumption. Overcoming this—occasionally exaggerated—discomfort remains a challenge to the logic of integration even today. It is symptomatic of the still significant state-centric orientation to political life that has defined intra-European and international affairs for centuries. It also indicates the persistence of the mentality that fostered the nationalistic impulses particular to each nation and contributed to cultural prejudices and historical hostilities between neighboring countries that constrained their relations and retarded mutual development.
Europe’s integration has in no small part been a process of dispensing with simplistic binaries that previously constructed and limited the identities of its various peoples. These include notions of the self and other and the inside and outside that traditionally defined belonging in a community and circumscribed opportunities for becoming. It is this widespread idiocy, as Nietzsche saw it, that his idea of Europe and the ‘good Europeanism’ presupposed by it were in large part conceived to overcome.

This twentieth century effort to construct European institutions capable of managing its trade, fiscal policy and infrastructure so as to regenerate the continent’s vitality corresponded with the greater project of reordering the international system. This broader project entailed extending a mixture of European laws and values universally through the institutional apparati of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and other international organizations. Post-war American and Western European collaboration in the construction of this new international order was and remains so significant to any comprehension of the macro-level, institution-led processes of globalization and the paradigm of globality emergent from them that it may accurately and usefully be described as a complex at the heart of globalizing processes. This is empirically demonstrated by (among many other things) the very high degree of policy interdependence between the two powers and the shared ultra-liberal-modern values they cooperatively seek to universalize as global norms. Thus I refer to it as the US – EU ideological power aggregate within which a transatlantic ruling class emerged determined to achieve a unified Europe, and from which it has developed and will continue to define itself.765
The US–EU ideological power aggregate arose through the creation of post-war international institutions and within a broader trilateral commercial-trading conglomerate that, by the mid to late 1960s fully included Japan. It presently exists inside an expanded, multi-lateral set of international institutions comprising a web of states outside the US and EU, as well as prominent IGOs and, arguably, many NGOs. Numerous corporate entities act synchronously with it, their success in no small part a result of the globalizing institutions, processes and forces the post-war international order (dominated—by design—by the US and major European, now principal EU states) was in part created to realize.

Another important historical context for comprehending the development of the EU and its simultaneous role in the creation of the contemporary globalization complex is the fact that the EU emerged within and was ideologically and existentially contingent upon the East–West Cold-war and the transatlantic alliance. The security challenge presented by the confrontation of opposing ideological blocs that divided the continent defined a critical role for the US in European defense and political cooperation, both in leading NATO and in support of the development of unifying economic structures.

Victory over a common ideological enemy eliminated a primary impediment to economic unification, nascent processes of globalization and embryonic globality, removing a set of possible complications that could have hampered the birth of the new paradigm gestating in Western institutions and practices. At the end of the Cold war Western Europe’s shared institutions were consolidating at a rapid pace. Due to its disproportionate endowment of wealth and military might and its global reach, the U.S. was better positioned in Europe to exploit the opportunities presented by Communism’s
collapse, stirring some anxiety and animosity in Western Europe as its corporations had to compete with each other as well as US firms for investment opportunities and new contracts. Moreover, European firms had higher operating costs within Europe due to its complicated tax schemes and the expense of currency conversion.

The commonly shared sentiment between US and European elites vis-à-vis CEE was an undisguised triumphalism. A spirit of *schadenfreude* accompanied the vigorous, competitive efforts to incorporate CEE into the Western fold. Today, the EU’s eastward expansion represents a logical extension of this process of incorporation. It not only underscores the momentum of globalization in the region, it physically extends the jurisdiction of EU institutions and assimilates millions of people as new citizen-constituents.

With the expiration of communism in Europe after a forty-year, largely rhetorical challenge to the prerogatives and momentum of the Western globalization complex, the institutions of neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy were positioned to fully absorb the former Soviet-bloc states and newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union into their increasingly internationalized apparatus. Communism’s collapse in 1989 and 1991 freed the EEC from certain conceptual constraints to consolidate itself economically and politically. Having done so throughout the 1990s, it is now proceeding to expand eastward across the continent in its mission to “unify” Europe, bringing its disparate parts together as a whole, according to its idea of one Europe.

In a development that good Europeans would—for highly qualified reasons—endorse, its institutions are creating a federally governed polity, whose supranational authority is transforming a set of traditional, reactive norms grouped under the general
heading of national sovereignty. This, according to Nietzsche’s vitalist understanding, expands possibilities for human flourishing or the spectrum of its capacities within the institutional order the globalization complex inadvertently enables. Furthermore, it increases the capacity of exceptional agents within those institutions to direct and exploit the potentials of globality.

Despite the inauthentic agonistic socio-political milieu through which EU expansion is occurring, Nietzschean critique makes evident the fact that along with the preponderant reactive forces (bodied forth as a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power) formative of the EU’s becoming, contending active forces (expressed as a positive will to creative destruction as generative power) however minute, simultaneously affects its development. Relatively healthier individuals are able to actively hijack and redirect some of the negative tendencies driving integration and augment others so as to hasten the EU’s eventual going down and overcoming. The origin of these decisive forces of our decadent epoch lies in reservoir of depleted volitional resources that might yet sustain an active dynamic. However infinitesimally small, this power—augmented by abstract potentials of globality—could serve as a match to set alight a renewed future. The EU’s internal process of consolidation, and its incorporation of other states has exacerbated reaction, resentment and bad-consciousness, yet this antagonism generates unanticipated affects with surprising trajectories; lines of flight that are ascending, healthy and generative.

For instance, as an ultra-liberal-modern institutional structure, the EU functions both to stabilize the continent and serve as an influential source and promulgator of institutional mechanisms upon which the emerging international order is predicated.⁷⁶⁷
Though this strives to regulate life and mediate disparate forces of globalization, each generates gaps between that which is conventionally considered impermissible and the officially sanctioned, through entrepreneurial, technological and intellectual innovations that race ahead of any authority’s competence, challenging its jurisdiction and mutating both practices and culture ahead of law. As such “advances” accelerate change, opportunity, creation and novelty proliferates in ways difficult to effectively restrain by even the most flexible governing institutions or legal codes.

Despite its remarkable power of interpolation the globalization complex is incapable of recognizing every instance of its own regulative impotence and these blind spots represent opportunities for exceptional individuals (‘outliers’ both for their insight and dumb luck\textsuperscript{768}) to exploit. As a burgeoning juridical–political institutional structure it nevertheless comprises an increasingly ubiquitous and reactive network enacting ever subtler and comprehensive methods of discipline, surveillance and control over life; augmenting what international order does exist. But it constantly lags behind the ongoing innovations emergently challenging it which are posed by the abstract potentials of globality it unintentionally generates.

To control or delimit such potentially destabilizing developments, elements of the preexisting order of formal, regulative institutions (national governments, religious authorities, etc.) attempt to reinforce and bolster their authority by rearticulating their codified injunctions and reified “essential aspects.” Their masochistic desire to maintain the forms of life the reigning order supports and which enervate them, expresses itself in an effort to define evaluative parameters of acceptable change, a threshold level of tolerance for dissention from and challenges to orthodox beliefs and norms which rapidly
emerging forms globality present. In so doing they become reactive and inflexible, perceiving their security as contingent on an already obsolescent international order that is passing into history.

Hegemonic institutions whose authority is waning are frequently incapable of recognizing that the form of their existence must change via adaptation or risk extinction. In our era of globalization, challenges posed to the prevailing international order (which the globalization complex constitutes) continually provokes disciplinary responses from constituent elements within it that seek to preserve their efficacy. The interpolating force of the globalization complex is one of its most distinctive properties. Institutional responses of this sort can have both invigorating and enfeebling consequences for human life. In the transitional age of globalization the result of such reaction depends upon how it ramifies the affective capacity of those few who are capable of realizing opportunities generated by globality, those strong enough to enact or conduct the forces needed to condition possibilities for further positive becomings.

Globality therefore suggests the dawn of an ascending epoch in maturation of the human species as such, for it follows that as its abstract potentials are realized an exponential increase of such positive forces can be expected and further abstract potentials generated. This should gradually overcome and thereby transmute many of the reactive institutions, processes and forces of globalization. The successor era to modernity, which we are far from achieving—whatever the assertions of certain literary theorists—will be one that conducts the human species toward its eventual overcoming and a post- or transhuman condition.
In response to the many objections raised against their further extension of the forces of globalization a dual dynamic arises from the hegemonic institutions of globalization (the circular compounding of reaction). One response to moralizing protestations against globalizing processes, typified by the social activism of alarm prone “liberal post-moderns” and other altruists, consists in the deeper sublimation of liberal discourses into the ideational objectives of globalization. This necessitates the concealment of the globalization complex’s violences—which bring it into contradiction with the values legitimating it—to placate the herds at its primary loci. Examples of its deceptive tactics include, for instance, the advocacy of so-called “fair trade” practices (in commodities such as coffee), campaigns for higher wages and improved working conditions in the developing world’s “sweatshops”, and the political rights (conceived in ultra-liberal-modern terms) of repressed or disenfranchised peoples (e.g.: the Tibetans or Burmese).769

The other, co-extending dynamic, consists of the ongoing effort by the reigning political institutions of our day (states, IGOs, etc.) to continually affirm their legitimacy and maintain order through ever-more sophisticated simulations of ultra-liberal-modern values. For skeptical ironists these efforts merely reveal their waning authority. The pathetic attempts by governments to justify themselves frequently result in the construction of supposedly threatening “others”.770 They serve to fortify the subjective-valuations-cum-ordering-principles of ultra-liberal-modernity via simulacrums of individual autonomy (free will), as well as legal equality and political enfranchisement – either as already attained or universally desired – and the duty of “the just” to disseminate via the exportation of liberal-democracy, at both the micro- and macro-political levels.
This dual dynamic describes the intensification of a perverse effort to impose a slave-moral will-to-truth through a particular ethos of promise-making and account-giving toward the rationalization of imposed responsibility for the purpose of ascribing blame. The incoherent relativism that results is indicated by the diffuse sense of entitlement characteristic of citizens in the ultra-liberal-modern societies at the center of the globalization complex. The mono-culture this produces is typified by easy consumption, indifference to the environmental human consequences of that consumption and which promotes a coarse familiarity resulting from the near total absence of any persuasive rank order of types and corresponding values (Rangordnung). In such a reactive, difference-annihilating culture, demands and promises are ever more casually made leading to a condition in which the legitimate assignment of responsibility becomes impracticable, the legal framework for adjudicating conflict and its imposition of sanctions becomes increasingly dubious and all authority comes to be viewed with cynical derision.

In theorizing the Western state’s propagation of globalization, the inadvertent, generative basis of potentials of globality, Shaw observes that:

The Western state has grown into a genuine power conglomerate precisely through the development of authoritative structures from their sovereign bases. It has evolved complex overlapping international institutions, from NATO and other military organizations through a wide range of political and economic bodies. Within Europe, it has developed an unprecedentedly deep economic (and increasingly political) union, with complex institutions, now directly as well as indirectly legitimated.771

The EU, as a macro-level conductor of globalizing forces, processes and institutions, is both a powerful arbiter of change to the norms and framework of international juridical order attempting to regulate globality and is symptomatic of them as well.
The US (as arguably the prototypical liberal-modern “European” polity) and EU—each an extremely large and complicated power constellation in its own right—share and promote identical values and many of the same interests. In so doing they comprise a massive power constellation at the heart of the globalization complex. Yet the different emphasis which the EU places on certain values distinguishes it from the US in subtle but important ways. Evidence of this lies in European attitudes toward capital punishment, social welfare, health care and access to affordable education. Through parallel institutions such as the OSCE\textsuperscript{772} and COE\textsuperscript{773} the EU is increasingly influential in determining the direction and character of globalization.

These institutions, along with NATO and its Partnership for Peace have been preparing states on the EU’s periphery for eventual admission to the organization and otherwise habituating them to the expectations of the US–EU ideological power aggregate’s framework for international order. Given its advantageous geographical location and the appeal of its ethos (perceived, however accurately, as an alternative to the US) the EU is approaching parity with the US in its ability to determine the character and priorities of globalization. Within the US–EU ideological power aggregate Europe always shared a significant role in steering the expansion of the globalization complex. While the US remains the world’s sole remaining superpower\textsuperscript{774} and exerts the single greatest influence on globalization’s unfolding, the EU is projected to become the world’s largest unified market in the next decade.

Between the US and EU pronounced differences have arisen in the emphases given the forces of globalization, as well as in the determination of common objectives of its institutions and processes. This increase of diversity can be expected to augment
opportunities for the realization of globality’s intangible probabilities. Among the myriad challenges these differences of emphases pose to the US – EU ideological power aggregate, none are more glaring than the resurgence of religiosity in American society and the co-extending conservatism and residually militarist or quasi-imperialist vision of globalization it exudes through its foreign policy objectives. These three trends are opposite to the prevailing secular, pacifist ethos of globalization in Europe, the inclination of whose majority publics’ judging from their prevailing attitudes and views, seek to realize a much different form of international integration.

However, differences between the Washington and Brussels should not be exaggerated, for European unification is itself symptomatic of the same globalizing forces and processes the US (with a few European allies) first exploited – processes that enabled America’s putative hegemony. No reactive government structure can effectively constrain or delimit the forces of globalization, and it would be incorrect to assume that temporary, largely partisan rivalries between administrations in the US and EU member state governments are profoundly distinguishing in the context of globalization’s broader paradigm. The self-perpetuating momentum of the phenomenon generates possibilities for becoming that may or may not be seized upon, but the US – EU ideological power aggregate’s ongoing collaboration in creating / maintaining the reactive international order does exist (and which it largely imposed) and its stake in extending and deepening it, fundamentally links American and European interests. The US – EU ideological power aggregate has developed into a mutual economic, political and cognitive reliance that neither can opt out of, and this practical reality will continue to have ramifications for life on both sides of the Atlantic and throughout the world.
From a Nietzschean perspective the tendency of its consequences are mainly positive due to its gradual fulfillment of the abstract potentials of globality. As reactive forces of globalization sustained by this complex perfect an integrated, transnational socio-cultural and politico-economic machine made rational, just and normal by the simulacrum, “a counter-movement is inevitable” which “aims to bring to light a stronger species”:

Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of this economy – as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller ever more subtly “adapted” gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of all dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose individual factors represent minimal forces, minimal values.

In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a reverse movement is needed – the production of a synthetic, summarizing, justifying man for whose existence this transformation of mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his higher form of being.

Morally speaking, this overall machinery, this solidarity of all gears, represents a maximum in the exploitation of man; but it presupposes those on whose account this exploitation has meaning. Otherwise it would really be nothing but an overall diminution, a value diminution of the type man – a regressive phenomena in the grand style.775

As abstract potentials of globality are further realized they will collectively come to describe “a new aim for humanity,” and—if conducted according to the active force involuntarily driving the native volition characteristic of healthy individuals—provide renewed and more authentic meaning to the tremendous process of Europe’s integration, which the forces of globalization serve.

The EU, as both an instantiation and promulgator of globalization, is a product of the twentieth century’s “tremendous socialist crises,”776 and although its conceptualizers, instigators and present day arbiters (excepting an extraordinary few from among the pack of mediocrities) may remain unaware of its ultimate consequence for humanity, its
expansion draws open the curtain on a stage its development has set for the drama of breeding aristocratic masters capable of elevating humanity by augmenting and encouraging heroic endeavors. As Nietzsche writes, “This man of the future,” or ‘good European’:

will redeem us not just from the ideal held up till now, but also from the things which will have to arise from it, from the great nausea, the will to nothingness, from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great decision which makes the will free again, which gives earth its purpose and man his hope again, this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and nothingness – he must come one day ...

Such declarations express Nietzsche’s hope and confident optimism in humankind’s ability to overcome itself, but are also suggestive of the messianic expectations implicit in his concept of the Übermensch.

Despite Nietzsche’s angry outbursts against it, morality is an essential tool for Nietzschean “immoralists” for managing the masses in support of the production of higher culture. Again, it is upon the examples of classical Greece, the Renaissance and the Napoleonic wars that Nietzsche (somewhat romantically) suggests that, unless destroyed by the intense nihilism of our dissipated era uniquely characterized by the resignation and contentedness of the last-man, a future, revivified epoch will be achieved via the values nomothetically legislated by European society’s exemplars (e.g.: ‘good Europeans’). The volitionally propagated ideals enacted through such legislations will establish an authentically healthy, commanding system of ascetic-discipline for self-training, cultivation and the instinctual guidance of the herd. They do so by instantiating a system of morality (value-norms, mores, taboos, etc.) to ramify and/or transform the affective capacities already operative within their society. If successful, this gradually
cultivates a new rank order of types (Rangordnung) that arises naturally from the changed disposition (eros) and cultural practices (askesis and poiesis) of their society’s members. A relative degree of liberality ensures that the weak and the defective are allowed to destroy themselves through enfeebling self-indulgence.

Although jarring and counter-intuitive to contemporary liberal sensibilities, such a form of social organization is most advantageous for the majority of individuals within society as it maximizes the potential becoming of each—to augment the flourishing of those who are capable—for the production of ever more energetic and impressive human specimens. It is not merely libertarian and certainly not utilitarian, ideological stratagems whose pure forms Nietzsche rejected, but combines insights critical of both, resembling, in ways that would likely have surprised Nietzsche himself, a radically agonistic democracy. Therefore, rather than feel “exploited” (particularly in a Marxian sense) the multitude gradually improves itself by means of such a disciplinary regime. The inculcation of the masses with such a value-system succeeds in constituting it through an exploitation of the pre-existing heteronomy of will, or “false consciousness” that corresponds with their need “to believe in [themselves as] a neutral independent ‘subject’ …that interprets [its own] weakness as freedom and [its] being thus-and-thus a merit”.

Nietzsche’s recognition of the ordinary yearning among average human beings for a placid contentment in conditions of intensifying nihilism prompted his insight into how “the modern, noisy, time-consuming, self-satisfied, stupidly proud industriousness” of contemporary Western man could be utilized by future, cultural exemplars toward the production of higher—stronger, healthier—individuals. The nihilism cultivated by modernity makes the majority indifferent to everything but quantifiable productivity,
largely out of the ascetic-consumerist desire to labor in order to conspicuously consume. This provides those whose naïveté lies in their liberal tolerance and who are convinced of their superiority over past ages and types (an illusion reinforced by modernity’s discourse of “progress”), validation of their own self-worth.

In our own hyper-decadent age, the ethos of the prevailing technological rationality rewards displays of material prosperity by raising the stature of the industrious within our hedonistic community. “Success” within such an environment becomes a mask with which the inherently vulgar attempt to conceal their presumption as well as their rabble natures and origins. A cold cash nexus, as Marx and Engels aptly put it, functions as the sole determiner of beauty, justice and aptitude. The reinforcement and naturalization of such crudity through its constant, media-led celebration is orchestrated by ultra-liberal-modern arbiters of herd-values.

But, as Nietzsche knew and has the extremity of contemporary popular examples makes apodictically clear, these fêted trendsetters and style gurus are fundamentally incapable of genuine spiritual development. By this Nietzsche meant the serious and difficult considerations of higher, subtler matters in which genuine ‘spiritual nomads’ must continually engage and pass through. Moreover, the all-too-many of our age, being incapable of authentic reverence of anything, are utterly uninterested in the limitations imposed by their congenital disability, and are incapable of undertaking what recuperative therapies might be available to them to overcome those limitations anyway.

Nietzsche’s notion of a master morality of breeding was intended, in part, to prohibit the sort of promiscuous panmixis of types characteristic of liberal-modernity, but this wanton fraternization is not defined according to conventional reactive criteria (be
they racist, sexist, classist or other forms of chauvinism, etc.) but rather according to the differing vitality of individuals. The best, who when allowed to thrive in a reinvigorated social order, irrepressibly distinguish themselves from among the many, would recognize one another by virtue of their corresponding desire and develop agonistic friendships to spur one another to ever-greater heights of creative self-overcoming.

The conditions for such a political architecture at first sounds dangerously abusive or dubious to ears attuned to the liberal-democratic slave morality of taming, but they do not aim for a state of affairs too far removed from (or so perverse) the highest condition such mediocre specimens of the species are likely capable of achieving. The willingness of the many to toil, their eagerness to work, when harnessed to their plebian greed and/or a base desire for fame, would allow the best to cleverly deploy the herd’s energies to achieve the invigorated cultural greatness necessary to provide humanity’s existence with meaning.781 This notion would seem to anticipate aspects of Leo Strauss’s mid-20th century thought, but Nietzsche’s vitalist politics crucially distinguishes his thought—in both its esoteric and exoteric meanings and intent—from that of Strauss, who was concerned with the maintenance of power over others, conventionally understood.

Just who again are these great exceptions—good Europeans or proto-Übermenschen—among the throng of humanity? They are real, undoubtedly foibled persons who happen to enjoy a strong constitution. Not to be confused with the pale race of liberal-optimists the modern “improvers of mankind”, their healthier condition enables them to see a farther horizon. The efficacious instinctual ordering of their involuntary drives and impulses (the anorganic power surging through them as embodied capacitors of life-force) permits them to characteristically expend themselves toward the realization
of their distinctive passions (*eros*) via law generating (*nomothetic*) acts. These acts result from self-imposed disciplinary regimes (*askesis*) of self-creation (*auto-poiesis*). In our decadent age their becoming authentic constitutes their going-down, but it incrementally transitions humankind toward its needed overcoming.

They are difficult to identify, not least because the effects of a single individual’s accomplishments, the value of their lifetime achievement, can only be gauged posthumously. Good Europeans, like Nietzsche himself, are posthumous individuals. We must therefore look back at and survey the affective contributions of a person by discerning the symptoms of its significance to humankind’s destruction / overcoming. Conway defines Nietzsche’s notion of the higher man as follows: “the *Übermensch* is any human being who actually advances the frontier of human perfectibility.”

That tremendous task—one the vast majority are too enervated to perform—amounts to the going-down of great creators. However, our age can only afford skeptical ironists who lampoon, and thereby subvert, the ascetic-consumerist ideals that have destroyed our capacity for culture and left us too exhausted to recognize the extent of our degeneracy. These are the good Europeans of our age, individuals enfeebled by decadence whose defiant expenditure may arouse and so strengthen others to perform similarly inspiring acts of authentic self-creation, and so on, acts that condition the possibility of future, law-giving *Übermenschen*.

The futural architecture of an ascending, life-affirming order may be drafted by good Europeans. Such proto-*Übermenschen* are creatively destroying decadent norms and practices through subversive revaluations of the governing axiomatique of our volitionally depleted age. By doing so they arouse ingenious alternatives to its nihilistic
will to nothingness. They may put the spandrels in our dilapidated social structure to productive use through their critical identification of hitherto unrecognized lacunae in its institutional design. Not content to passively accept status-quo power relations, they experiment, utilizing unnoticed spaces in the design of the community they inhabit to create divergent possibilities from its political motifs. They seek to transform the function of the existing order and construct new forms from it. In so doing they may create spaces within which authentic becoming may be nurtured and a revitalized order favorable to the development of culture established.
BOOK FOUR
Realizing Nietzsche’s Idea of Europe

Section One
Conditioning the Possibility for Good Europeanism

Part One: Exploiting the abstract potentials of globality: Good Europeans as instigators of a successor era to modernity.

It is somewhat ironic that contemporary European studies specialists, integration theorists and political philosophers take little note of Nietzsche, as his concerns for Europe entailed “many of those attributes that Europeanists are seeking to cultivate for the institutions of the European Union”. Nevertheless, while the concerns of contemporary Europeanists may resemble some of Nietzsche’s own, their respective objectives and his own are quite different. Throughout this work I have employed his vitalist political and power ontology to examine how the major theories of European integration, the EU and the globalization complex advance the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity. In book four I examine opportunities for destabilizing its axiomatic narratives of democracy, political legitimacy and prosperity and suggest a kynical-ironist method for doing so that, based in ancient skeptical practices, corresponds with the ethos and should augment the virile drives of good Europeans.

It is important to note that Nietzsche cannot be counted among the conventional “improvers of mankind”, the liberal-optimists whom he excoriated. While he believed that a certain degree of material prosperity is necessary for a stable social order and the
generation of a higher culture through which the best might flourish, he rejected the acquisitiveness and all-consuming pursuit of lucre and security that occupied “the newspaper reading demi-monde of the spirit” who unwittingly spread ressentiment throughout European society, increasing nihilism thereby.\(^7^8^4\)

Yet (to reiterate), the policies and institutional preferences of the EU (predicated on a popular, largely un-philosophical emancipatory metaphysical and naïve realism), have consistently sought to realize overt forms of pity that function to cover-up sublimated envy and ressentiment. As prescriptive norms the worldview (Weltanschauung) they simultaneously construct and enforce has come to dominate, or even constitute, the ethos of the emerging European society comprised by all those member-states of the EU and its penumbra (Norway, Ukraine, Turkey, etc.), who have formally reformed their political institutions and practices, civil laws and social policies in order to conform with legislations from Brussels.

The privileging of equality over identity and endeavor to eliminate suffering, as the primary aims of the political order the EU is creating, underlies this transformation and the ethos emerging from it. The values coextending with this objective have been thoroughly instantiated in socio-political structures that always already support neoliberal capital processes and populist democracy. The contradictions inherent to the former (e.g.: the generation of extraordinary wealth and grinding poverty rationalized via appeals to equality of opportunity, etc.) and the radical egalitarianism characteristic of the latter promote a becoming-ochlocratic, or massification of individuals and majority rule via the formation of mob factions, at both the level of socio-cultural life the political macro–sphere and at the individual level, or political micro-sphere, in which coercive
inducements to becoming-same overwhelm individuals, depriving them of the space and
time for self-creation and the freedom for authenticity.

This enforces the proto-fascist culture of conformity and abjection referenced
throughout this dissertation. It is typified by the homogenizing capitalist democracy
universally compelled by the conventional globalization complex. Born of fear and the
weakness of will trepidation produces, these philistinistic tendencies are expressed in a set
of social and economic violences that enforce obedience to its ideological prerogatives –
the political status quo. As a decadent development globalization is analogous to a
metastatic cancer within the social organisms it invades. While reproducing excessively,
it frequently induces pluripotent cells capable of becoming anything to augment the
ailment it represents. The latent capacity of those pluripotent cells is thereby wasted,
further undermining the health of the body politic, rather than fortifying its health.

While demanding compliance such decadence punishes authentic difference and
resists genuine creativity (which inherently challenge it), fostering a mentality of
resignation and compliance essential to the maintenance of the ascetic-consumerist
ideals, the *absurdissimum* of which is its simultaneous simulation of an openness to
innovation that effectively encourages discovery within the parameters of its myopic
standards. This culture of abject conformity is driven by a transnational, self described
“creative class” of philistinistic vulgarians whose secularized Christian–Platonic values
continue “the one will alone [that] ruled over Europe for eighteen centuries [and is] set on
making man into a sublime deformity.” Furthermore, this culture, disposition and will
are inextricably intertwined with the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity to which
the EU appeals in its unremitting efforts to furnish itself with legitimate grounds for its existence and promote its development.

As I have asserted throughout this work, the doctrines of free market neoliberal capitalism and populist democracy are mutually reinforcing modes of organization integral to its liberal–optimism and massifying technological rationality. What is made to seem morally gratifying through its evaluative lenses (earning ones’ own living, contributing to ones’ society, participating in the determination of the political course of ones’ nation, etc.) cannot be made to consist with their own “reasoned” conception of the self-interests of individuals in society, or with a coherent notion of society in which the theoretically equal members—irrespective of their diversity—constitute an organic whole defined by a common set of values.

By providing spectacularized existential meanings and simulated ontological purposes to a thoroughly dissipated, nihilistic age, the dominant, globalizing ideology covers-up the contradictions it generates through procedures of consultation and “free” debate in an ostensibly authentic social commons legitimated by the participation of the all-too-many. This demonstration seems to validate its commitment to the ideals of individual enfranchisement and equality as the worst mob factions—ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment—determine the rules of the game.787

The similitude of the EU’s institutional organization, practices and stated objectives with ultra-liberal-modern ideals is epitomized by its re-creation at the supranational level of the originally Western European, liberal nation-state and its bureaucratic practices and institutional forms. These ideals are further exemplified by the
EU in its arbiter’s ceaseless endeavors to re-shape the world according to their ascetic-consumerist values.\footnote{788}

In light of this, good Europeans would certainly be indisposed toward the reactive will-to-truth through which the EU has translated a pastiche ‘idea of Europe’ into the ideological agent of resignation to a consumerism. That nihilistic philistinism or culture of conformity banalizes everything refined, distinguished, sublime and magnificent in favor of mass-produced homogenizing commodities and vulgarizes everyone by encouraging an ethic of transparency that confuses endearing openness with shameless self-revelation and mistakes impudicity for sincerity. The consumption of material goods, necessary at the base level for life, has become the highest purpose and spiritual meaning of life imposed on “humanity” by the institutions, processes and forces of globalization—understood as the contemporary ‘Europeanization’ of the world. Implicit in such a comprehension is the need to view with wry skepticism occasional attempts by the EU’s more reactionary advocates to define it as an endeavor conceived to protect Europe and its markets from the very globalization complex with which it largely corresponds.

To summarize a few salient points argued above, the EU has its origins in a reactive will to truth that seeks the attainment of security in a strategy to secure the energy and industrial sectors (coal and steel) of post-war Western Europe and ensure economic development toward material prosperity. Jealous of their own prerogatives, these objectives were partially sublimated into a broader, arguably nobler effort among the member states to give a collective account of themselves in the aftermath of World War Two, a debacle in which many of them tacitly cooperated with the Nazis and were complicit in their genocide of Jews, Gypsies and Homosexuals. In the wake of this
complicity with horror, three generations of Europeans have now striven to set the continent on its liberal, integrating course. Doing so would necessarily entail asserting a will-to-truth that presupposed a superior knowledge of justice and the authority to pursue instituting it.

While it would stretch credulity to argue that the ultra-liberal-modern course Europe has pursued by means of steady economic liberalization and political democratization and devolution has been worse than the pre-war (dis)order it replaced, its primary value at this juncture in European history lies in its unintentional conditioning of the possibility for overcoming its increasingly evident limitations as an ultimately reactive framework for modes of being and forms of life. This is to acknowledge that in some quasi-Hegelian sense Europe’s on-going ultra-liberal-modern phase of hyper-decadence has been productive of future, truly salubrious potentials for the overcoming of humankind.

However, effectively challenging the prevailing order always-already entails convincing its arbiters (the defenders of any existent socio-economic, political arrangements) that they do not in fact know best, so as to instigate change. The zealous ideological convictions of our sickened epoch’s ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment almost ensure the impossibility of this (a fact which serves to underscore another contradictions such as those referenced above). Due to the support they derive from the use of reason and the quasi-metaphysical faith in science, which they also cultivate, the ideals of our putatively secular age are believed in as fervently as the religious values defining any other.
The enduring conceit of conventional political authority is that it knows what is best for all. In our age of populist democracy, or (more precisely) kakistocratic ochlocracy – rule by the worst mob factions – this can be particularly dangerous. In this vein Hutter critically observes that:

Politically, programs of action of the envious are often seen to be dictated by the requirements of security. One of the deepest lies in envious souls is the belief that they already know what is just; just are called those actions that bring relief, if only temporary, for feelings of displeasure about themselves.²⁸⁹

As an outgrowth of the nihilism inherent to the secularized metaphysical realism and envy propagated by secular ascetic-consumerist priests, the EU contrives to re-create a new patriotism and corresponding identity as it usurps the function, importance and place of the nation-state and sublimes its incorporation of the increasing meaninglessness of the latter entity. In so doing its arbiters assuage their feelings of displeasure and rationalize their presumption.

Through its treaty agreements, the Acquis Communitaire criteria for accession to the union, institutional organization and respective bodies’ protocols, and effort to promulgate a Constitution the EU engages in multi-dimensional acts of “self”-presenting and “self”-concealing simultaneously. The EU’s discursive concealments generate rhetorics and shape judgments about the need for and benefits of integration in addition to the functioning of the EU bureaucratic apparatus itself. Even when its acts of presenting constitute a Being toward the authentic possibility of realizing the EU’s ownness as it were, they are always already a product of the homogenization of different types and interpolation of a conflictual multiplicity of desires. The intrinsically coercive nature of this, feebly glossed over via democratic processes and corresponding appeals to popular
legitimacy, makes the EU’s “self”-presenting acts somewhat dubious in that even those who believe in the authenticity toward which they point have a bad-conscience over the conditions which gave rise to their possibility. This, by extension, further sublimes the decadence whose ideational precursor Nietzsche saw as characteristic of and expressed in the nationalism that threatened in his lifetime. 790 In Nietzsche’s view the EU would therefore have been likely understood as a crudely expanded form of the slave-moral construct of the nation-state, some twenty-seven putatively “sovereign” examples of which now comprise it.

Conceived in response to the horrifying world wars in which the pernicious trend of nationalism culminated during the twentieth century, the EU has paradoxically intensified central aspects of the very forms of control it aspired to displace, and achieved the quintessentially liberal objective of abolishing certain, obvious forms of suffering in its aim to prevent war. 791 In Nietzsche’s view it would simultaneously be an entity of diverse potentials: on the one hand it would likely strike him as a set of institutions of frightening bureaucratic proportions—a all-too-human monstrosity and/or difference annihilating machine. Yet, despite the culture of conformity he would suspect it of fostering he would also perceive it to be an apparatus with immense promise for those with the strength to exploit it.

The space for such widely divergent interpretations, as well as the hope that the EU might be made into a means of cultivating the authentically human and eventually, übermenschlich types, arises from the affects which it may have for culture. As an apparatus conceived according to the imperatives of the technological and actuarial rationality of positivists, rationalist and economists—“the flies of the marketplace”—its
unanticipated, emergent traits as an instrument for the invigoration of culture against those aforementioned reactive prerogatives provides us with a persuasive basis to expect that it may become something more truly life-affirming than its creators imagined or its administrators can envisage. This expectation is developed into practicable action through the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness characteristic of ‘good Europeanism’.  

In many obvious ways the EU appears as a psychologically deepened and geographically expanded bastion for the “tarantulas” and “flies of the marketplace” Nietzsche described in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Yet although it re-presents monolithic aspects of the traditional nation-state, that “coldest of cold monsters”, through its institutional arrangements and relentless efforts to acquire ever greater decision making powers over its member-states, as such it can also (undeniably) be seen as a driving force that actively serves the promotion of complexity and progress in the diverse, *positive* meanings it indeliberately generates as a hybrid form of governance. For, whatever degree of negotiated inter-state cooperation precedes its various treaties, legislative decisions and policy agendas, the EU is a supranational institutional arrangement arrived at through inter-state bargaining. As such it is correctly understood as a hybridized political formation of previously unaffiliated peoples whose relatively autonomy is increased in certain ways through the multiplication of affective capacities, many of which operate and are interconnected in a multitude of ways that lie outside the EU’s purview.

This “independence” is not intrinsically threatening to the EU’s institutional legitimacy, however, as Brussels has codified guarantees of and the means for
maintaining the appearance of self-determination at a number of socio-cultural and political levels. This method of accommodation and conservation constitutes an anticipatory means of accounting for the aforementioned affective capacities before they develop. Its method of multi-dimensional integration occurs between numerous institutions at various levels of political community and generates new relations between long affiliated authorities within European society. The increase in points of connectivity and greater cooperation and communication between formerly distinct entities via this hybridic supranational organization has endowed many of them both with greater purpose and self-sufficiency and reinvigorated their relevance, as devolution in the United Kingdom or the enhanced national autonomy of Catalonia and Wallonia demonstrates.

Through these points of connection which are proliferating at multiple levels of institutional authority a dual sense of gratification and displeasure arises. The former perception develops out of enhanced security and a sense of belonging to a broader community from which a correspondingly strengthened sense of identity may arise. Conversely, the latter feeling emerges from a perception of the inauthenticity of this potential, an element of artificiality perceived in the unreal extension of community that includes peoples and cultures largely alien to oneself and one’s people. Furthermore, corporate media and business interests—the juggernaut of spectacularized technological society that quantifies everything and presumes to administer life via its own economistic rationality—are observably banalizing and actively homogenizing traditional differences through consumerist massification, which creates a feedback loop of supply and demand that provides it with its own rationale.
If not actually threatening traditional ways of life, some stipulations and mandates codified in EU law (the Common Agricultural Policy being a notable example) contribute to a perception that time-honored methods of production and by extension the authenticity of certain modes-of-being are being diminished through regulations determined without broad consultation with established producers. Moreover, organized interest groups are seen to be exerting undue influence over the EU’s priorities contributing to the perception of a democratic deficit, even as some allege this is precisely for whose needs the EU seems specifically designed to facilitate.\textsuperscript{794}

The advocacy and deployment of the noble, inclusive-sounding rhetoric of “expanded community” with the aim of fostering a deepened sense of Europeanness is viewed with much distrust, as the underlying will-to-truth of the discourse of unity is perceived to be—and occasionally exposed as being—at odds with its purported ideals of enhanced pluralism and self-determination. That inauthenticity produces reaction as individuals reassert their ideant allegiance to a locale, region, nation-state, etc., in what is often an effort to re-inhabit a nostalgic sense of authenticity that is, in actuality, no longer vital. In these moments the EU fails to provide its citizen-constituents with the existential meaning and ontological purpose it must supply if it is to be credible or its stated objectives supported. Rather, it indeliberately supplies them with further reasons for skepticism about EU institutions and their purposes, if not rationales for active cynicism as well as notional resources to determine their own meanings, the emergent affects of which cannot be anticipated.

Elbe affirms the negative dimension of this, albeit without the caveats Nietzsche
would likely have included:

Nietzsche’s ‘good European’ would view the growing convergence of state and business interests with considerable suspicion, because these actors were unlikely, in his view, to move the debate on the European idea beyond visions grounded on the will-to-truth, and would thus not be able to increase significantly the welfare of Europeans in terms of finding a way of rendering European existence meaningful.  

In fact, from early on Nietzsche did view this modern convergence, or more accurately the domination of the state by business interests, with suspicion. Though it is doubtful that the change is as profound as Nietzsche makes it seem, for when in recorded history have rulers not united political considerations with, or themselves been dominated by, “business” interests?

However, contra Elbe, ‘good Europeans’ would not merely be suspicious of such a convergence (as indeed Nietzsche was in his own lifetime, particularly as it functioned to usurp the role of culture); rather they would not leave the task of defining a meaningful existence for Europeans up to reactive state and business interests. Nor would their primary short term ambition or long term goal be a putative increase in the “welfare” of the many, so defined. For, as detailed above, in Nietzsche’s view the “welfare” of the masses only improves with the increased vitality of the best, their positive enhancement of cruelty and the pathos of distance to invigorate the culture; none of which tasks the innately vulgar crowd, whose ranks comprise those aforementioned sectors of every society, can undertake.

Against and simultaneously through the molar forces of globalization, ‘good Europeans’, as artist-philosopher norm-entrepreneurs, may exploit the nisus of globality to hasten fortuitous becomings. According to Nietzsche’s vitalist understanding of life,
they will as an inevitable result of their conation; they are pre-reflectively compelled by innate volition that is symptomatized by their desires, to enact and maximize their overflowing forces; enactments of a positive will to creative destruction as generative power. \(^{798}\) However, their plight is tenuous, and their acts endangering. Distinguished from the *profanum vulgus* \(^{799}\) by their adaptive capacity (exhibited in youth as an “inability” to conform) and critical disposition, they are prone to being singled out for the concentrated attention as customary socialization or moral discipline, of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment.

The persecution and revilement they are likely to incur / endure is necessary and even desirable for them so long as they are not destroyed by it. \(^{800}\) Those who possess native resources sufficient to bear the opprobrium their defiant temperaments arouse are likely to reendow suffering with meaning through their striving to become who they are. \(^{801}\) The challenges with which these “untimely others” confront the governing morality of taming constitute nomothetic acts that inspire emulation. As experimenters their ingenious subversion of the enforced nihilism of the prevailing ascetic order—through self-legislating, *kynical* pranks lampooning the ressentiment and playful mockery of ascetic/materialist herd values—transmute reactive forces into active ones, provoking other, similar types by their passion (*eros*) to undertake disciplinary regimes (*askesis*) of self creation (*autopoiesis*) through the medium of globality.

Among those extraordinary, pluripotent few with requisite strength, enactments of globality’s abstract potential (affirmations of difference through the cultivation of change and the aforementioned temporal engagement of oneself as a Dasein in the world via futural projections of the possibilities to which this engagement gives rise) serve as a
rehabilitative therapy on the micro-political (individual) level to fortify their regnant system of instincts. This further invests them with the fortitude needed to resist resignation to globalization’s life-demeaning values (the temptation to fall back into inauthenticity) and the resilience to enact transfigurations of governing instincts at the level of the political macro-sphere through their nomothetic legislations.

In the course of their political education such healthy types recognize that the EU (as a crucial instantiation and locus of globalization) re-presents an exhausted, reactive form of socio-economic and political organization. They thereby come to desire and are empowered to corroborate in its transfiguration. An increased pathos of distance develops between them and the contented masses. Nietzsche frequently describes the latter, ‘the herd,’ as placated and comforted (even as it is spiritually diminished) by the slave morality of taming. The ‘herd’s’ strength is derived from this moral system’s defense of “Truth,” which serves as a crutch for the weak—those who cannot endure the suffering caused by their existence.

*Life not an argument.* – We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith no one could endure living! But that does not prove them. Live is not an argument; the conditions of life might include error.

This possibility: that the essential conditions of life might include the very errors that have unintentionally caused the dissipative hyper-decadence of our ultra-liberal-modern age, are only comprehensible to the freest spirits.

There are at least three major aspects to the angst generated by the anguish intrinsic to human life worthy of consideration here: consciousness of one’s mortality; the “ability to imaginatively extend [oneself] beyond [one’s] own genesis” through
awareness of one’s place in a chain of being (cognizance of the past) and of the continuation of existence beyond their own death (looking forward into the future) wherein their legacy may be preserved through physical reproduction or great works; and, finally, one’s standing “in opposition to the determinative species of which one is a part,” which refers to the paradoxes of the *principium individuationis*, or self-determination of man as an animate entity distinct from the whole; that is, the apprehension arising from ones’ separation from the life ground of Being. 804

The sick are too dissipated and/or cowardly to contend with the apparent purposelessness of life in a constructive manner. This prompts a dull resignation to an insurmountable sense of nothingness. Simultaneously the inevitability of their ultimate negation induces a hopeless impression that all human action is futile. It is this sense of void whose brink the weak were formerly able to skirt by virtue of the ontological certainty afforded by transcendentals truths now widely recognized to be hollow.

The trust in life is gone: life itself has become a problem. Yet one should not jump to the conclusion that this necessarily makes one sullen. Even love of life is still possible – only one loves differently. 805

Presently, this condition of ‘enlightened’, if quite ‘unhappy false consciousness’ is symptomatized by the prevailing, hyper-decadent cynicism that exacerbates and covers-up its nihilism. Distrust in life and individual instincts is in large part due to the “misleading and parochial character of teleological philosophies of history (whether Hegelian or positivist),” a mixture of which is exemplified in the West’s ultra-liberal-modern values systematically universalized via globalization. 806

The challenge of affirming the present, of loving the world and humankind differently, requires the sort of transformed ubiety necessary for attaining the free
spiritedness (thymos), or sovereign individuality, of ‘good Europeanism’. It also ramifies
the skeptical praxis for overcoming the hyper-decadent values of our ultra-liberal-modern
age, which I explicate below. However, this eroded trust in the discredited illusions that
sustained a groundless confidence in a particular interpretation of life has—as Nietzsche
anticipated—given the hoi polloi new impetus for devaluing life and further empowered
contemporary ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment thereby. In the self-
contradiction of the ascetic life:

[S]atisfaction is looked for and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness,
voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice.
This is all paradoxical in the extreme: we are faced with a dissidence which wills
itself to be dissident, which relishes itself in this affliction and becomes more self-
assured and triumphant to the same degree as its own condition, the physiological
capacity to live, decreases.807

The life-denying impulse of this nihilism is discordant with authentic becoming. It seeks
ease, instinctively desiring the abolition of all suffering, but only intensifies suffering
through a sublimation that leads it to wish for suicide.

The suicide by resignation and indifference happens to be the (in)authentic desire
of our hyper-decadent age. That the herd—whose members taken individually are
continuously and systematically deflected from themselves by the prevailing culture of
conformity—does not possess either the insight to recognize this fact (low-level
consciousness) or the resolve to execute the task of overcoming (weakness and mutually
disabling affect of the collectivity) means there will invariably be occasional enactments
of group annihilation. They are occurring all around us, in the form of systematic neglect
of the incapacitated (the mentally ill, homeless and aged in America), school or
workplace shootings, calculated acts of political terror, low level conflicts, and organized genocides.

The all-too-many, as Nietzsche observed, prefer fantastic delusions of liberatory and salvific deliverance from there mis-identified afflictions (hence the philosophical appeal of liberal-modernity and the power of its discourses), placing unwarranted faith in spurious ideals and notions of an otherworldly, super-sensible beyond, as well as the co-extending secular spectacles of democratic enfranchisement, ever-“advancing” technology and consumerism—liberal-modernity’s simulations of fictive equality and fulfillment. These self-deprecating and injurious figments are preferred to the tragic beauty that lies in the finitude of this-worldly existence and the life-enhancing challenge of affirming its affective power.808

It should be noted that this condition does not, in most cases, even constitute genuinely inauthentic belief. It amounts to pathetic resignation coupled with a dim hope. Nagging doubts that the religious beliefs, shopping trips, disapprobation and punishments of transgressors of social mores and values, etc., actually gratify with answers or imbue ones’ life with significance, are simply guarded against and, in jejune fashion, denied. The vast majority do so almost instinctively, lacking the critical thinking skills required to examine their own convictions. Bereft of the political education necessary to posit ascending valuations of existence or to judge with any acuity they fail to live pre-ontologically and are therefore incapable of creating works of art that affirm our transitory condition within the ‘unified ground of being’809 The herd’s members, taken individually, cultivate the very conditions within which they live largely standardized, unremarkable lives of self-induced intellectual and spiritual anesthetization. The inability
to recognize a persuasive meaning and believable purpose to existence leads them into an abyss of passive (suicidal) nihilism. So it is important that in his late period Nietzsche insists that life has no other “end” than itself, reiterating his recognition of life’s lack of any objective meaning in his early essay *The Greek State*.810

The reduced life of herd members still remains artificially grounded on the fictive consolations of the “dignity of man” and the “dignity of labor” in our ultra-liberal-modern age. This enables them to remain productive (an instrumentally essential condition to the eventual overcoming of the hyper-decadence of our present) whilst avoiding the terror any recognition of their solitary, unbounded existence would be likely to provoke.811 Their embrace of a diminished existence (as both symptom and effect of passive nihilism) inhibits their potential contribution to the advancement of the species insofar as they may inadvertently supplement the freedom of the rare genius capable of creating horizons to provide existence with (a sense of) purpose; of legislating values to create protracted cultural meanings.812

It is, in a specific sense, the aim of ascetic-consumerist priests of resentment, and the cultural philistines—or educated mob—they succor, to rationalize and habituate the herd to placating delusions.813 According to Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality, the Judaeo-Christian tradition’s notion of equality of souls in the eyes of God was translated via Enlightenment ideals into the secular believe in the fundamental equality of men, which further devolved into the radical egalitarianism and enfranchisement of our present, hyper-decadent age.814 In political life this has is expressed through an ochlocratic demand for equality and a denial of the exception in favor of a leveling mediocrity. The result is a base culture that celebrates the lowest common denominator of
the most inferior types. With a discordant instinctual system governing their unhealthy drives and impulses, herd members, deluded into believing they inhabit the best of all possible worlds, are eventually prevented from effectively willing at all.

Accustomed to this mis-representation of their weakness by secular slave morality, their antipathy for life becomes so banal that it eventually fails even to culminate in an urge to suicidal nihilism: they are too indifferent or sedated to contemplate self-destruction. Primary among the ambitions of ‘good Europeans’ is to provide those capable of rescuing themselves from such a numb condition with the tools to do so, while allowing the incurably sick to pursue their own demise. They would offer this for the future of the species, by adhering to the master morality of breeding. While Nietzsche’s normative exhortations eschewed reliance on the confusion of cause and effect (his identification of which was a central feature of his epistemological critique of the Western philosophical tradition), the resilient ‘good Europeans’ he identified cultivate within themselves, through ongoing efforts at self-overcoming, an improved instinctual system for governing their native drives and impulses. This effective self-regulation affects macro-level improvements of the social order within the existing socio-political milieu. Their courageous experiments on both themselves and the community into which they are thrown constitute a deliberate engagement with their fate in a collaborative creation of possibilities for their own becoming.

Part Two: Good Europeans as instigators of a successor era to modernity

As for achieving their shared ‘idea of Europe’ in the present, Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ “as heirs of Europe, the rich but also excessively obligated heirs of millennia
of European spirit” reject any reactive, pseudo-revolutionary programs to replace globalization’s metanarratives with a salvific alternative—though they might strategically support aspects of them consistent with their “right” to tell a ‘noble lie.’ Rather, they recognize the EU’s utility as a mechanism for expanding the range of conventional political options through increased interconnectivity, multiplicity and institutional diversity and seek to hijack it, to transform its disposition and divert its course. They aim to gradually install an alternative, anti-Christian-Platonic (anti-liberal-modernist) ideal toward their ‘idea of Europe’ to cure the nihilism and treat the injurious effects of the hyper-decadence of their age. As artists whose medium is the political reorganization of dissipated life, they strive to give form to machinic instruments capable of assisting the achievement of their objective.

There is another paradox entailed in this however, as Ansell-Pearson, reflecting on Nietzsche’s advocacy of such creative acts, of artifice, notes:

Nietzsche’s demand for the philosophical legislation of a new politics of breeding and cultivation, which owns up to the artificial character of its own artful techniques of selection, reveals its own revenge against time, against the time of evolution, exposing a fear and loathing of contingency and the reign of chance hitherto.  

The all-too-human fear of our radical temporality and related loathing of contingency and chance often results in a propensity for other-worldly explanations of reality and salvific promises of redemption, all of which entail anti-natural acts of self-denial. Historically, mis-leaders have exploited the fear and insecurity that prompts this tendency and manipulated communities by means of the superstitious inclinations it generates for profit and/or political power. Mediocrity tends to predominate when humankind is left to the
devices of these agents of anti-naturalism, deniers of the body and weaklings, whose legislations retard the healthy development of the species thereby.  

By implementing a politics of breeding legislated by the best the realization of an overhuman condition might be hastened in defiance of the passive nihilists’ resignation and the deterioration of certain capacities to act. By this I refer to the priorities given to the affective powers (\textit{dynamis}) of an entity via enhancements of its functioning and actualization (\textit{energeia}) – a relation inextricable from the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness referred to above. It is through the norms conferred by values particular to a cultural milieu and ones’ emplacement in the world that an individual’s corresponding stance toward the unfolding of time is conditioned. Values, or changes to them, therefore determine the interdependent relation of motion and time in the experience of the world particular to a people – a experience expressed as culture.

As Conway makes clear, in the midst of a thoroughly exhausted age Nietzsche thought that even the most effective legislators (\textit{Gesetzgeber}) could only stabilize the social organism (polity) until it was capable of undertaking a revitalization, i.e.: until conditions were conducive to its fuller rehabilitation.

The lawgivers who preside over declining peoples and epochs are not the mythical creators of new values, but crafty bricoleurs of depleted, recycled and abandoned political resources. If ruled wisely, declining peoples can continue to thrive, through a strategic inhabitation of the traditions and institutions founded (and externalized) by their predecessors. But they can neither found new institutions and traditions of their own nor contribute to the objectified vitality of those they inherit.  

The EU, in the context of globalization, is such an innovative response to certain crises fomented by reactive trends and all-too-human preferences extending back into the late-19\textsuperscript{th} century.
The EU’s policies, enforcement of norms and instrumental role in distilling liberal values into contemporary human rights discourses (It’s arbiters’ tactical enactments of the customs established by their forbearers—as Conway describes in the citation above) have had the effect of insuring greater security and raising so-called “living standards” in all regions of the continent into which it has expanded, as well, quite discernibly, as the world beyond its borders. These achievements suggest at least the partial and on balance positive fulfillment of the EU’s original purpose, at least as defined by those who, as Nietzsche would likely have put it, suffer indigestion for having eaten badly.

But are the EU’s arbiters merely managing a depleted set of institutions or are they creating conditions of possibility for a future nomothetic legislator? In the same passage Conway asserts that:

The resourceful innovations of a plucky bricoleur may not be as impressive as the founding labors of a legislator of new values, but decadent peoples and ages simply cannot afford the luxury of a Promethean lawgiver.823

In our dawning age of globality the most unexpected becomings are ever more likely, not as more of the becoming-same the contemporary hegemonic technological rationality propagated through the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity compels to present as innovation (the contemporary doctrine of “progress”) but in startling challenges to current convention. These genuinely radical transmutations of familiar forms of life are ever more unconstrained and ever more dangerous to the ascetic-consumerist priests whose loathing of the incalculable (of authentic becoming or life itself) serves as the basis of prevailing values in post-industrial society.

The selective tastes of those courageous experimenters willing to embrace chance and legislate nomothetically may unintentionally contribute to an enhancement of vitality
at the macro-level of the political sphere, and possibly found new institutions and traditions. Whether their pioneering acts or the nomothetic legislations of one promethean exception will be so profitable cannot be known except retrospectively. They are likely to occur as lucky accidents. But such fortunate occurrences are being made more probable through realizations of the abstract potentials of globality. The capacities they create are just as likely to be exponential as linear in their development.

Anticipating essential elements of the globalization complex (what Hardt and Negri have dubbed *Empire*), ‘the common economic management of the earth,’ as an inevitable consequence of the reactive trends of his own age, as well as the positive potentials it would inadvertently create for the salubrious development and overcoming of humankind, Nietzsche wrote:

…as the consumption of man and mankind becomes more and more economical and the “machinery” of interests and services is integrated ever more intricately, a counter-movement is inevitable. I designate this as the secretion of a luxury surplus of mankind: it aims to bring to light a stronger species, a higher type that arises and preserves itself under different conditions from those of the average man… Once we possess that common economic management of the earth that will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of this economy—as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller, ever more subtly “adapted” gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of all dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose individual factors represent minimal forces, minimal values. In opposition to this dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a reverse movement is needed—the production of a synthetic, summarizing, justifying man [the “Übermensch”] for whose existence this transformation of mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his higher form of being… Otherwise it [the economic mechanization of man] would really be nothing but an overall diminution, a value diminution of the type man—a regressive phenomena in the grand style…

Aside from demonstrating Nietzsche’s sensitivity to the conditions of life in Europe during his age and his inimitable foresight, the extent to which the section above
accurately characterizes contemporary life may be debatable, but it truly foreshadowed many contemporary critiques of everyday life (e.g.: the Frankfurt School, post-structuralists, deconstructionists, post-modern and post-Marxian or “Marxis” analyses). The passage conveys his desire to see such potentially harmful trends, which for the prevailing decadence of the age were inexorably to worsen, used productively, by artist warriors or thymotic free spirits; that is, he hoped to spur certain of his readers to transfigure those trends through their machinic becomings and ultimately overcome them(selves) to realize a transhuman future.

In a passage from the same period (1887—1888) Nietzsche hints at the force of will required to transfigure the conditions of life he anticipates in his “overall view of the future European”, by which he refers to the mediocre multitude:

…the most intelligent slave animals, very industrious, fundamentally very modest, inquisitive to excess, multifarious, pampered, weak of will—a cosmopolitan chaos of affects and intelligence. How could a stronger species raise itself out of him? …To fight upward out of that chaos to this form [the übermenschlich striving for moral and political perfection]—requires a compulsion: one must be faced with the choice of perishing or prevailing. A dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and violent beginnings. …Obviously, they [übermenschlich] will come into view and consolidate themselves only after tremendous socialist crises—they will be the elements capable of the greatest severity toward themselves and able to guarantee the most enduring will.

It is upon this foundation – the toil of the many – that the healthiest individuals are relieved the burden of laboring for their survival, in order to pursue the greater project of their personal self-overcoming. Their severity toward themselves and the endurance of their will arouses the passion of others who are provoked to create for themselves and participate in the founding of culture.
Though it strikes us as cruel sounding, on this point Nietzsche, as Conway observes, is adamant, for suffering in unavoidable and can only be given meaning through the spiritualization of cruelty – the acceptance of suffering – “lest [by attempting to abolish suffering and refraining from all cruelty] we disable the engine of moral progress [and] indulge our pity ‘for “the creature in man,” for what must be formed, broken, forged, torn, burnt, made incandescent and purified—that which necessarily must and should suffer’”\textsuperscript{826} Earlier in the same text, Conway reminds us that, with regard to the quest for perfection, “Nietzsche envision[ed] the completion (rather than the transcendence) of the all-too-human.”\textsuperscript{827} The terms of his perfectionism are not comprehensible to those incapable of no more than unconsciously reiterating the slave-moral ascetic ideals and the decadence Nietzsche strove to overcome and in which, as a product of modernity, he himself was implicated.

With regard to the prospects of forging, or inventing, a new, shared European awareness and sense of identity, Von Ham notes that, “[c]learly Europe can look back on a checkered past and the only way [to overcome the ressentiment this inflames is] to develop a ‘European consciousness’ [by] turn[ing] our backs on European history [so as to] develop as a community that is oriented toward the future.”\textsuperscript{828} In the same context he suggests that a disembedded identity forged out of a reversed identity politics capable of fostering a shared and intersubjective understanding of culture, and commensurate sense of solidarity may ultimately serve as a basis for a new form of community.\textsuperscript{829}

Based upon Nietzsche’s quasi-prescriptive formula of self-overcoming through the experimental art (\textit{Versucherkunst})—regimes of self-discipline (\textit{askesis}) and agonal acts of self-creation (\textit{auto-poiesis})—I suggest a six-fold strategy, or techne, based on key
classical, primarily skeptic principles, through which the “best-types” might co-opt the EU’s institutions from within to become good Europeans. By extension, they thereby realize ever-higher approximations of the moral and political perfection they seek at the macro-level as they actualize their idea of Europe. These philosophical principles, drawn from the ancient skeptical, stoic and cynic traditions, correspond directly with and presumably influenced many of Nietzsche’s own. They coextend with and support his appeal for the strongest to engage in regimes of voluntary discipline, including (as enumerated by Hutter, 2006) periods of recuperative solitude, the cultivation of agonistic friendships, the often excruciating exercise of writing and reading oneself, continual attention to and regulation of ones nutritional needs (physical, psychical and intellectual) and habitation, and the promotion of dance for the physical expression of spirit as well as laughter (Nietzsche’s “gay science”) whereby one says what is most serious through that which gives amusement.
Section Two: Nietzschean praxis

Part One: A Six-Fold Skeptical Strategy to Foster Weltironie or ‘Good Europeanism’

A skeptical knowledge of reactive power’s deleterious affective capacities may provide Nietzsche’s thymotic sovereign individuals with the tools, power and capacity necessary to utilize it advantageously; not a doctrine (which would replicate dogmatisms or ascetic ideals it seeks to avoid), it comprises a set of yielding strategies for action and active coping with our hyper-decadent epoch. As Pappas notes, “[a]s a rule skepticism exacerbates the weakness of the average person. But a strong skepticism in the same culture… can turn the groundlessness of modern values into an occasion for new discoveries.” He cites BGE: 209, in which Nietzsche praises the kind of skepticism that fosters the world-historical irony, or Weltironie, required by would-be comedians of the ascetic-consumerist ideals that preponderate in our hyper-decadent age:

This skepticism despises and nevertheless appropriates; it undermines and takes possession; it does not believe but does not die out on this account; it gives the spirit a dangerous freedom, but is severe on the heart.830

It is an encouraging product of the same “immense physiological process …the process of increasing similarity [hybridization] between Europeans”, the leveling effects of which are more often than not negative, and thus an unanticipated affirmative result of “Europe’s democratic movement”.

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As stated above, Nietzsche associates the atypical, positive consequences of this with the ethos of good Europeanism, “the intrepidity of the gaze, the courage and severity of the dissecting hand, or the tenacious will to dangerous voyages of discovery,” as against the dissipative, liberal sympathies of “warm-blooded and superficial humanitarians,” whom he criticizes as “gentle, good-hearted, weak-willed poetic fools.” Such unexpected outcomes, enactments of “their need to go further, with bold and painful experiments” through the exploitation of emergent potentials of globality, evince their conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness. This distinguishing temperament and worldview co-extends both with their skepticism and the world-historical irony that enables good Europeans to take a longer view with regard to the question of what humankind ought to become. Their Dionysian (tragic) understanding makes them capable of taking responsibility for themselves through disciplinary regimens (\textit{askesis}) of self-creation (\textit{auto-poiesis}) that become nomothetic legislations. Good Europeans will arouse the passions of other healthy individuals through the naturalizing effect of their \textit{eros}. The future-shaping mimetic performances which are spurred by their agonal striving for self-perfection (active force or a positive will to creative destruction as generative power), will incrementally instantiate an alternative, natural, political order.

For what should be obvious reasons, classical skeptics were generally wary of admitting certain guidelines or rules for behavior, though they did seek to advise their students on the necessity of cultivating a skeptics’ disposition, and these can persuasively be taken as stratagems for living that, when combined, loosely substantiate a doctrine. But this can be done so only with difficulty, and cannot be said to strictly consist with the radical, Pyrrhonic variety of skeptical thought. But it does consist closely enough with
varying articulations of skeptical thought from the Academic school typified by Arcesilaus and Carneades to post-Academic skepticism of Anesidemeus and Sextus Empiricus, and down through the challenges posed by doubters of the Middle Ages and Renaissance – thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne, Blaise Pascal (through his Jansenist wager) and his protestant contemporary, Pierre Bayle, to be consistent with the spirit of that influential philosophical school of thought. Since Descartes’ reinvigoration of skeptical thought, a skeptical approach has defined Western philosophy, culminating in Nietzsche’s startling critique of modernity. Today the post-Nietzschean skeptical tradition manifests itself in deconstructionist, post-modern and post-structuralist thought; contemporary expressions of a long, qualifiedly anti-rationalist intellectual tradition consistent with the authentic spirit of Western thought.833

In the present, the healthiest and most clever individuals, whose joy in and desire for life best equips them to resist the poison-mixing ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, may exploit the simulacrum generated by globalizing institutions and processes to overcome its addling effects. Each of these unique “lucky strikes” are likely to emerge from the multitude – would-be exemplars of some dimension of humankind’s potential advantageously gifted by fate with the capacity to implement the skeptical strategies and discipline for living necessary to co-opt the potentially totalizing control over reality exerted by the simulacrum.834 Opposed to nihilism, Nietzsche’s would-be heroic individuals seek, without nostalgia, to provide the multitude with hope through meaning, new meaning for life, even if all meaning is mortal.835 Anticipating certain insights in the recent works of Foucault and Agamben (including such concepts as
“technologies of the self” and “bio-power”) that so excite students today, Nietzsche asserted:

Truth has need of power. – In itself truth is no power at all – whatever its flatterers of the Enlightenment may be accustomed to say to the contrary! – It has, rather, to draw power over to its side, or go over to the side of power, or it will perish again and again! This has been proved sufficiently and more than sufficiently.836

And he also maintained that:

Knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it increases with every increase of power… In order for a particular species to maintain itself and increase its power, its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of behavior on it.837

While based on the skeptical knowledge that its own “truth” corresponds with the power inherent to a superior spirit of will, it dares, if only as an expression of its own beautiful folly and willful (self-)delusion, to posit a “truth” for itself at least. This entails a double awareness that this will is truly reflective of the interests of the best, but not in and of itself universally true.

To effectuate their objectives they must (as Conway suggests) become master rhetoricians and deploy related masks that persuasively convey both the esoteric meaning of their truths, to those capable of comprehending it, and their exoteric message, for those who cannot be changed but may nevertheless be persuaded to unwittingly further their political goals and thus be instrumentally useful. Conway observes Nietzsche’s own failure to attain rhetorical mastery for his inability to “enforce an effective distinction between [his] esoteric and exoteric teachings.”838 This is based on Nietzsche’s own practical recognition that:

The distinguishing mark of rhetorical mastery is the strategic deployment of rhetorical devices in the service of larger political ends. The rhetorical master
succeeds not only in assembling an elite cadre of esoteric readers, but also in persuading his exoteric readers of the wisdom and justice of his political vision; these latter readers need not be exposed to the master’s esoteric wisdom in order to serve his covert political ends.\textsuperscript{839}

As preeminent rhetoricians gradually succeed in indiscernibly usurping power by means of its discourses and hijacking its exertion and thus its control through bio-power, the esoterically conveyed values of the strongest will be productively misunderstood by the mob, populi or political parties, and so must be represented and exoterically enforced as “true” for a salubrious socio-ethico-political order to nurture the becoming of übermenschlich.\textsuperscript{840}

Before the herd, and particularly when challenged, it must be unyielding and strident – that is cruel, like any value system, through a system of reinforcing traditions, mores and laws – in order to be either appreciated or believed. For the dawning post-modern epoch’s transhuman future this does not intimate revolutionary social upheavals in the usual sense of barricades in the streets, but an incremental intensification of the agon by the herd itself, the sublimation of its increased suffering accomplished through the simulacrum’s of neo-liberal capitalism and representative democracy that inure it and teach it to find satisfaction in its own exploitation. Such intensification will invariably hasten the overcoming of those social forms by fomenting crises the basis of which are generated by contradictions internal to their own doctrines, i.e.: capital process’s mantra of unlimited profit growth and democracy’s sham of political inclusion through predetermined participation.
Modernity must run its course and exhaust itself. Conway states an important correction to common misunderstandings of the role of the lawgiver or the even worse misreading of the Übermensch.

No mortal can legislate against the economic destiny of his age as a whole. The emergence of a lawgiver who creates new values does not cause a new epoch to begin, but instead signals that the career of a new epoch is already underway.

Fundamentally transformed notions of ecological responsibility, innovation in bio-genetic engineering, artificial intelligence and prosthetic augmentations of the human form will assist a machinic evolution of transhuman freedom in and functioning toward a higher future. Nietzsche realized early on that a paradoxical feature of life in civil society and productive freedom was the systematic exclusion entailed in valuing and pitiless utility of a spectrum of exploitations. These were distinguishing and inextricably characteristic features of political life, or humankind in community, irrespective of the racial, cultural, or historical context of the society in question.

Once again, it was in the early, unpublished essay ‘The Greek State,’ where Nietzsche first (and perhaps most evocatively) articulated his understanding of the role of the political dimension of human activity, as the formalized enactment of cruelty and appropriation, for the improvement of humankind:

Accordingly, we must accept this cruel sounding truth, that slavery is of the essence of culture, a truth of course, which leaves no doubt as to the absolute value of existence. This truth is the vulture that gnaws at the liver of the Promethean promoter of Culture. The misery of toiling men must still increase in order to make the production of the world of art possible to a small number of Olympian men. …For it is not to be forgotten that the same cruelty, which we found in the essence of every culture, lies also in the essence of every powerful religion and in general in the essence of power, which is always evil; …Therefore we may compare this grand culture with a blood-stained victor, who in his triumphal procession carries the defeated along as slaves chained to his chariot,
slaves whom a beneficent power has so blinded that, almost crushed by the wheels of the chariot, they nevertheless exclaim: “Dignity of labor! Dignity of man!”

If the objective of providing humanity with meanings for life requires the context of healthy cultures within which great works can fortify and disseminate values as ideals to be maintained, then some aspect of expropriation of productive activity must occur given the differences in the fallenness of the ‘They’ – the resignation and acquisitiveness of the herd – and the conative dispositions or anticipatory resoluteness of genuinely free individuals. The latter are distinguished from the many by their intuitive recognition of the logos, or underlying grounds for meaning and political authority provided by their extraordinary health.

This logos is enacted through their nomothetic legislations: their ongoing striving for perfection through regimes of self-cultivation and overcoming that comprise a personal praxis. The affective power of their vitality and effectiveness of their insight for life influences weaker types, spurring them to mimetically pursue creative disciplinary techniques of the self that further accentuate difference (thereby productively stimulating desire as a consequence of generating otherness) and fostering acceptance for the authentic rank order of types (Rangordnung). Along a spectrum from the strongest or healthiest to the weakest or sickliest, the authenticity of authorial selfhood becomes visible, from those ‘spiritual nomads’ and wanderers who, as authentically authentic – agonists who share the foundational experience (logos) of the No-thing and remain open to the mysterious source of Being (always understood as the entirety of becoming), to those who engage in meditative thinking and nobly struggle to resist fallenness, the ease of herd resignation to which less vital types succumb and who, strive though they may,
are only able to become authentically inauthentic. The latter do not strive to perfect
themselves, per se, but may nevertheless unwittingly serve to enhance the species by
performing the inferior, albeit necessary role of calculative thinkers, out of whose striving
the scientific rationality and technological society predicating globality arises.

The basest and most dangerous type for life (the sort dominant in our hyper-
decadent epoch) is gradually eliminated. They are lent assistance in pursuing their own
self-destruction and actively bred out of existence via the biopower exerted through rule
by the best. These are the terminally ill, inauthentically inauthentic “individuals”, who
utterly carefree and indifferent about it are content to exist as mere semblances of
beings. Conversely, in a healthy milieu the best are uninhibited, and become masters
both of action (which comes to comprise their exoteric teaching) and style (which comes
to comprise an esoteric teaching) with the strength of will to affect change according to
their social vision and corresponding political design for attaining the future greatness of
European culture.

Unlike Hume’s skepticism, which in an echo of Pyrrho went so far as to doubt
even the basis for skepticism itself and so anticipated the contemporary aporias of
thought and epistemological dilemmas so many liberal post-moderns find themselves in,
Nietzsche’s übermenschlich types risk themselves by recognizing this transhistorical fact
and accept the objective it sets for them to achieve a “truer” or re-naturalized order.
Taken collectively the strategies comprising Nietzsche’s skeptical techne express a wary
disposition toward a decadent society’s standard values – the prerogatives of the herd.
Thus it constitutes an “ironic” scheme for identifying and achieving the good for the
strongest (and by extension humankind), that consists with a Pyrrhonistic *ephectic* drive.\textsuperscript{845}

Developed in terms of the contingency of all truth claims and the “fundamental” irrationality of all solutions to humanity’s problem of meaning, it effectively accounts for the Habermasean objection to genealogical critique as leading to a performative contradiction. It also accounts for Fraser’s insistence on the need to postulate norms, as an explicit prescription for greater individual autonomy and type of normative program for expanding the capacity and capability of individual self-determination. Moreover, it fulfills certain Foucaultian objectives, for warrior-genealogists implement its critical ethos to sustain an anti-liberal ethics and practice of dissent.\textsuperscript{846}

Such a scheme will not appeal to irredeemable decadents, but energetic agents may enact it as an expression of and effort to realize their native vitality, according to the volitional resources they possess.\textsuperscript{847} Conceived as aesthetic acts in a nomothetic medium, those spirited enough to adhere to its tenants pursue and fulfill them in an ongoing effort at self-creation, taking themselves as their masterpiece, they become their own ongoing works of art. Thus this technique of the self directly corresponds to Nietzsche’s perfectionism and insistence on the necessity of positing values.

Six interrelated skeptical principles comprise this pragmatic criterion through which pluripotent individuals may maximize their power, transfigure dissipative ascetic-consumerist values and augment a more “natural” organization of macro-political instincts in the public sphere. They are explicated below (in no particular order of significance):

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Akatalepsia, entails recognition of the impossibility of certain knowledge, or the ultimate ungraspability of truth. The doctrine of akatalepsia foreshadowed Nietzsche’s skeptical, interrogatory disposition toward all truth claims, a disposition that led him to formulate his notion of will-to-truth and to assume a “perspectivalist” stance toward all “truth” claims. This is brilliantly explicated in Nietzsche’s unpublished essay On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense (1873), which anticipates the insights of Derridian deconstruction and much of twentieth century linguistic philosophy, among other movements that would become fashionable a century later:

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.

Nietzsche’s critique of values extends from a critique of the criterion of truth and the function of language in generating and validating it; the legitimacy of dogmatic assertions of facts and their objectivity in reality and the convictions that arise there from. Nietzsche rejects the positivist notion that objective truth is attainable but accepts that empirical observations of the world can provide a perspectivally contingent basis for the assertion of guiding facts for action in life. In this he possibly resembles a philosophical falliblist more than a skeptic of the Pyrrhonic variety.

“Truth” as a will to (self-)deception was, Nietzsche asserted, a complex operation in which an individual chooses to believe in untruth for the convoluted reason (in a dual sense) of metaphysical realism and its enforcement via social convention. As settled-upon error, what gets called truth is really mass assent to matters of belief about putatively
objective facts resulting from a mischaracterization of the \textit{facticity} of things. This produces a tautologous circuitry to reinforce its own delusory portrayal of the world and engender confidence in a correspondingly grounded reality. The effort to externalize these mass ascensions to beliefs-cum-convictions and enforce compliance with them is the starting point of moral systems and arguably the political.

\textit{Akatalepsia}, in the spirit of open-mindedness and wonder is a crucial component of a Nietzschean worldview (\textit{Weltanschauung}) that corresponded with Descartes’ famous counsel “\textit{de omnibus dubitandum} [everything is to be doubted]”. Our awareness that objective or final truths are impossible is based on our recognition of the subjectiveness of our assessments of what is or is not an ‘evident’ object of inquiry, the establishment of which is a key precondition for ascertaining (such hypothetical) facts about the world beyond what is immediately, empirically evident; claims about the objective world. The evident – non-evident distinction over the nature of claims about legitimate matters of inquiry raises significant uncertainty about what possibly crucial dimensions of reality we are unable to access or sufficiently comprehend, thereby warranting \textit{akatalepsia}.\textsuperscript{849}

The doctrine of \textit{akatalepsia} virtually compels another skeptical stance, that of \textit{epoche}, the second aspect of the skeptical techne comprising Nietzschean praxis. \textit{Epoche} refers to the practice of suspending judgment on the truth or falsity of moral values or the fixed applicability of particular ethical virtues (disregarding Nietzsche’s persistent, if romantic, preference for the virtue’s of classical Greece), and one’s belief or disbelief in certain notion, principles or ideas. It also involves recognition of the condition of \textit{isostheneia} (equipollence) characteristic of opinions and the imbrications of all
perspectives in the health of the individual advancing them as well as the culture in which an individual/perspective developed. This is necessitated by the realization that:

Human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner: it is hopeless curiosity that wants to know what other kinds of intellects and perspectives there might be. Rather has the world become “infinite” for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that it may include infinite interpretations.

On the will-to-truth in morality and science, Nietzsche asks:

Just consider thoroughly: ‘why do you not want to deceive?’, especially when it should appear, – and it does appear! – as though life were aimed at appearance, I mean at error, deception, dissemblance, delusion, self-delusion, and when on the other hand, that great manifestation of life has, in fact, always shown itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi. Such a resolve might, to give it a mild gloss, perhaps be a piece of quixotism, a small, enthusiastic folly; it could, however, also be something much worse, namely a destructive principle hostile to life… ‘Will-to-truth’ – that could be a hidden will to death. – In that way, the question: why science? leads back to the moral problem: Why morality at all, when life, nature, history are non-moral? …our faith in science is still based on a metaphysical faith… that truth is divine …but what if precisely this becomes more and more unbelievable, when nothing any longer turns out to be divine except for error, blindness and lies – and what if God himself turned out to be our oldest lie?

Every will-to-truth always already contains a moral dimension, in so far as it seeks to maintain an imposition of meaning on a world lacking any. Science, as Nietzsche saw it, rather than pursuing knowledge for its own sake for the sheer wonderment it excites and the passion it arouses, all too often served as a tool for rationalizing and justifying such – ultimately moral – impositions of meaning. Though Nietzsche would likely qualify this assertion today, he would have remained just as critical of the purposes science serves.

_Epocha_, is the practice of suspending one’s belief in final truths, as absolutely certain knowledge of reality is ultimately unattainable. It is adopted by ‘good Europeans’, to maintain a worldview (Weltanschauung) appropriate to their higher, “immoral”
objectives. The practice of epoche supports their personal cultivation of the autochthonous habits and practices of “their” hybridized and plastic cultural, regional and national affiliations and identities so that they may in time transcend them, incorporating their history, facticity and socially conferred meanings into an encompassing cosmopolitan disposition (Weltanschauung) augmented by globality.

Their recognition of the relative situatedness of all customs, habits and mores provides the distance required to both accept their “heritage” and integrate difference into their perspective on life (including, crucially, themselves). They may thereby strategically avoid the counter-productive extremes of an unmitigated Pyrrhonic skeptical stance and its deleterious consequences (popularly understood as a radical form of doubt—or unreasonable relativism—in which it is asserted that no truth claim can correspond with reality whatsoever, or that if one could its correspondence could not be definitively known). In other words the practice of epoche enables them to recognize the necessity of behaving as if truths were certainly real and as if the essentialisms of the arbitrary identities and culturally specific values that (at least initially) construct persons as “individuals” are transcendentally true. Such behavior is unnecessary among their peers, but crucial to the preservation of order among weaker types for whom (universal or essential) truths are critically important.

Ataraxia is the ancient skeptic and stoic doctrine of disciplined withdrawal; mastering one’s desires to achieve a state of relative imperturbability. As a part of a Nietzschean skeptical techne this doctrine must submit to a measure of qualification, for it is not included here to suggest any reluctance on the part of the practitioner of ‘good Europeanism’ to take decisive action (as it did in its original Stoical variation) rather,
here the doctrine of *ataraxia* is applicable to Nietzschean *praxis* as the recommendation of long contemplation in the effort to become what and who one is. It is coterminous with Nietzsche’s ascetic practice of solitude, ramifying the cultivated state of contemplativeness and inner rumination necessary for self-knowledge. In addition it augments the free spirit’s quiet rejection of the simulacrum’s simulated values and ersatz existential fulfillments, as well as the spectacular practices that serve to provide the herd illusory ontological purpose, through a critical stance toward all such specious truth claims.

Toward this (and against “Socratic, malicious certitude”) Nietzsche asserts that:

> He shall be the greatest who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, the superabundant of will; this shall be called greatness: the ability to be as manifold as whole, as vast as full.\(^\text{853}\)

Mastering the ability to direct, via instinct, as much of one’s superabundant will as possible is the challenging task that demands solitude and concealment (a particularly difficult requirement in an age of the public confessional). This will to power is expressed in the energy involuntarily surging through one as drives and impulses.

This is a task Nietzsche recognized the importance of and attempted to master when poor health compelled his early retirement from academia. As Conway states, Nietzsche shifted his attention to his own becoming, or the political microsphere:

> In order to become a philosopher and reclaim the task [*Aufgabe*] reserved for him, [Nietzsche] withdrew from the political macrosphere as he understood it, resigning his professorship at Basel and vanishing into a lonely, nomadic existence.

And further:
In order to see himself as a political agent, [Nietzsche] first had to situate himself within the microsphere of late modernity and discipline himself to acknowledge the ethical resources arrayed therein. He relocates his perfectionism to the political microsphere only after personally testing it for himself.854 Nietzsche, like his Zarathustra, left the society of which he was a part in order to prepare for an “armed” re-entry to the political macrosphere, which would only occur posthumously through his works. In his final weeks of cogency this manifested itself in the form of threatening outbursts directed at prominent figures of his time in letters to friends, some of whom recognized his developing insanity thereby. However, his effectual reengagement in the macro-political sphere was also bodied forth in the texts and publication of those works he conceived and executed in solitude (i.e.: his oeuvre from the middle period onward).

Echoing his Zarathustra, who returns to society knowing himself but appearing to those he encounters as a buffoon, Nietzsche’s late writings announce the macro-political project he settled on, only to be misunderstood, manipulated and much maligned in the century to come. Given our contemporary inability to read slowly and with due care it his project would still appear foolish to many. But when his works were beginning to be taken seriously in the Anglo-American philosophical community, he was “charitably”, though incorrectly, labeled an “anti-political” thinker (as explicated above).855 With the dramatic increase in serious Nietzsche scholarship from the 1970s onward, the ethico-political dimensions of his thought have been more thoroughly examined and appreciated.

*Ataraxia* is a crucial component of the skeptical techne required to cultivate the outstanding misfits and invalids who will likely embody the highest development of the
hyper-decadence afflicting our ‘late-late-modern’ epoch. As Conway observes, it is not the heroes and beasts of Nietzsche’s fantasies that may redeem us in our dissipative age of globalization, for the superlative individuals who will realize the abstract potentials of globality and hasten the transfiguration of values to revivify the health of humankind and initiate a new epoch, “are not readily apparent to us”, and anyway “will remind no one of [the] world-historical conquerors” Nietzsche frequently cites as exemplars of his own decadent vision.856

The fourth principle is *Apangelia*, an avowal not involving a commitment to truth or falsity. *Apangelia* developed in recognition of the temporal contingency and epistemological situatedness (e.g.: determined nature) of all consciousness, knowledge and truth claims. Where Nietzsche remarks that “The charm of knowledge would be small if so much shame did not have to be overcome on the road to it,”857 he plays on the assertion, ‘I know only that I know nothing’ famously attributed to Plato’s Socrates.858 The point is that even such a paradoxical (or falsely modest?) assertion amounts to a conceit that reveals tremendous arrogance vis-à-vis the actual condition of knowing in / having knowledge about the world.

The charm of knowledge, such as it is, lies precisely in the realization that every assertion of fact is either tautologous (and therefore charmingly naïve) or hubristic (and charmingly brazen), and that to make any assertions of or appeals to knowledge we must, in good conscience, overcome the tremendous shame that would otherwise keep us as silent as Pyrrho of Elis. With such a realization in mind we may profitably reorder the microsphere (or political life of ourselves) and avow certain truths as always contingent
and contextually situated and affirm the efficacy of proximate kinds of knowledge without committing ourselves to them dogmatically.

In the macro-political sphere, however, it is prudent to cautiously adhere to certain of society’s mores, taboos and proscriptions, however incurably decadent one’s society has become. One’s self-creation or discovery of one’s übermenschlich potential requires no more undo interference than the innate eccentricities of such individuals are certain to incite – the hassles they will inevitably endure both inure them to certain hardships, including a degree of loneliness and obscurity, but they need not be aggravated needlessly. Though they are frequently alone and “their pursuits of self-perfection go largely unnoticed, along with the micropolitical legislations they enact,” this aids them in their self-creation and discovery as well as empowering them for future macropolitical labors.

Adoxastos is a critical aspect of a Nietzschean praxis. The Greek word meant “without belief” and referred to the disciplined effort to resist forming firm convictions about any issue by its skeptical exponents. In terms of their engagement at the macro-level of the political, adoxastos is demonstrated by ‘good Europeans’ through feigned conformity to the prevailing social conventions and value standards of the day. This corresponds with Nietzsche’s advocacy of the need to experimentally adopt masks, in part to represent oneself “correctly”. Through the donning of masks one may outwardly conform to social conventions and mores in order to maximize the quanta of power one is, in other words, succeed. In our declining epoch the sort of individual capable of self-cultivation would be accustomed to deploying masks and disguises. Among
contemporary Europeans of all ranks Nietzsche is clear that none would be discredited for doing so:

The hybrid European – a tolerably ugly plebeian, all in all – definitely requires a costume: he needs history as his storeroom for costumes. He realizes, to be sure, that none of them fits him properly – he changes and changes.859

The actual virtues of superlative exemplars must be disguised from the envious masses, if only in the interest of their self-preservation. This is not analogous to advocating cowardice in the face of likely persecution; rather it is the sort of pragmatic stealth required in order for rare, pluripotent exceptions to remain immune to their society’s imposed identities and malignant dissipation. Artfulness and mimicry are necessary for them to stand any chance of success.

Sensitive to the spirit of revenge inherent to the meanings liberal society confers upon life, the furtive efforts of the strongest must to a certain point be hidden. Their effort to remain veiled is symptomatic of their intellectual and spiritual strength – the ploy utilized to achieve a threshold level of conventional success and/or legitimacy, and possibly never revealed as such. Theirs is a truthful deception fabricated in the face of existential threats and with the future greatness of the species in mind.860

If liberal egalitarians would object to such distinctions and rank ordering of types and subvert, through slave ressentiment, the unpopular virtues of the healthiest, the threat the former pose to the latter’s becoming must be mitigated through deception.861 This thoroughly “Nietzschean” strategy, despite requiring a pragmatic distrust as a part of the good-conscience of those capable of adopting it, can therefore by understood as quasi-eudemonic, in so far as it facilitates continued, unobstructed self-overcomings among the best (the sustained expenditure of excess force through their positive will to creative
destruction as generative power) and coheres with their objective of realizing affirmative potentials of globality.

The latter, as a macro-political aim, depends on the flourishing of the strongest, who seek to overcome, that is, to creatively destroy and thereby transfigure the globalization complex and the ultra-liberal-modern value matrix that sustains it. As the strongest have, by necessity, to turn within so as to continually re-discover and invigorate their “virtues,” this objective consists with the natural route of their becoming.

We Europeans of the day after tomorrow, we first-born of the twentieth century – with all our dangerous curiosity, our multiplicity and art of disguise, our mellow and as it were sugared cruelty in spirit and senses – if we are to have virtues we shall presumably have only such virtues as have learned to get along with our most secret and heartfelt inclinations, with our most fervent needs: very well, let us look for them within our labyrinths!862

‘Good Europeans’ would adopt this strategy of employing a multitude of disguises as a part of the Nietzschean skeptical techne and ascetic practices of self-cultivation to become who it is they are. Through the artful deception of masks—the enactment of certain social roles, such as professor, doctor, or politician—they may remain incognito long enough to constructively co-opt ultra-liberal-modern (secularized Christian-Platonic) values and direct the transmuted volition in them to natural ends.

The feigned conformity to social conventions and popular, “common-sense” convictions, which the doctrine of *adoxastos* mandates for the strongest, necessitates mastering the art of employing masks. This does not suggest that they hide from the scrutiny of others, only that they refrain from revealing themselves in conformity with the confessional notion of openness that prevails among the herd.863 Their works reveal what their outward persona does not, posing challenges to the spirit of revenge. Through
strategic expenditures of force they squander themselves with purposeful intentionality in willing their own inevitable downfall. *Adoxastos* may also be translated “as ‘without false or ungrounded beliefs’”, ⁸⁶⁴ and calls for representing oneself “correctly” to succeed in the conventional terms of ordinary life without being impeded by or unduly suffering from popular herd chauvinisms and prejudices. This directly corresponds with another of Nietzsche’s insights, specifically that:

> The degree of psychological falsity and opacity needed to sanctify the affects essential for the preservation and enhancement of power (in order to create a good conscience for them). ⁸⁶⁵

It also matches his view, stated in another unpublished note that “*Good Europeans*”, in their “preparation for becoming the legislators of the future,” live:

> [b]eyond good and evil—but we demand that herd morality should be held sacred unconditionally. We hold in reserve many types of philosophy which need to be taught: possibly, the pessimistic type, as a hammer; a European Buddhism might perhaps be indispensable. We probably support the development and maturing of democratic institutions: they enhance weakness of the will: in socialism we see a thorn that protects against comfortableness… We take our accidental positions, our experiences, as foreground and stress them to deceive about our depths. ⁸⁶⁶

Active power cannot reveal itself fearlessly in a decadent epoch, and is therefore compelled to disguise itself: its source, motive and intention: ergo the psychological falsity required to ensure its preservation. On the contrary, reactive power always already ramifies the established order, or status quo of such unhealthy periods. Reactive power does not mask itself, but is intrinsically afflicted with a counter-productive bad-conscience as it arises out of ressentiment so thoroughly sublimated in its very enactment that it appears natural.
In addition to the pragmatic use of masks and strategic (mis)representation, Nietzsche also asserts that willing against the stridency of all reactive will-to-truth is an integral characteristic of the übermenschlich:

The great man is necessarily a skeptic (which is not to say that he has to appear to be one), provided that greatness consists in this: to will something great and the means to it. Freedom from any kind of conviction is part of the strength of his will.  

867

When considering the meaning of this passage it is useful to recall that Nietzsche loathed the popular, uncritical skepticism of the masses, which he heard as an echo of the ersatz skepticism of their (and our present day) ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment: a base appeal to the egalitarian, laisser aller, ethos of his and our own day. Such a shallow, equivocal doubt of all values is but one of the poisons the latter mixed with secularized Christian values and with which it effectively inebriates the herd.

Where this crass relativism, which prevails among educated philistines (the so-called culture class), is not operative, overt and inflexible demagoguery is deployed to deprecate the value-systems and cultural meanings of others with whom the arbiters of the globalization complex come into conflict.  

868 This is especially clear when one recognizes that most consumer automatons in the post-industrialized “West” (the centers of the globalization complex) cannot reflectively assess their society’s values or the significant features distinguish their culture from others. Falling back upon patriotism and jingoistic prejudices to justify their received worldview, they are unlikely to find their inability to cite substantive differences problematic and remain indifferent to the fact, a reaction that indicates how thoroughly an uncritical relativism has conditioned contemporary attitudes. The ultimately contented disposition Nietzsche associated with
the “last man” arises from the annihilation of life-affirming meanings and significations rather than genuine dialogue about reigning values. Although such indifference does enable a certain sort of tolerance, this let-it-be attitude is antithetical to the perspectivalism of good Europeans, who strive to overturn the all-too-human spectacularized meanings of ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment and re-introduce natural values according to their good-conscience, rather than merely pander to popular conviction.  

The final tenet, *Parrhesia*, or fearless speech, is a concept and form of *praxis* recently examined in some depth by Michel Foucault. It developed as a part of the doctrine of the ancient school of the Cynics. This corresponds directly with the untimeliness of truly free or noble spirits, the efficaciousness of whose acts is enabled by the preceding stances. *Parrhesia* – if it is to be constructive and not an utterly self-defeating exercise – must be practiced with irony, great humor and always toward immediately creative, albeit destructive ends that correspond with the long-term, constructive ambition of healthy individuals.

As a sophisticated challenge to the reigning ascetic/materialist ideals its utility is realized by those (such as Nietzsche) capable of harnessing, as Conway observes, “the erotic power of ascetic practices to tempt some individuals away from the anti-affective animus of Christian morality.” The immediate objective of such “comedians of the ascetic ideal” is to spur those with the native vitality into accepting the unique, constitutional danger that would single them out from the herd and drive them toward realizing their intrinsic greatness. As Nietzsche observed:

Each of us bears a productive uniqueness within him as the core of his being; and
when he becomes aware of it, there appears around him a strange penumbra which is the mark of his singularity. Most find this unendurable, because they are... lazy, and because a chain of toil and burdens is suspended from this uniqueness.\textsuperscript{872}

It is the purpose of ascetic-consumerist ideals to turn the possibility presented by this essence of life against life itself; to distract persons from this potential within themselves until they are no longer capable of identifying it – what later existentialists would identify as self-estrangement. The ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment, who demand “that we should accompany” them, and who “impose [their] valuation of existence” universally, punish those who accept that chain of toil whose burden it presents in the form of a continual desire for self-overcoming as becoming other.\textsuperscript{873}

Anticipating Freud’s identification of \textit{Thanatos}, a death instinct or drive, Nietzsche recognized that the ascetic-consumerist priest succeeds with the vast majority by exploiting the temptations to succumb to the reactive force or negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power.\textsuperscript{874} This is because, being too weak to enact healthier instincts, the many finds denying them easier than adhering to an agonal regime of self-discipline and creation. Instead they yield to the pressurizing habituation of a culture of conformity imposed by ascetic-consumerist priests.

…An ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here an unparalleled ressentiment rules, that of an unfulfilled instinct and power-will which wants to be master, not over something in life, but over itself and its deepest strongest, most profound conditions; here, the green eye of spite turns on physiological growth itself, in particular the manifestation of this in beauty and joy; while satisfaction is looked for and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice.\textsuperscript{875}

Contemporary asceticism in post-industrialized service economies resembles its classic predecessor only in so far as self-denial remains the definitive practice with the goal lying
in the attainment of rewards provided by crass materialism and/or an other-worldly suprasensible beyond.\textsuperscript{876} Its strategy for the attainment of self-denial is \textit{avoidance}, not of physical exertion or pleasures or even of solitude, rather it is reached via innumerable acts of consumption intended to divert the attention of the consumer from the meaninglessness of her own existence. Activities such as shopping, exercise and fitness, myriad entertainments and petty diversions, career obsession, etc., completely occupy the consciousness—and encumber the consciences—of contemporary “ascetics”, who come to feel ashamed of themselves if they are not constantly occupied. By performing in accordance with their inherently slavish nature they maintain the happiness of the last man. Blinking idiots, they are bored and anxious when a pensive mood encroaches on them. Out of a mendacious truthfulness they consider themselves unworthy of authentic leisure, which they consider time wasted, and indeed, they are undeserving of it.

The new form of ascetic denial consists of consciously resisting any temptation to engage in critical reflection. An anti-human form of practice co-extending with the anti-cultural ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity, it consists of deliberate abstention from contemplative introspection. This exercise in self-denial is support with the medically prescribed (re: institutionally sanctioned and medically supervised) aid of psychotropic pharmacological therapies, when necessary.\textsuperscript{877}

In its highly-secularized new form Christianity now functions to divert its followers from the most dangerous form of asceticism: self-denial for the sake of oneness with the eternal. With no time for esoteric truths, neo-liberal capital process cannot afford to have otherwise productive workers “going off the rails” in pursuit of some mysterious spiritual enlightenment. Since the death of God Christianity must promote compliance
with the values of a hyper-decadent consumer society to stay relevant, and this means shifting the focus away from what does not feel good, namely sin and suffering (including the suffering of Jesus), and onto self-fulfillment through the happiness that is achieved via the attainment of one’s materialist goals. Ever-increasing consumption is the new salvation offered through Christ.

Among the best-types this counter-instinctual aversion to introspective examination is learned at a tremendous cost. Born into the ascetic/materialist milieu of our declining, hyper-decadent age, individuals are indoctrinated from birth into “slavish” forms of conceptual servitude and disciplined to behave as docile and obedient herd animals, “whose physiological capacity to live decreases,” and who, as an individual-that-might-have-been-but-wasn’t, strenuously resists any effort by individuals-in-the-making, those who seek to become themselves, through their efforts at becoming other, or in Nietzsche’s qualified sense, following Pindar, who it is they are.

By adhering to these positive skeptical standards that collectively describe a Nietzschean technique of the self, individuals endowed with the prerequisite strength may attain enough conventional social rank, authority and power to engage, through a specifically genealogical approach, in generative acts of parrhesia. By speaking fearlessly they seek both to preserve the simulacrum and to challenge and re-naturalize society’s beliefs and habits of action. Thus their fearless speech constitutes a deliberate intervention in the dominant power-knowledge regime that confronts conventional, reactive authority. Evolutionary rather than revolutionary, their legislations must appear to preserve the existing social order precisely to allow them to insinuate themselves into conventional authority structures to increase their conventional power.
Skeptical of the veracity of all “truth” claims, warrior-genealogists (along with those who share their unspoken understanding of the perspectivalist nature of all truth claims, the significance is comprehensible in direct proportion to the relative strength of the individual, the practical utility of which is contingent upon their ability to translate it into power in a hyper-decadent era), still posit values, or “truths” that correspond to the interests of the best, that may ultimately transform the social order and stimulate other healthy individuals to do the same. The warrior-genealogist’s approach, “while not being able to effectively legislate autonomy, may nevertheless seek to demonstrate its possibility as well as its commitment to it, [wishing] to encourage others to ‘fight’ for the experience of freedom without recourse to universal norms.”

Through parrhesia they are the only “real enemies and injurers” of the ascetic ideal, making themselves comedians of it “to deliberately arouse mistrust” of its precepts which they can then exploit. As Elbe further observes in the context of examining genealogical critique,

What the genealogist hopes is that while he refrains from giving his insights universal attributes, the demonstration of his own critical distancing from traditional structures of thinking might lead others to recognize their capacity for critique, and might even motivate them to pursue a similar path.

They become, in Nietzsche’s term, artist-philosophers, who strive, through a stealthy militancy, to co-opt the reactive prerogatives of the simulacrum and gradually transfigure its simulated values to intensify and “re-naturalize” individuals’ experience of the agon. In so doing they elevate humanity.

Hitherto these extraordinary promoters of mankind have seldom felt themselves to be friends of knowledge but, rather, disagreeable fools and dangerous question-marks (who) have found their task, their hard, unwanted, unavoidable task, but
finally the greatness of their task, in being the bad conscience of their age. By laying bare the knife vivisectionally to the bosom of the very virtues of the age they betrayed what was their own secret: to know a new greatness of man, a new untrodden path to his enlargement. 881

As Zarathustra propounded, myriad paths to man’s enlargement are most likely to be created by thoroughly unconventional individuals standing outside society’s mainstream, whose nomothetic actions are at first contemptuously dismissed by the so-called “higher men” who enjoy conventional social prestige and authority. But they may also be revealed by apparently unremarkable persons completely ensconced in conformist social structures whose enforced orthodoxy diminishes the vitality of healthy individuals.

As long as institutionalized bad-consciousness and ressentiment have not completely debilitated them (as it does the vast majority) this can occur in whatever capacity or realm they have succeeded in attaining conventional power: as bureaucrats, corporate officers, politicians, academics, artists, etc. Thus, as a response to the simulacrum generated by globalization this skeptical techne provides a means to correct the millennia’s old inversion of natural relations between the strong and the weak (noble and base) by actuating the forces needed to maximize each individual’s quanta of liberty to ramify the positive potential in globality.

**Part Two: Increasing the utility of the herd to maximize the power of the strongest**

In Nietzsche’s naturalistic view the capable few strive to strengthen the forces disaggregating the instincts in a declining age in order to hasten their transmutation and the overcoming of its decadence. In our era this would equate with the intensification of the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and globalization’s corresponding forces,
processes and institutions to stimulate potentials of globality and augment their exploitation by the strongest. In so doing the healthy may become who they are, not to liberate the masses from their condition of mediocre complacency, but to segue humankind to a post-human future. Extraordinary individuals have a self-interested stake in the welfare of the herd that co-extends with their broader, noble concern with creating a higher culture to confer meaning on existence. This lies primarily in preserving the herd’s practical utility by maintaining the simulacrum that endows its life with a placating illusion of meaning and purpose.

This concern, which is neither utilitarian nor eudaemonic, corresponds with their concernful engagement for reaching elevated meanings and truths, which in any case can never pertain to the herd, as it cannot be emancipated from its baser nature (the liberal fantasy). Therefore any abrupt end to the simulacrum of ersatz meaning and purpose it is provided by the contemporary spectacles of our technological society would be disruptive and damaging. Nietzsche’s tragic artist–philosophers merely hasten the tempo of the dance, to increase the feverish expression of globalized society’s ingramescent decadence, which would proceed apace anyway. In so doing they condition the possibility—or stochastic development—of its overcoming, the materialization of new emergents and the likelihood of the appearance of Übermenschen thereby.

In an important, if counter-intuitive sense, this fulfills the Rawlsian (autocratically liberal) demand that inequality between strong and weak function to the advantage of society’s weakest members, for the hoi polloi lack strength to achieve, let alone tolerate, more complete liberty. Their “freedom” is realized in living regulated, predictable lives anchored by stable meanings and essences that fortify their existence with purpose.
As the majority of people cannot endure too much of the suffering inherent to becoming (to life itself) they seek the sort of psychological and moral anodynes globalization’s simulacrum provides. 883

Nietzsche was quite contemptuous of the popular skepticism and resulting relativism that typified his own era (much like Socrates), which ruined the most promising young men with the “incurable wretchedness of a heart which is no longer hard enough for evil or for good, of a broken will which no longer commands, can no longer command.” 884 He saw it as coextending with the secularization of slave morality propagated through the liberal precepts of rationalism and individual autonomy. Nietzsche was adamant that the herd fundamentally needs sustaining beliefs in universal moral truths and for this reason he determined the creation of values to be among the highest objectives of the master’s of the future who should naturally rule the earth.

The popular skepticism—or superficial relativism of ‘laissez aller’—that manifested the decadence of 19th century Europe and Wilhelmine Germany merely compounded the nihilistic outlook among the throng—the all-too-many who could not, even marginally, contribute to the development of humankind once infected by the poison of relativism. 885 Such skepticism threatened the already weakened basis of culture through anarchy bred by an “anything goes” absence of socially enforced values that could undermine the collective sense of purpose nurtured by the social bond. 886 Nietzsche therefore contrasts the “indubious qualities which distinguish the critic from the skeptic: I mean certainty in standards of value, conscious employment of a unity of method, instructed courage, independence and ability to justify oneself.” 887
The term critic is here employed to distinguish the affirmative authentically skeptical stance adopted by his philosophers of the future, from popular skepticism that breeds a casual and ruinous relativism the motto of which might be ‘don’t worry; be happy’. As genuine skeptics Nietzschean critics already know there are no eternal or universal truths (consistent with the premise of *adoxastos*), but involuntarily act to create values they *will* universal adherence to, as their duty to themselves. This then is at once their “categorical imperative” and “noble lie”—an outlook corresponding to the truthful deception mentioned above. Good Europeans overcome the potentially paralyzing knowledge that ultimately nothing can be known through (critical) acts that correspond with and realize their native volition.

The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values, he does not need to be approved of, he judges ‘what harms me is harmful in itself’, he knows himself to be that which in general first accords honor to things, he creates values.888

According to Nietzsche, the burgeoning power of mankind’s representative exemplars is synonymous with humanity’s development, and crucially depends on providing the herd with the relatively stable moorings of an ethico-political framework capable of duration.

In the present, which is increasingly characterized by the technological domination of humankind, the common objective of all artist-warriors is that of augmenting the institutions of globalization in order to exploit potentials of globality. As these largely reactive dynamics increase activity, and by extension suffering, the innovations they give rise to bring to light opportunities for globality’s further realization. This requires delicately balancing the need to conscript the herd as a resource by appealing to their self-interest as changes brought about by globalization force them to
adapt, and increase their suffering. The simulation of agonistic political relations practiced in contemporary democracies—the interpolating axiomatic narratives propagated through the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity by the globalization complex—realizes Nietzsche’s premonition regarding the consequences of decadence, the high costs of which “the naïve propagators and panegyrists, the apostles of ‘modern ideas’, would be the least inclined to anticipate.”

Modern democracy prepares the ground for the works of thymotic free spirits—“philosophers of the dangerous ‘perhaps’”—able to call into question the usefulness of all values, or “truths”, for life. In the same passage where Nietzsche meditated on the likely, albeit unanticipated consequences of democratization for Western civilization and realization of the noblest ideal of Europe (the salience of which may be applied to the prerogatives of European unification and broader political trends of globalization today), he asserts:

This process of the European in a state of becoming, the tempo of which can be retarded by great relapses but which will perhaps precisely through them gain in vehemence and depth… The same novel conditions which will on average create a leveling and mediocritizing of man – a useful, industrious, highly serviceable and able herd-animal – are adapted in the highest degree to giving rise to exceptional men of the most dangerous and enticing quality. While the total impression produced by such future Europeans will probably be that of multifarious, garrulous, weak-willed and highly employable workers who need a master, a commander, as they need their daily bread; while therefore, the democratization of Europe will lead to the production of a type prepared for slavery in the subllest sense: in individual and exceptional cases the strong man will be found to turn out stronger and richer than has perhaps ever happened before – thanks to the unprejudiced nature of his schooling, thanks to the tremendous multiplicity of practice, art and masks. What I mean to say is that the democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the breeding of tyrants – in every sense of that word, including the most spiritual.

Here the likelihood is suggested that in some rare instances an exceptional individual will
emerge to become self-legislating – in Call’s sense of the post-modern anarchist. Such unprejudiced “spiritual tyrants” seek to utilize the masses as a reservoir of power for the enhancement of their involuntary positive will. In such a capacity the herd might serve as a resource for the historically contingent means of revaluing advancing a life-affirming culture they pursue. In an epoch of ascending vitality governed according to the edifying tradition of cultural practices that facilitate a healthy instinctual organization of the drives and impulses at both the micro- and macro-levels of the political, the weak would derive the real meaning and true purpose of their existence through serving as the instruments of great creators.

Nietzsche asserted that “the philosopher as we understand him, we ‘free Spirits’”, would be,

…the man with the most comprehensive responsibility, whose conscience bears the weight of the overall development of humanity, this philosopher will make use of religion for his breeding and education work, just as he will make use of the prevailing political and economic situation.

Good Europeans, who may become who it is they are through the skeptical praxis explicated above, make the most of existing conditions, however dissolute and philistinicide, to hasten the appearance of future Übermenschen.

The notion of a nomothetic legislator (Gesetzgeber) creating custom and determining law by force of will as suggested by each of the passages cited above, is not at odds with the assertion that the democratization of Europe may breed magnanimous tyrants. Nietzsche’s use of the term ‘tyrants’ is interesting for many reasons, primary among which is his recognition of the character such a lawgiver assumes. Nietzsche plays on the conventional conception of the tyrant to suggest an important double meaning: the
democratization of Europe is breeding liberal ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment who are modernity’s vengeful “tyrants” over socio-political life, supervising the diminution of Western culture.

Additionally, a thoroughly democratized Europe is fostering conditions within which a few may effectively resist its infinitely regressing simulacrum and thwart their anti-natural ideals by hijacking them. Through their unique, experimental art (Versucherkunst) they may subvert and co-opt the interdependent, interconnecting web of dynamic relationships constitutive of the philistinic culture and its correspondingly ersatz political order. As every act of valuing expresses a will-to-truth (itself constituting arrogance toward life, as cited above) it follows that the positing of meanings and “truths” is always already “tyrannical” and necessitates an embrace of cruelty. Nietzsche’s use of these terms should properly be understood thus and taken to suggest his startlingly brave honesty.

The motif of the nomothetic legislator (Gesetzgeber) could be seen as a romanticization, for in actuality no nomothetic legislator as such ever acted in a wholly autonomous fashion. The mythologized exploits of heroes such as Gilgamesh and Thales aside, more familiar, historically verifiable accounts of the acts (and travails) of great law-givers through recorded history essay the point, irrespective of historical epoch or cultural context. The exploits of diverse world-historical lawgivers such as Solon, Lycurgus, Xerxes, Alexander, Caesar Augustus, Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Suleiman the Magnificent, Akbar and Dara Shikoh, Jefferson and Madison and Napoleon, all personify the type. Alternatively, those whom liberal-optimists would identify as great leaders, men such as Roosevelt and Churchill, Monnet and Schuman, Wałęsa and Havel,
are in fact “plucky bricoleurs” who stabilize a declining order, mustering the residual volitional resources of a society to extend its duration. They effectively put off a civilization’s inevitable expiration by doctoring their diseased age to recuperate its residual resources. However, they are too sickened by decadence to establish, that is nomothetically legislate, a vital new order.

The experience of each of these “great men” also serves to underscore the point that the most independent and capable leaders are only able to exercise and maintain power by satisfying the interests of those social groups upon whom his authority as leader or tyrant depended, whether it was—in Weberian terms—charismatic, traditional (monarchical) or bureaucratic in form and structure. Otherwise, any notion of conventional power conceived in macro-political terms is a false one, as the possibility of unsanctioned domination—however “spiritual”—lies outside any conceivable notion of legitimate political community. Although conventional political authority always already rests on an originary act of usurpation, actual rule by one, as such, is in practice a fiction, except perhaps in the case of a person living as a hermit.

Nietzsche sought to contend with and reconcile a fundamental dilemma intrinsic to the political: that of our unavoidable dependency on others and the need for community it imposes, versus our desire to be autonomous. In his view only an exceptionally power few can expend the force required to truly approximate authentic individualism. His recognition of this inescapable human condition, aptly summarized by John Donne’s famous observation that “No man is an island”, as well as its complication by differences in the power that individuals are, motivated him to recommend the experimental art of tyrannizing oneself to cultivate a needed interiority in the public
process of becoming who one is. He believed that societies had to enact similar violences of self-creation if they were to prosper and that so too would the human species, if it were to creatively evolve and not expire from exhaustion.  

As noted above, every regime arrogates to itself the authority to make (inherently subjective) determinations of value and define “justice”—determinations that are invariably coercive and which mystify their own autocratic conceit. These presumptions inevitably strike some as unjust. However, the Disneyesque, villainous ‘tyrant’ of ultra-liberal-modernist ideological representations, the “illegitimate dictator” or “authoritarian despot” serves to fortify self-justifying liberal myths legitimating democratization itself—doctrinal axioms upon which our hyper-decadent age’s ascetic-consumerist priests rely for their legitimacy.

It is precisely through the superficially harmless yet extremely subversive participation of vivacious anomalists in the very mechanisms and procedures of tyrannical control over / upon everyday life dominated by liberal autocrats that the best may concretely initiate the thorough revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe) they instinctively desire. The involvement of such noble types occurring through their involvement in repressive (i.e.: anti-natural) political networks of authority and legitimation, the modes of social conformity and prevailing reason sabotaged through appropriation, transgression and (sovereign) acts of taking that create new political antagonisms and means of dealing with their cooptation by conventional authority.

To maximize their will to power, sufficiently strengthen themselves through their exploitation of abstract potentials of globality, uncanny individuals or “lucky strikes” may employ the aforementioned skeptical techne to carefully manipulate dominant social
mores and beliefs into serving their interests (the creative destruction of prevailing nihilistic values) as need merits. Recognizing even in late-modernity’s secular faith in reason and fetish for science a kernel of the ascetic ideal, the final phase in its development, they conceal their doubt, atheism and incredulity toward all beliefs with masks of “orthodox faith” (be they secular-materialist and/or some form of coexisting faith in a supernatural divinity) and so outwardly appear to uphold and abide acceptable social conventions and practices through performative, mimetic enactments of conformity.

Using the tolerance of (ersatz) difference that the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity deploys to reproduce itself, they challenge the permitted traditions and identic sensibilities comprising that difference through mocking parody’s of it. Not to be mistakenly conflated with the crass relativism perpetuated by the globalization complex itself, their kynical irony and challenging lampoons of hegemonic values subvert globalization’s efforts to instantiate universal normative, positive law and neo-liberal capitalism. They upset received authority to encourage the idea of political authority as originating within and emanating from forceful individuals (those capable of expending the greatest quanta of force) rather than as imposed from outside.

This is occurring in myriad ways and mediums, both in globalization’s primary loci and at its periphery according to a complex, variable calculus arising from the encounter of ultra-liberal modernity’s ideological prerogative with differing cultural and identic sensibilities. It happens in innumerable acts of brilliant defiance consisting of steady, consciousness-raising subversion that may or may not employ humor to make their point. Some examples from around the world include the anti-consumerism of
Adbusters, audacious subversions of corporate authority “performed” by The Yes Men, Zarganar’s seditious lampoons of the Burmese junta, Charbel Khalilor’s brave parodying of Lebanon’s fractious politics, Hikari Ōta’s comical spoofs of Japan’s parliament, and Sun Mu’s wry paintings which subtly deride North Korea’s state propaganda. Without humorous intent, the heroically militancy of environmentalist Paul Watson constitutes another example. His anti-whaling ‘Sea Shepherd’ missions play a dangerous game in the gray area of international conservation law to protect endangered marine life.

These defiant acts incrementally hasten the demise of slave-morality by challenging social norms and exposing the absurdity of regularized practices. In culturally specific contexts they beg the question: “What does all will-to-truth mean?” Nietzsche elaborates:

… and here I touch on the problem again, on our problem, my unknown friends: what meaning does our being have, if it were not that that will-to-truth has become conscious of itself as a problem in us?… Without a doubt, from now on, morality will be destroyed by the will-to-truth’s becoming-conscious-of-itself: that great drama in a hundred acts reserved for Europe in the next two centuries, the most terrible, most dubious drama but perhaps also the one most rich in hope…

The will-to-truth is a product of the native volition to confer meaning to existence, an ultimately random and potentially dangerous activity in so far as it may be self-deluding and damaging to potential becomings. However, necessity compels us, in the Aristotelian sense of the spirit (nous and energeia as correlative of his concept of dynamis) to create such meanings. Good Europeans must creatively destroy (transfigure) the residual vestiges of slave morality so that the megalopsychoi in our midst can make new use, according to their pathos, of the herd. Putting the all-too-many to work, particularly in ways that provide them with contentedness and possibilities of self-overcoming (in so far
as they are capable), will enable would-be Übermenschen to engage in the productive agonisms by which they perfect themselves. By managing (politically ordering) the desires and irrational prejudices of common people be it through mass-education, a new religion, etc., the strongest few might thereby achieve a post-human future; a consciousness of unanticipated, and presently inexpressible possibilities and more empowering modes of being.\textsuperscript{896}

If successful in this risky endeavor, they may empower themselves (and the herd by extension) enough to engage in the aforementioned generative acts of parrhesia that incite every noble type to acts of self-overcoming.

Whoever has thought profoundly about where and how the plant man has hitherto grown most vigorously must conclude that…the opposite of all the herd thinks desirable are necessary for the elevation of the type man. A morality with such reverse intentions, which desires to train men for the heights, not for comfort and mediocrity, a morality with the intention of training a ruling caste – the future masters of the earth – must, if it is to be taught, appear in association with the prevailing moral laws, in the guise of their terms and forms.\textsuperscript{897}

Those who fail to attain a necessary degree of power but engage in acts of parrhesia anyway risk being dismissed as fools, shunned as social pariahs or even condemned as criminals and punished for their audacity and transgressions of norms.

Yet in the post-modern era of globality this danger is not as prevalent as in previous eras because forces of globalization also circulate simulations of defiance of their “norms” in alternative sub-cultures and organized civil disobedience. Ultimately they spectacularize the anti-globalization movement’s oppositionality as another commodified identity. The culture industries and mega-media glamorize the illegal and / or homicidal activities of governments (regimes both within the globalization complex, on its periphery and in a state of exception to it), political radicals of various stripes,
criminal cartels (Hollywood, et al.) and terrorist networks (CNN and Al Jezerra), which utilize numerous aspects of globalization’s many forces and processes to flourish. Globalization’s diverse simulacra of autochthonous cultural practices and spectacularized desire as consumption come thereby to comprise a hyper-reality, the reactive forces of which aim at totalizing forms of control to manage the chaos they themselves bring about. Yet as a molar assemblage it is still dynamic enough to modify its objectives and interpolate (take possession of) alternative discourses that challenge it to banalize alterity without completely annihilating it.

Its internationalizing effects simultaneously accommodate and co-opt difference in striving to fulfill globality’s potential. However, in this post-modern environment (which arguably represents an improvement over the limitations imposed in late-modernity) the success of potentially great individuals is still unlikely, and so must be qualified, for:

In every kind of injury and loss the lower and coarser soul is better off than the nobler: the dangers facing the latter are bound to be greater, the probability that it will come to grief and perish is, considering the multiplicity of the conditions of its life, enormous. – When a lizard loses a finger that finger grows again: not so in the case of a man.

This assertion is, however defensible, quite comic. For it seems obvious that those accustomed to leisure and a contemplative life are going to find enduring hardship less bearable than the “lower and coarser soul” inured to it by a lifetime of deprivation. Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism is demonstrated in all its outrageous glory here. His political naivety led to such unqualified pronouncements, which lent his work a dangerous quality that comprehensively all-too-human political parties such as the
National Socialists of Germany would make murderous use of in the half-century following Nietzsche’s death.

Transversally innovating the impetus of ‘good Europeans’ through their realizations of abstract potentials of globality, the exemplars of humankind, irrespective of their cultural realm, civilizational milieu or national origin, condition the possibility for future occurrences of becoming-other through their acts of seditious satire and comical derision of prevailing ascetic values, which are themselves largely culturally European in origin. Their *kynical* mockery also serves to diminish the probability that they will perish, that is resist succumbing to the reactive requirements of the prevailing spirit of revenge in our hyper-decadent era. It also enables them to reclaim their place in the world – to reassert themselves via an invigorated positive will to power to retake their cultural, social and political space from its appropriation by inauthentic, imposed European-ness – reclaiming these aspects of themselves through form-giving acts, evaluations and descriptive engagements that eventuate in new and enhanced hybrid varieties of life. This necessitates resourcefulness to convert injury and loss into positive conditions for their flourishing – the incorporation of wounds suffered in the course of becoming in a dissipative time into the multiplicity of conditions that conduce with the fullest realization of their emergent potentials.

The ironic, skeptical, critical stance of good Europeans toward themselves and all truth claims admits a multiplicity of othernesses that enhances this capability just as effectively as it does among non-European peoples who may be resisting decadent Western influences or the anti-human effects of their now hybridized form of life. Against the prerogative of the globalization complex, the transformative potentials of
globality present opportunities both to individuals in their specific geographical locales and, when realized, to the becoming of others around the world almost instantaneously. The paradox is that even a residually Euro-centric concern can, even in the strong wake generated by centuries of racist (and occasionally genocidal) colonialism, foster such chances and prompt active transformations of anti-human institutions and practices.

Part Three: The objective of “good Europeans” as nomothetic legislators: realizing a Nietzschean idea of Europe

Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology may not provide a satisfying, or some would argue persuasive, program for the sort of fundamental transformation he advocates. Prankish acts of subversive defiance and experiments in value creation, however life-affirming, do not in themselves provide the outlines for practicable alternative institutions for organizing and governing human communities or administering their increasingly complex needs. Yet it is just such a positivistic outlook—an idealistic prejudice corresponding with the discourses of scientism—that Nietzsche identified as inhibiting our futural becoming. Kynicism, as Sloterdijk defines it, conceptually dovetails with Nietzsche’s effort—an anti-dogmatic praxis—to provoke his philosophical reader’s to become practitioners of the “art of experimentation’ (Versucherkunst)... [that] engender the superlative human beings who alone warrant the future of the species.” Becoming experimenters and questers and comedians of the ascetic ideals that would otherwise oppress them, does provide a means of hastening their own and society’s going-down, however in so doing they may prepare the way for
Übermenschen endowed with the strength for nomothetic acts of self-creation that legislate for humankind.\textsuperscript{902}

Before genuinely radical innovators could come along, our exhaustion in decadence would have—ineluctably—to occur. According to Nietzsche’s vitalist determinism, the pre-eminence of decrepit instincts at the macro-political level made such a collapse both unavoidable and necessary for the species’ revivification.

It is no use: we have to go forwards, and I mean step by step further into decadence (– this is my definition of modern ‘progress’…). One can inhibit this development and even dam up the degeneration through inhibition, gather it together, make it more violent and sudden: but that is all you can do.– \textsuperscript{903}

The best individuals, or representative exemplars within our comprehensively hyper-decadent culture, reflexively seek to overwhelm the metaphorical dam of which Nietzsche speaks in the citation above. They aim ultimately to hijack the EU by assisting in its perfection so as to overcome it. Their championing of the formal, institutionally driven, ongoing reactive project of unification is a subversive brand of support that seeks to transmute the EU’s ethos surreptitiously.

Against the ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment of our age who inhibit authentic, positive change for the sake of preserving a defunct order and naturalizing decadence, ‘good Europeans’, as ‘unscrupulous polytropoi’, plucky rule dissidents and criminal betrayers of hegemonic values, customs and laws, act so as to increase the pressure on the dams that block the flow of change. They hope thereby to intensify society’s decadence – raising the shaky dam higher – as well as the pressure for release via their simultaneous discrediting of the all-too-human values that intensify decadence. This exerts amplified force upon the dam just as it exacerbates stress fractures in its
foundations. As satirists, ironists, humorists and critics they undermine the dam’s structure in order to unleash the cleansing flood whose violence and consciously augmented ferocity will, they know, eventually be forgotten as new, enhanced life forms thrive in the transformed landscape it leaves behind.

To reiterate, Nietzsche’s vitalist approach to the political and corresponding power ontology do not provide means by which they can be empirically tested and/or refuted. But this criticism also applies equally to the more popular and hegemonic philosophical view of post-Enlightenment liberal-modernity, the tenets of which are arguably even less demonstrable in the world, as it were. On the basis of this putative lack of practical veracity, any doubts about Nietzsche’s theoretical program would provide no objective warrant or more substantive pretext for rejecting it than it would that of the reigning liberal paradigm. For however seemingly implausible or factually indemonstrable Nietzsche’s general theory of decadence may be, it is significantly more modest and more intellectually honest than its liberal–modern antipode. This is underscored by Nietzsche’s own acknowledgment of the impossibility of proving his theory’s accurate correspondence with the world – though he hoped it might and even expected that it would someday be proven true by science. Although this hope may have been a symptom perhaps of his own decadence – a falling back into inauthenticity via a wishful longing for the hypothetical reassurance empirical evidence would provide his theory by scientifically validating it in terms of the prevailing will to truth.904

Finally he suggests that we ought only to act as if it were a “true” (in the traditional, transcendent sense) basis for our instinctive “hatred” of the ugly exhausted and disintegrating in order to supplement the production of edifying culture and
maximize the thriving of mankind. Yet, with relevance to Nietzsche’s possible “vindication” by contemporary science, it is extremely interesting to note that recent developments in both cognitive neuro-science and evolutionary psychology have lent significant empirical support to some of Nietzsche’s most central (and philosophically innovative) insights in the form of discoveries pertaining to emotional memory. Additional support for some of Nietzsche’s key ideas may be found in the burgeoning fields of epigenetics (i.e.: the physical experiences of previous generations effecting an individual’s present health) and cosmology (i.e.: the notion of probability that any entity may physically re-emerge in the cycle of infinitely expanding universes in which everything that can occur will roughly correlates with his notion of the eternal return of the same, etc.). There is also a sense in which Nietzsche, in so far as he rejected Newtonian determinism and the corresponding (and metaphysically / ideologically sacrosanct) belief in free will, could even be said to have anticipated some of the philosophical issues raised recently by quantum physics. In summary it is highly probable that Nietzsche is still significantly underappreciated and if so this would suggest that the present flurry of activity in Nietzsche studies—of which we are now well into the third decade—is unlikely to abate anytime soon.

Within his general theory of decadence Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology provide an analytical framework for assessing the health of a society and the disposition of individuals within it. Nietzsche’s core propositions essay a genealogically consistent hypothesis about what sort of shared values best conduce with the power of the strongest transversally (i.e.: across disparate cultures and traditions within Europe, and arguably beyond it). His theory of decadence is based upon critical, qualitative
deductions about the salubriousness of the values particular to a culture at a given time in its cyclical development. It maintains that the health, or political organization, of the society from which a system of values arises is symptomatized by its effective facilitation of durable institutions that maximize the highest potentials of all its members, but especially the creative powers of its representative exemplars. These individuals are those healthy enough to be capable of re-invigorating their culture’s signature institutions in healthy epochs, sustaining some semblance of them in declining eras or of destroying them to create new ones in decadent ages wherein the former vitality of a culture is thoroughly exhausted.905

Via regimes of ascetic self-discipline (askesis) as well as self-creation and experimentation (auto-poiesis) the healthiest will instinctively strive to resist resignation to the besetting decadence epitomized by the banal mass culture and vapid consumerist society of our hyper-decadent era. In so doing they will simultaneously enact the decline of our age while exploiting liberalism’s simulacrum of equality and simulated enfranchisement, to perform both the “No” and the “Yes” of their eros. Though they will inevitably appear ridiculous to the all-too-many as they transform their very lives into monological works of art, their salutary acts give rise to a new praxis. Their disciplinary regime of self-creation, the desire to see the world as they would have it, and to will it so, will provoke emulation by others. As they realize the reality they envisage they become who it is they are and are simultaneously confirmed as nomothetic legislators (Gesetzgeber); each mimetic enactment and manifestation of their passion—or will to power—understood as the actualization their dialogical artwork.
The authentic nomos of their new praxis inspires mimesis by those who share a similar conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness, and these performances generate form a part of the communal ethos of qualified cosmopolitanism in Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeanism’. This encouraging ethos of life-affirmation spurs those sensitive to it to broaden their striving; it is likely by extension, to proliferate novel modes of being according to the thymotic pothos (longing for the unattainable) of the strongest individuals (the most efficient capacitor or dividuum). Their striving creates ascending values and secures an authentically meritocratic social structure that reflects natural hierarchy and cultivates an agonistic socio-political realm against the rule of the worst mob factions (kakistocratic ochlocracy) that the liberal-optimism and technological rationality of our age has brought into being.906

Toward the ultimate attainment of an Apollonian organization of humanity, incrementally instantiated through law, such artist-philosophers must also abet the perfection of globalization’s myriad spectacles for a long time to come, as they mask their true, radical objective – to overcome and transmute the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity – before the masses, who, startled by the appearance of free spirits, would demand that they give an account of themselves according to the parochial slave morality of taming. These übermenschlich types reveal themselves through irony, self-parody and lampoons of the ignoble lie that all are equally free agents in the global liberal order. They must, according to the native volitions, become comedians of the ascetic-consumerist ideals of our age.907

It is essential to their success that they preserve the soothing illusions of meaning and purpose to which the unsophisticated herd has become accustomed. Their reversal of
values must be a subterranean occurrence for some time to prevent a catastrophic paroxysm of violence originating among the most reactionary ascetic–consumerist priest of resentment, whose suicidal nihilism would prompt them initiate the complete ruination of the human race. Science will have to be brought back into the service of life and the responsible management of the earth, which will require radical even subversive means.

The socio-political lines along which science is presently being employed may be leading directly to the horrors presented in fictional works such as *Brave New World* or *Gattaca*, which our ever-advancing technology and simultaneously deepening ressentiment have the combined power to realize. Khan suggests a plausible strategy for mitigating certain of the dangers technology presents through “the Western notion of freedom as a primitive concept”. He asserts, “We can think of technology as extending the scope of action over space and time. Such an extension is institutionalized in the history of development in the West through a coherent set of social, economic and political institutions and articulation of ideologies of modernity.”

Analogous to a healthy immune response to an ubiquitous pathogen, the best individuals are consistently repudiating, in yes-saying acts that array “tremendous counter forces” against the existential threat of slave morality’s social leveling that constantly seeks to infect them, the prerogatives of the sickliest and despisers of the body. These acts utilize the “fatality that lies concealed in the idiotic guilelessness and blind
confidence of ‘modern ideas’”⁹¹⁰ against “the corruption, the ruination of higher human beings, of more strangely constituted souls.”⁹¹¹

Their heightened “senses” – in the cognitive exercise and increased sensitivity their engagement with the enhanced consciousness of globality provides – endow them with the perceptivity needed to detect the disease of hyper-decadence that erodes noble values. This also enables them to take life-affirming prophylactic measures against the hegemonic mediocrity of the all-too-many, in acts largely invisible to the dull and so unperceived by the dissipated crowd. Thus the truly noble exceptions ineluctably edify one another. Through the productive agonism of contending disciplinary regimes of self-creation they arouse the exceptions in their midst and breed future generations of their high-spirited kind to, fittingly, create values for—and so indirectly rule over—a more natural and healthy social organism in future.

On a higher level their endeavor constitutes the creation of a new ascetic ideal for the perfection and overcoming of globalization’s ultra-liberal-modern nihilism by its transmutation into the life-affirming abstract potentials of globality. In our “post-modern” era, the spectacles of neo-liberal capitalism and its corresponding democratic state form combine in the constructive simulacrum already disciplining advanced industrialized societies to serve as a basis for this double function. While promulgating profound changes (perceived as improvements) in the material conditions of the herd, the simulacrum maintains the appearance of “regularity” in everyday life even while radically altering it.⁹¹²

Globalizing institutions such as the EU, and transformative processes such as its expansion, mollify the multitude with political empowerment (through representation)
and the promise of increasing material wealth while conditioning the possibility for the best individuals, as warrior-genealogists, to continuously overcome themselves. This improves the latter’s prospects of actualizing and maintaining their innate authority politically, to elevate humanity by determining mankind’s “where to” and “what for”. The happiness or fate of such “‘free Spirits’”—their eudemonic aim—is contingent on their striving to implement the aforementioned Nietzschean technique of the self, rather than in attaining political power or conventional recognition in fame. Thus they remain faithful to their duty to enact their authentic nature, behaving in with seeming “liberality” toward those innately inferior to them as they do so. This gives an especially “ironic” twist to the Rortian notion of solidarity, which it affirms in a way Rorty might have found surprising.\textsuperscript{913}

The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves – in part through self-parody – so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.\textsuperscript{914}

By capitalizing on the nisus enabled by the EU within globality to build on its productive network of forces, the strongest may exploit the simulacrum, generate untimely becomings and describe a new aim for humanity. As Nietzsche asserts:

\ldots the ‘fundamental will of the spirit’ wants to be master within itself and around itself and to feel itself master… In this its needs and capacities are the same as those which physiologists posit for everything that lives, grows and multiplies. \ldots Finally there also belongs here that not altogether innocent readiness of the spirit to deceive other spirits and to dissemble before them, that continual pressing and pushing of a creative, formative, changeable force: in this the spirit enjoys the multiplicity and cunning of its masks, it enjoys too the sense of being safe that
If enough healthy individuals can realize this “imperious and domineering” will of the spirit to become ‘good Europeans’ the anti-naturalism of our hyper-decadent social order (predicated on radical equality, the alleviation of suffering and advocacy of pity—all of which unduly constrain the experience of freedom of the strongest) may be completely transmuted in the future. In becoming ‘good Europeans’ and unifying the continent they strive to reinstate a natural order of rank to actualize further potentials of globality and thereby realize the strongest possible human type, with the aim of ultimately going beyond humankind via Übermenschen who derive joy from uncertainty, to attain a post- or transhuman future.

In little more than a century since Nietzsche’s death science has brought humankind to the threshold of a new epoch, one in which we as a species may be able to take ever greater control of our future and transform our world. However misleading modernity’s discourse of progressivism may be, these momentous advancements in technology, biology and genetics, and cognitive and neuro-psychology are profoundly changing human life (primarily in the post-industrial societies of the West, at present) and are likely to change the trajectory of our species’ evolution. The developments to which these scientific innovations are giving rise will pose opportunities for revaluing the nihilistic values of our hyper-decadent age, including the liberal optimism and positivistic scientism which have in part enabled them. The changes they permit will create manifold ethical challenges concerning the future management of human societies and the earth, as
our ability to alter the world and enhance (or destroy) life—to overcome and assimilate ever greater quanta of power—increases exponentially.

Specifically, developments in neuroscience, biotechnology, genetic engineering, computer science, nanotechnology and robotics may soon enable the convergence of the machinic and the human in a much-anticipated moment dubbed “the singularity”. Ongoing efforts to decode the human brain in order to replicate its functioning and translate our inner experience—or mind—into electronic signals will soon enable the replication of thought and consciousness as recordable, transmissible, manipulable data. Via quantum computers, which are in nascent stages of development, multiple minds—and the very atoms comprising them!—may be utilized in the form of vast neural networks to simultaneously solve problems of enormous complexity by integrating many terabytes of information.

This will ineluctably transform what it means to be a human being, and what constitutes authentic experience as the virtual and the physical worlds merge. Integrating our biological existence with a virtual one that will—at some time in the next century—be augmented by and interfaced with other virtual minds, may make corporeality—an embodied existence—unnecessary. In this dawning future, persons could hypothetically maintain two existences, one physical and the other virtual. Bodies could be programmed to work with or without the consent of their “owner”; it is possible that one day people won’t use their physical brains after some time for development, as the existence of their mind becomes virtual and integrated into an immensely large neural structure. A brain might be employed in multiple ways simultaneously, both in its physical form governing
a body and the performance of physical tasks, and in numerous virtual ones to solve other problems in a larger, integrated system.

Other imminent developments include that of pharmacology and genetic engineering enabling enhanced intelligence, the elimination of deleterious deficiencies and illnesses, and physical strength; robotic and nano-technological enhancements of health through the treatment of disease and to provide artificial organs and limbs of possibly greater efficiency; the engineering of primates to attain a level of intelligence necessary for their use in manual labor. Obviously each of these brief scenarios (and there are many more) raises multiple and complex ethical, legal and social questions, all of which bear directly on the political.

How an individual may (be allowed to) exercise control over their destiny (understood as comprising their mind and their physical body) will become more oblique as technology transforms the way our brains may function. Determining what rights and protections individuals should enjoy and what mechanisms will be created to enforce the free exercise of their prerogatives will inevitably foment conflict. These futural possibilities also raise terrifying prospects for the conduct of wars, with the possibility that nations of people could be surreptitiously pacified and manipulated, or physically zombified and used as instruments, or even genocidally annihilated through genetically engineered weapons targeting individuals from a specific ethnic or racial group. These innovations will radically alter conceptions of community and security as well as the measures employed to achieve and maintain it.

The vast potential for instantaneous enhancement this would create raises the real possibility of a directed evolution of humankind. The implications of such innovations
are likely to affect every aspect of life, particularly how people are educated, how they work, the privacy they may expect and how the individual as such and her rights are conceived. The redefinition of the individual and personhood which will invariably occur also portends the reorganization of human societies in fundamental ways. As the problematic—and largely specious—notion of individuality wanes before the widespread recognition and appreciation of the dividuum each of us is in a unbroken chain of existentially crucial relations, challenging ethical questions will arise over how to accommodate the materialization of super-human specimens as well as manage the intentions of tremendously intelligent machines. These will be challenges best handled by good Europeans whose philosophical education, exceptionally broad experience of the world, ability to recognize and exploit the emergent potentials of globality and radical affirmation of life and its diversity of types will cultivate within them the needed disposition to effectively determine how they ought to be managed for maximally salubrious effect.

Already both theoretical contemplation and practical research is occurring that attempts to deal with the implications of all of this for the political. The possibilities these questions, possibilities and scenarios raise are at once frightening and exhilarating, insofar as they indicate ways in which the human might be overcome and new means by our species might, as it takes control of and hastens its evolution, better fulfill its responsibility to the earth. The prospect of generating new socio-political power constellations in the process of overcoming the ossified nation-state and its negative bio-power over life is very exciting.
That scientific “advances” arising from scientism’s naïve pursuit of truth as reality may be put to overcoming the ascetic-consumerist slave morality of taming that subtends it and cultivate authentic becomings (always a becoming-other) against the privileging of the ‘last man’ and his ideal of molar becoming-same, is a poetic reversal Nietzsche would have found very pleasing. The dangers will be tremendous as a few plucky, intrepid souls battle to prevent congenitally botched, world-reprehending ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment from using technological innovations and the merging of the human and machinic to “perfect” their anti-human, no-saying socio-political mnemotechniques of control to further limit alterity and possibilities for authentic becoming. The human race could easily destroy itself in this process, either directly, through malice and stupidity or by creating machines over which it loses control. In a nightmare scenario from the perspective of Nietzschean good Europeans these burgeoning technologies could be applied in ways that enhance the spirit of revenge and leave humankind more thoroughly dissipated and enslaved than ever before. This could permanently inhibit the emergence of the profligate geniuses whose expenditure of force and going down condition the possibility for the emergence of übermenschlich types.

Perhaps the greatest danger good Europeans face in overcoming themselves lies in the seduction of liberal optimism, which, naturalized by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity also drives much of the scientific innovation producing these transformative potentials. The axiomatic narrative rationalizing the status quo may inhibit the realization of the most significant possibilities for change. The universal dominance of the stories naturalizing secularized slave-morality and the corresponding reign of self-idolizing, solipsistic ascetic-consumerist priests of ressentiment makes it likely that the
most radical potentials these innovations produce will be suppressed. Rather than enhancing prospects for the breeding (in both the literal and figurative sense) of a higher species man, social conditioning may prevail in favor of the further leveling and dissipation of man, extending our hyper-decadent era of mindless consumption and nihilistic self-satiation.

In a related consideration of the apocalyptic potentials (in both senses of the word apocalyptic, i.e.: a revelation and the end of the world) being generated by technology, De Garis anticipates an “Artilect war” (“artilect” referring to the “artificial intelligence” of the “massively intelligent machines” it could be harnessed to create) between those supporting the creation of intelligent machines, whom he dubs “cosmists”, and those who will inevitably oppose such creations as threats to human life, whom he names “terrans”. This controversy will, he predicts, be understood in the most significant existential terms, and come to define the socio-political life of the late 21st century. His admittedly reductive scenario omits the possibility that critical ironists, such as good Europeans, may advocate the creation of such machines for specific purposes, as well as the contention that will arise over ethical considerations over them (i.e.: the uses to which they may legitimately be put).

In de Garis’ vision, these ‘artificial intelligences’ will appeal to the “cosmists” in part because creating god-like machines will comport with the creation of a new scientific religion. Nietzsche anticipated and opposed such a possibility (as examined above, in part one of book two), fearing that faith in science—as a naïve ‘will to truth’—might lead to a new form of uncritical, quasi-religious devotion. Insofar as super-intelligent machines could be employed to found a gay science (*fröhliche Wissenschaft*)
that admits of a plurality of perspectives on life, enhance the discharge of active force in
the positive will to creative destruction as generative power of healthy types, and
augments the making of a higher culture, Nietzsche—and his free spirited descendents—
would support their creation.

However, good Europeans might very well come down on the side of “terrans” in
this battle if the prospect seemed too great that such machines would be used to advance
the world-weary despisers of the body and their life-calumniating ideals. Unfortunately,
the U.S. military is presently among the most enthusiastic researchers and developers of
these new technologies, for the purpose of advancing the governmentality it exists to
defend. By the waging of wars, suppression and comprehensive control over “enemies”
and additional groups of people the conventional authorities with a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force/violence others control over people might be extended in
frightening ways that include neutralizing potential threats and defiance of the law by
altering or even directing the very minds of resisters.

Today the conventional realm of the political is a field of human activity (multiple
forms of life and competing power constellations) dominated by cynicism, inauthenticity
and the coercion of unproductive antagonisms that constrain dissent and inhibit
becoming. But it could, through the despotic negative power of the globalization
complex, enable a means of attaining biopower over life more sinister and invidious than
in any previous epoch of human history. That terrible possibility is one that good
Europeans instinctively oppose through their active realization of adjacent possibilities
provided by technological innovation and the exploitation of cognitive spandrels in the
“architecture” of international society—potentials comprising abstract potentials of
globality. Aware that a quantum difference in thought can change the world, humankind’s highest exemplars are resisting the temptation to succumb to nihilism and exploiting the opportunities provided by our hyper-decadent, ultra-liberal-modern condition to become who it is they are. However seemingly obscure or insignificant, these defiant ‘outliers’ and probable buffoons are transforming the future in doing so.917

Conclusion: Toward a Re-naturalized Future

When a fortuitous individual successfully capitalizes on his innate ability, self-discipline (askesis) and chance (in amor-fati) via these four stances, adopting Akatalepsia as a governing disposition and the remaining three doctrines as a practical strategy for gaining necessary conventional authority in order to transform it, they may, through nomothetic, creative acts and fearless—if tactically pragmatic—speech, implement a revaluation of all values that ultimately redirects and augments the course of human development.

While becoming who it is they are in innumerable, diverse capacities, they mask their agenda before the priests of ressentiment in order to ‘go down among them’ and utilize the existing social milieu and governing institutions to surreptitiously achieve the improvements they desire. In so doing it is as though they are ‘returning to the cave’ to cast new shadows on the wall before its mesmerized audience; shadows they have learned to make as their self-undertaken political education has advanced.

Another effect of their involuntary volition is that their highly visible eros arouses corresponding passions among those with a similar conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness, exciting them to pursue the ‘political education’ necessary for the
cultivation of a higher, edifying culture. Among these potential exemplars, some may attain conventional authority and even inhabit some (of the EU’s innumerable) offices to achieve their political objective. In whatever role they assume, they all strive to engage in acts of fearless speech to transform their polity’s (re: the EU’s) ethos and objectives. Exploiting the abstract potentials of globality in this cunning manner such ‘good Europeans’ will gradually execute a revaluation of all values to revivify an authentically agonistic, Dionysian politics, instantiate a corresponding rank order of types (Rangordnung) and reinvigorate European culture for the improvement of mankind.

Nietzsche’s particular idea of Europe is one in which no nation-state borders constrain the movement (life) of individuals and all are free to develop themselves as far as they are able. It is anti-liberal precisely for its commitment to truthlikeness, which necessarily refuses both the transcendental “Truths” of equality and rights presupposed by our post-Enlightenment liberalism and its consequent if somewhat paradoxical “relativizing” of all values. The immanent crisis that Western civilization faces is further suggested by its inability to square the supposed universal applicability of its legally instantiated notion of equality and rights protections with certain of its own practices which do not cohere with these ultra-liberal-modern regimes as well as those of the manifold cultures into which it disseminates its relativity of values via the globalization complex.

“Nietzsche believed the dominant economic, political and cultural forces of the age were progressively “barbarizing” European society and preparing the way for a series of calamities.” Rather than conclude the crisis of nihilism, the catastrophic conflicts of the twentieth century gave rise to the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and a
reactive globalization complex to universalize its intensified decadence. A significant assemblage within that larger power constellation, the EU has traded former social disparities for new forms of existential ennui and malaise codified in legal equality and human rights. As a consequence, it symptomatizes the century’s hyper-decadence. Nevertheless, the molar growth of its reactive mode of life is hastening the ultimate demise of ultra-liberal-modernity and conditioning the possibility for fundamental regeneration through globality.

Nietzsche thought his idea, and counter-ideal, of Europe would be embodied in individuals of exceptional integrity, whose will to power would nurture an enlarged perspective, far-sightedness and corresponding capacity to think freely and to shrewdly speak the truth. An authentic commitment to truthlikeness necessitates no small quanta of cunning and subterfuge in a hyper-decadent age; their faithfulness to themselves gives rise to a wily form of candor. This sophisticated verisimilitude corresponds with a dedication to fearless speech (*parrhesia*), such as that practiced by the cynic philosophers of Classical and Hellenistic age Greece, and the partiality of radical life-affirmation or yes-saying.

A “change of attitude” (or *conative disposition*) and determined effort to take hold of oneself (corresponding with *anticipatory resoluteness*) among the artist-philosophers Nietzsche anticipated “will be required to transcend” the spirit of revenge characteristic of “modernity”. Actualizations of abstract potentials of globality may augment an authentic being-towards the *Dasein* of a future mode of ennobled European life that secondarily spurs existentially significant modifications of the ‘They’ (such as the EU and the institutions, forces and processes typical of the globalization complex) and its
Publicness. As with their positive realizations of globality, which these adventurous Gewaltmenschen conceive from unique, epiphantic experiences and realize via the pursuit of their passions (eros) which their concernfully absorbed actions arouse in others, their ecstatic affirmations of life and embrace of chance (amor fati) may uncover previously buried possibilities for being-towards the Dasein of ‘good Europeanism’ and its ownmost possibility for Being.

In contemporary Europe (as in America) these tests are likely take the form of novel challenges to and unanticipated developments of the EU’s authority; the objective of ‘good Europeans’ being a certain perfection of the EU’s institutional apparatus as prerequisite to the EU’s eventual overcoming. They are neither sedentary academics nor are they solitary hermits who withdraw from society by way of rejecting it, rather they are charismatic individuals proactively engaged in the tasks of everyday life, which they perform in accordance with their striving to perfect the EU so as to destroy it. In masking this intention they become authentically inauthentic in order to adapt various social roles and outwardly conform to the prevailing – reactive – social mores of the day. This could easily and correctly be understood to include theorists of European integration, whose works – the envisaging of a reality which they would will into being – as acts of world creation, occasionally resonate in such a way as to dominate conceptions of the project of Europe’s formal political integration for sustained periods. Ideas factically create worlds.

With the long vision particular to ‘good Europeans’ these exceptions prepare the way for future generations of more vigorous men who will be capable of implementing the fundamental revaluation of all values to which such a growth is indispensable. Theirs are futural acts undertaken with a good-conscience according to their involuntary
instincts and drives that incrementally generate a qualified aristocratic ethos shared among a few and out of which a new master morality may arise “that justifies the strong and makes possible the solitude and the leisure of the few”.  

Supplemented by conscious enactments of their volitional urges (e.g.: their experimental art or *Versucherkunst*) which excite others, the *auto-poiesis* of ‘good Europeans’ further serves the ends of genuine integrity. Underscoring the principle concern Nietzsche had in cultivating vital political community as a work of art for the enhancement of power, Elbe summarizes Nietzsche’s vision of Europe as:

…one that (i) avoids nationalist and racist interpretations of existence; (ii) that refuses to fix the deeper meaning of the European idea and thus also remains open to those who currently remain outside the borders of the European Union; (iii) that would not seek to impose its freedom on others, but would equally not shy away from exemplifying this commitment to a deep experience of freedom; and (iv) that seeks to address the problem of the increasing globalization of the ‘last man’ through combating the refusal to cultivate, within existence, an important reflective depth.  

While the third point is slightly problematic for its unclear meaning (what, in practical terms, would it mean to “exemplify this commitment to a deep experience of freedom”?), Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ would be foremost concerned with the depth of their own experience of freedom in so far as it augmented their individual regimes of self-discipline and creation. As opposed to MacIntyre, their “ethics” (Nietzsche occasionally heaps scorn on the category, as the “science of morals”, and the leveling “morality of mediocrity”[^925]), can only be decided personally; its broader social coherence depends on their masking of the awareness that—at least among healthy individuals—all such determinations are subjective.[^926] From this perspective Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ are fictionalists, insofar as they *act* as if, or *make-believe* that there are moral facts, when
they “know” there are none. The need for order as a civilizational requirement compels them to pretend as though transcendentally true values corresponding with a knowable and certain reality, exist. In Nietzsche’s view the question—one of ultimate significance to the political—is who determines that “reality”, those made healthy by life or those ailing from it.

‘Good Europeans’ would likely take it as given that peoples outside the Anglo-European (“Western”) cultural realm—those outside the centers of the globalization complex—would have a quite different, albeit deep, experience of freedom that, being largely inaccessible to them as Europeans, would necessitate the suspension of their judgment of its qualitative merits. Aside from this ambiguity, Elbe’s points are generally correct. The fourth point in particular corresponds with my own concern, one that I am confident Nietzsche would have shared: that of devising a practical strategy for overcoming of the nihilistic prerogatives of the globalization complex through the revaluing of the decadent values that typify our hyper-decadent age. Toward that end an experimental art to realize abstract potentials of globality that I have expounded on above shows the way forward.

The benefit of a Nietzschean analysis of the EU and its expansion may not be immediately apparent to many Europeanists, because it starts from unfamiliar premises. Its value lies in the disconcertingly honest way it denudes liberal-modernism’s ideals of their desirability and provides a strategy for the overcoming of the decadence they generate. It is also uniquely valuable for the recognition it provides of the ideological equivalence of the partisan debates in which many European integration and globalization theorists are engaged. Finally, it points the way toward viable and radically
different directions Europe (and by extension, the world) could take in its beneficial development of the species man. Nietzsche’s vitalist politics queer, and thereby make visible, the reactive and debilitating power arrangements that naturalize the degeneration of man.

His co-extending critique of liberal-modernity (which I have contemporized and applied to our hyper-decadent age of globalization) strongly suggests the necessity of (reactive) EU expansion and globalization for subordinating the Staatinstinkt (state instinct) and ultimately nation-states themselves to ultimately attain an even higher purpose. That preparatory process entails an invigoration of the positive will to creative destruction as generative power (foreshadowed by globality) among those “legislators of the future,” whose descendents will possess the instincts and strength to act as “masters of the earth”. As an initial objective in this European and global development, ‘good Europeans’, as “a new caste dominating all Europe,” nurture the growth of “a protracted and terrible [European] will “which could set its objectives thousands of years ahead.”

According to Nietzsche true philosophers, the ‘laughing lions’ among so-called “higher men”, avoid directly ruling over their society except on ‘millennial occasions’ when they undertake to reinvigorate it by revaluing their decadent society’s exhausted values to bring a natural hierarchy into being. The compelling active force of such a hierarchy, predicated on an affirmative pathos of difference between types to facilitate the authenticity of each, would ensure its duration, which is the philosopher’s primary aim. The most important consequence of their imposition of order over society is the permanence of that order – the creation of an epochal regime lengthy enough to foster the emergence of civilization and above and out of that, an authentic, lasting culture.
crass lust for rule, in the conventional exercise of power over others, is today, as it has been throughout Europe’s decadent epochs, usually characteristic of the spirit of revenge and inauthenticity compelled by ascetic priests who tempt the majority to resigned falleness and enforce the prerogatives of ressentiment against all that is strong and healthy. Nietzsche cites a few exceptions to this generalization, including Napoleon, who arose from the ruins of a decadent era to revitalize Europe with a new hope and instantiate an enduring order.

Those herd-leaders who are afflicted with a lust to rule over others emerge as embodied symptoms of their society’s dis-ease. They signal the degeneration of its culture and reigning forms of life, the corresponding order that extended from these as well as the evaluative stance, conative disposition and anticipatory resoluteness necessary among its highest exemplars to sustain them. Ochlocratic leaders undermine the efficaciousness of formerly noble ways of esteeming, thereby subverting the modes of being these maintained. In so doing they seek validation and recognition out of their bad-conscience and through the ressentiment of others. It is the envy of the ‘They’ which they most value.

The rare artist-philosopher is—even in our hyper-decadent era of abjection under the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity—at once a subversive and a nomothetic legislator (Gesetzgeber) whose valuations or acts constitute an on-the-way that transitions mankind to a future return to his natural surface; although these philosophers have difficulty occupying the present due to its pervasive spirit of revenge and imposition of a guilty bad-conscience, they struggle heroically – and in anti-modern fashion – to “give the realm of appearance an ontological foundation”.932
In Heideggerian terms the mood of ‘good Europeans’ (a feature of their distinctive conative disposition and manifold perspectives) tunes them into certain realities of life on the continent in such a way that the Dasein of the EU (as a macro-political entity) is disclosed to them in all its fallenness. In taking hold of themselves in anticipatory resoluteness they are sensitized to the way in which the average-everydayness of the EU compels inauthenticity and rewards the das Man state of becoming-same that Nietzsche associated with the herd mentality and its hegemony.

In addition to more truthfully, and by extension accurately, perceiving the nature of the EU and its affects throughout the continent and world, ‘good Europeans’ comprehend its *Existenz* and the Being-towards its ownmost potentiality for Being, or future potential becoming, thereby. The EU’s fallenness consists in large part of the tasks and performances it requires in order to sustain and perpetuate itself and the forms / modes of life it favors, namely an approximation of Schmitt’s “quantitative total state”. This consists with its privileging of the ‘They’ – the leveling down and obligatory mediocrity of its Publicness (ways of Being for the “they” — by which ‘good Europeans’ identify the contemporary mob-hodgepodge which exists according to dissipative ascetic-consumerist values and uncritically inhabits the simulacra provided it by the globalization complex of which the EU is a part. This correlates with Nietzsche’s notion of the comfortable resignation of the herd to the imposed slave morality of taming.

‘Good Europeans’ are, on the contrary, actively engaged in the tasks they perform, thereby authentically becoming who it is they are and living ontologically – as concernfully engaged Daseins. This crucially distinguishes them from the masses who are unreflectively absorbed in the daily inauthenticity – the average everydayness – of
fulfilling the expectations their communities, nations and the EU itself prescribe for them as its “citizen constituents”. The ‘They’ disburdens these individuals from the responsibility of creating themselves and imposing disciplinary regimes for their fullest flourishing, diminishing their inherently limited *eros*, which becomes one-dimensional.

Conventional society also naturalizes the partial repression of their native instincts and drives (while aiming to completely repress them, the instincts and drives are, however enfeebled, irrepressible), and their condemnation as harmful to the greater good, so as to impart the bad conscience of self-regulation. It simultaneously makes the herd into an ahistorically quantifiable and instrumentally useful component of the technologized life of globalization complex. The tasks with which the EU is primarily concerned are oriented toward weakening the capacity of individuals to make choices, meaning that they are always already giving an account of themselves in their performance of the tasks for which they are held responsible. The herd, as a contented mass of automatons, surrenders to a regularizing regime of ascetic-consumerist discipline imposed from without, and which arises from and thoroughly imbricates them in the spirit of revenge—the ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity. This cynicism turns them, consciously or not, against their fellow human beings, their environment and life itself, to ossify in ressentiment of the world into which they have been thrown.

Simultaneously, ‘good Europeans’ would vicariously utilize the international class of laborers out of whose toil abstract potentials of globality may be realized.⁹³⁴ The possibilities in those actualized potentials could enable the eventual modification and renaturalizing of the means by which labor is organized, without gratuitous violences or undue suffering – not involving any more exploitation than that which mainstream
liberals already explicitly accept as reasonable, or any life-affirming Nietzschean would find necessary. The product of an authentically agonistic drive in an inauthentically antagonistic socio-political milieu, the utilization of globality would occur with a good-conscience and in accordance with the nature of those who by virtue of their innate capacities and conative disposition ought to create without the limitations imposed by anti-natural, life-denying values, as explicated above. As well as symptomatizing suicidal nihilism, the aforementioned characteristics of our hyper-decadent age indicate exploitable potentials, which redirected could augment the creation of a vital civilization of global proportions. Such a quasi-cosmopolitan development would be flexible enough to include any and all nations and peoples, while resisting the reactive urge to impose a uniform culture on them.

In the present the inherently deficient existential meanings required by the herd can continue being provided via simulated identities, ersatz happiness and mass media spectacles. The marketing, entertainment and culture industries will continue to create injurious desires and provide the means to fulfill them for the foreseeable future. Ensuring the ability of the all-too-many to consume will continue satiating their need for ontological purpose. Rendered docile, the masses remain preoccupied with (enslaved by) mindless diversions, thereby providing those compelled to exploit globality relatively greater leeway to do so.

The global environmental emergency caused by current levels of consumption in the industrialized “North”—the primary loci of the globalization complex—also provides good Europeans with a potential means of transmuting the values of ultra-liberal-modernity. These nihilistic values (indifference and resignation) have directly led to the
ecological disaster humankind has stupidly created, a disaster that threatens its survival as well as the survival of many species of flora and fauna. For the sake of the earth Nietzsche’s *thymotic* experimenters would—paradoxically, given the momentous role of science in industrialization and its methodical destruction of the natural world—employ all scientific means available to reverse the destruction of the planet and conserve endangered species. If the conditions for life are to be sustained, levels of consumption will have to radically change for all human beings. This will require a profound transformation of life as we know it, with wealthy residents of the West consuming far less and poor residents of the developing “South” receiving assisted in environmentally responsible developmental strategies. A radical affirmation of life impels good Europeans to forcefully advocate for the earth as they pursue their distant goal of overcoming humankind. Such an advocacy amounts to an act of self-conservation in personal expenditure.

For those capable of conducting them, globality presents opportunities to transmute the decadent values of our declining age. However, good Europeans, as immoralists, would not seek to deny, nor imagine themselves capable of depriving the all-too-many of their nihilistic standards. Aware that the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity universalized by the globalization complex is driving humankind into a new and bleak kind of slavery, they can only exploit this tragic state of affairs to develop conditions conducive to humankind’s future legislators. Their revaluation of values cannot be executed in a day. These iconoclasts must live philosophically as they struggle to overcome the decadence in themselves, educating / arousing a few others by their
example (eros), and preparing the way for Übermenschen who have yet to be born.

Law giving moralities are the principle means of fashioning man according to the pleasure of a creative and profound will, provided that such an artist’s will of the first rank has the power in its hands and can make its creative will prevail through long periods of time, in the form of laws, religions, and customs.\textsuperscript{938}

Such artist-philosophers furnish life—and the going-down of humankind with tragic meaning through their striving. Their works joyously affirm the suffering that is characteristic of existence as it maximizes the power they are. This determination to prepare the felicitous environment required for preeminent individuals, “future masters of the earth,” prompts them to spontaneously create out of their tremendous passion and higher (noble) egoism.\textsuperscript{939}

The changed mentality engendered by globality and exploited by ‘good Europeans’ can be expected to transform the norms and practices that typify the globalization complex by invigorating the instincts of a few and fortifying nascent übermenschlich types. Ultimately such exceptions aim to reorder Europe and the world, as well as to provide a mechanism for the rejuvenation of European culture, through a positive “Europeanization” that both originates from and manifests itself in “‘good Europeans’, who can actually tolerate free thoughts.” Such individuals stabilize the herd’s decline through a spectrum of disciplinary techniques comprising the slave morality of taming sublimated in ever-diversified practices of consumption and the reification of productivity.\textsuperscript{940} This could include subversively theorizing European integration to unmask the EU’s constitutional conceits and the anti-natural basis of the values in which it originated and which it continues to embody.
*Mutatis mutandis*, these transformed conditions are likely to secure the necessary order for the enhancement of higher types, thereby preventing “the physiological ruination of mankind” Nietzsche so feared. As the healthiest, pluripotent types steadily transfigure and overcome the forces, processes and institutions of globalization through their realization of globality they effectively breed an improved, or higher, species man. Nietzsche’s ideal of ‘good Europeanism’ and his idea of Europe offer practical, anti-metaphysical aims by which individuals might edify their own lives by becoming who it is they are and transform the world via their increased authenticity.

The efforts of exceptions are at once involuntary and consciously pursued, per the cognitive limits to conscious recognition of the affective power that limit the self-understanding. This consists with the spirit intrinsic to Nietzsche’s perspectivalism, in that it acknowledges the multivariate, dynamic relationship between an individual’s native volition and the effective nurturing provided by their environment; that is to say, the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness which permits them to resist succumbing to the socio-cultural infirmities of their epoch. Realizing abstract potentials of globality, their striving conditions the possibility of a new type of man, expressed in re-founded, if not entirely original ascetic practices – *kynical* techniques for sabotaging and hijacking the all-too-human ascetic-ideals of globalization to redirect their coercive power and mock their life denigrating valuations – will facilitate the self-discovery, – overcoming and –creation required for free spirited ‘good Europeanism’.

Good Europeans strive to bestow an aim upon human life by imbuing it with it with a salubrious if imperfect meaning. Their transformed consciousness of the individual as an involuntary agent of will to power in the world generate life-enhancing affective...
capacities (exemplified in their unique practices of discipline and self-creation) to foster the appearance of genius within disparate cultures and societies in all the regions of the world. As a revaluation of all values the realization of their potentials, even if halting and uneven, incrementally reshuffles the social DNA controlling society’s development, effectively reprogramming its governing norms, mores and rules. The ascendancy of a healthy instinctual organization of the drives and impulses from these strong individuals provides the necessary elements for remaking the social organism (at the level of the political macro-sphere) from within. Over time, the body politic may thereby become polymorphously proficient at correcting deficiencies and ablating threats to its health.

The expressed passion of good Europeans arouses the eros of others to become who it is they are in an authentic agonism productive of the sort of individuals necessary for an authentic community’s maximal flourishing and long-term immunity to the disease of decadence.

Consistent with his anti-dogmatic perspectivalism, Nietzsche was reluctant to universalize his values, so refrained (or failed?) to posit a programmatic alternative to the decadent, liberal-modern values that were coming to prominence in Europe during his lifetime, and which in an evolved and intensified form naturalize the hyper-decadent ethos of our ultra-liberal-modern era. Resignation to its life-calumniating ascetic-consumerist values sustains contradictory yet wholly interrelated practices of self-denial in and through self-destructive levels of consumption. This nihilism is maintained by the cynical, enlightened false consciousness that typifies our culture of abject conformity.

In this work I have striven to disclose how Nietzsche’s critique of the Western tradition of metaphysical rationality may be seen as providing a coherent and practical
means of overcoming our disabling decadence and realizing his idea of Europe. Toward this end I have explicated the under-acknowledged problems inherent to the prevailing, illusory economic optimism of our globalizing world. In that context I have analyzed the EU as a primary institutional locus of the forces and processes that are fundamentally transforming the European continent and, by extension, the world. My analysis has accorded with a syncretic reading of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics, power ontology and perspectivalist epistemology.

The unconscious drives and impulses that imperfectly express the anorganic forces surging through us, as enacted in symptoms of our will to power, within socio-political constraints imposed from outside into which we are thrown by fate and which we mediate via our instincts, largely determines our destinies. Nietzsche’s cheerfulness is counterintuitive to those convinced of the contemporary liberal-optimistic view, for he accepts the fact—as a radical affirmer of life—that the vast majority of people are “bungled and botched”. However, for a lucky few – the anxiety-inducing question that unsettles ultra-liberal-modern readers of Nietzsche) the very limited control indicated by the ability to exercise of discipline over our instincts and our ability to affirm our fate suggests that ultimately it is up to each one of us to become who it is we are by discovering the capacities through which we might strengthen our will to realize our noblest potential, be it in a dignified obedience to and instrument of a genius.

Clever individuals, who remain relatively imperviousness to the many “corrupters of the will, the great slanderers and vindictive enemies of life” by creating personal regimes of self-discipline (askesis) in accordance with their unique passions (eros), virtually without regard for social proscriptions, may subvert the ascetic-consumerist
values of our age. Through witty lampoons that piercingly mock decadent values they may condition the possibility for future nomothetic legislators to overcome the ascetic–consumerist ideal that now corrupts human life. Those proto-Übermenschen may then unreservedly posit values according to the native volition—an overflowing health. Future generations might benefit by the vivifying “presence[ing] of life… the process whereby life strives for immanence, strives for and succeeds in manifesting itself”, thusly.

By reinvigorating instincts of strength and joyful power at the macro-level of the political sphere and instituting a new, authentically agonistic order predicated on life-affirming values, future Übermenschen could renew European cultural greatness for the fullest flourishing of the strongest types. For such free spirited good Europeans, the zest for life and the suffering it induces are simultaneously increased in the process of maximizing the positive will to creative destruction as generative power, by which they give style to their character and create an environment conducive to who it is they are.

Toward realizing Nietzsche’s idea of Europe through the overcoming of petty state politics and the uniting of the continent, the EU is providing for the emergence of a new European consciousness. Combined with innovations and challenges from social ‘outliers’, self-experimenters and norm-entrepreneurs determined to realize abstract potentials of globality this, arguably, is occurring in numerous ways. It may very well be the case—in ways counter-intuitive to most Nietzscheans—that among the more remarkable examples of this is the creation of “multilateral human rights mechanisms”; the creation of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that “draw their authority from global and regional international organizations… [and] lawmaking treaties”. Precisely because these ultra-liberal-modern institutions provide a space for
the best to develop relatively uninhibited by the preachers of death, the “destruction of loftier types” might be mitigated.947

Although it will likely strike many Nietzsche scholars as counter-intuitive, I contend that the potentials that human rights protections and laws generate for reversing the anti-natural values out of which they arose make them suitable instruments for the future masters of the earth. For most Nietzscheans “rights” is an offending term. Yet although Nietzsche consistently opposed claims to rights, there is no reason to think Nietzsche would not have supported international efforts to prevent senseless killing and mass-genocides, however tainted by liberal-optimism; he too would have been horrified by the Holocaust that motivated adoption by the United Nation in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nietzsche recognized both that ‘suffering for what’ is the ineliminable question preoccupying human existence (a condition which always entails suffering), and that the answers to that question have traditionally proffered other-worldly explanations for human suffering that denigrate life, ossify its forms and inhibit their becoming—leading to decadence.

However, the sort of gratuitously exacerbated suffering resulting from malice which originates in a nihilistic spirit of revenge—whether Christian or secular in origin—offended him to action (e.g.: his Genealogy of Morals). His anti-liberal, anti-modern program is a product of his desire (a will to truth symptomatic of a will to power) to devise a naturalistic—authentic—means of contending with suffering through the joyous affirmation of life. There is no reason, by Nietzsche’s own terms, that the healthiest exemplars wouldn’t put their strength to securing the masses from the egregious cruelty of a cultural philistine par excellence such as Hitler. In order that great individuals might
become who they are, by being allowed the freest play to realize their passions, Nietzsche would very likely have supported human rights as an instrument, if only a temporary one, for nomothetic legislators to revalue the decadent values—“herd animal ideals”—that lead to mass psychosis and unwarrantable violence.948

Human rights need not serve to enforce mediocrity or to eliminate the natural rank order of types, but may be utilized as a means for elevating culture by dissuading would-be persecutors of difference. The will to dominate (will to power) that Nietzsche celebrates cannot be correctly equated with a will to annihilate human diversity or eliminate opposition. “Only when a culture has an excess of powers at its disposal can it also constitute a hothouse for the luxury cultivation of the exception, the experiment, of danger, or the nuance: —this is the tendency of every aristocratic culture.”949 An authentic agon conduces with a form of polity (be it democratic, as Hatab so persuasively has shown, or otherwise) which fosters an ‘excess of powers’ embodied in differences between types that cultivate nobility of soul. Such a socio-political milieu also permits the terminally flawed to pursue their own ruin. Contrarily, the ultra-liberal-modern polities of our hyper-decadent epoch pursue their downfall—an inevitability which might also exterminate the human race—by enforcing a spurious equality and prohibiting the botched from destroying themselves.

Human rights, an anti-natural product of ideals conceived in reaction, have themselves given rise to unanticipated, abstract potentials of globality by providing salubrious means by which those capable of becoming strange to themselves might do so. While consisting in undeniable ways with the ethos and ideological thrust of our epoch’s metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity, the developing body of international human
rights law is strongly suggestive of just one of the practical (if also counter-intuitive or even paradoxical) means by which the nihilism of our hyper-decadent era—and the resignation (re: enlightened false consciousness) to cynicism it compels—may ultimately be overcome. The instinctive physiological and spiritual weakness of genocidal regimes and the extreme danger to life and culture posed by their psychotic nihilism provides apodictical evidence of the necessity for universal human rights against the ascetic–consumerist priests of ressentiment, however imperfect or occasionally ineffectual. These regimes are fortifying healthy types who have been—or would be—systematically weakened by world-weary despisers of the body, incrementally transforming them into strong-willed personifications of authentic health in the best (Nietzschean) sense.950

Human rights law, though born of post-Enlightenment, liberal individualist (quasi-Rousseauian) ideals that Nietzsche opposed and which from the perspective of his vitalist politics largely ramify slave moral values and the spirit of revenge they rationalize, comprises a notional apparatus especially suitable to hijacking for the purpose of combating the very forces of ressentiment and anti-naturalism from which it arose. Either through the struggle to codify the ultra-liberal-modern ideals in law or once established as customary norms, human rights law offers a means for subversively critiquing power, waging a productively agonistic, anti-dogmatic struggle against ossified traditions and interrogating and combating irrational prejudices as an active revaluation of all values. Human rights law, conceived positively as means of a recognizing the existing variation of natural attributes, volitions and differences in the degree of anorganic power surging through persons, might facilitate the differing affective capacities of every individual, enable the ‘outliers’ of society and its stultifying
conventional values—Nietzsche’s free spirited good Europeans—to discharge themselves via active forces expressive of a positive will to creative destruction as generative power.  

The EU hardly approximates the unification of Europe Nietzsche envisaged according to his Napoleonic ideal of grand politics (grosse Politik). However, insofar as the EU constitutes a nascent form of supranational political governance and economic management, and stands as a primary loci of human rights law throughout the world, it is a development, which, though imperfect, may be utilized as a preparatory labor toward a new genuinely aristocratic ideal for humankind. It can be commandeered to establish a naturalized rank order of types, one prevenient to a future ruling caste comprised of the continent’s healthiest exemplars.

Europe’s integration is certainly generating a new ethos that may be made to correspond with the realization of a potentially Nietzschean, quasi-cosmopolitan idea of Europe based on the alleviation of gratuitous cruelty and violence arising from the urge for revenge, both of which Nietzsche opposed. Advocating these rights as a mask in accordance with the skeptical doctrine of adoxastos, they may use the powerful social narratives of equality before the law and accountability to re-naturalize the inverted rank order of types of our decadent age. Modifying these principles would also realize their broader aim of undertaking a revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe). In so doing they may become who they are while joyously affirming the totality of life in the process.

In becoming good Europeans—a process the EU, in combination with abstract potentials of globality, inadvertently facilitates—healthy individuals are revaluing the
prevailing values of our hyper-decadent age. This includes challenging the axiomatic narratives propagated by the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity and particularly its representation of democracy as the only legitimate, valid and effective means of affecting social and political change. The inspiring self-discipline (askesis) and passion (eros) of their self-creation (auto-poiesis)—the struggle entailed in their experimental art (Versucherkunst)—is likely to arouse emulation (mimesis). A fundamental transformation of values may follow, along with the establishment of new political myths to ground corresponding attitudes and beliefs about human prosperity, the proper role of cruelty and legitimate authority.

New myths capable of providing the masses with truly life-affirming meanings that galvanize them to their task of working in the service of greatness, to create a genuinely vital higher culture, promise to test anew the possibilities and limits of moral change in the world and initiate the eventual overcoming of liberalism as a living political tradition. As a quantum difference in thought may transform the world, the concerted endeavoring and unconscious expenditure of active force in the positive will to creative destruction as generative power of good Europeans is accelerating salubrious change—the “evolving self-understanding of the meaning and implications of [liberalism’s] central theoretical commitments.”

The experiments and self-overcomings of the thymotic good Europeans Nietzsche envisaged may elevate and ennoble humankind by this means, then serve as a basis for its overcoming. Their attempts to re-naturalize our political order conditions the possibility for the appearance of future Übermenschen – individuals with the requisite vitality to transmute the enfeebling values of our nihilistic age. Not imaginary figures in a salvific
fantasy of redemption, these *kynical* ironists—the good Europeans and highest exemplars of humankind Nietzsche hailed—will discredit the poisonous ascetic-consumerist ideals of our day through comic mockery, to posit viable, life-affirming alternatives that transfigure the human by facilitating innovative, non-linear becomings.
Notes

1 Nietzsche’s “good Europeans”, are the audacious, “preparatory human beings” (GS: 283) and “free spirits” (BGE: p) he hailed as the nomothetic legislators whose involuntary passion would hasten the down-going of a decadent and exhausted European [Western] civilization. In so doing they lay the groundwork, as it were, for the appearance of Übermenschen capable of overcoming the human and initiating a transhuman future.

2 I employ the term ultra-liberal-modern/ity both to convey the intensification of decadence since the late 19th century, which Nietzsche identified as ‘late-modernity’, and to acknowledge that the present is not yet ‘post-modern’. The term ‘ultra-liberal-modernity’ conveys the global extension of the Enlightenment project and ubiquity of the liberal-modern precepts and capital processes typifying the enervated condition it has conferred on contemporary life. An ideological juggernaut, ultra-liberal-modernity is thoroughly reactive, but it is not static, rather it is reflexive and dynamic. It re-interpolates challenges to its prerogatives and contains or punishes dissent. It refracts desire in particular ways, to focusing the attention of consumers whilst distorting perceptions of need. It affectively directs the priorities of both individuals and communities. Informing my use of the concept is Khan’s observation that “the ensemble of attitudes and institutions that are assumed to be coterminous with the idea of modernity are themselves in flux and need to be described as a system of motion.” Khan, 2003: 329.

3 Nietzsche’s conception of “the morality of decadence”, a central feature of his vitalist politics and power ontology, is explicated at (among other places in his oeuvre) TI: skirmishes-35.

4 By “globalization complex” I refer to the inextricably connected and mutually reinforcing machinations of capital-process and the ideology of ultra-liberal-modernity, which consist of the interrelated institutions, processes and forces conventionally associated with globalization. Without reifying the affective capacities engendered by these reactively dynamic processes, they are understood in summa as a power constellation. As such it simultaneously exemplifies and coercively disseminates the nihilistic meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.

5 Conway, 1997a: 20

6 Ibid, citing A: 4

7 Conway, 1997a: 3

8 Conway, 1997b:14
There are numerous examples documenting this position throughout Nietzsche’s texts. See TI: The Four Great Errors, 1 – 8, for a particularly notable example.

Peters, 1967: 42

See WP: 1067

The apodicity and veridicality of Nietzsche’s system (including the will to power hypothesis, corresponding theory of decadence and eternal return of the same) is no more vulnerable to positivistic critique than any of the major systems of speculative philosophy in Western intellectual history.

GS: 112

There are a number of variations and types of liberalism, all of which correspond with a set of shared value presuppositions emphasizing the equality of the individual. Among these differing expressions of the liberal impulse Donnelly distinguishes neo-classical or market oriented economic liberalism; rights based political liberalism the origins of which are found in the works of John Locke, Keynesian neo-liberal economics, and democratization as liberalization. Donnelly, 1998: 156

Donnelly, 1989: 69

See for instance, D: 179 and 184, BGE: 203 and 207, GS: 357, and WP: 783, among others. The modern notion of the individual reduces the multiplicity of a person—more properly understood as a dividuum comprised of competing affective forces—to a modern subject. It is this condition which reduces persons to citizen-constituents, “individuals” vulnerable to the whims of the modern state. This threat necessitates the construction of protective rights against the organizing structure of the community upon which the existence of the protected depends. This contradiction is a result of inconsistencies inbuilt to the nation-state, the preeminent and hegemonic form of political organization in our era. The contradiction is particularly glaring in the case of democratic nation-states, whose legitimacy theoretically derives from the consent of the governed, and which purports to guarantee the security and uphold the innate dignity of a citizenry it ultimately demeans and who rightly distrust it. This topic is revisited throughout this work.

Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology was utilized to great effect in the penetrating works of the French social critic Michel Foucault, who applied his own powerful variation of it to a number of subjects including the development of medical treatment,
the prison and carceral thought, the social construction of sexuality and the category of insanity.

20 Nietzsche’s psychological insights would heavily inspire Freud nearly half a century later.

21 By contrast, Marxian analysis does not provide this; but from a Nietzschean perspective reiterates and intensifies the prerogatives of ascetic-priests of ressentiment in the service of a semi-secularized Christian–Platonic notion of justice. Post-Marxian critical theories do provide it, in proportion to their indebtedness (acknowledged or not) to post-Nietzschean critique. My work draws upon the latter.


23 Stefan Elbe’s “Europe: A Nietzschean Perspective,” is an important secondary text on the crucial link between Nietzsche’s notion of good Europeanism and his idea of Europe in the broader context of his perspectivist epistemological critique of the Christian–Platonic will to truth and the death of God.

24 Conway, 1997b: 94.

25 I use the term “Anglo-European” to refer very generally to the entire, extended European cultural realm, which includes the member-states of the EU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the United States and Canada, and Australia and New Zealand. These are typified by the ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity instantiated in the mutually ramifying and by extension globally hegemonic, if locally varied, institutions of liberal democracy and neo-liberal capital process. Other loci of Anglo-European value norms and practices include Chile, Argentina and Brazil. Non-European majority regions such as the UAE, India, South Africa, Turkey, South Korea, Japan and Hong Kong, among others, have been profoundly transformed by modified variations of these nihilistic values, which arguably dominant in their societies, at least insofar as they prejudice national priorities and drive “development”.

26 On Non-places the erasure of frontiers and the management of transformed social spaces in ultra-liberal-modernity see Augé, 1995.

27 The “quantitative total state” was the liberal-interventionist form of bureaucratic administration Carl Schmitt strongly opposed. He considered it the most obtrusive sort of state, in so far as it attempted to micro-manage the lives of its citizens. Furthermore, he thought it the least organic form of state and contrasted it with what he took to be the Hobbesian, qualitative state. See: Scheuerman, 1999: 215.

28 Hardt and Negri’s idea of “Empire” is itself an ideologically loaded explanation of the imperialistic character of and interpolative capacity of globalization. However, despite its
Marxian excesses, it does provide some fairly insightful perspectives on and apt descriptions of the globalization complex.

29 These include discourse analysis, deconstruction and constructivist approaches, though Nietzsche’s work has also significantly impacted post-Marxian debates in the IP discipline and the field of European integration theory, respectively.

30 John Richardson’s term for Nietzsche’s complicated notion of being as a process of becoming via will-to-power – see his excellent and rightly influential study *Nietzsche’s System*.

31 WP: 708

32 Among eminent Nietzsche scholars who discount the importance of his thought for the political, is Walter Kauffman.

33 WP: 12a

34 As Conway states, “Decadence [as Nietzsche understands it] is predicated not of the visible, corporeal body, but of the “invisible,” instinctual body, the subsystem of drives and impulses that propagates the native vitality of the animal organism. Whereas the visible body invariably (if erratically) manifests the prevailing condition of its governing system of instinctual regulation, only the visible body directly bears the affliction of decadence (Conway, 1997b: 25).”

35 Conway (1997a: 48) explicates this distinction stating that “The political macrosphere comprises the network of relations that obtain between a people’s institutions and its representative exemplars, while the political microsphere comprises those relations between a people and its representative exemplars that are not mediated by social institutions.” Throughout this work I utilize this understanding and also use the terms to distinguish more generally between the community (as the macrosphere) and the individuals comprising it (microsphere) of the socio-political.

36 *Eros* is understood hereinafter, following Hutter, as denoting erotic drive, creative force and an emotional attachment or enthusiasm.

37 Conway, 1997a: 8

38 UM: III–6

39 Conway, 1997a: 8

40 Martin, 1995: 144
Donnelly defines democratization as “the process of establishing electoral democracy.” He states that “Although it might be seen as a type of liberalization, the qualitative leap involved justifies a separate category.” Liberalization, by contrast, “involves a decrease in human rights violations and opening of political space for at least some previously excluded groups, which roughly means progress in civil and political rights short of democratization.” Donnelly, 1998: 157

It may be surprising to many readers to learn that political scientists are not often absorbed by axiological concerns.

On a Nietzschean notion of post-modern anarchism, see Lewis Call’s “Postmodern Anarchism”.

Kaufmann, 1950: 412, 418; contrary to Nietzsche’s opposition to the idolatry of the state and political liberalism, it does not follow that he is, as he asserted in the context of denying any affiliation with political parties of his day (EH: I-3), “antipolitical” in the broader sense Kaufmann takes from the statement. Rather, he is opposed to partisan politics as constituted in a liberal-modern and thoroughly decadent epoch.

Those who dismiss Nietzsche as a bonafide political philosopher must deliberately ignore these parts of his work.

TI: VIII–4

Discourse analysis, textual analysis and historical analysis are the primary methodological tools applied in this study.

“In simplest terms, governmentality refers to the arts and rationalities of governing, where the conduct of conduct is the key activity. It is an attempt to reformulate the governor – governed relationship, one that does not make the relation dependent upon administrative machines, juridical institutions, or other apparatuses that usually get grouped under the rubric of the State.” Pp 4 of the collaborative introduction from “Foucault, Culture Studies and Governmentality”, editors: Bratich, Jack Z., Cameron McCarthy and Jeremy Parker; 2003.

See Althusser, 1984; and Gramsci, 1988 and 1991. It should be noted that the strongly Marxian elements of their respective philosophical analysis are downplayed in this work.

Ibid

Conway, 1997b: 12

On Nietzsche’s views of the law as formative, see BGE: 188; GM: II-2 and III-9; A: 57.
53 Right should here be understood as suggesting ‘warrant’ or ‘authorization’.

54 See Lewis Call’s Post-modern Anarchism, 2002.

55 GM: I-10 and 13

56 GM: I-7 and 8

57 GM: II-12 thru 14

58 In the present, figures such as the late Princess Diana or the business tycoon Bill Gates personify this impulse and corresponding system of values. Gates has famously donated hundreds of millions of dollars to a foundation of his own creation that seeks to find cures for diseases such as malaria and AIDS, toward the amelioration of suffering and—as he imagines—poverty in the “developing” world.

59 WP: 963

60 For the concepts of the simulated (the feigned or ersatz) and simulacrums (copies that lack any original) I here rely on conceptual innovations by Jean Baudrillard, specifically in “Simulacra and simulation” who drew in part on an earlier notion postulated by Pierre Kossowski (author of “Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle”).

61 My use of the notion of ‘spectacle’ and the contemporary ‘spectacular technoculture of everyday life’ derives from Guy Debord’s seminal work “Society of the Spectacle” among other works including post-Situationist Nietzschean studies, including “Nietzsche’s Corps/e and the Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life”, by Geoff Waite (see bibliography).

62 My understanding (and this account) of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics is significantly indebted to both Daniel Conway’s Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols, and his Nietzsche and the Political. For other excellent extended examinations of Nietzsche’s politics see Leslie Paul Theile’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul, Bruce Detwiler’s Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism, and Tracy Strong’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration.

63 HH: II: 2–292

64 HH: I: 475; note that the first volume of Human, All Too Human, was published 1878, two sequels (Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, written in 1879-80 were published latter as the second volume.

65 BGE: 242
An example of the former would include the pledge of allegiance; shrill media pundits exemplify the latter.

See Z: I-11 (On the New Idol)

Lampert, 1986: 55

Smith: 154

This is a term from the early essay *The Greek State*, translated by Carol Diethe. Levy translates the same term “international homeless money hermits” by which Nietzsche aptly referred to the then emerging class of international business owners and monopolists who utterly lacked the positive aspects of the “state instinct”.

Call, pp. 56.

Hutter, pp 60 – 61


Lampert, 1993: 229

A deconstruction of the nation-state must include its evolution and its essential characteristics such as sovereign independence and territorial integrity, in addition to its absolute power to determine and confer formal communal identity and political belonging through citizenship.

See Z: I-11 (On the New Idol)

BGE: 61

Appel: 15. I shall henceforth refer to the modernity of our contemporary era – and all the offshoots of modernity Appel specifies – summarily under the moniker *ultra-liberal-modernity*.

Conway, 1997a: 76
My conception of Empire is only distantly related to Hardt and Negri’s conception of “Empire”. Hardt and Negri define Empire as a totalizing, yet continually shifting and decentered phenomenon: “In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers.” Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiii

On Nietzsche’s view of ‘the hybrid mixed man of Europe’, see BGE: 223; his acceptance of difference should not be conflated with the superficial, and difference annihilating “multi-culturalism” of our ultra-liberal-modern era, the relativistic basis of which is to be found in the axiomatic narratives comprising its meta-discourse.

At GS: 40 Nietzsche distinguishes between the dominant industrial societies that had arisen in Western Europe and the US in the late-19th century and traditional military culture that he favored over the former. Obviously he could not anticipate the merger of industrial society and military culture in the latter half of the 20th century, which would give-rise to a form of militarism that he would have seen as bereft of the merit-bestowing qualities and identity forming honor codes characteristic of traditional European military cultures.

This assertion echoes Debord’s over-arching thesis in ‘Society of the Spectacle’.

I use the term ‘cover-up’ in the Heideggerian sense, as an indeliberate revelation; Freud’s notion of Thanatos is clearly related to Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism.
See “The Gay Science,” “Beyond Good and Evil” and “Twilight of the Idols,” among others of his works.

See the essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral sense”, “Beyond Good and Evil”, and unpublished notes collected as “The Will To Power.”

For Nietzsche’s qualified critique of liberal-modernity and the negative side of the Enlightenment—particularly its Rousseauian strand—see HH: I–26, 150, 463, and II 2–221; D: 197; BGE: 44 (on “the scribbling slaves of the democratic spirit and its ‘modern ideas’”), 46; TI: skirmishes 38, 39, 48, 49; and CW: epilogue.

Nietzsche’s doctrine of will-to-power is complicated and incorrectly understood as being in some way analogous to the metaphysical notion of autonomous agency that plagued Western philosophy. Nietzsche wrote, “The will-to-power not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos – the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge (WP: 636).”

Conway, 1997b: chapters two and three

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari thought these important concepts; I draw them from their respective works and the important application of them by Keith Ansell Pearson (1997).

Ansell-Pearson, 1997: 91

This sentence constitutes a partial response to claims by Lampert, 1986: 55, which it paraphrases.

Kynical is the adverbial / adjectival form of Kynicism, a term derived from the Greek term, kynismos, and has been utilized by Peter Sloterdijk to refer to the playfulness that transfigures cynicism. He defines kynical acts as the “kind of argumentation [which] respectable thinking does not know how to deal with”, “a dialectic of disinhibition” characterized by a “cheekiness” that “gives a new twist to the question of how to say the truth (Sloterdijk, 1987: 101–4).” In Book four I link it with the Cynical doctrine of Parhessia.

Notably, Frankfurt School Critical Theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno did make this discomfiting connection in their ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’, as refugees from Hitler’s Germany.

Plato’s concept of forms, Augustine’s notion of grace, Spinoza’s idea of substance, Leibniz’s theory of monads, Kant’s postulations of synthetic a priori reason and categories, Hegel’s belief in world spirit, Marx’s view of labor, and Rawls’ theory of
justice, are all just as vulnerable to dismissal as indemonstrable metaphysical suppositions.

108 For just a few examples of this single aristocratic aspect of Nietzsche’s broad concern with the subject of beauty see HH: II: 1-118; GS: 85-6, 339; TI: VIII-5, IX-47, A: 57 and in the Nachlass see: August – September 1885, 41 [1 – 16].

109 This is suggested in a modified form by the Frankfurt School’s mid-twentieth century critique of Enlightenment liberal modernity, which had produced the opposite of its original ideals. See Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.

110 BGE: 208. Hardt and Negri’s notion of *Multitude* whose act to resist Empire, bears some, albeit little, relation to Nietzsche’s best or noble types and their enactments of positive will to creative destruction as generative power through active force. For, in so far as Multitude is an inclusive category within which exceptional, pluripotent individuals (irrespective of class, race, gender, etc.) in the nations of Europe (and the world) defy the reactive suppression of difference, they mimetically replicate (if not personify) primary tenets of ultra-liberal-modernity and come to re-comprise a mainly reactive herd. After multiple readings of Empire I am still struck by what seems, in their notion of “Multitude”, to be a transparently obvious palliative for post-Marxians reluctant to disavow their populist and revolutionary sentiments. While they admit they are not speaking of the masses per se, but rather of exceptionally engaged individuals, it is difficult to distinguish the motives or objective of such individuals from the partisan liberal ideologues Nietzsche would have disdained for uncritically replicating the ascetic-materialist herd values of ultra-liberal modernity. It is equally difficult to accept the “revolutionary” potential Hardt and Negri confer upon the Multitude’s insolent and raucous actions when they seem an obvious effort to expand liberal ideals. Regardless, it is such conscientious, concerned individuals who Hardt and Negri assert collectively comprise a large and possibly transformative group, hence “Multitude.” Though I appreciate the inherent optimism of such wordplay, it seems *prima facie* obvious that relative to the hordes of those indifferently consuming in their midst, such individuals hardly represent a “multitude”. A mob of belligerent 20-somethings “demonstrating” in Seattle, Genoa or Prague may be disruptive, but however honorable their efforts, it does not constitute a substantive challenge to the power of the globalization complex, which was humorously demonstrated when the Ministerial Conference of the WTO was moved to Doha, Qatar in November, 2001 – a site so isolated and strictly controlled as to be impossible for protestors to get to. For an examination of the potentials inherent in popular dissent, which Nietzsche’s good European would seek to exploit as a mechanism for achieving their (far more radical) ends, see Bleiker, 2000. His analysis is as simulating and thoughtful as Hardt and Negri’s with the advantage of being significantly less vaporous.
Over a long period we might expect – as Nietzsche hoped – that these acts (and becomings) of ‘good Europeans’ will produce a new specimen, one endowed with exceptional foresight, a few “over” or “super”-men who, out of their own superlative will-to-power, appear preeminent from the fray. The advent of our ‘global age’ (and its positive abstract potential of globality) indicates that this is _emergently_ possible.

For an example of Nietzsche’s disdain of _work_ for its own sake or work undertaken to fend off boredom (as it anticipates “workaholism”, our pathological work fetish), see GS: 42.

The creative types Nietzsche envisaged should be understood in such a way as to exclude nearly all those engaged in producing contemporary popular media and related pap.

Echoing this (and passages in TI) in more provocative language is an unpublished note (WP: 960) in which Nietzsche states, “From now on there will be more favorable preconditions for more comprehensive forms of dominion, whose like has never yet existed. And even this is not the most important thing; the possibility has been established for the production of international racial unions whose task will be to rear a master race, the future "masters of the earth";--a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be made to endure for millennia--a higher kind of man who, thanks to their superiority in will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists upon "man" himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will have a different meaning (WP: 960 1885 – 1886)). This forcefully expresses Nietzsche’s hope and objective for mankind and reiterates significant elements of themes expressed in unpublished prefaces in 1872 particularly _The Greek State_ and _Homer on Competition_. One must take care to learn the subtle meanings of the seemingly familiar terms here, for Nietzsche uses many of them, including “tyrants” and “politics” in a very particular and deliberate sense.

See TI: V-6
By *Dasein*, I take Heidegger’s (Nietzsche-influenced) notion and modify it to suggest the event of *becoming* through which the question of being comes into being, thereby giving rise to the need and ability to discern, elucidate and transform our mode of being – a need realized through Nietzsche’s vitalist symptomatology of affects, which Heidegger largely neglected.

Although the worth of this oft-ballyhooed feature of neo-liberal globalization is regularly asserted by its faithful advocate-apologists – it amounts to better technology for more stupidity, and the “dumbing-down” of the herd (NCW: We Antipodes).

The “last man” is the antipode to the Übermensch, a developmental cul-de-sac who personifies the end of personal growth. The last man as a type represents the terrifying death of becoming through ultimate resignation to the passive-nihilism of our hyper-decadent age. This should not be conflated with ‘the ugliest man’ who, miserable and self-despising but without need of pity, contends with the meaninglessness of life after the ‘death of God,’ prompting Zarathustra’s awareness of the need for the overcoming of man (Z: IV – 7). By contrast, the ‘last man’ is untroubled about meaning or any crisis resulting from its absence, so long as suffering is abolished (Z: P-5; BGE: 202, 225).

*Conation* is a Latin term for the innate propensity or striving of an organism or entity. It is related to eros, and hereafter shall be used in a specifically Nietzschean sense, as the “conative disposition” indicative of certain types of involuntary, erotic enactments of will to power. To the very limited extent that it can be consciously grasped, insofar as it is suggested by an innate proclivity towards life, it is further related to the useful Heideggerian notion of *anticipatory resoluteness*.

*Anankê*, refers to the earlier, pertinent Greek idea of necessity understood as an irrational, undirected element in the universe that conveys a volitional tendency impelling (or impeding) certain actions through/as physical necessity. Throughout the paper I will relate it to *nisus*, the Latin philosophical term conveying the “creative tendency in the universe toward the production of qualitatively new emergents” (definition from *The Harper Collins Philosophy Dictionary*; see bibliography: Angeles, Peter A.). Importantly, each of these interrelated concepts serves both to substantiate and clarify the historical precedents, basis for and the precise meaning of Nietzsche’s central notion of will-to-power.

This should not be taken as a general rejection of development efforts in impoverished regions of the world, but as a practical critique of and view on both the desirability and utility of universalizing contemporary consumerist values (and attendant morality of taming and passive-nihilism) outside the post-industrialized, “developed” economies of Europe, the Anglo-European nations of North America, Australia and New Zealand. It also applies to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Asian “tiger” economies, all of which have already succumbed to the ascetic-consumerist ethos of the West’s secular priests of ressentiment.
Nietzsche’s concern for human evolution has to do with a transformation of comprehension and elevation. It entails an unfolding refinement through an ever-deepened cognizance of life, and that is the sense – versus a simplified or crude neo-Darwinism – in which Nietzsche’s advocated evolution. Without denying his very real interest in the ultimate objective of breeding a ‘new species man,’ Nietzsche would have been appalled by early twentieth century Social Darwinism, and rightly seen its advocates as plebian exponents of a pathetically pseudo-naturalized ressentiment. See Weaver Santaniello’s *Nietzsche, God and the Jews*: pp 74, 87.

Hyper-decadence is meant to connote the exponential intensification of the decadent trends Nietzsche identified in the late nineteenth century across the twentieth century and up to our present. It combines Baudrillard’s apropos critique of the hyper-real condition of contemporary life which Nietzsche’s nineteenth century critique of late-modernity anticipated and to which Baudrillard’s notion is indebted. Nietzsche correctly forecast the inexorable increase of negative forces he identified as characteristic of the decadent, and their culmination in a contemporary “hyper-decadence” in which they automatically naturalize and extend themselves aptly conveys the concentration of late ultra-liberal-modernity’s decadent tendencies and their paralyzing effect on contemporary life.

129 TI: IX–39

130 WP: 887

131 Owen, 1995: 56-7; on the philosophical outlook to which the ascetic ideal gives rise, see Owen, 2007: 124-25.

132 Ibid


134 Smith, 1996: 144–6, citing BGE: 45

135 BGE: 211

136 Smith, 1996: 148

137 Ibid, 147

138 Ibid

139 Elbe, 2002: 37
Aspects of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe are, however counter-intuitively, reflected in certain, however few, protections and guarantees promulgated by EU law.

These provisions take a variety of forms, being legally codified or (especially in the social and cultural realm) adhered to as community wide norms. Nearly all are articulated in the language of protected human rights guarantees. These are considered among the most “progressive” on earth.

The reaction these liberal policies breed takes numerous forms, finding expression in political correctness that imposes strictures on language, for instance.

Nietzsche writes of the ‘supra-European’ way of thinking that characterizes good Europeans at WP 132.

Nietzsche first wrote of ‘good Europeans’ in HH: 475, titled “The European human being and the abolition of nations,” then again in GS: 357 “What is German”, and 377 “We who are homeless”. In BGE he articulates the necessity of the strongest individuals to become good Europeans (or otherwise refers to them) in the preface, 201, 202, 241, 242, 243 and 256. The theme is reiterated in GM: 3-27 echoing GS377; as well as at EH: I: 3 and variously in WP: 117, 132, 405, 765, 783, 868, 1051. The term is sometimes used in quotes to indicate Nietzsche’s self-conscious awareness of its short-hand utility. Good Europeanism in part references the ephectic drive and cultivated stance of skeptical irony informing the conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness of such individuals. It must be understood in the context of his vitalist politics and power ontology.

Nietzsche’s vitalist politics largely consists of his symptomatology of the affects, an evaluative stance that corresponds with his Genealogy of Morality. It implemented his belief that “it is insufficient for philosophers simply to observe cultural practices; they must also interpret these practices as symptomatic of their invisible preconditions,” and
necessitated a performative reversal of perspectives in practice (Conway, 1997b: 79). The primary difficulty with it is that it relies on presuppositions which are contestable: those of his famous assessment of “master” and “slave” moral systems. As Conway notes, “he offers no empirical means of evaluating the merit of his ensuing diagnosis (Conway, 1997b: 81),” however, this fact can in part be accounted for by his perspectivist epistemology and hermeneutics, in the context of which it was developed – and it should be noted that this problem plagues advocates of any evaluative standard, i.e.: the veracity of ultra-liberal-modern values cannot be empirically demonstrated, either, yet its apodicity is widely, if falsely, assumed. Nietzsche’s related power ontology or hypothesis that everything is will to power provides him with a framework for theorizing the impelling force that is all that exists, which I also utilize to conduct this thought experiment and critique.

153 TI: IX–24

By ‘transformation’ I refer primarily to re-presentations of the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity by its institutional arbiters/enforcers to interpolate challenges to it/them, but also to the development of theories explaining integration.

154 Nietzsche is not considered to have done philosophy of science, per se, but to have critiqued the foundations for an appropriate philosophy of science and problematized (what were) conventional prejudices then informing—and in modified form still privileging—scientific practice (e.g.: positivism) as the best means of knowledge creation/acquisition (see Babich, 1994: 2–3). I must emphasize that it is neither my aim here, nor within the scope of my abilities, to give a full accounting of Nietzsche’s thought in the context of 20th century philosophy of science. It can be plausibly argued that aspects of Nietzsche’s thought can be identified with nearly all the major movements of 20th century philosophy of science, due primarily to his anti-dogmatic perspectivalist stance and corresponding disposition toward truth claims and knowledge acquisition.

155 Conway, 1997a: 127–8: “Although Nietzsche unequivocally declares bankrupt the grand, sweeping dream of the Enlightenment, his genealogical method nevertheless celebrates the subversive, unmasking power of local applications of reason. Drawing on a familiar image of Enlightenment, he praises the demystifying power of his Genealogy… If he is to contribute to the self-overcoming of Christian morality, then it must be the case that he too labors in the service of the will to truth, that he too takes his flame ‘from the fire ignited by a faith millennia old, the Christian faith, which was also Plato’s, that God is truth, that truth is divine (GS: 344, cited in GM: III–24).’”

156 Ansell Pearson, 1997: 55

157 Moore, 2002: 8
See, for instance, D: 432–33. In the former, ‘Investigators and experimenters’ Nietzsche anticipates key concerns elaborated a century later by Feyerabend and Hempel; the latter aphorism ‘Seeing with new eyes’, contemplates “the faithful interpretation of actuality,” and “knowledge of reality”, in terms of the beautiful, and ponders the role of the artist in the age of science.

His critique anticipates some of the insights developed according to a much different will to truth by philosophers of science a century later, for instance, in notions as diverse as Popper skepticism and aversion to dogmatism (set forth in The Open Society and The Logic of Scientific Discovery), Kuhn (the dependence of truth on a dominant scientific paradigm or worldview (Weltanschauung), and those of Feyerabend (incommensurability of theoretical stances). However, Nietzsche rejected the fetishization of rationalism and progressivism characteristic of much 20th century philosophy of science, seeing in their scientific ideal of truth a correspondence with metaphysical and moral prejudices.

Babich, 1994: 3

Babich, 1994: 147; Not so paradoxically however, the contemporary normative social science practices of which Nietzsche would likely have approved (versus efforts to apply analytical and/or quantitative methods to the study of social processes) could only have developed within the context of—and so are themselves a product of—the anti-natural, ultra-liberal-modern ideals to whose ends they were developed and are employed. Furthermore, when taken to their logical limits they inevitably lead to the recognition of the radical contingency of all knowledge claims. However, unlike in Nietzschean perspectivalism where this can be understood as productive, it results in a paralyzing relativism in the context of conventional social science practice, which presents a quixotic aporia for the latter’s most intellectually honest practitioners. (It is not much of a crisis for the average academic social scientist however, as they generally do not pursue the logic of their methods so far, selectively employing various methods as they fit their immediate aims. They are able as a consequence to maintain their comfortable faith in the univocality of reason and “Truth”.)

TI: V-4 and VII-5

Conway, 1997b: 56

Again, see Conway, 1997a: 47-8

Again, kynicism is a derivation of the Greek term, kynismos, and has been utilized by Peter Sloterdijk to refer to the playfulness that transfigures cynicism. He defines kynical acts as the “kind of argumentation [which] respectable thinking does not know how to deal with”, “a dialectic of disinhibition” characterized by a “cheekiness” that “gives a new twist to the question of how to say the truth (Sloterdijk, 1987: 101–4).”
Nietzsche’s concern with evidentiary proofs for his hypotheses is suggested at TI: IX–20, among other places.

See BGE: 34, a passage in which Nietzsche argues that “The faith in “immediate certainties” is a moral naïveté that reflects honor on us philosopher; but—after all we should not be “merely moral” men. Apart from morality, this faith is a stupidity…”, and that “there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and appearances…” and BGE: 36, where he suggests, by way of challenging Western “faith in causality,” that the world might be credibly understood as the sum product of our drives, the reality of which could plausibly be understood in terms of “one basic form of the will, namely of the will to power.”

Philosophical critics have observed serious problems with the presuppositions of his critique of values in ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’, observing, for instance, that his account omits certain inconvenient facts about the very evidence it employs to make his case, such as his attempt to establish an ultimately arbitrary correspondence between master morality and health and slave morality and weakness. These are problems of unwarranted assumptions and argumentative circularity that at some level plague all philosophical works, a fact that Nietzsche would have seen as underscoring his view that all truth is perspectively contingent upon the sort of life that compels us to posit values and which is symptomatized by those value standards. For the purposes of my application of his vitalist politics and power ontology to contemporary Europe, I largely set aside such objections to his arguments and proceed according to the specified strains within the secondary literature.

Babich, 1994: 5

Feyerabend famously rejected epistemological prescriptions, advocating methodological anarchism, in which the only guiding principle for scientists pursuing knowledge should be: anything goes. See his provocative work ‘Against Method’, pp 9 - 19.

Babich, 1994: 5

Conway, 1997b: 7, citing CW: P
The challenge of overcoming the decadence of our ultra-liberal-modern age does not reverse the effects of decadence and their consequences; rather it seeks to establish a radically different order through a creative discipline (poiesis and askesis) of great suffering.

See Twilight of the Idols: Whether we have become more moral.

This is suggested in a modified form by the Frankfurt School’s mid-twentieth century critique of Enlightenment liberal modernity, which had produced the opposite of its original ideals. See Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment.

BGE: 208. A note on Hardt and Negri’s notion of Multitude, which is somewhat analogous to Marx’s proletariat; the radicalized individuals who concertedly act to resist ‘Empire’, is antithetical to Nietzsche’s aristocratic elitism where the best or noble types
rule in a naturally ordered polity. While Hardt and Negri assert that they are not speaking of the masses per se, but rather of exceptionally engaged individuals, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the motives or objective of such individuals as they describe from the partisan liberal ideologues Nietzsche would have disdained for uncritically replicating the ascetic-materialist herd values of ultra-liberal modernity. It is equally difficult to accept the “revolutionary” potential Hardt and Negri confer upon the Multitude’s insolent and raucous actions when they seem an obvious effort to expand liberal ideals. Regardless, it is such conscientious, concerned individuals who Hardt and Negri assert collectively comprise a large and possibly transformative group, hence “Multitude.” Though I appreciate the inherent optimism of such wordplay, it seems prima facie obvious that relative to the hordes of those indifferently consuming in their midst, such individuals hardly represent a “multitude”, so conceived.

197 Over a long period we might expect – as Nietzsche hoped – that these acts (and becomings) of ‘good Europeans’ will produce a new specimen, one endowed with exceptional foresight, a few “over” or “super”-men who, out of their own superlative will to power, appear preeminent from the fray. The advent of our ‘global age’ (and its positive abstract potentials of globality) indicates that this is emergently possible.

198 This practically defines the contemporary condition/affliction of hyper-decadence.


200 Examples of recently re-emerging ontological essentialisms and conflicts they have fomented include the former Yugoslavia, conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Darfur / Sudan civil war, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts in Indonesia and Central Africa. In Western Europe it has taken the form of anti-immigrant movements, the erratic—but generally growing—support for ultra-nationalist parties and even a resurgence in Communist party support in Central and Eastern Europe.

201 An algodicy is an interpretation and/or explanation of human suffering.

202 Specifically the logic of self-determination, which the UN charter instantiates in law, as well as the developing corpus of human rights law, also set forth in the charter, holds this exciting and authentically life-affirming potential.

203 Elbe, 2003: 119

204 For an example of Nietzsche’s disdain of work for its own sake, efforts to dignify it or work undertaken to fend off boredom (as it anticipates “workaholism”, our pathological work fetish), see GS: 42.

205 D: 175
The creative types Nietzsche envisaged should be understood in such a way as to exclude nearly all those engaged in producing contemporary popular media and related anti-cultural pap.

Echoing this in more provocative language is an unpublished note (WP: 960) in which Nietzsche states, “From now on there will be more favorable preconditions for more comprehensive forms of dominion, whose like has never yet existed. And even this is not the most important thing; the possibility has been established for the production of international racial unions whose task will be to rear a master race, the future "masters of the earth";--a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants will be made to endure for millennia--a higher kind of man who, thanks to their superiority in will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists upon "man" himself. Enough: the time is coming when politics will have a different meaning (WP: 960 1885 – 1886)). This forcefully expresses Nietzsche’s hope and objective for mankind and reiterates significant elements of themes expressed in unpublished prefaces in 1872 particularly The Greek State and Homer on Competition.

One must take care to learn the subtle meanings of the seemingly familiar terms here, for Nietzsche uses many of them, including “tyrants” and “politics” in a very particular and deliberate sense.

Although the worth of this oft-ballyhooed feature of neo-liberal globalization is dogmatically exaggerated by its faithful advocate-apologists – it amount to little more than “better technology for more stupidity,” as a former professor of mine was fond of saying.
214 The “last man” is the antipode to the Übermensch, a developmental cul-de-sac who personifies the end of personal growth. The last man as a type represents the terrifying death of becoming through ultimate resignation to the passive-nihilism of our hyper-decadent age. This should not be conflated with ‘the ugliest man’ who, miserable and self-despising but without need of pity, contends with the meaninglessness of life after the ‘death of God,’ prompting Zarathustra’s awareness of the need for the overcoming of man (Z: IV – 7). By contrast, the ‘last man’ is untroubled about meaning or any resultant crisis for its absence, so long as suffering is abolished (Z: P-5; BGE: 202, 225). See further notes for other references.

215 Conation is a Latin term for the innate propensity or striving of an organism or entity. It is related to eros, and here used in a specifically Nietzschean sense, as the “conative disposition” indicative of certain types of involuntary enactments of will to power. To the very limited extent that it can be parsimoniously defined, insofar as it is suggested by an innate proclivity towards life, it is related to the useful Heideggerian notion of “anticipatory resoluteness”.

216 Anankê (or Anangke) refers to the classical Greek idea of necessity understood as “that inner force which impels certain things to be done or prevents them from being done… the physical necessity understood as the constantly present, irrational, nonpurposeful, undirected and uncontrolled element in the universe”. Throughout the paper I will relate it to nisus, the Latin philosophical term conveying the “creative tendency in the universe toward the production of qualitatively new emergents” (Angeles, 1992: 11 & 204). Importantly, each of these interrelated concepts serves as substantiating and clarifying historical precedents for Nietzsche’s central theory of will to power.

217 Bernstein, 2002: 121; paraphrasing Kristeva, 1982


219 There are innumerable examples of this in contemporary Western societies. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s focus on curing Malaria and aiding African nations exemplifies this trend. Such projects resonate with Western humanitarians while avoiding the scrutiny and controversy that would arise if they were to tackle difficult socio-economic disparities in the developed world, particularly the United States, where Gates earned the larger part of his fortune. Another excellent example is the fashion of micro-loans to small businesses in the Third-world, which can be done online by credit-card, thereby assuaging the shame of donors, who may or may not be aware of the fact that just a few blocks away homeless people go hungry or even freeze to death on America’s city streets.

220 This should not be taken as a general rejection of development efforts in impoverished regions of the world, but as a practical critique of and view on both the desirability and utility of universalizing contemporary consumerist values (and attendant morality of taming and passive-nihilism) outside the post-industrialized, “developed” economies of
Europe, the Anglo-European nations of North America, Australia and New Zealand. It also applies to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Asian “tiger” economies, all of which have already succumbed to the ascetic-consumerist ethos of the West’s secular priests of ressentiment.

221 Nietzsche’s concern for human evolution has to do with a transformation of comprehension and elevation. It entails an unfolding refinement through an ever-deepened cognizance of life, and that is the sense – versus a simplified or crude neo-Darwinism – in which Nietzsche’s advocated evolution. Without denying his very real interest in the ultimate objective of breeding a ‘new species man,’ Nietzsche would have been appalled by early twentieth century Social Darwinism, and rightly seen its advocates as plebian exponents of a pathetically pseudo-naturalized ressentiment. See Weaver Santaniello’s *Nietzsche, God and the Jews*: pp 74, 87.

222 Hyper-decadence is meant to connote the exponential intensification of the decadent trends Nietzsche identified in the late nineteenth century across the twentieth century and up to our present. It combines Baudrillard’s apropos critique of the hyper-real condition of contemporary life which Nietzsche’s nineteenth century critique of late-modernity anticipated and to which Baudrillard’s notion is indebted. Nietzsche correctly forecast the inexorable increase of negative forces he identified as characteristic of the decadent, and their culmination in a contemporary “hyper-decadence” in which they automatically naturalize and extend themselves aptly conveys the concentration of late ultra-liberal-modernity’s decadent tendencies and their paralyzing effect on contemporary life.

223 Through kynical acts, comedians of ascetic ideals expose the absurdity and counter-productive effects of anti-human values. Their playful scorn, or seeming buffoonery, dis-empowers conventional authorities whose interests the nihilistic status-quo serves, and who are unable to respond effectively to the undermining of their credibility.

224 TI: IX–39

225 WP: 887


228 Smith, 1996: 144–6, citing BGE: 45

229 BGE: 211

230 Smith, 1996: 147-8

231 Ibid, 147
Aspects of Nietzsche’s idea of Europe are, however counter-intuitively, reflected in certain, however few, protections and guarantees promulgated by EU law. These provisions take a variety of forms, being legally codified or (especially in the social and cultural realm) adhered to as community wide norms. Nearly all are articulated in the language of protected human rights guarantees. These are considered among the most “progressive” on earth.

The reaction these liberal policies breed takes numerous forms, finding expression in political correctness that imposes strictures on language and behavior, for instance.

GS: 270 and 335; Nietzsche’s conception of masterly virtues should not be misconstrued in terms of an imposition of power-over-others or traditional oppression, tyrannical authority or coercive power relations, but as an incorporation of weaker powers into stronger ones in ever-evolving power aggregations.

Nietzsche first wrote of ‘good Europeans’ in HH: 475, titled “The European human being and the abolition of nations,” then again in GS: 357 “What is German”, and 377 “We who are homeless”. In BGE he articulates the necessity of the strongest individuals to become good Europeans (or otherwise refers to them) in the preface, 201, 202, 241, 242, 243 and 256. The theme is reiterated in GM: 3-27 echoing GS377; as well as at EH: I: 3 and variously in WP: 117, 132, 405, 765, 783, 868, 1051. The term is sometimes used in quotes but should not be taken as an ironic trope. By placing the term in quotes Nietzsche meant to acknowledge his self-conscious awareness of its short-hand utility and convey this to his readers. Good Europeanism references a broad and cultivated philosophical stance as well as a corresponding conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness that must be understood in the context of his vitalist politics and power ontology.
For the concepts of simulation I here rely on conceptual innovations by Jean Baudrillard, specifically in “Simulacra and simulation” which draws in part on an earlier notion postulated by Pierre Kossowski (author of “Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle”) and simulacrums (the replication of essential attributes without reference to an original copy; a referent’s lack of any original).

Sartre, 1984: 112 – 113; The ‘Faith’ of Bad Faith: “Bad faith does not hold the norms and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith. …Bad faith apprehends evidence but it is resigned in advance to not being fulfilled by this evidence, to not being persuaded and transformed into good faith.”

My use of the notion of ‘spectacle’ and the contemporary ‘spectacular technoculture of every day life’ derives from Guy Debord’s seminal work “Society of the Spectacle” among other works including post-Situationist Nietzschean studies, including “Nietzsche’s Corps/e and the Spectacular Technoculture of Everyday Life”, by Geoff Waite (see bibliography). It also draws on Baudrillard’s notion of spectacle, which goes beyond Debord’s notion of expanded commodity fetishism, conceiving it as processions of simulacra that transform material reality into pure representation simulating reality (Morrison, 1998: 203).

Colm Hogan, 2001: 40, 43; Hogan also usefully examines the operation of ‘interest differentiation’ and ‘microhierarchization’ in the construction of socio-economic interests and desire—vis forces of conformity—in advanced capitalist democracies of the West (47–48). On the ‘New Economy’ consensus, and its myriad simulations of a thoroughly homogenizing non-conformity and putative celebration of “outside-the-box” thinking by individuals whose myopic worldview inhibits them from actually perceiving the “box”, see Frank, 2000: 18–19.

As stated in Book One, my understanding (and this account) of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics is significantly indebted to both Daniel Conway’s Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols, and his Nietzsche and the Political. For other excellent extended examinations of Nietzsche’s politics see Leslie Paul Theile’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul, Bruce Detwiler’s Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism, and Tracy Strong’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration.

HH: II: 2–292

HH: I: 475; note that the first volume of Human, All Too Human, was published 1878, two sequels (Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and His Shadow, written in 1879-80 were published later as the second volume.
252 BGE: 242

253 BGE: 254

254 BGE: 242

255 BGE: 256

256 GS: 377; Cf. A: 36

257 I do not mean to suggest that Europe can be described in terms of a simple dyadic binary distinguishing those who support Europe and those opposed to it. The vast majority of Europe’s citizen–constituents are somewhere in the middle, between these camps. The majority recognize that unification has benefited them, but maintain somewhat ill-formed notions and incoherent reservations about the Union’s hasty expansion. There is also widespread reluctance to approve a deeper political merger occurring prematurely or in a way that erodes democratic accountability. Nonetheless, the reductive binary of Europhile versus Europhobe does capture some fundamental aspects of the debate.

258 Sloterdijk, 1987: 5

259 See Z: I-11(On the New Idol)

260 Lampert, 1986: 55

261 Smith, 1996: 154

262 This is a term from the early essay The Greek State, translated by Carol Diethe. Levy translates the same term “international homeless money hermits” by which Nietzsche aptly referred to the then emerging class of international business owners and monopolists who utterly lacked the positive aspects of the “state instinct”.

263 Call, 2002: 56

264 Hutter, pp 60 – 61

265 See Z: I-11 (On the New Idol)

266 BGE: 61

267 Appel: 15. I shall henceforth refer to the modernity of our contemporary era –and all the offshoots of modernity Appel specifies – summarily under the moniker ultra-liberal-modernity.
My conception of Empire is only distantly related to Hardt and Negri’s conception of “Empire”. Hardt and Negri define Empire as a totalizing, yet continually shifting and decentered phenomenon: “In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers.” Hardt and Negri, 2000: xiii. Despite their assertions to the contrary, this goes too far in the direction of a metaphysical ontology for me, given the specificity of the institutions, processes and forces driving globalization and the apodictic of their effects upon the lives of billions. In fact there are loci of globalization’s power, which definitely does establish barriers to exclude an outside from its central power constellations. Furthermore, in performing many of its key functions—all of which relate to the universal dissemination and enforcement of the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity—it remains quite blatantly imperialistic. It is imperialistic in the cultural chauvinism of its fundamental tenets and through highly sophisticated and sublimated means of deployment. It also covers up the imperialistic nature of its action by deploying spectacles of fulfillment, simulated existential meaning and ontological purpose; the provision of a ready-made, massifying “reason for being” for the enfeebled homunculi it has reduced to and manages as “consumers”.

On Nietzsche’s view of ‘the hybrid mixed man of Europe’, see BGE: 223

Aristotle, Metaphysics: 980a

WP: 898

Rawls, 1971: 3–4

Van Ham, 2001: 135

Ibid: 159
See BGE: 26 and 27. This should not be taken as implying that Nietzsche was opposed to science. Rather, he opposed its privileging above all other values, saying “the objective person…the ideal scholar in whom the scientific instinct, after thousands of total and semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end, is certainly one of the most precious instruments there are; but he belongs in the hand of one more powerful. [The scientist] is genuine only insofar as he may be objective. [He is] a precious, easily injured and clouded instrument for measuring… but he is no goal, no conclusion and sunrise… (BGE: 207).” In radically deconstructing the conventional notion of cause–effect relations he asserted “one should use ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ only as pure concepts, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and communication—not for explanation. In the ‘in-itself’ there is nothing of ‘causal connections,’ of ‘necessity,’ or of ‘psychological non-freedom’; there the effect does not follow the cause, there is no rule of ‘law.’ It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, for-each-other, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol world into things as if it existed ‘in itself’ we act once more as we have always acted—mythologically (BGE: 21).”

These include the discourses of rationalism and universalism, for example.

Sloterdijk, 1987: 5

WP: 866

The anti-human trends promoted by the ascetic ideologues of unregulated free markets and populist democracy may be productively subverted by attempters whose individual regimes of self-creation and discipline inevitably revalue the dissipative values subtending these institutions.

Babich: 204 – 5. Also see BT: 15 and 18, for early indications of Nietzsche’s critique of science.

To reiterate note two above, the discourses of scientism coextend with and ramify those of liberal-modernity, i.e.: rationalism, universalism, progressivism, secularism and humanism.

See MacIntyre, 1998 (excerpted from ‘Whose Justice?, Which Rationality?’): 183–84; and Ricci, 1984: 3–4, 90–91

It is interesting to note that the positivistic orientation that dominates most academic studies by the discourses of scientism occurred during the late 19th century’s age of nationalism, when the logic of self-determination and identic particularism (ethnic, racial, religious, etc.) drove the disparate constituent peoples of various European Empires to pursue sovereign autonomy via independent statehood. Political Science, as a distinct
academic discipline, arose in the late 19th century (largely and almost concurrently in the United States and the United Kingdom), at the same time ideology came to dominate Anglo-European politics and made a fetish of the state. Both the discourses of scientism and nationalism are coextending products of the logic (or technological rationality) of liberal-modernity, which was then reaching its late stages. Shortly after Nietzsche’s death it would culminate in the violent dissolution of those empires and the Holocaust. The same nihilistic impulse is still evident today, as the breakup of the former Yugoslavia demonstrates.

291 The central tenet of Nietzsche’s epistemology is that all ‘knowledge’ is perspectivally contingent; “truth” insofar as it can be said to exist, is always conditioned by the experiencing “subject” (GS: 354; GM: III-12). It is not correctly understood as a simplistic “Protagorean” sort of relativism. See Wilcox (1974) chapters 4 and 5; Owen (1995) pp. 32-39; Conway (1997a) pp. 130-33; Richardson (1996) pp. 36-38, 200, 218-19, 226-28, and 263-64.


294 Prominent theorists of supranational institutionalism include Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stonesweet.

295 This is not to deny that these perspectives – as well as their advocates – are mutually understood as bitterly opposed in their own superficial, partisan political terms.

296 Rosamund, 2000: 161

297 See Ricci, 1984: 118-19, on ‘The Scientific Community’ and the problem of the acceptance of scientific propositions, such as the 19th century belief in the inherently unequal status of races, as well as Popper’s response to the danger of such undo endorsement, that being a scientific “spirit of experimentation” in the open society he envisaged.

298 It is Nietzsche’s dilemma as well, exemplified by his postulation of Will to power as the prime agency in the world, which arguably shifted the “ultimate” cause in the world onto a different metaphysical grounding, than those of conventional science. Hence a significant part of Heidegger’s contention that Nietzsche was the last metaphysician.
The terms ‘not showing’ and ‘announcing’ are Heideggerian, and enable us to comprehend a hidden dynamic of the disclosure that occurs in much science.

For an example of innovative critical perspectives on theories of European integration, Peterson (2001) considers whether integration theorists are developing theories that actually vie with one another, as they generally believe they do. He contends that major schools explain different outcomes at different levels in a multilevel system of governance, leading to misleading debates between ultimately compatible theories that masquerade as rivals. He argues that there is dearth of a credible general theory of EU governance and this raises particular dilemmas for theorists in choosing which type of outcome they wish to explain.

It is known that prominent theorists in the field believe so dogmatically in the “truth” of their differing perspectives on integration that they nurture stultifying personal animosities for one another.

Diez and Wiener, pp 2, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004

Rosamund, 2000: xi

Hass, 1971: 18; cited in Rosamund, 2000: 11; emphasis added

Chrysssochoou, 2001: 14

These assumptions legitimate and naturalize the grounds for and development of the EU as an Urstaat, or totalizing, molar polity in Deleuze’s sense.

What practical significance it does attain / provide, is not necessarily applicable outside the unique case of European integration. Philosophically it serves (redundantly) to reinforce assumptions always-already present in the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity.

Chrysssochoou, 2001: 15

There is nearly perfect correspondence between the ideological presuppositions of the major schools of European integration theory and the Copenhagen Criteria, which were agreed upon in June 1993 and specify the criteria for applicant state accession to the EU. These include liberal democratic political and legal institutions that comply with human rights norms and protect ethnic and cultural minorities from discrimination, a free market
economy and the institutional capacity to adopt and abide by the numerous obligations of membership et forth in the Acquis Communautaire. As far as I know, the values upon which the EU is founded are not interrogated anywhere in the literature on European integration.

313 Diez and Wiener, pp 3, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004

314 The significance of the differences between the approaches is quite exaggerated both in order to keep the scholarship vital (the academic stake) and for transparently partisan political reasons. For instance, scholars fiercely dispute whether the EU is integrating Europe along essentially neo-liberal, state-centric intergovernmental lines or whether the EU is not actually more characteristic of a set of supranational institutions that are incrementally supplanting the authority of decreasingly relevant nation states. In my estimation the answer is clearly both. Europe’s integration is a symbiotic process of intergovernmental cooperation that is giving rise to a set of supranational institutions (under the rubric of the EU) that has begun to dictate the terms of its member states’ cooperation and enforce a distinct will that shall eventually supplant its individual nation-state members themselves as the preeminent political authority on thoroughly integrated continent. Each state’s respective mask may still slightly differ, but the actors wearing them are all players in the same carnival.


316 However, it must be said that in ideological terms the spectrum of viewpoints represented in the academic realm is much narrower than in the partisan political arena. Whereas within the former (academic realm) there is general agreement on certain liberal premises, in the latter (partisan political arena) extreme nationalist groups, far-left Greens and reformed communists all compete for public attention, though the necessity of parliamentary coalition building tends to attenuate the radicalism of these political factions, once elected.

317 The EU’s website, named Europa is accessible (English language) at: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm.

318 An excellent example of the effort to be relevant and justify itself as such is the Europe Direct service, through which citizens can contact an expert for answers and practical information about the EU via telephone, email or by going to an information center in their community. See: http://ec.europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm.

319 See the ‘Have your say’ page, at: http://europa.eu/debateeurope/index_en.htm

320 The ‘European Cultural Foundation’ website on Advocacy Actions, at: http://www.eurocult.org/we-advocate/advocacy-actions/, accessed June 2008. Also see the EU Europa website page on the Commission’s decision to declare 2008 the
‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’, in order that the EU create a single means by which to raise awareness and promote the cultural sphere with a view to encouraging EU inhabitants to manage cultural diversity, at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l29017.htm.

321 This was most evident in the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which failed to pass and so was re-held immediately the following year; likewise the Irish voted against the Treaty of Nice, a defeat of the EU agenda intolerable to its “elites” and so-called “leaders” in both Brussels and Dublin; the next year it was repeated so that the “correct” result could be achieved, after which no referendum was held on the question again. In both Denmark and Ireland many of these respective treaties’ opponents protested such cynical and manipulative tactics, but to no avail.

322 The “higher men” Nietzsche scorns are vulgarians and buffoons—masters only within the mob (Z: IV-11 and 13). They are clearly antithetical to the \textit{Übermenschlich} types such as described by Zarathustra in ‘On Human Prudence (Z: II-21)’.

323 Thomas Risse: pp 170, in Wiener and Diez, eds, 2004

324 Tsoukalis, 2003: 170

325 Colm Hogan, 2001: 122

326 Underscoring this point, Wilmer observes that normalizing terminology “serve[s] to maintain a political order which in turn generates a reflexive and tautological discourse deployed to disarm contestations that might disrupt or subvert that order (Wilmer, 2002: 59)”.

327 This understanding combines Adorno’s seminal critique of the modern culture industry, through the massifying process of which a mediated “[r]eality becomes its own ideology through the spell cast by its faithful duplication (Adorno, 1991: 63)”, with Taylor’s notion of a ‘social imaginary’, by which he refers to “the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellow, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations (Taylor, 2004: 23).”

328 WP: 584

329 Nietzsche maintained that every philosophical work was, wittingly or not, autobiographical and therefore symptomatic of its author’s strength and vitality.


331 Dewey, 1929: 196
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s publication of Pan-Europa in 1923 launched a formal effort to establish a cosmopolitan trans-national alliance of individuals committed to the neo-Kantian ideals of a unified Europe. Their concept of Europe as a political idea would find echoes in the Kellogg-Briand Pact—whose signatories renounced war—(1928), and Coudenhove-Kalergi expounded an anti-fascist position consistent with his pan-European ideals in his 1938 work *The Totalitarian State Against Man*. This contrasts with recent efforts among European far-right nationalist parties which have quixotically combined in an anti-cosmopolitan pan-European movement opposing European integration. Their ‘Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS) Party’, briefly enjoyed official status as a party in the EU Parliament, until the “Italian MEP Alessandra Mussolini, the grand-daughter of fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, reportedly described Romanians as ‘habitual law-breakers’,” prompting the Romanian delegation to resign in protest. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7086986.stm. For details about the constitution of the group and its 20 MEPs, See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6249513.stm.

Despite its initial “failure” (for being rejected by voters in national referenda in both France and the Netherlands), the content of the original constitution remains ninety percent intact according to some accounts. See: *EU treaty 'same as Constitution'* at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7034052.stm; and ‘*The EU treaty, What Lisbon Contains*’ at: http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=3833071&story_id=10024471; the EU’s rather self-serving webpage promoting the treaty:
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm; and the full text of the Lisbon Treaty, at: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm. The veritable imposition of the constitution upon the EU citizens via the Lisbon Treaty underscores what an elite driven project the EU is. Still, the treaty must be ratified by democratically elected member-state governments to take effect, so it is quite difficult to plausibly argue that it is in any sense illegitimate or undemocratic.

345 Mitrany, 1966: 68


347 Ibid: 57 – 58

348 Ibid: 57

349 Ibid: 43

350 Chryssochoou, 2001: 41


352 Henig, 2002: 15

353 Ibid.


355 Ibid: 45 – 51

356 Mitrany, cited in Rosamund, 2000: 34


358 Chryssochoou: 2001, 41
By the late 20th century Michel Foucault (along with other post-structuralists and post-moderns) would articulate a liberal relativist, genealogical interpretation of knowledge (while rightly acknowledging his significant intellectual indebtedness to Nietzsche) and would cast doubt on the authority of all knowledge and rationalities, as power – knowledge regimes that arrogate the determination of truth to themselves and perpetuate themselves discursively, comprising technologies of the self that formatively, constructively discipline individuals and communities through affective mechanisms of “bio-power”.

Innumerable functionalist technical bodies and specialized agencies oversee the administration of social programs in most nation-states today. The UN is comprised of many, as are bureaucratic apparati in the US and the EU. Albertini referred to the ‘unitary trap’, which identified the “dilemma” that states’ faced in trying to solve common problems separately – one that compelled the functional imperative to European integration, which rejected permanent divisions of authority and ignored the alleged need of a governing constitution (as cited in Chryssochoou and paraphrased here; Chryssochoou: 2001, 41).

Hooghe and Marks: 20 – 21 (Multi-Level Governance in the EU)

372 Haas: 12

373 Chryssochoou: 54

374 Rosamund, 2000: 55

375 Haas, 1968: 388 – 9

376 Haas’s dictum, from Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 450; cited in Chryssochoou: 54

377 The (theoretical and practical) recognition of the inevitability of new bureaucratic forms of management and organization echoes Max Weber’s earlier observation that the most rational form of legitimate authority is the hierarchic, bureaucratic sort of administrative governance by the most qualified. See Weber’s Economy and Society.

378 From a long historical perspective the Treaty of Versailles and establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 as well as the founding of the UN in 1945 are also formative moments in the arc of modernity’s process of elite socialization, edifying the neo-functionalist intuition that increased cooperation gradually subordinates inter-state conflict and broadens elite perceptions of the national interest.

379 Chryssochoou, 2001: 54

380 Sloterdijk, 1987: 5

381 Debord, 44: “The spectacle is a permanent opium war which aims to make people identify [existential and ontological] goods with commodities and satisfaction with survival that increases according to its own laws. But if consumable survival is something which must always increase, this is because it continues privation. If there is nothing beyond increasing survival, this is not because it is beyond privation but because it is enriched privation.” Debord points out the negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power of ascetic—consumerist priests of ressentiment in observing the fatuousness of their objective: enriched privation. In ultra-liberal-modern society new and improved commodities are the highest goods, “goods” in a dual sense equally imbued with existential importance. They are acquired not through proper training, critical reflection and a virtuous life, but by purchase. Their significance lies in their function as moral-ethical surrogates for all other forms of action. The satisfaction with a materially improved survival to which Debord refers suggests – if not reiterates – Nietzsche’s contempt for the ‘last man’ who content, passively accepts the condition he finds himself in as the best of all possible worlds. “We have invented happiness,” say the last men,
and they blink (Z, I-P: 5)’, happily existing in a dazed state of unreflective indifference to life, which is stripped of all greater significance and marketed back to them as perfect.

382 Rosamund, 2000: 73

383 Rosamund, 2005: 251

384 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2006) *Interwar and Postwar Ideas of Europe*, in *Debates on European Integration, A Reader; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed.:* 31

385 Rosamund, 2000: 44


387 Chryssochoou, 2001: 50

388 Rosamund, 2000: 43


390 Deutsch, 1966: ch.10

391 A central motive in the Treaty of Rome establishing the ECSC was increasing cooperation—and by extension, reliance and familiarity—between Germany and its neighbors (especially its historic rival France).


393 Chryssochoou, 2001: 50


395 Chryssochoou, 2001: 50

396 The Scandinavian countries’ relations, like those between the United States and Canada, make the point rather well.

397 The EU’s relations with Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Croatia and Israel, among others, as well as the (changed) attitudes among the populations of those non-EU states, demonstrate this point.


400 Rosamund, 2000: 43

401 Chryssochoou, 2001: 50 – 51

402 Rosamund, 2000: 44

403 Ibid: 44 – 45

404 Deutsch, et al., 1969: 81

405 Chryssochoou, 2001: 50

406 Ibid.


408 BT: 15

409 Puchala, 1972: 267

410 Ibid: 276

411 Ibid: 272

412 Ibid: 278

413 Ibid: 277

414 Chryssochoou, 2001: 86

415 Badie observes that: “Political models are not necessarily exported consciously; nor is such an exportation part of a plot or, even less, a ‘Western stratagem,’ …The most effective exportation has often been the most diffuse, carried by the configuration of power that has structured a worldwide, international order since the end of the eighteenth century, activated and reactivated by the claim to universalism that characterized the Western political construct (2000: pp 8).”
Hatab, 1995: 118; Using Nietzsche’s concern for authentic agonism as a basis for the attainment of higher culture against his tendency to essentialize individuals and groups according to type, Hatab concludes (in part) that “no person can be essentially devalued to the point of being excluded from the political order because of a presumption of some kind of fundamental, unalterable inferiority (119).” Had Nietzsche studied the matter—and existing forms of political organization—more carefully, he might have recognized that the United States of America represents the initial modern attempt to contend with this dilemma according to its founding ideals, insofar as it strove to realize a viable alternative to the intrinsic problem of the European nation-state, predicated on a majority ethno-national affiliation and other deleterious ontological essentialisms.

Maas, 2007: 75

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, 2006 (Theorizing the Common Market: Neo-functionalism and its Critics; Introduction): 103; in Debates on European Integration, A Reader. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed.

Ibid: 102

Hoffmann, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, 1966. In Debates on European Integration, A Reader; pp 135; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., (2006).

Rosamund, 2000: 78; Chryssochoou, 2001: 65

Rosamund, 2000: 77

Section and citation: Rosamund, 2000: 76 – 77


Hoffmann, 1995: 75 (Obstinate or Obsolete? 1966)

Hoffmann, 1995: 311 (Goodbye to a United Europe? 1993)

Chryssochoou, 2001: 43

Elazar, 1998: 5, 40, 50 and 53

Nietzsche arguably reified a different set of particularisms, and anyway never persuasively stripped his central notion of will to power, which in a very real sense serves as his ultimate foundation or logos, of metaphysical characteristics.

Rosamund, 2000: 87-88

597
Within the framework of Nietzsche’s vitalist politics and power ontology, characterizing the precepts of a theory, or acts of theorizing, in terms of its active or reactive disposition, helps illuminate what a particular theory, or meta-theoretical stance (such as the positivistic orientation compelled by the discourse of scientism) takes for—and sets out to demonstrate as—knowledge. Assuming it provides an accurate psychological analysis of human behavior, it productively uncovers and the motivations underlying that way of valuing. It also permits the identification of certain signs of decadence in a discourse and the ways in which it thereby serves to ramify either a positive will to creative destruction as generative power, or a negative will to nothingness as nihilistic power. That is, by doing so one can diagnose the extent to which a theory affirms and enables life or constrains and disables opportunities for becoming-other.

Rosamund, 2000: 92

Schimmelfennig, Frank. *Liberal Intergovernmentalism*, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004: 75
Schimmelfennig, Frank. *Liberal Intergovernmentalism*, in Wiener and Diez, eds., 2004: 76. On the preceding page Schimmelfennig defined “[t]he first order problem [as the] overcoming [of] collectively suboptimal outcomes [to] achiev[e] coordination or cooperation for mutual benefit. The second-order problems arise once the suboptimal outcomes are overcome.” Then he asks, “[f]irst, how are the mutual gains of cooperation distributed among the states? Second, how are states prevented from defecting from an agreement in order to exploit the cooperation of others?”

Chryssochoou, 2001: 105

Ibid: 143

See Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 12–14, 83–86 and 120.

Rosamund, 2000: 136 – 7)

Schimmelfennig, 2004: 77

Chryssochoou, 2001: 105

Moravcsik, 1998: 52

Ibid


Examples include lawsuits brought by individuals, businesses and other groups to the ECJ against member-state governments, provisions at the EU level for greater political autonomy and cultural rights of minority regions, etc.

Discussions have long occurred concerning the potential creation of such a mechanism; the UK even held a referendum on the question in 1975, which was defeated. Efforts to provide for this contingency culminated in Article I-60 of the Constitutional treaty, which was defeated in the Dutch and French referendums in the spring of 2005. It has been reincorporated in the Lisbon Treaty.

Chryssochoou, 2001: 105


Ibid: 63
An example of this may be Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s attainment (in 1984 at a summit in Fontainebleau) of a refund for the United Kingdom of some of the funds it contributes to the Union.

This is demonstrated by the recent expansion of the Union from 15 members in 2003 to 27 members today—with still more aspirant states anxiously awaiting their opportunity to accede to full membership. It is also true of new member countries in Central and Eastern Europe, whose accession to the union confirmed their transition from former Soviet Republics or Soviet-bloc satellite states, to full-fledged members of the European community of nations.

Moravcsik, 1998: (From Rebate to Reliance: “Stand up and be counted”) 349-50, and 452-53.

Rosamund, 2000: 153

Ibid

For example, Moravcsik’s own ‘liberal inter-governmentalist’ approach corresponds with a partisan disposition that is skeptical toward the project of European integration. So called Euro-skeptics or the more extreme Europhobes, generally see the state as primary and as remaining preeminent to the institutional structures and authority of the EU.

BGE: I–6

Chryssochoou, 2001: 112-13

Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 299

Ibid: 307

Chryssochoou, 2001: 113

Rosamund, 2000: 126

Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 302

Ibid: 307

Rosamund, 2000: 127

Ibid

Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 308
The EU’s expansion since 1995 has consisted of an incorporation of territories into its domain (both in Scandinavia and East and Central Europe), that physically expanded its social field. The EU can thus be understood as engaged in a systematic process of actually capturing nation-states and their peoples, in ways much more like those of traditional imperialist powers, rather than strictly along the lines of Hardt and Negri’s notion of dis-embodied, deterritorialized “Empire” (though it also exemplifies aspects of their conception of Empire).

I mean the perfection of the nation-state form of polity and its logic. On a related issue, the EU’s process of becoming-imperialist, through expansion, understood as an extremely complex set of mechanisms of capture and re-capture, exemplifies the statist impulses and drives at work within it. (This is also a subject big enough for a dissertation in itself.)

Large, powerful states have disproportionate influence over treaty creation; while the Commission initiates, implements and supervises European-wide law, but in the interpretation and enforcement of EU law large and small countries alike are subject to rulings by the ECJ and other supranational institutions with jurisdiction.
494 Chryssochoou, 2001: 113

495 Some of these exceptions, not all of which are limited to new member-states, have included declining to fully adopt the social policy and opting out of the European exchange rate mechanism, and the common currency, the Euro (Sweden being one example).


498 Ibid

499 Ibid: 309

500 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 3

501 Chryssochoou, 2001: 115

502 Rosamund, 2000: 114 and 116

503 Comitology is the study of how committees operate to problem solve and of their role and practices within institutions.

504 See Pierson, in Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ed., 2006: 308-9

505 Pollack, in Weiner and Diez, eds., 2004: 144

506 Rosamund, 2000: 111

507 Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 1

508 Ibid: 3

509 Ibid: 2

510 Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, in Weiner and Diez, eds., 103

511 Chryssochoou, 2001: 107

512 Rosamund, 2000: 111

513 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 338-39
In addition to eliding the contradictions inherent to the metaphysical presuppositions of the statist logic, such as the freely willing and rational, agentic individual who consents to be governed, and assumed (slave-moral) virtue of the modern democratic state apparatus, which from an ultra-liberal-modern concern with the best form of society enables the “most qualified” (the elites) maintain their rule by means of its technocratic meritocracy, over the rest (citizens), for the greater good, etc., it territorially defines an inside of belonging and an outside of exception—a fact at odds with its overarching metanarrative of human equality and universal rights. The ideologically instantiated discourses comprising the ultra-liberal-modern metanarrative of our hyper-decadent age are implicated in the very statist logic they are often (mis)construed as challenging. The logic of statism and the discourses of liberal-modernity developed concurrently in historical terms, with the latter serving the ends of the former. Contemporary liberals—economic optimists—are often oblivious to the fact that their putatively universal values actually foment reaction and ressentiment, ineluctably leading to conflicts between communities. Furthermore, these discontinuities replicate a form of antagonistic knowing (a negative will to nothingness) that seeks to persecute difference, by privileging the familiar subject (identified with the good, the just and the true, etc.) as defined according to the state’s objective and rational exclusion of an enemy other (instinctively understood as unfamiliar, bad, unjust, untrue, etc.).
‘Spectacles of consumerism’ are meant to evoke the reactive ethos of economic optimism Nietzsche condemned. See Cohen: 2003, who explicates “the notion of a Consumers’ Republic that entrusted the private mass consumption marketplace, supported by government resources, with delivering not only economic prosperity but also loftier social and political ambitions for a more equal, free, and democratic nation (13).”


This includes the hope for an expanded conception of community and of shared stakes in its welfare and prosperity is the EU’s objective for its citizens, as codified in the new “Charter of Fundamental Rights in Europe’s primary law”, as well as provisions “for new solidarity mechanisms and ensuring better protection of European citizens (http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm)”. The promotion of these values includes educational games for children on the EU’s official website, see: http://europa.eu/europago/welcome.jsp

One strains to understand how this does not inevitably lead to the development of supranational institutions that ultimately take over the authorities and many administrative functions traditionally enjoyed and/or performed by the member-states.

Chryssochoou, 2001: 138


That confidence depends crucially on institutional guarantees of each minority groups’ security and enfranchisement within a multi-ethnic polity. When that confidence is eroded factionalism increases. This often leads to contending separatist movements that, if ignored, tend to produce civil strife and even war.

These include the role of the Social Charter in domestic courts, appeals to the Committee of the Regions or to the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities or even the Commission itself as a conciliator. And of course, formal action can be taken in the European Court of Justice, among other means of conflict resolution. It must be noted that it is hypothetically conceivable that a multi-ethnic nation-state member of the EU could withdraw from the organization if it believed the stakes to its national sovereignty were high enough. This is unlikely to happen, however, as EU membership is associated with political legitimacy on the continent, and mentalities regarding the use of force have been significantly transformed by decades of compliance with the EU’s developing body of law.

Hatab, 1995: 141 (referencing Z: I, 17)
The ressentiment of contemporary liberals (as in Nietzsche’s era) is “schizophrenic” insofar as they seek to improve humankind. They crave power-over-others while simultaneously professing their belief in universal equality and dignity. They seek to realize the latter ideals without forsaking any of the material privileges they enjoy at the top of the socio-political hierarchy.
For Nietzsche, as against Kant, all meaning is and all values are heteronymous, as is our conscious comprehension of what it is we take to be our will, i.e.: the conventional notion of will-power and the traditional Western misconception of willful, causal agency. The Kantian notion of autonomy of the will coextends with and, indeed, was intended to strengthen this fatuous metaphysical fiction. According to Nietzsche we can only become authentic when involuntarily expressing the will to power we are, and in our hyper-decadent age of decayed instincts this is increasingly difficult and rare. However, it is only ever the healthiest exceptions who may enact will to power; the all-too-many do not possess the strength to do so nor can they stomach the “truths” offered by postmodernism. They must therefore be supplied with “transcendent” meanings by the best, acting as nomothetic legislators.

This is to say that while it is indisputable that there are political facts, none are known apolitically. Power-knowledge discourses (as Foucault explicated, after Nietzsche) constitute the frameworks within which meaning is attributed to facts and from which they gain their significance. Methodological debates are then understood to be games of
establishing veracity, and the utility of a given methodology lies in its effective maintenance of a discourse’s authority.


569 Haas, P.: 1992

570 Hall and Taylor, 1996: 948, quoted in Rosamund, 2000: 119

571 Neufeld, 1995: 42

572 Rosamund, 2000: 119


574 GS: 374

575 Gladwell (2008) provides a compelling explication of social ‘outliers’.

576 In fairness it must be said that the contingence and subjectivity of all truth claims and the tautologous character of all assertions of empirical fact are characteristic weaknesses of any scientific inquiry. This counter-intuitive claim as doubt can always be cast on the presuppositions of the former, that is, the effectiveness of a given hermeneutical or epistemological framework to discern or correspond with an external reality, or upon the veracity of the putative facts adduced there from. Each sort of claim is vulnerable to the skeptical disposition of a perspectivalist epistemological stance.

577 In referring to the mainstream of European integration theory I mean to exclude – for the aforementioned reasons cited in the previous section – ‘constructivist’ approaches and ‘discourse analyses’ that directly challenge the hegemony and bases of the former.

578 Haas, 1975: 8–10, 99-100

579 Again, this does not apply to recent ‘constructivist’ and ‘discourse analysis’ critical approaches.

580 By “standard” I mean to indicate the reactive response to the volitional urge to Europe’s unity that has largely driven the creation of the EU. Experienced as a transformed conative disposition or anticipatory resoluteness among Europeans and symptomatic of the nisus of globality in its active, healthy expressions, this acts as an impetus to new forms of economic and political community that are ineluctably changing the life of the continent in spite of the institutional constraints imposed on it by the EU and globalization complex.
A “super-structure / base” dichotomy would not be entirely inappropriate here, in that the meta-discourse of ultra-liberal-modernity (functioning as a sort of notional “superstructure”) is served by manifold narratives (that function as the “base”) particular to diverse classes, nations, regions, localities, etc., which however seemingly distinct in and of themselves, ultimately support its over-arching ideological prerogatives, serving its ends or co-opting challenges to it. If a dissenting discourse resists interpolation by ultra-liberal-modernity’s “superstructural” tenets it is de-legitimated, marginalized and forcibly silenced.

Elbe, 2003: 87 (emphasis mine)

The competitive markets of which I speak are broadly understood to encompass all financial exchange and trade activity between the members of the WTO, and to a lesser extent those states outside its jurisdiction (for whom minimal compliance with its provisions is compelled by necessity.

The internet has created a great challenge by providing online services that cannot generate conventional profits and so are transforming some traditional industries, newspapers and other print media being primary among them. The capitalist owners of these entities are desperately seeking ways to interpolate these means for the survival of their businesses and corresponding ideological control over information / representation of reality.

It might be plausibly argued that certain speculators like George Soros have, from a certain regard, done this at least to a limited extent. Surely we have all imagined on what a grander scale our schemes for transforming the world could be realized with the benefit of great monetary wealth.

The globalization complex’s myriad spectacles of prosperity—which are so crucial to sustaining the legitimacy of its ultra-liberal-modern values—are exposed as shambolic when hardship broadly increases, particularly in its primary loci, the post-industrialized democracies of the West. Such a crisis improves the reception of those comedians of its ascetic ideals who kynically mock them. It thereby augments the conditions of possibility of a comprehensive revaluation of values.
591 Ibid: 80

592 BGE: 44


594 Ibid

595 See GS: 348-49; BGE: 58 and 204, among many other relevant passages.

596 Conway, 1997a: 104 – 105

597 I refer to the state-centric and hierarchical axiomatique of the European Union and conceptualizations of it, and conceptualizations of it explicated above, as intertwined with meta-narrative of ultra-liberal-modernity.

598 Colm Hogan, 2001: 81

599 Elbe, 2003: 119

600 These interrelated, anti-natural concepts are exemplified by the civil, political and economic rights guaranteed Universal Declaration (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), among other international treaties, and epitomize the ethos of the ultra-liberal-modern ideology. In the next two books I examine the ways in which these may be understood, in ways consistent with broad themes in Nietzsche’s thought, as useful to the emergence of individuals with the strength necessary to transfigure the dissipative values that gave rise to these legal regimes.

601 They do so through conscience-vivisection and disciplinary regimes [askesis] of self-experimentation and creation [auto-poiesis] that arouse the passions [eros] of witnesses to their agonistic struggle to become-other.

602 Nietzsche’s good Europeans cannot be easily analogized to any contemporary American politician. In the staid milieu of conventional politics they would probably be doomed to fail. As gadflies outside mainstream political processes they would force the establishment to contend with them. They succeed in transforming the world thereby.

603 Decadence understood in the Nietzschean sense of the declining health of a social organism: the weakening of the traditions that sustained it. Such a decline is typified by the disgregation and enervation of the instincts among the vast majority of the individuals comprising the diseased polity.
Nietzsche defines decadence (in relation to Socrates) as a condition of “Having to fight the instincts” (TI: Socrates-11). One who is so at odds with herself denies her instinctual urges, inhibiting her own drives and impulses. When their instinctual ordering is awry the drives and impulses manifest themselves in unhealthy ways, exercising a disintegrating influence. The native volition of the dis-eased sufferer is thereby blocked.

This is to suggest that the ultra-liberal-modern values universalized by the globalization complex encourage other value-systems/cultures/knowledges to destroy themselves. Its nihilistic ethos—the Western disease—weaken healthy cultures and induces them to suicide.

It seems (in the Heideggerian sense) to support or validate these claims through simulacrum of enfranchisement, personal liberty and rights.

By ‘axiomatique’ I refer to a set of corresponding propositions or metatheoretical beliefs, which function as an basis or evaluative framework for action. The presuppositions constituting an axiomatique enjoy wide acceptance despite a dearth of definitional clarity or objective means of validation.

I refer to this complacent state of contentment as ‘hyper-decadence’, a condition of blinking apathy in which the comprehensively enervated and inauthentic (in the Heideggerian sense) victim cannot even affirm her will to negate, yet believes herself to be happy, nevertheless. It is the condition of ‘the last man’ whose appearance Nietzsche foretold.

Conway, 1997a: 3

He understood cultural greatness as resulting from an autochthonous milieu specific to a people that facilitated their highest creative potentials. Through great works of art—“the great stimulus to life (TI: IX-24)”—and experimentation, a society’s geniuses, as its supreme erotics, would provide its people with vital meanings and purpose.

As explained in the previous two books, the liberal-modern values of the late 19th century were a secular development of Christian-Platonic values that had dominated Europe since at least the formal adoption of Christianity by Rome in the fourth century, CE.

Prime examples of such influential metaphysical fictions in Western philosophy include Plato’s divided line and theory of forms and Kant notions of transcendental ego and synthetic a priori reason. For Nietzsche’s psychological explanation of why cause–effect relations are desired and believed in see GS: 357, BGE: 21 and TI: VI, 1–8 (‘The four great errors’: the ‘error of confusing cause and consequence’; the ‘error of a false causality’; the ‘error of imaginary causes’ and the ‘error of free will’.)
Nietzsche’s views on both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment are complex. He recognized the latter’s positive effects praising Voltaire, as well as its negative, Rousseauian ones, and suggests that with Napoleon’s defeat, the negative or anti-natural effects won out. See HH: I–237, 463 and 472.

This dynamic is perhaps best documented and explicated by post-colonial cultural critics/theorists, such as Edward Said, among others.
Ibid: 43

Ibid: 65

Khan, 2004: 171

I specifically refer to the IMF, which many argue has failed to take effective preemptive action to prevent crises since its creation.


Khan, 2004: 171

Scott, 1985: 324–326 (pertaining to the effects of green revolution practices and technologies on agrarian communities in South-East Asia).

It is sometimes feared, and argued that TNCs and MNCs increasingly operate in a netherworld outside any national authority, effectively exempting them from law and regulation. This is clearly not the case however, as they all must abide by law within the nations in which they operate, as well as a growing body of international regulatory oversight and authority.

O’Connor and Wong summarize C.D. Broad’s definition of “two types” of “Emergentist” “laws: (1) ‘intra-ordinal’ laws, which relate events within an order, i.e., a law connecting an aggregate of that order instantiating a property of that order at a time with some aggregate of that order instantiating some other property at a certain time; and (2) ‘trans-ordinal’ laws, which characterize the emergence of higher-level properties from lower-level ones.”

See Shaw, 2000: 76 (referencing Herman and McChesney, 1997)

Urry, 2002: 76–78 and 38 with regard to the effect of Europeanization on travel.

Young, 1999: 112–13 and 117–22, 131 on the rise and effectiveness of international environmental regimes.

Hirst, 1997: 206–12, as a skeptic about globalization Hirst nevertheless acknowledges its profound effects and affective power on the perceptions and attitudes of citizens and policy makers; on humane normative strategies for enhancing the ultra-liberal-modern project of “geogovernance”, see Richard Falk, 1995: 207–10.

Axford, 1995: 174–6 on the politics of identity in the age of globalization; also see 132–4 on the state in the discourses of modernity and globalization, and 158–9 on the shaping of global culture by the hegemony of modernity.


Robertson, 1992: 27, on the role of globality in the formation of a post-modern consciousness.

Albrow, 1996: 144

Scott, 1985: 184, 241, 304

This process of increasing demands for accountability is symptomatic of the entrenchment of the spirit of revenge, which the globalization complex invariably propagates.

Donnelly, 1989: 210

Ibid: 25

Donnelly, 1989: 64

Prominent among the theorizers of modern rights was John Locke in his second treatise on government.

Donnelly, 1989: 25–27

If every human being enjoys a discernable, inalienable degree of dignity it would be redundant to codify it in rights over-above pre-existing legal proscriptions on violations of another individuals’ personhood, such as assault, rape, murder, etc.,. As “rights” are thought necessary to ensure the preservation of that dignity, it is not clear that dignity really does inhere to every individual, only that we are expected to behave as if it does. The term dignity itself is never precisely defined by human rights advocates, who seek to make common a good of the notion, and thereby empty it of any meaning. Human rights’ defenders reference the term to the intrinsic condition of being human, which risks tautology, and is quite unrelated to the original meaning of the term, which specified nobility or elevation of character; worthiness to the deference of inferiors that accrues from possession of a high rank, office or station. According to Nietzsche, the reasoning behind the human rights notion constitutes a classic slave-moral move: an effort by the weak to invent pretexts that will secure for them privileges from the strong, whose dignity is—or would other-wise be—more demonstrable than their own. These mutually reinforcing notions of dignity and rights epitomize the conceits of liberal-modernism and underscore the bankruptcy of its rational basis. Nietzsche’s Good Europeans might
concede that “dignity” is a particular form of the qualia of being human, but that like an appreciation of beauty, such an experience is never the same between two persons (justifying equality of rights for all) or that it can in itself legitimately confer any privileges to the person experiencing it. It would be understood as a perspectively contingent experience. Nietzsche would likely have responded by suggesting that there is a broad spectrum of such qualia, and that the differences between those experiences correspond to how much power an organism (as a capacitor of force) is effectively able to involuntarily discharge. Recognition of the need for an authentic socio-political agon in which such difference of vitality (or “dignity”) could be ascertained might itself indicate a higher level of “dignity”. An awareness of the need to overcome the human would presumably constitute another, even higher level of qualia. Nietzsche’s call for a re-institutionalization of a natural rank order of difference (Rangordnung) between types specifically opposed the liberal-modern notions of “dignity” and “rights”, which serve to cover-up the anti-natural basis for ultra-liberal-modernity’s own hierarchization of types from a leveled mass of automatons.

659 Hatab, 1995: 232

660 BGE: 203

661 BGE: 202

662 Reminder: the metadiscourse of ultra-liberal-modernity consists of the interrelated positivist discourses of progressivism, humanism, rationalism, secularism and universalism.

663 WP: 897

664 WP: 894

665 For example, the violent suppression of ostensibly pro-democracy Burmese monks in Yangon in late September of 2007 by the ruling junta elicited a tepid response from ASEAN members, who were embarrassed by the incident but ultimately unwilling to punish member-state Myanmar’s government for its action.

666 Gill, 2003: 44

667 The term ‘Washington consensus’ was coined by John Williamson in 1990.

668 This paragraph draws on “Revisiting how Malaysia overcame the financial crisis”, by Martin Khor in Global Trends, Sunday 18 January 2004; on the website Third World Network at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/gtrends1.htm. It also paraphrases the abstract of “Malaysian Economic Crisis: Causes, Effects, Recovery Actions and Lessons Learned” by Amir Hashim, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey; online at:


670 DeMartino, 2000: 239-40; Demartino advocates overcoming reductionistic characterizations of capital process toward a “more manageable [pragmatic] politics …for social change”. He proposes alternative strategies for contending with the excesses of neo-liberal capitalism by more liberal means.

671 Went, 2002: 114

672 Lyon, 2001: 40-2

673 Dicken, 2007: 232-40 and 532

674 Kiely, 1998: 11, 54-6

675 Tehranian, 1999: Introduction

676 Friedman, 1994: 86

677 Sklair, 1995: 87-9, 150-2

678 Paterson, 1997: 145-160

679 It could be argued that no radical alternatives to the liberal-modern project have succeeded. Popular and influential satellite networks such as Al Jazeera in the Arab world / Islamic cultural realm, hardly present a threat to the dictators of the region that most of their viewers inhabit. Closer to home, Amy Goodman’s “Democracy Now” is arguably typifies the ethos of ultra-liberal-modernity more than any broadcast in the United States today.

680 EH: destiny-1

681 D: 206 indicates his support for colonialism as a potential solution to the problem of superfluous European workers.

682 EH: CW-3 reflects his derision of the German Kaiser’s aims in Africa.

683 BGE: 208

684 BGE: 241
Post-modern ascetic priests of resentment, the arbiters of secular slave morality, are ideologues who believe in and are satisfied by the “reality” generated by the simulacrum and its power to “emancipate” humanity. As the authentic representation of legitimate authority and desire, this consists with the over-arching objective of globalizing institutions and processes.

HH: WS-9; by “ruling classes” Nietzsche contemptuously refers to those ambitious bureaucrats and professionals who, attaining high offices or positions, are paradoxically the most subjugated of men.

Keith Ansell Pearson suggests that Nietzsche seems to have conflated aspects of Rousseau’s notion of the general will and its correspondence with the general welfare with Diderot’s notion of the general welfare, a cosmopolitan idea which Rousseau expressly rejected in favor of his notion of the unique, sovereign will characteristic of a people. The extent to which Rousseau remained consistent with this rejection is open to question. However, it must be stated that Nietzsche’s understanding of Rousseau was arguably informed by confusions and misreadings of his texts. Nevertheless it suffices to say that Nietzsche would likely have opposed Rousseau’s call that ‘the people’ join together through a ‘social contract’ to preserve themselves and remain “free”. The putative authority of the “general will”, a notion that like the so-called “state of nature” was imbued with metaphysical significance and never sufficiently explicated or demonstrated by its author; the former could not be shown to protect individuals from subjugation to the wills of would-be autocrats or other powerful persons anymore than the latter concept could be shown to be the salvific alternative to corrupting civilization Rousseau seemed to argue it was. In attempting to show that by ‘obeying themselves as collective authors of the law’, Nietzsche would have perceived Rousseau to be a clever ascetic priest of ressentiment intent upon seducing the masses into a narcissistic trance through anti-natural, and embarrassingly self-serving, populist rhetoric.

For an extensive examination of Nietzsche’s misunderstanding of, commonality and rivalry with Rousseau, see Keith Ansell-Pearson’s *Nietzsche Contra Rousseau*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

See GM: III-15 for corroboration.
In this regard he was a great admirer of Machiavelli, and cited the Renaissance as an example of a healthy era, the most recent in Europe to his own lifetime.

Indoctrinating practices that regularize “norms” and “rights” at the individual, local, regional, national and international levels provide the mob with fabricated meaning and purpose in services, information, etc.

Generally high rates of employment, education, access to good health care, and a whole complex of social-welfare institutions as well as the norms of charity serve to reinforce this illusion of security.

My understanding in this section, as elsewhere, of Heidegger’s notion of Ethics as abode, as I utilize it to explicate Nietzsche’s meaning of ‘good Europeanism’ as a disposition toward the world and praxis or engagement with it, as well as their fearless resolve in accepting the abyssal dimension of life as this Heideggerian idea relates to a Nietzschean affirmation of the tragic and corresponding embrace of the Dionysian is all heavily indebted to Lawrence Hatab’s reflections and analysis in his paper ‘Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy’, presented at the 1997 conference “After Post-modernism”, online at: http://www.focusing.org/apm_papers/hatab.html.

See: WP: 954; it must be said however, that the übermenschlich are always-already “emerging” and that the practicum is their life itself and does not finally end until they perish. In other words they may never celebrate any sort of “graduation” where their becoming-other is concerned.
Genocidal regimes are a consequence of the ultimate nihilistic breakdown of society through decadence.

For explications of these themes in Nietzsche’s works see Tracy B. Strong: 1988; Lawrence J. Hatab: 1995; Keith Ansell-Pearson: 1997; and Horst Hutter: 2006.

From the ruins of decadent thought, skeptical “artist-philosopher militants” create new conceptual frameworks for organizing cultural, social and political life which they unyieldingly attempt to impose so to provide future individuals the conditions necessary to overcome themselves. As humankind’s highest exemplars such individuals provide the herd with meaning, purpose and dignity through their example.

“Warrior-genealogists” comprehend how humanity has arrived where it is and so are most capable of leading the battle to chart its future, of nurturing it to health and strength from decadence and nihilism. The term corresponds with Nietzsche’s notion of “philosophers of the future”.

Albrow, 1996: 115

Beck, 2000: 79

Ibid: 78 – 79

Ibid: 80

Shaw, 2000: 18-19

GM: III – 19


Eade, 1997: 4–5

Beck, 2000: 10

Robertson, 1992: 142 and 113

Robertson, (in Featherstone, Lash and Robertson, eds.) 1995: 30
Nietzsche specifically addresses such matters at BGE: 268, in consideration of culture and the common experience of a people.

Deleuze, 1995: 54 and 57

See A: 36 and EH: CW-4 for Nietzsche’s notion of ‘world-historical irony’ in varying contexts.

Nisus (as defined by the Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition) is “a striving; an effort; the conative state of a thing,” and “a creative tendency …toward the production of qualitatively new emergents (pp 204).”

Appadurai, 1990: 297–299. Briefly, Appadurai’s notion of ideoscapes refers to the global exchange and debate of ideas, the dissemination of propaganda, mass-marketing and publicity, and corresponding ideological interpolation and political resistances; his concept of ethnoscapes refers to movements of people that disrupt established links between place and belonging, and lead to trans-national identity formation; his idea of technoscapes refers to the instantaneous communications and financial transactions, transformed business practices that typify the global marketplace and their profound ramifications on labor practices and relations and methods of production. They are broadly specified dimensions of bio-power in the age of Empire.


Examples of globalizing institutions include regional economic and security organizations with international powers of legal enforcement such as the WTO, the ICC, the WB, the OSCE, the WHO, ASEAN, NATO the IMF, OAS, the UN and its plethora of agencies, and at other levels of influence and authority includes organ-izations such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Doctors without borders etc.

Post-Fordist / Taylorist theories of economic organization, as well as neo-liberalism are complicated and debated, I invoke them reductively to refer to the contemporary
compound form of capitalist production. For nuanced definitions see Went, 2002: 96 – 98.


739 Debord wrote, “The spectacle is a specialized activity which speaks for all others. It is the diplomatic representation of hierarchic society to itself, where all other expression is banned…(23),” and “[t]he spectacle is the existing order’s uninterrupted discourse about itself, its laudatory monologue. It is the self-portrait of power in the epoch of its totalitarian management of the conditions of existence. (24)” Of the bored and contented youth of his day, Nietzsche observed (in “the desire for suffering”), “[t]hey do not know what to do with themselves—and therefore paint the distress of others on the wall; they always need others! And continually other others! (GS: 56)”

740 Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 360; “the State-form, as a form of interiority, has a tendency to reproduce itself…”

741 Globalization is a consequence of a radical extension—“molar” growth—of the slave morality of taming and instantiates the decadence that the latter naturalizes. It is a despotic machine cum Urstaat. See part five of “The Deleuze Reader,” ed. Constantine V. Boundas.

742 Martin Albrow identifies the commencing epoch as the Global age, one characterized by “Globality,” the term he prefers because it leaves open the possibilities of human agency (Albrow, 1996: 4 – 5).

743 Shaw, 2000: 18–19 (emphasis added)

744 Albrow, 1996: 110

745 Despite their recognition of the contribution they make to the hyperreal nature of everyday life in the post-industrialized Western world which they see as compounding their alienation, such passively nihilistic individuals are likely to still shop at Wal-mart for cheap goods, take their children to Disneyland and, perhaps, teach at a University.

746 The damaging effects of globalization to human flourishing include environmental effects: the annihilation of pristine habitats, the disruptive effects of the so-called green (agri-industrial) revolution, global warming, etc.; cultural effects: the extinction of languages and indigenous cultures, urban sprawl and commensurate poverty in the wake of rural demographic flight, etc.; and economic effects: the emerging global division of labor and its effect of leaving billions in destitution while providing a level of consumption heretofore unknown in human history for the post-industrialized world. The destructive and disruptive consequences of globalization are experienced in many other
dimensions of human life. Little of the damage done is completely irreversible. However, these practices have fostered change and contributed to laying the groundwork, as it were, for an eventual revaluation of values through globality. With luck, technological innovation and adjacent possibilities creative geniuses realize will provide good Europeans to remain faithful to the earth and undo the environmental damage industrialization has wrought upon it.

Nietzsche’s active / reactive binary as a tool for comprehending the response of an organism to such challenges and to adduce its health was usefully expanded by Deleuze into a rhizomatic / molar binary that is arguably more “Nietzschean,” in the sense that, as an observation of differing forms of growth, it withholds the implied judgment of positive / negative that—it might be argued—inheres to the former dualism.

Albrow, 1996: 5

Ibid: 4, 107

Ibid: 5, 109–11

Eade, 1997: 4-5

Beck, 2000: 10–11

Robertson, 1992: 113

Shaw, 2000: 19

Haecceity (This thing, here is; or the “this-ness” / formally distinct particularity of or presence of a phenomena), a term Gilles Deleuze employs after David Hume (1711 – 1776) and John Duns Scotus (1266 – 1308) to convey the experience of a set of nonsubjectified affects. According to Deleuze and Felix Guattari, there are assemblage haecceities, which refer to the dimensions of multiplicities, and interassemblage haecceities, which mark the potentialities of becoming within each assemblage (1987: 262 – 3).

The character of globality can be related to the ethos of the Eternal Return in so far as it anticipates the Dasein of Übermenschen, becoming consistent with a radical affirmation of life and its contingency. On the latter see Bernd Magnus’s discussion of “Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative,” Magnus, 1993: xiii and 142.

Z: I–11

Lowith, 1995: 204
Thomas Heilke argues, in his identically titled book, that “Nietzsche’s Tragic Regime” envisages a political education for the production of “Dionysian pessimists” who could effectively contend with European nihilism and thrive.

The twentieth century was punctuated by the mass-slaughters of two World Wars and organized genocides in Anatolia, Europe, South-East Asia and Africa, across which and in response to, developments such as the universalization of secular-humanist values, democratization and rights codified in international law, etc. occurred. These events would strike Nietzsche as symptomatic of a spreading disgregation of the instincts and resultant weakness of will (akrasia). Such all-too-human violences, both the gratuitous seeking of power over others and conventional efforts to prohibit it indicate the perseverance of decadence, the latter a form generated by ultra-liberal-modernity.

Nietzsche’s anti-modernism should not be mistaken as advocating a return to pre-modern socio-cultural forms. He recognized that in the wake of the death of god, Europe would be forced to overcome the decadence into which it had descended and by re-creating meanings and traditions for itself. The existential calamity it faced was that of the irrecoverable nihilism (hyper-decadence) of the ‘last man’, the extreme danger of which was any future basis upon which persuasive meanings or new truths could be created might not be attainable.

See Kees van der Pijl’s 1984 examination of the trans-Atlantic ruling class.

Despite its ideological denunciations and anti-Capitalist vitriol, the Soviet Union’s reluctant and limited trade with the capitalist “West” and instrumental role in the creation of the UN and other post-war institutions attenuated any actual ideological or existential threat it presented. Mainland China had already begun reforms to open its markets and “join” the world economy by 1991.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague provides an example. Unfortunately, the US has obstreperously refused to participate in that organization.

See Malcolm Gladwell’s recent, fairly compelling thesis on the conditions that give rise to ‘outliers’.

The doubt Nietzsche raises about such political rights brings us to a sticky point in his thought and one of the most difficult aspects of it for us ultra-liberal-moderns. Nevertheless, he would not have agreed with today’s liberal activists that a person or
group is inherently less free for being deprived of what we in the West consider “free” speech, or full political enfranchisement, etc. However, this is not to suggest that he would have condoned Beijing or dismissed its repression and systematic subversion of Tibetan culture, or the unauthentic agon imposed on the beleaguered people of Myanmar by the ruling military junta. Rather, he would have opposed these regimes for many of the same reasons he would have opposed the governing regimes in Washington and Brussels.

770 Existential threats such as the recent menace of terrorism, or arms proliferation, etc., suffice to create an outside enemy.


772 Again: the OSCE, originally the CSCE, is a trans-Atlantic security organization that promotes conflict resolution, democracy and human rights.

773 The Council focuses on promulgating and monitoring human rights and democratization among its members, among other functions.

774 At least in military terms, if no longer in economic and political ones.

775 WP: 866; also see 890 and 898

776 WP: 866 and 868.

777 GM: II–24

778 Lawrence J. Hatab’s work “A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy” (see bibliography) makes this link extremely clear and thoroughly develops it. In particular see the very relevant chapters four (“Agonistic Democracy”) and five (“Democracy, excellence and merit”) of that work.

779 GM: I-13

780 BGE: 58

781 This notion would seem to anticipate aspects of Leo Strauss’s mid-20th century thought, but Nietzsche’s vitalist politics crucially distinguishes his thought from Strauss’s.

782 Conway, 1997a: 20

783 Elbe, 2003: 13
BGE: 263; Nietzsche’s aspersion for the conventionally educated—the Democratic bourgeoisie—who he held primarily responsible for the vulgarization of European culture in the late 19th century.

Its two-fold “moral imperative” is that shopping is in itself a spiritually edifying activity and that purchases equate with / provide existential fulfillment and satisfy an important social duty. When the consumer–automatons become reluctant to spend their money, they are incentivized by the government, as in the $168 billion fiscal stimulus a two-year program authorized by Congress and President Bush on Feb. 13 2008. Reported to be the largest legislative initiative to ease an economic downturn in American history (<http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/4170/1/531>), it provided every American approximately $600. Six months later (28 November 2008) a man was trampled to death by a mob of hysterical bargain shoppers at a Wal-Mart in Long Island, New York. See: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/business/29walmart.html?scp=2&sq=wal-mart&st=cse>.

BGE: 62

Jürgen Habermas is a preeminent contemporary advocate of this ideology and exponent of practices—he has dubbed “communicative action”—to instantiate it.

The EU has become a powerful force for the dissemination of ultra-liberal-modern values globally, as explicated in Book Three above.

Hutter, 2006: 104

In Nietzsche’s view the newly established Reich and its personification, Bismarck, exemplified the decadence of German culture during his lifetime.

From a Nietzschean perspective the paradox of this formal abolition of war is that every institutionally instantiated form of political authority entails a fundamental arrogation of right – a conceit whose enforcement necessarily requires coercion along a spectrum of violences. Foucault’s numerous exegeses’ of power / knowledge regimes (in practices concerning health, carceral techniques and in/sanity brilliantly elaborated the point.

I refer to the potential to transform the EU while using it as an instrument to advance their aim of conditioning the possibility for genuine culture in Europe through a gradual instantiation of authentic, agonist relations predicated on a natural rank order of types.

Examples include legal provisions for the export of cultural goods and the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a member state, as well as codified regional policy, various aspects of which are overseen by the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, the European Regional Development
Fund and the Committee of the Regions. The COE’s European Committee of Social Rights and Directorate of Culture, Cultural and Natural Heritage, as well as the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities augment the EU’s policies.

This argument was persuasively made in a recent editorial by Roland Vaubel, a professor of economics at the University of Mannheim, in The Wall Street Journal. See: State of the Union: Disproportionately Undemocratic, July 30, 2007 edition.

Elbe, 2003: 79

See The Greek State, wherein Nietzsche voices concern with the “present day phenomena in which [he detects] dangerous signs of atrophy in the political sphere… attributable to] men [lacking any sense of obligation to the state] placed by birth… outside the instinct for nation and state, who thus have to recognize the state only to the extent to which they conceive it to be in their own interest…” Nietzsche refers to them as truly international homeless, financial recluses as really those whose fear stands behind [the] movements… [the liberal–optimistic, post-Enlightenment world view and democratic ethos of universal suffrage].

Again, nisus refers to “a striving, the conative state of a thing, also a creative tendency in the universe to produce qualitatively new emergents” (Harper-Collins dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition). This corresponds nicely with the emergentist strains of Nietzsche’s vitalism.

Conway explicates Nietzsche’s dual conception of the Will to power, “to designate the boundless, amoral agency that propagates itself through human capacitors [and] the system of instincts that best provides for the unimpeded propagation of vitality.” (Conway: 1997b, pp. 49.)


This is expounded in the notes. “Types of my disciples.-- To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities-- I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not--that one endures. [The note continues in Nietzsche's MS: "I have not yet got to know any idealist, but many liars… (WP: 910 [Spring-Fall 1887])." Later Nietzsche writes, “That one stakes one's life, one's health, one's honor, is the consequence of high spirits and an overflowing, prodigal will: not from love of man but because every great danger challenges our curiosity about the degree of our strength and our courage (WP: 949 [Nov. 1887-March 1888])."]
Nietzsche implored his readers to ‘become who they are,’ a notion adopted from Pindar (and possibly Stirner), toward arousing recognition of the necessity for self-awareness (a recognition of our existenz) and self-overcoming toward fulfilling one’s highest potential, or destiny.

In our hyper-decadent age the political-education of Übermenschen is a largely self-undertaken endeavor resulting from their erotic concern with mastering themselves and the world. In Nietzsche’s ideal polity this dimension of breeding the best-types would not be left to such chance but would be deliberately cultivated (As is the case that Socrates’ expounds in Plato’s Republic).

Baudrillard explicates the simulation that interposes on everyday life, noting especially the role of the copy and representation’s displacement of the real in our electronic, digitized and wireless age which has impaired our sense of time and space. Moreover, the media driven dissociation of values from any referential criteria has the effect of deterring the real, as all meanings are banalized through the absence of equivalence toward the annihilation of authentic culture. My notion of ‘hyper-decadence’ is supported by Baudrillard’s observation that, “The universe, and all of us, have entered live into simulation, into the malefic, not even malefic, indifferent, sphere of deterrence: in a bizarre fashion, nihilism has been entirely realized no longer through destruction, but through simulation and deterrence.”

I refer to the Heidegger’s notion of Dasein’s awareness of its own being-in-the-world.

See Nietzsche’s unpublished early essay “The Greek State (1872)” on the dignity of work.

See The Greek State (in On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic (1887); translated by Carol Diethe; Cambridge University Press, 1994) and WP: 866-68

One is here reminded of our self-aggrandizing, stultifying “creative class,” which proudly take themselves for the “higher members” of the mediocre crowd.
For Nietzsche’s critique of the Western moral tradition and the predominance of the slave morality of taming see all of On the Genealogy of Morality and The Antichrist. See BGE: 260 for a specific example of how he anticipated the intensification of decadence to come in the century ahead – the development of which I have labeled the ‘hyper-decadence’ of our age.

Many individuals are actually “sedated” through the use of psychotropic pharmaceuticals.

See (the notoriously misused passages from) TI: IX – 36 and A: 2.

Far from being a merely rhetorical or metaphorical exhortation, Nietzsche’s advocacy of this master morality of breeding finds explicit expression in both the late published works (BGE: 61-2, 213, 262; TI: VII-2 – 5 ; A: 3-4, and as a system of breeding is related by example via the law of Manu, which Nietzsche cites to illustrate how a well ordered polity might by ordered and its health preserved, 57) and the Nachlass (see WP: 397-98, 866-68, 898, 957). Also see Strong, “Nietzsche is talking about developing men who are not subject to the “human-all-too-human.” He repeatedly uses the word zuchten, which means to breed, raise rear, grow or cultivate, as word normally used in connection with animals or plants. After leaving Basel, he conspicuously stops using erziehen, which has connotations of “bring up” and educate (Strong, 2000: 274).” Also see Conway (1997a) pp. 34-9;


GS: 377

Ansell-Pearson, 1997: 110

I refer to the terminal condition of anti-culture, the state of laissez aller which prevails in decadent epochs.

Conway, 1997b: 76

Ibid.

WP: 866

WP: 868

BGE: 225; Conway, 1997a: 89

Conway, 1997a: 18
828 Von Ham, 2001: 70

829 Ibid; also see Rorty, 1989: chapter 9 on solidarity, and page 198 of the text. This is not to endorse Rorty’s position on the previous page that Nietzsche and Heidegger “privatize their projects, their attempts at sublimity – to view them as irrelevant to politics and therefore compatible with the sense of human solidarity with the development of democratic institutions has facilitated. …[T]hat they subordinat[e] sublimity to the desire to avoid cruelty and pain.” Rorty is anxious that the Nietzschean pursuit of sublimity deprives us of a shared neutral ground for the creation of alternative institutions to hegemonic liberal democratic ones, but this assumes the latter are the best (most efficacious for human flourishing) and that nothing more effective will come along as a consequence of pursuing Nietzsche’s project of attaining sublimity via experimental art.

830 Pappas: 201; BGE: 209

831 BGE: 209 and 242

832 See Hutter, 2006: 65

833 That being to comprehend life, man’s place in the universe, the nature of “truth” and the best strategies for living.

834 On “lucky strikes” see A: 4


836 D: 535

837 WP: 480

838 Conway, 1997b: 148

839 Ibid

840 See: H: II-71

841 Conway, 1997b: 94

842 TGS

843 See TI: IX-36
This condition is, in Heideggerian terms, a state of irrecuperable fallenness; such failures comprise the ‘They’: beings from whom Being has withdrawn and whose presence is only an absence; personifications of Nietzsche’s thoroughly nihilistic ‘last man’ type.

I disregard Nietzsche’s derisive use of the term at GM: III-9; the ephectic drive—which arguably characterized the native volition impelling Nietzsche in his own life’s work—need not lead to shallow relativism and nihilism.

Elbe, 2003: 105 and 113 on the creative ethos of good Europeanism.

Conway, 1997b: 54-5

OTL, in Breazeale’s “Philosophy and Truth, Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the early 1870s”, pp 84.

Bailey: 123 - 25

Hankinson: 314

GS: 374, Our new “infinite”

GS: 344, How we, too, are still pious

BGE: 212

Conway, 1997a: 50

This can be attributed to Walter Kaufmann, among others. Kaufmann was largely responsible for re-habilitating Nietzsche’s work in the post-war era among generations of scholars for whom the prevailing representation of Nietzsche’s ideas and advocacy had been a malign mis-characterization that dissuaded serious readings of them.

Conway 1997a: 51

BGE: 65

The quote attributed to Socrates takes numerous forms. Among them is: “I know nothing except the fact of my ignorance.” Socrates, from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Variations on this theme occur in Plato’s dialogue the Apology, at 21d7, for example. However, Priscilla Sakezles, an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Akron, has published an interesting argument claiming that this is a popular misinterpretation of Socrates’ (Plato’s) meaning. See her article, ‘Socratic Skepticism’ in the June 25, 2008 edition of eSkeptic, the newsletter of Skeptic Magazine, at: <http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/08-06-25.html>
Although *adoxastos* might remind some of the Islamic concept of *taqyyia*, it is not analogous. The Nietzschean skeptic and good European acts only on the instinctual urge to become who it is they are, *against* a decadent society determined to thwart them. Furthermore, they act out of strength rather than weakness.

There is no paradox in the need for the adoption and employment of disguises among ‘good Europeans’ as the strongest individuals. Given that the value of their strengths (i.e.: their constitution and the nisus of their Being) being discredited and held in contempt by the hyper-decadent society they find themselves thrown into, they must contend with the most virulent animosity and constant efforts to weaken them and divert them from their noble course. The hatred they provoke among the multitude is in fact proof of the intrinsic weakness of the latter, their (would-be) oppressors; the crucial need to hide ones’ essential character and values should not be taken as a sign of weakness when revealing oneself would be self destructive.

I refer to the undignified openness that admits of no private realm. It is motivated by the ultra-liberal-modern will to truth and its injunction to reveal oneself in a pathetic gambit for social acceptance, a premise that presumes toleration of the most venal acts and types. It also, somewhat hilariously, presumes the supposed merit of humility among the botched whose lack dignity it exposes. Secularized Christian pity and charity—a Rawlsian concern with ‘freedom from shame’—operates to cover-up the degrading nature of the charade. However tawdry, pathetic or humiliating the facts revealed are the subject is praised—and thanked!—for their “bravery” in revealing them. The audience experiences a voyeuristic catharsis through the act of witnessing another’s confession, and the spirit of revenge is briefly satiated. These spectacles are nearly ubiquitous in the Western world, and exemplified in popular television talk-shows hosted by insipid celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey, et. al.

Nietzsche recognizes that the maintenance of power requires manipulating / managing the herd’s resentment either by the best, in active will to power that creates an authentically good conscience or by ascetic priests, in negative will to power, which naturalizes a bad-conscience to make it seem good.
Take for example the treatment President Mahathir bin Muhammad, the quasi-authoritarian leader of Malaysia, came in for when he took his nation’s currency and exchange mechanisms out of the international system to protect his domestic economy from speculative foreign investment during the Asian monetary crisis of 1997 – 1999. Despite widely acknowledged systemic flaws in the very international financial institutions (and apart from Mahathir’s shrill pronouncements and irrational blame of individuals such as George Soros for South-East Asia’s brief financial turmoil) he was excoriated by Western arbiters of globalization as “protectionist”.

Good Europeans are Nietzschean “great men”, or the closest approximation to them we can expect to encounter in our decadent age.

Conway, 1997a: 109

Conway, 1997a: chapter six

UM: III-3

GM: III-11

Much of Freud’s thesis in *Civilization and its Discontents* constitutes little more than an unacknowledged extrapolation from the third book of Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

GM: III-11

Some conservative strains of American Protestantism combine these notions of reward, linking material wealth with God’s grace, understood to be a consequence / reward for their divinely conferred grace faith here on earth.

See, for instance, the novel “Prozac Nation,” by Elizabeth Wurtzel (1994). With maniacal, mindless consumption celebrated above all else, contemporary Protestant religious services are adopting the entertainment ethos, holding Las Vegas style services at converted sports arenas to accommodate the throng. Celebrity pastors eschew “negative” messages about guilt, sin, and eternal damnation in favor of a feel good message that serves to cover-up their faith’s condemnation of life with a mindless happy face. For an example of this trend see the Lakewood Church of Houston, Texas, led by celebrity Pastor Joel Osteen.


GM: III-27.

This would, from Nietzsche’s viewpoint, have seemed a fact that Rawls, as an ascetic priest devoted to proselytizing an anti-natural form of idealistic liberalism – a secular slave-morality of taming *par excellence* – would be incapable of seeing, or at least admitting.

“All becoming and growing—all that guarantees a future—involves pain.” TI: X – 4

The liberal-modern will to nothingness (relativism) that deprives all former meanings of veracity and all traditions of their authority would provoke an intensely homicidal-suicidal reaction epitomized in the National socialist party a few decades later. That reaction would destroy Germany and much of the world.

Nietzsche suggests by way of an example, that the growing power of Russia might produce “a single will by means of a new caste dominating all Europe – so that the long-drawn out comedy of its petty states and the divided will of its dynasties and splintered will of its democracies should finally come to an end.”

Conway, 1997b: 76; the designation “liberal-optimist” also applies to such notable 20th century figures as Gandhi, Kemal Atatürk and Ben-Gurion, as they each effectively established—or laid the groundwork for the establishment of—nation-states which are *ressentiment*-driven polities.

Conway, 1997a: 104

Conway, 1997a: 129, on the publicness of healthy self-creation.

GM: III – 27
I mean ‘empowering’ in a specifically Nietzschean sense here, as that which increases the active forces expressed as a positive will to creative destruction as generative power in healthy individuals.

WP: 957

Baudrillard, 1994: 121

Take the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre, Brazil, for instance: it is the wealth generated by globalizing institutions and (capital) processes that gave rise to the infrastructural capacity and motility that enabled so many to travel there from all points of the earth. The delegates attended the forum, held in a distant locale, to protest globalization and strategize opposition to its prerogatives. These acts in turn mingle perspectives (however reactionary) to generate new and/or increased awareness of globality and realizations of its abstract potentials, irrespective of their ideological motivations. It is globalization that makes such organizing—alternative ascetic practices and experimental arts—directed against the inauthenticity and reaction inherent to “exploitative capital process” possible.

BGE: 276

Conway, 1997a: 78–9

GM: III – 27; Conway, 1997a: 105

TI: 9–43

See TI: 9-20 for his discussion of the imaginary “dynamometer” with which he hypothesized the degree to which the ugliness or degeneration in an entity might be quantifiably measured at some distant time in the future.

Conway, 1997b: 14

BGE: 211; a condition that, by Heidegger’s understanding, constitutes a deprivation of Being from beings.

GM: III – 27

Khan, 2003: 330

BGE: 268

BGE: 203
See Michel DeCerteau’s *The Practice of Everyday Life*.

See Richard Rorty’s *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, which put a liberal face of sorts on some influential aspects of Nietzsche’s thought.


BGE: 230

WP: 1059; also see WP: 999

See Gladwell, 2008

See OFEI and UM–3

It must be noted that in an unpublished note Nietzsche forbade his future heirs, intellectual successors or ‘good Europeans’ from seeking conventional power or participating in the “base” activity of ordinary political life. This is somewhat incongruous however, as every one of the exemplars Nietzsche admires achieved conventional success, power and authority in their particular historical context within and through the political life of their respective socio-political milieu. Nietzsche may have contemplated exhorting ‘good Europeans’ not to feel as though they must immerse themselves in the repellent setting of conventional political institutions – to the extent that avoiding them is possible.

Nietzsche would understand these rights as a cynical contrivance and ideological tool for rationalizing further penetrations into other cultures by the globalization complex.

Taylor, 1997: 3–4

Smith, 1996: 170

Ibid: 147

Elbe, 2003: 120–21

BGE: 186 and 262

MacIntyre, 1998: 202 - 220

Nietzsche asserts (against Platonic faith in truth and reason and corresponding arguments against relativity, such as those in the Parmenides) that “there are absolutely
no moral facts” (TI: VII-1), and “Morality the Circe of humanity, has fundamentally falsified – moralified – all psychologica – to the point where you get complete nonsense like the claim that love is something unegoistic …” (EH: Why I write—5).


929 WP: 132

930 BGE: 208

931 Smith, 1996: 166-7

932 Ibid: 169

933 Heidegger, Being and Time: 165

934 As alluded to above; for corroboration of my understanding of Nietzsche’s view on the utility of the masses / labor of the herd see his essay The Greek State; HH: I – 475, II – 304; BGE: 242, 258, 259, 262; TI: 7 – 3; A: 57, and WP: 866-68.

935 Fukuyama (1992) was led by certain ambiguities in Nietzsche’s thought to conclude that ultra-liberal-modernity and capital processes provide the ideal means of fulfilling this objective. This (neo-Straussian?) imputation mis-reads Nietzsche, whose exoteric teaching clearly conveys his condemnation of these reactive and decadent ideologies. Nietzsche resists making specific recommendations as to how the aims of his good Europeans would be attained. The apparent efficacy of ultra-liberal-modern values to ensure individual freedom and rights, as well as the strong faith individuals have in them suggests that overcoming them will be a long process indeed, and speculating about what it might produce would be futile.

936 Certain “post-modern” critiques of everyday life, such as those posited by Jean Baudrillard and (the Situationist) Guy Debord, while undeniably valuable and relevant, are hereby revealed as implicated in the very “decadence” they themselves identify and condemn as characteristic of their age (an echo of Nietzsche’s own self-implicating critique of decadence). This is evidenced by the fact that they largely fail to glean the positive potential in the simulations and spectacularizations of reality they respectively (reactively) identified as primarily negative for human and civilizational development.

937 Consider HH: 224, BGE: 202 and especially this passage from the late notebooks, “My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic morality. The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd
require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or the ‘beasts of prey,’ etc.” WP: 287

938 WP: 957

939 GS: 328; TI: 85; WP: 957

940 Elbe, citing Nietzsche, 2003: 121

941 EH: VII-2

942 WP: 116

943 Ibid

944 Del Caro, 2004: 63

945 D: 364

946 Donnelly, 1998: 82

947 BGE: 269

948 WP: 936

949 WP: 933

950 Recent historical examples abound: the Turkish genocide of Armenians, the Nazi holocaust in Europe, the genocide of ethnic Tutsi’s by racist Hutu extremists in Rwanda, and the ongoing genocide of Darfuris by Arab Sudanese.


952 GS: 362

953 A number of economists have recently suggest that in the wake of the global financial crisis, which has tarnished the Western “Washington consensus” model of capital process and economic globalization, China’s policies of development resonate among the leading elites in developing nations.

954 Donnelly, 1989: 103–4
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Textual abbreviations for the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and their corresponding bibliographical references:

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I “David Strauss, the Confessor and writer”

II “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”

III “Schopenhauer as Educator”

IV “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth”


I Volume One

II Volume Two

a “Assorted Opinions and Maxims”

b “The Wanderer and his Shadow”


**Z** *Thus Spoke Zarathustra, A Book for All and None* (2006), translated by Adrian Del Caro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


I  First Essay: “Good and Evil,” “Good and Bad”

II  Second Essay: “Guilt,” “Bad Conscience,” and Related Matters

III  Third Essay: What do Ascetic Ideals Mean?


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