Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil Peace

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Winning Well: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success, Democracy, and Civil Peace

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Abstract

Several recent studies indicate that revolutions of non-violent civil resistance lead to more democratic and peaceful political transitions than either violent revolutions or elite-led political transitions. However, this general trend has not been disaggregated to explain the many prominent cases where nonviolent revolutions are followed by authoritarianism or civil war. Understanding these divergent cases is critical, particularly in light of the problematic transitions following the "Arab Spring" revolutions of 2011. In this paper I explain why nonviolent revolutions sometimes lead to these negative outcomes. I show, through quantitative analysis of a dataset of all successful non-violent revolutions from 1900-2006 and comparative case studies of the revolutions in Egypt and Yemen, that the mechanism of success whereby the non-violent revolution achieves its goals, such as an negotiation, election, or coup d’etat, has a significant impact on the likelihood of democracy and civil war. Most centrally, mechanisms which involve pre-transition capacity-building, civil resistance campaign initiative, and broad political consensus are significantly more likely to lead to democracy and peace. This research has powerful implications for understanding both the options available to non-violent activists seeking revolutionary goals and the choices likely to lead to optimal outcomes during the post-revolutionary transition.
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**Introduction: When the Revolution Wins**

As, in a quavering voice, the vice-president of Egypt officially announced that Hosni Mubarak, authoritarian president of Egypt since 1981, was stepping down immediately, the crowds in Tahrir Square erupted. For 18 days, despite repression and concession, despite tear gas and thugs on camel-back, despite the regime repeatedly assuring them that their demands had been heard and there was no point in remaining in the streets, they had stayed. They were tired of assurances, tired of fear, tired of a country where the most central facts were unemployment, poverty, and a criminal government. And now, through their steadfastness, they had nonviolently ousted the regime that had ruled longer than many of the protesters could remember. Around the world commentators talked about the hope of Egypt, of a new prosperous society united across social and religious divides, led by passionate young liberal technocrats from Google.

Yet over the following months the military regime which replaced Mubarak, headed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), backtracked on their support for the revolution. Thousands of civilians were arrested, sometimes tortured, and sentenced in quick, secretive courts. Promises of democracy were hampered by guarantees of military immunity and the continued preferential treatment of old regime elites. And when Egypt’s first free and fair presidential election in history brought the
Muslim Brotherhood to power, conflict grew. Clashes between Christians and Muslims in Egypt became increasingly common.

Finally in July 2013, after protests of an almost unprecedented size and scope,\(^1\) the military once again stepped in and ousted the elected government in a popularly-backed coup d’etat. This second coup has been followed by months of violent clashes between brotherhood supporters and the military, with little indication of the possibility of a long-term sustainable solution. As the third anniversary of the Egyptian revolution passed, Amnesty International bleakly observed that “the revolt’s causes not only remain but in some cases have grown more acute…the motto of the uprising, ‘bread, freedom, social justice,’ rings hollow” (Amnesty International, 2014, 5). Three years of revolution have left many Egyptians wondering what went wrong and if it any of it was worth the sacrifices they endured to make it happen.

Many have speculated on what happened to that hopeful moment in 2011. Perhaps it was an incompatibility of Islam with democracy, or the continuing influence of authoritarian elements, or maybe the destructive history of the totalitarian regime which preceded the revolution. But what much of this analysis misses is that Egypt, and several similar cases from the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, are part of a much larger historical trend. Since the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century there have been over eighty successful nonviolent campaigns that have ousted a government, expelled an occupying

\(^1\) Media estimates range from the millions to the tens of millions, numbers which, if accurate, would account for almost a third of Egypt’s population and make the June 2013 protests among the largest in history.
power, or seceded from a nation-state. Of these cases, over a quarter were followed by major episodes of political violence, and more than a third failed to transition to democracy.\(^2\) Why is this the case? Why are successful nonviolent revolutions sometimes followed by autocracy and violence?

This historical trend is made more puzzling because several studies have shown that political transitions initiated by revolutions of nonviolent civil resistance tend to result in greater peace and democracy over the long term than other kinds of transitions. Theorists of civil resistance contend that the dynamics of nonviolent struggle inherently incline societies towards democracy since they diffuse power throughout many different societal actors (Sharp 1973). Transitions initiated by nonviolent campaigns are more likely to be democratic and internally peaceful than transitions initiated by violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), more likely to be democratic than transitions orchestrated by elites (Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005) and more likely than violent campaigns to lead to democracy than a new autocracy (Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch 2013). If these studies are accurate, what explains the widespread occurrence of exceptions to this trend?

In this thesis I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in how the civil resistance campaign achieves its goals. These mechanisms of success play a central role in shaping the nature of the political transition process which follows them as the various strategic actors in the transition process respond to the initial stimulus of the mechanism of success.

\(^2\) See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the data informing these figures.
in consistent, path-dependent fashion. Like a chess game between grandmasters in which the opening sequence shapes the rest of the game so mechanisms of success inform and confine the strategic decisions throughout the transition process. These decisions in turn dramatically shape the likelihood that the transition will be characterized by violence and what political system will be established at its conclusion.

The first step in my argument is an examination of the previous literature on civil resistance. I find that while the civil resistance literature convincingly argues for the positive effects of nonviolent action on society its underlying theory of power, informed by the work of Gene Sharp, makes it ill-equipped to consider the future effects of successful civil resistance campaigns. In addition the empirical work on civil resistance has been primarily concerned with explaining civil resistance success and has not disaggregated the set of successful campaigns in order to understand the variation which is clearly observed in their outcomes. Thus I find the extant literature to be insufficient to answer my question.

Having established the necessity for my project based on these gaps in the literature I then explain the nature of the various mechanisms of success and lay out the essential characteristics which separate them from one another. Informed by theories of nonviolent action as well as scholarly accounts and primary sources I present a six-tiered typology of mechanisms of success which captures all of the variation in the historical cases. I argue that transitions which are characterized by three factors: campaign initiative, broad political consensus, and pre-success political capacity-building are likely
to initiate transition processes which will not lead to violence and which will result in more democratic future societies.

This argument is not intended to be a generalized theory of either democratization or political violence, but rather is limited in scope to the particular conditions following the success of a civil resistance campaign. I do not preclude the possibility that mechanisms of success may play an important role in other types of transitions. Studying their effects in these different environments would doubtless be a fruitful avenue of research. However, following the insights of Johnstad (2010) and Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005) I consider successful civil resistance campaigns to have a distinct transitional path, with its own dynamics dissimilar from the larger set of regime transitions. Hence, because of this uniqueness, I limit the scope of my argument to transitions following successful civil resistance campaigns.

I test my theory using an original dataset of successful civil resistance campaigns, their mechanisms of success and future levels of democracy and violence. I find that, while the small size of the dataset makes statistical results somewhat unstable, the data is strongly suggestive of my theory. Mechanisms of success which possess my three essential factors, namely negotiations and electoral victories, are significantly associated with higher levels of post-campaign democracy and lower levels of violence. These results continue to hold when a series of control variables informed by the literature on democratization and civil war are included to test for alternate explanations.

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3 For example see Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014.
I bolster my statistical findings through an examination of two contemporary cases: the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Yemen. Traditional explanatory variables for democracy and civil peace would suggest that the transition in Egypt would be more peaceful and democratic, while Yemen would be likely to be characterized by violence and a return to authoritarianism. In contrast, while both transitions are preliminary at this point, the Yemeni transition has been much smoother and more inclusive and the Egyptian transition has resulting in authoritarian retrenchment and increasing political violence. This difference can be explained in large part by the difference in the two cases’ mechanisms of success.

Finally, I conclude by re-stating my argument in light of my findings and laying out areas of research which remain to be examined and other crucial questions which can be fruitfully pursued in this important area of research.
Chapter One: Civil Resistance, Democracy, and Civil Peace

In this chapter I review the major literature on civil resistance and its effects. I follow this general review with a more in-depth analysis of the theoretical work of Gene Sharp (1973, 2004) which has informed much of the civil resistance literature, emphasizing the four mechanisms of success which Sharp postulates based on his theory of power. I critique Sharp’s exclusive focus on the ability of civil resistance to degrade existing structures of power without taking into account the new power structures which must replace those degraded, a bipolar focus on struggle between the nonviolent campaign and the regime which does not take into account other actors’ agency, as well as the lack of empirical parsimony in his discussion of mechanisms of success. I propose instead a more empirically-grounded theory of success mechanisms which connects the initial insights of Sharp’s theory to the historical record of successful civil resistance campaigns.

Civil Resistance: From Pacifism to Pragmatism

Nonviolent resistance has been a facet of many political systems for much of human history, even as early as ancient Rome (Sharp, 1973, 75-76). Civil resistance has played an important role in several struggles of national liberation (Bartkowski, 2013), including the American Revolution (Conser Jr., McCarthy, Toscano, & Sharp, 1986). More recently, civil resistance campaigns were a major factor in the end of the
Communist regimes of Eastern Europe (Garton Ash, 1990), the spread of multi-party democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997), and the overthrow of authoritarian leaders in the post-Communist “color revolutions” (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011). Thus, understanding the occurrence and success of civil resistance is of central importance for political scientists. However, the clear theoretical articulation and careful scientific study of civil resistance has lagged significantly behind its historical importance.

Early literature on civil resistance came primarily from ideological pacifists. Henry David Thoreau articulated a theory of civil disobedience as “gumming the wheels” of an unjust system (Thoreau, 2004). Adin Ballou, a Unitarian minister and anti-slavery activist, wrote extensively on the ethical duty of Christians to reject the use of violence based on Jesus’ teaching in the Sermon on the Mount to “not resist one who is evil” (Matthew 5:39 English Standard Version) and argued for the potential of achieving political goals through nonviolent means (Ballou, 2003). Ballou’s works were an inspiration to the Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy, who drew on them in his writings on pacifism; most famously The Kingdom of God is Within You (Tolstoy, 1927).

Tolstoy’s works in turn served as a central inspiration in the intellectual development of the 20th century’s greatest theorist and practitioner of nonviolent resistance: Mohandas “Mahatma” Gandhi. Gandhi and Tolstoy corresponded extensively early in the Indian independence leader’s life (Gandhi, 1983). This correspondence,
along with *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, formed much of the basis for Gandhi’s development of the idea of *satyagraha*, or “soul force,” whereby a nonviolent contender willing to take on suffering for the sake of a goal is able to both undermine and win over his opponent. Gandhi wrote extensively on Satyagraha in the context of the Indian struggle for independence (Gandhi, 1958), and his example spawned its own literature, with many works both in India and internationally drawing upon his ideas and practices. Other well-known practitioners of civil resistance such as Vaclav Havel (2009) and Aung San Suu Kyi (1995) have also written influential works which combine both normative and pragmatic arguments on the use of civil resistance as a tool to fight political oppression. Yet while these pacifist and practitioner works provide inspiring narrative and compelling normative arguments in large part they fail to approach civil resistance from an objective or scientific viewpoint and are more interested in advocating for nonviolence rather than understanding it.

Academic literature on civil resistance largely springs from the work of Gene Sharp. Sharp marries Gandhi’s strategic insights with insights into the nature of political power from thinkers such as Machiavelli and Etienne La Boetie. He argues that power is not a constant quality which a leader possesses but one which requires constant replenishment through the consent and cooperation of the governed. Nonviolent action overcomes powerful leaders and achieves revolutionary change through organizing

\[\text{\footnotesize 4 See, for example Bondurant 1958, Dalton 1993, Klitgaard 1971, Sharp 1960, Sharp 1979, and Shridharani 1939.}\]
collective dissent which dissolves the leader’s power (Sharp 1973). Sharp outlines 198 methods of protest, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention which can all be used to achieve this collective dissent.

Sharp and later Helvey (2004) particularly emphasize the ability of nonviolent action to undermine the power of regimes through co-opting their “pillars of support.” These “pillars” are the social and political institutions through which a political regime maintains its power and through whom consent and thus political authority are channeled. Armed struggle pursues a strategy of either annihilating the opponent’s “pillars” in order to coerce them to surrender (traditional warfare) or of eliminating the leadership of the regime through violence and assuming control over the pillars which remain (guerilla warfare). These destructive strategies are necessary because violent resistance is likely to consolidate regime opposition through a “rally round the flag” effect since most members of the “pillars” are physically threatened by the armed struggle. In contrast, nonviolent resistance pursues a bottom-up strategy of weaning the support of the “pillars” away from the regime, dissolving its power.

Sharp’s theoretical work is very strongly focused on individual agency. His basic argument is that nonviolent action has the potential to both occur and successfully achieve change no matter the circumstances. Thus Sharp discounts the kinds of preconditions which have been typically used to explain the occurrence of nonviolent political contention such as an “open” political opportunity structure (Eisinger, 1973) or
pre-existing organizational networks (McAdam, 1982). He also is less concerned with the challenge of revolutionary dissent as a collective action “rebel’s dilemma” which requires incentive-based strategies in order to succeed (Lichbach, 1995). From Sharp’s perspective, the inherent fluidity of power means that nonviolent action is possible and may even succeed under any circumstances, even when objective political opportunities may not exist (Kurzman, 1996). Sharp’s key scope conditions for limiting the possibility of nonviolent action thus rest almost entirely on the action’s possible participants. If they are able to prevent fear and adequately strategize for success then they are likely to devise methods for organizing dissent and achieving political goals.

Sharp’s work was not particularly influential upon its publication but has stood the test of time as one of the clearest formulations of how nonviolent methods of struggle are able to achieve change, and has inspired several works which draw upon his insights. Boserup and Mack (1974) use Clausewitzian strategic analysis to argue for the possibility of the use of nonviolent “weapons systems” in national defense. Ackerman and Kruegler (1993) develop a 12-point agenda of strategic factors which they find crucial for success in six case studies of nonviolent action. Schock (2005) connects Sharp’s insights on the nature of power with theories on mobilization and social movements from sources such as McAdam (1982), Tarrow (1998) and Tilly (1978). Mattaini builds on Sharp’s insights using behavioral systems science (Mattaini, 2013). Sharp’s work has also been used as a source to develop a practical toolkit for civil resistance by practitioners seeking to achieve political change (Popovic, Djinovic, Miliojevic, Merriman, & Marovic, 2007).
Others have critiqued Sharp’s approach for failing to take into account the structural causes of consent (Burrowes, 1996), being overly dismissive of the importance of “principled” nonviolence (Weber, 2003) or reinforcing an agenda of global neoliberalism (Chabot & Sharifi, 2013).

Sharp has also been used as a foundation in the empirical literature on civil resistance, which most frequently seeks to explain the onset of and factors of success in civil resistance campaigns. The authors in Zunes, Kurtz and Asher (1999) use a wide variety of cases to point to the geographical dispersion and frequency of campaigns of nonviolent action. The authors in Bartkowski (2013) examine the role of civil resistance in various national liberation struggles. The authors in Roberts and Garton Ash (2009) similarly present a wide variety of cases to show the various forms that civil resistance has taken around the globe. And Shaykhutdinov (2010) uses quantitative analysis to show the superior ability of nonviolent resistance to successfully achieve territorial autonomy arrangements. An extensive literature has also developed around particular prominent cases of civil resistance, often with a regional comparative analysis component.\(^5\)

The most central question examined in the literature has been the factors in or corollaries of nonviolent action which lead to its success. The literature’s primary task

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has often been portrayed as overcoming a bias towards violence common in the broader literature on political struggle and arguing that nonviolent action may be effective, perhaps even more effective than violent action (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Various authors have pointed to security force defection and elite division (Nepstad, 2011), resilience and tactical innovation (Schock, 2005), relationships of direct dependency (Summy, 1994) and broad, diverse participation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) as critical factors in explaining success.

Most works have relied on simple case narratives or comparative case studies. In contrast, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) use a comprehensive dataset of the global population of nonviolent and violent campaigns from 1900-2006 to show that nonviolent campaigns are not only frequently successful but are, in fact, more than twice as successful on average as violent campaigns. Critical in explaining this success is the nonviolent campaign’s ability to achieve broad participation. Following Sharp and Helvey, Chenoweth and Stephan argue that as higher levels of participation increase the likelihood of members of the campaign linking to the opponent regime’s “pillars of support” and thus undermining the regime’s power.

*After Civil Resistance: The Puzzle*

The contributions of this burgeoning literature on promoting a better understanding of civil resistance cannot be overstated. However, this focus on strategic success as the key dependent variable means that most of the literature has either failed to
explain the future effects of successful civil resistance campaigns. Exceptions to this rule are Sharp (1973), Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch (2013). All four of these argue that not only does civil resistance work but its effect over the long run is positive. Sharp (1973) argues that the participation in a civil resistance campaign has a power-diffusing effect across society. This effect means that people in a society which has experienced a successful civil resistance campaign are unlikely to allow new autocracies to arise. Ackerman and Karatnycky, using data from Freedom House, show that political transitions which follow successful civil resistance campaigns are much more likely than elite-led transitions to result in democracy. Chenoweth and Stephan show through their dataset that successful nonviolent campaigns tend to lead to much higher levels of democracy and civil peace than violent campaigns. And Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch similarly find that successful civil resistance campaigns have a positive effect on future levels of democracy.

These findings contrast with arguments on democratic transitions from the seminal work of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986). While not directly addressing the violence-nonviolence paradigm, O’Donnell and Schmitter’s insight from various transitions from authoritarianism to democracy is that a peaceful transition with a democratic outcome is most likely to occur through a “pacted” transition process. Through this “pact” regime moderates come to an agreement with opposition elites to gradually liberalize the political system. In exchange, regime moderates restrain “hard-
liners” while opposition elites suppress the rise of civil society and non-institutionalized dissent. Collective mass dissent of the type imagined by Sharp and described by Chenoweth and Stephan is seen as a dangerous hindrance to a smooth democratic transition rather than a positive driving force towards peace and democracy.

Support for O’Donnell and Schmitter’s skepticism towards mass action can be found in the multiple cases of successful civil resistance campaigns which have resulted in significant levels of violence and reverted to autocracy. While the most prominent case is the 1979 revolution in Iran, others that could be pointed to include the nonviolent uprising against President Jaafar Nimeiry of Sudan or the student uprising against President Syngman Rhee of South Korea. These and many other cases of successful campaigns of civil resistance failed to follow the general trend of successful civil resistance leading to democracy and peace. This extreme variance calls for disaggregation of the subset of successful civil resistance campaigns to explain it. What caveats are necessary in the civil resistance literature to explain why nonviolent activists sometimes “win well” and sometimes fail to do so?

One potential explanatory variable comes from Bunce and Wolchik’s (2011) work on the various “color revolutions” in the post-Communist world. As part of their examination of this set of cases Bunce and Wolchik seek to explain the variation in future levels of democracy. Among other factors, they find that the mechanism of success used to overthrow the authoritarian regime had strong effects on future levels of democracy.
Their cases followed two types of transition mechanisms. First, elections, in which the opposition ousted the authoritarian leader through a free and fair presidential election (often obtained and ensured through the use of protests and other forms of civil resistance). Second, elite coups, which Bunce and Wolchik describe as “extra-legal seizures of power that did not use democratic methods to achieve democratic outcomes” (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011, 324) The first led to more democratic outcomes, Bunce and Wolchik argue, because preparation for the election required civil society mobilization and opposition capacity building which were later critical in maintaining a successful democracy. In contrast, elite coups led to a transition characterized by a weak civil society and fractured opposition which was unable to consolidate its initial democratic breakthrough.

If mechanisms of success are important, and may provide insight into solving the puzzle of why successful nonviolent revolutions are followed by civil war and authoritarianism, how can the civil resistance literature use this insight to solve this puzzle? What tools currently exist within the literature to tackle this approach?

*Sharp’s Mechanisms and the Need for New Mechanisms of Success*

In the literature on civil resistance the question of transition mechanisms has been most comprehensively addressed in the work of Gene Sharp, mentioned above. Sharp addresses the question of transition mechanisms with a four-fold typology of “mechanisms of success” whereby nonviolent movements can achieve their goals. His
typology flows directly from his consent-based theory of power and is best understood in terms of that theory.

Sharp’s first mechanism of success is “conversion” (Sharp 1973, 2005), and is a close corollary to Gandhi’s idea of Satyagraha as a tool not just to overcome an opponent but to reconcile with them. In “conversion” the example of the nonviolent campaign converts the opponent to their point of view. The opponent thus willingly grants the campaign’s demands. Conversion can be achieved through a simple process of rational argument but is more typically associated with the practice of self-suffering. The members of the nonviolent movement take suffering upon themselves to show their opponents the violence inherent in the system they support. This causes the opponent to see the injustice of the system and leads them to willingly accede to the movement’s demands.

Sharp’s second mechanism is “accommodation.” While the opponent remains “unconverted,” the actions of the nonviolent campaign change the power dynamics such that the opponent agrees to grant the campaign’s essential demands rather than “risk a more unsatisfactory result” (Sharp 1973). This may take place for a number of reasons. Violent repression may be seen to be impractical or inappropriate, the opponent may wish to minimize political or economic losses, or they may seek to control potential defection or dissension within their own ranks.
The third and fourth mechanisms, “nonviolent coercion” and “disintegration” are closely related, distinguished largely by degree. In both, the actions of the campaign have so degraded the capacity of the opponent that they lack the essential capacity to accept defeat. Rather, defeat occurs without their consent as their structures of power no longer sustain them. The distinction between the two comes in the effects of the nonviolent action on the opponent group’s cohesion. In nonviolent coercion change occurs while keeping the opponent’s essential political structures intact. In disintegration, the opponent “simply falls apart.” Political structures have been so fragmented and dismantled through the withdrawal of cooperation that they simply cease to exist.

Sharp’s typology is helpful in understanding the various ways in which nonviolent action may lead to political change. However, his typology has several prominent shortcomings which limit its utility in using mechanisms of success as an explanatory variable.

First, since Sharp is primarily concerned with explaining the potential effects of nonviolent action rather than mechanisms of regime change, his model lacks operationalizability. In the “people power” revolution of 1986, for example, which mechanism of success led to the ouster of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos? The unwillingness of soldiers to shoot at unarmed protesters may be seen as “conversion.” Coup leaders’ negotiations with presidential candidate Corazon Aquino might be seen as
“accommodation.” As Marcos’ forces rapidly began ceasing to obey orders, his regime doubtless seemed to be undergoing “nonviolent coercion” or “disintegration.” Simply establishing which mechanisms took place would be a doubtful empirical challenge. Making a further argument as to which mechanism was the critical causal factor in achieving success would be an even greater challenge, perhaps impossible.

Second, Sharp’s mechanisms assume a binary perspective on how political change occurs. In all four mechanisms the essential question is the power relationship between the civil resistance campaign and its opponent.\(^6\) This binary perspective provides helpful theoretical parsimony. However, as a way of understanding mechanisms of success so as to empirically test their effects it is so divorced from reality that it fails to be useful. In every political struggle multiple actors pursue their interests, engage in strategic interaction, and seek to capture political power and authority. Even simple theoretical models such as in Tilly (1978) incorporate the interactions of governments, other members of the polity, challengers, and international actors. A comprehensive view of mechanisms of success must go beyond the binary campaign-opponent perspective.

Finally, Sharp is focused solely on the power-negative effects of nonviolent action. He makes a detailed argument as to how civil resistance can degrade existing power structures but has little to say on how new power structures fill the void left by that.

\(^6\) Typically the government, though Sharp does not explicitly state this.
degradation. As with his theory’s campaign-opponent dichotomy this emphasis on degradation may be justified for the sake of theoretical parsimony. Sharp is not attempting to empirically describe reality but rather to build a clear theoretical model of the political power of nonviolent action. The theory is useful insomuch as it is used for that purpose. But to understand mechanisms of success and apply them empirically to understand future outcomes Sharp’s theoretical contribution is insufficient.

In order to use mechanisms of success to examine the puzzle of violence and authoritarianism after civil resistance a new toolkit is necessary. While Sharp’s theoretical contribution can still be fruitfully applied to understanding situational dynamics, full-fledged political transitions require a typology of transition which is empirically grounded, takes into account the possibility of significant action by third parties, and shows not just how a mechanism degrades the power of the existing regime but also sets in place new political structures. While other works, such as Bunce and Wolchik (2011) mentioned above, have made strides at creating such a typology, no comprehensive categorization which can apply to the global population of successful civil resistance campaigns currently exists. In the following chapter I will lay out my new typology of transition mechanisms and show how to apply them in answering this thesis’s empirical puzzle.
Chapter Two: Mechanisms of Success

In this chapter I outline my typology for categorizing civil resistance mechanisms of success as well as my argument for why particular mechanisms can be expected to lead to varying outcomes related to democracy and civil peace. This typology is the result of a careful study of the population of successful maximalist civil resistance campaigns in the 20th and early 21st centuries, and captures all of the variation observed in these campaigns’ mechanisms of success.

I divide mechanisms of success into six ideal types which and point out three critical features of the various mechanisms: degree of consensus-building, campaign initiative, and political capacity-building. I then lay out an argument informed by the democratization and civil war literatures as to why the essential characteristics of these different mechanisms of success would be expected to precipitate different outcomes.

Defining Terms

I will first briefly offer my working definitions of several central concepts. First, I define “civil resistance” most broadly as the use of nonviolent and yet transgressive methods of political struggle to achieve a political goal. This definition draws upon
several definitions offered in the literature,\(^7\) as well as closely aligning with definitions of “revolutionary protest” from sources such as Kim (1996) and Tilly (1978), and parsimoniously captures civil resistance in its most essential aspect: its place in the political space not accounted for either by traditional politics or by violent political contention. It also helpfully serves to illustrate several things which civil resistance is not, such as personal feelings or beliefs about nonviolence, “weapons of the weak,” or passive acquiescence to political injustices. It is fundamentally a method of political struggle.\(^8\)

In this formulation civil resistance may be broadly used by any number of different political actors for any number of political ends. Thus for the purposes of this study I narrow the broad range of possible manifestations of civil resistance in two major areas. First, since I am concerned with civil resistance campaigns which initiate a political transition, following the lead of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), I examine only civil resistance campaigns with “maximalist” goals of regime change, expulsion of a


\(^8\) I also use the term “civil resistance” rather than “nonviolence” or “nonviolent action” to express an instrumental, political frame of reference rather than a normative frame of reference. As Bond (1988) points out, even the ostensibly solely descriptive use of the word “nonviolence” can imply a certain moral prescriptiveness, with the “nonviolent” being judged “good” and “violent” judged “bad.” I explicitly avoid this normative discussion because it obscures the political focus of my research. Thus for the purposes of this study I use the term “civil resistance” and attempt to maintain a strictly empirical definition. Normative questions are certainly relevant to the study of violence and nonviolence but are not the focus of my thesis.
foreign occupation, or secession. Second, I limit my study to campaigns, where individual acts of civil resistance are coordinated and sequenced in a purposive manner to achieve the stated goal.

The second major concept to define is success. Following Nepstad (2011) I define success as the negative removal or defeat of the opponent through the civil resistance campaign’s actions. It is the moment when the dictator steps down, the occupier leaves, or the state gives up its right to the secessionist territory. Observers may point out that in many senses this moment of “success” is only the beginning of a possibly much longer process of political struggle. Thus using the term success is misleading. This insight, that the moment of victory over the original opponent is not the end of a political struggle, is in fact one of the central inspirations for this work. Yet I maintain that defining success in this way is analytically useful. It captures the perspective of the campaigns themselves, whose goals and identities are typically defined around this concept of success, and it allows us to clearly delineate between distinct

9 Another close corollary of this concept is “autocratic breakdown” in Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).

10 Note, for instance, that the iconic motto of the Arab Spring was: “ash-sha’ab yirid isqtan-nizam” – “the people want the downfall of the regime.”
phases of political activity: the initial political struggle and the political transition. Campaign success is the moment dividing these two phases.

The language of mechanisms of success or mechanisms of change originates with Gene Sharp (1973, 2004). He uses this language to describe the four theoretical ways in which nonviolent action can alter power dynamics and achieve victory. However, as laid out in the previous chapter Sharp’s typology, while analytically helpful, becomes deeply problematic when applied to real empirical cases. Thus, while I find the language helpful I shift the definition to make it more applicable to my question. I define a mechanism of success as the immediate causal antecedent of success. It is the final strategic action, by the campaign or another strategic actor, which precedes success – the last strategic action in the initial political struggle and the first in the period of transition. The mechanism of success thus occupies a bridging position between the two phases.

Having defined civil resistance, success, and mechanisms of success, I now move on to the six mechanisms of success observed in successful civil resistance campaigns.

*The Six Mechanisms*

The first mechanism of success is the coup d’état. I define a coup d’état as an independent seizure of power by a group of regime elites, military or civilian. While

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11 Similar to Rustow’s (1970) “preparatory phase” and “decision phase.”

12 As defined in the preceding paragraph.
Coups may be precipitated by certain indicators they are fundamentally unexpected events from the side of the regime and often from the side of the civil resistance campaign as well. A coup may follow the classic form of a military coup, with soldiers in the streets assuming control over key government assets, or may take place in the corridors of power, with coup leaders orchestrating the ouster behind closed doors. While coups are typically initiated without the knowledge of the civil resistance campaign they act as a mechanism of success by bringing about the self-defined goal of the campaign. The regime which the campaign opposed is ousted and new leadership is brought to the fore.

Coups may engage with the civil resistance campaign in a number of ways. Coup leaders may proclaim their action to be in solidarity with the civil resistance campaign, as in Egypt in 2011. Coups may even be initiated after the campaign explicitly encourages regime figures to seize control of the state, as in Guatemala in 1944. But their unifying characteristics are an independent, unexpected seizure of power by regime elites.

The second mechanism is negotiations. In negotiated transitions the civil resistance campaign engages in a bargaining process with the regime (often mediated by domestic or international third parties) to establish the terms of the regime’s departure. Negotiations may take place in pre-arranged institutional settings such as the roundtable discussions between Solidarity and the Communist Party in 1989 or they may be more informal yet nonetheless authoritative discussions between the regime and the campaign leadership.
I only consider negotiations to be a mechanism of success if the negotiation results in the achievement of the campaign’s central goal. Negotiations may happen often throughout the course of a civil resistance campaign, both before and after success, and may be either a source of strategic progress or reversal. Negotiations may be a stalling tactic used by the regime to blunt the campaign’s momentum or to satisfy critical international observers. They may also be used by the campaign to meet intermediate strategic goals or gain concessions. None of these negotiations are true mechanisms of success since they do not directly lead to the achievement of the campaign’s goals. For negotiations to be considered a mechanism of success they must result in the ouster of the regime, the withdrawal of the occupier, or successful secession.

The third mechanism is elections and referenda. In this mechanism the campaign achieves its goal through an institutionalized electoral process. In the case of regime change this typically occurs through an election in which the incumbent regime is defeated. This victory is often ensured through the threat, or sometimes actual use, of civil disobedience if the regime fails to honor the terms of the election. Some of the best examples of this transition mechanism are the various “color revolutions” of the early 2000s, though the defeat of Indira Gandhi by the Janata party in the 1977 election in India is an early example which has been understudied.

As with negotiations, it is critical to distinguish elections which function as mechanisms of success from elections which occur in the course of the civil resistance
campaign or simply occur with relative regularity and predetermined results in “electoral authoritarian” regimes around the world. An election or referendum only functions as a mechanism of success if it is the direct cause of the achievement of the campaign’s goal.

The fourth mechanism is international interventions. Interventions may be diplomatic (as in the Ruhrkampf in 1923) or military (as in East Timor in 1999). The key distinguishing factor of an intervention as a mechanism of success is that the intervention precipitates the achievement of the campaign’s goal and is a necessary component of the success. Thus some international involvement may be involved in other campaign situations as part of a negotiated transition process or international observers may enforce the terms of a negotiated transition but are not decisive in the success of the process itself.

While these definitional criteria contain some level of subjectivity, I maintain that they are the most clear and parsimonious reasonably possible. International action either by states or non-state transnational actors often plays a role in civil resistance movements, but this role is rarely decisive in success (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Thus I maintain an extremely conservative position in defining an international intervention as a mechanism of success.13

13 Summaries of all my coding decisions which show this conservative process in practice are included in the attached codebook (Appendix A).
The fifth mechanism is resignations. In a resignation the regime relinquishes power independent of an election, negotiation, or other previously institutionalized or negotiated process. The leaders of the regime, perhaps fearing the consequences of remaining in power, simply choose to leave. For example, this was the mechanism of success in the East German revolution, as a string of resignations by members of the socialist party led to the overthrow of the regime (Nepstad 2011).

Resignations are closest theoretically to “elite coups,” in which the civilian elites in the regime force the top leadership out in an independent attempt to seize power. The distinction between the two is in the mechanism’s initiative. Coups involve a fundamental break in the upper echelons of the regime followed by a decisive seizure of power by a particular regime faction. Resignations, though they may be preceded by a certain degree of pressure from other members of the regime, are undertaken through the initiative of the regime leadership.

Finally, the most dramatic transition mechanism is overwhelming. An overwhelming represents the closest empirical approximation to what Gene Sharp described as “disintegration” (Sharp 2005). Participation in the campaign reaches such a high level and defection from the regime becomes so widespread that the organs of government simply cease to function and the regime collapses. For instance in the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan police ceased repressing the increasingly massive
protests, protesters occupied the major government buildings in Bishkek, and authoritarian president Askar Akaev simply fled the country.

**Mechanism of Success Characteristics**

The genesis of my transition mechanism typology is empirical, the result of a study of the population of successful civil resistance campaigns since 1900. Having confronted the problems of looking at mechanisms of success through the theoretical lens offered by Sharp, I sought to strongly foundationalize my theory in the actual empirical record, creating intuitively discrete categories. However, through this examination I have generated a rudimentary theory of nonviolent transitions rooted in Gene Sharp, Robert Helvey, Peter Ackerman, and others. These theoretical distinctions are rough, but do provide essential guiding points for understanding the effects of the different mechanisms on future outcomes.

As mentioned in the introduction, this theory of mechanisms of success is not intended to be a comprehensive theory explaining democratization or the onset of political violence. These larger questions are intimately related to my question and I have sought to inform my theory with insights from these broader literatures. Yet at this stage I intentionally limit the scope of my explanations to transitions following successful civil resistance campaigns. Mechanisms of success may or may not be useful as an explanatory variable in other cases of regime transition, and future expansions of this work might fruitfully examine their effects in these other cases. However, I maintain that
limiting the scope of the current study to transitions following successful civil resistance campaigns is justified by the unique effects of civil resistance on regime transitions, as shown in the studies described in the previous chapter.

The six mechanisms described above vary along three key metrics. First, they vary in regards to initiative. The mechanism of success as a strategic action may be initiated by any of several different potential actors. In overwhelmings, for instance, the initiator is the civil resistance campaign. In resignations, the initiator is the leadership of the regime. And in coups and international interventions the initiator is a third party, domestic or international. Because mechanisms of success are at such a critical strategic juncture this question of initiative may be crucial for determining the characteristics of the transition process which follows them.

Second, the mechanisms vary in regards to consensus. The transition mechanism may be a strategic action undertaken with mutual consensus by the various strategic actors, as in a negotiation or an election, or may be independently imposed (violently or nonviolently), as in coups or overwhelmings. This distinction is crucial in understanding the framing narratives and political incentives which confront the various strategic actors during the transition. A mechanism of success involving broad consensus

\[14\] Thanks to Nils Petter Gleditsch for pointing this distinction out.

\[15\] For elections, the “consensus” is centered on the mechanism itself, rather than the outcome.
from the major strategic actors is likely to facilitate framing narratives for all the actors involved which legitimize the later transition process and discourage the use of political violence.

Third, the mechanisms vary in the degree to which they require political capacity-building by the civil resistance campaign prior to the moment of success. As Bunce and Wolchik (2011) focus on in their cases, certain mechanisms of success by definition require a degree of political institutionalization and capacity-building in order to succeed, while others, primarily through a reliance on outside actors, do not require the same degree of capacity-building prior to success.

The six mechanisms may be categorized along these three lines as shown in Table 2.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coups</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Regime Insiders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Campaign/Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Campaign/Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>International Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignations</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Regime Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overwhelmings</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This categorization represents ideal types. Mechanisms of success may be characterized by lesser or greater degrees of these three characteristics. For example, negotiated transitions may enjoy the participation of all or nearly all segments of the civil
resistance campaign, as in the round table negotiations in Poland, or may be led by only certain factions of the campaign, as in the GCC-led negotiation process in Yemen. I thus expect the following arguments on the mechanisms’ effects on democracy and civil peace to hold most closely when the mechanism most closely follows the ideal types on consensus, capacity, and initiative shown above. I now consider how these essential characteristics lead to the mechanisms’ varying effects on democracy and civil peace.

Democracy

As mentioned in the previous chapter, many studies on civil resistance have focused on its advantages in promoting democracy. The association between the two has been powerfully reinforced by major waves of successful civil resistance movements such as the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, the “Color Revolutions” of the early 2000s, and the “Arab Spring” of 2011, all of which were characterized by millions calling for democratic rights. Yet as the literature on democratization shows, the process of actual democratization is typically far less inspiring, much more complex, and often deeply problematic. As Carothers (2002) points out, “transitions to democracy” are often complete misnomers as countries rarely go on straight tracks from authoritarianism to full-fledged democracy and instead often end up in “feckless pluralism” or “dominant-party democracy.”

In considering civil resistance campaigns, part of the problem is that campaigns often articulate broad goals of “freedom” or “democracy” with little substantive ideational content. Democracy may be the slogan presented for the media, but the democratic master narrative presented by elites may have little connection to the actual political attitudes of campaign participants (Beissinger, 2013). In other cases the overthrow of the regime, even through civil resistance, may be pursued by actors attempting to replace prior clientelist networks with their own (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Thus explaining democratization simply through the overthrow of an autocrat by ostensibly “democratic” forces is insufficient.

Structural factors such as development, levels of education, and proportion of democratic neighbors have all been pointed to as explanatory variables to account for successful democratization. Yet despite the vast size of the literature, the effect of these claims is disputed and uncertain (Geddes 2009). And the existence of numerous exceptions to these general indicators suggests that the impact of any one of them, while substantial, is neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining a democratic outcome.

In contrast, I explain democratization following successful civil resistance through a dynamic model of strategic interaction between various players initiated by the success of the campaign. This approach is similar to several seminal works on democratization (Rustow, 1970; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Where I depart from these works is in my emphasis on the central role of bottom-up civil
resistance movements as a key actor which engages in strategic interaction with the
government, other members of the polity, and extra-polity challengers (Tilly, 1978). The
mechanism of success informs how this strategic interaction takes place and thus
critically shapes the outcome. This influence is not deterministic, nor does it always
trump the general impact of the broader structural factors mentioned above. However, in
the majority of cases the mechanism of success will be a critical factor in leading to a
democratic outcome.

First, the aspect of consensus raised above is likely to be critical. A mechanism
of success such as negotiations and elections, which involve a degree of consensus and
shared understanding between the various actors: regime, campaign, and domestic third
parties, is more likely to initiate a democratic transition because it incentivizes actors to
work together and thus broadens the “winning coalition” which governs (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003). With more power players involved before the transition begins it
is likely to be more difficult to exclude them once the transition is underway. While this
may not lead to a perfect democracy, at the very least it may lead to “consociational”
arrangements which move the country further along the democratic continuum.

Mechanisms of success which lack broad consensus, such as coups and
occupations, are likely to tilt the transition towards non-democratic outcomes. For the
coup, this inclination is more obvious. Coup leaders typically assume power not to
simply abandon it but to gain personal, political, or economic goals. Thus the coup
leaders are more likely to attempt to maintain or even consolidate authoritarianism rather than democratize. Even in coups which at least appear to be genuinely motivated by concern and support for the civil resistance campaign such as the “October Revolutionaries” in El Salvador the action of the coup itself has the effect of centralizing power, at least temporarily, in the hands of a small cadre of plotters. This makes the transition process vulnerable to capture by potential autocrats within the coup group.

Successful coups also inform the strategic calculations of other actors. Participants in the civil resistance campaign may take the lesson that, while nonviolent tactics may be useful in applying pressure for political action, the actions of a small group of armed actors are really the only way to achieve power. Thus strategies for setting the rules of the game during the transition period may involve centralization of power in an armed wing which attempts to seize power through future coups and counter-coups.

Overwhelmings may appear to incline more towards democracy. Indeed, Sharp’s theory would lead us to expect them to. One cornerstone of Sharp’s theory of civil resistance is that successful civil resistance diffuses power throughout a society (Sharp 1973). Individuals, newly awakened to their capacity to overthrow existing power structures, no longer fear new would-be autocrats and instead, aware of their new power, continue to use tactics of civil resistance to achieve more open and democratic political institutions. An overwhelming represents the purest form of this power diffusion since
the transition is not mediated by a third party or campaign elite but comes directly from
the people.

While I do not deny the potential for a power-diffusion effect following a
successful civil resistance campaign this effect is insufficient to lead to democratization.
Stable democracy requires more than simply an awareness of power, it requires the
implementation of rules of the political game which check various actors against one
another and protect citizens from abuse by the state. The diffusion of power in an
overwhelming, rather than informing the transition process with a strong aspect of
“protected consultation” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001), instead informs social actors
that victory is best achieved through a maximization of efforts and ratcheting up of tactics
to the extreme.

Because an overwhelming does not empower or even strictly require an
organizational leadership it is also likely to not develop leadership structures which
remain in place after the transition occurs. Thus it fails to promote the political capacity-
building by the civil resistance campaign which can then maintain a pro-democratic
opposition after success occurs. With no “civil” leadership structure, or at least structures
which are weak, ethnic, religious, and other narrower entrepreneurs may more easily rise
to power.

The lack of consensus in the overwhelming also signals elite actors, both in the
regime and outside of it, that civil resistance is a dangerous tool that will not operate
according to the rules of the political game. It thus may have the effect of creating an authoritarian consensus among actors who otherwise might be inclined to democratize. Thus, the overwhelming is likely to initiate a transition process characterized by former regime elites struggling to maintain power by any means necessary, possibly supported at least tacitly by more moderate extra-regime elites who fear the social consequences of a resurgence of popular discontent.

Initiative is also likely to be critical in determining the direction of the democratic transition process. In political transitions, the player who plays first is likely to have an outsized impact on the transition process. This is the case because of the fundamental uncertainties involved in political transitions. As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) point out, in transition processes structural factors fade into the background. The rules of political life are up for grabs and intelligent strategic thinking and personal virtu is likely to play a much more critical role.

Decisions prior to the transition moment are also likely to play an important part in shaping the transition. From the point of view of Sharp’s work on civil resistance every gain for the campaign represents degradation in the existing power structure and thus an increased opening of the political space. Nonviolent resistance and the withdrawal of consent involved in it thus slowly changes the political rules such that pre-existing norms and institutions become less important and strategic decisions come to the fore. However, the moment of transition still represents a critical jumping off point
where the power position fundamentally shifts. The pre-existing power structure is no longer simply degraded, but turned on its head. Thus the initiator of this particular decision, this particular move, has special power.

The importance of initiative may be helpfully illustrated by examining coups. A successful coup, such as the 2011 coup in Egypt (to which I will return in much more detail in the case studies), places rule-making authority in the hands of a new actor: the coup leaders. Coup leaders typical first action is to lay out their vision of the new rules of the political game: what kind of political dissent will be allowed, what will be done with the top leadership of the ancien regime, what place there will be for the leaders of the civil resistance campaign, etc… This agenda represents the first frame of the political transition, the point from which other actors must frame their own political agendas and in the context of which other actors will have to formulate new political rules.

Resignations also provide a powerful illustration of the importance of initiative. Resignations typically occur in large part through Sharp’s mechanism of “accommodation” (Sharp, 1973). The leadership of the regime: the military junta, the party politburo, or the tinpot autocrat, “sees the writing on the wall.” Perhaps there have been rumblings about defection from the military or security services. Perhaps cabinet ministers are resigning en masse and throwing their support behind the opposition. Perhaps, as with Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, their superpower patron will no longer return their calls except with advice to “cut and cut cleanly.” For whatever reason,
the regime’s top leadership no longer believes it has the capability to maintain power and thus decides to try to shape the future political order as best as possible through resignation. As with the coup, the resignation is often accompanied by an agenda of how the following transition will take place: who will assume interim power, how future leaders will be chosen (the terms and timing of a new election), which frames the transition period.

The two examples above illustrate negatively what I believe to be the transition mechanism characteristic for promoting democracy: initiative, at least in part, by the civil resistance campaign. To achieve success a civil resistance campaign is likely to have a wide, diverse base of support. Thus in order to satisfy the campaign participants who have been integral in the campaign’s success the campaign is more likely to incorporate the more open, democratic power structures.

Finally, as mentioned above, the degree to which the mechanism of success involves building the civil resistance campaign’s capacity prior to the breakthrough is critical. This is partially the case because, as Beissinger (2013) shows, civil resistance campaigns are often based upon a “negative coalition” which is only able to overcome collective action problems through its shared opposition to a particularly hated regime institution or figure. If the campaign has not been able to build political capacity and put in place organizational mechanisms for continuing to coordinate pro-democracy actions prior to the ouster of the target of its “negative coalition” then it may fall apart once
success occurs. In contrast, if the transition mechanism itself, such as an election or negotiation, requires some degree of institutionalization, coordination, and campaign capacity-building then the civil resistance campaign will be well-placed to continue to coordinate politically-effective collective action for pro-democracy goals in the transitional period.

Transitional Violence

Political violence is likely to occur during transition periods for two basic reasons: either the main actors struggling to shape the new political regime use violence to achieve political goals or other social or political actors use the state’s weakened monopoly on the use of force to violently pursue their own agendas. These two challenges may be referred to in short-hand as “politics by other means” and “opportunistic violence.” Both are likely to be correlated with transitions following civil resistance campaign success. Thus solutions to the problem of transitional violence must meet these two distinctive challenges.

The challenge of “politics by other means” is essentially the problem of reconciling disparate goals through nonviolent avenues. The downfall of a regime through civil resistance creates a unique set of winners and losers who are likely to enter the transition with widely varying objectives. The winners, i.e. the members of the civil resistance campaign, typically desire radical changes in the fundamental political structures of the state which will empower new groups. Furthermore, campaigns
typically desire that members of the old regime, in particular those involved in repressing
the campaign’s earlier contention, be punished. There are calls for corruption
investigations, purging of the ranks of the bureaucracy, and sometimes peremptory trials
and executions. The losers, such as members of the former regime, traditional elites, or
businessmen with connections to the state, desire the exact opposite. The ouster of the
upper echelons of the regime may have left many of their positions intact, but often with
reduced access to upper authority structures. And erstwhile regime supporters fear the
prospect of a setting straight of the wrongs of the former regime.

The influence of civil resistance on the initiation of this conflictual dynamic may
be significant; particularly if principled nonviolence has been a characteristic of the
campaign. The influence of figures such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu in South
Africa comes to mind. But more often than not either this ethic is absent or insufficient
to prevent the onset of violence.

This dilemma may be simply stated as follows: the winners must be incentivized
against using the fruits of their victory (power) to transgress against the defeated
opponent and the losers must be incentivized against violently counterattacking. The
two are, of course, related. A violation by one side is likely to trigger a response by the
opponent, with the potential for violence to continue until a new political regime arises.

\[17\] Thanks to Oliver Kaplan for suggesting this particular formulation.
which can ensure political order. However, if no initial action is taken the two sides may very well hold back the dogs of war until a stable political order is established.

The importance of initial actions in sparking violence brings us back to the factor of initiative. As with democratization, I argue that campaign initiative in the transition mechanism, rather than initiative by the regime or a third party, is likely to reduce incidences of politics by other means. This is the case because the campaign, by definition, is an unarmed actor which does not use violence to achieve its ends. If the transition mechanism follows campaign initiative it will thus begin the transition with a nonviolent step, a step which may be iteratively followed to create a nonviolent transition process.

In contrast, if an actor who relies on the use of violent force initiates the transition process, violence or the threat of violence will be present in the transitional period from the beginning. Other actors will thus be incentivized to respond with their own violence, creating an escalation cycle.

Consensus in the transition mechanism is also likely to decrease the incidence of “politics by other means.” If all or most of the major parties in the political system, from the regime to the campaign, have been involved in the mechanism of success, or are invested in the institutional framework which underlies it (as in elections) then it is likely that they will perceive their interests as best pursued through the transition framework, rather than through violence. Since the major strategic players already have experience
that consensual regime change can occur, an appeal to consensus-building, nonviolent methods of contention is more likely to be the first avenue pursued during the transition process.

In contrast, non-consensual transition mechanisms are likely to be perceived as illegitimate by the political actors not party to their shaping. While it is certainly possible that groups who perceive the transition as illegitimate will attempt to shape the political order through nonviolent methods, they may lack the popular support to make nonviolent action effective (particularly if they come from groups privileged in the ancien regime) and thus turn to violent contention as a preferable option.

The strategic lesson taught by a non-consensual transition mechanism is that one can achieve maximalist political goals without taking into account the preferences of all the major political actors. This counters the logic of civil resistance, which focuses on achieving goals through broad, diverse participation, and instead inclines the political conversation towards violent methods of political struggle, which do not require broad participation but instead a small, highly-invested minority.

While addressing the possibility of “politics by other means” is central to solving the problem of post-campaign violence, many incidences of violence which follow successful civil resistance campaigns do not fall into this category. Instead, they can be described as “opportunistic violence.” After the downfall of a regime, the expulsion of an occupation, or the successful secession of a particular region it may be difficult for the
state to perform its function as the holder of a monopoly on the use of force. A lack of state capacity – real or perceived – may create opportunities for various groups to pursue social or political agendas through the use of violence.

The literature on failed or fragile states cites numerous examples of how this general dynamic may come into play.\(^1\) Ethnic or religious entrepreneurs may use the weakness of the state to assert demands for greater autonomy, settle ethnic scores, or even attempt to capture the state in order to pursue their own narrow agenda. In a sudden breakdown of state authority ethnic groups may also find themselves in a “security dilemma” which leads to conflict (Posen, 1993), or rebel or criminal groups may seek to take advantage of lootable natural resources. Breakdown in state coercive power may also give space for insurgents or transnational terrorist groups. Preventing opportunistic violence thus requires both the maintenance of at least some degree of state capacity and also the incorporation of the general demands of aggrieved groups into the political transition process so that these groups are not incentivized to use violence.

The “consensus” transition mechanisms of negotiations and elections are likely to lead to the lowest incidences of opportunistic violence. This is first because by their nature consensus mechanisms involve a degree of maintenance of state capacity. In both cases the *ancien regime* participates in the transition as a strategic actor whose fundamental structures have not been completely eliminated by the actions of the civil

resistance campaign. Even if security force defections during the civil resistance campaign have in fact degraded the ability of the state to respond to armed challenges there is at least likely to be a perception, since the state continues to operate as a party in the mechanism of success, that some degree of political continuity can be expected. Thus the perceived opportunities for violence are lower. Consensus-based transition mechanisms may also initiate systems of political practice which incorporate previously-excluded actors, significantly reducing the incentives for political violence.

Maximalist civil resistance campaigns over the 20th and early 21st century have succeeded through the use of six empirically discrete mechanisms of success: coups, negotiations, elections, international interventions, resignations, and overwhelmings. Out of these six, two mechanisms – elections and negotiations – are characterized by broad political consensus, campaign initiative, and pre-success political capacity-building. These three characteristics make these two mechanisms of success much more likely to lead to democratization and not be followed by political violence. Having laid out my basic theoretical argument, I now turn to the quantitative testing of my hypotheses.
Chapter Three: Testing the Effects of Transition Mechanisms

My research on the effects of mechanisms of success followed a two-stage process, both quantitative and qualitative; in order to both establish the general correlative trends associated with mechanisms of success and also to process-trace the causal dynamics behind this correlation. The latter step, two comparative case studies, will be addressed in the following chapter. In this chapter I explain my broader research into the global population of successful civil resistance campaigns and present the results of my quantitative analysis of that population.

Methodology

The first step in my research was a brief examination of each case of successful maximalist civil resistance since the beginning of the 20th century. My set of civil resistance campaigns was drawn primarily from the NAVCO 1.1 dataset created by Erica Chenoweth (2011), which contains consensus data on violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1900-2006 including campaign duration, participation, and outcome.

19 Campaigns are a series of sequenced tactics, distinguishing them from random riots or isolated events. In order to be included in the dataset, campaigns had to have at least 1,000 members, maximalist goals (regime change, secession, or anti-occupation), and persist for at least a week (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

20 Chenoweth codes campaigns as either “success,” “limited success,” or “failure.” Campaigns are coded as successful if the campaign achieved its stated goals within a year.
This dataset was compiled using several comprehensive bibliographies of nonviolent action as well as extensive consultation with leading experts. I augmented this list with additional cases from later iterations of the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013),21 cases from the ongoing Major Episodes of Contention data project,22 and additional cases from my own independent research. Aggregating these sources led to a final dataset of 83 campaigns from 1900-2006.23

For each of these 83 cases I independently researched the cases’ mechanisms of success. I relied primarily on scholarly accounts and narrative data found in sources such of its year of peak activity. Campaigns are coded as “limited success” if they failed to achieve their stated goals but were able to achieve significant concessions from an opponent. For example, a secessionist campaign that fails to achieve full independence but is able to gain significant levels of political autonomy. Campaigns are coded as failures if they fail to achieve their stated objectives or achieve any significant concessions.

21 This data is available for download at www.navcodata.com.

22 This project is ongoing and the data has not been publicly released as of the time of writing. See http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_mec_major_episodes_contention.html for more information.

23 Several additional cases, including the 2011 “Arab Spring,” have taken place since 2006 but were not included because of data limitations and the desire to measure outcomes at least five years after the end of the campaign.
as the Global Nonviolent Action Database (Swarthmore College, 2014), with occasional augmentation from primary sources such as historical newspapers when necessary.24

I used the information gathered from this research to generate values for a nominal variable describing the mechanisms of success based on the six-tiered typology outlined in the previous chapter. These categories satisfactorily covered all 83 campaigns in the study with conceptual precision and empirical discretion. In most cases the coding was relatively straightforward, as the various sources consulted were in agreement on the mechanics of success. However, in some cases sources were in disagreement on the mechanism of success, or choosing the particular breakthrough moment to consider the moment of success was unclear. For these more difficult cases I followed a three-step process to ensure reliability. First, I consulted as many sources as could be feasibly obtained in order to get as clear a picture of the transition as possible. Second, I explained the rationale for my coding decisions in “methodological notes,”25 and third, I included a dummy reliability variable in my dataset in order to run statistical tests both including and excluding these more difficult cases. Out of my population of 83 cases, I identified nine cases as “weak:” cases in which the impact of civil resistance in the transition was unclear or the maximalist nature of the campaign was questionable. I also

24 For brief narratives of each transition and a complete list of references on individual coding decisions see Appendix A: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success codebook.

25 Available in Appendix A.
identified eleven cases as “uncertain:” cases whose inclusion in the dataset I was confident in but which had some ambiguity in the coding of one or more variables.

I used pre-existing data from the Center on Systemic Peace (CSP) to generate values for my dependent variables of democracy and civil peace. The Polity IV dataset is a commonly-used tool to represent levels of democracy. It collects time series data on a variety of political characteristics in a country in a particular year. This data is then used to generate a score from -10 (completely autocratic) to 10 (completely democratic) (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2011). I collected the polity scores of each country five and ten years after the end of the civil resistance campaign to create two sets of three variables: POSTPOLITY (the score itself), POLITYCHANGE (the change in polity score from the year of the end of the campaign to five and ten years afterwards), and POSTDEMOC, a dummy variable which captures whether or not the country was a democracy five years after the end of the campaign (i.e. had a polity score of 6 or higher).

To represent the future outbreak of civil conflict I used data from CSP’s Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset (Marshall 2010). MEPV collects time-series data on various forms of political violence including international war, civil war, and ethnic violence. I created two sets of dummy variables (POSTWAR) to capture whether civil conflict occurred in the five years and ten years after the end of the civil

26 The MEPV dataset records data from 1946-2010. For the four cases in the NAVCO dataset which ended prior to 1946 I used data from Gleditsch 2004. For country-years from 2011-present I used data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (2014).
resistance campaign. This variable was coded as a one if any of the five or ten country-years had a value above 0 for any of MEPV’s civil conflict variables.

I also included several control variables to account for some of the most widely-accepted structural causes of democracy and civil war. There is a widely-acknowledged relationship between development and both democracy and civil war – positive for the former (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, Lipset 1960, Geddes 2009) and negative for the latter (Kalyvas, 2009; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). As a proxy for development, I include a measure of GDP per capita from the World Bank databank, a tool used in several seminal quantitative studies (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). Other studies have indicated that a country’s location in a “democratic neighborhood” increases the likelihood of democratization (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). I thus include the proportion of neighboring countries which were democratic in the country-years in question 5 years and 10 years after the end of the campaign. Population has also been recognized as having a strong and consistent effect on the likelihood of civil

---

27 There remains significant scholarly disagreement on the precise effects of development on democracy. Some, most prominently Przeworski et al (2000), argue that development has no effect on transitions to democracy but instead has strong effects on the survival of democratic regimes, thus explaining the statistical correlation between high levels of development and democracy. For my purposes whether development initiates a transition or instead makes democratic stability more likely is largely irrelevant. Either causal mechanism will lead to a higher likelihood that the country will be a democracy five years and ten years after the transition mechanism and thus must be controlled for.

28 The data on proportion of neighboring democracies is from Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch 2013.
war (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006), in my regressions on political violence I thus include population data from the COW national material capabilities dataset, version 4.0 (Singer, 1987).  

The rich literatures on democratization and civil war have both offered a number of additional potential explanatory variables for their respective outcomes. Yet the “canonical” status of many of these variables remains contested, or their causal mechanisms are poorly articulated, thus I exclude them. For instance, several studies have found a significant negative relationship between democracy and large Muslim populations (Barro 1999, Fish 2002). However, the causal mechanisms linking Islam and authoritarianism are unclear (Teorell & Hadenius, 2007); particularly in the light of relatively high support for “democracy” among Muslims (Tessler, 2002) and whether the “Muslim effect” is simply an “Arab effect” remains contested (Stepan & Robertson, 2003).

Others have argued that a heritage of British colonization is likely to lead to more democracy (Weiner, 1987; Payne, 1993) but other studies find little empirical support for this contention (Fish, 2002), and some find that Spanish colonies perform better when colonialism is conceptualized holistically (Bernard, Reenock, & Nordstrom, 2004). Thus I do not include additional control variables for democracy or civil peace.

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29 The data on country-years post-2007 is from The World Bank 2014.

30 In addition, these studies do not take into account the still-unfolding effects of the “Arab Spring” in 2011.
In addition, considering the small size of the dataset, the multiplication of explanatory variables would lead the regressions into severe degrees of freedom problems. Thus, while including additional control variables might provide helpful differentiation, the shape of the data precludes inclusion of a “grab bag” of explanatory variables. This exclusion may make the statistical findings on their own problematic. However, I address this issue through the use of the case studies in the following chapter.

Finally, I include dummy control variables to indicate whether the country was a democracy or experienced a major episode of political violence in the five years prior to the transition. Values of these variables were informed by the same datasets as the POSTWAR and POSTDEMOC variables.

This dataset allowed me to perform a series of statistical tests framed around two central hypotheses, explicated in detail in the previous chapter and stated formally as follows:

\[ H_1: \text{There is a positive, significant relationship between elections and negotiations as mechanisms of civil resistance campaign success and future democracy.}^{31} \]

---

31 Throughout this chapter I will use “consensus-based” and “non-consensus-based” as shorthand for the two categories of transition mechanisms that follow the scheme of my hypotheses (“consensus-based” referring to elections and negotiations and “non-consensus-based” referring to the four other mechanisms of success). This is purely for the sake of stylistic convenience and is not meant to imply that the characteristic of
H2: There is a negative, significant relationship between elections and negotiations as mechanisms of civil resistance campaign success and future political violence.

My primary means of testing these hypotheses was multivariate logistic regression, using the binary measures of post-campaign democracy and civil conflict as my dependent variables and using dummy variables to represent each category of the transition mechanisms. I also used OLS regression for measures of the post-campaign polity scores and levels of change in the polity score from before the campaign to five and ten years afterwards. In each regression I excluded a single transition mechanism category from the model. The resulting regression coefficients represent the effect of the transition mechanism on the probability of democracy or violence relative to the excluded transition mechanism. Because GDP per capita data was only available from 1960 onwards, excluding several cases from my dataset, I also ran models which did not incorporate the GDP per capita control variable. Finally, I ran regressions of all the dependent variables using a combined dummy variable representing both negotiations and elections (i.e., a value of one if the transition mechanism was either of these consensus-based mechanisms). I also ran each regression both including and excluding consensus is more important than the characteristics of campaign initiative or pre-success capacity building.
the nine “weak” cases. All of these various categories of regressions added up to a total of 176 regression models.  

Results: The Shape of the Data

The final dataset of 83 cases represented a truly global sample of country-years, with almost even distribution of cases across all the major geographic regions. The only region significantly under-represented is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with only 3 cases of successful civil resistance. There are three reasons for this under-representation. First, the region is the smallest out of the five, with a much smaller number of countries and thus an expected lower absolute numbers of cases. Second, while several different forms of civil resistance have played a political role in the Middle East (Stephan, 2009), the region’s authoritarian regimes have shown themselves to be particularly resilient to popular challenges, an empirical fact for which a number of explanations have been put forth in the literature. This resilience, whatever the particular causes, means cases of successful regime change through any means are rare. And finally, as mentioned above, the temporal scope of my dataset excludes the wave of “Arab Spring” cases from 2011.

32 Tests were conducted using the SAS 9.3 statistical software, with confirmation of selected tests using both SPSS and Stata. SAS Program with code for all tests available from author upon request.

33 The dataset includes 18 cases from Africa, 20 from the Americas, 19 from Asia, and 23 from Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Since my theory aspires to be a global explanation, I address the under-representation of Middle Eastern cases in my selection of case studies in the following chapter. However, this geographical limitation should be taken into account in the following quantitative analysis.

In contrast to this relatively even geographic distribution, there is a strong temporal trend towards recent cases, as shown in figure 3.1. While my data sources begin their sampling of civil resistance campaigns in 1900 no successful cases take place until 1923 and the numbers rise sharply over time. The peak decade is the 1990s, although my data only goes until 2006, thus the total number of cases from 2000-2010 is likely higher. This trend follows Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) finding that the rate of success in civil resistance campaigns has risen over time. Thus a dramatic increase in the absolute number of successful cases is to be expected. Better global media coverage and scholarly attention to popular uprisings are also likely a factor.

Figure 3.1: Temporal Distribution of Successful Civil Resistance Campaigns (Absolute Numbers)
Out of the six transition mechanisms outlined in the previous chapter, four are well-represented in the data (See Figure 3.2). Elections are the most common, with 27 cases. Resignations, coups, and negotiations are also well-represented, with between 15 and 20 cases of each. International interventions and overwhelmings are much rarer, with only four cases of each.

![Figure 3.2: Distribution of Transition Mechanisms](image)

Dividing the cases by transition mechanism and correlating with the data on democracy and political violence five years after success yields initial support for my hypotheses. As seen in figure 3.3 the rate of democracy in cases of both negotiations and elections is over 70 percent, while resignations, the next highest, have only around a 50 percent success rate and coups are even lower. The relationship becomes even stronger when weak cases are excluded, with elections in particular nearing a democracy rate of 80%. Aggregating the mechanisms into the “consensus-based” and “non-consensus-based” categories yield a similar strong division (see figure 3.4).
The data on political violence shows the expected inverse relationship. Rates of post-campaign political violence are significantly lower in cases of negotiations or elections, though, as with the democracy numbers, resignations perform unexpectedly well – coming somewhat close to negotiations in their percentage of post-campaign transitional violence (See Figure 3.5). The aggregated mechanisms show the distinction much more clearly, with the combined political violence rate in consensus-based
mechanisms just over a third of the rate following other transition mechanisms (See Figure 3.6).

This relationship holds, and in fact becomes more prominent, when the successful campaigns are disaggregated based upon the prior occurrence of major political violence.
In cases with at least one major episode of political violence prior to campaign success, consensus-based mechanisms had only a 25% rate of recurrence of violence. By contrast, non-consensus-based mechanisms of success had an over 70% rate of recurrence (See Figure 3.7). In cases with no prior political violence rates were low for both categories (though marginally lower for the consensus-based mechanisms). This suggests that, while the differential effects of the mechanism of success in sparking new episodes of violence may be minimal, consensus-based mechanisms of success can have powerful preventive effects in situations where violence has already taken place.

Democracy and Political Violence Regressions

Regression analysis of the democracy hypothesis yielded mixed results. While the logistic regressions of all cases using dummy variables for the individual mechanisms of success all followed their expected signs, with negotiations and elections consistently
showing positive coefficients relative to the other transition mechanisms, no coefficients reached levels of statistical significance. This lack of significance is due in part to the small size of the dataset, but does put the democracy hypothesis in question.

The relationship, however, does become significant when the cases identified as “weak” are excluded from the dataset. The combined negotiations/elections variable was significant in regressions which both included and excluded the GDP per capita variable, with a 0.1 level of significance in the first and a 0.05 level of significance in the second. In addition, in the model of all transition mechanisms excluding weak cases and the GDP per capita variable the election coefficient had a positive, significant effect relative to the coup d'etat coefficient.

As with the logistic regressions, OLS regressions of the polity score itself failed to yield significant relationships, though the signs were consistently in line with their expected direction. Interestingly, though, regression of the change in polity score showed several significant relationships, with the combined election/negotiation variable having a consistently positive effect. A selection of the relevant regression models is in table 3.1.  

The logistic regressions of the post-campaign political violence variable closely followed the prediction of my hypothesis. Most strikingly, elections had a significant and negative effect relative to both coups and overwhelmings. The combined

35 Coefficients and standard errors of all regression models available from author upon request.
election/negotiation variable had a significant negative effect across all variations of the model at both the 5 and 10 year stage. The one exception was negotiations in the 5-year, all cases model, with a small positive (though not significant) effect relative to resignations. A selection of relevant regression models is in table 3.2.
### Table 3.1: Selected Democracy Regression Models (Logistic Regressions, standard errors in parentheses)

**Likelihood of Democracy 5 Years After Success, All Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-7.6068*** (2.4713)</td>
<td>-6.2119*** (2.2025)</td>
<td>-6.9376*** (2.4718)</td>
<td>-6.9916*** (2.2998)</td>
<td>-6.9878*** (2.4503)</td>
<td>-20.2370 (164.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coups</td>
<td>-1.3949 (0.9959)</td>
<td>-0.7258 (0.9261)</td>
<td>0.0539 (1.4523)</td>
<td>0.0502 (0.8670)</td>
<td>-0.0038 (1.5071)</td>
<td>13.2460 (164.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>1.3949 (0.9959)</td>
<td>-0.7258 (0.9261)</td>
<td>0.7797 (1.4489)</td>
<td>0.7759 (1.0231)</td>
<td>14.025 (164.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>0.6691 (0.8057)</td>
<td>-0.7258 (0.9261)</td>
<td>0.0539 (1.4523)</td>
<td>0.0502 (0.8670)</td>
<td>13.300 (164.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>0.6152 (1.5097)</td>
<td>0.7797 (1.4489)</td>
<td>0.0539 (1.4523)</td>
<td>-0.0038 (1.5071)</td>
<td>13.2460 (164.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignations</td>
<td>0.6190 (0.9424)</td>
<td>0.7797 (1.4489)</td>
<td>0.0539 (1.4523)</td>
<td>-0.0038 (1.5071)</td>
<td>13.2490 (164.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overwhelming</td>
<td>-14.6300 (447.5)</td>
<td>-16.0250 (447.5)</td>
<td>-15.3000 (447.5)</td>
<td>-15.2460 (447.5)</td>
<td>-15.2490 (447.5)</td>
<td>13.2490 (164.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Democracy</td>
<td>0.6888 (0.9478)</td>
<td>0.6888 (0.9478)</td>
<td>0.6888 (0.9478)</td>
<td>0.6888 (0.9478)</td>
<td>0.6888 (0.9478)</td>
<td>0.6888 (0.9478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Neighboring Dems</td>
<td>-0.5206 (1.2554)</td>
<td>-0.5206 (1.2554)</td>
<td>-0.5206 (1.2554)</td>
<td>-0.5206 (1.2554)</td>
<td>-0.5206 (1.2554)</td>
<td>-0.5206 (1.2554)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>2.6934*** (0.9328)</td>
<td>2.6934*** (0.9328)</td>
<td>2.6934*** (0.9328)</td>
<td>2.6934*** (0.9328)</td>
<td>2.6934*** (0.9328)</td>
<td>2.6934*** (0.9328)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quasi-Complete Separation of Data Points (Overwhelming variable)

- **n = 75**, Chi2 = 24.361, p > Chi2 = 0.002, c = 0.847

**Likelihood of Democracy 5 Years After Success, Weak Cases Excluded**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.2313*** (0.4722)</td>
<td>-5.3072*** (1.8564)</td>
<td>0.6228 (0.9207)</td>
<td>0.6888 (0.9478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections/Negotiations</td>
<td>0.9404* (0.5235)</td>
<td>1.0782* (0.5908)</td>
<td>0.2637 (1.0608)</td>
<td>1.7365** (0.6840)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Democracy</td>
<td>1.1326 (0.1988)</td>
<td>0.6228 (0.9207)</td>
<td>Prop Neighboring Dems</td>
<td>2.1918** (0.8627)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Neighboring Dems</td>
<td>2.4699*** (0.8576)</td>
<td>0.6228 (0.9207)</td>
<td>Prop Neighboring Dems</td>
<td>2.1918** (0.8627)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **n = 82**, Chi2 = 18.2068, p > Chi2 = 0.0004, c = 0.788

**Likelihood of Democracy 5 Years After Success, Weak Cases Excluded (GDP per capita variable excluded)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
<th>Estimate (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.2266** (0.4822)</td>
<td>1.1450** (0.5475)</td>
<td>0.9196 (0.9163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections/Negotiations</td>
<td>-1.2313*** (0.4722)</td>
<td>-5.3072*** (1.8564)</td>
<td>0.6228 (0.9207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Democracy</td>
<td>0.9404* (0.5235)</td>
<td>1.0782* (0.5908)</td>
<td>Prop Neighboring Dems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop Neighboring Dems</td>
<td>2.4699*** (0.8576)</td>
<td>0.6228 (0.9207)</td>
<td>Prop Neighboring Dems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **n = 73**, Chi2 = 15.8034, p > Chi2 = 0.0012, c = 0.78

* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01
Table 3.2: Selected Political Violence Regression Models (Logistic Regressions, standard errors in parentheses)

Likelihood of Major Political Violence 5 Years After Success, All Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.4165 (3.3490)</td>
<td>-4.4767 (3.3083)</td>
<td>-6.0613* (3.5274)</td>
<td>-3.4800 (3.0062)</td>
<td>-4.7447 (3.4760)</td>
<td>-2.9880 (3.7356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coups</td>
<td>1.0602 (0.9986)</td>
<td>2.6448*** (1.0179)</td>
<td>0.0636 (1.7758)</td>
<td>1.3283 (1.0864)</td>
<td>-0.4285 (1.6461)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>-1.0602 (0.9986)</td>
<td>1.5846 (1.1212)</td>
<td>-0.9967 (1.8513)</td>
<td>0.2680 (1.1306)</td>
<td>-1.4887 (1.7015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>-2.6448*** (1.0179)</td>
<td>-1.5846 (1.1212)</td>
<td>-2.5813 (1.8359)</td>
<td>-1.3166 (1.1534)</td>
<td>-3.0733* (1.6871)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>-0.0636 (1.7758)</td>
<td>0.9967 (1.8513)</td>
<td>2.5813 (1.8359)</td>
<td>1.2647 (1.9076)</td>
<td>-0.4921 (2.2696)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignations</td>
<td>-1.3283 (1.0864)</td>
<td>-0.2680 (1.1306)</td>
<td>1.3166 (1.1534)</td>
<td>-1.2647 (1.9076)</td>
<td>-1.7567 (1.7390)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overwhelming</td>
<td>0.4285 (1.6461)</td>
<td>1.4887 (1.7015)</td>
<td>3.0733* (1.6871)</td>
<td>0.4921 (2.2696)</td>
<td>1.7567 (1.7390)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Political Violence</td>
<td>1.6115* (0.8435)</td>
<td>1.6115* (0.8435)</td>
<td>1.6115* (0.8435)</td>
<td>1.6115* (0.8435)</td>
<td>1.6115* (0.8435)</td>
<td>1.6115* (0.8435)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>-1.2267* (0.6722)</td>
<td>-1.2267* (0.6722)</td>
<td>-1.2267* (0.6722)</td>
<td>-1.2267* (0.6722)</td>
<td>-1.2267* (0.6722)</td>
<td>-1.2267* (0.6722)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likelihood of Major Political Violence 10 Years After Success, All Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.8540 (2.7612)</td>
<td>-3.3235 (3.5442)</td>
<td>-3.4800 (3.0062)</td>
<td>-4.7447 (3.4760)</td>
<td>-0.4285 (1.6461)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections/Negotiations</td>
<td>-1.5731** (0.6698)</td>
<td>-1.5714* (0.8819)</td>
<td>2.4424** (0.9608)</td>
<td>1.4336** (0.7196)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Political Violence</td>
<td>1.5038** (0.7075)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>1.4278** (0.6367)</td>
<td>2.8937*** (1.0715)</td>
<td>2.8937*** (1.0715)</td>
<td>1.2874** (0.6479)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>-1.3910** (0.6369)</td>
<td>-3.3196*** (1.045)</td>
<td>-3.3196*** (1.045)</td>
<td>-3.1287* (0.6396)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likelihood of Major Political Violence 5 Years After Success, Weak Cases Excluded

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.8540 (2.7612)</td>
<td>-3.3235 (3.5442)</td>
<td>-3.4800 (3.0062)</td>
<td>-4.7447 (3.4760)</td>
<td>-0.4285 (1.6461)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections/Negotiations</td>
<td>-1.5731** (0.6698)</td>
<td>-1.5714* (0.8819)</td>
<td>2.4424** (0.9608)</td>
<td>1.4336** (0.7196)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Political Violence</td>
<td>1.5038** (0.7075)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
<td>1.5243** (0.7327)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>1.4278** (0.6367)</td>
<td>2.8937*** (1.0715)</td>
<td>2.8937*** (1.0715)</td>
<td>1.2874** (0.6479)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>-1.3910** (0.6369)</td>
<td>-3.3196*** (1.045)</td>
<td>-3.3196*** (1.045)</td>
<td>-3.1287* (0.6396)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01
Interpretation

Interpretation of these results must be prefaced by a methodological caution: with an n of only 83 the accuracy of statistical tests may be imperfect. As mentioned above, some mechanisms have an extremely low n, with only 4 cases of international interventions and overwhelms. Both of these particular mechanisms of success may have interesting effects but the small number of cases makes regression an unsuitable tool, as these variables tend to exhibit either quasi or complete separation of data points, making their regression coefficients effectively meaningless. See, for example, the coefficients for the overwhelming variable in table 3.1.

I have attempted to compensate for the small number of particular cases in part by also performing regressions of the aggregate elections/negotiations variable, but this aggregation, while offering utility in supporting my argument on consensus, campaign initiative, and capacity-building, limits the ability of my analysis to directly compare the particular effects of certain mechanisms of success which may be interesting. Overwhelms, in particular, are a unique political phenomenon deserving of more study. The small number of cases, though, makes the quantitative approach less valuable. Future work should rely more on qualitative analysis.

Having brought up these cautions one encouraging note also bears mentioning. The combined datasets used to generate cases are at least a close approximation of the complete global population of successful civil resistance campaigns during the period of...
examination (1900-2006). Since these 83 campaigns are the population (not a sample) even results which do not reach standards of statistical significance may be instructive, though of course to be accepted with caution. The summary statistics presented above do show powerful trends, even if statistical tests using the data fail to reach robust standards of statistical significance.

On democracy, an honest evaluation of the results provides only tentative support for my hypothesis. The results are strongly suggestive of the positive effects of elections and negotiations. However, while some relationships of statistical significance do emerge, particularly when “weak” cases are excluded from the analysis, the results are unstable. The small size of the dataset, as well as a lack of differentiation among the covariates is the likely cause behind this instability. Yet a lack of strong, statistically significant relationships calls for further analysis before firmly arguing for the democratizing effects of elections and negotiations. Due to this uncertainty, the democracy question will be the primary concern in the following chapter’s case studies.

In the future, this issue might also be dealt with by expanding the population of cases to different types of regime transitions. This would require a theoretical re-casting of the model, since as it is its logic is limited to successful civil resistance campaigns, but would provide a way to expand the dataset so as to make statistical tests more stable.

The much more striking and consistent finding is on the effects of mechanisms of success on political violence. Here the data consistently point to extremely divergent
effects from the various mechanisms. Overwhelmings have the highest rate of political violence (75%) while negotiated transitions and electoral victories have by far the lowest rates (less than 15% combined). This finding is consistent with Chenoweth and Stephan’s arguments on why nonviolent campaigns tend to lead to better civil peace outcomes than violent campaigns. Nonviolent campaigns have these better effects because they tend to have lower participation barriers and thus a larger, broad base of support which is able to more easily incorporate former opponents into a post-success political order. Consensus-based transition mechanisms are the logical extension of this pattern.

The question of perceived political legitimacy may also be a potential explanation for these trends in the data. There seems to be an inverse relationship between the degree of perceived political legitimacy and future civil conflict. Overwhelmings, in which the mass of the population simply occupies the organs of government, could be argued to be the mechanism most alienating to former regime supporters and least politically legitimate. Coups d’état, the category with the next highest mean rate of political violence, are illegitimate in that they are extra-institutional, but they represent a decision by at least a portion of the former regime elite to side with the civil resistance campaign and thus may grant somewhat more legitimacy than overwhelmings. Resignations and electoral victories follow institutional mechanisms and thus while they may disenfranchise segments of former regimes they carry with them a high degree of legitimacy. And finally, negotiated transitions are likely to be perceived as most
legitimate because by definition they involve all the actors granting them a certain degree of legitimacy *ex ante*.

The unexpectedly positive performance of resignations on both democracy and civil peace indicate a potentially important theoretical clarification not captured in my typology. I have argued that resignations are likely to perform poorly because the mechanism’s initiative rests with the *ancien regime*. However, it is not only conceivable but indeed highly likely that there is significant variation on both consensus and initiative within the sample of resignations. A resignation may be a canny move on the part of an autocrat seeking to control the terms of his departure but may also be a desperate last-ditch action by a regime that is falling apart – one carefully anticipated and planned for by the civil resistance campaign. The particular intra-regime dynamics which lead to a resignation may also be opaque or at least difficult to determine, making a full analysis of these dynamics highly time-consuming. More extensive research into resignations may reveal meaningful disaggregations which further clarify this question.

*Addressing Endogeneity Concerns*

One central concern in my analysis was the possibility that transition mechanisms themselves are endogenous to larger historical processes or particular structural factors present in the cases prior to transition. It is dubious to consider transition mechanisms to be comparable strategic choices if structural conditions preclude the exercise of particular mechanisms of success. I considered three endogeneity arguments: that transition
mechanisms can be explained by geographic region, the country’s level of pre-existing democratic openness, or previous regime type.

The first argument is closely tied to the “democratic neighborhood” argument mentioned previously which I controlled for in my democracy regressions by including the proportion of neighboring democracies. Certain regions may be associated with more peaceful, democratic norms due to historical circumstances. Europe and the Americas, for example, with a relatively long history of stable democratic nation-states, might be expected to have a higher proportion of consensus-based transition mechanisms than the less stable regions of Africa or Asia.

As shown in Figure 3.8, the distribution of the transition mechanism categories is far from equal across geographic regions. However the distribution does not follow the expected breakdown outlined above. Perhaps most strikingly, Africa has more than three times as many consensus-based as non-consensus-based mechanisms of success, and the Americas have 50 percent more non-consensus-based mechanisms. Asia and Europe follow the expected pattern more closely, but still not exclusively. In particular, out of 23 cases from Europe, 9 follow non-consensus-based mechanisms. The geographic distribution of cases of successful civil resistance thus does not explain the occurrence of particular mechanisms.
The second argument is intuitively straightforward: the less authoritarian and more democratic the country, the more likely it is that massive political changes can be achieved through consensus-based mechanisms such as elections and negotiations. Norms of institutionalized political contention and discourse are likely to be ingrained deeper in more democratic countries. In contrast, authoritarian countries with hegemonic regimes do not possess such norms and institutions. Civil resistance campaigns may not see them as viable mechanisms of success and the regime’s “pillars of support” may not respond to their legitimacy in achieving political change. Thus highly authoritarian regimes are likely to only be ousted through heavily coercive transition mechanisms such as coups or overwhelmings.

While this argument has an intuitive appeal it is not borne out in the data. As shown in Figure 3.9, the average polity score in the year prior to transition is almost identical across the four most common transition mechanisms. International
interventions and overwhelmings diverge from this trend, but as mentioned above both have an n of only four cases each, and thus play only a marginal role in my analysis. A scatterplot of the prior year polity scores (Figure 3.10) shows a similarly random distribution across the four most common transition mechanisms.

Figure 3.9: Average Prior Year Polity Score by Mechanism

36 Note too that both are included in my “non-consensus-based” aggregation and have opposite average prior polity scores, thus counter-balancing one another.

37 In Figure 3.10, the transition mechanisms are signified by numerical indicators. Coup = 1, Negotiation = 2, Election = 3, International Intervention = 4, Resignation = 5, Overwhelming = 6.
The third argument comes primarily from the work of Barbara Geddes (1999) on the effects of the type of authoritarian regime on the process of democratization. Geddes divides authoritarian regimes into three major types: personalistic, military, and party-based.\textsuperscript{38} Geddes argues that out of the three, military regimes are most likely to negotiate their way through a peaceful democratization process because of military values of force integrity and a desire to peacefully return to the barracks. Party-based regimes are more likely to hold onto power than military regimes but when external or domestic pressure increases they are also likely to have a smooth, peaceful transition to democracy.

In contrast, personalistic regimes are unlikely to voluntarily give up power, instead opting to fight to maintain political control as long as possible. This is due primarily to the regime’s close connection to the state, with the state often being seen as

\begin{figure}
\centering
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{axis}[
    title={Figure 3.10: Prior Year Polity Score Scatterplot},
    xlabel={Year},
    ylabel={Polity Score},
    xmin=-10, xmax=10,
    ymin=-10, ymax=10,
    xtick={-6,-4,-2,0,2,4,6},
    ytick={-10,-5,0,5,10},
    grid=both,
    grid style={draw=gray!30},
]
\addplot[only marks, mark size=2pt, mark options={fill=blue}]
    coordinates {
        (-6,9) (-4,7) (-2,5) (0,3) (2,1) (4,1) (6,3)
    };
\end{axis}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{38} Geddes’ later work incorporates other types of authoritarianism such as monarchies and oligarchies, but these three types remain the most common.
the dictator’s personal property, and the consequent zero-sum nature of political transition. Whereas militaries can negotiate a political exit to return to their barracks and party-based regimes may be able to liberalize but remain a part of the political process, personalistic regimes are unlikely to be able to integrate into a new political order and may face reprisals, even death, once out of political power. Applying Geddes’ logic to my mechanisms of success typology, one would expect that consensus-based transition mechanisms would be endogenous to military or party-based regimes while highly unlikely in personalistic regimes.

To test this question I collected data on regime type from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Their data covered the majority of my cases with three major exceptions: cases prior to 1946, cases of transition from colonialism, and transition from democratic regimes. In the first case, I performed the prior regime coding myself. As mentioned above, this is very small number of cases, and all involved straightforward coding with little or no ambiguity as to the prior regime type. In the second and third cases I simply added new categories to capture these cases. Extending Geddes’ argument one would expect in both colonialism and democracy that a higher proportion of cases would follow consensus-based transition mechanisms. In democracies these types of transitions have already been institutionalized while in colonial cases the post-WWII environment of European decolonization would seem likely to incentivize consensus-based mechanisms.
A breakdown of transition mechanisms by prior regime type is in Figure 3.11. The data provides a mixed answer to Geddes’ argument. Personalistic regimes have a significantly higher number of non-consensus mechanisms, with more than three times more non-consensus transition mechanisms as consensus transition mechanisms. Party-based regimes show an inverse relationship, with significant numbers of consensus-based transition mechanisms relative to non-consensus based transitions.

However, Geddes’ argument holds less powerfully in relation to military regimes, which have nearly equal numbers of both consensus-based and non-consensus transition mechanisms. Most surprising are the cases of transitions in democracies, which have twice as many non-consensus transitions as consensus mechanisms.

Figure 3.11: Mechanisms by Prior Regime Type (Absolute Numbers)

39 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz also code several regimes as hybrids of their major categories. Cases coded as hybrids were incorporated into the counts of both relevant categories.
While these issues with military regimes and democracy do put Geddes’ argument in question, the strong relationship shown in the party-based and personalistic regime numbers do make the endogeneity question still salient and puts the effects of mechanisms of success into question. Can the occurrence and effects of different mechanisms be reduced to the influence of the prior regime type? In order to address this question, it will be necessary to more deeply examine the causal dynamics which both lead to and follow differing mechanisms of success. In particular the dynamics of consensus-based transition mechanisms in personalistic regimes and of non-consensus based transition mechanisms in party-based regimes will be critical to examine.

Conclusion

From 1900-2006, there were 83 cases of successful maximalist civil resistance campaigns. These campaigns utilized six mechanisms of success in achieving their goals. Out of these six mechanisms elections and negotiations (“consensus-based” mechanisms of success) resulted in significantly higher rates of post-campaign democracy and significantly lower rates of post-campaign political violence, supporting my argument on the effects of mechanisms of success from the previous chapter. These relationships are statistically significant, though in the case of post-campaign democracy the significance is unstable. While my hypotheses were generally supported, the large-n analysis left several significant questions. First, what are the actual causal mechanisms which link mechanisms of success to democracy and civil peace? Second, is the mixed statistical significance on democracy due to the small number of cases or to a weakness in the
argument? And third, are the various mechanisms of success viable strategic alternatives to one another or is their occurrence endogenous to the country’s prior regime type? In order to address these questions, I now turn to my comparative case studies.
Chapter Four: Transition Mechanisms and the Arab Spring; The Cases of Egypt and Yemen

I have two broad objectives in this chapter: to further support my hypothesis that mechanisms characterized by consensus, campaign initiative and political capacity-building, lead to more democracy and less transitional violence, and to delve more deeply into the causal mechanisms at work which lead to the occurrence of this general trend.

I will also seek to address the endogeneity concern of regime type raised at the conclusion of the preceding chapter. Are mechanisms of success relevant to understanding democratization and civil peace after civil resistance campaigns or are their effects reducible to the political opportunity structure inherent in the previous regime? Note, however, that in many respects Geddes’ argument is in line with my own. The positive effects which she points to from military and party-based regimes are based on their greater likelihood of following less coercive, less violent transition mechanisms. The causal mechanism whereby Geddes’ argument generates its effects is, in essence, a close corollary of my own.

The endogeneity concern, however, becomes relevant if regime type can be shown to reasonably preclude the possibility of differing types of mechanisms of success. If certain regime types practically exclude the operation of particular mechanisms of success then it is not meaningful to consider the independent effects of mechanisms or
examine them as strategic equivalents. This is the argument I will seek to address in my case studies through testing the following hypothesis:

\[ H_3: \text{Regime type, while influencing, does not predetermine the reasonable possibility of civil resistance campaigns pursuing varying mechanisms of success.} \]

Finally, I will address the geographic and temporal underrepresentation of recent Middle Eastern cases in my quantitative analysis in order to show the global impact of my argument. Thus, the cases I will examine are the recent “Arab Spring” revolutions in Egypt and Yemen, cases which I fit into my mechanism of success typology as a coup d’état and negotiation respectively.\(^{40}\) These two cases are optimal for my purposes for the following reasons: their close geographic, cultural, and temporal proximity as well as the similarity of their pre-revolutionary regimes eliminate the need to control for many larger environmental factors, their recent occurrence means that they fall outside of my dataset and thus are better-suited to test its findings, and the large degree of media

\[ \]

\(^{40}\) I consider Yemen’s transition mechanism to be a civil resistance campaign-regime negotiation rather than a purely elite-based “pacted” transition because of the role of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) which actually signed the agreement as a key part of the civil resistance campaign up to the signing of the agreement. While certainly not every faction of Yemen’s revolution took part in the negotiation process, those who did negotiate can be rightfully categorized as a major faction of the civil resistance campaign rather than an elite third party. This categorization was also how the JMP was perceived in Yemen both by the government (Yemen News Agency 11/28/11) and the factions of the campaign which did not participate in the negotiations (Yemen Times 11/17/11).
attention given to both cases means that significant popular and scholarly resources exist with which to examine them.

I excluded the two additional cases of successful Arab Spring regime change – Libya and Tunisia – because the nature of their transitions makes them less optimal tests for my hypotheses.41 In the case of Libya, while the revolution began with nonviolent protests it quickly shifted to an armed struggle, so quickly in fact that it is doubtful if the protests in Libya can even be meaningfully described as a civil resistance campaign. The effects of this shift on Libya’s transitional path are doubtless an interesting avenue of inquiry but lie outside of the scope conditions of my theory.

The Tunisian case, while clearly lying within the scope of my theory, offers less clear distinction on my independent variable. The Tunisian revolution would fit into my typology as a resignation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the findings of my quantitative analysis was that resignations seem to occupy a more ambiguous middle ground between consensus-based elections and negotiations and the other non-consensus-based mechanisms of success. Tunisia’s revolution exemplifies this ambiguity. While military defection played a key role the military did not seize power, thus events in Tunisia were not a coup. Instead, when President Ben Ali resigned and fled the country parliamentary speaker Fouad Mebazaa created a unity government with the opposition. Thus the mechanism of success involved a certain degree of consensus and campaign

41 H₁ and H₂ formally stated in the previous chapter, page 52.
capacity-building, unlike Egypt, where the events of February 11th, 2011 were clearly a coup d'état, but is not a straightforward consensus-based mechanism of success, as is the case in Yemen.

While there are many similarities between the pre-revolutionary regimes in Egypt and Yemen, they also vary across Geddes’ authoritarian regime typology, with Yemen under President Ali Abdullah Saleh coded as a personalistic regime and Egypt under Mubarak a three-way hybrid of party-based, military, and personalistic. While a purely party-based authoritarian regime would be a more optimal comparison, these differences in regime type do make the comparison meaningful for addressing the endogeneity question. Geddes’ approach might be uncertain on the likely trajectory of the Egyptian transition because of the hybrid nature of the Egyptian regime. However, Yemen’s clear personalistic regime structures would make a consensus-based transition mechanism highly unlikely.

Furthermore, the other ways in which the two cases differ make the cases a “hard” test for my central hypothesis. Several traditional explanations for democracy and political violence would lead one to expect strongly better outcomes in Egypt than in Yemen. In 2010 Egypt’s level of development was significantly higher than Yemen’s. GDP per capita in Egypt was more than twice that of Yemen (The World Bank, 2014). The Yemeni government relied heavily on oil revenues for its income (Revenue Watch Institute, 2013), a factor often argued to increase the likelihood and stability of
authoritarianism (Luciani, 2005). Egypt’s reliance on fossil fuel revenue was much more marginal (See Figure 4.1).

![Figure 4.1: Fossil Fuel Revenue as Percentage of Government Income](image)

Perhaps most importantly while the Egyptian government faced no serious armed opposition, the government of Yemen was deeply engaged in a struggle with multiple armed insurgent groups. While the general trend in the Middle East against democracy would perhaps not make democratization “likely” in either case, these factors and others would indicate that political violence in Yemen would be extremely high, while the likelihood of democracy would be extremely low.

Democratic transitions can be lengthy processes and both Egypt and Yemen are too early in their transitions for their democratic progress to be fully evaluated. I conduct my analysis under the assumption that significant transitional periods remain in the future for both countries. This analysis is by no means the last word on the democratic transitions in these countries, nor do I purport it to be so. However, the three years and
two years respectively since the success of civil resistance campaigns in these two countries provide a rich and fruitful ground for analysis of the effects of mechanisms of success, and also give insight into how the continued democratic transition in both countries may be expected to play out over the coming years.

*Laying the Groundwork*

Prior to 2011, the political environments in Egypt and Yemen were in many ways similar. Long-time authoritarian presidents, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, had been in power for similar periods of time, held periodic “elections” which served to legitimize their rule, and were both considered to be grooming their sons to succeed them. While both regimes allowed limited forms of political opposition this took the form of “liberalized autocracy” (Brumberg, 2005) arrangements which allowed minimal public criticism but prevented opposition political parties or other groups from achieving real political power. Saleh’s Yemen was a personalistic regime revolving around the Saleh family and sustained through a network of tribal patronage. In Egypt the Mubarak regime sustained itself through the all-pervasive ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), an extensive *mukhabarat* internal security apparatus, and a politically and economically powerful military.

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42 Saleh became President of North Yemen in 1978 and continued as President when North Yemen unified with South Yemen in 1990. Mubarak became President in 1981 after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.
In Egypt, an armed insurgency against the Mubarak regime by Islamists in Upper Egypt had been successfully crushed in the late 1990s. While sporadic minor attacks took place in the Sinai region, these were minimal and did not present a serious challenge to the Egyptian government.

A political opening in the mid-2000s under pressure from the United States led to Egypt’s first multi-party presidential election. However, extensive legal restrictions on the eligibility of presidential candidates and the formation of political parties severely tilted the playing field in favor of the ruling NDP. The election itself was characterized by widespread electoral manipulation by the regime, the imprisonment of President Mubarak’s most serious contender, only 22 percent voter turnout and an 88.7 percent victory by Mubarak (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2005). Nonviolent civil society groups until the mantle of the “Kefaya” movement led protests against Mubarak’s rule around the time of the election but these largely faded after the election was over.

Government privatization and other neo-liberal policies spearheaded by President Mubarak’s son Gamal had sparked widespread protests and strikes by workers, most prominently in the city of Mahalla, but this labor activism remained largely contained to non-maximalist goals and did not directly threaten the political monopoly of the regime

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43 *Kefaya* means “enough” in Arabic.

44 For a summary of the Kefaya movement see Bisgaard-Church 2011.
The government also faced sporadic opposition from activist bloggers, who advocated a diverse set of causes but primarily acted to publicize incidences of police brutality. However, in general the political environment in Egypt was characterized by a cognitive dissonance as the informal rules of political discourse limited criticism of the regime to private discussions (Cook, 2012). Thus by the time of the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” in late 2010, with these few exceptions there was little visible opposition to the Mubarak regime. Political discussions in Egypt were overwhelmingly focused on the question of Presidential succession, with two regime insiders: the President’s son Gamal and intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, considered the two most likely contenders.

In contrast, the regime of Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh entered the Arab Spring confronting a wide variety of violent and nonviolent political opposition. Three major challengers, two violent and one largely nonviolent, are particularly deserving of attention.

First, the Yemeni government faced an ongoing insurrection in the northern province of Saada from Zaidi rebels known as “Houthis.” The Houthi rebellion was initiated in 2004 when the Yemeni government attempted to arrest radical preacher and
political leader Hussein Al-Houthi. Al-Houthi, as leader of the Zaidi\textsuperscript{45} group al-Shabab al-Moumeen (the “believing youth”) had led virulent anti-US demonstrations which the government interpreted as covert anti-government activity. Al-Houthi was also accused of attempting to revive the Zaidi imamate, the theocratic government which had ruled Yemen until 1962. Al-Houthi’s followers protected their leader violently, resulting in three months of armed clashes. Hussein al-Houthi was killed and the rebellion briefly died down in September of 2004, but was re-initiated in 2005 by his father, Badr-eddin, and his brother, Abdelmalik. The following years saw several cycles of violent clashes and temporary cease fire arrangements, peaking in August of 2009, when the government launched “Operation Scorched Earth” to eliminate the Houthis. Battles continued through early 2010, when the two sides signed yet another cease fire agreement. However, clashes continued between the Houthis and pro-government tribal militias throughout the rest of the year.

Throughout the conflict, while the government accused the Houthis of seeking regime change, the Houthis themselves painted their insurgency as much more defensive in nature – focused on protecting the Zaidi regions of Yemen from Sunni persecution (particularly from the increasing influence of Salafist groups) and gaining greater autonomy for their home region.

\textsuperscript{45} Zaidis are a sect of Shi’ite Islam found most commonly in Yemen. They are a majority in Saada Province, the heart of the Houthi rebellion, but a minority in the total population of Yemen.
Second, a largely nonviolent protest movement, the Hiraak al-Jenoobi,\textsuperscript{46} known across Yemen simply as “Hiraak,” led protests and demonstrations across the formerly independent state of South Yemen.\textsuperscript{47} The demonstrations were initiated in 2007 primarily around the issue of benefits for South Yemeni soldiers forced into retirement after the South’s abortive civil war in 1994, but grew more radical in both their demands and tactics as the government responded to Hiraak activity with widespread violence. By late 2010 most Hiraak leaders were calling for full independence.

The Hiraak movement was (and is) deeply fragmented, incorporating elements of the former ruling party of South Yemen, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), as well as independent youth activists, moderate Islamists, and others. While the majority of the movement pursued its goals through nonviolence, several armed factions regularly clashed with police and targeted both police and government forces in hit-and-run attacks.

Finally, the local branch of Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), was involved in an insurgency against the government. Islamist militants had a long-standing presence in Yemen, dating to the Yemeni government’s support for the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Most famously, al-Qaeda associated

\textsuperscript{46}Meaning “Southern Movement” in Arabic.

\textsuperscript{47}For a history of South Yemen and background on the grievances and historical conditions framing the Hiraak, see Brehony 2011.
militants launched an attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden in early 2000, killing 17 US sailors. The Cole attack’s impact was initially limited in Yemen, as militant groups lacked popular support and were even connected to high elements in the government (Day, 2012). However, after President Saleh’s eager adoption of the Bush Administration’s “war on terror” and in the wake of widespread outrage over the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Al-Qaeda activity steadily increased.

_Yemen: Compromising the Revolution?_ 48

When fruit seller Mohammed Bouazizi self-immolated and initiated the “Arab Spring” the political situation in Yemen was already precarious. Under the terms of the Yemeni constitution President Ali Abdullah Saleh was required to step down from power at the end of his term in 2013. However, in late 2010 MPs from Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC), the overwhelmingly dominant party in the Yemeni parliament, announced a series of proposed constitutional amendments which would remove presidential term limits and allow Saleh to remain president for life. The move enraged both the formal opposition, led by the Islamist Islah party, and several of Yemen’s powerful tribal sheikhs.

48 The following case studies are informed by a wide reading of primary and secondary sources, all of which are listed in the bibliography. Since much of the narrative relies on common-knowledge, open-source information and comes from multiple overlapping sources I have not cited each source individually at each usage in the text. However, in a few cases, particularly for pieces of information which are disputed or not based on easily-available or uncontested information, I have included a specific in-text citation to support my narrative.
Thus, when news of President Ben Ali’s resignation and flight from Tunisia reached Yemen the news fell on fertile ground. Students at Sana’a University held small protests where they praised the Tunisian revolution and called for a similar uprising in Yemen. Civil society activists and some low-level members of Islah, including future Nobel laureate Tawakkul Karman, participated in these first protests and were briefly detained by the authorities.

Protests escalated after the fall of President Mubarak in Egypt on February 11. Al-Jazeera coverage played a key role as people across Yemen watched the dramatic events unfold. When Mubarak stepped down tens of thousands came into the streets, mobilized almost spontaneously via social media and text messages. The youth protesters in the streets echoed the slogans and tactics of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, occupying a square near Sana’a University which they named “change square” and refusing to leave until President Saleh stepped down.

Opposition parties attempted to capitalize on the enthusiasm of the youth and organized their own rallies but initially remained much more moderate in their demands. While the youth explicitly demanded that Saleh leave office immediately the opposition instead called for political reforms and greater political inclusion.49 However, the major

49 The Islah party even attempted to shift the slogan of the revolution from “the people want the downfall of the regime” to “the people want the reform of the regime.” This new slogan had an intentional double-meaning in Arabic, as the word for “reform” happens to be Islah, the party’s name.
opposition parties, under the mantle of the “Joint Meeting Party” (JMP) alliance played a key supportive role in maintaining protest momentum, supplying student activists with supplies and sending their supporters into the streets and squares (Yemen Times 1/12/12).

From the beginning the street protests were violently attacked by security forces and government supporters in plainclothes. This repression peaked on the “Friday of Dignity,” March 18th, when pro-government gunmen attacked a protest, killing at least 45 people. This massacre was followed by waves of defections from the Saleh government. Perhaps most importantly, three days after the massacre Major General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the commander of Yemen’s First Armored Division and widely considered the second-most powerful man in Yemen, announced support for the revolution and said that his troops would protect nonviolent protesters from attacks (BBC News, 2011).

The military and political defections, as well as the continuing size of the protests, led Saleh to begin negotiating with the opposition. He offered significant economic concessions, including an increase in public sector salaries and guaranteed jobs for unemployed students (one of the largest demographics in the protests). Saleh also promised to resign before the end of the year and that his son would not succeed him. However, neither the formal opposition nor the street protesters considered Saleh’s offers credible and protests continued. A process of negotiation between the opposition and Saleh under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stop-started for several months until late May, when President Saleh definitively refused to step down.
Saleh’s refusal sparked violent clashes in the so-called “Battle of Sana’a” as Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, chief of the powerful Hashid tribal federation, declared support for the protesters and led his supporters in attacking government forces and occupying several government buildings. However, the clashes only lasted a few days and the tribesmen quickly withdrew from their positions. More critically, on June 3rd a rocket attack on a mosque where Saleh was praying critically injured him. He was forced to flee the country for treatment in Saudi Arabia, leaving executive authority in the hands of his vice president, Abdurabh Mansur Hadi.

Over the following months as protests continued to maintain their size and were protected by armed tribal groups and Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar’s first division, Hadi revived the scrapped GCC initiative which proposed a political transition in which Saleh would step down and hand over power to Hadi in exchange for immunity from prosecution. The UN was also heavily involved, with special envoy Jamal Benomar facilitating dialogue and the UN Security Council passing Resolution 2014 which called for all parties to sign the GCC agreement. In November, ten months after the beginning of protests, President Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the GCC agreement, officially giving up his executive power and beginning the next stage of Yemen’s political transition.50

50 In more detail, the GCC agreement’s terms were as follows: In exchange for immunity from prosecution for him and his family, upon signature, President Saleh would immediately cede all executive authority to Vice-President Hadi. Vice-President Hadi was required to call early presidential elections within 90 days of the signing of the
This breakthrough moment was a revolutionary anticlimax. The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) and ruling GPC, the primary beneficiaries of the agreement, lauded it. However, on the streets youth activists decried concessions to the regime such as the GPC retaining half of all government ministries. In particular, the youth were outraged that, as a condition for signing the agreement, President Saleh and his family had received immunity from prosecution.

This sense of disillusionment led to continued mobilization in the “Change Squares” both in Sana’a and across Yemen. Tens of thousands of activists, including Tawakkul Karman and youth wings of many of the country’s major political groups,

government of national unity was required to make decisions by consensus, with Hadi as a final arbiter if consensus could not be reached. Among the primary tasks for Hadi and the national unity government articulated in the agreement was establishing a committee to reform and professionalize the military and a conference for national dialogue. The conference for national dialogue, which explicitly required the participation of youth, the Houthis, the Hiraak, other political parties, and women, was tasked with making recommendations for a new constitution, as well as discussing an array of political problems in Yemen (Southern separatism, the grievances of the Houthis, etc…). When the national dialogue concluded, a constitutional commission would be tasked with implementing their recommended constitutional changes, which would then be voted on in a referendum. Once the new constitution was in force, parliamentary and presidential elections would be held under its auspices. Other important provisions of the agreement included an explicit statement that the agreement superseded any provisions of the Yemen constitution, that women were required to be included at all stages of the transition, and that mechanisms were established for working out difference of interpretation over the agreement. The complete text of the agreement is available in English at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/yemen/yemen_transition_agreement.htm.
remained in the squares to push for more democratic opening and ensure that President Saleh did not use the GCC agreement as a means for returning to power. While participation in protests fluctuated the youth remained mobilized as a potent check on all the political parties in power (Yemen Times 6/7/12). Youth organizations also shifted tactics, building political organizations to monitor human rights and advocate for democratic causes (Yemen Times 12/12/11).

The new unity government, while suffering from severe internal coordination problems, moved quickly to implement the terms of the transitional agreement. Critically, the agreement itself assumed a role in public discourse as the primary instrument of political legitimacy. Both opposition figures and former President Saleh himself used the rhetoric of supporting the transitional agreement as their primary tool to defend themselves and attack political opponents. Contention was at times extremely fierce, with both sides accusing the other of undermining the transition process for the sake of individual political advantage. Critically, however, the “field of contention” had moved from the all-or-nothing political struggle of 2011 to a limited range of institutionalized political tactics, all of which, to be considered legitimate, required adherence to the principles of an agreement which clearly laid out a path towards democratic good governance. As President Saleh said in late 2011: “The initiative is clear and you must not deviate from...its mechanisms, you can but seek its provisions” (Yemen News Agency 11/28/11). The Al-Ahmar family, the heads of the Hashid tribal federation, also said that, while they wanted all members of the Saleh family immediately
removed from power, implementing the terms of the agreement was more important than settling their individual grievances (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 12). The agreement did not eliminate political contention but framed it in a nonviolent, institutionalized context that set the stage for greater political inclusion.

The terms of the agreement had also laid out a specific program that called for the inclusion not just of the parties which had signed it but of all the major political forces in Yemen; including the youth in the squares, the Houthis, and the southern separatists. Groups which had previously been subject to intense government repression (the youth and the southerners) or waves of outright civil war (the Houthis) were now targets of intensive negotiation and dialogue to incentivize their participation in the transition process. In particular, appeals were made for all parties to join the inclusive national dialogue, conceived as the key means for working out the constitutional changes which would determine the post-transition political order.

These political outreaches had mixed results. The Houthis, initially deeply skeptical of the GCC agreement, agreed to participate in the national dialogue because “dialogue is part of our culture” (Yemen Times 6/4/12). Youth as well participated in record numbers, both as representatives of political parties and as representatives of independent revolutionary organizations. Many factions of the Hiraak refused to participate in national dialogue because they believed the southern issue should be
resolved first before considering any other issues. However, several more moderate factions did choose to participate.

At the same time, President Hadi, elected in his own right in February 2012, began working on resolving several critical security issues. During the instability of 2011 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its supporting organization Ansar ash-Sharia had taken control of much of the southern province of Abyan, including the provincial capital Zinjibar. President Hadi launched a sustained military operation that, with the cooperation of local tribal militias, successfully ousted AQAP from its areas of territorial control in Abyan. US military support also assisted in the successful prosecution of the conflict, as US intelligence experts helped coordinate the operation and US unmanned drones supported the operation from the air.

The fight against AQAP was successfully prosecuted despite continuing splits in the Yemeni military and the presence of hostile armed camps in cities across Yemen. The defection of the First Armored Division in March 2011 had split the Yemeni military first into two and then into three separate armed camps: a segment loyal to ex-President Saleh (centered on the Republican Guard, which was commanded by Saleh’s son Ahmed), a segment loyal to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and later a segment loyal to President Hadi. Attempts to reform this fragmented structure (a key part of the GCC agreement) met with strong resistance, even open mutiny. However, the strong support for the transitional process across all aspects of the political spectrum, even the former ruling
party, de-legitimized attempts to undermine President Hadi’s military reforms (Alley, 2013). While the reform process was slow, major figures were eventually removed from command and the military structure centralized in a non-partisan arrangement.

Minor violent clashes between other actors did occur throughout the transition process. By the end of 2011, Sana’a in particular had been divided into four hostile armed camps which only slowly withdrew from their positions. Minor clashes occurred over territorial disputes, old grievances, and attempts to jockey control over the transition process. However, the clashes which did occur were also quickly contained, and decreased as the various armed factions moved out of their occupying positions in Yemen’s major cities. Clashes also occurred between the Houthis and Salafist tribesmen in Northern Yemen. However, this violence was widely seen as counterproductive, and the Houthis in particular suffered politically because of it (Al-Muslimi, 2014). While Yemen’s longstanding culture of an armed populace willing to use violence retained a powerful influence the investment of all the major armed parties in the transition led to a dramatic de-escalation of political violence.

The national dialogue was initiated in March 2013, with participation from all major political parties, the youth, Houthis, and moderate factions of the Hiraak. A required quota of 30% also ensured women’s participation at all levels of the dialogue.

51 For example, it was only in June of 2012 that MPs agreed to stop carrying guns in parliament (Yemen Times 6/14/12).
Policy decisions from the conference required consensus by at least 90% of participants, ensuring both a high-degree of buy-in for the conference’s prescriptions and extreme difficulty in accomplishing anything. The negotiations suffered deep challenges, particularly relating to the issue of South Yemen’s independence, a point on which most factions of the Hiraak refused to negotiate. The issue of southern separatism was made more problematic by rising demands for greater autonomy from the Hadramawt region of eastern Yemen and the region surrounding the city of Aden. In the end, the national dialogue was forced to conclude without a definitive answer to the Southern issue. Only after the conclusion of the dialogue did President Hadi announce that a subsequent committee had decided that the best solution was the division of Yemen into six federated regions, two in the south and four in the north.

Perhaps the most critical aspect of the national dialogue was the chance for all parties to be involved in a real, substantial discussion of the nature of the Yemeni state. One of the primary problems for democratization across the Middle East has been the artificial nature of state boundaries and a lack of coherent national identities. Yemen, with its bifurcated history and multitude of tribal and religious identity groups, is no exception. What it means to be Yemeni, the relationship of the people to the state, and the acceptable modes of political discourse have all been unresolved questions. In the national dialogue, for the first time all of Yemen’s various groups were able to come together and work out many of these questions.
When the national dialogue conference concluded in January 2014, it was clear to all parties that the country was not prepared for the next stage of the GCC-planned transition process: a referendum on constitutional changes worked out by the national dialogue conference to be immediately followed by legislative and presidential elections. The conference thus extended President Hadi’s mandate for a year to continue the transition process, implement the NDC’s recommendations, and move towards constitutional changes and new elections. As of the date of this writing the transition process remains underway, with a committee of legal experts working to draft the recommendations of the national dialogue conference into a new constitution. A referendum on the constitution they produce and new presidential elections must be held prior to January 2015.

Yemen’s prospects for both democratization and civil peace are most accurately characterized as “uncertain” at this point. However, the GCC agreement staved off a major political crisis, proved critical in opening the political space to new actors, and averted an almost-certain civil war.

_Egypt: The Army and the People – One Hand?_

In Egypt, the immediate antecedent to the events of 2011 was the 2010 legislative elections. A sense of hope for political change sparked by the return to the country of former IAEA chief and potential presidential candidate Mohamed el-Baradei was crushed as some of the most blatant government fraud in recent memory brought a legislature to
power completely dominated by the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), with NDP members winning over 80 percent of the seats.

As news of the successful revolution in Tunisia came to Egypt increased attention was placed on a protest already planned for January 25th, 2011 – Egypt’s “police day” – by opposition groups, including the Facebook group “We are all Khaled Said” organized by Egyptian Google executive Wael Ghonim. The Egyptian interior ministry attempted to suppress the protests through a massive security force deployment, but was thwarted by innovative “flash mob” protest tactics employed by the activists. The surprising turnout and new protest approach allowed the activists to reach and briefly occupy Cairo’s symbolic Tahrir (“liberation”) square.

Over the next 18 days, protests rapidly grew as opposition political parties, including the banned Muslim Brotherhood, joined youth protesters in Tahrir square. While the largest protests were in Cairo additional protests took place in several cities across Egypt, particularly in the Suez city of Port Said. After initial clashes in the first few days of protests the police largely disappeared from the streets of Cairo; to such an extent that many attributed the withdrawal to a deliberate tactic on the part of the

52 Khaled Said was a young Egyptian from the city of Alexandria who was brutally tortured and murdered by Egyptian police after publicizing incidents of police brutality.

53 For an excellent description of the planning and execution of this initial protest, see Levinson and Coker 2011.

54 Where some of the most violent confrontations of the revolution took place.
government to foment a breakdown in law and order and incentivize the protesters to return home. The Egyptian army deployed to the streets of Cairo on January 28 but declared its intention not to interfere with the protests and instead often operated as a buffer between protesters and regime supporters.

While protests escalated, the Mubarak government attempted several conciliatory tactics. Mubarak re-shuffled his cabinet and appointed intelligence chief Omar Suleiman his first-ever vice-president. Immediately after taking office Suleiman was tasked with negotiating with the various political factions in Tahrir Square. Several political parties engaged in negotiation, but the majority of people in the square, predominately the many diffuse groups of “revolutionary youth,” refused to negotiate with the regime while Mubarak remained in power (Abaza, 2011). Prominent Egyptian “wise men” also attempted to mediate between the two sides, pushing for a transitional plan in which Mubarak would retain the title of “honorary president” but cede all of his authority to Vice-President Suleiman. Suleiman would then be tasked with forming a unity government and overseeing constitutional changes leading up to free and fair elections (Daily News Egypt 2/4/11).

While such concessions would have been unthinkable before the beginning of protests on January 25th, the combination of repression, condescension towards protesters, and lack of initiative on the part of the regime both angered protesters and convinced them that continued action could eventually achieve their most cherished goal.
of forcing Mubarak out. Protest leaders, including Mohamed el-Baradei, also called on the military to force a solution to the conflict (Daily News Egypt 2/10/11).

As negotiations broke down on February 9 Vice-President Suleiman warned of the likely occurrence of a coup if protests continued. Protesters largely derided this as a bluff or intimidation tactic and expressed their intention to continue to escalate tactics until Mubarak left office (Daily News Egypt 2/9/11). Meanwhile, a wave of solidarity strikes by workers across Egypt pushing for both political change and labor concessions added strength to the protest movement and continued to inflict devastating damage on the Egyptian economy.

On February 10, widespread reports surfaced that President Mubarak was on the verge of resigning. However, after hundreds of thousands of Egyptians gathered to hear news of the announcement Mubarak announced that he would not step down and reiterated his firm intention to maintain his office until the end of his term in September. Furious protests took place across the country and opposition leaders called for immediate military intervention. Later reports indicated that Mubarak had been prepared to resign and had communicated such to prominent regime insiders but had changed his mind at the last minute after his son and former presumed heir Gamal had talked him out of it (Daily News Egypt 2/15/11).

As protesters planned increased demonstrations and other tactical escalations the military chose to take control of the situation. Field Marshall Muhammad Hussein
Tantawi, chief of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), held a four-hour overnight meeting with President Mubarak. While the contents of their discussion were not revealed, the meeting was the end of the Mubarak presidency. The following day, February 11, as President Mubarak fled to the resort town of Sharm al-Sheikh Vice-President Omar Suleiman gave a brief statement that Mubarak had stepped down and handed over political authority to Tantawi and SCAF.

The downfall of Mubarak was hailed both in Egypt and around the world as one of the greatest moments in Middle Eastern history. A sense of euphoria pervaded the country as activists hailed the victory of “people power” and eagerly anticipated a quick transition to democracy as promised by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi and SCAF. SCAF actively encouraged this narrative, promising activists that all of their goals would be met, meeting with youth leaders such as Wael Ghonim, and quickly forming a committee to revise the Egyptian constitution. A number of businessmen associated with the corruption of the Mubarak regime were also ousted from power and prosecuted.

However, military assets remained inviolable, reform of the military was never an option on the table, and opposition figures, while consulted, were not given real political power. Cabinet reshuffles undertaken to assuage protester concerns were largely cosmetic and orchestrated to keep the old guard in power (Daily News Egypt 2/25/11). In contrast to transitional plans which had been considered during the revolution, such as a power-sharing arrangement between the NDP and opposition to oversee constitutional
changes before the scheduled elections in September (Daily News Egypt 2/9/11b), the army suspended the constitution, maintained the longstanding state of emergency, and kept all the levers of real political power in its own hands.

Critically, this approach by the army successfully de-mobilized much of the massive coalition which had come together to oust Mubarak. Certain more radical youth “revolutionaries” attempted to remain in Tahrir Square advocating for greater openness and democracy and condemning SCAF’s authoritarian tactics, and selected mass protests continued throughout SCAF’s time in power. However, the mass of the people either accepted the rhetoric that the army’s ouster of Mubarak represented the victory of the revolution or simply no longer felt motivated to engage in political action. Organized political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood split from the young revolutionaries to carve out their own political arrangement with the military.

Meanwhile SCAF continued to arrest, detain, and try in secret courts over 7,000 activists (Martini & Taylor, 2011). SCAF’s concern with maintaining public support and its own air of apolitical legitimacy inclined the generals to move away from direct rule, but they were determined to ensure that any future ruler would be unable to interfere with their continued political independence and domination of the country’s economy. Thus, while SCAF maintained a public face in favor of democracy, its manipulation of the transition process, unchecked by any serious partner in power, pushed towards keeping a non-democratic autonomous military with little or no civilian oversight.
SCAF’s direct rule was gradually withdrawn, first with parliamentary elections in November 2011-January 2012 and then presidential elections in June 2012. Both elections were dominated by Islamists, with the Muslim Brotherhood taking the largest proportion of seats in the new parliament (followed by the Salafist al-Nour party), and Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi elected as Egypt’s first democratically-elected President.

Morsi’s election was a moment of democratic hope. International observers hailed the historic nature of the election (Egypt’s first real democratic leader in its history). TIME magazine put Morsi on its cover with the caption: “The Most Important Man in the Middle East.” Perhaps most stunningly, Morsi quickly forced the resignations of SCAF Chief Muhammad Hussein Tantawi and Army Chief of Staff Sami Hafez Anan, a move hailed by liberal activists and seen as a clear repudiation of military rule. However, some observers cautioned that the move had been taken in consultation with military leaders and seemed to be acceptable to the military leadership (Fahim, 2012).

Optimism about Morsi’s rule dissipated as Egypt’s economic problems continued to worsen, public services broke down regularly, and Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist leaders pushed moralistic policies alienating to many Egyptians. However, the key moment mobilizing opposition to Morsi came in November 2012, when Morsi issued a constitutional declaration granting him sweeping executive powers. The declaration was ostensibly made to protect the upper house of parliament and constituent assembly
from judicial interference but its effect was to grant Morsi greater power than the president had held at any time under Mubarak (International Crisis Group, 2013). After widespread protests Morsi quickly scrapped the declaration, but its effect was to drive away what limited opposition participation there was in the constitution-making process, leading to the completion of an Islamist-tinged constitution passed in a controversial low-turnout referendum.

In early 2013, a challenge to Morsi’s rule emerged in the activist group Tamarud (“rebellion” or “mutiny” in Arabic). Tamarud launched a petition drive, aiming to collect at least 15 million signatures on a petition calling for Morsi’s resignation. The campaign’s message fell on fertile soil. While Morsi still enjoyed broad support amongst the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters, the rest of Egyptian society had become deeply disillusioned with him, with 95 percent or higher of those outside his support base expressing a lack of confidence in his rule, and two-thirds saying his election was a setback for Egypt (Zogby 2013a). While the opposition was divided on the best course of action to take against Morsi, many favored extreme responses, with over 80 percent calling for scrapping the constitution and 60 percent advocating for at least a brief return to military rule (Zogby 2013a).

On June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration as President, Tamarud’s long mobilizing process and simple message “Irhal!” (“get out”) paid off. Millions, perhaps even tens of millions, joined protests across Egypt demanding Morsi’s
immediate ouster. On July 1, the military gave both the President and the opposition 48 hours to resolve their differences or they would intervene. Morsi angrily responded in a statement reiterating his position as Egypt’s democratically elected and legitimate president and condemning any interference in politics by the military. His statement failed to sway the military leadership and on July 3rd Defense Minister Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi deployed troops across Cairo and placed Morsi and much of the Muslim Brotherhood’s top leadership under arrest. An interim government under the leadership of chief constitutional court judge Adly Mansour was put in power.

Morsi’s supporters reacted to this military coup with huge demonstrations, centered on sit-ins in Cairo’s Nahda and Raba’a al-Adawiya squares. After receiving a “mandate” from protesters to “fight terrorism,” al-Sisi led a massive military crackdown on the sit-ins on August 14, 2013, with at least 600 and possibly many more people killed on that day alone. The scale of the massacres made the events of August 14 the worst incident of mass killing in Egypt’s modern history. While the military claimed that the protesters had been widely armed and had engaged in firefights with soldiers, evidence from eyewitnesses suggests that, while some protesters may have carried weapons the vast majority were unarmed or armed only with stones and other improvised weapons (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

In the months since the military coup repression of the Muslim Brotherhood has escalated, with the organization first banned and then declared a “terrorist organization.”
The military-backed government has arrested thousands of Muslim Brothers and their supporters. The crackdown, however, has not been limited to Islamists, with the military arresting prominent youth activists and other well-known liberal opposition figures. In one of the most prominent abuses of civil liberties, three Al-Jazeera journalists were arrested on charges of having links to terrorism, a stiff charge whose sole source appears to be reporting on government repression of the Muslim Brotherhood (Fahim, 2014). The new Egyptian constitution, passed in a referendum characterized by military intimidation and an opposition boycott, expands the definition of terrorism to create a de facto military state, and widely expands the President’s ability to call a state of emergency (Revkin, 2014).

This escalating crackdown on any form of popular dissent has been tied with a fall in levels of confidence in the military. While 93% percent of Egyptians expressed confidence in the army immediately following Morsi’s ouster, only 70% continued to express confidence in September 2013 (Zogby 2013b). However, the military remains the institution most trusted by Egyptians. A cult of personality has also been built up around General al-Sisi, with widespread petition campaigns launched to push Sisi to run for president and comparisons made between Sisi and Egypt’s still-popular second military president, Gamal Abdel-Nasser (Carlstrom, 2014). The military gave Sisi its official blessing to run for the presidency on January 27, saying that his election was a

55 Abdelhakim Abdel-Nasser, son of President Nasser, went so far as to say that his father’s spirit had been found in Sisi.
“mandate.” Considering the low levels of confidence in all other potential political leaders and the continued blanket repression of all political opponents, it is extremely likely that Sisi will handily win the upcoming presidential election.

A disturbing rise in violence has accompanied the months since Morsi’s ouster. While the military itself has been by far the largest propagator of violence (casualty estimates from the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood are upwards of 1,400 deaths), there has also been a rise in terror attacks by the Islamist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Partisans of Jerusalem). These attacks have been denounced by the Muslim Brotherhood but are attributed by the military to its supporters. In the immediate aftermath of Morsi’s ouster there were also widespread attacks on churches by Brotherhood supporters, who blamed Christians for their support for Morsi’s ouster. Recent protests have also seen violent clashes between Sisi supporters and the “Anti-Coup Alliance,” a group led by the Muslim Brotherhood which has led protests against the military. On the third anniversary of the beginning of the Egyptian revolution more than 50 people were killed in street clashes.

In short, the situation in Egypt is much like it was before Mubarak’s ouster, with the main difference being an increased level of violence. Some hope remains – Egyptian activists say the level of political engagement and awareness alone created by the

56 No political party or political movement (such as Tamarod) enjoys a confidence rating half as high as the military’s (Zogby 2013b).
revolution and subsequent transition will prevent Egyptians from ever submitting passively to authoritarianism again (Noujaim, 2013). However, the likelihood of a transition to democracy remains slim at best.

*The Effects of Mechanisms of Success*

The disparate mechanisms of success in the Egyptian and Yemeni revolutions have had clear and powerful impacts on their transitional processes. In the Yemeni case, the negotiated transition by multiple major actors, characterized by consensus, initiative on the part of the opposition, and political capacity-building led to a transitional arrangement in which no single actor was able to impose its agenda upon the transition. Instead all of the major political groups were forced to work together in order to achieve their goals, creating a system of both formal and informal checks and balances which has moved the country towards a more democratic, open political system.

Perhaps critical as well was the very anticlimax associated with the transitional agreement. In Yemen, the pervasive sense that the revolution was incomplete led activists and politicians alike towards continued mobilization for change, some going so far as to say that the most difficult stage of the revolution had not even begun until Saleh’s ouster (Yemen Times 12/12/11). Thus not only did the mechanism of success itself demand political organization and capacity-building, but its effect even on those who did not participate was increased nonviolent popular dissent and political capacity-building.
Furthermore, the negotiated GCC agreement normalized and institutionalized an environment of negotiated problem-solving and consensus-based governance. Actors which had previously interacted on purely conflictual terms were integrated into a process of dialogue which gave them political legitimacy based on their adherence to norms of cooperation and democratization. In its initial stages this process only included the major elite actors, but the nature of the transition is gradually expanding the political space to include outside actors such as the Houthis. Perhaps even Yemen’s violent history became an asset as, despite a full-fledged counterinsurgency against AQAP, concerns of security were not considered legitimate excuses for centralization of authority (in contrast to Egypt) and instead seen as impetus towards reforming the government and military and completing the democratization process.

A rise in political violence did follow the breakdown in state capacity during the revolution in 2011, in particular due to the rise of AQAP in Abyan Province. However, the negotiated mechanism of success allowed the Yemeni state after Hadi’s election as President to focus on re-asserting its control over the regions lost during the 2011 revolution. Had a different mechanism been followed, for instance a coup by the al-Ahmar family or General Ali Mohsen, the country’s armed forces would likely have been fully engaged fighting amongst themselves at the center, and AQAP might well have remained in control of much of southern Yemen until today. Instead, the consensus on a transitional path which maintained state capacity and involved de-escalation by the armed actors at the center allowed the state to refocus its strength in regaining control over the
periphery. While AQAP remains a threat its position has been critically weakened since the beginning of 2012 and its support is rapidly waning amongst Yemen’s tribes.  

In Egypt, the coup d’état of 2011 also followed its expected outcome. Because the transition mechanism was not based on consensus but rather on a simple assertion of power by regime insiders (SCAF), these authoritarian insiders were able to manipulate the transition process for their own ends. They were also able to do so because the lack of campaign initiative and capacity built prior to the transition mechanism left only a fragmented, weakened opposition. The military was also able to subvert the revolution’s message through selective prosecution of its rivals in the old regime and its narrative of being the defender of the revolution. The military was less interested in directly ruling Egypt than it was in maintaining its privileged reputation and economic advantages. Hence, rather than attempting to prolong military rule it pushed for rapid changes which prevented meaningful mobilization or discussion against it.

The combative, winner-take-all politics initiated by SCAF’s coup was evident in the year-long administration of Mohammed Morsi as well. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood attempted a full-fledged capture of the state and showed a deep unwillingness to negotiate or compromise with their opponents. In contrast to Yemen, where consensus is becoming the model, in Egypt whatever political actor is in power has

57 Tribal defections were a key factor in AQAP’s defeat, as “Popular Resistance Committees” left AQAP and fought alongside the Yemeni military.
attempted to rapidly consolidate that power through any means possible. This is a lesson which was taught powerfully by the coup in 2011 and has now been repeated through the coup of 2013 (Pahwa, 2013). Whether it was SCAF, President Morsi, or General Sisi, a zero-sum political game has become normalized. Since the vast majority of the political cards remain in the hands of the military, this zero-sum game has led to military dominance and authoritarian repression.

Furthermore, while political violence was minimal in Egypt prior to the revolution, since the revolution it has dramatically escalated. The military has used massive political violence first to suppress dissent from the liberal activists who critiqued its direct rule in 2011-12 and now to essentially attempt to wipe out the Muslim Brotherhood and any voice of domestic dissent. While such one-way violence does not necessarily imply that other actors will also take up arms, the growing number of attacks by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis and violent clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and supporters of the military suggest that at least a low-level insurgency is growing.

This argument is by no means deterministic or fully definitive. In Yemen, democratization clearly remains a fragile outcome, to be hoped for but by no means assumed. Former President Saleh remains a potent transitional “spoiler,” attempting to sabotage the transition and retain power for himself and his family. Significant elements
of the Yemeni military remain loyal to Saleh.\(^{58}\) The federal solution to Yemen’s southern problem has been condemned by most factions of the Hiraak and continued significant political upheaval on the north-south question is highly likely. Yemen also faces multiple economic and environmental crises: a shattered economy, declining water table, and highly armed populace still fragmented into hostile tribal and religious units. Any one of these would prove a serious challenge to emerging democracy or the maintenance of civil peace.

However, what hope there is for democratization definitively comes from the manner of Yemen’s transition (Juneau, 2013). In late 2011, Yemen stood on the brink of devastating, multi-front civil war. The example of Syria demonstrates the likely counterfactual scenario. Yemen remains fraught with violence and has an uncertain future, but its salvation from Syria’s fate can be attributed to the norms and political incentives created by its civil resistance campaign’s negotiated mechanism of success.

In Egypt, too, the return to authoritarianism is by no means predetermined. Many activists in Egypt are re-thinking their trust in the military and the transitional structures which were put in place by the coup d’état of 2011 (Raouf, 2014). Activists are calling for political mobilization directed towards more consensus-based, realistic change rather than the “negative coalition” demands which have ousted two presidents but failed to

\(^{58}\) Though this threat has been significantly lessened since the removal of Ahmed Saleh as the commander of the Republican Guard.
achieve democracy (Kaldas, 2014). And while General al-Sisi enjoys broad support this support is not monolithic. There is, on other hand, continued broad support for an inclusive national dialogue, with nearly 80% of Egyptians expressing support for a process of national reconciliation (Zogby 2013b). This increased political awareness on the part of activists tied with the desire for national reconciliation has the potential for moving Egypt away from the winner-take-all politics initiated by the coup and towards a more democratic future. However, the effects of the coup of 2011 remain powerful.

The case studies also shed significant light on the endogeneity question raised at the end of the previous chapter. In Yemen’s case, the possibility of various mechanisms of success is straightforward. A coup by General Ali Mohsen might have easily taken place, or an overwhelming as the regime’s sources of support continued to disintegrate. If anything, the GCC agreement was the least likely option. Saleh led a personalistic regime, which should theoretically make negotiation less likely. Sporadic and growing armed conflict incentivized him to not deal with the opposition. However, despite these factors the JMP faction of Yemen’s civil resistance campaign was able to reach a negotiated transitional agreement.

The endogeneity question is also addressed by the Egyptian case. Counterfactually, it was certainly not inevitable that Egypt’s transition process would follow the path that it has. Egypt’s 2011 coup now has a feeling of historical inevitability
which was certainly not there at the time. Significant factions of the protesters in Tahrir Square were in favor of negotiations with the government.

Several alternative transition paths were proposed, including the proposition of the “Wise Men” mentioned above, which closely resembled the arrangement reached in November 2011 in Yemen. In exchange for immunity from prosecution for him and his family Mubarak would remain in office as “honorary president” while transferring his executive powers to Vice-President Suleiman. A unity government of half opposition figures and half government figures would be instated and tasked with constitutional revisions to pave the way free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in September 2011. Such an arrangement, particularly the immunity clause, would have been unpopular among many, but might have been reasonably expected to lead to significantly better outcomes than the ouster of Mubarak by coup d’état.

It is even possible that, had Mubarak resigned voluntarily on February 10th rather than being pushed out by the military on February 11th the shape of the transition may have been radically altered. A Suleiman administration, deeply unpopular, would have had significant difficult co-opting the revolutionary narrative, and would likely have been heavily incentivized to seek allies in the opposition through a negotiated agreement. A number of groups unwilling to negotiate before Mubarak’s ouster, including the April 6 Youth Movement, had said they would be willing to negotiate once Mubarak left.
Thus, these mechanisms of success were not meaningfully predetermined the political opportunity structure of the prior regime. This supports hypothesis H₃ stated at the beginning of this chapter and addresses the endogeneity concern from Geddes. Alternative mechanisms were realistic strategic options which the various strategic actors carefully considered and which can be reasonably assumed to have had radically divergent consequences.

Perspectives on the Arab Spring around the world have largely moved from euphoria to caution to cynicism. The way in Syria and continued violence and uncertainty across the region have convinced many that the uprising was a blip, with few or no lasting effects on the prospects for democracy and peace for the peoples of the Middle East. Perhaps “people power” is destined to lead to such violence and instability.

This emotional perspective, while understandable, does not match the realities on the ground. As I have shown in this chapter, these broad strokes miss the critical difference in mechanisms of success which have radically shaped and continue to shape the prospects for democracy and peace across the region. The effects of these different mechanisms of success follow the theoretical argument I made in chapter 2, formally stated in H₁ and H₂, and support the large-n quantitative evidence presented in chapter 3. Yemen’s negotiated transition has set the country on a path of decreasing, though by no means absent, political violence and increasing political inclusion and democratic openness. Egypt’s 2011 coup d’état has enshrined the power of the military, normalized
a conflict-based, winner-take-all politics and will likely result in a return to authoritarian rule as violence by security forces and Islamists opposed to this new regime continues to escalate. In the long-term, new factors may arise which will radically change the prediction. As Egypt and Yemen move away from their mechanisms of success the iterative effects of the mechanisms may gradually decrease. Only time will tell.
Conclusion: How Does Civil Resistance Win Well?

The central question of this research project is “how can civil resistance win well?” In an era where people around the world are increasingly rising up against the political powers that be and seeking to bring about new orders through the power of nonviolent action, this question is critically important.

I have shown here that the answer to this question lies in the nature of their victory. If civil resistance campaigns succeed through mechanisms which rely on broad political consensus, utilize own initiative, and build their political capacity to push for positive goals once their negative goals have been achieved, then their efforts are likely to result in a stable, internally-peaceful democracy.

My work offers indications of how victory in civil resistance campaigns should be won if the victors seek to preserve their hard-fought gains. In particular the data caution against perhaps the most dramatic and triumphant of nonviolent victories: overwhelmings which completely seize the reins of power. If a campaign has reached a level of power and influence where such a victory is possible it will be deeply tempting to use such power. But my research indicates that a wise campaign leader will hold back, not giving in even to nonviolent hubris, and develop a method of transition which will engage and include former regime elites to protect the future peace. In this regard the example of the “self-limiting revolution” of Solidarity in Poland is particularly fitting. Even though the movement had the capacity for an overwhelming victory they chose first to engage the
opponent in roundtable talks and then to achieve victory only through the lawful, institutional means granted through those talks. Poland’s high level of democracy and enduring civil peace speak to the effectiveness of the “self-limiting” path these activists chose.

For academics, this research is one step in beginning to develop a deep understanding of the effects of civil resistance. Many questions remain unanswered. Some of these, such as disaggregating the nature of resignations to understand their unexpectedly positive performance, I have mentioned previously. Other case studies may also shed light into the particular dynamics of the mechanisms of success not covered by my two cases. The importance of strategic interaction which I have argued for here also has powerful implications for understanding the broader population of transitions to democracy. Do these types of incentives work similarly in cases of violent revolution or elite-led liberalization? If so, in what ways are the dynamics similar and different? How do structural factors affect the operation of these dynamics? All of these are fruitful avenues of inquiry which the initial insights of this research leave unanswered.

For policymakers my research provides a more nuanced understanding of what to expect following civil resistance campaigns and thus what interventions are appropriate. Chenoweth and Stephan’s work has given us broad strokes both for understanding the widespread existence and frequent success of civil resistance. My work builds on theirs to help understand what we can expect from these campaigns when they succeed. This
has implications both for which movements governments should seek to assist prior to success, the shape of that assistance, and how we should relate to them after they come into power.\textsuperscript{59} International actors, particularly the UN, played a key positive role in helping Yemen’s negotiated mechanism of success come about through well-timed resolutions and skillful mediation. Efforts by states and international organizations along these lines are to be encouraged and multiplied.

There are many cautionary tales of civil resistance failure: Burma in 1988, Tiananmen Square in 1989. But there are also cautionary tales of civil resistance success such as Iran in 1979. But what these tales of both failure and success often fail to capture is the deep complexity and multifaceted nature of civil resistance. Civil resistance campaigns do not fail simply arbitrarily, they fail because they are poorly organized, or because they lack a broad base of support, or for any number of other reasons. Similarly, here I have argued and begun to show that when they succeed, civil resistance campaigns do not simply arbitrarily produce good or bad outcomes. Just as there are complex reasons for failure, so there are complex reasons for failure after success. If civil resistance is to win well, its practitioners must understand these complexities.

\textsuperscript{59} Events unfolding in Ukraine as of this writing provide a particularly potent example of the importance of this understanding.
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Appendix A: The Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success Codebook

Introduction

This project represents the first systematic attempt to empirically categorize the transition mechanisms of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, building on the work of Bunce and Wolchik (2011), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), Sharp (2005) and Helvey (2005), among others. It is also the first attempt to correlate these transition mechanisms with future outcomes of democracy and civil peace in order to answer questions about which transition mechanisms lead to better outcomes. Data available from the author upon request.

Section 1: List of Variables

1. **New, MEC, NAVCO 2.1, NAVCO 2.0, NAVCO 1**: Dummy variable indicating the original source of the campaign. New = author research.
2. **campaign**: Name of the campaign.
3. **location**: Country of the campaign.
4. **lccode**: COW country code for the country. Source: www.correlatesofwar.org/COW_state_list.xls
5. **target**: Name of the target regime.
6. **byear**: beginning year of the campaign
7. **eyear**: end-year of the campaign (year of the transition mechanism)
8. **Decade**: Decade in which the transition mechanism took place (coded by first year, i.e. 1990 for all campaigns ending in the 1990s).
9. **Africa, Americas, FSU, MENA, Asia, Europe**: dummy variables indicating the region of the campaign.

10. **tranmech**: 6-level nominal variable indicating transition mechanism. Values are as follows: 1 = Coup d’état, 2 = Negotiation, 3 = Election, 4 = International Intervention, 5 = Resignation, 6 = Overwhelming. (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 below for more details on this variable and sources for all coding decisions).

11. **trangood**: Dummy variable indicating if the transition mechanism was a negotiation or election.

12. **traninst**: dummy variable indicating whether transition mechanism was institutional (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 for more information and sources on coding decisions).

13. **trancoerce**: dummy variable indicating whether transition mechanism was directly coercive (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 for more information and sources on coding decisions).

14. **transharp**: 4-level nominal variable indicating which mechanism of success from Sharp (2005) matches the case most closely (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 for more information and sources on coding decisions).

15. **tpop5, tpop10**: country’s population (in thousands) 5 years and 10 years after the transition mechanism (Source: All country-years prior to 2008 Correlates of War
16. **lpop5, lpop10**: natural logarithm of tpop5 and tpop10 respectively.

17. **GDPpercap0, GDPpercap5, GDPpercap10**: GDP per capita in the year of, 5 years after, and 10 years after the transition mechanism (Source: World Bank Databank, www.data.worldbank.org)

18. **logGDPpercap0, logGDPpercap5, logGDPpercap10**: natural logarithm of GDPpercap0, GDPpercap5, and GDPpercap10 respectively.

19. **propdem5, propdem10**: proportion of neighboring countries which are democracies 5 and 10 years after the end of the campaign (Source: Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch 2013).

20. **prewar**: dummy variable indicating whether a major episode of political violence took place in the five years prior to the end of the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)

21. **predemoc**: dummy variable indicating whether the country was a democracy (Polity IV score ≥ 6) prior to the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)

22. **postwar5, postwar10**: dummy variables indicating whether a major episode of political violence took place in the five years and ten years after the end of the campaign respectively (Main Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes

23. **postwar5tot, postwar10tot**: sum of major episodes of political violence in the five and ten years after the end of the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm).

24. **logpostwar5tot, logpostwar10tot**: natural logarithm of postwar5tot and postwar10tot respectively.

25. **postpolity5, postpolity10**: Country’s Polity IV score 5 and 10 years after the end of the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)

26. **politychange5, politychange10**: Change in the country’s Polity IV score from the end of the campaign to 5 years and ten years after the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm)

27. **postdemoc5, postdemoc10**: Dummy variable indicating whether the country was a democracy (Polity IV score ≥ 6) 5 years and 10 years after the end of the campaign (Source: Author’s calculation based on Polity IV dataset).

28. **tranmech1, tranmech2, tranmech3, tranmech4, tranmech5, tranmech6**: Dummy variables indicating the country’s tranmech category.
29. **uncertainty**: Dummy variable indicating whether the author is uncertain about the coding of tranmech, traninst, or trancoerce.

30. **Exclusion**: Dummy variable indicating whether the case is considered a “weak” case, i.e. whether the transition in question can truly be considered regime change or the influence of civil resistance on the transition is unclear.

**Section 2: Description of Unique Variables**

**TRANMECH**

Nominal variable describing the empirical transition mechanism by which the civil resistance campaign achieved success. These six empirically discrete categories do capture all of the 83 transitions in my dataset with relative accuracy. Critically, the coding of this variable indicates the mechanism whereby the civil resistance campaign succeeded, not merely the empirical occurrence of one of these events. Sometimes the coding decisions are not immediately clear and require careful study of the events themselves. In all my coding I attempt to be as strictly empirical as possible. For explanations of all coding decisions see the transition narratives in Section 4.

Possible values for **TRANMECH**

1. **Coup d’état**.
   The civil resistance campaign achieves success when the military or other former regime elites independently seize power and, when in power, grant the demands of the campaign.

2. **Negotiated Transition**.
The campaign achieves success through a process of negotiation whereby the campaign and its opponent come to a mutual agreement.

3. **Electoral Victory.**
The campaign achieves success through an election or referendum which removes its opponent from power. Electoral victory may be ensured through popular civil disobedience but the election itself must be critical to the campaign’s success for this variable to be coded as a 3.

4. **International intervention.**
The campaign achieves success through the intervention, military or political, of an international third party (a foreign state or international organization).

5. **Resignation.**
The campaign achieves success when its opponent resigns or otherwise steps down from power. This category is distinct from category 3 in that category 5 transitions do not involve an election or other popular vote. The opponent simply leaves office.

6. **Overwhelming.**
The campaign achieves success through a complete overwhelming and disintegration of the organs of government. The opponent regime simply ceases to function and the campaign takes over.
TRANSHARP
Nominal variable which assigns the mechanism of nonviolent success the campaign followed. Since Sharp’s definitions are more theoretical with unclear empirical components, coding decisions demanded some speculation and are somewhat arbitrary.

Possible values for TRANSHARP.

1. **Conversion.**
   “The opponent, as a result of the actions of the nonviolent struggle group or person, comes around to a new point of view which embraces the ends of the nonviolent actor.” (Sharp 2005, 415-16)

2. **Accommodation.**
   “The opponents decide to yield on an issue rather than risk a still more unsatisfactory result.” (Sharp 2005, 417)

3. **Nonviolent Coercion.**
   “Shifts of social forces and power relationships produce the changes sought by the resisters against the will of the opponents.” (Sharp 2005, 418)

4. **Disintegration.**
   “The opponents’ regime or group falls completely apart…opponents’ power is dissolved.” (Sharp 2005, 419).

TRANCOERCE
Dummy variable which captures whether a transition mechanism was categorized by a high degree of direct coercion. While all mechanisms by their nature involve some
degree of coercion, this variable captured whether the coercion was direct, explicit, and central to campaign success.

0. Non-coercive mechanism.
1. Coercive mechanism.

**TRANINST**

Dummy variable that measures whether the method of transition followed pre-existing legal institutions. For example: leaders voted out according to constitutional mechanisms or elections or resigning and being succeeded by constitutionally-mandated successor.

0. Non-institutional mechanism
1. Institutional mechanism

*Section 3: Special Coding Decisions*

**Notes on Data Sources**

All data on conflict in country-years from 1946-2008 comes from the MEPV dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace. Data on conflict in country-years prior to 1946 comes from Gledistch 2004 war list. Data on conflict from 2008-2012 comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program

Upon individual case examination, several end-years from the NAVCO database did not capture the true year in which the mechanism of success occurred. Any discrepancies between my end-year coding and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) thus arise from my re-coding to define the end-year as the year in which the mechanism of success took place.
Specific Coding Special Decisions


PREDEMOC for Ghana, Malawi, Zambia all coded as 0 due to all nations being British colonies prior to transition.

PREDEMOC and POLITYCHANGE for Anti-Balaguer. 1962, year of Balaguer’s overthrow, Polity codes Dominican Republic as an 8. However, Balaguer’s regime was still in transition at the time, and was in essence a continuation of the Trujillo regime which came before it and was consistently coded a -9. Thus, for PREDEMOC and POLITYCHANGE I use the -9 number for Trujillo’s regime.

POSTPOLITY5, POSTPOLITY10, POLITYCHANGE for Anti-Huong. Polity IV codes the years 1965-1972 in South Vietnam as “Interruption,” i.e. a period where an occupying power terminates the existing polity and re-establishes a new one when it leaves and thus has no polity score. This coding seems strange considering the South Vietnamese government continued to function during the entire period of US occupation in the country and engaged in political struggle, political activity, etc… South Vietnam’s Polity IV score for every other year of its existence is a -3, thus I have extrapolated a -3 score for the years of “interruption” in order to generate values for these variables.

PROPDEM5 for Anti-Alkatiri. Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch (2013) do not include East Timor in their dataset. In 2011, the country-year for PROPDEM5, Indonesia, the
only country bordering East Timor, had a score of 8 from Polity IV, making East Timor’s neighbors 100% democratic; hence PROPDEM5 was coded “1.”

PROPDEM10 for Anti-Diouf: Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch (2013) do not include Senegal after 2007. PROMDEM10 (0.5) is author’s calculation based on Polity IV scores of six neighboring countries in 2010 in which 3 were 6 or higher.

PROPDEM10 for Sierra Leone Defense of Democracy: Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch (2013) do not include Sierra Leone after 2007. PROMDEM10 (0.5) is author’s calculation based on Polity IV scores of two neighboring countries in 2008 in which 1 was 6 or higher.

POLITYCHANGE5 and POLITYCHANGE10 for Active Voices: I base these values on the 1990 Polity score since this is the last one consistent with the Ratsiraka regime and not contaminated by the success of the civil resistance campaign at the end of 1991.

All dependent variables for Velvet Revolution: Since the Velvet Revolution took place in Czechoslovakia, a country which ceased to exist shortly after the revolution, I use the mean of the scores of both the Czech Republic and Slovakia to inform these variables.

All independent variables related to country-year data prior to the transition (PREWAR, PREDEMOC, POLITYCHANGE) in USSR countries is coded with the relevant values for the USSR.
Section 4: Transition Narratives and Sources

In many cases the coding of the transition mechanism is fairly straightforward. However, in some cases coding required significant research and the coding transition mechanism is open to interpretation. In all of these cases I have included a “methodological note” (signified: MN) to explain my coding decision in more detail.

Name: The Ruhrkampf

Country: Germany

End Year: 1923

Transition Mechanism: International Intervention

Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional.

Summary: The Ruhr region was annexed by France in an attempt to force Germany to pay exorbitant reparation rates. The German government denounced the occupation as illegal and attempted to organize “passive resistance” against it to prevent the French both from gaining economic benefit from the occupation and to prevent them from annexing the region. While “passive resistance” was initially unsuccessful, the English and Americans intervened, pressuring the French to agree to an international commission to re-negotiate Germany’s post-war reparations and withdraw from the Ruhr.

Sources

Name: Anti-Ibanez Revolution

Country: Chile

End Year: 1931

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: After a student-initiated uprising which was styled a “civil revolution,” President of Chile Carlos Ibanez resigned. He was succeeded initially by Pedro Opazo, the president of the Chilean Senate, a succession mandated by the Chilean constitution. Opazo almost immediately resigned after continued demonstrations against his rule convinced the Chilean senate that he could not restore order, and was succeeded by the premier of the cabinet, Esteban Montero – another succession following guidelines in the Chilean constitution. While the military and civilian political leadership did support the new regime there is no evidence that Ibanez’s resignation was the result of a military or civilian elite coup.

Sources


Name: Guatemalan October Revolutionaries against Ubico dictatorship

End year: 1944

Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat (Military)

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: A civil resistance campaign, led by students, rejected attempts by the Ubico government to negotiate transition. Instead, Ubico abruptly resigned, a move which created a constitutional crisis. Ubico’s resignation, however, was not the critical moment of success as the military infrastructure which had run the country during Ubico’s tenure remained in place, and a junta of close Ubico supporters was left in charge of the country. The real transition was initiated in October when junior officers, appealed to by the civil resistance campaign, staged a coup d’etat which overthrew the junta and established a brief interim administration which organized the election of campaign leader Juan Jose Arevalo as the next president.

Sources

Name: Strike of Fallen Arms
End Year: 1944
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional

Summary: The general strike initiated by students and later coordinated by the “National Reconstruction Committee” achieved success through the resignation of President Maximiliano Martinez. The NRC had attempted to negotiate a transition path with Martinez, but while the negotiations had an effect on the later transition they ultimately failed to reach agreement on the terms of Martinez’s departure – Martinez wanted to remain in power for another month to oversee the transition, while the NRC demanded his immediate departure. As the prospects for a violent clash between the campaign and the military increased, Martinez finally agreed to resign after being urged to do so by members of his cabinet to avoid bloodshed.

Sources

- Ackerman, Peter and Jack DuVall. *A Force More Powerful*
Name: Anti-Lescot Revolution

Country: Haiti

End Year: 1946

Transition Mechanism: Coup D'état

Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional.

Summary: A student-initiated five-day general strike in Haiti was aimed at overthrowing authoritarian president Elie Lescot. When Lescot ordered military leaders to use whatever force necessary to repress the strike they refused and instead, in consultation with the American ambassador, staged a coup d'état, ordering Lescot to resign through threats to his life. Lescot fled the country and the coup leaders assumed control of the state, promising to hold free elections.

Sources


Name: Anti-Magloire Revolution
Country: Haiti

End Year: 1956

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: After several months of student protests a nonviolent campaign against Haitian dictator Paul Magloire expanded to include a general strike by business leaders. When Magloire was unable to break the strike through intimidation, and fearing the consequences if he attempted a broader violent crackdown, he resigned and fled the country.

MN: Sources indicate that the resignation was Magloire’s decision, and not one initiated by the army, hence this is coded a resignation rather than a coup. However, there are some indications that the army at least pressured Magloire or perhaps “requested” his resignation. Further research might indicate that a “coup” coding is more appropriate.

Sources

Name: Anti-Rojas Revolution

Country: Colombia

End Year: 1957

Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional.

Summary: Initial protests by students over the arrest of an opposition presidential candidate quickly escalated to include workers’ strikes and a number of other nonviolent tactics. Transition occurred when a three-member military junta withdrew support from Rojas and demanded that he step down. While Rojas resigned, this transition is a coup d’etat rather than a resignation because of the initiatory influence of the junta which took power when Rojas stepped down.

Sources
Name: Convention People’s Party Movement

Country: Ghana

End Year: 1957

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional.

Summary: The Convention People’s Party of Kwame Nkrumah organized opposition to British colonialism through a campaign of “positive action” which successfully pressured the British first to allow elections which brought CPP figures into power and eventually, through a UN referendum and a vote in the newly-created parliament, led to full independence.

Sources


Name: Anti-Jimenez Revolution

Country: Venezuela

End Year: 1958

Transition Mechanism: Coup d’état

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional.

Summary: After an abortive coup in early January shook confidence in the government, a coalition of underground political parties organized a general strike and mass demonstrations in Caracas with the aim of ousting dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez. The coalition directly appealed to the military to intervene on behalf of the people. The military did so, ousting Jimenez in a coup d’etat and guaranteeing free elections.

Sources


Name: Congolese Independence Movement
Country: Congo-Kinshasa

End Year: 1960

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional.

Summary: Political parties in the Belgian Congo, primarily ABAKO and the Parti Solidaire Africain organized demonstrations against Belgian rule and a massive boycott of elections for local Congolese authorities (which would remain under Belgian control). The political disturbance, along with a number of other factors, convinced the Belgians to hold a roundtable negotiation where they agreed to grant the Congo independence.

MN: While this transition mechanism is certainly clear, this case is somewhat suspect because it is doubtful to what extent the mobilization by ABAKO and PSA genuinely represents a civil resistance movement. Civil resistance activities seem to be limited, possibly only including encouraging Congolese to boycott the Belgian-organized elections. It may be more appropriate to simply code this transition as an elite-led pacted transition.

Sources


Name: Anti-Rhee Student Movement

Country: Ghana

End Year: 1960

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional.

Summary: After a rigged election sparked popular discontent against the authoritarian regime of South Korean president Syngman Rhee students in Seoul initiated a massive campaign of protests against Rhee’s rule. The protests continued to grow in scope despite government repression, eventually leading to Rhee’s resignation.

Sources

• Kim, Quee-Young. “From Protest to Change of Regime: The 4-19 Revolt and the Fall of the Rhee Regime in South Korea.” Social Forces 74 (1996); 1179-1208.

Name: Nyasaland African Congress

Country: Ghana

End Year: 1960

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional.

Summary: The Nyasaland African Congress, led by Dr. Hastings Banda, led agitation for independence for several years against the British, peaking in 1959 with a widespread organized civil disobedience campaign, during which time Hastings Banda was placed under arrest. In 1960, under pressure from the continued disturbances by the NAC, the British released Banda and held a series of constitutional negotiations with the NAC which gave Africans rule in Malawi and led to Malawi’s eventual independence.

MN: While Malawi did not become formally independent until several years later, the constitutional negotiations of 1960 marked the critical turning point in which the balance of power shifted to Banda and the Congress. Thus I consider the negotiations of 1960 to be the critical transition mechanism.

Sources

Name: Zambia Anti-Colonial Struggle
Country: Zambia
End Year: 1962
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional.

Summary: In 1961, as the British government was attempting to disengage from its African colonies, the white minority in Zambia attempted to impose a constitution which would ensure white minority rule. A widespread civil resistance campaign led by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party pressured the British to reopen the constitution and change the rules to allow Africa-majority governments. The constitutional changes, civil resistance, and tireless electioneering by Kaunda, led to the election of the first African-majority government in Zambia.

MN: While Zambia did not become formally independent until 1964, the election of 1962 was the critical turning point where the British and European settlers in Zambia capitulated to African demands for political self-determination and African parties moved from semi-legal opposition to a major role in government. The remaining two years of ostensible British rule are better considered as a part of the transition.
Name: Anti-Balaguer Revolution

Country: Dominican Republic

End Year: 1962

Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional.

Summary: President Joaquin Balaguer of the Dominican Republic was a holdover from the brutally authoritarian regime of Dictator Rafael Trujillo. Civil society groups mobilized strikes and demonstrations against Balaguer because of this, demanding he step down and allow for free elections. After several months of protests Balaguer negotiated a transitional process with the opposition, but before this process could truly begin Balaguer was removed from office in a military coup orchestrated by the head of the air force. The coup was vigorously and vocally opposed by the United States, and a group of junior officers, supported by the United States, staged a counter-coup a few days later which brought the opposition into power.
Sources


Name: Anti-Karamanlis “Unrelenting Struggle.”

Country: Greece

End Year: 1963

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, Institutional

Summary: in 1961, a group of right-wing politicians and military figures engaged in widespread electoral fraud in Greece to ensure the victory of Conservative leader Constantine Karamanlis. The fraud led to an outcry across the country and the initiation of an “unrelenting struggle” by opposition parties, student groups, and labor unions to oust the Conservatives, a civil resistance campaign of strikes, demonstrations, and nonviolent occupations. This struggle was a major factor first in Karamanlis resignation in June 1963, and finally led to victory in parliamentary elections in November of the same year.
MN: While Karamanlis did resign in June, his resignation did not spark a real transition of power, as the transitional government which ruled until the election in November remained completely controlled by the Conservatives. The real transition did not occur until George Papandreou and liberal Center Union party won the election in November.

Sources


Name: Anti-Huong Campaign

Country: South Vietnam

End Year: 1965

Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional.

Summary: Buddhist monks demanded that Prime Minister Tran Van Huong step down after several members of his cabinet were chosen from loyalists to former dictator Ngo Dinh Diem. Campaign tactics included demonstrations, symbolic hunger strikes, and
general strikes across several areas of Vietnam. On January 27th, the Vietnamese military deposed Huong in a bloodless coup and the Buddhists ended their campaign.

Sources


Bangladesh Independence Movement

Location: East Pakistan/Bangladesh

End Year: 1971

Transition Mechanism: International Intervention

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: Beginning in March, 1971, hundreds of thousands of East Pakistani protesters, led by Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman, marched in Dhaka demanding independence for East Pakistan. Local government officials refused to follow orders from West Pakistani authorities and instead followed a series of directives from the Awami League leadership, almost immediately making the Awami League the *de facto*
government of East Pakistan. After the West Pakistani military attempted to brutally re-assert control of East Pakistan through mass slaughter of civilians, with tens of thousands massacred in the first 48 hours of the attack, Bengali military units defected to the Awami League and the nonviolent campaign shifted to a military conflict. After a military intervention by India, East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh.

Sources:

- “Rally Urges PM to Step Down.” *The Times of India* (1975, June 24).

Anti-Tsiranana Campaign

Location: Madagascar

End Year: 1972
Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Summary: Student protests against the Tsiranana government in Madagascar emerged as early as January 1972, when youths around the country began denouncing deteriorating economic conditions. On May 12, 1972, protestors organized a strike involving as many as 100,000 secondary-level students, and many were arrested as the protests spread beyond the capital of Antananarivo into the provinces and other cities. By May 19, students were calling for the immediate resignation of President Tsiranana. Though he did not formally resign for several months, he ceded power to the military the following day.

Sources:

Thai Student Protests

Location: Thailand

End Year: 1973

Transition Mechanism: Coup D’état

Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional

Summary: In October of 1973, students in Thailand less mass protests, initially demanding the release of imprisoned student union leaders but later increasing their
demands to include constitutional reform and the expulsion of Thailand’s military dictators. After the military began violently repressing the protests, Thailand’s king Bhumibol Adulyadej, working through Deputy Army Commander Krit Sivara, orchestrated the ouster of the military dictators.

Sources:


Carnation Revolution

Location: Portugal

End Year: 1974

Transition Mechanism: Coup D’état

Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional

Summary: In April of 1974, a small group of younger leftist military officers, aided by mass mobilization of civilians, overthrew Portugal’s authoritarian regime in a coup d’état.

Sources:


Greek Protests Against Military Rule

Location: Portugal

End Year: 1974

Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: Uprisings by students, workers and others in 1973-74 along with a disastrous military adventure in Cyprus and threat of war with Turkey, led insiders in the Greek military to oust junta leader Ioannidis and return Greece to civilian rule, bringing former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis back into power.

Sources:

Name: Anti-Bhutto Campaign

Location: Pakistan

End Year: 1977

Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat

Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional

Summary: After elections in March of 1977, a wide variety of civil society and opposition groups began a campaign to depose the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The campaign was sparked by accusations that Bhutto had rigged the election to favor his Pakistan People’s Party. Demonstrations, nonviolent interventions, and day-long general strikes were widespread across Pakistan, with broadbased diverse support. Demonstrations were violently repressed, with scattered incidents of protesters being shot and tens of thousands of opposition leaders arrested. Bhutto also attempted to appease the opposition by offering new elections or a referendum on his rule but his opponents refused, insisting instead that he leave office immediately. When final negotiations between Bhutto and the opposition in July broke down, Bhutto was deposed in a military coup by General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq.
Sources:


**Anti-Indira Campaign**

Location: Portugal

End Year: 1977

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional

Summary: Anti-corruption activists led a campaign to oust Prime Minister Indira Gandhi after she was found guilty of election fraud and ordered by a court to step down. Prime Minister Gandhi responded by declaring a year and a half long emergency in which civil
liberties were suspended and tens of thousands of opponents arrested. When the emergency was unexpectedly lifted in January 1977 and Indira Gandhi called for an election to validate her rule the activists which had opposed her joined together in the Janata party and successfully ousted her from power.

Sources:

- “Rally Urges PM to Step Down.” *The Times of India* (1975, June 24).

**Name:** Iranian Revolution

**Country:** Iran

**End Year:** 1979

**Transition Mechanism:** Overwhelming

**Secondary Codes:** Coercive, Non-Institutional

**Summary:** A year and a half-long campaign of protests, strikes, and demonstrations against the dictatorship of the Shah of Iran peaked in February 1979 when the Shah’s appointed Prime Minister, Shapour Bakhtiyar, allowed religious and dissident leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to return from exile in France. Millions welcomed
Khomeini and supported his desire to establish an Islamic government. While Bakhtiyar maintained his government’s legitimacy, two years of revolution had so shifted the balance of public support that Bakhtiyar’s regime ceased to function and Khomeini’s new Islamic government assumed rule over Iran.

Sources


Name: Anti-Junta Struggle

Country: Bolivia

End Year: 1982

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional

Summary: Popular opposition to the series of military juntas which had ruled Bolivia for several years peaked in 1982, when various civil society groups including unions, employers’ groups, and the Catholic Church all came together in a unified civil resistance
campaign. The military, which had tired of rule and was looking for “una salida” to leave power, accepted a negotiated transition process whereby an opposition government voted into power in an annulled election in 1980 assumed power.

Sources


Name: Pro-Democracy Movement

Country: Argentina

End Year: 1983

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional

Summary: Popular resistance to the Argentine military dictatorship and its brutal “dirty war” against its own people, spearheaded by the “Mothers of the Disappeared” protest group, blossomed into a full-scale civil resistance campaign after the Argentine government’s defeat by Great Britain in the Falklands war. The military, seeking to extricate itself from rule, agreed to hold free and fair elections. The elections
successfully ousted the military and gave power to the strongest opponents of military rule, the Radicals.

Sources


**Name:** Diretas Ja

**Country:** Brazil

**End Year:** 1985

**Transition Mechanism:** Election

**Secondary Codes:** Non-Coercive, Institutional

**Summary:** A campaign of protests and demonstrations for direct presidential elections in Brazil unified opposition parties, unions, and civil society groups to launch a united challenge against Brazil’s retreating military dictatorship. This challenge, bringing on board many moderate defectors from the military regime, successfully ousted the regime in the 1985 election which brought a non-military president to power.
Sources


Name: Uruguay Anti-Military
Country: Uruguay
End Year: 1984
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: Protests and strikes by labor unions and opposition parties successfully pressured the Uruguayan military dictatorship to abide by an earlier agreement to hold elections in November of 1984. The opposition successfully won the election, bringing an end to military rule and restoring democracy.

**MN:** A process of negotiation between the regime and opposition did lead to the elections, thus the transition mechanism may be classified as negotiation. However, since the fundamental breakthrough in power dynamics occurred through the election I consider the election to be a better transition mechanism classification.

Sources

**Name:** Anti-Nimeiry Protests  
**Country:** Sudan  
**End Year:** 1985  
**Transition Mechanism:** Coup D’etat  
**Secondary Codes:** Coercive, Non-institutional  
**Summary:** A massive wave of strikes and demonstrations organized by students, professional organizations, and other opposition political parties against the regime of President Jaafar Nimeiry took place while Nimeiry was on a trip to the United States. Protest leaders convinced the military leadership not to repress the protests and instead stage a coup when Nimeiry returned to Sudan. The coup succeeded, ousting Nimeiry.

**Sources**


**Name:** Anti-Duvalier Protests
Country: Haiti

End Year: 1986

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional

Summary: Beginning in October 1985, widespread protests against the government of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier called for his ouster and asked the army to assume power in Haiti. The protests were largely leaderless and spontaneous, though the bishops of the Catholic Church played a key role. Duvalier attempted to violently repress them by the army largely refused to attack protesters, and the US government, one of Duvalier’s primary benefactors, threatened to withhold aid. Finally, in February 1986, with the army refusing to follow orders and preparing to assume control of the country, the US explicitly calling for Duvalier’s exit, and little or no government control in most of the country, Duvalier fled the country. A military junta assumed power.

MN: This transition mechanism is difficult to code because of the secretive nature of the relationship between the Duvalier, the Haitian army, and the United States. Pressure from both of these parties means that the mechanism could conceivably be coded as a coup or international intervention. The wide breakdown of government control also indicates at least partially towards an overwhelming. The key factor in my decision to code “resignation” is the indication that Duvalier departed when he did largely under his own choosing, and that he also named the military junta members who succeeded him.
This level of initiative and ability to shape the post-transition order makes “resignation” the most accurate coding of this transition.

Sources


Name: “People Power.”

Country: Philippines

End Year: 1986

Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional

Summary: In 1986 Ferdinand Marcos blatantly rigged a presidential election, sparking the beginning of a civil resistance campaign against him by the opposition, led by Corazon Aquino. However, just as the campaign was beginning a group of Marcos insiders staged an abortive coup. When the coup failed, the coup plotters declared their support for Aquino and asked for her protection. Millions of Filipinos then gathered around the camps where the coup plotters were stationed. With monks and nuns in the front lines, Marcos’ troops refused to attack the nonviolent protesters. As the coup plotters engineered high-level defections from within Marcos’ ranks, rank-and-file
soldiers and security forces defected en masse. Marcos, his regime collapsing around him, fled the country in an American helicopter.

Sources


Name: South Korea Anti-Junta

Country: South Korea

End Year: 1988

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.

Summary: A burgeoning pro-democracy movement against military dictator Chun Doo-Hwan organized protests to push Chun to allow direct presidential elections. After rallies grew increasingly powerful, Chun eventually agreed to hold direct elections. While a split in the opposition meant that Chun’s successor, Roh Tae-Woo, was elected to the presidency, the election marked a critical turning point for South Korea and fundamentally changed the character of the South Korean regime.
Sources

- Lakey, George. “South Koreans Win Mass Campaign For Democracy, 1986-87.”
  http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/south-koreans-win-mass-campaign-
  democracy-1986-87.

Name: Anti-Pinochet Campaign

End Year: 1988

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: A unified opposition campaign successfully defeated authoritarian president
Augusto Pinochet in a national plebiscite on the continuation of his rule. After Pinochet
lost the plebiscite the military refused to support him any longer and Pinochet was
replaced by a democratically-elected president.

Sources

- Bernath-Plaistad, Shandra and Rennebohm, Max. “Chileans Overthrow Pinochet

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Name: Solidarity

End Year: 1989

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: The Solidarity trade union movement waged a nearly ten-year nonviolent struggle against the Communist government of Poland, first pushing for independent trade union rights and later pushing for democratization. A wave of strikes in 1988 pressured the Polish government to agree to engage in “Round Table” negotiations with Solidarity. These negotiations successfully initiated a political transition in which Solidarity first entered parliament and eventually elected its leader, Lech Walesa, to the presidency.

Sources


• Kurtz, Lester R. and Lee Smithey. “‘We Have Bare Hands:’ Nonviolent Social Movements in the Soviet Bloc.” in Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah
Name: Pro-Democracy Movement, East Germany

End Year: 1989

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: The East German transition involved three major mechanisms: an intra-party elite coup which ousted party leader Erich Honecker, the mass resignations of the remaining SED government which followed Honecker’s ouster, and the eventual election which followed the SED’s resignations. However, the elite coup only provided the initial major opening for the pro-democracy movement while keeping SED rule intact, and the election followed several months after the regime had effectively ceased to function. Thus, the critical transition mechanism in the East German case were the final wave of SED resignations in December 1989.

Sources

Name: Pro-Democracy Movement, Hungary

End Year: 1989

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: Liberalization by moderates within the Hungarian Communist party sparked mass civil resistance mobilization recalling past Hungarian nonviolent uprisings and calling for democracy. These changes led the Communists to hold a series of negotiations with the united Opposition Round Table which fundamentally restructured Hungary into a democracy.

Sources


Name: Velvet Revolution

End Year: 1989
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: Inspired by the successful nonviolent revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany, students and dissidents in Czechoslovakia sought to oust their Communist rulers “in ten days.” While the revolution did take slightly longer, after three weeks of continuous mass demonstrations and general strikes the Civic Forum, an alliance of opposition groups, held negotiations with the Communist party which led to a new interim government led by dissidents.

Sources


Name: Bulgaria Anti-Communist Campaign

End Year: 1990

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: Civil resistance in Bulgaria was largely initiated after an intra-Communist party coup, where long-time leader Todor Zhivkov was ousted from power by Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov. While Mladenov began instituting reforms, opposition groups joined together to push the pace of reform and held protests and demonstrations demanding an end to Communist single-party rule and the institution of multi-party democracy. After months of increasingly powerful protests and strikes the Communists agreed to hold roundtable negotiations with the opposition. As a result of the negotiations (backed by continuing external protests) the Communist party relinquished its constitutional sole hold on power and control over the military, and agreed to allow for multi-party elections.

MN: Some sources (Roberts 1991) consider the “palace coup” against Zhivkov to be the breakthrough point in this campaign. However, Mladenov’s coup was prior to the central stages of the campaign, and did not grant protesters essential demands. These demands were instead granted as a result of the negotiations sparked by protests after Mladenov’s coup. Therefore I consider the negotiations to be a more accurate coding of the transition mechanism.

Sources


Name: Latvia Anti-Communist Campaign

End Year: 1990

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: Several pro-independence organizations in Latvia organized protests, strikes, and various forms of creative nonviolent resistance to push for democratic rule and independence. Their agitation led to the first free election to the Latvian Supreme Soviet in 1990, in which pro-independence candidates assumed control of the government. While Latvia did not finalize its independence from the Soviet Union until after the Soviet coup the following year, this election represented the critical breakthrough point
where the civil resistance campaign achieved its goals of democracy and de facto independence.

Sources


**Name: Singing Revolution**

End Year: 1990

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: Estonian civil society organizers led a nonviolent civil resistance campaign for democracy and independence in the Soviet republic of Estonia. Their efforts, along with liberalizations by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, led to the election of the Congress
of Estonia in 1990, an alternate governing body that orchestrated Estonia’s independence from the USSR by August of 1991.

**MN:** As with Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia did not achieve formal independence from the USSR until 1991 and civil resistance continued against attempts by the USSR to reassert its control over Estonia. However, the election in 1990 was the critical breakthrough point where political authority and *de facto* independence largely passed to the civil resistance campaign.

**Sources**


**Name:** Sajudis

**End Year:** 1990

**Transition Mechanism:** Election

**Secondary Codes:** Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

**Summary:** Lithuanian civil society groups, led by the Sajudis group, led protests declaring the illegality of Soviet rule in Lithuania and demanding democracy and
independence, as well as a number of other creative nonviolent resistance tactics. Their efforts led to a number of organizations, including the Lithuanian Communist Party, ending their relationships with the USSR and the election of Sajudis to a massive majority in the Lithuanian Supreme Council in February 1990. Sajudis declared independence a few months later and successfully nonviolently repelled attempts by the USSR to re-assert its authority.

**MN:** As with Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania did not achieve formal independence from the USSR until 1991 and civil resistance continued against attempts by the USSR to reassert its control. However, the election in 1990 was the critical breakthrough point where political authority and *de facto* independence largely passed to the civil resistance campaign.

**Sources**


Name: Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement

End Year: 1990

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: Violent ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in early 1990 sparked a nationalist movement in the Kyrgyz oblast of the USSR demanding greater democracy and independence. After protests peaked with a mass hunger strike in Bishkek, the Supreme Soviet in Moscow allowed the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet to create the post of President and hold elections for it. The elections were won by reformer Askar Akaev, who began a rapid process of democratization and declared full independence from the USSR after the Communist hardliner coup in August of 1991.

MN: This case only weakly meets inclusion criteria since it is not clear whether the protests were directly calling for democracy/independence (and were thus maximalist) or were simply in response to unemployment and mistreatment of ethnic Kyrgyz. Thus it is possible that this case may be better considered an elite-led transition rather than a transition initiated by a successful civil resistance campaign. Statistical tests were run with this case included and excluded.
Sources


Name: Slovenia Anti-Communist Movement

Country: Nepal

End Year: 1990

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.

Summary: A wide range of alternative groups arose in the 1980s in Slovenia, pursuing a wide range of liberalizing agendas. In response to repression by Yugoslavian authorities, Slovenian alternative groups came together through protests and demonstrations to push the sympathetic Slovenian Communist government to liberalize and move away from Yugoslavia. These protests led to Slovenia’s first democratic elections in 1990, in which a coalition of opposition parties was brought into power with a mandate to get Slovenia out of Yugoslavia. Slovenia achieved full independence within a year.
MN: This case only weakly meets inclusion criteria – the evidence for an organized civil resistance campaign, while it might show itself to be more extensive after further research, is quite limited. However, the existence of the semi-organized “alternative” and their activities pushing for democratization and independence are certainly strong indications of organized civil resistance. As with similar post-Communist cases I consider the transition mechanism to be the election whereby liberal oppositions first came into power, rather than the formal declaration of independence a year later. As with other cases whose inclusion in the dataset is weak, statistical tests were run which both included and excluded this case.

Sources


Name: Benin Anti-Communist Campaign
End Year: 1990

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: A year of civil resistance, primarily strikes by students and labor unions, with support from the church and civil society institutions, forced long-time Communist leader Mathieu Kerekou to agree to hold a national dialogue. The national dialogue concluded by declaring its own sovereignty, stripping Kerekou of his powers, and creating a multi-party democracy in Benin.

Sources

  

Name: Mongolia Anti-Communist Campaign

End Year: 1990

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional Transition

Summary: The politburo of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), the Communist party which had ruled Mongolia for almost 70 years, resigned after the Mongolian Democratic Union organized larger and larger street demonstrations
demanding an opening of the Mongolian political system. While the resignation was followed by a process of negotiations and eventually multiparty elections, the transition mechanism itself is best identified as the resignation, while what followed was essentially part of the later political transition.

Sources


Name: Anti-Ershad Campaign

End Year: 1990

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional

Summary: An alliance of major political parties, along with student groups, organized a series of paralyzing strikes to demand that dictator Hussein Muhammad Ershad step down and hand over power to a Vice President selected by the opposition. Ershad attempted to suppress the uprising through force, but his violent tactics sparked broader mobilization against his regime. The leadership of the military, believing that Ershad’s actions were tarnishing the military as an institution, decided that they could no longer support Ershad as president. Upon receiving news of the military’s defection, Ershad
acceded to the opposition’s demand, resigned, and handed power over to the candidate selected by the opposition.

**Methodological note:** The central role of the military defection in Ershad’s resignation might lead some to code this transition as a coup. The key distinction is that, while the military did defect, they did not attempt to independently seize power, nor did they themselves initiate the transition. Ershad, rather, chose to resign and himself took the initiating step. Power was also handed over to the candidate selected by the united opposition, not taken up by the military. Thus it is more appropriate to code this transition mechanism as a resignation.

Sources


**Name:** Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

**Country:** Nepal

**End Year:** 1990

**Transition Mechanism:** Negotiation

**Secondary Codes:** Coercive, institutional.
Summary: In 1990 the Nepali Congress, along with a constellation of other political groups, students, and others led strikes and demonstrations demanding an end to monarchical rule and a move towards a constitutional monarchy. When neither co-optation nor violent repression succeeded in suppressing the movement the king issued a proclamation allowing for the drafting of a new constitution. Through a process of intensive negotiation between the king and the opposition an new constitution was promulgated making Nepal a constitutional monarchy.

Sources


Name: Niger Anti-Military Campaign

Country: Nepal

End Year: 1991

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: In 1991, protests by students and independent labor unions successfully pressured Col. Ali Saibou, military ruler of Niger, to begin a transition to democracy. The campaign demanded that Saibou allow a “national dialogue” group of government and civil society leaders to determine how to transition the country to democracy. Saibou
agreed, and the national dialogue was put in place. After three months of negotiations the national dialogue dissolved the government and put in place a transitional administration.

**MN:** The establishment of the National Conference and its process of putting in place a transitional government does fit the general profile of a mechanism of success. However, it would also not be unreasonable to code the transition as occurring when Niger officially voted on a democratic constitution in 1992 or when the first democratically-elected government assumed office in 1993. These different codings effect how Niger’s future outcomes are coded because Niger suffered a brief return to authoritarianism from 1996-98. According to PolityIV, Niger was a robust democracy for three years after the negotiated transition, and returned to at least weak democracy after the coup of 1996 led to that brief period of authoritarianism. Thus the particular timing of Niger’s transition process may have outsized effects on how it appears in the data.

**Sources**

Name: Albania Anti-Communist Campaign

Country: Albania

End Year: 1991

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: Civil resistance to the Albanian Communist regime, which had begun in 1989, peaked in May-June of 1991, when a general strike organized by students and labor groups along with the recently-formed Democratic Party paralyzed the country for four weeks. Along with economic demands the strikers called for an end to Communist rule. Unable to end the strike, the Communist government resigned. I consider the resignation to be the key transition mechanism for two reasons: although Albania did have a previous democratic election, the election failed to unseat the Communists, and the leadership of the country remained largely unchanged. After the strike while the Communists did not fully depart from power they only remained in power in a coalition transitional government along with the Democratic Party until new elections were held. The Communists who remained also purged much of their former leadership and completely changed their platform to move from being a Communist party to a Democratic Socialist party. Thus the period of interim government is more appropriately considered as part of the transition, rather than part of the civil resistance campaign.
Name: Zambia Pro-Democracy
Country: Zambia
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional.
Summary: Powerful Zambian labor unions spearheaded a civil resistance campaign beginning in 1989 against the one-party rule of long-time authoritarian President of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda, demanding a change in Zambia’s constitution to allow multiparty rule and oust Kaunda from power. The campaign gained momentum in June when the government raised the price of Maize, sparking riots, and when massive celebrations when reports were issued that Kaunda had been ousted in a coup publicly revealed the extent of popular opposition to President Kaunda. As protests grew larger President Kaunda agreed to allow multi-party elections and created a commission to draft a new constitution. Multi-party elections in 1991 successfully ousted Kaunda and brought the opposition, under the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) into power.

Sources

Name: Russian Anti-Coup Protests
Country: Russia/USSR
End Year: 1991
Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional.
Summary: In August of 1991 a group of Soviet “hardliners” attempted to stage a coup against the leadership of reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. However, mass popular uprisings against the coup, initiated but only partially led by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, led to mass military defections and the disintegration of the coup leaders incipient regime.

MN: I code this transition mechanism as “overwhelming” because of the disintegrative nature of the campaign’s success against the coup leaders. The coup’s organizational structure quite literally fell apart as the campaign sparked widespread military defections. Thus while physical overwhelming may not have occurred, the disintegrative mechanism is best coded as overwhelming.
Sources


Name: Belarus Pro-Democracy Movement

Country: Belarus

End Year: 1991

Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: Democratic and nationalistic opposition had been building in Belarus for several years, with protests and demonstrations supporting demands for a break from the Soviet Union and a more open political system. In 1990, despite election rules which heavily weighted allocation of seats towards the Communist Party members of the opposition were elected to the Belarussian Supreme Soviet. In the following year the Belorussian Communist party quickly lost members, so that, when the August 1991 attempted coup occurred in Russia, the Belorussian Communists were severely
weakened. With demonstrators gathering outside the parliament demanding
independence and an end to Communist rule, the Supreme Soviet held a two-day
extraordinary meeting. In this meeting more liberal members of the Communist party
allied with the opposition, forced the resignation of the President of the Supreme Soviet
and declared Belarus independent. A few days later the entire cabinet declared that they
had “suspended” their membership in the Communist party, officially ending Communist
rule.

**MN:** Belarus is a difficult case to code because the transition lacks very clear, distinctive
transition points. However, when understood from the POV of the goals of the campaign
(independence and an end to Communist rule) the August declaration seems to be the
clearest transition moment. The mechanism I consider to be an elite coup because it was
essentially a rebellion and assumption of power within the ranks of the Belorussian
Communist party. However, a plausible argument could be made for coding the
transition as either a resignation or a negotiation. Resignation I find less plausible
because of the aspect of pressure from other members of the Communist party on the top
leadership. Negotiation is more plausible but also problematic because sources indicate
that the primary actors were intra-Communist, with the opposition merely playing a
pressuring role. However, additional research might lend greater credence to coding this
transition as a negotiation. In my statistical tests I run separate regressions coding
Belarus both ways, with no significant effects on my results.
Sources


Name: Thailand Pro-Democracy Movement

Country: Thailand

End Year: 1992

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: The Campaign for Popular Democracy, an umbrella group of opposition parties, students, and other civil society groups organized mass demonstrations in Bangkok and other cities around Thailand to demand an end to military rule and promote a more democratic constitution. The protesters also called specifically for the resignation of Prime Minister Suchinda, who was from the military. Suchinda resigned in May of 1992 after several days of bloody protest suppression by the military, but protests and other political activism continued until an election in September, when a coalition of pro-democracy parties was voted into office, thus the election, not the resignation of Suchinda, is the key moment of success in this campaign.

Sources

**Name:** Active Voices Campaign  
**End Year:** 1991  
**Transition Mechanism:** Negotiation  
**Secondary Codes:** Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition  
**Summary:** The unified “Active Voices” opposition staged a six-month general strike in 1991 that forced authoritarian president Didier Ratsiraka to agree to a negotiated power-sharing arrangement that put opposition figures in most major positions of power and led to a new constitution and Ratsiraka’s eventual final ouster from power in a presidential election in 1993.

**MN:** I consider the breakthrough to be the negotiations of late 1991 because these resulted in the fundamental shift of the opposition from civil resistance to a position of power shaping the transition process. While Ratsiraka retained some power throughout the following two-year transition his power was largely subordinated to the opposition. Thus the negotiation is a better coding of the transition mechanism than the election.

**Sources**


**Name:** Anti-Hoyte Protests

**Country:** Guyana

**End Year:** 1992

**Transition Mechanism:** Election

**Secondary Codes:** Non-Coercive, Institutional

**Summary:** Protests in the early 1990s successfully pressured authoritarian Socialist leader Desmond Hoyte to hold free and fair elections in Guyana. The elections successfully ousted Hoyte.
MN: The role of civil resistance in this case was unclear based on the research performed. This case may be better considered an elite-led transition. Statistical tests were run both including and excluding this case.

Sources


Name: People Against Violence

Country: Slovakia

End Year: 1992

Transition Mechanism: Negotiation

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional

Summary: People Against Violence, a Slovak dissident group, was a critical force in the 1989 “Velvet Revolution” which ousted the Communist government of Czechoslovakia. Over the following three years Slovak activists continued to push for an independent Slovakia. A series of negotiations between Czech and Slovak leaders, backed by continuing pressure from the streets in Slovakia, led to Slovakia’s peaceful secession in November of 1992.
Name: Mali Pro-Democracy Movement

Country: Mali

End Year: 1991

Transition Mechanism: Coup d’Etat

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: Students, opposition groups, and labor unions led a massive civil resistance campaign against Mali’s military dictator: General Moussa Traore. When violent repression backfired and the campaign continued to grow the military defected en masse and joined protests. A group of officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure staged a coup, arrested General Traore and promising to initiate a transition to multi-party democracy.

Sources


**Name:** Malawi Multi-Party Democracy Movement  
**Country:** Malawi  
**End Year:** 1993  
**Transition Mechanism:** Election  
**Secondary Codes:** Non-Coercive, Institutional  
**Summary:** Strikes and demonstrations by students, labor unions, and the Catholic Church successfully pressured long-time authoritarian President Hastings Banda to hold a referendum on moving Malawi from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy. The civil resistance campaign, with help from UN observers, successfully won the referendum, initiating a process of constitutional reform which ended with a free and fair election in 1994 which finally ousted President Hastings Banda from power.

**MN:** An argument could be made that either the election or the referendum are the critical mechanism of transition in this case. This does not affect how the transition mechanism is coded, since both would fall under my category of “elections,” but does change whether the end year of the campaign is considered to be 1993 or 1994, and thus has effects on the values of the control variables. I consider the referendum to be the transition point because it placed multi-party election advocates in significant authority.
and initiated the constitutional reform process. Changing the end-year does not cause significant changes in the values of Malawi’s post-campaign variables.

Sources


Name: South African Defiance Campaign
Country: South Africa
End Year: 1992
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional
Summary: A series of nonviolent mass uprisings, including boycotts of white businesses, creation of alternative institutions, and labor strikes, as well as an international divestment and sanctions campaign, led the government of apartheid South Africa to engage in a negotiated transition process, under the auspices of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). While it faced significant challenges, CODESA eventually led to an agreement in late 1992 to hold national elections and a five-year
national unity government. The election, held in 1994, led to the election of freedom fighter Nelson Mandela as South Africa’s first black president.

**MN:** South Africa’s transition presents a significant coding challenge. There are three significant points which can be argued as the mechanism of success: de Klerk’s decision to legalize the ANC and free Nelson Mandela in 1990, the CODESA negotiations which concluded in 1992, and the election in 1994. CODESA is the best choice for the following reasons:

- The 1990 decisions by de Klerk, while they significantly opened the ability of the ANC to shape the future of South Africa, did not lead to a real shift in power, thus they are not significant enough to be considered the mechanism of transition.

- The 1994 election, while groundbreaking, took place under an already agreed-upon negotiated framework. When the election took place, the ANC was already in the position of strenuously pushing its agenda through its own political influence and was guaranteed at least some role in the post-election government (because of the agreements on forming a government of national unity made at CODESA). The election thus determined primarily how big the ANC’s power in the government would be, not whether they would have a role.

- The negotiated agreement from CODESA thus represents the best coding of the transition mechanism. It gave the ANC and other African groups significant
political influence, and critically shaped how South Africa’s future transition took place.

Sources


Name: Anti-Suharto Protests

Country: Indonesia

End Year: 1998

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: A massive civil resistance campaign, primarily led by students and fueled by a major economic crisis, led to mass defections from the regime of Indonesian dictator
Suharto. As his regime increasingly lost cohesion Suharto resigned, handing over power to his vice-president, B.J. Habibie, who initiated a democratic transition.

Sources


Name: Sierra Leone Defense of Democracy

Country: Sierra Leone

End Year: 1998

Transition Mechanism: International Intervention

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: After a military coup ousted Sierra Leone’s first multi-party democracy labor unions, teachers unions, and student groups organized protests and strikes against the new
military government. The campaign ended successfully when an African peacekeeping force invaded the country and ousted the coup leaders, restoring democratic governance.

Sources


Nigerian Anti-Military Rule

Location: Nigeria

End Year: 1999

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional

Summary: Civil society organizations in Nigeria launched civil resistance throughout the rule of military dictator Sani Abacha to demand an end to military rule and a return to multi-party democracy. Domestic resistance, tied with a declining economy and the death of Abacha in 1998 led to a rapid liberalization under General Abubakar and finally an election in 1999 which was won by Olusegun Obasanjo.
**MN:** Initial research puts only limited links between the civil resistance which took place in Nigeria and the transition away from military rule. A better understanding may be to look at this case as an elite-led transition from a reluctant ruling military following Abacha's death. Thus this case is considered to only weakly meet inclusion criteria. Statistical tests were run which both included and excluded this case.

**Sources**


**Name:** Timorese Resistance

**Country:** Indonesia/East Timor

**End Year:** 2000

**Transition Mechanism:** International Intervention

**Secondary Codes:** Coercive, Non-institutional.

**Summary:** After a long struggle against Indonesian occupation involving both guerrilla warfare and nonviolent resistance the citizens of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for
independence from Indonesia in a 1999 referendum. However, immediately after the referendum Indonesian-backed militias invaded East Timor to reassert Indonesian rule. Independence was only achieved the following year when an Australian-led UN force invaded East Timor and established East Timor as an independent state.

MN: I do not consider the referendum to be the mechanism of success in this case because it was followed by a de facto invasion to reassert Indonesian authority. Thus, while the referendum was no doubt central to how future events played out the key mechanism of success was the international military intervention.

Sources


Name: Anti-Fujimori
Country: Peru
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.
Summary: Discovery of evidence implicating a top advisor of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori of corruption sparked mass protests demanding Fujimori’s resignation. The protests, tied with continuing investigations into corruption in Fujimori’s administration led to his resignation.

Sources


Name: Anti-PRI Campaign
Country: Mexico
End Year: 2000
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.
Summary: Several waves of protest, as well as economic challenges and elite-led liberalization, led to the successful ouster of the long-time authoritarian PRI party in Mexico in the 2000 Mexican presidential election.

MN: Initial research revealed a minimal civil resistance role, thus the case is considered a weak example. Statistical tests were run both including and excluding this case.

Sources


Name: Croatia Democratic Opposition

Country: Croatia

End Year: 2000

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.

Summary: An alliance of opposition parties and civil society activists came together to challenge the rule of Croatia’s semi-authoritarian nationalist government. Protests, innovative campaigning, and the unexpected death of Croatian President Franjo Tudman, all came together for the opposition to win a majority in parliament and the presidency and initiate democratic reforms.
Sources


Name: Bulldozer Revolution/Otpor

Country: Yugoslavia

End Year: 2000

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: The Serbian student movement Otpor spearheaded a campaign of civil resistance against Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic, engaging in creative protests to undermine the narrative of Milosevic’s inevitable rule and successfully unifying the fragmented Serbian opposition into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). Due in large part to Otpor’s efforts, DOS’s presidential candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, defeated Milosevic in the 2000 Yugoslavian presidential election. When Milosevic falsely claimed that Kostunica had received less than 50% of the vote and thus a second round of elections was called for Otpor and opposition activists engaged in a wave of massive demonstrations, occupying central Belgrade, while outside of Belgrade workers at the
Kolubara coal mines (which supplied half of the country’s electricity) went on strike. Faced with increasing resistance and with police largely refusing to obey orders to disperse protesters the constitutional court reversed its ruling claiming a second round was required, Milosevic renounced his claim to the presidency, and Kostunica was made President of Yugoslavia.

**MN:** Coding the transition mechanism in this case is challenging because of different possible interpretations of the importance of the election. An argument could be made for this case being an example of negotiation (because the court reversed its decision and Milosevic stepped down after meetings with Kostunica), or of overwhelming (since after the election the massive protests, strikes, and defections by police and local government officials were crucial in ending Milosevic’s rule). However, while the largest mobilization took place after the election itself, I consider the election to be the crucial transition mechanism for X reasons

- Winning the election was clearly a necessary component for the mobilization which took place afterwards.
- The protests were explicitly focused on ensuring the government honored the terms of the election rather than seeking a different route to power, e.g. through negotiation or extra-institutional seizure of power.
- The final victory took the form of the constitutional court reversing its stand on the election and Milosevic acknowledging the results of the election.
Sources


Name: Anti-Rawlings Campaign

Country: Ghana

End Year: 2000

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.

Summary: After almost 20 years of continuous rule by authoritarian leader Jerry Rawlings (first as an un-elected coup leader and later as Ghana’s President), Ghana’s
democratic opposition launched a successful campaign to prevent Rawlings’ successor, Vice President John Atta Mills, from succeeding him. The political campaign, backed by pro-democracy protests, successfully defeated Mills and consolidated Ghana’s democratic transition.

**MN:** Initial research only revealed a tenuous role for civil resistance, and the case may be better considered as an elite-led transition followed by a traditional election rather than a civil resistance-led transition. Statistical tests were run both including and excluding this case.

**Sources**


**Name:** Surinam Anti-President Movement
Country: Surinam

End Year: 2000

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.

Summary: Labor unions in Surinam organized protests and demonstrations against President Jules Wijdenbosch. The unions, along with opposition parties, unsuccessfully attempted to oust Wijdenbosch through parliamentary procedures. However, as protests continued, Wijdenbosch agreed to hold early elections if the unions would temporarily call off their disturbances. The campaign shifted tactics to ousting Wijdenbosch electorally and successfully defeated him in the early election.

Sources


Name: Anti-Diouf Movement

Country: Senegal

End Year: 2000

Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional.

Summary: An alliance of opposition parties and defecting figures from the long-time ruling Socialist Party organized a concerted challenge to long-time ruled Abdou Diouf. The opposition organized successful protests against plans by the Socialist Party to rig the vote, and successfully defeated Diouf in the second round of the presidential election.

Method Note: While the mechanism of success is very clear, whether this case should be considered civil resistance or simply regular election politics is unclear. I consider it civil resistance for two reasons: first, the one-party authoritarian nature of the regime which preceded the election and second, the real and effective use of demonstrations and the threat of mass civil disobedience by the opposition to pressure the regime into holding a free and fair election.

Sources

- “New Senegalese President Sworn In, Ending 40 Years of One-Party Rule.”
  *Agence France Presse* (2000, April 1).


- McKenzie, Glenn. “Senegal Elections: Peaceful Change or Violent Renewal?”
Name: Anti-Chaudhry Campaign

Country: Fiji

End Year: 2000

Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat

Secondary codes: Coercive, non-institutional

Summary: Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, was elected in May of 1999. The election was widely resented by ethnic Fijian nationalists, particularly activists in the Takuei Movement, a Fijian nationalist group which had participated in agitation prior to the Fijian coups of 1987 (See Anti-Coalition Government Protests). On April 28, 2000, the Takuei movement and other Fijian groups organized a protest march to demand the resignation of Chaudhry’s government. In response to the march the government banned any additional protest marches. The nationalists ignored the ban and planned a march on May 19th, the one-year anniversary of Chaudhry’s installation. As the protest march was underway Fijian nationalists led by failed businessman George Speight staged a coup, taking captive Prime Minister Chaudhry and announcing the overthrow of the government. The police and military initially declared the coup illegitimate but wavered in cracking down on the plotters. The Takuei Movement declared its support for Speight’s coup and thousands of supporters descended on the parliament building to show their support for Speight. After a ten-day standoff and riots around the Fijian capital by Speight supporters on May 29th the army announced that
they had assumed executive authority to resolve the crisis, permanently overthrowing the Chaudhry government.

Sources:


Name: Second People Power Movement  
Country: Philippines  
End Year: 2001  
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.  
Summary: In 2001, outrage over political maneuvering to save Philippine President Joseph Estrada from conviction in a corruption investigation resulted in a call for mass demonstrations to oust Estrada from office. Over four days, millions of protesters gathered in Manila in echoes of the 1986 “people power” revolution against Philippine
dictator Ferdinand Marcos. The mass uprising sparked quick defections from the head of the military and the supreme court, which issued a declaration denying Estrada legitimacy and installing his vice-president, Gloria Arroyo, as president.

Sources


Name: Anti-Chiluba Protests

Country: Zambia

End Year: 2001

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: In 2001, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was set to step down due to a two-term limit in the Zambian constitution. However, early in the year Chiluba expressed his unwillingness to step down and instead began putting in place mechanisms to remain in power for a third time. In response students, civil society groups, and
churches launched mass protests to demand that Chiluba give up power. In response to the protests, Chiluba agreed to not run for a third term.

**MN:** Confidence in including this case in the data is limited – while civil resistance did play a role in motivating Chiluba to not seek a third term, whether this qualifies as seeking “regime change” and thus being maximalist is questionable. Statistical tests were run which both included and excluded this case with no significant difference in the results.

**Sources**


**Name:** Madagascar Pro-Democracy Movement

**Country:** Madagascar

**End Year:** 2003

**Transition Mechanism:** Negotiation

**Secondary Codes:** Non-Coercive, institutional.
Summary: After an election filled with widespread fraud, supporters of opposition candidate Marc Ravalomanana held daily protests to demand the annulling of the election and the ouster of long-time president Didier Ratsiraka. When the Madagascar High Constitutional Court (under pressure from Ratsiraka) refused to acknowledge the fraud and claimed that neither candidate had received more than 50% of the vote, thus requiring a second round, Ravalomanana’s supporters nonviolently occupied government buildings in the capital, Antananarivo, while Ratsiraka retreated to his demographic base on the coasts. After several months of standoff, the two parties were brought to Senegal, where, under the auspices of the OAU, they reached a negotiated settlement which put an interim government in place and recounted the votes from the election. The recount gave Ravalomanana an absolute majority, and thus the victory.

MN: The election itself was clearly an important mechanism of success for the Ravalomanana campaign, however, as the narrative above shows, victory in the election was only a preliminary for true victory. The major phase of the campaign took place after the election. Victory was only achieved after the process of negotiation put the interim government in place which recounted the vote and issued the new High Constitutional Court verdict. Thus I consider the negotiation to be the most accurate coding of the transition mechanism.

Sources

Name: Rose Revolution

Country: Georgia

End Year: 2003

Transition Mechanism: Resignation

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: Opposition and civil society groups in Georgia, led by Mikhail Saakashvili, joined together to contest parliamentary elections against Georgian President and former Soviet official Eduard Shevardnadze. When widespread electoral fraud gave Shevardnadze’s supporters the victory, Saakashvili and his supporters organized civil resistance in Tbilisi. The campaign peaked with Saakashvili and thousands of protesters storming the opening session of the new Georgian parliament and demanding Shevardnadze’s resignation. Shevardnadze resigned from office within weeks.

Sources


Name: Orange Revolution

Country: Ukraine

End Year: 2004

Transition Mechanism: Election

Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional.

Summary: The 2004 presidential election in Ukraine pitted opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko against the handpicked successor of authoritarian President Leonid Kuchma, Victor Yanukovich. After Yanukovich attempted to steal the election through widespread public fraud, Yushchenko’s supporters began protests which eventually pressured the country’s constitutional court to acknowledge the widespread fraud and demand a new run-off election. In the second election, monitored closely by domestic and international observers, Yushchenko defeated Yanukovich.

Sources


**Name:** Forajido Rebellion  
**Country:** Ecuador  
**End Year:** 2005  
**Transition Mechanism:** Coup D’etat  
**Secondary Codes:** Coercive, institutional  
**Summary:** A widespread popular civil resistance campaign organized protests in Quito against the regime of President Lucio Gutierrez. The campaign was based around a number of grievances, most particularly Gutierrez’ replacement of supreme court justices with his own followers. As the movement grew, the military became unwilling to continue repressing nonviolent protesters and announced they would no longer support President Gutierrez. As soon as the military withdrew its support the Ecuadorian congress voted 60-2 to remove Gutierrez from office on the grounds that he had “abandoned his post.”

**MN:** The coding of this transition is problematic because it contains both institutionalized elements and non-institutionalized elements. I code it as a coup for two
reasons: first, the action by the Ecuadorian congress voting Gutierrez out was clearly in response to the military defection. Second, the vote, rather than being a carefully legislated process, was rather more of an institutional front to a rapid independent seizure of power by elites. Thus the transition is best-coded as a coup.

Sources


Name: The Gas Wars
Country: Bolivia
End Year: 2005
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional
Summary: A protest campaign in favor of nationalizing Bolivia’s natural gas reserves from 2003-2005 led by Socialist leader Evo Morales among others led to the ouster of President Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 and later to the ouster of Sanchez de Lozada’s successor, Carlos Mesa. As protests continued to grow and reformist measures failed to placate them Mesa resigned in June 2005.
MN: I code this as a single successful campaign rather than two successful campaigns (one against President Sanchez de Lozada and one against President Mesa) for two reasons. On the data side, including a unit of analysis for both campaigns would skew the data as the outcome years are close to the same. Thus, even if both were included in the dataset any analysis would have to exclude one. Since protests continued after Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation it therefore made sense to me to analyze this as a single campaign ending with Mesa’s resignation in 2005, which was followed by a brief transitional period and the election of Evo Morales as president soon afterwards.

Sources


Name: Tulip Revolution

Country: East Timor

End Year: 2005
Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: After local opposition leaders were defeated in parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, widespread protests erupted almost spontaneously across the south of the country against the rule of long-time authoritarian President Askar Akaev. As protests (some but not all under the control of the opposition) grew, various government ministries stopped obeying Akaev’s orders. As protesters massed in Bishkek, scattered attempts to repress them failed as police defection grew. As protesters occupied the Kyrgyz “white house” Akaev fled the country.

Sources:


Name: Cedar Revolution/Independence Intifada

Country: Lebanon

End Year: 2005

Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: In early 2005, after popular Lebanese politician Rafiq Hariri died in a car bombing widely attributed to Syrian intelligence services opposition parties in Syria organized mass demonstrations demanding an end to the occupation of Lebanon by Syrian troops. At the peak of the campaign over 1.2 million people (more than 25% of Lebanon’s population) protested against Syrian occupation. As a result of the protests, all Syrian troops were withdrawn from Lebanon by April of 2005.

MN: I code the transition mechanism in this case as “resignation” because Syrian President Bashar Assad unilaterally decided to withdraw Syrian troops. This initiative aspect makes resignation the best coding, though of course no formal political resignation on the part of the Syrians took place.

Sources:


Name: Anti-Alkatiri Campaign
Country: East Timor
End Year: 2006
Transition Mechanism: Resignation
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional
Summary: After Prime Minister Alkatiri’s dismissal of 600 soldiers who claimed they had been discriminated against sparked violent unrest thousands of protesters began holding demonstrations in Dili demanding that Alkatiri take responsibility for the unrest and step down. They asked President Gusmao to dissolve the government. As protests continued, on June 20th President Gusmao threatened to resign if Alkatiri did not step down. On June 26th Alkatiri resigned, allowing Gusmao to form an interim government.

Sources:

- “Pressure mounts on ETimor PM to resign after protest rally.” Agence France Presse (2006, Jun 6).

Name: Nepalese Anti-Government
Country: Nepal
End Year: 2006
Transition Mechanism: Election
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional

Summary: Years of agitation by pro-democracy forces in Nepal culminated in a massive general strike in April of 2006 demanding an end to emergency rule, the return of the elected parliament, and the ouster of King Gyanendra, who had essentially ruled by decree since 2002. In late April Gyanendra agreed to allow parliament to reconvene, and on May 18th parliament voted to officially strip him of his monarchical powers. While the political transition in Nepal continued in an uncertain fashion after this moment (and in still in a great deal of flux today) this vote represents the critical transition mechanism when the king lost his power as an absolute monarch and the balance of power shifted to the elected parliament.

MN: I code this transition mechanism as an “election” because of its democratic process nature - an institutional process by an elected parliament.

Sources:


Name: Anti-Thaksin Campaign

End-Year: 2006

Transition Mechanism: Coup D’état

Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional

Summary: In 2005 and early 2006 the People’s Alliance for Democracy, a “royalist” protest movement led by middle and upper class residents of Bangkok began a protest campaign against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was popular in rural areas of Thailand but widely despised in Bangkok. The protesters repeatedly appealed to the king to remove Thaksin, but he refused to do so. In 2006, the military ousted Thaksin in a coup.

Sources

Appendix Works Cited


