Norm Articulation in International Organizations: Democracy, Governance, and Participation at the UNDP and the World Bank

Roni Kay Marie O'Dell

University of Denver

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Norm Articulation in International Organizations: Democracy, Governance, and Participation at the UNDP and the World Bank

Abstract
Constructivist analyses of international norm articulation assume that norm articulation happens through the process of international discussion and agreement, yet such works lack a rigorous analysis of how international organizations articulate norms for the world internal to the organization. Further, analyses of international organization norm articulation almost completely ignore the important influence of leadership. This dissertation analyzes two distinct norms of gender equality and participation in two international organizations, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. The theory developed here argues that the leader's ability to influence norm articulation is dependent on the organizational culture which reflexively impacts the influence of the leader. Leadership drivers of norm articulation include major speeches, influence over and relationship with organizational Executive Boards, and punishment and reward tactics. In analyzing gender equality and participation, I argue that the two organizations articulated the norms differently based on different logics of governance. The World Bank prioritizes government public service delivery efficiency and effectiveness in achieving development goals, while the UNDP favors civil society empowerment and participation in decision-making procedures and government policies. These logics affect the way the leader is able to articulate the norm and impacts the final articulation into policy and practice for both organizations.

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NORM ARTICULATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, AND PARTICIPATION AT THE UNDP AND THE WORLD BANK

A Dissertation

Presented to

the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies

University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Roni Kay Marie O’Dell

June 2014

Advisor: Professor Timothy Sisk
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Constructivist analyses of international norm articulation assume that norm articulation happens through the process of international discussion and agreement, yet such works lack a rigorous analysis of how international organizations articulate norms for the world internal to the organization. Further, analyses of international organization norm articulation almost completely ignore the important influence of leadership. This dissertation analyzes two distinct norms of gender equality and participation in two international organizations, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. The theory developed here argues that the leader’s ability to influence norm articulation is dependent on the organizational culture which reflexively impacts the influence of the leader. Leadership drivers of norm articulation include major speeches, influence over and relationship with organizational Executive Boards, and punishment and reward tactics. In analyzing gender equality and participation, I argue that the two organizations articulated the norms differently based on different logics of governance. The World Bank prioritizes government public service delivery efficiency and effectiveness in achieving development goals, while the UNDP favors civil society empowerment and participation in decision-making procedures and government policies. These logics affect the way the leader is able to articulate the norm and impacts the final articulation into policy and practice for both organizations.
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUSAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Bank Policy (World Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy (World Bank)</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Common Country Assessment (UNDP)</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Development Framework (World Bank)</td>
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<td>CGAS</td>
<td>Country Gender Assessment Strategy (World Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DGG</td>
<td>Democratic Governance Group (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGTTF</td>
<td>Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
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<td>EMB</td>
<td>Electoral Management Board</td>
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<td>EPTA</td>
<td>Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (UN)</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy (World Bank)</td>
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<td>GDI</td>
<td>Gender Development Index</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GES</td>
<td>Gender Equality Strategy (UNDP)</td>
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<td>GEM</td>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
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<td>GPECS</td>
<td>Global Programme on Electoral Cycle Support (UNDP)</td>
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<td>GRB</td>
<td>Gender Responsive Budgeting</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (World Bank)</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation (World Bank)</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation (United States)</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MIGA</td>
<td>Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (World Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OMS</td>
<td>Operational Manual Statement (World Bank)</td>
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<td>OP</td>
<td>Operational Policy (World Bank)</td>
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<td>OPD</td>
<td>Operations Policy Department (World Bank)</td>
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<td>POPP</td>
<td>Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (UNDP)</td>
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<td>PREM</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (World Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (World Bank and IMF)</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNIHP</td>
<td>United Nations Intellectual History Project</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Why do international organizations articulate governance and democracy norms differently in the policies that guide their projects and programs when those development organizations have similar histories, development foci, and work extensively together on implementation of projects in country settings? This dissertation argues that international organizations pick up norms from various sources (whether they be member states, transnational civil society, norm entrepreneurs, or non-governmental organizations) but that the process of norm articulation happens within the organization in such a way that leadership and organizational culture affect the way the norm is articulated in policy and practice.

In its first stab at governance issues, the World Bank produced a report in 1981 informally called the “Berg Report” named after its main author, Elliot Berg. The report, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, suggested that the economic crises experienced by developing African countries in the late 1970s, and their poor economic performance, was due to inefficient government policies related to macroeconomic instability and corruption in decision-making processes (World Bank 1981). The report shocked many in the developing world because it argued that detrimental state economic policies, rather than exogenous influences, were the cause of economic crises facing Africa. The report led to an era of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) encouraged as loan conditionalities through the Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The report and the Bank practices that it inspired sparked an internal debate within the Bank, but also an external debate over the important characteristics of governance and whether or not international organizations should push governments on particular governance principles. That discussion came to the fore after the disastrous and negative social effects of the SAPs pursued in the 1980s. Another Bank publication that discussed the importance of efficient and effective government policies, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (World Bank 1989), supported the suggestion that government efficiency and correct policies were necessary to achieve development goals.

For the Bank, governance has to do with efficiency and effectiveness of public institutions in providing public goods and services to a population, considering anti-corruption and transparency aspects of public administration of great importance. Based on the analysis in this dissertation, the Bank’s governance norms support neoliberal ideology of limited state intervention and free market efficiency just as it did in the 1980s with the SAPs. This conclusion builds on research studies documenting the infusion of neoliberal economic ideology throughout the Bank’s work (Ayre 1983; Griffin 2009, 9; Hales 2007, 150; Nelson 1995, 115; Pincus and Winters 2002, 9). The Bank promotes governance as governments acting in all their practices, as efficient, effective, and transparent (World Bank 1993; Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2010) with “predictable, open, and enlightened policymaking” (World Bank 1994, vii). Everything that it does in sector and thematic work supports that overarching goal, including in civil society participation and gender equality. Even in recent years the Bank struggles with its impact on the political environment in its member countries. It is now more likely to suggest that
formal or informal power sharing agreements are important in political structures, a characteristic the Bank called “inclusive-enough” governance in its World Development Report (WDR) on conflict (World Bank 2011b). Good governance or inclusive enough governance takes on an apolitical definition for the World Bank which means that governments are efficient, effective, transparent and accountable to citizens (Ager 2000; Cheemma 2003; Grindle 2004, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, 2010).

Yet, in comparison to the World Bank, other international organizations like the United Nations (UN) spend a greater amount of time and resources to encourage states to follow certain accepted democratic governance norms that focus on citizen participation in politics and in the political process of their governments. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Cold War the UN’s advocacy on democracy strengthened, especially through the speeches and statements of the influential Secretary General Boutros Ghali. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) followed and even led in the promotion of democracy through the influence of leaders like William H. Draper III who supported the idea and creation of the human development paradigm which focuses on the freedom of the individual in all aspects of life: political, economic, and social. The human development paradigm and index created in the 1980s at the UNDP contends with a version of development that focuses on macroeconomic and GDP growth. In contrast to economic concerns, the focus on civil society engagement and participation supports the notion that citizens should be directly involved in their governments through voting, engaging in the decision-making procedures of government, holding government accountable, and running for office (Acamoglu and Robinson 2006, 2011; Cheema 2005; Feinberg 2008; Franck 1992; Held 1987, 1995).
The fact that the World Bank emphasizes governance norms of government efficiency in public service delivery while the UNDP emphasizes building democratic institutions as the best way to achieve development goals is puzzling because they work together frequently on development projects in countries, have similar histories, similar member states, and similar benefactors. This is not to say that the World Bank does not work on supporting democratic institutions or citizen participation, they just do it in a different way than the UNDP and vice versa. These two organizations also drive the accepted goals of international development practice evident in their cooperation on creating the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a feat accomplished during the 1990s along with hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and major development organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011; Hulme and Scott 2010; Hulme 2009). Further, they are currently working in solidarity to replace the MDGs when they expire in 2015. For instance, they work together with other United Nations (UN) agencies in the UN System Task Team to discuss and develop new world development goals and targets for the post-2015 development agenda (United Nations Task Team 2012).

The UNDP and World Bank are instrumental in promoting norms to states through their publications and actions. This includes working in specific sectors, like the agricultural and financial sector for the World Bank and tackling issues of corruption in public administration. For the UNDP it means building programs on knowledge sharing, civil society capacity building, and electoral cycle support. It is essential to understand how these organizations articulate norms because of their respective impacts on state policy and programmatic work in states that exhibit different policy outcomes.
This study addresses this puzzle by considering how international organizations articulate new norms that turn into policy and practice, eventually guiding organizational behavior. It asks why similarly placed organizations that pursue similar development goals diverge on the normative frameworks set up to achieve those goals. While the difference in governance promotion between the two organizations may have diminished in recent years just as their polarized support for economic versus human development has minimized (Joshi and O'Dell 2013), it is still puzzling that development organizations articulate policies differently when pursuing similar goals. The study focuses on the development of governance norms in general within the two organizations as well as focusing on two specific governance norms: participatory development and gender equality.

In each of the empirical chapters I ask the following questions of each organization from 1985-2012 in order to flesh out my theory of institutional path-dependence and leadership influence. (1) How did the World Bank and the UNDP articulate norms from 1985 to 2012 in policy documents and outcomes? (2) How did leaders influence norm articulation for governance, gender equality, and participation? I argue that the reason for the difference in norm articulation has to do with the logic of the organization and the reflexive relationship that the leader sets up with the organization throughout his or her tenure. While leaders can have a significant influence on the way that the norm is articulated that is dependent on his or her own ideology, it is still important for leaders to speak to extant organizational culture and beliefs. The articulation of the norm happens in a process of articulation in speeches and statements, feedback and evaluation from the organization, discussion and suggestion on pursuing
norms through punishment and reward, and constraint by organizational processes. Finally, a norm is articulated in policy and publications as a result of leadership influence and the reflexive influence with the organizational culture.

Questioning how governance norms are articulated in international development organizations is important because these organizations have such a critical influence on the way that governments economically, politically, and socially govern their respective societies. International development organizations exercise such influence in a multitude of ways. First, conditionalities on loans require that governments change certain policies or structures conditional to receiving loans. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are well known for their conditionality practices. Secondly, international development organizations provide governments with technical assistance and advice to government officials, impacting the way that they govern. Technical assistance ranges widely. Examples include advice on writing a constitution from the UNDP, or guidance on changing the health care system from the World Bank. Thirdly, international development organizations support civil society organizations (CSOs), encouraging interaction between government and citizens.

This dissertation analyzes the difference in governance policy promoted by the UNDP and the World Bank; the main difference is not in regime type, but in the actors that are the focus of the governance intervention and the extent to which the governance promotion supports democratic principles. The UNDP’s version of governance, self-labeled democratic governance, more explicitly centers on civil society, citizen engagement and inclusion with government. This version of governance focuses on the demand for governance coming from citizens. The World Bank engages with
governments, specifically with the Finance Ministries, and its version of governance focuses to a greater degree on government efficiency, effectiveness and public service delivery while it still has some strong versions of citizen participation and gender equality that contend with the UNDP. The World Bank’s version of governance is often called good governance, good enough governance, or supply-side governance.

Secondly, arguing against the traditional understanding of how international organizations articulate and internalize norms, this dissertation argues that leadership influences the way that organizations articulate governance norms (and thus policies) in a reflexive relationship with organizational culture and processes. That influence is sometimes based on normative preferences of leaders, yet, there is also a clear path of influence that starts with leaders articulating ideas in speeches and statements, and ends with policy outcomes most often stated in strategic plans, operational policy documents or guidance notes. Such documents reflect the reigning logic of governance already developed in the organization’s beliefs and ideology. The more traditional explanations suggests that international organizations pick up their cues from member states or from external forces, and then articulate the norms based on that influence, even if IOs do have some independent capabilities in the relationship with their member states (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984; Schermers and Blokker 1995).

The issue of which governance norms are promoted to states through international organizations is of utmost interest in development circles today because of the debate over what will replace the MDGs. Indeed, the Sustainable Development Goal Review Process is ongoing as I have written this dissertation and will continue until new goals are created to replace the existing ones that expire in 2015. The 2000 MDG conference
included discussions on governance, but so much controversy surrounded it that governance was only placed in the MDGs surreptitiously in goal 7 and 8, calling for environmental sustainability and global partnerships. Yet the Millennium Declaration itself, upon which the MDGs are based, suggested “democratic and participatory governance” as an essential norm of international relations (United Nations September 18, 2000). The idea has not been forgotten and the new goals may yet include targets for governance (United Nations 2012).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NORMS

The theory of norm articulation that relies on the influence of leadership and organizational culture that I develop here does not ignore external influences. Both internal and external forces influence development organizations to articulate norms which turn into policy and practice. The forces work both simultaneously and in relationship with each other. Yet I argue that leadership does indeed have a greater ability to influence the articulation of governance policy in an organization than do outside forces such as member states or civil society. While most studies heretofore focus on the external forces that affect the normative leanings and actions of international organizations, this study develops a concrete theory of the internal forces at work, focusing on organizational culture and individual leadership, while including external variables as important in the analysis.

The following table represents the various forces at work in international organizations on norm articulation. For external forces, the UNDP and World Bank have similar forces working to influence them (albeit for different reasons and in different
ways): epistemic communities, partner development organizations, bilateral capital flows and funding sources, and member countries (194 UN countries with UNDP offices in 174; 188 World Bank member countries).

Table 1.1: Individual and Collective Forces on Norm Articulation

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<th>External Forces</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Collective</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bilateral Funding Sources</td>
<td>• Transnational Epistemic Communities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Influential Member Countries</td>
<td>• Partner Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Forces</td>
<td>• Bureaucratic Leaders and Decision-Makers</td>
<td>• Organizational Culture</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Organizational Epistemic Communities</td>
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The internal forces at work on norm articulation are multitude. For the UN the UN General Assembly (UNGA) influences UNDP policy. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) provides mandates and missions. Policy is created by the Executive Board (36 Representatives) and Executive Bureau (5 Representatives). The UNDP Administrator is head of the UN Development Group (UNDG) which brings the UNDP to work closely with other agencies. The Administrators and Assistant Administrators influence policy formation because of their important positions. Resident Representatives play an important part in implementation and re-articulation of policy. Finally, the Strategic Plan and stated mission of the organization influence policy articulation as well as the culture built around democratic ideals and social goals of development.

For the World Bank internal forces include the Board of Governors (188 Country Representatives) and Executive Board (25 Representatives) who deliberate over policy articulation. The President and Senior Management’s influence is particularly important because of their strong roles in the organization. The Development Committee plays a role in guiding development ideology. The Articles of Agreement guide the structure and
actions of the organization. The International Development Association (IDA) Replenishment Plans, which the Board approves every three years, guides policy, especially in sectoral work. The Operational Policies (OP) and Bank Procedures (BP) guide all policy implementation. Finally, the stated mission and culture influence the way that policy is implemented around the world. Leadership works reflexively with all these variables to articulate norms.

My argument suggests that despite the numerous exogenous and endogenous forces at work on norm articulation, it is leadership and institutional path-dependence that are the best explanation for why the UNDP and World Bank articulate particular norms. External forces matter, but the extent of their influence on the ways that international organizations articulate norms is challenged in this dissertation. This argument suggests that the nature of bureaucracy is fundamental to the changing nature of any organization, but that it does not preclude the ability of leaders to influence and change the direction or influence of the organization.

METHODS

This dissertation uses small-N case-study and complex narrative method as seen most often in Weberian analysis (Della Porta 2008). The study uses the structured focused comparison method, comparing two well known international development organizations on the formation of their respective governance norms are articulated in policies (George and Bennett 2005). The case study is inherently qualitative; the methods of analysis include semi-structured interviews, content analysis, and process tracing.
The UNDP and the World Bank exhibit similarities within the organizational structure, including bureaucratic organization as well as substantive development focus; both the organizations are development funding organizations that have traditionally focused on economic development, technical assistance, and public administration support. These two organizations are in a similar organizational field defined as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (Dimaggio and Powell 1991, 64-65). This is important for the emphasis that the study places on policy analysis. In policy analysis, a problem is addressed or analyzed by considering the policy environment, which includes a policy domain, “the substantive area of policy over which participants in policy making compete and compromise” and a policy community which “consists of those actors who are actively involved in policy making in a particular domain” (Birkland 2001, 95). By choosing these two organizations, I can extrapolate to the larger universe of international development organizations that have a similar history, foundation, structure, and interaction model. In this list I include many UN specialized agencies, and regional development organizations and banks.

The “building block” analysis identifies common patterns within cases and between the variables under study. This helps to theorize about the process of norm articulation and policy creation within an international organization. Studying two cases of the emergence of governance concepts in international organizations in depth reveals much about the particular history, social position (both within the international organization, and of the international organization among the international community),
and complex interactions of actors in the process of articulating norms. It provides an understanding of what happened in a particular place at a particular time and how the actors were purposive in making decisions at the same time that the structure of a system forbade or permitted. The study uses process tracing, document analysis, and interview data in identification of the variables under study.

The interviews for this research project were carried out over a period of approximately one and a half years from May 2012 to December 2013. Interviews were conducted with a variety of individuals. Some currently work with the World Bank and UNDP on policy analysis. I also interviewed individuals in bilateral development organizations who had knowledge of the World Bank and UNDP and had worked with the organizations in various capacities, either through policy engagement or in country level planning and projects. Finally, I interviewed academics who study development organizations. The interviews included open-ended questions under the following categories: (1) Policy process, (2) Leadership influence and impact on policy, (3) Organizational culture, (4) Member state influence on policy, (5) Governance policies and outcomes, and (6) Norm articulation. I have not included any quotes from my interviewees in this dissertation because many of my interviewees were concerned about attribution and the possibility that their quotes would be interpreted in ways that they did not intend, which is a concern for anyone describing political processes.

Finally, the methodology includes content analysis of key policy documents published by both the UNDP and the World Bank. “Content analysis is the intellectual process of categorizing qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities, or conceptual categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables
or themes” (Julien 2008). Content analysis includes considering the words that are used in primary and secondary texts and coding or categorizing those words into meaningful categories in order to attest to what is going on in the context of the situation under study. The analysis of qualitative textual data is an inherently inductive process; however, this study used both a deductive and an inductive process to identify the important words that came out of the text.

**STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTERS**

The main premise in this study is that international organizations are autonomous actors and influence the way that states govern. International organizations do not simply act as functional representatives of states, but have bureaucracies, norms, ideas, idiosyncrasies, and impacts in their own right. The only way that we can understand how they act in this way is to understand the organizational culture and leadership of a particular time and how this interacted with other variables within an organization to explain actions (in this case, norm articulation in policy). Furthermore, this research focuses on governance policies that are prevalent in international relations and with which international organizations are (surprisingly) concerned. This research adds to the literature by further illuminating the internal functioning of international organizations from a sociological standpoint and argues that leadership works in a reflexive relationship with organizational culture to articulate norms.

Chapter one offers a theoretical foundation for explaining the difference in the UNDP and World Bank governance policy outcomes. The theory of leadership influence argues that the leader’s ability to impact norm articulation is dependent on the
organizational culture (i.e., the logic of governance), which reflexively impacts the influence of the leader. Leadership drivers of norm articulation include major speeches and statements, the leader’s influence over and relationship with the Executive Boards of the organization, and tactics of punishment and reward to encourage employees to follow a particular understanding of the norm. International development organizations do not simply adopt norms from member states or from the prevailing agreement on what is right in international politics (i.e., custom). Norms go through an extensive process of formulation through dialogue, discussion in meetings between key leadership and Executive Boards and Boards of Directors, through key leadership statements and speeches, through re-articulation and discussion in lower levels of the organization, and finally into the policy outcomes. Through this reflexive process, governance norm articulation is influenced by the logic of governance that guides the organization, evident in the shared beliefs and values of the organization’s employees developed over time. This process is based on our understanding of how leaders influence organizations and on how organizations themselves act. The basis for my argument that norms reflect internal more than external forces comes from the theory that is detailed in chapter one.

Chapter two then lays the framework for analyzing primary documents and for conducting interviews, arguing that norm articulation is best studied through those two methodologies. It first considers the influence and impact of liberal democracy norms in development during the twentieth century. The importance of such a focus becomes evident when considering the influence of Western states and transnational civil society on international organizations, which many studies have thoroughly examined. What is interesting in these studies is how little they consider the importance of the internal
culture and leaders of international organizations themselves; they assume that international organizations are more susceptible to values and norms from member states (Keohane 1984) or transnational civil society movements (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002) than they are to internal forces. My analysis shows the contrary; that the level of influence that member states and transnational civil society have on international organizations depends heavily on the shared values and beliefs of the organization and its leaders. The chapter develops a typology between two logics of governance, one in which government efficiency in delivering public services to a population is highlighted (most evident in the World Bank), the other in which citizen participation and freedom to engage in government policies and politics is paramount (most obvious in the UNDP). It also develops a framework for the quantitative content analysis used in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter three describes the UNDP and World Bank policy making process in understanding the development of democratic governance for the UNDP and good governance for the World Bank. The analysis shows that the UNDP is much more likely to promote civil society participation in government from the civil society perspective while the World Bank is more likely to promote government efficiency and effectiveness in delivery of public services to a population. The historical overview of both development organizations shows why it is essential to focus on internal forces on changes in international organization behavior, rather than on external forces, in order to understand the norm articulation process. This chapter considers Annual Reports and Development Reports produced by the two organizations, analyzing them through quantitative content analysis and coding. The chapter discusses specific policies that the
UNDP and World Bank pursued that suggest differences in logics of governance and therefore in governance norms as articulated in policy. Based on the content analysis and interview data this chapter argues that the UNDP and World Bank do indeed work according to different logics of governance.

Chapter four then discusses the individual influence of leaders of the organization. Because of the limited time and space, this study focuses on the highest leaders in authority in each organization, asking how they influenced governance outcomes and how they interacted with staff and Executive Boards in the process. UNDP Administrators who have led the organization from 1985 to present include William H. Draper III, Gustaf Speth, Mark Malloch Brown, Kemal Derviş, and Helen Clark. The World Bank Presidents represent the highest leadership position in the Bank. From 1985 to present this list includes Barber Conable, Lewis Preston, James Wolfensohn, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Zoellick, and Jim Yong Kim. I identify the primary mechanisms of influence that guide the whole organization on policy. These include articulation of norms through speeches and statements, influence with Executive Board members, and the use of tactics to reward and sanction employee behavior.

Chapters five and six comprise the two case studies of the dissertation: each of the organizations under study is analyzed for how they articulated the governance policies of participation and gender equality. These chapters show that the UNDP has been more successful in changing its mandate and articulating its support for governance in a way that supports liberal democracy than has the World Bank, but that both organizations move forward in promoting participation in development and government. Considering that both the organizations are from the same development field and they both focus on
development as the importance of macroeconomic stability and poverty alleviation, it is puzzling that they articulate these norms so differently, especially when they have similar exogenous pressures on them to change their policies in similar ways. Thus internal variables explain the variation, not exogenous influence. Through in-depth process tracing and isolating the impact of leaders, these two chapters show how leadership engages with these organizations to influence policy outcomes. Further, leadership commitment to the norm under study influences the way that policy is articulated. The study is very issue-specific and thus shows that each policy case is different.

The analysis provides important implications for thinking about future development policies, such as the 2015+ debate and the relative influence that member states and transnational civil society will have on the creation of new development policies as compared to the impact of leadership as it interacts with organizational culture. The final chapter also assesses the strengths and weaknesses of my argument in relation to various other alternative arguments.
I: LEADERS AS NORM ARTICULATORS

How do the UNDP and the World Bank articulate governance norms into policy? This chapter argues that the neo-liberal, functionalist, and principal-agent approaches to explaining norm articulation and policy outcomes in international organizations do not offer sufficient explanations for how and why international organizations articulate norms. What is needed is a combination of these theories with a more robust analysis of the particular internal forces at work in international organizations. This dissertation studies how organizations discuss and articulate norms into policy.

Norms are important if international organizations have autonomy because international organizations influence the way states behave. The UNDP and the World Bank influence how a state is politically structured and how it governs its citizens, impacting the lives of millions of individuals all over the world. As many theorists have pointed out, international organizations are an essential part of normative influence on states (Finnemore and Barnett 2004). Theorists seeking to answer when and why international organizations act autonomously of member states consider both macro- and micro-levels of interaction: some taking the perspective from the structure of the international system (Bull 2002), others focusing on the internal (bureaucratic) structure of the organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Weaver 2008). They delve into the individual idiosyncrasies of leadership styles and staff (Karns 2004), and into the interactions with civil society or domestic groups (Hopgood 2006).
Norms are of increasing interest for international relations theorists because of how norms work as a part of the structure of the international system (or international society) to constrain state behavior (Checkel 1999). Martha Finnemore argues that international organizations are “teachers of norms” in some cases, teaching states how to behave on global governance issues (1993). International law and regime theory focus on the importance of international organizations as holders of information and treaties, and as centers of global governance discourse and action (Keohane 1984; Schermers and Blokker 1995; Keohane 2000). Just so, international relations literature focuses on international organizations as the purveyors of the normative framework that binds the structure of international society (Dimaggio and Powell 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Finnemore 1996a, 1993, 1996b; Haas and Haas 2002). Because of their importance, it is absolutely necessary to study how international organizations articulate norms and create policy based on those norms. This dissertation shows how the UNDP and World Bank exhibit that process on governance policy articulation.

It is important to understand how international organizations identify, adopt, and promote norms to states because of the integral part that international organizations play in the international arena. The findings in this dissertation on how international organizations articulate norms and write them into policy can be applied to various types of organizations in the international arena including international development organizations, both bilateral and multilateral (i.e. intergovernmental organizations or IGOs), as well as to other international and regional development banks.
First, they can be applied to development organizations because of the substantive focus of the dissertation. All development organizations promote governance, a trend that started in the 1990s. Bilateral organizations like the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) (2013), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) (2013), and Australia’s Agency for International Development (AusAID) (2011) increasingly focus on promoting democracy around the world, arguing that governance and democratic institutions are essential for reaching development goals such as poverty reduction. The methods these organizations use to promote governance to states are similar to those of international development organizations, save that they usually are not hindered by the need to remain apolitical because of their direct connection with one state and its democratic institutions and regime. However, the findings in this dissertation on the importance of organizational culture and leadership for norm articulation can be expanded to explain why agencies like USAID promote democracy through their loan programs, or why the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created by the US Congress in 2004, specifically supports states that exhibit democratic governance practices and policies deemed acceptable according to MCC democratic governance criteria and indicators (Millennium Challenge Corporation 2007, 2009).

The findings are most important for those organizations that are similar in bureaucracy, membership and hierarchy to the two under study. Such organizations include all the UN agencies, which in one way or other affect the governance outcomes in states, whether it is the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the
UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). All these organizations work closely with
governments to promote specific kinds of governance in their own ways, but the
similarities with the UNDP and the World Bank go beyond the substantive focus and
include the bureaucratic nature of the organizations. When organizations must worry
about multitude of members that have very different opinions on an issue, when they are
hindered by the funding they receive from these members, when they have to be aware of
their mandates and Articles of Agreement with those members, it causes organizations to
act in different ways than do bilateral aid organizations who do not have the complexity
of voices contending for power and control. This dissertation shows that complexity and
power between different members gets played out in practice in governance norms and
policies.

Finally, the findings from this dissertation apply to regional organizations and
banks that have similar development missions and apolitical mandates, with a host of
member states. Banks like the South African Development Corporation (SADC), the
African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) among many others make a long list of organizations to which this research
can be extrapolated.

While I do not return to these organizations because of the focus of this research
on the UNDP and World Bank, it is important to note how influential all these
organizations can be in international politics, especially as relates to governance policy
and norm promotion.
Articulating and Promoting Policy

The UNDP and the World Bank both act as norm promoters and agenda-setters in international development. One example of such agenda-setting is in the production of the Human Development Reports (HDRs) and the World Development Reports (WDRs). The Reports convey the current thinking and practice in development ideology and guide other organizations on development theory and practice (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2010; Yusuf et al. 2009). These two organizations also create a wealth of information in knowledge products. Promoting norms relates to the autonomy of the UNDP and World Bank because of the implications for influencing political outcomes for member states. Norms often do not represent planned, calculated policies dictated by member states. Rather, norms emerge as “unplanned, unexpected results of individuals’ interactions” (Bicchieri, Muldoon, and Zalta 2011) which are associated with observable and unobservable practices and are both moral and social. International organizations act as an authoritative pressure, guiding and influencing state behavior and thereby acting as mechanisms of norm diffusion to states.

Because of the influence that international organizations have on government behavior, it is especially important to understand how an organization articulates norms in policy and publications. Asking why and how norms become important to an organization as exhibited in policies and projects is crucial. International organizations impact whether or not governments adopt and internalize international norms, thus

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1 A vast literature exists on the definition of norms. For the differences between norm types and varying definitions see (Elster 1989) and (Bicchieri 2006).
international organizations act as the mechanism of norm emergence and diffusion (Legro 1997; Barnett and Finnemore 1999) because international organizations are influential actors in “teaching” states how to behave (Finnemore 1993). Governance norms have the possibility of influencing state behavior.

The norm life-cycle theory (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) suggests that norms emerge, cascade, and internalize through a society (or international society) through specific mechanisms. Analyzing how norms internalize in societies is important because it allows us to begin to have an understanding of why some norms become so constraining on individual or group behavior and why other norms are rejected by individuals and societies. The UNDP and World Bank represent an organizational society of hundreds of members who work at specific functions to fulfill specific purposes, but who all have a vision of development toward which they are working, and share particular beliefs and ideals. Those beliefs and ideals become entrenched in an organization in ways that regulate the behavior of the group.

A social norm is “an idea in the minds of the members of a group, an idea that can be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or other men should do, ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances” (Homans 1950, 123; Bernstein 2001). In this context social norms are not simply observable unplanned or planned behavioral outcomes; they rely on shared moral ideals of members of a group.

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2 Academics highlight a range of mechanisms for norm diffusion to states. Mechanisms include metanorms (Axelrod 1986, 1096), internalization processes (Opp 2002; Coleman 1990b; Demsetz 1967; Diefenbach and Opp 2007), social embeddedness (Matzat 2004), reputation (Bicchieri 2010; Keohane 1984; Cook and Hardin 2001; Holländer 1990; Elster 1989; March and Olsen 2006), or sanctions (Parsons 1951). Recent international relations constructivist literature highlights global deliberation, decision making, and bargaining that occurs in and through non-state actors at the international level such as transnational networks, NGOs, and IOs (Dubash 2009; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ensminger and Knight 1997).
Thus norms are ideational and behavioral (though not always concomitantly). They are historical (whether evolving over a short or long period of time) and are related to a group of individuals who interact with each other based on deeply embedded relationships and shared worldviews (i.e., the norm cannot be merely traced to the beliefs or behaviors of individuals within the group). Furthermore, social norms normatively (morally) specify the correct behavior that members (and sometimes non-members) of the group should follow. Norms can be planned and unplanned, formal and informal.³

Governance norms, specifically participation and gender equality norms, emerged in international relations for differing purposes. Development projects encountered failure in actually achieving development goals almost from the inception of development practice in the 1940s up to the 1980s. In the 1980s a consensus among development practitioners suggested that the real problem with the development failures was not necessarily the development foci and plans themselves, but rather the structural impediments and hindrances to their full implementation and realization. In this sense, governance norms became crucial to connect to development to explain the failures of the development practices and to ameliorate future failures. Rational choice theory is one of the most influential heuristic accounts of individual and collective normative behavior, applied in all disciplines for explaining individual and group behavior. At the structural level functionalist, rational-choice accounts explain that groups deal with externalities, i.e., problems that arise that threaten a group’s society, way of life or existence, by

³ The list of social norms characteristics comes from a range of definitions given in the literature on social norms (Bernstein 2001; Bicchieri 2006; Coleman 1990a; Elster 1989; Homans 1950; Legro 1997; Parsons 1951; Parsons 1968 [1937]).
creating norms that help the group collectively address the problem/s (Demsetz 1967; Coleman 1990a; Cook and Hardin 2001; Diefenbach and Opp 2007). Norms emerge in a society under “a condition under which a demand for effective norms will arise...[and] a condition under which the demand will be satisfied” (Coleman 1990a, 241).

Internalization of a norm is a powerful mechanism for a group institutionalizing behavior that addresses an externality, especially one that is detrimental to society (Demsetz 1967; Opp 2002; Diefenbach and Opp 2007). In considering governance norms in the international development institutions in this way we come to an answer for why the two organizations turned to promotion of governance norms in the 1990s. They both needed to counter the failures of the projects they had been funding for years by suggesting an explanation for those failures and they both needed to change their behavior in some way to reflect the needs of development in the post-Cold War world that required more than public administration support.

The end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy to more states in the 1990s represents a situation in which the structure of the international system was changing in such a way that international organizations had to change along with it to survive. Indeed, after the end of the Cold War the major Western powers did not see as much of a need to support development projects throughout the world and therefore development funding to both the UNDP and World Bank decreased in the 1990s, making it imperative for both organizations to look elsewhere for their funding and importance in international relations. Agency-based evolutionary models explain norm emergence by suggesting that individual actors maximize utility at all costs and respond to external stimuli in order
to save themselves (Parsons 1951; Parsons 1968 [1937]). Game theory modeling suggests
that members of a group (players in the game) will act to maximize their self-interest
(i.e., utility) in order to come to the Nash Equilibrium, or best option under the

These authors take into account the constraints of lack of knowledge, lack of trust,
and unfamiliar contexts (i.e. bounded rationality) (Bicchieri 2010; Bicchieri and Chavez
2010; Bicchieri, Muldoon, and Zalta 2011; Alexandar 2007). Bicchieri and colleagues
add the condition that players have “expectations and preferences” that alter the game so
that the Nash Equilibria outcomes depend on context (Bicchieri 2006, 1993, 2010;
Bicchieri, Duffy, and Tolle 2004). Under this explanation, the UNDP and World Bank
appropriated governance norms in order to maintain relevance in an international system
that did not see the need for them anymore. Each organization had particular expectations
about its position in the international system, and within the UN system, and therefore
changed its policy.

The rationality-based explanations above provide powerful and nuanced reasons
for why governance norms became integral to international society and for explaining
norm divergence between the UNDP and World Bank. Indeed, the UNDP was influenced
by the preferences of the international system to focus on human rights principles and
practices, while the World Bank had consistently been focused on economic progress and
poverty alleviation (which it had always associated closely with GDP per capita). Thus,

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Cook and Hardin show that norms work better as cooperating mechanisms dealing with externalities in a
small society than in a large one, the latter has to rely on trust mechanisms rather than norms; they also
make a distinction between “exclusionary norms” as applying to small groups and “universalistic norms” as
applying to large groups (Cook and Hardin 2001).
each organization changed its stance on public administration in a way that allowed it to adapt to the changes in the international community and continue to make itself relevant in development. Furthermore, as shown in many of the arguments of particular UNDP Administrators and World Bank Presidents, each organization tried to make itself relevant by creating its own competitive advantage in an internationally competitive business environment.

The UNDP’s comparative advantage in development is to offer political advice and assistance on political structures including electoral commissions or the whole electoral cycle process, on practices that will include all members of society in government in order to make it legitimate in international relations, and on parliamentary training and support. On the other hand, the World Bank’s comparative advantage entails focusing on enhancing the economic structures of a society, on making public administration of goods and services to society as efficient as possible, and on fostering a sense that efficiency means including participation of the population in development projects as well as transparency and anti-corruption measures.

While the above explanations offer a good framework for understanding the differences in governance policy outcomes between the two organizations, they still lack a consideration of the normative framework in which these organizations function that also provides evidence for choosing one policy outcome over another. Organizations and individuals also act out of normative based beliefs or from a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2006). Another interpretation of norm internalization suggests that the

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5 March and Olsen called this distinction on following behavior the “logic of consequences” versus the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989). This distinction is a relatively well known concept in
influence of human rights norms and liberal democracy ideology, connected with ideas, morals and identity (Finnemore 1996a, 1993, 1996b; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Towns 2010, 2012) of both the organization and individuals within that organization offers a strong explanation for why the UNDP pursued liberal democracy norms in a political manner while the World Bank did not. This strand challenges the assumption that norms always serve a functional purpose, as is also lightly done in rational choice literature (Kitts 2006).

Thus, the explanation for why the UNDP and World Bank articulate governance norms differently may be indeterminacy of individual understanding of context, avoiding negative outcomes associated with following a norm, or simply value orientations that are not influenced by material considerations. March and Olsen’s (2006) argument that individuals sometimes act from a logic of appropriateness and sometimes from a logic of consequences, depending on the context, provides an analysis that bridges the divide in the norm evolution literature. Landolt argues that ideational interests and calculations cannot be separated from consideration of material interests, even in discussion of compliance with norms (Landolt 2007). Furthermore Elster (1989) argues that rational choice theory is dependent on outcomes and therefore cannot be applied to the range of normative experiences in life, although his interpretation of rational choice theory is criticized by Opp (2013) as too narrow. However, this dichotomy is not without its critics who argue that the two motivations cannot be separated from each other if we want to understand complex social situations (Epstein 2008).

sociological literature as evidenced in Berger and Luckman’s discussion of symbolic universes (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 117).
An element of constructivist theory argues that norms become so important to a group that they will follow that norm simply based on its power to dictate or constrain behavior because it has become accepted (and not necessarily because it is the most rational choice). As such, the social embeddedness or path dependence of a norm is an important element of the institutionalization of norms as shown in Matzat’s study in which individuals behaved in certain ways based on how well they knew and connected with their counterparts (Matzat 2004). Applying this idea to the UNDP and World Bank would indicate that promoting governance norms had to do with the kinds of agreements that existed between members of each organization, the pressures they felt from leaders as well as from each other to act in certain ways, and the closeness they felt to each other (all elements of organizational culture). Indeed reputation is an important part of identity and is therefore considered essential to norm emergence and compliance in rational choice literature (Bicchieri 2010; Keohane 1984; Cook and Hardin 2001; Holländer 1990) as well as constructivist literature (Elster 1989; March and Olsen 2006). Further, authors identified global deliberation (Dubash 2009), bargaining and decision-making (Ensminger and Knight 1997), and the bottom-up approach (opposed to dominance) (Clapp and Swanston 2009) as mechanisms of norm internalization among international actors in international politics.

Moreover, not only do actors behave in certain ways because they are forced to do so, and therefore act rationally to save themselves, but that they act out of concerns for legitimacy (Schmelzle 2011; Wendt 2002). Checkel notes variation with state compliance to norms and argues that the variation has to do with domestic characteristics (ranging
from elite learning to societal pressure) and domestic diffusion techniques (Checkel 1999, 90). Clapp et. al. (2009) note the varied national implementation by arguing that national implementation of the anti-plastic shopping bag norm varies from one state to another due to local characteristics and differences “best characterized as the result of non-networked, locally specific set of initiatives and campaigns” (323).

Applying these domestic, internally focused arguments for norm internalization and articulation to international development organizations therefore offers a more complex understanding of why they would act differently, not based on rational-choice calculation only, or based on exogenous influences only, but based on the differing internal characters, influences, and processes of each individual organization. Indeed, the UNDP and World Bank share many organizational trait characteristics such as having executive boards, strong leadership roles (in the UNDP Presidents and World Bank Administrators), being both hierarchical in the way that policy is created, but decentralized in the way that policy is implemented, which would indicate conformity on development policy and outcome. Yet the internal processes, individual characteristics, individual belief systems and leadership capabilities of leaders all contribute to creating very different environments within which organizations articulate norms.

**A THEORY OF NORM ARTICULATION**

It is essential to study the internal bureaucracies, functioning, and mechanisms of international organizations in order to explain why they differ on supporting governance norms in policy and practice. The principal-agent rational-based analysis offers powerful
explanations for differing support, yet it does not fully explain that difference because it excludes the analysis of internal differing characteristics including belief systems and legitimacy concerns or extant normative underpinnings of individuals working within the organizations. Organizational culture offers a specific way to consider how international organizations function and provides particular entry points for explaining why similarly placed organizations would differ so greatly on governance norm outcomes.

The UNDP and the World Bank function as hierarchical organizations with powerful leaders in the organizational structure. In order to narrow down the scope of this study, this research focuses on UNDP Administrators and World Bank Presidents as powerful leaders who affect norm articulation within their respective organizations both by support for the norm and through collaboration with the organization’s staff. Because the UNDP and World Bank act as fundamental promoters of governance norms, specifically guiding states in particular issue areas, it is essential to study how the process works. The literature on norm internalization indeed suggests that leadership from various sources impacts the process of norm internalization (Yan 2011; DeMarzo 1992; Ikenberry 1992; Kim 1992; Sylvia and Pindur 1978). Based on this I argue that leadership affects norm articulation.

Further, independent evaluations of gender mainstreaming and participatory inclusion policies at the UNDP and World Bank, the policies themselves, and literature on the impact of gender mainstreaming policies, point to the importance of leadership and culture in guiding the intensity and success of the emergence and internalization of norms in an international organization’s policies and practice. I argue that UNDP and World
Bank leadership impacts the way that these organizations internalize, and thus articulate norms in their policies and projects; both related to normative orientations of the leaders, and in their leadership style, i.e., in the mechanisms they use to convince staff to follow particular policies concerning governance norms.

Organizational culture provides a profound way of analyzing norm articulation within the UNDP and World Bank. I follow Schein’s definition of organizational culture:

Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein 1990, 111).  

When an organization has an orienting logic or “pattern of basic assumptions” that guides its policies and practices, it means that new norms that develop will be guided by that logic. In the next chapter I develop what I argue are the two logics of governance that serve as the organizational culture that has influenced the way these two organizations articulated governance norms, and specifically gender equality and participation.

Furthermore, Schein breaks all this down into three levels under which organizational culture can be studied: artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions (Schein 2004, 26). First is the level of the artifact which includes “visible organizational structures and processes” (ibid., 26) such as the mandates already written in policy documents that guide the organization’s practice, the way that the organizational staff are

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6 Frost’s definition of culture relies on symbolism and interpretation to which Alvesson adds the notion of values and assumptions of social reality as important, focusing on culture as a metaphor (Alvesson 2002). Mohan’s review of organizational culture definitions classifies “three dominant theoretical approaches: cognitive, systemic, and symbolic,” and further outlines characteristics of organization culture as “assumptions, values, and artifacts” (Mohan 1993, 15). Similarly Ashkanasy identifies “culture, discourse and identity as key concepts in organizational theory” (Ashkanasy, Wilderom, and Peterson 2000, 12).
structured in relation to each other (i.e., the type of hierarchies), and the buildings or office spaces themselves. The level of artifact is one of the most difficult elements of organizational culture to study because of problems with outside interpretation. For example, the researcher will have one way of interpreting the mandate and mission statement, but the staff in the organization will have another (and it may never come to light what the difference is). Thus, this study does not focus on artifacts except to point out the similarities and differences between the UNDP and World Bank. They are both hierarchical structures with powerful leaders at the top rank making policy decisions, however they also function with a decentralized nature meaning that policies and project are implemented on a local level (through country offices) with little to no interaction with headquarters on some issues or implementation decisions.

Both the UNDP and World Bank furthermore suffer from a “silò” effect in which the organizations create departments focused on issue areas that do not communicate with other departments, thus making it difficult to coordinate efforts or mainstream policies such as gender equality policies. Both mandates argue that the two organizations should be apolitical in nature, though the UNDP has taken a very liberal interpretation of apolitical while the World Bank continues with its conservative interpretation. Furthermore, both organizations have a similar vision and history of development.

The third level of underlying assumptions of the staff is similarly difficult to study, especially for a longer-range research project such as this which studies the organization from 1985 to present. The level of underlying assumptions includes “unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings” (Schein
of staff members and argues that this has an effect on the goals and outcomes of the organization. It includes beliefs of the staff as a whole, their ideas about development, about their own roles and jobs, and about what they think the organization should be doing.

Since the UNDP and World Bank shared many staff members over the years, including cross-over with top leaders, we can assume that many of their beliefs about how the world works converge and they place similar pressures on each organization, but the two organizations have distinctively different organizational cultures. As an example, it has been noted that the World Bank largely focuses on neoliberal economic policy and hires people trained in neoliberal economics rather than having a diverse staff that holds differing economic views. Furthermore, the World Bank has not been very open to hiring people from the social sciences or political science, though this has changed in recent years with more hiring of experts from social sciences.

The level of organizational culture that this study highlights is that of espoused beliefs and values, meaning the “strategies, goals, and philosophies” (Schein 1990, 26) of the organization and its members, and this study narrows these down to the specific strategies, goals and philosophies of leadership, arguing that leadership normative persuasion impacts the internalization of norms in an international organization through specific strategies or sanctioning behavior. Under the espoused beliefs level two elements are important: leadership style, and the organizational culture. First, leadership style is

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7 Leadership style is usually subsumed under the heading of ‘organizational climate’ in the organizational theory literature, but for clarity’s sake I will only use the term leadership style here. Climate refers not only to the way that leadership guides the organization, but also the type of interaction that the leaders have with employees and the interactions that employees have with each other. It consists in how decisions are made,
an important characteristic of organizational culture (Lewin, Lippitt, and White 1939). Leaders use mechanisms to guide the organization, either in current work, or in creating new goals, missions, and changes in structure and policies. Indeed Weber argued that the individual had the capacity to “stand apart from society” (Kalberg 2005, 19) and from the structure and to analyze his or her position in society and to make autonomous decisions based on that position. This is true for leaders within organizations, i.e., they are able to stand apart from the organization culture to analyze their position and make decisions about their actions and which norms and ideas they will support.

Leader mechanisms and ways of acting and interacting in the organization have an impact on how the organization functions and how easily it adapts to the changing environment, including adopting new norms and practice that are then diffused to states. Indeed, the only way to understand how and why the organization functions is to understand how leadership impacts the organization (Cannella, Finkelstein, and Hambrick 2009). Academics and researchers consistently come back to the influence of leadership in political and economic studies. From Carlyle’s concern for hero worship in the mid-19th century (Carlyle 1841) to Weber’s discussion of charismatic leadership in the early 20th century (Weber 1947; 1964), to Cox and Jacobson’s discussion of decision-making in international organizations (Cox and Jacobson 1973), we see a concern with

and in the shared meanings, beliefs, understandings, and interactions that staff share together over a prolonged period of time. Climate is the intra- and inter-organizational interaction norms, principles, and behaviors of members of the organization (as members of a group). For clarity I focus on the basic dynamics of the leadership style in this analysis.

8 Schein identifies what he calls “embedding mechanisms” that leaders use to “embed their beliefs, values, and assumptions” into the culture (246). He also identifies the ways that leaders attempt to change organizational culture (319-336). I do not rely on all of these mechanisms, only the ones that I identify as essential to leadership style.
how leaders affect the efficient functioning of an organization, including the ability of a leader to garner support on particular norms and behaviors. In the contemporary context, leaders are pointed to as the main variable for explaining events or as actors in a structure in which they interact in various ways, both having an effect on events, and being affected by events (Grint 2005). This dissertation takes this latter perspective.

Indeed, leadership is one of the most important characteristics in the norm and policy articulation process. “[T]he way that you get new policy initiatives in Washington is to put them into the president’s speech” (Weiss et al. 2005, 189). Yet leadership effects are mitigated and changed through a reflexive relationship with organizational culture and processes. First, the way that the leader’s values are embedded into the organization will serve to change its focus and articulation of certain norms. Secondly, the ability of the leader to interact with the organization in a way that facilitates change toward particular values or adoption of new practices or norms that emerge in international relations is important to norm articulation.

The leadership focus does not highlight norm entrepreneurs or people who are considered “leaders” of a particular idea. Rather, the notion is that bureaucracies are created with particular sets of rules and powers that are embedded in the leadership role. Therefore no matter how many movements or people within the organization support a new norm and push for its adoption and inclusion, it is essential that the leader of the organization be committed to that norm as well, and he or she support the norm in both language and action. Yet, this support is not the only element that determines whether a norm will be adopted by an organization. The content of the organizational paradigm, and
the ability of the leader to couch the new norm in a way that it will be immersed in and defined by the paradigm, are essential for the norm adoption and internalization success.

Understanding the general characteristics and mechanisms of leadership offers a way to understand how leadership interacts with norm emergence, adoption, and diffusion within an organization. Following Schneider this study identifies four types of organizational culture that resonate with most of the typologies defined in the literature on leadership style: control, collaboration, competence, and cultivation (Schneider 1994). As represented in Table 1.2, the typologies distinguish between the way that the authority figures or leaders of the organization 1) make decisions, 2) facilitate the distribution of responsibilities and resources among staff, 3) implement changes in the organizational structure, 4) outline job and responsibility functions, and 5) implement practices on recruiting, hiring, and firing.

Table 1.2: Leadership Style Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Style</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Cultivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Autocratic – no consultation in decision-making (Paternalistic)</td>
<td>Decision-making based on consultation</td>
<td>Democratic (Consensus) decision-making (Participative)</td>
<td>Decision-making as last resort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(developed from Schein 2010, 192; Schneider 1994)</td>
<td>Dictates Responsibility</td>
<td>Responsibility goes to the most likely to succeed</td>
<td>Delegates Responsibility</td>
<td>Abdicating responsibility to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes made immediately and without</td>
<td>Changes made in consultation with staff (more likely)</td>
<td>Few changes made and only after coming to</td>
<td>No changes made – no “rocking the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 An excellent overview of the different organizational cultures or leadership styles advanced in the literature is found in Schein’s well known and loved book on organizational culture, much used in classrooms. I used much of the information that Schein collected in creating my two influential elements of leadership style and paradigm and in creating a scale for each of these. See (Schein 2010), especially pages 189-202. His overview includes the following typologies of organizations that inform my two types and scales: Coercive, utilitarian, normative (Etzioni 1975); Use of Authority including Autocratic, Paternalistic, Consultative or Democratic, Participative and Power Sharing, Delegative, and Abdicative (delegating tasks and power/control) (Schein 2010, 192); Fragmented, Mercenary, Communal, and Networked (Goffee and Jones 1998); and Clan, Hierarchy, Adhocracy, and Market (Cameron and Quinn 1999).
consultation in the organization (structural, staffing, etc); more likely to bring in new staff
  • Tell staff how to function
  • Recruiting, hiring, firing done at top levels
to change and continue with current staff than bring in new
  • Show staff how to function (model in leader’s behavior)
  • Recruiting, hiring, firing in consultation with staff
complete consensus
  • Decide together how staff should function (dual definition of role)
  • Recruiting, hiring, firing on the basis of merit
boat”
  • Each person decides how to function – no input from leadership
  • Very little Recruiting, hiring, firing occurs

Bringing the ideas of espoused beliefs and values of the leadership together with leadership style, Table 1.2 describes how leadership espoused beliefs and mechanisms of leadership style fit into the puzzle. For research purposes, leadership espoused beliefs and values, i.e. leadership normative persuasion and sanctioning behavior, impacts the norm articulation process in ways that foster different outcomes for similarly placed organizations. Table 1.3 shows what that the normative leanings and persuasions of UNDP and World Bank leaders have indeed been different over the years and conform to the differences in UNDP and World Bank governance outcomes, and that their sanctioning behavior for the most part has followed similar patterns within each organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.3: Espoused Beliefs and Values of UNDP and World Bank Leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Organization Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative Persuasion of Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Philosophies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38
Law essential to promote successful political and economic development
○ Participation in politics absolutely necessary - both in voting and running for political positions
○ Demand side for public services the main focus of law good, but especially (or only) as relates to open and free market
○ Participation of citizens necessary in development not necessarily in politics
○ Supply of public services the main focus

A focus on leadership alone would provide an inadequate analysis of why norms which are seemingly similar in international relation’s agendas should come out so differently in similarly placed organizations. The second important characteristic focuses on structure as sociologists and historical institutionalists point out as a constraining force in society, either through command of embedded institutions or through value-orientations (Kalberg 2005; Weber 1978). The organizational paradigm or the shared mission and goals of members of the organization and of the organization as a whole act as guiding principles for the organization’s decisions and actions embedded in the policy-making process. Schein defines the formal philosophy as the “broad policies and ideological principles that guide a group's actions toward stockholders, employees, customers and other stakeholders” (13). Yet the substance of the philosophy or paradigm does not guarantee or eliminate the possibility for a norm to be adopted in all cases. Therefore I refer to the level of clarity on defining the organization’s mission and goals as the variable that impacts the emergence or adoption of a norm.

The logic of the culture provides the leader with the ability to either mold current policy or create new policy that will be accepted. It follows that when an organization’s mission and goals are clearly understood and in line with the new norm presented, it is
possible for the new norm to be adopted by the organization and furthermore the organization is more likely to change the content or substance of the norm in order for it to conform with the mission. When there is a less clearly defined mission, the norm may be adopted depending on the level of promotion and ability of communication of the leadership, but it will likely remain undefined and less institutionalized and less articulated in the organization’s policies, rhetoric, beliefs, and practice.

This study operationalizes the variables as follows based on the above discussion. First, leaders’ espoused beliefs and values, along with the leadership style and ability to function in the organizational culture, determine the ability of a new norm to be articulated within an international organization. In order to identify those espoused beliefs and values (the leader’s commitment to the norm) the study analyzes leader statements, speeches, their own accounts and others’ accounts of their beliefs and values (interviews, secondary and primary sources). In both norm cases, the study considers conformity to the norm, the frequency that the norms are considered and the way that the norms are couched. Furthermore, the research identifies the leadership style according the Schneider’s typology to discern the effectiveness of the leader in guiding the organization.

**ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS**

Three types of alternative explanations from international relations theory explain the difference in UNDP and World Bank governance policies: division of labor (liberal
institutionalism and functionalism); following different mandates (principal-agent relationship); and external influences from civil society.

Division of Labor

This study asks why the UNDP and World Bank should create such different governance policies, specifically considering participation and gender equality governance norms, if they are guided by the same member states, and work in the same organizational field of development and therefore have similar exogenous and endogenous influences. The expectation would be that both organizations would take up governance norms in a particularly liberal democratic way, creating policy that suggested that states should have constitutions that ensure multi-party politics, endorse free and fair elections, and promote equal participation in government from all groups and individuals of society either through voting or through active participation in political positions. The connection with the ability of an organization to act autonomously is important in this situation; whether or not international organizations act autonomous or follow explicit or implicit direction from member states is a perennial question in regime theory and institutional theory of international relations (Keohane 1998). Autonomy means to be self-governing, without the political or moral influence of other actors and especially focuses on the ability of an organization to practice “political independence” or the “impermeability of the organization to external institutional interferences” (d'Aspremont 2011).
Member states created the UNDP and the World Bank to function for specific purposes, but after some years these organizations gained some autonomy from their member states. Autonomy as defined by principal-agent theory explains the behavior of the actors always in relation to the principal; in the case of international development organizations, principals are member states in the international system that created the specific international organization to serve a specific function or a set of specific functions, yet the organization can veer from its original mandate outside the aegis of the principal on specific issues. The United Nations Charter (1946) called for fostering economic security around the world (United Nations 1945; Browne 2011) and it purported to do so by creating a fund for the transfer of technological knowledge from the global north to the global south (i.e., to the developing world), which started out as the Extended Program for Technical Assistance (EPTA) and became the UNDP in 1965. The UNDP later became its own funding agency in the 1980s, and also became a trend-setting advocacy organization with the publication of the Human Development Reports (HDRs), thus straying from its original mandate and member state direct request. The World Bank was created as a bank for funding reconstruction in Europe post-WWII at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and soon moved beyond merely funding reconstruction to alleviating poverty through funding economic and infrastructure development, and technological transfer to developing countries. The Bank furthermore sought to become a norm-setter in development by creating the World Development Reports (WDRs) (published every year from 1978-present) that report comparative
economic development indexes and topical development issues for countries throughout the world.

Both organizations were created to serve specific functions and have also deviated from their original mandates, functions, and even from the express desires of their member states in some cases. Agency slack is “independent action by an agent that is undesired by the principal” in principal-agent theory (Hawkins et al. 2006, 8). Mission creep is usually defined as when an organization moves or ‘creeps’ from its original mandate and mission as given by its member states in order to take on new responsibilities (Pincus and Winters 2002, 2; Weaver 2008, 143-148). Both these terms are applied under a theory that does give some leeway for international organizations to act autonomously as agents, and the explanation for their actions is based on rational cost-benefit calculations (a central tenet of the neorealist, neoliberal, and functionalist theories that use these concepts). For the neorealist theorists, other entities exist at the behest of states and do their bidding meaning that international organizations do not have autonomy—they may veer from their original purpose, but they function according to instructions from their principals. Yet, when using the principal-agent theory to analyze the behavior of the UNDP and the World Bank, it alone does not explain why these organizations would pursue policies in the way that they do.

On the face of it, the institutional, functional, principal-agent theories do seem to provide adequate answers to the question of norm divergence and therefore different policy outcomes. The World Bank provides loans as a bank to facilitate infrastructure development. While a specialized agency of the UN, it works independently, closely
aligned with the IMF. It is interested in economic growth. Conversely, the UNDP is an agency of the UN directly under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. The UNDP must embrace the role of supporting and promoting democracy worldwide as one of the global norms upheld by the UN. However, contradicting the apparent divergence in function, mandates, and goals, the UNDP and World Bank both work closely together on country projects. In this capacity, they work to remain apolitical or disinterested entities, supporting each country in its development despite a country’s politics or government institutional arrangements. Further, they work on the same international development goals and pursue the attainment of those goals together. These goals include the creation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) based on the Millennium Conference and Declaration of 2000, and the current discussion of the development goals that will replace the MDGs when they expire in 2015. Finally, strong member states certainly do have an impact on policy creation, but that impact is not always as tangible and evident as some would argue.

It is too simplistic to say that the World Bank and the UNDP pursue different policies because of their mandates, mission as relates to development goals, or individual associations with other agencies (as in the functionalist and principal-agent explanations). Constructivist and sociological theories analyze the culture, belief systems, ideas, and identities of actors. These characteristics are then connected with their actions to offer a different explanation for behavior than do rational outcome calculating theories (as in most institutionalist liberal and principal-agent theories). Under the constructivist analysis, much of the pressure for pursuing specific policies and projects comes internally
from within each organization, rather than from without. Further, the internal characteristics consider the identities, beliefs, and interactions of actors. The analysis also considers the path-dependence of policy formation, the relationship that each organization has set up with individual countries and pressures from transnational civil society.

**Member States**

In principal-agent theory, which closely mirrors neorealism in international relations (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001, 1994), the principal always has some kind of control in the relationship, guiding the international organization in how it should serve those functions and what it should do to achieve the principal’s goals. Both the UNDP and World Bank exhibit the truth of this statement. Both have executive boards made up of representatives from member states that meet regularly to decide the policies of the organizations. The UNDP is further guided by General Assembly resolutions and requests. In project funding and implementation, both organizations work on a “demand-based” system, only offering advice, technical assistance, funds and projects to member states when requested by the member state. Thus far, principal-agent theory offers a convincing explanation for why these organizations might act in different ways depending on the mandates set forth by their member states as well as the requests from member states for funding. However, the evidence does not solely support this explanation. First, member states consistently request political structure advice and support from the World Bank, and yet the Bank consistently denies such support,
preferring to remain as neutral an organization as possible when it comes to politics and
claiming their lack of knowledge and technical skill in that area.

Secondly, the UNDP consistently receives criticism for the work that it does in
the political arena, criticism both arguing that the UNDP should stick more to its
principles and not work with authoritarian states as well as criticism that suggests the
UNDP is wrong to be involved in political structures. Critics suggest that the UNDP
should go back to supporting only the efficiency and effectiveness of public
administration as the World Bank does. In both cases, rational cost-benefit analysis
would suggest that the UNDP and World Bank would lean more toward a neutral middle
rather than sit at the opposite ends of the spectrum; their responses suggest that the
organizations have not only strayed from their original missions and the direct authority
of their principals, but that they do so for normative and value-laden reasons.

The principal-agent literature narrowed the scope of the answer to simplify and
operationalize the possibility of studying the issue of autonomy of organizations; that is,
when international organizations act against the will of the principal or at least without
the principal’s influence or consideration (Haas 1958; 2004; Keohane 1982). In so doing
it created a problem of lack of alternative variables in the analysis. Indeed, actors do not
only act out of rational, efficient, utility-maximizing consideration of the costs and
benefits of the possible action, they also act out of value considerations or what is
considered appropriate by the social structure and culture (March and Olsen 2006).
Functionalist arguments do not tell us enough about the changing nature of international
organizations, or about their bureaucratic and internal processes.
Civil Society

One trend in the literature assigns the changes in international organizations to the pressure applied by civil society, whether from one nation or a multitude of nations as transnational civil society. Indeed, the literature on the impact and influence of civil society organizations (CSOs) has blossomed in recent years as the number of NGOs and CSOs increased. These authors claim that it is largely the pressure from transnational civil society that causes international organizations to make changes to their roles or their policies because the normative pressure is so intense. Indeed some claim that without civil society pressure, these organizations would not even remain relevant and would become intractable in their organizational culture and bureaucracies.

The transnational CSO literature builds out of a vast literature on the impact of national civil society on national politics and policy outcomes (Scholte 2002; Freeman 1997). Some argue that CSOs have become stronger and more influential in an age of mass media. They suggest that media allows CSOs to garner more citizen support and make their statements well known and influential in government circles (Aucoin 2012; Themudo 2013). Others argue that civil society does not have as much impact on the state as current globalization literature would like to think because it is simply not as strong as the national government apparatus against which it is contrasted in mainstream literature (Diamond 1994).

Others are more nuanced, noting that transnational civil society is certainly important in particular situations, but that the international arena is so complex that there
is usually something else going on at all levels of analysis. For instance, Audie Klotz argues that while transnational and national CSOs were influential in shaping foreign policy decisions regarding putting sanctions on South Africa for the continued use of Apartheid laws, other variables were most influential in getting governments to impose those sanctions as well as in pushing South Africa to finally end Apartheid (Klotz 1995).

Indeed, CSOs have become very important in the recent era of globalization and development (Fraser-Moleketi 2012), as will be seen in the discussion of the participation norm later in this dissertation. Governments are more aware of the impact of CSOs and the importance of gaining the approval and support of civil society. International organizations are more concerned with influencing governments to care about and ensure the participation of civil society in government decision making or at a minimum in development project planning and implementation (United Nations Development Programme 2012c; World Bank 2007). Indeed, many of the norms that become influential in development organizations do start with CSOs rallying around a particular issue. We see this in the gender equality norm that this dissertation will also discuss later. It was largely due to CSO pressure and indefatigable insistence that the UN hold conferences on gender-specific issues related to development and that the international community of states and organizations started paying attention to gender based issues.

This dissertation does not deny the importance and influence of CSOs on the normative leanings and changes that happen in organizations. However, I argue that the ultimate responsibility and influence for the way that the norm becomes articulated in policy in the organization has to do with the organizational culture and path dependence
of the ideas that formed or shaped the organization. It also has to do with the influence and impact of the leader on how the norm will be articulated, interpreted, and finally implemented into the practice of the organization. Once that ball starts rolling within the organization, CSOs become less influential because they are outside the organizational bureaucracy and do not have the same normative and material pressure as those within the organization.

APPLICATION

Neofunctionalist, behavioralist and constructivist analyses begin to explain the internal workings of organizations, including how autonomy may be different than simply creeping away from a mandate for rational reasons (Hawkins et al. 2006, 32). These theories give agents some independence based on rational considerations plus concern for non-rational based explanations. Neofunctionalist work spans the gap between rational explanations of international organization behavior and that of constructivist considerations which focus on normative considerations and influence, suggesting that international organizations act for other reasons than maximizing efficiency, fulfilling mandates and functions, and only for material considerations (Haas 1958; 2004); as Haas argues “the ontology is not materialistic: values shape interests, and values include many nonmaterial elements” (2004, xv).

Indeed, international organizations can be autonomous agents, perhaps more so in an era of globalization wherein intergovernmental organizations, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational civil society, and other entities make all
the difference for certain issues of global importance, or what is often called global governance (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). Related to their missions and mandates, international organizations can be ‘dysfunctional’ by making decisions that overturn their original goals and upset their ability to meet their mandates (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Weaver 2008). Furthermore, constructivist arguments in favor of international organization autonomy focus on their bureaucratic nature, pointing to how the bureaucracy’s impersonal characteristics or normative leanings allow for autonomy (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Oestreich 2012).

My theory builds on the constructivist analyses and further suggests that internal forces are most important to study in the analysis of how international development organizations articulate norms for the world.
II: GOVERNANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In the twenty-first century international development organizations promote specific governance ideas by funding and implementing policies and projects that are based in ideas of what it means for a state to govern well. The UNDP and many Western bilateral aid agencies focus on supporting democratic principles through development projects, arguing that democracies are the best form of polity to enhance development outcomes, or at least arguing that democracy and development are inseparable. Organizations like the World Bank articulate and promote governance focused on public administration efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency while, at least in rhetoric, minimizing the importance of democracy for reaching development goals. Despite the obvious dichotomy in rhetoric, the definitions of democratic and good governance remain contentious. This dissertation argues that democratic versions of governance that highlight the need for citizen involvement in government are founded in the historical evolution of human rights and human development paradigms. Versions of governance that focus on efficiency and effectiveness of government in providing goods and services to citizens are founded on the historical evolution and support for public administration development assistance.

This chapter has two arguments concerning the definitions of governance. First, despite diversity in the governance notion and definitions found in practitioner and academic literature, there are two logics of governance that guide each organization. One
focuses on the importance of individual participation in government (demand side). The other focuses on government institutions providing public goods and services to a population (supply side). The demand and supply side governance dichotomy refers to public administration and delivery of goods and services (Coston 1998). The terms most commonly applied in practitioner literatures, “democratic governance” and “good governance,” respectively refer to these different definitions. This does not mean that the governance notion is ever at one time monolithic and unchanging (obviously reality is the reverse). Yet, in order to study what goes on in international organizations on the promotion of governance norms, the distinction is essential. This argument is based on an historical analysis of governance in development practice, showing how historical trends influenced the different ideals represented in democratic versus good governance, i.e., human rights and public administration support.

Second, this chapter argues that the term governance does not always refer to state institutions and that there are a multiplicity of actors involved in governance mechanisms and actions. The term governance applies to institutions, authorities, and mechanisms of controlling society that extend beyond the state institutions of government, and thus we see a trend to include civil society organizations in governance norms and policies. In development practice, the term primarily focuses on government authority figures, mechanisms of control, and institutions. Yet, this trend to focus solely on government is changing to meet a changing world, and thus we see a focus on the governance of civil society outside the purview of the state. The chapter provides a mechanism for
identifying when we are discussing state actors versus market or civil society actors in the actions of governance.

The historical analysis and analytical framework for studying the definition and focus of governance guides the analysis of the UNDP and World Bank history and structure as presented in the following chapters in which the two organizations under study are considered for the way they have discussed governance throughout the years.

**HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISM**

In the Western world the nineteenth through twenty-first centuries witnessed “waves” of democratization in which groups of states changed their forms of government from authoritarian to different forms of democracy that emphasized the will of the people and the ability of people to choose their representatives in government positions (Markoff 1996b; Huntington 1993; Whitehead 2001). Measurements of the types of political systems in the world show such waves. Well known and used measurements include Polity IV, Freedom House, the EIU Democracy Index, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and Vahanen Democratization Index. In their different ways these measurements show the overarching change among states from mostly authoritarian polities in the nineteenth century to mostly democratic polities in the twenty-first century. For instance, the Center for Systemic Peace, which publishes the Polity IV Index, recorded that

During the Cold War period, there had been a steady increase in the number of democracies at the rate of about one new democracy every two years. During the early 1990s, the number of democracies increased by thirty (30) in five years (from 48 in 1989 to 77 in 1994)” with “95 countries classified as democracies in late 2011” (Marshall and Cole 2011, 12).
In their 2013 *Freedom in the World* publication, Freedom House categorized 212 countries as electoral democracies of which 90 countries were labeled mostly free using indicators based on political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2013).

Despite the waves of democracy as perceived in the measurements described above, and as written about in the academic literature (Fukuyama 1992), contention still remains over defining the appropriate principles and characteristics of democratic polities. The contention spills over into desires to define the precise meaning of governance and indicate the best form of governance for a group of people. A brief historical overview provides the main ideas that have surfaced over the years on what the best form of governance would be, including ideas about the best type of political entities. The practices of liberal democracy formed from the ideas of liberalism starting in seventeenth century and the European Age of Enlightenment, especially exemplified in, but not restricted to, the writings of John Locke, Montesquieu, and Thomas Hobbes (Rawls 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). While encompassing a broad range of principles and ideals, political liberalism, especially classical liberalism, focuses on three overarching and guiding ideas: the primacy of the individual (individualism focusing on creating a system in which individuals can pursue the good life as they see fit, i.e., positive liberty), limited government (especially that run by constitutionalism and the rule of law), and the free market (represented by the protection of private property, i.e., negative liberty) (Gaus 2000). Libertarianism, an interpretation of liberalism by early theorists such as Thomas Paine, argues that the state should be drastically limited in the social, economic and political life of the people; this argument continues in modern
debates (Nozick 1974) as shown in the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001).

John Locke’s theory (1698; 1988) is particularly important for identifying the foundation of the liberal democracy and governance debate. Locke is perhaps one of the best known natural law theorists. He lived in a time when the British questioned the tradition of absolute monarchical rule. The English Civil Wars (Great Rebellion of 1642-51) in progress against the Stuart Monarchy (1632-1704) caused contention in the society between the monarchs, or ruling authority, and subjects on issues of decision-making procedures along with the right of voting, and arbitrary taxation on private property. It was during this era that Charles I was executed (1649) and Oliver Cromwell took over as Lord Protector. The English conflict between the parliamentarians and the monarchists concerned who had the right to rule (whether it was the monarch or the people) and was especially a rebellion against arbitrary rule (Tilly 1990). For instance, Charles I sent an army to quell the Irish rebellion against the will of the English parliament, a policy with which the parliamentarians disagreed.

It was in the context of problems arising between the parliament and the monarchy that Locke wrote his *Two Treatises of Government* (1690). Locke argued that the state of nature is a state of freedom and in this freedom the law of nature governs human action to consider others as equals:

> The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions” (2:6, p. 271).
The first principle developed from this use of natural law was that individuals were at liberty in nature and therefore should be as close to that in society as well. The second principle, on the limitations of government, is connected with the first. The ruling authority or civil government run by magistrates or representatives of the people is only allowed two rights that are given to them through the consent of every citizen and the onus is upon them to justify the imposition of lack of freedom. According to Locke, the only rights of government could be the right of punishment and the right to seek reparation. In Locke’s writing we begin to see the development of freedom of the individual and limited government, two essential ideals of liberalism.

Contention over how the market fits into liberalism developed from a long history of change from the feudal system to that of capitalism. Structural shifts in economic organization that resulted in calls for changes in political representation meant that liberalism became a defining battle cry in the eighteenth century (Ishay 2004). Indeed, the political and economic order of Feudalism broke down all over Europe under internal and external pressures (Markoff 1996a). European feudal lords, and the emerging middle class, challenged the monarchical, authoritarian nature of the political system in which they had no rights to decision-making procedures. Lacking a voice in decisions of government was especially irksome for those who owned property when monarchs taxed property arbitrarily. As the middle class formed and people gained economic status, they challenged the political ideas and leadership of the time. Challenges erupted in outbreaks of political and violent disputes. Examples of the violence include the English Civil Wars and Great Rebellion of 1642-51, the French Revolution (1789-1799), and the American
Revolution (1775-1781). During these conflicts groups of people following liberal ideological principles of individual freedom and limited government acted in violent opposition to the ruling monarchical and colonial (in the American case) authorities.

Classical liberalism encourages the free market and limited government intervention into the market. This is a contentious issue in development that has produced deep divides over what people think is the type of economic system that is appropriate for states to pursue in conjunction with a governance structure. Indeed, development practice traditionally focuses on providing technical advice and knowledge about how developing states should handle the market-state relationship, as evident in practices and policies of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and the United Nations Development Programme. The varieties of capitalism literature suggests that two possibilities, or ideal types, emerge from the key debates over classical and modern liberalism that developed: liberal market economy featuring reduced government intervention, and the coordinated market economy which features extensive government intervention. According to Peter Dicken these can be further broken down into “neo-liberal-market capitalism,” “social-market capitalism,” developmental capitalism,” and “authoritarian capitalism” (Dicken 2011). Keynesian economists favor the free market while arguing that government intervention is necessary to address market failures, thus advocating a welfare state or social-market capitalism. Chicago school theorists, such as Milton Freedman and Friedrich Hayek, support “liberal-market capitalism” arguing that any intervention in the market causes distortions, not least because individuals in government are opportunistic and self serving and will
always make decisions in their own interest rather than in the interests of all (Hayek 1944). The contention over these arguments spilled over into development practice in the 1950s through 1970s, especially as development organizations provided technical assistance and public administration support to dozens of decolonizing countries.

The Bretton Woods Institutions, created by the countries that emerged triumphant after World War II, were heavily influenced by thinkers such as John Maynard Keynes who supported the ideals of classical liberalism in a conservative sense. These institutions continue to champion international and domestic political and economic institutions built around the ideals of classical liberalism embedded with a sense of social responsibility and need for some government intervention in order to avoid crises (Ruggie 1982). The continual negotiation over liberal principles defines governance: negotiation over the level of government intervention in economic institutions, the ability of the individual to engage in government and the economy, and the ability of a government to provide goods and service to citizens; all these continue to be paramount in what the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO (formerly GATT), and even the United Nations do today.

In support of the development state, or development capitalism, the New International Economic Order created by the Group of 77 developing states in 1960 and supported through the UN Conference on Trade and Development suggested a new system of economic organization that would not be solely based in free market functioning (United Nations General Assembly 1974; Stokke 2009). Despite such progress in defining a program, the new block of countries experienced economic crises in the 1970s which destabilized their power in the United Nations. In the 1980s the
Reagan and Thatcher respective conservative governments in the US and UK supported the classical economic liberal ideals, thus pushing for change toward a free, unhindered market. Some argue that it was these countries that pushed international financial institutions (especially the World Bank and IMF) to require that states receiving loans should implement neoliberal policies such as deregulation, privatization, floating exchange rate system, and a whole host of other “structural adjustments” in order to create what they considered to be functioning and efficient economies in developing countries. This neoliberal agenda, also called the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990), continues today under less stringent conditionalities and reforms.

Equality, as an element of the liberal economic and political order developed in the Western world, continues to be of major interest to theorists and development practitioners in the governance debate. Under the theoretically equal operations of a free market, everyone has a similar chance to the same opportunities as all and has the same capability to pursue those opportunities (Freidman and Freidman 2002; Hayek 1944). The question in today’s debate is whether or not he or she will take the opportunity and can make use of the opportunity provided (Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999). Remembering that capability does not mean functioning (Nussbaum 2000, 86-96) one approach is to create public institutions that allow for people to actively engage with their government and economy, but does not require them to do so. This kind of policy is closely associated with the meritocratic approach, which can be problematic for those who support equality and equal rights (not only equality of opportunity). Meritocracy argues that the free market sorts out the dross; those who work for the opportunity to have better access to
goods and services will obtain it, those who do not work for it have given up their equal opportunity or chance to that access.

Contemporary development and political theorists consider equality as an essential element of societal and development practice, but also argue that the free market is a powerful mechanism for ensuring that equality in access and capability, not necessarily functioning. Development theorists are apt to consider equality as equality of opportunity, not equality of goods, services, or income. Amartya Sen’s arguments for development consist in the principle of equal access to the market and policies based on the notion that each person should have the same capability to function in the economic and political system of their country, i.e., equity (Sen 1999). Without such access, individuals and societies cannot easily achieve the human freedom outlined as important under liberalism, but with equitable access it is up to the individual to turn that capability of access into functioning, highlighting the importance of meritocracy.

Political theorist John Rawls also argues for a market-based meritocratic interpretation of equality that would lead to a world system of just societies. Building on classical liberal ideas, his guiding principles stipulate that societies should be guided by the “justice as fairness” and the “difference principle,” both founded in the idea of equal respect for persons:

1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1999, 5-6).
While Rawls may indeed be “justifying the status quo in the developed West” (Jaquette 1990, 61), he also provides a foundational argument for development practice. The focus should not be on creating equal societies where everyone has the access to the same amounts of goods and services, rather it is about creating societies in which “public policy to foster human capabilities and substantive freedoms in general can work through the promotion of these distinct but interrelated instrumental freedoms” [political, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security] (Sen 1999, 10). Following this line of thinking, one employee for the World Bank argued that the Bank was not responsible for encouraging affirmative action policies or programs in country states in any way, rather, the Bank should be concerned with influencing policies built on the principle of meritocracy.

While the argument for meritocracy may have prevailed in the economic liberal version of governance, it is still contentious in the political version. Indeed, equality in political representation and participation in government remains crucial in development thinking. In recent years the trend to promote participatory inclusiveness and stakeholder participation in development projects increased substantially (along with a push through the governance ideology for states to include citizens in decision making procedures). Equality, equity and meritocracy are deeply embedded in the way that international organizations pursue development goals in the contemporary era, though contention surrounds how these principles should work in practice. In the end, most development practice concerns creating societies focused on procedural, not distributive, equality.
Along with the importance of participatory development in recent decades, international development practice exhibits a trend to focus on the individual as the level of analysis rather than state, society, or family. The human development paradigm enhanced individualism. Historically, the focus on the individual was also evident under the poverty alleviation paradigm that was especially important to the World Bank during the McNamara years, yet poverty alleviation tends to focus on groups of people as a whole rather than as individuals struggling to exist on one or two dollars a day.

Western liberalism influenced the modern form of liberal democracy, including the government’s connection with the market. Classical liberalism’s main tenets of the primacy and freedom of the individual, limited government, and a free market continue to cause debate, contention, and disagreement in development practice and discussions, especially over the issue of the proper mode of governance to be connected with development practice. Democracy theorists suggest different forms, or ideal types, of the modern state, including constitutionalism, the liberal state, liberal or representative democracy, or one-party polity (Held 1995, 50-51). Varieties of capitalism theorists suggest that different forms or ideal types of capitalism include “neo-liberal-market capitalism,” “social-market capitalism,” developmental capitalism,” and “authoritarian capitalism” (Dicken 2011), or more simply, the neoliberal, free market economy and the coordinated market economy.

This section of the chapter has shown that the governance concept developed out of a long history of contention between the power of those people who are in authoritative positions and the people over which they intend to rule. The most important
elements of governance to develop out of this historical understanding are that of representation and access to decision-making, provision of goods and services to citizens in an efficient and effective manner, the contention over the involvement of the government in the market, and equality/equity among citizens. The next section discusses how these ideals were further crafted by development practice in the 20th century to take two different foci on the substantive elements of governance that are appropriate for modern states (especially developing states). The two trends are (1) human rights protections and political freedom, and (2) public administration efficiency.

GOVERNANCE PROMOTION

Governance is promoted by international development organizations through policies and projects. This is a contentious issue when we consider what it means for global governance and globalization. Global governance encompasses the key elements of the theoretical nature of liberal theory by suggesting that the international political and economic order should follow liberal principles and that international organizations should be involved in promoting those principles. Called idealism in the interwar years, later called functionalism and neo-functionalism, liberals argued that international organizations would be able to address collective action problems that surfaced in global governance better than individual states, and especially better than individual politicians (Mitrany 1943), and take global governance problems out of the realm of power politics in which states traditionally interacted. Later theorists argued that power politics are inextricably linked to global governance issues, and elites must be connected and buy in
to the use of international organizations to address the problems or else they will fail as was the fate of the League of Nations (Haas 1958; 2004).

Governance, or the way that states themselves govern their citizens, emerges as a global governance problem when connected with development practice for three reasons. First, development organizations have traditionally been connected with providing advice and help to governments in public administration capacity. Organizations argue that this work is apolitical, only offering advice to states on the proper conduct and organization of government institutions. Secondly, development practitioners noticed that when governments function poorly in providing goods and services to the population, or being responsive to a population’s needs and requests, development does not proceed at rapid pace if at all. Third, globalization, while creating enormous prosperity in some parts of the globe, has not had an equally beneficial effect. The apparent goods of globalization have meant ‘bads’ as well, such as increased inequalities and imbalances in knowledge, technological access, and capability of income generation (Arizpe 2005; Aucoin 2012; Rondinelli and Cheema 2003) that states themselves have to deal with, requiring efficient and effective governance. Thus, the internal political and economic governance systems of states entered the realm of being a global governance problem that international organizations take responsibility for addressing in different ways.

The post-World War II era proved to be a boon to the ideals of global governance built on liberal principles, leading to the creation of the Bretton Woods Institutions (addressing the issue specific areas of finance, reconstruction/development, and trade), the United Nations (as a collective security organization), the European Coal and Steel
Community (coordinating European trade and reconstruction) which eventually evolved into the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (collective security for Western member states), among other international and regional organizations created to address specific issue areas (Haas 1958; 2004; Keohane 1984). From the beginning these organizations operated as arbiters between states, creating rules and laws deemed to guide state action, even if that action was voluntary. Regime theorists put high hopes in such organizations to create a situation in which states would be less likely to go to war with each other over specific problems because such organizations take on functions that are delegated to them by their member states and thus international organizations provide important functions to states (e.g., reducing transaction costs) (Abbott and Snidal 1998).

The United Nations views individual state governance as a global governance issue. Its main body, the United Nations Security Council, functions as a collective security institution for all the member states. However, it quickly expanded to pick up a concern with human rights through the creation of the Human Rights Commission that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948 (Weiss et al. 2005; Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009; Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2010; Weiss and Thakur 2010). Through its promotion of human rights and support for elections, even before the end of the Cold War, the UN influences states to follow an ideology based on Western liberalism promoting aspects of liberal democracy as the appropriate form of political orientation, especially equality between human beings and the rights of participation in one’s government.
UN leaders’ promotion of liberal democracy ideals increased in the 1990s when there were drastic shifts in the structure of the international system (end of the Cold War) that freed up the space for such influence. Boutros-Boutros Ghali partially influenced this change by producing policy statements such as *An Agenda for Democratization* and *An Agenda for Peace* (Ghali 1996, 1992) which were a response to requests from the General Assembly. However, Boutros Ghali created his own interpretation of peace-keeping, turning it into a mandate for peace-building (Karns 2012). Both Boutros Ghali’s policy documents were accepted by the General Assembly, and both charted a course for UN influence in post conflict situations for peace-building (beyond peace-keeping) and for supporting democracy in member states.

For development organizations like the UN Development Programme (UNDP) the shift meant that development should include encouraging states to follow democratic governance principles. This shift largely started in the 1980s when William H. Draper III was Administrator of the UNDP. One of the largest influences he had on the organization was in the area of advocacy of development. Prior to this time the World Bank and economists were the most influential in development politics and policy, making a claim that development was about income, poverty reduction, and macroeconomic growth and stability. However Draper and others found this understanding of development to be too narrowly focused on income. He hired the famous economist Mahbub ul Haq who then applied to Amartya Sen to join in the project to create a new paradigm of development, labeled human development, in which the freedoms and capabilities of the human being were at the center of development goals, not income aggregation. The human
development paradigm influences the UNDP and development ideology to focus on the human being as the center of analysis, paving the way for development to be inextricably linked to liberal democracy norms as well as human rights principles.

Most other bilateral development organizations, especially those situated in Western liberal democracies, have followed in the same footsteps as the UNDP and actively promote democratic governance, at least in rhetoric. Most notable are the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) whose governance department was created by Roger Wilson and colleagues in the early 1990s, USAID, the US based Millennium Challenge Corporation created during the G.W. Bush Administration specifically to fund development in countries that exhibit “good governance” policies, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Australia’s AusAid, among others from OECD countries. These organizations all focus on promoting democracy, encouraging elections, and supporting public administration toward changes that encourage the creation of democratic polities in their bilateral relations.

Furthermore, regional development organizations and development banks follow suit in pressuring for a shift in political orientation of developing, non-democratic countries. The most important here include the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-American Development Bank, and the European Union. These regional development organizations increasingly highlight the importance and
influence of governance, suggesting that states need to govern in a particularly liberal way in order to enhance development project success in each country.

While many of the regional and bilateral development organizations listed above do not have limitations on the kinds of influence they can have on politics within countries, the mandates and Articles of Agreement prohibit international development organizations (like the UNDP and the World Bank) from engaging in politically influencing states. Yet, since the 1980s they have increasingly done just that under the benign and obtuse language of good governance or even democratic governance. The next section analyzes governance rhetoric, highlighting the origins of the democratic versus good governance concepts.

**Defining Two Governance Concepts**

Two concepts emerge from an analysis of the governance for development literature. First, one trend in development is to push countries toward democratic regimes and rules, ensuring representation in government, and ensuring equal participation in decision-making procedures of government and in running for government. The first trend is called either democratic governance or demand-side governance. The second trend is to focus on how governments can efficiently and effectively carry out their duties of providing goods and services to their populations. The second trend is a focus on good, good-enough, or supply-side governance. I argue that good governance takes a more tangible and evident definition in international development than some would argue, yet
it does not exactly parallel either substantive liberal democracy or the neoliberal ideology of the conservative right.

Yet, just as historical contention over the definition and rights associated with liberal democracy has not been overcome, and continues today, the definition of the appropriate form of government and mechanisms of governing remains ambiguous. Practitioners and academics usually contend that the concept includes any or all of the following substantive elements: accountability, decency, effectiveness (in problem solving and decision-making), efficiency (in allocating resources to the public), fairness, lack (control) of corruption, legitimacy, participation, responsiveness to citizens, rule of law (judicial framework), transparency, security enhancing, and maintaining social peace and political stability (Coston 1998; Kaufmann 2009; Rodrik 2008, 18; Hydén and Court 2007; Keefer 2004; Ager 2000; Schmelzle 2011).

A vociferous critique exists over both the relevance and definition of the good governance concept. One side argues that the good governance concept is imprecise and therefore inapplicable, or at the very least inefficient to either meet development outcomes (Nanda 2006; Jabeen and Iqbal 2010; Grindle 2007; Andrews 2008). There are those who argue that good governance is not an apolitical concept, but that it was built on liberal democracy and/or neoliberal beliefs and policies and does not stray far from liberal democracy principles (Williams 2009; Keefer 2004; Hewitt de Alcántara 1998; Moore 1966). Others argue that the good governance concept offers clarity to governance issues where the democratization literature does not (Hydén and Court 2007).
Several studies pull together the various works on governance to formulate substantive theories and definitions of good governance. These definitions are supposedly objective of any regime type as identified in the democratization literature (from authoritarian to democratic) and measurable. Two major studies focused on developing a definition of good governance and measurable indicators that have caught international development attention and have been used widely in development: the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by Daniel Kaufmann and colleagues at the World Bank (Kaufmann 2009, 2010), and the World Governance Survey developed by Göran Hyden and colleagues at the United Nations University and ending the project at the Overseas Development Institute World Governance Assessment (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004; Hydén and Court 2007).

Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Since 2002 the authors have measured six dimensions of governance including “Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption” (Kaufmann 2009, 2). These aggregate indicators are all based on subjective understandings of governance and perceptions on governance, attempting to get an idea of how individuals in societies feel about their own government on the six dimensions. The authors’ definition of governance relates to the process of government institutions but is also connected to outcomes of governance:

We define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann 2009, 5).

The World Governance Assessment specifically attempts to overcome what the authors see as a subjective trend in assessments of good governance that conflate good governance with liberal democracy (as in the Worldwide Governance Indicators). Göran Hydén, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease focus on regime type, process of exercising authority, and public administration capacity (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004, 15). They use the process dimension of governance to assess a country’s measurable results using principles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and not, as they claim, a substantive understanding of liberal democracy. Thus their definition of governance is process oriented: “Governance refers to the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions” and governance is measured by these authors by six objectifiable indicators: “(1) participation, (2) fairness, (3) decency, (4) accountability, (5) transparency, and (6) efficiency” (Hydén and Court 2007, 3).

While these two projects attempt to measure governance on the whole using several different aggregate indicators and speaking at either process, outcome dimension or both, a multitude of other indexes and indicators measure what the international development community accepts as characteristics of governance.¹⁰ Considering the numerous attempts at measuring governance and the multitude of substantive foci as well

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¹⁰ Some of the most well-known and widely used include Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index,” the Polity Project measuring regime types from democratic to authoritarian, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports measuring political and civil freedoms, and the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index.
as differences in the way that the indexes analyze processes of government (hierarchical versus vertical control and associated mechanisms) and whether or not the index is primarily focused on process or outcome, it is no wonder that the idea of governance having a shared or definitive substantive meaning is both incomprehensible and difficult to claim definitively. However, some key similarities abound in the attempts at measurement as well as in governance definitions in academic and practitioner literature that conceptually separate democracy and good governance, or demand versus supply governance (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004).11

Based on these studies and analysis of the literature on governance discussed above, two trends in governance appear: one built on the notions of public administration provision of goods and services (good governance or supply side governance). The other built on the ideas of democracy and individual freedom (democratic governance or demand side governance). It is not that the one excludes the concepts embedded in the other. Rather, they create a very different focus on the norms and ideas that go along with governance. Both these trends and concepts build on the tradition of democratic and economic liberalism that developed in the West, and both are utilized by development agencies and practitioners at different times for different purposes.

11 In a working paper produced for the World Bank Phillip Keefer argues that while there is no unifying concept on governance among international development organizations and academics, at the core of all definitions is some aspect of securing "property rights, voice and accountability, or the performance of bureaucracy"(1). I agree with this to the extent that securing property rights are an element of equal access to goods and services (which does not mean having property or securing property rights to every society and the governance concept is sufficiently vague to deal with this ambiguity). The performance of bureaucracy is the process versus outcome issue and as we have seen definitions differ widely on whether or not they include process or outcome. Finally what this author terms voice and accountability is the idea of stakeholder participation which is an essential element of all the definitions of governance listed above (Keefer 2004).
Two Historical Trends: Human Rights and Public Administration

This section summarizes how the two governance trends of democratic governance and good governance developed historically that now guide the governance debate. It shows that democratic governance developed out of the historical trend to support human rights and the human rights regime, as well as in the creation of the human development paradigm. The good governance trend, on the other hand, traces back to support for public administration in development aid and funding with the notion that governments can be efficient and effective in public service delivery and growth no matter what their political bent, as long as they follow certain bureaucratic rules of organization.

International development organizations have long focused solely on public administration as a way of enhancing government capacity to deliver goods and services to citizens, function in the international global economy (through trade especially), and engage with other states through efficient public sector (bureaucratic) institutions (Williams 2009; Leftwich 1993; Keefer 2004). In the 1980s public administration theory and practice started to include considerations of the content and substantive aspects of government institutions with what became termed new public administration and new institutionalism (North 1990).

The trend to support the capacity of public administration and ignore the content and quality of government changed in the 1980s near the end of the impacts of structural adjustment. The International Financial Institutions (the World Bank and IMF) acknowledged that changes were needed in order to make amends for social costs that
were felt in the developing world because of unnecessarily strict neoliberal policies impressed on states through conditionalities for receiving loans. Furthermore, international development organizations were tasked from the beginning with apolitical mandates that kept them from influencing or impacting governments beyond capacity building (Moore 1966; Nanda 2006; Williams 2009). Thus the governance concept was useful as a tool for development organizations to begin focusing on government content and quality without being considered political.

The failed nature of development projects themselves also proved an impetus for a shift toward a focus on governance in the development community. Practices and lessons learned from past attempts to reduce poverty and increase growth emerge as an important reason for focusing on the governance of a country. One respondent from UNDP argued that UNDP has focused on governance because of difficulty with succeeding in development in the past associated with problems related to the way that the government implements or works to implement projects. From failed projects of the past, development practitioners realized that there was a need to focus on governance or else there would never be success in development.

**Democratic Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights**

The first trend in governance is to focus on the ability of the individual to participate equally in government through decision-making procedures, voting, and running for office. This built out of the democratization experience and literature of the latter 20th century, and out of the human rights regime connected with the United
Nations. First, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the political structure of democracy continued to expand to more countries of the world in the 20th century (Cheema 2005, 3), especially at the end of the Cold War in which many of the former Soviet Union countries identified as democracies (Kenney 2010). Indeed, some democracy theorists called this a triumph of democracy and the ultimate end of history in the sense that humans have perfected the best form of polity. Francis Fukuyama, well known for making this argument, commented on the rise of democracy and its connection with human rights by saying that democracy “is the right held universally by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is, the right of all citizens to vote and participate in politics,” thus making a connection between liberalism and democracy (Fukuyama 1992, 43).

Democracy theorists are most concerned with the ability of individuals to engage and participate in government equally. David Held argues that the most important element of contemporary democracy is that “decisions affecting a community are taken not by its members as a whole, but by a sub-group of ‘representatives’ who have been elected by ‘the people’ to govern within the framework of the rule of law (1995, 51),” a position often labeled representative democracy. While democracy and democratic rule vary from the constraints of liberal democracy, most theorists note that liberal democracy has become the “dominant form of the modern state” (Held 1995, 51) and it includes the following principles:

(a) the constitutional entrenchment of control over governmental policy in elected officials; (b) the removal of elected officials in frequent, fair and free elections; (c) the right to vote for all adults in such elections (unless legitimately disbarred due to severe mental illness or criminal conviction); and (d) the right to run for
public office. In addition, there must be (e) an effective right for each citizen to freedom of expression, including the freedom to criticize the conduct of government and the socio-economic system in which it is embedded; (f) accessible sources of information other than those controlled by government or by any other single body or group; and, finally, (g) an established right to form and join independent associations, whether they be political, social or cultural, that could shape public life through legitimate, peaceful means (Held 1995, 51).

One of the most influential theorists on democracy, Robert Dahl, argues that “democracy provides opportunities for effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda, and inclusion of adults” (Dahl 1998, 38). Francis Fukuyama simply defines democracy saying that “a country is democratic if it grants its people the right to choose their own government through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage” (Fukuyama 1992, 43). The democratization literature is vast, incorporating much controversy over what democracy means and how it is implemented in various ways throughout the world (Diamond 2009), yet it centers around the ideas developed in the Western world on liberalism, that the individual should have the right to participate equally in government—this historical trend and literature has influenced the way that development organizations think about and articulate the proper mode of governance for developing countries.

Second, the United Nations influence in human rights created a sense that participation in government is a right of all human beings and should be respected through democratic representation. The United Nation’s concern with norms or ideas12 of

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12 The terms norm and idea are frequently used interchangeably by authors to mean the same thing, yet they are distinctly different. Here note that I take norms to be standards of behavior that actors follow and through which they analyze and interpret each other’s behavior. Ideas are thoughts, concepts, or notions
international relations abounds. Indeed, writers stress the influence of UN ideas in the international system.\textsuperscript{13} Two projects of note studied and traced the impact of ideas, both within the United Nations, and from the United Nations: the United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP), and the Creation, Adoption, Negation and Distortion of Ideas in Development project (CANDID).\textsuperscript{14} Using a constructivist perspective, these authors found that ideas (or norms) were influential and important in international relations and that actors like the United Nations could function autonomously and have an influential impact on world politics. The United Nations has influence over development ideas, human rights norms, and norms of security, cooperation, and nation-state behavior (Boas and McNeill 2004; McNeill 2006; Schrijver 2010; Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001; Jolly et al. 2004; Stokke 2009). Human rights norms are influential in the development of governance ideas, including normative ideas. Human rights norms have been especially important to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) because of the close relation with the formation of the United Nations, with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and thereby, with the human rights regime.

The norms associated with democratic governance are founded in the human rights treaties and documents that representatives to the United Nations created first in

\textsuperscript{13} Virtually every book written for the Intellectual History Project on the UN stresses that the UN has been influential in promoting the ‘ideas’ that pervade the international system. See for example: (Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009) Also (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001; Jolly et al. 2004) and (Stokke 2009).

\textsuperscript{14} The UNIHP project published a series of volumes, four of which address the change in the concept of development at the UN, and eight of which include the UNDP in the specific study (Reinalda 2011). The most influential publication from the CANDID project was a book that traced the progression and diffusion of ideas in the UN, one of them being governance (Boas and McNeill 2004).
1948 and subsequently in further documents (Fox 2003, 181-82; Pollis and Schwab 1979). Of special note are the three documents of the Universal Bill of Human Rights which are accepted by all states, and which garner the most attention in human rights practice because of their authoritative status. These documents attest to a right of a citizen to participate in his/her government, and to be involved in the decision making process of one’s state. The ideas elucidated in the International Bill of Human Rights were a precursor of the focus on participation that emerged as the first important concept in democratic governance in the 1990s, closely associated with electoral assistance and voting rights.

The UNDP’s documents underline how certain human rights bolster and provide a foundation for the concept of democratic governance. In 2011 the UNDP said about itself that “in its efforts to advance human development, UNDP supports Member States and partners in grounding their national development plans, policies and processes in the human rights principles of participation, inclusion, equality and non-discrimination” (United Nations Development Programme 2011b). Indeed, the focus on human development to which I return below is a prime example of the connection between human rights and democratic governance. Human development puts at the forefront the idea of the freedom of the individual, which is of high priority for human rights norms.

15 Here I refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) which every state in the world has supported through either signature, ratification, accession, or succession. (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 1996).

16 See UDHR, Article 21; CESCR, Article 1, and CCPR, Article 1.
Norms offer a particular social purpose to the community that accepts them. Human rights, accepted by the international community, provide the social purpose of protecting the citizen from the state, or encouraging respect of citizens by states, and of legitimating a state in the international community. Human rights were created in order for the international community to regulate that relationship between the state and the individual, arising from the harsh realities of powerful states against citizens occurring in World War II (Lauren 2003, 2nd Edition; Donnelly 2007). Human rights have become more than just statements of right and wrong and attempts at regulating state behavior toward citizens; human rights serve as legitimation of a state’s right to exist, or its “political legitimacy” (Donnelly 2003, 2nd Edition, 12). States claim legitimacy and authority based on their track record for signing human rights treaties, reports to human rights committees, and membership in organizations that support human rights such as the United Nations or regional organizations.

The development discourse shift within the UNDP toward sustainable human development is a clear forerunner of democratic governance concept (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001; Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2010; Dadzie 1995). The UNDP experienced a crisis of identity as an agency of the UN in the 1980s and 1990s, but leadership worked to overcome this crisis by redefining the work of the UNDP and pushing it in a new direction, a move that paved the way for the democratic governance practices that

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17 The four stages, as outlined in Weiss, Forsythe and Coate from Kenneth Dadzie, are: National state capitalism (1945-1962), International Affirmative Action (1962-1981), Return to Neo-Liberalism (1981-1989), and Sustainable Human Development (1989-present). My analysis will be concerned only with the latter two stages of development and how these incorporated “good” or “democratic” governance norms. Furthermore, my analysis suggests a subsequent stage rather than ending at Sustainable Human Development.
developed at the end of the 1990s. First, the UNDP stopped funding other agencies of the UN and started funding its own work in technical assistance. This was a propitious moment for the UNDP as it started to take on the being of an independent organization and leader of the UN system as a whole on development, rather than a fund. This occurred under the leadership of William H. Draper III along with a shift in the focus on the development agency, from the focus on poverty as an economic issue to incorporating the human rights and democracy focus on the UN in ‘human development’. The shifting nature of the organization to try to promote its own development ideology as well as its own policies and practices on the ground rather than supporting other agencies is most evident in the Human Development Reports that began annual publication in 1990.

The concept of human development was created by Mahbub ul Haq who later described the period of the shifting notions of development to incorporate the idea of freedom of the individual and concerns above and beyond economic status (Haq 1995). Haq is considered the founder of the Human Development Reports, having been charged with the task of creating such a report by William H Draper III in the latter 1980s. Draper came to the UNDP with his own ideas and principles of development, i.e., “promoting the private sector, women, non-governmental organizations of 'civil society', and the environment” and a belief that the organization needed “something to believe in” (Murphy 2006, 240; 239). Draper had heard about Haq and sought someone to help back up his ideas in the UNDP (Murphy 2006). Haq worked with a team of development experts on the project that would redefine the development practice. The human

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18 The team included Amartya Sen, Paul Streeten, Frances Stewart, Gus Ranis, and Meghnad Desai (Murphy 2006, 247; Kaul 2003, 85).
development paradigm redefined the UNDP’s role in development and its impact in states around the world, re-articulating the very concept of development in a way that considered human freedom as crucial to development. Prior to the concept of human development, the focus in development studies centered on economic prospects, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and the structure of economic relations within and between states. The economic development focus came from a focus on comparative economics that emerged in development studies in the mid-20th century with well-intentioned and concerned people such as Hans Singer, Walter Rostow, and especially John Maynard Keynes who is said to have created the idea of macroeconomics.

A stanch economist, Mahbub ul Haq came to argue that human agency and freedom, that is, what one could do and be in life, was of crucial importance to development work and that thinking about development must move beyond the statistics and income calculations so important to development economists in the early years; this in contrast to his early focus on economic indicators (Weiss et al. 2005, 98). Amartya Sen, one of Haq’s colleagues on the human development reports, later wrote a famous work that argues for the primacy of thinking of development as the freedom to do and be what one wishes in life (Sen 1999), which was not only influential in creating the human development concept and Human Development Reports (HDRs) that the UNDP began publishing, but also in changing the nature of the international debate on development thinking (Fukuda-Parr 2011). Perhaps the most influential aspect of the human development idea was the attempt to quantify it in the Human Development Index (HDI). Human development remains as an integral aspect of policy and project formation in the
UNDP, guiding decisions. The Strategic Plan 2008-2011 clarifies the focus on human development by saying that “This means that all UNDP policy advice, technical support, advocacy, and contributions to strengthening coherence in global development must be aimed at one end result: real improvements in people’s lives and in the choices and opportunities open to them” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, 6).

Human development was to set the stage for the development of the democratic governance framework later in the 1990s because of the way that it focused on the individual’s capabilities within a domestic structure rather than on the economic structure itself. Refocusing required a reordering of conceptual orientations on the kind of structure that should be in place and how it should affect the individual life, not lives on aggregate. The foundation for democratic governance is revealed in the first Human Development Report (United Nations Development Programme 1990). The report continually claims that “human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living” (United Nations Development Programme 1990, 10). More to the point, political freedom is supported predominantly in this document as exemplified in the overview statement: “additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights, and personal self-respect” (1). An influential and controversial HDR in proclaiming these kinds of political structural aspects of human development is the HDR 2002 which

19 Article 17 of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 affirms the Executive Board’s decision to focus on human development: “Emphasizes that UNDP should take a human development-based approach to programming” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c).
considered how democracy was important to increasing the freedoms entailed in human development (United Nations Development Programme 2002).

This section argued that the democratic governance paradigm that focuses on individual freedoms, especially as related to decision-making in government, running for office, and equal access to government, was founded in the human rights regime and in the democratization literature and experience of the latter 20th century. The UNDP played a large role in the creation of the democratic governance paradigm through the human development paradigm and reports.

**Good Governance and Public Administration**

International development organizations focused on supporting public administration efficiency and capacity building through projects that provided technical assistance throughout the developing world in the 1960s-1980s. The reigning development practice consensus was that technical assistance was most important and most needed by developing countries. Indeed, technical capacity and knowledge was the major aspect of running a country that was missing from the developing world. Development organizations focused on technical training, capacity building, and transfer of technical knowledge and skills. This was especially true for countries in the 1960s and 1975 that emerged from colonial rule with the need to learn how a state functions and what kinds of rules, roles, and laws characterized modern states. In the early years of development, public administration meant supporting states in their administrative and bureaucratic capacity to function as states that needed to provide goods and services to
their populations. In the aftermath of World War II, the developed states were concerned with the ability and capacity of losing states to govern well, thus the heavy focus on technical assistance (Farazmand 1996).

In the 1950s the World Bank, and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance or EPTA (the predecessor of the UNDP), funded projects in which consultants travelled to developing countries to train people on how to be functionaries, administrators, parliamentarians, statesmen, politicians, clerks, economists, administrators, and secretaries (Sady 1973). They trained people on how to run a state (training on holding elections came later), and on the kinds of public services the state was supposed to provide to its citizens. They trained people on how to structure their economies with a vision of becoming competitive in the international market. From the 1960s onwards the UNDP was in charge of funding technical assistance projects in other agencies of the UN in order to fulfill their role of helping states develop the capacity to rule, all discussed under the rubric of public administration (Emmerich 1971).

Funding and implementation practices often pointed to the importance of public administration reform in development assistance. For instance, writing on the UN Programme in Public Administration, two authors and former employees of the UN note that the shift from 1970s to 1980s in public administration was a shift toward a market-based approach that highlighted the minimalist efficiency of the state in allowing the market to function (as associated with the Washington Consensus of other UN agencies) (Bertucci and Alberti 2005). Shifting back toward a focus on the state itself rather than
the market, the 1990s policies were less market-driven and refocused attention on the goods and services that the state provides rather than how those are provided.

The focus on public administration shifted to that of a focus on governance and institutionalism, less obsessed with functional interpretations of the state, and more concerned with normative aspects of process and outcome. A trend to enhance the analysis of delivery of goods and services to a population beyond the state was first evident in European public administration literature (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004; Peters and Pierre 1998). In the Americas the New Public Management and new institutionalism analysis heightened awareness of the extent of governance mechanisms that existed beyond the state (North 1990; Andrews 2008). These trends in public administration analysis followed closely with the changes evident in globalization and international relations historic moments such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the apparent spread of democracy to newly formed post-Soviet states, the extension of multi-party politics and elections throughout Africa and Latin America in the 1990s, and the effects of a new era of globalization represented in expansion of trade and interdependence among states.

The World Bank followed the trend to focus heavily on public administration support in its funding policies and projects, and continues to this day to define governance in relation to public administration. The trend partially explains why the World Bank heavily focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration delivery over the type of polity that is delivering those services. It partially explains the
focus on anti-corruption and transparency measures that are the highlight of the Bank’s
good governance policy and projects.

This section argues that good governance as a second paradigm can be separated out from the focus on democratic governance. Good governance developed from a focus on public administration efficiency and effectiveness, the technical assistance and knowledge that characterized the first decades of development practice in the mid-20th century. The public administration concept remains focused on the aspects of how the state’s government provides goods and services to a population, how a government is set up bureaucratically, and how a government engages successfully both with its citizens and with other governments or civil society groups. Thus, the focus is on the supply side of government which has always been a conscious element of development assistance. What has changed in the 1990s is a concern that government institutions are set up appropriately to engage with citizens in a legitimate, efficient, and effective manner. Since the 1990s this has also meant a radical focus on anti-corruption efforts, a trend first championed by the World Bank under the leadership of James Wolfensohn.

_Two Governance Types: Good Governance and Democratic Governance_

The above argues that the governance concept developed out of a long tradition of liberal democracy in the Western countries, but that this tradition was melded in particular ways in the development literature and practice in the 20th century to eventually create two trends in governance promotion, one that upheld democratic principles of citizen participation in government and representation built out of the human rights
regime (demand side governance or democratic governance), and one that promoted efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery to citizens built out of concern in the early years of development for public administration efficiency (supply side governance or good governance).

Building on the literature and practice of development thinking concerning governance, the following tables identifies the definitions, concepts, and keywords most often associated with the two trends. These tables are used in the content analysis of primary documents as shown in the next chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Good Governance (supply side; outcome oriented) – employing mechanisms of control over citizens in such a way that provision of public goods and services is provided to all in an efficient and effective manner while encouraging some participation in decision-making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Concepts</td>
<td>accountability, anti-corruption, anti-nepotism, arms-length business practice, budgeting, business-friendly, citizen voice to law-makers, civil society inclusion, competition within civil service, contested elections, decentralization, development, development growth, disciplined government, documentation, due process rights, economic growth, effective government, fairness, financial management, fiscal discipline, fiscal stability, formal checks and balances, formality, formalized rules, fragility, high health standards and statistics, infrastructure development, law-makers responsive and accountable, legal checks, limited government, low infant mortality, management, meritocratic, outcome-oriented, participatory, patronage, physical structure, poverty reduction, predictability, private sector, pro-business, professional ethos, protect private property, public events, reform, responsive, revenue dependent, rule of law, security, service delivery, service provision, stable policies, tax-based system, technocrats, transparent, voice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.2: Democratic Governance Definition and Keywords

| Definition | Democratic Governance (demand side; process oriented) – employing mechanisms of control over citizens in such a way that citizens are able and willing to participate in decisions that affect the way that goods and services are distributed to citizens, as well as participate in employing those mechanisms of control |
| Key Concepts | Accountability, civil society autonomy from state, civil society strong, civil society holds government accountable, constitution that guarantees civil rights, control of agenda, dissemination of information by civil society, effective participation, elections, electoral, electoral cycle, equality, equality in voting, fair elections, fairness, free elections, freedom, guarantees rights, judicial reform, justice, human development, human dignity, human condition, human rights, human poverty, overcoming human deprivation, inclusion of adults, individual, integrity, legitimacy, literacy, opportunity for participation, peace, pluralism, political equality, political participation, poverty reduction, processes (parliamentary, judicial, electoral), prosperity, protection of rights, quality of life, right to political participation, rule of law, self determination, social trust, social accountability, transparency, trust, understanding, vote, voting. |

Taking from this list and separating out according to the distinction between demand and supply side governance, the following list of key words emerges. A cursory review of the concepts and terms associated with each type of governance shows that many of the terms overlap but that there are some pertinent differences. In order to analyze the documents, speeches, and writings of the organizations to see which types of governance are being promoted, this study makes as clear as possible a conceptual differentiation between “good” and “democratic” governance, also identifying the mechanisms of control and actors that are focused on in the governance ideology. The study therefore chooses the keywords and concepts that are considered most often in the articulation of the idea of governance as identified in the literature as shown in the following table. The keywords were chosen based on the differences in the way that the
governance concept was articulated in the majority of the literature. Further, the concepts fall under the categories identified as crucial elements in the history of the liberal theory and governance debate: the importance of the individual’s freedoms, the engagement of government with the market and civil society, and market freedom including business relationships with government and protection of private property. The next chapter utilizes these keywords in quantitative content analysis to analyze which key words are most often used by each organization and under what circumstances.

### Table 2.3 Governance Keywords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Governance</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Accountable/Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption/Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections/Electoral</td>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>Efficient/Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Effective/Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development</td>
<td>Financial Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Poverty</td>
<td>Fiscal (as in Discipline or Austerity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Right/s</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Responsive/Responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Transparent/Transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote/Voting</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTORS, MECHANISMS AND MODES OF GOVERNANCE**

Building off of the analysis of the definition of the governance concept above, the following considers the different types of authorities (institutions), and different mechanisms of control utilized in governance (ranging from forceful coercion to persuasion), noting that the governance concept incorporates different principles or norms depending on culture and historical circumstances (Borzel 2010; Risse 2012).
Attempts at conceptual clarity in regime types and procedures of government outlined in the democratization literature (Dahl 1998), suffer from lack of clarity on the definition and application of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Collier and Levitsky argue that the concept either does not achieve enough differentiation between democracies or regime types, or suffers from such ‘conceptual stretching’ that it applies to all regime types that become indistinguishable. The authors suggest conceptual clarification strategies including Sartori’s ladder of generality, diminished subtypes, précising the definition, and shifting the overarching concept. In order to achieve differentiation and avoid conceptual stretching on the governance concept the following analysis uses the strategy of creating ideal types and précising the definition, starting with an analysis of functional differentiation in governance literature in order to identify categories of actors and mechanisms of control that are included in the governance process.

Globalization further meant impacting the government’s mechanisms of controlling or steering society so that an expansion of the concept of governance beyond the institutions of the government/state was necessary in order to address new modes of control, new mechanisms of service delivery, and new incapacities of the government institutions which traditionally had the monopoly of the use of force, control of society, and provision of public goods to society (Rhodes 1996; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Hewitt de Alcántara 1998; Peters and Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998). “The need to improve governance and public administration and to enhance the state's capacity to carry out new functions and roles is now widely recognized” (Rondinelli and Cheema 2003, 8). Such a discourse has led to various routes in conceptualizing what governance means for an era
of increased globalization and considering how institutions of governance should be built on the international level to help states address externalities that they all face as well as control societal issues that cannot be addressed by the state itself (Keohane 2000; Rosenau 1995).

At its very core, governance refers to control of society and thus the foci concerns how a society makes decisions and creates rules, laws and norms that provide stability to its existence. Beyond controlling how large groups of people interact with each other, governance is also focused on the provision of goods and services to those people, thus including decision-making, rules and norms on how groups of people will share public goods is an essential element of the analysis. A focus on mechanisms of governance therefore means a concern with how authoritative figures control society and how society obtains access to public goods and services provided by authoritative figures. Yet, a mere focus on functional and control elements of governance precludes the important aspects of normative foundations and theories of governance such as the type of governance regime (authoritarian, democratic, fascist, totalitarian) or the principles that guide governance processes and outcomes (efficiency, effectiveness, inclusiveness).

Typologies of governance help identify the various elements of governance, the most crucial of which are: the authorities (institutions), mechanisms or modes of governance, the processes of governance, and the outcomes of governance. There are several reasons why a typology based on functional interpretation of governance proves illuminating. Focusing on the institutions of governance, sociological systems theory analyzed control of society, often termed “steering” society, providing a functional,
autopoietic (self-governance), representation of governance from the purview of
government institutions (Esmark 2011). Functional representations of governance in
governments help identify the process of decision-making and provision of goods, and
the outcome of distributing those goods to society.

Sociological literature on governance influenced much of the governance
contceptualization and tendency for governance scholars to focus on modern societies as
categorized by increasing functional differentiation creating separate and distinct
societal sectors that dealt with specific issues. Under a functionalist interpretation the
different institutions of society deal with different issues and public problems. First, the
state (or government) dealt with politics and was tasked with the delivery of public goods
to society and making sure that society followed rules and regulations (i.e., enforced
societal strictures) to ensure survival. Second, the market works with public sector to
deliver public goods, but goes beyond in a capitalist society with a motivation to compete
(using rational negotiation) with other actors to deliver goods and services to society.
Finally, civil society represents the horizontal, networked groups that create norms to
make up for any lack in provision of goods and services by state or market, and also to
hold governments accountable to citizens (Esmark 2011, 96).

20 Rosenau prefers the term steering or control over “command mechanisms” precisely because of the
changing nature of governance to incorporate “bottom-up” approaches from civil society to dealing with
societal problems and delivering public goods (Rosenau 1995).

21 The governance literature that uses this typology of state, market, and civil society to explain and study
modern societies is vast. Esmark offers a good overview of the literature (96). See (Dahl and Lindblom
Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953); Oliver E.
Williamson, "The Economics of Governance," The American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (2005); C.E.
Further, functional differentiation provides a way to look at the practice of governance without focusing solely on the institution type or actor that is attempting control of society (Draude 2007). Function is deeply tied with the concept of outcome, i.e., that the interesting governance element is what the government or authoritative actor does for a society (the kinds of goods and services it provides) and the outcome of that provision. Concerns over efficiency and effectiveness are closely tied to concerns with outcome in that an inefficient public service delivery mechanism will have poor outcomes. One author provides a two-by-two continuum of process to results and steering to rules that offers an interesting way of combining the ideas of process and outcome together into a framing mechanism (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004).

Functional differentiation also concerns the methods used in order to carry out those functions (coercion, competition, and cooperation) which are often conflated with the three distinct social institutions (government, market, civil society). Börzel’s typology connects multiple “modes of control” of society with the institutions falling under three categories that nicely align with the sociological literature: “governance by government,” “governance without government” and “governance with government” (Börzel 2010, 9). On a dichotomous scale, governance mechanisms can be either vertical

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22 Multiple authors have noted other ways of distinguishing between mechanisms of control including Gerry Stoker’s "principal-agent relations, inter-organizational negotiation, and systemic coordination" (1998, 22). Kooiman discusses social interactions as interferences, interplays, and interventions (2003). I use coercion, competition, and cooperation because it is the simplest and works well in dividing governance actors (institutions) into a typology along with the mechanisms of control they are most often associated with (though do not only or even primarily given the circumstances and historical trends that can be identified in empirical analysis).
or horizontal. Vertical control indicates hierarchical relationships between those who have authority, means of control, and (usually) coercive enforcement of rules, or “governance by government.” Horizontal control is characterized by cooperative decision-making and creation of rules, roles, and control mechanisms between equals in society. The latter refers to networked governance or “governance with government,” multi-level governance, and civil society or “governance without government,” and to modes of control that range from competition and rational negotiation to collaboration and relational networks built on trust and norms. Table 2.4 breaks down the functional differentiation typology by governance type, actors involved, mechanisms of control typically used by those actors, and the processes of governance (or decision-making procedures).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Governance</th>
<th>Authority (Institution) Governing</th>
<th>Mechanisms of Control and Process of Governance (Decision-Making Procedures)</th>
<th>Keywords identifying which type of governance is being discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-between horizontal and vertical</td>
<td>Market Institution: corporations, companies, non-regulated entities, individual entrepreneurs Sometimes includes public-private partnerships</td>
<td>Mechanisms of Control: Competition: rational cost-benefit analysis, efficiency, reputation accountability (especially competitive reputation) Decision Making: Organic</td>
<td>Market/ Free market Business Company Corporation Competition Accountability Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal, Civil Society Institutions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The first type of governance focuses on the institutions of government which Börzel argues can provide a “shadow of hierarchy” (Börzel 2010, 11) as the dominant rule structure of a society, guiding the way that actors interact and eventually the way they govern. The contemporary government structure takes on a particular form including bodies of executive, legislature, and judiciary. Furthermore, according to international norms and principles identifying modern governments, it is characterized by four crucial elements: a bureaucracy, a population, borders (and control over borders) and the monopoly on the use of force.23 Forms of government range from authoritarian to democratic and include a vast array of different institutional structures including Presidential and Parliamentary Systems (Dahl 1998).

Of primary importance in this typology is the dominating way that governments control and provide goods and services: by hierarchical, top-down, coercive means. Development and state-building literature focuses on the institutions of government (especially as a modern state conceptualization), and on how to increase the capacity and

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23 This categorization of the characteristics of the modern state goes as far back to Weber but is also evident in treaties such as the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States signed on December 26, 1933 at the International Conference of American States by (in order on the manuscript) Honduras, United States, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, Peru and Cuba. It outlines the definition of a state according to modern international assumptions.
strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those institutions. Yet, governance does not only occur through the state and its bureaucratic and coercive institutions. Indeed, while Max Weber was the first to suggest that modern state has the control over the legitimate use of force, this does not mean that the modern state is the only institution or entity that uses such force or has ever controlled the legitimate use of force.

Under the second conceptualization of governance, the market and market mechanisms control society and provide goods and services to society through modes of competition, rational negotiation, and largely based on reputation with consumers in a capitalist system. Such control can occur both with or without government: “gradually, the international community has come to recognize that economics and politics are inexorably intertwined, and that the institutions of government have an impact on market performance” (Feinberg 2008, 160). The market almost never works alone, i.e., there is always the connection with government institutions however strong or weak. In an era of globalization government institutions have had to conform and change to new demands of the integrated and interdependent nature of the international system and work with the private sector in order to provide goods and services traditionally considered the purview of the state (Rondinelli and Cheema 2003).

Public-private partnerships are essential here as a mode of governance with the idea that the state provides the environment in which the market can function well, also termed the “shadow of hierarchy” (Börzel 2010; Risse 2011). A trend to focus on market modes of control and the possibility of public-private sector coordination started in Europe and has slowly made its way to the United States (Peters and Pierre 1998). A
good example of public-private collaboration is the delivery of health care to the population in the United States; obviously a public good that has been given out to private service providers and which is still, at least partially, regulated by government. These actors can also work outside of the state and act in self-regulating ways. Rosenau identifies institutionalized self-regulating mechanisms of control over society that appear in both formal and informal non-state actors such as transnational credit rating system or transnational criminal organizations (Rosenau 1995, 32)

Third, governments also work with non-state actors in order to fulfill the functions that it is meant to provide under whatever normative understanding of governance exists at any given time and place (Aucoin 2012; Braithwaite and Levi 1998). Some authors conceptualize this as the give-and-take between supply-side governance and demand-side governance with government on the former and civil society on the latter side (Coston 1998). Civil society is represented by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society groups, networks of civil society and other private actors, or warlords and tribal leaders (the latter under the clan categorization of governance) (Ouchi 1980). In Coston’s conceptualization of demand-side, or civil society governance, the state is still the unit of analysis, however, this is not the case for all literature focusing on the horizontal mechanisms and modes of governance – in some ways civil society can provide governance even where states or governments do not exist.

Civil society mechanisms of control include collaboration and constant interaction in the decision making procedures (Freeman 1997). While Kooiman focuses on boundaries between the political and social including creating a typology that is similar to
the state/market/civil society typology, his interaction approach fits well here in that he highlights the social interactions of individuals in groups and the interactions of individuals with structure (Kooiman 2003). Civil society actors, for different reasons and motives and in different ways, often provide the kind of governance over which states are currently thought as having the monopoly, or they demand better governance from the government structures (demand-side of governance).

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE VERSUS GOOD GOVERNANCE

This chapter argued that the governance concept developed out of a Western experience that emphasized trends in liberal democracy such as individual participation in government, equality in representation and in access to goods and services provided by authority figures, and the idea that authority figures must be efficient in delivery of public services while limited in intervention in the economy. It further argued that while the definition of democracy and governance are both tenuous and ambiguous in academic and practitioner research, it is possible to see two trends developed in the 20th century in development practice as related to governance promotion. Democratic governance, the first trend, is associated with the human rights regime and democratization literature. It emphasizes the ability of citizens to interact with government in both having their voice heard in decision making procedures and in actually running for positions in government and being actively involved in implementing the mechanisms of government over the citizen population. The first trend emphasizes demand side governance. The second trend, good governance, promoted the ideas of public administration efficiency and
effectiveness in delivering goods and services to a population, and while voice and participation play a small part in this trend, it is heavily focused on supply side governance. These two trends continue to influence the way that development organizations promote governance and implement governance ideology into their projects, programs, and policies.

This chapter developed an analytical foundation for which to analyze the primary texts and interviews carried out for this study. In the next chapter, primary texts are analyzed using content and keyword analysis to determine at which points in time the two organizations under study (the UNDP and the World Bank) either promote democratic or good governance, and to determine which mechanisms of control, authorities and processes of governance are supported by these two organizations.
III: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN THE UNDP AND THE WORLD BANK

While the UNDP and the World Bank are both development organizations seeking to achieve similar development goals, especially poverty reduction, they pursue those goals in different ways as relates to governance promotion. The UNDP supports democratic governance and liberal democracy based on the human rights regime that developed since the 1940s. The World Bank focuses on public administration accountability and transparency, built out of the focus on supporting public administrations in development starting with decolonization era. Even though the UNDP and World Bank’s ideologies have grown similar in recent decades (Joshi and O'Dell 2013; Thérien 2007), they still differ on reaching development outcomes and on governance promotion.

This chapter considers how the structure of the organizations may give more power to a leader, providing the context in which the leader is able to push for policy changes. I argue that the UNDP’s leadership has more leeway and more flexibility to pursue shifts in policy than does the World Bank. This is because of the structural constraints of the guiding operational policies of the World Bank (day-to-day functions) and the greater decentralized nature of the UNDP (giving power into the hands of more people on making project decisions). These two elements of organizational culture partially explains the UNDP’s ability to stray from its apolitical mandate in focusing so highly on democratic governance, but it also explains the conditions under which a leader
of an organization can make changes to an organization’s policies, and when he or she is constrained from doing so.

This chapter shows how international development organizations are bureaucratic entities and argues that the organizational culture and leadership served to create an environment in which governance norms developed in different ways within similarly placed organizations. In a large part, the actions of international organizations are path dependent on the mandates and missions created at their inception or given them by their member states. At the same time, organizations function on their own once set up to do so, and create their own missions in line with mandates. In some cases, an organization reinterprets its mandate to meet changing international needs. In others, organizations feel tied to the original mandate with little wiggle room. This chapter shows how the UNDP has reinterpreted its mandate and melded with the UN’s democratic focus while the World Bank continues to feel constrained by its original mandate.

The development of norms is never simple in any context, least of all in a context such as an international development organization. Influences on policy creation and change include individuals working in the organization (from different cultures and backgrounds and knowledge expertise), lobbying from outside groups, development partners, member states’ interest promotion through funding or other influences, and also a need to explain the failures of development projects up to that point.24 Policy change in

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24 This latter point is brought up consistently in the literature and came up consistently in my interviews. It was not only the structural adjustment programmes from the IFIs in the 1980s that caused a concern for making development projects more successful, it is also a concern with development from the 1940s up to that point that elicited new ways of thinking about development. Bad governance became the explanation for why development did not work and therefore good governance was the answer to that problem.
these organizations follows specific paths: path dependence on ideas that came before 
and were already institutionalized in the organization’s policies and practices; pressures 
from important external forces that influence decision-making in high levels of the 
organization, leaders on the Executive Boards that specifically influence and write policy; 
senior policy personnel (in the context of the UNDP this would be Administrators and the 
World Bank would be Presidents); and changes in the nature of the international system 
(such that space is opened up for debates on specific issues that then spiral to become 
important to relevant actors). Finally the organization has to be in such a position to be 
able to accept change and modify itself to the changes that are coming from all these 
influences. When an organization begins to define its goals and identity according to 
specific principles, those principles stick with it through different leaders and changes in 
the international community. Thus, as Berger and Luckmann argue concerning the 
development of symbolic universes in cultures that end up guiding individual behavior: 
“if one is to understand their [symbolic universes] meaning, one has to understand the 
history of their production” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 97).25

WHY DO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARTICULATE NORMS 
DIFFERENTLY?

Governance discourse and policy in the UNDP and the World Bank is of prime 
importance for this analysis because of the connection with the issue of international 

25 Simply put, a symbolic universe encompasses the norms, explanations, actions, institutions that go into 
the ordering of everyday social life, or is “a social product with a history” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 
97).
organization autonomy as outlined in chapter one in this dissertation. Nation states claimed sovereignty over governance and decision-making procedures (also known as internal sovereignty) as a highly accepted norm of the 20th century. Despite the weakening of sovereignty in the recent era of globalization, it still remains a distinct issue for international relations and is deeply tied to political interests.

The UNDP and World Bank have a similar origin, born out of a structural environment wherein their member states gave them mandates to act in the world to support infrastructure development and public administration. World War II followed swiftly after the end of World War I and the economic crises of the first few decades of the twentieth century, most notably the crash of 1929, negatively impacted growth and infrastructure development throughout the world. The wars and economic crises occurred in an international system that was less interdependent in trade, unable to coordinate on shared threats, and unable to stem off crises by coordinating on market and fiscal policies. Therefore, in 1944, Western states created the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions to meet coordination problems with a view to preventing wars and economic downturns. Both the UNDP and the World Bank are associated with the United Nations which was created as a collective security organization in 1944, but quickly expanded to create agencies working on disparate issues of collective importance (Haas and Haas 1995).

The UNDP and World Bank have their founding in an unstable and uncoordinated international environment among leaders who suggested that coordination of global governance problems could be best solved through multilateral and international
organizations with specific functional purposes. Indeed, the Bretton Woods Institutions, one of which became the World Bank, were envisioned by United States leaders who had been planning worldwide coordinating institutions since entering into World War II in 1941 (Toussaint 2008, 9). The UNDP and World Bank both started as organizations to fund technical assistance, public administration, and infrastructure (re)building throughout the world in the aftermath of devastation of World War II.

Because of limitations in obtaining the data, in order to identify organizational culture and its affect on governance norm articulation, in this chapter I focus on the level of artifacts, interpreted as structural elements of the organization that contribute to the policy making process. The General Assembly voting procedures indicate that each member state of the UN has an equal vote. Six principle organs under which subsidiary bodies, programmes and funds, research and training institutions, committees, commissions, and other UN entities function provide the policy context to the UNDP and World Bank. The World Bank Group is one of the specialized agencies of the UN; as such, it functions autonomously from the UN and subsidiary agencies. The UNDP, on the other hand, started out as a fund of the UN (the EPTA and Special Fund), but now functions as a programme under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Table 3.2 specifies the important aspects of structure, highlighting more structural similarities than differences between the UNDP and the World Bank.

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26 Functionalist interpretations highlight the creation of international organizations as a rational calculation made by states in order to address global governance issues while taking the issues out of the realm of power politics between states.
Table 3.1: UNDP and World Bank Structure

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Structural Element</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>World Bank</th>
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| Executive          | • Executive Board – 36 Representatives elected by ECOSOC (meets annually) (GA Resolution 48/162)  
                     | • Executive Bureau – 5 Representatives (representing 5 regional groups)  
                     | • Administrator and Senior Management (Assistant Administrator, etc.)     | • Board of Governors – 1 Representative (188 total) from each member country  
                     |                                                                     | • Board of Executive Directors – 25 Representatives and President of Executive Directors – 20 rotating members  
                     |                                                                     | • President and Senior Management                                        |
| Forums             | • UNDP Administrator serves as Chair of the United Nations Development Group – unites 32 funds, programmes, agencies, departments, and offices of UN | • Development Committee – advises Board of Governors on development issues – est. 1974 |
| Guiding Documents  | • General Assembly & ECOSOC Guidance through Resolutions              | • Articles of Agreement                                                     |
|                    | • Strategic Plan                                                       | • IDA Replenishments                                                       |
|                    | • Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP)              | • Operational Policies (OP)                                                |
|                    |                                                                     | • Bank Procedures (BP)                                                    |
| Member Countries   | • 194 UN member countries                                             | • 188 member countries (same as IMF membership)                           |
| Voting             | • Executive Board voting by consensus                                  | • IBRD – Share votes (one vote per share held) plus basic votes            |
|                    |                                                                     | • IDA replenishments designate votes                                        |
| Funding from Member Countries | • Voluntary bilateral contributions from wealthy member countries: regular and other (earmarked) resources  
                                    | • Multilateral contributions                                              | • IBRD – Financial Markets                                                |
|                    | • Country resources                                                   | • IDA – Voluntary bilateral contributions from wealthy member countries (replenishments); IBRD and IFC income; borrower repayments. |
| Funding to Member Countries | • Grants for projects                                                  | • IBRD – Loans at market interest rate to middle income and credit worthy lower middle income countries  
                                    | • Trust funds (55 administered by UNDP)                                   | • IDA – Interest-free loans and grants to 82 least developed countries     |
| FY 2012 Funding    | • $4,074 (in millions)                                                | • $35,335 (in millions)                                                  |
| Employees and Country Offices (2011) | • 8,099  
                               | • 5 Regional Offices                                                   | • 9,000 (2/3rd in Washington, D.C.; 1/3rd in country offices)             |
|                    | • 130+ country offices                                                | • 124 country offices                                                     |
| Country Programming | • Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) created by country office  
                         | • Guided by Project Appraisal                                           | • Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) developed from Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or other |

27 The information contained in this table comes from various sources including World Bank and UNDP documents, websites, and academic literature. All sources are included in the narrative section that describes the information in the table.
Committee (PAC) at country level  |  country-owned document (BP 2.11)
---|---
Accountability Structure  |  
- Evaluation Office  |  - Independent Evaluation Group
- Country/Regional Office Evaluation  |  - Country Office Evaluation

Many link the formation of governance policy to the major failures of development policies in the 1980s (Shihata 1995). After the problems and social costs associated with structural adjustment of the 1980s (linked to conditionality for receiving development loans), development organizations suggested ways that governments should function in order to create the “enabling environment” that would ensure the success of development projects and outcomes. Such interference in nation-state governance affairs questions the apolitical status of development organizations and speaks to the prospect of organizations acting autonomously of member state interests (Stokke 2009, 327-29).

**THE UNDP: A MISSION TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**

The UNDP’s original mandate approved apolitical technical assistance and support to be offered through a United Nations agency which was born out of the development debate following World War II. At the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the Extended Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) in order to offer technical assistance and knowledge to those countries that were not doing as well as the United States (Browne 2011, 9). After much debate over what comprised development assistance, the UNDP was created in 1964, a merging of a UN Special Fund and EPTA under ECOSOC resolution 1020, which came into force in 1965 with Paul Hoffman as its Administrator (Browne 2011, 18). The UNDP functioned as a fund up until the 1980s, dispersing funds to other UN agencies or country governments to implement. It was under the leadership of William H. Draper III (Administrator of the
UNDP from 1986-1993) in which UNDP became an implementing agency rather than acting solely as a fund. UNDESA, formerly Department for Technical Cooperation in Developing Countries, was the main implementer for UNDP, especially in public administration projects. The reason for shifting to implementing and advocacy role rather than funder was because of the shrinking “portfolio” in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s.

Becoming an implementing agency meant that UNDP also became a leading development agency, guiding development ideology and norms. Indeed, since it became an implementing agency the UNDP has been behind the shifting nature of development goals, playing an instrumental role in defining what those goals are, not only for the UN system but for the international development community. Yet it still faces constraints: the UNDP’s mandate is provided by the General Assembly resolutions, making it dependent on guidance from UN member states, but also allowing for flexibility in labeling the UNDP’s role in the UN system. In the 2000s, General Assembly mandates encourage the UNDP as a coordinator of the UN system’s service provision in member countries, recognizing that the UN agencies must work as one in a policy push labeled “Delivering as One.” The UN General Assembly suggested in two resolutions that the UNDP should be helping support South-South cooperation and dialogue on development.\(^2\) It is from these resolutions that the UNDP gets its mandate, beyond the ECOSOC resolutions and the UN Charter itself. Because the UNDP is a programme of the Economic and Social

\(^2\) UN General Assembly Resolution 59/250 (December 17, 2004) and UN General Assembly Resolution 62/208 (March 14, 2008) focus on the issues of UN as coordinator under the “Delivering as One” framework and enhancing South-South cooperation.
Council (ECOSOC), UNDP reports to ECOSOC and ECOSOC guides and justifies UNDP’s activities following the UN Charter. Any policies that are pursued by Administrators do need to be approved by ECOSOC and the UNDP’s Board of Governors and Board of Executive Directors.

Since becoming an advocacy development organization rather than simply a fund or coordinating agency, the UNDP has challenged the notion of development that the World Bank championed since its inception. Mark Malloch Brown became the Administrator in 1999 and immediately worked to hone in the agency’s goals under six practice areas, as well as deal with the inefficient organizational structure itself. Most importantly though, which led to the ability for Malloch Brown to make such changes, was the creation of the Human Development Report (HDR) and the Human Development Index (HDI) under William H. Draper III (Draper appointed Mahbub ul Haq for the job of putting this first theoretical framework and report together for publication in 1990).

The HDR became an authoritative report on development from a different perspective than what was given by the World Bank in its World Development Reports (WDRs), securing UNDP’s place in the development world in the 1990s, even with a huge reduction in funding as a result of the end of the Cold War. The creation of measurable and possibly achievable development goals in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that followed from the Millennium Declaration of 2000 is of prime importance here for the progress it made toward these Human Development ideals as well as for the degree to which those ideals were overshadowed by traditional foci on economic goods and services (Vandemoortele 2011). The MDGs “have been
misappropriated to propagate an economistic perspective of development. As a consequence, they have failed in their attempt to shift the focus of the development discourse from income-poverty to the multi-dimensional nature of human poverty” (Vandemoortele 2011, 1). Nevertheless, the UNDP’s leadership was instrumental in the creation of the MDGs and took on the challenge to promote the achievement of the eight goals through its coordination of development agencies, NGOs, and country-led development projects.

Table 3.2: UNDP Committees, Departments and Units on Democratic Governance

- Management Development Programme (1988)
- Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and Bureau for Development Policy (BDP)
- Global Programmes facilitating service from the Bureaus:
  - Access to Justice and Rule of Law;
  - Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness (Phase I: 2008-2010, Phase II: 2011-2013);
  - Democratic Governance Assessments;
  - Electoral Cycle Support;
  - Human Rights Strengthening;
  - Parliamentary Strengthening (launched 1999)
- Democratic Governance Programme Initiative (2001)
- The UNDP Legal Empowerment Initiative
- Management and Development Governance Division (1995) changed to the Institutional Development Group and is currently the Democratic Governance Group which functions under the aegis of the Bureau for Development Policy
- Oslo Governance Center (2002)
- Democratic Governance Practice Network

The UNDP interprets its mandate as supporting democratic governance and processes, largely because of the deeply embedded norms of democracy promotion that have prevailed in the United Nations since its founding but also because of the specific ideological leanings of its Administrators. This does not mean that the UNDP has strayed from its apolitical mandate, rather, it created a deeper niche for itself than the World Bank has done in working with elections, electoral commissions, and parliaments on instituting liberal democracy governance norms. Following upon the GA Resolution
59/250, the UNDP argues that its first mandate is “to strengthen its role in supporting the promotion of coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations system as a whole at the country level” through the Resident Representatives, and secondly “to provide policy and technical support by working on and advocating for the multisectoral challenges of poverty reduction, democratic governance…” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, 10).

The UNDP made a major shift in the way that it conceptualized UNDP’s role in governance promotion in the 1990s.

In this recent era [the 1990s], more than in the era of decolonization, UNDP has directly promoted democratic institutions, organizing and helping to set up parliamentary systems, monitoring elections, and supporting the evolution of new political parties and the strengthening of older ones (Murphy 2006, 8).

Though the UN and UNDP influenced public administration capacity building for decades, the 1990s change toward promoting specifically democratic governance institutions was new in that it did not solely focus on strengthening the state, but rather was based on ideas of transparency and openness. The early years of UNDP as a funding agency combined with its focus on technical assistance and public administration informed and molded later years. However, the path to a focus on governance was not as clear-cut as just a shift from public administration capacity support to democratic governance promotion.

The UNDP Executive Board, Administrators, and staff institutionalized the democratic governance concept over the years through the creation of programs that offer support in specific governance areas to countries in need. In the 1990s the language was mostly couched as creating an enabling environment for sustainable human development.
Beginning in 2001, “Democratic Governance” became a programme initiative in UNDP’s national policies and programmes, and in budget allocations. The UNDP Democratic Governance program\(^{29}\) argues that “democratic governance is essential to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. We aim to build effective and capable states that are accountable and transparent, inclusive and responsive — from elections to participation of women and the poor” (United Nations Development Programme 2011f). The UNDP consistently argues for an interrelationship between good governance, democracy, and development: “In order to achieve and sustain human development, both the ends and the means of good governance should be ‘democratized’” (United Nations Development Programme 2009, 15).

Policy documents and guidelines created by the UNDP headquarters on governance promotion do not require specific governance support to states. The policy documents provide guidelines for the way that country and regional offices are expected to give advice and assistance to states. Democratic governance policies are written by the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) under which the Democratic Governance Group (DGG) operates.\(^{30}\) The other Bureaus that report to the Administrator and create policy for the UNDP include the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the Bureau of Management, and the Partnerships Bureau.

\(^{29}\) The programme, at both the UNDP and national levels, includes the following nine focus areas as instrumental in promoting good governance: Access to information and e-governance, access to justice and rule of law, anti-corruption, electoral systems and processes, human rights, local governance, parliamentary development, public administration, and women’s empowerment (United Nations Development Programme 2011e).

\(^{30}\) The Democratic Governance Group was formerly the Management and Development Governance Division and then the Institutional Development Group. I will refer to all policies made by these divisions as created by the DGG since it is the same department only given a different name over the years.
The Administrator of the UNDP is very influential in guiding the purpose, mission and practice areas of the organization. William H. Draper III is largely responsible for the creation of the human development paradigm which focuses on human freedoms; Gus Speth for instituting the concept of Sustainable Human Development; and Mark Malloch Brown for overseeing the shifting language to democratic governance rhetoric. This influence is obvious when we consider in the next chapter the deep influence that each Administrator had on the way that governance policy was couched. Yet, the Administrator reports to and is influenced by the Executive Boards and the UN Secretariat. The Administrator reports to the Chief Executive Board and the UN Secretary General on the UN Development Group (UNDG) progress (over which the Administrator is Chair and therefore guides policy implementation and goals for 34 UN agencies). The Administrator also reports on managing the Resident Coordinator system.

Despite the UNDP’s lack of coordinating success in the past, the UNDP has made an indelible impact on UN development policy through the UNDG because of certain Administrators: for example, Gus Speth “restored links with the UN system through the UN Development Group” (Browne 2011, 73-74), links marred by William H. Draper III’s tenure, mission and philosophy guiding the UNDP in the 1980s (Draper had wanted the UNDP to be an autonomous agency from the UN). The UNDG is one of the executive committees (ExComms) that was created in 1997 by Kofi Annan when he entered office as Secretary General in order to facilitate horizontal communication and coordination between UN agencies (United Nations Development Group 2013; Browne 2011, 62; Griffin 2003, 208).
While the UNDP has much leeway in its policy writing and creation, it also reports to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations, and is monitored by ECOSOC as well as by the General Assembly. ECOSOC appoints the Executive Board based on General Assembly resolution 48/162, which is the same Executive Board as two other UN organizations. The Executive Board meets annually, in planned regular sessions (2-3 per year) that are decided upon at the annual meeting, or for special sessions called by the President of the Board, the Administrator, or an Executive Board member. As per the regulations set out in the rules of procedure for the UNDP Executive Board, last updated January 2011, the Executive Board is responsible for monitoring the funds and programmes under the UNDP, communicating with ECOSOC, and deciding upon new programmes, administrative and financial plans, and budgets (United Nations Development Programme 2011d). This includes endorsing Strategic Plans that guide the policies and development outcomes which the UNDP strives to meet. These Strategic Plans are instrumental in guiding policy in headquarters in the different departments as well as in regional and country offices. The last few Strategic Plans have markedly increased the use of democratic governance language which has been approved by the Executive Boards with very little resistance or questioning.

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The way that the UNDP is structured provides its Administrator\(^{32}\) with leeway in creating and implementing policy. First, the UNDP Administrator holds the senior position as head of the executive office which oversees operations in New York headquarters, including nine offices reporting directly to the Administrator.\(^{33}\) The Administrator serves as one of the Under-Secretary Generals to the UN system as a whole, reporting directly to the UN Secretary General. The Administrator is in charge of setting the agenda for the UNDP by articulating and guiding policy, especially through speeches and statements that become articulated in strategic plans and guidance policies. The Administrator office is responsible for oversight of the day-to-day operations and for overseeing the creation of and implementation of the Strategic Plans that guide UNDP development practice. The oversight includes regional centers, country offices and UNDP departments.\(^{34}\) In these roles, the Administrator guides policy as he or she sees fit. In fact, the Executive Board, which meets only once a year, votes by consensus. Thus, the issues that are put before the Board on which to vote have been created by the Administrator, senior officials, and employees without very much input from the Board. The documents (such as Strategic Plans and financial plans) are created in a way that follows the

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\(^{32}\) The office of the Administrator was initially filled by Paul Hoffman who had been the Administrator of the Marshall Plan for the US Government, thus the advent of the title Administrator rather than Under-Secretary General or President (Browne 2011, 18).

\(^{33}\) At present those operations include nine departments and a special unit: the UN Development Operations Coordination Office, the Human Development Report Office, the Evaluation Office, the Office of Audit and Investigations, the Ethics Office, the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy, the Bureau for Development Policy, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the Bureau of Management, and the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation.

\(^{34}\) There are five regional bureaus: Africa, Arab States, Asia and Pacific, Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The Assistant Administrator is also in charge of the UN Capital Development Fund, the UN Volunteers and the country offices of which there are currently more than 170.
mandates of the General Assembly and ECOSOC, but also provides a greater influence from the Administrator on the kind of policy the UNDP will pursue.

UNDP’s structure allows the organization to be what some have called a “learning organization,” allowing it to learn new ideas and quickly change its structure or practices in accordance with what is currently needed by member states. The way that UNDP responded to governance rhetoric and ideas is a good example of its capacity to learn and change, an oddity for most bureaucratic organizations (Murphy 2006). Learning, or consensual knowledge, is a must for international organizations that wish to remain relevant in a changing world, especially those who rely on donors for their funding.

Discussing the importance of learning organizations, Peter and Ernst Haas define learning as “a process by which actors, playing roles, engage in institutionalized behavior that shows their recognition that problems currently on the IOs’ [international organization’s] agenda are much more complexly linked than was recognized at an earlier time” (Haas and Haas 1995, 259).

Following such logic, Craig Murphy argues that one of the reasons for UNDP’s ease of shift in focus toward “democratic” governance is that it is not a typical bureaucracy that gets bound in rules and hierarchies. Rather, the UNDP is a creative bureaucracy that is able to learn from its own mistakes and successes, as well as from outside knowledge, and incorporate that learning into its practices (Murphy 2006, 17). UNDP’s ability to learn is evident in how it interprets its mandate and mission to achieve new development challenges and change course when needed in order to meet new demands. Furthermore, UNDP is beholden to its member countries, and not to its original
mandate or articles of agreement. If the General Assembly decides that the UNDP will follow a new goal that it has never taken on before, it will do so. This functioning is an example of the principal-agent theory in action. UNDP follows the mandates given it by the General Assembly and ECOSOC, building off the most recent ones. Yet, the language of democratic governance is a perfect example of the organization (and senior people within the organization) interpreting the mandate as seen fit, even if it does not in the end directly lead to achieving the UNDP’s development goals.

While my argument suggests that the UNDP is much more supportive of demand-side governance (that is focusing on the ability of citizens and civil society to interact with their governments and demand goods and services), I do not suggest that the UNDP is not also concerned with supply-side governance. In fact, the UNDP has been involved in supply-side governance since its inception, providing technical assistance and advice on public administration reform. The debate then turns into how goods and services are supplied to a population and UNDP has focused on the ability of citizens and civil society to be involved in that process rather than focusing solely on how the government can be responsible in providing goods and services. For instance, former Democratic Governance Group (DGG) leader Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi makes a distinction between “models of governance” of “technocratic” governance or “market or business models” which she further distinguishes from “democratic governance” (Fraser-Moleketi 2012). The latter is different from the former because it is based in effective leadership and in citizen participation in the decision-making procedures of their government. Her argument is that the technocratic and market/business models of governance are to blame
for the response failures to natural disasters. Technocratic/market/business models failed because of their lack of focus on citizen’s well being. An example of this governance model is the turn to support for public-private relationship has been closely associated with the “good” governance concept (Utting and Zammit 2009). While Fraser-Moleketi is speaking for herself and not for UNDP in her piece, her argument for democratic governance largely aligns with other employees of UNDP and with official UNDP documents on democratic governance.

The decentralization of the structure of the UNDP creates a situation in which democratic governance policy as stated in headquarters is not always implemented at country level. The UNDP has five regional offices and more than 130 country offices that implement UNDP policy and projects. The country offices coordinate projects between organizations in country settings with roughly 9,000 employees distributed mostly through the regional and country offices (United Nations 2011, 16). One of my respondents suggested that the country offices were more like “fiefdoms” than offices in that they functioned almost entirely on their own and acted and implemented projects the way they wanted to do. For the UNDP, decentralization changed somewhat under Mark Malloch Brown’s tenure because he had a focus of the organization as being a policy leader and advocate in development. Through his leadership the democratic governance focus has been further solidified in practice areas and programs that offer direct support for democratic governance ideals, yet the onus for implementation is still on regional and country offices.
The UNDP is set up to be the coordinator of the UN’s work in country settings under the “Delivering as One” mandate approved by the General Assembly in 2006 and, and the Administrator is the Chair of the UN Development Group (UNDG) (Browne 2011, 62; United Nations Development Group 2013). Because of this leadership the UNDP holds particular sway on encouraging democratic governance throughout its work. For instance, in coordinating peacebuilding operations requests for assistance go to the Under-Secretary General, and then through the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), which then decide whether or not the UN will agree to help and be involved in the state to help set up elections or provide other technical assistance. After this the UNDP becomes involved to provide technical assistance. Even so, implementing democratic governance policy relies heavily on the regional and country offices in that these are given leeway to use the democratic governance polices as guidelines, but in the end they have the ability to push for democratic governance concepts in their countries and regions. Such a decentralized system is often argued as necessary by UNDP employees because of the nature of sovereignty and the original UNDP mandate and UN Charter.

Authorities at headquarters craft governance policy for the UNDP, but because of changes in the nature of decentralization, they include input from country and regional offices. On the other hand, decentralization keeps the UNDP from clearly articulating its policies or implementing them with similar resolve in all countries. One of my

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35 This was made evident in my interviews concerning the UNDP. Many respondents expressed their frustration with the decentralized nature of the system and the lack of firm policy for each country on implementing policies.
interviewees noted, for example, that the UNDP and the UN as a whole are not very good about having clear, calculated policies that will inform all projects on specific issues, lamenting that there was no overarching policy that suggested where the UN stood on particular issues, and that it just isn’t the way that UNDP planned. Even when the Strategic Plan mandates that the Bureau for Development Policy clusters should function under an organizing principle, individual offices still act as they wish based on leadership commitment as well as embedded practices within each department and office.

Table 3.3: UNDP Policies on Democratic Governance

- Initiatives for Change (1994)
- Governance for Sustainable Human Development (1997) – UNDP’s Governance Policy
- Strategic Plan 2008-2012 extended to 2013
- Strategic Plan 2014-2017
- Country Programme Action Plans

The policies and procedures written down have a large effect on the way that members of the organization perceive their role in promoting democratic governance, even when those policies are easily moldable and changeable. The UNDP is guided by the Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP). These offer general guidance to UNDP employees about the structure of the organization, accountability, functional day-to-day activities and how to implement policies, programmes, and projects. Rather than strict and unmoving operational and procedural guidelines the POPPs are flexible. This gives the Administrator and the Executive Board the ability to change the organization’s procedures and policies rather easily while at the same time being held to specific standards and beliefs that filter throughout the organization’s members.
The following statement introduces the Democratic Governance section of the Strategic Plan 2008-2011: “To consolidate and deepen democracy, free and fair elections must go hand in hand with efforts to support all people in attaining the opportunity to participate in the decisions affecting their lives” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, 25). Indeed, statements like the above are re-written and re-articulated in almost every policy document that guides the UNDP’s work on democratic governance. The Strategic Plan is one of the most important documents defining the structure and role of the UNDP, providing guidance from the Executive Board and based on guidance policies from ECOSOC. The 2008-2011 Strategic Plan follows the guidance from the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (United Nations 2007). The plan outlined promoting democratic governance through “fostering inclusive participation, strengthening responsive governing institutions, and basing democratic governance on international principles” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, 2009).

[The Strategic Plan] Articulates UNDP roles in line with its mandate defined through the intergovernmental process: (i) To support the coordination and enhancement of United Nations system efficiency and effectiveness at the country level and; (ii) To provide knowledge, policy advice, advocacy, and technical support in four focus areas on the basis of good practice and comparative advantage: poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and sustainable development (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, 6).

UNDP representatives and academics associate democratic governance with achieving sustainable development goals, human development goals, conflict-free societies, and urban or local governance outcomes in publications, reports, and speeches (Malloch Brown 2003; Malloch Brown 2004; Cheema and Maguire 2001; United Nations Development Programme 2003). Though not the first to institute democratic governance
practices,\textsuperscript{36} Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator from 1999-2005, wrote and spoke extensively on democratic governance and on how the UNDP could incorporate it into policy. He used the term democratic governance and democracy interchangeably, showing no conceptual variation between them. For instance, he argues “that democratic governance is vital not just for ensuring sustainable development, but also for sustaining peace within societies” (Malloch Brown 2003, 142). Furthermore, making the connection between democratic governance and democracy he says

\begin{quote}
The bottom line is that if democracy is understood as not just the occasional election or a particular set of institutions, but as both of those underpinned by a deep political culture that encourages accountability and participation, then the establishment of functional systems of democratic governance in conflict-affected societies is an indispensable dimension of efforts to build lasting peace (Malloch Brown 2003, 145).
\end{quote}

Moreover, the Strategic Plan 2008-2013 argued that democratic governance includes key result areas of “fostering inclusive participation,” “strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions” and “grounding democratic governance in international principles” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, 27-28). The creation of a Strategic Plan, and the service lines that were instituted under Mark Malloch Brown’s Administration, act as a boon in helping the UNDP define its governance agenda. However, the plan and service lines can also be constraining, limiting changes that may be needed in the organization. This was especially evident in the way that UNDP has defined and continues to define its work in governance, as noted

\textsuperscript{36} In fact, academics and staff members that I interviewed often credited former Administrator Mark Malloch Brown with creating and implementing the idea of democratic governance into the UNDP as it exists today, when in fact he was building off the shoulders of his predecessors, especially James Gustaph Speth (1993-1999) and William H Draper III (1986-1993). See the next chapter on leadership in the UNDP for their particular contributions.
by one respondent discussing the creation of the service line approach in the latter 1990s under Mark Malloch Brown. Having six to seven service lines or areas of work within democratic governance, helps UNDP specialize, but it also creates some difficulties including problems with communication with outside organizations and between the service lines.

Once created, the service lines have stuck so that getting them out of the documents and policies is difficult. They become entrenched in the way people function in the organization. In answer to this question of bringing the service lines together and creating communication across areas of work, my respondents noted that a discussion began before the organization wrote the 2008 Strategic Plan, and that streamlining meant the creation of three clusters under which the UNDP staff on governance now work: Inclusive Participation, Responsive Institutions, and Norms and Principles. These clusters have also been evident in the Annual Reports that report on money expenditures under the three clusters rather than under each of the service lines (although spending on the latter can be found in the Annual Reports and other reporting documents). They also currently define what the UNDP means by promoting democratic governance.

The UNDP associates democratic governance with the possible success of achieving development goals, which in the 2000s has meant instituting democratic governance in countries in order to make progress toward and fulfill the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In fact, the very creation of the MDGs themselves included debates concerning governance. The Millennium Declaration states in article 13 that “success in meeting these [development and eradication of poverty] objectives depends,
inter alia, on good governance within each country” and again in article 24 that “we will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development” (United Nations 2000, September 8). The 2010 resolution that upholds the commitment to achieving the MDGs also affirms the connection between democracy and development (United Nations 2010). Again, in the Secretary General’s Guidance Note on Democracy the connection is asserted that “the appeal of democracy stems in part from its association with the advancement of the quality of life for all human beings, and thus, with the work to reach the Millennium Development Goals” (Kimm). The theme of democratic governance leading to less fragile, less conflict prone states comes up consistently in UNDP documents, in official statements, and in publications that highlight the work of the organization (Malloch Brown 2003; Ball 2005; Santiso 2002; United Nations Development Programme 2002, 85; Dijkzeul 1999). For these authors and reports, the UNDP became involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, especially after the end of the Cold War and after Boutros Ghali forged a path for the concept of peacebuilding through his “Agenda for Peace” (Ghali 1992; Karns 2004; Call and Cook 2003; Griffin 2003). The UN’s development assistance during the Cold War required Resident Representatives to work with countries and be asked by countries for assistance in order to implement development projects. The UN’s work with developing countries after the end of the Cold War also meant increasing capacities of government and accountability of country leaders, and increasing the ability of
individuals to impact their government leaders and decision-making. Thus, leaders at the UN connected the ideas of governance with development and placed democratic governance firmly in the purview of the UNDP and other development agencies. Dijkzeul argues that armed conflicts and violence that occurred after the end of the Cold War created a confusing situation for development agencies: “All of this [experience] blurs the traditional distinction between security, relief and development” setting the UNDP up to be involved with peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts (Dijkzeul 1999, 94).

In sum, the UNDP’s definition of democratic governance incorporates a multitude of concepts, practices, and connections with development goals and outcomes that are included in the policy documents and statements that guide UNDP practice. That the rhetoric around democratic governance has continued for so long is surprising but telling for its level of institutionalization.

The Annual Reports provide instrumental insight into how the UNDP wishes to portray itself in the world. They include descriptions of policy and practice of the organization on democratic governance. Each Annual Report utilizes anecdotal stories from its project successes to display its impact in the world, both to its beneficiary countries and to its donors to whom it is accountable for the money that is spent. As indicated above, the Reports document spending in the practice areas as stated in the strategic plans (that were crafted and approved by the Administrator and the Executive Board).

A review of the annual reports using the keywords as chosen in Chapter two (Table 2.3) shows that the UNDP’s language vocabulary promotes the notion of
democratic governance or democratization as a citizen-focused project. The quantitative content analysis of the UNDP Annual Reports\textsuperscript{37} shows that the main concern on governance related issues and policy is on civil society and political participation. Table 3.4 shows the frequency of keyword counts for each of the keywords.

**Figure 3.1: Quantitative Content Analysis of UNDP Annual Reports\textsuperscript{38}**

As shown in the figure, democratic governance keywords were more frequent from 2001 to 2007, but then the frequency changes to favor good governance terms. The percentage of democratic versus good governance keywords shows a decrease in the frequency of democratic governance keywords used over the 2000 decade, and an increase in the frequency of good governance keywords used from 2008 onward. The difference between the 2001 and 2013 Annual Report shows a 22.15% decline in the frequency of democratic governance keywords and increase in good governance keywords. However, the reports still consistently favor democratic governance keywords.

\textsuperscript{37} UNDP Annual Reports are only available beginning in 2001.

\textsuperscript{38} See Appendix 2 for data for Figure 3.1.
with an average of 1.98% distribution in favor of democratic governance keywords. The democratic governance words that decreased in usage over the 2000s include “human development” which peaked in 2006 at 40 words and declined steadily to 9 in 2012, up again to 15 in 2013. The keyword “human rights” showed an even steadier decline in usage from a peak of 15 in 2007 down to only 2 counts in 2013. The keyword “information” also peaked in 2001 at 25 and 2008 at 29, reaching a low in 2012 of 3 and 2013 of 6. Finally, “participation” reached a high of 21 in 2007 and 2008, declining to 3 and 4 in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The keyword ‘political participation’ was not counted in the list above, but is interesting for its presence in the 2002-2008 (between 1 and 4 counts) and complete absence beyond 2009 as well as a complete absence in the comparative World Bank Annual Reports (see the next section for these frequencies).

The shift in the use of good governance keywords in the 2000s tells us that the UNDP, while traditionally focused on the essence and language of democratic governance, has turned to supporting good governance rhetoric in its Annual Reports more regularly while still favoring democratic ideals in projects and programming, and in other types of reports. The good governance keyword “transparency” started out with a low frequency in the beginning of the decade, peaking at 11 in 2008 and declining only to 9 in 2013. The keyword “government” increased significantly in use between 2001 (12) and 2013 (29) with a peak of 47 in 2011.

The Human Development Report (HDR) is produced every year in order to provide up-to-date development information to practitioners, academics, and countries. What is more, these reports give an indication of what UNDP thinks are the most
pertinent issues in the development field, and gives indications of its own policy changes. Using the keywords identified in Chapter two to analyze the reports gives us more of an indication that the UNDP supports a version of governance that is focused on civil society participation in government.

**Figure 3.2: Quantitative Content Analysis of the HDRs**

![Bar chart](chart.png)

The HDRs show an average of 36.53% in favor of democratic governance keywords as opposed to good governance key words. As with the UNDP Annual Reports, the HDRs show a decisive bent toward democratic governance ideas, especially when compared to the World Development Reports produced by the World Bank (see next section). Keywords like civil society appear more often than government. The keywords of democracy, elections, electoral, human development and human rights occur much more often than keywords of efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and economic growth and development.

39 See Appendix 2 for data for Figure 3.2
Table 3.4: Key Findings from Quantitative Content Analysis of the UNDP

- On average, the Reports show that the UNDP is decisively more focused on demand-side governance than supply-side governance
- The UNDP’s statements and practice show a bent toward governance projects that favor bottom-up approaches to governance change

Table 3.5: UNDP Funding for Democratic Governance

- Capital Development Fund
- Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund
- Global Program for Electoral Cycle Support
- Average of 35.27% of Core-Funding devoted to Democratic Governance practice area (spending equals an average of $1,236,000,000 per year)
- Multi-Year Funding Framework

The UNDP incorporates democratic governance funding in its regular projects and programmes through what is called core-funding. Yet, in some cases, countries desire to support new, ground-breaking projects on democratic governance that cannot be supported through core-funding because of resistance from some core-funding member states. In such cases, countries and other donors channel their funds through trust funds that are administered by the UNDP. The UNDP administers 55 trust funds. Those that are most applicable to governance projects are Capital Development Fund, the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF), and the Global Program for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS) (United Nations Development Programme 2012b).

The UNDP created the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF) in 2001 in order to allow funding to projects that were innovative and outside of the traditional funding avenues and projects of the UNDP and its country offices. Donors are allowed to contribute to this fund for special country office projects that have democratic governance principles. The funding and projects indeed sometimes appear to contravene
the country demands, though the country always approves the projects before they are implemented.\textsuperscript{40} It is through this fund that much of the gender equality and electoral cycle support projects are funded. The themes of democratic governance promoted by the DGTTF are civil society, human rights, and gender issue oriented.\textsuperscript{41} The DGTTF is yet another example of how the UNDP is attempting to “mainstream” democratic governance into its policies and has to go around traditional methods of funding and project/policy creation in order to do that, thus acting autonomously of its member states.\textsuperscript{42}

Beginning with the creation of the practice areas, of which democratic governance is one, the UNDP Annual Reports detail what the UNDP is doing around the world in each practice area, as well as how much is spent under each practice area starting in 2002. Data prior to 2002 and for 2003 is unavailable. As one can see from the table, UNDP spends a large amount of its budget on projects and programming in support of democratic governance, though spending reduced from its height in 2005 down to an average of 25% in recent years.

\textsuperscript{40} Judged by the following statement that was made in a recent report of the DGTTF: “CO [country office] staff, including managers, particularly appreciate having access to a fund that can be mobilized outside the existing programmes agreed with government and one that addresses a key need, democratic governance” (x). (United Nations Development Programme 2008a, x)

\textsuperscript{41} Fully half of the projects “addressed gender issues” (x) and electoral cycle support takes up a large portion of the inclusive participation cluster projects.

\textsuperscript{42} Indeed, an internal document on democratic governance that was quoted in an evaluation of the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund says that “fostering democratic governance is at the heart of UNDP, as underscored by the September 2000 Millennium Declaration. In signing this document, the heads of state pledged to spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms” (United Nations Development Programme 2008, 5).
“Good” governance is inextricably linked to development politics. For the World Bank good governance means public administration efficiency and effectiveness, making sure to include stakeholders in development projects and planning, and reducing corruption: pervaded by a focus on the state institutions and supply-side governance. In its definitive 1992 report the Bank defined governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (World Bank 1993, 3) and later defined good governance as predictable, open, and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government.
accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law (World Bank 1994, vii).

The Bank shifted its commitment on development several times throughout the twentieth century, to poverty alleviation, away from it, and back again and public administration or governance has always been a part of that shifting paradigm. Since the 1980s, the Bank has been “wedded to economic development in the neoliberal sense” with a focus on poverty alleviation and good governance (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2010, 297). For the Bank, the 1980s focused on what John Williamson termed the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990) and on the implementation of structural adjustment programs.44 The collapse of the Soviet Union refocused the Bank’s attention on middle-income rather than less-developed countries (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 373), and allowed the Bank to branch out in its promotion of governance to the new fledgling democracies.

The Bretton Woods founders created the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) as a special agency of the United Nations to offer aid in the form of grants and loans to European countries destroyed by World War II, yet its practice soon expanded to development for developing countries.45 The IBRD’s original

44 Structural adjustment policies (SAPs) demanded changes in the economic, and sometimes political, policies of the state as a prerequisite for provision of funds by the IMF and the Bank. However, the SAPs further created economic downfall in developing countries. Practitioners in the IMF and the Bank largely subsequently associated that failure with inefficient political and economic institutions within the country and they therefore began focusing on changing those institutions (Ndulu 2006, Chapter 6).

45 The leaders took cues from what had happened after World War I when Germany had to deal with economic and infrastructural destruction as well as repayments for World War I. This created a national attitude that was anti-international and felt the need for revenge. After Germany rebounded, according to the realist tradition, its leaders and people sought a revanchist policy because of the devastation that it had endured after the ending of the war. This narrative guided the Bretton Woods discussions so that the focus was not on making the “enemy” pay only, but also helping them to enter back into the international community through offering aid.
purpose, to which it still abides (last amended June 27, 2012), is set forth in the Articles of Agreement, Article I (i):

To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries (World Bank 1944).

Expanding its practice, the IBRD added four new agencies over the years, collectively now called the World Bank Group. The five agencies are, in order of the dates they were founded, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (1944), the International Financial Corporation (IFC) (1956), the International Development Association (IDA) (1960),46 the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (1966), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (1988).47 The World Bank nomenclature typically refers to the IBRD and IDA (Marshall 2008, 9), a practice I follow in this work.

46 The IDA offers low interest loans, interest free loans, and grants to countries. Countries can only participate in these services if they meet certain criteria associated with Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Bank’s founders conceived the IDA during a crisis with developing countries who were unable to service loans at or near market rates but needed the money for financing development projects and gaining technical assistance. The IDA Articles of Agreement state in Article I the goals of the IDA: “The purposes of the Association are to promote economic development, increase productivity and thus raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of the world included within the Association's membership, in particular by providing finance to meet their important developmental requirements on terms which are more flexible and bear less heavily on the balance of payments than those of conventional loans, thereby furthering the developmental objectives of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter called “the Bank”) and supplementing its activities” (World Bank 1960).

47 The IFC encourages private sector investment in the developing world. MIGA aids donors and other development agencies in making investments in developing countries which are usually risky investments — the agency works to guarantee those investments in order to encourage transfer of money to places that sorely need it through private and public investment and other loans. The ICSID helps settle disputes between countries and investors on investment disputes. This information can be gleaned from the World Bank Group Website: www.worldbankgroup.org. Several good overviews of the history of the World Bank Group agencies provide deeper review of their specific functions and purposes. I recommend the following: (World Bank 2011a,7-106; Marshall 2008,1-9, 59-92; Weaver 2008,45-59).
The World Bank agencies have apolitical mandates written into their Articles of Agreement that are stated almost exactly the same:

The Association and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in this Agreement (World Bank 1960Article III, Section 6).

The apolitical mandate is the most contentious element of the Bank’s Articles, proving difficult, if not impossible to follow considering the member states that provide the greatest resources and influence.

Because of the original Articles of Agreement and its apolitical mandate, the World Bank strives to keep out of influencing politics in any way. Its early focus centered on macroeconomic policy, on modernization theory and liberalization, on increasing national incomes, and on industrialization. The World Bank, and the United States through the Bank, impacted the way that the development community thought about how practitioners should be following development policies. The focus in the early decades of development was on the state and whether or not the state was engaging in the right macroeconomic policies that would allow it to continue to be more integrated into the international economy, would preclude mercantilist tendencies, and would progress toward an industrialized economy. Leading economists who wrote on these issues

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48 Economists like Samuel Kuznets, closely associated with the United States government and with the World Bank, created the concept of GDP and GNP, the ability to calculate the progress of countries according to how much was produced and consumed in a country, and the possibility of comparing countries to judge progress on the trajectory of macroeconomic growth and consumption. The use of macroeconomic indicators like GDP instilled in the Bank a long and deep belief that anything that was important and deserving of focus could be measured.
impacted thinking on development both in a national and international context; among them Sir Arthur Lewis, W.W. Rostow and Friedrich Hayek.49

Because of its status as an International Bank that is supported by the western world and especially by the United States, the World Bank is very influential in the development community on the particular policies and practices that are followed. This is especially evident in the World Development Reports (WDRs) that the Bank produces once a year beginning in 1980. Each of these reports sums up the most important development issues that the world is facing during the prior years and is therefore themed. It also reports on the economic progress of countries around the world (thus providing a comparative development resource). The changes in its governance policies are most evident in shifts toward promotion of anti-corruption and work with civil society on development projects. These changes are reflected in the WDRs, especially in the 2000 and 2004 reports which attempted to expand the Bank’s understanding of its role in public service support and delivery, and even outlines the Bank’s engagement with civil society (World Bank 2003; Williams 2009).

49 Development ideology based itself in a study of Western historical trends, arguing that countries followed a specific path toward industrialization; the path led from agricultural organization to industrialization and eventually to higher consumption rates and service oriented economies (Rostow 1990). Economists of this era assumed that this industrialization trajectory was a priority for all states and argued that following specific macroeconomic policies which mirrored the industrialization era of the West would eventually lead to greater economic growth and prosperity.
## Table 3.6: World Bank Committees, Departments and Units on Good Governance

- Task Force on Governance (1991)
- Governance and Public Sector Management Group under the aegis of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM) (est. 1997) – also includes professionals from the Development Research Group and the World Bank Institute
  - Five thematic groups in the Public Sector Group: Administrative and Civil Service Reform; Anti-corruption; Decentralization; Law and Justice Institutions; Public Finance
- World Bank’s Corruption Study for Europe and Central Asia
- World Bank Institute
  - Governance and Anti-Corruption Program
  - Governance Group
  - Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996-2012)
  - Governance Diagnostic Capacity Building
- Working Group on Anti-Corruption, Governance and Capacity Building
- Independent Advisory Board on Governance and Anti-Corruption (2008)

In recent decades the World Bank is best known for its controversial structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that it used to try to get developing countries back on track in macroeconomic growth after the devastating blow to the world economy felt in the economic crises of the 1970s. The Bank’s governance policy changed to explicit support for anti-corruption, encouraging transparent budgeting rules in Ministries of Finance, and support for privatization (Williams 2009, 608). The Bank, led by an economist named Elliot Berg, argued that it was the fragility and instability inherent in the developing countries’ policies, such as import substitution policies and command economy politics, that had created the reaction to the OPEC increase in oil prices that led the developing countries into extreme hardship in which they could not repay their loans and had to continue to borrow from the IMF in greater amounts in the 1970s and 80s in order to make sure they could pay their creditors. The IMF and World Bank responded by giving developing countries greater loans in return for concessions on macroeconomic policies that the ‘neoliberal’ economists argued would help countries surmount their economic crises and bring them back on a development path to greater prosperity and
progress. Some have argued or noted that good governance was a “second-generation reform” following the structural adjustment period (Marshall 2008, 35; Santiso 2002, 563-565; Weaver 2008, 98).

Perhaps one of the most controversial reports written by the Bank under the leadership of Robert McNamara was the first to give an indication of how the Bank would promote governance in member countries. The “Accelerated Development for sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action” or “Berg” report suggested that the crisis facing developing African countries in the late 1970s was due to inefficient policies related to macroeconomic instability and corruption in decision-making processes (World Bank 1981). Among other suggestions, the report stated that “African governments must lead the way because domestic policy issues are at the heart of the crisis” (World Bank 1981, 121). The structural adjustment policies promoted in this report, and subsequently incorporated as prerequisites into funds given to developing countries from both the Bank and IMF, received a rash of criticism as well as praise (Tribe 1982; Howell 1985; McNamara 1985, Nov. 1; Riddell 1992; Stiglitz 2002). The “Washington Consensus” expanded on the policy changes outlined in the “Berg” report and undermined the anti-poverty focus of the Bank. Yet, the “Berg” report still has a major impact on changes in policy at the Bank (Williamson 1990; Murphy 2006; Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 715-720); and may be the most influential in terms of suggesting to practitioners within

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50 Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist at the Bank, wrote a scathing critique of 1980s/1990s development policies of the Bank and IMF in which he posited that the structural adjustment programmes followed the Western liberalism and free market ideals that became known as the Washington Consensus. He recognized, however, that the West had long ago tempered the policies within Western countries, but that the World Bank and IMF to forgot that temperance was needed and pushed SAP policies that drove developing countries into further hardship (Stiglitz 2002).

The Bank’s employees and documents pointed to the problems of governance in developing countries as one of the main reasons for lack of development. Yet its employees still could not craft policy that would allow it to assume a role that became deeply involved in the relationships between citizens and their government beyond support for public administration capacity. Policy on governance dates back to the previously mentioned reports such as the “Berg report” but really solidified in the 1990s in relation to the discussions of ameliorating the difficult social impacts of the structural adjustment programs. The first policy document formulated Bank’s ideas concerning getting involved in governance by referring back to the Articles of Agreement. As noted in the most recent Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy (GAC), the Managing Development document

Observed that governance includes the form or nature of the political regime; the processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources; and the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policy and deliver goods and services…*the first aspect fell outside the Bank's mandate, requiring that it focus on the second and third elements. This remains the Bank’s position today* (World Bank 2012c, emphasis added, 9).

The Bank’s governance policy is largely informed by the decisions made and written down by the Executive Board. Indeed, one of the most influential meetings for the Bank’s governance policy occurred on December 16, 1993 in which the Bank decided on
the term “good governance” and debated over how much the Bank should be involved in governance policy (World Bank 1994, iv-v). The World Bank is more hierarchical than the UNDP in the sense that its policies and procedures for doing business are very firm, creating a bureaucracy that follows rules and regulations rather than being easily open to new ideas and actions. The Executive Board, made up of 5 top donating members of the Bank (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 20 rotating members, makes most of the policy decisions for the Bank, including each IDA funding round. The Board oversees the operations of the Bank by living and working in Washington, D.C., meeting 2-3 times a week to discuss issues and resolve problems. The Bank President has a powerful influence on policy making through his (all 12 Presidents have been males) speeches and influence with the Board.

Like the UNDP, the World Bank has country offices all over the world (124 country offices) and has roughly 9,000 employees, with 2/3rd of its staff stationed at headquarters in Washington, D.C. (World Bank 2012). Decentralization is being pursued by the Bank to a greater extent in recent years, yet the hierarchical nature of the Bank’s inter-relationships is deeply embedded within the organization. Staff must carefully follow the policies that guide and dictate how staff members interact with member states. This makes the policies that are written at headquarters influential and relevant for country offices and practice.

Despite the backlash that the Bank received on the “Berg” report (from the UNDP, among others), the Bank continued to create reports that significantly challenged the ideas made popular in the Lagos Plan of Action. However the Bank did begin to
incorporate ideas on the political role of the state that differed from the Bank’s original focus on the state simply as a tool for fostering market efficiency and providing an enabling environment for markets. For example, “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,” published in 1989 was one of the first reports where the Bank suggested “good” governance in public institutions was the elixir that would fix the financial crises of sub-Saharan African countries and reintroduce GDP growth, terms of trade, and an enabling environment for small businesses and entrepreneurship. The 1989 report also incorporated state subsidization agendas (World Bank 1989). The President of the World Bank at the time, Barber B. Conable, wrote in the introduction that

A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance—a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public (World Bank 1989).

By the late 1990s the Bank fully accepted its role in promoting “good” governance as a method of development, largely in response to the negative feedback from structural adjustment programmes, but also as a way to promote macroeconomic growth (Nanda 2006). Scholars studying the Bank note that it “is not a politically-neutral institution” anymore (Harrison 2005, 240). A further significant report, “World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World,” indicated the changing nature of the Bank’s promotion of “good” governance by suggesting that the internal institutions of the state need to be changed in order to bring about development through markets. Joshi notes at least two important documents that suggest change in policy at the Bank toward influencing state governance: the Comprehensive Development Framework of the Bank since 1998, and an influential report of the same year entitled “Assessing Aid

Real support for good governance policy in the Bank was institutionalized in the World Bank Institution (WBI) and took on the form of a greater support for integrating civil society into development projects in the latter 1990s and 2000s. During his term James Wolfensohn, then President of the World Bank, pushed for an organizational restructuring of the Bank that would allow the Bank to become more able to learn from outside sources and from changing knowledge in the world. He promoted a learning organization that he called the “Knowledge Bank.” The policies on governance developed directly out of this period and were very much associated with James Wolfensohn, both his support for the new anti-corruption efforts and his concern with engaging civil society in Bank projects and programs.

The Bank is constantly under a program of restructuring in order to make it relevant to the international context in which it works. One of the most influential restructuring programs for how the Bank has re-organized its governance policy is the Strategic Compact of 1997. The Strategic Compact created the 5 thematic networks under which employees would function, one of which is the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM) under which the Governance and Public Sector
Management Group works. The group is made up of Bank employees from all over the Bank including from the World Bank Institute and form the Development Research Group. These employees create documents and policies according to how they perceive the practice changing from input from country offices, their own understanding of the Bank’s functions and beliefs, and through direct consultation with each other.

The Bank’s governance policy, variously called good governance, good enough governance, or inclusive enough governance is constantly couched in terms of supporting the public administration capacities of states and encouraging stakeholder participation in development projects:

It [The Bank] helps strengthen public sector management systems within the executive branch, including the management of public finances and public employment. It also seeks to improve the broader governance environment within which the public sector operates, supporting institutions for public accountability, such as parliaments and offices of the ombudsman, and tracking improvements by measures of the rule of law, state legitimacy and trust in government institutions. Efforts to reduce the risk of corruption are prominent in both of these (World Bank n.d.a).

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<th>Table 3.7: World Bank Policies on Good Governance</th>
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<td>• Structural Adjustment Programs and Policies</td>
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<td>• Governance and Development (1992)</td>
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<td>• Country Assistance Strategies; Poverty Reduction Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational Policies and Bank Procedures on Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy (GAC) (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• New Access to Information Policy (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthening Governance, Tackling Corruption: The World Bank’s Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan (2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Bank’s first attempt at norm articulation on governance came in the form of the 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa and by a memorandum written by the General Counsel on the limits of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement in reference to governance.
Certainly the General Counsel’s memorandum on governance provided to the board in 1990 (ibid, 12) helped to guide how the Board would articulate its involvement with good governance. Following both the concern from Bank employees who wrote the 1989 report, and the General Counsel’s advice, the Bank carved out a non-political stance on governance in an influential 1994 publication, *Governance, the World Bank’s Experience*. The publication argued that the Bank could be involved in “(i) public sector management; ii) accountability; (iii) legal framework for development; and (iv) transparency and information” (World Bank 1994, viii).

Over the years, following its practice, the Bank has written and implemented Operational Policies (OP) and Bank Procedures (BP) that guide and direct the practice of all Bank employees on governance promotion.

Operational Policies (OPs): are short, focused statements of policy that are based on the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the General Conditions, and policies approved by the Bank’s Executive Directors. OPs set out the mandatory policy requirements for the conduct of Bank operations…Bank Procedures (BPs): are statements setting out the general mandatory procedural requirements necessary for Bank staff to carry out the policies set out in the OPs. They are designed to ensure Bankwide consistency and quality in Bank operations (World Bank n.d.e).

In 1999 the World Bank, in partnership with the IMF and the UNDP, initiated Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) for the least developed countries who received loans through its IDA branch (IMF 2011). The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and UN recognized the social costs of structural adjustment and sought to step in, not to change the system or promote another attempt at a New International Economic Order, but to consider how to implement structural adjustment with less social cost. The UNDP’s “Social Dimensions of Adjustment Project,” the UNDP Policy Paper on Poverty Eradication, and the 1995 World Summit for Social Development served as
foundations for the creation of the PRSPs (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997; Murphy 2006, 290; United Nations Development Programme 1995). The PRSPs were meant to instill national ownership and civil society participation in development projects and included a component of planning the internalization of good governance in government institutions (Ndulu 2006).  

Developing its governance policy further, the World Bank created its first Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2007 which it updated in 2012. These documents show a shifting understanding of its governance policy work. Previous articulations had made it clear that participatory development was an essential aspect of the way that countries and the Bank should work with beneficiaries. Yet, despite making statements that suggested participation is important, the Bank’s primary focus has been on engaging governments and making them efficient, effective and transparent. This focus is changing in recent years as the Bank opens up to engaging with civil society and communities that benefit from projects and programs. The Bank, through its policies, is beginning to articulate that the focus on civil society and working with civil society is not against its mandates, and it is even acceptable for the Bank to encourage and support citizen engagement with government. The recent GAC update shows how the Bank is continuing to support governance promotion and project implementation on transparency and accountability, and works with civil society in many projects to enhance governance.

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51 Critics of the PRSP process maintain that it does not instill national ownership or civil society participation because the drafters of the PRSP are elites who fail to internalize the policies they have signed in the PRSP.
The Annual Reports are important for the World Bank in that they represent the organization to its shareholders in a similar way that companies use Annual Reports to ensure transparency and trust among shareholders. Shareholders in this context mean the wealthy, developed countries who contribute the most to the Bank’s IDA and IBRD funds. But it also means private investors who work with the IFC and MIGA, and developing countries who are receiving the funds. Thus the Bank has to be very careful about the language and examples it uses to demonstrate its effectiveness as a development organization. The following represents the distribution of keyword counts of good versus democratic governance keywords in the World Bank Annual Reports from 2001-2013 (the same keywords as listed above with the UNDP).

The World Bank’s Annual Reports show a decisive tendency to favor good governance keywords over democratic governance keywords. The reports showed an average of 47.68% in favor of good governance keywords. The highest keyword counts in the World Bank Annual Reports were “services,” “government,” “fiscal,” “effective,” “effectiveness,” and “business.” The Annual Reports had a heavy emphasis on the ability of government to provide goods and services to a population, as well as on the services that were offered by the World Bank Group in conjunction with government. Surprisingly, there were some years in which efficient and efficiency of public service delivery was a major priority (2001-2004), and other years in which the keywords and discussion did not even come up at all (2005, 2006, 2010, 2012).
Next, the World Bank’s production of the World Development Reports (WDRs) is crucial to its standing as a development organization. The WDRs can be analyzed for setting the Bank’s agenda, for distributing key findings and statistics on development around the world, and also for “their task as communicating major themes and disseminating major ideas in development economics” (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 577). Figure 3.5 shows that in the World Bank’s case, almost every year’s language leans heavily toward the use of good governance words with the exception of 1998 and 2012. Overall, the average percentage difference is 48.26% in favor of good governance keywords. Opposite of the UNDP, the percentage use of democratic governance words actually increased over the two decades, starting with 9.93% in 1990 ending with 33.83% in 2013 with highs in 1999, 2007, and 2012. This indicates that while the World Bank generally favors good governance, it has been shifting in use of language and therefore

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52 See Appendix 2 for Data for Figure 3.3.
governance policy toward favoring more democratic governance ideals. The average percentage of good governance words shifted downward from 2001 (17.83%) to 2013 (25.6%) by 7.77% and up with the use of democratic governance words by the same number.

**Figure 3.5: Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank Development Reports**

The use of the keyword “civil society” occurred less frequently throughout the decade from a peak of 47 in 2003 to 0 in 2012 and only 10 in 2013. This is somewhat surprising given the recent increase in concern at the Bank with working with civil society through encouraging governments to engage in development project planning and implementation, and through recent funds that support civil society networking. Over the years there was zero use of the keyword “constitution” and only 1 use of the word “democracy” (in 2001). The keyword “participation” remained somewhat steady, though

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53 See Appendix 2 for data for Figure 3.5.
its use dwindled by 2012 and 2013 as well and the use of “political participation” only occurred once in 2005. The Bank’s use of words shows its support for the concepts associated with good governance over and above those associated with democratic governance. Yet, the trend is toward incorporating more democratic governance terms into the Annual Reports in more recent years.

Table 3.8: Key Findings from Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank

- On average, the Reports show that the World Bank is decisively more focused on supply-side governance than demand-side governance. In other words, the World Bank supports the efficiency and effectiveness of government institutions to provide government services more often than it encourages participation from groups affected by government projects to engage with government on the provision of government services.

- The World Bank’s statements and practice show a bent toward governance projects that favor top-down approaches to governance, however this focus is changing in recent years, especially in the most recent changes to the GAC Strategy

The Bank is currently working on articulating a new governance and anti-corruption strategy and “stock-taking” on implementation of the Bank’s governance strategy up the present. The Bank had to compromise on the original governance and anti-corruption strategy according to one respondent, not only because of the challenge of incorporating governance rhetoric into Bank policy, but because of the various opinions of how the Bank should be involved in governance, from the champions of governance like Wolfensohn, to those country representatives on the Executive Board who disagreed that the Bank should be at all involved in a country’s governance structure. The Bank is on the ground impacting the way that states govern and virtually doing the same thing to support democracy as does the UNDP, yet its rhetoric regarding democracy has been difficult to change.
The Bank also increased the amount of loans for the specific purpose of funding public administration capacity for good governance. Table 3.16 represents the Bank’s governance spending according to sector. The Bank traditionally lends by sector. Since 1998, with the creation of the Comprehensive Development Framework, the Bank carefully plans and provides development loans to countries by sectors. The financial information by sector is provided in the Annual Reports. The sector that best represents governance spending is that of public sector reform whose name changed to public administration in 2001. Law and justice projects where added in 2001.

Contradictions in the annual reports make financial analysis difficult. For example, while the individual Annual Reports only account for public sector spending each year in the 1990s between one and five percent, the 2002 Report suggests an average of 15 percent for the years 1992-1997 without discussion of why this statistic changed between Reports. Other changes between reports note the difference between planned and actual spending on public sector reform or public administration; where possible I used the most recent data on actual spending rather than planned spending.

Looking at trends in governance project spending for the available years provides evidence for the major shift toward promoting governance reform in the 1990s and 2000s in very different ways than the Bank had done in prior years. First, a major shift is evident in the amount of funding provided to the public sector management/public administration sector.

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Table 3.9: World Bank Funding for Good Governance

| Public Sector Reform/Public Administration Sector |
| Global Partnership and Trust Fund – World Bank Group administers $29.2 billion in trust funds 28% of which are in the Public Administration and Law Sector |

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administration sector. The 2000s show a stable percentage of total spending forwarded to public administration, law and justice (ranging from around 21 percent to 29 percent). The 1990s represented support for public sector reform in much lower percentages of total spending (ranging from nearly one percent to nearly five percent per annum).

The World Bank now administers over 1,000 trust funds and is the largest multilateral channel for trust funds next to the World Food Program and the UNDP (World Bank 2012a, 5). The World Bank has consistently outpaced UNDP in the amount of money that it sends into the developing world to fund projects backed by policies. Indeed, while both organizations continue to ‘fund’ projects in their own ways, projects that are led by a results-based-framework, there is a push to lend according to policy based outcomes and ideas rather than project based results. This organizational culture change occurred in the mid- to late-1990s and has been influential in the way the two organizations conceptualize development and the role of their governance portfolios.

The push comes from an understanding based in empirical evidence that lending and granting for development projects will more likely be able to meet certain overarching development goals if that work is done in a comprehensive way to meet policy goals rather than for simply obtaining project outcomes. In other words, it is not just the outcome of having built a functioning well in a village that allows villagers to access clean water, it is the idea that building that well is contributing to a society that is sustainable, increasing in growth, and meeting development goals that increase human freedom and livelihoods. For example, the building of a well must be connected with projects that increase the capacity of local government to deliver goods to citizens, that
increases citizen participation and ownership in the well, and that increases the ability of the private sector to respond to needs such as parts for the well that may break down in the future. Policy based lending and granting is the new trend in the development community and both the UNDP and World Bank follow this trend.

**Figure 3.6: World Bank Good Governance Expenditure as a Percentage of Total**

![World Bank Good Governance Expenditure as a Percentage of Total](image)

**IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNDP AND THE WORLD BANK**

The UNDP and World Bank argue that they only provide advice when countries ask for it, as all of my respondents made clear. Working in a country office means that staff members are trying to meet the needs of the country at any given time. Yet it is obvious that even when states ask for the technical assistance, advice or loans for

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55 Information gleaned from World Bank Annual Reports 2000-2012. See Appendix for data for Figure 3.5.
infrastructure development they work in concert with the organizations that provide such services.

Development organizations do indeed have input and influence in the kinds of “requests” they get from states. Indeed, my respondents noted that influencing states was of major importance to the work of the organizations. Influencing states to implement certain changes, following certain norms that are promoted by the international community and UN, or considering alternate points of view on sensitive issues, means being in the right place at the right time in order to make that influence and push for change. The role of the international community of states and other organizations is important too, but access to governments and local authorities and elites is the key to making change. The UNDP and World Bank are both largely advisory organizations. Their job is to understand the complex system and situation in which states have to make policy decisions. They must be on the ground with those states in order to provide governments with the appropriate and relevant advice that is needed. These organizations make recommendations to government authorities on the types of policies they should follow. In order to do that, they must not only master the political, economic, and cultural situations given them – they must also be in the right place at the right time – close to governments and ministers – in order to make those recommendations.

This chapter argued that though the two organizations under study create policy that is heavily influenced by member states and the path dependence of the organization, leadership and organizational culture still play an instrumental role in policy formation on governance norms through normative as well as strategic influence. It further argued that
UNDP’s leaders promoted democratic norms that focused on citizen participation and empowerment. The World Bank leaders supported government institutional efficiency and effectiveness. Leaders influence policy by promoting their ideals in speeches and statements. Such speeches include those given to the Executive Boards at the Annual meetings which detail the plans and goals for the next year of the organization. They also include speeches that simply guide the policy articulation that is then used in subsequent policy documents. Leaders furthermore meet with heads of departments and executive boards, pushing their own agendas for change in the organization. Finally, through sanctioning or rewarding appropriate ways to articulate policy, the leaders guide the organization in the path they see fit.
IV: UNDP AND WORLD BANK LEADERSHIP PROFILES

This chapter argues that top leaders in the UNDP and the World Bank impacted the way that governance norms were articulated for each organization despite pressure from outside sources like member states or transnational civil society. Further, it shows how leaders are also constrained and guided by the extant organizational culture and belief systems surrounding what governance means within each organization. Two leaders stand out as the most influential in the creation of governance policy since 1985. James Wolfensohn supported the anti-corruption agenda at the Bank in such a way that the focus on corruption and addressing its detrimental practices became a major practice of the Bank in the latter 1990s. William H. Draper III supported the need for equality in development outcomes at the UNDP. His influence in the UNDP helped to create the human development paradigm that focuses on the rights and freedoms of the individual in society to both have a say in government decision-making and structures, and partake in the economy freely. Such leaders restructured their respective organization as they saw fit, and influenced policy outcomes by promoting their own sense of what development meant. At strategic points, the leaders set the agenda for how their organizations would pursue governance policies and activities. Yet, the formation of governance policy was also impacted by the organizational beliefs of the UNDP and World Bank members and culture that had built up over the years.
Leaders normatively influence policy creation by promoting their ideals in speeches and statements and meetings with heads of departments and executive boards. They also sanction or reward behavior they think is appropriate. The UNDP’s leaders became heavily invested in promoting democratic norms beginning in the latter 1980s, and it is through the process of influence from leaders that the UNDP started to turn to democratic governance promotion. The World Bank had leaders that thought liberal democracy important, but not as essential for meeting development outcomes, and therefore included liberal ideals with little reference to democracy in policy statements and leadership strategies of sanctioning and reward. Leaders also work with organizations that have stanch and sometimes unmoving organizational cultures. In such cases, the content and clarity of the beliefs about development and governance held by members of the staff and already articulated in policy acts as a guide in the development of new policy. Shared beliefs influence the day-to-day functions of these two organizations. Shared beliefs place pressures on the leadership and staff to act and think in certain ways.

Using Schein’s second organizational cultural level of beliefs and assumptions, each leadership profile below assesses the beliefs and ideas of each major individual leader in the UNDP and World Bank from 1985-2012. I analyze speeches, statements, policy initiatives, organizational change initiatives, and publications in order to determine how each leader impacted the articulation of governance norms within each organization. While recognizing that other leaders influenced the formation of the norm, especially authority figures in specific departments or on specific issue areas, this analysis reduces the number of subjects to the leaders of the organization on the basis of the actor-specific
foreign policy analysis which asserts that leaders at high positions in authority make decisions that affect the way that organizations and states act.

WHY DO LEADERS INFLUENCE NORMS DIFFERENTLY?

Administrators and Presidents made a greater impact on governance policy outcomes than traditionally thought. The evidence from interviews, document analysis, and process tracing shows that leadership impacts policy to a greater degree under three structural conditions. First, when the organization is a learning organization in which the members share knowledge and beliefs about the organization’s role in development and know how to achieve its development goals, but are also open to change, it is more likely that leaders will be able to work within the organization to promote change and influence policy. On the other hand, when the organization is too stanch in its beliefs about development goals, it is difficult to change entrenched beliefs and policy structures. Second, being open to change means that the organization at all levels, from the people working in the field to the Executive Board, are willing to reinterpret the mandate and mission of the organization to meet changing world needs. When such an organizational culture is extant in an organization, it is more likely that leaders will influence policy changes and outcomes. Third, leadership style that is collaborative, providing chances for organization employees to offer their own voice and ideas concerning particular policy outcomes, allows the leader to more positively affect change and influence policy. Policy creation, change, and even implementation depend on individuals and on leaders from all levels.
Notably, the leadership may have been influenced just as much by policies that existed before coming into office, as by his or her own cultural ideals about the governance and development nexus. There are both corporate barriers and there are corporate facilitators to change. My interviewees noted often that individuals both at the top leadership levels, and at lower levels, had an enormous impact on the articulation of policy. In fact, this dependency on leadership for policy articulation and change can cause problems in organizations like the UNDP and World Bank which are so decentralized from headquarters. It means that departments and sectors are constantly pursuing different tracks and goals. It also means that policy articulated in some venues of the organization may not be implemented in other venues since it depends on whether or not the leaders of sectors, country offices, and other venues would actually agree with the policy.

Others noted how personal the policy process is and how change and influence really depend on individuals pressing their own interests and ideas. Guidance notes on particular issues, for instance, are dependent on the particular expertise of the people involved in their creation. If the people creating the guidance notes do not have specific expertise on certain issue areas, it is likely those issue areas will not be included in the guidance notes. Further, sustaining gains that have been implemented in the organization is of incredible importance for gender equality, democracy, and any other contested norms. But much of the gains and sustainability of these ideas resides in the individuals who push them forward and promote them. In other words, the articulation and implementation of policies into practice is dependent on leaders at all levels of the organization because of how it is so decentralized.
THE UNDP ADMINISTRATORS: LEADING IN DEMOCRACY

In recent decades, UNDP Administrators created a vision and advocacy role for the organization, ranging from support for and promotion of development concepts such as human development, sustainable human development, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and governance. The following provides an overview of the last five UNDP Administrators’ espoused beliefs and values as well as the important characteristics and elements of each one’s leadership style and what each one did to influence governance policy articulation in the organization.

Table 4.1: UNDP Administrators (History and Background)56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrator</th>
<th>Years in Office</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Ideals/Vision on Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Gustaf “Gus” Speth</td>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>World Research Institution founder, Chairman of Carter Administration Council on Environmental Quality</td>
<td>Environment, enabling environment for good governance, participatory focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Malloch-Brown</td>
<td>1999-2005</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Businessman, UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1979-83</td>
<td>Democratic governance, legitimate states, capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemal Derviş</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>World Bank, Turkish Parliament</td>
<td>Delivering as One, Anti-Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helen Clark</td>
<td>2009-present</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Prime Minister of New Zealand (1999-2008), Minister in Parliament, Deputy Prime Minister, Academic (U. of Auckland)</td>
<td>Political party support (administrative, capacity building)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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56 Information for this table gleaned from several different sources on the history of UNDP including online and historical texts (Brown 2011, 36).
When Draper came to the UNDP in 1986 it had no central paradigm, mission, understanding of its function in development, or even its place within the UN system. Draper asked of his new colleagues: “What does the UNDP believe in?” and “Should it not be advocating what it believes in?” (Weiss and Thakur 2010, 194; Murphy 2006). By mobilizing people within the UNDP, and by changing the structure and practices of the organization, Draper was instrumental in providing a foundation in UNDP programming for an “advocacy role” (Murphy 2006; Browne 2011). This culminated in what became incredibly influential ideas for development and its connection with governance policy found in the human development paradigm. Draper’s introduction in the first Human Development Report (HDR) exemplifies this change.

An irresistible wave of human freedom is sweeping across many lands. Not only political systems but economic structures are beginning to change in countries where democratic forces had been long suppressed. People are beginning to take charge of their own destiny…In the midst of these events, we are rediscovering the essential truth that people must be at the centre of all development (United Nations Development Programme 1990).

The UNDP supported technical assistance capacity that was couched in democratic terms. Yet, because of Draper’s influence, UNDP’s development assistance practice changed so that it was now focused on the individual and his or her choices and freedoms both in development and in government structures. The nascent governance concepts included the gender-governance-development nexus. Governance concepts focused on women’s

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57 Murphy cites Arthur Holcombe on this dual track strategy that the latter called “running on two tracks” (Murphy 2006, 238). The first goal of funding technical assistance measures to enhance government capacity was left over from the inception of the organization; the second goal represented the change to an organization that advocated development beliefs, ideas, and norms in international relations, as evinced with the creation of the Human Development Reports that represented a change in the ideals and definition of development from purely economic to that based on expanding human choices and freedoms.
inclusion and participation. The governance policies supported neoliberal policies that encouraged privatization and free market economies, sustainable development of the environment, and democratic civil society incorporation and participation as important for development.

Draper sanctioned practices that did not support the human freedom ideas, and rewarded those that did. On gender equality policy, Draper made sure that each project considered how women would participate and what the effects of the policy would be on women. “One of the [project] approval criteria which was receiving growing emphasis was an attention to the concerns of women, which Draper championed” (Brown 2011, 47). As a venture capitalist, Draper supported decentralization, a free market and liberalization of developing economies; otherwise known as the “Washington Consensus” policies in this era.\(^{58}\) He encouraged his colleagues to collaborate with the private sector as a development partner. Many of his colleagues at the UNDP gave him a hard time for this focus, since the prevailing feeling about the private sector’s influence on development was quite negative at the time (Brown 2011, 43). Yet, Draper persevered and set precedence in the UNDP for engaging with the private sector which largely turned into engagement with civil society organizations.

\(^{58}\) Draper was appointed by the Reagan administration after having served in the US Export-Import Bank (Browne 2011, 36). The connection with the Reagan Administration and Draper’s own background in investment and business as a venture capitalist is important for the changes that Draper made, both surprising and unsurprising, in the focus or paradigm of the organization. The characteristic development paradigm of the 1980s in the US and other powerful bilateral donors, and in the World Bank, was one of a focus on neoliberal economics with a high respect for the market’s free functioning, reigning in state intervention in the market, and highlighting the need for private business and investment. Draper was no stranger to such ideologies and was appointed to the UNDP largely because of his background in venture capitalism and the hope that he would push the neoliberal development agenda in the UNDP and promote coordination with the private sector, which indeed, he did.
Even before introducing the human development report in 1990, his language increasingly supports the notions underlying the new human development paradigm as evinced in his speeches and statements to the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, and Executive Boards (United Nations 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1992). He thought that people should have choices and the capabilities to function in society and market as they wished and was supportive of the UN and UNDP’s role in “assisting countries in their transition to democracy and free enterprise systems” (United Nations 1992, section 15, p. 5). Draper was an idealist with a pro-poor view of development. Draper believed that development practice was not impacting the individual and that a drastic change was needed in development thinking. It was because of Draper’s vision, ideals and leadership that human development became one of the most influential development paradigms. “Draper will be remembered by many people in the UN…as the person who insisted on giving the organization something to stand for, thus helping to complete its transformation into a more comprehensive development agency” (Murphy 2006, 48).

Draper’s influence on governance policy articulation was instrumental in the UNDP. First, he successfully restructured the organization to make it function as an advocacy organization. Second, he mobilized individuals to create the human development paradigm, centering development focus on human choices and freedom. Human development informed the way that the UNDP then thought about governance, it was essential to focus on individuals’ ability to participate in government in ways that gave them voice and power, emphasizing participation of the individual in almost every
aspect of UNDP’s work with governments. Third, Draper sanctioned and rewarded behavior that he thought complimented human development so that employees always considered equality and participation as essential to development projects, essential aspects of democratic governance. Finally, Draper’s speeches and statements influenced the way that UNDP moved forward as an advocacy development organization. It is easy to see how he left a heavy imprint on the development of UNDP governance policy and we see his ideas in every subsequent Administration in differing ways.

James Gustaf “Gus” Speth (1993-1999)

The phrase “creating an enabling environment for sustainable human development” is attributed to Gus Speth’s leadership on environmental sustainability during the 1990s. Sustainable human development needed an “enabling environment” that would allow development projects to succeed in implementing projects that did not harm the environment and were sustainable for future generations. Indeed, it was during this time that the UNDP started to think strategically about democratic governance and even to use the language much more often.

Speth took up the notion of participatory development in a way that proposed a particularly democratic ideal for good governance. Through a long process of pressuring the Executive Board of the UNDP to include good governance ideas, Speth remembered that “we - both me personally and UNDP - spent a lot of time and energy making 'good governance' a legitimate theme…and then building it up as a major focus of country programming…including the big issues of corruption and human rights” (Murphy 2006,
It had been a trend in the 1990s to focus on governance in development agencies. However, the UNDP’s particular governance focus was connected with democratic ideals and principles founded on both Draper and Speth’s leadership. Indeed Murphy notes that many of Speth’s speeches on good governance made an explicit connection with democratization (Murphy 2006, 276-277).

During the 1990s the UNDP grappled with what the human development paradigm meant and how to continue to advocate for it through its development practice. The topics that were most controversial were the use of the term “good governance” and the problem with encouraging states to comply with governance norms, and environmentally sustainable human development. Speth’s impact on the changing nature of and understanding of human development in these two areas was greatly marked by his experience as an environmental researcher, activist, and lawyer (Murphy 2006, 269-271). Speth used language like good governance, human rights, and gender equality. On gender equality he focused on gender parity, talking about increasing female representation among the UN employees, especially among Resident Coordinators working at the country level. Speth’s focus on the environment and sustainable human development emerges in all his speeches and writing; in one speech he notes that the UNDP gave a fourth of their resources to sustainable environmental development (United Nations General Assembly 26 June 1997).

Speth was concerned with continuing UNDP’s connection with the UN system by enhancing its coordinating role (Browne 2011, 61). Speth made sure that the UNDP fulfilled its mandate as the coordinating organization between all other UN agencies.
through the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), thus strengthening the UNDP’s position in the UN system as well as the Administrator’s position as the Chief of the Executive Board.

Yet Speth’s leadership also proved to be lacking in many areas including his inability to gain more funding for the UNDP in an era when funding for development declined at a significant rate after the end of the Cold War. He attempted to raise morale within the organization but found it increasingly difficult, and his leadership style lacked the character that would inspire people to follow him and his ideas. Murphy characterizes him as shy and intellectual, noting that the benign picture drawn of UNDP has a flying elephant with glasses was an apt representation of Speth’s leadership. Speth traveled extensively, talked with employees, and was concerned with the UN’s relationship with the rest of the UN system. Yet because of his shy demeanor, most of his legacy has been attributed to Mark Malloch Brown (Murphy 2006, 264-277).

The particular strategies that Speth used in impacting the way that governance was framed by the UNDP were somewhat different than Draper’s strategies. Indeed, Speth relied on collaboration and cooperation between employees in the organization to a great degree. He certainly used his intellectual and collaborative capabilities to expand his influence over the Executive Board to ensure their support for democratic ideals. His speeches and statements did not use the same outright support of democracy as Draper had done, but all his language on environmental sustainability, human development, gender equality, and human rights betrays that focus. Indeed, my interviewees said that
Mark Malloch Brown simply came into the organization and changed the language from “enabling environment” to “democratic governance.”

Mark Malloch-Brown (1999-2005)

Mark Malloch Brown is the Administrator most often credited with making an impact on UNDP programming, and creating the democratic governance concept (or at least promoting the rhetoric of democratic governance in a different way than his predecessors). Malloch Brown was certainly influential in the UNDP’s deepening focus on governance as support for liberal democracy norms and principles rather than governance as simply focused on efficient and effective institutions. However, Malloch Brown built on his predecessors’ impact and influence on the UNDP’s direction in promoting governance ideology to states. Most notably in his administration is the focus on communication to a large audience, changes in the organizational structure and in staff postings, and in the changes to terms rather than to actual principles or concepts.

Following in Gus Speth’s footsteps, Malloch Brown used the enabling environment idea. He argued that an enabling environment was needed for sustainable human development as well as for achieving all developmental goals. Thus, the term “enabling environment” was changed to “democratic governance” (Browne 2011, 66). Malloch Brown was an influential communicator and what he did for the democratic governance concept was to put it up on the web. Despite his predecessor’s success, Malloch Brown had his own ideas and vision concerning governance. He supported democratic changes in Cambodia and the Philippines: “Democracy, I became convinced,
might have saved the million or more lives lost in little Cambodia” (Malloch Brown 2011, 80). He backtracked later in a book written about his experience when he writes that he realized that democracy was not a panacea for meeting development or human rights goals, rather, that it had to be coupled with economic success: “Good economics is a precondition for good politics” and he concludes with “my personal crusade for national democracy as the cure for a country’s backwardness had run up against its limits. It was a vital but not sufficient condition for development” (Malloch Brown 2011, 96-97).

The ability for the Administrator and the UNDP as a whole to begin using the terms “democracy” and “democratic governance” was founded in the speeches and publications of the Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996) and bolstered by Secretary General Kofi Annan (1997-2006). The latter coincided with Mark Malloch Brown’s tenure as UNDP Administrator. Boutros Ghali made a large impact with his three “Agendas” that informed, and still inform, policies in the UNDP on democracy promotion. In fact, it was Boutros-Ghali that led the UN to be more involved with peace-keeping missions than it had previously been (Karns 2012). Boutros-Ghali’s leadership into post-conflict peacebuilding reignited a focus on democracy promotion in the UN. Kofi Annan’s support for the democratic principles that Boutros Ghali articulated was more institutional than normative; Annan continued the

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59 These were “Agenda for Peace” “Agenda for Democracy” and “Agenda for Development” (Ghali 1994).

60 Margeret Karns explains how the UN General Assembly had asked Boutros-Ghali to create a policy document that would guide the UN in its efforts to help in conflict situations in the new international structure after the end of the Cold War. She shows that Boutros-Ghali included, without being asked, the notion of post-conflict peace-building and therefore created a new role for the UN in post-conflict situations.
changes and support for democracy initiated under Boutros-Ghali’s tenure (Haack and Kille 2012).

Malloch Brown represented an Administrator whose public persona and business sense redefined and changed the structure of the organization to position itself with comparative advantage in the international development system. Malloch Brown’s Administration was characterized by vast changes to the structure of the organization, to its marketing capacity, and to its way of doing business. He argued that democratic governance ideals should be the development goals of the organization.

Malloch Brown suggested in several speeches that the UNDP was trying to create a niche for itself with a business plan. He noted that the UNDP seemed well placed to support governments in drafting laws and constitutions, provide electoral assistance, and work in areas that development traditionally avoided. “UNDP views itself as a campaigning organization, committed to stoking the demand for change, but we are also a policy advisory agency, helping Governments craft policies and institutions that drive gender equality and women's empowerment” (United Nations General Assembly June 9, 2000, 68). Moreover, Malloch Brown argued that the UNDP’s vision should be different from other organizations:

An unambiguous message needed to be taken to the highest political level. The business vision of the UNDP would be sharpened, determining where it belonged in the fight against poverty, with its broad coalition of partners. It would prioritize the capacity-building and governance role that was emerging as its most differentiated future function (United Nations Economic and Social Council July 22, 1999, 4).

Malloch Brown’s strategies for influencing governance policy articulation were different from his predecessors. His business and marketing background made him
influential in couching the governance rhetoric and marketing it to the public. He was not afraid, as his predecessors had been, to use the word “democracy,” or to publish the idea of democratic governance as widely as possible. He also worked collaboratively with the UN Secretary General in a way that solidified the use of the democratic governance language for the decade to follow. Malloch Brown’s collaborative leadership style and his vision to guide the organization like he would a business venture helped the UNDP to articulate its policy for the world.

Kemal Derviş (2005-2009)

Kemal Derviş’s entry into the UNDP administration in 2005 was novel for several reasons including the fact that Derviş was the first UNDP Administrator to represent a country who had actually received development funds from the UNDP (Murphy 2006, 90). Derviş had a long and esteemed development and academic career. Because of his experience Derviş came to the UNDP with a stronger and better understanding of development and economics than his predecessors (Browne 2011, 80). Furthermore Derviş had a vision of change for the United Nations following on what many of his predecessors had envisioned for the UNDP (Murphy 2006, 331). Derviş was one of the people behind the *Delivering as One* report and initiative that had been started by Kofi Annan at the end of his tenure as Secretary General. The *Delivering as One* document
suggested ways that the United Nations could become a more unified system (United Nations 2006).\textsuperscript{61}

Derviş did not make many policy impacts or changes on governance. Several crises occurred during his administration that called into question his leadership and the structure of the UNDP as a whole. The crises included the problematic nature of supporting the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), the Executive Board’s dislike of the first draft of the 2008 Strategic Plan and call for revisions, and the lack of reform that the UNDP needed and that Derviş had promised. Browne notes that Derviş was absent from key Executive Board meetings in 2007. Further,

It was apparent to the UNDP staff that [Dervis’s] heart had never really left Washington… There was an unfortunate irony in the fact that the first UNDP administrator to have been chosen on a meritocratic basis, and with the strongest resume of any of his predecessors, had been so short-lived (Browne 2011, 80).

Derviş had very little impact on the way that UNDP couched governance policy. All of the work that Malloch Brown had done helped the UNDP glide through the troubled years of Derviş’s tenure. The Strategic Plan of 2008-2011 still incorporated democratic governance as one of the main areas of UNDP work. UNDP development support and practice continued to support democratic governance projects, knowledge products, and assistance to states. Thus, everything that had been institutionalized by former UNDP Administrators continued on unhindered in the Derviş years.

\textsuperscript{61} Speth and Malloch Brown had been arguing for with the reform of the Resident Coordinator system, both of them suggesting that the Resident Coordinators should not only represent the UNDP in the country offices but should also coordinate for and act as representatives for the whole UN system.
Helen Clark (2009-Present).

As with any new Administrator it is difficult to say what the Administrator’s focus and changes will be on the organization while they are in office. Helen Clark started in office in 2009 and is there at the time of this dissertation’s publication. One thing that is notable about Helen Clark’s appointment as Administrator is that she is one of the first women to take on the role as Under-Secretary General, and is the first woman to be a UNDP Administrator. She also comes from a strong parliamentary background and my interviewees thought that pushing the UNDP on concern for parliamentary strength, training, and support would be one of Clark’s legacies in the governance policy realm.

THE WORLD BANK PRESIDENTS: LEADING IN GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY

Even while the Board of Governors\(^6\) hold the final responsibility for policy articulation and creation at the Bank, the Presidents of the World Bank have a large influence on the policies that are articulated and implemented, the daily functions of the Bank, and the way that projects are funded through the Bank.

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\(^{6}\) Member countries of the Bank appoint a governor to the Board of Governors who are completely responsible for policy at the Bank, however, the Board of Governors, in practice, gives authority for most decisions to the Executive Directors which is made up of 24 representatives. “They are responsible for making policy decisions affecting the Bank Group’s operations and for approving all loans” (World Bank Group 2007, 9).
Table 4.2: World Bank Presidents (History and Background)\(^\text{63}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrator</th>
<th>Years in Office</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Ideals/Vision on Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barber Conable</td>
<td>1986-1991</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>US Marines (WWII and Korean War), lawyer, Served in New York State Senate and US House of Representatives</td>
<td>“Greening” the Bank, focus on Gender and Development (GAD), Macroeconomic growth as the way to reduce poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis Preston</td>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>US Marines (WWII), Commercial/international banker (J.P. Morgan); lawyer</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction, client-oriented focus, inclusion of social and economic issues in lending and projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Wolfensohn</td>
<td>1995-2005</td>
<td>Australian, Naturalized Citizen of the United States</td>
<td>Banker, Officer in Australian Air Force, Lawyer</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption focus, Poverty Reduction, need for efficiency in development delivery, participation in development planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Zoellick</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Banker (Goldman Sachs), US Trade Representative, US Deputy Secretary of State, positions in the US Department of Treasury</td>
<td>Gender Equality as smart economics, increased focus on democratization as essential for development, importance of macroeconomic stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The President’s speeches and statements influence the way that the Board votes, the policies and actions pursued by the employees of the Bank, and how Strategic Plans and IDA funding replenishments are couched. Indeed, the President is chairman\(^\text{64}\) of the Boards of Executive Directors and is responsible for day-to-day functions of the Bank, making sure that the Bank is pursuing its mandates appropriately, and ensuring that all projects and policies conform to the most recent articulations of the mission and focus of the Bank (World Bank n.d.h). Further, “within the IBRD and IDA, most organizational

\(^{63}\) This chart (especially column two on governance and development vision) is developed from Katherine Marshal’s chart on a summary of the World Bank’s Presidents (Marshall 2008, 32-33), and World Bank publications (World Bank 2011a, 203).

\(^{64}\) While the president is the chairman and chairs all meetings of the IDA, IBRD, MIGA, and the IFC, he or she does not have a vote in the decisions made (World Bank Group 2007, 8).
units report to the president and, through the president, to the executive directors” with the exception of the Independent Evaluation Group and the Inspection Panel (World Bank 2011a, 9-10; World Bank Group 2014).

When Robert McNamara was President of the Bank (from 1963-1981), the Bank’s focus shifted to poverty alleviation and McNamara’s vision guided the Bank on this front (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997). The Bank that McNamara molded during his Presidency is still largely the Bank today, both in process and structure (Marshall 2008, 39). He contended that poverty could be measured and poverty could be reduced.

McNamara was able to counteract the decade of minimization of the work and purpose of the Bank that had occurred in the wake of the Marshall Plan by increasing capital flows through the Bank. This was a shift from the focus on development to a greater focus on poverty reduction that occurred early on in the organization’s history (Marshall 2008, 37-39). Yet near the end of McNamara’s Presidency the 1970s economic crises inspired a turn to focusing on macroeconomic stability which became evident and controversial in the structural adjustment programs that placed macroeconomic policy conditionalities on low and middle income countries for receiving Bank and IMF loans (Marshall 2008, 40).

After McNamara left the Bank in 1981, poverty reduction took on less importance in the Bank’s development practice, though poverty reduction was still a major goal of the Bank’s development practices. The new administrators favored a macroeconomic focus to development. Yet, in the 1990s the focus on poverty reduction reemerged, especially in light of the negative impacts of the SAPs.

When Barber Conable came to the Bank in 1986, the organization was heavily involved with the IMF in implementing SAPs to low and middle income countries whose economies had been struggling since the 1970s debt crises. The governance rhetoric for most of the 1980s can be summed up in one quote from Conable’s speeches: “Economic growth is the cornerstone of successful development and poverty reduction” (World Bank 1991, 149). Conable was instrumental in his efforts at reorganizing the Bank and in encouraging a development focus to organize the governance rhetoric around market oriented freedoms. He was very supportive of the SAPs and the market economy, considering poverty reduction a special focus of the Bank done through support for macroeconomic growth. In a speech to the Board of Governors at the 1987 Annual Meetings, Conable endorsed the market-based approach.

The World Bank is ready to play a reinvigorated role in the fundamental tasks of development—to promote economic growth and to combat poverty. We will give strong and reliable support to the adjustment efforts of our member countries. We will work to preserve the open global and financial trading system, which is essential for growth. And we will vigorously promote the market-oriented policies and reforms that best mobilize private capital flows and encourage the creative energies of millions of people for efficient growth (World Bank 1991).

Barber Conable spent much of his time defending the SAPs and the focus of the Bank on macroeconomic growth and stability as the best way to encourage a country to development and reduce poverty.

The first lesson is that adjustment is not a quick fix and the debt crisis cannot be resolved overnight. It must be done; failure to change failed policies leaves the poor without hope. But…the process of stabilization and structural reform has been, and will continue to be, painful for many (World Bank 1991).
Figuring out how to handle criticism and how to make changes to SAPs was a highlight of Conable’s Presidency. Conable desperately tried to revive the reputation of the World Bank in an era that created the Fifty Years is Enough Campaign that tried to put it to an end.

It was not until near the end of his term as President that Conable started integrating the language and term of “governance” into his speeches and discussions with a large group of institutions including the Board of Governors of the World Bank, but also with other Banks and regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity, now the African Union. The governance discussion in the Bank revolved around the ability for governments to provide goods and services to its citizens, and engage its citizens in free political and economic systems, sometimes even endorsing democracy. At the same time, aware of its apolitical mandate, its Presidents and employees tend to couch governance in apolitical terms.

The World Bank is not about to involve itself in the internal political affairs of any country or to introduce any new political conditionalities in its work. We are a development institution, and we will continue to focus our attention only on those aspects of governance that directly affect development—accountability, transparency, predictability, adherence to the rule of law, and so on. These are not new issues for the Bank…we will be paying increasingly more attention to them in the years to come” (World Bank 1991, 170).

During his tenure the Bank certainly increased its focus on poverty reduction. Indeed, the Bank’s goals were to lead in development, to increase the consideration of women in development, and to focus on environmental issues (World Bank 1991, 172-173). He was a politician, so his tactics for engaging the Bank in governance and development were those that politicians would use. He encouraged the Congress to work with the Bank and give it aid, and he also created alliances in the Executive Board right
after he came into the organization in a way that allowed the Board to approve the
budget. His political acumen allowed him to communicate with others in a way that won
them over to his arguments, as in the discussions he had with African Presidents on
implementing SAPs (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 192), an element of his good
governance approach.

One thing that may have made Conable successful in his reformation efforts at the
Bank was that he was an outsider. Everyone expected a banker from Wall Street to be
appointed to the position so when Conable was appointed there was great surprise, even
on his own account. Because he was new to the organization he had more sway in
changing it (Saxon 2003). The reorganization that he instituted was painful for many and
lasted several years longer than he had wished (from 1987-1989), but in the end he felt
that the Bank had a better sense of its mission in the world: to reduce poverty by
supporting macroeconomic growth and an enabling environment for a free market in
which all citizens could participate.


Lewis T. Preston’s most influential impact on the Bank’s governance policy was
to encourage the mutual inclusion of social issues with economic issues in the entire
Bank’s project planning and lending programs. Lewis was concerned with the Bank’s
place and role in the World, especially in the time of international turmoil of the early
1990s. The Fifty Years is Enough campaign to end World Bank lending was at its height,
and severe critiques of the World Bank’s impact on social living because of SAPs
threatened to make the World Bank a relic of the 20th century. Preston entered the scene and tried to overcome these major problems and debates in which the Bank was embroiled, while also influencing the way that the Bank saw its place in the world. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the entry of a multitude of states into the Bank’s membership in the 1990s encouraged a heightened integration of the Bank into public administration work, i.e., in helping new states set up their bureaucracies and public service policies, in increasing social sector lending, and maintaining an important focus on poverty reduction (World Bank n.d.d). Preston made sure that the social issues of development were also at the forefront of how the Bank dealt with these new countries. The shift in governance policy to focus more specifically on social issues was very different from his predecessors and changed the vision of governance policy for the Bank henceforth.

Preston’s presidency would be best classified as cultivation because of his ability to work with colleagues and make them feel welcomed and respected, although this collegial relationship did not always transfer to his relationship with the Executive Board (Binder 1995). Yet, he was reserved, lacked a personal understanding and vision for development, and lacked the necessary ability to project a public persona that would re-inspire trust and respect for the Bank. Mallaby (2004) argues that on the mission of poverty reduction Preston “utterly failed to deliver this message with punch or conviction” (57) and that furthermore “Preston's qualities—his reserve, his modesty, his gentlemanly style—were no match for the theatrical talents of his NGO critics” (63). Furthermore, his speaking abilities and public persona in large groups left him wanting in
his abilities to change the organization to overcome the major problems it was facing with its programming and the criticism from outside sources (Ramsamy 2006, 175).

Preston struggled to make changes in the organization. His tactics consisted of engaging with individuals and small groups. He tried to rebalance the bureaucracy and minimize the differences in staffing that he saw as problematic (reducing the number of high paid staff and encouraging gender parity in higher positions in the organization). He was concerned with the Bank’s lack of focus on social issues and instituted some changes in project lending that would ameliorate this problem. While he set the Bank on a path to incorporate social issues with economic, his legacy is tattered with the vast amount of changes in the international system that overwhelmed the Bank in the early 1990s, and with the intense criticism coming from NGOs, countries and civil society groups that would have liked to see the Bank destroyed.


Just as Mark Malloch Brown was most influential in the UNDP for making a presence for governance on the UNDP’s agenda, and for marketing democratic governance to the world, so President James Wolfensohn marketed good governance as a focus on anti-corruption for the World Bank. Wolfensohn represents one of the controversial Presidencies of the Bank. He was charismatic, called the ‘Renaissance President’ for his extensive interests, and determined to make the changes that he thought necessary; Mallaby characterizes Wolfensohn as “a charmer, a seducer, a force of nature” (2004, 79). The first few months and years of his Presidency represented a controlling
culture in which he replaced senior management and attempted structural change with passion. He worked hard with a resistant organization to change the structures of the slow and intractable bureaucracy. Yet while he had a vision of poverty alleviation that rivaled Robert McNamara’s vision, Wolfensohn struggled to make the changes to the organization that would allow for a re-focus and definition of policy and projects onto individual poverty alleviation in a more meaningful way that that which was already embedded in the organization. “Wolfensohn did have a vision for the organization as an organization dedicated to relieving poverty, but failed to put in place the management systems that would support and reinforce that vision” (Denning 2011).

He succeeded in changing the structure of how the organization loaned money which became a crucial aspect of the Bank’s governance policy. The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), written by Wolfensohn and adopted as policy in January 1999, focused on the idea of country ownership of development projects. Wolfensohn was very supportive of inclusive participation of each community and country in the planning and implementation of development projects that affected them. The CDF represented a change in the way that the World Bank went about creating and implementing projects. It placed the communities and countries at the center of the development and poverty reduction strategies, creating mechanisms in which they participated and in which the social as well as economic aspects of development were combined.

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65 Ramsamy writes that Wolfensohn drafted the CDF by long hand (Ramsamy 2006, 201 fn.4). This was presented to the World Bank Board of Governors in 1998 (World Bank Group 2014).
[Wolfensohn] reflected that complexity by constantly reaching out to groups previously remarkably neglected by the Bank, notably youth, cultural leaders, the disabled, and faith leaders and communities…He was also deeply moved by what he saw of poverty, and often echoed the influential Voices of the Poor work (Marshall 2008, 50).

Including participation as a fundamental aspect of how the Bank loaned money to countries was not an easy feat to make. Changing the organization’s traditional ways of doing country assessments, of creating the development policies and projects, meant that the employees of the organization who had been working one way for so long revolted in some ways. The new ideas about participation certainly built off the long trend of the Bank to encompass social development issues into its projects and to encourage participation, yet it also challenged traditional development practices for the Bank. The changes culminated in the Poverty Reduction Strategies.

In contrast to past approaches, which were applied to countries by donor organizations, developing countries now write their own strategies for reducing poverty. The resulting Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) then become the basis for IDA lending from the World Bank… (World Bank 2011a, 52).

Crucially, the way that PRSPs are created is by including civil society groups and representatives in the discussion. Thus, Wolfensohn helped craft the Bank’s governance participation policy and put it into practice through the CDF.

Wolfensohn was very concerned with governance and was continuously advised not to use the “c” word, i.e., corruption, because of its political implications (Marshall 2008, 50). Wolfensohn famously discussed corruption in his address at the 1996 Annual Meetings, arguing that corruption was a “cancer” that hindered development (World Bank n.d.b). Corruption was thought to be too connected to a government’s political structures and while the Bank certainly focused on encouraging transparency and
accountability in its previous work (especially starting in the 1980s with the SAPs), it had maintained an aloof discussion on corruption up until Wolfensohn’s Presidency and his speeches and statements that did not shy away from pointing out corrupt practices of member states. While his colleagues pressured him not to discuss corruption, he pressured them back, arguing that corruption was one of the main reasons for lack of development and inability to address poverty in many developing countries. Since Wolfensohn, the Bank almost sees good governance and anti-corruption as interchangeable words – it is the heart of the good governance agenda.

Making changes toward “mainstreaming good governance” represented a huge barrier for Wolfensohn, partially because of the intractability of the operational culture and partly because of the political nature of focusing on corruption (Weaver 2008, 11). Wolfensohn’s impact on the changing nature of the Bank’s paradigm to incorporate a good governance agenda with an anti-corruption tint (Marshall 2008) created a defining moment for governance promotion within the Bank that focused it on efficient and effective government transparency, accountability, and public service provision.

The difficulty of making policy or structural change in the Bank becomes evident even when Presidents are interested in changing the focus of the organization in order to become more efficient and effective in the World Bank’s operations. For instance, when James Wolfensohn became President he had a vision for poverty reduction and development that he wanted the Bank to follow and was therefore committed to a particular vision of development. He is most well known for initiating a focus on anti-corruption at the Bank, but he also pushed the concepts of good governance, poverty
alleviation and reduction, and achieving the MDGs. In order to achieve the changes that he thought necessary on policy and implementation at the Bank, Wolfensohn initiated an organizational and structural change that became known as the Strategic Compact.

The structural changes were meant to change the nature of the Bank to create what he championed as a “Knowledge Bank” both creating new knowledge and learning from other’s knowledge. However, the Strategic Compact reorganization proved to be too unwieldy and broke against the rigid hierarchy and rules of the Bank. Though many changes were actively instituted, such as the creation of knowledge sharing platforms and establishing distance learning centers, the lofty goals of the change were never really implemented. “Where newly espoused theories differ greatly from long-standing theories-in-use, the sheer complexity of transforming norms, mindsets, and habits will at best produce slow and incremental change” (Weaver 2008, 42). Even so, Wolfensohn’s strategies of organizational change, his influence through statements and speeches, and his sheer personality allowed him to influence the articulation of Bank governance policy in ways that increased the link between rhetoric and reality on both participation and on anti-corruption.

Paul Wolfowitz (2005-2007)

Paul Wolfowitz came to the Bank from the United States Department of Defense. He was very concerned with African countries, especially heavily indebted countries, and was supportive of democracy. Indeed, during his time at the Bank he supported strengthening the Bank’s support for African countries and strengthening the Bank’s
work on anti-corruption (World Bank n.d.f). Yet, Wolfowitz’s Presidency proved tumultuous for the Bank, first because he did not get along well with his new colleagues at the World Bank and even clashed on particular issues (DeYoung 2007). The distrust was in some part because he was perceived by some to be doing the bidding of the United States government.\textsuperscript{66} Second, he became engulfed in his own corruption scandal when it came to light that he had arranged for large pay and promotions to be given to his girlfriend, Shaha Ali Riza, a World Bank employee (Weisman 2007). It was the scandal with Ms. Riza that led to Wolfowitz’s early resignation from the Bank. Through this process, he drew the Bank back into the distrust and public relations crises it experienced in the 1980s and 90s and many developing countries voiced their displeasure with the long tradition of having the United States appoint the President of the Bank, a practice that, though challenged, has not changed.

Wolfowitz had a clear vision to make the Bank abide more closely to the neoconservative stance on government intervention and the free market, including supporting African countries by reducing their debt and encouraging the reduction of corruption within those countries. He pursued a reorganization in which he brought in outsiders as senior management staff, which many Bank employees became upset about (Denning 2011). Wolfowitz’s initial strategy on anti-corruption was to clean up the corruption problems in a way that was much stricter than the Executive Board was.

\textsuperscript{66}According to Cassidy “He has suspended loans to developing countries that he regards as corrupt— among them Chad, Kenya, and Bangladesh—while expanding the bank’s activities in places where the United States and its allies have intervened militarily, including Lebanon and Iraq. “Karl Rove would be proud: the man whom the world associates with the war in Iraq has recast himself as the crusader for good governance and development,” Manish Bapna, the executive director of the Bank Information Center, a not-for-profit organization in Washington that monitors the bank’s activities, said. “But inside the bank there is still a perception on the part of some staffers that his real agenda remains hidden, and that it reflects priorities from the Bush Administration” (Cassidy 2007).
willing to support. For instance, Wolfowitz pushed the board to have a stricter stance on loans to those countries that had corruption problems. Wolfowitz interpreted the anti-corruption agenda as punitive. Wolfowitz was attributed with connecting good governance with democracy (Cassidy 2007), the latter concept traditionally being minimized by the Bank because of its political implications, though it is evident in most publications and discussions with Bank employees that they support democracy and participation in government.

Wolfowitz’ tenure was characterized by a control environment that led to lack of influence on most issues. Despite his concern with anti-corruption and poverty in Africa, his influence was largely impeded by his own controlling behaviors, by his background, and by his actions as President in making decisions connected with his girlfriend, Shaha Ali Riza, that some regarded as corrupt. Indeed, Wolfowitz slightly undermined the governance and anti-corruption agenda that Wolfensohn had supported. Wolfowitz showed how embroiled into corruption scandals the World Bank and its employees could be.


Zoellick’s tenure was characterized by quietude after the extravagancies of Wolfowitz, but during this quiet a change wrought in the organization strengthened the governance policy in ways that Zoellick’s predecessors were unable to bring about. A focus in IDA16 replenishment on results based lending and the inclusion of goals and

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67 Every few years the International Development Association or IDA conducts meetings to plan for funding sources and development themes for the upcoming funding round.
targets for getting to development outcomes meant that the World Bank redefined itself to accommodate the world’s environment. Zoellick was just as concerned with governance issues, especially anti-corruption, as his predecessors. Partly because of Wolfowitz’s problems, Zoellick ramped up the Bank’s investigative arm, the Institutional Integrity (INT) Department.

Though Zoellick’s Presidency was not the first evidence of gender equality norms in the World Bank, it did spark a concern that had not been evident to the extent that it became in planning for the IDA16 funding round. That funding round included measurable outcomes, such as the writing of the WDR 2012 that focused on gender issues. It also focused on specifically measurable ways to assess gender equality. In the same way that Draper’s Administration in the UNDP influenced planning of gender mainstreaming into policies, Zoellick’s Presidency tapped into the ability of the World Bank to increase its focus on gender equality even with the deep divide that exists between states in gender equality practices.

Jim Young Kim (2012-Present).

Jim Young Kim started his tenure very recently in the World Bank and thus it is very difficult to gauge what his impact on governance policy will be. However, he is certainly making strides in pushing for change in the organization. As per usual, he is concerned about poverty reduction. The 2013 Annual Meetings and World Bank Group Strategy that he presented, and which was approved by the UNDG and the Executive Board, shows his leadership in this area. He has committed the Bank to “end extreme poverty: reduce the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to 3 percent by
2030” and to “promote shared prosperity: foster income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population in every country” (World Bank 2013a). For Jim Young Kim, as exhibited in the World Bank Group Strategy, governance is closely associated with anti-corruption and efficient, effective public institutions.

Kim’s Change Management Initiative and science of delivery theory of development suggest a particular version of governance that is different from what Presidents have articulated in the past. Many of my respondents are impressed with how Kim is listening to staff on particular issues instead of marching ahead with his own agenda as had been the experience with previous Presidents, especially with Wolfowitz (a strategy that proved unsuccessful).

**LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE ON NORM ARTICULATION**

As the evidence shows, leaders have a powerful influence on policy outcomes under certain conditions and using specific mechanisms. On the whole, as others have noted before me, when the organization is a learning organization that is open to new ideas and change, it is more likely that it will change or modify its policies to meet changing needs and conditions. It is also important for groups with consensual knowledge who understand the organization’s role in development and know how to achieve its development goals to work together on formulating new policy. Thus when a leader has a more collaborative leadership style in a learning organization along with a drive to push those ideas through the intractable organizational culture, the leader is more likely to be able to press for change, both within the Executive Board of the organization
and among employees working in different departments at headquarters and in country offices. We saw this kind of collaborative leadership style most often with Gustaf Speth at the UNDP and Lewis Preston at the World Bank, though the others exhibited collaboration in different ways at some points in their administrations.

Control policies, such as staff reorganizations and structural changes in how the organization does business, often get the organization moving in the direction of change but meet significant barriers in fulfilling the ideals of the leadership and in making significant changes in the organization on policy and practice since it is necessary to have buy-in from those who will be making the changes. Staff can become bitter and upset when their roles are downplayed, when they are asked to re-apply for their position because the structure of the staff has been re-organized, and especially when they see their colleagues losing their jobs. Such drastic re-ordering of the organization’s hierarchy and practice can cause a loss of morale and thus distract from the efficient and effective practices of the organization. We saw these problems in the restructuring of the World Bank pursued by Barber Conable (1987-1989 with lingering effects into Lewis Preston’s Presidency), in James Wolfensohn’s change to World Bank practice in the CDF of 1999, and even in William H. Draper III’s significant changes to the UNDP in the 1980s.

All of these leaders exhibited elements of sanctioning and rewarding behavior among staff and even with the Executive Board to get through the changes that they wanted, especially in terms of governance and development policy. Most often we see reward, not punishment, in the way they pushed people in their organization to make changes to governance policy. They used their speeches and statements as influential
ways to impact policy and projects in their respective organizations. The Strategic Plans and the Strategies that the Boards of each organization approve have the ineffaceable influence of the leader of the organization, and in some cases completely written by that leader without much input from staff.

The barriers to leadership influence on governance policy are most evident the “silo” effect between the departments. When departments do not share knowledge, do not know what the other departments are doing or articulating, and do not have a shared vision of development, the leader is less likely to be able to influence them because of the disparate nature of the organization. We see this in the World Bank more than in the UNDP because the UNDP attempts to overcome this with an overarching Strategic Plan that all departments are supposed to follow, as well as instituting knowledge sharing platforms in which employees have become highly engaged. The World Bank has had less success in this, as shown in Lewis Preston and James Wolfensohn’s desire to bring the organization together on poverty alleviation as the main development goal, as well as implement efficiency within the organization. It was difficult, and the Strategic Concept was only partially successful at the time, though the idea of the Knowledge Bank continued after his tenure.

When the organization is able to reinterpret its mandate, the likelihood that the organization will follow new trends pushed by the leader is greater. This is most evident in the UNDP’s ability to take a mandate to coordinate the development activities of the UN community under the “Delivering as One” scheme, and the mandate to facilitate South-South cooperation, into a mandate to promote governance in order to alleviate
poverty. The UNDP further has an advantage because its mandate is flexible and changes according to the desires of the General Assembly and ECOSOC decisions, giving it more leeway than the Bank to change in order to adapt to a new international environment and make itself relevant.

The extensive literature on successful leadership highlights the importance of a leader being able to listen to employees and work together and alongside them rather than command their obedience. The evidence from my interviews and historical analysis of the UNDP and World Bank bolster this claim. When the leadership style is collaborative, providing chances for organization employees to offer their own voice and ideas concerning particular policy outcomes, the leader will be more successful in guiding the organization and in making and implementing changes, whatever the changes may be. However, the most successful leaders also exhibited aspects of the control leadership style along with collaboration. Gaining cooperation and ownership among employees is a necessity if any major change, whether procedural or substantive, is to be made in large organizations.
V: PARTICIPATION

The idea that individuals should be involved in the decision-making procedures and actions that affect them is as old as the development of governance ideology. Indeed it is at the heart of the governance debate. Concern with state-society interactions pervades governance literature from ancient to contemporary times. Considerations of how state-society interactions should be carried out changed over the years, especially in relation to the shift in the nature of the rule starting in the seventeenth century Europe and culminating in what we now consider a modern Weberian state. However, the underlying principles of what is accepted in this debate continue to this day and guide the way that liberal democracies formed in the contemporary era.

This chapter considers how participation became a norm in development policy planning and implementation, how leaders in the World Bank and UNDP promoted this norm in different ways, and how it has impacted the realm of development policy and planning to such an extent that development practice changed inextricably since the 1990s when development organizations first introduced participation policies. I show how the participation norm was both institutionalized in the organization at various times and how leaders were influential in establishing the norm in each organization in their own ways. I argue that leaders like James Wolfensohn in the Bank and Gustaph Speth and Mark Malloch Brown in the UNDP impacted how each respective organization dealt with new ideas of development practice built on inclusion and participation.
PARTICIPATION AS A GOVERNANCE NORM IN DEVELOPMENT

In international development literature the terms for participation vary widely. One encounters stakeholder participation, popular participation (Mupedziswa 2010), participatory governance (Golooba-Mutebi 2004), civil society participation, inclusivity, collaboration, voice and accountability (Kaufmann 2009), transparency and anti-corruption (World Bank), and empowerment. These concepts, especially when considered in the development and governance nexus, focus on the importance of individuals’ or civil society representatives’ involvement in decision-making procedures in some way. As one World Bank document wrote early on,

participatory development is the process by which people, especially disadvantaged people, influence decisions that affect them…’participation’ means influence on development decisions, not simply involvement in the implementation or benefits of a development activity, although those types of involvement are important and are often encouraged by opportunities for influence (World Bank 1992, 27).

Development practice in the 1950s and 60s closely connected participation practice with nationalism. The newly created, decolonizing states not only needed public administration aid to develop bureaucracies, they needed people to pledge allegiance to the state and become its citizens. The focus on participation in development had to do with legitimizing the states that emerged in the international arena in the 1960s and 70s under decolonization, including a legitimization of their boundaries and newly administered governments.68 Community development meant creating a connection...
between people and government in a modern state. Practice included bottom-up efforts of improving livelihoods, local development projects (in rural communities even while international development primarily focused on urban industrialization), and education in changing social and cultural systems (United Nations and Social 1971, 6-7).

Community development and modernization theory went hand-in-hand for development practitioners and theorists in the 1960s and 70s (Hickey and Mohan 2004; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994). Modernization is the notion that traditional societies move in phases from traditional, agrarian societies toward modern, industrialized societies (Rostow 1990). Community development projects engaged people’s participation in the economic and industrial advancement of society and largely encouraged creating liberal democracies. As a part of its program, community development focused on training men and women to politically participate in their governments through voting and other forms of political participation. Yet societal trust in those governments was not strong and continues to fracture along traditional/modern lines (Ashford 1965).

Up to the 1990s development practitioners and theorists increasingly accepted the connection between development, governance, and the participation norm. The end of the Cold War allowed the Western states to claim ideological success and continue to spread liberal democracy norms through international organizations (Fukuyama 1992). The number of states that espoused liberal democracy and republican norms continued to increase. Furthermore the conflicts that emerged around the world, in which the UN became more involved, engaged international development organizations in politics in a
new way, inciting a trend to encourage participation in government through multiparty elections. Boutros Boutros-Ghali crafted out a space for the UN to engage in democracy building and peace building, activities that would have been criticized as too political during the Cold War (Ghali 1992, 1994, 1996; Karns 2012). Some argue that the support for peace building and democracy is directly linked with the mandate of the UN to support human rights promotion; making sure that people participate through elections instills human rights in a society and thus should be supported by the UN (Fox 2003).

The backlash against the structural adjustment programs and associated social costs encouraged a renewed look at participation for international development organizations, especially the World Bank (NGO Working Group on the World Bank 2001; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Covey 1998, 97).

In a very general sense the revival of participation reflects the dismal failure of past development efforts to solve basic problems of poverty and human survival and reflects new hopes that more participatory approaches may provide a way out of otherwise insoluble crises of human relationships and livelihood (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994, 221).

For the Bank, the focus has been largely on connecting with the vast number of non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, identifying the negative impacts of conflict and civil war on the success of development, the World Bank very recently started to support the ideas of participation through what it has called inclusive-enough or inclusive-governance in which governments make sure to include minorities and marginalized voices in government decisions (World Bank 2011b).

Thinking of civil society as a separate entity from the state serves as the foundation of the modern understanding of state-society relations. It focuses on the
importance of the individual and his or her ability to be involved in decision-making procedures, challenge the status quo, or legitimate authority. The concept of civil society developed over the long process of the creation of modern states. In the contemporary era it was prompted by a need to explain the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states in Eastern Europe with seemingly strong opposition to the state apparatus (Buttigieg 1995). Theorists think of civil society as the state apparatus itself (Hobbes 1651; 1982), as separate from the state and economy (Hegel 1821;1991), and as legitimizing the state (Rousseau 1762; 1997). Civil society is supposed to challenge the state and hold it accountable (Diamond 1994). In this way civil society is inextricably connected with the notions of democracy and democratization. Civil society is made up of voluntary formal and informal institutions and includes individuals from society who purport to represent group’s interests to government (Diamond 1994). “Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state” (ibid., 5) and represents society’s interests. Civil society changes organizational forms constantly within and between societies and does not directly lead to state transparency and accountability (Ahrne 1996).

Proponents of participatory development argue that including beneficiaries in the planning and implementation process of development projects is the only way that development will be successful. Advocating this idea since the 1960s, they suggest that when individuals are involved in their own development projects, investing in their communities rather than receiving goods and services from others, then they are more likely to accept the changes to the community, make those changes sustainable, and result
in successful development projects (Ashford 1965; Apter 1955; Hayward 1973). Indeed current evidence suggests that including individuals of a community in the creation and implementation of development projects does indeed mean a greater chance of its sustainability and success than otherwise (Adefila J 2012).

**ARTICULATING THE NORM OF PARTICIPATION**

Both the UNDP and World Bank included the participation norm as the main foundation of their governance policies and projects in recent years. Through governance promotion both organizations became more involved in political structures rather than primarily economic structures of their member states in the post-Cold War era (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994, 224). The prevailing agreement among these development organizations was that the neoliberal policies that were promoted through the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s were implemented too quickly without sequencing and pacing (Stiglitz 2002). Development organizations agreed that the failures and social costs associated with the SAPs were not inherent in the neoliberal policies that guided them; rather, they were the outcome of implementing them incorrectly. Further, development organizations blamed member governments for the lack of political structures that would ensure that the policies be implemented correctly. Citations of government failures included corruption at high levels and lack of transparency about how governments implemented the SAPs and how they spent their money. Development organizations began arguing that the social costs of the SAPs were associated with bad
governance and that in order for these sound theories to work to achieve development goals, changes in the political structures of member countries were needed.

Participatory development and governance concerns took over in the rhetoric of the development organizations, not only as a way to fight against poor public administration, but also to continue support for neoliberal policies that pervaded both organizations. Yet, the participatory development and governance norms that emerged in the UNDP and the World Bank took on very different focal points for both the organizations; though in many cases their work on participation overlaps and definitely complements the other. The UNDP couches participation in liberal democracy terms, arguing that individuals must be involved in the political decisions of government. UNDP supports citizen engagement with political structures of government by offering advice in the writing of constitutions, supporting the electoral cycle, and supporting grassroots organizations to engage in politics. In this sense, much of the UNDP’s policy and practice on participation circles around advice and technical support for governments to implement free, fair and regular elections. The World Bank has retained the community development approach of the 1950s and 60s arguing that participation in development (and ostensibly in politics) should be about engaging society in nationalistic identity formation, national growth, development at the local level as well as the national level, and in transparency and accountability measures instituted in government that presumably helps civil society hold government accountable for its actions.

In what follows I explore the development of these two norms in these two organizations from the mid-1980s to present. I argue that leadership in both these
organizations at the highest levels had an indelible impact on the way that participation has been couched since the end of the Cold War and the decade of the 1990s. That impact is based on the leader’s ability to articulate policy, but it also depended on the organization’s ability to accept a change in the way that the norms that had already been articulated in the organization and in development in general. Both these organizations argue that the focus on participation is apolitical and does not mean that the UNDP or the World Bank would ever become inextricably involved in a political debate or issue in country. A good example of this claim is that made by Barber Conable in a memorandum to the Bank made on August 29, 1991 in which he said,

> There remains some apprehension among our borrowing members that our staff might exceed the Bank's mandate in ways which could be interpreted as interfering in the political affairs of our borrowers. This concern, given the difficulty of drawing the lines in this area, is understandable. I am confident that we will respect the sensitivities and concerns of borrowers while not shying away from issues relevant to development performance when these need to be raised (Conable 1991, quoted by Stiefel and Wolfe, 225).

Using the theory of norm articulation as laid out in chapter one, I ask two questions of each organization on the development of the norm of participation. How was participation articulated by these two organizations? Second, how did leaders influence the participation norm in each organization? In each case I find that the extent to which the norm was embedded in policy and practice of the organization had an effect on the ability of the leadership to bring it forward and push it onto the agenda of the organization.
THE UNDP’S DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

The UNDP’s articulation of the participation norm closely followed its shift in development paradigm that came under William H. Draper III’s Administration. During that time period Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq created the human development report and index to offer a counterbalance to the reigning macroeconomic theories of development. The human development paradigm closely associated development goals with choices and freedoms of the individual (Sen 1999, 2000; Haq 1995). In this sense, the emerging focus on democratic governance is about participation, and it is difficult to separate the two concepts. However, participation could have been couched in very different ways by the UNDP. Why did the UNDP define participation in governance and development as making sure that every citizen had the ability and choice to participate in elections (vote and run for office) rather than simply focusing on participation in development projects as the World Bank has done?

Resolutions from the General Assembly on this issue were influential in guiding the practice of the UNDP. The shifting nature of international relations in the aftermath of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the end of Apartheid in South Africa caused the UN to take a stance for democracy and human rights promotion in a way that it had not done before. In greater numbers member states began to ask for support for elections and instituting political systems that were more transparent and accountable to all citizens. General Assembly Resolution 46/137 (United Nations General Assembly 1991), passed on December 17, 1991, tasked the UNDP and other UN agencies with providing electoral assistance and support to member states that were asking for it.
However, UNDP’s participation norm does not date to that mandate. The focus on citizen participation in governments and equality of all citizens in participating in governments dates to the creation of the human development reports and index, informed by a concern to support the UN human rights agreements, and by support and influence of leadership in that organization.

The Human Development Reports supported the importance of participation by promoting the notion that human development means freedom and that freedom means access to government and the ability for individuals to partake in decision-making that affects their lives.\(^6^9\) The idea of participation is not only an aspect of democratic governance for the UNDP it also is an integral element of development goals and outcomes.\(^7^0\) Further, support for participation in government decision-making procedures is directly related to the ideas of sovereignty and legitimacy of government that developed in the West under liberal democracy. The UNDP has been an essential agency of the UN in supporting elections and what is now termed the “electoral cycle” since the 1970s. It relates direct support for elections and the electoral cycle to its mandate, to its vision of human development, and to support for human rights. As the UNDP Democratic Governance Group states, “in recent decades, there has been a rapidly expanding reliance on electoral processes as the principal way to legitimize governance at national, regional, and local levels” (United Nations Development Programme 2012f, iv).

\(^6^9\) Of special note are two HDRs that focused on the role of the state in development and what that meant for human freedom and access. (United Nations Development Programme 2002, 1992)

\(^7^0\) Some argue that this kind of connection and definition makes the relationship tautological and that concepts like human rights, development and democracy cannot be fully disconnected from each other to make any acceptable claims about the effects of one on the other (Donnelly 1999).
How did the UNDP articulate the participation norm in policy?

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<tr>
<th>Table 5.1: UNDP Committees, Departments and Units on Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Management and Development Governance Division (1995), Replaced by the Institutional Development Group, Replaced by the Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Civil Society Division, Partnerships Bureau with Oslo Governance Center, Bureau for Development Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Communities of Practice: Democratic Governance Practice Network; Capacity Development Network; Electoral Community of Practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Civil Society Advisory Committee to UNDP (2000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Sustainable Development Networking Programme in participating countries (since 1989)</td>
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<td>• Communication for Empowerment Initiative (pilot launched Madagascar and Mozambique 2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Collaboration on Electoral Assistance with other agencies and organizations: Support for Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) curricula on electoral administration; EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance (2007); Member of the Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism on Electoral Assistance; Member of ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (est. 1998)</td>
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The UNDP’s engagement with participation supports democracy as is stated in the Strategic Plan: “The ultimate UNDP goal is to deepen democracy and accelerate sustainable human development by giving all people the ability to participate in the decisions that affect their lives” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, paragraph 1; United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office 2012, ix). UNDP works with all the other agencies of the UN, especially in its mandate as coordinator of the UN development system entitled “Delivering as One.” The UNDP’s interpretation of participation in governance and development focuses on the ability of the individual to (1) interact with his or her government through elections or running for office, (2) obtain equality of access to government goods and services by holding government authorities accountable, and (3) be included in the project planning and process phases of development.

UNDP’s concept of participation focuses highly on the individual. Connected with its human development paradigm, the vision encourages the individual to be
involved in government policies and processes through voting and running for office. With this in mind, the most important elements of the UNDP’s participation policy are associated with its work in supporting elections and the electoral cycle. UNDP works in partnership with the UN Electoral Assistance Division and many other agencies and electoral non-governmental organizations to provide countries with the knowledge and capacity they need to run free and fair elections. The other element of the UNDP’s work on participation involves its connection with civil society organizations, which has been rather weak to date. However, on this latter issue the UNDP has been making progress. The most influential departments in the UNDP on the concept of participation are the Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy and the Civil Society Division, Partnerships Bureau.

As part of its development of the idea of participation in its own projects and policy-making, the UNDP started what it calls ‘communities of practice’ in the latter 1990s, groups that engage in online platforms to discuss issues of importance and share knowledge and lessons learned. The communities connect individuals working in the New York headquarters, especially those in the Bureau for Development Policy working on policy formation, and individuals working in country offices and regional offices. Current formulations on participation are informed by these communities. Giving policy advice or technical assistance advice to countries is not just a matter of headquarters responding to requests, but is a matter of interaction between all players involved. For example, the democratic governance practice network has about 1000-1500 participants. These participants share their knowledge, glean from others, and interact through the
online platform. Policy documents are even created based on the online discussions. As an example, UNDP staff created a handbook on political party support that encouraged the inclusion of women in political parties which was very successful because of all the informative practical experience that was included based on discussion and response in the online platform (Ballington 2011). Although not all policy documents are created this way, the UNDP has an excellent precedence for engaging its community of practitioners and scholars in policy formation.

Having all that community feedback is sometimes not as much of a boon to policy creation as it sounds. The reason it may be a hindrance is because of the sheer number of people communicating on a particular issue, making it extremely difficult to mold all their voices and responses into one coherent policy statement. One respondent noted that sending out documents for review is required in order to make sure that documents created by any one person or office cohere with the beliefs and policies of everyone else in the organization. The practice can and does hinder efficiently producing documents in a timely manner and becomes incredibly cumbersome for those who have to edit the document after review by hundreds of eyes, including everyone’s ideas and concerns. The document or policy then becomes a combination of so many different interests and perspectives that it can be interpreted in all kinds of ways and have no defining set of proposals or action plans.

Support for participation through electoral assistance ranges across a broad base of practices in which the UNDP engages in order to assist countries in elections. “On average, UNDP is engaged in supporting an election somewhere in the world every two
weeks. Yet, UNDP does not only concentrate on particular election events but embraces an integrated, long-term election-cycle approach to electoral assistance” (United Nations Development Programme 2010, 17). The UNDP has to manage a fine line between support for elections and the electoral cycle and actually interfering in the politics of a country. Support for Electoral Management Boards (EMBs) is one area that has gained increasing attention because it is one of the specific elements of the UNDP electoral assistance approach and it has become a norm to have EMBs as a part of offering elections. Indeed, “helping to build the institutional capacities of electoral management bodies between electoral events, [is an] increasing focus of the organization’s work” (United Nations Development Programme 2011f, 6).

The UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) is the agency that is most involved in the post-conflict and transitional areas, and is more politically involved with countries than other UN agencies. For the UNDP, for example, country requests for any kind of support first go to the UNDPA and the Department for Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), i.e., through the under-Secretary Generals. These agencies make the decisions about whether or not to help and offer aid, and then the UNDP is charged as a coordinating agency, to create policy and programming for the request and to coordinate the implementation between multiple agencies working in the country.

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71 The electoral assistance support that the UNDP coordinates and implements include “legal reform; independent and permanent electoral management bodies; systems for planning, monitoring and budgeting to ensure credible and cost-effective electoral processes; voter and civic education for democratic rights and responsibilities; coordination of electoral assistance among donors and international and national partners; and women's participation in elections as voters and candidates” (United Nations Development Programme 2011a)
In the 1990s the General Assembly gave UN institutions a greater mandate to be involved in elections. The UNDP’s involvement in electoral assistance dates back to its inception through technical support (funding other programs providing electoral assistance), but has ramped up since the 1990s (López-Pintor 2000; Rich 2001; Newman and Rich 2004; Ponzio 2004).

The idea that citizens should and do have a right to participate in their governments is becoming an uncontested principle in the democratic governance practice and literature. Indeed the phrase speaks to the idea of participation. Governance as the element of an authority controlling society and providing certain societal goods, and democratic as the means by which the choices and decisions for providing those goods are made. The bulk of the argument that development practitioners and theorists make for the right to participation in government decision-making rests on the human rights regime; i.e., the instruments and documents that have been written over the last few decades and accepted by most states as international law, especially the initial documents of the Universal Bill of Rights (Rich 2001; Franck 1992). Fox argues that the “emerging body of international law strongly supports democratic institutions and has not to date made exceptions for nondemocratic politics even in the most fragile postconflict states” (Fox 2003, 192). Further, Rafael López-Pintor suggests that “the existing consensus on how to organize multi-party elections is not solely the outgrowth the end of the Cold War [sic]; it stems from earlier provisions of international law” (2000, 87).72

72 Those international law provisions are cited as follows in the texts indicated. Article 21 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; UN General Assembly Resolution 46/130; the Conference on Cooperation in Europe in 1990; Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights
The concept of democracy is deeply connected in the contemporary era with the idea of elections. Indeed, elections are now seen as necessary for a democracy (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1998). Recent democratization literature makes much of this trend of democratization and instituting multi-party elections (Huntington 1993; Fukuyama 1992). Those who criticize the practice of elections note that elections do not mean that a government is democratic, and that elections can be a straw man set up by an authoritarian regime to make it appear legitimate to outside observers (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Yet, the notion that participation is best offered to a population through elections abounds in international development practice.

The practice of countries asking for and obtaining technical assistance from the UN in order to hold elections spread across the world as a form of legitimation of sovereignty; in this respect the UN has been instrumental in supporting and teaching this norm to states (Rich 2001, 26).73 As of 2012 Freedom House has declared that the number of electoral democracies has reached 117 out of 195 countries, thus 60 percent of the states in the world are electoral democracies, a drastic change considering that the

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73 In saying that the UN has “taught this norm to states” I follow the work of Martha Finnemore who has argued that the international organizations have become teachers of norms in particular instances, teaching states how to act according to the accepted norm. See (Finnemore 1993)
same table reports 41 percent in 1990 (Freedom House 2012). The UN has offered technical assistance for elections to 100 states since 1991 at the request of those states. This assistance has been provided by a coalition of UN agencies led by the UNDP as the “implementing body” (United Nations Department of Political Affairs 2012).74

The first instance of electoral assistance in its current policy implementation began in Namibia in 1989 (Fox 2003, 185). Certain UN peacekeeping missions acted as election monitors in the past, including in Cambodia in 1992/93 and in Timor-Leste in 2001 and in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 (United Nations Peacekeeping Missions 2012). The UNDP supported observer missions and domestic observer groups in the past; indeed, the UN can and has observed and monitored missions under the UNDPA when given a mandate by the Security Council (United Nations Democratic Governance Group 2007, 1). Yet the UN agencies including the UNDP reject electoral monitoring and validation activity when at all possible because of implications of being political. Meanwhile the UNDP and other UN agencies continue to support the whole electoral cycle from the creation of legal documents (constitutions) that delineate how elections will be implemented, to providing training and support in electoral management, systems, education, and gender equality in the electoral cycle (United Nations Development Programme 2014).

The UNDP claims that while it is involved with supporting the electoral cycle, it remains a neutral organization, meaning that it does not support any one political party or

74 Other UN agencies involved with most if not all electoral assistance projects are the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Volunteers (UNV), and the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS).
political system, and is apolitical in nature, only providing objective technical assistance to states that ask for such support. Indeed, the UNDP has a very different relationship with member countries because it offers grants and funds projects in developing countries whereas organizations like the World Bank usually lend money to governments for projects and development in the member country.

The UNDP is now very concerned with supporting civil society engagement in politics and in development projects. One reason is its intense focus on the individual and whether or not the individual can participate and engage with his or her government. Yet, UNDP’s policies have caught up with the trend in development. In 2000 the UNDP followed the World Bank’s example and set up a Civil Society Advisory Committee to the Administrator (CSOAC). This group of CSO representatives, initially 14 individuals chosen by the UNDP Bureaus, advised the Administrator and Board on how the UNDP could be more involved in civil society, what the UNDP could do to strengthen its engagement and track record on civil society. The CSOAC was conceived as a way to engage the high-level UNDP representatives with CSOs so as to obtain valuable information about CSO concerns with UNDP projects and programs. The CSOAC has been largely unsuccessful and did not even meet with the Administrator from 2006-2008 (UNDP Partnerships Bureau CSO Division 2008).
Table 5.2: UNDP Policies on Participation

- Resolution 46/137, December 17, 1991 on UN Electoral Assistance to member states
- Human Development Index and Report, first published (1990)
- Resolution 55/2, September 18, 2000 on the UN Millennium Development Declaration
- UNDP and Civil Society Organizations: A Policy of Engagement (2001)
- Practical Guidance Note on Communication for Empowerment (2006)
- Priority Areas in the Strategic Plan (2008-2011/13)
- UNDP Corporate Strategy on Civil Society and Civic Engagement (2012)

While UNDP does have POPP policies on participation, many of the policies and guidance notes are informal. In fact, before the Administrator, Executive Board, or other authorities write a norm into policy, the practice is usually already implemented at the country level through projects and programs. This becomes evident every time the Democratic Governance Group creates a new policy guidance note. It starts by connecting with the community of practice to see what is going on in the country offices, and then using its own resources and knowledge, creates a cohesive guidance note that represents practice as it is, and practice as it should be according to UN human rights principles. The UNDP emphasizes that it creates policy in response to country demands.

These informal documents catalogue the current best practices regarding participation, and they publish these as documents that are meant to guide and inform the rest of the organization’s employees on how they can implement participatory practices. Yet, because of the decentralized nature of the UNDP, it is difficult to identify clear and coherent practice across the whole UNDP. For the most part, the policy documents and statements support the idea that democratic governance is about individual participation.
in their governments and that all citizens should be able to vote and run for office equally. However, not all member countries agree with these ideas despite them being incorporated into General Assembly Resolutions like 46/137 which created the UN Electoral Assistance Division and gave the UNDP a coordinating role in the delivery of electoral assistance and advice, or 55/2, the Millennium Declaration, which said that “we will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development” (United Nations September 18, 2000).

UNDP policy statements encourage staff to engage with civil society organizations (CSOs) as equal partners in development rather than simply representatives of civil society or implementers of development projects. This is quite different than how the World Bank and most other development organizations view their relationship with civil society. “The underlying purpose of the CSO Advisory Committee was to promote a partnership based on “genuine reciprocity” that would offer guidance to the Administrator and senior management on key policy and programming issues, leading to more consistent and practical forms of civil society engagement” (UNDP Partnerships Bureau CSO Division 2008, 5).

Furthermore, setting it further apart from other intergovernmental development organization’s policies on civil society, the first policy document on UNDP’s relationship with CSOs says that the Partnership with CSOs is founded on the principle of horizontal relationship between parties which, while institutionally different, are of equal standing in promoting the same development objectives, especially poverty reduction through sustainable human development. The relationship is premised on mutual trust that
must be earned by both sides (United Nations Development Programme 2001b, 8).

The UNDP considers its relationship with civil society just as important as its relationship with the state. It suggests that its target audience is not only to support government in the pursuit of human development goals, but to make sure that each society has a functioning and “vibrant” civil society. Thus, “interacting with civil society is a duty and not an option for UNDP at all levels of its work” (ibid., 9).

The UNDP also engages civil society in the creation of Common Country Assessments (CCAs) and in the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), both documents that are created by country and regional offices in conjunction with the member country government. These documents guide how the UNDP, and the UN agencies as a whole, will work with that country in order to achieve goals. They also guide how the country itself will support and implement the development projects that are funded by the UNDP and other UN agencies. Having voice and participation from civil society and from citizens in the CCAs is crucial for the UNDP in order to make sure that it is supporting democratic goals of participation in all processes. Although the UNDP is not successfully implementing this participation policy across all the countries with which it works, the new policy on civil society engagement mandates that it be done (United Nations Development Programme 2012c).

Table 5.3: UNDP Funding for Participation

- Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF)
- UNDP works with the UN Democracy Fund est. 2005 by Secretary General (110 million dollar fund per year to support civil society)
- Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS) (Launched 2009)
The UNDP emphasizes that promoting democratic governance is articulated at UNDP headquarters or country offices, but the impetus for actual projects and support comes from donor demands or requests from states. The Democratic Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF) provides a perfect example of the organization acting autonomously in a situation in which the institutionalized organizational practices move too slowly for some states. The DGTTF was created in 2001 so that countries and other donors could make donations that would be handled outside the regular donation funding practices and donors could earmark their donations for specific democratic governance projects in specific countries. It is considered a “venture capital fund” that supports UNDP’s Strategic Plan governance practices and the Evaluation Office suggests that it should be seen as a fund that “tests innovative approaches to difficult democratic governance issues” (United Nations Development Programme 2008a).

The DGTTF is interesting because it offers an example of how the organization’s culture is slow to change to meet the demands from donors as well as from receiving countries who are asking for more support for specific democratic governance projects. Here, the DGTTF was created to fill that gap as a venture capital fund, showing the autonomy of the organization, that the UNDP was willing to go outside its bounds to change course when its main areas of funding would not be flexible enough.75

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75 The UNDP support for the electoral cycle has culminated in the Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS) started in 2009 with a $35 million initial budget, and continuing on after its three year mandate in supporting the electoral cycle outside of the electoral events like elections. The DGTTF 2011 Annual Report reported that it had supported 18 countries with electoral assistance and 200 advisory services in 60 countries (United Nations Development Programme 2008, 28).
Trust funds devoted to specific democratic governance inputs enable the UNDP to create a role for itself that would otherwise be much more difficult considering the variant voices on the Executive Board and General Assembly. For instance, in support of electoral assistance, the Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS) launched in 2009 has increased the capacity and ability of the UNDP to offer electoral assistance and advice to countries in need. Mostly funded by the Government of Spain and through European organizations, GPECS enabled the UNDP to assist “more than 80 countries through approximately 400 projects, investing well over $2 billion” (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office 2012, 1).

Finally, as part of its civil society engagement, the UNDP funds and directly works with civil society in some cases, rather than working through the state government and getting CSOs involved in implementation or participation. The UNDP argues that this direct connection and support of CSOs, while contradicting the way that the UN works in fundamental ways, is essential in building a fully functioning democratic society. CSOs can now be directly engaged in execution of policy not just as subcontractors through government. “Since the introduction of the modality in 1998, some 300 projects totaling over $100 million have been executed in this way” (United Nations Development Programme 2012c, 18).

Civil society organizations are directly funded by the UNDP through trust funds as well, circumventing the government as the beneficiary. CSOs benefit from small grants through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the Local Initiative Facility for Urban Environment (LIFE), the Poverty Trust Fund, and the Governance Trust Fund.
While the UNDP administers many funds, these are most involved in supporting participation and CSO engagement (United Nations Development Programme 2012c, 18)

How did leaders articulate the participation norm in the UNDP?

Draper is perhaps the most influential leader on the way that participation was articulated as a governance norm and became institutionalized in the organization. His support for the idea of human freedoms that comes out in the human development paradigm is evident in everything he did and every change he made in the UNDP. Crucially, his support for participation was specifically focused on women’s ability to participate in development projects and in making sure that there was gender parity in the organization itself. These two trends have run through the organization so that we continue to see them today in the way the UNDP thinks about participation. Draper’s support for democracy and a free market in which people could freely participate is intricately felt in UNDP’s participation policy today.

After Draper, Speth was instrumental in creating the language of “sustainable human development” and creating an “enabling environment” for achieving development goals. Although enabling environment terminology is very abstract, it meant support for elections and changes in the political system to incorporating democratic principles for those who used that language. Speth was instrumental in pulling this language out of the human development reports and crafting the movement of the organization toward promotion of democracy. He connected the idea of good governance with democracy and democratic ideals. He was also concerned with enhancing the ability of organizations,
both CSOs and other UN agencies, to work with the UNDP on projects and programming in country offices, an essential component of UNDP’s participatory development vision.

Rhetorically, it was Mark Malloch Brown who pioneered the use of the term democratic governance and continued to push the UNDP toward support for elections and electoral assistance. His speeches were consistently in support of democratic governance and the UNDP’s advocacy of that concept and associated principles. Furthermore, it was under his leadership from 1999-2005 that the UNDP institutionalized the governance practices that had been first developed by William H. Draper III and Gustaph Speth. Draper was certainly influential in making sure that participation, and especially inclusion of individuals in governments through voting and running for office, were supported by the UNDP. Without his leadership the UNDP may have taken a very different route in supporting participation. The leadership of Boutros Ghali in support for democratization, which includes elections, was instrumental in the institutionalization of support for elections in the UNDP and allowed Malloch Brown to pursue further electoral assistance for the UNDP.

Despite their influences, we do see some restrictions on how far the leadership was able to go in getting the UNDP to support participation in government, especially through support for elections. Electoral cycle support offers an alternative to support for elections and thus gives a neutral aspect to the projects in which UNDP engages. Furthermore, the creation of the DGTTF is an example of the organization restricting the ability of leaders to shape the funding practices of the organization, and offers an
example of leaders and the organization circumventing that process in order to act autonomously and support democratic governance where demanded.

THE WORLD BANK’S STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

The World Bank came through a series of phases on the norm of participation in support of including stakeholders in policies and projects in ways that differ from the UNDP. Certainly, the UNDP supports inclusiveness in policies and projects, but as we have seen, the UNDP’s version of participation includes a larger version of democratic participation in government, rather than focused almost exclusively on inclusion in development projects. The World Bank’s stance is changing in recent years with new efforts in the World Bank to support democratic governance ideals on participation, but has not always been the case, at least rhetorically.

How did the World Bank articulate the participation norm in policy?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 5.4: World Bank Committees, Departments and Units on Participation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Social Dimensions of Adjustment Project (SDAP) – launched 1987 to address social costs of adjustment programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Bankwide Learning Group on Participatory Development (1990)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Worldwide Governance Indicator Project (1996) – one of the governance indicators focused on Voice and Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Participation and Civic Engagement Group (Social Development Department)</td>
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<td>• Social Development Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Global Partnership for Social Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Social Accountability and Demand for Good Governance (DFGG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Civil Society Specialists placed in Country Offices</td>
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The World Bank work in the 1970s and 1980s on participation and inclusiveness reached out to the burgeoning mass of organizations that were also working in similar development circles and on development issues. In the 1970s and 1980s the participation norm largely had to do with getting the appropriate input from these organizations on project implementation. In fact, the World Bank quickly figured out that non-governmental organizations (NGOs), often church groups or mission groups, could implement projects in a much cheaper way than private sector contractors, and therefore World Bank employees encouraged governments to work with NGOs in implementing projects funded by the Bank. It was this inchoate relationship with such organizations that fostered the participation norm in the World Bank. Though, while some argue that the NGOs themselves were the reason for the World Bank’s changing ideas on participation, I argue that their involvement with the Bank and influence on the participation norm could not have progressed as it did without the support of staff and leadership (including the Presidents and Executive Board).

The first committee created in the World Bank to address the issue of participation was named the NGO-World Bank Committee (hereafter the Committee), established in 1982 to facilitate dialogue between the World Bank and the large group of emerging NGOs working on development (Covey 1998). Up until that point the Bank’s bulk of experience was working with governments, and mainly Finance Ministries, as stipulated in the Articles of Agreement that created the World Bank. Once set in place, the Committee that represented the Bank’s desire and willingness to work with NGOs provided a foundation for continued cooperation and concern with participatory
development practice. The Committee, comprised of authorities from the World Bank and from NGOs, encouraged the World Bank on policy-making and practice through meetings held twice a year, and in assessing and evaluating the impacts of the structural adjustment programs on the lives of the poor. The Committee became the ad-hoc meeting arena for Civil Society Organization (CSO) and NGO voice and engagement with World Bank operations, projects and policy that facilitated dialogue between the independent NGO-Working Group on the World Bank (NGOWG) and key World Bank staff.

Much of the impetus for the inclusion of participation in World Bank development policy and practice dates to the latter 1980s and the concern with figuring out why structural adjustment programmes had been such a failure in the 1980s. Many pointed to the lack of ideal governance in member state countries. This reason was included in the WDR 1991 as quoted by Seamus Cleary “success in promoting economic growth is most likely when governments complement markets” (Cleary 1996, 67). After much debate, the Bank created a new way of assessing the needs in developing countries which focused highly on participation and inclusiveness: needs assessments. Needs assessment meant that those who are directly affected by proposed projects should be consulted on how the project would affect them. The NGOWG, through its dialogue with World Bank staff in the Committee, was influential in the World Bank’s propensity and concern with including participation through assessments. It was also influential because of its connection with the Operations Policy Department (OPD) which was tasked with NGO-World Bank relationship oversight, and was also tasked with creating operational
policies on participation (Covey 1998, 97). However, without OPD staff and the support coming from various Board members, the changes may never have been institutionalized.

The assessments identified alternatives to negative effects and ways to ameliorate any negative effects of policies and projects. The assessments include the Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and other assessments for individual issues such as gender equality or sectoral assessments (though the latter two have not been as successful as the CASs and the PRSPs). The assessments also meant considering the best way forward on any project through consultation. The Bank’s consultation capabilities had increased since the 1980s when consultation on projects mostly consisted of discussion with government and finance ministers. Indeed, the Bank is very concerned now with making sure that there is community input and buy-in for any project that is implemented.

The Bank’s relationships with NGOs, focused on Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) more often than NGOs, continued to grow through the use of and implementation of the needs assessments. However, it was not until the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) was implemented fully that the relationship really took on a more integrated and institutionalized aspect. In fact the Bank has received much criticism to the effect that its so-called concern with participation and relationships with NGOs is just a front for pushing NGO criticism to the side. But the CDF shows instrumentality in engaging NGOs in each of the assessments that are required before a project is implemented.
The Bank’s commitment to participatory development blossomed in the 1990s under the leadership of President James Wolfensohn. It resulted in the creation of several different working groups and departments that were devoted to understanding how participation could be a boon for the World Bank’s development policy. The World Bank was also concerned with the new rhetoric on participation because it did not want to become politically involved and suggest policies to governments that it felt were outside of its mandate. Thus, in the 1990s the Bank started a Learning Group on Participatory Development to determine how the Bank should be involved in engaging stakeholders and participation of civil society in the work they do with governments in countries around the world. A few years later in 1996 the Bank published the World Bank Participation Sourcebook with an introduction by James Wolfensohn endorsing the ideas of stakeholder participation in development. The sourcebook is not a policy document but rather a work that provides guidelines for helping Bank staff include a focus on participation in the work that they do, and provide them with examples from Bank work already being done on participation. The Sourcebook articulates participation as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” (xi). James Wolfensohn himself, in the introduction to the Sourcebook, said,

I am convinced that [in-country stakeholders’] involvement and collaboration can not only make our development efforts more effective and sustainable, but can also foster ownership and a sense of belief in the relevance and value of our programs right down to the community level…I personally believe in the relevance of participatory approaches and partnerships in development and am committed to making them a way of doing business in the Bank. (World Bank 1996, ix).
The creation of the idea of stakeholder participation in the Bank, both through institutionalized support in the form of committees and departments, and through the influence of NGO pressure, was contentious as represented in the Learning Group on Participatory Development’s discussions and decisions. One example is that of choosing the term “stakeholder participation” rather than “popular participation” the latter noting the participation of the poor and most vulnerable in the project creation and implementation. The Learning Group settling on supporting the former term of “stakeholder participation” which is including powerful stakeholders who have a lot to say and much to lose if they are not included in the decision making procedures and processes. Such stakeholders include the government authorities, NGOs that are directly or indirectly affected, and the Bank staff themselves because “attempts to bypass powerful stakeholders often resulted in opposition from them” (World Bank 1996, 6-8).

Once the Bank institutionalized communication and coordination with community leaders through relationships with NGOs, there was little to stop that influence. However, the changing nature of NGOs and CSOs in the 1990s led the Bank to reconsider how it worked with these organizations through the NGO-World Bank Committee. Indeed, the Bank had more experience working with NGOs by that time and was able to expand its connection throughout the country offices, rather than just in a meeting twice a year with the NGOs that were on the docket (Covey 1998).

The Bank dealt with the need to engage NGOs and new CSOs by reorganizing. First, the NGO-World Bank Committee was replaced with a more permanent department called the Civil Society Team in 2004 in the wake of a conference that discussed a draft
working paper on the Bank’s relationship with CSOs (Aycrigg 1998). The Civil Society Team worked in different ways with CSOs, actually funding CSOs by encouraging and supporting governments to engage with and fund CSOs with World Bank loans. The Small Grants Program, later the Civil Society Fund, and now the New Global Partnership for Social Accountability, offers small grants (usually under $10,000) to CSOs. Secondly, civil society specialists were deployed to country offices in keeping with the decentralization mission and the notion that the best way to engage with CSOs is through country offices rather than through headquarters in Washington, D.C.

### Table 5.5: World Bank Policies on Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy and Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP 14.70 (1981)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BP Development Policy Lending</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Compact</td>
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<tr>
<td>OD 4.30 Involuntary Resettlement (1990)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP 4.36 Forestry (1993)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation Action Plan (1994); BP 10.00 Elements of a Project Implementation Plan (1994) and Outline for a Staff Appraisal and Outline for a Memorandum and Recommendation of the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment (1999); OP 4.20 The Gender Dimension of Development (1999); GP 13.55 Implementation Completion Reporting (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development Report 2000: Attacking Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Level Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAC Governance Strategy (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Development Strategy (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP/BP Indigenous Peoples (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP/BP 4.11 Physical Cultural Resources (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy Phase I (2007), Phase II (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance Note on World Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement (2009)</td>
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</tbody>
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76 The list was compiled from various World Bank website sites and the 2003 Draft of Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations, Annex A.
Operational policies (OPs), bank (business) procedures (BPs), operational directives (ODs) and good practices (GPs) constrain and guide the behavior of staff in their various duties from development policy planning, administrative work, and implementation. What has gone before will, like a mandate, dictate the kind of behavior and norms that are accepted. To the extent that there is decisive practice connected to the policy statements, it becomes even more difficult for ideas to change and new practices to develop. Over the years, beginning in 1981, the Bank developed policies intended to guide the way that citizens and civil society organizations are included in policy-making and implementation.

The CDF, adopted by the Board in 1999, served as a new guide for implementing development. Organizational and structural changes instituted during Wolfensohn’s tenure served to increase the institutionalization of participation practice in the Bank, especially in the development projects that the Bank funded. Engaging CSOs through funding projects and implementation, in concert with expanding the number of people in the World Bank working or designated as civil society specialists, instituted a more solid foundation for encouraging participation. One analysis of World Bank participation experience suggests that when CSOs received grants from the Civil Society Team (now the New Global Partnership for Social Accountability) they were more likely to engage in the needs assessments. Because of that, they would be more likely to be able to represent citizens in development projects (World Bank NGO Unit 1998, 5). Further, the Strategic Compact reorganization and the implementation of the CDF led the Bank to engage with participation in a much more structured way through the required needs assessments.
The CDF reoriented the way that the Bank worked with countries on funding development projects, encouraging the government authorities and stakeholders to take the lead on planning and implementing development strategies and projects. “The CDF advocates: a holistic long-term vision; the country in the lead, both "owning" and directing the development agenda” (World Bank n.d.i). The CDF requires that Poverty Assessment Strategies and Papers (PRSs and PRSPs) are undertaken by government in consultation with Bank staff as well as civil society stakeholders before the Bank funds development projects. The Assessments guide the type of development project and the way that the project will be implemented over the next years. The CDF shifted the Bank’s activities from “donor-led development assistance strategy…to the development of a country strategy led by a country itself” (Owusu 2003, 1657).

Yet poverty assessments and needs assessments implemented and used by the Bank have come under a lot of criticism for their lack of support for participation in development and government. Some works, especially those commissioned by the Bank, suggest that the poverty assessments have been successful at engaging the people who will be affected by a development policy (Robb 2002). There is some evidence that suggests that the assessments have allowed countries and citizens to take more ownership of development projects. Yet, the assessments also leave out the important “primary beneficiaries” and allow governments and wealthy, informed stakeholders to channel development projects and funds to benefit the wealthy rather than the poor.

PRSPs remain steadfastly part of the neo-liberal agenda and are simply a new 'technical framework' which does not address uneven power relations within countries and between them and donors. Importantly, underlying processes of development remain shielded from view (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 161).
Despite the criticisms, the Strategic Compact reorganization represented a sea change in the Bank’s policy shaped by the lessons learned from participatory development. It was strategically crafted by President James Wolfensohn and his staff in his speeches and statements.

Even the very influential WDRs shifted the rhetoric on participation, specifically the 2001 and 2004 WDRs. Social Development policy blossomed out of the movement for supporting participation in government as essential to creating more efficient governance and development. The Social Accountability and Demand for Good Governance Department now encourages governments on instituting the important elements of participation, such as engagement with CSOs and encouraging elections in each country. The Bank has defined Social Development as “transforming institutions to empower people” through creating “inclusive institutions, cohesive societies, and accountable institutions” that serve the needs of all citizens (including both men and women) and are open and responsive to citizens (World Bank 2005, 1-2). Participation has been the focus on development policy and projects for the Bank, yet governments stand in the way of allowing the Bank to fully integrate the stakeholders and beneficiaries into projects and policy design and implementation. Any work that is done with civil society needs the country’s approval, whether finance minister or other person in authority. Such necessity to cater to the government limits the ability of the World Bank to implement its participation policies and practices.

During Wolfensohn’s Presidency a focus on anti-corruption measures as an aspect of governance abounded, especially as relates to his anti-corruption speech which he
delivered in 1997 and to which every person discussing the focus on anti-corruption in
the Bank points. The issue of bolstering anti-corruption policies in the Bank is
inextricably related to participation because of the issues of transparency and holding
government accountable. The exchange inspired a dialogue within internal management –
but it also created contention among Bank employees because Wolfensohn’s concern
with corruption was associated with how money was not reaching the beneficiaries.

The original idea about corruption was that money from the Bank was not getting
to its intended recipients; instead people at various levels of the funding process were
siphoning the money for themselves. Loans are lent through a complex process for
funding projects. An implementing agency opens a national bank account in the country
of the intended project. Then there is a deposit from the Bank treasury which goes into
the new account. Thereafter, the implementing agency and those implementing the
project have access to those funds and at that point can fund their friends or foes.

Anti-corruption remains the key factor of governance that the Bank focuses
highly on, and is related to participation in that anti-corruption assumes transparency and
openness toward citizens of a country. Indeed, during the creation of the GAC strategy
there was an understanding among the Bank’s board that the Bank needed to outline how
it would interpret these two governance ideals—the Board eventually sided with focusing
on anti-corruption. The GAC strategy that was eventually created and guides policy for
the Bank was created based on consultation from people all over the world.

The Bank’s support for stakeholder participation remains closely tied to
development projects rather than political, making them very different from the openly
supportive UNDP. Indeed, some Bank employees argue that it would be completely out of the Bank’s purview and expertise to support elections in any way as the UNDP does.

The lack of support for elections or the electoral cycle does not mean that the Bank does not actively promote equal representation in decision-making procedures. The Bank is constrained in its rhetoric concerning participation in government and free and fair elections although, in some cases the Bank supports these practices in the country office and in projects that it funds and implements.

**Table 5.6: World Bank Funding for Participation**

- Communication for Governance and Accountability Program (CommGAP) (2006-2011 Trust Fund)

The New Global Partnership for Social Accountability focuses on direct support for CSOs and NGOs and engaging them with Bank lending project planning and implementation. It also encourages governments to work with CSOs in all capacity of development planning, both in creating national development strategies (such as in the PRSPs) and also in hiring CSOs to implement development projects that are funded by the Bank. The Social Development Civil Society Fund (CSF) built off years of working with and funding CSOs through the Small Grants Program and the CSF whose mission was to

…strengthen the voice and influence of poor and marginalized groups in the development processes, thereby making these processes more inclusive and equitable. To this end, it supports activities of civil society organizations whose primary objective is encouraging and supporting civic engagement of these target populations. By involving citizens who are often excluded from the public arena, and increasing their capacity to influence policy and program decisions, the CSF
helps facilitate ownership of development initiatives by a broader sector of society (World Bank 2010b).

The Bank’s main customer is the national government and it works with Finance Ministers and offices, but the Bank has taken a stance on the importance of engaging and funding CSOs. The funding itself is not a large amount compared to what the Bank funds governments. For instance, from 2001-2008 the CSF distributed approximately $2.8 million per year to fund-worthy organizations. It has served to engage CSOs more in their governments and allow respected CSOs and NGOs to be closely connected in a way that encourages their participation in PRSPs.

As with the UNDP, some countries have overcome the obstacles inherent in the Bank’s mandate and regular funding by creating trust funds that serve particular purposes associated with governance that would be controversial if the Bank engaged in the practice in some countries. Thus, trust funds are set up in order for governments to fund what they think are ideal development-governance policies. The Communication for Governance and Accountability Program (CommGAP) was set up by the government of the UK to fund governance interventions through the World Bank in countries that asked for governance assistance. Though it is still focused on providing aid to governments to make them more accountable to citizens (the supply-side approach), trust funds like these represent a new mode of communication and intervention for the World Bank in asserting democratic ideals to governments.
How did leaders articulate the participation norm in the World Bank?

Participatory approaches must be reflected in the attitudes and behavior of all actors at all levels...Again and again a new authoritarian manager has set the clock back, ruining the participatory culture and practices patiently nurtured by a predecessor. Sustained leadership and support from a high level are critical—progress is often made by incentives and example. The bottom line in participatory change is individual and personal (Blackburn, Chambers, and Gaventa 2000, 10).

While other Presidents in the Bank certainly supported participation in development projects, it was James Wolfensohn who was most influential on articulating the norm of participation. He did this through direct support for existing policy, encouraging participatory development practice in statements and speeches, and engaging with the Executive Board and country office and regional office employees on how to articulate and implement participation. Most importantly the CDF was Wolfensohn’s idea to deal with the criticisms the World Bank had been fielding since the latter 1980s. Including communities and country authorities in the projects and development planning of their own countries was essential to making sure that development projects and lending were successful.

Wolfensohn’s anti-corruption agenda was another important norm that intermingles with participatory development. At its heart, anti-corruption measures are set up to encourage governments to be open and honest with their citizens, being transparent and accountable to them concerning budgeting and policy-making. This in turn encourages participation by the citizenry in decision-making procedures, or simply in having a voice in their government. Wolfowitz also supported the anti-corruption agenda and encouraged governments to engage with CSOs in their societies in order to reach people in the most need. Despite the latter’s lack of successfully leading the
organization, his focus on democratic governance was intractable. Even while he talked in the good governance language, he was the President with the least fear of discussing democratization openly. Perhaps, in this latter instance, Wolfowitz has had more of an impact on the Bank’s policy than some would like to admit. We have seen that the Bank’s policies have increased attention on social issues and free societies, both economic and political. Much of that support has come directly from leaders like Wolfensohn and Wolfowitz, with much backlash from those in the organization who want to maintain a very closed and structured apolitical stance on the Bank’s lending and development assistance policies.

**PARTICIPATION IN ACTION**

Identifying the culture of the organization under study provides a way of understanding why some norms are highlighted more than others but leadership in this context of participation is obviously an instrumental part of the story. Leadership provides that impetus to focus in particular ways on a norm. Thus, in the UNDP the leadership of all the Administrators, backed by the Secretaries General of the 1990s and 2000s, proved influential in promoting a concept of development that encapsulated human freedom and rights, thus promoting a rights-based understanding of development. In that conceptual context it would have been difficult for any of those leaders to deny the importance of a country having a government in which people participate in decision-making procedures and are actively involved in politics through some form of voting in elections. While focusing solely on elections as the impetus for democratization is
negative, the UNDP overcomes this by supporting civil society in a multitude of ways, especially by including them in decision-making procedures of both project-based development and government decisions.

The World Bank took a different route on focusing on stakeholder participation through practices like the CASs and PRSPs which are meant to include civil society concerns by having their representatives stand in as part of the process. Stakeholder participation, however, is much less all-inclusive and does not have as much of a focus on inclusiveness of all in the political decision-making of a country, though many of my interviewees argued that while the Bank does not support that kind of inclusion in rhetoric or publicly, Bank projects and country level activities certainly provide such support.
VI: GENDER EQUALITY

International development organizations included consideration of women’s issues and rights in development rhetoric and policy since the 1950s, especially as evidenced in the committees and treaties of the UN. Gender equality in international development includes a greater focus on women in development and a shift to funding projects that take account of women, gender sensitive budgeting, gender mainstreaming in domestic and international organizations, increasing focus on the nexus between women and violence (including focus on rape as a weapon of war), and acceptance and institutionalization of gender quotas.77

This chapter discusses how international development organizations articulated gender equality norms and implemented those norms into operational policies and projects. Gender equality in international development builds off of 60 years of human rights documents and treaties that articulate the rights of women.78 The 1970s UN Decade of Women, and the movements in development implementation and policy

77 This is only a partial list; there are many ways in the international system in which gender equality issues have been incorporated in recent years.

78 Gender equality norms started with the agreement on women’s equal rights guaranteed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1950s UN Commission on the Status of Women, UN General Assembly Resolution 56, the 1979 Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination of Women (CEDAW), the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, and UN General Assembly Resolution 1325 (Krook and True 2012).
formation highlighted women’s issues and rights in development: Women in Development (WID); Gender and Development (GAD); and Gender Mainstreaming.

The UNDP began articulating gender equality policies in the 1980s but implementation into practice, both in operational policies and in implementation through projects, has proved slow. The World Bank has furthered the implementation process in recent years and has been at the forefront of implementation into operational policy since its inception. The World Bank’s success emeats from its practical application of gender mainstreaming policies in sectors, through operational statements, and by including gender equality targets into funding goals. The World Bank has made a clear argument for what gender equality means for the organization and has even, in recent years, spoken out about women’s political participation in reports and publications, including support for women’s participation in politics and legislative areas (World Bank n.d.g). However, in the latter area, the World Bank is a bit more hesitant than the UNDP to create projects related to political participation because of article 20 of the Articles of Agreement that states that political activity is prohibited by the World Bank. This does not, however, mean that the World Bank does not support political participation of both men and women in government, especially in holding government accountable for its actions.

Because of their contested history and implementation, gender equality norms provide illustrative examples of how norms are articulated in international organizations to become diffused within the organization itself (among leaders, staff members, and consultants of the organization). Based on the findings here, I suggest that there are two critical elements to advancing gender equality in an international development
organization. First, it means a strong commitment to gender equality and gender
mainstreaming by the whole organization: “in research, legislation, policy development
and in activities on the ground, and to ensure that women as well as men can influence,
participate in and benefit from development efforts” (United Nations 2001). This largely
means education on how to implement gender equality and gender mainstreaming tactics
and why they are important. Second, leadership and management at all levels of the
organization (from headquarters, to sector areas, to regional, and finally to country level
offices) must support gender equality and mainstreaming efforts in tangible and
thoughtful ways if any progress is to be made on gender equality both in development
practice and in these organizations themselves. 79

In other words, it is not enough to create brochures, pamphlets, research, gender
departments, or commitments to gender equality. Both the organizations studied here
have done this to an exceptional degree. What is needed is strong leadership support at all
levels, and a commitment to understanding how to make sure that gender equality and
gender mainstreaming tactics should be implemented in the practices of the
organizations. This chapter introduces gender equality as a governance and development
norm, discussing how and why it has become influential in development studies and

79 The theme of encouraging leadership and management to support gender equality and gender
mainstreaming appears consistently in assessments of international organizations’ work in gender equality. For
instance, the 2006 assessment of UNDP’s gender practices said “UNDP management has created
ambiguity and decreased visibility, in the way it has moved gender mainstreaming structures around, and
has allocated insufficient staff and financial resources” (vi). Concluding remarks argue that “leadership at all
senior management levels in the organization is necessary if gender mainstreaming is to succeed” (emphasis in original) (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, 46).
within the internal practices as well as development thinking and projects of international development organizations.

**GENDER EQUALITY AS A GOVERNANCE NORM IN DEVELOPMENT**

Gender equality inclusion in international development followed three trends since the 1970s: (1) introducing gender mainstreaming policies into development organization’s operational policies and development projects; (2) increasing women’s equal participation especially in political representation (represented by the Beijing Platform for Action); and (3) increasing women’s access to goods and services especially evident in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with goal number three specifically identifying women in the goal and targets. In what follows I explain how the first trend has been incorporated by both organizations, and how the UNDP zoned in on the second trend while the World Bank developed the third trend. Even so, each organization has promoted all aspects of gender equality at various times.

Gender equality in politics has a long history dating back to the fight for political freedoms and emancipation itself. Extending the franchise beyond property-owning-white-males in Europe from the 15th to the 20th centuries spilled over into an equally historical struggle of extending the franchise to women. Despite their predecessors’ successes, in places all around the world women are still severely limited in access to political processes and positions, in training for politics, and in being able to participate in the political process (Kristof and WuDunn 2009). At the beginning of the second

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80 “Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women” with a Target 3.A to “eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.”
decade of the 21st century the world average for women holding places in parliament is roughly 20 percent, with developing countries generally falling to the bottom.\textsuperscript{81}

Statistics of gender divisions in parliaments give an indication that the world, and even the developed world, has only slowly moved forward on gender equality in issues relating to governance and political participation. In recent years the gender equality issue has moved onto the development scene as an essential way to reach development goals, culminating somewhat in the MDG number 3 to “Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women” with a Target 3.A to “eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015” (United Nations 2014).

In the area of human rights, women have garnered much attention, especially in UN discourse (Krook and True 2012). The UN promoted gender equality and the rights of women to have equal status to that of men in its founding documents, in treaties promoting and ensuring that the rights of women be protected by states, in worldwide conference and meetings, in speeches and statements of its leaders, and in gender mainstreaming in its own organizational settings. The UN Charter (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and UN Resolution 56 all contain language that promotes the equal rights and protections of men and women (Krook and True 2012).

\textsuperscript{81} However, when one looks at individual country comparisons a new trend emerges. The countries at the top of the list for gender equality in parliamentary representatives is highest for developing countries, especially those who have received a high amount of aid in recent decades, such as Rwanda at the top of the list with 56.3 percent in the lower house, however only with 38.5 percent in the upper house overtaken by developing countries such as Senegal and just barely by Argentina. Developed countries, other than Nordic countries and Belgium, fall far down on the list with the United States coming in at 16.9 percent in lower house and 17 percent in the upper house, comparable to developing countries like Turkmenistan. The Inter-Parliamentary Union regularly collects information on the number of women participating in politics. \url{http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm} Accessed September 26, 2012.
The UN formed the Commission on the Status of Women in the 1950s. In 1979 the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), a remarkable document for its vision of equality; it entered into force only two years later in 1981. Further documents include the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, and UN General Assembly Resolution 1325 (United Nations Development Programme 2014).

The UN further promoted gender equality through efforts such as ECOSOC’s Convention on the Status of Women, the International Women’s Year of 1975, and the directly following UN Decade for Women that resulted in four conferences on gender equality (largely focused on women’s empowerment) and a Platform for Action in the most cited Fourth Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 (Krook and True 2012, 113). The United Nations started an International Women’s Day to celebrate women. The UN has been a catalyst in the promotion of women’s rights through ECOSOC as well as through the multiple agencies of the UN including the UNDP. The UN has a major influence on the ways that the international community thinks about issues like gender equality, even while the implementing power of the UN is limited.

When the governance concept took its nascent form in the 1990s in the UNDP, the World Bank, and other international development organizations, gender equality became one of the leading governance principles. Gender equality is sometimes subsumed under participation and elections and it is therefore not as obvious that it exists as a target outcome, especially in indexes that measure governance. Yet increasingly
development organizations include the focus on gender, both in the activities of the organization through gender mainstreaming, and in the projects that the organizations fund. The gender-governance-development nexus has consistently been an important element of study for feminist scholars who note that power has been and remains in the hands of the male gender and that male governance privilege should be challenged (MacKinnon 1983; Preece 2002).

Global governance literature focuses on the nexus between governance and gender through the issues of public policies of state governments (Brush 2003), violence against women, corporate governance (Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagné 2008), globalization (Shepherd and Ferguson 2011), women and the global political economy (Griffin 2010, 2009), women and democratization (Waylen 1998; Beer 2009), women and poverty, and women and migration (Benería, Deere, and Kabeer 2012). Governance literature focuses on increasing women’s participation in various ways, from increased participation in development projects to increased participation in decision-making procedures of governments, either by voting or holding governmental posts (Jabeen and Iqbal 2010; Burnet 2008; Haque 2003; Rezazadeh 2011).

The four UN Conferences on Women made an indelible impact on the development community’s perception of the issues that women face in development, and on the importance of incorporating a gendered focus to development. The Conferences (Mexico City 1975, Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985, and Beijing 1995) shifted the gender focus to specific issues that affected both men and women in development, but especially outlined the negative effects of development projects and programming on
women and how to overcome them. The first conference in Mexico pushed women in
development on the agenda and opened up a dialogue for such discussions. It was the
impetus for the creation of a research organization that would focus specifically on
women’s projects, as well as a UN agency devoted to women in development. The
United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of
Women (INSTRAW) was originally set to have a base in Tehran until political instability
made it impossible. Thereafter the Dominican Republic offered office space and support,
and it found its base in the Caribbean until 2012 when it merged into UNWomen. The
second organization, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM),
functioned as a fund of the UNDP until it merged with UNWomen in 2012. This
organization funded projects specifically devoted to women’s development needs such as
support for gender budgeting.

The second conference in Copenhagen focused on specific women’s health needs,
not just maternal health. The third conference in Nairobi brought about issues of human
settlements and the environment as related to women’s experience. Finally, the fourth
conference in Beijing focused on women’s participation in development projects and
planning, and in decision-making procedures and positions in government. While there is
a lobby for a fifth UN Conference on Women, many reasons exist for its delay and
possible nonexistence. These include lack of funding, lack of support in conservative
Western political administrations, and the argument that women’s development issues
should be dealt with under issue-specific conferences or agreements (i.e., that they should
be mainstreamed) rather than as separate issues.
In the 1990s the focus on gender equality in development projects was combined with the rising governance debate by suggesting the men and women both should equally benefit from good governance, and should participate equally in their governments. Gender mainstreaming techniques became the accepted way for including gender equality into organizational corporate governance, development and governance policies, and projects. Much debate exists over the impacts of gender mainstreaming techniques (Jacquot 2010; Page 2011; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002a, 2002b; Prugl 2009; True and Mintrom 2001; Zalewski 2010). Yet gender mainstreaming continues to be the status quo for including gender equality in governance policies and outcomes. Indeed, the argument that gender equality should be a major focus of development policies is taken up by development professionals and academics with increasing fervor (Kothari and Valodia 1998). Gender equality continues to be an important focus in the governance and development literature and practice, especially in terms of equal participation of both genders in politics and government decision-making procedures, and in terms of equal access to goods and services.

ARTICULATING THE NORM OF GENDER EQUALITY

Both the UNDP and World Bank have worked hard to articulate the norm of gender equality into policy and projects. The UNDP created a multitude of different departments within the UNDP tasked on creating a gender policy for the UNDP as well as teach employees on the importance of gender equality in projects and programming. Both these organizations are concerned with achieving gender equality in all areas of
development including access to health care, education, political representation, and economic mobility. They both implement a version of gender mainstreaming, defined by the UN General ECOSOC 1997/2 Resolution as

> The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, v).

The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality. As related to governance the two organizations differ in the way that they articulate the focus of gender-governance-development nexus. The World Bank is concerned with the supply-side governance, making sure that governments are equally serving both populations. The World Bank’s gender equality policies and strategies focus on engaging women in the economic sectors\(^\text{82}\) in which the World Bank works (Gender Action Plan 2007-2010). Certainly the World Bank supports women’s equal participation in social sectors such as health care, education, and in society in general (Gender Mainstreaming Plan 2001). Support for equal engagement in policies is, on the other hand, rather indirect based on practice, Articles of Agreement, and path-dependence of how the World Bank set up gender equality strategies to be incorporated in current sectoral projects and programs.

For the UNDP, the concern is with demand-side governance. In relation to governance, the UNDP has been very clear about how gender equality fits in. Women should be able to access government resources, have an impact on decision making

\(^{82}\)“Economic sectors include agriculture, private sector development, finance and infrastructure (energy, transport, mining, ICT, and water and sanitation). (Gender Action Plan 2007-2010, footnote 2, p. 1).
procedures and policies through active engagement, and be able to exercise the right to vote and run for office. The UNDP seeks to achieve gender equality through “vigorous action to ensure women’s expanded participation” in all branches of government, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, at all levels, including local and decentralized levels, and especially in decision-making positions” as one of the four focus areas of the Gender Equality Strategy 2008-2011 (United Nations Development Programme 2008b, 11, emphasis in original).

Using the theory of norm articulation as laid out in chapter one, I ask two questions of each organization on the development of the norm of gender equality. First, how was gender equality articulated by these two organizations? Second, how did leaders influence the gender equality norm in each organization? In each case I find that the extent to which the norm was embedded in policy and practice of the organization had an effect on the ability of the leadership to bring it forward and push it onto the agenda of the organization.

THE UNDP AND WOMEN’S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

UNDP’s concern for women’s participation in politics is evident as one of the four areas of the Gender Equality Strategy 2008-2011. For the UNDP, the nexus between gender equality, governance and development centers on making sure that women have the same choices and freedoms as men in their societies. This means having equal access to goods and services, but crucially for the UNDP, it means that women access the political processes. In this tradition, the UNDP supports the direct participation and
inclusion of women in the political process through voting and running for office.

“Inclusive democracy implies the participation of all social actors, including women, in public policy dialogue and decision-making” (United Nations Development Programme 2008b, 22 n. 63)

Since the 1980s the UNDP focused very closely on equal participation of women in the UNDP itself, with the projects and programs it implements, and also in its governing body through equal opportunity employment campaigns. Other elements of the UNDP’s gender equality strategy include training government employees to be more gender aware, ensuring that women have the needed training to engage as public servants, encouraging civil society participation and action on gender issues, and engaging political parties to ensure they are gender aware and open to women’s engagement (United Nations Development Programme 2008b-26). Such policies were strategically pushed through the organization by various leaders, Administrators being key to getting the Executive Board to approve such measures at some points.

How did the UNDP articulate the gender equality norm in policy?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 6.1: UNDP Committees, Departments and Units on Gender Equality</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Women in Development Unit (1975), Replaced by Women in Development Division (WIDD) (1975), Replaced by Gender in Development Division (GIDD) (1987), Replaced by Gender in Development Programme (GIDP) (1992), Replaced by the Gender Unit (2000), (the latter two units function under the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP))</td>
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<tr>
<td>• UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (1976), Replaced by UN Women (2012)</td>
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<td>• UNIFEM and UNDP Sub-Group on Women</td>
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<td>• Gender Mainstreaming Evaluation Team (2008)</td>
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<td>• Gender Steering and Implementation Committee (2006)</td>
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<td>• UNDP as Chair of the Global Gender Steering and Implementation Committee</td>
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The UNDP created several different departments throughout the 1980s and 1990s, keeping pace with the changing nature of gender equality projects and philosophy in the development community, and often leading in gender equality policy. In 1975 the UNDP established the Women in Development Division (WIDD). WIDD did not make a huge impact on UNDP policy, if at all, but under Draper WIDD changed to the Gender in Development Division (GIDD) in 1987 with a role “to ensure [each] project was sufficiently sensitive to women’s needs” (Browne 2011, 47). WIDD was more successful in making changes in UNDP’s gender policies. Thus, it was not until 1987 that the norm of gender equality was articulated and mainstreamed into UNDP policy and this was largely because of Draper’s influence. Further, Draper created GIDD just at the time when the human development paradigm made waves through the organization. The human development paradigm encouraged a focus on human freedom and participation in government processes, and that focus was directly influential in the articulation of gender equality for the UNDP.

Gender mainstreaming became an important element in the UNDP’s development practice just as the organization was taking on a leading role in development in the 1980s. While the UNDP women’s division changed names, placement, and influence over the years, the concept of gender continues to be incorporated into policies and programming. GIDD turned into the Gender in Development Programme (GIDP) under the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) in 1992. GIDP was highly productive in creating publications and works that would guide the UNDP’s gender equality practice in years to come. Many of its works focused on explaining gender equality and gender mainstreaming both to
UNDP staff and for outside consumption (United Nations Development Programme 2001a).

GIDP produced the Gender and Development Monograph Series, a series that sought out academics to articulate gender equality and discuss specific issues related to gender, development and governance. This series, as well as a multitude of other working papers and documents produced by UNDP gender departments, continuously highlight the importance of women’s inclusion in politics as active and equal participants.

The World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen 1995, addressed itself to the removal of poverty, the achievement of full employment and social integration. Many believe that these questions cannot be effectively addressed without the kind of democratization [sic] of the representative process… (Jain 1996, 14).

“This failure of governance is also a key economic issue of efficiency and equity. At the root of it again is the treatment of women as “natural” physical reproductive and nurturing beings, rather than legal and economic agents with rights” (United Nations Development Programme 2001a).

UNDP’s measured success in the democratic governance practice area spills over into the gender equality focus on participation. UNDP democratic governance policies and projects engage citizens (both men and women) in political processes and political parties of local/national government. The Evaluation Office notes that UNDP does well on gender equality in democratic governance by focusing most of its projects and resources on women’s participation, even to a fault.

83 A monograph is defined by the UN system as “a bibliographic resources that is complete in one part or intended to be completed within a finite number of parts” quoting from the Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules, 2002 Rev. Most of the UN documents are monographs, not intended for publication but as documents that give an overview on a particular issue area.

Often, however, the approach remains focused on women’s participation, rather than recognizing gender-related impediments and addressing gender inequality…Most programmes focus on women running for political office or support for Ministries for Women… (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, viii).

On sensitive and contested issues like gender equality, the ability for an organization’s members to share and discuss knowledge is crucial to the way the norm is articulated in policy. Knowledge sharing, creating institutional memory through communities of practice, and collaborative efforts serve to help colleagues create guidance notes together and respond to demands in a comprehensive manner. Collaborating on gender equality is essential to gender mainstreaming success because collaborating with colleagues allows for dialogue and the ability to challenge roles and cultural norms that counter gender equality.

Organizational barriers and push-back from vested interests make the practice of gender mainstreaming difficult, and even make it difficult for leaders to get across their points and make changes in the organization. Yet the reviews of gender mainstreaming in UNDP cite that leaders have a crucial role to play in the success of the organization: “The organization not only needs to establish a new and stronger institutional structure, but also to demonstrate leadership…” (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, iii)

The internal reviews of the UNDP’s gender equality policy and gender mainstreaming policy have been largely negative. The reviews argue that while the UNDP certainly produces a variety of knowledge products on gender equality and articulates gender equality quite well in statements and policy, it does not implement the policies well in practice. The 2006 review argues that the main reason for such
problematic implementation of the UNDP’s gender mainstreaming strategy is because of ineffective leaders who lack the support that is needed for the organization to move forward. “The accomplishments of some very committed individuals were constrained by absence of leadership at a higher level. Top management should clarify what gender mainstreaming means for UNDP, and introduce mechanisms to institutionalize policy” (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, ix).

Yet leaders are not the only hindrance to internalization of the policies articulated by leaders and the organization in various places. One consistent problem with the UNDP gender departments is that they work separately from other departments and working groups within the organization. Such separation means that attempts to encourage colleagues to institutionalize gender equality policies into projects and programming remain difficult, especially if the departments are encouraging something other than inclusion of women in the political process. The Gender Unit, established under BDP in 2000 and 2004 (though removed for a short time to the poverty practice area in 2002) promoted gender mainstreaming through all the departments. Yet, despite all the efforts to mainstream gender equality into all its development projects and policies, the UNDP still suffers from the silo effect which produces barriers to horizontal influence between departments.84

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84 My respondents referred to the culture of work as a barrier to promoting gender mainstreaming within the UNDP: the silos in which people work in groups on thematic areas or practice areas but have no connection with other groups, and thus the communication between groups is very little and serves as a major barrier.
For the UNDP, the gender-development-governance nexus has centered on support for women’s equal access to all aspects of government, policy-making, and jobs. Within the UNDP, the Administrators supported equal access to higher level positions through the “Gender Balance in Management” policies instituted through the 1990s and 2000s. UNDP supported gender mainstreaming policies throughout the development work that it does in guidance notes and support from the Gender Department. In governance promotion, the UNDP focuses closely on engaging women in politics by advising countries on how they can encourage women to vote and engage in political parties and political office. Administrator Gustaph Speth supported the creation of the gender indicators included in the 1995 HDR, a huge step in developing a place for gender considerations in the development paradigm. The UNDP rallied behind the new concept of human development and connected that with expanding women’s freedoms and choices.

Over the years gender mainstreaming navigated a tentative position in UNDP’s practice areas and goals. In the Strategic Plan of 2000-2003 gender was demoted to
inclusion as a “cross-cutting” issue rather than a thematic area, noted as a weakness in the 2006 evaluation report of UNDP gender mainstreaming policy (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006). Guidance notes and policy papers from the variously named Gender Units laid the foundation and framework for the Corporate Gender Strategy created in 2006. The creation of the Gender Strategic Plan represented a turning point in that the gender unit gained more attention and thus more employees even while team members still felt overwhelmed with the amount of work they are required to do because they are understaffed.

In recent years, and in light of some critical evaluations of UNDP’s gender policy, the organization and leadership worked tirelessly in identifying gender mainstreaming goals, training staff, and incorporating gender analysis into projects and budgets. Starting with the Strategic Plan of 2008-2011, gender equality and the empowerment of women is a practice area that is incorporated in all four of its focus areas (UNDP 2008-2011, 33). Furthermore, the UNDP created its own Gender Equality Strategy for 2008-2011 following on the 2006-2007 Gender Strategy (United Nations Development Programme 2008b). The Gender Equality Strategy of 2008-2011 represented a crucial step in the UNDP’s gender mainstreaming because it closely mirrored the UNDP Strategic Plan and took a more comprehensive and corporate approach to systematizing the inclusion of gender equality and women’s rights across the UNDP’s thematic mandate areas.

The Strategic Plan furthermore incorporated gender mainstreaming and gender equality concerns into the way that the UNDP creates its policies and runs the
The focus on gender equality in the UNDP Strategic Plan and the creation of the Gender Strategic Plan came about because of demand from countries for UNDP support in a range of areas. Even the Executive Board, donors, and evaluation reports suggested that the UNDP should focus on gender equality more closely. The pressures from these areas did help the UNDP to change its strategies, strengthening the gender team, and strengthening the UNDP’s approach to gender equality practice, which is covered by the gender equality strategy.

One of the ways that gender equality has developed is through the publication of documents that suggest that the UNDP and development organizations must support gender equality in all projects and programs. The *Gender and Development Monograph Series*, published under UNDP’s GIDP in the 1990s, claim a strong role for gender in development (Miller and Ravazi 1998). In more recent years the Gender Unit commissioned a series called *Primers in Gender and Democratic Governance* that argue that gender equality and the promotion of democratic governance are essential to reach development goals.  

At this point in the UNDP’s history, it would be difficult for the UNDP to reduce its support for gender mainstreaming strategies because it has become incorporated into

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85 Article 18 of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 says that the Executive Board “Take notes of the improved integration of a gender perspective into the UNDP focus areas, and encourages UNDP to continue to build internal capacity to address gender dimensions in its work including, inter alia, the creation of enabling incentives and accountability systems for staff at all operational levels, and calls upon UNDP to continue to mainstream a gender perspective and to pursue gender equality in country programmes, planning instruments and sector-wide programmes and to articulate specific country-level goals and targets in that field in accordance with national development strategies” (4). (United Nations Development Programme 2008c)

86 The primers cover five areas of democratic governance and are written by academics or practitioners commissioned by the UNDP (Douglas 2007; Hijab 2007; Hijab and Zambrano 2009; Hossain, Musembi, and Hughes 2011; Sidhu and Meena 2009)
the way that the UNDP functions, as evident in the Gender Strategies produced by the organization. Even so, gender mainstreaming is a slow and somewhat painful process when results are not quickly forthcoming. Gender mainstreaming is tedious and requires a long view of history. For example, western states have been very slow to include women at the same rate as men in economic and political life. Many argue that we cannot expect developing countries to do better than western states have done. Putting a new norm into practice and implementing it is no easy feat. The inclusion of a gender perspective in policies and projects, especially at the country level, is slowly and intermittently implemented, depending on the leader in the position of authority who can promote gender equality. Within the UNDP, resistance to gender mainstreaming is minimal. Yet, the lack of connection in the minds of practitioners between conceptualizing gender equality and putting it into practice can be debilitating. When leaders provide entry points for new norms the possibility of internalization and implementation is greater.

One example of actually providing those entry points in practice is evident in the UNDP publication on gender and political parties (Ballington 2011). The document includes an easy to read summary of entry points on pages 2-3 that include three stages of the electoral cycle in which gender equality good practices can be implemented: Pre-election period, election period, and post-election period. After the publication of this document the UNDP received calls from around the world telling them that the checklist/mapping methodology created in the political parties document was really well received by political parties and parliaments all around the world because there were
clear entry points and outcomes given. It wasn’t a long document, but it was clear, and it offered tangible actions and results. In this example, norm internalization and implementation had to do with knowing exact and specific practices that would promote the norm.

For the UNDP, quotas represent the importance of gender equality and representation in politics, an aspect of the development focus and paradigm of democratic governance. For instance, the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995 discussed the importance of having women participate in governments, not only for society as a whole, but also in order to advance the cause of women’s equality. The conference produced the Beijing Platform of Action which highlights the necessity to include women in decision-making, and for women to have an equal representation in politics (Ballington 2011; Dahlerup 2007; Krook 2006; Tripp and Kang 2008; Htun and Jones 2002; Bush 2011). The UNDP incorporates support for women in political participation and supports quotas, in part because of the ideas that became influential at the Beijing conference. It melded these ideals into its own policies, providing country support and guidance. UNDP’s goals in this area are to

Increase the number of women in public office; Enhance women's leadership by helping to reform electoral processes, change political parties, and strengthen parliaments, judiciaries and the civil service; Promote judicial reform to ensure equal legal protection to poor women and men (United Nations Development Programme 2012a, 2011c).

87 Htun and Jones offer insight into where the norm came from in their oft-cited chapter. They argue that "pressure from women politicians and international norms were the central causes of quotas" along with presidential support and interest (Htun and Jones 2001, 35).
The acceptance and adoption of gender quotas by most developing and many
developed countries around the world, indicates a norm in international relations because
it is an accepted standard of behavior that states follow (Krook 2006; Bush 2011; Baldez
2006; Dahlerup 2007, 2006). There are multiple types of gender quotas and are usually
classified as candidate gender quotas or reserved seat quotas.\footnote{Quotes come in a multitude of forms. Drude Dahlerup breaks down quotas into three categories of
importance: Candidate quotas (designating a percentage of candidates on party lists to one gender),
reserved seats quotas (allocating a percentage of the parliamentary seats for women), and aspirant quotas
(assigning a percentage requirement to the pool of potential candidates that will run). Dahlerup notes that
parties and their tactics and regulations are essential to the quota system and that the level of democracy
and the type of electoral system are crucial to whether or not gender quotas bring about the “equality of
result,” i.e., a higher percentage of women in political offices. On the other hand, Dahlerup considers the
“equality of opportunity,” i.e., that women are included in decision-making procedures, and that they start
seeing themselves as having agency, as more important that equality of result: if quotas achieve an
“equality of opportunity” they have been successful even if an “equality of result” has not been achieved
(Dahlerup 2007, 2005).
}
Gender quotas often take
on the form of pushing for thirty percent women’s representation, though there is no
precedence in international law for that number, only in practice.\footnote{I am indebted to one of my interviewees for pointing out that the Beijing Platform for Action was
important in creating gender quotas, and that the norm of using a thirty percent quota target for women
reserved seats in parliament started with a 1990 ECOSOC, continued in the MDG target.
}
The gender quota
norm increased dramatically in acceptance since the mid-1980s. To date, 109 countries
have institutionalized at least one type of gender quota, whether legislative or
voluntarily.\footnote{Global Database of Quotas for Women. \url{http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/search.cfm} Accessed
November 15, 2012. Voluntary Party Quotas have been of interest lately and have garnered much attention
because of the importance of party practice in implementing quotas. An exciting publication on political
parties and gender equality, including quotas, published by the UNDP incorporated local knowledge and
included specific action points for change. Party leaders in various countries were impressed with the
publication and used it to change party regulations and practices. (Ballington 2011)
} “These measures [gender quotas] have appeared in countries in all major
world regions with a broad range of institutional, social, economic, and cultural
characteristics” (Krook 2006, 113).
While the norm of gender quotas did not emerge in the UNDP itself, the organization adopted the norm and defined it according to its own concerns with development and human freedom. UNDPs work in post-conflict peace-building processes includes encouraging states to include quotas in constitutions or legislation in the formative years so that gender equality is ensured, at least by law. The UNDP has further stated that gender equality, as represented in the norm of gender quotas, is an essential element of democratic governance. The ideas for promoting gender as an essential component of democratic governance turned into norms of gender quotas in constitutions, gender mainstreaming policies, and gender training for parliaments and other authoritative state figures.

The rise of quotas as gender-governance-development policy in the UNDP was directly influenced by the people working in the organization on gender issues and the types of policies that they chose to push. Furthermore, these “norm-entrepreneurs” did not receive much resistance in promoting gender equality policies in UNDP. Gender quotas were institutionalized in UNDP projects and policy because gender equality and gender mainstreaming had already been well accepted in the organizational culture through prior policies and departments that highlighted the importance of women’s participation in development projects and in government. The GPECS program supports the electoral cycle by training electoral management boards (EMBs), consulting countries on how to run elections, and actively working with civil society to ensure equal access and participation to the voting process.
Table 6.3: UNDP Funding on Gender Equality

- UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) established 1976, GA Resolution 31/133; under UNDP according to GA Resolution 39/125, 1984
- Direct Line 11 – Resources and Funding dedicated to Gender Mainstreaming (1996)
- Gender Thematic Trust Fund Established (2001)

Administrators and Executive Boards make a big impact on norms in the form of funding or de-funding and commitments in the budgets and Strategic Plans of the organization. Administrator Speth’s renewal of Gender Mainstreaming Strategy with earmarking of resources and staff positions (Memo to Staff, 1996) shows how he was committed to gender issues (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, vii). The Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYYF) of 2004-2007 restored Gender Unit to the BDP and included gender equality as a service line for achieving MDGs, thus directly channeling funding toward gender equality practices and policies.

The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has been instrumental in guiding much of UNDP’s development work based on its ability to garner funds from the UN. The UN created this fund to support the particular needs of women that were made so obvious in the First UN Conference on Women. UNIFEM emerged out of the debate in the 1970s over the need to help women by giving them access to funds and by creating a situation in which women would be able to recreate those funds so that they would not be dependent (i.e., not dependent on ad-hoc or revolving accounts) (Snyder 2004, 44).

UNIFEM directly encouraged funding projects that considered the different impacts that the projects had on different genders, and projects that reflected the prevailing understanding of how women should be able to engage in society. UNIFEM was placed under the operational policies and bureaucracy of the UNDP in 1984. One of the reasons for this is because of the UNDP’s coordinating role throughout all UN agencies (Snyder 2004, 44).
The UN had just begun to craft out a role for itself as a development implementing agency (and not just a funding agency) and the prevailing thought was that UNIFEM would now have the chance to continue its work and encourage other UN agencies to implement gender equality policies.

Trying to integrate UNIFEM into the operational policies and practices of UNDP further, in 2004 Mark Malloch Brown appointed the Director of UNIFEM as UNDP Special Advisor to Administrator. This change meant that the Administrator was much more likely to hear about and know what was going on in UNIFEM and collaborate with UNIFEM and make sure that the whole UNDP was working with UNIFEM.

How did leaders articulate the gender equality norm in the UNDP?

Gender equality gained substantial attention within the UNDP when William H. Draper III was Administrator of the organization from 1986-1993, although only in the form of inclusion into policy and incorporating into ad hoc practice. It was under Draper’s leadership that the UNDP took on the shape and quality that we know today, not only in the way that it carries out its coordination of the UN development system through its Resident Representatives, but also in its very vision of development. As regards gender equality, Draper actively worked to promote women to higher levels of office within the organization, as well as to promote the kinds of development activities that

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91 Draper, upon his appointment as Administrator, asked of the organization: “What does the UNDP believe in?” and “Should it not be advocating what it believes in?” (Weiss and Thakur 2010) (194). Murphy recounts that though Draper was a venture capitalist he did have a good understanding of development politics because his father, Bill Draper, had been associated with Paul Hoffman when he was Administrator of the Marshal Plan; furthermore Draper’s desire to include women in development planning, projects and implementation was directly related to his work in the Export-Import Bank that occurred before his time at UNDP (Murphy 2006, 236).
included women as important recipients of aid under the WID paradigm. His leadership was crucial to incorporating gender equality as a principle of democratic governance, and indeed, in developing the concept of democratic governance in the UNDP.92

Draper appointed women to high positions in the UNDP when he was Administrator including Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appointed as Director of the Africa Bureau, Elena Martinez as Regional Director, and Ingrid Eide as Head of the Women’s Division (Browne 2011, 47; Murphy 2006, 260-262). Following Draper’s lead the issue of “gender balance” in positions of authority rose to the notice of UNDP leaders in the 1990s and 2000s. UNDP published its first policy to directly support women’s status as leaders and to promote women to positions of authority in 1995 under Gus Speth’s Administration which was followed by two other such policies entitled “Gender Balance in Management” (Bessis 2004). The trend however has not caught on at an equitable rate, especially for positions of upper management.93 Yet in 2009 the first women honored to hold the position of UNDP Administrator and Assistance Administrator were Helen Clark and Rebecca Grynspan.

92 As far as this author is aware Draper never used the term “democratic governance” although in his second to last speech to the General Assembly as the UNDP Administrator he said that “undoubtedly, freedom and justice were the foundations of economic growth; but they must be underpinned by good governance, effective policies, appropriate technologies and wide-ranging skills” (Sec. 16, p. 5). (United Nations General Assembly Forty-Sixth Session 1991)

93 For instance, as of 2010 women make up 40.4 percent of the UN system in 2010, up from 33.5 percent in 2000. However, when considering from the viewpoint of ranks, women make up 30.9 percent of upper ranks management in the UN system including Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General, Director-General, Assistant Director-General, and Deputy Director-General and only the bottom two ranks of employees have equitable (if not inequitable toward men) percentages of women in positions: 60.2 percent of P-1 ranks are women and 57.3 percent of P-2 ranks are women whereas the P-3, P-4, P-5, D-1, and D-2 ranks have 45.1 percent, 38.4 percent, 31.7 percent, 30.2 percent, and 25.7 percent respectively. See United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. (31 December 2010). “Gender Balance Statistics,” http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/fpgenderbalancestats.htm Accessed February 1, 2013.
Speth was very supportive of gender equality in the UNDP, following hard on his predecessor’s promoting of the concept in practice and very specifically in project creation. Yet even with a leader whose support for a concept is strong, roadblocks emerge with the organizational structure and functioning. Gender mainstreaming saw ups and downs under Mark Malloch Brown’s tenure as UNDP Administrator. Brown immediately changed the rhetoric, marketing, and structure of the organization. He started the trend to endorse practice areas as a way for UNDP to advocate development goals and specialize (or gain a comparative advantage) on specific issue areas. The promotion of democratic governance further changed the nature of the organization’s vision of development. However, gender equality has mostly been incorporated as a cross-cutting issue rather than a practice area, which marginalizes gender issues. The current Secretary General (Ban Ki-Moon) and the current UNDP Administrator and Under-Administrator (Helen Clark and Rebecca Greenspan) have been influential in supporting gender programs and are concerned with gender equality and gender parity in the organization. In fact, one respondent called these leaders “gender champions.”

THE WORLD BANK AND WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY

Many documents describing the Bank’s development of gender equality policies argue that forces outside the Bank were the most influential in getting the Bank to focus on the issues and importance of gender (Snyder 2004). From their own experiences, they describe how pressure from civil society organizations and feminist groups brought about changes in international organizations (Fraser and Tinker 2004). However, these usually
miss out on the nuances of the internal changes and influential leaders of these organizations. Indeed, I argue that without the specific leaders of these organizations actually highlighting gender equality as an important issue in international development, the organization would have been less likely to change its focus and support for gender equality in the way that it has done. In the 2000s it seems completely acceptable to focus on gender issues in development, but that was not the case even as early as the 1970s and 80s. While there was much lobbying coming from outside sources on the UNDP and World Bank, influential leaders had to push their organizations to the edge in order to influence change in policy and practice.

The World Bank has had advisors and departments devoted to gender issues since the 1970s, and it has interpreted gender issues as those related to its particular sectors and issue areas. The World Bank speaks of expanding women’s freedoms and choices in society, while much of its work on gender is to gain equality in access to goods and services through government intervention. The most telling for the focus that the World Bank takes on the gender-development-governance policy nexus is found in its recent International Development Association (IDA)16 funding round, the WDR 2012, and the associated commitments that the Bank has made concerning gender equality. The Bank made commitments to include gender considerations in safety net projects, agriculture and rural development, and health, creating an Education Sector Strategy, writing a Reproductive Health Action Plan, in support for fragile areas, and in creating regional gender action plans. All these focus on the supply-side of governance, urging governments to supply goods and services to women and make sure that they have equal
access to all the goods and services in their society, especially participating in the economic sector. The Bank very closely connects its gender equality commitments to poverty reduction.

*How did the World Bank articulate the gender equality norm?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women in Development (WID) Advisor appointed</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Development Unit created</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Gender Consultative Group established</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Development Board established in PREM Network</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Development Board head promoted to director level</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Equal Campaign</td>
<td></td>
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Gender equality is largely articulated by the Bank as increased efficiency and effectiveness in the government’s provision of public goods and services to women, although there is certainly a component of women’s participation in government and development practice. The reason for focus on the former as belied in organizational culture is three-fold. First, the organizational processes of the Bank dictate that it work mostly with governments, traditionally the country offices primarily work with the finance ministries of the country. Thus, supporting the government’s provision of public services for women through public administration support came naturally to Bank employees. Second, the Bank works in sectors and support for gender equality in those sectors came to mean focusing on how women could be supported in greater depth in each sector. Finally, the Bank started out with a focus on macroeconomic policy. It still mostly hires economists who are very focused on measurements. In fact, for the Bank, the culture suggests that “if it can’t be measured, it’s not important” and that idea goes all the way back to the McNamara Presidency. Thus, measuring the kinds of goods and
services that are accessed by and available to women is a major focus of how the gender equality norm is articulated by the Bank.

The Bank’s support focuses on inclusion of gender considerations in all the Bank’s formal policies and sector activities. The World Bank incorporates gender equality in projects and funding with an increasing focus on country gender diagnostics and gender indicators (related to attaining MDGs on health and maternal mortality since 2000). Essential characteristics of the World Bank’s gender mainstreaming norms outline the definition and focus the World Bank takes on gender equality. “Informing country policy dialogue; enhancing country-level gender diagnostics; scaling up lending for domestic priorities; investing in gender-relevant data and statistics; and leveraging partnerships” (World Bank Sept. 2012, 6). The Bank is making strides toward integrating gender equality and mainstreaming practices throughout its sector work, supported by the WDR 2012, its policy documents, and gender strategies from headquarters.

Gender mainstreaming is country focused in that the responsibility for implementing and enacting gender equality norms, including gender analysis in budgets and projects and training staff, lies at the country office level. The Bank works on the country-demand principle so that the gender mainstreaming policies are incorporated into Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) with consultation and agreement from civil society and governing authorities of the country. The trend in decentralization is evident even in how the norm emerges and is adopted in the World Bank considering that some countries do better than others; the
variety in implementation is ostensibly related to country office leadership, level of accountability, and domestic politics in the country itself.

The Bank’s gender mainstreaming focus is on measurable outcomes of projects. This is intensely obvious in the IDA16 funding round which included gender equality as one of its thematic areas of focus. The overarching theme that the executive board agreed on in the IDA16 meetings held in Brussels, Belgium in December 14-15, 2010 was that of “delivering development results” (International Development Agency Nov. 2012). The theme meant that the Bank enhanced its results management system and created projects and policies that focused on the results based framework and tools of obtaining measurable results for the money spent on aid. Success of loans, investments, and aid had to be measured with targets of outputs and outcomes of the development projects.

World Bank gender equality norms and rules evolved in the 1980s and 1990s largely through incorporation into the operational policies manual. The goal was to encourage the inclusion of gender concerns in all World Bank policies and projects. After the acceptance of Wolfensohn’s CDF this meant implementing gender considerations into every CAS and PRSPs prepared by the World Bank staff in concert with the country in question. These new policies came in response to commitments from leaders; Conable, Lewis and Wolfensohn stand out in their commitment to engage women in all development projects. But it was also a result of the criticism that the Bank endured from the late 1980s to the late 1990s on the impact of its SAPs. Feminist economics literature evaluates the impact of the Structural Adjustment Policies on women and argues that those policies negatively impacted women by creating a situation in which women’s
unpaid work at home increased in order to meet the societal demands represented in men being out of work and social services cut. Thus the SAPs placed an excessive burden on women that was not even calculated by the Bank in any of its assessments of the impact of SAPs. Sophie Bessis argues that it was not until 1985 that the World Bank seriously focused on women as a way to deal with such criticisms of the SAPs, and that the focus has remained since (Bessis 2004, 641).

In its operations the World Bank Group incorporated gender considerations as early as the late 1970s just as gender was becoming more important worldwide. The World Bank’s first effort was to create a position called Women in Development Advisor (World Bank 2010a), a position that had very little authority or power (Bessis 2004, 640). Yet contrary to what some argue, the Bank itself was influential in the creation of the Women in Development (WID) movement and in charting out gender equality norms for the organization. The name for the new movement, WID, developed out of an expert group report for the Social Development Division. Gloria Scott wrote the phrase “integration of women in development” in the report, and the name caught on (Scott 2004, 17). Scott was then hired by the Bank to "increase staff and borrowers' understanding of how women affected, or were affected by, bank-financed activities" (Scott 2004, 21). The “meagerness of the resources attached” to the WID advisor in the World Bank limited action and influence, but Bank President Robert McNamara was supportive and “insisted that WID issues be integrated within the framework of each project” (Scott 2004,22).
Early considerations of gender equality incorporated into the operational manual statement (OMS) in 1984 (OMS 2.20) which highlighted that women should be considered in operations and activities of the Bank in certain economic sectors as identified by country offices and authorities as needing a gender component (World Bank 2010a, x). Later additions replaced OMS 2.20 with the operational policies (OP) and bank procedures (BP) in the Operational Manual under OP 4.20 in 2001.

The 1994 OP 4.20 not only guides staff action related to incorporation of gender mainstreaming analysis into projects and planning, but provides rules on where the analysis should be included. Gender mainstreaming policies should be included in CASs and into sector areas in which the Bank works that have been identified as needing a gender component in consultation with country authorities and civil society participation, thus building on OMS 2.20. This represents a process of rule-making and norm-making that culminated in the Gender Mainstreaming Strategy of 2001 (Gender and Development...
Group World Bank January 2002) which was followed up by the Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2007-2010 and the current GAP Transition Plan 2010-2013.

Major policy documents of the Bank articulate the rules and associated practices. These include the most recent World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development which states: “Gender equality is a core development objective in its own right. It is also smart economics” (xx). That “gender inequality is manifestly unfair” comes out in the pages of the reports that the World Bank Group puts out on gender mainstreaming in its internal practices and operations as well as in its funding operations (World Bank 2012b).

In the latter 1990s the World Bank altered the way it lent money and the way it encouraged states to make structural changes, a change instigated by the critiques of the Bank’s 1980s macroeconomic lending practices (World Bank Independent Evaluation Office April 2012). The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) represented a new way for the Bank to couch its development policy: through increasing the extant support for civil society and participation, which included gender equality.94

The two practices that developed out of the CDF guided by the principle of civil society participation and stakeholder inclusion are the CASs and PRSPs. Although the PRSPs are influential in the development practices pursued by the country and guided by the World Bank and IMF, the CASs include gender strategies by sector called for by

94 The CDF called for alterations to lending practices under four principles: 1) “Development strategies should be comprehensive and shaped by a long-term vision; 2) Each country should devise and direct its own development agenda based on citizen participation; 3) Governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders should work together in partnership led by recipient countries to carry out development strategies; and 4) Development performance should be evaluated on the basis of measurable results.” Comprehensive Development Framework. http://go.worldbank.org/N2ND6E5QL0 Accessed February 10, 2013. See also (World Bank 2011a, 52-54.).
OP/BP 4.20, although it is not required in CASs. Country office incorporation of gender equality practices in CASs further stands out because of its impact on staff members and on how countries go about implementing development projects to achieve development goals. Country office staff create CASs with the involvement of the government, however government officials do not have final say in what is included in the CAS. The CAS goes through a rigorous review by various elements of the World Bank’s departments before approval (World Bank 2011a). While the OP/BPs mandate that CASs always include a gender component, the practice is not always the case unless the country office and country authorities themselves are on board. While the practice did not catch on right away, the recent Gender Action Plan, IDA16 discussions, and associated Bank strategies encouraged more integration.

The Bank Group’s Gender Action Plan (2007-2010) boosted attention to innovative programs to promote women’s economic empowerment. Over 2006–10, the share of the Bank’s lending operations integrating gender issues in design increased by nearly 20 percentage points (to 53 percent), and the share of gender-informed Country Assistance Strategies increased by 27 percentage points to a record 83 percent (World Bank Development Committee Sept. 2011, ii).

While the first gender mainstreaming strategy of 2001 called for Country Gender Assessments (CGAs) to guide the CASs, very few countries actually conducted CGAs. The 2001 gender mainstreaming strategy that created the CGAs represented a time when assessments were required for almost every sector or cross-cutting area and thus Bank employees were overwhelmed with the number of assessments they were required to undertake, which is one reason that the CGAs did not become incorporated into practice.

95 As an unofficial rule, more like a guidance note, gender equality analysis is incorporated into a CAS according to OP/BP 4.20. As part of the review, the CAS is analyzed by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) and given a rating on how well the CAS has done on incorporating a gendered perspective.
as was hoped by the strategy. However, the very idea of a separate assessment for gender is completely contradictory to the idea of gender mainstreaming in which one considers gender in every sector. CGAs were not implemented or successful for that reason. Yet progress shows that even without the CGAs, country-based staff include gender analyses and gender considerations in the CASs. In the 2010 FY funding cycle all of the CASs that were created included a gender component (World Bank 2010a).

Within the focus on incorporating gender equality policies and analysis into CASs under the CDF the 2001 Gender Mainstreaming Strategy and the IDA16 Strategy highlighted work in sectors in which the Bank showed strong impact and in which civil society participation and country negotiation identified gender analysis needs. The World Bank continues to focus on targets and for this reason puts much effort into research and projects that will aid countries in achieving the MDGs 4-5 related to maternal mortality, girl’s education, and health. The highlights of the gender mainstreaming norms are in the inclusion into CASs (which does not have a good record until very recently) and inclusion in IDA16 which created targets and goals for reducing maternal mortality and increasing girl’s education.

Furthermore, IDA 16 required the WDR report to focus on gender in which the report created three dimensions of gender: endowment, opportunity, and agency. These dimensions are not easily measured and the Bank’s Gender team is currently working to create measurements and expressions of these dimensions, especially that of agency, in

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96 Furthermore Country Gender Assessments are costly and it is inefficient for the Bank do to them since so many other organizations and countries are conducting their own. The Bank turned to an operational practice of using other organization’s or country’s gender assessments, or integrating gender assessments into the Country Assistance Strategy sectors in order to overcome the inefficiency.
the trend to measure everything that is important. The measurements of women’s agency may include women’s control over resources (such as land and assets), gender based violence, sexual and reproductive rights, freedom of movement, and political voice. Furthermore, because of the decentralized nature of implementing such policies, the focus on gender equality in some cases does depend on personality and independent leadership. Uneven support across sectors is due to the personalities and support of team leaders—some are diligent in getting gender into the policies and sectors.

The World Bank’s gender equality projects are most successful on the ground, at the country level, in small projects. While the Bank has been instrumental in pushing for gender equality in its development projects for decades, it could be much better at promoting gender equality in its own work as well as through development advocacy. As the Bank has shown, creating a dialogue with the government on mainstreaming gender is essential, and the argument must take into account instrumental effects of gender inequality as well as moral arguments (i.e., that gender inequality is harmful to a country’s GDP growth, to agricultural production, and so on). Yet, even in places where women outperform men it does not mean they are better off; it could mean they are taking on the brunt of the work. In such cases, development organizations need to address specific cultural issues that result in gender inequality, not just have a blanket approach, because cultures differ around the world and women and men are affected differently based on those cultures. Creating a dialogue by organizing is an essential way that both development organizations and nongovernmental organizations can be involved. It appears that the Bank is moving in this direction, especially since the creation of the
World Development Report on gender inequality and the heightened concern for integration of gender issues into all sector work.

Table 6.6: World Bank Funding on Gender Equality

- IDA 16 Funding Round
- Support for Gender Responsive Budgeting (GRB)

Over the years the Bank has focused on incorporating gender equality policy into its sector work, and not something separate from that work. Thus, most of the monetary support for gender issues is catalogued by counting those projects that have a gender sensitive component. Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of projects that include a gender component. The 2012 evaluation of gender mainstreaming noted that “86 percent of projects classified as gender informed in FY11” (World Bank Sept. 2012, 7). Further, between 2006 and 2011 the World Bank records that it has devoted a record amount to projects that support women’s issues.

Over the last five years, the World Bank allocated more than $65 billion, or 37 percent of its lending, to operations supporting developing countries’ efforts to improve girls’ education, women’s and mothers’ health, and women’s access to credit, land, agricultural extension services, jobs and infrastructure services (World Bank Development Committee Sept. 2011, ii)

One more important norm that both the World Bank and UNDP supported throughout this period was gender responsive budgeting. The norm emerged in Australia and South Africa as an entry point in enhancing women’s participation in development and considering how a project or policy would either positively or negatively affect women. UNIFEM learned about gender budgeting from a conference in Zimbabwe. The UNIFEM staff had not heard of it before and after the conference they pushed for considering this budget process as an important aspect of women’s development needs. Belgium ended up supporting an initial project on gender responsive budgeting called
“Gender and Economic Governance” and while the outcomes were not positive everywhere, there was a major positive impact in Southeast Asian and South American countries including increasing money to women, but also in making the budget allocation process more equitable to women. My respondents suggested that the gender sensitive budgeting trend helped organizations, like the UNDP and UNIFEM, connect with government offices to a greater degree.

_How did leaders articulate the gender equality norm in the World Bank?_

The Bank’s focus on gender as an essential element of development policy and practice culminated during Wolfensohn’s Presidency, even with the recent IDA 16 funding focus. Wolfensohn made an incredible impact in the Bank related to gender equality because Wolfensohn was inspired by Clinton’s speech at the Beijing Conference for Women which gave him an impetus for trying to incorporate women’s concerns into policy and practice. One of my respondents discussed how Wolfensohn would always refer to the Beijing conference and the importance of including gender into the Bank’s policy. Wolfensohn’s Presidency represented a peak and then fading, like any trend in development. However, gender is still a significant focus for the Bank. In the latter 1990s the development trends that took gender’s place as an important development issues included anti-corruption, education and health.

In social settings norms are not often articulated or based in rational argument, they are followed on the basis that they are right. The articulation of the reason for incorporating gender equality policies into World Bank functioning is the very basis for
the existence of a norm. The argument stems back to Robert Zoellick’s essential focus on gender mainstreaming during his Presidency and is almost taken verbatim from a statement he made at an event entitled “Ways to Bridge Gender Gaps” in 2007. Zoellick said

One motivation for women’s empowerment is basic fairness and decency… Young girls should have the exact same opportunities that boys do to lead full and productive lives. But second, the empowerment of women is smart economics… studies show that investments in women yield large social and economic returns (Zoellick 2008).

Some critics argue that the Bank focuses on women as a means to an end goal of economic progress and development, and that such a focus is detrimental to its impact on women’s equal access and rights (Hales 2007). Such a critique cannot be leveled at the Bank’s gender rhetoric since Zoellick’s influence. Indeed in any document that has been produced since his time, the Bank has argued both that focusing on gender and gender mainstreaming policies are important for their own right and then secondly as smart economics. Further, gender equality as fair and right bolsters the conceptual argument that social norms cannot be separated out distinctly from moral norms or spliced up into disaggregated practices, behaviors, and/or beliefs.

Though Zoellick’s Presidency was not the first evidence of gender equality norms in the World Bank Group it did spark a concern that had not been evident to the extent that it became in planning for the IDA16 funding round which included measurable outcomes such as the writing of the WDR2012 to have a specific gender focus among other practices as outlined above. In the same way that Draper’s Administration in the UNDP influenced planning of gender mainstreaming into policies, increased positions for women in higher management because he placed them there, and a concerted effort to
include gender mainstreaming across the work of the organization, Zoellick’s Presidency tapped into the ability of the World Bank to increase its focus on gender equality even with the deep divide that exists between states in gender equality practices.

**GENDER EQUALITY IN ACTION**

This chapter shows that leadership influences policy under conditions in which the organization is willing to learn and incorporate new policies (such as gender equality) into practice, able to expand or change the original mandate, and in which leaders use collaborative and inspirational leadership in order to influence policy. It is evident that both organizations have a long way to go in overcoming the barriers to implementing gender equality norms, whatever the focus (whether on health or political participation). Within each organization, gender mainstreaming policies are weak and unevenly applied across departments and in country offices. This is partly due to the decentralized nature of the country office setting (under Zoellick’s leadership the World Bank started pursuing this structural decentralization in the same manner as the UNDP). But often this has to do with a simple lack of knowledge and understanding on how to incorporate these new norms into practice. One important element of norm emergence is trying to figure out how to put a new norm into practice and implement it. The best way for people to understand how to implement gender equality and gender mainstreaming techniques into their work is to understand what those techniques mean and how they should do it.

Increasing knowledge in the area of gender equality is as important as putting these
techniques into practice because it helps people working in development organizations understand how to practice gender mainstreaming and why it is important.

On promoting new and sensitive norms to states, and even to colleagues, my respondents indicated that it was a matter of waiting, a matter of knowing when the time was right, and a matter of giving the right information in the right way so that the ideas were comprehensible. In terms of gender equality this means taking into consideration the culture and the lack of knowledge as resistance, then thinking of entry points to address the lack of knowledge and to sensitize those who are not willing to consider gender equality or actions to overcome gender inequality. In cases where there is a cultural barrier, opening up the dialogue so that these issues can be addressed is most important. Leaders can be (and have to be) gender champions in order to overcome the cultural barriers to achieving gender mainstreaming in projects, gender equality, and gender parity within the organizations.

Both organizations are praised for their best practices: preparing gender guidance notes, facilitating knowledge-sharing networks, writing gender mainstreaming strategies at the operational level, and initiating in-house and independent evaluations of their gender mainstreaming progress. Yet both organizations’ evaluations find them lacking, both in the support they give to gender mainstreaming and in the very support for women’s equal opportunity (neither organization has achieved gender parity in management positions, though lower positions in the organizations changed throughout the 1990s and 2000s to increase the number of women).
Problems with implementing gender mainstreaming include the decentralized nature of the organization, lack of accountability of country staff, and cultural values and resistance because of cultural expectations of gender roles. If these organizations are to be taken seriously on gender equality both in development and in political representation, their own internal practices and allocations of resources to gender mainstreaming projects and research need to change to highlight gender parity. Gender parity must be met in all categories of jobs in both organizations. Resources must be allocated to initiating training on gender sensitive project management and budgeting, policies must be created that are followed both in country office and at headquarters, gender units should not be alone in implementing practices of gender equality—the very definition of mainstreaming is that it is implemented in such a way that it is naturally considered and enforced by all.

Without effective institutionalization and internalization of gender mainstreaming norms through the mechanisms of leadership climate and organizational ideology, diffusion of norms to states through development projects will be mixed, ineffectual, and unreliable. An important element of what the UNDP, the World Bank, and other development organizations do for promoting gender equality was creating constituencies that support gender equality.
CONCLUSION

The shift in development practice toward promoting governance intrigues many in development circles (Acamoglu and Robinson 2006, 2012; Ager 2000; Cheema 2000, 2003; Feingberg 2008; Kauffmann, Kray and Mastruzzi 2009). This dissertation argued that it is a puzzle that similarly placed international organizations articulate and promote governance norms differently despite similarities in history, mandate, and coordinated project implementation. It is odd that international development organizations take responsibility to promote governance to their member states when their Articles of Agreement and mandates clearly state that they should be apolitical organizations, offering aid to further development, not hindering or impinging upon state sovereignty. Indeed, the very essence of political behavior “is behavior which affects or is intended to affect the decisional outcomes of government” (Milbrath 1965).

Some have noted that international organizations who engage in government agencies are by definition political (Miller-Adams 1999), it is just that they cannot characterize their work as such. International organizations influence decisions made by a state’s executive, legislature, and judiciary concerning the provision of public goods and services to citizens. They provide advice on how to set up bureaucracies, and even how to run elections in the UNDP’s case. They have an enormous influence on the way that states govern their citizens. Of course, there are several ways to interpret the promotion of governance, including the suggestion that international development organizations
only offer advice when they are asked by states and that they do remain apolitical by not being involved in politics (that is, not supporting one party or political candidate over another).

And yet, international development organizations that promote governance do not have a clear, agreed upon understanding of what governance is and which norms should be promoted to states. They focus on different aspects of governance. The UNDP represents those organizations that interpret governance as connected to and ineluctably melded with democracy or demand-side governance (Coston 1998). On the other hand, international development organizations like the World Bank hold strongly to their original Articles of Agreement in the current democratizing age. They argue that good governance is about the efficient and effective provision of goods and services to a population. They support supply-side governance, encouraging states and their governments to act according to transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption efforts in order to create an environment for sustainable human development.

**REVIEW OF ARGUMENT AND FINDINGS**

International development organizations are certainly influenced in various ways by actors and events outside the walls and purview of the organization, yet the internal structure and leadership are most influential in norm articulation into policy and programming. Further, they also greatly affect the way that new norms and policies are implemented in the practice and funding of the organization. Indeed, leaders use their own personal influence to guide policy articulation in specific ways which is why
focusing on the organizational culture level of espoused beliefs and values (Schein 2004) is so important to this dissertation study. First, they sanction and reward employee behavior in order to make changes in the organization that they think are important. William H. Draper III provides an excellent example of this when he refused to sign projects or programs that did not include a consideration of how the project affected women and men differently (Browne 2011, 47).

Leaders influence policy through speeches and statements. James Wolfensohn’s support for anti-corruption measures, especially in the “Cancer of Corruption” speech, changed the way that the Bank spoke about governance and increased the Bank’s focus on and funding of anti-corruption policies and projects. This emphasized the participation norm as government efficiency and including stakeholders in decision making procedures. Most difficult to assess is the way that leaders collaborate with and lead ideas among employees on norm articulation or controlling employees with rules they create. Gus Speth and Lewis Preston represent leaders whose leadership style was collaborative. Many of the changes they made in their respective organizations were behind the scenes, collaborating with employees to encourage work and change. Despite the disparate nature of all these tactics, leaders use them to influence the way norms are articulated in policy.

However, the level of internalization that the norm has already taken in the organization has an effect on how influential the leadership can be (Schein 2004; Weaver 2008). Indeed, if a norm is internalized into policy and practice, the only thing a leader needs is a perfect moment (triggering event) to get it on the agenda and thus articulate the norm for policy and practice. Often this is done by highlighting international events in
speeches and statements, and then using the norm to interpret the event and suggest how the organization can change to follow certain practices that will make a difference in the way the organization handles the event.

My argument suggests that internal forces of the path-dependent nature of international organizations and leadership are more important in norm articulation than external forces. This goes against the traditional explanations of member state influence (Babb 2009; Pincus and Winters 2002; Toussaint 2008), transnational or national civil society influence (Covey 1998), or even more abstractly because of changes and shifts in the international system (Buira 2005). I argue that norms may indeed emerge from these places in international relations, but that the process of adoption and articulation within international organizations will be dependent on the path that the norm takes in the organization itself as well as on the leadership influence. My argument builds on those that have focused on the influence of the bureaucratic nature of international organizations on their behavior.

Further, this argument has implications for international organization autonomy. Based on the evidence I have uncovered concerning norm articulation, I argue that international organizations have a great deal of autonomy, especially when it comes to norm articulation and policy outcomes. It is evident that international actors influenced the way that international organizations think, act, and formulate policy. However, after the organization picks up the norm from international actors, it melds it to fit in with the shared beliefs, values, and practices already embedded in an organization. What is more,
the leadership can be very influential in pushing the organization to reinterpret the mandate or mission in order to articulate a new norm in policy and practice.

NORM INTERNALIZATION IN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The findings from this dissertation suggest that organizations internalize norms long before leaders articulate norms into policy so that policy and norm articulation follows practice. This is important to understand as it relates to how influential outside forces can be on norm articulation. It takes years in order for a norm to become integrated into the way people think and behave in their various roles in an organization, and then, at specific points in time, leaders are able to meld the beliefs and practices of an organization into the way that it talks about its own work and in the way that policies are written. This suggests that in order to change an organization to have it meet new needs in the international arena, it is necessary for the practice to become imbedded before trying to change rhetoric and policy statements.

We saw this trend both in the development of the gender equality norm and in the participation norm. For the World Bank, gender equality and participation slowly became integrated into the macroeconomic outlook and sectoral work that the organization did at the country level. More women and more citizens were consulted in development projects in the 1980s, largely having to do with social costs of structural adjustment and the understanding that new macroeconomic policies had some very consequential, if unintended, impacts on citizens. Including them in discussions was a way to ameliorate these negative impacts. Later, in the 1990s, Wolfensohn made this a specific policy and
practice of the organization by incorporating civil society participation into the CDF and its associated participatory documents, the CASs and PRSPs.

Because participation and concern for civil society had been developing throughout the 1970s and 80s in the World Bank’s practice at the country level, the leaders were then able to take up the idea and form it into specific policies and make it a very clear element of how the Bank worked with countries. In the same way, gender equality filtered into the practice of the World Bank through the sectoral practices, thus we see that gender equality is couched mostly as “smart economics,” in terms of integrating women into economic sectors, and in terms of making sure that government supplies certain goods and services to women that are needed.

The UNDP’s story is somewhat different in the way that the norms were articulated into the organization because it got a new lease on life in the 1980s when Draper turned the organization from a funding agency to an actual development implementing agency. That meant that there was a clean slate to work with, and Draper took advantage by both challenging the nature of development thinking through the human development report, and creating practices in the organization that took on a very path-dependent character. On gender equality, Draper made sure that each project contained a consideration of how the development loans and implementation would affect genders differently. He hired women to authoritative positions and set in motion an organizational strategy to strive for gender parity at all employment levels.

The Human Development paradigm drastically refocused UNDP’s work on demand-side governance by suggesting that development was actually about human
freedom and choice. Thus, subsequent versions of what the UNDP did always focused on creating a society that was aiding people (of all genders) to participate in all aspects. Participation came to be focused on participation in government through democratic processes of voting, influence, running for office. Administrators that came after Draper proved influential in making sure that the UNDP met that idea of supporting democracy around the world, most notably with Gustaf Speth’s support for an “enabling environment” and Mark Malloch Brown’s unhindered language of support for “democratic governance.”

International organizations articulate norms in policy outcomes, a process that affects the way that the organization interacts and influences state behavior. The implications suggest that international organizations are not only autonomous entities, but create their own ideas about governance norms they promote to states rather than taking cues from member states or transnational civil society. This means that norms shift and change between the times when actors encourage international organizations to promote norms, and the norms international organizations actually promote. I have added to the literature on norm promotion through international organizations (Legro 1997; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Park 2006) by focusing specifically on how the embeddedness of the norms in the organizational practices and policies, along with the influence of leadership through specific mechanisms, influences norm articulation.
LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE ON NORM ARTICULATION

Leaders influence the articulation of the norm and its importance for the organization, thus solidifying the practice for future theory and practice within the organization. While donors, member states, civil society, and the changing nature of international relations are also important, they usually have little influence over the way that the organization articulates a norm into policy and pursues it in practice. The evidence presented here shows that the typical studies that focus narrowly on bureaucratic nature and systemic levels of analysis (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Weaver 2006) miss out on important influence of individual actors. Indeed, those authors do discuss leaders, but discuss them in the context of a system in which they are forced to act rather than as their own independent variables.

As we have seen, the structure of the organization dictates the way that policy can change and often indicates the ability of an organization to change or reinterpret its mandate. In the UNDP’s case, the mandate was heavily dependent on the changing nature of Resolutions coming from UNGA and ECOSOC, and thus UNDP was able to revise its stance on governance. But differences within member states represented by UNGA and ECOSOC showed that UNDP would also have to take its own stand on what it thought governance norms should be. In this respect, the leaders of the organization made that difference. William H. Draper III started it off with a complete overhaul of the organization in the 1980s, turning it from a funding agency to an advocacy agency and getting the staff to rally behind a development paradigm that they could support. He hired new staff to articulate the new version of development. The human development
paradigm now rivals the development focus on economic structures and growth by arguing that human freedoms and choices are the ends and the means of development work. Gustaf Speth and Mark Malloch Brown further solidified this new paradigm of development and inspired the UNDP to promote governance to states that focused on the individual’s freedoms.

Because of the strong leadership influence, backed by the Executive Board and by the UNGA and ECOSOC, the UNDP now promotes democratic governance and democracy around the world. Leaders in the organization who were collaborative with some controlling tactics generally led the organization to fill that role in international politics. Indeed, Mark Malloch Brown’s strong belief in democracy and use of language to that effect did much for instilling in the organization a sense that the UNDP’s comparative advantage was democracy promotion through technical assistance and advice.

The leaders of the World Bank, along with its intractable hierarchical culture, made governance promotion a very different phenomenon for the Bank. Indeed, the Bank shied away from discussions of governance up until the late 1980s, early 1990s when it appeared inevitable that the Bank would be drawn into such development issues because of the impact of its SAPs policies. It was Lewis Preston and James Wolfensohn who had the biggest impacts on how governance was to be articulated in the Bank. Preston came in to lead the Bank in a very tumultuous time, when it seemed that the world was democratizing at the end of the Cold War and the fall of Apartheid. In the 1980s,
developing countries reached such a degree of social misery they argued were caused by World Bank loan conditionalities (SAPs) and criticism was at its height.

But it was really James Wolfensohn that defined governance for the Bank, with his concern for inclusion of civil society in government decision-making and his belief that corruption hindered the success of development and the impact of the Bank around the world. His “Cancer of Corruption” speech is still cited as the turning point for the Bank on governance policy. While the Bank had been working with governments since the 1980s on creating practices in which countries were transparent and accountable to citizens, it was not an openly discussed topic until Wolfensohn’s vision and leadership made it so. In fact, after corruption became an open topic between World Bank and country Finance Ministries, government public servants would come to the World Bank country offices and thank the Bank employees for finally making a stand concerning corruption issues.

For most of its history, the Bank has shied away from discussing political governance openly, choosing to focus on supply-side governance and how to make government more efficient and effective in the delivery of public goods and services. Yet, norms and practice change on a daily basis and the Bank’s move toward open support for democracy and democratic ideals in recent years of the latter 2001s is interesting and surprising. Indeed, it currently is supporting measures in some states for instituting democratic governance and has beefed up its direct support for civil society.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

This dissertation analyzed the extent to which the articulation of a norm into the policies of an international development organization, along with the influence of top leaders in an organization, influence the way that governance norms are articulated in policy. It finds some strong conclusions that indeed, from the moment the norm begins to be articulated in policy, a path-dependence runs through the articulation of the norm so that each successive step in the articulation of the norm depends on the last. Further, leaders influence norm articulation through speeches and statements and in the way that they work with employees of the organization. Their own beliefs and ideals then make an indelible impression on the policy and practice of governance norms.

The implications are threefold. First, those actors outside powerful development organizations who wish to make a difference in policy, either in the creation of policy or changing current policy, must understand the beliefs, values, and current practices of the organization. One way to understand extant beliefs of the organization is by considering the multitude of publications, statements, guidance notes, policies, and knowledge products that an organization produces. While they vary in authors and influence, they will betray a guiding understanding of what constitutes a particular norm. Actors wishing to influence international development organization policy should also understand the impact and influence of a leader in that organization, noting whether or not the leader is accepted, trusted, and respected by his or her peers. Making change in an international development organization means assessing the extent to which the norm is already
embedded in the practice and beliefs of the people who work in the organization. Then it is important to get it on the agenda through leadership support.

Second, no matter the documents and statements that these organizations sign on the international level, they will implement the ideas in ways that the organization leads. This is crucial for the influence that international development organizations have on nation-states. If these organizations really want to meet development goals, end poverty, or reduce inequalities, then they should come together more often to plan what they mean by, for instance, governance, or any other issue so heavily connected with development.

Third, changes to how international organizations promote governance policy go through a sometimes long and tedious process of internalization and consensus-making in the organization, even before being written into policy. Further, the way that the norm is articulated in policy depends not on international agreements or pressure from member states; rather it depends on the type of consensus already agreed upon in practice in the organization. It also depends on leadership to capitalize on that consensus, using triggering events to get the idea out of practice into rhetoric. These findings may be applicable and important for discussion and contention in the Sustainable Development Goal Review process going on at the moment. Governance as a goal that will be part of what replaces the MDGs is a contentious topic because it does not have worldwide support from member countries, but also because there is very little that binds governance and a cohesive concept. Practices that are already embedded within these organizations that are currently part of the Sustainable Development Goal Review process will be more likely to be accepted and actually implemented than any new ideas and thoughts leaders
or countries might have. Thus, building on extant goals and current accepted practice may be the most influential way to introduce governance goals into the new development goal framework.

Some of the limitations in the study of the process of norm internalization within an organization are insurmountable. For constructivists, it is difficult to study the beliefs of individuals within an organization at a certain time, studying such variables through the process of triangulation, makes the endeavor more difficult if the study is being done after the time period is over. The interviews conducted for this research included people who came to the UNDP or World Bank within the last 5-10 years, making it impossible for them to speak of the organization as it was in the 1980s or 90s. Furthermore, the few exceptions of interviewees who had worked at the organization longer than that did not really recollect or remember what the organization was like at the time, or could not speak to my questions on norm influence because they had been involved in lower level administration work in the early years. Moreover, an individual’s memory is rather unreliable and therefore does not offer a full understanding of the organization as it was. Further, many of my respondents preferred not to be quoted but were more than willing to help in uncovering the institutional processes and policy processes of the organizations.

Based on the above limitations on understanding the beliefs and social context of an organization in periods of time before the immediate present, the nature of this research shifted to examine the policy making process with a view to showing that constructivist elements, such as beliefs and values, influenced that process. The
dissertation relied on interviews, document analysis, and historical process-tracing to indicate which elements of leadership style and influence were most important in the process of creating policy in the international organization.

An agenda for future research is assessing the actual impact of governance policies on state behavior and development outcomes. This is an ongoing subject for study, but still needs further research, especially empirically. Much academic work has been written on the connection between governance, democracy and development, but much of it is theoretical in nature, saying nothing of the actual impact that governance policies have on states’ prospects and movement toward achieving development outcomes. Hopefully this dissertation will spur further interest in such research so that our understanding of the policies that lead to achieving development outcomes can be further solidified. At the same time, development is a local issue and perhaps finding grand policies, even ambiguous guidance policies, will not bring the development community closer to achieving its goals. As the participation studies show, perhaps bottom-up approaches are the best answer for development. If this is true, then international development organizations may be doing more harm than good in promoting governance, and should rather strive to achieve limited goals while allowing states or local government actors to make the real governance changes.
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———. 1989a. Second Committee 30th meeting held on Friday, 3 November General Assembly Forty-Fourth Session A/C.2/44/SR.30.

———. 1989b. Second Committee 38th meeting held on Friday, 17 November General Assembly Forty-Fourth Session A/C.2/44/SR.38.

———. 1990. Second Committee 33rd meeting held on Tuesday, 6 November General Assembly Forty-Fifth Session A/C.2/45/SR.33

———. 1992. Second Committee 30th meeting held on Friday, 26 October General Assembly Forty-Seventh Session A/C.2/47/SR.21


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http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx.


APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: INTERVIEWS

31. Weaver, Catherine. Author, Associate Professor of Public Affairs, *Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin*. May 1, 2013.
APPENDIX II: DATA

Table A.1: Quantitative Content Analysis of the UNDP Annual Reports
(Data for Figure 3.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Annual Report</th>
<th>Democratic Governance Keywords Total</th>
<th>Good Governance Keywords Total</th>
<th>Total word count for Both</th>
<th>Percentage of Democratic Governance Keywords</th>
<th>Percentage of Good Governance Keywords</th>
<th>Percentage in Favor of Democratic versus Good Governance Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>63.13%</td>
<td>36.88%</td>
<td>26.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>54.20%</td>
<td>45.80%</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>59.68%</td>
<td>40.32%</td>
<td>19.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>53.62%</td>
<td>46.38%</td>
<td>7.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>50.51%</td>
<td>49.49%</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>60.34%</td>
<td>39.66%</td>
<td>20.68%</td>
</tr>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>52.91%</td>
<td>47.09%</td>
<td>5.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>49.86%</td>
<td>50.14%</td>
<td>-0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>214</td>
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<td>60.75%</td>
<td>-21.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>142</td>
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<td>317</td>
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<td>-10.41%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>46.38%</td>
<td>53.62%</td>
<td>-7.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>47.24%</td>
<td>52.76%</td>
<td>-5.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>40.98%</td>
<td>59.02%</td>
<td>-18.05%</td>
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Table A.2: Quantitative Content Analysis of the UNDP Human Development Reports
(Data for Figure 3.2)

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<th>HDRs</th>
<th>Democratic Governance Keywords Total</th>
<th>Good Governance Keywords Total</th>
<th>Total word count for Both</th>
<th>Percentage of Democratic Governance Keywords</th>
<th>Percentage of Good Governance Keywords</th>
<th>Percentage in Favor of Democratic versus Good Governance Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>0.577990431</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<td>0.618343195</td>
<td>0.381656805</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>651</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>1423</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>903</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>282</td>
<td>1088</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>1117</td>
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<td>897</td>
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<td>1291</td>
<td>0.694810225</td>
<td>0.305189775</td>
<td>38.96%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Programme Expenditure Distribution by Focus Area</td>
<td>Programme Expenditure (in millions)</td>
<td>Total Programme Expenditure (in millions)</td>
<td>Percentage of Total Loans</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Fostering Democratic Governance</td>
<td>$987</td>
<td>$4,074</td>
<td>24.23%</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>Fostering Democratic Governance</td>
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<td>$4,608</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>Democratic Governance</td>
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<td>43.26%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>$3,000</td>
<td>46.50%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>$3,000+</td>
<td>~ 36.25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>$3,000+</td>
<td>~ 36.25%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>$744</td>
<td>$1,850</td>
<td>40.22%</td>
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</table>

97 The 2007 Annual Report gives an average of governance spending for 2002-2007 as 36.25% but the Annual Reports for the years 2003-2004 fail to give specific breakdowns on governance spending like all the other Annual Reports from 2002 on.
Table A.4: Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank Annual Reports  
(Data for Figure 3.4)

<table>
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<th>Year of the Report</th>
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<th>Percentage of Good Governance Keywords</th>
<th>Percentage in Favor of Democratic versus Good Governance Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1004</td>
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<td>82.17%</td>
<td>-64.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1114</td>
<td>17.86%</td>
<td>82.14%</td>
<td>-64.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>22.32%</td>
<td>77.68%</td>
<td>-55.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>659</td>
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<td>20.02%</td>
<td>79.98%</td>
<td>-59.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>253</td>
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<td>35.79%</td>
<td>64.21%</td>
<td>-28.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>26.02%</td>
<td>73.98%</td>
<td>-47.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>25.67%</td>
<td>74.33%</td>
<td>-48.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>594</td>
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<td>83.16%</td>
<td>-66.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>137</td>
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<td>61.43%</td>
<td>-22.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>215</td>
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<td>76.79%</td>
<td>-53.57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>55.81%</td>
<td>-11.63%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>25.60%</td>
<td>74.40%</td>
<td>-48.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.5: Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank Development Reports  
(Data for Figure 3.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WDRs</th>
<th>Democratic Governance Keywords Total</th>
<th>Good Governance Keywords Total</th>
<th>Total word count for Both</th>
<th>Percentage of Democratic Governance Keywords</th>
<th>Percentage of Good Governance Keywords</th>
<th>Percentage in Favor of Democratic versus Good Governance Keywords</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>9.93%</td>
<td>90.07%</td>
<td>-80.14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>891</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
<td>85.10%</td>
<td>-70.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>82.79%</td>
<td>-65.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>-75.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>88.48%</td>
<td>-76.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>18.04%</td>
<td>81.96%</td>
<td>-63.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>12.69%</td>
<td>87.31%</td>
<td>-74.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2401</td>
<td>17.49%</td>
<td>82.51%</td>
<td>-65.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>50.40%</td>
<td>49.60%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>453</td>
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<td>2029</td>
<td>22.33%</td>
<td>77.67%</td>
<td>-55.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1515</td>
<td>2033</td>
<td>25.48%</td>
<td>74.52%</td>
<td>-49.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>2439</td>
<td>30.22%</td>
<td>69.78%</td>
<td>-39.57%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table A.6: World Bank Good Governance Expenditure as Percentage of Total
(Data for Figure 3.6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sector representing governance Loans</th>
<th>Governance loan Amount (in millions)</th>
<th>Total Loans (in millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law, and Justice</td>
<td>$8,728</td>
<td>$35,335</td>
<td>24.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law, and Justice</td>
<td>$9,673</td>
<td>$43,006</td>
<td>22.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law, and Justice</td>
<td>$10,828</td>
<td>$58,747</td>
<td>18.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law, and Justice</td>
<td>$9,492</td>
<td>$46,906</td>
<td>20.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law, and Justice</td>
<td>$5,296</td>
<td>$24,702</td>
<td>21.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Public Administration, Law, and Justice</td>
<td>$5,468</td>
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<td>22.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Law, Justice and Public Administration</td>
<td>$5,857</td>
<td>$23,641</td>
<td>24.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Law, Justice and Public Administration</td>
<td>$5,569</td>
<td>$22,307</td>
<td>24.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Law, Justice and Public Administration</td>
<td>$4,978</td>
<td>$20,079</td>
<td>24.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Law, Justice and Public Administration</td>
<td>$3,956</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Law, Justice and Public Administration</td>
<td>$5,351</td>
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<td>Law, Justice and Public Administration</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Public Sector Management</td>
<td>$4,525</td>
<td>$15,276</td>
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</tr>
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</table>