Nationalism, Identity, and Rhetoric in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Rhetorical Analysis of Presidential Speeches, 2004-2012

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Nationalism, Identity, and Rhetoric in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Rhetorical Analysis of Presidential Speeches, 2004-2012

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A Thesis

Presented to

the faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

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Master of Arts

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by

Mary Miller

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Advisor: Timothy Sisk, PhD.
ABSTRACT

Ethnic divisions undermine statebuilding efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina almost twenty years after the end of a war among the three main ethnic groups in the country. The political elites influence on how nationalism and identity is experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina and offer reflections on how the country can or cannot be united. To what extent do the political elites at the level of the presidency articulate more narrow, ethnic themes or a broader national identity in public speeches? The rhetoric used by the political elites is explored to find occurrences of ethnic polarization or a framing of national identity. The thesis is informed by theories that account for the construction of identity and nationalism, in addition to theories around ethnic conflict and myth-making rhetoric. Speeches made by the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina are analyzed from 2004-2012 to find instances of specific word usage that encourages a unified Bosnian identity, promotes an ethnic identity, or attacks another ethnicity. Initial findings indicate the level of the presidency is too elevated to create narrow instances of ethnic identity advancement, resulting in a low number of occurrences of specific ethnic identity rhetoric. This was unexpected from what the conceptual orientation offered by scholars would predict. The political elite did offer ethnic specific expressions, but these were few in comparison to expressions around a unified, nationalistic Bosnian identity. The reality of ethnic divisions in the country is perpetuated at another level in the political or social landscapes of the country, not at the political elite level.
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPRY</td>
<td>Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDA</td>
<td>Qualitative Data Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republic of Srpska (Republika Srpska in the native language)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serb Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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INTRODUCTION

There is a nation where the national anthem has no lyrics because the ethnic groups could not decide on them.\(^1\) It is where last names place someone into a defined role and being a member of an ethnic group means more than being a member of the nation.\(^2\) In this nation, politicians work for ethnic parties not the people, and sections of the country are quarantined from certain ethnicities. Crossing simply from one entity to the next in the same country will introduce a traveler to a new language and a different set of laws.\(^3\) Individuals are ostracized due to their inherited religious beliefs and cultural practices. The blood from one ethnic group is considered different from another and the “game” of “counting blood cells” is often referred to when categorizing individuals.\(^4\) It is a nation scarred physically by mortars and bullet holes and emotionally by injustices and prejudices. The damage to its land and its people is deeply felt and outwardly seen, damages that affect the young, the old, the weary, and the vibrant. This nation is Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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\(^3\) Ibid.

Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is a country at the crossroads in many ways and this resulted in a torrid past and an uncertain future. Intertwined with the happy and sad memories of the past and present is the current political landscape. This is a crucial time for the political parties and citizens of BiH to come together not only under the banner of a unified identity, but to work together for economic growth and political unification. With Croatia joining the European Union (EU) in July 2013 and Serbia and Kosovo much closer to doing the same in the coming years, BiH can no longer afford to remain a divided society in a region that continues to move forward and prosper. BiH’s integration process into the EU is long and tedious, with no promise that acceptance will be afforded it within the next three to five years. As Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina with the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), told the United Nations (UN) Security Council in May 2013, “There can be no more excuses and there is no place to hide from their responsibilities. The choice is simple. They can succeed together or they can fail together.”

Politicians are elected according to ethnicity, resulting in a perpetuation of ethnonationalism. Ethnic elites, especially those holding public office, are capable of forming messages and ideas around their ethnic group through the use of rhetoric and political symbols (Kaufman 2001; Cohen 1974; Geertz 1973). The speeches made by the political elite, those holding the office of the presidency, elucidate the construction of identity along either ethnic or national lines (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Through

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word choice and stimulation, those in power create opportunities to either liberate a
country of ethnonationalism or foster ethnic identities.

This thesis accounts for a period in BiH’s recent history to analyze what the political elite
say and how this affects the sentiments and attitudes around the country in respect to fellow
citizens. The thesis answers the question of how political elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina make
appeals to build nationalism and emphasize commonality of the ethnicities or promote ethnic
identity as the common binding point (Wimmer 2008; Nagel 1994). As the members of
the presidency publically express their ideas on what it means to be Bosnian, the public
listens and forms their opinions and reactions based on their fellow group members. The
presidents are in a position of power to shape history with the use of their words and this
is imperative in understanding not only the current situation in BiH, but how future
leaders might use the same rhetoric tools to create a new identity in the country (Cruz
2000; Anderson 2006; Barth 1969).

To what extent to BiH’s political elites at the highest level of the presidency
articulate more narrow, ethnic themes in public speeches and to what extent do they
emphasize broader national identity? This thesis is important to better understand why
BiH is still stagnant and relentless in its refusal to move forward after a civil war that
ended almost 20 years ago (Beiber 2005; Velikonja 2003). The case study of BiH is
illustrative of a broader set of post-conflict societies that deal with ethnic divisions such
as Rwanda, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. The heuristic nature of the BiH case offers
insight into the saliency of ethnicity and informs the role of institutions in shaping ethnic
identity. The multitude of cases of ethnically divided societies are spoken to in texts and
essays by scholars in the field who identity the causation and implication of divisions in
the national institutions (Uvin 1997; Samarasinghe 2009; Cederman et al. 2009). The
theories and findings presented in the thesis are demonstrative of a larger representation
of ethnic identity and its role in nationalism.

Speeches made by members of the presidency of BiH from the year 2004 to 2012
are analyzed to account for statements of nationalism, ethnic nationalism, or anti-ethnic
sentiments. A total of 54 speeches, 18 from each of the three main ethnic groups, were
coded to determine how political elites create ethnic divisions. The findings indicate that
political elites speak in broader terms in public speeches and do not use ethnic specific
language as much as one would expect as theories suggest political elites are more
responsible than not for propagating and maintaining ethnic divisions. The reasons for
this will be discussed in the conclusion.

The reconciliation efforts done by citizens, international organizations, and
national institutions seem to be in vain as long as the political system remains ineffectual
and a proponent of separate ethnic identities within one country (Belloni 2007). This is
not to say a country can only be homogenous in order to have an effective political
structure, quite the opposite, in fact, as diversification of people allows for a more robust,
authentic representation within a democratic system. However, the ethnic identities
within BiH are so alienating of one another that the debates which make the political
process rich and rewarding are nothing more than disparaging attacks on ethnic groups
and their policy initiatives.

For BiH to continue into the twenty-first century as a viable member of the EU
and an economic and political force in the Balkan region, the political leaders and the
citizens needs to understand why the division exist, how the divisions are promoted, and
what can be done to counter the attitudes formed by so many years of mistrust and abuse. This thesis looks at the why and how of the questions raised above while developing opinions as to what those living in BiH can do to make their country a safe space for all future citizens.

Chapter one presents the conceptual background for the paper. Theories around identity, ethnic identity, symbolic politics, and nationalism are discussed in relation to the implications for the work presented in the thesis. Chapter two delves into the history and contextual backdrop for how the theories are applied in regards to BiH from its early history to the war. The political organization and current landscape are also explored to give the reader a better grasp on the inner workings of the political process.

After the conceptual and contextual orientations are laid out, Chapter three analyzes the current situation in BiH in regards to how ethnic divisions manifest themselves in everyday situations. The information and results for the thesis are presented in chapter four. How the speeches were chosen and coded and the initial findings are presented. The conclusion examines the findings and inferences that can be made to the theoretical base, as well as the limitations of the thesis and the implications for future research.

In 2011, the UN Security Council held 213 public meetings to discuss civilian protection in the countries with actual and symbolic violence. In the case of BiH, the Council issued a decisive statement that asked political leaders to overcome the current situation by making progress towards EU integration and refraining “from divisive
The thesis initiates an examination of the use of rhetoric by political leaders to evaluate their role in the stagnation and failure of BiH to become a nation unified under a communal identity.

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Identity is important to all human beings (Turner and Oakes 1986; Hogg and Williams 2000). We label ourselves in terms of personal and professional roles and ensure our persona reflects that which fits the expectations associated with a specific role. This is complicated further when identity is more than being a mother or a son or an executive, but is based on ethnic, nationality, religious, gender, or any number of other ambiguous categories that are standard in the modern world. A person can identify themselves as Jewish ethnically but Christian religiously, or ethnically Arab but a German nationalist. The categories are immense and intricate, thorny by nature and cause for physical, emotional, spiritual, and social battles.

In terms of ethnicity, history shows us this is the most antagonistic and incompatible aspects of the human identification system as many ethnicities live side-by-side with conflicting values that escalate into hatred and bloodshed. From the Crusades to the Spanish Inquisition to the Holocaust to the Bosnian War, physical conflict has centered on separating one group from another and singling out members of either group to be ostracized or, in some extreme cases, terminated. Ethnicity is a term with a myriad of definitions and understandings, often debated and altered in academic, political, and social settings. In terms of the topic of ethnic communication and conflict, it is best to understand ethnicity as a way to identify people and categorize them in a way to best fit the needs of the elite, controlling members of society (Horowitz 1985).
Three schools of thought exist in identity formation around ethnicity to help elucidate the foundations of ethnic conflict and divisional propensities. They are the construction of identity to build ethnicity, nationalism to develop ethnic identity, and symbolic politics to divide ethnicities.

CONSTRUCTING ETHNIC IDENTITY

Kanchan Chandra asks in the title of his paper “What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?” (2006). These questions are raised in response to what he feels is the lack of understanding in the political science field on the proper method to classify ethnic groups in contemporary times. The definitions presented by top scholars in the field (Horowitz 1985; Fearon and Laitin 2000) fall short of including all necessary aspects of identity to properly classify individuals or groups of people. The thesis is a working definition, looking at various aspects of identity in the modern world to create a definition that fits all the needs Chandra considers most important in identifying and classifying human beings.

Not considering established definitions of identity that focus on common ancestry, territory, and a common history, among others (Spencer 2006), Chandra points out just two factors that are important in ethnic classification centered on descent-based attributes. He calls these “constrained change” and “visibility.” Constrained change is presented as the concept that “attributes associated, or believed to be associated, with descent are, on average, difficult to change in the short term” (2006, 414). This is centered on the notion of stickiness, or how difficult it is to actually change certain features. The most common example is skin color, but even this, as all aspects of
attributes, has degrees of difficulty in labeling it (2006, 415). However, skin color, along with other attributes, that are difficult to change in an overall group due to the descent factor are better associated with ethnic identification than just a common heritage. Like the idea of constrained change, the idea of visibility is also important in categorizing along ethnic lines. Attributes such as language, attire, and physical features are highly visible and “can be ascertained through superficial data sources” (2006, 416).

Chandra’s presentation on how to properly categorize individuals in ethnic groups based on the nature of the attribute and not the attribute itself helps to understand that definitions of ethnicity only matter so much as how others understand the attributes. For example, a group of individuals can have a specific dialect that distinguishes them from others, but if their skin color is what is being used as a determinant of ethnicity, the dialect does not matter in the identification process in this instance. Ethnic identity is a concept that can be molded and remolded to fit a situation, a time period, or a region. Chandra gives us a base to go from in regards to not only pinpointing attributes that categorize a group of people, but evaluating the attributes to ascertain is they are earnestly being used to categorize a group. Many definitions of ethnicity are presented in many papers and here we will focus on the implications of identity in the public arena as described by key scholars in identity studies (Bermeo 2002; Elkins and Sides 2007; Habyarimana et al. 2007). The way identity is used and understood is more substantial to an argument on ethnic identity as a source of conflict as presented in the following sections that move us from how identity is constructed to how its talked about to how it is expressed, with a later look at how these ideas merge in BiH.
Consuelo Cruz opens her paper “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures” (2000) by invoking the identity politics at play in the Balkans at the time the paper was written. The issues she and other identity scholars saw in the Balkan region in regards to hatred and conflict through ethnic identity still persist to this day and Cruz’s insight into the construction of identity through collective memory and national rhetoric that unites a group along their identity lines is important. Other forms of grouping, such as familial, do not have the same widespread unifying affect as does the notion of share culture. The identity constructed within a nation then in turn plays a significant role in the development of a nation. Chandra tells us how identity is used in identification on the part of other people, and Cruz takes it a step further to tell us how identity is used internally to build consensus around group ideals and values.

It should be stated that there are scholars who argue for a primordial approach to identity. These scholars defend the idea that identity is as innate to human nature as survival instincts (Joireman 2003). With all arguments presented, this paper will follow the ideas presented by Cruz and her fellow scholars who follow the constructive approach to identity (Smith 1987, 1991). Humans have grouped themselves into categories for as long as humans have recorded history and these groupings, in this author’s opinion, were and are defined by our own construction.

Collective identity is the method of unification for any group of people. A nation does well to present a united front through a shared history and culture that lends itself to creating an environment where arguments are not along which ethnic group is better but how best to develop policies to better their political, economic, and social conditions.
Cruz (2000) illustrates this through a comparative study of Nicaragua and Costa Rica by looking at how elite politicians developed, or didn’t develop, a national story to unite all citizens around common goals.

In her case study, Cruz (2000) describes the post-colonial identification systems within Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Even during the colonization of the two countries, political elites were shaping a national rhetoric that either developed or deteriorated a national identify. In Nicaragua, a localist approach was taken when talking about identity and leaders promoted partisan political separation. In contrast, political leaders in Costa Rica took a nationalistic approach that promoted a shared concept of identity among all citizens. There were differences in regional needs and wants in the public arena, but these were minor when compared to the national needs and wants for all Costa Ricans.

In Cruz’s conclusion, she finds that identity is more than just a category, it is a decisive statement from a person, a group, or a nation that declares what values comprise the individuals. “A normative constitution mandates what a group cannot or will not do out of deference to its self-defining convictions and sense of viable justice” (2000, 310). What Cruz calls “rhetorical frames” is the foundation for the creation of the identities that are so important to human beings. In Nicaragua, civil wars and divisional politics are present 100 years after the end of Spanish Colonization, while in Costa Rica a peaceful existence has persisted over the years. Political entrepreneurs have a large say in fostering the way a public thinks, feels, and acts dependent on the identity created and described by those in power. The rhetoric used by the political elite constructs the nationalistic identity that becomes important in a collective group; this is important in how nationalism is viewed and talked about.
NATIONALISM AND ITS ROLE IN ETHNIC IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

In the modern world, we are ever more connected to those around us, both physically and symbolically. Members of a certain religion can practice their faith in a physical setting with members in their community and then watch an online viewing of a service in another country. Newsletters and websites are tailored to very specific identity groups that range from social hobbies to ethnic forums and these allow people all over the world to easily pick and choose which identity(ies) they belong with. Nationalism in this world is therefore much more important than it was with our ancestors in terms of uniting people within border and around the globe. American citizens live abroad and many nationalities dwell within the borders of the United States but stay connected to the situation and people in their home country. As Liah Greenfeld (2006) puts it, “nationalism, in short, is the modern culture. It is the symbolic blueprint of modern reality, the way we see, and thereby construct, the world around us, the specifically modern consciousness” (204).

The modern world has a modern culture that is more than just customs and values, but an entire system based on identity that transcends borderlines. Nationalism is no longer about a country, but about a people and this is important in understanding how identity can turn individuals against one another and nurture attitudes to other groups.

To sum up: nationalism is a fundamentally secular and humanistic consciousness based on the principles of popular sovereignty and egalitarianism. These three characteristics are present in every specific case of nationalism. Modern culture, more generally, is essentially nationalistic in the sense that it has at its core the nationalist world view and that it projects this world view on every sphere of cultural/social activity. (Greenfeld 2006, 205)

The way our mind perceives this construction indicates how we relate to one another and how we learn social cues and normative behavior. The mind contains our memory and
political entrepreneurs with the rhetorical ability to construct a specific collective approach to nationalism can manipulate memory. Our reality is created starting from the time we are born and never ceases to be added to and altered, as every experience and interaction in our lives has implications in our existence (Greenfeld 2006, 214-215).

Identity is more than just a classification; it is a way of life. Greenfeld explains how nationalism is perceived in our modern world and how this perception is used to build our relations in the physical world around us. The creation of identity for a national or ethnic group is largely in the hands of the political elite who use specific rhetoric, which include symbolic politics, to enhance the image they deem necessary to further whatever agenda is present, be it malicious or not (Cederman et al. 2010; Woodward 2003).

Arguably of even greater moment is the fact that the symbolic ennoblement of the populace in nationalism makes membership in the nation, i.e. nationality itself, an honorable elevated status, thereby tying one’s sense of dignity and self-respect to one’s national identity. (Greenfeld 2006, 206)

Symbols are used to construct the identity and the identity is used as a paradigm to build a reality best suited to the elite needs of a population.

SYMBOLIC POLITICS

In Stuart Kaufman’s book *Modern Hatreds*, he explores how politics as a platform for promoting ethnic superiority through symbols and rhetoric to incite violence that erupts into ethnic war. He defines ethnicity and lays out the specific uses of symbolic politics before and during an ethnic conflict while using the case studies of Armenia-Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Yugoslavia to show symbolic politics in action. The use of symbolic politics to endorse ethnic war is an age old concept rooted in
fear, cultivated in ignorance, and ripened in acceptance. People fear what is unknown and fight for comfort and familiarity, all of which can be promised by elite political leaders invoking hatred of the unknown and promoting a way out of fear by outright violence.


1. If an area was ours for 500 years and yours for 50 years, it should belong to us— you are merely occupiers.
2. If an area was yours for 500 years and ours for 50 years, it should belong to us— borders must not be changed.
3. If an area belonged to us 500 years ago but never since then, it should belong to us— it is the Cradle of our Nation.
4. If a majority of our people live there, it must belong to us— they must enjoy the right of self-determination.
5. If a minority of our people live there, it must belong to us— they must be protected against your oppression.
6. All of the above rules apply to us but not to you.
7. Our dream of greatness is Historical Necessity, yours is Fascism.

This passage enlightens the complications and partiality that surrounds the notions of ethnicity and ethnic politics in determining not only borders, but rights to governance.

Kaufman follows the definition of ethnicity that Anthony Smith articulates, that an ethnic group is one “sharing five key traits: a group name, a believed common decent,
common historical memories, elements of shared culture such as language or religion, and attachment (even if only historical or sentimental) to a specific territory” (Kaufman 2001, 16). He also defines several terms relevant to his discussion of ethnicity, and thus relevant to better understanding how symbolic politics fit into nationalistic and ethnic identity formation. These are:

Nationalism: the belief that one’s own group should be politically autonomous (16)

Chauvinism: the belief that one’s own group is better than others, and therefore has the right to dominate or displace them (16)

Hostility: relating to another group as to an enemy (16)

Myth: a belief held in common by a large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning (16)

Symbol: an emotionally charged shorthand reference to a myth (16)

The above definitions are to clarify what certain aspects of the discussion mean, how groups are categorized, and how elites transfer sentiments.

Ethnic wars start by a combination of ancient hatreds, manipulative leaders, economic rivalry, and a spiral of insecurity (Kaufman 2001). All of these relate to the use of propaganda to direct sentiments of fear, stress, and uncertainty onto a source outside of those you connect most with so as to place blame where it can easily be manifested. The idea of ethnic groups as the main proponent of violence is propagated in rational, psychological, and symbolic political theories and each explains why ethnicities serve as the foundation for violent conflict. (Valentino 2004; Kalyvas 2006) In rationalist terms, ethnic war is a product of elites organizing the masses around specific goals, generally focused on self-interest and economic superiority (Kaufman 2001). From the
psychological standpoint, ethnic war is a product of identity, be it primordial or constructed, being a tool to justify actions against another group to promote kinship and maximize group potential (Kaufman 2001).

In terms of symbolic politics, ethnic war is a product of emotional appeals on part of elite figures to pursue group goals. Fear of group extinction is a driving factor in ethnic war, as the central postulation around symbolic politics assumes in “that people make political choices based on emotion and in response to symbols” (Kaufman 2001, 29). Negative emotions toward another group are stimulated and expanded, and “therefore, if emotional appeals to ethnic themes simultaneously appeals to ideas that lead one to blame another group, those appeals are apt simultaneously to arouse the feelings of anger and aggression most likely to motivate people to want to fight” (Kaufman 2001, 29).

Conflict among different groups happens frequently, but it does not always escalate to war. Kaufman presents specific conditions that are more likely to result in ethnic war rather than just disagreement between two or more groups. The conditions he presents are myths justifying ethnic hostility, ethnic fears, and the opportunity to mobilize and fight (Kaufman 2001). If these aspects are present, the conflict is more likely to result in a full-fledged war than if there was simply conflict among ethnic groups (Weinstein 2007; Valentino et al. 2004). There are also several processes and outlooks to understanding the outbreak of an ethnic war, all of which encompass mobilization of the ethnic group around a common cause to combat erupting emotions of mistrust, fear, and instability.
Myths and symbols are important not only in that they provide a basis for using violence against another group, but they explain “how ethnic groups understand their interests” especially in regards to insisting “on political dominance in the territory under dispute” (Kaufman 2001, 206). This has been proven to not only be a factor in ethnic war, but elite-led political interactions as well. “In cases of elite-led violence, the initial degree of hostility can be even lower: as long as leaders have myths to work with, they can create hostility and fear by provoking conflict and violence” (Kaufman 2001, 207). Ethnic identity can create a case for mobilizing a group as a way to gain physical or political ground in a region, as Louis Kriesberg and Bruce W. Dayton relate in their book *Constructive Conflicts*, “claiming a shared identity can help generate resources that may be used to advance individual and common benefits” (2012, 51). Kaufman shows us that “the symbolic politics approach is useful for analyzing any political dynamic involving elite-mass interaction” (Kaufman 2001, 218). Symbolic politics is a tool used to incite feelings necessary for elite leaders to promote their causes and interests as intended for the betterment of the population they serve.

As a side note, the potential for societies to move forward after ethnic conflict is great and can be aided with the help of structured institutions and interventions. These approaches are not to be discussed here, but the ideas behind them are important in understanding how nations move forward after conflict. There are instances, even within BiH, of cooperation among ethnic groups in a commitment to create anew a society secure to live in that develops a nationalism reaction (Stewart 2000; Cederman et al. 2009; Coakley 2009; Fearon and Laitin 1996).
CHAPTER TWO: How History Shaped Ethnic Identity in BiH

In its most distant and recent past BiH was plagued with contentious boundaries, divided peoples, and controversial claims as Eastern and Western civilizations often meet within the area. The country is at the heart of the Balkan region and was at the center of the former Yugoslavia. Claims from neighboring Croatia and Serbia after the breakdown of Yugoslavia were neither new nor unprecedented. For centuries, the people inhabiting the region fought over the rightful ownership of the land and its resources. To understand the past battles and present divergences is to understand the context in which present day elite communicators set their stage. The history, resources, peoples, and stories that make up BiH have a place in forming the current relations among those residing in its present boundaries.

The history of BiH, both as an independent state and as a member of other societies, is unique and integral to the modern day situation. With an understanding of the concepts around ethnic identity and nationalism and how those affect sentiments, the study of the history of BiH offers insight into how these ideas play into the real world. The following chapter analyzes the history of BiH through its role in shaping and handling ethnicities, from the Ottoman Empire to the modern sovereign nation.

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7 The BiH tourism agency promotes Bosnia-Herzegovina as the “Heart-shaped Land” and in answer to the question, “Where are we?” claims it is at the heart of SE Europe. http://www.bhtourism.ba/eng/
GEOGRAPHY AND EARLY HISTORY

A part of Southeastern Europe, BiH shares a border with Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro, with a small strip of land abutting the Adriatic Sea. The country itself is divided into two regions, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Situated in the southwest portion of the country, Herzegovina’s culture is not all that dissimilar to Bosnia, but in its 12,000-year-old history, the many civilizations and settlements left their mark on the region. A Croatian majority in the western part and a Serbian majority in the eastern part currently settle the area. Herzegovina is diversified in natural resources, including fresh water and green forests, and boasts a more Mediterranean climate than the rest of the country.

Bosnia covers the north and central areas of the country and the word itself comes from an old Indo-European word *bosana* that means water. The central part of Bosnia is the past home to the kings and elites who ruled during the Ottoman Empire. This region was important in both the rise of Christianity and Islam in the country, as Catholic churches, monasteries, and mosques were built throughout the centuries. Rich in metallic resources, coal, and fresh water sources, Bosnia quickly became a coveted region when globalization began, before the term was even coined. Here, people from different cultures, religions, and ethnicities came together in search of the same rich land to cultivate and make their own, interconnecting people earlier than technology allowed.

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The modern day capital city of Sarajevo was always a central aspect of BiH culture and society. Located in a valley with the Miljacka River flowing in its midst, Sarajevo was founded as a city in the mid-1400s by the Ottoman Empire (Donia 2006, 8). Originally intended as a center for Islamic ideology, early settlers and planners “accommodated neighborhoods and places of worship for Catholic, Orthodox, and (by the mid-sixteenth century) Jewish residents” (Donia 2006, 8). Since its founding, each governing power shaped its urban context to their vision, resulting in a unique mixture of religions and cultures evident by the architecture, occupants, and heritage (Donia 2006, 2). When the Ottoman Empire conquered the region around 1460, it brought with it an impressive 450 year period of constant expansion and fortification, not only of Sarajevo but of the country as a whole (Donia 2006). The city of Sarajevo itself is not easily fortifiable due to its location and “its very survival depended on peace” (Donia 2006, 23). Regardless of whom held power, those in ruling positions did their best to represent the myriad of voices and viewpoints from Sarajevo citizens by setting up city councils with a diverse religious composition or promoting transient political parties (Donia 2006).

The peace that encompassed Sarajevo during the Ottoman Empire was in conjunction with a mixture of ethnicities and religions. The Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs that still compromise the three largest ethnic groups in the country were just as important in BiH’s early history. Referred to as Bosnian Muslims, Catholics or Latins, and Serbian Orthodox or Greek Orthodox Christians, respectively, up until the late twentieth century (Donia 2006, 2), the major ethic groups and their associated identities shaped the politics, culture, and conflict in BiH. After World War I and during the formation of Yugoslavia, political divisions and decisions were based on ethnicities that centered on neighborliness
and friendly differences (Donia 2006, 3-4). The “common life” that was referred to by all residing in the city consisted of permissive attitudes and empathetic tolerance to one another (Donia 2006, 4).

The tolerance, appreciation for diverseness, and side-by-side living not only in Sarajevo but in the region all but seemed to vanish once the Ottoman Empire was disbanded. The history of BiH during the Ottoman Empire, and before, is filled with stories of people from dissimilar civilizations meeting at the natural crossroads within BiH and forming bonds that unified them in progressive living. While not immune from wars or major conflict over the centuries, the Balkans and BiH were not a center of bloody ethnic battles or prolonged fighting, until the 1900s. When the Ottoman Empire lost its control in the region and the Austro-Hungarian occupation began in 1878, BiH began to be shaped as its own country complete with newspapers, administrative and legal structures, and educational systems (Hoare 2007). There were regional and religious uprisings in the fight for autonomy, most prolific being the Mostar rebellion in 1882\(^{11}\) and the Muslim national movement from 1896 until 1906\(^{12}\). And as these movements for ethnic autonomy took shape and grabbed hold of the people, ethnonationalism began to rise in the region. On the eve of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, political parties in BiH formed and thus separated the people and politics along ethnic lines. As one scholar observed:

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\(^{11}\) The Mostar rebellion started in January 1882 when a rebel force comprised of Serbs and Muslims attacked a police station and were able to govern until April 1882 when the rebellion was crushed. This marked the end of rebellions based on the traditional Ottoman model (Hoare 2007).

\(^{12}\) Starting in Mostar as well, this movement was focused on the religious rights of Muslims within the country, not on its national rights. The Muslim population was concerned with their rights to practice freely and educate their children as desired. It consisted mainly of peaceful means and ended with a cooperation agreement that “called for unity of purpose with ‘our brothers of Latin faith’” (Hoare 2007, 79).
These political parties- the Muslim National Organisation, Serb National Organisation, and Croat National Union- therefore represented the institutionalising of the Bosnian national movements under the Hapsburg monarchy, along the line already laid down by the other nationalities of the empire. (Hoare 2007, 81)

As World War I started, BiH was under Austro-Hungarian rule but the government was losing influence and Serbian power began to seep into BiH’s borders. The Austro-Hungarians were fighting a battle on the Serbian front due to the perceived notions that Serbia was against the monarchy in its language and agitation (Malcolm 1996, 156). Troops, including Bosnian Serbs, were sent to the front lines and after a year the Serbs were forced to retreat (Malcolm 1996). At the same time, Croatian and Slovenia politicians were spouting an idea of a unified Yugoslav state envisioned as a “unified Yugoslav entity as an equal partner with Austria and Hungary within a continuing Habsburg Empire” (Malcolm 1996, 159). This was also touted as a way to prevent a ‘Greater Serbia’ from forming (Malcolm 1996). By 1918, Austro-Hungarian power was significantly decreased and the rulers waited too long to act with the initial proposal for a shared power system. A National Council was formed in October 1918 that created separate ruling parties within the six territories of what would become Yugoslavia to form a sovereign state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (Malcolm 1996); the Austro-Hungarian rule was collapsed and a new nation was organized.

FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE OF YUGOSLAVIA

The formation of Yugoslavia in 1918 banned together divergent political and cultural systems in aspirations for these ideologies to express themselves through a common desire for autonomy (Hoare 2007, 99). In January 1918, Woodrow Wilson gave
a speech to the U.S. Congress outlining point of interest in ensuring peace around the world and forming the idea of the League of Nations, known as “Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.” Number 11 of these points specifically addressed Yugoslavia and its territory, stating “self-determination and guarantees of independence should be allowed for the Balkan states.”

Yugoslavia, under many manifestations in its 70 year history from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and finally the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was conceived as a place for the Slavic people (the name literally means south slavs in the Slavic language) to live under their own rules and cultural preferences, rather than an outside force such as the Ottomans or Austrian-Turks.

While formed under a desire for autonomous rule and ethnic freedom, the initial years of Yugoslavia were anything but ideal. There were several concerns among the groups on how power would be officially divided and implemented and each main group, the Croats, the Serbs, and the Slovenes, conceived drafts of a constitution in direct odds with one another (Benson 2004). Disputes on boundaries, centrality of government, and religious freedoms were but some of the initial governance issues that could not be easily resolved; this resulted in “two decades of political paralysis, which ended (when it was too late to make any difference) with the partitioning of the state and the outbreak of Hitler’s war in the Balkans” (Benson 2004, 37).

In the late 1920s, Germany experienced resurgence in power and European countries began forming alliances in the region to counter this growing power. France and Great Britain created the Balkan Pact in 1934, a document that aligned Yugoslavia,
Romania, Greece, and Turkey in their interests to protect against German and Soviet influence (Dedijer et al. 1974, 510). The Balkan Pact was somewhat inconsequential as Yugoslavia still voted to admit the Soviet Union to the League of Nations and claimed a policy of neutrality during World War II. This neutrality did lead to Yugoslavia’s economic dependency on Germany during the 1930s when the country became a leading exporter and importer, surpassing both France and Great Britain in the time period (Dedijer et al. 1974, 512). The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was doomed to fail in its first iteration due to contentious politics that led to inadequate policies to deal with the rising international tensions and economic ruin.

The lack of political clout in the region and internally assured Yugoslavia did not have the authority to affect much control over when happened during the World War II. Slovenes and Serbs in Croatia and BiH were forced to resettle and thousands of Serbs, gypsies, and Jews were systematically massacred, not to mention looting of cultural artifacts important to Serbs and Slovenes (Dedijer et al. 1974). World War II claimed the lives of more than one million Yugoslav citizens. Of the total Yugoslav deaths from the war, 52 percent were Serb, 19 percent were Croat, and 10 percent were Bosnian, or 81 percent of the total deaths could be accounted for in the Bosnian, Serb, and Croat populations (Benson 2004, 77).

The devastation leading up to and during World War II was mirrored by the rise in power of Josip Broz, better known as Tito, in 1934 as a delegate of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Benson 2004). In 1937, he was appointed General Secretary of the party and remained a prominent member of the party and Yugoslav politics through World War II. Tito took the formation of a new Yugoslavia under his command and
when Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill met in Yalta in February 1945, they agreed to recognize the Democratic Federative of Yugoslavia before World War II was officially over (Benson 2004, 85); this Federation would officially be a people’s republic called the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) (Dedijer et al. 1974, 698). While designated a republic, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia held official power and was legitimized as young people looked to its leadership in the reconstruction efforts following the war. Each People’s Republic within the nation (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, BiH, Macedonia, and Montenegro) followed the Constitution of the FPRY, “whose two basic principles were the unity of authority and democratic centralism” (Dedijer et al. 1974, 698).

During the following years, Yugoslavia remained a contentious member of the region, with leaders from neighboring areas trying to get rid of Tito as a formidable leader. The Soviet Union was looked to as the leader in the fight against Western capitalism and some saw Tito’s politics as in direct conflict (Benson 2004). At the same time, Yugoslavia was becoming a player on the world stage, being elected to the UN Security Council in 1948 and gaining the support from the UN General Assembly over the Soviet Union in the same year (Benson 2004, 94). The country continued to deal with communist resentment from the western societies and an internal revision sentiment to rid the political landscape of outside influence.

The people of Yugoslavia were plagued with poverty, unemployment, and overall dissatisfaction with political leadership. By the time the 1960s came to an end, “an estimated 20 per cent of working-class and peasant households lived on the margins of existence, while another 70 per cent barely made ends meet” (Benson 2004, 114). Many
Yugoslavs worked abroad, a large portion of which worked in capitalistic markets and these workers saw little incentive to make their way back to Yugoslav markets, as the economic situation at home was nothing to champion (Benson 2004). Individual regions within Yugoslavia conducted surveys and reviews of economic policies to determine how to decentralize the market in order to improve conditions. Reform became the guiding principle of the 1970s and individual republics within Yugoslavia were focused on improving their economies, each acting in their own interest with a certain regard for providing aid to other regions (Benson 2004).

Reform was also being organized at the national political level. The Constitution was drawn anew to equalize the individual republics but also to affirm the basis of power for the central government. This Constitution was adopted in 1974 and was the longest in the world at the time with 406 articles (Benson 2004, 127). The government also tried to establish its connection with the working class and created the Law on Associated Labour in 1976, a document that focused on the basic organization of a labor force (Benson 2004). What was critical about these two documents wasn’t what they included, but rather what they left out. Neither mentioned the freedom of political association. The government was focused on creating a systematic, ordered society and intended the people to have influence only in “decision-making as voters, as members of work collectives, [or] as members of a dozen or more socio-political organizations” (Benson 2004, 127).

In 1979, the World Bank issued a study showcasing the economic weakness of Yugoslavia (Benson 2004, 129). Foreign investment plummeted, government spending increased, and the value of imports exceeded exports by three times. Elites lived lavish
lifestyles while the working class became more unskilled and unemployment reached new heights. The skilled workers from abroad and the higher-education system overtook the available jobs and by 1977, “40 per cent of unemployed had been registered for more than a year” (Benson 2004, 130). The country was divided along economic lines, which became an issue when individual republics began focusing on their own citizens to strengthen the economy. Tito died in 1980 and, without his revolutionary leadership, his cynics became looking for ways to get what they felt was owed them after years of living under his policies.

Tito tried to centralize the Yugoslav government by allowing the individual republics room to create policies, but leaving the federal government as the main creator and enforcer of legislation and institutions. This was widely held in contentment among the republics, as they felt both geographically and ideologically separated from one another and did not want a federal system dictating their policies (Benson 2004). The republics saw themselves as separate from one another almost since the creation of Yugoslavia and resented any form of government that tried to unify them in more than geographical terms. The six Yugoslav republics would begin discussions in the early 1990s that served as the central forum from which “disintegration would be regulated” (Glenny 1992, 37). With Tito gone, inner fighting and jockeying for stronger positions among the republics started and by the end of the 1980s, the federal government could not do much more than facilitate arguments among the republics. (See Kaplan 2005 and Maass 1997 for more about the divisions among the former Yugoslav republics.)

There are also instances of social cohesion (Easterly et al. 2006) in BiH in the 1980s, most notably the hosting of the 1984 Winter Olympics in Sarajevo and a high level of intermarriage rates among ethnicities. BiH had a stable intermarriage rate of 11.9 percent in 1989 as compared to earlier years, not declining with
ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA AND WAR IN BiH

The cause of the wars that would manifest themselves with the dissolution of Yugoslavia are debated among historians. Some, such as the last American ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, profess it was the political leaders propagating violence and supreme reign for an ethnic group. Zimmermann even goes as far to call the political leaders “villains” with deformity of character (Zimmermann 1996). Others claim the long history of ethnic divisions was too persistent to transition the Yugoslav nations into sovereign nations in a peaceful way (Glenny 1992). Still other claim it was the failure of the international community to meaningfully handle the economic and political needs for the new nations (Woodward 1995). No matter the cause, the fact remains that in many of the former Yugoslav nations, most notably BiH, war was the manner in which independence was gained.

Slovenia and Croatia were the first to declare independence from Yugoslavia and did so with little bloodshed. The two nations were formed without much contention from neighboring regions and thus started their path to democratic statehood under peaceful, civilized measures. However, when BiH declared its independence in 1991, the Serb region was not ready to give up the land it deemed its own without a fight. Claims to the region by Croatians, Bosniaks, and Serbs ensured that BiH would have a long, hard battle before beginning the path to statehood.

The fall of Yugoslavia has structural, economic, political, and cultural explanations and these diverse effects were all the more felt in BiH due to its multiethnic makeup (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 21). As Croatian and Serbian nationalism increased in bids for independence as in other republics such as Kosovo and Macedonia (Kalvas and Sambanis 2005, 200).
the late twentieth century, BiH became an object of competition for both nations that saw its history imbedded with its own. “Those promoting integralist visions of the nation in Croatia and Serbia looked upon the region and its inhabitants as part of their own imagined nation-state” (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 49). The residents of BiH, regardless of which group they most identified with, were put into the crosshairs of a battle to accumulate the most support and cultural community. A census conducted in 1991 produced results that only perpetuated existing fears that the Muslim population was increasing in the region, pushing out the once dominant Orthodox and Catholic groups (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 67).

Large, overarching fighting officially broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, less than a year after it declared independence. War crystalizes identity as people look to in-group member for support, physically and emotionally. The ethnic security dilemma plays out in a real sense during times of war and the one in BiH was no different (Roe 1999; Posen 1993). The coming years saw battles that centered on ethnic killings and with the Serb forces organized and methodological in its planning, the city of Sarajevo was surrounded by its armed soldiers who would go on to conduct a three year siege on the citizens of the city. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established and arrived in 1993 to act as observers and by the end of 1994, several safe zones were setup around BiH for the Bosnian Muslims to turn to for humanitarian aid and security. In the small town of Srebrenica alone, around 30,000 Bosnian Muslim men, women, and children were camped out with the assurance from UNPROFOR that they would be safe from their enemies.
The international community decided to intervene directly in the war after, on February 5, 1994, Sarajevo saw a mortar shell attack that killed 68, the deadliest day in the war until that point (Malcolm 1996, 255). The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested for the North Atlantic Council (NATO) to begin air strikes against the forces, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Yugoslavia, around Sarajevo that UNPROFOR claimed were responsible. NATO and UNPROFOR then began a relationship of support that lasted over the next two years as they coordinated air strikes and operations to assist BiH in its defense (Malcolm 1996). This was the beginning of the end for the war, as the mainstream media began covering the war more closely and the international community lent their support for a peace settlement as quickly as possible. In November 1994, the United States lifted the arms embargo against BiH that allowed for the government to begin a more strategic defense against the opposition forces (Malcolm 1996, 260).

The first months of 1995 saw little change in violence, other than a more aggressive resistance on the part of BiH. This changed in July of that year, when in the town of Srebrenica more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed by the Serbian forces under the command of the Republika Srpska (Malcolm 1996, 264). Looking back on the events that led to the genocide, historical scholars point to the actions and words of the Republika Srpska Army General, Ratko Mladić.

On July 11, 1995, Mladić made a statement to a news crew after entering the safe zone and seeing the Serbs in control: “Here we are in Srebrenica on July 11, 1995...We present this city to the Serbian people as a gift. Finally, the time has come to take revenge on the Turks” (Stover and Peress 1998, 88-9). Mladić was committed to a pure
race, stating in an interview with the New York Times, “Bosnia and Herzegovina was an artificial creation of the Communist system and before that in the Austrian Empire. We Serbs reject the term ‘Bosnia.’ We are Serbs and we know who we are.” The history of speech and action by him and other political at the time in the former Yugoslavia show the length they would go to achieve radical goals with single-minded determination. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the stage was set ethnic divisions to manifest through framing rhetoric presents at the national level. Ethnicity was the main topic discussed as the former Yugoslavia fell. Now, almost twenty years later, the rhetoric at the elite level is re-examined to see if this continues.

After the Srebrenica genocide, international pressure to end the conflict intensified and in mid-October a cease-fire was initiated as the leaders and their coalitions departed to Dayton, Ohio, to start peace negotiations that ended with the construction of the Dayton Accords (Malcolm 1996, 268). The Dayton Accords were officially approved and signed in Paris, France, in December 1995.

ETHNCITY AND THE DAYTON ACCORDS

Decided in 20 days, the Dayton Accords had the goal to ensure that BiH was formed as one state. The territory was divided into two main entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, along with a district that was to remain untouched due to its isolation and neutrality during the war; this district is Brčko and sits near the Northwest corner of the state (Chandler 2000, 67). The main reconstruction and

oversight came from the international community, with NATO leading the charge on ensuring that the peace agreement was followed. The general framework of the agreement and the constitution of BiH leave no room for building a trust-based structure but rather focus on the setup of a “functioning” government, the existence of boundaries, and the assurance of a cease-fire.¹⁶

The rotation of the office of the president was set forth in the constitution as outlined in the Dayton Accords. Also outlined was the structure of the parliament that takes on a similar layout as the presidency, with the leaders of each chamber rotating the chairmanship among the members that represent the three ethnic groups (Thorp 2011). The design of the rotation of government leaders was to prevent any majority with the nation from imposing decisions on the other groups. This rotation was meant to counter the divisions in the nation by ensuring a voice from each of the main ethnic groups was equally heard routinely, an idea that ensured peace but not cohesion.

The peace agreement did not address the underlying issues, namely those related to ethnic tensions, and the process to build relationships centered on trust were not accounted for. In a 2013 report by the UN High Representative for BiH Valentin Inzko, these effects are evident in his summary of the political stability of BiH. “Of a more fundamental concern…is that some representatives of the Republika Srpska continued the policy of the last several years of open and direct challenges to the fundamentals of the Peace Agreement and the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Inzko 2013). This evidence is also mentioned by Richard Holbrooke, the chief U.S. negotiator, in his 19 year anniversary speech, where he recounted the moment when the BiH president at

the time of the Dayton Accords, Alija Izetbegović, accepted the agreement by saying, “it is not a just peace, but it is peace, our country needs peace.”

Table 1: Prewar and Estimated Postwar Population Structure of Sarajevo (ICG, 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sarajevo</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1997 Est.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canton 9</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>252,013</td>
<td>356,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>34,659</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>138,453</td>
<td>42,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18,778</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>55,822</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>499,725</strong></td>
<td><strong>388,447</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Toal and Dahlman 2011, 219

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It is seen in table 1 and figure 1, the articulation of the peace settlement left BiH physically divided by its ethnic factions. Before the war there was integration within BiH and the ethnicities lived together in cities and towns.

Social indicators such as intermarriage rates suggest that the former Yugoslavia had achieved a degree of cultural interpenetration well beyond that of the United States. The dehumanization process in the Balkans may have been based on nationalist myths, but the hatreds themselves needed to be created anew. (Day and Vandiver 2000, 54)

The Dayton Accords separated the ethnicities into specific, defined territories to represent the ethnicities politically and socially that could be attributed to the recreation of the hatreds (Holbrooke 1999). A “separate but equal” system was setup in all aspects of life,
from education to healthcare to rule of law, leaving citizens of BiH to feel the divide in their everyday interactions.\textsuperscript{19}

**POST-DAYTON ETHNIC DIVISIONS**

As the war ended and the Dayton Accords were implemented, the international community was intervening in state affairs to work toward building an effective, competent state. Statebuilding efforts conducted by the UN Office of the High Representative (OHR), the U.S., and other international groups centered on the administrative capability of the political and legal structures to conduct public affairs in an efficient manner and provide its citizens with the support and relief necessary after the war. The motives and memories from the war around ethnic divisions stayed with the politicians and citizens as the nation tried to rebuild itself, adding another layer to the international community’s obstacles in developing systems to govern the country. As researcher Thorsten Gromes (2010) observed, “at least one party to the conflict rejected the concept that its own ethnic group would constitute a single sovereign political community together with its rivals. Consequently, the sense of being a common nation was missing” (360). From the beginning of its life as a nation in relative peace, BiH felt the weight of its ethnic divisions and those manifestations after a bloody, difficult civil war (Belloni 2007).

The OHR was decentralized and erratic in its structure, resulting in fragmentation of decisions and no formal authority to implement any decisions made (Zaum 2007).

Organizations working within BiH reflected a Western system of political organization, divided into departments, institutions, and agencies, each with their own goals and policies to achieve those goals (Zaum 2007). The Dayton Accords set forth a constitution as an integral aspect of the agreement and with it the recognition of BiH as a state in the international community. This statehood necessitated BiH to formally accept normative responsibilities, such as respecting human rights and refugee resettlement programs, for all people living within its borders.

The constitution also setup a federal system of government, defined as a combination of “self-rule and shared rule and constitutionally allocates power to the general and the constituent-governing bodies” (Gromes 2010, 356). This becomes important because, as Gromes points out, “institutions do matter. Their rules and procedures define what is appropriate, reward certain activities and actors and punish others” (2010, 355). The stage was set for the institutions, based on self-rule federalism, to work along ethnic lines as each group with its own leadership worked in the same administrative system. Each entity the Dayton Accords named were equally powerful and had the same responsibilities to provide for its citizens, which made the nation of BiH and its central government derisory in its power to unify the people (Gromes) 2010. The entirety of BiH is a federal system, with a separate federal system and a separate republic system in its borders. The confusion and inadequacy this created carries into the 21st century as politicians work within a broken system that doesn’t allow for a fusion of policies but rather enables a separation of ethnic positions.

The parties of the Dayton Accords were the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They agreed to
promote enduring peace through the adoption of the agreement and its annexes. Two of the annexes specifically address ethnicity and governance, annex three around elections and annex four around the constitution. The third annex of the Dayton Accords calls for free and fair elections, the freedom of expression and of the press, and equal suffrage to all adult citizens. Annex four deals with the framework of the constitution, stating BiH shall consist of two entities, there shall be freedom of movement for all citizens, a human rights commission shall be established, and there shall be cooperation and compliance with international standards.

The current context of political BiH stems from the original statebuilding initiatives enacted immediately after the war and for many years following. Part of this is not only in the structure and systems the Dayton Accords setup, but also in the presidential tri-cameral body. There are three presidents elected, one representative for each of the main ethnic groups. The presidents rotate into the Chairman of the Presidency position every eight months during their four-year term. There are also presidents for each entity. The legislative branch is a parliamentary assembly divided into the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. At both the executive and legislative levels, ethnicities can only vote for political leaders within their same identified ethnic group. The highest judicial institution, the BiH Constitutional Court is comprised of nine appointed members; four are selected by the Federation of BiH (Bosniak and Croat) legislative branch, two are selected by the Republika Srpska’s legislative branch, and three are non-Bosnian selected by the European Court of Human Rights.
These offices, as arranged by the Constitution set forth by the Dayton Accords, work as the Common Institutions. Due to the creation of politically strong, separate entities, the creation of five common institutions worked to have BiH function as one state (Zaum 2007). Along with the executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, the Central Bank was formed to provide economic guidance for BiH as a whole. The Constitutional Court has international influence from the appointment of three judges by an outside organization, and the Central Bank joined this status when the International Monetary Fund appointed the first governor (Zaum 2007).

The tri-cameral presidency has an additional aspect that affects the policy and decision making capacity. Each presidential member has the power to veto a decision made by another, no matter if he is sitting in the Chairman’s position or not, if he feels it is in violation of the interests of the people and entity he represents. Along with the veto, the legislative house in alliance with the president who initiated the veto process must vote in favor to carry out the veto by a two-thirds majority. This resulted in little legislation being passed until 2000, “as nationalist parties dominated the Presidency as well as both parliamentary chambers” (Zaum 2007, 7). The institutions at work in BiH were so divided that little was done to move the country forward in the first 10 years after the war officially ended. “Indeed, as long as the wartime parties were in power on the central state level...both chambers of Parliament spent most of their time debating their agenda, and very little legislation was passed” (Zaum 2007, 8). The continuing tensions among the ethnic groups caused more than just a political paralysis, they created a void defined by immobilization and preserved by acceptance and indifference. No one wanted the bloodshed to return and a general apathetic mood as to what went on in the central
government blanketed the country; the fact that nothing was getting done in the government was nothing compared to the terror of the war, something all ethnicities could agree on.

The problem with the incapacity of the state institutions came not only from ethnic divisions but also from the lack of capacity for the institutions to work effectively. The OHR was looked to for guidance and the passage of legislation that was necessary at the time. Two of the main legislative initiatives to combat ethnic divisions before 2001 came from the OHR office. The first was a law to create a license plate that did not identify the driver by an ethnicity and the second law was the establishment of citizenry at the state federation level, not at the entity level (Zaum 2007). Both of these laws ensured free movement for all of BiH citizens around the country.

The international community continued to intervene in state institutions to build capacity, but soon they would also focus on reconciliation efforts to put BiH on the path to engendering trust among peoples. The better governance and reconciliation efforts by agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) are still the main intervention initiatives at work.²⁰

The importance of rhetoric in establishing identity within a divided society is seen in the nation of BiH. Moving forward, this paper will examine the communication styles of the tricameral presidents from 2004-2012 to determine if the political elite is hampering or encouraging the creation of one Bosnian identity.

²⁰ Such programs include a Municipal Training System (UNDP), a Contribution to Constitutional Reform (SDC), creating a Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index (USAID), and the Social Inclusion Foundation (SDC).
CHAPTER THREE: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN BiH

The specific instances of ethnic identity construction are seen in BiH from the 1990s to the present. The history of BiH set a stage for ethnic tensions and conflict to manifest in ways not only during the war, but years later as the ethnicities try to navigate living and working with one another. The symbolic politics utilized during and immediately after the war began to shape the identity, or lack of identity, of BiH and frame the context in which intergroup cooperation took place. Current studies of BiH to measure social distance find there is still a large gap among the ethnicities and cooperation is not easy to recognize or confirm.

SYMBOLIC POLITICS DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

Focusing specifically around symbolic politics in Yugoslavia during the downfall, Kaufman (2001) gives us a look at the dynamic situation in the region with respect to ethnic identity. The case study of BiH presents a particularly unique situation as compared to the other Yugoslav republics where a majority ethnic group dominated the territory. In BiH, there was no ethnic majority and historically strong hostile feelings toward other religious groups were dominant. As an English traveler in Bosnia in the 1600s noted:

The hatred of the Greek Church for the Romish was the [cause of the] loss of Belgrade…and is so implacable as he who in any Christian warre upon the Turke should expect the least good will from the Christians in those parts would finde himself utterly deceived. (Kaufman 2001, 168)
The fragility of the region the variety of ethnic groups present, especially after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, constrained political and economic unification, even with a strong political leader such as Josip Broz Tito.

Tito was able to somewhat unite the people of the region and during his reign, “ethnic tensions among individuals was relatively low, and intermarriage, especially in ethnically mixed areas, was high and increasing” (Kaufman 2001, 169). However, after Tito’s death and when Yugoslavia begin to deteriorate, “nationalist ideas had reemerged: each nation’s writers and historians tended to trumpet the heroic deeds of their nation’s history while obscuring its past atrocities and exaggerating the historical crimes of other groups against theirs” (Kaufman 2001, 169). The national groups were getting boosts of worthiness from the elites of the republics and this was a major factor that led to all out ethnic war in the early 1990s (Giddens 1986, 1987; Anderson 2006). In fact, in the 1990s, “most people in Yugoslavia were led to believe that their identities as Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, or Bosniacs were more important than their identity as Yugoslavs” (Kriesberg 2012, 51).

The Serbs and Croats were especially calculating in their use of myths and symbols to promote hatred toward other groups. The leaders, specifically Slobodan Milosevic21, used nationalist myths and symbols to “justify hostility and chauvinism” (Kaufman 2001, 201) which setup a situation of “interlocked and intractable security dilemmas resulting from competing demands for dominance” (Kaufman 2001, 200). The sentiments promoted during the Bosnian War remain into the 21st century (Beiber 2005; Stefansson 2010; Campbell 1999; Guzina 2007). An all-out ethnic war has yet to re-

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21 Milosevic was the Serbian President during the Bosnian War and was a large proponent of Serbian nationalism and mobilizer for war (Kaufman 2001).
erupt in the region, but the incitement of ethnic hostility during the initial ethnic war took its toll on how ethnic groups would continue to relate and interact with one another.

**SOCIAL DISTANCE AND LANGUAGE IN BiH**

The theories and ideas around ethnic identity that explain the Bosnian War after the fall of Yugoslavia are applicable to the present day situation in BiH and how political elites are using symbols, myths, and ethnic categorization to advance certain interests and goals. The emotional violence from the war is still manifested and encourages political and economic unproductivity. In a recent article by the BBC, it is noted how a focus on ethnic rhetoric distracts from the real issues at hand in the country:

> It seems that it suits political elites in both entities to constantly foment ethnic intolerance as a way of masking the real problems facing Bosnia-Herzegovina due exclusively to their inability to reach agreement. Issues such as budget deficits in both entities are simply taken off the agenda by the skillful tactic of ratcheting up political rhetoric the exclusive aim of which is to divert people’s attention. (2011)

The current situation sees political elites not using ethnic symbols to incite fear and violence but to blame other groups on the inadequacy of the government to conduct its duties to the people.

In a 2009 study to compare social distance in BiH with the North Caucasus region of Russia, political science researchers conducted a survey with 4,000 responses with the goal:

> To measure and document the nature of attitudes and preferences towards the contemporary situation, social networks, socio-demographic and national characteristics, and the nature of cross-national relations in the light of experiences of conflict and the continued unsettled political environment of the region. (Bakke et al. 2009, 235)
Social distance is different to geographical distance in that it measures feelings, perception, and attitudes toward other ethnic groups in the same region to determine group interactions and preferences (Bakke et al. 2009).

The results of the study focused on the role ethnicity plays in the measure of social distance and do find that in BiH, at least compared to the North Caucasus, ethnicity is not a strong determinant of measuring social distance or explaining violence in the region. As shown in the study’s results, “in BiH, members of different ethnic groups are mixed in terms of their distribution in the social space” (Bakke et al. 2009, 239). The authors of the study do note that there is ethnic segmentation in BiH and they do not look explicitly at how ethnic groups view one another and explain the findings as a matter of time passage and the lack of a non-dominant ethnic group. In the North Caucasus, ethnicity plays a stronger role in social distance, but this can be concluded that the violence in more recent than in BiH and the Russians are a dominant group (Bakke et al. 2009).

Language in modern day BiH is a great issue of contention in explaining the relation among ethnic groups. There are three main languages present in the country: Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian. All have roots as a Serbo-Croatian and still resemble one another, but recent changes in the languages can demonstrate the differences among the groups (Tolimir-Hölzol 2011). Interviews were conducted with citizens in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar; each are regarded as central cities for Bosnians, Serbians, and Croatians, respectively. These interviews reveal how language is a modern way to categorize an individual and associate an identity to them without knowing any more than the words they use. In one interview with a young Bosniak female from Sarajevo, she
explains that when she and her sister wanted to take an exam in Croatian, criticism was high. “But then, my sister and I—because we are Muslim—we were harassed about why we would want to do it in Croatian. They said that because we were Muslim, we had to do it in Bosnian” (Tolimir-Hölzol 2011, 62). A young female from Sarajevo who has a Croatian father and a Serbian mother relates in another interview about her difficulty in fitting in with her Croatian friends, as she does not use Croatian words and they consider this disrespectful to half of her heritage (Tolimir-Hölzol 2011, 64).

The interviews conducted for this study do not divulge dominance by any particular ethnic group in relation to the language spoken, nor does it establish measures of social attitudes. What it does conclude is that “in spite of the fact that all three languages/varieties are considered to be equal, it is absolutely essential which of the three one speaks or writes in which region” (Tolimir-Hölzol 2011, 66). As in measuring social distance, it is not important in what is found in attitudinal measures or feelings, but rather in the fact that ethnic differences are present and apparent. Identity along ethnic lines is obvious and used in the country and this can be capitalized on by political elites when choosing communication tactics to promote their goals.

EXPRESSIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

In recent years, scholars have begun talking about social capital, or social groupings, in terms of bridging or bonding. These ideas are a way to identify whether a group conducts activities and uses expressions that promote in-group identity or whether the group moves beyond those identified within a group to build relations with those outside. Bonding “is associated with closed networks” and bridging “entails crosscutting
or overlapping networks” (Coffe and Geys 2007, 122). Robert Putnam is the leading scholar in this field and began the discussion on categorizing groups, societies, and nations into how they relate to others: whether though bridging efforts or not at all with a focus on bonding the in-group members. Since he first developed the scholarly ideas around these concepts, other scholars have used them to apply to nations, individual organizations, businesses, and social networks.\(^{22}\)

Once an identity is established through rhetorical frames and a collective consciousness around a shared, symbolic history, this identity can be used within a group to encourage animosity to those in another group and incite feelings of hatred and in some instances physical violence. Whether talking about a social group, a Fortune 500 company, or an entire ethnic group, the aspects of encouraging a specific attitude to those considered outside the group are the same. Putnam focuses on the social capital and civic engagement of the United States and its citizens, but the concepts are generalized to describe any culture on the planet. In particular, in his book *Bowling Alone* (2000), Putnam looks at how civic engagement and political participation

When dealing with a heterogeneous nation, it is imperative to promote bridging activities that bring together the many ethnic identities as to avoid violent and symbolic conflict. The potential for either form of activity is present in every group, although a homogenous group makeup lends itself to more opportunities for bonding activities to enhance the level of in-group sharing. However, this is what is needed when homogenous groups are living side-by-side. If bonding efforts are conducted across groups and not just within, then closer societies and nations can be developed and

\(^{22}\) See Geys and Murdoch 2010; Coleman 1998; Putnam 1993; van Oorschot and Arts 2005 for additional information on the bridging and bonding theory applied.
heterogeneous nations can become more homogenous along the lines of nationalistic identities and sentiments.

This is vitally important in the discussion of political rhetoric and identity shaping in divided societies such as BiH. Those in elite positions have the power to either bond their identity group or bridge all those present within the nation. The expression of an identity group in terms of bridging or bonding is ever more vital in understanding how group hatred escalates to violence and genocide. The move from identity to talking about it to the expression of it as a means to engender social capital (Alder and Kwon 2002) can be seen in two Bosnian cities, Banja Luka and Mostar.

A GLANCE INTO TWO MODERN TOWNS

The theories presented above can be seen in action in two towns in BiH: Mostar and Banja Luka. Mostar is in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and is generally regarded as the dominant Croatian center of the country, although it has a strong Serbian presence. Banja Luka is the capital of the Republika Srpska and is the Serbian stronghold of the country. Both cities can be used to study and illustrate ethnic relations in BiH after the war and into the 21st century.

According to Anders H. Stefansson’s (2010) study of the reconciliation process in Banja Luka after the war, much improvement has been made but not enough to affect real, long-term changes. Physical security and refugee rights are much improved and mandated by laws, “[B]ut a spirit of reconciliation in any deeper sense has yet to take root at the political and elite levels” (Stefansson 2010, 64). This is due in part to the divided political situation that allows for a decentralized form of government between the
entities, which many in the RS prefer in hopes of future secession opportunities, or at the very least continued autonomy over internal policies (Stefansson 2010). Many UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports indicate that refugees and displaced persons from the Bosnian War have returned to their home communities where another ethnic group is in the majority\textsuperscript{23} and this is generally touted as a positive reconciliation effort in incorporating the ethnic groups together without conflict. However, Stefansson and other scholars don’t feel these statistics show the real picture of the situation on the ground, especially in Banja Luka and neighboring communities. Stefansson cites the inflation of UNHCR numbers are due to persons returning to their homes but then selling them or living in more ethnic enclaves and not actually integrating into the new community (2010). Minorities may be returning to the RS but this does not mean any real reintegration or reconciliation is taking place at a high level.

Those returning to Banja Luka prefer to stay in communities with their own ethnic group and where there is limited integration of the Serb population with those of other ethnic groups, there is a sense of tolerance based on economic dependence and a need to avoid conflict in everyday life (Stefansson 2010). Going back to the early 1990s in Banja Luka, it is easy to see why ethnic integration in today’s world is difficult and tedious. The Serb majority carried out brutal crimes against Muslim and Croat peoples living in the area and about 60,000 non-Serbian residents of the area were displaced (Stefansson 2010, 66). Since 2000, only an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 displaced persons have returned to reclaim their pre-war home (Stefansson 2010, 66). Those that have

\textsuperscript{23} Since December 1995, the UNHCR has recorded the return of 987,713 refugees and displaced persons throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of this number, 438,948 were refugees and 548,765 were internally displaced persons. The figures included 436,238 minority returns (UNHCR 2004 http://www.unhcr.org/407bf7cd4.html).
returned found a different situation than the one in which they left, as the Serb
government changed town names, destroyed mosques, and developed a flippant attitude
to what transpired during the war (Stefansson 2010).

Overall, Stefansson found that reconciliation efforts in post-war BiH, especially in
the urban area of Banja Luka, do not reach the deep level of suffering and only create
tolerance and co-existence at a surface level. The mere act of returning refugees and
displaced persons to their home communities is not enough to confirm a new mood of
acceptance and integration among ethnic groups. In the end, Stefansson concludes that
“minority return is relatively limited in scale and paradoxically often reproduces scattered
pockets of semi-isolated ethnic minority communities, this minimizing the level of and
need for social interaction across communal boundaries” (Stefansson 2010, 71). The
current situation in Banja Luka is not dissimilar to those in communities across BiH, as
can be seen in Adam Moore’s study of Mostar.

Moore (2013) begins his book with a recounting of two days in Mostar in 2007
when Croat and Bosniak youths violently clashed due to sporting and ethnic rivalries.
These incidents are evidence of the failed efforts to bring about peace and settlement in a
heterogeneous community after the war ended. The book is a comparison of Mostar and
the Brkčko district, two communities with a mix of ethnic groups with very different
outcomes from the peacebuilding efforts following the Bosnian war. The initiatives and
programs introduced in Brčko resulted in a cohesive, peaceful community, while those
conducted in Mostar have not done much to build tolerance. Moore’s look at these two
towns paints a picture of modern day BiH as a divided, segregated country with restricted
capacity for official peace. Here, the book will be used to show the scene in Mostar, an
area with a Croat majority and a Serb minority, to demonstrate the current situation in another area of the country.24

Peacebuilding in Mostar is characterized by international intervention. After the Bosnian War, money from governmental and non-governmental organizations poured into the country to address the immediate and long-term needs of the Bosnian people in a post-conflict setting. The international aide created dependency and often contradicted itself, as one organization created programs that either overlapped another’s interventions or challenged goals set by another. There was a large disconnect between the local and national governments (Moore 2013, 133), in addition to the international community. Disorganization and corruption plagued the efforts that were put forth and Mostar was never able to get the support or resources necessary to move forward in a meaningful way.

In present day Mostar, divisions still exist both politically and physically. The city is divided into neighborhoods and some authorities do not have control over certain areas.

In the former Old Town municipality surrounding the Stari Most, for example, few businesses- which profit greatly from tourism- pay taxes to the central city administration. Nor do police regularly patrol that part of the city. Instead this neighborhood continues to be controlled by politically connected syndicates running protection rackets. (Moore 2013, 64-65)

The institutions needed to ensure a smooth, just transition into a functioning government were never put in place after the war and this lack of government capacity has allowed for divisions along ethnic lines to persist. Without institutions to control the basic

24 The Brčko District is a unique case study and does not account for the majority of the country. The District has autonomy in its government system and is separate from both the RS and FBiH in its structure. Those who created the Dayton Accords understood the uniqueness of the area and kept it separate from the institutional processes in the rest of the country.
functions of a city, there is no ability to control and mitigate the deep-rooted problems that are a part of the history and makeup of Mostar, a phenomenon occurring across the country.

Ethnic identity is present in every nation and these identities are often different, or in conjunction, with the nationalism of a particular country. In most instances, these identities can live peacefully together in the absence of physical violence, but in some cases these identities cause violent episodes that have detrimental, long-term effects on a nation, the region, and the world. The performing arts community in Mostar is just as divided as the city itself and its institutions. There are two theaters in the city, one on either side of the Neretva River for each ethnic group. The Balkan Insight observed “the actors, directors and writers working in the two theaters do not form a single community of artists, meet rarely and never conduct joint projects.”

When talking about identity, it is imperative to know what identity is, why it is important, how it is described and categorized, and how it is expressed by those in charge to build collective consciousness.

In BiH, identities in direct conflict with one another along many different lines have been present for many, many years. Since before the end of the Ottoman Empire, Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats, along with a myriad of other Slavic ethnicities, have resided in the boundaries of present day BiH. The collapse of Yugoslavia resulted in these groups fighting for shared land, making the difference among the identities all the more obvious and nonconductive to a peaceful resolution. The context of the war elucidates

the theoretical ideas around identity, not only during the war but into the twenty-first century.
CHAPTER FOUR: Evaluating Presidential Speeches, 2004-2012

The political leaders of any nation use rhetoric in public speeches to convey specific messages, sentiments, and ideas. Give a national platform with a large, sometimes national, audience, politicians are in the unique position to be entrepreneurs of movements, historical encounters, cultural ideas, and nationalism to reach all the citizens of the nation on the same level. This power can also be used in a manner that promotes radical, antagonistic viewpoints to rally citizens around a cause or thought that ostracizes or alienates a certain group, idea, or process. People listen to leaders of all types and more often than not follow the leaders in their proposed solutions to a problem or in their thoughts to change a system. This can be in a positive or negative way in regards to the welfare of all citizens, in the nation and around the world. Political leaders do not necessarily need training in rhetoric practices or public oratory, they just need to understand the weight their words say and calculate speeches to convey whatever message is on their agenda.

In BiH, the situation of political entrepreneurs at the helm is trifold. Each president has a separate agenda in terms of protecting the rights of those in the ethnic group whom voted for them. The messages they convey in public speeches run the gamut of political topics, from the economy to international relations to ceremonies. The level of the presidency is chosen for the purpose of this thesis due to the important nature of the highest office in any nation or organization. With power, the elite can manipulate
and shape citizens how they see fit in the context of their goals (Mills 2000). An analysis of speeches in a specific time frame offers insight into the themes and ideas talked about and endorsed on the public stage and how those themes and ideas affect national sentiments and views.

SPEECH IDENTIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY

In the choosing of the speeches, it was important to identify speeches by all presidents from the year 2004 and on in a variety of settings and on a variety of themes. No more than three speeches per year per president were chosen for this study. In total, each ethnicity has 18 speeches. These 18 are spread out over the years and by the presidents. Each of the 54 speeches coded in this study is an independent observation on the rhetoric framing of the BiH presidents. For the remainder of the thesis, a case refers to an individual speech and a code refers to one of the three variables as defined below. A complete list of the speeches can be found in the Appendix.

The study was capped at 54 individual cases due to the difficulty in finding more relevant speeches. Nevertheless, the number of cases was still significant and provided insight into the rhetoric expressions used in BiH politics. Once the source for the speech collection was identified, the speeches were chosen randomly to account for the variety of topics and settings. The only consideration when choosing the speeches was ensuring that as many presidents and years were represented. Title and location were not factors when originally looking at available speeches and choosing the 54 for this thesis. These factors were analyzed after the fact in relation to their paralleling with code frequencies.
For the Bosniak Muslim and Croatian Catholic ethnic groups, there were three presidents represented, but only two for the Serb Orthodox ethnic group. The unequal distribution of years, themes, and presidents represented in the speeches do have an effect on the findings in that with an equal distribution, occurrences of each variable may be different. As seen in the results, there were specific topics that leant themselves to being a proponent of one code or another, and if one theme was more frequent than others, this proclivity would show in the results. However, this effect was not noticed or relevant until the coding and results were complete; the speeches were chosen randomly and without indication of anything besides which president was the speaker.

The speeches were coded into a software program called QDA Miner (Qualitative Data Analysis software) from Provalis Research. Each speech was read from the lens of looking for bridging statements that focus on a national Bosnian identity or a bonding approach that focuses on an ethnic identity respective to the ethnicity of the president. The original reading of the speeches was with the goal of gaining a better understanding of what the presidents were saying. Once the speeches were read once, the codes were articulated; this was originally set to be two codes, one for the narrow and one for the broad framing that was expected. However, while reading the speeches, it became clear a third coding classification was needed, one that accounted for instances when a president vilified or negated another ethnicity. The dichotomous approach turned into a trichotomous approach for coding the speeches. The three coding definitions, National Identity, Ethnic Identity, and Against Ethnicity, are the dependent variables in the study. The independent variable is the overall affect the speeches have on the public.
When reading the speeches, the sentences for each code were identified due to the interpretation as a good representation of each respective code. The role of an archivist was taken to judge the speeches for the framing instances. The emotionality and specific interpretations of sentences, words, and phrases cannot be spoken to in this thesis. Rather, this thesis speaks to the frequency of occurrences.

Each speech was classified by the president, the ethnicity of the president, the type of oration, the general theme of the oration, the location, and the date. Most speeches only had occurrences of one category or another, but in some instances the presidents made reference to two or three of the categories. These were also codified. In the end, the analysis focuses on the frequency of occurrences of the variables, not on the overall leaning of a speech. Tables 1-3 demonstrate the examples of ethnic expressions by president according to ethnic groups, along with summary findings of the overall framing of their speeches in reference to ethnicity and identity. The references for the speeches can be found in Appendix B under the speech for the date listed for each quotation.
Table 1: Bosnian Muslim Presidential Expressions by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Bakir Izetbegović</th>
<th>Haris Silajdžić</th>
<th>Sulejman Tihić</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>“We belong to a small but proud Bosniak people.” (Dec. 3, 2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td>“…we had the Bosnian army that fought only for Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (Aug. 4, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td>“To those whose offices…in Republika Srpska are open today, I am disappointed by this disrespect for the laws of this country…” (Nov. 25, 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Findings</td>
<td>Tended to be general in terms used in unifying the groups or supporting the Bosniak ethnic group.</td>
<td>Propensity to a national identity, but spoke against the Serb population more often than not.</td>
<td>Promoted a national identity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Croatian Catholic Presidential Expressions by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Željko Komšić</th>
<th>Ivo Miro Jović</th>
<th>Dragan Čović</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>“The State and Homeland of all of us together, and not more someone’s than someone else’s…” (Nov, 24, 2011)</td>
<td>“…the denial of the personal and collective identity is part of the past and that will never again someone’s identity be denied…” (Oct. 10, 2005)</td>
<td>“It is our wish for all our citizens to have a better and a more dignifying life…” (Dec. 16, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td>“All this is part of the political process, [h]rough which the Croatian people is being deprived of their rights and not brought in the same position as the other two peoples in BiH.” (June 21, 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Findings</td>
<td>Tended to speak in very broad terms and framed all expressions to a national identity.</td>
<td>Promoted Croatian identity but spoke to a unification often.</td>
<td>Only expressed a national identity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Serb Orthodox Presidential Expressions by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Nebojša Radmanović</th>
<th>Borislav Paravac</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“We can and must solve our internal problems alone, because it is in our best interest.” (June 15, 2012)</td>
<td>“…and create conditions for better living of our citizens.” (Nov. 22, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Identity</th>
<th>Nebojša Radmanović</th>
<th>Borislav Paravac</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Serbs among them are denied participation and contribution to the national liberation fight and the real truth is left untold.” (June 27, 2010)</td>
<td>“We have secured the identity of the Serbian people and the military heritage of the Army of the Republic of Srpska.” (May 11, 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Against Ethnicity</th>
<th>Nebojša Radmanović</th>
<th>Borislav Paravac</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Unfortunately, there are those at high places in BiH that contest the equality…” (May 12, 2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary Findings</th>
<th>Nebojša Radmanović</th>
<th>Borislav Paravac</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Framed a national identity but tended to promote a Serb identity often.</td>
<td>Spoke to a national identity and tended to frame an ethnic identity in broad terms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The national identity coding variable includes references to the three ethnicities working together to build a better future, cultivating a tolerant existence, and invoking romanticisms of a shared past filled with tragedy. This variable is not necessarily in reference to statements of a pure Bosnian nationality, but rather the idea that the land is shared by a multitude of ethnicities and it is the right for each of those groups to live freely and equally on the land. There are occasions of phrases that use the ‘we’ pronoun in relation to Bosnian, but in most cases the presidents acknowledge that the three ethnicities are separate in their culture and religious practices, but these are minor in the scheme of things and what is important is that all groups are represented and equal. An example of this from the speeches comes from Željko Komšić in 2012,

Let us show that we are responsible people and politicians who will consider not only our own interests, but wishes and aspirations of those who belong to our political, ethnic, and religious or any other group. Let us think about the needs, wishes, and fears of others, and not only of those of ‘our own’ alone.26

26 Željko Komšić, “Address on the Occasion of Independence Day of BiH” (speech, Sarajevo, March 1, 2012), Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=16672,1,1
When coding for the variable ethnic identity, it was important to locate phrases and sections that invoked a specific ethnic group as either the most important in the region or the only citizens those in the group needed to watch out for. The coding wasn’t looking for general references to the differences among the ethnicities, but rather specific language that glorified an ethnic group above others. President Nebojša Radmanović gives us a strong example in a 2010 speech, “All strategic issues of the Republic of Srpska’s future will be a result of the political will of the Republic of Srpska citizens and its legitimately elected representatives.”

The against ethnicity coding variable was included to call out specific instances when the presidents mentioned another ethnic group in a negative light. The use of rhetoric to invoke feelings of hatred and fear is just as vital in the development of identity of those feelings that invoke pride and happiness for one’s ethnic group. As will be seen shortly, these instances were not as numerous as the first two variables, but when it did occur, the language was harsh and unforgiving. As Haris Silajdžić said in 2007,

While I am convinced that you are all mindful of the fact that [it] is the Republika Srpska leadership that is responsible for the political stalemate, you must find a political will to identify the culprit, however strategically or politically inconvenient that may be at the present time.

ROLE OF THE PRESIDENCY AND POLITICAL PARTIES

An important factor in the analysis of the data and overall findings of this thesis is the role of the president, not only in BiH, but as a general office. When the president is

27 Nebojša Radmanović, “Speech at the Traditional Folk Assembly Dedicated to the Celebration of the Uprising Day of BiH Peoples” (speech, Milica Gaj, July 27, 2010), Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency
http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=14968,1,1

28 Haris Silajdžić, “Address at the Meeting of Political Directors of Peace Implementation Council Steering Board” (speech, Sarajevo, June 18, 2007) Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency
http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=10853,1,1
the highest office of a nation, his role is to build national unity, eliminating the opportunity to express sentiments that do not build trust and enhance social distance. Presidential rhetoric, generally defined, is the quantifiable effect of “measurable changes in indices of people’s attitudes or beliefs” (Zarefsky 2004). The presidential power to create definitions and shape universal thought is analyzed and examined by many scholars with the conclusion that presidential rhetoric is vital in national unity discussions (Druckman and Holmes 2004; Cohen 1995). What the president says matters.

The president is the symbol of a nation, the name recognized across borders and on the international stage. As defined by Annex four, Article five of the Constitution of BiH as set forth by the Dayton Accords, the president’s office is responsible for working with the Parliament to enact legislation and to conduct the foreign policy of BiH, including working with international organizations in and without of the nation. This definition and narrow scope of power constrain the president to focus on topics and ideas popular on an international stage. Without specific mandates to create policy around ethnic agendas, the presidents of BiH are limited to what they can publically orate to the masses.

In BiH, the entities, as created by the Dayton Accords, hold more power over policy and legislation creation in regards to interests of ethnic groups. The presidents of the two entities have more responsibility in ensuring ethnic agendas are set and followed. The Dayton Accords setup the national government to be limited in scope in order to create a peace agreement that could be decided upon by all parties. The entities, with majority populations of the respective ethnic group, control the governmental outcomes.

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that are obeyed by the people. Without mandates to enact real change or policies, the presidents at the national level are tied to their role to promote national unity as a way to build relations on the international stage. With this in mind, the findings are expected, an occurrence not in line with the concepts of political elites and ethnic divisions.

Table four presents the presidents in terms of who succeeded each and what the framing context of each president was in terms of framing rhetoric (as seen in tables 1-3 above in the summary findings section). This chronologically shows how presidents spoke over the years and how they followed, or didn’t follow, their predecessor in his framing techniques. The table is meant to provide a general framework for whether the time or the ethnic origin mattered more in setting the stage for each president’s speech.
Table 4: Presidential Framing by Succession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years in Office</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Framing Context</th>
<th>Successor Framing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakir Izetbegović</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>Bosniak Muslim</td>
<td>Spoke to unify the groups, and promote the Bosniak ethnicity,</td>
<td>Spoke to a national identity, and against the Serbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haris Silajdžić</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>Bosniak Muslim</td>
<td>Spoke to a national identity, and against the Serbs.</td>
<td>Promoted national unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulejman Tihić</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>Bosniak Muslim</td>
<td>Promoted national unity</td>
<td>Not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Željko Komšić</td>
<td>2006-2012</td>
<td>Croat Catholic</td>
<td>Spoke in general, unifying terms.</td>
<td>Spoke to unification and the Croatian identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivo Miro Jović</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>Croat Catholic</td>
<td>Spoke to unification and the Croatian identity.</td>
<td>Expressed a national identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebojša Radmanović</td>
<td>2006-2012</td>
<td>Serb Orthodox</td>
<td>Framed national unity but promoted the Serb identity often.</td>
<td>Framed ethnic identity in broad terms and spoke to a national identity often.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borislav Paravac</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>Serb Orthodox</td>
<td>Framed ethnic identity in broad terms and spoke to a national identity often.</td>
<td>Not available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are many political parties that operate in BiH, but the three main ones are the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) which dominates the Republika Srpska; the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) which is the main Bosniak party; and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ). These parties are the dominant forces in the modern political landscape. As Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2010 report notes, “Despite regular elections, there is no genuine rotation of power among political parties.
representing competing views within the three dominant ethnic constituencies.” The report continues, “As the DPA [Dayton Peace Agreement] defines each constituency in ethnic or national terms, the result is a political and electoral system with a self-reinforcing cycle.”

Each party is radical in terms that it makes decisions and focuses attention only on the specific ethnic group associated with it. When references to the Republika Srpska are made, it is in reference to the SDS party and its political leadership; references to the SDA party also include references to the FBiH. There are few parties that cross ethnic boundaries and these have no leverage in elections and the cycle of presidents continue to come from the three main parties as noted above. Each ethnic group not only has its own political party, but is affiliated with a specific media outlet. Many citizens get their news and information from a source that is lenient to their respective identity. A list of the political parties can be found in the Appendix.

EVALUATING ETHNIC IDENTITY EXPRESSIONS

Overall, as seen in table one and figure one, the occurrences of the variable on national identity was more present than the other two. However, as will be explored later, the frequency of the ethnic identity and against ethnicity variables is significant and in some cases, just as high as the nation identity variable. While national identity was promoted across all ethnicities, it was in conjunction with specific rhetoric to elevate one ethnic group or belittle another. For almost every two times a president expressed a

national identity, there was one case of a president expressing ideas either for an ethnic identity or against an ethnicity.

Table 5: Overall Results of the Expression Frequencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% Codes</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>% Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Identity Expression of identity in terms of a national, Bosnian ethnicity</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>67.40%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>83.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Identity Expression of identity in terms of a specific ethnic group</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22.70%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Ethnicity Expressions against a specific ethnic group that is not one's own</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.90%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results were divided to see the frequency of the variables in use by each president and ethnic group. Also analyzed was the frequency of the variables over time and by the overall theme of the speech. Each analysis will be explored in greater detail in the following sections. Across the 54 speeches, the count of each variable was also divided to demonstrate the number of instances within the total of speeches. A complete account of the results and the graphs produced can be found in the Appendix.

Figure 1: Distribution of Expressions
The expression of national identity, ethnic identity, or against ethnicity by each ethnic group is shown in figure two. As the overall totals show, national identity was expressed the most across all three ethnicities. However, the Serb Orthodox ethnicity presents the largest percentage of ethnic identity expression, almost equal to the percentage of national identity expressions. Of the 36 specific expressions looked at in the Serb Orthodox ethnic group, 18 were a national identity expression while 16 were an ethnic identity expression.

What is surprising is the Bosniak Muslim ethnic group having the largest percentage of against ethnicity expressions. There were 14 instances of against ethnicity expression across the speeches and 10 of these came from the Bosniak Muslim ethnic group. The Croatian Catholic ethnic group had the least instances of expression for ethnic identity or against ethnicity.

**Figure 2: Frequency of Expression by Ethnic Group**
With the exception of one, the instances of expressing a national identity is highest compared to the other two variables, as can be seen in figure three. For the most part, the presidents focus on unifying language and building a future nation where everyone is equal and ethnicity does not determine identity in the political sense. There are instances when the leaders use just as much, if not more, references to an ethnic identity, but overall the expressions are for cooperation among the groups.

**Figure 3: Frequency of Expression by President**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Ethnic Identity</th>
<th>Against Ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakir Izetbegovic</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haris Silajdzic</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulejman Thic</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeljko Komsic</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivo Miro Jovic</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragan Covic</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebojsa Radmanovic</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borislav Paravic</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expression of the variables over the years influx as a result of the leader, as each has their own rhetoric demeanor. What is notable, as seen in figure four, is the national identity expressions remain highest and in the most recent years, expression of ethnic identity and against ethnicity have decreased. Since 2009, only four of the 14 total expressions against ethnicity occurred. While there was a jump in 2011 for
expressions of ethnic identity, of the 32 total occurrences, only 18 were from 2009 to 2012, with eight of those occurring in 2011.

**Figure 4: Frequency of Expression by Year**

The speeches were categorized into one of five thematic scenarios. The themes are a commemoration, a celebration, an inauguration, international politics, and national politics. The commemoration and celebration themes indicate the president was at an event that was in remembrance or celebrating an occasion; these generally were historical or cultural in nature and tended to be more specific to each ethnic group. For the instances when available, the inauguration speeches for their first terms were used in the study. The last two themes are around political references, both on the international and political level. These speeches generally revolved around economics, justice, and reconciliation topics and were given on national or international platforms.
Figure five demonstrates the frequency distribution of the variable expression by theme. In the speeches centering on national politics, there were no instances of ethnic identity or against ethnicity expressions, and in inaugural speeches, there were also no instances of against ethnicity expressions. The only theme where a significant frequency of ethnic identity or against ethnicity expressions occurred was in international politics. There are a number of possible explanations for this, one being that each leader and political party may be trying to praise their own work toward a better future while belittling the other parties, essentially placing the blame elsewhere.

The largest occurrence of ethnic identity expressions were in commemoration and celebration speeches. There were 32 total expressions for ethnic identity and 27 of these occurred in commemorative or celebratory settings. This could be explained by the nature of such events in that they celebrate a specific event or cultural occasion in relation to the ethnicity and religion of the leader.
The results also indicate the probability of either expressions of national identity or ethnic identity of occurring, and which variable is more likely to be found in political speeches. The national identity code occurred 95 of the total 141 times in 45 of the 54 individual cases; the ethnic identity code occurred 32 of the total 141 times in 15 of the 54 individual cases. Table two demonstrates the potential for national identity expression to occur more than ethnic identity and vice versa. Essentially, for every instance of ethnic identity expressions, there were three national identity expressions.

Table 6: Probability of National and Ethnic Identities Expressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code A</th>
<th>Code B</th>
<th>Freq A</th>
<th>Freq B</th>
<th>Freq (B</th>
<th>A)</th>
<th>Freq (A</th>
<th>B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

The divisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina among the ethnic groups are still present and are still addressed at the national level. The speeches are indicative of both stagnation and progress. Rhetoric at the political elite level does have instances of building a national identity on the basis of equality and fairness for all those living in BiH. However, even in 2012, there are still references to ethnic identities in the sense that specific groups are better or more deserving of egalitarianism than others. As international leaders have commented, the elimination of discordant, contentious language at the national stage is a great step in integrating the ethnic groups in BiH into an inclusive, just community for all.

FINDINGS

The overall findings show the presidents of BiH framing in broader, generalized terms when speaking in public for official duty. The narrow, ethnic focus that was expected did not dominate the rhetoric of the elite leaders. While there were cases of ethnic promotion, these were limited and lesser than nationalistic word usage. This indicates that the myth making, ethnic identity publicity was not apparent nor can it be traced to cause of the current ethnic divisions affecting BiH. The theories that informed the original research question did not come to fruition in the way the thesis set to
accomplish. However, it was expected to find the Serb presidents narrower in ethnic expressions than their counterparts, which did hold true in the findings.

Kaufman tells us that political elites are one of the reasons ethnic divisions exist and the ethnic divisions are used by the political elites to promote their agenda on the national and international stage. Here we see that the political elites were not promulgating an ethnic identity as originally considered and this cannot be utilized as a leading reason a national Bosnian identity has yet to fully take hold. Theories around the construction of identity and the role nationalism has in creating ethnic divisions do have relevancy in the findings in that political elites are not doing enough to build a national identity. As mentioned, there are still occurrences of ethnic identity promotion and these may be enough to constraint the ability of a national identity to form.

From the findings, it can be inferred that the political elites are moderate in the speech because they are constrained by their position and their constituents. The office of the president of BiH is a mix of the three ethnic groups and the presidents themselves cannot appeal to an ethnic agenda due to the constitution restraints on what the president can do and say. The office itself is committed to unity through the language in the constitution and this is how the presidents must continue to speak. The institutional incentives to get things done only through harmonious rhetoric and actions are known by the presidents and this is followed.

Another conclusion is that the presidents speak to an international audience and with the goal for EU integration, they are well aware their language will be interpreted and used to either demonstrate readiness to enter the EU or offer proof that the country is still
far behind. The presidents know how to play to the appeals of the EU and the UN to show progress and this knowledge lends itself to controlled ethnic appeals (Thorp 2011).

The level analyzed in this thesis appears to be too high to draw any strong conclusions about why ethnic divisions are still persistent when using the theories around symbolic politics and identity construction. Based on this research, Kaufman is misguided and constructionists like Cruz are more on target for explaining ethnic divisions. However, this is only concluded at the elite level of political rhetoric and a mid-level elite, such as the entity presidents or political party leaders, analysis may be more appropriate to determine how ethnic divisions still exist in BiH.

It can also be inferred that ethnicity is not front and center in the public sphere as it was in the early 1990s. When Mladić and other ethnic entrepreneurs were also political elites, their fiery rhetoric and narrow framing was a function of the current political landscape and volatile situation. Ethnic divisions still exist in the country, but they are not a result of modern presidential rhetoric, possibly due to the time since the war when ethnic promotion was the normal framing technique. The end of the war and the signing of the Dayton Accords ushered in an epoch of peace, but also may have ushered in an epoch of national unity at the highest levels.

The principal findings show as that the political elite is not the ethnic dividers. There are other, lower-level occurrences at work within the country that contribute to the ongoing divisions and the inability for the social, political, and economic institutions to effectively work for all citizens of the country. A more in-depth, widespread analysis of additional potential ethnic dividers needs to be conducted to determine where the divisions are being disseminated and supported.
LIMITATIONS

From the findings, a major limitation to the thesis was the level of play analyzed. The presidents at the elite level are closely scrutinized and this affects the word and context usage in their speeches. The speeches were confined in the potential of national or ethnic identity references from the source, something not fully apparent until after the analysis was concluded and the thesis findings were confirmed.

The speeches chosen are translated in English through the Office of the Presidency, already biased to an appeal with an international audience. After 2008, more speeches were translated and made available on the office’s website. This could be a political move to show ethnic unity promotion to a worldwide audience. At the presidential level, it is expected to see national unity framing and it was no surprise to come across this rhetoric, a limitation from the source of the speeches. The audience effect factor was built into the speeches used here from the source. The volume of speeches available after 2008 also limited the results in that more occurrences of any of the codes are expected with more content to analyze.

Another limitation of this thesis was the lack of data available to measure social distance and ethnic group statistics in BiH. The last census conducted was before the war and the data available on the country was sporadic and inconsistent. A new census was conducted in the fall of 2013, but this data was not available on the publication date of this paper. In addition, the software used for the data limited the scope to which the data could be analyzed. Frequency and counts are as sophisticated as the software could get.
IMPLICATIONS

The institution of a rotating presidency lends itself to evoking mixed sentiments and messages in the framing of concepts by the three leaders. While a broader reference to national identity was discovered in this thesis, that is not to say there were not references to a narrow, ethnic identity by all the presidents and this can cause confusion or continued divisions among the citizens. In order to build a unified message, it is imperative that the elimination of the rotating presidency be addressed in discussions of parliamentary and government reform in the coming years. BiH is seeking EU integration and without the evidence the nation is working to build one identity, acceptance will be difficult to achieve. By defining the presidency as one leader elected by all ethnic groups, BiH can take the necessary steps to achieving its goal.

Rotating presidencies in any institution are criticized for several reasons, including, “lack of continuity…the abuse of the political nature of the chair, chaotic organization…and the pressure to show long tally sheets.” As a unification institution of a nation, the presidency is generally created and defined to bring citizens under one banner for the better good of the nation. When the contribution a president can make to unification is muddled by a system of consociationalism, such as the one outlined in the Dayton Accords for BiH, the limitations to present one consistent message are large. In Lebanon, the same type of system was enacted to promote national development. However, it is largely seen as a failure.

The political outcome of this arrangement is such that the confessional elites have become adept at grasping onto the patronage spoils from a division of the public

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sector pie, trading alliances and allegiances in efforts to maximize their proportion of influence. The main consequence of this outcome is that low priority is given to overcoming the common and pressing reform issues that challenged the entire country, such as the need for economic growth, public accountability, and the rule of law. (Salmey 2009)

In the case of BiH, the presidents work to create national unity framing, but with their representation still tied to individual ethnic groups, constraints are high and regulate what true sentiments can be generated. As seen in Lebanon and in BiH, priority is given to creating policies and justice for the better good of a specific group, not of the nation.

A more conclusive, encompassing study on speeches made by leaders over a greater number of years and themes is necessary before any real implications can be made as to the effect of rhetoric on building nationalism, as well as other levels of the political and institutional spheres. Scholarly articles and studies exist that look at how nationalism is built through the use of communicative tools and what this means for the citizens of a nation (Giddens 1986, 1987; Anderson 2006). The findings are usually in a general sense and do not get at the source of the issue, mainly what is explicitly coming from the mouths of ethnic and political entrepreneurs. With a wider study, one could further analyze the specific rhetoric and symbolic tools used by politicians to indicate the true impact on nationalism.

When the 2013 census is complete and the results widely available, the findings in this thesis could be compared with national demographics, attitudes, and an overall sense of the nation’s situation. The implications of the thesis as it stands are limited due to the dated records and figures currently available. There is little statistical evidence to back up the conclusions drawn, only opinions generated through the theoretical understanding of how identity is defined and how ethnicities cooperate. However, the thesis was able to
find that there were occurrences of the promotion of ethnic identity and this fits into the concepts around the formation of ethnic identity and attitudes about one’s and another’s ethnic group.

With the knowledge that there are three dominant ethnic groups and by all accounts these groups are not cohesive in nature, the study implies that political leaders are largely responsible for this through their use of the political stage as a platform to construct an ethnic image they deem warranted. If the theories around ethnic identity formation and the use of the identity by political elites to control or guide a group are accurate, than BiH is a nation with rhetorical challenges and leadership disappointments.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX

A. List of the Presidents whose speeches were analyzed in this thesis, with their ethnic group and years in office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Month/Year Entered Office</th>
<th>Month/Year Left Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakir Izetbegović</td>
<td>Bosniak Muslim</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
<td>December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haris Silajdžić</td>
<td>Bosniak Muslim</td>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>October 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulejman Tihić</td>
<td>Bosniak Muslim</td>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>October 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Željko Komšić</td>
<td>Croat Catholic</td>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivo Miro Jović</td>
<td>Croat Catholic</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>October 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragan Ćović</td>
<td>Croat Catholic</td>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>April 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebojša Radmanović</td>
<td>Serb Orthodox</td>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borislav Paravac</td>
<td>Serb Orthodox</td>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td>October 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. List of speeches analyzed in this thesis

**Bosniak Muslim**

**Bakir Izetbegović**

a. Address at the 10th UNESCO summit of heads of states of Southeast Europe
   i. Location: Mostar
   ii. Date: 03 June 2012
   iii. Theme: International Politics
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=19904,1,1

b. Address on the occasion of the independence day of Bosnia and Herzegovina
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 01 March 2012
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=16673,1,1

c. Address at the ceremony of marking the Day of the Armed Forces of BiH
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 28 November 2012
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=192559,1,1

d. Keynote address at the Sarajevo Business Forum
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 06 April 2011
   iii. Theme: National Politics
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=15792,1,1

e. Address on the occasion of the marking of the 20th Anniversary of the Patriotic League of Bosnia and Herzegovina
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 13 June 2011
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=16000,1,1

f. Address at the official Opening Ceremony of the First Congress of the Islamic Religion Teachers of Bosnia and Herzegovina
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 03 December 2011
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=16474,1,1

g. Inaugural speech
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 10 November 2010
iii. Theme: Inauguration
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=15267,1,1

Haris Silajdžić

a. Address on occasion of the 15th anniversary of genocide against the Bosniaks of the, UN Protected Zone “Srebrenica and the burial of identified victims from July 1995
   i. Location: Memorial Center Potočari
   ii. Date: 11 July 2010
   iii. Theme: Commemoration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=14918,1,1

b. Speech on the occasion of celebrating BiH Independence Day
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 27 February 2009
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=13233,1,1

c. Speech on the occasion marking the National Day of Bosnia and Herzegovina
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 25 November 2009
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=14165,1,1

d. Address on occasion of the celebration of the 16th anniversary of “Pretis 92” action – remembering Safet Hadžić
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 18 April 2008
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=11985,1,1

e. Address on occasion of the 13th anniversary of genocide in Srebrenica
   i. Location: Srebrenica
   ii. Date: 11 July 2008
   iii. Theme: Commemoration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=12321,1,1

h. Address at the meeting of Political Directors of Peace Implementation Council Steering Board
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 18 June 2007
   iii. Theme: International Politics
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=10853,1,1

i. Speech at the formal academy on occasion of honoring the fourth anniversary of death of Alija Izetbegović, the first president of the RBiH presidency
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 19 October 2007
j. Speech on a reception at the Presidency in honor of the upcoming holidays
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 18 December 2007
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=11525,1,1

k. Address at the formal session
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 6 November 2006
   iii. Theme: National Politics
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9859,1,1

Sulejman Tihić
a. Speech at the event “Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina”
   i. Location: Veliko Polje
   ii. Date: 4 August 2006
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9721,1,1
b. Address on Occasion of The Independence Day of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1st of March)
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 28 February 2006
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9125,1,1

Croatian Catholic

Željko Komšić
a. Address on the occasion of Independence Day of BiH
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 1 March 2012
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=16672,1,1
b. Speech at the opening ceremony of the Third Forum of the Ministers of Health
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 12 October 2011
   iii. Theme: International Politics
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=16327,1,1
c. Address on the occasion of the Statehood Day of Bosnia and Herzegovina
   i. Location: Sarajevo
ii. Date: 24 November 2011
iii. Theme: Celebration
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=16447,1,1
d. Address at the Official Military Ceremony on the occasion of the Day of the Armed Forces of BiH
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 1 December 2011
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=16468,1,1
e. The speech by the BiH Presidency member, H.E. Zeljko Komsic, on the occasion of celebrating BiH Independence Day
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 27 February 2009
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=13221,1,1
f. Speech on the occasion of opening ceremony of the manifestation ‘Mostar Spring 2009- Days of Matrix Croatica
   i. Location: Mostar
   ii. Date: 15 April 2009
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=13382,1,1
g. Speech at the presentation of the First semi-annual report, Monitoring of the European Integration Process of Bosnia and Herzegovina” BiH Parliament building
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 22 July 2009
   iii. Theme: National Politics
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=13740,1,1
h. Speech on occasion of celebrating the Battle at the Neretva river
   i. Location: Jablanica
   ii. Date: 26 April 2008
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=12021,1,1
i. Speech on the occasion of National Day of Bosnia and Herzegovina
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 25 November 2008
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=12843,1,1
j. Address during a visit to the Municipality of Višegrad
   i. Location: Višegrad
   ii. Date: 5 June 2007
   iii. Theme: Commemoration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=10767,1,1
k. Address on the occasion of The Srebrenica Investment Conference at Konak residency
   i. Location: Sarajevo
ii. Date: 5 November 2007  
iii. Theme: National Politics  
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=11339,1,1

l. Address at the Formal Academy on occasion of the 2nd anniversary of the BiH Armed Forces  
i. Location: Sarajevo  
ii. Date: 30 November 2007  
iii. Theme: Commemoration  
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=11450,1,1

m. Address at the formal session  
i. Location: Sarajevo  
ii. Date: 6 November 2006  
iii. Theme: Inauguration  
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9858,1,1

Ivo Miro Jović  
a. Speech at the International Conference “establishing the truth in the post-conflict period: Initiatives and perspectives in the West Balkan”  
i. Location: Sarajevo  
ii. Date: 5 May 2006  
iii. Theme: International Politics  
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9305,1,1

b. Speech at the Central Conference of the 14th festivity ‘Lipanjske zore Mostar 1992-2006’  
i. Location: Mostar  
ii. Date: 21 June 2006  
iii. Theme: Celebration  
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9514,1,1

c. Speech at the 33rd General Conference of UNESCO  
i. Location: Paris, France  
ii. Date: 10 October 2005  
iii. Theme: International Politics  
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=7456,1,1

Dragan Ćović  
a. Speech on the occasion of the Statehood Day of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
i. Location: Sarajevo  
ii. Date: 24 November 2004  
iii. Theme: Celebration  
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=4966,1,1

b. Speech on the occasion of the Christmas Reception, Konak Presidency  
i. Location: Sarajevo  
ii. Date: 15 December 2004
iii. Theme: Celebration  
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=5184,1,1  

Serbian Orthodox  

Nebojša Radmanović  

a. Address at the central ceremony marking the Day of the Army of Republika Srpska and the Day of the 3rd Infantry Regiment (Republika Srpska)  
i. Location: Banja Luka  
ii. Date: 11 May 2012  
iii. Theme: Commemoration  
iv. Web site:  
 http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=19831,1,1  

b. Address at the Summit of Head of States of the South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP)  
i. Location: Belgrade, Serbia  
ii. Date: 15 June 2012  
iii. Theme: International Politics  
iv. Web site:  
 http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=192236,1,1  

c. Address for the marking of 50 years of existence and work of the Boxing Club “Slavia” from Banja Luka, at the official Academy  
i. Location: Banka Luka  
ii. Date: 22 October 2012  
iii. Theme: Celebration  
iv. Web site:  
 http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=192480,1,1  

d. Speech in Donja Gradina  
i. Location: Donja Gradina  
ii. Date: 11 April 2010  
iii. Theme: Commemoration  
iv. Web site:  
 http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=14583,1,1  

e. Speech at the traditional folk assembly in Milića Gaj dedicated to the celebration of the Uprising Day of BiH Peoples  
i. Location: Milica Gaj  
ii. Date: 27 July 2010  
iii. Theme: Celebration  
iv. Web site:  
 http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=14968,1,1  

f. Speech at the constitutive session of BiH Presidency  
i. Location: Sarajevo  
ii. Date: 10 November 2010  
iii. Theme: National Politics
iv. Web site:
http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=15265,1,1

g. Address at the international conference “Where Peace Begins: Pivotal Role of Education for Lasting Peace”
i. Location: Sarajevo
ii. Date: 12 March 2009
iii. Theme: International Politics
iv. Web site:
http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=13254,1,1

h. Address at the 6th Annual South-East European Gathering "Richness of Diversities"
i. Location: Banja Luka
ii. Date: 23 May 2009
iii. Theme: International Politics
iv. Web site:
http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=13520,1,1

i. Address on occasion the celebration of the Day of the 3rd Infantry Regiment
   i. Location: Republic of Srpska
   ii. Date: 12 May 2008
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site:
   http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=12078,1,1

j. Speech at the ceremony celebrating the Day of BiH Armed Forces
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 1 December 2008
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site:
   http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=12870,1,1

k. Speech on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the army of the Republic of Srpska and the day of the 3rd infantry regiment of the BiH armed forces
   i. Location: Republica Srpska
   ii. Date: 11 May 2007
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site:
   http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=10675,1,1

l. Farewell speech at the funeral of Dr Milan Jelić, the President of the Republic of Srpska
   i. Location: Modrića
   ii. Date: 3 October 2007
   iii. Theme: Commemoration
   iv. Web site:
   http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=11217,1,1

m. Address at the formal session
   i. Location: Sarajevo
ii. Date: 6 November 2006
iii. Theme: Inauguration
iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9857,1,1

n. Speech at the ceremony on occasion of celebrating the 11th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 21 November 2006
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9927,1,1

Borislav Paravac
a. Speech on occasion of celebrating the 14th anniversary of RSA and the Day of the 3rd Infantry Regiment
   i. Location: Republic of Srpska
   ii. Date: 11 May 2006
   iii. Theme: Celebration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=9339,1,1
b. A speech at the send-off of B-H Armed forces Unit for destroying unexploded explosives
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 1 June 2005
   iii. Theme: Commemoration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=6371,1,1
c. Address on the occasion of taking over the duty of The Chairman of The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 28 October 2004
   iii. Theme: Inauguration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=4793,1,1
d. Speech on the occasion of the Dayton agreement anniversary
   i. Location: Sarajevo
   ii. Date: 22 November 2004
   iii. Theme: Commemoration
   iv. Web site: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/gov/1/?cid=4920,1,1
C. Additional charts from QDA

Distribution of keywords (No of Cases)
- National Identity: 66.2%
- Ethnic Identity: 22.1%
- Against Ethnicity: 11.8%

Distribution of keywords (% of codes)
- National Identity: 70%
- Ethnic Identity: 21%
- Against Ethnicity: 7%
D. Major Political Parties as listed by Balkan Analysis

BOSS (Bosnian Party/ Bosanska Stranka)

BPS SH (Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party-Sefer Halilović/ Bosanskohercegovačka patriotska stranka Sefer Halilović)

DNS (Democratic People’s Alliance/ Demokratski Narodni Savez)

GDS BiH (Citizens’ Democratic Party/ Građanska demokratska stranka)

HDU BiH (Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Hrvatska demokratska unija BiH)

HDZ BiH (Croatian Democratic Union of BiH/ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine)

HDZ 1990 (Croatian Democratic Union 1990/ Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine 1990)

HNZ (Croatian People’s Union/ Hrvatska Narodna Zajednica)

HSP (Croatian Party of Rights/ Hrvatska Stranka Prava)

HSS-NHI (Croatian Pleasant Party - New Croatian Initiative/ Hrvatska seljačka stranka- Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa)

LDS (Liberal Democratic Party/ Liberalna Demokratska Stranka)

NS (Our Party/ Naša Stranka)

NS “Radom za Boljitak” (People’s Party Work for Betterment/ Narodna Stranka Radom – Za boljitak)

PDP RS (Party of Democratic Progress/ Partija Demokratskog Progresa)

PZP BiH (Movement for Changes/ Pokret za Promjene)

SBiH (Party for BiH/ Stranka za BiH)

SDA (Party of Democratic Action/ Stranka Demokratske Akcije)

SDP BiH (Social Democratic Party of BiH/ Socijaldemokratska Partija BiH)

SDS (Serbian Democratic Party/ Srpska Demokratska Stranka)

SDU BiH (Social Democratic Union/ Socijaldemokratska Unija)

SNSD (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats/ Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata)

SP (Socialistic Party/ Socijalistička Partija)
E. Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the entities marked

a. Yellow: Republika Srpska

b. Green: Federation of BiH

Source: www.emapsworld.com