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Japan's Missile Defense

Noriyumi Namatame

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JAPAN'S MISSILE DEFENSE

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirement for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

BY

Norifumi Namatame

November 2008
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ABBREVIATIONS

GPALS  Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (US)
JASDF  Japan Air Self-Defense Forces
JDA    Japan Defense Agency (From July 1954 to January 2007)
JGSDF  Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces
JMD    Japan's missile defense program
JMSDF  Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces
LDP    Liberal Democratic Party
MD     Missile Defense program (US)
MDE    Mutual Defense Emphasis
MOD    Japan's Ministry of Defense (Since January 2007)
MOFA   Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SDF    Self-Defense Forces
SDI    Strategic Defense Initiative (US)
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The international security environment in East Asia is far from stable and predictable. A variety of states in the region have long, troubled relationships. The People's Republic of China (PRC, or China in the following discussion) is a regional military power with a nuclear arsenal, and it could contend for global superpower status in the future. China has a number of security problems inside and outside of its vast territory; among which their greatest concern is the issue of the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). Taiwan has an advanced economy and considerable military forces to counter the threat from the mainland. Its close relationship with the United States has provided some power balance with China. The split of the Korean Peninsula is a legacy of the Cold War. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), under dictator Kim Jong Il, has posed the most imminent post-Cold War threat to the region with its nuclear weapons development and ballistic missile programs. The Republic of Korea (ROK or
South Korea), like Taiwan, showed impressive economic growth in the 1980s and has maintained a stable democratic regime since the late 1980s.

Following the defeat in World War II, Japan became known as a peaceful nation and mercantile state. However, the second largest economy in the world has gradually developed its role in the international security field and increased its military power. There exists "a complex, multidimensional, multilevel security agenda that has forced changes and has tested Japan's security policy" (Hughes 2004, 3). Japan faces a number of issues with its neighbors: territorial disputes with China regarding the Senkaku Islands, with South Korea regarding Takeshima (Dokdo) Island, and with Russia regarding the Northern Territories; historical legacies such as Japanese prime ministers' worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine, reactionary revisions of Japanese history schoolbooks, and chemical weapons abandoned by the Japanese military in Chinese territory during World War II; and economic concerns like the development of energy and natural resources in the East China Sea.

Above all, the United States, the only global superpower after the Cold War, is the key actor in the region. George W. Bush's administration has been engaging in
an unprecedented "war against terrorism," adopting an approach to policy which critics condemn as "unilateralism."
The United States has played an irreplaceable role in East Asia, adopting a hub and spokes type of alliance with Japan, South Korea, and (informally) Taiwan, unlike the collective defense organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. In this complex environment, Japan's defense and security policies have a significant impact on international relations.

Meanwhile, the development of military technology through history has been remarkable. In order to fight and win wars, humans have invented such offensive weapons as bows and arrows, cannons, gunpowder, tanks, airplanes, and missiles. The history of war consists of battles between offense and defense, and we have tried to counter offensive weapons with shields, fortifications, trenches, anti-tank weapons and anti-aircraft missiles. Such battles and the need to win wars have encouraged further advancement of military technology. Recent developments in information and communication technology (ICT) have brought about the so-called "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). Some believe that we can finally "hit a bullet with a bullet" and shoot down nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles before they hit a
target. The United States has aggressively pursued the development of a missile shield for the sake of its own national security, but there remain many issues to be solved. Japan has been involved in the US missile defense program since 1993, and recently announced that it would build its own missile defense system. However, the development and deployment of Japan's missile defense could have grave implications for regional and global security.

This study will focus on Japan's missile defense program. This issue has been little discussed in public until recently, compared with the debate on ballistic missile defense in the United States. This is true even in the Japanese international security literature. This can partly be attributed to the fact that Japan has only been cooperating with the United States on missile defense research and had not made a decision to deploy its own missile defense system until recently. But the substantive shift in Japan's defense strategy should be of great concern. There have been few scholarly works on the development of strategic thinking in Japan's policy on defense against ballistic missile threats. Considering the growing importance of strategic views on emerging ballistic missile threats, it is worth exploring the defense and security
policy of the second largest economy in the world, a major actor in the regional and world security arena, and the holder of one of the world's largest and most sophisticated armed forces.

This is a case study based on qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. While it refers to theories of international relations, its basic approach is inductive, descriptive and discovery oriented. This is a historical and narrative study of Japan's defense and security policy, mainly focusing on the modern period following 1945, the year that Japan was defeated in World War II and began reconstructing its foreign and defense policy from scratch. The data sources primarily consist of the following three. First, this research used official documents from records of the Kokkai (Diet; Japanese congress), Defense White Papers, and other official publications by the Self Defense Forces (SDF), Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and so forth. Second, the author updated readings from the wealth of materials continually coming out on the missile defense issue, including relevant books and academic journals articles, as well as documents, data, and other materials available through the Internet. Third, this research made use of media sources, including editorials,
op-eds, and reports from leading newspapers in the United States and Japan.

This research is conducted at three levels of analysis: systemic, state, and individual. The systemic level includes international structures, state power polarity (unipolar or multipolar), international economic conditions, and the Cold War and post-Cold War environments. It also involves regional analysis, referring to Japan's political relations with China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, as well as their economic ties and interdependence. The state level of analysis examines institutions (e.g., the government, Diet, constitution), bureaucratic politics (JDA and MOFA), partisanship (e.g., Liberal Democratic Party, Socialist Party), civil-military relations (SDF), the military-industry complex (e.g., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), mass media (newspaper, television, and journals), public opinion, domestic economy (economic development, recession, and financial resources), security culture (World War II experiences, anti-nuclear sentiments, historical legacies, and other philosophical bases), and national identities. Finally, the individual level of analysis comprises perceptions of leaders and elites such as prime ministers, LDP leaders, and JDA
officers.

The objectives of this study are threefold. First, it provides an original case study for the international security field. A number of historical case studies on Japan's diplomacy and foreign policy can be found; however, there has been no specific work on the relationships between missile defense and Japan's grand strategy of national security, the field to which this study contributes. Second, this study offers empirical evidence testing theories of international relations. Realism is a dominant school of thought in the field of international security, but it has constantly been attacked from other theoretical perspectives. While neither supporting nor opposing realism, this study provides evidence that should contribute to the development of the field by analyzing an important specific case of Japan's national security policymaking. Third, this study presents implications for future defense and security policies of Japan and the United States, with regard to long-term grand strategies regarding ballistic missile threats to both states.

This study is presented in the following four parts: Chapter two defines strategic concepts and discusses theoretical perspectives on Japan's national identity.
Chapter three reviews Japanese security policies after World War II and illustrates shifts and changes that have occurred. Chapter four analyzes the missile defense program pursued by Japan and assesses the goals of its national and international security policies. Finally, chapter five offers a proposal for future Japanese policy in the field of international security.
Chapter II
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This chapter provides theoretical frameworks for the following discussion on Japan's missile defense. First, several key strategic concepts are defined. Here, debates on the distinction between offense and defense are reviewed, and a clue to examine the question of whether missile defense is truly "defensive" or not is provided. Second, the sense of Japanese identity underlying Japan's defense and security policy is analyzed from perspectives drawn from international political theory.

A. Basic Concepts

"Grand strategy" is the broadest and most basic concept of international security used here. It is generally defined as "a plan of action that is based on the calculated relation of means to a larger ends" (International Security Studies at Yale University). Grand Strategy is usually thought of as drawing on all the instruments of statecraft.
(military, economic, diplomatic, and so on) for the advancement of the interests of the state. In other words, grand strategy is equivalent to a state's overall national security policy. This study particularly focuses on "the politico-military and governmental realms" (ibid.), using a broader concept than a common definition of "military grand strategy" at the level of movement and use of an entire nation state at war, which includes calculations of economic resources, manpower and moral resources, and what is sometimes called national will.

"Strategy," "disarmament" and "arms control" are the main components of a grand strategy. In forming a grand strategy a state defines its interests and formulates appropriate policies to protect or maximize such interests, not only in warfare but also in peacetime. It can be said that this concept is equivalent to policymaking in the national security field. "Strategy" includes "war-fighting" and "deterrence." And for the sake of the discussion on missile defense, this study makes a distinction between "deterrence by punishment" and "deterrence by denial." Finally, arms control components, "mutual assured destruction (MAD)" and "mutual defense emphasis (MDE)," are examined.
1. Strategy, Arms Control, and Disarmament

Military strategy is generally defined as the art of a commander-in-chief in warfare; that is, the art of projecting and directing overall military movements and operations of a war or battle. It is usually distinguished from the narrower concept, tactics, which is the art of handling forces in battle or in the immediate presence of the enemy. Strategy involves looking at the war as a whole and supervising each tactic employed. Moreover, strategy involves unilateral pursuit of a state's national interest, including, in many cases, actual military action, and it does not require negotiation or collaboration with other states.

Disarmament is a traditional term meaning agreements and negotiations for reduction or removal of armament. According to Dictionary of World History, disarmament "envisages a dramatic reduction in arms in order to achieve peace" (Larsen and Smith 2005, 1). Disarmament can occur both on a tactical level and/or on a strategic level. Its early practices were "largely postconflict impositions of limitations on military force by the victor upon the vanquished"; however, "efforts to avoid conflict by
cooperating to demilitarize likely regions of contact and to restrict the use of new and destructive technologies" can be seen as early as the 448 B.C. Athens–Persia Accord (ibid.). Disarmament can be a voluntary action by a state motivated by its own strategic interests, financial constraints, or foreign pressure. But such a unilateral act is a state's own choice based on self- rather than mutual-interest. Therefore such unilateral actions belong more to the area of strategy than disarmament. Disarmament can also take the form of a cooperative multilateral action among states aimed at easing international political and military tensions. This study considers this form of disarmament, as a cooperative endeavor between states to reduce military forces, with the alternate objective of eliminating entire categories of weapons or forces.

Arms control emerged to replace the concept of disarmament early in the nuclear age. It is defined as any international limitation of the development, testing, production, deployment, or use of weapons, usually applying to specific types of arms or geographic areas. At the same time, in contrast to disarmament, the goal is the limitation rather than the complete elimination of particular types of weapons or forces (Ogawa 1996, 22–27). This approach is
based on the recognition that in the nuclear age the abolition of nuclear weapons is unobtainable in the near term. In terms of nuclear weapons, then, an important difference between disarmament and arms control is that the latter gives priority not to reducing or eliminating military capabilities but to minimizing the likelihood of war. According to the classic differentiation of Hedley Bull, "disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments, while arms control is restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy – not only the number of weapons, but also their character, development, and use" (Larsen and Smith 2005, 3). Arms control implies some form of collaboration between generally antagonistic states in areas of military policy. Moreover, arms control emphasizes not only reducing the risk of the outbreak of war but also limiting the destruction in case of war.

2. War-Fighting, Deterrence, and Alliance

These three concepts belong to the larger notion of strategy. "War-fighting" is distinguished from "deterrence" in that the former is a wartime value, while the latter is a peacetime objective. War-fighting is a policy based on pursuit of a military strategy for the purpose of prevailing
against the enemy in war. War-fighters "see aggression as a constant threat" and "are drawn toward a policy based on unilateral pursuit of a military (war-fighting) strategy" (Goldfischer 1993, 22). They "claim that all forms of arms control are unnecessary" because a strong state can "defend itself through unilateral efforts" (ibid., 4).

According to Glenn Snyder's classic definition, "Deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain" (Snyder in Adams 2004, 404). Deterrence in essence is a coercive strategy, but it is a "means" to achieve the desirable "end" of peace (Walzer 1977). Deterrence in this study of the nuclear age mainly refers to nuclear rather than conventional deterrence. It is logical to see nuclear deterrence as far more powerful than conventional deterrence, thanks to the "crystal ball effect," in which the destructive power of nuclear weapons is so frightful that decision-makers easily understand the consequences of nuclear war and would never initiate such a war.

The crucial difference between war-fighting and deterrence is that the war-fighting approach regards nuclear weapons as "usable," while nuclear deterrence is based on
the assumption that they are "unusable." Bernard Brodie is said to have first put forward the idea of nuclear deterrence (Iwata 1996, 24). In 1946 Brodie stated, "Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose" (Brodie in Schell 1982, 197). Deterrence is seen as working "through the punitive threat of irresistible hurt to the enemy's social and economic structure, rather than through the prospect of victory in combat" (Freedman 1981, 192-193). Therefore, "[w]hat is important are the political effects that nuclear weapons produce, not the physics and chemistry of the explosion" (Jervis 1988, 83). During the Cold War, Robert Jervis argued that nuclear deterrence theory "is probably the most influential school of thought in the American study of international relations" (Jervis 1979, 289).

Another important definition here is the distinction between "deterrence by punishment" and "deterrence by denial." Deterrence by punishment means dissuading the enemy from initiating attack by threatening it with massive nuclear retaliation. Deterrence by denial is discouraging the enemy from attacking through the ability to defend
against an attack. These two concepts work quite differently when applied to conventional forces versus nuclear forces.

Hard-nosed nuclear war-fighters may not believe in the efficacy of any deterrent posture, since they see war as inevitable. Still, war-fighters generally believe in nuclear deterrence. A state may deter some range of aggressive action by an adversary through the credible threat to wage and prevail in a nuclear war.

Finally, an "alliance" is a military agreement between two or more countries related to wartime planning, commitments, or contingencies. This is a bilateral or multilateral action of states. Military alliances should be considered an aspect of strategy, because they are largely an outcome of unilateral quests for fulfilling self-interest rather than a result of a belief in cooperation as an end in itself. "Alliances are temporary coalitions of self-interested states who come together for instrumental reasons in response to a specific threat" (Wendt 1996, 53).

3. MAD Versus MDE

MAD and MDE are defined within the concept of arms control. The MAD situation during the Cold War may have been a mere consequence of power balancing by the superpowers,
which were unilaterally pursuing both quantitative and qualitative buildup of their nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, once the United States and the Soviet Union perceived the equilibrium of offensive nuclear forces, however illogical the ultimate number of those weapons was during the 1960s and 70s, it was based on bilateral or multilateral agreement, or at least understanding, of a reality. The superpowers were mutually deterring a deliberate nuclear attack upon each other by maintaining a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, even after absorbing a surprise first strike. MAD emphasizes offensive nuclear forces and opposes deployment of defensive weapons. Its advocates held that allowing a defensive weapon buildup could lead to a spiraling offense-defense arms race and might even destabilize the superpower nuclear stalemate. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which prohibited developing and deploying shields against offensive ballistic missiles, was the most important product of a MAD arms control approach. The arms race in offensive nuclear forces continued after that, but at least this treaty played a significant role in preventing an arms race in strategic defensive weapons, which might well have further accelerated the offensive arms race. MAD advocates
argue, "defense is unnecessary because bilateral 'offense-only' deterrent forces can provide a safe and durable arms control framework" (Goldfischer 1993, 4). Therefore, MAD is defined as a school of nuclear arms control because it is based on bilateral or multilateral agreement or at least mutual understanding (Ishikawa 2002, 222-223).

In order to pursue their national interests, states have built up their military capabilities. Defensive weapons, as well as offensive weapons, may well be developed for the purpose of war-fighting and deterrence. Nevertheless, pursuing missile defense shields is not necessarily unilateral and strategic. If states agree on and cooperate in building defensive weapons while reducing offensive ones, tensions among them might be eased, and defenses might help stabilize strategic relations between states. This approach has been called mutual defense emphasis (MDE). From this perspective, "an agreement on limited defense would be seen as a useful first step toward a more far-reaching defense transition" (Goldfischer 1993, 4). In the case of the nuclear age, MDE places emphasis on defensive weapons to reduce societal damage in an actual nuclear war. It renounces reliance on offense-dominant nuclear policies, which are based permanently on threats of mutual
annihilation in case deterrence should fail. "Mutual defense emphasis advocates have claimed that their approach can satisfy the arms control requirements of nuclear parity and deterrence stability and provide a means to limit damage if deterrence somehow fails" (ibid., 5; original emphasis).

Both MAD and MDE affirm the importance of deterrence. On the one hand, MAD obviously bases its logic upon massive retaliatory nuclear forces, which would be launched in case of a first strike by the enemy. This is an arms control policy of "deterrence by punishment." On the other hand, a missile defense system may dissuade the enemy from attacking by offering the prospect that the attack will be rendered ineffective. This is a policy of "deterrence by denial."

These two concepts in a nuclear world connote a striking difference. The former indicates that in case of deterrence failure, a massive retaliatory nuclear assault would result. Disastrous nuclear annihilation would occur even if the enemy had only a small number of nuclear weapons. The latter leaves the possibility that a state could defend itself even if deterrence should fail and the enemy initiate a first strike with or without nuclear weapons. This is the exact point on which MDE advocates criticize MAD as a form of "madness" which has forced us to live with tens of thousands.
of nuclear weapons that could destroy the whole world many times over.

4. Offense versus Defense

The issue of the offense-defense distinction has been debated for many years. Some scholars and politicians contend that the differentiation does not matter in international politics, while others argue that it is of critical importance. The author considers the distinction important and believes it should have a crucial impact on missile defense debates. The so-called "offense-defense theory" is that "the character of international politics is influenced by whether offensive military operations are easy or difficult" (Lynn-Jones 2004, xi). When offense has the advantage over defense, war and conflict will become more likely; when defense has the advantage, peace and cooperation will be more probable.

Offense involves breaking into the enemy's territory, and offensive forces are those that enable invasion from the land, air or sea. Karen Ruth Adams defines offense as follows: "a state uses force to attack another state's military or nonmilitary assets to conquer its territory or compel compliance with policy directives (impose its will on
"the other state)" (Adams 2004, 408). Looking at the other side of the coin, according to Jervis' classic definition, "the essence of defense is keeping the other side out of your territory. A purely defensive weapon is one that can do this without being able to penetrate the enemy's land" (Jervis 1978, 39).

However, the distinction between offense and defense is complex, particularly because many scholars argue from not only technological but also political points of view. Some weapons are easy to distinguish: strategic bombers, ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers that facilitate invasion of distant territories are clearly offensive; fortifications, trenches and landmines that have no mobility are purely defensive (Lieber 2000, 78-79). Nevertheless, many weapons are in the gray zone. Particular weapons can be both offensive and defensive on the battlefield, as well as in larger strategic environments. Tanks are usually regarded as offensive, but in Japan this is not the case. It possesses a sizable number of sophisticated tanks for the purpose of defense, since the country is surrounded by the sea and cannot invade other states with tanks. On the contrary, landmines and machine guns are often called defensive, but when used in the enemy's territory for a
strategic purpose, they become offensive. An ostensibly defensive missile shield can be regarded as offensive when the missile defense capability is considered in combination with an offensive nuclear first-strike capability. If the United States develops a reliable missile defense system, it will pose a tremendous threat to other nuclear states because the United States will be able to launch a first nuclear strike without fear of retaliatory nuclear attack.

In the case of possible conflict in East Asia, even the missile defense capability of Japan, the country with no offensive capability, can be viewed as offensive, when combined with the massive offensive forces of the United States, Japan's most powerful and reliable ally.

A majority of scholars in the offense-defense debate argue that nuclear weapons favor defense. Considering the vast power of nuclear weapons, building and maintaining a second-strike capability can be attained at relatively little cost for states, and conflict among nuclear states becomes "virtually impossible" (Van Evera 1998, 255). "Defense is impossible – a triumph not of offense, but of deterrence" (Jervis 1978, 34). However, the author disagrees. Nuclear deterrence should be distinguished from the conventional offense-defense debate, since it is a situation
of stalemate in which states faces each other with massively destructive and "offensive" bombers and ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Besides, the argument that includes deterrence as a special form of defense is dangerous and misleading, because it could promote proliferation of nuclear weapons among states claiming their pursuit of nuclear capability is for "defensive" purposes.

The distinction between offense and defense can also be characterized in terms of perception: "the real state of offensive or defensive bias may be less important than the perceived bias" (Quester 2003, ix-x; original emphasis). As Jervis argues, when the distinction is possible and defense has the advantage, the perceived threat is minimal and relations between states should be stable. However, when offense has the advantage and the distinction is not clear, the perceived threat can be grave and that may lead to a preemptive or preventive first strike by a state (Jervis 1978).

Strategists tend to reject the distinction between offense and defense. The only thing that matters is whether or not particular weapons systems favor unilateral advantage for their country. It does not matter if such systems are offensive or defensive. Arms controllers and disarmament
advocates are inclined to embrace the distinction in order to diminish risks and costs for all states concerned (Goldfischer 1993, 26). As discussed earlier, emphasis on offense or defense separates MAD advocates from MDE supporters. Disarmament proponents in general believe that both offensive and defensive weapons must be reduced, though some may emphasize more on disarmament of offensive weapons than defensive. The 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference sought such a ban on arms specifically for offensive operations. On balance, the distinction is possible and essential, when we carefully look at various factors such as military technology and doctrine, geography, national social structure, and diplomatic arrangements. The author will adopt this perspective and make a clear distinction between offense and defense. Chapter four will discuss whether and how missile defense issues fall within this argument.

The preceding discussion of strategic terms is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1. International Security Study Concepts

Grand Strategy

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<th>Unilateral Approach</th>
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<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
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<td>War-Fighting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>by Punishment</td>
<td>MAD (Deterrence by Punishment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by Denial</td>
<td>MDE (Deterrence by Denial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offense-Defense distinction does not matter.</td>
<td>Offense is good.</td>
<td>Defense is good.</td>
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B. Realism and Pacifism in the Japanese Identity

"Identity" refers to how people define themselves "in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations and, at the broadest level, civilizations" (Huntington 2001, 131). Identity "is a central aspect of the human experience" and "should be of vital concern to those interested in security issues" (Wyn Jones 1999, 114). Before August 15, 1945, the Japanese homeland had never been invaded, or occupied by another country. Therefore, for Japan, the defeat in the Pacific War and the following occupation by the United
States brought not only the total disruption of the fundamental character of the state but also the loss of the nation's sense of identity as the leader of Eastern civilization (Kato 2002). Under the occupation, the United States eliminated Japanese militarism completely. With various democratization measures, it forced the Japanese to Americanize as well as to distance themselves from other Asian states, while establishing stronger ties with Western civilization. This was the Japanese people's first experience with drastic and direct influence from the outside world.

After the war, two different national identities with regard to national and international security emerged in Japan: a "realist identity" and a "pacifist identity." Clashes between these "dual identities" (Soeya 1998) have played a role in various behind-the-scene debates in Japan's postwar political history. These will be described in detail in chapter three. It would not be accurate to describe these debates as clashes of ideologies (e.g., conservative versus radical, liberal versus communist, or right wing versus left wing), since at bottom, there has clearly been a common perception that the most important thing is to secure the country and its people. The issue that emerges from this
perception, namely, "what should be done to secure the country and how should it be achieved," fundamentally separates these two identities. Competition between the dual identities has swung Japanese minds from one identity to the other at a national level as well as at regional, local and individual levels.

1. The Realist Identity
   a. Basic Features

   The realist identity considers the balance of material forces as critical to national security, including the military balance among states, and economic strength as the basis of military power. Soon after the end of the Second World War, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union emerged and fated the Asia-Pacific region to further conflicts. Japan, under occupation by the United States, became a part of the western alliance, even after its independence was restored. Facing threats from Communist China and North Korea, as well as from Soviet forces in the Far East, calls for rearmament, from a strategic point of view, grew louder in Japan. Recognizing the reality of the Cold War, the realist camp concluded that Japan's security and prosperity should be achieved based on a military
alliance with the United States. After the end of the Cold War, the realist identity retained its focus on military, political and economic ties with the United States, and it aimed at international contribution only within the framework of this relationship, while promoting modernization of Japan's defense capability.

b. Theoretical Background

The basis of the realist identity is the international political theory of "realism," the mainstream school of thought in the field of international security. Realists consider the world to be in a state of anarchy, where there is no governing body above the sovereignty of individual states. In the international environment, unlike within the state, there are neither legislative functions that create order, nor administrative mechanisms that maintain order. In addition, traditional international laws have no actual authority over sovereign states, and the exercise of international law depends heavily on the will of each state. Given the absence of a world government, a state is able to act as it wishes in pursuit of its national interests; therefore, clashes of interest among states are inevitable. From a realist viewpoint, relations among states
are essentially conflictual. Realists focus on power relations among states, and they take a pessimistic view of international cooperation. A state seeks to maximize its national power to ensure survival, or may regard the maximization of national power itself as a goal. The state may thus do whatever it takes to achieve this goal. In history, states have invaded other states and fought wars in pursuit of national power goals.

Nevertheless, "realism" is not a monolithic view. Depending on theoretical assumptions and policy implications, one can classify a variety of "realisms," such as classical realism, neo-realism, neo-classical realism, and so on (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Among these, the most influential theory of realism in the United States over the past three decades has been that of Kenneth Waltz, whose perspective has been labeled "neorealism." Neorealism is based on four important assumptions. First, the state is the principal actor and the most important unit to analyze. Actors other than states, such as international organizations, groups or individuals, which would include even the United Nations and international terrorist groups, are considered far less significant. Second, the state is looked on as a unitary actor. In the domestic decision-
making process there are various perspectives among actors such as political leaders, bureaucrats, public opinion, media, and so on. Nonetheless, by means of reconciliation, coordination, and compromise, a government provides one unified voice in the end. The state is assumed to act as if it were an individual, independent actor. Third, the state is regarded as essentially a rational actor. That is, the state logically assesses its goal, considers all the means and options to achieve it, analyzes every possibility to attain the goal with that selected means, and calculates cost-effect ratio. And then the state makes policy decisions to maximize its national interests. Fourth, realists regard national security as the most important issue in the international arena. Hans Morgenthau, the most influential realist scholar during much of the Cold War era, argued that issues such as defense of a state, international conflict and war were a matter of "high politics," while economic and social issues such as trade and finance were in the less important realm of "low politics" (Morgenthau 1985).

Based on the above assumptions, from the realist point of view the world is often compared to a "billiard" table. On the table (the globe), hard balls (the sovereign states) keep hitting one another. But the sizes of the balls
are not equal, and a larger ball (a state with more power) will smash and crush smaller ones. This relation among states is Thomas Hobbs's well-known "war of all against all" in international relations. In this "state of nature," wars among states are inescapable. Human history repeats itself, and therefore it is a history of war. Furthermore, out of this theory arises "alliance theory." According to one strand of alliance theory, when one state or a group of states holds superior power and poses a threat of invasion to others, the weaker states may unite to confront the threat. A frequently cited example is the situation in Europe before the First World War. The confrontation between the east and west blocs during the Cold War is another instance. Balance of power theory and alliance theory are two core theories of the realist school of thought; however, some realists deny the "balancing" theory, and prefer the "bandwagoning" argument that weaker states go along with a strong state or a group of states led by a strong one. They observe this "bandwagoning" of weaker states with great powers as particularly prevalent in recent international politics (Walt 1992). For instance, in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the neighboring Arab states took sides with the United States, instead of balancing against the US.
c. Realism and International Security

The concept of national security is, in the narrowest sense, focused on maintaining a nation's territory and society (Nagahisa 1998). To put it more concretely, national security is how "militarily a state protects its own territory, independence, lives of the population, and property from military invasion from outside enemies" (Kamiya 1998, 4). A state must defend its material resources by physical means. This perspective is consistent with the realists' worldview in which only material and military factors matter to national security. For realists, the international arena is a world filled with suspicion and unpredictability, in which other states' intentions and actions are uncertain (Waltz 1979). There is no trust among states, and it is dangerous to let one's national security depend on others. A state cannot expect others to help in a crisis of survival. It is a system of self-help. Realism is based on the zero-sum assumption in which a gain for one state means a loss for others, and the national interest is considered in such relative terms. Gains in the national interest are a competitive victory, and states tend to take advantage by deceiving others. Under the self-help system,
states have to prepare for the worst-case scenario in which the enemy's intention is to attack. Therefore, states fall into a spiraling competition in military build-up. This situation is the so-called "security dilemma."

Increasing the power of one state means decreasing power of another in relative terms. Therefore, international relations are necessarily based on confrontation and competition over power among states. A state tries to achieve its security through expanding war-fighting capabilities and developing the economic strength to build them up. Naturally, the possession of nuclear weapons, the weapon of ultimate mass destruction, makes sense from this perspective. Even regarding Japan, realists have been clearly predicting its nuclear armament since the early 1970s, when Japan's miraculous economic growth thrust it onto the stage as one of the world's leading economic powers (Khan 1970; Waltz 1993; Waltz 2000). Even now the smoldering argument regarding Japan's nuclear armament is rooted in the realist perspective.

d. Realism and International Cooperation

Some realists are more conscious of international organizations or institutions than others; however, for them
the roles of such actors are limited by states' national interests and their efforts to survive and maximize their power. Realists do not see global interdependence as necessarily favorable, for relationships between dependent states based not on equality but on dominance and obedience.

From a realist position, Joseph Grieco emphasizes that international institutions and regimes affect the prospects of cooperation only marginally, because of two significant barriers to state cooperation: concerns about "cheating" and "relative gains" (Grieco 1988). Grieco contends that realists provide a more comprehensive theory of the issue of cooperation than liberalists. He points out that liberalists consider only "absolute gains" from cooperation and the worst possible outcome is simply a lost opportunity. Realist theory explores how cooperation might result in lost security. As Jack Donnelly points out, a regime requires limited renunciation of sovereign national authority in an issue-area in order to achieve mutual benefits from cooperation (Donnelly 1986). From the realist perspective, it is very difficult for a state to give up its own rights, even partially, in a self-help system.

Realists also argue that international regimes matter to the extent that they benefit the national interest of
states. The theory of hegemonic stability links regime creation and maintenance with the existence of a dominant power, and the weakening of regimes with a waning hegemony. John Mearsheimer contends that the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. Institutions are mere "arenas" for acting out power relationships (Mearsheimer 1995). For realists, as Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons maintain, regimes require no formal international commitments or institutional machinery to function (Haggard and Simmons 1987). Some examples have been cited. In the nineteenth century Britain controlled international finance with the gold standard system, and it formed the international order, the so-called "Pax Britanica." In the twentieth century, particularly after the Second World War under the Bretton Woods system, the United States took over Britain's position and dominated the world economy (at least the western hemisphere), the so-called "Pax Americana." As a regional case, the United States has dominated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A strong argument can be made that the current phenomenon of globalization is fundamentally based on the power of the US to sustain a system based on US-style capitalism and free
market economy. For realists, international organizations and regimes are only "dependent variables," which are subordinate to the primary and independent variable of national interest.

e. Offensive Realism versus Defensive Realism

Naturally, the realist strand within the Japanese national identity would be inclined to adopt a "strategy" rather than "arms control" or "disarmament." In a world of anarchy and self-help, a state can rely only on its own material power. States act unilaterally and only form alliances and/or cooperate with other states so far as the cooperation serves their national interests.

Nonetheless, in terms of "strategy" versus "arms control," one can find serious differences among realists that can gravely affect the debate on missile defense. Although both assume the anarchical nature of the world, the two schools of realism - offensive realism and defensive realism - diverge in explaining states' behavior. This division "represents a fundamental divergence on the implications of anarchy" (Taliaferro 2001, 134). Offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer, see the world of anarchy as a strong incentive for state expansion. The goal of the
state is to increase its power and security, which is prone to provoke conflict among states. Glenn Snyder calls such states "maximizers," which seek power and security maximization through struggle to become a hegemon (Snyder 2002, 154). Offensive realists recognize little security dilemma among states, nor the difference between offense and defense. As Snyder quoted Mearsheimer in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), "The best defense is a good offense" (ibid., 156).

Defensive realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, regard anarchy as an incentive for state expansion, but under certain conditions. That is, a state will seek expansion and wage war when it feels threatened and insecure. Basically, the state will try to maintain the existing order and balance of power. According to Snyder, such states are "satisfiers," which seek to preserve power and status quo, so long as they can maintain security and survival (ibid.). One of the leading defensive realists, Robert Jervis, sees good chances here for arms control and even disarmament. As discussed earlier, Jervis argues that when the distinction between offense and defense is possible, and when defense has the advantage, the perceived threat is minimal and relations between states can be stable (Jervis 1978).
To put it differently, while offensive realists exclusively consider states' capabilities, defensive realists take perceptions of state leaders into account. Offensive realists would see little room for diplomacy and negotiation, and their policy for the state is likely a unilateral "strategy." But defensive realists differentiate offensive and defensive weapons and postures and look upon "arms control" approaches as a useful alternative. Missile defense systems can play a role in arms control approaches from defensive realist perspectives.

2. The Pacifist Identity

Pacifism in the Japanese national identity contrasts with realism. Pacifists seek peace by nonviolent and diplomatic approaches instead of military capability and coercion. They highly regard ideational factors such as laws, institutions, norms, culture, history, national character, domestic politics, ideas, preferences and values. This type of national identity emerged from the self-questioning resulting from the destructive war and from the pacifist ideal of making postwar Japan a model peaceful state. With Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan as its core, the Japanese pledged never again to cause the horrors of war.
They renounced war and military capability and sought to construct a non-nuclear, peaceful country. This led to the idea of entrusting national security to the United Nations. During the Cold War era, the pacifist identity was seen in Japan's omni-directional diplomacy that aimed for international security based on broad international cooperation, as well as on people's desire for unarmed neutrality, protection of the Constitution, and opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty as a military alliance. After the end of the Cold War, the pacifist identity has been seen through non-military contributions to international society within pluralistic frameworks such as the United Nations.

The pacifist identity of the Japanese is easily linked with the multilateral approaches of "arms control" and "disarmament" in contrast with a unilateral "strategy," toward which the realist identity should tend to orient itself.

3. Cognitive Approach to Explaining the Japanese Identity

In the field of international security studies, realism has been the mainstream approach. As mentioned above, realists adopt a state-centric approach. They assume
rationality of a state and primarily analyze observable material factors. As a result, strictly speaking, realism theoretically lacks analyses of any ideational factors such as identity. The state's rational decisions issue from a "black box," and realists deal with national interests and identities as "given." However, this study defines the Japanese realist identity as the will or self-image of people who "intend" to secure the country based on the realist worldview. The Japanese people define themselves through the realist and the pacifist identities in considering national security issues. The existence of the dual identity in Japan is an ontological observation. The next question is where these identities come from, and whether or not, or when and how, these identities have been formed and have changed in the course of history. This issue can be explored through a school of thought, called cognitivism.

In the 1980s both realism and liberalism pointed to a new stage in rationalist approaches. In realism Kenneth Waltz rigidly excluded human and domestic elements and established "neorealism," which analyzes international relations from deductive theory building, referring to microeconomics (Waltz 1979; 1986). A sovereign state, like
an enterprise, is regarded as a unitary rational actor, which pursues the maximizing of its own interests. State activities are constrained by the structure of the anarchic international political "system," just as enterprise activities are constrained by the structure of the market. Hence neorealism is also called "structural realism," which has a deterministic view unconcerned with any individual human factor. In liberalism, the so-called "neoliberalism" or "liberal institutionalism" made a significant theoretical compromise with realism. While emphasizing absolute gain from cooperation among states and the importance of international organizations and regimes, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye admitted and even stressed the value of power relations among states based on the coercive force of military capability (Keohane and Nye 1977). Most essential was their acknowledgement that a state is a rational actor, and the principal actor in international politics. Consequently, neorealism and neoliberalism came to largely converge as a rationalist approach, sharing a similar view on the following three points: International relations are in a state of anarchy. A sovereign state is the principal actor in international politics. And a state is a unitary rational actor that egoistically maximizes its national
interest. What separates them is the difference in "relative" versus "absolute" gains of a state through international cooperation.

Cognitivism is a reflective approach to international issues, which opposes rationalist approaches. Cognitivism is a broad concept framed by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, which includes social constructivism, critical theory, and postmodernism. It emerged in the latter half of 1980s and has significantly influenced international political studies, including the field of international security. Various schools of thought, with critical differences, constitute cognitivism, but they share a central feature: an epistemological view on international affairs. This approach is radically different from standard scientific approaches such as behaviorism and positivism, in that moral judgments are given power to explain events, facts, and figures. Cognitivists see epistemic and perceptive limitations of material structures and regard international order as a construction of various actors. Cognitivist analyses are aimed at finding truth by decomposing, dismantling and deconstructing concepts that constitute the order (Hasenclever et al. 1997).

Cognitivists, like classic idealists and liberalists,
make a point of analyzing not only nation states but also actors like bureaucrats, political parties and individual decision-makers. They also emphasize the importance of ideational factors such as personalities, perceptions of national leaders, ideologies, norms, cultures, values, beliefs, ideas, knowledge, and identities. Moreover, they argue that foreign policies of a state result from domestic politics, and domestic political movements often echo international relations; hence dynamic aspects are significant.

Analytical factors prioritized by a cognitivist approach are dynamic knowledge building, communication and cooperation among actors, and roots and processes of national interest formation. They focus on the origins of interests as perceived by states and on the role of causal and normative ideas. Ideational factors can alter actor interests. National interests are not a given, as realists argue, and interests cannot be completely deduced from power and situational constraints. Interests are socially formed and constructed. Cognition of the national interest and even apparently tangible military and political power depends on individual and societal knowledge, upon which these interests and forms of power are based. Both structures and
ideas are important and influence one another in construction and transformation of the national interest. The international and domestic political structures restrict actors through subjective apprehension of the actors, and the formation, reconstruction, and change of these structures are influenced by the practices of the actors. Linking the structures and actors is the so-called intersubjective meaning, a structure or framework that formulates the meaning that the actors interpret and through which they understand one another (Wendt 1992).

Cognitivists argue that states are not utility maximizers but role-players in international relations. Growing interdependence means that groups at the domestic level increasingly have "regime interests" and continually reconsider their self-interests and priorities. Likewise, national interests are conditioned by historical limitations, ideologies of actors, interpretative frameworks, and agreed and shared knowledge. The learning processes of actors also further shape national interests. Then cognition, misconception and information building processes reveal merits and demerits of particular behaviors of states and influence cooperative relationships among and within states. For cognitivists, international organizations and regimes
are key factors in international politics. Once they are established, international regimes acquire their own will, independent of the international structure or national interests and may possess enough power to change states' self-interests and power relations. Therefore, international cooperation and regimes, for cognitivists, are "independent variables" that can impact international politics.

Among cognitivists, the most explicit on identity issues in the international security field are scholars of social constructivism. Peter Katzenstein argues that international and domestic environments shape state identities. The international society of states shapes varying state identities by virtue of recognizing their legitimacy and admitting them to international organizations whose membership is often restricted. And the state is a social actor, embedded in the social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors (Katzenstein 1996). Alexander Wendt contends that states act differently toward friends and enemies because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us who is a friend and who is an enemy. The distribution of power always affects states' calculations,
but how it does so depends on intersubjective understandings and expectations, and on the "distribution of knowledge," which constitutes their conceptions of self and others. According to Wendt, there are three types of international security system: competitive, individualistic, and cooperative, depending on states' negative, indifferent or positive stance toward each other's security (Wendt 1992).

One example of social constructivism applied to the field of international security is a critique of nuclear deterrence theory, one of the core theories in traditional international security studies. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare since the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The realist account of the so-called principle of no-first use of nuclear weapons, which we can call a sort of international regime, is the following: The United States and the Soviet Union possessed enough second-strike nuclear capability that they could survive a first strike and retaliate. The reason why all-out nuclear war has not happened is that a first strike with nuclear weapons would mean immediate national suicide. The overwhelming destructive capability of massive nuclear forces compelled them to eliminate a nuclear first strike from their rational options and created a situation
in which the superpowers deter each other. This is the logic of MAD. However, constructivists point out that a significant normative element must be taken into account in explaining why these weapons have remained unused. Even before the nuclear balance between the superpowers emerged, when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, the norm of no-first use already existed. The reason why Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the first and the last places where bombs were actually dropped comes from the "taboo" of using nuclear weapons, which is an ideational factor caused by our recognition of and our will against the indiscriminate and inhumane nature of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) (Price and Tannenwald 1996). Years have passed since the Cold War ended, and the nuclear balance between the United States and other states has gone. From a constructivist point of view, nuclear weapons will never be used, even without a MAD situation, as long as we are conscious that nuclear weapons must not be used, and as long as the "taboo" persists.

The author takes the position that identity is critically important in international politics. This is particularly true in analyzing Japan's defense policymaking and debates on missile defense. The struggle between the
"realist" and "pacifist" national identities has shaped defense and security policy in postwar Japan. The two identities have developed through political processes in legislation, administration and judicature, claims of political parties, voices of political leaders, journalists and critics, and public opinion, and have been repeatedly expressed in the mass media. The dual identity of the Japanese is subject to change. The people in fact have shifted from one to the other in the course of history. They will certainly change in the future also. From this point of view, postwar Japanese national security policy will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.
Chapter III

JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY

This chapter will review Japan's post World War II defense and security policy, based on the Japanese dual national identity argument defined and discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will be divided into four periods: from 1945 to 1960, from 1961 to 1980, from 1981 to 1990, and from 1991 to the present.

A. From Defeat to Re-Armament (1945-60)

The total defeat in the Pacific War, following the two atomic bomb attacks and the Soviet invasion, represented the first complete wartime defeat in Japanese history. It also represented the loss of Japanese national identity as the agent of hegemony in Asia, an identity built around Japanese militarism and imperialism. Under occupation by the United States, Japan confronted drastic changes in every respect. Its labor system was democratized, zaibatsu (financial cliques) were dismantled, and farmlands were
redistributed. Most importantly, the United States eliminated Japanese militarism completely. It is pointed out that the most significant gift that the United States provided Japan was "neither democracy nor economic assistance, but the American willingness to take over the costs and risks of Japanese security" (Scalapino 1992, 214). At the time, Japan's rearmament was not necessary for the western alliance, because US nuclear capability was considered far beyond that of its Eastern counterpart. Therefore, the United States did not have to strengthen regional conventional forces in the Far East. And in Japan, reflection on their experience during World War II led people to embrace pacifism.

1. The Defeat and the Constitution

To begin with, the core of postwar Japanese national identity was the Constitution of Japan, taking effect in May 1947. Article 9 of the Constitution renounced war and military capability, and this became a central value of the Japanese, who had just made a fresh start as a peace-loving nation. Article 9 states as follows:

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of
settling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

A pacifist identity grew out of this and developed into demands for Japan's diplomatic neutralism or a position based on unarmed neutrality. The Japanese people realized that "military capability was not at all useful for its national security and had even ruined the nation" through the devastating defeat (Tanaka 1997, 16). In reality, Japan, under occupation, was forced to put its own national security into American hands, but at the same time, most Japanese people tended to shy away from discussing national security issues. All they could do was try to survive the time of postwar poverty and ruin.

As for Article 9, the final draft, written by the General Headquarters (GHQ), was a relaxation of the first draft's "Macarthur Principles" that directed Japan to completely renounce any kind of war. Its purpose was to give Japan the right of self-defense. That is to say, Japan should renounce "war as a means for conflict resolution," but it should permit "war as a means for self-defense."

However, Shigeru Yoshida, then prime minister of Japan,
noting that most recent wars had been started in the name of self-defense, had a different idea. His interpretation of Article 9 was that "by prohibiting all armaments and the right of belligerency, it renounced war even as an exercise of the right of self-defense" (ibid., 28). The overwhelming majority of the Japanese accepted his interpretation, though there existed some arguments for the right of self-defense.

Yoshida envisioned postwar international security being maintained through peacekeeping activities under the leadership of the United Nations. He thought that this was the best way to maintain Japan's security without its own armament. Nevertheless, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union that emerged soon after the end of World War II forced the United States to shift its policy toward Japan largely from constructing a de-militarized country to making it a bulwark of democracy against the communist bloc in the Far East. World-shaking events in 1948-49, such as the Berlin Crisis, the Soviets' successful nuclear test, and the victory of communism in China and subsequent establishment of the People's Republic changed the whole situation in the region. The United Nations Security Council became a battleground between the two superpowers, and the security system that Japan envisioned
was paralyzed. As with NATO in Europe, Japanese military forces needed to be re-established by the United States in order to contain communist power. The US interpretation of the Japanese Constitution changed as well. On the issue of the right of self-defense, General Macarthur's statement on 1 January 1950 said: "It is absolutely impossible to interpret Article 9 as completely denying the inviolable right of self-defense against attacks from opponents."

Yoshida stated in response: "Renouncing a war does not necessarily require us renouncing the right of self-defense all together." However, most Japanese people believed that the United States expected Japan to be neutral, and they still strongly supported Macarthur's comment in March 1949: "The role of Japan is to become a Switzerland in the Pacific" (ibid., 92).

2. The Korean War and the Restoration of Independence

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was particularly important in Japan's break from the policy of unarmed neutrality and the rise of a realist identity. The United States "used Japan as a large workshop to produce supplies for U.S. troops in Korea" (Drifte 1986, 9). In July 1950, while US military stationed in Japan were deployed to
the Korean Peninsula, the GHQ reached critical decisions that directed Japan's rearmament: the establishment of the Keisatsu Yobitai (National Police Reserve; NPR) with 75,000 personnel, which was the predecessor of the present Ground Self Defense Forces, and increasing by 8,000 the number of personnel in the Maritime Safety Agency, which was to be the foundation of the current Maritime Self Defense Forces. At the time, the Japanese public generally believed Prime Minister Yoshida's explanation to the Diet that these decisions were made for the genuine purpose of increasing police capability to maintain domestic order, making up for the loss of US occupation forces which had been shipped to Korea.

The ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism had a significant effect on Japan's domestic politics. The authorities in Japan were very concerned about the rise of the Communist Party, which, backed by labor movements, had been increasing its influence emerging from food crises. In August 1952, the new section in the Maritime Safety Agency was cut loose and renamed as Keibitai (Maritime Guards), and the NPR was strengthened and transformed into Hoantai (National Security Forces). These gradually increased "capabilities" were discussed
intensively, and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau finally issued the government's unified view in November 1952. It read: "While Section 2 of Article 9 in the Constitution prohibits maintaining 'land, sea, and air forces', it is constitutional to maintain and use force that is less than the 'forces' required to defend Japan from invasion. Since the Maritime Guards and the National Security Forces are part of the police force, not military, they are constitutional" (Shugiin Kenpo Chosakai 2004, 25).

As the end of occupation and the restoration of independence approached, public opinion in Japan was divided along the lines of this dual national identity. Those on one side argued that Japan should seek an overall peace with all of the belligerent states, both capitalist and communist. At the other end the argument was that Japan should give a higher priority to peace treaties with states in the western camp led by the occupying United States. In the sphere of academics and journalism, those who had been forced into silence during the war started to make strong appeals for an overall peace in such opinion magazines as Sekai (World). This pacifist argument was widely supported and was dominant in academics and journalism for a long period (Kato 1998). The debates on this issue resembled a kind of domestic Cold
War between "rightists" (conservatives) and "leftists" (radicals). The former, backed up the US-Japan Security Treaty, supported pro-American policies, promoted a constitutional amendment for the sake of rearmament, and demanded an autonomous defense for Japan. The latter opposed the US-Japan Security Treaty, supported pro-Soviet policies, asserted the preservation of the Constitution, particularly Article 9, and demanded Japan's unarmed neutrality. This contrast can be explained in terms of realist versus pacifist identities when viewed from a broader perspective.

In September 1951, the Japanese government signed the "Treaty for Peace with Japan" at the Peace Conference in San Francisco, California. Out of the fifty-five nations belonging to the United Nations, forty-eight appeared and signed the treaty. As an ambassador plenipotentiary, Yoshida initially aimed at pursuing international cooperation based on mutual economic interests; however, in the end he abrogated an overall peace. Several states including the Soviet Union, China, and India did not sign the treaty. Japan at the same time signed the "Security Treaty between Japan and the United States." With this, Japan chose to continue leaving its own national security in the hands of the United States and to become a part of the western
alliance. This choice led to the situation in which the pacifist constitution and realist military alliance with the United States co-existed, and an institutional framework was thus established for the two, in a sense, contradictory national identities. With the Japanese policy regenerating itself as an economic power and contributing to the realist alliance economically, Japan began to seek national development consistent with its pacifist identity (Iokibe 2001).

In the early 1950s, political parties confronted one another on the issue of the rearmament of Japan, and heated debate went on in the Diet. As for the government party Jiyūto (Liberal Party) led by Yoshida, there was some opposition to Yoshida's security policy within the party. For example, Ichiro Hatoyama, returning to public service in the summer 1951, argued for rearmament. However, there was fundamental agreement that Japan should "seek a gradual increase of self-defense capability according to the growth of its national strength" (Kusunoki 1998, 154). Yoshida himself intended to establish "a respectable military" when the time should come to rearm. The reasons why Yoshida opposed immediate substantial rearmament were these: to place a high priority on rebuilding its economy, to contain
the threat of reemerging militarism, and no less importantly, to echo the lack of public support for rearmament (Tanaka 1997, 52). The conservative Kaishinto (Reformist Party), which was formed in February 1952 under Hitoshi Ashida's leadership, insisted on amending the Constitution and rearming by the establishment of a "self-defense military." However, not all party members shared this opinion. Shakaito (the Socialist Party) declared the Four Principles for Peace, consisting of the following positions: overall peace with every state; strict maintenance of neutrality; opposition to US military bases; and opposition to rearmament. Nonetheless, after independence, confrontation between right and left wings within the party over the issues of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty became serious, and the party ended up splitting. Kyosanto (the Communist Party), which supported worldwide communist revolution, declared its opposition to the United States, thus becoming, to the government, a direct threat to Japan's security. Still, it earned substantial public support that could not be ignored.

Japan's rearmament was the most crucial issue in the general election in October 1952. In contrast with academics and journalists, right-wing politicians and veterans, who
had been purged until the previous summer, publicly demanded rearmament. However, the argument for rearmament lost momentum owing to strong opposition from youth and female voters. Neither Kaishinto nor the Hatoyama faction in Jiyuto could increase their seats in the Diet; thus they did not gain public support for rearmament. In the following general election in April 1953, rearmament was once again a central issue, and the rearmament schools lost seats while both the right and left wings of Shakaito increased their representation considerably. After all, neither pro- nor anti-rearmament schools could win an absolute majority, and the issue of rearmament through a constitutional amendment was pigeonholed for the time.

3. The Self Defense Forces

In July 1954, the Defense Agency Act and the Self Defense Forces Law, the so-called Dual Defense Laws, were put into effect. Developing the then National Security Forces and the Maritime Guard, and adding an air force branch, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) was established. The SDF consists of Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces. In the process of congressional debate, the Three Conditions for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense were developed and
have become a fundamental principle of Japan’s defense policy and a guideline for the government's interpretation of the Constitution. These three conditions are as follows: there should exist a threat of urgent and unjustified invasion; there should be no other means to eliminate the threat; and Japan should employ the minimum capability necessary to defend against it. In the same month, a resolution that prohibits sending the SDF abroad was passed in the Diet. This resolution emerged from the idea that "self-defense" should be a justified action against an unjustified invasion, so it should be strictly limited to tangible cases of defending Japan’s own territory. This was in line with Japanese public opinion and their deep regret that the Japanese military had invaded foreign countries in the name of self-defense. As a whole, while making steady progress in realist rearmament, the Japanese put a clear pacifist brake on the exercise of its forces. The Japanese concept of self-defense has remained along these lines.

After the birth of the SDF, voices questioning the official interpretation of "forces" in the Constitution became louder within the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. They recognized a need to determine whether or not the Constitution could justify an SDF whose mission was to deal
with direct invasion from foreign enemies. According to the government's unified view issued in December 1954, the Constitution does not deny the right of self-defense. Japan is naturally entitled to possess the right of self-defense as an independent sovereign state. Also, the Constitution does not prohibit combat for the purpose of self-defense. Article 9 renounces a war "as means of settling international disputes," thus in case of an attack by other states, its forces should be employed only in clear self-defense, a case essentially different from resolving international conflict. And finally, maintaining a capability just sufficient to defend Japan, like the SDF, is constitutional, because the Constitution recognizes the right of self-defense. Therefore, the SDF does not constitute the "land, sea, and air forces" prohibited by section two of Article 9. This is the official interpretation of the Constitution by the government that has been consistently held to this day.

In September 1955, the right and left wings were united, and the newly unified Shakaito (Socialist Party) was founded. Sensing a threat from this merger of the government being overthrown by radicals, in November Jiyuto (Liberal Party) and Minshuto (Democratic Party) also merged and
established Jiyu Minshuto (Liberal Democratic Party; LDP). Representatives from the two parties dominated the Diet. Thus a two-power structure of LDP conservatives and Socialist Party leftists came into existence, and this so-called 1955-system continued for the next thirty-eight years. As for national defense policy, the Socialist Party was rather flexible in the beginning, but gradually became increasingly insistent on the unconstitutionality of the SDF and rigidly adhered to an unarmed neutrality policy. In the meantime, there was no unified opinion among members in the LDP. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that "it is possible to maintain a military capability for self-defense," and some defense experts in the party kept demanding rearmament. However, the LDP could not construct and rearm a self-defense system by specifying the Self Defense Forces as "military forces." Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who led the following administration, was a class "A" war criminal and known for his right wing discourse. Kishi nonetheless did not pursue drastic rearmament, but took the Yoshida line, which had aimed to gradually strengthen defense capabilities based on the US-Japan Security Treaty. The Yoshida line was firmly established down the road as a national defense policy (Tanaka 1997).
When the US-Japan Security Treaty was concluded, there was no need to debate limitations on the exercise of self-defense. However, as Japan's defense capabilities were strengthened with the establishment of the SDF, the issue of limitation on self-defense, individual and collective, was laid on the table. The right of individual self-defense is a right of a state to defend itself by force against military assault by other states. The right of collective self-defense is a right of a state to defend its ally or affinitive state in case of military attack by a third state. In the case of Japan, the latter has been much more debatable than the former. While the Constitution of Japan declares its pacifism, it is widely believed that Japan possesses the right of individual self-defense, namely, to use force to defend itself, since it is hardly possible to consider that the Constitution should allow immediate surrender to military invasion by other states, and such logic would eventually lead to denial of Japan's very existence. The right of collective self-defense is a far more complex issue for the Japanese. If Japan is invaded, the SDF and US troops stationed in Japan will jointly meet the aggression. It will naturally be a case of individual self-defense. Meanwhile, it will become controversial
whether Japan could use force or not, if the United States should be invaded by a third state.

Although Article 51 of the United Nations Charter approves the exercise of individual and collective self-defense by its member states, the government's interpretation since May 1955 has been following: It is natural for Japan as a sovereign state to hold the right of collective self-defense from an international legal perspective; however, the Constitution of Japan restricts the exercise of the right of self-defense to a minimum, and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is considered to be beyond this limitation and thus unconstitutional. In short, exercising individual self-defense and possessing military capabilities for this purpose are constitutional, while exercising collective self-defense is not. The unconstitutionality of collective self-defense had been debated over time, but the government's first formal publication of this interpretation in the Diet was far later, in May 1981. As mentioned earlier, this quite moderate interpretation resulted from Japanese sensitivity toward the prewar foreign deployment of their military and their expansionist policy in the name of self-defense, and from the recognition of a danger of possible
broader re-interpretation of self-defense in the future.

The Diplomacy Blue Book issued for the first time in 1957 held up "UN-centrism" as the first of the Three Principles of Diplomacy of Japan, along with "cooperation with democratic countries" and "firm maintenance of the position as a member of the Asian nations." This "UN-centrism" earned public support; however, Japan was unable to participate in UN Forces activities since the government had clearly declared that the Constitution prohibits deployment of the SDF abroad. When a conflict broke out in Lebanon in July 1958, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld asked the government of Japan to send an SDF contingent to participate in the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). The Japanese government rejected this request for the reason of possible infringement on domestic laws, even though it was possible for the government to interpret a dispatch of the SDF as constitutional. To say nothing of the Socialist Party's opposition, general public opinion was very negative toward sending the SDF to other countries. Practically, one scholar pointed out, the Three Principles of Diplomacy of Japan in reality were: first "cooperation with the United States," then "international cooperation" within the limits of the first principle, and
lastly "economism" (Iokibe 1999). As the nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR heated up and the situation came to a deadlock, the United Nations turned into an arena of the Cold War. The UN Security Council that was supposed to deal with international security issues ceased to function due to repeated exercises of veto by the two superpowers. Japan's "UN-centrism" gradually faded away as its bond with the "West" became clear.

4. The Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty

From the mid-1950s, when Japan's economy, triggered by so-called special procurements for the Korean War, started back on track calls for revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty grew louder. Several problems were behind this growing demand. The first was the "clause on internal disturbances," in which the treaty permitted the US military to quell domestic riots within Japan. Japanese political leaders asserted that this clause was unsuitable for Japan as an independent state, and eventually the clause was deleted in the newly revised treaty. Second, the existing treaty did not clearly mention the obligation of the United States to militarily defend Japan while it did specifically state the duty of Japan to provide military bases to the
United States. This point made the treaty appear "one-sided." This was also addressed in the new treaty by describing the US responsibility to defend Japan.

Third, there was a fear, mainly on the pacifist side, that Japan might be automatically dragged into an American war against its will in the name of "maintaining peace and security in the Far East." As previously mentioned, collective self-defense was, and still is, considered unconstitutional in Japan. Thus, in the revised treaty this issue was taken into consideration, stating that Japan-US military cooperation should not deviate from the limit of the right of individual self-defense. Then, as requested by Japan, the revised treaty prescribed its coverage of defense as "the sphere under the administrative right of the Japanese government" including US military bases in Japan. Therefore the Japanese government could avoid changing its constitutional interpretation to finalize revision of the treaty. Fourth, Japan was concerned with the possibility that the United States might bring nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil against Japan's will. To deal with this issue, the treaty included a new clause on "prior consultation," which required the US government to consult with Japanese counterparts if it planned major changes in weapon systems.
of the US military in Japan, such as bringing nuclear weapons onto a US military base in Japan or having its nuclear armed vessels enter a Japanese harbor. The United States kept pressuring Japan to rearm itself; however, seeing the Hatoyama and following Ishibashi administrations' attempts to normalize relationships with the Soviet Union and China, the US government feared that Japan might pull away from the US and declare neutrality. So after all, it yielded and gave up on rearming Japan for the sake of strengthening the alliance. Consequently, the newly revised treaty was adopted largely in line with Japan's wishes (Wada 1998).

Following the Sunagawa Incident, involving an anti-US base movement by local residents in 1955 and the Gerard Incident of 1957, in which a US soldier shot and killed a Japanese housewife who was collecting spent ammo cartridges from military exercises, Han-bei (anti-American) and Han-Anpo (anti-US-Japan Security Treaty) sentiments grew among the general public in Japan. Revision of the treaty was partly an attempt to contain public opposition to the alliance. However, people thought, on the contrary, that the revised treaty might drag Japan into another war. Prime Minister Kishi's strong reactionary image fueled the
opposition and led to massive, organized anti-treaty movements (Inoki 2000). In January 1960, after agreeing with the US government on the new treaty, the Kishi administration presented it to the House of Representatives. But the majority LDP suddenly called off interpellation and stopped the debate in May. Prime Minister Kishi then pushed through passage of the bill with the votes of LDP members alone, while bringing police forces into the House to contain the opposition. The other parties rejected the result and the Diet ceased to function. Kishi's anti-democratic moves shocked the Japanese public. A number of intense protests were held every day, with repeated clashes between demonstrators and police. The situation grew worse, and finally a college student was killed in the chaos as demonstrators rushed into the Diet in a failed attempt to stop automatic approval of the treaty. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America went into effect on June 23, 1960, and on the same day Kishi declared his intent to step down as prime minister.

5. Early Debates on Missile Threats

According to Frances Fitzgerald, the quest for anti-
ballistic missile systems started shortly after World War II, with a recognition that "the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile was only a matter of time" (Fitzgerald 2000, 114). Following the technological advance of rocket science in the early twentieth century, Nazi Germany developed "vengeance weapons" during World War II (Ford 1971). They caused serious damage, both physically and psychologically, terrorizing citizens in London and Paris. The Vergeltungswaffe-1 (V-1) looked like a small, unmanned airplane, and was the prototype for cruise missiles developed after the war. Powered by jet engines, it created a loud noise, and was called a "buzz bomb." The incoming noise and subsequent explosions added to its psychological impact. About 5,500 people were killed, and 16,000 injured in V-1 attacks (Hogg 1957, 145).

The Vergeltungswaffe-2 (V-2) was a radical innovation in that it was powered by liquid fuel. The development of the liquid fueled rocket and guidance systems led to the development of launch vehicles that could escape the earth's atmosphere and eventually put satellites into orbit, and the V-2 was the predecessor of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The V-2 rockets had a range of 220 miles and it reached four times the speed of sound. Since V-1 rockets
were relatively slow and flew low in the air, it was possible for jet fighters and antiaircraft guns to shoot them down, or to defend against them with balloon barrages. Out of 9,017 V-1 missiles launched by the Germans in August and September 1944, 3,461 (38 percent) were shot down and 2,340 (26 percent) reached the London area (ibid., 141). However, it was impossible to defend against V-2 rockets which overwhelmed existing radar and interception capabilities (Nogi 2000, 295). "[T]he missiles' inaccuracy and flight failure rate helped reduce their military potential dramatically" (Handberg 2002, 40), but they posed serious threats to defenseless citizens of the UK and France. Germany launched 1,359 V-2 missiles toward London, with 517 hits, about 2,400 citizens killed and 5,850 injured (Hogg 1957, 144). This new weapon "fundamentally altered the nature of strategic warfare" (Mitchell 2000, 5).

During the first decade of the Cold War, the Soviet Union began to develop a series of long-range bomber aircraft capable of reaching targets within the continental United States. The potential threat posed by such aircraft became much more serious when the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb in 1949. In response, the United States developed generations of surface-to-air Nike guided missile
systems. The first generation Nike system, Nike-Ajax, was a
two-stage missile with a range of 25-30 miles. Nike-Ajax
batteries became fully operational in 1953. The initial
mission of the Nike system was to defend against such
aircraft, but a later variant of the system provided a
limited capability to defend against ballistic missiles.
However, the threat of intercontinental ballistic missile
was initially remote for the United States. Ernest Yanarella
points out that the first serious attempt to develop an
anti-ballistic missile system began in 1955, with the US
army's "decision to undertake feasibility studies into the
technical problems and practical possibilities of missile
defense" (Yanarella 2002, 6).

In Japan, missile threats were perceived and publicly
discussed as early as February 1954. The earliest debates
were on how Japan should defend itself against air-launched
guided missiles (GM), but the clear conclusion was that the
just recently started SDF had no such capability. Japan had
no choice but to leave this issue to US air defense
capability. To cope with ballistic missile threats, through
the Cold War period and thereafter, Japan's national
security has depended on the US extended nuclear deterrence
strategy, the so-called "nuclear umbrella." The Japanese
government nonetheless began studying GMs for defensive purposes. It was later revealed that a study on missiles had begun within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1955 (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 1966a). The JDA asked the US government to provide seven types of missiles, including the Nike. The second generation Nike system, Nike-Hercules, was a nuclear-armed missile and became operational in 1958. The mission of Nike-Hercules was to defend against Soviet bombers and primitive cruise missiles with nuclear explosions. It was truly unthinkable for the Japanese people to admit possessing such a nuclear weapon, and naturally the constitutionality of its introduction into the SDF defense posture was intensely discussed in the Diet. In May 1957 the Kishi administration denied the possibility of deploying nuclear-armed GMs and even expressed its intent to reject a likely request from the United States to employ such nuclear missiles on US bases in Japan.

The "Sputnik Shock" in October 1957 propelled debate on missile threats and popularized the term misairu (missile) among the Japanese public. But the development of missile technology did not have a direct influence on the SDF arsenal. Kishi persisted in maintaining that the SDF should only have the "necessary minimum" capability to face
a direct invasion with conventional weapons. An attack with nuclear weapons was not expected since it would immediately lead to all-out nuclear war between the superpowers, and would thus be out of the hands of the Japanese. In general, there was a domestic consensus that Japan should deal with nuclear missile threats through the deterrence provided by the Japan-US security arrangement, not by Japan's own military means. There was also the alarming fear that Japan could be made into a US nuclear missile base against the Soviet Union. Realist political elites believed that Japan needed an anti-missile missile system to face ballistic missile threats. They did not see the illegality of such missiles as long as anti-missile missiles were non-nuclear. In reality, however, technology had not yet reached the level of practical deployment. In addition, pacifists in the Japanese public were so sensitive about the offensive capability of guided missiles that even introducing the US Sidewinder for a "study" was subject to a debate on constitutionality. (The Sidewinder was a heat-seeking, short-range, air-to-air guided missile carried by fighter aircrafts.)
B. The Cold War and Japanese Security (1961-80)

1. Economic Security

The anti-US-Japan Security Treaty movement, which shook the nation like "the eve of a revolution," died out quickly after the revised Japan-US security treaty went through and Prime Minister Kishi stepped down. Despite the chaos, revision of the treaty did not, in essence, affect Japanese security policies, since the basic structure, of US forces defending Japan and Japan providing bases in return, was left intact. Nonetheless, the anti-treaty movement greatly influenced the future security policy of Japan, in that both Ikeda and Sato, the successors of Kishi, kept a "low profile," passive stand on national security issues. The lesson of avoiding any more chaos like the anti-treaty struggle, resulted in an informal policy of avoiding frank, open debate on security matters in Japan, and revision of the Constitution of Japan did not become a key issue in politics again for the next thirty-four years.

During the 1960s, the Cold War drastically shifted from a mood of impending total nuclear war to a stabilized relationship between superpowers. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union came
to acknowledge their mutual superpower capabilities, and endeavored to institutionalize their relations to avert nuclear catastrophe. They established a series of agreements on arms control such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The overwhelming nuclear capabilities of the US and the USSR led to a situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD), in which the superpowers mutually deterred a preemptive nuclear strike with retaliatory second nuclear attack capability sufficient to completely destroy the first attacker. MAD broadly provided strategic stability in the international political circumstances.

At the same time, however, both superpowers offered "nuclear umbrellas" to their allies. For example, if Japan were attacked by the Soviet Union, the United States would retaliate with its nuclear forces. This was also called "extended deterrence." Thus there was a widespread fear that a regional conflict could lead to a major confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. This meant that the defense capability of Japan had no definitive significance in the world military balance no matter its size; for once a "hot war" between the nuclear superpowers broke out, this would immediately mean a full-scale nuclear
war and total annihilation. It was far more important for Japan to maintain its tight alliance with the United States than to build up its small-scale defense capability. What was required of Japan was to participate in international society as an economic power with a moderate military capability within the framework of the US-Japan alliance (Tadokoro 1999).

It was obvious that the Japanese government based its national security policy upon a realist identity, but it was also true that the pacifist identity of the general public put firm brakes on the government's realist approach. On the issue of the stalemate in the Vietnam War the government took a pro-American position, while most Japanese were against the war, seeing the government's mistake in identifying the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation as a falling domino in the spreading worldwide communist movement. When the United States began bombing North Vietnam in February 1965, Japanese media and peace activists considered it an invasion, and movements to help people in Vietnam arose among the people (Inoki 2000). The Vietnam War symbolized the dilemma, in which Japan was caught between its two identities: pacifism that would restrain Japan's involvement in an American war and realism of
"cooperationist line with the United States." As a result, Japan managed to take a centrist stand, but this also reflected the lack of clear definition in its security policymaking (Tadokoro 1999).

Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda pledged a "national income doubling program" and built a national consensus to focus on "economics rather than politics" with the aim of becoming an economic power in the region. Ikeda succeeded in healing the nation's wounds from Kishi era division over security issues by shifting attention from political conflicts to economic development. Kishi was a symbol of reactionism harking back to prewar Japan, and when he stepped down, the anti-treaty movements lost its target and dissolved, with opponents suffering from a sense of defeat and powerlessness against the steamrolling approval of the treaty by the LDP. Most Japanese regarded economic prosperity as the center of Japan's national interest, and this recognition later developed into the idea of "economic security" (Katzenstein 1996). The economic security concept focused on reducing Japan's dependence on natural resources from abroad, and on technological development as a tool for expanding its share of the world market. During the 1960s, Japan demonstrated impressive economic development by
importing raw materials while exporting value added manufactured goods. Meanwhile, its rising economic power pushed Japan toward a position of responsibility. Japan joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1952, and acceded to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 1955. It became an "Article 11 member" of GATT in February 1963, under which Japan could no longer place quantitative restrictions on imports, and became an "Article 8 member" of IMF in 1964. Japan was thus required to abrogate any limitations on monetary exchange. As a state living on foreign trade, Japan expanded interdependent relationships with other countries through liberalization of trade and deregulation of industry. Truly, "economics is national security for the Japanese" (Samuels 1989; original emphasis).

"The Study of Integrated Defense War Games in FY1963," code-named the "Mitsuya Study," secretly simulated security scenarios such as deployment of the Self Defense Forces in case of an emergency situation in the Korean Peninsula, in which the conflict might severely influence Japan. This secret study by the Defense Agency was revealed in the Diet in February 1965 and caused a huge controversy. The section on "wartime defense legislation" in the study,
discussing needs in crises, attracted particular attention. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was deeply unsettled and critical, saying that conducting such a secret study behind the government's back was "never acceptable." The public also reacted negatively and considered it a conspiracy by the Self Defense Forces, similar to the Imperial Army's activities before World War II. Later, Sato backtracked somewhat and commented that the study itself was legitimate, even stating, "It is natural to study a case of military penetration." But he added, "Issues such as a national mobilization plan were not a matter for uniformed personnel to discuss" (Tanaka 1997). As a result, the Defense Agency came to avoid study of yuji (emergency situations) and discussions on emergency defense legislation.

Okinawa was still under US occupation and played an important role as a strategic frontline base in Asia against the Communist bloc. However, the 1951 Peace Treaty permitted the Japanese government to hold the so-called "remaining sovereignty" in Okinawa, and the legal status of Okinawa was kept obscure. Local autonomy in Okinawa was limited, and welfare support for local residents provided by the US civil affairs section was far from satisfactory. The Americans' annoying attitude of superiority as an occupying power
stimulated the people's desire for reversion to Japanese sovereignty. The United States took on the image of an arrogant empire just as had the Soviet Union, which kept ignoring the issue of the Northern Territories (Tadokoro 1999). When Sato became the first prime minister to visit Okinawa in August 1965, he stated, "Japan's war will not end until Okinawa returns to Japan." From that time, efforts for the reversion of Okinawa increased (Inoki 2000). Although the intensified war in Vietnam, and the US demand for Japan's self-imposed limits on its export of textiles to the United States complicated the negotiations, in November 1969 Prime Minister Sato and President Richard Nixon finally reached an agreement on the return of Okinawa with the unambiguous phrase, "return in 1972, without nuclear weapons, with the same treatment as the mainland" (Wakaizumi 1994). This meant that any nuclear weapons deployed in and around Okinawa should be removed, and that requirements for prior consultations prescribed in the Mutual Security Treaty should be applied in the same way as on the mainland. At the same time, however, they added the so-called South Korea Clause and Taiwan Clause that expressed the importance of stability of neighbors for the peace and security of Japan, and therefore Japan began to bear more responsibility for
stability in the Far East.

2. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles

No other nation has demonstrated such fierce objection to nuclear weapons as Japan. When atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Japan became the only country in history to suffer nuclear attack. Thousands of people were instantly vaporized by the explosions, and hundreds of thousands of others were killed slowly by the radiation released. Even now many are suffering from radiation sickness caused by the bombs. In March 1954 the Dai Go Fukuryumaru Incident shocked the whole nation. A Japanese fishing boat was exposed to deadly radioactive ash from a US hydrogen bomb test, and one of the crew died half a year later. The other 22 crew members survived, but they suffered from serious radiation aftereffects. This incident was remembered as "the third A-bomb attack." Public anger led to a swelling mass movement against nuclear weapons and campaigns for nuclear disarmament. Popular sentiment in Japan was overwhelmingly against nuclear weapons, making the prospect of Japan's nuclear armament out of the question. The renowned "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," a symbol of Japan as a peaceful
nation, remains a popular and highly valued policy among the general public in Japan.

For the Japanese elites, however, it did not necessarily mean that Japan completely excluded the nuclear option from its future national security policy. In May 1957, the Kishi administration suggested a constitutional interpretation by which possessing nuclear would not be unconstitutional as long as it was judged to be necessary to a minimum self-defense capability. Also, the 1955 Atomic Energy Fundamental Law prohibited the use of nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes. This limitation was based on the idea that Japan's nuclear armament was still "constitutional," but it was "illegal" in terms of the current legislation. Thus, the government did not have to amend the Constitution to legalize nuclear armament. Going nuclear would only require changing some laws. Nuclear armament is a matter of political will.

In April 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda avowed: "As a constitutional argument, I think it is widely held that if it [nuclear weapon] is not for offensive but for purely defensive purposes, this [Constitution] does not juristically prohibit it. But no matter how it is juristically considered, I am saying that we will not
possess nuclear weapons as a matter of policy" (Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 1961).

Unfortunately, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were not a product of nation-wide argument, promoted by those who sought ideal peace, but a result of compromise in the Diet to break through the deadlock on the issue of the reversion of Okinawa (Tanaka 1997, 224-225). The Socialist Party was adamant that Okinawa, as well as any other Japanese territories, must be demilitarized.

In January 1968, Prime Minister Sato declared the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of "not producing, not possessing and not allowing entry of nuclear weapons into the country." However, Sato also asserted that the set of three principles was only one part of the four pillars of Japan's nuclear policy. The other three were: promoting worldwide disarmament, depending on US nuclear deterrence, and advancing peaceful use of nuclear energy. Concerning these four pillars, it was especially important to note that, "the Three Non-Nuclear Principles could be maintained only when they went hand in hand with the other three nuclear policies, and Japan cannot single out and promote the principles" (Katzenstein 1996, 128).

Thus Japan's non-nuclear policy was only a partial
one, integrated with the nuclear umbrella supplied by the United States. But the public and the Diet soon accepted the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. They have become an essential factor in national security policymaking, and are recognized as kokuze (national policy).

3. The Nixon-Shocks

In vivid contrast to the turmoil of the 1960s, the 1970s started rather calmly, symbolized by the automatic extension of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in June 1970. The political atmosphere was not much influenced even by the Yodogo Incident in March 1970, in which young communists hijacked a Japan Airlines passenger airplane, nor by the Mishima Incident in November 1970, an attempted coup d'état ending with the suicide of the prominent novelist and rightist Yukio Mishima. These shocking actions by leftists and rightists attracted public attention, but only briefly.

Yasuhiro Nakasone took up the post of Director General of the Defense Agency in the third Sato Cabinet in January 1970, and tried to reform Japan's defense policy. He attempted to create a basis for that purpose on his own initiative. As his "personal view," Nakasone announced his Five Principles of Autonomous Self-defense: to protect the
Constitution and concentrate on defense; to unify defense with diplomacy aimed at harmony with other national policies; to maintain civilian control; to sustain the Three Non-Nuclear Principles; and to supplement them with the Japan-US Security Treaty. He stated that Japan should achieve autonomous defensive capabilities in a gradual manner (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors, 1970). This guideline set the US-Japan mutual security system as "subordinate" and autonomous self-defense as the "main" component of Japan's security policy. In October 1970, the first white paper on the national defense of Japan was published, and shortly after, the Outline of New Defense Buildup Plan was released. The Fourth Defense Buildup Program, a 1972-76 five-year plan presented in the Outline caused serious backlash domestically and internationally, because its estimated budget of 5.2 trillion yen (14.4 billion dollars at the prevailing rate of exchange) was more than twice that of the previous program. Nakasone's idea of "autonomous self-defense" was criticized for its lack of consideration of the United States, and, in fact, drew a caution from the US government. At the same time, China denounced it as a revival of prewar Japanese militarism. Nakasone stepped down from the JDA post in July 1971,
leaving the "Nakasone vision" frozen (Sato 2002).

In July 1971, Washington and Beijing agreed on
President Nixon's visit to China in the following year, but
without consulting Tokyo. This action, known as the "Nixon
Shock," shook the Japanese, since the United States improved
relations with China "over Japan's head." Nonetheless, it
was also true that reconciliation between the US and China
simultaneously decreased the perception of China as a
formidable threat. The general sense of threat from abroad,
which had been gradually decreasing, declined even further,
and recognition of the trend toward détente spread
throughout the country. In August 1971 President Nixon again
shocked Japan and the world by coming off the gold standard.
These two Nixon Shocks evoked temporary public distrust of
the United States, but soon trust was recovered. Prime
Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing in September 1972 and
agreed with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on diplomatic
normalization between Japan and the People's Republic of
China (PRC). By this agreement Japan terminated diplomatic
relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. When
Tanaka and his cabinet started normalization talks with
Beijing in early 1972, Japan was particularly concerned
about the Chinese reaction to the US–Japan Mutual Security
Treaty. Surprisingly, China expressed its support for the Japan-US security alliance. Premier Zhou Enlai even said that the Mutual Security Treaty was very important for Japan and it was natural to firmly maintain it. As a result, the Socialist Party of Japan which took a pro-PRC, anti-Security Treaty stance found itself in an awkward position, while public opinion, which had been generally anti-Treaty and anti-US for quite some time, changed dramatically. The number of Japanese viewing the United States as a likable country steadily increased from 1973 to the latter half of the 1980s (Nakanishi 1999, 159-160). On one hand, domestic political outlook on international security shifted to seeking regional stability and maintaining the status quo. On the other hand, in the economic sphere, Japan faced the chaos of "run-away inflation" caused by the 1973 Oil Shock. As a result, concerns about national defense and security faded away, and few directly discussed a "vision" for Japan's security policy (Tanaka 1997).

4. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Contrary to their hatred of nuclear weapons, the Japanese public has been quite tolerant of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the Japanese government has intensively
developed peaceful nuclear programs. The Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1955, and became part of the Prime Minister's Office in the following year. Substantial progress began in 1961, and by 1967 it became clear that Japan had overcome the technical barriers to commercialization (Endicott 1975, 114). In the early stages, the Japanese government was quite optimistic and had high hopes for dramatic progress as its foreign counterparts did. But in practice it faced technical difficulties and entered an era of slowed progress. As of August 2004, about 50 percent of Japan's total supply of electricity was provided by nuclear power plants. Fifty-two nuclear power plants are currently in operation, five plants are under construction, and six more are planned.

Japan's nuclear development has been based on a long-term goal of energy independence. Japan has very few traditional natural resources, and is heavily dependent on imports to meet its needs for food, energy, and raw materials, such as iron ore. In Japan, 99.7 percent of oil is imported, with 87 percent of this coming from the Middle East. Overreliance on this unstable energy source is a critical issue for the Japanese people. This vulnerability was brought into focus during the chaos of the oil shocks in
1973 and 1979. As of 2002, owing to nation-wide endeavors to make industry more efficient, oil accounted for only 49.7 percent of total energy consumption in Japan. The figure was 77 percent before the 1973 oil crisis. Nuclear power is the dominant energy choice even if Japan has to depend on imported uranium. Proponents of nuclear power argue that uranium can be stored within the country for a long period of time, and therefore it can be regarded as a semi-domestic resource (Asa made Nama Terebi! 1989, 25). The main suppliers of uranium are Canada and Australia, which are politically far more stable than the oil suppliers in the Middle East. This point is critical in reference not only to energy issues but also to national security issues. Moreover, when reprocessing of spent fuel becomes available, plutonium will become a stable and semi-permanent source of energy. From an environmental point of view, nuclear power also has been seen as a clean and efficient energy resource, replacing the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, which are thought to contribute to global warming.

Nonetheless, there remain a number of issues in developing nuclear energy programs. Safety concerns have grown since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster terrified the world and posed serious questions about the safety of nuclear
energy. Failings that led to the Chernobyl incident have been scrutinized and faults and dangers of nuclear power plants around the world have been pointed out. It has been increasingly revealed that many nuclear plants in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have been dangerously mismanaged, and they could potentially cause disasters similar to Chernobyl (ABC News 1992). The disaster's long-term influence on area residents and soil are still unknown. Even in Japan, one of the most technologically advanced countries, a number of minor accidents have been reported. The 1999 accident in Tokai village alarmed the Japanese people and the world. Enough uranium in solution was mistakenly poured together to reach critical mass and cause a nuclear chain reaction. Three workers at the site died and 56 rescuers and 119 neighbors were exposed to radiation. It was the worst accident in the history of the Japanese nuclear industry. Another problem is the skyrocketing cost of nuclear plant construction, the main reason for the recent retreat of the nuclear industry. Those who advocate complete shutdown of the nuclear power industry welcome "the collapse of nuclear power in response to the discipline of the marketplace," because it has partly been a driving force behind weaponry proliferation, an
ineffective way to displace oil, and a still dangerous means to generate electricity (Lovins et al. 1980, 1138).

Furthermore, the issue of nuclear waste remains unresolved. This problem has forced many governments to give up their nuclear plans. In fact, nuclear industries started their electricity generation programs assuming future development of satisfactory methods of dealing with nuclear wastes. These have not arisen. Presently, huge amounts of nuclear waste have accumulated. There is no place to dispose of them, and with no resolution to the problem, nuclear wastes are piling up. Many methods, such as launching into space, burial in Antarctic ice or the deep sea, and enclosure in concrete buildings have been discussed, but all are questionable. South Carolina had been receiving nuclear wastes from all over the United States, but, in 1979, the governor of South Carolina rejected two trucks from Three Mile Island, carrying high level nuclear wastes contaminated in the nuclear plant accident. As long as nuclear wastes exist, this sort of struggle will remain internationally as well as domestically.

In 1993 it was revealed that the former Soviet Union had dumped its nuclear wastes, including 18 obsolete nuclear reactors from retired nuclear submarines, into the Barents
Sea, Kara Sea, and the Sea of Japan after 1966. More surprisingly, the Russian government announced that it would not stop dumping for the time being (Broad 1993). Japan has asked the UK and France to reprocess its nuclear wastes, and a significant amount of plutonium has been returned to Japan. However, electric power generation programs using plutonium with mixed oxide fuel (MOX) have had significant obstacles: technical uncertainties, concerns with safety, issues of construction, and so on.

Considering the size of Japan, similar to that of California, the density of nuclear power plants in Japan is astonishing, and it is remarkable that Japan continues to promote nuclear utilization in spite of the limited land area, volcanoes, earthquakes, high population density, high construction costs, and so forth. In addition, the aging of nuclear plants in Japan has become a serious problem. In this era of international terrorism, a possible attack on nuclear facilities has become a grave concern, as well. For all that, the Japanese government is still calling for more nuclear plants in spite of the worldwide retreat from nuclear electric production (although this is recently reversing). The Japanese government focuses on the need to compensate for the lack of domestic energy resources, and
its confidence is backed by Japan's economic and technological strength and its achievements in avoiding major accidents. However, the incidence of numerous minor accidents makes this assertion appear shaky. The Japanese government has strongly promoted nuclear utilization, and public movements against nuclear energy development have been fairly weak. The public has been extremely tolerant of peaceful nuclear development in comparison to its attitude toward nuclear weapons. Anti-nuclear plant movements have never had a major impact on Japan's nuclear policy. Although local opposition has often arisen at the first stage of nuclear power plant construction, political pressures from the government and its effective financial subsidization to local authorities (in case they accept to offer construction sites) have gradually lessened the heat. Feelings of powerlessness and passivity among people also seem to have weakened public movements.

Intensive promotion of the "peaceful" utilization of nuclear power seems to be consistent with the pacifist identity in that it asserts anti-nuclear weapon sentiments on the one hand and promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy on the other. However, the nuclear industry could, in various ways, contribute to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, escalate the danger of clandestine nuclear weapons development, expand the chances of nuclear smuggling, and increase the possibility of international conflicts. To produce nuclear weapons, three elements are necessary: materials, equipment, and technology. Materials include uranium and plutonium. Uranium can be mined in limited areas, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa, and plutonium is a secondary product of uranium. Equipment and technology are closely related critical factors, and the types employed distinguish between weaponry and peaceful use of nuclear power. The enrichment of uranium and separation of plutonium require an extremely high level of technology and secure facilities. It is difficult for nations who do not possess nuclear weapons to obtain these technologies, not only because they are controlled by several advanced countries, but because nuclear weapons technologies are key factors in a state's national security. States possessing nuclear weapons are extremely cautious about leaks of information. A notable exception was when, in January 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely regarded as the founder of Pakistan's nuclear program, confessed to involvement in a clandestine international network spreading nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan.
The technological gap between weaponry and peaceful nuclear applications still controls access to the nuclear club, but technology developed for peaceful use of nuclear power has played a significant role in the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. Barry Buzan suggests that technological development has historically been a critical factor in warfare, and that "any civil industrial society contains a latent military potential. This potential lies in its stock of knowledge, equipment, material, technique and capital" (Buzan 1987, 28). He directly points out that, "perhaps the clearest example of this latent potential in today's world is the civil nuclear power industry" (ibid., 29). Even if it was impossible to convert a peaceful energy resource to a deadly weapon yesterday, it may become possible as technologies develop. Frederik Willem de Klerk asserted that the clandestine success of South African nuclear weapons production was not dependent on the transfer of technology from other countries (Keller 1993). However, there is no doubt that nuclear weapons are an outcome of cumulative knowledge. Japan is well known as a nation that has clearly rejected development of nuclear arms. However, no one doubts the capability of Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons (Sorenson 1975; Endicott 1975, 127-128; McIntosh 1986, 64;
Reischauer 1988, 367). The rising number of fast breeder reactors (FBR) and the growth in plutonium use raise the potential for nuclear weaponry development in Japan. This capacity, combined with its space program-oriented development of sophisticated rockets that could be converted to nuclear-tipped ICBMs, has left neighboring states, including North and South Korea and China, skeptical about "Japan's nuclear ambitions" (Harrison 1996, 4-5).

5. Reviewing the US-Japan Security System and Limiting of the Defense Budget within One Percent of GNP

The first half of the 1970s brought dramatic events in international politics: détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, reconciliation between the US and China, and the end of the Vietnam War. This reduced Japanese fears of getting caught up in an American war due to the Mutual Security Treaty. In parallel, the situation allowed Japan to review its security system (Nakanishi 1999). The first step in the review was the Defense Agency's report, "Limits of Peacetime Defense Capability," ordered by Prime Minister Tanaka. This was an attempt to reframe the Mutual Security Treaty, not only as a deterrent to threats, but also as a means to promote the détente then in progress. The report, renamed "Peacetime Defense Capability," was made
public in February 1973. However, it caused confusion in the Diet and was eventually withdrawn, because many Japanese regarded any hint of buildup in autonomous defense capability as a revival of prewar militarism.

Michita Sakata took up the post of Director General of the Defense Agency under Prime Minister Takeo Miki, who took office in December 1974. Sakata thought it was essential for the cabinet to receive broad public support for national defense policymaking. He organized the Society to Consider Japan's Defense, consisting of scholars and civilian international security specialists, and in 1976 he resumed publishing a white paper on national defense, which had been issued only once previously. Ever since, white papers have been published annually. In addition, he pushed to complete a proposal on the fundamentals of defense policy, which could replace the earlier Defense Buildup Programs. The concept for the yet unnamed proposal was called Fundamental Defense Capability, and focused not on preparing for a specific threat, but on maintaining minimum defense capability to protect the nation. In other words, it tried to reduce the risk arising from uncertainty in international relations by focusing Japan's defense capability sufficiently to independently repel a small-scale direct
invasion. Based on this idea, in October 1976 the government formulated the National Defense Program Outline, the so-called Taiko, thus shifting the emphasis of defense policy from US-Japan cooperation towards autonomous defense of the country.

In 1954 when the Self Defense Forces were established, defense spending was less than three percent of Japan's gross national product (GNP). During the era of almost miraculous economic growth in the 1960s, the defense budget benefited, as well. The defense budget for the Second Defense Buildup Program, the five-year program of 1962-67, was approximately 1.16 trillion yen (3.2 billion dollars), but in the end, the budget exceeded 1.37 trillion yen (3.8 billion dollars). However, the defense budget for FY1966 was only 1.1 percent of the GNP, far less than the previously estimated 1.5 percent. This tendency continued during the Third Defense Buildup Program. The defense expense for FY1971, the last year of the five-year program, was 670.9 billion yen (1.9 billion dollars), more than half of the total amount of the previous five years, but only 0.8 percent of the GNP.

When the Taiko was approved in Cabinet meeting, setting a clear-cut limit on the defense budget was
suggested. Responding to this, in November 1976, the Miki Cabinet concluded that annual defense expenses should not exceed one percent of GNP. The cabinet resolution read: "For a time, in each fiscal year the total defense expenses should be targeted within one percent of the amount of the GNP of the respective year" (Nakanishi 1999). In spite of restrained words such as "for a time" and "target," the decision was widely supported by the Japanese public, and it has endured as a fundamental line of Japanese defense policy ever since.

6. Comprehensive Security

Having depended heavily on oil supplies from the Middle East, Japan was forced by the Oil Shock of 1973 to shift its policy drastically and to make clear its pro-Middle East stance in order to secure oil resources. This experience revealed the vulnerability of the basis of Japan's economic power. Japan was dependent on imports, not only for oil, but for various natural resources and foods. More Japanese came to realize that losing their supply lines could threaten national security even in the absence of a military threat. In January 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda stated in his administrative policy speech that the
most important issues for Japan's national economy and for its people's lives were securing the supply of natural resources and energy and developing its science and technology. He concluded that these factors would influence the survival and prosperity of Japan and were the most crucial security issues for such a resource-poor country.

During the LDP's presidential election of November 1978, Masayoshi Ohira offered the concept of "comprehensive security strategy" as one of the three pillars of Japan's fundamental policy. The first pillar was to firmly sustain the existing collective security system through the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States. The second was to maintain Japan's own high quality, moderately sized defense capability. Complementing the first two military pillars, the third pillar, comprehensive security strategy, was a plan "to preserve Japan's security comprehensively, by generally improving such domestic affairs as the economy, education and culture, as well as by strengthening diplomatic efforts, including international economic cooperation and cultural diplomacy" (Tanaka 1997, 276-277). Nonetheless, it was indeed the economy that received particular emphasis. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) explained in the 1980 Diplomatic Blue Paper
that Japanese economic aid to Pakistan, Turkey, and Thailand was "a means to maintain national security in a broad sense." In this strategy, foreign economic assistance was used to strengthen the western alliance and balance Japan's limited military expenditures, constrained to one percent of GNP. Here the concept of "strategic aid" was born. Strategic aid is provided based on national interests and goals, in contrast to "humanitarian aid" providing relief to victims of wars and natural disasters, with no conditions placed on the aid. Since 1980, Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Third World countries, mainly in the Asia-Pacific region, increased year-by-year, backed by an enormous trade surplus. Japan finally became the world's largest ODA supplier in 1989, surpassing the United States.

During the 1970s, in the international economic sphere, Japan moved beyond the stage of being caught between dependence on or independence from the United States. Japan became the only developed country in Asia, an established economic power able to play a significant role in the global economy. Simultaneously, the end of US military and economic superiority became manifest. International relations were shifting from "peace maintained by the United States" to "peace maintained by burden sharing in international
society" (ibid., 278). In October 1978, the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between Japan and the United States, the so-called Gaidorain, were concluded. They consisted of three sets of items: 1) a system to obviate invasion by other states; 2) counteractions to military attacks against Japan; and 3) cooperation between Japan and the United States on Far East issues that would significantly impact Japan, but that emerged outside of Japan. The third point led to hot debate over the legitimacy of sending the SDF abroad and over the definition of "Far East." This guideline was designed to promote substantial Japan-US cooperation, and since then, Japan-US joint exercises, training, and research have been actively practiced, starting with the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 1980. In May 1979, for the first time, a prime minister of Japan, Ohira, called the United States Japan's "ally." Gradually but steadily, realist security policy prevailed in Japan, while it restricted its own military capability, thus continuing to take into account pacifist claims.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and the Cold War intensified once again. President Ronald Reagan came into office in January 1981 "with a great deal of martial music about the Soviet threat
and the need for a military buildup" (Fitzgerald 2000, 147). Reagan publicly called the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and pushed his hostile policies against the USSR. Japan's perception of the "Soviet threat" heightened rapidly as well.

7. Studies on Missiles in the 1960s and 70s

Studies on missile threats in the early 1960s were basically focused on defense against enemy bombers and cruise missiles, but as offensive ballistic missile technology developed after the "Sputnik Shock" of 1957, their scope broadened to include anti-missile missiles. In the United States, President John F. Kennedy's "missile gap" rhetoric during the 1960 election campaign opened a way to promote the third generation Nike system, Nike-Zeus. This three-staged interceptor, employing a nuclear warhead, had major problems dealing with decoys and multiple targets. In a 1962 experiment, a radar-guided Zeus missile with a dummy nuclear warhead was fired, and it passed within two kilometers of the reentry vehicle of an Atlas ballistic missile, "close enough to destroy it with a nuclear blast" (ibid., 115). By 1963 Nike-Zeus was replaced by Nike-X, reflecting technical advances in radar, rocket acceleration and data processing systems. The Nike-X system consisted of
two missiles: the Spartan with a range of 70-100 miles, and the Sprint with a 20-30 mile range (Handberg 2002, 49-50). This fourth generation Nike system was politically boosted by such international events as China's first detonation of an atomic bomb in October 1964 and the Soviet deployment of the "Galosh" antiballistic missile (ABM) systems around Moscow in late 1966 (Mitchell 2000, 7).

In the late 1960s nuclear-tipped ABMs were a matter of serious debate in the United States. There were a number of problems with them. First, even if ABMs succeeded in intercepting incoming hostile missiles, their debris would produce serious radioactive fallout and threaten the area they are designed to protect. Second, the nuclear blast would generate a massive electromagnetic pulse (EMP), destroying communication lines and delicate radars. Even though the United States might be able to defend against a first strike by ballistic missiles, the anti-ballistic missile system would then be blind and unable to deal with following attacks. And third, the increasing number of Soviet nuclear warheads was troublesome. Americans could not conceive of so many interceptor nuclear warheads detonating over their own territory. "[N]o one wanted nuclear-tipped ABMs going off in the atmosphere" (Fitzgerald 2000, 120).
The development of multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology during the 1970s accelerated this trend, and the US government shifted its focus from nuclear ABM to a "hit-to-kill" type of kinetic-energy weapon (KEW) for its ABM interceptors.

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, led the "great ABM debates" and the road to the 1972 ABM Treaty (Mitchell 2000). He was convinced that "continually enhanced offensive penetration aids could be deployed that were capable of overwhelming any possible defensive configuration" (Handberg 2002, 51), and that "the only alternative to spending billions of dollars on a pointless offensive arms buildup was to convince the Soviets that ABM deployments were destabilizing, and to get them to agree to strict limits on defenses" (Kartchner 2001, 21). Many remember the well-known episode at Glassboro, New Jersey in June 1967. When President Lyndon B. Johnson had McNamara explain to Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei N. Kosygin the rationale for limiting ABM defenses to head off an arms race in offensive weapons, the infuriated Kosygin pounded the table shouting, "Defense is moral, offense is immoral!" But later the Soviets accepted the idea that building missile defenses could lead
to an offense-defense arms race and moved toward signing the ABM Treaty. While America's ABM capability continued to be based on existing Nike-X technology, in 1967 McNamara gave the system a new name, Sentinel, in order to gain control over the debate. The Sentinel was designed as a heavy anti-Soviet missile defense system, but McNamara wanted it cancelled completely to achieve MAD. However, President Johnson ordered him to deploy some sort of missile defense system, so McNamara "was compelled to announce a limited ABM deployment" (Goldfischer 1993, 214). Its rationale was primarily to protect US cities against accidental attack or small-scale launch of ballistic missiles, thus "not from Soviet attack but from a much smaller Chinese threat" (Graham 2001, 7). China had already conducted six nuclear experiments, "including the 3-megaton thermonuclear device" (McMahon 1997, 38).

President Richard Nixon, who took office in January 1969, on one hand pushed ahead with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, his administration continued development of the ballistic missile defense system, renamed Safeguard in March 1969. The Safeguard program was a scaled down version of missile defense, ostensibly aimed at providing minimal
defense for the American population. However, its real objective was to secure US strategic nuclear forces against a Soviet disarming first strike so as to preserve second-strike capabilities (Mitchell 2000, 32). The Safeguard finally survived domestic debates, and Nixon used it as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations for offensive nuclear force reductions with the Soviet Union.

In May 1972 the SALT I Agreement was signed in Moscow, part two of which, Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, became known as the ABM Treaty. It prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from deploying ABM systems to protect their whole territory, only allowing defense of two sites: the capital and one ICBM base (the 1974 protocol limited ABM deployment to just one site). This was for the purpose of protecting command and control centers and/or securing retaliatory second-strike capabilities. Consequently, the nuclear superpowers institutionalized a situation in which they could only develop their offensive capabilities, leaving themselves vulnerable to nuclear missile attacks. An attempt to initiate a nuclear war with a preemptive strike would be a suicidal act for either state. This should, in theory, have restricted the superpowers from striking first, leading to
strategic stability in nuclear competition. The superpowers established a system where they "deterred" themselves from waging nuclear war by exclusively depending on their offensive nuclear capabilities. The United States built its permitted ABM system, Safeguard, at Grand Forks, North Dakota, but "it was dismantled as useless" one year later (Eisendrath et al. 2001, 7).

In the early 1960s, the Japanese public was so suspicious that emerging missile technology was immediately linked with nuclear deployment. People tended to confuse missiles designed to deliver a warhead with the nuclear weapon itself. Therefore, developing and deploying an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) strongly implied possession of a nuclear weapon (Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 1963). Introducing such missiles was regarded as being subject to "prior consultation," and the government could not help but negotiate with its US counterpart in such a case. In the meantime, it was confirmed in the Diet that short-range missiles were not to be considered as a means of delivery of nuclear warheads.

The Japanese government continued to study GMs, and as the capability of the SDF grew, the introduction of a
Nike system to defend the mainland against direct threats from hostile aircraft became realistic. Research included work with such weapons as surface-to-air (SAM), air-to-air (AAM), and anti-tank (ATM) missiles. The defense budget related to GMs was 286 million yen (794,000 dollars) in FY1963 and 419 million yen (1.16 million dollars) in FY1964. The total expense for studying GMs from 1956 to 1964 mounted to 3.11 billion yen (9.47 million dollars). While admitting that US missiles were capable of mounting nuclear weapons, the Japanese government explained that it would study them with a precondition that such antimissile missiles should not be equipped with nuclear warheads (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 1962).

Since China had detonated its first nuclear device in October 1964, the Japanese were well aware of nuclear threats from Communist China. McNamara's statement on a future "thin" deployment of anti-missile missiles against the new threat of China's small nuclear arsenal aroused debates on deploying defensive missiles in Japan in June 1966 (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 1966b). Within the government and political sphere, arguments for and against ballistic missile defense were intense and continued for months. Proponents claimed that Japan's missile deployment
would be purely defensive and avoid conflict with Japan's Constitution and postwar security policy. Opponents asserted that missile defense technology was not mature enough to provide secure defense against ballistic missile attack. In April 1968 JDA Director Kaneshichi Masuda called the US ABM system a nuclear weapon system and clearly denied the possibility of Japanese ABM deployment (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 1968). In the end, the JDA found that an ABM system would not provide secure and meaningful defense. It offered several reasons for this conclusion: 1) Japan's ABM deployment might invite a preemptive nuclear assault; 2) it could lead to political tensions in East Asia; 3) it would bring domestic turmoil; and 4) the issue of management of such a system was yet to be resolved with the US government.

Once the US and USSR concluded the ABM Treaty, Japan lost interest in antiballistic missiles. ABM debate in Japan died out in the Diet, and did not reemerge until Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech in 1983.


1. The Issue of Nuclear Weapons Presence in Japan

The renewed Cold War triggered by the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan shook the Three Non-Nuclear Principles that seemed to be unanimously supported by the Japanese. Compared with the first two principles, non-production and non-possession, the Japanese government has flexibly managed the third principle, non-transfer of nuclear weapon into Japan. Violating the first two principles would clash head on with the pacifist identity of the Japanese. However, the third principle was not as generally tangible or politically strict as the other two. In addition, Japan had control over the first and second principles, while the third principle was largely dependent on actions of the United States.

In 1981, Edwin O. Reischauer, former US Ambassador to Japan, stated that nuclear weapons had been brought into Japan. Although both governments denied this statement immediately, it created an intense controversy over whether nuclear weapons existed within Japan's borders. Numerous studies on this issue revealed that, in fact, nuclear weapons had been brought into Japanese territory (Niihara and Asami 1978; Toyoda 1983; Hara 1992). It is widely known that the United States was free to transfer nuclear weapons into Japan under the former Security Treaty, and Okinawa was an obvious nuclear base under the US occupation before it was returned to Japan in 1972. As the clause of "prior
consultation" was added to the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty, Japan and the United States agreed on the removal of all nuclear weapons deployed in Okinawa. However, the situation did not seem to change. It is an open secret that Yokosuka port near Tokyo, the main naval base for the US Seventh Fleet, has been a major base of nuclear forces. The "prior consultation" clause has been substantially disregarded. Under this clause, the US government must consult with the Japanese before it brings nuclear weapons into Japan, and the Japanese government's position is essentially one of trust that the United States would not transfer nuclear weapons into its territory without an offer of consultation. That is, Japan has no way of checking on American nuclear transfers and can only trust the US to hold to the agreement. Has the United States upheld the agreement? Information regarding this issue is also controlled by the United States. The United States does, in fact, have its nuclear-armed fleets call at port in Japan without reporting the matter and even brings nuclear weapons onto its bases in Japan (Hara 1992, 211). There is no way for the Japanese to recognize, discuss, or judge the matter, without such information. If the United States wants to bring nuclear weapons into this particular area of the Far East, it will
simply say nothing about it, because the Japanese would
doubtless reject the idea if prior consultation were offered.

From a strategic viewpoint, it is natural to assume
that the United States has nuclear weapons in Japanese
territory as necessary parts of its "nuclear umbrella."
During the Cold War, many believed that the US government
would not have felt secure if their Soviet counterparts were
convinced that there were no nuclear weapons in Japan. The
Americans needed to make the Soviets believe there were
nuclear weapons in Japan (Mainichi Shinbunsha Gaishinbu
1982). One could argue that it is the US nuclear threat, not
the location of particular weapons, that matters. However,
it was difficult to believe that the US would allow a
nuclear "hole" in this critical area, while stationing
"nuclear weapons on US soil in the Pacific (on Guam) and on
certain naval ships" (Van de Velde 1988, 20), and on the
lands of other Asian allies such as South Korea and the
Philippines. Peter Heiz asserts, based on historical
evidence, that nuclear weapons had been stored permanently
in Japan and that Japan was a center of possible nuclear
warfare from the US strategic viewpoint (Heiz 1987, 78-88).

This discussion does not suggest that Japan possesses
nuclear weapons, but does suggest that Japan provided its
territory to the United States as a strategic nuclear base. As a declared non-nuclear state, Japan has suffered from a deep dilemma over nuclear security. Zenko Suzuki, taking over the government after the unexpected death of Prime Minister Ohira in the midst of a general election campaign in April 1980, emphasized the non-military aspects of national security and maintained a low profile on security issues. After the government denied the Reischauer comment in 1981, an American journalist once asked Suzuki, if he could infer that Japan did not want the US "nuclear umbrella" because Suzuki would not allow the nuclear-armed US fleet to call at a Japanese port. Suzuki replied that the government has to deal with the issues realistically through prior consultation. Then, when a Japanese reporter asked him the meaning of "realistically," Suzuki said that the government might say "yes" or "no." But he hurriedly corrected his comment, stating, "The Japanese people have a strong 'nuclear allergy', and I wish to adhere to non-nuclear principles. Therefore, we should come to a conclusion based on these facts, and we will say 'no', realistically" (Mainichi Shinbunsha Gaishinbu 1982, 178-180). Suzuki's confusion symbolized the ambiguity and dilemma of Japan's security policy.
2. The Nakasone Era and the Expanding Role of the Self Defense Forces

In contrast with his predecessors, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, after taking office in November 1982, got actively involved in military aspects of Japan's national security policy. Nakasone once insisted on Japan's rearmament through constitutional amendment when he was a member of the National Democratic Party in the early 1950s. Later he became known as "an advocate for constitutional amendment" in the LDP. However, after assuming the post of prime minister, he kept silent on the issue because of strong opposition in the Diet.

The "Three Principles on Arms Export" prohibit exporting weapons to communist countries, to countries to which United Nations resolutions prohibit the export of weapons, and to countries that are, or are likely to be, involved in international conflict. These principles were for the first time presented by the Sato Cabinet to the Diet in April 1967, and the Miki Cabinet proclaimed the principles as the unified view of the government in February 1976. However, following strong pressure from the United States, in January 1983 the Nakasone Cabinet decided, in exception to the principles, to license Japanese weapons
technology to the United States. This clearly showed the
government's prioritization of the realist US-Japan alliance
over pacifist principles. In addition, the Nakasone
government approved non-government level participation in
the SDI announced by the Reagan Administration in March 1983.
This will be analyzed in detail in the following section.
Furthermore, Nakasone increased annual expenditure on
defense far more than other areas in FY1984. Finally, in
January 1987, the cabinet approved an accounting change:
estimating the defense budget not on a year-on-year basis,
which had been common practice, but on the calculated cost
of the five-year Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program.
Accordingly, in the following year the Japanese defense
budget weighed in at 1.003 percent of GNP, the first time
that a defense budget had exceeded the one percent limit
that was Japanese national policy. This was taken by the
public as an important sign of Nakasone's hawkish view on
national security, already indicated by remarks such as,
"Japan is an unsinkable aircraft carrier of the United
States" and "Japan and the United States share the same
destiny."

Due to the renewed Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union, Japan-US military cooperation expanded,
and the capability as well as the role of the Self Defense Forces progressively increased through the 1980s. The Ground Self Defense Force was no longer a sub-military organization just for containing domestic disturbances, but a powerful armed force that could conduct military operations beyond its coastline. In 1981, then Prime Minister Suzuki promised the United States that Japan would defend the one-nautical-mile sea-lane off the Japanese coast. However, there were no specific regulations regarding sea-lane defense, and this move substantively expanded operations of the SDF beyond Japan's territorial waters without any clear defense policy changes. The Air Self Defense Forces had also widened the concept of "self-defense" during the 1980s. Japan introduced and deployed F-16 fighters at Misawa Air Base in northern Honshu (main island), which potentially represented an offensive capability because their range of attack included eastern Russia. The Maritime Self Defense Force reinforced its capability as well by deploying four new Aegis warships, even though it had already focused heavily on antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Those military buildups obscured the clear-cut distinction between offense and defense in Japan's national defense policy.

In the late 1980s, Japan-US relations began to sour
while the United States and the Soviet Union came closer with the emergence of Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Communist Party. The Toshiba Incident occurred in April 1987. It was revealed that some parts of a screw propeller, which could reduce submarine noise and help them go undetected by US sonar, were exported to the USSR against regulations of the Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Areas (COCOM). This incident reinforced Japan's image as a selfish country that sought its own economic interests at the price of the security of the western alliance. In May 1987, Japan was requested by the United States to deploy its minesweepers to the Iran-Iraqi War to protect international shipping. This brought a controversy over Japan's legitimate contribution to international society. Faced with strong opposition, the Nakasone Cabinet finally refused. Instead, Japan provided expanded economic assistance to countries in the region and increased the budget for supporting US facilities in Japan (Keddell 1990, 15). The Japanese were again shaken in the dilemma between a realist policy of cooperation with the United States and pacifist popular opposition to sending the SDF abroad.

As the Cold War came to an end in a series of upheavals such as the Tiananmen Square Incident and

3. Strategic Defense Initiative

I call upon the scientific community in this country, who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to give us the means of rendering these weapons impotent and obsolete. (Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983)

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan gave his famous "Star Wars" speech. For the purpose of making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," he proposed building a shield that could shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. This took US "defense experts in and out of the administration" by surprise (Fitzgerald 2000, 210). The SDI invited huge debate in and out of the country since it directly challenged the prevailing posture that had been a foundation of arms control and strategic stability for the past decade (Saito 1992, 23). The Japanese government
reacted calmly, about a month later announcing that it could "understand" this strategic choice of the Reagan Administration, as its intention was defensive and moral.

The SDI program, however, was not formally launched until Reagan entered his second term in 1985. The president for the first time explained his SDI plans to his Japanese counterpart when they met in Los Angeles in early January. Prime Minister Nakasone expressed his interest in SDI. He expressed his "understanding" of the SDI study for four reasons: 1) the SDI is not a nuclear weapon; 2) it is a defensive program; 3) it is designed to protect against nuclear ballistic missiles; and 4) its ultimate objective is the total abolition of nuclear weapons from the earth. In March, US Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger formally wrote to Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe and invited Japan to participate in the SDI.

In Japan, the opposition to nuclear weapons was such that whether the SDI interceptor was a nuclear weapon or not was a delicate and important issue, and the non-nuclear feature of the SDI was a crucial point in the government's participation. As mentioned earlier, the US government had already retreated from developing nuclear-tipped anti-ballistic missiles. Nonetheless, the space based X-ray laser
beam of the planned interceptor would be generated as a result of a nuclear explosion, and this issue led to a debate in Japan. The US government repeatedly emphasized that the SDI was not a system with nuclear weapons, and the Nakasone Cabinet made this point clear by defining nuclear weapons as follows: "a nuclear weapon is a weapon that uses radioactive energy generated by nuclear fission or fusion reactions for the purpose of destruction or slaughter" (Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 1986b). Thus the X-ray laser that would not directly produce a nuclear blast to destroy enemy missiles was not regarded as a nuclear weapon.

While finding moral justifications in Reagan's position, Nakasone offered five conditions for Japan's participation in the SDI, adding that Japan's participation must be based on thorough and prudent discussions. First, the United States should not pursue strategic superiority over the USSR. Second, the SDI should be conducive to strengthening overall deterrent strategy. Third, offensive weaponry should be substantially reduced simultaneously. Fourth, the SDI should be in compliance with the ABM Treaty. And fifth, the development and deployment of the SDI system should proceed in consultation with US allies and negotiated with the Soviet Union. The Japanese government sent research
groups to the United States three times, simultaneously monitoring the attitudes of other US allies. Following the UK, West Germany, Italy, France and Canada, Japan announced in September 1986 that the Japanese private sector would participate in the SDI. This decision was made based primarily on the political position of Japan as a member of the western alliance. The JDA explained that the SDI did not aim at offensive military buildup, and it was "congruent with Japan's fundamental position as a peaceful nation" (Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 1986a). Japan officially signed a memorandum with the United States in July 1987. The West Pacific Area Missile Defense (WESTPAC) program started in November 1988, and top players in the Japanese military industry, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, independently joined in.

Heated debates continued in the United States in terms of military effectiveness of the system, cost of development and deployment, and implications for relations with the Soviet Union. The concept of layered defense, which existed as early as the 1960s, was developed systematically in the 1980s, envisioning deployment of "several missile defense systems, each designed to intercept an attacking missile or warhead at a different stage of its flight"
trajectory" (Hildreth and Pagliano 2004, 18). The SDI missile defense system consisted of four stages: boost phase, post-boost phase, mid-course, and terminal or reentry phase. The planned space-based, mid-course interceptor was the target of especially severe criticism. Proponents of the SDI, who believed in the US technology that had put humans on the moon, were optimistic about the SDI program. But the expected technological breakthroughs did not occur, and critics stressed that space-based interceptors would be "sitting ducks" and that the SDI was a task like "pulling the Titanic from the ocean floor and putting it into orbit" (Fitzgerald 2000, 375). The SDI consumed more than 120 billion dollars in FY1985-88, with no idea how much eventual implementation of the system might cost. Another worry was the Soviet Union, which remained skeptical about SDI technology and about the intentions of the other superpower.

In the meantime, important political events shook the Reagan Administration in the latter half of the 1980s. General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev launched his peace initiative after taking the post in March 1986. Focus shifted from the SDI to arms reduction such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The
popularity of the SDI in the US public had peaked in October 1986, but gradually fell by the autumn of the next year.


1. The Gulf War and Japan's International Contribution

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the following war in the Persian Gulf shook the foundations of Japan's national security policy. The end of the Cold War eliminated the danger of a full-scale nuclear war and the Soviet threat. However, ethnic conflicts surfaced all over the world, and a new kind of threat, terrorism, emerged. At the outbreak of the Gulf War, the world started seeking a new world order in place of the Cold War system. Initially the interruption of oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait did not cause much disruption in Japan, and the Gulf Crisis did not become a major security issue there. However, it was impossible for Japan, as the second largest economic power in the world, not to join in the response against Iraq. Yet, the situation was neither a war involving invasion upon the Japanese territory nor a war that could be reasonably rationalized as self-defense. The tangled, torturous arguments over how to react left Japan incapable of any timely, significant
involvement. After drawing harsh criticism from the international community, Japan provided a total of 13.5 billion dollars in financial assistance and sent several non-military personnel to participate in the operation, but much too late. When the Kuwaiti government published an advertisement in an American newspaper to express its appreciation to the world after the war, Japan was not included. It gave the general impression that Japan was subject to ridicule and loss of esteem, appearing as a country that having shed neither blood nor sweats, tried to make up for it with money in response to criticism. During the Cold War, Japanese foreign policy was "labeled decidedly passive and reactive" (Fukushima 1999,164). Now, Japan was bitterly asked how it intended to be a responsible partner in international security efforts and was severely challenged as a member of international society.

After the war, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu dispatched minesweepers of the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) to the Persian Gulf to clear underwater mines, and Japan recovered some respect. It was the first time that Japan had sent its minesweepers to operate beyond its own waters since the Korean War. Debate on sending the SDF abroad subsequently turned hot, and the issue of Japan's
contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) was discussed as well. The Kaifu Cabinet submitted the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to the Diet in October 1990, but it was scrapped. At that time, more than half the Japanese public opposed participating in PKO, with only 20 percent in support. The debate continued, and in June 1992 the International Peace Cooperation Law, the so-called PKO Cooperation Law, was passed in the Diet. During this period, debate among politicians, journalists and scholars heated up, and public opinion changed dramatically, with those for and against Japan's participation in UN PKO roughly equal.

Ichiro Ozawa, then secretary general of the LDP, claimed that Japan could participate in UN PKO, including military operations, without constitutional amendment, and he put forward the "normal power" argument suggesting that Japan should participate in common international duties just as the other responsible countries do. "The responsible practices should include military roles in the service of international security" (Ozawa 1993). Masayoshi Takemura, the leader of New Party Sakigake, stood in direct opposition and insisted that Japan need not make a military contribution in line with its economic power and should feel no responsibilities as a major power (Kato 2002). The
division in Japan's national identity over how Japan should place itself in international society was very serious. Based on the PKO Cooperation Law, the Japanese government sent 2,000 SDF personnel to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and provided logistics support. With the success of the Cambodia peace process, the majority of Japanese came to support participation of the SDF in PKO.

With the domestic political stalemate, the collapse of the economic bubble, and recurring exposure of corruption among bureaucrats, Japan of the 1990s was in a somewhat chaotic situation. The LDP was divided over political reform, and the 1955-system finally came to an end when the LDP lost power in August 1993. In the following coalition governments, policies regarding national security remained fuzzy because coalition parties took fundamentally different positions on security policy. Then the leader of the Socialist Party, Tomiichi Murayama, became prime minister of a coalition government in June 1994, and stunned the Japanese people by drastically shifting the Socialist's view on national security policy. He officially accepted the US-Japan military alliance and stated his intention to "firmly" maintain the Mutual Security Treaty, even recognizing the Self Defense Forces as constitutional. The Socialist Party,
which had argued for unarmed neutralism, in a sudden stroke tried to accommodate the actuality of the US-Japan alliance and the reality of international society. However, this move led to a loss in public support that continues to this day.

There were also intense journalistic debates over the search for Japan's national identity. On one hand, Yomiuri Shinbun published its original "Tentative Plan" for a Constitutional Amendment in November 1994. It recommended abolishing Section Two of Article 9 while keeping Section One, clarifying the existence of the SDF by stating, "Japan can maintain an organization for self-defense." On the other hand, Asahi Shinbun advocated "constitutional" diplomacy in an editorial in May 1995, suggesting that Japan should focus on non-military contributions to international society (Kato 1998).

Interestingly, the economic depression of the 1990s, following the collapse of the economic bubble and various financial crises, threatened the economic basis of Japan's national power. But this point was hardly recognized as a national security issues.

2. Re-Definition of the US-Japan Security System

In September 1995, the rape of a twelve-year-old girl
by three US Marines in Okinawa shocked the Japanese people. Residents in Okinawa were outraged, and the incident led a majority of Japanese to express opposition to the US-Japan mutual security system. Okinawa represents only one percent of the Japanese land area, but contains seventy-five percent of the total area of US military bases in Japan. This has led to a preponderance of crimes by US personnel being committed in Okinawa. Mainland Japanese at last began to understand that the mutual security system designed to defend the country could also threaten the safety of residents in Okinawa. The US-Japan alliance, which had been "drifting" since losing its principal perceived threat, the Soviet Union, was thrown into its greatest crisis (Funabashi 1997). Nonetheless, both governments made every effort to defuse the situation, and the discussion of the alliance was moved from breaking it off to firmly upholding it, but with sufficient consideration for the people of Okinawa. As a result, it was agreed that the United States would relocate an air base and return Futenma Air Station to Japan, but leave the foundation of the US-Japan security system unchanged.

In contrast with former Soviet-bloc countries in Eastern Europe, which had achieved democratization only to
face a new set of ethnic conflicts, remains of the Cold War structure still existed in East Asia. South Korea undertook a diplomatic offensive including establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990, while North Korea lost economic aid from its patron. Although it maintained a stable relationship with China, North Korea was economically pushed into a corner and increasingly isolated in the international community. It began to focus on nuclear and missile development (Wada 1998). North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993, and in May it succeeded in developing a mid-range ballistic missile Nodong that could reach any part of Japan (Ozu 2002, 204). Tensions rose in the region. In the meantime, Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui's visit to the United States in June 1995 triggered renewed confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. China conducted a missile launch exercise with live ammunition, and military tension between Taiwan and China mounted. Obviously, Cold War-era tensions had changed, but had not disappeared.

In these circumstances, Japan and the United States initiated a restructuring of the Mutual Security Treaty and their alliance. In November 1995, Japan laid down the New National Defense Program Outline (New Taiko), which
reconfirmed the significance of the Japan-US mutual security system and aimed to make international contributions more positively and actively. In April 1996, President Bill Clinton visited Japan and introduced the Japan-US Joint Communiqué on Security with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. This was called a "redefinition of the Japan-US mutual security system." Key components of the communiqué were the following: First, the mutual security system should aim at "peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region" instead of facing "the threat of Soviet Union," the common enemy in the Cold War era. Second, it committed both sides to the presence of US military forces in Japan and surrounding areas. The communiqué was released in concert with the Strategic Report on East Asia issued in February 1995, which confirmed that the US should keep around 100,000 personnel in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, in September 1998, new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (New Gaidorain) were established. Thus, the former Taiko of 1976 and the Guidelines of 1978 were both replaced for the new era of the Japan-US alliance.

The most notable feature of the redefined Japan-US mutual security system was the introduction of the concept, shuhen jitai (situations in areas surrounding Japan). This
concept was not geographic, but was defined as "situations that could gravely affect the peace and security of Japan." Hence the geographic aspect of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, which for years had been limited to the "Far East," was now extended over the entire globe. The redefined Japan-US cooperative relationship and the national security policies of Japan were quickly initiated. Bills regarding shuhen jitai were passed in the Diet, and air tankers and spy satellites were slated for development. The former enabled mid-air aircraft refueling, and the latter enhanced the area for intelligence and reconnaissance. Due to these moves, Japan's "offensive" capability was increased significantly, and the line between offense and defense was further blurred.

Japan seemed to have begun moving toward strategies beyond its borders on land, at sea, and in the air, backed by cutting edge technologies in the areas of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). However, the legal basis for military actions of the Self Defense Forces remained unclear. There was no legal basis for the SDF to operate freely, even on Japanese soil and even in an emergency. With a watchful eye on the situation in the
Korean Peninsula, the government sped to establish emergency-related legislation. In June 2003, the Diet passed three bills, finally defining specific wartime actions, which had been considered taboo since the Mitsuya Study.

3. The Constitution of Japan and the Self Defense Forces

After the end of World War II, as the international atmosphere has changed, Japan has steadily developed and strengthened its defense capability, symbolized by the establishment and development of the Self Defense Forces. This change was achieved not by revising the Constitution, but by changing its interpretation. The government's approach to the issue has been called a "constitutional transition method" or ridiculed as an "interpretive revision of the Constitution." The evolution of the government's interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution has substantially altered its original aims, and over time the Japanese people have come to accept these interpretations. The shifts in interpretation have had the effect of a revision of the Constitution without its actually being altered. This change has involved a process of refining the definition of the armed forces in such a way that they should not fall under the definition of military forces as
prohibited by Section Two of Article 9 (Kobayashi 1998). The constitutional basis of the Self Defense Forces is still very vulnerable, but since the end of the Cold War, the public view toward the Constitution and the Self Defense Forces has changed to a considerable degree. Lately, the status of the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces has risen steadily, and the Defense Agency was even upgraded to a ministry-level organization in January 2007. Emergency disaster relief missions of the SDF have always been highly regarded. In general people preferred struggles against nature to the killing of war. Thus the public has supported participation of the SDF in international rescue efforts, and the SDF has steadily built up its track record of disaster relief. The majority of Japanese people now recognize the SDF, and many even acknowledge it as a military force. From other countries' point of view, the Self Defense Forces are clearly a world-class military force.

Constitutional Research Councils were established in both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet in January 2000, and have been discussing possible constitutional amendments, involving Article 9. In November 2000, even the Communist Party recognized the Self Defense Forces.
4. The GPALS Program

Facing the end of the Cold War, George Bush, following President Reagan, reviewed the SDI and announced the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program in January 1991. The GPALS shifted the focus of defense from massive nuclear attack in total warfare with the Soviet Union to accidental launch of nuclear missiles or limited ballistic missile assaults (up to several hundred warheads) by Third World countries. This change was a response to the Gulf War experience in which Iraq attacked Saudi Arabia and Israel with Soviet made Scud B ballistic missiles, and to the proliferation in the Third World of chemical weapons, which are called "the nuclear weapons of the poor."

The protection objective of the missile defense system was reevaluated as well. While SDI was to mainly protect the continental US, GPALS focused on the protection of US forces deployed abroad and US allies. The components of GPALS were: 1) Theater Missile Defense (TMD) to defend US troops abroad and allies and friends, 2) National Missile Defense (NMD) to protect the US mainland, and 3) Global Missile Defense (GMD) to defend against long-range ballistic missiles. GMD included a space-based anti-ballistic system
with a thousand very small, highly intelligent orbiting satellites with kinetic warheads. They were called "Brilliant Pebbles," and were an attempt to avoid problems with the SDI concept of large sophisticated battle stations and nuclear-pumped X-ray laser satellites.

GPALS also faced harsh criticisms. First, as with the SDI, the estimated 41 billion dollar cost of development and deployment was very large. Second, GPALS would violate the ABM Treaty's prohibition against deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in space. And third, threats from Third World ballistic missiles were still remote. The prolonged debate did not quiet until Bush left office. Theater missile defense (TMD) and national missile defense (NMD) were succeeded by the Clinton Administration's ballistic missile defense programs.
We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Defense can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation. (George W. Bush on May 1, 2001)

This chapter will analyze the course of events in the United States and Japan with regard to missile defense, evaluate the utility and dangers of Japan's missile defense program, and consider what defense policy Japan should choose in the future.

A. Missile Defense Concepts

Before we enter the missile defense debate, we need to clarify concepts regarding missile defense in order to avoid confusion due to the varying usage of strategic terms over the course of history. The broad concept of "strategic defense" can be divided into three spheres: ground, sea and air defenses. Strategic missile defense belongs to air
defense, including defense against bombers, fighters, and so on.

Missile defense is still a broad concept. A "missile" is a military weapon normally carrying a warhead and guidance system. It is launched on land, at sea or in the air. There are two distinct types of missiles. Cruise missiles (CM), powered by jet engines, are low flying strategic guided missiles. They are essentially unmanned aircrafts, but are distinct from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in that cruise missiles are used only as weapons and not for reconnaissance. Ballistic missiles (BM), powered by rocket engines, can be launched into space. Missile defense might be expected to include response to both CMs and BMs, but in practice it usually entails only defense against BMs. The term "missile defense" has come into official use relatively recently. "MD" has been used for US missile defense programs since the current Bush administration removed the distinction between national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) in May 2001. Ballistic missile defense (BMD), a general concept commonly used in the past, will be avoided in this study. This word, with its long history, can be confusing since the BMD concept was used in both President Reagan's Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) program and President Clinton's program in different ways. BMD in the former was a part of SDI combined with satellite systems, while BMD in the latter was a total program equivalent to SDI, consisting of NMD and TMD. Moreover, the fact that the Clinton Administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was formerly called the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) may cause additional confusion. The BMDO was reformulated and promoted as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) under the current Bush Administration.

The US missile defense programs, NMD and TMD, were distinguished in terms of what/who is being protected and what range of ballistic missiles are being defended against. In this study, NMD is defined as a missile defense system that protects the continental territory and civilians of the United States, and TMD is defined as one that protects US forces stationed abroad. Distinction by range is dismissed since there was no agreement on the exact range that divides NMD and TMD.

The Japanese government avoided using the term TMD in joint missile defense development with the United States. The US TMD in East Asia should in large part play the role of national missile defense for Japan. But the Japanese
regarded TMD as a specific US program, which would defend US forces stationed not only within Japan's borders but also outside Japanese territory. On this line of argument Japan's participation in the US TMD could have been considered a stepping out of the constitutional self-defense mandate that prohibits collective defense. Therefore the Japanese government has called the joint study program BMD. This may add even more confusion. In May 1996, the Japanese government made clear that TMD is defined as a specific system of the United States designed to defend US troops, not only in Japan but also around the world, as well as US allies and friends. In order to avoid confusion, this study will use the term JMD to describe Japan's own missile defense program, apart from TMD.

In sum, missile defense terms printed in lower case, such as "missile defense," are used to describe general concepts. Those in upper case represent specific missile defense programs of the day, such as SDI of the Reagan Administration, GPALS of the Bush Administration, NMD and TMD of the Clinton Administration, MD of the George W. Bush administration, and JMD of the Japanese government.
B. Missile Defense Development in the United States

As reviewed in the previous chapter, the issue of missile defense has been debated in the United States since the 1950s, however, such programs as SDI and GPALS remained merely an unrealized vision. In terms of an actual missile defense system in the post-Cold War environment, the debate did not become animated until the presidential campaign of 2000. Debate on missile defense intensified between the Republicans, who actively supported the program, and the Democrats, who were less enthusiastic. President Clinton's missile defense program was composed of TMD and NMD. TMD was a combination of upper tier system (Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense [THAAD], Navy Theater Wide Defense [NTWD], and Airborne laser [ABL] of the Air Force) and lower tier system (Army Patriot Advanced Capability 3 [PAC-3], Navy Area Defense [NAD]). The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) was developed in cooperation with Germany and Italy, and the Arrow System developed with Israel is also a lower tier system. NMD was to defend the continental territory of the United States from a limited ballistic missile attack, succeeding the GPALS program. NMD consisted of land-based interceptors, radar and space-based sensor
systems. The Clinton administration prioritized TMD, because the United States perceived more imminent threats to its foreign military bases from Iraqi Scud and North Korean Nodong missiles, and because NMD faced the political obstacle of violating the ABM treaty.

After taking office, President George W. Bush declared his stance on the promotion of missile defense. He announced in his speech at the National Defense University in May: "We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty" (Bush 2001). President Bush's calling for major deployment of missile defense systems and removal of the distinction between the NMD and TMD programs indicated that the United States would promote its MD in a comprehensive manner under one administrative umbrella, despite technical and conceptual distinctions between NMD and TMD, and despite vigorous criticism of these programs (the criticisms are analyzed in detail in the next chapter). A new stage was set for debate on missile defense. Initially, the Bush administration did not make clear its plans for integration of the two programs or what specific kind of system it intended to pursue. It did not identify "an
architecture that it [would] seek to deploy nor [establish] a schedule for the development and deployment of any particular system or element, but, a clear underlying objective [was] the early deployment of a defense against missiles aimed at U.S. territory" (Hildreth and Woolf 2004, 5). Later it suggested that it had been taking a "spiral approach," adopting a flexible and incremental course of development dictated by technological advances, instead of employing rigid, long-term planning. This approach has also been called "strategic ambiguity."

The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 immediately shifted the focus of US national security policy to anti-terrorism campaigns, but it did not eliminate debate on the US MD program. Given the impact of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, two separate paths could have been followed: the United States could pursue an active MD shield program, taking into consideration possible future terrorist assaults with ballistic missiles (Funabashi 2001, Spring 2003), or it could reconsider the program and prioritize other counter-terrorist options, some of which are currently under way (Dowd 2001, Klare 2003, Wright 2003). In the end, President Bush was preoccupied by ballistic missile threats from Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and the Bush Administration "seemed as
determined as ever to move ahead with a national defense system" (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2001). Attention was distracted from missile defense issues for a while, but President Bush firmly decided to pursue a missile shield for the country. US MD plans have significant strategic implications not only for security policies of the United States and its allies, but for future world security.

**C. Japan's Missile Defense: the Program**

In 1993 the US government officially proposed that Japan join its TMD program. This coincided with North Korea's declaration of its withdrawal from the NPT and its first launch of a Nodong short-range ballistic missile. At the Japan-US Defense Summit in September 1993, it was agreed that a forum for policy study on ballistic missile defense would be established under the Security Sub-Committee (SSC). Following this agreement, the TMD Working Group (TMD-WG) was established in December 1993. Since then, TMD-WG meetings have been a forum for exchange of information at the administrative level, including opportunities for the US government to further explain its TMD programs. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government has avoided using the term
TMD for its own missile defense program, and called it BMD (relabeled JMD for purposes of this study).

In September 1994, it was agreed that a Japan-US bilateral study would be undertaken to allow Japan to obtain the information on TMD necessary for its policy decisions. JDA established the Office of Ballistic Missile Defense Research (BMDR) in April 1995 (Venable 2001, 80). Since January 1995, experts from both nations have been studying the characteristics of ballistic missiles, the technological feasibility of missile defense systems, and so on. A white paper on defense claimed, "it is necessary to investigate various issues of BMD thoroughly from comprehensive perspectives in order to make decisions on Japan's future attitude" (Japan Defense Agency 1999). Based on this recognition, the JDA has been conducting a study, entitled Comprehensive Research on Japan's Future Air Defense System, with cooperation from the United States. Costing 560 million yen (4.7 million dollars) from FY1995–98, the study focused on TMD weapon systems, sensors, and Battlefield Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (BMC4I) systems. Continued cooperation in these studies on missile defense was assured by the Japan US Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996, signed by then
President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto.

In August 1998, North Korea's test launch of a three-stage rocket, possibly an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Taepodong 1, spurred the argument for JMD. The rocket flew over Japanese territory, and the Japanese people were stunned and deeply humiliated by the intimidating test of a missile "over their heads." At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC or "2 plus 2") meeting on September 20, 1998, the Director of Japan's Defense Agency and the US Secretary of Defense expressed a commitment to proceed with further work in the direction of conducting cooperative research on missile defense. In October the Security Council of Japan convened, and the JDA announced that it would begin internal coordination in the Cabinet with an additional budget request. In December, prior to the compilation of the government's budget for the fiscal year 1999, relevant ministers met in an attempt to reach consensus on the importance of JMD. Subsequently, on December 25, the Security Council of Japan was convened, and it approved the initiation of Japan-US cooperative technological research on Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD). This was later reorganized as the Sea-based Midcourse Defense (SMD) system.

Simultaneously, the government announced its views in the
"Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary Regarding Japan-US Cooperative Technological Research on Ballistic Missile Defense."

Through its research to date, JDA has reached the basic conclusion that cutting-edge technology, including Japan's own, has reached a level where JMD systems are feasible, if not today, at least in the foreseeable future. By 1997 JDA concluded that the NTWD system "would be the TMD system most amenable to bilateral cooperation and capable of defending Japan most effectively" (Takeda 2005, 67). At the Japan-US Defense Summit in December 1998, it was announced that JDA was going to begin domestic development, with coordination on technical matters where such cooperation was possible. JDA appropriated 26.2 billion yen (218.3 million dollars) over the 1999-2005 periods for joint efforts with the United States on Requirement Analysis and Design (RA&D) for the following four components of NTWD (The RA&D included risk reduction activities concerning elements of the infrared seeker).

1) Nosecone: to protect the infrared seeker from heat while in flight
2) Kinetic warhead: warhead that directly hits the incoming ballistic missile and destroys it with kinetic energy
3) Infrared seeker: seeker that uses infrared rays to detect and follow targets
4) Second-stage rocket motor: second-stage rocket of a three-stage missile

In December 2003, the Security Committee and the Cabinet Meeting of the Japanese government approved the introduction of JMD into Japan's defense posture. Japan has officially shifted its position from the stage of joint study to that of development and deployment. These decisions regarding JMD did not attract much public attention nor received major media coverage. However, it signified that Japan had taken a step toward a major shift in its strategic thinking with regard to security policy. The decisions show the Japanese government's willingness to defend Japan with its own missile defense shield, and could represent a substantial shift in defense strategy from dependence on US deterrent forces to its own active defense.

D. Japan's Missile Defense: the Debate

The Japanese government has put forward the following rationale for establishing its own missile defense system: First, the significant proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represent an emerging threat. Forty-six or more states possess ballistic missiles as of 2005, and the threat of those weapons has increased
substantially (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005a). Second, Japan has no system that can defend its territory and people in case of actual ballistic missile attack, and there is no viable alternative to missile shields like JMD (Ishiba 2005). Third, Japan's missile defense shield is purely defensive, and will not pose any threat to other states. Japan deploys neither ballistic missiles nor WMD, and building a JMD system is not likely to destabilize strategic relations with neighboring states. The government has been especially conscientious about JMD's defensive posture in line with its national *sen-shu boei* (exclusively defense-oriented) policy.

Missile defense issues have been brought up in the Diet more often since 1995, particularly after North Korea launched its three-stage missile over Japanese territory on August 31, 1998. However, they have been overshadowed by other sensitive and more immediate security issues such as the rape incident in Okinawa in 1995, the debates in 1997 and 1999 on the Japan-US Security Treaty's "guideline," and the collision of the US submarine, Greenville, with the Japanese fishing trawler, Ehime Maru, in February 2001. For some time following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, there appeared to be little interest in Japan in discussing JMD.
Although MD issues had been in the forefront since President Bush took office and announced his strong commitment to "deploy missile defenses to strengthen global security and stability" (Bush 2001), these issues disappeared both from the Japanese Diet and the media after September 11. The primary issue then was whether and how Japan should dispatch the SDF to support retaliatory US attacks on the al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, and subsequently in the Iraq War. Nonetheless, cooperation with the United States on missile defense did not slow down and has been steadily maintained. Joint study on NTWD was succeeded by SMD midcourse defense research, and it has remained intact in President Bush's current MD program. The debate on MD issues in Japan was revitalized after the government decided to move toward development and deployment of JMD in December 2003.

In the Japanese Diet, debate on JMD issues has pitted proponents--the government, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and other conservative parties (such as the Democratic Party, Conservative Party and the Liberal Party) against critics--the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. Nevertheless, as the Social Democratic Party has been losing seats in the Diet since 2000, critical
voices have been progressively muted. Generally, these debates have been tedious and unproductive, due to repeated assertions by ministers and government officials that the missile defense issues are still under investigation (Namatame 2003). Missile defense can be regarded as a specific military posture on a strategic level, so it is essentially a matter of choice for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and SDF, not for politicians or general public. However, it will have a tremendous impact on broader Japanese security and strategic policy.

The most remarkable feature of the domestic debate regarding JMD since 1993 is the long-term consistency of the government's policy toward JMD. This consistency has been maintained despite the frequent regime transitions following the demise of the 1955-system in which the LDP dominated the Diet. These include the post-LDP coalitions--Hosokawa and Hata administrations (August 1993–June 1994); the LDP coalition with the Socialist Party--Murayama and Hashimoto administrations (June 1994–July 1998); the LDP coalitions without Socialists--Obuchi, Mori, Koizumi, Abe, and Fukuda administrations (July 1998–September 2008). This may be attributed to Japan's security policymaking process, in which bureaucrats in MOFA and MOD take leadership in making
concrete decisions and crafting bills. It is also a manifestation of the stable relationship between Japan and the United States, despite the occasional political tensions and the "drifting" alliance during this period (Funabashi 1997).

The following section reviews the debates in terms of five specific points of contention. These aspects are: 1) nature of the threat; 2) technological feasibility; 3) costs and other economic factors; 4) international political relations, especially with Russia and China, including the international legal dimension of the 1972 ABM Treaty; 5) domestic Japanese issues regarding missile defense; and 6) moral considerations. The first four points coincide with conditions the Clinton administration considered in deciding whether it would pursue deployment of NMD, or whether it would pass along that decision to the following administration. Arguments peculiar to either NMD or TMD will be discussed within the appropriate section. The fifth section deals with issues unique to Japanese domestic politics. And the final section examines the moral aspects that underlie all the points analyzed previously.
1. Threat Assessment

During the Cold War, the primary threat to the United States and its allies were Soviet strategic nuclear forces and the danger of annihilation in case of an all-out nuclear war between the superpowers. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union such a danger has become remote. In the post-Cold War era, new threats have arisen, including ethnic and religious conflicts, international terrorism, and proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles.

For US proponents of MD, the ballistic missile threat is "real and persistent" (Pena 1998) and "growing" (O'Hanlon 1999). In July 1998 the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States issued a famous report. The so-called Rumsfeld Report, named after chairman, Donald Rumsfeld, who was Secretary of Defense in the Reagan and Bush Administrations, warned that ballistic missiles are "not a distant threat." The Rumsfeld report also criticized a report by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) published in 1995, which stated that there would be no threat in the next 15 years (Garwin 1998). It is also reported that 46 or more nations now possess ballistic missiles, and further proliferation of missile technology is looming ahead (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005).
There are three sources of ballistic missile threat. The first is from so-called "rogue states," such as North Korea and Iran, representing the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Third World states. Although Libya, named "rogue" by President Bush, announced the abandonment of its nuclear program, the "rogue" threat has continued to grow. The Iraq War broke out in March 2003. The United States called it a preventive attack against Iraq and part of "a war against terrorism," despite the opposition of major states in the UN Security Council. They believed that the Saddam Hussein regime could develop nuclear weapons and had a strong connection to Osama bin Laden and the al Quaeda terrorist network. However, they have proved neither of these "facts," even after demolishing the Saddam regime.

Seven of the "tyrannical states" identified by Bush in his new national security strategy announced in March 2006--North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Myanmar and Zimbabwe--remain with regimes intact. In particular, North Korea has become a serious threat with nuclear weapons and missile development, along with a number of troubles emerging in the last several years: suspicious boats, spy ships, abductions, and so on. In particular, state-sponsored kidnapping of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 80s has
agonized the Japanese people. At the end of August 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket over Japan's territory. It was believed to be a long-range Taepodong 1 ballistic missile. The Japanese people were infuriated and at the same time realized the imminent presence of missile threats from a neighboring country (Nakatomi 2005). Although another missile, the Nodong, first tested in 1993, can also reach all of Japan, the psychological impact of Taepodong on the minds of the Japanese people was enormous. Furthermore, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles on July 5, 2006. North Korea not only "fields the largest ballistic missile force in the Third World," reportedly two hundred or more, but it is also "the world's greatest proliferator of ballistic missile systems, technologies, and components" (Bermudez 1999). Basically, however accurate they are, ballistic missiles with conventional warheads are not militarily effective, and hence not themselves a threat. They become a real threat only when they are combined with WMD, and the problem is that the "rogues" concurrently pursue possession of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. Missile defense proponents fear that leaders of those states, who may not behave rationally in a crisis situation, will not be deterred by threat of reprisal (Spring and Anderson
If they possess nuclear weapons, they might become even more aggressive in their regions out of confidence that the United States would not go to war against them. In fact, North Korea declared that it tested nuclear device on October 9, 2006, posing even more serious threat worldwide.

Secondly, it has been pointed out that the threat after the Cold War has shifted from direct confrontations between nation states to "asymmetric" threats from lesser actors such as terrorist groups, religious cults and individuals. International terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist network regard the United States and its allies and friends as inveterate enemies and have waged war against them with terror attacks. Possession of WMD by such actors is one of the newest and worst fears confronting world society.

The third source of threat, though of less concern, arises from the established nuclear powers, notably Russia and China. The United States has been concerned with economic problems and political instability in Russia. A conservative US think tank, the Heritage Foundation, pointed out that Russia's fragile political situation could lead either to a breakdown in the chain of command controlling its arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs or to a renewal of
hostile relations with the United States (The Heritage Foundation 1999). The current Putin regime has been stable, and it was once cooperative with the United States. But concern still exists, especially since revelation of the confrontation between Russia and the United States over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline from the Caspian to the Mediterranean Sea. Responding to the Bush administration's announcement in June 2007 that it would deploy its missile defense system in Europe, President Putin expressed strong opposition and even threatened countermeasures. Putin has repeatedly mentioned Russia's possible withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, and in December 2007, Russia dropped compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which restricts deployment of non-nuclear arsenals. In 2008 the Bush administration initiated a plan to deploy its MD in Poland and the Czech Republic, which has aggravated its relation with Russia.

Meanwhile, although the US government and its allies have avoided directly referring to China, national security experts and scholars have been quite explicit about their concerns (Japanese Diet 2006, House of Councilors). They point to China's gradual military modernization, especially
the development of ballistic missiles, which is transforming military geography and making US bases there vulnerable. China also substantially improved the accuracy of its missiles over an eight-month period, a feat that took the United States and the Soviet Union 25 years to accomplish (Bracken 1998). Despite the facts that no one knows the actual size of China's strategic forces (estimates vary from seven to twenty ICBMs and from 225 to 1,000 nuclear warheads) and that Beijing appears to be focusing on its economic development, "the very uncertainty of China's future is a cause of concern" (The Heritage Foundation 1999). Besides, China is regarded as a major supplier of missile-related materials (Ogawa 2000). China has reportedly been increasing its military spending more than 10 percent annually, and the uncertain nature of the expenditure has itself been a matter of grave concern.

Critics of missile defense argue that such threats are overstated. One critic argues that the threat confronting the United States from ballistic missiles was much greater in the mid-1980s than in the post Cold War environment (Cirincione 2000). The Rumsfeld Report was criticized for assessing what ballistic missile threats were "possible," not what threats were "likely" (Gronlund and
Wright 1998). Critics supported the 1995 NIE and 1996 government intelligence assessments that progressing from short to medium range missiles would require a major leap in technology, and an immediate threat to the United States would not emerge in the next 15 years (Cirincione 1997; 2000). They also argue that North Korea is not in a position to constitute a threat to either the United States or even neighboring states, since it has no economic base to support the development of its missile programs (Wang 2000). As of the fall 2008, thirteen years after the NIE warning, it seems that the ballistic missile threat has spread around the globe, but is not yet critically imminent.

There is debate on this point, however. Perception of threat is a matter of judgment, and depends on politics as much or more than technology. The emerging threat of ballistic missiles to international security is still debatable, although

2. Technological Feasibility

Behind the recent missile defense debate, there is recognition that technological development has finally made "shooting a bullet with a bullet" possible. One MD advocate simply declared, "the technology is ready" (Spring 2000).
The feasibility of "hit-to-kill" missile technology "was proven in a series of successful intercept tests in 1999" (Spring and Anderson 2000). Following the reportedly successful first intercept test on 15 July 2001, the Bush administration has conducted missile defense experiments in an incremental manner. Nonetheless, MD proponents' optimistic pronouncements remain to be proved. The two intercept tests prior to the first success were miserable failures. This undercut confidence in the system's feasibility, leading President Clinton to postpone the program. Even the seemingly successful interception in October 1999 was in doubt, due to indications that an object other than the target momentarily distracted the interceptor (prior to this test, the success rate of interception had been just two hits in sixteen attempts). Opponents of MD contended that it was a "rush to failure" to decide on deployment of such systems without enough testing (Cirincione 1998). Moreover, they argued that even the widely deployed short-range missile defense system, the Patriot system, had a remarkably low success rate in the Gulf War despite the fact that it had a perfect test record (17 hits in 17 tests) before the war (Lewis, Postol and Pike 1999). Indeed, it was pointed out that ballistic missile
defense would be far more difficult than shooting down a bullet with a bullet. The speed of a typical bullet is about Mach 2.5 while "an incoming warhead moves at Mach 6 and more" (Hermetz 2001, 363), though a warhead is far larger than a bullet.

Other than the feasibility problem, there are a number of technological issues. With regard to the terminal phase, the upgraded Patriot surface-to-air missile (PAC-3) is nearly an entire system redesign, intended to intercept tactical ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. As of March 2005, it was reported that ten out of twelve tests had been successful, and the Japanese government regarded the reliability of the PAC-3 system as sufficient to announce that Japan would begin deployment in 2006. However, the utility of the PAC-3 terminal phase system against high-speed Nodong missiles is unknown. The issue of wreckage remains to be discussed as well.

As for the midcourse defense system that Japan aims to introduce, the Aegis-launched SMD system succeeded in six out of seven tests. Some critics, however, pointed out that these should not be counted as successful tests since they were merely checking out the radar system, confirming the separation of kinetic interceptor from the rocket, and
guiding and controlling the interceptor in space. They were not tests for actual intercepts but a kind of pre-test for intercept tests. This was compared to taking swinging practice and hitting tossed balls before beginning actual batting practice (Japanese Diet, House of Councilors 2005b). The sixth test was legitimate and successful in destroying a target, but the successful interception was conducted at an altitude of 137 kilometers. Some discounted the result, since the Nodong ballistic missile would actually be engaged as high as 300 kilometers above the ground.

Plans for interception during the midcourse phase have attracted the most technological criticism, emphasizing the availability of countermeasures. Critics argue that even if MD were now technically feasible on the test range, the attacker "would be able to take straightforward steps to defeat this system" (Lewis, Gronlund and Wright 2000). A number of authors have pointed to a variety of possible countermeasures: submunitions, decoys, cooled shrouds, chaffs, aerosols, and so on (Cirincione 2000; Lewis, Postol and Pike 1999; Garwin 1999; Mendelsohn 1999; Lewis and Postol 1997).

Furthermore, some opponents of MD also argue that emphasizing MD systems is meaningless because "rogue" actors
would likely deliver WMD by means other than ballistic missiles, such as suitcases, vans, trucks, small civilian airplanes, container ships, cruise missiles, subway cars, and so forth (Cirincione 2000; Mendelsohn 1999; Gronlund and Wright 1998). Such means are less expensive, and easier to covertly develop and deploy (possibly enabling attackers to evade retaliation), more reliable, accurate, and effective than ICBMs (Krepon 2003, 80). In fact, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks were conducted by way of the nearly unthinkable but well prepared hijacking of four commercial airplanes full of fuel. The actual weapons of the terrorists were said to be box cutters.

As for the countermeasure argument, MD supporters respond that a properly designed system "should be able to anticipate and neutralize potential countermeasures" (Spring and Anderson 2000). However, MD critics refer to the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, arguing that, "it is far easier and cheaper to deploy simple and effective countermeasures against defenses than it is for the defenses to respond" (Cirincione 1997). Therefore, "each move drives up the defender's costs much further than it does the attacker's" (Bracken 1998). As for other means of delivery, MD advocates object to "putting all defense eggs in one
basket." That is, it is not right to just give up "simply because missile defense is not a panacea" and to leave people utterly vulnerable to this particular type of attack (O'Hanlon 1999). They condemned the Clinton Administration's reluctance to support MD deployment, contending that the danger of ballistic missile stems not only from the spread of these destructive weapons but also from the policy of purposeful vulnerability to these weapons. "Long-range ballistic missiles are the only weapons against which the Clinton Administration has decided, as a matter of policy, not to field any defense" (Spring and Anderson 2000). This remark is relevant and closely related to the moral aspect of the debate, which will be mentioned later.

While some MD advocates support a total missile defense shield (boost phase, mid-course phase and terminal phase) (The Heritage Foundation 1999; Canavan 1999), others support boost phase defense for technology-oriented reasons (Postol 2000; Garwin 2000; Green 1997). Boost phase defense is designed to intercept ballistic missiles while their rocket engines are still burning, and "their target size for radar is largest before the separation of booster rockets" (Hughes 2004, 184). Still in the midst of acceleration, they are slow and emit high heat, so they are easily detected.
Moreover, the intercept occurs within the enemy's territory, and there is no worrying about debris fallout. Another merit of boost-phase defense is that it can be carried out before enemy missiles launch decoys and other countermeasures. Supporters of this system argue that a boost phase interceptor system involves mainly proven technology, unlike the mid-course intercept system formerly proposed by the Pentagon, with its susceptibility to countermeasures. Ballistic missiles are said to be perfect weapons for a surprise attack (Nose 2007. 82). A serious problem with boost phase systems, as well as with mid-course interception, is that operational time-constraints become acute; for instance, a Nodong missile would reach Japan in ten to fifteen minutes after launch. Therefore detection and communication technologies are crucial. Also, a boost phase system would require deployment of Aegis warships in the Sea of Japan, but the decision to intercept would have to be made within minutes of detecting a launch. In March 2007, the Japanese government decided to authorize an onsite commander to launch intercept missiles at his own judgment in case of a missile attack.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration has pursued a comprehensive MD system after all, following a "spiral
approach" of incremental development as dictated by technological advances. Flight tests have been steadily conducted, showing significant development in intercepting ballistic missiles. The PAC-3 tested on July 2007 successfully intercepted a subscale aircraft target that had electronic countermeasures. Also, on December 2007 Japanese Kongo Aegis destroyer launched a Standard Missile (SM)-3, which are to be employed in the SMD system, and successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target. This was "the first time a non-US ship fitted out with the Aegis BMD system was able to intercept a ballistic missile target" (Center for Defense Information 2008).

3. Cost Analysis

In the United States the merits of NMD were vigorously debated during various periods (from 1967 until 1972, in the early 1980s, and since 2001). On the contrary, the costs of TMD were little discussed, mainly because TMD development was only at the early stage of assessing specific technologies. NMD had far greater strategic importance from the US perspective, while TMD was not clearly defined; for instance, whether it should protect only US forces deployed abroad, or allies and friends also.
The cost would depend on the definition (Morimoto and Takahashi 2002, 306).

The United States has spent well over 100 billion dollars on missile defense since the mid-1950s. A large portion of the money (44 billion dollars) went to SDI from 1983 to 1993. Since 1993, around 3.5 billion dollars has been devoted to NMD annually (O’Hanlon 1999; Cirincione 1997). A wide variety of estimates for MD implementation have been presented: from two to three billion dollars by upgrading Aegis destroyers and cruisers with antimissile interceptors, to 60 billion dollars for the deployment of an NMD system, to 116 billion dollars over 20 years to deploy, support and operate MD systems (Cirincione 1997).

As a matter of fact, missile defense advocates tend to favor lower estimates, while critics are inclined to employ analyses based on much higher costs. The Heritage Foundation study argued that an affordable and effective system would be possible in four years for eight billion dollars or less (The Heritage Foundation 1999), while critics pointed out that there were no official cost estimates for a long-term comprehensive MD system (Lewis, Gronlund and Wright 2000). Moreover, defining a system as expensive or not depends on subjective judgments. For
example, the average annual expenditure of 3.5 billion dollars on NMD elicited varying responses. It appears cheap when compared with the 1999 national defense budget of the United States (only 1.2 percent of 292.1 billion dollars). But it appears very expensive at more than the half the 6.8 billion dollar budget for the 2005 Head Start program, which provides comprehensive education, health, nutrition, and parental involvement services to more than 905,000 low-income children and their families (Administration of Children and Families 2006). It seems inexpensive when compared to the annual cost of the US air traffic control system (6 billion dollars), but not so cheap when compared to US foreign military financing program (3.5 billion dollars). In any event, now that the current Bush administration has adopted a "spiral approach" and "strategic ambiguity" with no published plan for specific MD systems, it is difficult to debate the real costs.

Missile defense costs and budgets have also been the subjects of debate in Japan. However, since the government maintained that it was only at an early stage of studying specific technologies, estimated costs were not presented, and discussion on MD costs did not develop to any extent. The Japanese government appropriated modest annual expenses
for investigation, spending 15.6 billion yen (141.8 million dollars) from 1999 to 2003 for the joint study with the United States on TMD technologies. After the decision in December 2003 to develop JMD, the government has provided an estimated 800 billion to 1 trillion yen (7.3 to 9.1 billion dollars) for the development and deployment of Aegis SMD and PAC-3 ground-based terminal missile defense systems by 2011.

4. International Political Environment

A missile defense protecting a state's own territory and people from hostile ballistic missiles, possibly carrying WMD, is purely defensive in theory. What sort of defensive measures the state should take is also a domestic matter. No other country should interfere in this, as long as the principles of equality of state sovereignty and nonintervention in internal affairs hold from an international legal perspective. Nevertheless, deployment of MD systems by the United States will have a grave impact on existing arms control regimes, and therefore, it is of serious concern for other states. By the same token, JMD will affect the complex international political situation in East Asia. This region is "one of the most dynamic and potentially unstable ... in the world today, yet the
security institutions that are available to manage tensions are scattered, weak or non-existent" (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama 2002, 69).

The largest obstacle to deployment of US MD systems was the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union from building nation-wide missile defense systems. The signatory powers to the treaty were redefined in the 1997 New York Agreements, and four former Soviet republics formally replaced the USSR (McCarty 2003). Since the other three republics transferred their nuclear weapons to Russia and became NPT signatories as non-nuclear states, Russia in effect became the sole successor to the Soviet Union for purposes of the ABM Treaty. Some MD advocates contended that the treaty was no longer valid because the Soviet Union had ceased to exist (Spring 2000). In addition, they justified withdrawal from the treaty by pointing to a number of Soviet and Russian violations of the treaty in the past (The Heritage Foundation 1999). Other MD supporters recommended a partial amendment of the treaty, considering the importance of cooperation with Russia (Garwin 2000).

The US government has asserted that its MD is purely defensive against ballistic missiles and poses no threat to
other countries, and therefore it does not affect the strategic balance with other nuclear powers. In theory, US MD can be consistent with a mutual defense emphasis (MDE). However, the international political reality is not in favor of such a unilateral assumption. In practice, US deployment of its missile defense is just beginning and its posture remains offense dominant. In addition, there is nothing mutual about the initiative, since the other major nuclear powers lack missile defense systems. MDE and international stability can only be realized if all the major states agree and recognize the United States MD program as purely defensive. However, Russia and China have explicitly and repeatedly opposed it and warned that they could build up their offensive nuclear forces to overcome such an MD shield. Even US allies in Europe have not been cooperative. The Australian government has supported US MD, but is hesitant to allow US forces use of its territory for MD. In February 2005 the Prime Minister of Canada, Paul Martin, announced that it would withdraw from the MD program. The current Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, has been cautious about the decision, but the Canadian people in general have opposed participation. These two states had been expected to host MD radar sites, and their decisions will have a significant
impact on US MD. Only friends of the United States in East Asia, notably Japan and Taiwan, have shown positive support for the US plan. Above all, the crucial actors are Russia and China, nuclear powers positioned outside the US alliance.

Although Russia showed flexible but inconsistent reactions to the US proposal to review the ABM Treaty (Russia has even indicated its interest in joint defense with the United States), it basically opposes the US MD plans. Russia worries about long-term consequences of the program, which is limited at present but could be expanded in the future, possibly even nullifying Russian strategic nuclear forces at some point. Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, questioned the rationale of NMD, which risks "serious deterioration in Russia-US relations, global strategic stability, and, ultimately, US security" (Ivanov 2000).

The Bush administration claimed that the ABM treaty did not fit the post Cold War environment in which the United States must face the new and imminent threat of ballistic missiles from "rogue" states and terrorists. Despite the opposition of many countries, the United States declared its withdrawal from the ABM treaty in November 2001. President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, then in need of Bush's
cooperation in dealing with his own problems with Chechen terrorists, reacted softly to the US decision, but he called it a "mistake" that could destabilize the strategic balance. As mentioned earlier, Putin has been skeptical toward Bush's intention in deploying MD in Europe.

MD critics believed that any amendment of the treaty would cause fundamental changes compromising the security benefits the treaty provided (Lewis, Gronlund and Wright 2000; Gronlund and Lewis 1999). That is, a revision allowing even a limited MD shield would undermine the assumption of MAD. Russia might perceive that MD could provide the United States a capability to initiate a first strike with its enormous offensive nuclear forces and also to absorb a retaliatory nuclear attack from Russia, which would have already been weakened by a massive and accurate US first strike. Logically, this scenario is destabilizing. This would lead Russia to build up offensive nuclear forces to overcome the US missile shields.

Though not a party to the ABM Treaty, China has been consistently and adamantly opposed to amending the treaty as well as to the US MD program. The US MD plan would have a direct impact on Chinese nuclear forces. Even a limited MD system would become a serious problem for China, since it
has only a limited number of strategic nuclear missiles deployed (Van Ness 2000). This would undermine China's current nuclear deterrence strategy (Wang 2000; Yan 1999). Many Chinese suspect that the US MD plan is intended to counter China's strategic forces. "Despite its well-established ballistic missile program, China is apparently less confident in its ability to overcome future defenses" (McMahon 1997, 79). In fact, though no government has clearly mentioned the "China threat," some scholars have been explicit about the efficacy of MD against the threat from Chinese ballistic missiles (Ogawa 2000; Green 1997). "Viewed from Beijing, an East Asian TMD looks like a new multilateral security alliance against China" (Van Ness 2002, 145). China is particularly sensitive to the issue of TMD in the East Asia region because of the possible involvement of Taiwan, which may give an illusion of safety and provide a strong incentive for the Taiwanese to pursue independence. China will not tolerate this, since Taiwan is of supreme national interest to China, and it would be too costly and dangerous for the United States and its allies to encourage the Taiwanese and provoke the Mainland Chinese (Christensen 2000; Wang 2000). Consequently, MD critics, especially Chinese scholars, believe that US MD would upset the
regional military balance and undermine existing arms control regimes (Gu 2000; Zhang 1999; Hong 1998). It is reported that China has already been preparing countermeasures such as electronic jamming equipment and decoys for its ballistic missiles (Kaneda et al. 2006, 62).

Some MD proponents argue that a defense-oriented military posture with MD systems, rather than an offense-oriented one, will contribute to global and regional stability (Canavan 1999; Ding 1999; Krepon 1999). Nevertheless, with all the assurances that the US MD plan is not aimed at Russia or China, both states are deeply skeptical about the intentions of the United States. In such circumstances, a decision by the United States to pursue a missile defense system, especially when made unilaterally, could destabilize the strategic relationship with Russia and China and trigger renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons and a ballistic missile arms race (Mendelsohn 1999; Lewis and Postol 1997).

Critics of JMD have criticized Japanese participation in the US MD plan, maintaining that JMD will destabilize strategic relations in the East Asia region. First, they believe that a defense shield will make Japan more confident and more militarily ambitious (Hong 1998). Second, they
suggest that TMD can be both defensive and offensive. The essential elements of ballistic missiles and most TMD systems are similar, and the differences between them are only in their warheads (Yan 1999). The point is that the difference between defense and offense depends on the intension of the Japanese. Third, because Japan and the United States are close allies, it would not be ridiculous for MD critics to connect JMD with US offensive capability. The forces combined could constitute a significant war-fighting capability in the region. The Chinese government has repeatedly objected to the JMD program, as well as US MD, which it regards as a sign of the revival of Japanese militarism and as part of the strategic enlargement of US forces in the East Asia region. As detailed in Chapter Two, this requires careful distinctions between offense and defense and analysis of the relationships between them.

5. Japanese Domestic Issues

The Japanese government takes the position that the missile defense issue is an operational level matter in the MOD and SDF, and thus claims that it is not necessary to consult the Diet and ask for approval. However, JMD has led to various debates on Japanese domestic issues: the issue of
exercising the right of collective self-defense, the conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Export, the balance with the parliamentary resolution on the peaceful use of space, and so on.

First, as reviewed in Chapter Three, the Japanese government has interpreted the Constitution as not inhibiting Japan from possessing the Self Defense Forces, which it regards as totally defense-oriented. However, the Constitution does prohibit participation in collective self-defense, the most obvious example of which would be to participate in US military operations abroad as an ally. The position publicized by the government is that, "the exercise of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country. The government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, permissible under the Constitution" (Japan Defense Agency 2005). Especially after President Bush announced the unification of NMD and TMD in favor of integrated boost, midcourse and terminal defense segments, Japan's cooperation with US efforts to shoot down ballistic missiles might be regarded as a "use of collective self-defense" (Sakaue 2004,
Furthermore, some argue that on a regional level the actual operation or even deployment of a missile defense system may make cooperation with not only the United States but also South Korea or Taiwan inevitable. The Japanese government has countered the criticisms, contending that defending its own territory does not conflict with collective self-defense and that JMD systems will be applied within the independent right of self-defense. Meanwhile, the recent argument for boost-phase defense was more problematic, because it is very difficult to judge, within minutes of detection, whether the launched ballistic missile is aimed at Japan or another country. And that is exactly the reason why the Japanese government has excluded a boost-phase defense from JMD options.

Second, the possibility that Japan's TMD technology could be transferred to South Korea or Taiwan would violate the Three Principles on Arms Export, which prohibits the export of weapons. The Three Principles, declared in April 1967, stated that Japan is not allowed to export weapons to: (1) communist countries; (2) countries to which exporting weapons is prohibited by United Nations resolutions; and (3) countries that actually are, or are likely to be, involved in international conflict. In February 1976, the Japanese
government announced its unified view on this issue, which stated that in addition to the three exclusions above, Japan would abstain from exporting weapons to "any other" country. However, in January 1983, following ardent requests from the United States, Japan decided to open the way for the transfer of its military technology to the United States as an exception to the Three Principles. As of 2001, Japan had decided to transfer to the United States twelve types of military-related technology.\textsuperscript{1} Therefore, it is considered that the joint study of MD with the United States does not legally violate the principles, and that this issue would arise only if a project involved a third country. The Japanese government has argued that the transfer of a missile defense system is only a future possibility, which cannot be discussed right now. This had been the basic position of the Japanese government before it decided to move forward with development in December 2004. The

\textsuperscript{1} Such technology includes: technologies related to portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), technology for the construction of US naval vessels, technology for remodeling US naval vessels, technology related to support fighters (F-2), technology related to the digital flight control system (DFCS) to be installed on the P-3C, technology related to joint research on a "ducted rocket engine," technology related to joint research in "advanced steel technology," technology related to cooperative modification of the "ACESII ejection seat," "advanced hybrid propulsion technology," and technology related to cooperative research for the F-2 system (Japan Defense Agency 1998 and 2001).
government has been quite clear on the distinction between the stages of 'study', 'development' and 'deployment' of a JMD system, and it has cautiously avoided any argument regarding future stages.

Third, the deployment of SMD, the formerly planned upper-tier TMD system, may violate the 1969 Diet resolution that called for peaceful use of outer space. In May 1969, a plenary session of the House of Representatives declared that development and use of any objects and rockets launched into space are to be limited to peaceful use. Following this resolution, Japan pledged that it would not deploy offensive weapons in outer space, although Japan has reserved the possibility of developing a spy satellite to collect and transmit information for the purpose of national security. After the "Taepodong shock" of 1998, Japan introduced "information satellites," but their operations are under the control of the cabinet, not JDA, to support the claim that they are not "spy satellites" that can be used militarily. Also, their visual resolution was intentionally restricted to one square meter, instead of a militarily effective level of some square centimeters. The "peaceful use of outer space" pledge has been included in Japan's basic national defense policy. Here the term "space" is defined as the area
above the atmosphere, and the Diet resolution would contradict the joint study of SMD technology that aims at mid-course intercept of incoming ballistic missile above the atmosphere. The Japanese government has responded to the criticisms, maintaining that the 1969 Diet resolution should be revised to permit purely defensive activities including the planned SMD, because of recent technological developments and emerging threats.

Outside the Diet, JMD supporters have found several other merits in Japan's missile defense program. First, JMD supplements the US extended nuclear deterrence strategy in coping with threats from rogue states, and therefore Japan need not possess its own nuclear force to counter them (Green 1997). This argument has to be assessed carefully. The expected deterrence effect of JMD is "deterrence by denial," which is quite different from "deterrence by punishment," which has been supplied by the US "nuclear umbrella." If JMD is positioned as a supplement to the umbrella, the combined forces will represent a significant war-fighting capability for Japan and the United States.

Second, JMD may help the Japanese defense industry, which can also have a positive spin-off effect for the general Japanese economy (Morimoto et al. 1998). This
argument is not a major one. However, not only JMD proponents but also those Japanese who have benefited from the development of military technology believe that various technologies developed from missile defense programs can be applied by the private sector in civilian fields, and should contribute to Japan's technological and economic development. For instance, in the latter half of the 1950s Japan was licensed to produce Lockheed F-104 fighters. Production essentially relied on Lockheed's capabilities, but the Japanese learned many things in the process. For example, techniques for converting and molding aluminum allowed innovations in disc brakes for bullet trains.

Third, a number of arguments, including those from the MOD itself, point out that Japan's decision would help improve its relationship with the United States (Japan Defense Agency 1999). A major reason why Japan favored TMD was that "if such a system were to be put in place, participation would strategically link Japan even more tightly with the United States" (Van Ness 2002, 144). In fact, there exists very little discrepancy between the two governments in the recognition of imminent ballistic missile threat and of the necessity to build a defensive system against it. The cooperative relations of the two have been
quite consistent and deliberately maintained. The current joint study, development and deployment of MD systems may contribute to strengthening the alliance, which has been occasionally shaken by incidents mentioned earlier.

Japanese who advocate JMD from this viewpoint have tended to fear "abandonment" by the United States that might injure the alliance, and the possibility that United States might look to other powers in the region, such as China. On the contrary, critics of JMD fear that Japan could be "entrap ped" by the alliance with the United States and dragged into military conflicts elsewhere (The Stanley Foundation 1999). In any case, JMD will be, in essence, "a weapons system that cannot function without the active cooperation of the United States" (Hughes 2004, 187).

Nevertheless, it seems that the argument for prioritizing the alliance with the United States misses the point. A more logical approach would begin with the premise that the alliance must be a part of a grand strategy to promote the national interest, so one should first seek to identify the national interest. The issue of maintaining the alliance should be secondary.
6. Moral Considerations

Other than the five dimensions focused on above, it should be noted that an underlying element in the debate on missile defense belongs to the philosophical or moral spheres. An important rationale for the development and deployment of MD systems was the recognition that Americans could no longer tolerate leaving their people vulnerable to ballistic missile-based WMD that have significantly proliferated in the Third World. The "Star Wars" program, started in 1983, included recognition of this danger, and post-Cold War argument for MD gave emphasis to Third World threats (Fitzgerald 2000). The moral argument holds that, if the technology is ready, it is wrong to maintain current policy, which depends on a MAD policy based on Cold War politics and technology. For MD advocates, the threat is real enough that even if technology cannot provide a perfect defense, if expected costs of development are high, or if other states argue against it, "No Americans should be left defenseless in the event of missile attack" (Spring and Anderson 2000). From this perspective, differences over threat assessment, technological feasibility, cost, international political environment, and domestic politics, should be weighed in light of the moral imperative of
protecting the American people.

The Japanese public is divided over the issue of JMD. While most major Japanese newspapers have recommended that the US take a cautious approach in its pursuit of national missile shields, particularly taking into account its relations with Russia, their responses to the issue of Japan's own missile defense have been more sharply divided. *Yomiuri Shinbun*, a rather conservative newspaper with the largest circulation in Japan, expressed immediate support for Japan's participation in the US MD program (*Yomiuri Shinbun* 2003). *Sankei Shinbun*, known as a particularly conservative publication, also argues for JMD. Their specific emphases are on the emerging threats of ballistic missiles and the advantage of basing deterrence (deterrence by denial) on MD systems (*Sankei Shinbun* 2003). On the contrary, *Asahi Shinbun*, a relatively liberal newspaper with the second largest circulation, has argued strongly against Japan's missile program. *Asahi* has raised concerns about technological feasibility, costs, and a possible regional arms race, should JMD be deployed (*Asahi Shinbun* 2003).
International conflict resolution can take one of two courses: a war cycle or a peaceful settlement cycle. This dichotomy coincides with the dual Japanese identities and the theoretical concepts categorized and analyzed in this work.

On the one hand, realists see international relations in terms of conflicting values and goals. Methods to be used are selected primarily according to considerations of national interest and effectiveness; and their approaches tend to be unilateral. Interests are often competitive and zero-sum, making threats and coercion a regular part of the process of interaction, and when other methods of pursuing self-interest fail, force is the ultimate arbiter. Accordingly, when an international security issue comes up, realist reactions can lead to armed confrontation. Heightened tension may result in a stable balance of power or war. Given that worldview, realists may regard JMD as a part of military strategy in which JMD becomes an actual shield against ballistic missile attacks in war.

On the other hand, pacifists see the realist preoccupation with competition and conflict as a cause of
unnecessary danger. From this perspective, an emphasis is placed on the importance of maintaining mutual trust and confidence in relationships with others. Their approaches are therefore multilateral. They view interests as often competitive but still compatible and non-zero-sum, so that maximizing their own interests may allow others to maximize theirs as well. They regard threats and coercion as inappropriate. Underlying norms should govern interaction of states, and the ultimate goal is mutual agreement serving all parties. Hence when an international security issue arises, pacifist approaches emphasize negotiation rather than coercion. This leads to the pursuit of arms control (MAD, emphasizing offense and deterrence by punishment, or MDE, emphasizing defense and deterrence by denial) and disarmament. Peaceful settlement can be facilitated through implementation and establishment of legitimate international regimes. From a pacifist perspective, if Japan puts a pronounced emphasis on defense and builds a JMD system, JMD will not play a role in war with other states but instead become a shield against extraordinary incidents such as the accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles. Limited defenses against such threats can provide a chance to establish "a cooperative defensive transition as an
ultimate arms control objective" (Goldfischer 1992, 171).

The realist approach to international security can trap Japan into unacceptable risk and danger. The pacifist approach may be a favorable option. Then, within the peaceful settlement cycle, one wonders whether the Japanese should choose offense (MAD) or defense (MDE). Here, the distinction between offensive realism and defensive realism is useful. As mentioned in Chapter II, offensive realists are prone to adopt unilateral strategy and an offensive posture for the state. Defensive realists see the state as seeking its survival and security, not necessarily territorial expansion. An emphasis on defense and reduction of offensive weapons will serve the national interest of the state, and lead to a status quo of stability in international society. Defensive realist approaches and MDE can be useful.

If we choose to live in the MAD world, there will be no need for missile defense. However, people have been losing faith in MAD since the end of the Cold War. The assumption of human rationality has become shaky with the emergence of apparently irrational leaders of "rogue" states and international terrorists. President George W. Bush is an example of a leader with little faith in rational behavior.
by other countries, and that was the exact reason he strongly promoted MD, along with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001.

MAD has a long history of debate. It has been severely criticized in terms of its logical bases, lack of evidence for its effect, questionable morality, and so on. The purpose of the nuclear forces the superpowers established at vast cost was not to use them. According to the Japanese scholar, Iwata (1996, 41), "We must not attempt to survive nuclear war, and we must be prepared to die once it breaks out, then we do not have to die. This is an insane logic." Political scientists Samuel Huntington and Stanley Hoffmann put it in different way, stating that the significant element for maintaining deterrence is "fear" that deterrence may not work in case of a crisis (Carnesale et al. 1983, quoted in Iwata 1996, 42). MAD advocates have at times claimed that nuclear weapons have been a major contributor to avoiding a global war. But crucial problems are, as Jervis pointed out, "the lack of search for supporting evidence" and the fact that "deterrence theory is largely deductive" (Jervis 1979, 301). Keith Payne also argued that the chances for testing nuclear deterrence policies had been too few and unpredictable, and information
about the enemy's decision-making too limited to understand whether nuclear deterrence in fact has prevented war. "The penalty for failure was too high to engage in a conscious testing scheme" (Payne 1996, 7). John Vasquez attacked Waltz's deterrence theory, pointing out that it was based on a faulty causal inference. Following the example of the story of a boy in Brooklyn, Vasquez suggested that deterrence theorists instigated the build-up of nuclear weapons (running down the street waving his arms wildly every day) in order to keep the invisible nuclear war (the elephants) away, and that they (the boy) declare, "See, it works!" (Vasquez 1991). As he asserted, the point is that we do not know, and it is not easy to find out because we try to explain what did not happen. In other words, "For every case of a 'deterrence success', the possibility will thus remain that no deterrence was needed, and that no effect was achieved, that no test was passed" (Quester 1989, 62).

Deterrence theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, argued in favor of a well-managed proliferation of nuclear weapons as the preferable route to world stability (Mearsheimer 1990; Sagan and Waltz 1995). This position is problematic not only because it promotes proliferation of nuclear weapons but also because it
increases chances of nuclear war. The fundamental assumption that has sustained deterrence theory is the rationality of the state, but this has been seriously questioned from psychological, organizational, and moral perspectives. Jervis contends that deterrence theorists "have ignored decision makers' emotions, perceptions, and calculations and have instead relied on deductive logic based on the premise that people are highly rational" (Jervis et al. 1985, 1). Scott Sagan maintains that nuclear deterrence will likely fail, because organizational culture can be disturbed by self-serving organizational objectives, because organizational priorities are conflicting, and because organizational learning with hazardous technologies can be difficult due to strong disincentives against exposing serious failures. "Nuclear weapons may well have made deliberate war less likely, but, the complex and tightly coupled nuclear arsenal we have constructed has simultaneously made accidental war more likely" (Sagan 1993, 264; original emphasis). And finally, "The notion of MAD has been frequently attacked not only as militarily unacceptable but also as immoral since it holds the entire civilian populations of both countries as hostages" (Keeney and Panofsky 1982, 298). This moral argument has been a major
motivation behind missile defense promotion since the 1983 speech of President Reagan.

Consequently, defense (MDE) should be emphasized. It would be recommended that Japan should build JMD on this line of argument. From the pacifist point of view, disarmament should be the ultimate goal, but that goal must also be recognized as difficult to achieve in this realist world. Defensive realist and MDE approaches would be a realistic alternative in the current security environment and an effective middle ground toward the pacifist goal of peace. Arms control stressing defense should be the safe and steady policy as a transition process toward disarmament. Nevertheless, pacifist approaches and MDE are not risk-free. It may be all too easy to disturb the peaceful settlement cycle and bring back the realist war cycle through violence, including preventive or preemptive attacks and terrorism. It will be extremely difficult to pursue a peaceful process in the face of bloody violence that causes pain and death and provokes anger and sorrow which can lead to vengeance. The peaceful settlement cycle is a long, patient, and rugged process, while the war cycle is a rushed, thoughtless, and simple one. The world in which we live may well, in fact, be a realist world. In this international environment with no
authority above national sovereignty, states have acted as they have wanted. This history of war and conflict may be rooted in a fundamentally violent human nature. Ideal peace and nonviolence may be an illusion, since violence easily invites violent reactions. The peace cycle may well be pulled back to the war cycle with a single act of terror. The power of physical violence is enormous, and therefore people may well believe in the realist's concept of peace through stability and balance of power in international relations. And, indeed, most people have been realists behaving as if realist assumptions were true.

Nevertheless, from a constructivist point of view, this is a matter of identity (Namatame 2004). If we treat a state as an enemy, it will become an enemy. More specifically, as Joseph Nye points out, "If the United States treated China as an enemy, it was likely to guarantee itself an enemy, particularly given that nationalism has been rapidly replacing Communism as the dominant ideology among the Chinese people" (Nye 2001, 97). If states believe it is a realist world, it will become a realist world for them. In the words of Alexander Wendt, "whether or not a state's system is anarchic will be determined by the entity with which member states identify with respect to the
performance of their functions, especially security. If states identify only with themselves, so to speak, the system will be anarchic" (Wendt 1996, 47; original emphasis). And they will continue to live in a realist world. Such a world will be created and re-created by realists, based on a "reality" that they themselves create. Realism is what Robert Cox characterizes as "a problem-solving form of knowledge" for dealing with the challenges of preserving one's position in the existing realist order (Cox 1986; 2001, 106).

If one imagines a different world from a realist "reality," there may be a possibility of opening a peaceful settlement cycle. The realist worldview can pose extreme danger in the contemporary world, in which military technology has produced tremendous destructive power. Even a small-scale nuclear war, once begun, would result in enormous death and destruction. Peaceful conflict resolution through the peaceful settlement cycle is necessary.

In the final analysis, Japan may well pursue its own missile system, but it must be cautious and prudent in doing so. JMD faces significant obstacles. First, threat assessment is a matter of perception, and the threat Japan faces at present from the North Korean dictatorship regime
appears real. The China threat, about which some JMD proponents warn, seems remote and quite possibly exaggerated. It is occasionally pointed out that the Cold War bipolar structure was much more stable and less dangerous than today's situation. However, such judgment is only made in retrospect, and in the midst of the Cold War the threat of total nuclear warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union and subsequent nuclear holocaust was real, and even imminent, at various moments. Second, the technological feasibility of JMD is still debatable, though the Japanese government seems quite confident. Technological developments may at some time lead to breakthroughs and overcome current difficulties, but the potential performance of the PAC-3 terminal defense against ballistic missiles is still unknown, and the issue of countermeasures overshadows the Aegis SMD midcourse defense. Third, costs must be considered, but thus far, the cost to develop and deploy JMD, which is estimated to be 800 billion to one trillion yen (7.3 to 9.1 billion dollars), has not disturbed the momentum toward establishing JMD systems. As the detailed components of the system are specified, the cost of JMD will become an important issue. Unless struck by a serious economic decline in the near future, Japan will go forward with missile shields against
current and future threats, for moral considerations hold that the government cannot leave the people vulnerable to nuclear missile attack. Fourth, domestic constraints, such as the Three Principles on Arms Export, may not hold back JMD for long, and they may well be removed by political decisions following development and deployment. As the government has repeatedly stated, in theory, JMD is a purely defensive weapon that should not threaten any other state. Nonetheless, in practice, it is again a matter of perception, and if other states, such as China, see JMD in combination with offensive capabilities of Japan or the United States, they may perceive a strong threat. Japan can restrict its offensive capability, which might favorably affect Chinese perceptions, and the US could also move toward offensive nuclear disarmament and even MDE arms control involving China, Russia and Europe, which could also greatly help resolve "security dilemma" thinking. But, so far, the Chinese and Russians have been highly skeptical toward the intentions of the Japanese and Americans. Consequently, the author finally emphasizes the remaining point, the importance of the international political environment.

The United States under President George W. Bush has vigorously promoted a unilateral and coercive security
policy, including missile defense programs. And the Bush administration's pursuit of missile shields has invited much criticism due to its unilateral character. In fact, it seems that the United States intends to pursue a narrow interpretation of its national interest no matter what other states would argue. US unilateralism became apparent in its abandonment of the ABM Treaty, as well as its intention to withdraw from international regimes such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Kyoto Protocol. Such a "strategic" policy is contrary to the "arms control" approach, which requires bilateral or multilateral collaboration.

The Bush administration has often linked its call for MD to its intention to reduce US offensive nuclear forces. This may well lead to strategic stability on a global scale, if the spirit of arms control and MDE drives it. However, it has not at all convinced the other states concerned. So far, statements by the US government appear only rhetorical because they have been unilateral declarations. Unilateral reduction can be easily turned to unilateral buildup, if the United States deems it necessary, because there exists no restraining mechanism to enforce, verify, or monitor the disarmament effort. Also, the United States has been storing
its nuclear warheads instead of destroying them. It would be quite difficult for unilateral efforts by the United States to be fully trusted by states other than its close allies. The United States needs to shift its approach from missile defense "strategy" to "arms control" and "MDE" in order to maintain stable strategic relationships, especially with suspicious nuclear powers like Russia and China. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 made it necessary for the United States to collaborate with these states and create a coalition against terrorism. This could have changed the future course of MD debates, but it did not. The United States rushed to "wars against terrorism," often ignoring prudent advice from the international community. The Bush administration gained support for its war against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, but the war against Iraq in 2003 invited severe criticisms internationally. The United States in fact defeated the Saddam Hussein's regime, but it failed to prove connections with the al Qaeda terrorist network or to find WMD in Iraq--the two most important rationales for going to the war. Terrorist attacks against US forces have not ceased, and the political and social situations have been far from secure and stable for the
people of Iraq.

Japan's decision to pursue JMD could represent a substantial shift in defense and security policy. From a viewpoint of "strategy," Japan may have shifted its strategic focus from dependence on US deterrent forces to its own active defense; and in an extreme sense, from prevention of war to preparation for war. Japan may have shifted from one kind of deterrence policy to the other. Or, Japan may be pursuing both defense and deterrence at the same time. A succession of JDA Directors has repeatedly claimed that the planned MD would be "independently applied" within the right of self-defense, emphasizing that it would not be applied to defend any other state. However, JMD could also be regarded as a unilateral military buildup from a strategic point of view.

JDA officials have claimed that JMD is purely defensive and poses no threat to neighboring countries, but such a claim is a one-sided assertion and therefore unilateral. It was reported that the Japanese government began to explore the introduction from the United States of Tomahawk Missiles with a range of 1,700 kilometers, which were used for pinpoint attacks in Iraq War. The government has explained that in the case of an enemy's obvious intent
to carry out an imminent missile attack, it was within the limits of self-defense to conduct preemptive attacks against the enemy's missile bases at the a missile launch stage (Ozu 2002, 209). In July 2006, after provocative ballistic missile tests by North Korea, leading politicians, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, explicitly argued for a preemptive attack on North Korean missile sites. The view that justifies preemptive attack for defensive purposes has been official since the 1950s, but the introduction of long-range offensive missiles like the Tomahawk will clearly exceed Japan's national pledge of "exclusively defense-oriented" policy, and other states may even regard it as a nominal cover-up of Japanese militarism.

A strategic shift to include counterforce would end any effort to affirm a purely defensive posture of the Japanese security policy. A Japanese missile shield could be regarded as offensive even though Japan does not possess obviously offensive weapons, particularly if one considers its connection with the offensive capability of the United States. Japan's closest ally has the largest and most sophisticated offensive forces in the world, including a massive nuclear weapon stockpile. The combined force of US offensive forces and Japan's missile defense systems could
constitute a significant war-fighting capability and destabilize strategic relationships in the region. For other states, this capability would increase the prospect of a preemptive and preventive attack, for after the United States launches a massive first strike against an enemy in the region, JMD could absorb the opponent's retaliatory ballistic missile attacks, already depleted by the first strike.

This strategy would not serve Japan's national interest. It is clear that most of the criticisms toward missile defense mentioned earlier are related to views against "strategy" (Krieger 2002). An arms control orientation and MDE should be the answer to these criticisms. If Japan pursues JMD, its arms control orientation must be shared with other states in the region, including China and in a sense even North Korea, so that they would not perceive a threat and that regional stability would be maintained. The current international political environment is not in favor of JMD. For the time being, it will be difficult for Japan to achieve national security by deployment of a JMD system.

The Japanese government should make clear that its intention is MDE. It is not enough just to declare
unilaterally that JMD is defensive; there are a number of measures that Japan can actively take both bilaterally and multilaterally. Japan should encourage other states to believe in its defensive orientation through negotiation and diplomacy. The Japanese government should begin to seek discussions with China, Russia, Britain, France and the United States about a shift from offense to MDE. It should utilize communication channels such as confidence building measures (CBMs), play an active role in peaceful conflict resolution through international organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the United Nations, and promote international security regimes, including inviting and bringing in the reluctant Americans.

In 2001 Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka showed her interest in President Bush's willingness to reduce US offensive nuclear forces while pursuing MD, and this can be a good starting point for the discussion. She stated: "The most important thing in President Bush's announcement is that a major premise for US missile defense is further reduction of [offensive] nuclear weapons" (Japanese Diet, House of Representatives 2001). Unfortunately, Japan's leaders have not adopted this point, and related discussions have been blocked by the government's refusal to answer
important questions. With the government advancing toward development and deployment of JMD, it does not appear that Japan has been considering JMD from arms control and MDE perspectives. Japan is, in fact, in a strong position to pursue MDE since it unmistakably has little offensive capability. Japan possesses no WMD, ICBMs, long-range strategic bombers, or offensive aircraft carriers. Japan has the famous peace constitution, along with many other peaceful constraints, which prohibit Japan from becoming a military power. These constraints include the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the long-standing pledge that Japan's defense expenses in the annual budget will not exceed one percent of GNP, the Three Principles on Arms Export, exclusively defense-oriented policy, participation in a number of international arms control regimes, and so forth. Japan should use its position as leverage for offensive arms reduction in the region, especially in negotiation with China, the regional nuclear power that possesses ICBMs and has reportedly been building up its offensive capability in a dramatic fashion. In addition, Japan should encourage the United States, whose reduction of offensive forces within a multilateral framework would be a key element in helping persuade China and also Russia to join the circle of arms
control and take a step toward MDE. These actions would substantially contribute to regional stability.

The current situation leads to the pessimistic view that realization of MDE is hardly possible in the foreseeable future, seeing that China has adopted policies based on strictly "strategic" thinking (Johnston 1996). China has calmly observed, and in a way made use of, the unilateral behavior of the Bush administration, which has accelerated its realist strategic security policy on a global scale. Nevertheless, within realist dominated world politics, the United States seems to understand that the regional situation in East Asia is unlike other regions. Identifying North Korea as one of the "rogue" states, the Bush administration has adopted a more cautious and multilateral approach to the Kim Jong Il regime than to others, such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

On balance, Japan has taken cautious steps toward both JMD and US MD. While Japan shifted gears toward development and deployment of JMD recently, the government has not accepted the US unilateral MD initiatives entirely, although it has repeated its "understanding" of the US push for national missile shields. Still, seeing that its alliance partner has been quite ardent to develop and deploy
its missile defense system, Japan's "wait-and-see approach" (Urayama 2001) will not allow Japan to escape from the fundamental question for long. Japan should show its willingness to pursue MDE, making its position clear and starting dialogue with the states concerned. This will be a most difficult task, since all the actors must eventually understand and agree on the concept in order to realize MDE. It would be a historic moment in the nuclear age. The shift from MAD to MDE would require a drastic change in existing strategic thinking, not only because the emphasis would be on defense instead of offense, but also because pursuing MDE in the Asia-Pacific region could even mean joint development of missile defense shields by all the major states in the region: the United States, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China (but not Taiwan for the time being, due to the issue of the Chinese sovereignty). Above all, MDE will be the inevitable choice if we wish to escape from the MAD world and promote arms control while the new threat of ballistic missiles and WMD is emerging.

If the Japanese government is not willing to make efforts to achieve MDE, it should stop pursuing missile defense. Unilateral, or even collateral with the United States, development and deployment of a missile defense
system will only invite regional instability and possibly a spiral of offensive and defensive arms race. A unilateral JMD system will provoke antagonism in North Korea, and possible acceleration of its nuclear weapon and missile programs. Skepticism will also grow in South Korea, which may lead to a somehow corresponding counteraction with the North to confront Japan. China will regard it as a revival of Japanese militarism and overtly criticize Japan, justifying its own military buildup. This scenario contradicts the national interests of both Japan and the United States. JMD must be part of the path toward a more stabilized and peaceful international society (Cronin et al. 182). "Indeed, the era of passive Japanese foreign policy has come to an end. Japan is now expected to play a substantial, if not leadership role, in helping to create post-Cold War international order and institutions" (Fukushima 1999, 169).
This study has explored and analyzed the Japanese missile defense program, and explained the development of strategic thinking on ballistic missile threats in Japan's defense and security policy. Nevertheless, it is still unclear if the intention of the Japanese government is to shift its security policy from passive "deterrence" to positive "defense" in a war-fighting strategy, or from MAD "deterrence by punishment" to MDE "deterrence by denial" in the context of arms control. It is also questionable if the embrace of JMD has resulted from thorough review and articulation of national security strategy by Japanese defense policymakers. The author concludes that Japan's "defensive realism" and MDE approach would be a good compromise between the Japanese realist and pacifist identities.

Against the background of suspected nuclear weapons development and possible reckless use by North Korea, the possibility that Japan might go nuclear has been the subject
of considerable conjecture, both domestically and internationally. In October 1999, an undersecretary of the Japanese Defense Agency argued for nuclear armament as soon as he took office, and he was immediately replaced. In June 2002 a senior government official remarked that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles should be revised. After North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles in July 2006, US Senator Sam Nunn, an expert on nuclear issues, revealed in an interview on Cable News Network (CNN) that Japanese officials had told him that Japan would have to develop nuclear weapons if the United States did not step up to protect them.

A process that could not be imagined in the past is under way. More clearly, the Japanese are breaking taboos and weakening the brakes on militarization. Neighboring states have repeatedly warned against Japan's ambitious nuclear policy (Kim 1996). Nonetheless, the prediction by some realist scholars that Japan would move toward nuclear armament has so far been proven wrong. There is no doubt about Japan's capability to develop nuclear weapons, but there is still no sign of actual nuclear armament. In spite of serious causes for concern, such as its plutonium stockpile, Japan has confounded what realist theory
predicted. As for the military capabilities of Japan, despite its having the world's second largest defense budget, and cutting-edge equipment and technologies, Japan's threat to South Korea cannot be compared with the threat posed by North Korea, whose 2000 defense budget was only three percent of Japan's. Even with the ability to develop nuclear weapons, few Japanese look upon nuclear armament as a desirable symbol of international status. The majority still considers nuclear weapons and a strong military force not as sources of wealth and power but as potential sources of enormous danger through the tragic calamity of war.

Japanese postwar defense and security policy has been a product of struggles between the pacifist and realist national identities. Identity is an ideational factor and it cannot by itself thoroughly explain defense and security policy or diplomatic policy. Identity is sometimes overcome by the structural power of international politics and sometimes works itself as a powerful driving force in policymaking. This ideational factor is built and rebuilt, intertwining with other ideational factors and with structural, material ones. The national identity is closely linked to changes in international situations. Compared with the fact that individual perceptions of threat are affected
largely by conflicts or regime changes in neighboring countries, the national identity as a whole--that is, "who and what we the Japanese are" and "what we should do as Japanese"--seems to change to a far lesser degree. At the same time, it is very hard to pull back a mega trend once the national identity shifts in a particular direction, just like movements deep in the earth's crust. Facing the upheavals of post-World War II international politics and confronting a series of threats, the Japanese public's view of national security and security policy have gradually changed.

In Japan, people rarely reach an agreement through debate, and views swing only slightly within a limited range until the situation changes drastically through some major event. Looking back on the postwar era, Japanese domestic political currents have shown a distinctive development though internal dynamics, at the same time largely defined by international circumstances. Political leaders--cabinet members, party leaders, and bureaucrats--shifted in the early stage of the postwar era towards realist policies because of the escalation of the Cold War. However, the general public, including individual citizens, peace organizations and journalists, became attached to pacifist
ideals. Thus, the government has prioritized realist policies in the name of the Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty, while the people have resisted this. For most people, the military buildup and repeated constitutional re-interpretations by the government are seen as a gradual movement toward rearmament. In spite of the domination of the realist LDP in the Diet after World War II, political leaders have not been able to ignore the opposing voice of the pacifist public.

Nevertheless, the pacifist identity has not outstripped the realist identity. After the war, Japan started over under the world's preeminent pacifist constitution, but there has been no country to follow its footsteps, and the international political environment has not led to promotion of its ideals. International efforts towards nuclear disarmament and arms control have not made much progress, and the United Nations has been the stage of realist confrontation between great powers. Global-scale anti-war and anti-nuclear movements have gradually fallen apart. Looking back upon the time right after the war, the confrontation between pacifism and realism in Japanese security policy was centered on issues such as the existence of the right of self-defense and the choice of unarmed
neutralism, and nobody imagined that Japan would send its troops abroad in the future. In contrast, today's debate features discussion on contributing internationally, including military options, and this way of using the Self Defense Forces is already recognized by the public. That is to say, the counterview has shifted from pacifism towards realism in the last 60 years. Lately, even preemptive attacks and nuclear armament are publicly argued for. It can be said that the Japanese political current has departed from the pacifist identity and listed heavily to the realist identity. In other words, "Japan's transition from a norms-based to interest-based defense strategy" (Kliman 2006, 88), bringing "growing realism, frayed idealism" (Green 2001, 6). Hereafter, the national identity of Japan may gradually change like a landscape exposed to the wind and rain of the international security environment, or it may radically change, shaken by the shifts in the crust or giant earthquakes of wars in the neighborhood. As realist scholars have indicated, Japan may someday become a military superpower and, even, eventually a nuclear power.

The warning to the United States from a former Australian Ambassador to the UN, Richard Butler, holds true for JMD:
Research on defense against ballistic missiles could continue ... But a unilateral decision to deploy such a system should not be made unless it becomes clear that others will not join the United States in dealing directly with the threat of nuclear weapons. If the United States does find a reliable way to defeat the threat of ballistic missiles, it should examine the question of how this technology could best serve global safety and stability - by solely national deployment or by deployment shared with others (Butler 2001, 16)

JMD can be a tool of either realist military strategy or pacifist arms control. The author concludes that Japan should choose defensive realism and MDE arms control as a middle way, which may eventually open a pacifist route to disarmament. Japan possesses the world's most sophisticated technology and a tradition of pacifist identity, and because of this, Japan is in a unique and advantageous position. The "wars against terrorism" of the Bush Administration have painted the globe black and white, where rogue states and international terrorists are challenging democracy and freedom. Thus far, few states have completely rejected the United States' claims, no matter how skeptical and reluctant. There is a great opportunity to promote arms control and MDE: building missile shields against rogue and terrorist missile attacks or accidental or unauthorized launches, while advancing offensive arms reduction among major states. Japan can and must become a leader in such a shift toward a
less dangerous world.


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JAPAN'S MISSILE DEFENSE

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ABSTRACT

For some years, Japan has pursued its own missile defense system in cooperation with the United States. The Japanese government claims that the missile defense (JMD) program is purely defensive and will not pose a threat to other countries. JMD may seem justified by North Korea's development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. However, neighboring states regarded it as a sign of military ambition and revival of Japan's prewar militarism. The development and deployment of JMD could have grave implications for regional and global security. This dissertation focuses on these implications, domestic and international political considerations and the future direction of Japan's defense and security policy.

After the Cold War, when the superpowers maintained strategic stability with massive offensive nuclear arsenals (mutual assured destruction—MAD), new threats from rogue
states and terrorists have forced us to rethink the credibility of MAD. But attempts to build shields against nuclear ballistic missiles could trigger a new phase of the arms race pitting offensive vs. defensive capabilities. The author argues that defense must be emphasized in order to achieve stability and security (mutual defense emphasis—MDE). Characterization of JMD as truly defensive or not depends on theoretical and strategic viewpoints. The key is the distinction between defense and offense, and whether Japan will emphasize defense, and convince other states that its strategic intentions are really defensive.

For the Japanese, with their dual realist and pacifist identities, JMD can be a tool of either realist military strategy or pacifist arms control. Japan should choose defensive realism, including MDE arms control, as a middle way that may eventually open a pacifist route to disarmament. With the world's most sophisticated technology and a tradition of pacifism, Japan is in a unique and advantageous position to promote arms control.

In pursuit of JMD, the Japanese government should not only promote arms control and MDE—building missile shields against rogue and terrorist missile attacks or accidental or unauthorized launches, but also advance offensive arms
reduction among major states. Japan can and must become a leader in such a shift toward a less dangerous world.