U.S. Military Engagement with Authoritarian East/Central African States

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U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
WITH AUTHORITARIAN EAST/CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
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by
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Abstract

This paper examines the question, “How can the US best engage authoritarian governments in Africa militarily, in order to facilitate more positive outcomes for that country’s citizens?” In order to answer this, it is necessary to examine the presumption that authoritarian governments do not promote positive outcomes for their constituents. If this is not the case, then it may be possible to use different, non-traditional means in order to identify positive performance indicators. This can lead to a more holistic assessment, and allow the US to leverage the resources of the military to further promote these outcomes.

In this thesis, I argue that if it is possible for an authoritarian government to facilitate positive outcomes for its people, it may be possible to craft a military engagement plan so that the US military can help continue this cycle. The benefits of a well-crafted engagement plan can improve the lives of that country’s citizens, and improve governance by its leaders. For the everyday people in these countries, the consequences of a poorly-crafted plan could hardly be worse.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

From the time European colonialists first started expanding their territory in the 1400s, they wrote about the perceived backwardness of the natives, and their lack of development. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, the official historian of the Spanish Court in 1547, argued that Amerindians in newly-conquered territories of the New World were “dim-witted and mentally lazy, although they may be physically strong enough to fulfill all the necessary tasks, [they] are by nature slaves.”¹ Other writers referred to indigenous people as “suffering under satanic oppression, ignorance and disease, effected by a combination of political, economic and religious forces that cooperate under a regime seeking the benefit of both ruler and ruled.”² It is noteworthy that these attitudes are by no means relegated to a distant, ignorant, and racist past: In 2007, Nobel Price-winning geneticist James Watson stated that he was “inherently gloomy about the prospect of Africa” because “all our social policies are based on the fact that [Africans’] intelligence is the same as ours—whereas all the testing says not really.”³


As a result of this view, for years governments, missionaries, and adventurers saw venturing into the heart of Africa—the “Dark Continent”—as a noble and worthy undertaking.\(^4\) Belgium’s King Leopold II, self-described alternatively as the “King-Sovereign” or “proprietor” of the Belgian Congo (later Zaire, and then the Democratic Republic of Congo), said, “To open to civilization the only part of our globe which it has not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which hangs over entire peoples, is, I dare say, a crusade worthy of this century of progress.”\(^5\) Arguments about the benefits of “civilizing the natives” rested on the presupposition that they were not civilized, and that Africa remained behind an ideal that Europeans had conveniently already achieved. It is through this skewed lens that outsiders viewed Africa, drew conclusions about her status, and made policy decisions.

The decisions that European colonial powers made, particularly in the wake of the “Scramble for Africa” in the late 1800s, had stark implications for both colonizers and Africans themselves. This sense of “going to Africa to fix Africa” continues in contemporary times with aid programs like those criticized by Dambisa Moyo in her book *Dead Aid*. In it, she argues that well-intentioned aid has actually contributed to problems in Africa by enabling corruption among elites, exacerbating conflict, and creating a poverty cycle. In short, misconceptions about Africa have only made things there worse.

\(^4\) For purposes of this thesis, “Africa” and “Sub-Saharan Africa” will be used interchangeably, in reference to the 48 countries there, though not North Africa.

All of this is not to say that it is difficult to find indicators of poor performance by the 48 countries of the continent. In many areas, state capacity is extremely limited, and in human rights, development, health, and others, the continent lags behind many areas of the world. They make up 30% of the bottom 50 countries in Reporters Sans Frontiers’ “Press Freedom Index.” 40% of the bottom 50 countries in the Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception Index” are from the region. The Fund For Peace’s “Failed States Index” is a “1 to 10” scale of stability, with “10 being the most at-risk of collapse and violence;” in Sub-Saharan Africa, 36 countries are ranked as 8 or worse. And, of the 52 countries in the world that the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks as “authoritarian,” 23 of them can be found there.\footnote{Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index,” http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html. Fund For Peace, “Failed States Index,” http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi. Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index,” http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index,” http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf. All accessed April 22, 2012.}

But what if there is another level to the story about conditions in Africa? What if what has transpired thus far is a cycle of bad news begetting bad news, and that the above views only perpetuate further negative outcomes? If this is the case, then it may be possible to find positive performance indicators using different, non-traditional means to get a more holistic assessment, and begin the opposite cycle. After all, if conventional assessments, perceptions, and approaches have facilitated negative outcomes, then it may follow that alternative assessments, perceptions, and approaches may facilitate more positive outcomes. The challenge in Africa is to first seek out and validate those positive indicators, and then decide how the US can best engage a country once armed with that information.
The literature is sharply divided over the linkages between regime type and development and capacity building. Collier finds that any difference between the average performance of democracies and that of autocracies is dwarfed by the difference in the dispersion of performance among autocracies [such as military, single-party, or personalist regimes]: they can be both much worse and much better performance than democracies.\footnote{Paul Collier, “The Political Economy of Fragile States and Implications for European Development Policy,” Oxford University Department of Economics (May 2009), 7-8.}


In support of this paper’s central idea, Olson writes that the state is a “stationary bandit,” incentivized to ensure its survival by providing for the common good of its people, who in turn appreciate the order the state provides.\footnote{In the same paper, he argues that a democracy is better for development. For more, see Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 567-576.} Elbadawi and Sambanis note that both democracies and autocracies can be less prone to civil wars than anocracies, though “deeper democracies may be better able to handle regime transitions than midlevel regimes or autocracies”\footnote{Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Jun., 2002), 311.} (Fjende further stratifies by saying “military regimes and multi-party electoral autocracies run a higher risk of conflict than single-party authoritarian regimes”\footnote{Hanne Fjende, “Generals, Dictators, and Kings: Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict, 1973–2004,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 27, no. 195: 215.}). And Persson and Tabellini find that “countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better than those carrying out the
opposite sequence,” a conclusion that seems to be borne out by the history of China since the late 1970s and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{12}

However, other literature on various forms of autocracy—such as a benevolent or soft dictatorship, or façade democracy—and their associated elites do not paint a positive picture of the development and capacity-building outcomes they facilitate in such areas as public administration, international diplomacy, justice and citizen well being, and the establishment of rule-of-law. Chebal finds “authoritarian (or ‘evil’) elites...profoundly unfavorable to the prospect of development and that, as a result, the economic situation of most African countries continues to worsen.”\textsuperscript{13} Larsson and Parente found that elites in autocracies enact policies that can retard development (though they also found that democracies are “inherently susceptible to the erection of barriers that retard development).\textsuperscript{14} Finally, Bates argues that, while elites can provide for public good in the long term, the limited governance infrastructure present in Sub-Saharan Africa after independence of the 1960s “shortened the time horizons of politicians and lessened their incentives to act for the public good.”\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{13} Patrick Chebal, “The Quest for Good Government and Development in Africa: Is NEPAD the Answer?” International Affairs 78, no. 3 (2002), 461.

\textsuperscript{14} Anna Larsson and Stephen Parente, “Democracy as a Middle Ground: A United Theory of Development and Political Regimes,” Stockholm University (May 2009), 25 and 5.

This thesis assumes that the US—particularly in a post-conflict environment—will not always have the privilege of engaging a country with the government that it wants, but rather will find itself engaging the government that the country has. As such, knowing the most effective way to engage an existing system—autocratic warts and all—has obvious benefits.

This thesis will propose non-traditional methods of assessment, albeit using traditional methodologies, in order to get a more holistic picture of different countries and regions in Africa. Because of the various metrics included here, this thesis will include anthropological, political science, and socio-economic perspectives, and will look at the broad themes of military engagement, state capacity building, and resultant stability. It will also involve the domains of military affairs, human rights, and development. It will not, however, be primarily hypothetical, or based on a single theory: It will be issue-driven throughout. This paper limits itself to only looking at US responses to the information presented, and policy decisions regarding the findings; it does not consider multi-national approaches, nor does it factor the role that other nations—particularly China—would play when crafting an engagement plan.

This thesis will argue that it may be possible to identify new ways for researchers to assess authoritarian elites in Africa, in order to identify areas that hold promise and so these outcomes can then be used to drive improvements to more traditional indicators. However, the findings of each chapter are only part of the overall approach espoused here: that the US can and should take a holistic view of a country and region before deciding the best way to intervene and interact with that country militarily.
For hundreds of years, outsiders have seen the continent as backwards, lacking the will, the discipline, or the intelligence to develop at the same rate and to the same level as their Western counterparts. But if researchers can discover alternate means of assessing countries in Africa, it may be possible to create a more positive narrative from which more positive outcomes may originate.

**A Note on Organization**

This thesis is divided into two distinct parts: The first, “Through A New Lens,” proposes unconventional metrics by which researchers may assess the state of countries in Africa. It will look at the possibility of positive outcomes via benevolent dictatorships, as well as how a countries can leverage lesser-known natural resources as a spring board to fuel more success.

The second part, “So What? Moving Forward with New Insights,” examines how the US military can engage authoritarian states and their elites given this knowledge, so that they can facilitate more positive outcomes. This includes a study of attempts to leverage military assistance to shape outcomes in repressive countries, and a final chapter that makes several programmatic recommendations for military planners about how to proceed in crafting a military engagement plan with African nations.

It was written not only as an explanatory summary, but also to make programmatic and policy recommendations, with an eye towards affecting future engagement and outcomes.
CHAPTER TWO: RWANDA—NEGATIVE GOVERNMENT, POSITIVE OUTCOMES?

Introduction

In Africa, nearly 80% of the countries are run by authoritarian governments of varying degrees.¹ And while a strongman in a situation like this can use his consolidated power to institute a top-down program of repression, in theory, it can also make it easier to implement more positive changes. Thus, any study into the potential for positive outcomes in African countries can greatly benefit from starting at the top. And few places in Africa have shown the benefits of a strong hand at the top like Rwanda.

For a visitor to Rwanda, there is a stark distinction when compared with other African countries such as Sierra Leone, Lesotho, or even neighboring ones such as Uganda. The streets are cleaner, houses are painted and yards tended, and there are fewer of the 10-foot, broken-glass-topped security walls so emblematic of Sub-Saharan Africa. When I visited in January 2011, there were still street hawkers, to be sure; the difference was that in Kigali, instead of selling air fresheners for cars, they were selling copies of The Economist. Less anecdotally, the government in Kigali has overseen some of Africa’s most impressive growth since the end of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. This is especially impressive considering key two factors.

First, the turmoil and ethnic strife that were in place when the Paul Kagame regime took power after the 4-year Civil War and 1994 Genocide, in which 800,000 to 1 million people, mostly Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were murdered in the span of around 100 days. And second, the domestic turmoil and regional conflicts that seem to plague other African nations. As The Economist noted in August 2010, “Its GDP has doubled, albeit to a tiny $5 billion, since 2005. Most Rwandans have medical insurance. Tax revenue may rise by 12% this year and GDP is expected to go up by 6%”. Foreign aid (as a percentage of GDP) has dropped from nearly 100% in 1994 to 50% today; “Mr. Kagame wants to see it fall to 30% by 2017.”² (Some of the foreign aid given after the end of the Genocide is no doubt tied to Western guilt over their lack of intervention. But it is important to remember that foreign aid did provide an economic springboard for the government in Kigali to jumpstart the economy, while ensuring that foreign aid was viewed as only a temporary fix and not a long-term solution).

If Rwanda does indeed “work,” and this condition is considered desirable for a nation, especially in a post-conflict setting as horrific as it was after the Civil War and Genocide that resulted in several million killed, wounded, maimed, and displaced, several questions need to be addressed. The most important one, and the one that this chapter seeks to answer, is: does Rwanda indeed “work,” and has the regime of Paul Kagame provided stability and security for Rwandans, and improved their welfare, since the end of the Civil War and Genocide in 1994? Compared with most other African countries, Rwanda appears to be more stable, secure, and prosperous, but this really the case? Are

these true indicators of recovery and success, so atypical in post-conflict settings in
general, and in African nations in particular? Or are these simply window dressing,
masking residual feelings of animosity that could flare up and shatter an illusion that the
administration in Kigali has carefully built? Finally, how could knowing more about a
perceived benevolent dictator allow the US Government to prevent the occurrence of, or
mitigate the tragedies associated with, a civil war, if there are indicators that the ends (a
stable nation, decreased violence, and improved welfare) will justify the means (the
conduct of the war, the potential for limited civil freedoms, and possible human rights
abuses)?

This chapter will conclude that the benevolent dictatorship of Paul Kagame has
been a positive framework for post-civil war governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, even if it
is not truly benevolent. While there are definite shortcomings when it comes to human
rights and civil liberties, it is Kagame’s focusing on the essentials of security and
stability—even if improvements to welfare continue to lag—that have allowed Rwanda
to make the undeniable gains that it has. Finally, I will explain how the US Government
supporting one side in a conflict, despite potential civil and human rights abuses, can
possibly prevent a civil war, or at least limit the tragedies associated with it.

**Challenges and Limitations**

There are aspects of the Rwanda question that this chapter does not seek to
address, but that would indisputably contribute to a better understanding of the dynamic
there. For one thing, this chapter does not seek to analyze Rwanda’s actions outside its
own borders: It is possible, even probable, that in the wake of Kagame taking power, the
mass emigration of Hutus—guilty and innocent alike—allowed Rwanda to succeed by exporting its problems and problem citizens, and that there is still ethnic tension. The ongoing conflict on the Rwanda-Congo border alone would appear to support this.

Similarly, I do not address Kagame’s impact on the region, or pretend that it has been as positive as it has been domestically. There is ample evidence that Kagame’s deployment of Rwandan troops to intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) make him responsible for some of the same brutality as the Interahamwe, though clearly not the same scale. A United Nations (UN) report released in 2006 documented over 600 major crimes including mass rape, targeted killings of civilians and other crimes against humanity from 1993 to 2003. The report implicates armed forces from Uganda and Rwanda in many of the crimes, suggesting that some may have amounted to genocide.

Data Availability

With regards to the limits of this research chapter itself and the information available, it can be difficult to find records from before the Civil War and Genocide as the Hutu regime sometimes destroyed the records. In Conspiracy to Murder, Linda Melverne notes,

Most of Rwanda’s arms deals were negotiated through the Rwandan embassy in Paris...When the Genocide was over, extensive records were found in the Embassy offices, but not one of them concerned Rwanda’s relationship with France. All the documents related to this crucial aspect of the Genocide had been destroyed by Colonel Sebastien Ntahobari (Rwanda’s military attaché in France).

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3 Professor Guy Burgess, corrections to draft in e-mail message to author, October 29, 2011.


Another potential barrier to information gathering is rooted in Kigali’s policy prohibiting *ubwoko*, or tribal affiliation, in order to build a sense of “Rwandaness” after the conflict. Consequently, ethnicity is extremely taboo and it is quite difficult to talk to Rwandans about their tribal affiliation. One newly arrived US Embassy employee, after asking a Rwandan about his tribal affiliation at a party, was declared *persona non grata* by the government in Kigali and departed Rwanda less than a week after he arrived.

These laws, addressed in greater detail below, amount to censorship that prevents free discourse about the direction of the country or the government. When using data from surveys or interviews, this must be taken into account as Rwandans might alter their true answer or mask their true feelings.

**Government-Provided Data**

There is always the problem of government-provided data. In Rwanda, as elsewhere, there is truth to the idea that, “history is written by the victors.” The Kagame regime has gone to great pains to portray Rwanda as a success story, which has benefitted the country. As such, there is no motivation to provide data that would convey a negative image or scare investors away. However, some researchers might not want to avoid these subjective evaluations, as much can be learned by peoples’ attitudes and the manner in which government data is presented, as long as it is properly vetted against more objective data.

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7 W. Stuart Symington (US Ambassador to Rwanda), in discussion with author, January 24, 2011.
Outliers

Finally, researchers must identify outliers that could account for Rwanda’s post-conflict success. Undoubtedly, some of the praise, and accompanying aid, heaped upon Rwanda by the West since the Genocide comes from a guilt-ridden Western world as a way to quell its conscience. Assessments of Rwanda are also made in relation to other African nations, some of which are perpetually in a state of chaos and anarchy.

Mitigations

One way to mitigate many of the problems listed here is to analyze documents, books, papers, and studies authored by Rwandans themselves. However, as already mentioned, Rwanda limits free speech under the umbrella of preventing “genocide ideology” and “sectarianism,” a broadly-applied law widely criticized in the international community as a tool of political repression and a means of silencing legitimate critics of the government. As British ex-pat Graham Holiday wrote in his “Kigali Wire” blog, “The blogging community, such that it is, consists mainly of expats blogging. Most of those appear to be transient, they'll often only be here for a year or so

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and then they're gone. So, there's little to no effect. Its rare to find bloggers within Rwanda blogging on these issues (of censorship).”

Indeed, research I have conducted thus far has not identified a significant body of Rwandan authors, writers, or bloggers; none of the stature of better-known African writers such as Nigeria’s Chinua Achebe (Things Fall Apart), Lesotho’s Thomas Mofolo (Chaka), or South Africa’s Alan Paton (Cry, The Beloved Country); and certainly none critical of the government. A researcher’s true understanding of Rwanda is therefore limited by this dearth of first-hand resources; further study or carefully-conducted research could mitigate this problem in future studies.

A Recent History of Rwanda

Although it is easy to identify when Rwandan rebel forces crossed the Ugandan-Rwandan border, it is difficult to pin down the spark that ignited the Rwandan Civil War between the two main ethnic groups. Tribal tension existed for years, with struggles resulting in power passing back and forth between Hutus and the Tutsis long before the Germans (and later the Belgians) claimed Rwanda as one of their colonies during the “Scramble for Africa” in the late 1800s. Surely the Belgians codifying their support for “the disenfranchisement of the Hutus and the reinforcement of ‘the traditional hegemony of well-born Tutsis’ ” in the 1930s did not help. The Hutus, with a majority of the population, eventually formed the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu

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10 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Picador, 1998), 56.
(Parmehutu), taking power after overthrowing the Tutsi-run government in November 1959, and Gregoire Kayibanda eventually won a UN-supervised election less than two years later. However, rampant corruption in his administration resulted in a military coup d’état in July 1973, and Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a fellow Hutu, took power.\textsuperscript{11}

Shortly afterwards, as a result of the violent overthrow and increasingly repressive policies of the Belgian-administrated and Hutu-led Habyarimana government, around 130,000 Rwandan Tutsis fled to neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{12} Although initially tolerated most places, these refugees soon made up a majority of the population in many areas, increasing tension over food, land, employment, and other limited resources. Eventually, a combination of host government xenophobia towards Tutsis, increasing Western pressure for democracy in Africa, and a longing for “the way it used to be” by the Diaspora (by 1991 numbering almost 400,000), resulted in some Tutsi clamoring for a return, by any means, to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{13}

It was from these refugees that General Fred Rwigyema formed the 4,000-man Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990, officially starting the Rwandan Civil War\textsuperscript{14}. After three years of brutal fighting, and no lack of war crimes or human rights violations on either side, both parties met at Arusha, Tanzania in


\textsuperscript{12} Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 160.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 530.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 491.
1993, eventually signing a power-sharing agreement. However, further massacres of Tutsi prompted the RPF to recommence their attacks, eventually putting more pressure on the Hutu-regime.

Tension came to a boiling point when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on 6 April 1994, sparking the genocide. RPF forces once again went on the offensive, eventually taking Kigali; Paul Kagame, until then the military leader of the Tutsi-dominated RPF, took charge. However, Hutu militias (referred to as Interahamwe, literally “those who work together”)16 fearing punishment and Hutu tribal members fearing retribution, fled the country in droves, eventually numbering two million and settling largely in the Great Lakes region, notably Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Standing up a government-in-exile, they began a campaign to destabilize the Tutsi-dominated government, basing their operations out of the refugee camps and employing recently emigrated Hutu. Of the refugees crossing into Zaire, the UN Force Commander at the time, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, writes in his book *Shake Hands with the Devil* that

The Zairians were finally disarming the RGF (Rwandese Government Forces, mainly Hutus at that time) at the border, stripping some of them of items such as machetes and rifles, but large weapons—artillery, heavy mortars, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank systems—were being waved through and escorted north of the city. Neither the Zairians nor the French were taking any measures to separate the militias, gendarmes or soldiers from the civilians as they crossed the border.17

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15 Ibid, 507.

16 Gourevitch, 93.

It was a situation that would hardly facilitate regional stability.

As a result of the attacks inside Rwanda that followed, President Kagame decided to send RPF forces into Zaire to counter the treat posed by the Hutus, beginning a series of conflicts subsequently dubbed “First Congo War” and “Second Congo War.” The latter, eventually involving nine African nations and resulting in the death of 5.4 million people, is referred to without hyperbole as “Africa’s World War.”

Echoes of it are still felt in the region today.

**The Bottom Line: Does Rwanda Work?**

In order to properly decide if Rwanda works, it is necessary to decide what it means for a country to “work.” It cannot be merely stability, for totalitarian regimes can provide stability while citizens live in fear. It cannot be purely security, as a brutal military can be a tool of a one-party democracy. For the purposes of this chapter, I will define a country as “working” by evaluating the most common metrics used by various Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), think tanks, government agencies, non-profits, etc. Because of the focus that Rwanda has gotten as a result of the Genocide and the stability and rebuilding that followed, there exists copious amounts of data (quantifiable, qualifiable, and anecdotal) on which to base an assessment of Rwanda’s status today.

It is important to note that in most cases, the connection between the indicators below and measuring if a country “works” or not, is a corollary relationship, and not a causal one. In other words, seeing a country increase its educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP, or witnessing very few coup d’états, does not *cause* a country to

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work; it could simply mean a tyrant is spending more money, or effectively using his security apparatus to quell any chance of a coup. But rather, there is a correlation, a link, between a country that “works” and one that seeing the indicators listed below.

Stability

“Stability” means there is as a continuity of governance at all levels, with little “likelihood that the established government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”

Put more simply, there will be no “unscheduled” changes of government, and that when it is time for a ruling party to depart, as dictated by elections, constitutional mandate, or other means, they will do so.

Continuity of Government

While continuity of government could be seen as an indicator of stability, in studying Africa one must delineate between “continuity of government” and “continuity of leadership.” A dictator who refuses to leave office might be providing a type of continuity, but this certainly does not indicate the kind of “political stability” we associate with, for example, 43 peaceful transitions of power in the United States.

Number of Coup d’État Attempts

Since President Kagame assumed power in 1993 (via coup d’état, ironically) there have been only two unsuccessful coup attempts (December 2008 and April 2010) (Rwandaonline 2009, and Rwandarwabanyarwanda 2010), which is fairly insignificant.

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This is especially true compared with other African nations in that same period of time, for which coups—both attempted and successful—have been a way of life: Chad, Lesotho, and Nigeria have had 4 attempted or successful coups d’état. Code d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe have had 5; The Gambia and Guinea have had 6; Mauritania and Niger 7; and Equatorial-Guinea an astounding 11\textsuperscript{20}. For Rwanda, this may indicate satisfaction with the administration, though more likely, as an effective security apparatus.

**Invasions**

There have been no invasions since General Paul Kagame invaded (or “returned to liberate,” depending on your take) Rwanda in 1990.

**Insurgencies**

There is an on-going fight in DRC and North-west Rwanda, directly related to the emigration of Hutus after Kagame’s RPF took charge in 1993. Many *Interahamwe* understandably feared retribution by the Tutsis because of the Genocide and fled to neighboring Zaire (now the DRC). It is unlikely that those Hutus in command, made up largely of Hutus facing the most serious charges in connection with the Genocide, will give up either their fight or their units, and the conflict will continue for the predictable future, though without tangible threat to the regime.

**Terrorist Acts Aimed at Overthrowing the Government**

There are occasionally individual grenade attacks (the least committal in terms of conducting an attack), most in Kigali and frequently cited as examples of Hutus continuing to target Tutsis, or extremists from both sides trying destabilize the Kagame administration. But aside from the Northwest region, there has been no large-scale fighting inside Rwanda region since 1994.

Security

“Security” means having limited threats, both domestically and externally, to Rwandan citizens’ physical welfare (the most important immediate need for Rwandans—or anyone in these circumstances—in the wake of the Civil War and Genocide). While they sound similar, “stability” addresses attempts at destabilizing or overthrowing the government, while “security” addresses various attempts targeting the people of that country.

Crime Rates and Patterns

The US State Department lists Rwanda’s crime rates as “medium,” and warns, “Attempted home robberies, automobile break-ins, pick-pocketing, purse snatchings, and theft of vehicle accessories in Kigali do occur, but most crimes committed in Rwanda are non-violent.” They go on to state that drugs are not a problem, there is little evidence of scams, and notably for Africa, there are no “off limits” areas.21 Of the 15 Africa

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countries I visited in 2010-2011, Rwanda felt by far the safest, possibly because of greater economic opportunity precluding the need to turn to a life of crime.

Numbers of Political Prisoners and Politically Motivated Executions

Although Rwanda initially used the death penalty to punish perpetrators of the Genocide, the government outlawed the death penalty in 2007. There remain miscellaneous reports of illegal detentions, holding of political prisoners without charge, and other abuses, though it does not appear to be widespread.

Limited Threats to Physical Welfare

And according to the Rwandan Judicial Police, since 2005, “cases of murder have gone down 36%, rape and defilement 34%, and robbery 4.7%.” These improvements, as with “Crime Rates and Patterns” above, may be related to improved economic conditions benefitting the average Rwandan.

Incidents of Inter-Ethnic Violence

As mentioned in the above section on “terrorist acts,” there are extreme and irreconcilable members of both Hutu (and Tutsi, it should be noted) factions who continue to target moderates and members of the opposition. Not widespread because of an effective security apparatus, it undoubtedly combines with relatively recent memories of the Genocide to cause fear in the minds of everyday Rwandans.

Improved Welfare

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Initially less pressing than security concerns, but as important or perhaps more so in the long run, “improved welfare” is defined by all the other issues a nation needs to address for its people to believe that things are getting better. This includes the metrics that can be hardest to measure (improvements to education and health, expanding freedom of press), but that conceptually capture if life is improving.

**Food Security**

According to the Economist, Kagame counts providing food for all Rwandans as his greatest achievement:

“For the first time in Rwandan history we have almost 100% food security.” He says his government has given villagers cattle, fertilizer and better seed. He reels off a list of crops that, he claims, have had record harvests: cassava, maize, rice, sorghum, sweet potatoes and wheat. “We’re selling food to Burundi, Tanzania and Congo.”

**Health**

The government in Kigali has doubled health expenditures during Kagame’s reign (from 4.5% of GDP in 1994, to 9% today), and this improved focus on health has resulted in lower crude birth rates (from 24 per 1000 in 1993, to 19.7 in 2009) and infant mortality rates (from 135.7 per 100,000 in 1994, to 59.1 today). Simultaneously, life expectancy has increased from a low of 26.8 years in 1993 (undoubtedly still low from the Civil War and Genocide), to 54.7 in 2010. Access to improved sanitation facilities has increased

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(52.4% of the population had access in 1990, compared with 60.6% in 2009). HIV prevalence rates remain unimpressive, remaining at #25 on the continent, even if it has declined slightly in the last couple of years.

Education

This has been a mixed bag in Rwanda. The administration in Kigali has also increased expenditures slightly (from 4.3% of GDP in 1999, to 4.9% in 2009), ranking 10th of the 35 African countries for which data was available in 1999, and 13th of the 33 countries available in 2009. 85% of youth are enrolled in primary school, and both males and females (ages 15-24) have achieved a 77% literacy rate. The percent of trained teachers greatly improved from 48.6% in 1999 to 93.9% in 2009, but during that same time frame, Rwanda achieved to the second highest teacher/pupil ratio in Africa, dropping from 54.2 to 1 in 1999, to 68.3 to 1 in 2009.

Economic Security

Per capita GDP has more than doubled under Kagame, from $4,507 in 1994 to $9,216 in 2010. But poverty remains a pressing problem, with no significant change in


the past 5 years to the 58.5% of the population living below the poverty line; 89% of people are living below $2/day, and 76% living on $1.25/day.\textsuperscript{28} Recognizing this, Kagame published his “Vision 2020,” with ambitious but realistic goals for the country. This economic project plans to

boost GDP sevenfold, find paying jobs for half of Rwanda’s subsistence farmers, nearly quadruple per capita income to $900, and turn his country into an African center for technology, all by 2020. The government is doing what it can—it has, for instance, committed to investing annually 5\% of its GDP in science and technology by 2012—but to reach those goals, it’s going to need outside assistance.\textsuperscript{29}

As a way to get this outside assistance to fund continued growth without accepting more aid, President Kagame is actively trying to attract foreign investors, and his efforts have paid off: The World Bank rated Rwanda “world's top reformer” in their 2011 Doing Business report, saying, “Rwanda is the easiest place to do business in East Africa and the fourth best in Africa.”\textsuperscript{30} Kagame should also be commended for avoiding the “aid mentality” so prevalent in Africa; his approach was clearly reflected in the attitude and work ethic of the Rwandans I met.

\textbf{Freedom of the Press}

Ranking #107 in Reporters sans Frontières’ (RSF) 2002 “Press Freedom Index,” Rwanda dropped almost 60 places to #169 out of 178 in 2010. RSF stated that, “Rwanda,\textsuperscript{28,29,30}"

\begin{itemize}
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Yemen and Syria have joined Burma and North Korea in the group of the world’s most repressive countries towards journalists.”\textsuperscript{31} Amnesty International’s 2011 report notes that, “The government used regulatory sanctions, restrictive laws and criminal defamation cases to close down media outlets critical of the government…Some leading editors and journalists fled the country after facing threats and harassment”.\textsuperscript{32}

**Freedom of Expression**

In the same report, Amnesty International reported, “A clampdown on freedom of expression and association before August [2010] presidential elections prevented new opposition parties from fielding candidates.” They continue, “The authorities continued to misuse broad and ill-defined laws on ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘sectarianism’. The laws prohibit hate speech, but also criminalize legitimate criticism of the government.”\textsuperscript{33}

**Free and Fair Elections**

“Labeled a staunch economic reformer by Western governments, but also called a ruthless dictator by his opponents and by human rights groups,” the Christian Science Monitor wrote in August 2010, “Mr. Kagame is widely expected to win by a landslide, at least in part because several of his opponents have been forbidden from participating and


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
others have been killed in what rights groups and analysts suspect were assassinations.”34

He ended up winning 93% of the vote.35 However, given how fractured the Rwandan political process has been in the past, Phil Clark proposed in the UK’s “Guardian” that

while the Tutsi-dominated RPF is hardly loved in the countryside, many Hutu (who constitute around 85% of the population) view a vote for Kagame as a vote for continuing peace and stability—no mean achievement after years of violence. The whole stability of the country therefore depends on Kagame maintaining his status, and so repressive political acts can be an integral part of Rwandan progress. To maintain cohesion in a divided party, Kagame has struck out against relatively unthreatening targets as a show of strength.36

Perhaps the Hutu fear the renewed retribution of a divided but hard-liner dominated RPF more than the repressive policies of a united but stable Kagame administration.

Corruption

In its 2010 “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International gave Rwanda a score of 4.1; this certainly doesn’t put it on par with Sweden or Switzerland, but it is the 5th best score in all of Sub-Saharan Africa.37

Conclusion


Human Rights Watch (HRW) questions Kigali’s approach of accepting “economic development first, human rights later” by asking, “Would we be prepared to sacrifice our right to free speech or political participation for the sake of ‘reasonably equitable development’ or subjective ‘political stability’?” Despite this valid question, the majority of the metrics used to measure stability and security in Rwanda show a positive trend. While there are undoubtedly gains to be made with regards to improved welfare, in particular more civil liberties and human rights, these are not the things that people in a post-conflict setting initially need the most. Where it gets tricky, however, is in determining when “enough” time has elapsed, and when a country is “ready” for the more liberal aspects of “improved welfare”: Freedom of the press, a true multi-party democracy, the ability to criticize the government without fear of retribution, the right to a fair trial, and others.

There is a threshold past which people who have grown used to only having their basic needs met begin to demand the greater freedoms which Kagame increasingly restricts. It is past this brink that a regime’s tolerance of opposition will be truly tested, as we have seen during the Arab Spring. Given that 70% of Rwanda’s population will have been born after the Genocide by 2020, this point may be reached sooner than the current administration hopes: the next presidential election will be in 2017.

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Immediately following a brutal conflict like the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide, a “benevolent dictatorship” is more beneficial, and more stable in the long run, than a pure, Western-style democracy with regards to establishing citizens’ basic rights. Rwanda under the current regime may never be a true democracy, though Kagame certainly doesn’t seem to apologize for this. It may not even an African version of it, with election returns for the four-term incumbent giving him 99% of the vote. But given Rwanda’s post-conflict success, Jack Chapman in “Think Africa Press” puts it succinctly:

Kagame rules Rwanda with a strong centralized government, uncompromising in its management of the economy and willing to violate human rights…(But) human rights violations are a small price to pay for Rwanda’s remarkable progress. Kagame is a dictator. But as long as he maintains stability and delivers reasonably equitable development, he is the sort of dictator Rwanda needs.\(^{40}\)

Other African nations, given the basic level of development of most, might be able to benefit from the same kind of dictatorship.

CHAPTER THREE: ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA—EXAMINING AUTOCRACIES

Introduction

Like Rwanda, leaders in both Ethiopia and Somalia have exhibited some of the traits common to dictators in any part of the world. However, while the previous chapter dealt with if a benevolent dictator is possible, this chapter deals with the process by which dictatorships facilitate positive outcomes, before measuring how they well they provide for their people. Rwanda established that a benevolent dictatorship can provide for security and stability but not improved welfare; this chapter focuses more broadly on basic needs (such as education, health, and economic security) and basic freedoms (freedom of speech, stability/security, and the perception of honest government). It will conclude that because of numerous factors and conditions, few countries have the potential to benefit from an effective benevolent dictatorship as much as Ethiopia. And, because of the chaotic situation in which Somalia finds itself, if a modicum of stability is ever achieved, it may only be a benevolent dictator who will be able to hold the country together.

Challenges and Limitations

One of the most obvious challenges is the availability of data: few despots would keep records that show negative information, and few administrators would record information exposing “the emperor’s new clothes.” In any dictatorship, there is the
problem of access to the information, whether because it is not made public, or because the public does not want to speak about it. In Ethiopia, reporters, activists, and regular citizens have been arrested for criticizing the government;¹ in Somalia, both Islamic fundamentalists and government forces have targeted critics for speaking out.²

In Somalia, the chaos that reigned there following the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 means that there are precious few data available to researchers; the same can be said of Ethiopia during the last decade of Mengistu’s rule, however Ethiopia has an institutional history of bureaucracy and efficiency; Indeed, “Efficiency was a national trait.”³ This means that, for the diligent researcher, records may be available, though they might not be made available.

**Ethiopia**

“The Amhara suffers from no illusions about homo sapiens at his best...One may say that the Amhara’s view of human nature is dominated by the perception of man’s inherent aggressiveness and unworthiness.”

-Donald L. Levine, *Wax and Gold*

Its six major ethnic groups made Ethiopia fertile ground for tribal manipulation, and Emperor Haile Selassie used it to stay in power for almost sixty years, one of the

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longest ruling leaders in Africa. So when Mengistu came to power in 1974, consolidating it by 1977, he took the same tribal factions into consideration. One of the drivers of the Derg overthrowing Selassie was the leadership role that the ruling Amhara ethnic group had played at the expense of other ethnic groups. Ironically, Major Haile Mariam Mengistu rode to power on the tails of the radical Dergue party that “began to fissure along ethnic lines” soon after overthrowing Selassie. Kaplan explains, “The ethnic animosities basic to an empire of great diversity quickly became dominant.”

Being partly from the lower-status Oromo people instead of the Amhara who had ruled Ethiopia for decades, Mengistu was seen as a unifier; this image did not last long after he took power.

One of the first things Mengistu did when taking power was to consolidate this power in the main cities by way of eliminating existing Selassie loyalists. He then turned on some of the same people who helped get him to power, including the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON in Amharic). Hundreds were killed and thousands were jailed; “Having destroyed the EPRP with the help of MEISON, the Dergue was turning against MEISON itself.” At the same time, he created a new national narrative, a “variant form of Amharization” that “manipulated myth, tradition, and history to recast (the Dergue’s)

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4 Kaplan, 15.

5 The Dergue, formally known as the “Coordinating Committee of be Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army,” ruled Ethiopia with Mengistu at its head until he was deposed in 1989.

6 Kaplan, 21.

7 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 244.

8 Kaplan, 25.
strategies in a more favorable light,” similar to the way Selassie had in creating the myth of Amhara superiority and his own status as a deity. This storyline remained a “‘festering wound’ in contemporary political affairs” under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

Once secure in his position, Mengistu turned his attention to the ethnic groups that had been rebelling against “Abyssinian colonialism” for decades, particularly Eritreans and Tigrayans in the north; ironically, his effort targeting intellectuals may have weakened his own position and strengthened that of these opposition groups: “The suppression of dissent under Mengistu brought death to many educated Ethiopians and drove others into exile, depriving the country of a critical human resource that could have contributed to solving the famine problem.” At the same time, his “Red Terror” “drove intellectuals and other skilled professionals into rural regions, which in fact led to the bolstering of rebel forces who later overthrew Mengistu.”

Drought and Famine

Throughout history, governments have leveraged resource allocation to influence states, entities, or other polities, internal and external. It can be withheld, such as when the US government withheld federal funding from states like Louisiana in order to

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10 Ibid, 58.


12 VanArsdale, 49.
pressure them to set the drinking age at 21.\textsuperscript{13} Or it can be given like Washington’s financial and military aid to Pakistan, which can “influence Pakistan in directions that provide for greater regional stability and security.”\textsuperscript{14} In much the same way, Mengistu used resource allocation during the droughts (not to be confused, definition-wise, with a famine) in the early 1980s to stay in power, repress those whom they viewed as a threat, and shore up support with key stakeholders.

Between 1900 and 2010, the 10 worst natural disasters were all droughts, several associated with famines, and all occurred after July 1965.\textsuperscript{15}

Like the five previous ones that had devastated Ethiopia since Haile Selassie assumed power in 1916, this famine took place in the north; an area that the Amhara emperor had a strategic interest in keeping underdeveloped.\textsuperscript{16}

Mengistu, like Selassie before him, acted in a way that facilitated a famine, one that was not inevitable given the amount of foreign aid that was forthcoming. From Addis Ababa, he enacted Marxist policies including collectivization, villagization, and resettlement that exacerbated the effects of the 1983-1985 famine. It was no coincidence that this resource restriction was directed towards areas where opposition groups had extensive popular support.

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\textsuperscript{13} Jeffery Miron and Elina Tettlebaum, “Did the Federal Drinking Law Save Lives?” The Cato Institute, \textit{Regulation} (Spring 2009).
\textsuperscript{16} Kaplan, 20.
\end{flushleft}
He spent $200 million celebrating the tenth anniversary of the revolution that brought him to power, and then told foreign countries he did not have the resources to purchase food.\(^{17}\) And at the height of the famine, when foreign donors gave more than 1.7 metric tons of grain, it would rot on piers because Mengistu withheld Soviet-supplied military trucks and planes that could have transported the aid to the interior, instead diverting them to the resettlement effort instead;\(^{18}\) limited fuel supplies were also reallocated to other military operations and away from relief organizations.\(^{19}\)

In the provinces themselves, his policies ensured misery for farmers, instituting grain quotas. “In Gojjam province in 1983, nearly one-third of farmers failed to grow enough to meet their quotas and had to sell livestock in order to buy grain.”

But what turned rural hardship into disaster—even before drought struck—were the counter-insurgency measures Mengistu’s army employed…Using scorched-earth tactics, the army destroyed grain stores and houses, burned crops and pastures, killed livestock and displaced about 80,000 farmers…the army requisitioned food and enforced blockades of food and people. Food was routinely used as a weapon of war.\(^{20}\)

As a direct result of Mengistu’s policies, some 400,000 people died.\(^{21}\)


\(^{19}\) Kaplan, 149.

\(^{20}\) Meredith, 333-4.

\(^{21}\) DeWaal’s estimate in a 1991 Human Rights Watch report is much lower than the official UN estimate of around 1 million people, for which he has roundly criticized them. See Alexander DeWaal, *Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 175.
At the same time, a cunning method Mengistu used to stay in power was to keep the major cities well stocked with goods:

Eritreans, Tigreans [i.e., Tigrayans], and others in the northern provinces died by the hundreds of thousands (while) the markets of the Amhara fortress of Addis Ababa were brimming with grain…it was strategically necessary for the regime to keep the local population pacified.\(^{22}\)

He espoused the idea of reducing the power of the long-ruling Amhara people, who had generally resided in the fortress towns from which they had ruled. Ironically, as a result of their geographic location, they remained in a position that allowed them to benefit after the Selassie’s demise and to fare much better than their rural countrymen.

Mengistu also made sure to control information coming out of the famine-wracked areas. His government restricted the movement of Western aid and news agencies, allowing the regime to conceal evidence that could cause international criticism. Aid flowed in, helping Mengistu to stay in power longer, well funded by Western donors who did not initially see the true drivers of the famine.

**Mengistu’s Overthrow**

In 1991, Mengistu was overthrown by Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan and military leader in the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). One would hope that, having been on the receiving end of ethnic-based repression like the Tigrayans were under Mengistu, they would see the folly of aggravating ethnic distinctions, and avoid it in the future. But similar to Rwanda where the perennially dominated Hutus exacted revenge on the Tutsis under whom they had lived for years, Zenawi showed signs of

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\(^{22}\) Kaplan, 38.
“disproportionately favoring Tigrayan people”\textsuperscript{23} while serving as President and, until his August 2012 death, Prime Minister.

One way he did this was to sign a UN peace treaty ending the war with Eritrea (his mother was Eritrean) that opposition leaders in both the TPLF and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDA) saw as unfavorable to Ethiopia; the most vocal opponents were jailed shortly afterwards.\textsuperscript{24} He also ensured that the top brass in Ethiopia’s military were predominantly Tigrayan: “The TPLF represents 6 percent of the Ethiopian population of 90 million. More than 90 percent of the top commanders of Ethiopia’s defense and security forces are represented by this minority ethnic group.” Additionally, he ensured that “access to wealth and wealth-making assets is dependent on loyalty to the government” for Tigrayan elite.\textsuperscript{25}

The short sightedness of Zenawi’s pro-Tigrayan policies caused worry in the region. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki expressed concern with Ethiopia’s stability under a factionalized system such as it has. “Ethiopia…will weaken internally as the Oromos and others demand more power. Its ethnic-Tigrean president…already lives inside a vast security apparatus designed for his own protection.”\textsuperscript{26} In this regard, the similarities between Zenawi and Selassie are disturbingly similar; and unless the administration in Addis Ababa revises its approach to other, majority ethnicities—such as

\textsuperscript{23} VanArsdale, 56.


\textsuperscript{26} Kaplan, 207.
the Oromo (who make up 35% of the population), the Amhara (26.9%), or Somali (6.2%)—the minority Tigrayans could once again find themselves in the role of the powerless.

Moving Ahead Today

Ethiopia today—though the country remains repressed, its economy underdeveloped, and its people subjected to restrictive government policies—is stable and secure, rare characteristics in Africa where coups d’état are more common than in any other part of the world ("Coup watching was not a pastime of the diplomatic circuit in Addis Ababa the way it was elsewhere on the continent"). One of the most disheartening things about Ethiopia today is not the high level of corruption, government policies that keep the population repressed, or even the violence directed towards the population; It is how much unrealized potential Ethiopia has. Were the government willing to develop and leverage the nation’s extensive natural resources and national characteristics, and use the results to act more benevolently towards its population, there could be even more positive outcomes.

National Consciousness

Ethiopia has long had a national consciousness that other African nations—colonial creations that ignored strongly held and deeply set tribal affiliation—were unable to parallel. But Selassie and Mengistu ignored this potential source of strength,


29 Kaplan, 16.
and instead relied on a culture of terror to maintain their power and position. When Zenawi and his TPLF party took power, they initially instituted policies that created the semblance of a multi-party system: “the parties sharing power were numerous…the idea was that each (ethnically divided) region would actively participate, with no single region dominating—an ancient cause of resentment.”

However, in a familiar pattern, Zenawi soon reverted to showing favoritism to the Tigrayans, his own ethnic group, to the exclusion of other minority ethnic groups. It is by marginalizing these other groups, to the clear benefit of that of the ruling party, that Ethiopia will remain divided. Zenawi could have addressed this power disparity without giving up his position of authority by incorporating other ethnic groups into leadership and ranks of the government and military. This would also create opportunities for opposition parties to take part in the political process and air grievances; while opposition parties would not be given enough power to threaten Zenawi’s position, and not all of grievances would be addressed, this would be a positive step towards creating an Ethiopia in which more groups would feel they participate.

Agriculture and Hydropower Development

Although drought and famine have wracked parts of the country for years, the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) notes, “Ethiopia has great agricultural potential with its vast areas of fertile land, diverse climate, water resources and large labor pool on which to build in order to achieve national and household food security.”

30 VanArsdale, 56.

But in order to take advantage of this, the government must ensure that foreign aid goes to those most in need of it and those most able to benefit from it (as opposed to those most connected to the decision makers). Another method for developing this land is to invite outside investors. Recently, India and Ethiopia signed a bilateral agreement allowing New Delhi increase its investments in Ethiopia, already valued at $660 million. 65% of this is in the agricultural sector, and in some areas locals account for over 99% of workers,\(^\text{32}\) there are obvious benefits for all parties involved. Additionally, instead of just asking for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), government requests for foreign investment may give both investor and recipient increased buy-in, and incentivize both parties to seek positive outcomes to the benefit of Ethiopian citizens.

Ethiopia also has striking hydropower potential, as is the second largest hydropower potential in Africa. Its first large dam—initially set to generate over 5000 megawatts, but eventually able to generate over 10,000 megawatts—will improve Ethiopia’s position as a regional economic powerhouse.\(^\text{33}\) Complicating the project are opposing environmental impacts: on one hand, the project could reduce the need for Ethiopians to depend on dung and forest wood for energy, while the sale of electricity could fund other development projects in both urban and—heretofore underdeveloped—

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rural areas. The government’s goal is to expand electricity availability to three-quarters of the population, an increase from the current 41% of the population.\textsuperscript{34}

On the other hand, “environmentalists are not in favor of the ambitious hydropower project for its alleged impact on the hundreds of thousands of pastoralists in Kenya, who are dependent on Lake Turkana.”\textsuperscript{35} The lake is listed the lake as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997 as it is the largest desert lake in the world; it is also an “outstanding research area for animal and plant communities.”\textsuperscript{36} Ethiopia must find a way to develop its hydropower potential, and to use it fairly for positive outcomes, without carelessly threatening the livelihood of area pastoralists, or the surrounding biosphere.

National Characteristics

Ethiopia has a tradition of efficient and effective administration, even if it sometimes crossed over to bureaucracy. Indeed, “efficiency was a national trait,” and during Mengistu’s time, this characteristic was used towards perverse ends:

The efficiency of the RRC [Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, a government aid organization] was impressive. But this was not due to any humanitarian commitment on the Dergue’s part. In Ethiopia, administrative finesse was not exclusive to the RRC…Could the government of any other sub-Saharan country—after announcing an intention to collectivize several million people—actually be able to do it, however crudely?\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{36} Ashine.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
Effective and honest administration, which can indicate a trained and educated middle class of sorts, is necessary to realize the benefits of the agricultural and hydroelectric projects outlined above, including maximizing production and ensuring fair distribution of output. However, it is often lacking in despotic countries that fear education and training could create a “thinking citizen” who could one day rise up to threaten a despot’s rule. It is extremely difficult to manage the daily affairs with which the state is run, and the government in Addis Ababa must be willing to create this class of engineers and administrators, and make training and education available for all ethnic groups.

Addressing the areas above would require the leadership in Addis Ababa to loosen the grip on power it so tenaciously holds, incorporate other ethnic groups into both leadership and the ranks of the government and military, spend money on development projects instead of pet projects, and invest in the training and education of regular citizens. But in the end, Ethiopia and Ethiopians could benefit greatly: it could create increased job opportunities and improved financial situation for both regular people and non-dominant parties, improve regional development and access to basic services for citizens, and actually reduce opposition strength by addressing social issues that form part of their platform. Thus far it seems that the administration has not realized that by addressing opposition grievances, they could actually strengthen their position, power, and influence.

Outcomes During Mengistu’s Rule

As judged by criteria implied earlier, there were a few positive outcomes to Mengistu’s rule, for example,
His cadres have dramatically increased the literacy rate in Ethiopia. The country’s peasants have been given land from the vast holdings of the imperial family and its feudal nobles, and they are no longer required to hand over a portion of their meager earnings to the Coptic Church that once helped repress them. Access to basic health services is much greater than it was under Haile Selassie.\textsuperscript{38}

However, most of these improvements were short-lived, done for reasons of self-interest, or made things worse in the end. Mengistu focused on literacy (“one of the regime’s few undeniable success stories”) so that his cadres could spread the “good news” of Marxism:

Even in the campaign to increase literacy…extending the central government’s control over the peasants is a principle theme. Amharic is the language of instruction throughout the country, and the textbooks are a vehicle for Marxist indoctrination.\textsuperscript{39}

He did make good on his promise of “land to the tiller” by divvying up lands formerly belonging to Selassie and his cronies. But this low yield method of sustenance farming, especially in areas frequently ravaged by drought, only made the specter of famine more real. The only difference is that many farmers starved on their own land, instead of that of absentee landlords. Mengistu accomplished this by enacting policies setting official prices, establishing production quotas, and displacing families to collectivized farms.

In a country with a Christian tradition longer than many countries in Europe, the Coptic Church was a key and powerful institution in Ethiopia, where Selassie was considered the one true God—the “Lion of Judah”—by his followers. Ending payments


\textsuperscript{39} Kaplan, 27
to the church, as well as executing the patriarch of the church, was designed to reduce its power and influence, which had made it a threat to his own.\textsuperscript{40}

Outcomes in the Post-Mengistu Era: Basic Needs

There has been notable improvement for Ethiopians, even as personal liberties and civil rights have remained at the same dismal place they were during Mengistu’s time.

**Education**

Ethiopia has seen a marked increase in its educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP since 2000, going from 3.5% to 5.5% in 2007.\textsuperscript{41} However, this amount was “virtually unchanged from its 1993–94 level of about 3.0 percent of the GDP.”\textsuperscript{42} Total adult literacy rate during the years 1994-2004 increased from 36% to 50% for males, and 18.5% to 22.8% for females;\textsuperscript{43} from 2004-2008 it increased to 62% and 39%, respectively.\textsuperscript{44} Additionally, a number of new universities and colleges have been built. But while educational expenditures and literacy rates have improved in recent years, the percentage of trained teachers has dropped considerably. In primary schools it

\textsuperscript{40} John R. Watson, *Among the Copts* (Brighton: Sussex Press, 2000), 58.


\textsuperscript{43} UN, “Literacy Rate: Ethiopia” http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=%22literacy+rate%22+ethiopia\&d=GenderStat \&f=inID%3a49%3bcrlID%3a34 (accessed December 15, 2011).

has gone down from 90% in 2008 to 39% in 2010; in lower secondary schools it has decreased from 65% to 54% respectively.45

Health

Life expectancy has increased from 38.4 years in 1960 to 47.0 in 1990 to 58.1 in 2009; similarly, infant mortality rates continue a precipitous decline, from 152.9 per 1000 in 1965, to 67.8 in 1990, to 41.0 in 2010. Malnutrition prevalence as a percentage of children under-5 dropped from 42% in 2000 to 34.6% in 2005.46 The percentage of urban population with access to water increased steadily from 77% in 1990, to 98% in 2008.47 While these last two statistics show a positive trend, because the rate has been dropping since Selassie was in power this improvement cannot be fully credited with the current regime; they can only be commended for contributing to the improvement. In addition, despite some fluctuation, health expenditures as a percentage of GDP remain virtually unchanged from 2.1% in 1995 to 2.0% in 2009.48

Economic Security

Ethiopia is categorized by “Low Human Development” by the UN Development Program’s “Human Development Index,” ranking 174 out of 187 countries in the world


48 World Bank, “Data (Ethiopia).”
(depressingly, 27 of the bottom 28 are in Sub-Saharan Africa). Its position improved two places between 2006 and 2010, but made no change from 2010 to 2011.\(^\text{49}\)

After a small increase, per capita GDP dropped from $250 in 1990 to $124 just 4 years later, and it remained near that point until 2002. After that, it increased to a record high of $393.70 in 2009, indicating an improvement for everyday Ethiopians.

Outcomes: Basic Freedoms

**Freedom of Speech**

*Reporters sans Frontières* (RSF) ranked Ethiopia 139 out of 178 in its annual Press Freedom Index; the government under Zenawi used “Surveillance of the press and a decline in the climate for journalists during the May elections.”\(^\text{50}\)

**Stability and Security**

Foreign Policy’s “Failed State Index” uses around 130,000 publicly available sources to analyze 177 countries and rate them on 12 indicators of pressure on the state during the year … Taken together, a country's performance on this battery of indicators tells us how stable—or unstable—it is.\(^\text{51}\)

In the 2011 edition, Ethiopia ranked as the 20\(^{th}\) worst state, and was classified as “In Danger,” along with neighboring countries that have a have directly contributed to Ethiopia’s status in one way or another, such as Eritrea, Uganda, and Kenya.

**The Perception of “Honest Government”**


\(^{51}\) *Foreign Policy*. 45
Few would argue that during the years Meles Zenawi was in power, he did not act like a dictator. For even if the violence was better hidden, the repression was not. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s “Democracy Index” measures a country’s rank in the areas of electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties.

[It] provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories—this covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast majority of the world’s independent states (micro states are excluded).

In 2010, Ethiopia was classified as an “Authoritarian Regime,” ranking 12th from the bottom after dropping 13 places since 2008. This drop was precipitated by the regime’s active and effective repression of “opposition activities, media, and civil society. The passage of restrictive laws governing media, civil society, and political funding was a main driver behind the landslide election in May 2010.”

Each year, Transparency International publishes its “Corruption Perception Index,” which measures “the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 183 countries and territories in the world.” In 2011, Ethiopia placed 120 out of 182; while this ranking may seem relatively positive compared with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is

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53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Transparency International.
worth noting that it tied with nine other countries, including such notables as Iran and Chinese-administered Mongolia.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Somalia}

\textit{“In the ‘Background Notes’ the State Department provides for every nation in the world, I could find only one country labeled with the following description: ‘Government Type: None.’ Somalia.”}

\textit{-Slate Magazine, January 2, 2007}

When Mohammed Siad Barre took power in a bloodless coup in 1969, it opened the doors to more than 20 years of a repressive, though stable dictatorship. However, despite his efforts to create a sense of nationalism, Somalia’s deep-rooted clan-based society was never far beneath the surface, and with it, the roots of chaos.

Somali society has torn itself in pieces, not only because the institutions set in place in 1960 gave play to the rivalries of a clan-structured society but, worse, impelled these rivalries with new methods and resources. So that within a few years of independence, this Somalia claimed to possess no fewer than sixty parliamentary parties, none of which was or in reality could become more than a mask for clientelist rivalries.\textsuperscript{57}

In fact, it may have been only Siad Barre’s ill-fated invasion of the Ethiopian Province of Ogaden in 1977, forcing the Soviets to take sides—in this case, Somalia’s enemy, Ethiopia—that ruined his chances of building a “Greater Somalia” with a nationalism that transcended clanism. “When the government’s irredentist campaign ended in humiliating military defeat, it set in motion an implosion of the Somali state.”\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{58} Meredith, 466.
This, combined with the end of the Cold War and its associated funding and emphasis on the Horn of Africa, meant that the “good life” for the Siad Barre regime was ending, and with it, his relatively-progressive policies. Repression soon followed.

After over 30 years in power, turbulence and shifting international rivalries created the conditions for the United Somali Congress (USC), led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid of “Blackhawk Down” fame, to overthrow Siad Barre in 1991. Soon after, the country dissolved into chaos as warlords, well armed from years of proxy involvement by the US and Soviet Union, held the only “legitimate” power. In 2004 the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was founded, taking its seat in Mogadishu in 2006.

The problem in Somalia is not one of a malevolent dictator: unlike neighboring Ethiopia and Eritrea, there have not been any real leaders, let alone dictators, in Somalia since Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, nor has there been a true government from which a dictator could spring. The problem is that the TFG of Somalia today is “too weak to be strong,” and has proven unable or unwilling to focus on its duty of taking care of its people as it faces myriad issues. It is fighting a real, existential threat in the Islamic militant group al-Shabaab. The TFG is also hamstrung by corruption, having wasted hundreds of millions of dollars worth of foreign aid. “Most of the foreign aid has ended


up lining the pockets of opportunists rather than building up the TFG’s capacity.”61 And foreign incursions by Ethiopia and Kenya have also weakened domestic support for the federal government.

There appear to be simply too many issues, many with roots in ethnic factionalization and fragmentation, for a weak, fledgling government to handle. The TFG will continue to have trouble strengthening itself as the core institution in Somalia as long as it remains squeezed from both internal pressures (such as the efforts to expel Ethiopia by the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, discussed further below) and external pressures (such as the 2006 invasion by Ethiopia, or 2011 invasion by Kenya).

It is the combination of these pressures that has warped the TFG’s sense of priorities, since “the yardstick used to assess the TFG’s legitimacy and viability is progress in drafting constitutions and establishing committees rather than protecting the lives of its own citizens.”62 The ongoing humanitarian emergency in Somalia proves that the government has failed at its primary mission: “to provide its citizens with basic protection from physical threat and extreme deprivation, whether from war, criminal violence, or natural disaster. Everything else should come second.”63

External Actors

Ethiopia has long been influenced by external actors, from Italy in the late 19th century and during the early part of World War II (1936-1941), to Britain after liberating


62 Menkhaus.

63 Ibid.
Ethiopia from Italy in 1941. It also is important to keep in mind those external actors who have played a role in Somalia’s recent past, namely Ethiopia and Kenya, when discussing the causes of Somalia’s issues today. Recent foreign incursions highlight “the rapidly deteriorating international approach of the Somali conflict and the intricate political choices Somalis have to make.”\(^{64}\) Thus far, Somalis have chosen poorly.

Animosity between Somalia and Ethiopia had existed for some time, manifesting itself in Siad Barre’s decision to invade the Ethiopia’s Somali-dominated Ogaden Providence in 1977 as part of his “Greater Somalia” strategy. However, massive Soviet shipments to Ethiopia—including “tanks fighter aircraft, artillery, armored personnel carriers and hundreds of military advisers” (including 17,000 Cubans)\(^{65}\)—rapidly reversed the gains that Somali forces had quickly made: “When the government’s irredentist campaign ended in a humiliating military defeat, it set in motion an implosion of the Somali state.”\(^{66}\) These wounds festered for years.

In January 2007, TFG-encouraged and US-supported Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia, fighting alongside secular militias allegedly backed by the US. Ethiopia viewed the increased influence of fundamentalist groups such as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) as a threat to the government, not only because of their fundamental Islamic ideology, but also because of the increasing amounts of public support they gained as a result of the

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\(^{65}\) Meredith, 247.

\(^{66}\) Ibid, 466.
stability and security they were able to create.\(^67\) While the invasion and subsequent ouster of the ICU—at that time the only effective means of governance in the war-torn country—allowed the TFG to solidify its rule, it also turned regular Somalis against the federal government. Citizens doubted “whether an American-backed Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government occupation will lead to anything more than another weak, violent state and a newfound haven for outside terrorists.”\(^68\) And, although the Djibouti Peace Agreement (discussed below) resulted in Ethiopia withdrawing from Somalia, animosity against the TFG remains.

More recently, Kenya invaded Somalia in October 2011 ostensibly as a result of kidnapping and killings of Western tourists in Kenya (where tourism is worth $737 million per year), the operation (called “Linda Nchi,” or “Protect the Country”) quickly spiraled out of control, and Kenya is becoming bogged down in guerilla warfare for which they are not prepared.\(^69\) “Kenyan-TFG forces have moved no more than 70km into the country and only control the main roads. Kenya has had to admit that it cannot afford to fight on its terms…The consequences of the misadventure have already blown back across the border” into Kenya.\(^70\)


Not only has al-Shabaab physically struck *across* Somalia’s southern border, but it has also struck at the gains the TFG has made *within* Somalia’s borders, including key efforts to reduce support for al-Shabaab. “In the face of the Kenyan aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, all bets are off and we may see renewed support for al-Shabaab as happened during the Ethiopian invasion in 2006”\(^{71}\) (shortly thereafter, Ethiopian forces also returned to Somalia in November 2011).\(^{72}\)

Kenyan troops have also caused suffering at the personnel level, allowing Somalis to blame them for their suffering instead of al-Shabaab. As reprisals for the deaths of Kenyan troops, “The army has gone house to house in the area doling out punishment beatings to local Kenyan-Somalis.”\(^{73}\) This is hardly a strategy for gaining popular support.

**The Issue of Clans**

Before analyzing ethnic factionalization and fragmentation, it is necessary to look at just how deeply the clan system runs in Somali society. As the UN wrote, “The social context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clan affiliation. Lineage identity is a central organizing force in Somali society.”\(^{74}\) And Meredith described the depth of clan loyalty in 2005:

\(^{71}\) Dirshe.
\(^{72}\) Howden.
\(^{73}\) Ibid.
Somalis asked each other not whence they came but to whom they were related. Every child of eight years was expected to be able to recite their family’s genealogy through the mail line stretching back some ten or twenty generations or more to a common patriarch...No other bond of mutual interest had so many far-reaching ramifications in all aspects of private and public life.\(^5\)

With five major clans—the Digil-Mirifleh, the Hawiye, the Isaq, the Dir, and the Darod\(^6\)—one would hope that the right leader could leverage such strong family loyalty into a similar sense of loyalty to the nation. Unfortunately, that same UN report noted, “One of the paradoxes of contemporary Somalia is that some of the most powerful social and economic forces (such as tribal affiliation) are simultaneously sources of both stability and insecurity.”\(^7\)

It had been this way before Siad Barre took power, and one of his main projects after the 1969 coup d’état was to press for an end to clanism.

We will abolish bribery, nepotism and tribalism. Tribalism was the only way in which foreigners got their chance of dividing our people...We will build up a great Somali nation, strongly united and welded together to live in peace.\(^8\)

However, once he was president it was his own clan that benefitted from his position. In 1986 one author wrote,

While the Somali population is relatively homogeneous, especially compared to those in other African nations, there remain serious rivalries

\(^5\) Meredith, 465.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia, 9.

among clans. Rather than be a conciliator, Siad Barre has kept wealth and
to be a conciliator, Siad Barre has kept wealth and
power in the hands of his own clan and family.\footnote{Ungar, 379.}

For some time, Siad Barre kept the tribes so divided that they could not form an
effective coalition to fight him. But in the end it was the clan system that ended his rule
when he was overthrown by the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) in
1991. And with that, “the traditional system that once bound clans to preserve peace, or
at least stem war, dissipated with the clouds of cordite…nothing short of destroying the
enemy sub-clan would end the complex blood feud.”\footnote{Scott Peterson, \textit{Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda} (New York: Routledge, 2000), 23.}

Incorporating Clans

Given a background such as this, a re-emergent Somali government must find a way
to deal with the intricacies of the clan system if it is to ever have any hope for creating
stability. However, since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, it is not a case of the
TFG not dealing with ethnic factionalization and tribal fragmentation; it is that Somalia is
the very \textit{embodiment} of ethnic factionalization and fragmentation. With the most tenuous
grasp of power in Mogadishu, a divided central government, and both external and
internal pressures, the TFG must gain the consensus of three key groups: the major clans
besides those in the TFG, moderates in opposition groups such as the remnants of the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), and
hard-line militants in groups like al-Shabaab. Doing so may allow the shaky first steps
towards a legitimacy that is now non-existent.
Attempts by the TFG to include more than just the majority Hawiye clan included the “4.5 plan,” where the 92 Parliamentary seats are divided with 61 seats for the majority clans and 31 seats for the rest of the clan groups. Even with this arrangement, “there were groups that felt that they didn’t get their fair share,” according to former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn. While there will always be groups that are not satisfied with any arrangement, regardless of how well-intentioned it is, efforts must be made to include as many stakeholders as possible.

With regards to transcending clan loyalties, one example can be seen by studying the ICU. “Through an overarching Islamist ideology, which was able to transcend clan allegiance, and a working network of Sharia courts in Mogadishu, the ICU had gone a long way to improving security in the capital.” The Enough Campaign describes the success of the ICU in a 2008 exposé:

The ICU…was poised to end Somalia’s 16 years of state collapse. The ICU quickly delivered impressive levels of street security and law and order to Mogadishu and south-central Somalia. It reopened the seaport and international airport and began providing basic government services. In the process, the ICU won widespread support from war-weary Somalis, even those who did not embrace the idea of Islamic rule.

Though this fundamentalist group did not win friends in the West, they did provide the only stability and security Somalia has seen since the fall of the Siad Barre


regime. As former US Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn told TFG leaders in 2010, “This is the one area where al-Shabaab has had some success that is welcomed by Somalis.”

However, putting as much emphasis on fundamentalism as they did, they faced the same problem currently facing al-Shabaab: “In trying to articulate a religious idea they are too ideological. So they are insensitive to the political calculations and compromises they have to make,” costing them popular support. A divided ICU may have fared well against divided warlords and a weak TFG, but when Ethiopia invaded in 2006, backed by the US and possessing one of the largest armies in Africa, it came as no surprise when they were quickly defeated.

An additional method for establishing stability can be found in the wake of this invasion. Although the ICU was quickly defeated, the ARS rose to fill the opposition role the ICU had previously played. After combating the TFG for 16 months—resulting in thousands killed and more than a million displaced—the ARS began to discuss a peace agreement with the TFG. Radicals opposed to the peace accord split from ARS, and went on to form the more militant al-Shabaab, against whom the TFG is still fighting.

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But it was moderate leadership of the ARS, once violently opposed to the TFG, who agreed to attend a peace conference in Djibouti in 2009. The outcome was the Djibouti Peace Accords, which resulted in Ethiopia withdrawing from Somalia, the formation of a new TFG, and the inclusion of the ARS into the parliament; ARS member and moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif Sheekh Ahmed was chosen as president. This success may serve as a template for the TFG’s ongoing efforts to create stability and security: By working with and co-opting moderates, less radical elements, and one-time hardliners of opposition movements, the TFG achieved some semblance of compromise that was lacking in previous efforts to create a more inclusive government. It also drove a wedge between moderates and more radical elements, alienating the latter and setting them up for a targeted military campaign.

Military Strategy

Once other clans have been brought into the government, and moderates in opposition groups have been co-opted, there will undoubtedly be hardliners and splinter factions that remain. A constraining military approach should never be the primary option for a government facing an insurgency. It is necessary for the re-emergent Somali


government to address the conditions that create an environment in which extremists can survive, whether these be poverty, corruption, concerns about outside interference in domestic issues, etc. If not, it will simply create a familiar cycle of moderate groups being brought into the government fold while new splinter groups, discouraged at erstwhile attempts to create stability, continue to fight.

For those violent groups that will never be brought into the process, it will be necessary to use military force, and TFG forces with the manpower and material support of African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) must take a coordinated and decisive stand against those armed factions that currently keep Somalia unstable. Alongside AMISOM, TFG forces have demonstrated that a coordinated effort against clans and rebel groups can be successful, as they were in taking back Mogadishu several times since 2007 (of course, “taking back” means they lost it, but this is another issue).

But any stand they take must be disciplined, as TFG security forces, instead of taking care of the Somalis, have become some of the worst perpetrators of violations against them. A 2008 report by Amnesty International notes, “Forces of the TFG are frequently reported to act as if they believe they are immune from accountability, investigation or prosecution, including for crimes under international law.”90 Such conduct will continue to reduce popular support away from government forces.

A small but important piece of the military strategy must be to address the issue of “technicals,” or civilian vehicles that armed factions have modified with machine guns and other types of armaments. The name comes from civilian agencies having to hire

local gunmen and their armed vehicles, but not being able to write it up like this on their budgets; instead, they would enter an expense for “technical assistance,” and the name was born.\textsuperscript{91} In a country that saw such a huge influx of arms in Africa during the Cold War, especially after the fall of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, simply having an AK-47 is taken as a given, and grants one neither influence nor status.\textsuperscript{92} But in an area where fuel and other resources are limited and go to the strongest, having a Mad Max-style “battle wagon” allows warlords to extend their power base and influence over others.

Such highly mobile firepower was first used with great effect in the 1980s in Chad’s northern Tibesti Mountains by President Hisssein Habre against Libya-backed rebels. The lesson of that success was not lost on the Somalis, whose battle in the thorny interior and sandy walled city alleyways required mobile force.\textsuperscript{93}

Eliminating these vehicles would not end the conflict, but it would remove a significant means of fighting it.

If al-Shabaab takes the same tack as its al-Qaeda affiliates in the Maghreb, it will begin a campaign to gain the support of the population, which is key terrain in an insurgency.\textsuperscript{94} Were these militants to do so, popular support for their cause—or at least tolerance for it, which is just as good in a fight such as this—may become so entrenched that the government may not be able to gain the population back, and Somalia will continue down the road of a failed state, unable to return.

\textsuperscript{91} Peterson, 31.
\textsuperscript{93} Peterson, 24.
Benefiting from a Dictatorship

Somalia today provides a perfect example of where a benevolent dictator could make a real difference in establishing security and stability. During his time in power, Siad Barre was determined to implement policies to benefit the country economically and socially, and to diminish the political influence of the clans. During his regime's early years, Somalia experiences considerable economic development, and efforts were made to replace clan loyalty with national pride.\(^{95}\)

It is how he went about achieving these goals that makes him less than benevolent. Were there a benevolent strongman in power in Mogadishu today, he would have his work cut out for him as clan divisions have undoubtably deepened since the Civil War started in 1991.

In places where the leaders have demonstrated genuine care for their charges, conditions are better, showing that progress is possible:

Famine conditions in the arid northern and central regions [of Somalia] are mitigated by responsible local authorities who provide a degree of security and are facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance.\(^{96}\)

This also provides an example for how a benevolent dictator could interact with NGOs, by not only attracting their assistance, resources, and participation in the first place, but also by facilitating aid and materiel delivery and distribution by their own people once it arrives. This mitigation must be pursued at the national level.

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Until the TFG takes the above steps, Somalis will see the government as no better than the terrorists they proclaim to be fighting, as they focus on self-preservation and self-enrichment. This will keep them from enjoying popular support necessary to defeat an insurgency. Once this happens and the government establishes enough “space” to consolidate its gains, both politically and militarily, it can begin to focus more on the everyday population and address the needs of the Somali people, for whom the current catastrophe “could join the ranks of the Rwanda genocide and the Darfur crisis in terms of scale and human suffering.”

Outcomes

Regardless of how one analyzes the data on Somalia, the TFG, either as an act of omission or commission, has not been an effective governing body. Despite years of foreign aid, “before the end of this year (2011) tens of thousands of people in Somalia—possibly hundreds of thousands—are going to die. Aid agencies say nearly 4 million people are in need of assistance and 750,000 at risk of starvation.” As a further indicator of the state of affairs in Somalia, for many data categories (below) organizations were unable to collect the data in the first place. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is the only country with this consistent dearth of information.


98 Amnesty International.
Basic Needs

Education

No data exist on UNESCO, World Bank, the CIA World Fact Book for education expenditures as a percentage of GDP, literacy rates, or percentage of teachers that are trained.

Health

Ironically, one of the only positive signs is life expectancy at birth, which continued an upward trend begun in 1960 (the first year for which data is available) at 36.0 years. In 1991, it was 44.1 years though on a slight downward direction, but was 50.6 in 2009 (this is still 19 years lower than the rest of the world, on average). Unfortunately, the life children can expect to lead does not imbue one with optimism.99

The World Bank records an under-5 mortality rate of 180 deaths per 1000 births for 1990, 2000, 2008, and 2009, which indicates efforts to ascertain the true number are based on secondary, inferential data and are probably not accurate. To put this statistic into context, this number is much better compared with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 121.2, and a worldwide rate of 57.9.100 While Sub-Saharan Africa’s malnutrition rate for children under-5 has dropped almost 3 points from 27.3% in 2000 to 24.6% in 2009, in Somalia the rate has increased 10% from 22.8% in 2000 to 32.8% in 2006.101

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101 Ibid.
Access to an improved water source in urban areas did increase from 36% in 2000 to 67% in 2008; however, in rural areas it dropped from 17% in 2000 to 9% in 2008.\textsuperscript{102} This may indicate the government focusing on urban population centers as a power base, similar to the approach that Selassie and Mengistu took while in power in Ethiopia.

**Economic Security**

Again, it is indicative of conditions in Somalia that it is listed in the UNDP’s “Human Development Index” as an “other country or territory,” and an absence of data that only five other places can beat.\textsuperscript{103} It is a sad commentary on the state of affairs in Africa in general, and Somalia in particular, when things are so bad—with statistics so inadequate—that the country is not even ranked in human development. There also exist no data on current per capita GDP, though per capita GDP increased between 1980 and 1989 a meager 0.9%, and decreased 1.9% between 1990 and 1999.\textsuperscript{104}

**Basic Freedoms**

**Freedom of Speech**

In 2010 the *Reporters sans Frontières* “Press Freedom Index” ranked Somalia 161 out of 178 and described a “situation of permanent chaos and a culture of violence and impunity taking root in which the press has become a favorite target.” The year prior

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\textsuperscript{103} UNDP, “Human Development Index Trends.”

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
it was “the world’s deadliest country for the media, with six journalists killed between 1 January and 4 July.”

Stability and Security

“Three African states…once again top this year's Failed States Index…For four years in a row, Somalia has held the No. 1 spot, indicating the depth of the crisis in the international community's longest-running failure.” This depressing revelation is the first thing on Foreign Policy’s webpage ranking the world’s most vulnerable countries, and speaks volumes about Somalia’s stability and security.

The Perception of “Honest Government”

Simply put, the 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index lists Somalia tied for last with North Korea. And in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, because members of Parliament are appointed and not elected, Somalia is not a democracy and therefore not ranked; but given other indicators above, it is probable that even if it were a democracy, it would be near the bottom.

Conclusion

Ethiopia and Somalia present two different cases in the study of dictatorships. Ethiopia, ruled by a lineage traced to King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, has been under a dictatorship from before Menelik II was Emperor starting in 1889, meaning that its people have consistently been under one form of authoritarianism or another for centuries. In Somalia, the chaos and violence since rebel groups overthrew dictator Siad

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105 Reporters sans Frontières.
106 Foreign Policy.
107 Transparency International.
Barre in 1991 has frustrated any attempts at creating a government capable of establishing stability and security. It was only the fundamentalist and dictatorial ICU that was able to create some semblance of order, albeit at the expense of the Western-backed TFG. In both countries, governments have used resource allocation and a “culture of terror” to maintain the status quo, though with some positive outcomes.

In Ethiopia, Mengistu withheld foreign aid resources from regions with opposition groups, while at the same time ensuring this same aid went to key population centers and geographic power bases. After Mengistu’s downfall, the dictatorship of Meles Zenawi withheld political influence and power from non-Tigrayans, while concurrently providing it to his fellow Tigrayans and the urban elite, again, in key geographic and urban areas. In Somalia, al-Shabaab often refuses to let food and medical aid through to those suffering from the current famine, and has restricted or closed the offices of NGOs who wish to work there. They have also restricted the flow of information out of al-Shabaab-held areas by preventing telecommunication companies from entering and setting up services. As such, the TFG is able to portray the terrorist group as the only thing keeping the situation as bad as it is. However, were al-Shabaab not a factor, clan divisions would undoubtedly play the same role in funneling resources

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towards certain groups at the expense of others. In either case, it is regular Somalis who suffer.

In addition to resources, dictatorships use a “culture of fear” to maintain their position. In Ethiopia, Mengistu leveraged a network of Marxist cadres, socialist planning policies like villigization and collectivization, and a parallel security apparatus using illegal detentions and torture in order keep the population frightened, submissive, and repressed.\(^{110}\) While he ruled, Zenawi stood accused of using electoral fraud, voter intimidation, and post-election police violence to win “legitimate” elections, while simultaneously jailing journalists and activists, and jamming opposition radio stations.\(^{111}\) While there is not the sanctioned violence of the “Red Terror” in Mengistu’s days, a culture of terror remains for people that have only known dictatorships.

In summary, with a national legacy and narrative, a tradition of effective administration, and fertile land with incredible hydroelectric potential, there are few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with the possibilities of Ethiopia. However until the government shows itself more willing to use its powers to leverage these resources towards benevolent ends, the only beneficiaries will remain the elite and well-connected, and the only positive outcomes those that seem improve regardless of how repressive the government is.

In Somalia, the TFG has proven too weak to create a culture of terror; but this same weakness allows its main opponent to create its own. This is the dark side of any

\(^{110}\) VanArsdale, 51.

order that al-Shabaab has brought to the areas they dominate: the extreme manner in which they enforce it, including stoning and amputations. Until the TFG is able to end the influence al-Shabaab has on Somalia, this terror of culture will continue, and allow the terrorist group to remain a “parallel government” within Somalia’s own borders.

With myriad issues continuing to hamstring efforts to stabilize, Somalia provides researchers a great example of where a benevolent dictator could have a positive impact. Indeed, perhaps only a dictator can do what a weak and corrupt federal government has thus far failed to do—stabilize the country by overcoming clan loyalties, incorporating political and military moderates, and defeating (with discipline) hard-line militants.
CHAPTER FOUR: DRC—SOURCES OF POSITIVE OUTCOMES

Introduction

The overall construct of the first part of this thesis involves alternative means of assessing the performance of countries in Africa. This chapter will ask if the positive outcomes in a poorly-performing country can be linked to the government and if so, if these modest success stories and prospective sources of improvements, can then be used to drive development and bring up lower ranked performance indicators. It will specifically look at the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—ranked 12th from the bottom of the Democracy Index, and “Not Free” with very poor political and civil liberties scores by Freedom House—with regards to its performance and potential in mining, forestry, and wildlife conservation.¹

Background

The Congolese Civil War began as a result of security concerns in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide in which over 800,000 people—mostly Tutsi and moderate Hutu—were killed in the space of around 100 days. Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), having agreed to an uneasy peace in Arusha, Tanzania after a three-year civil war, once again went on the offensive, eventually taking Kigali; Paul Kagame, until then the

military leader of the Tutsi-dominated RPF, took charge as Vice-President and Minister of Defense (he would prove to be the de-facto, and later actual, President)\(^2\). However, Hutu militias fearing punishment, and Hutu tribal members fearing retribution, fled the country in droves, eventually numbering two million and settling largely in the Great Lakes region, notably Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Standing up a government-in-exile, and supported by Zairian President Mobuto Sese Seko, they began a campaign to destabilize the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government, basing their operations out of the refugee camps and employing recently emigrated Rwandan Hutu exiles and Congolese Hutus as fighters.\(^3\)

As a result of the attacks that followed, Rwanda and Uganda—with assistance from Angola and Burundi, and accompanied by local Congolese Tutsi rebels—invaded Zaire. Thus began a series of conflicts subsequently dubbed the “First Congo War” (November 1996-May 1997) and “Second Congo War” (August 1998-July 2003), which resulted in rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila defeating Mobutu and taking over as President. The conflict is known without hyperbole as “The Great War of Africa,” and has had almost incomprehensible outcomes still felt today.

Where Has All This Left The Congo?

By many—indeed, most—indicators, DRC has had an abysmal performance record. Whether researching economic measures, human rights, infrastructure development, or almost any other metric, the Congo rests uncomfortably near the end of the scale. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked DRC 155 out of


\(^3\) Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 526-527.
Reporters Sans Frontiers’ Press Freedom Index at one time indicated a relatively free press when it first started keeping stats in 2002; DRC has since slipped more than 30 places and consistently ranked lower than 141 out of 178 for seven of the last nine years. And in Foreign Policy’s 2008 to 2011 Failed States Index, DRC ranked 6, 5, 5, and 4 respectively…from the bottom. More than 5.4 million people have been killed since the onset of hostilities in 1996, with children accounting for almost 50% of the casualties. The war created more than 1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and diseases normally preventable or treatable (such as malaria and malnutrition) continue to cause a majority of the casualties, with some 45,000 more dying every month. The stats go on and on in a similar vein.

But can the bottom rankings for the Congo be taken in absolute terms? Similarly, does the fact that the scores in each of the respective indices are extremely low tell the entire story? In the United Nation’s Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), DRC ranks 187; it is even lower than such notables as Somalia and Niger. But its HDI score has steadily improved since 2000, when Kabila

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took power, at a rate of improvement faster than the world average.\footnote{United Nations Development Programme, “International Human Development Indicators: Congo (Democratic Republic of),” http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD.html (accessed February 28, 2012).} Ranking last is bad, but there is some consolation in ranking last while steadily improving. As such, is improvement like this worth noting when assessing a country? And is it possible that Kabila’s authoritarian—even dictatorial—style of rule has facilitated some of these improvements? This chapter will argue that, despite the atrocities in DRC, there have been some areas with positive outcomes that can be linked to the government of Joseph Kabila, and which can be used to drive development and bring up lower ranked performance indicators.

Governments worldwide, particularly in developing nations, tout achievements and improvements for various reasons: to impress or appease donors in order to ensure continued resource flow, to avoid criticism from more liberal donors, or to avoid interference from external actors who might raise alarm about other conditions (such as human rights abuses). But it is necessary to discover the true source and nature of a purported success before deciding to continue support as continued resources may be used for the very programs these governments are attempting to conceal. In such a case, it may be handy to have a template to examine claims that governments make about positive outcomes they have had, in order to validate or refute these claims.

This chapter seeks to examine metrics that seem to indicate some improvement to conditions on the ground in DRC—however marginal—and to assess if they are due to the actions of the Kabila’s authoritarian administration, or because of some other driver or external actor. To assess these metrics, this chapter will use mining, forestry, and
wildlife conservation in order to help to confirm or deny my hypothesis. If the DRC is making improvements in some areas, whether through policy, program, or proclamation, they deserve credit, and continued support, for them. Continued gains can be used to fund the development of other, lower ranking indicators and improve the lives of Congolese. But, if positive outcomes can be tied to something other than Kinshasa’s efforts, the government might be put to task, and donors (be they nations, NGOs, or other organizations) can re-assess their approach, in hopes of facilitating a truly positive outcome.

**Areas of Improvement and Potential**

There are few countries in the world with the collective resources that DR Congo has, and mining, forestry, and wildlife conservation have shown both promise and some payoff. While many performance indicators dwell near the bottom of their respective scales, these three give one insight into DRC’s potential if the government properly funds the correct projects, and most importantly, provides the returns to the people of Congo.

**Mining**

One would be hard pressed to think of African conflict without associating it with its rich mineral resources; and whereas Sierra Leone and Liberia made “conflict diamonds” a household term, Congo—“the world’s largest producer of cobalt, third largest producer of industrial diamonds, and fifth largest producer of copper,” a well as considerable uranium deposits⁹—has been exploited for its resources since Belgian King Leopold’s initial interest in the colony because of the availability of rubber trees. During the First Congo War, Kabila’s rebel government granted mining concessions to foreign

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⁹ Stearns, 288.
companies to help finance the revolution.\textsuperscript{10} From there it was a small leap to Rwanda and Uganda conducting unilateral mining operations, ostensibly for the same reason: “Although Rwanda and Uganda possess little or no coltan, during the period of the war in the Congo…Rwanda’s coltan export went from less than 50 tons in 1995 to almost 250 tons in 1998”\textsuperscript{11} (In November 2011, Kigali returned about 82 tons of minerals\textsuperscript{12}).

With the shifting alliances of the Second Congo War, and with Rwandan and Ugandan troops rapidly approaching the capital, Kabila again sold mining concessions to pay his debts to Zimbabwe and Angola, securing their support and averting a military defeat.\textsuperscript{13} Rebel groups continue to use illegal mining as a source of funding since the conflict began; this alternative economy provided them with an estimated $185 million in 2008.\textsuperscript{14} With an estimated $24 trillion in unrealized mineral deposits, it is clear that mining holds great potential for any group willing to take advantage of it (even as it has served as a driver of conflict).\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{13} Sterns, 291.


There are several areas where new policies governing the mining industry have reaped benefits for DRC. A rise in world commodity prices in 2008 and 2009 has increased the potential return on any state investment into the mining industry. New government policies appear to be having their intended effect: A Swedish NGO wrote that, “Today, registered cassiterite and coltan exports are close to known mining capacity and fraudulent exports are a fraction of what they once were.” And USAID and its British counterpart, DFID, note improvements between cross-border networks and artisanal traders which can improve transparency.16

There also remains an almost indescribable amount of room for growth. The International Peace Information Service (IPIS) has noted that armed groups—including rebels, Rwandan militia, and Congolese army units—control 12 of the 13 major mines in Congo; both the UN and IPIS estimate that over 50% of the estimated 200 total mines in DR Congo are under control of armed groups17. If the remaining mines could be properly secured, developed, and managed, and when one takes into account the tax revenues that the DRC can gain from private mine corporations, the potential positive outcomes to harnessing the mining industry’s potential become even more clear.

However, policies can potentially have a negative impact as well. There are critics who say that regulations such as the 2009 Dodd-Frank Act, intended to block the

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purchase of conflict minerals that finance rebel groups, are having negative side effects on everyday Congolese. Companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Nintendo, and myriad cell phone manufacturers use minerals like coltan in making their electronic components, and this embargo (with voluntary compliance) effectively takes the largest consumers of these minerals out of the supply chain. An embargo on these materials could take funding from artisanal miners, even as they greatly reduce funding for rebel groups.\textsuperscript{18} However, it could push armed groups out of the mining industry, creating a vacuum into which the government can move, establish a credible industry, employ those left jobless by the embargo, and reap the benefits described above.

Concurrently, developing the mining sector should be used other than to simply enrich Kabila’s coffers. Given that most of the mines are located in the most poverty-stricken areas of Eastern Congo, any funding coming into the country should, at least in part, be directed towards sustaining the progress described in this chapter. If locals working in mines do not at some point see the fruits of their labor returned to them at least in part, they will once again be fertile grounds for recruitment into rebel group; and a mine run by militias is no longer generating capital for the state. Funding brought in from responsibly sourced materials should be used to assist these miners by developing human capital and mine production capacity in a way that employs more of locals.

\textit{Forestry}

Besides mining, there is perhaps no other area where the Congo has the potential to improve its own situation, or where there is greater risk to its environment, than with

properly executed natural resources and forestry programs. Besides the Congo River Basin regulating the world environment, the forests alone are sufficient to fuel development: “If they are conserved and managed well, DRC’s forests could provide many national and global benefits in perpetuity.”\(^{19}\) However, there has been little in the way of forests being “conserved and managed well”:

While the DRC has a potential for timber exploitation estimated at 10 million m\(^3\)/year, official timber exploitation (mainly industrial production) amounted to just 310,000 m\(^3\) in 2006. In contrast, artisanal and illegal logging was calculated as totaling approximately 1.5-2.4 million m\(^3\) in 2003—up to eightfold official figures. Both artisanal and industrial logging are overshadowed by annual fuel wood and charcoal production, estimated at 72 million m\(^3\).\(^{20}\)

Poorly regulated companies, many with the bribed consent of local politicians, have engaged in “uncontrolled industrial logging” in Congo’s jungles.\(^{21}\) And besides the 40 million Congolese who depend on the forests “in one way or another” according to Greenpeace,\(^{22}\) refugees and others fleeing the ubiquitous violence found safety in the forests, but at an environmental cost, especially for those in close proximity to refugee camps. “The end of the Rwandan civil war in 1994 caused 1.5–2 million people to flee, largely towards the DRC (then Zaire). More than 150 km\(^2\) of forest from the Virunga

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National Park was cut by refugees.”23 And that was just from the conflict in Rwanda; one can only imagine the negative impact that 1.5 million IDPs from the subsequent 15 years of war in DRC could have on the rainforests.

They crisscrossed Congo, fleeing the fighting and avoiding armed bands, fed off the land and felled the forests for shelter, campfires, and cooking. Today, trying to eek out a living in squalid conditions, refugees venture farther and farther from camps in an effort to forage for food and firewood.24 This not only exposes them to rebel groups and makes them vulnerable to rape and other crimes, but also contributes to soil erosion that, during the rainy season, reduces usable land even more and increases competition, if not outright conflict, over resources that remain.25 This is a microcosm of the cycle of resource conflict in Congo today.

However, there have been federally organized programs by the Congolese Government that have successfully slowed logging and deforestation in the Congo River Basin. Encouraged (and partially funded) by the World Bank, DRC has instituted various programs to preserve this vital area: In 2008, Kinshasa designated over 50,000 square


miles as protected areas, a six-fold increase in areas being conserved.26 And in 2009, DR Congo, in conjunction with the Forest Stewardship Council, increased its certification program to ensure sustainability among some 4 million hectares of harvesting projects, with a goal of having 10 million hectares certified by 201227 (In March 2011, however, Greenpeace issued a statement saying they were concerned about the rate at which Congo River Basin forests were being certified, leading to a lack of oversight and compliance28). A World Conservation Study found that the benefits to this certification extend to wildlife, noting that, “Elephants and apes roam the CIB certified forests concessions at densities that rival or surpass the adjacent Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park.”29

That same year, Congo undertook a comprehensive review of all companies operating logging interests in DRC; of the 156 applications (corresponding to 22 million hectares), just 65 were approved, and deforestation rates remain a relatively low 0.17% per year, lower than both Brazil and Indonesia.30 At the same time, Kinshasa has trained

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over 5,000 locals in conservation efforts, both providing jobs and expanding the
government’s “footprint” with which they can track changes and identify potential
problems earlier.\textsuperscript{31}

Additionally, Congo’s natural world heritage should be a source of funding that
could fuel development in those areas most threatened by its loss. A UN Great Ape
Survival Partnership (UN-GRASP) report notes that, “DR Congo’s tropical rainforests
extend over 1.55 million km\textsuperscript{2} and account for more than half of Africa’s forest resources,
making them a critical global ecosystem service provider and a potential source of up to
US$900 million in annual revenue up to 2030 through REDD+ (Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation).”\textsuperscript{32} Illegal logging itself is costing DRC $4.2
million per year.\textsuperscript{33} On the Congo River, the DRC and South Africa signed an agreement
in November 2011 to develop the Grand Inga hydropower project, which with its
potential for 40,000 megawatts (mW) of energy, the largest in the world; this would
greatly eclipse the next two largest producers of hydropower, China’s Three Gorges Dam
(22,400 mW) and Brazil’s Itaipu Dam (14,000 mW).\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{32} UN-GRASP, “UNEP Study Confirms DR Congo Biodiversity Under Threat,” http://www.un-
grasp.org/news/60-unep-study-confirms-dr-congo-biodiversity-under-threat (accessed January 29,
2012).

\textsuperscript{33} Note: This amount is not the unrealized revenue available from timber, but rather the amount
that is taken illegally each year; the unrealized revenue is much higher. For more, see The
Encyclopedia Of Earth, “Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts Of Armed Conflict In

\textsuperscript{34} Brian Latham, “S. Africa, Congo Plan Pact on World’s Largest Hydropower Project,”
Wildlife Conservation

The bio-diversity present in the Democratic Republic of Congo cannot be understated, and its contribution to world bio-diversity—and the threat it faces—is widely recognized. The Wildlife Conservation Society notes that Congo “contains more than half of Africa’s remaining rainforest within its borders. In addition to these vast lowland rainforests, the country’s landscape spans mountain forests, bamboo forests, savannas, and marshes that are home to an array of quintessential African animals.”

But how has this amazing array of wildlife and biodiversity been affected by the conflict?

Since 1996, Congo’s wildlife has suffered as rebels, hard-pressed for resources, have been accused of killing and eating endangered species like gorillas and hippopotami. The population of the form has declined from 22,000 in 1998 to just 900 in 2007, while the number of Eastern Lowland Gorillas may have declined as much as 70% during the decade from 1994 to 2004, from 17,000 to 5,000. Security affected other species as well, as armed groups resorted to poaching on a massive scale:

The Northern White Rhino, which had its home in the Garamba National Park is feared to have been hunted into extinction, while numbers of the remarkable Okapi—a forest giraffe only found in DRC—and elephant populations are seriously declining.

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And the UN’s GRASP project found that, “DR Congo has the highest level of biodiversity in Africa, yet 190 species are classified as critically endangered, endangered or vulnerable on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species.”

In addition to better-known endangered species, an increase in Congolese poaching of “bushmeat” (mostly consisting of monkey, antelope, wild boar, and duiker) for sustenance is emerging as a potential issue. Congolese are hunting and trapping these animals in ever-greater numbers, and by one UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) estimate, some 1.7 million tons of bushmeat are collected every year. This is closely related to the illegal logging trade, as the same roads being used to transport extracted resources are providing bushmeat hunters access into previously impenetrable rainforests. These workers are also a major consumer for the meat, driving the trade even more.

However, demonstrating the synthesis of the programs listed above, Congolese government successes in forestry have had a positive effect on wildlife conservation efforts. Logging certification programs have resulted in the discovery of an additional 125,000 Western Lowland Gorillas, previously unknown, in the Northern Congo, and there has been a 17% increase in the mountain gorilla population in the Virunga National

39 UN-GRASP.


Park compared to 20 years ago.\textsuperscript{43} And improvements via proclamation have had a positive outcome as well: rather than allowing commercial harvesting of rainforests, the Congolese government began a program of annexing large tracks of acreage heavily populated with wildlife to incorporate into existing parks such as the Nouabal-Ndoki National Park.\textsuperscript{44}

And Kabila’s government has taken the lead in efforts to preserve gorillas and their habitat, which spans several of the same countries that fought during the First and Second Congo Wars. He hosted the 2007 World Heritage Committee meeting where the Kinshasa Declaration was signed. With signatories such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola, was the most ambitious and wide-ranging effort to protect the Great Apes and the other elements of DR Congo’s biodiversity. President Kabila, accompanied by the Congolese Prime Minister, personally assured UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova that, “the Government was determined to implement all measures decided by the Committee.”\textsuperscript{45} It is not a little ironic that the same countries that fought for years and caused the suffering and death of millions of humans, were able to come together to protect hundreds of thousands of man’s closest relative.

These positive outcomes to wildlife conservation efforts should be a significant source of funding for development, as other countries in the region have demonstrated. In Rwanda, a concerted government tourism program resulted in the number of tourists to

\textsuperscript{43} World Conservation Society.


national parks growing from 61 in 1994 to 43,000 in 2002; tourism revenue grew from $6 million in 1995 to $202 million in 2008. “Tourist arrivals are projected to increase from about 980,000 in 2008 to over 2 million in 2020, thereby increasing foreign exchange earnings from about US$ 200 million to over US$ 600 million.” In Tanzania, the government codified its tourism strategy in the Tourism Policy of 1991 and Tanzania Investment Act of 1997. As a result, the number of tourists increased from 153,000 in 1990 (generating $65 million) to almost 640,000 in 2008 (generating $1.2 billion); additionally, tourism currently generates 719,000 jobs for Tanzanians.

Thus far, the Kabila administration—perhaps understandably—has not shown a sincere desire to develop the tourism industry in Congo. It currently only invests 2.2% of its total investment in tourism (and it is projected to decrease to 1.9% by 2021). As a result, Congo ranks last in the world (out of 181 countries) for the tourism’s contribution to GDP relative to the national economy. And tourism is responsible for only 7,000 jobs (14,000 including jobs indirectly related to the industry). But DRC’s Virunga National

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46 Tourist arrivals count visitors to the county who list “tourism” as their reason for their visit on their entry form; not all of these go to National Parks, and even fewer pay the $500 permit fee to trek with gorillas. In any case, the number of permits is extremely limited, with some people traveling all the way to Kigali only to find there are none available for the dates of their visit.


Park, home to one of the most active volcanoes in Africa, may show a glimpse of tourist potential, with no visitors in 2008 but 550 the next year; it doubled each year afterwards, with 3,800 visitors in 2011. If this success can be expanded across the DRC’s five national parks listed as a UNESCO’s World Heritage Site—and the three more that have been submitted—this area holds yet another area with potential for growth to drive development.

Conclusion

It should not come as a surprise that like many other areas in the Congo, mining, forestry, and wildlife conservation have suffered greatly because of the ongoing conflict there. It takes very little effort on the part of a researcher to identify depressing statistics, saddening data, or stories of a failed government and a suffering population. However, there are some positive outcomes—glimmers of hope in a pile of long-smoldering ashes—that can be credited to Joseph Kabila’s administration in Kinshasa which hold potential for an improvement to the human condition there.

Mining and forestry have made significant gains, in large part due to the policies and actions of the government in Kinshasa. Properly developed, managed, and secured sites could prove a rich source of revenue in the future from legal exports, taxes on corporations, and eliminating losses due to illegal mining and logging. Tourism still lags behind with regards to government focus, but must be recognized as being more directly


affected by the lack of stability and security in the very regions tourists would visit. In other countries in Africa, a concerted effort on the part of the federal government to harness their countries potential these areas has netted financial rewards, kept it in good standing with international bodies, and encouraged growth and development. In Rwanda, where tourism is the top revenue earner, per capita GDP is growing at 7.5%; in Tanzania, where it is second, the growth rate is 7.0%.\textsuperscript{53}

Although a strong, centralized government rules from Kinshasa, Kabila’s ministers need to play a key role in ensuring that these gains are realized. First and foremost, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) must secure the hinterland or, given the current security situation, efforts at improvement will likely be frustrated. In mining, both the MOD and the Ministry of Mining (MOM) must synchronize their efforts; the former should end its role in the production aspect of mining and instead direct their efforts towards securing the mines not currently run by the national government. This would allow the MOM to focus on developing Congo’s incredible mining potential.

In forestry, The Ministry of the Interior, along with the Ministry of Forestry, must continue to judiciously screen applicants for logging concessions. Additionally, they must find a way to balance the needs of refugees who scratch out a living from the forests, and the need to conserve the forests themselves. Efforts in these areas can help secure a revenue stream from properly regulated logging and hydropower projects, both of which can be used to fuel improvements in other areas. And in wildlife conservation, the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, and Tourism (MENCT) should work

to keep issues concerning DR Congo’s fragile eco-system in front of the national government, highlighting potential funding from tourism and international donors. MENCT efforts at training and educating locals not only provides jobs, but also can increase awareness in myriad areas via a much larger footprint throughout the country, helping to identify any problems at a more embryonic stage.

International actors have and can continue to play an important role in the above efforts. Bodies such as the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and Dian Fossey’s “Gorilla Organization” not only raise awareness about issues that nations are facing, but also bring expertise and (perhaps more important to cash-strapped governments) funding that can help drive the implementation of best practices. Rather than distract from nascent efforts by the governments themselves, these groups can leverage their resources in order to influence the policies and practices in at-risk regions, resulting in a more positive outcome for their respective area of concern.

This conclusion is not to say that more gains could not be made, either more efficiently or more effectively. It is also not to absolve Kabila’s administration for its role in a 15-year conflict that has claimed more lives than any other since World War II. It says only that there has been improvement in some areas that can hopefully serve as a springboard for future successes, and that improvement like this worth noting when researchers, politicians, and policy makers are assessing a country. This chapter also attempts to provide a template by which donors, NGOs, and government actors may assess claims about achievements by leaders of developing nations, in order to assess the source of these accomplishments and make decisions from there.
When assessing only quantifiable metrics, some analysts—understandably—come to the conclusion that the Democratic Republic of Congo is a failed state. There are undoubtedly justifiable concerns about how long DRC will last, even as some wonder how badly it has collapsed already. Kinshasa needs to leverage opportunities in natural resources and mining, forestry, and wildlife conservation, whether through policy, program, or proclamation. At the same time, they must allocate sufficient resources towards improving the components of human development indicators. When you are ranked last in most of them, you have nowhere to go but up. The above recommendations will obviously not put DRC on par with any developed nations, and might only put it “less behind” other developing nations, with its “bottom” higher than it is right now. At the very least, this may be an improvement for everyday Congolese, who certainly deserve a better outcome than they have seen for decades.
CHAPTER FIVE: ETHIOPIA—THE USE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Introduction

Foreign policy is not simply one country’s view towards another, or a list of intentions when dealing with other states. It is actions manifested in the proactive use of various tools in order to affect desired outcome of relations between two or more states. Put simply by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, “Foreign policy is getting someone to do something you want.”\(^1\) All countries have some means of promoting proactive foreign policy, but were a country to be a “one-trick pony” relying singularly on military force, economic sanctions, or other carrots \(\textit{or} \) sticks, it would be severely limited in its ability to impact the decision making of other countries in order to achieve its desired outcomes. Foreign policy is only effective if there are a number of tools in the hands of those in charge of setting and implementing it, and thus the more effective tools a country has, the more the potential for foreign policy to be implemented.

Additionally, it is useful to examine the relationship between “policies” and “programs” with regards to foreign policy. Usually, policies drive programs, as when President Kennedy, eager to institute policies that would “counter negative images of the ‘Ugly American’ and Yankee imperialism,” created the US Peace Corps in 1960.\(^2\)

\[^{1}\text{Madeline Albright, in a speech at the University of Denver, April 13, 2012.}\]

However, programs can also serve as an impetus for policies; the Kennedy administration again provides a pertinent example. Existing programs of technological advancement were codified into a government policy regarding the space program in the wake of the Soviets putting the first man on the moon:

> The moon program was a lever by which the young President, who extolled vigor and assaults on The New Frontier, and the nation, which seemed to have lost faith in itself, could find their legs and come to grips with the internal and external challenges of the post-Sputnik World.  

Determining which came first can illuminate potential outcomes. If a policy is created first, the program (usually the execution side) can be custom-built to fit within the stated policy framework. However, if the program comes first, a policy can still be created from it, but the program may need to be modified from its original format. This can change what it looks like on the ground and potentially impact the effectiveness that made it a driver of the policy in the first place.

For the US, its approach to foreign policy has evolved as it, too, has evolved as a nation. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the threat of military force as a singular means of implementing its desires has been diminished, both because of the fiscally prohibitive nature of troop deployments, as well as an increasing awareness that such deployments have rarely endeared America to the rest of the world. As such, the US has relied more and more on the Department of State (DoS) and its ability to leverage soft power (or more recently, “smart power”) to deal with other nations.

But the Department of Defense (DOD) does have a key role in the implementation of foreign policy. Through strategic partnerships, low-level

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engagements, joint training exercises, and various on-site funding programs, the US military has worked closely with key partners around the world, and Africa is no exception. It has used military assistance programs such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), and International Military Exchange and Training (IMET) as tools of foreign policy on the continent.

Some critics accuse the US for giving military assistance to repressive governments, which then use it against their own people. Military training and aid, the argument goes, is used to counter internal dissent rather than build capacity or prevent destabilization by external forces. This runs counter to AFRICOM’s beliefs that, “diplomacy, development, and defense should work hand in hand—and in balance—to achieve long-term security.”\(^4\) However, one must consider that when US assistance goes to governments in countries that are already repressive, the US can (and does) leverage military aid to steer their behavior towards less repressive outcomes, or to punish violations.

This chapter will analyze military assistance through this lens, looking specifically at Ethiopia as a crucial case study. Ethiopia was chosen because of the length of modern relations with the US (since 1903), the amount of aid it receives, its relatively long-duration governments, its strategic location in the Horn of Africa

and role in US security considerations, and its record of repression. One would be hard-pressed to find another country in Africa with this same set of circumstances.\(^5\)

This chapter will examine patterns in assistance provided via four different programs: IMET, FMF, DCS, and FMS funding. It will also analyze the level of repression there using a collection of indicators of basic freedoms, as well as specific incidents of repression. Further, it will analyze legislative efforts to prevent military assistance from being used by repressive governments, and the statements of US Government officials.

This chapter will then demonstrate that the US had been willing to withhold some specific military assistance from repressive African governments in order to punish human rights violations prior to September 11\(^{th}\). However, afterwards, because of strategic considerations, the US has chosen to instead shift the type of military assistance Ethiopia receives in order to preventing the US from being complicit in further repression, while addressing regional security concerns. It will show that legislative efforts to link military assistance to human rights have largely been unsuccessful because of these same regional security concerns. Finally, it will conclude that it is possible to balance security considerations with human rights concerns through the use of military assistance.

\(^5\) However, while Ethiopia does provide a great case study for linking aid and repression, one must be careful when extrapolating the findings here across other countries. While the case-study methodology is sound, differing circumstances for each country must be taken into account.
Background

1960s

Africa, long the colonial purview of European nations, had enjoyed only cursory interest by the US through the first half of the 20th Century. Both because it had already been long divided between Continental nations (the infamous “Scramble for Africa”), and because of American focus on expanding its influence in the Pacific, the US only had had oblique interests there. However, with the spread of Communist-backed revolution in the 1960s, the US took a more direct interest, playing both a direct and indirect role in the affairs of many nations. Unfortunately, as this period of time coincided with many liberation movements in Africa, some nations still begrudge the US for the role it took in supporting repressive governments as a bulwark against Communism. 6

1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and the Emergence of African Terrorism

The countries in Africa that had achieved independence during the 1960s spent the following decade consolidating their gains. Of the 54 independent African countries today, 32 countries (almost 60%) became independent in the 1960s, and 17 of these happened in 1960 alone (14 French colonies, 2 British, and 1 Belgian); 9 more became independent in the 1970s. 7 This state of near-constant change and subsequent power struggles may have contributed to the lack of centralized government and a focus on

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consolidation of power, creating the conditions that would facilitate terrorist group formation in the ensuing decades.

US interest in the Middle East greatly expanded in the late 1970s and 1980s with the emergence of petrol states, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the appearance of terrorist groups and state sponsored terrorism. The storming of the US Embassy in Iran in 1979, the bombing of the US Embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983, and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1989 thrust the region to the forefront of US national security policy (US Central Command was created in 1983). Meanwhile, key events in Europe—the fall of the Soviet Union, as well as conflicts in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other places—further distracted the US from events in Africa. Terrorist groups were largely missed until they became more active.

Osama bin Laden, departing Afghanistan in 1989 the Soviets defeat, tried to return Saudi Arabia but was exiled by his own country. He took sanctuary in Sudan, and began consolidating his operations there. In 1998, his Al-Qaeda operatives in Kenya bombed US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which resulted in the deaths of 223 people. The Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (MICG) began in 1998 with fighters who had trained in Afghanistan, and subsequently conducted several deadly attacks in that country, including the Casablanca Bombings in 2003; the group was also linked to

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the Madrid train bombings in 2004, which killed 191 people.\textsuperscript{11} The Armed Islamic Group (based in Algeria), founded to train fighters for Afghanistan, became militarily and politically active in 1992 (although a majority of its attacks occurred after 2007).\textsuperscript{12}

After September 11\textsuperscript{th}

The US Department of Defense had previously divided Africa between CENTCOM, Europe Command (EUCOM), and to a lesser extent, Pacific Command (PACOM). While the nations of North Africa and the Horn of Africa fell under CENTCOM, the islands off the southeast coast (Madagascar, Comoros, and Mauritius) fell under PACOM.\textsuperscript{13} The remaining 42 nations of Africa were the purview of EUCOM, whose Area of Responsibility (AOR) was so immense that a scattering of operations occurred:

United States European Command covered more than 13 million square miles and included 91 countries and territories. This territory extends from the North Cape of Norway, through the waters of the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, most of Europe, parts of the Middle East, to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa.\textsuperscript{14}

Domestic post-9/11 discourse largely involved US strategy in dealing with al-Qaeda and other terrorist and insurgent groups in the Middle East, the purview of


CENTCOM. Additionally, once military operations commenced in Afghanistan following September 11th, 2001, EUCOM was working to coordinate efforts among 17 nations from its AOR that were participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).\(^1^5\) Meanwhile, both al-Qaeda franchises and independent organizations increased their presence in the Trans-Saharan region of Africa, which increasingly caught the attention of US analysts. By 2006, the plethora of issues in Africa had become abundantly clear to the EUCOM Commander at the time, General Bantz J. Craddock:

> The increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest security stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR. The large ungoverned area in Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist throughout the continent are challenges that are key factors in the security stability issues that affect every country in Africa.\(^1^6\)

That same year, Secretary of Defense Gates spoke of “a more effective and integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central Command and European Command, an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.”\(^1^7\) In response to destabilizing threats, the risk of failed states, and increasing awareness of the strategic importance of Africa, the US created only its second Unified

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Combatant Command since 1963: AFRICOM. In doing so, the US had established a more integrated focus on the continent, but what of the repressive countries with which it dealt?

Repression in Africa and Ethiopia

As noted elsewhere, examples of repression in Africa abound. In Sudan, “Government authorities pursued familiar repressive tactics including harassing, arresting, detaining, and torturing perceived opponents of the government; censoring media; and banning political parties.” Further south, “The human rights situation in Malawi deteriorated significantly in 2011, with President Mutharika’s government acting in an increasingly repressive manner.” In East Africa, “the unnecessary use of lethal force by Ugandan security forces resulted in the deaths of nine people.” And in Kenya, “there was little progress on the ground in terms of accountability for post-election violence [in 2007] or human rights violations by security forces.”

Ethiopia itself has long had a reputation for repressive policies, some of which were facilitated by outside aid. President Haile Miriam Mengistu, who ruled from 1974-1989, was particularly adept at this: For example, at the height of the famine in the 1980s, when foreign donors had given more than 1.7 million tons of grain, it would rot on piers

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18 PACOM and EUCOM were established in 1947, SOUTHCOM in 1963, CENTCOM in 1983, and NORTHCOM in 2002. For more details on the UCCs, see http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/.


because Mengistu withheld Soviet-supplied military trucks and planes, diverting them to the resettlement effort instead.\textsuperscript{21} He spent $200 million celebrating the tenth anniversary of the revolution that brought him to power in a coup that overthrew longtime emperor Haile Selassie (himself no benevolent ruler), and then told foreign donors he did not have the resources to purchase food.\textsuperscript{22} Limited fuel supplies were also reallocated to other military operations and away from relief organizations.\textsuperscript{23} As a direct result of Mengistu’s policies, some 400,000 people died.\textsuperscript{24}

There has been little good governance since Mengistu was overthrown in 1991, and consequently Ethiopia’s ranking in several metrics of repression are among the lowest in the world. The following table offers a snapshot of repression since election violence erupted in 2005:

\textbf{Table 1: “Ethiopia’s Repression Rankings”}\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{24} Alexander DeWaal’s estimate in a 1991 Human Rights Watch report is much lower than the official UN estimate of around 1 million people, for which the UN was roundly criticized. For more, see Alexander DeWaal, \textit{Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia} (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 175.

Military Assistance Programs

AFRICOM, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, overseas all US military operations in Africa, and is commanded by a 4-Star General who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. Under AFRICOM, each branch of the US military (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) has a separate Component Command (COCOM), commanded by a 2-Star General and variously based around Europe. 26 This set-up is designed to allow for the most effective, decentralized implementation of military programs throughout the continent. A primary means by which the US military interacts with African partner nations is via Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based on a former French military site at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.

Their stated mission is to conduct “operations in the combined joint operations area to enhance partner nation capacity, promote regional security and stability, dissuade conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition interests.” 27 Given the proximity of countries such as Yemen, Somalia, and Qatar, it is not hard to assume the level intelligence gathering that occurs there as well. Additionally, Obama administration officials have spoken about bases for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). 28 All of the above make a positive

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relationship between the US and partner nations such as Djibouti and Ethiopia very important to mutual security objectives. To help maintain this relationship, the US uses military assistance programs, including:

- **Foreign Military Sales:**

  A government-to-government program through which the U.S. Government sells conventional military weapons, equipment, and services to allied and friendly nations to assist them in meeting their legitimate defense requirements.\(^{29}\)

- **Foreign Military Financing:**

  Provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. It is intended to promote U.S. national security by contributing to regional and global stability, strengthening military support for democratically-elected governments and containing transnational threats, including terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons.\(^{30}\)

- **Direct Commercial Sales:** “Regulates and licenses private U.S. companies' overseas sales of weapons and other defense articles, defense services, and military training.”\(^{31}\)

- **IMET:**

  Provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations...IMET facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships, which have proven to provide

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U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, democratic governments.  

**The Use of Aid to Ethiopia**

The US has a history of providing military assistance to Ethiopia to counter threats of the day, as well as tying this aid to reports of human rights abuses. From 1946 until 1975, the US gave $286.1 million (two-thirds of the total military assistance that Washington gave to Africa) in order to counter Soviet efforts in the region. The equipment mostly consisted of aircraft (including the F-86 fighter jet, the T-28D, the F-5, and trainer and transport platforms), as well as a grant of $30 million in arms and ammunition in 1974, and the sale of nearly $200 million worth in 1975.

However, when Mengistu took power via a bloody coup d’etat caused the deaths of thousands of people, “Secretary of State Cyrus Vance [informed] the Senate Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations that grant military assistance to Ethiopia was being suspended because of human rights violations.” President Carter cancelled $106 million worth of military aid grants, credit, programs, and arms.

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During the solidifying portion of Mengistu’s reign, from 1979 until 1989, all US military assistance stopped, but once Mengistu was overthrown, it quickly returned:

Between FY 90 and FY 01, Ethiopia concluded nearly $10 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and approximately $260,000 in Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). During the same period, Ethiopia received over $7 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and more than $2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET). Ethiopia received over $11 million in U.S. defense articles through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program.

In 1998, the US again withheld military assistance to Ethiopia in response to the human rights violations during the invasion of Eritrea. The US suspended delivery of two C-130 Hercules aircraft (two others had already been delivered), but offered to continue delivery as part of a peace agreement. A US diplomatic cable later noted that, “the Ethiopians have been long resigned to the fact that the remaining C-130s are no longer available… tensions remain and the two C-130s could not be held and were sent to Latin America.”

After September 11th, the US has seen Ethiopia as an ally and “front-line state” in the fight against terrorism, sharing as it does a border with both Sudan and Somalia, with their respective associations with al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. As a result of this strategic location and potentially because of their continued and sizeable contribution to UN


Peacekeeping Operations (it is the fifth-largest contributor of troops in the world), the increase in aid has been significant:

- Total military aid sent in the five years after September 11th was two-and-a-half time greater than the total sent before.
- Compared to the five years before September 11th, the five years after saw a doubling of U.S. arms sales to Ethiopia.
- Ethiopia has also benefitted intra-regionally and strategically from membership in the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP); the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (ATA) (part of the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Activities, or NADR); the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI); and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.40

Then in May 2005, 193 people died and more than 700 were wounded by Ethiopian security forces during protests over Prime Minister Zenawi’s victory that gave him two-thirds of Parliament, this amid accusations of voting irregularities, intimidation, and fraud.41 US Humvees, sold to the regime ostensibly for counter-terrorism operations, were used extensively by Ethiopian security forces to fire on protestors during the violence. In response, the US ended sales of Humvees to the country.42

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39 Center for Defense Information.

40 Ibid, 4-5.


42 Center for Defense Information, 4.
Huddleston, former Ambassador to Addis Ababa, said, “These vehicles were only for use in anti-terrorist activities. We have now decided not to sell any more Humvees to the Ethiopian army.” In this case, the US withheld further assistance to Ethiopia when elements of this assistance were used to commit human rights violations.

In late December 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia, arguing against the threat posed by the fundamentalist-leaning Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu. Addis Ababa received support from Coalition Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF- HOA) advisors based at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. This task force had a long-established relationship with Ethiopia, which “included the sharing of battlefield intelligence on the Islamists' positions... John D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence at the time, then authorized spy satellites to be diverted to provide information for Ethiopian troops.” The operation, while largely successful tactically, resulted in numerous accusations of human rights violations:

The UN reports that 400,000 Somalis have had to flee their homes in the wake of post-invasion violence. A recent Human Rights Watch report concludes that while atrocities have taken place on all sides, Ethiopian/TFG forces have conducted the worst abuses, including deliberate attacks on civilians.

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It seems that in this case, elements of US military assistance, although not directly the
cause of human rights violations, played an indirect part in the effectiveness of Ethiopian
forces, likely putting them in a position by which they could commit these violations.
Violations of human rights in 2005 and later, after the Somali invasion, served as the
impetus to US legislative efforts to restrict military assistance to Ethiopia.

**Legislative Efforts**

Several bills specific to Ethiopia were introduced in Congress, starting when
Representative Chris Smith (D-NJ) introduced the “Ethiopia Consolidation Act of 2005.”
It was intended to introduce legislation that would “suspend joint security activities until
a certification is made that Ethiopia is observing international human rights standards and
enforcing the principle of the rule of law,” and “prohibits nonessential [security] U.S.
assistance to Ethiopia if the government of Ethiopia obstructs U.S. technical assistance to
Ethiopian opposition parties.” The bill was introduced to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, but did not move past this stage.46

Smith tried again a year later with the “Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy, and
Human Rights Advancement Act of 2006,” using similar language.47 Human Rights
Watch advocate Saman Zarifi, speaking to the House International Relations Committee,
referred to US-trained Ethiopian troops as “among the most abusive on the continent.”48

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28, 2012).

The Committee approved the act; however, the bill never went before the full House for a vote, possibly due to pressure on lawmakers by former House Majority Leaders Richard Armey and Richard Gephardt, at that time in the employ of lobbying firm DLI Piper.

The firm, which the Ethiopian government had contracted at $50,000 per month for “strategic advice and counsel,”49 justified their actions using the “Global War on Terror,” and referring to Ethiopia as a “close ally today, particularly in the global war against terrorism. It is crucial for the United States to have friends and allies in the strategically important Horn of Africa region.”50 Following the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, Smith tenaciously tried a third time, but with the same outcome.51 Before its last incarnation, he said:

I believe that neither we nor the international community has pushed the Meles [Zenawi, the Prime Minister] government hard enough on human rights issues because we have been satisfied it cooperates with us to some extent in the war on terror.52

US Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ) then introduced the “Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007.” This bill prohibited “security assistance to


50 Ibid.


Ethiopia, with exceptions for peacekeeping, military education and training for civilian personnel, or counter-terrorism assistance.” Additionally, the military education and training would not be used for “training to security personnel or units against whom there is credible evidence of gross human rights abuses or violations.” However, Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) headed efforts to defeat the measure, citing a now-familiar “at least they fight against terrorists” reasoning:

[The bill] focuses only on shortcomings while blatantly ignoring the unprecedented progress the country has made…They continue to be a close friend of the United States and a strong ally in the War on Terror in the Horn of Africa.54

The bill passed the House but was defeated in the Senate.

Shortly thereafter, Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) introduced the “Support for Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia Act of 2008,” the text of which specifically indicated its origin in the post-election violence of 2005. It was introduced on September 9, 2008, just a month before AFRICOM became fully operational. Recognizing the need to balance human rights, humanitarian, and regional security concerns, Feingold wrote, “Genuine democratic progress in Ethiopia is essential if we are to have a healthy and positive bilateral relationship. It is also essential if we are going to successfully combat extremism, thereby bolstering our own national security here at home.” The bill would “prohibit United States funding to any unit of the Ethiopian security forces if there is credible evidence that a unit of the security forces has committed gross violations of


human rights.” It was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, but died there before the end of the session.

By 2010, the US had collected reports on Ethiopia’s human rights abuses by the UN Monitoring Group in Somalia, the Department of State, Freedom House, the EU Electoral Observer Mission, the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the NSC. In response, Senator Feingold re-introduced his 2008 bill in August 2010 as the “Support for Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia Act of 2010.” It prohibited military assistance unless:

Ethiopia has taken steps to: (1) ensure the freedoms of civil society organizations to pursue work on civic education, democratization, human rights, and conflict resolution; (2) respect the rights of and permit nonviolent political parties to operate free from intimidation, including releasing imprisoned opposition political leader…(5) promote respect for human rights within its security forces, including investigating allegations of abuse.”

However, Feingold was defeated for re-election in 2010, and the bill has not come up again. As such, no military assistance has been withheld since 2005, though the total amount has decreased considerably since then. Even more tellingly, the type of military assistance has changed considerably:

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57 Government Track, “S. 3757.”

While the total amount of funding increased after 9/11, for the most part (excepting a huge influx of aircraft parts in 2007) it decreased significantly after the 2005 violence. It is more notable that, starting with the 1998 invasion of Eritrea, IMET funding (which includes mandatory training in human rights and law of armed conflict) is the only program that has consistently increased; it started out as only 4% of the budget in 2005, but increased to 34% by 2010. Lethal aid via FMF and FMS mostly decreased as the overall budget mostly decreased during that same period of time: FMF consistently decreased before being completely eliminated in 2010, and FMS fluctuated before being completely eliminated as a source of funding in 2011 and 2012 (not shown). DOS notes

Table 2: US Military Aid to Ethiopia, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>IMET</th>
<th>FMF</th>
<th>FMS</th>
<th>DCS</th>
<th>Annual total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mengistu overthrow</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<td>$0</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>$500,000</td>
<td>$160,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
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<td>$117,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>$0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>$531,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$756,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td>$2,079,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Invasion of Eritrea</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>$279,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$554,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>$516,000</td>
<td>$2,900,000</td>
<td>$432,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<td>Global War on Terror</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$152,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>$0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>$0</td>
<td>$343,536</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$210,000</td>
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<td>$33,000</td>
<td>$748,080</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$451,000</td>
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<td>$4,333,000</td>
<td>$101,678</td>
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<td>Electoral violence</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$572,000</td>
<td>$7,050,000</td>
<td>$285,000</td>
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<td>$13,527,273</td>
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<td>Invasion of Somalia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$594,000</td>
<td>$1,980,000</td>
<td>$1,570,000</td>
<td>$1,468,301</td>
<td>$5,612,301</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$472,000</td>
<td>$1,900,000</td>
<td>$4,356,000</td>
<td>$25,223,900</td>
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<td>World financial crisis</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$386,000</td>
<td>$843,000</td>
<td>$2,218,000</td>
<td>$1,817,000</td>
<td>$5,464,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>$843,000</td>
<td>$1,493,000</td>
<td>$682,320</td>
<td>$3,552,320</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$700,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$319,000</td>
<td>$1,015,585</td>
<td>$2,034,585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that, “some military training funds (to Ethiopia), including training in such issues as the laws of war and observance of human rights, also are provided but are explicitly limited to non-lethal assistance and training.”\(^{60}\) This ensures that the US is not party to human rights violations committed with the assistance it provides.

DCS fluctuated after the violence, but except for the 2007 spike, never reached its 2005 levels afterwards. Because DCS is run by civilian companies, this may be a way for the US Government to stay engaged in Ethiopia (in recognition of its strategic location in the Horn of Africa and contribution to Peacekeeping Operations) while still being able to say that they are not (quite as) directly involved in supplying military assistance to repressive governments. In effect, it puts some of the blame on the companies that sell the items, rather the US Government itself, giving the latter a measure of deniability.

**Analysis**

This chapter has come to three main findings:

1. **The US has withheld military aid from Ethiopia in the past as a result of human rights violations. But it was used post facto, and not to prevent future violations.** The US took concrete, though limited, steps in withholding specific military assistance from Ethiopia as a result of Mengistu’s reign (1979-1991), the invasion of Eritrea (1998), post-election violence (2005), and the invasion of Somalia (2006). However, lawmakers unsuccessfully made efforts to enact pre-emptive legislation starting in 2005.

2. In response to previous aid being used to commit human rights violations, and in order to prevent it in the future, the US has shifted the type of military assistance away from lethal aid and towards non-lethal aid. This allows the US to maintain a relationship with Ethiopia, while increasing the likelihood that it does not contribute to human rights violations. This is indicative of policy affecting future programming.

3. The military could do more, but unless civilian leadership enacts legislation withholding this aid, it is not going to happen. Military assistance, one part of foreign aid in general, has long been used as a tool of government for foreign policy, including as a means to influence how a government views human rights. But as a military unit subordinate to civilian leadership, Robert Moeller, former Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations in AFRICOM, notes:

As a military organization, we do not create policy. Rather, we support those policy decisions and coordinate our actions closely with the State Department, U.S. embassies in the region, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. government agencies that have been trusted partners in Africa for decades.

Corollary to that, US military assistance to Ethiopia can serve as an example of programs driving policy: Congress has proven unable to created policies restricting military assistance programs to Ethiopia as a result of acts of repression against their own people. Instead, various funding programs have been decreased and, in the case of IMET, increased, in order to shift funding away from lethal (and potentially repressive) aid and towards non-lethal aid, to include education. Hopefully the positive outcomes of this

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61 Moeller.
program will empower Congress to create policies targeting regimes—even among our allies—that commit human rights abuses.

It can be difficult to use military assistance as a tool of foreign policy when it is hamstrung in Congress by competing interests and overshadowed by arguments about national security concerns. Policy makers must decide if a recipient of military assistance, frequently accused of human rights violations, can leverage a strategic relationship with the US in order to avoid penalties for these violations. Thus far with Ethiopia, this seems to be the case.

Conclusion

Announcing the creation of AFRICOM in 2008, President George W. Bush predicted that it “will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa.” The US military, both before and after the creation of AFRICOM, has been actively involved in the affairs of numerous countries on the continent: those democratically inclined, as well as those clearly repressive. But, as Ethiopia has demonstrated, it is possible to balance security considerations with human rights concerns through the use of military assistance. And, while AFRICOM is ideally placed to implement US foreign policy with regards to human rights violations in Africa, Congress must be willing to enact legislation to restrict military assistance, if needed.

Without question, it is strategically necessary to maintain a working relationship with Ethiopia; there are few areas of Africa more important than the Horn of Africa. But

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this relationship must not be maintained by turning a blind eye to its cost. Human rights are a key component of nation building, and a critical, stated component of US foreign policy since the Carter Administration. Security concerns are extremely important, but the US would be wise to heed Representative Chris Smith’s warning on the US’ relationship with Ethiopia: "We have to be careful that that old maxim — the enemy of my enemy is my friend — does not make us unwitting enablers of abuse."63

CHAPTER SIX: SUDAN—CRAFTING A MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PLAN

Introduction

"The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will remain America's relations with our allies, and our commitment to their security is unshakable. These relationships must be constantly cultivated, not just because they are indispensable for US interests and national security objectives, but because they are fundamental to our collective security."

United National Security Strategy, May 2010

On July 9, 2011, after a referendum vote earlier that year, South Sudan became the newest country in the world. Amid post-independence fighting and on-going violence, the fledgling nation is struggling to establish itself on the world stage. Larger nations concerned about vast oil reserves, Western nations preoccupied about terrorist groups, and others all have reason to be uneasy about how their own national interests may be affected by events there. The United States is no exception.

America has long been involved in the Great Lakes, East Africa, and Horn of Africa regions because of economic and security considerations, and an awareness of Africa’s importance became apparent when, in 2006, DOD created AFRICOM, its second overseas Unified Combatant Command since 1963. Terrorist and extremist groups on the continent include Al-Qaeda in Sudan, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa, and al-Shabaab in Ethiopia. The US Intelligence community continues

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to monitor for indicators of terror attacks like the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. And the instability associated with establishing a new nation can create seams that extremist groups can exploit to further their own strategic objectives. Therefore, the US must make it a top priority to construct a comprehensive military engagement plan—one pillar of an overall engagement strategy—that welcomes the nascent state, builds a mutually beneficial relationship, and continues to further its objectives in this militarily and economically vital part of the world.

But South Sudan lies astride several regions and issues that complicate efforts to simply shoehorn it into an existing policy. Its Christian majority was a major source of the decades-long conflict with predominantly Muslim Sudan. And while South Sudan has the support of black African nations to the south, both for solidarity reasons as well as the potential for oil wealth flowing through their states, Sudan has the support of Arab and Muslim North African and other Middle East nations, making larger regional alignments a further consideration for powers outside Africa.

About 75% of the area’s oil is produced in South Sudan, while the infrastructure for refining it is located in Sudan. Pipelines run north through both counties, and the type of petroleum produced there is in high demand by Asian nations. This lends itself to proxy involvement and influence by nations such as China and Japan, who seek a reliable and affordable source of need-specific oil.² And, the paparazzi-ready crises in Darfur and South Sudan have long garnered international attention, particularly among celebrity activists. Needless to say, the implications of a failed security program are considerable.

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This chapter seeks to identify the greatest challenges to South Sudan’s stability and find examples and best practices of current US military engagement that could address and mitigate these challenges. It will then recommend an engagement plan using these programs. This chapter will argue that, in order to craft the best engagement policy towards South Sudan, establish a mutually beneficial relationship, and do so in a timely manner, the US should use a combination of other engagement plans already used in the region. Any efforts should be synchronized with those of US allies and international bodies, such as the UN, and take third-party actors such as NGOs into account to the maximum extent possible. This can reduce inefficiencies and improve the speed of effective implementation, ultimately improving outcomes for South Sudanese more quickly. However, starting from scratch or using a turnkey engagement plan from another country would be inefficient at best, and disastrous for the country it was designed to help at worst. All effort should be made to avoid both.

Where Does South Sudan Stand Now?

South Sudan can trace the origin of conflict there to several sources. One is that Sudan is predominantly Arab, while South Sudan is mostly non-Arab. This is different from the commonly accepted “Muslim-Christian conflict” paradigm, because Sudan was not simply exploiting and attacking the primarily the black African, Christian, animist South. It was rather continuing to exploit them as non-Arabs, along with Sudan’s “predominantly Muslim groups like the Darfuris in the west, the Bejas in the east, the Nubians in the north and the Nuba in Kordofan.”  

had little in the way of natural resources that Khartoum could exploit, South Sudan contained oil wealth that, when taken by the north, provided a significant percentage of Sudan’s domestic exports revenues.4

South Sudan, understandably opposed to the unremunerated extraction of natural resources located within its borders and seeing little hope for a better future, fought a nearly half-century civil war against Khartoum and its associated militia that left over two million dead and over four million displaced.5 Only with the internationally brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 was there an attempt to definitely resolve a crisis in which one group largely wanted unity and the other equally wanted succession. A successful referendum on independence was held in January 2011, and as a result,

an estimated 3.8 million people, or 97.5% [of those registered], voted in the referendum, which was deemed peaceful and transparent by international observers. According to the South Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC), 98.8% voted for secession.6

Unfortunately, 18 months after the referendum and a year after independence, the problems that resulted from decades of conflict and understandable mistrust still face South Sudan today. Baker identifies the following contemporary sources of this mistrust:


• Oil-revenue sharing: The symbiotic nature of the oil industry in South Sudan (where most oil fields are located) and Sudan (where the refineries are located) necessitate an agreement on how to divide revenues.

• Debt: Sanctions, loans, and excessive spending have saddled Sudan with a debt of $38.7 billion. The question is how much of this debt should be assumed by South Sudan.

• Abeyi: Formerly oil-rich, this border region is fertile ground for cattle-grazing nomads from both sides of the border, and a potential flashpoint.

• Citizenship and migration: An issue for migratory pastoralists, this also concerns Christians from South Sudan living in the Muslim north, especially if President al-Bashir follows through on promises to enact Sharia law.

• Returning refugees: Millions of refugees that fighting over five decades, and their rate of return could put unsustainable pressure on the fledgling government of South Sudan with regards to stress on institutions, natural resources, farmland, etc.

• Infrastructure development: South Sudan may be “the least developed place on Earth,” and for the country to be able to achieve even basic developmental goals, it is necessary to focus on infrastructure development.\(^7\)

It is by addressing these issues that Sudan and South Sudan may be able to improve trust, and move forward with a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship.

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rather than continue direct diplomatic confrontation, in addition to indirect, kinetic proxy involvement by militias.\(^8\)

Mitigating these problems will require extensive effort by the international community, such as material and diplomatic support, as well as pressure on the governments of both Khartoum and Juba. There are also aspects of these issues that can be addressed and mitigated via a military engagement plan. It is through this that the US military, with its extensive reach, unique skill sets, and significant resources can make a difference in the stability and security of South Sudan.

**What Do Military Engagement Plans Consist Of?**

In order to decide how best to implement a military engagement plan, it is necessary to identify the components of such an engagement, identify successful regional examples, and apply those examples to South Sudan. Although there are many aspects of military engagement, this chapter will focus on three most necessary for the challenges that South Sudan faces:

- Training programs and professionalization of the military
- Anti-terrorism/Counter-terrorism programs
- Infrastructure Development

In none of the countries where any of these programs are currently implemented by the US military are *all* of these programs implemented with the same levels of efficiency of effectiveness. As a result, the US should not look to a single country as a template for engagement. One should note that none of the programs is without controversy either; there is no place in the world where the US military is engaged where

\(^8\) Strategy Page.
there is not criticism. But by looking across all military domains in order to build a
turnkey program of engagement, it may be possible to create what is best for South
Sudan, while still supporting US interests in the region, without “reinventing the wheel”
at a higher cost, using increased resources, with slower implementation.

Training Programs and the Professionalization of the Military

South Sudan had a standing army, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA), for years before it gained its independence. The SPLA was, for the most part, a
legitimate force by the four criteria set forth by the Hague Regulations in 1899.\(^9\)
However, the US has the ability to provide training to the SPLA that can make it a more
effective military, more respectful of human rights and the law of war, result in more
stability, and allow long-term influence by the US, to the benefit of both.

Effective Military

Foreign officers who attend middle and upper-level staff colleges in the US, such
as the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, are
exposed to the same level of training as senior officers in the American military who will
soon command battalions, brigades, and divisions. Because of the limited number of
seats available at these schools, only a nation’s best and brightest are chosen, as they are
frequently being groomed for higher positions. Colonel John Burbank, program director
for the US Army War College’s International Fellows (IF) program said:

\(^9\) “1) To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 2) To have a fixed
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 3) To carry arms openly; and 4) To conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” It is the last point that would take
away from their legitimacy, but few armies fight without some incidents that would call this into
question. For more, see International Committee of the Red Cross, “Practice Relating to Rule 4.
Definition of Armed Forces,” http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule4 (accessed
Well over half of our IF class will become general officers in their nation’s armed forces or are currently general officers right now. A significant number will become Army Chief of Staff, or Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff equivalents.\textsuperscript{10}

The collegial relationship between senior officers, and the prestige that attending such a program bestows on foreign exchange officers affords a credibility—both within their own armies and with partner nations—lacking in armies without this level of training. This can also facilitate stronger regional partnerships as a result of the shared experiences.\textsuperscript{11} A total of 112 nations have sent some 1053 officers to the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania since 1978,\textsuperscript{12} and there are currently 12 African countries represented in the 2013 class, though neither Sudan nor South Sudan have students in attendance. This is a gap that can be addressed immediately to the benefit of the military in Juba.

**Human Rights**

In a civil war characterized by war crimes on both sides of the fight, in order for the SPLA to gain and retain legitimacy in the eyes of the world, there must be an institutionalization of human rights and respect for law. This is especially true if human rights violations continue by Sudan and the threat of destabilization through retaliation remains. The US military is prohibited by the Leahy Amendment from proving any


\textsuperscript{11} Author’s conversation with COL John Burbank, Director, International Fellows Program, US Army War College, July 30, 2012.

training, whether overseas or at American bases stateside, to countries, military units, or individuals that stand accused of human rights violations, but the US can engage those with a clean record to provide this valuable training.\textsuperscript{13} The UN has already established some training programs in South Sudan focused on human rights,\textsuperscript{14} and the US has, in the past, instituted rigorous human rights training program into existing military schools. This came into place after graduates of the US Army’s Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC, formerly the School of the Americas), from several Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s, were accused of human rights violations upon returning to their home countries.\textsuperscript{15} As long as the US holds South Sudan accountable for human rights violations,\textsuperscript{16} makes military aid contingent on a more positive human rights record,\textsuperscript{17} and provides the opportunity for South Sudanese officers

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to attend human rights training, there may be the possibility to improve human rights outcomes from the start.

**Increased Stability**

Any training program should stress subordination to civilian authority and the proper importance of civil-military relations, in the image of a Western liberal democracy like the United States. This could cause a break from the norm in Africa of a military that is a powerbroker, kingmaker, or destabilizing force. Channeling Kant, this approach to stability seeks “solutions to conflict and issues of governance through...applications of moral conduct and law.” Thus, Neo-Kantians “see a ‘world of progress’ and seek solutions through the application/evolution of liberal democracies.”\(^\text{18}\) If the West is truly hoping for a liberal democracy to develop in South Sudan, and given Africa’s history of coups d’état, then institutionalizing the ideas of subordination to civilian authorities and adherence to rule of law for the military should be an important first step. Fukuyama noted, “political ideas, along with their associated values and belief systems, play critical roles in determining the future.”\(^\text{19}\) Given South Sudan’s shaky start, it is an idea that must take root if the future is to be brighter.

**Long-Term Influence**

Providing training to junior and mid-career officers also allows for an appropriate influence over these officers once they return to their home country. The Egyptian military’s behind-the-scenes role as a power broker has been proffered as a reason why

\(^{18}\) Peter VanArsdale and Derrin Smith, *Humanitarians in Hostile Territory* (Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2010), 79-80.

\(^{19}\) Ibid, 80.
they did not intervene during the Arab Spring in 2011. However, as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman stated, International Military Exchange Training (IMET) to Egypt “was invaluable in maintaining our relationships with Egypt’s military and civil society during the recent events there.”

As such, there is also the possibility that the significant cadre of military personnel trained by the US—some 4,200 total—contributed to the restraint and professionalism they showed. More broadly, the connections made between US military officers and foreign officers such as those from African can, through continued interaction after leaving an academic setting, “prevent security vacuums in the region and promote a reliable element of stability for regional populaces.”

For the population in South Sudan, this would be a stability that has been lacking for decades.

There have only been five Sudanese military officers who have benefitted from training by the United States, but the last one attended in 1990. If the US is able to ramp up its exchange programs with the new cohort of South Sudanese officers, it will be


able to develop a network, a cadre of officers, which the US may be able to appropriately influence during times of crisis, and later as they rise to positions of power in the military and government, towards continued positive outcomes in the future.

Anti-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism (AT/CT) Programs

The three major terrorist groups operating in Africa are Boko Haram (Nigeria), al-Shabaab (Somalia), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. General Carter Ham, the Commander of AFRICOM, said, “Each of these organizations is, by itself, a dangerous and worrisome threat. But what really concerns me is that the three organizations are seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts.”

Obviously, a concerted effort by Muslim extremists with the Khartoum-backed militias such as the South Sudanese Liberation Army (SSLA) could contribute to greater destabilization of its southern neighbor.

There is also potential for more involvement for groups not traditionally associated with the region. Speaking about alleged Iranian involvement in the area, “Israel's ambassador to the UN said that Israel was worried that West Africa had become a hub for Hezbollah, Lebanon's fiercely anti-Israeli, Iranian-backed party-cum-militia.”

However, existing programs on the African continent demonstrate best practices for crafting an anti-terrorism/counter-terrorism engagement plan for South Sudan.

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In Kenya, the US State Department-run Anti-Terrorism Agency (ATA) has provided over $3.2 million towards training efforts, including courses such as Preventing, Investigating and Interdicting Acts of Terrorism (PIIAT), Cyber-Terrorism Instruction, Combating Domestic and Transnational Terrorism, and Police Executive Role in Combating Terrorism.\(^{27}\) Most importantly, although some of the training in border protection has focused on Kenya’s extensive shoreline, there has also been significant effort to help the government in Nairobi strengthen its land borders, sharing a frontier as it does with Somalia.\(^{28}\) This may help alleviate concerns in South Sudan where the porous and disputed border region it shares with Sudan has been the source of much of the violence.

More widely, the US has contributed to AT/CT through regional organizations hosting training and other programmatic initiatives. The Trans-Sahel region, where al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist forces are suspected of basing their operations, has been the focus of this as the US military has extensive training operations in AT/CT. Started in 2005, “the initiative, with proposed funding of $500 million over seven years, covers Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia.”\(^{29}\)


There are 13 other multi-national operations held on the continent, including Operations “Flintlock” and “Cutlass Express.” These two exercises provide training by US and European Special Operations Forces (SOF), who specialize in AT/CT, to their African counterparts for whom the risk of terrorist attacks are very real. Inviting South Sudan to participate in these exercises would not only expose their tactical and operational unit-level officers to their colleagues from the Trans-Sahel region, but also facilitate the sharing of information, building relationships, and communicating best practices in anti-terrorism/counter-terrorism operations.

Infrastructure Development

Decades of fighting left South Sudan with only a shell of the infrastructure it needs to support its population of 10 million, including a mere 60km of roads in a country the size of Texas, and electricity provided almost exclusively by generator. Where a government has not been able to provide for basic needs and services, terror groups such as al-Qaeda and the FARC in Columbia have been able to make inroads; focusing on infrastructure and capacity development and reducing inequality is necessary for any government—of any age—to reduce the influence of extremists.


The US has significantly increased the use of Civil Affairs (CA) teams around the world, and in Africa in particular, as a means of doing just that. CA teams bring specialized skill sets to key cities, regions, or countries in order to address the problems unique to each of them. Some examples include Veterinary Civic Action Projects (VET-CAPs) in Tanzania, Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) in Djibouti, and Medical Outreach Programs in Mali.\textsuperscript{33} South Sudan faces significant problems with water rights and nomadic grazing, refugees and displaced persons camps, road infrastructure, among others. The use of CA teams can help mitigate these problems.

Water rights and the nomadic grazing that they support are also a source of conflict and suffering in South Sudan. Water and pasture resources are extremely limited for both the Sudanese-backed (and armed) Muslim Misseriya and South Sudanese backed Dinka tribes that traditionally graze their livestock near the border.\textsuperscript{34} Concurrently, decades of fighting have disrupted the harvest cycle, forcing rival tribes to concentrate in some of the same areas, therefore vying for the few resources available to them. This has resulted in severe fighting, deaths, and pushed thousands of refugees from provinces like Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile into already overburdened camps.\textsuperscript{35}


Exacerbating the violence are retaliatory raids for both cattle and women, which only fuel competition and conflict in both populations. Civil Affairs teams could be used to help drill wells and access other sources of water, as has already been done in Ethiopia and Uganda. By making sufficient water sources available to both groups, it could facilitate increased agricultural and herding outcomes. Additionally, the CA teams may be able to help develop agricultural projects, increasing productivity and output, and driving down prices. This may result in more stability, decreased fighting, fewer refugees, and greater health outcomes.

Refugees are an enormous problem in South Sudan today, with ongoing fighting regularly displacing hundreds of thousands of people.

Clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North have driven thousands of residents of South Kordofan across the border...Similar attacks are also ongoing in Blue Nile, driving over 113,000 people from their homes and into South Sudan’s Upper Nile state.

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40 Nelson.
With existing camps swelling well beyond capacity, the strain on sanitation, aid flow, and camp infrastructure can result in disease, starvation, and death. But CA teams elsewhere have a background in establishing and expanding refugee camps to a sustainable level until the host country government can take control or the situation is resolved. In March 1991, Civil Affairs teams helped work with almost 500,000 Kurdish refugees in the wake of Operation Desert Storm, later called “the largest humanitarian assistance operation since the Berlin Airlift.”

Other examples include Haiti and more recently, Kosovo.

Finally, road infrastructure must be strengthened in South Sudan. The government in Juba has already repaired 7,000 kilometers of roads since 2005, and built another 2,000 kilometers of “feeder roads” to bring agricultural areas into the network. Additionally, South Sudan has plans in the works for an extensive, 192-kilometer road system, linking the country to Uganda; the project will be funded by $225 million from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Civil Affairs teams can assist in this effort by helping smaller rural areas link to the rapidly developing road network so they can access aid and trade. Over 80% of the South Sudanese population lives in rural

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areas, and 78% rely on small-scale farming or animal husbandry as their main livelihood.\textsuperscript{45} A 2001 study by the World Bank indicated that benefits of access to road networks to rural areas included:

- “Improved accessibility to social infrastructure [schools and health centers];
- Increased opportunities to access education and health facilities and improved social interaction and mobility, which are important for social and economic development;
- Improved access to markets by reducing transport costs;
- Improvement of the marketability of perishable goods through timely and cheaper transport that will provide a direct incentive for more market-oriented agriculture, with more profitable cash crops, an increase in rural income and also additional employment opportunities.”\textsuperscript{46}

If the above improvements are realized, it could prevent the population from becoming disaffected and disenfranchised, the very situations that extremist groups seek when recruiting members. And, by working with Civil Affairs teams, the government in Juba could gain legitimacy and credibility with the local population as in some places in Afghanistan: “The (Civil Affairs unit) fronts the money, provided by U.S. taxpayers; U.S. civilian engineers...draw up the plans; local contractors do the work; and the Afghan


government takes the credit.”

For a fledgling state like South Sudan, as well as any nation seeking to work with it, it should be a very viable option.

Unfortunately, it is not just physical infrastructure that is in shambles in South Sudan, but also public administration. There can also be a dearth of timely information necessary for follow-on diplomatic and development efforts. To address these gaps, another potential asset could be what VanArsdale and Smith have referred to as “Diplomatic Expeditionary Field Teams” (DEFTs). Evolved from existing Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), DEFTs would serve as a “force multiplier” much in the same way as CA teams, albeit with a diplomatic orientation.

While some areas would welcome teams of military personnel, others may associate them with the violence of the civil war; in this case, DEFTs may have an advantage precisely because they are not military. Additionally, the number of requests that locals make of CA teams might result in frustration at the amount of time necessary to complete them. But DEFTs, able to move more quickly as they gather data, could help vet projects, increasing the efficiency of the CA teams. Finally, as personnel with diplomatic status, meeting with local stakeholders “would provide an added measure of official credibility to projects requested by local populations an regional authorities.”


48 VanArsdale and Smith, 273-275.

49 Ibid, 274.
While this “grassroots diplomacy” may not show the same immediate effects as drilling a well or grading a road, the seeds planted by DEFTs will undoubtedly pay notable dividends in establishing a more effective public administration in South Sudan.

Spoilers

There are no shortage of spoilers to a properly crafted military engagement plan between the US and South Sudan, and those who stand to benefit from an unstable government in Juba (or wherever the capital ends up). Not the least are those in Khartoum, as this would keep the South Sudanese dependent on them for the export of petroleum. A stable government there would allow the new nation to establish export infrastructure and establish stronger economic ties and with other, more friendly African neighbors to the south, namely Kenya and Uganda. A recent report noted:

> Already, Kenyan-owned Equity Bank has negotiated with the government of South Sudan its interest in oil development, and numerous foreign investment institutions have explored using Kenyan banks as intermediaries for ventures in South Sudan. In addition, Kenyan leaders envision prime markets for Kenyan exports in South Sudan.  

Sudan will have to carefully consider the consequences of a continued strong-armed approach to South Sudanese oil. Bully Juba too much, and she may exclusively seek

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petroleum export infrastructure with Kenya and Uganda. This will greatly decrease Sudan’s own coffers, as 50% of domestic revenue and 93% of exports come from oil.\(^{52}\)

Israel was one of the first countries to recognize South Sudan after independence. In January 2012 South Sudan shut down production of petroleum over price disputes. The dispute was not clarified until July 2012. Juba then signed an agreement with Israel covering mostly water issues (some reports state that there are also arms deals involved), however “the new agreement with Israel could potentially allow South Sudan to transfer its oil to Israeli refineries.”\(^{53}\) As Iran has sided with Khartoum—“where the government promised to strengthen economic ties, oil exploration included”—this could also be a source of both tension and proxy conflict between two countries seen concurrently as a US ally and a threat.\(^{54}\)

**Conclusion**

There is no lack of potential pitfalls in forming a military engagement plan with any country, such as when China and the US frequently clash over the sale of arms to Pacific Rim countries.\(^{55}\) Like any aspect of foreign policy, military engagement must

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take into account not only the immediate benefits, but also calculate the medium — and long—term effects, its impact on immediate and regional neighbors, and other unintended consequences. Competitors can view a particular aspect of engagement as a direct or indirect threat, while allies may demonstrate a type of “engagement envy.” These considerations must be foremost in the mind of civil and military planners as they continue to develop the nascent relationship with South Sudan.

However, there are sufficient examples of successful military engagement plans today that it need not be crafted from scratch. By pulling together applicable aspects of engagement, it may be possible to create an effective, comprehensive, and timely (which is not to say rushed) military engagement plan that contributes to stability in South Sudan and the surrounding region, benefits the US and her allies, and does not heighten existing tensions with Sudan or others working in the region. This chapter has demonstrated that the US can develop a strategy that provides training in institutionalization of human rights and respect for law (though not discussed in detail), resources for anti-terrorism/counter-terrorism programs, and assistance in infrastructure and capacity development, all based on “best practices” culled from existing programs. It is with such as comprehensive military engagement plan—one pillar of an overall engagement strategy—that the US can welcome the nascent state, build a mutually beneficial relationship, and continue to further its objectives in this militarily and economically vital part of the world.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Part One of this thesis has argued that benevolent dictatorships and autocratic elites can provide for improved state capacity, by measuring the performance of African states. In the first chapter, it examined Rwanda to establish whether or not the country was actually “working,” as well as if this performance could be attributed to the post-conflict government of President Paul Kagame. It also examined how the US Government, in supporting one side in a conflict and despite the potential civil and human rights abuses, can possibly prevent a civil war, or at least limit the tragedies associated with it.

This thesis then explored the process by which autocracies can facilitate positive outcomes and contribute to improved state capacity by looking at the cases of Ethiopia and Somalia. It also measured how these dictatorships develop state capacity to provide for justice and citizen well-being. Next, it proposed unconventional metrics by which the Democratic Republic of Congo—arguably one of the worst performing countries on the planet in many categories—may be assessed. It identified modest success stories that can be attributed to the Kabila regime, and prospective sources of improvements with regards to resource management. These could then be used to drive state capacity and bring up other performance indicators.

The first section is not the centerpiece of the study, but rather forms the basis upon which a holistic, informed military engagement plan could be crafted. This thesis
assumes that the US—particularly in a post-conflict environment—will not always have the privilege of engaging a country with the government that it wants, but rather will find itself engaging the government that the country has. As such, knowing the most effective way to engage an existing system—autocratic warts and all—has obvious benefits.

Part Two thus builds on the findings of the previous section and looks at how the US Government could leverage military engagement plans in order to facilitate more positive outcomes. A chapter examining programs in Ethiopia looked at attempts to leverage assistance to shape outcomes by repressive elites. And a final chapter used the example of South Sudan to make several programmatic recommendations for military planners about how to craft military engagement plans with African nations, even if they are not fully democratic.

Critics will undoubtedly voice concerns with a number of aspects of this approach, such as the limited number of case studies involved before drawing a conclusion. Admittedly, none of the results of the country studies presented here are sufficient to merit an across-the-board application in Africa. Each of the examples given is a single case study and neither fit the criteria for Eckstein’s “crucial case study” (1975), nor Gerring’s “pathway case” (2007). For Eckstein, “a case is crucial in the strongest sense when...no other theory can explain the facts of that case;” a situation which he admits rarely applies. The “pathway case” serves “not to confirm or disconfirm a causal hypothesis...but rather to clarify a hypothesis;” in this case, the hypothesis must already be well established. The case studies here most closely resemble Eckstein’s
“most likely” corollary to the crucial case study, and are most valuable for our purposes as such.¹

Due to space constraints, I have limited the scope of the study to simply US engagement plans in reaction to the findings. As such, it does not address the impact that input from countries outside the US—namely China—would likely have on policy makers’ decisions. Nor does it attempt to examine the question of how and when the US should get involved in the affairs of other nations within the context of a multi-national approach (such as through the UN or AU). In a real-world case, the US would likely couch its approach within a larger construct (such as the UN or NATO), but this is a matter for subsequent research. But the current length of this thesis, given its US-only construct, should indicate the volume necessary to include more stakeholders in an analysis.

There are limited examples of benevolent dictatorships (albeit numerous façade democracies, with a dearth of legitimate elections, and ineffective or non-existent opposition), which brings into question the generalizability of the findings herein. It saves for later the topic of why elites would choose to be benevolent rather than predatory. Additionally, it does not address how the US can predict the level of benevolence a dictator will demonstrate, only that, because many countries in Africa are less than fully democratic, it is useful to examine how to best engage them. Finally, there is always the challenge of measuring how benevolent a dictator is, or if one is “benevolent enough.”

This paper does not seek to endorse authoritarian, repressive governments, but it does

find that when they use their powers for some greater good such as state capacity building, and not purely for the sake of wielding power, a benevolent dictatorship can indeed facilitate positive outcomes and great state capacity.

Individual cases also seem to present flaws. Few autocrats—by definition—are going to be fully benevolent, and the 1994 Genocide may have provided such a shock to the collective systems of Rwandans that Kagame’s approach to governing has worked there where it might not in the absence of a similar impetus. Ethiopia serves as a proxy for countries in Africa that have vast reserves of natural resources but, unfortunately, also a government with elites that are more repressive and less benevolent. As such, these reserves are not leveraged for the people, and the potential for improvement is lost. The chapter on Somalia hypothesizes that only a true dictator may be strong enough to overcome the fundamental but ultimately destabilizing role of the clan system.

Academics and pedestrians alike can argue for which is worse: the current failed state of the country and accompanying decades of violence, or a dictatorship like that of Siad Barre.

The DRC’s past experiences with natural resources—indeed, the history of conflict there is inextricably linked to conflict minerals—does not seem to support the theory presented here that embryonic success in the areas of mining, timber, and wildlife programs can be leveraged towards more positive outcomes. But if Kabila’s government is making some progress, with the potential for more, it would be a lost opportunity to not take advantage of this in order to develop the state’s capacity.

With regards to what can be done with this insight, critics will point out that even after evidence of human rights abuses emerged, America’s post-9/11 world-view eroded
her political resolve to restrict the flow of military aid to Ethiopia. However, this paper
found that despite weakened legislative support, the US Departments of State and
Defense found a way to effectively shift the nature of this aid, which may have a positive
effect on abuses in the long term. This undoubtedly sends mixed signals to other
countries about what the US is willing to tolerate in its partners. But it won’t make
abuses any worse, and some countries will undoubtedly receive the message that there
will be some price for such violations.

Finally, South Sudan, not unlike Rwanda after the Genocide, may present a set of
circumstances that are truly unique and might facilitate a successful military engagement
plan. The problem arises when the circumstances are so unique that they do not apply
elsewhere. However, while South Sudan presents an opportunity as a new nation with a
proverbial blank slate, conceptually the principles remain the same: there can be no
boiler-plate solution when the US is deciding how to interact with another country. This
is particularly true with regards to military engagement in Africa, given the prevalence of
military-led coups d’état and military governments there.² Stability can come from a
professional military subordinate to a civilian government and accountable for its actions,
but history does not seem to indicate that this type of government will develop
organically.

More relevant than a criticism of the overall approach I have proposed is the
general concept contained herein: standard metrics of performance only seem to indicate
that things in Africa continue to go poorly, and the ways that the West and others have

² Monty and Donna Marshall, “Coups d’État: 1946-2010,” Center for Systemic Peace, June 15,
approached “solving” problems in Africa as a result do not seem to have worked. As such, it is necessary to find other ways to assess the performance of countries in Africa, to validate whether this is truly the case or not. If the situation there really is that bad, then the approach needs to be changed regardless, lest they continue to practice Einstein’s misattributed definition of insanity.\(^3\) However, if it is not the case, and there are other performance metrics which seem to indicate state capacities are better developed than previously assumed, it may be possible for outside actors to capitalize on these and leverage them towards more positive outcomes. The consequences for failing to do so are dire, yet unfortunately, not unexpected: “As state capacity erodes and weaker states emerge, the propensity for insecurity within and across African states intensifies, leading to serious challenges for maintaining peace.”\(^4\)

Few people who study Africa doubt its potential. A recent McKinsey & Company white paper reported several findings that others have touched on or predicted for years:

- Africa's growth acceleration was widespread, with 27 of its 30 largest economies expanding more rapidly after 2000.
- Future economic growth will be supported by Africa's increasing ties to the global economy.
- Africa's economic growth is creating substantial new business opportunities that are often overlooked by global companies.

\(^3\) “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”

• Today the rate of return on foreign investment in Africa is higher than in any other developing region.\(^5\)

But it is not just in economic realms that Africa shows potential. In governance, the Ibrahim Index found that “Just over half of the countries in Africa have improved in overall governance quality, and just under half have declined,” a statement that on the surface, is not one to celebrate. But as a subset of this figure, 48 countries made improvements to “Human Development,” and 38 countries made improvements to “Sustainable Economic Opportunity.”\(^6\) If a benevolent or well-intentioned government does not provide for full freedom and liberty, but facilitates improvements in the lives of everyday citizens, that may indeed be an improvement that can be continued with enlightened intervention.

Africa has failed to enjoy the same level of development as other poverty-stricken regions of the world.\(^7\) It would seem that a continent with such gross amounts of natural resources—not to mention much strategically vital geography—would be able to leverage both to achieve even greater gains than countries like China and India did in the 1980s. But this has clearly not been the case, and a serious effort towards improving the daily


lives of Africans must take a different tack than previous ones. As the World Bank wrote, “If Africa is to have a well-functioning public sector there needs to be a paradigm shift in how to analyze and build state capacity.” By doing so, it may finally be possible to identify new methodologies and avenues for assessing and subsequently improving the situation in Africa. Donors and benefactors deserve better from the execution of the efforts they support and resources they provide; for Africans, their situation could hardly get much worse.

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Appendix A

Key Variables

Stability: “Stability” is defined as a continuity of governance at all levels, with little “likelihood that the established government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”1 Put more simply, there will be no “unscheduled” changes of government, and that when it is time for a ruling party to depart, as dictated by elections, constitutional mandate, or other means, they will do so peacefully.

Security: “Security” is defined as having limited threats, both domestically and externally, to Rwandan citizens’ physical welfare (the most important immediate need for Rwandans—or anyone in these circumstances—in the wake of the Civil War and Genocide). While they sound similar, “stability” addresses attempts at destabilizing or overthrowing the government, while “security” addresses various attempts targeting the people of that country.

Improved Welfare: Initially less pressing than security concerns, but as important or perhaps more so in the long run, “improved welfare” is defined by the other, more abstract issues a nation needs to address for its people to believe that things are getting better. This includes the metrics that can be hardest to measure (improvements to education and health, expanding freedom of press), but that conceptually capture if life is improving.

Key Operational Definitions

“Dictatorship”: I will be using the definition of Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their 1965 classic, Totalitarianism, Dictatorship, and Autocracy. In it, a dictatorship is “taken as a mutually supportive organic entity” that is made up of the following: “an elaborating guiding ideology; a single mass party, typically led by a dictator; a system of terror; a monopoly of the means of communication and physical force; and central direction, and control of the economy through state planning.”²

One component of this “system of terror,” which includes all the means and methods a dictator uses to create fear, is a carefully scripted and thoroughly executed “culture of terror.” This is frequently accomplished by creating “parallel security systems,” outside the normal “chain of command” and loyal and answerable to the dictator himself. In Malawi, Dr. Hastings Banda created institutions such as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), the Women’s League, and others allowing him to serve as “President for Life” from 1961-1994.³ It can also happen when a dictator eliminates any opposition, especially if he perceives it emanating from within the groups that helped him come to power. After all, if one were willing to remove those who supported your ascent, what would one not be willing to do to stay in

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power? It is the institutionalization of this fear or terror that largely differentiates dictators from benevolent dictators.

“Benevolent Dictatorship”

The idea of a “benevolent dictator” will serve as the construct for this study. A benevolent dictator is a ruler who does not necessarily follow democratic principles, but who uses his absolute power to better the lives of his citizens and improve their existence. This is similar to the idea of “Enlightened Absolutism,” first put forth in the late 19th century by German historians.4 For a benevolent dictatorship to work, the ruler must truly act in the best interests of the citizens of that country, even if they do not put themselves in a position to be removed from power.

Benevolent dictators may also work towards the “greater good” as opposed to just the “public good.” Though seemingly similar, these two terms carry starkly different connotations that a dictator of any inclination can manipulate for his own good. While a population may call for elections with full participation by all, thus making it for the “public good,” a dictator may believe (and therefore, act on his belief) that his country is not ready for an election; he would therefore be acting in the realm of the “greater good,” or “what is best for the nation.” In the case of Ethiopia, Mengistu used torture, clearly not in the public good, which was “justified to enhance the greater good.”

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Some example outcomes of this behavior include declaring that a certain amount of taxes will be collected; that a certain amount of GDP will be spent on health or education; prohibiting plastic grocery bags throughout a country to reduce pollution, etc. Generally, these actions are ones that would either not come before a committee or panel for discussion because of their perceived insignificance, or would take a long time to debate and would end up being passed in a different form than they were proposed.

A benevolent dictator, acting in the best interests of his people, will not put his ideas up for debate, but rather simply declare them law so that they can gain greater, more immediate traction. Of course, one must be wary of any kind of dictator, as Lord Acton was right when he said, “Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”5 But a benevolent dictatorship may be “the best of what’s available” when it comes to Africa.

“Nation”: A “nation” will be defined as a people and not a delineated geographical area (though we often refer to countries as “nations”). A nation is a population with such character traits as a common language, an ethnic identity outside of any land boundaries (for example, the Kurdish nation that currently resides in Southern Turkey, Northeast Iraq, and Northwest Iran), and a common history or “story” that binds them together. Nations are much more important in Africa since “states” were external creations, often ignoring the cultural delineations of the nations that already resided there.

5 Professor Guy Burgess, in e-mail message to author, October 29, 2011.
“State”: Simply put, a state is a formal polity “that is sovereign over its members and occupies a well-defined territory. It is the formal apparatus of authoritative roles and law norms through which that sovereignty is exercised.” Of note, this definition makes no mention of a common language, history, or identity. It is dictators that rule over a state, but it is the nations in his state with which he must contend.

“Product (The End State or Outcome)”: The product will be defined as the results of a dictatorship (in the areas of stability and security, economy, health, education, the political process) on a state and its citizens.

**Indicator Variables**

1. **Basic needs**: Improvement to education (Education expenditures as a percentage of GDP, literacy rates, % of teachers that are trained), health (life expectancy, infant mortality rates, malnutrition, access to water), and economic security (Human Development Index, per capita GDP).

2. **Basic freedoms**: Freedom of speech (*Reporters sans Frontières*’ Press Freedom Index), stability and security (Foreign Policy’s “Failed States Index”), the perception of “honest government” (Corruption Perception Index, Democracy Index).

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