Japanese Worldviews, Ideologies, and Foreign Aid Policy

Richard Warren Shannon
University of Denver

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JAPANESE WORLDVIEWS, IDEOLOGIES, AND FOREIGN AID POLICY

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies
University of Denver

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

By

Richard W. Shannon

November 2008

Advisor: Joseph S. Szyliowicz
DEDICATION

For my parents, Warren and Jean Shannon, whose love and continuing support enabled me to complete the project, and for Suzuki Miyoko, who first showed me the beauty, sensitivity and love of the Japanese people when I studied in Kyoto as a young student.
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ABSTRACT

This project studies the ideational factors influencing Japanese foreign aid policy. It builds on previous research in political science on perception and foreign policy decision-making, Japanese political economy, economic and technological development, foreign aid, and in anthropology on perception, worldview, and international development.

The main goal of the research is to answer the question of how Japan’s historical experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations (and key leaders’ views of those areas) from 1850 to 1945 have influenced current aid policies. Second, the project aims to answer whether the Japanese development concepts of “modernization,” internationalization and translative adaptation accurately reflect Japan’s own experience. Third, the project asks how spirituality and religion may be influencing current aid policies.

In the research, I review key contexts of Japan’s historical experience from 1850 to 1945 in several important areas. I also study the beliefs and worldviews (cognitive frameworks) of seven key Japanese leaders for the same period: Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Kato Hiroyuki, Yanagita Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito. I analyze these historical experiences and leaders’ views through analytical concepts and lenses from political science, anthropology, and economics, in three main areas: development, technology, and cognition.
Among my key findings are that there is much continuity between Japan’s prewar culture of politics and the postwar system, including examples and ideas, which shape the policy environment in which Japan’s aid operates. Many of these are negative in nature, and some are ideas based on Japan’s own development experience. Several key lessons emerge, including the importance of: 1) a strong civil society to prevent abusive politics for the achievement of Japan’s national interests, whether in its prewar politics or the current aid system; 2) a strong, effective state for encouraging successful development; 3) Japan’s development experience for other regions (if carefully applied); and 4) the concept of translative adaptation, the idea that each nation’s development must be customized for its own conditions and experiences. I conclude that Japan needs better consideration of ground level factors in its assessments of ODA policy and international affairs.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my advisor, Joseph Szyliowicz, for much practical guidance, clear thinking, and a keen sense of humor as we discussed many details of politics, technology, and development. Several anthropologist colleagues engaged me in stimulating conversations about anthropological issues: Richard Clemmer-Smith, Sarah Hamilton, Angelique Haugerud, and Peter Van Arsdale. I thank Peter for his continual encouragement, advice, and critiques, on many levels. I greatly appreciate Haider Khan for many discussions on Japan and its foreign aid system, and Nakagawa Junji of the University of Tokyo for his advice on Japanese aid and historical periods. Gregory J. Moore, William F. Turner, and Mary Heathman gave great moral support as I progressed through the Ph.D. program at the University of Denver. The Japan Program of the Social Science Research Foundation allowed me to attend the 2004 Japan Studies Doctoral Dissertation Workshop, where I received valuable feedback. The Japan Studies Association provided a fellowship so I could present one chapter of the work in Honolulu in January 2008. Michael Woodward, the staff and seminarians of the Cardinal Stafford Theological Library (Denver) provided a warm, friendly environment where I cloistered myself for the last two years of writing. Charol Messenger, Mary E. Baker and Therese Tamburello helped with final typing. I also thank Susan Rivera, University of Denver, for her support throughout my study there. Finally, I am grateful to my parents for their love and unending support over many years as I persevered through many challenges.
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<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHN</td>
<td>Basic Human Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDBRD</td>
<td>European Development Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Planning Agency, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal year (economic term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>InterAmerican Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFO</td>
<td>International Financial Operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the new JBIC division of the new Japan Finance Corporation (JFC) (part of the latter as of October 1, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBIC</td>
<td>Japan Bank for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Japan Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOCV</td>
<td>Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, now part of JICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less developed country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLDCs</td>
<td>The least among the less developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METI</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan (formerly MITI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan (former name of METI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly industrializing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTCA</td>
<td>Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, Japan (forerunner of JICA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECF</td>
<td>Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECO</td>
<td>Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), joined the new, reformed JICA agency on October 1, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OOF</td>
<td>Other official flows (aid-related term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Private flows (aid-related term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSPs</td>
<td>Poverty-reduction strategy papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSIF</td>
<td>Private Sector Investment Finance, a part of OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Scientific or technological research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIDA</td>
<td>Research Institute for Development Assistance, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WID</td>
<td>Women in development</td>
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Part One

Introductory Perspectives
Chapter 1

Introduction

Introduction: Research Problem

Over the last century, Japan amazed the world with its economic development and technology, and initiated the world's largest foreign aid budget in 1989. Political science and economics have generated much knowledge about various aspects of Japanese technology, development and foreign aid, but until recently, there has been relatively little anthropological exploration of these phenomena. This project helps to fill that gap by surveying the broad contexts of Japan's experience with these areas from 1850 to 1945, examining the historical and ideological antecedents of Japanese foreign aid during the pre-aid period, from the dawn of Japan’s modern age (the point of the restoration of Japan’s open relations with the whole world) to just before the start of Japan’s aid programs in the aftermath of the nation’s defeat in World War II. Understanding this background will help us better comprehend what Japan’s massive aid

---

1 Note on Japanese names and pronunciation of the Japanese language: throughout the main body of this dissertation, when referring to Japanese names, I list them in the Japanese order, with family name listed first, and personal name second, i.e. Tanaka Hiroshi. When listing Japanese names in footnotes and the bibliography, however, the American order has been followed. Guide for pronouncing certain vowels in Japanese: the use of the following symbol over the letter o (ô), creates a double length vowel. For example, instead of saying keimo, where the o is said for one beat, one says keimô, with the o pronounced for two beats, like “keimoh.” This is also true for the following vowels as well: a (becomes â), i (becomes î), u (û), and e (ê).
program does, and why. My aim is to take a sounding of some of the most important historical trends and contexts surrounding Japan’s experience with technology, development and foreign relations, and the views of several important leaders about those trends from 1850 to 1945, to try to understand their evolution over time, and finally, their relationship with contemporary Japanese aid policy. An understanding of Japanese aid, within a historical view of foreign policy and ideas of development, will also greatly enrich our understanding of contemporary globalization processes. Cultural anthropology and political science are ideal, complementary approaches for this work. Using these disciplines, issues as diverse as technonational ideologies, development, policy, and cultural relations can be assessed over time.

In the first section of this chapter I introduce key concepts that underlie the research, including development, technology, worldview and related cognitive concepts. I also discuss the value of studying (leaders’) worldviews for connecting history and policy, the centrality of religion and spirituality in worldview issues and their relation to Japanese aid, and the influence of contexts on worldviews and the key themes of the research. Next I consider how to link ideologies, history and policy outcomes, and how Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations influences its

---

2 By this, I mean globalization in the form of foreign aid emanating from a non-Western source: Japan. For more on the types of globalization flowing from Japan, see Harumi Befu and Sylvie Guichard-Anguis, Globalizing Japan: Ethnography of the Japanese Presence in Asia, Europe, and America (London: Routledge, 2001).

3 Within broader anthropology, I am also using some concepts drawn from two subfields, applied and cognitive anthropology. Applied anthropology refers to anthropology put to use to solve human problems. Historically, applied anthropology is the branch of anthropology that has investigated the issue of international economic development the most extensively. Cognitive anthropology features several theoretical viewpoints that are helpful for this study. See the definition of cognitive anthropology in the Glossary.

4 See the discussion of technonationalism as ideology later in this chapter. I thank Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver, for several of these insights.
current aid policy. To answer this, I apply several important Japanese concepts of
development and technology to Japan’s own experience. Throughout the first section, I
gradually introduce the three main research questions and working hypothesis of the
project, which relate to the subjects of how Japan’s experience with technology,
development and foreign relations have affected today’s aid policies, if certain Japanese
development concepts accurately reflect Japan’s experience with development and
technology, and how spirituality has affected Japan’s aid. I argue that Japan’s experience
with these areas has indeed affected its aid.

In the remaining sections of the chapter, I review relevant literatures, discuss
my methodology and important contributions of the research. The key literatures relevant
to the research, especially in anthropology and political science, include social science
theory, work on linking ideology, history and policy, and research on Asian development,
Japan’s economic and technological development, its foreign aid policy, and the
intersection of religion, international affairs, and development. In the section on research
methodology and analysis, I review my choice of the leaders studied, data collection, and
data analysis. In the final section I review the contributions of this research to the fields
of international studies, to consideration of historical, cultural, and religious factors in
Japanese aid, and to the identification of human and ground level effects in international
relations. The primary theoretical paradigm for this project will be postpositivism, which
builds on the deterministic, naturalistic approach of positivism.  

At this point, we do not adequately understand the historical and cultural
backgrounds of Japanese aid, subjects that have been studied relatively little. We also

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5 See Positivism and Postpositivism in the Glossary section.
need to strengthen the contribution of anthropological research to such issues. The project’s topical framework focuses on Japanese foreign aid and development. The “Japanese” (or “Asian”) model of development has had a massive impact on other Asian nations, and they have tried to emulate it. Japan is the first case of a non-Western country to “successfully” industrialize. Development has been a hot topic of investigation by anthropologists, since the 1980s and even earlier. Perhaps anthropologists should be attracted to the Japanese case, but while many study development “failures” in other regions, few have considered the significance of this seminal case and model. In this project, I define development as, first, an increase in a society’s capacity for industrial production and the products of capitalism, and movement toward being a “modern” society. Second, it means improving quality of life, the standard of living, and eliminating or relieving poverty. It also includes “attempts to [build] …local capacity, and [encourage] …local participation and decision-making. Development almost always involves multiple groups, and therefore, multiple cultural perspectives.” Another key concept under study here, technology, I define as tools, knowledge, learning and information that people use to live and survive. It may also be

---

6 In this project, I use quotation marks in several cases: 1) to signify a direct quote; 2) to denote a somewhat questionable use of the term concerned, as in this example; 3) to indicate a judgment about the given issue that is controversial, unconventional, or not absolutely settled; or 4) to indicate a meaning of the term that is figurative.


seen as an interconnected system of tools and knowledge used in a society or economy to accomplish purposes in daily life and work.¹⁰

One way I seek to understand Japan’s experiences with technology and development is through looking at key leaders’ worldviews.¹¹ In a recent landmark study, theologian and philosopher David Naugle traces the roots of the worldview concept in philosophy, theology, and the sciences, concluding that worldview has had a crucial role in modern thought, is one of the most basic modern intellectual notions, and has extreme, if not the greatest, cultural importance.¹² Studying a topic of international relations like foreign aid in a holistic fashion like this, through the concept of worldview, should generate new, significant insights. For example, how have the worldviews of key leaders affected Japan’s aid policies? Looking at leaders’ worldviews is key for this purpose.

Political scientist Carol Lancaster shares this view. She argues that among various factors in domestic politics that influence a donor’s aid policies,¹³ worldview is among the most important:

There are several types of ideas,¹⁴ shared by significant portions of the public and political elites in aid-giving countries that can influence aid. Most fundamental are what some scholars have called “worldviews”—widely shared values (based on culture, religion, ideology) about what is right and wrong. These worldviews themselves are the product of a society’s history as well as major events and trends affecting its population. In terms of foreign aid, these might involve a view that all

¹⁰ This definition is largely anthropological. See the several treatments of technology in the Glossary.
¹¹ The key leaders whose views I study are Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Kato Hiroyuki, Yanagita Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito. For more details on these leaders, see Chapters 3 and 7.
¹³ The chief domestic political factors that Lancaster examines in her 2007 comparative study of foreign aid in five countries (the United States, Japan, France, Germany and Denmark) are ideas, interests, political institutions, and aid organizations (how “…governments organize themselves to manage their aid”). See Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 18.
¹⁴ See Lancaster’s definitions that immediately follow.
human beings have a right to liberty or a right to a minimum subsistence or that individuals (or families) should be self-reliant and responsible to the extent possible for their own well-being. Worldviews give rise to “principled beliefs” or norms—“collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity.”

The three main types of ideas that Lancaster identifies here are: 1) worldviews, 2) causal beliefs, and 3) principled beliefs or norms.

Lancaster further argues that these norms are often framed based upon fundamental values, which in turn can give rise to different types of policy outcomes. In Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (2007), she presents case studies from five different countries where “…aid-giving was framed and reframed in terms of different basic worldviews with very different outcomes vis-à-vis aid expenditures.” This, in turn, relates to another type of idea, what Lancaster calls “causal beliefs,” in this case, beliefs about what types of policies result in successful development.

Lancaster finds that different worldviews and beliefs may bring different (aid) policy outcomes in different societies. For example, Lancaster concludes that Japan’s weak state-society tradition has limited its development of strong relief and development NGOs, contrary to the situation in most of Europe and North America.

Regarding ideas, based mainly on her concepts of worldview and principled beliefs, in her study Lancaster asks two questions: 1) how basic values about the duties of

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15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 18–19.
17 Ibid., 19. Causal beliefs seem to be related to what anthropologists call cultural logics, which means people’s unspoken assumptions that underlie their worldviews, especially about global phenomena such as economic development. See cultural logics in the Glossary section.
18 Ibid. For example, Lancaster argues that beliefs that government aid is inappropriate and usually ineffective have resulted in criticisms by the political right of foreign aid programs in the United States. Strong norms of social solidarity and social democracy have led to strong public support for ODA programs in the Netherlands and Scandinavia.
19 Ibid.
the wealthy to aid the poor, and about the role of the state in those duties, influence foreign aid’s purposes in different nations, and 2) how widely held beliefs about the role of the state in society influence the presence of civil society organizations, which can also influence the purposes of ODA.20 These issues connect to cultural notions of charity, duty, and giving, and about the role of religion and of charitable, often religious, institutions, in those processes. Many of these views arise from religious and spiritual influences and worldviews. We will note several of these issues in Chapter 2. In this research, I am mainly dealing with worldviews and causal beliefs (cultural logics), not principled beliefs. I am particularly interested in the views and beliefs of important leaders in the Japanese case, the presuppositions under those beliefs, and how both have influenced Japanese aid policy outcomes. That is partly how I connect micro- and macro-issues and levels of analysis. I am not really interested in the collective expectations in Japan about what proper behavior should be pursued (the concept of “principled beliefs”).

I define image as the basic ideas and pictures in our minds about reality; how we organize these ideas and pictures in our minds about reality and the world around us. In anthropology, Michael Kearney calls images fundamental, general perceptions and concepts of reality that together form a worldview, while political scientist Martha Cottam defines images as “perceptual filters” or “cognitive organizing devices” we use to conceptually organize our worldview or conception of the environment.21 Images are

20 Ibid.
sometimes considered in both political science and anthropology to be subcomponents of a worldview, and important in a worldview’s basic formation.\textsuperscript{22} In this research, I define worldview as a set of pictures and ideas about the world, or a certain part of or thing in the world, that mostly makes sense, but which may not be totally correct. Here, worldview is essentially a cognitive framework about a certain topic or subject.\textsuperscript{23} It includes complicated pictures about the world and how it works, based on deep, previously held beliefs. What people and political actors see and believe affects what they do.\textsuperscript{24} Cultural logics are the unspoken, unconscious, shared, frequently local assumptions

\textsuperscript{3} The anthropological sense of image relates to the basic perceptions people hold, while the political science sense stresses how images function as perceptual filters. In their study of images, political scientists and anthropologists have usually emphasized analysis of smaller variables, rather than larger theoretical or cognitive frameworks. I also analyze smaller bits of information, but continually seek to identify the larger worldview(s) into which the images fit. What kind of images do leaders have of the basic variables under study? Into what larger frameworks do they fit? How do they function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? I will examine images as both basic perception and perceptual filter, and seek to understand their larger frameworks. This can be done for any domestic or international issue.

\textsuperscript{22} If one examines how anthropology and political science treat worldview, one sees that the former emphasizes a more holistic view, while the latter stresses a more specialized view of how a political actor’s perception of the world affects his/her understanding of events, uses of information, decisions, policies, and actions. Worldviews provide a mostly coherent framework for the numerous images people hold, and are relevant for any domestic or international issue.

\textsuperscript{23} The concept of worldview that I use for this research is not the approach customary to anthropology. My concept is based on both political science and anthropological approaches. I treat worldview mainly as a cognitive framework for a person’s beliefs on a particular topic, not as the overarching, almost cosmological framework that most anthropologists do. As such, one might argue that the worldviews I construct seem arbitrary. They may seem so, since I have not constructed or discerned them on the basis of firsthand ethnographic interviews with living informants. Since the actors researched are dead, I cannot crosscheck my findings with follow-up interviews. However, these worldviews are not arbitrary. They are formed from historical data collected from and about the attitudes, beliefs, writings, and actions of significant historical actors from Japan, gathered from the most relevant sources available, and based on a series of systematic steps. My concept of worldview is based on careful reflection of relevant aspects of the topic from anthropology, political science, and historical study on the concept since its origin in Germany several centuries ago. It is not arbitrary.

\textsuperscript{24} Here is a slightly longer version of my definition of worldview, drawn from anthropology and political science, used for this study: a cognitive framework or a “…a set of images and assumptions about the world…” (or a certain part of or thing in the world); “… mostly coherent, … though not always accurate” (Kearney quoted in Naugle, \textit{World View}, 242; Michael Kearney, \textit{The Winds of Ixtepeji; World View and Society in a Zapotec Town} [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972], 43). It includes complex cognitions and preconceptions of the world and how it works, based on prior assumptions (Cottam, \textit{Images and Intervention}, 10; Michael T. Hayes, \textit{The Limits of Policy Change: Incrementalism, Worldview, and the Rule of Law} [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2001], 8). Interaction between policymakers’
and cultural patterns beneath a people’s worldviews about, and responses to, global phenomena like economic development. So in this research, images are the basic bits of perception that together form a cognitive framework called worldview. Lying underneath the worldview framework are deeply held assumptions and cultural patterns of belief that are called cultural logics. If people are interviewed, they can state their images about any subject. A researcher can also construct a tentative worldview framework for any informant if s/he has gathered enough data on the persons’ images of a certain topic. There is no easy way that a researcher can easily uncover an informant’s cultural logics, since they are deep, normally unexpressed assumptions that underlie more surface beliefs. They must be philosophically inferred from data already gathered on images and worldviews. Nevertheless, investigating topics in a cognitive, holistic manner like this can yield rich results.

worldviews and environments affects their policy judgments [and actions] (Martha L. Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition [Boulder: Westview Press, 1986], 23, 26, 50). The behavior of individuals is shaped by how their worldview defines the world’s order, its political [and other types of] organization, and the actions, views and roles of self and others. As the cognitive structures of a worldview form a more meaningful “whole,” they influence the (political) actor’s perceptions, uses of information, and understandings of events and their causes (Chih-Yu Shih, “Seeking Common Causal Maps: A Cognitive Approach to International Organization,” in Contending Dramas: A Cognitive Approach to International Organizations, eds. Martha Cottam and Chih-yu Shih [New York: Praeger, 1992], 40-42; Kearney quoted in Naugle, World View, 242; Kearney, Winds of Ixtepeji, 43). See also the longer treatments of Worldview (anthropology) and Worldview (political science) in the Glossary section, upon which my definition is based.

25 See the more extended treatment of cultural logics in the Glossary. The concept of cultural logics is very relevant to this project, which focuses on Japan’s responses to global phenomena, and how those responses and beliefs shape its policies projected back out to the world as foreign aid. On domestic issues, the concept of cultural logics can help us to reflect deeply on Japan’s domestic responses to outside forces. I will follow the following procedure, in this and later chapters, to construct the cognitive frameworks of these leaders’ worldviews and to consider how they have affected domestic aspects of Japanese society. First, I will identify leaders’ images about a particular topic. Second, I will use images to attempt to verbally “construct” the leaders’ worldviews about the topic. Third, I will consider if technological systems have affected the worldviews, and if so, what aspects. Fourth, I will compare the worldviews, and fifth, try to conceptually identify the cultural logics and patterns underlying the worldviews, and compare them.

26 It would be good if the researcher could also crosscheck his/her worldview findings with the original informants, where the informants are still living.
What is the relationship between worldviews and cultural logics? Paul Hiebert recently argued that it is helpful to think of culture of consisting of several different levels. On the most surface level, the sensory level, we find patterns of behavior, cultural products, rituals and signs. On the second (middle) level, the explicit level, are belief systems. On the deepest or core level, there are worldview themes, under which lie (cultural) logics, and on the very bottom, epistemology.  

Although people commonly rely on different logics in different contexts, some are seen as more basic and are given more credibility. Other logics seem fuzzy and less reliable. Abstract, algorithmic logic supports most of the sciences. Other categories include analogical, topological, relational, and wisdom-based logics.

In this project, the concepts of worldview and ideology are interrelated, similar, and yet distinct. I do not mean to conflate them. Their essential meanings are different. The origin of both concepts, within both political science and anthropology, is related. Both derive from the German concept of Weltanshauung, or world-view, meaning one’s overall perception of the social world and how it works. In political science, an ideology is sometimes called a consistent set of beliefs, morals, and attitudes. Scholars of foreign policy argue that ideology can be viewed as a cognitive map, worldview, or guide to action. In my present research, I draw heavily on how Richard J. Samuels treats ideology, as “…the ways in which history and political structure conspire to constrain the strategic choices of nations.” Yet while ideologies and ideologies influence political outcomes,

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28 Ibid., 39-45.
they do not determine them.\textsuperscript{30} Anthropologist Michael Kearney argues that in their nature, content and function, worldviews are influenced by ideological biases, and can also function as ideologies. In the recent past anthropologists debated whether ideas cause social conditions or the reverse (called the debate between cultural idealism and historical materialism).\textsuperscript{31} This debate is now outmoded. Some anthropologists have argued that ideology is a more current area of inquiry than worldview, while others disagree.\textsuperscript{32} In this project, I especially focus on certain ideologies related to technology and development, and how they relate to policies connected to historical outcomes and processes such as colonialism.\textsuperscript{33}

Why is studying the worldviews of Japan’s leaders about Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign influences important, and what connection do these views have with later policies? Leaders’ beliefs and views of these subjects, in many cases, have had a significant influence on later policies that were eventually enacted, though not in all cases, and not always directly. Japan studies scholar Frederick R. Dickinson argues that it is helpful to study the earlier worldviews of key Japanese decision-makers, such as Yamagata Aritomo,\textsuperscript{34} to understand their later behavior and policy responses.\textsuperscript{35} As we study the worldviews of several important leaders, and the

\textsuperscript{31} Naugle, Worldview, 240-242, 244.
\textsuperscript{33} See my discussion of the work of Jean and John Comaroff later in this chapter.
\textsuperscript{35} Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Harvard East Asian monographs, 177. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 40. In this case,
policies that eventually followed, this influence should become clearer, though it is challenging to prove direct linkages between historical trends and later policies.\textsuperscript{36}

Leaders’ decisions on particular policies tend to be made incrementally, influenced both by their belief systems and the historical stream of previous policies: “sharp breaks with the past seldom occur.”\textsuperscript{37}

Many young Japanese who traveled abroad in the late Tokugawa period, like Mori Arinori, underwent a radical worldview transformation by encountering the West firsthand. It was not “West-worshipping” (forsaking one’s own country), but rather psychological reorientation or conversion, soberly coming to terms with a significant outside enemy. For these individuals, it was a “… complex process of response and

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Dickinson argues that the worldviews of certain leaders during World War I influenced their later policy responses in the 1930s.
\textsuperscript{36} Joseph S. Szyliowicz, \textit{Politics, Technology, and Development: Decision-Making in the Turkish Iron and Steel Industry} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). Szyliowicz argued this in several discussions I had with him at the University of Denver. In his “The Ottoman Educational Legacy: Myth or Reality” in, \textit{Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East}, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Szyliowicz discusses how “tradition” in the Ottoman Empire confronted modernity in the nineteenth century, treating many similar themes to those in the present research, including worldview, education, religion, foreign cultural influences, Western knowledge, study abroad, science, and technology. While the Ottomans were conservative and resistant to new ideas (pp. 285-286), the Meiji leaders of Japan were also ideologically conservative but extremely open to new outside influences. Another example of the challenges of connecting history and later political realities (pp. 303-304), through a broadly comparative approach, considers the imperial legacy of the Ottoman Empire on later behavior and perceptions in the Balkan region and the Middle East. Brown and others argue that possible connections between the past and present can be shaped by selective memory (Ibid., 9, 12), colonialism (Ibid., 11), the evolution of psychological perceptions of other cultures and peoples over time (Ibid., 14; Norman Itzkowitz, “The Problem of Perceptions,” in \textit{Imperial Legacy}, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 30; the historical legacy of great cultures on later civilizations (Halil Inalcik, “The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case,” in \textit{Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East}, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 17; and stereotypes/images (Brown, \textit{Imperial Legacy}, 304), among other influences.
\textsuperscript{37} Szyliowicz, \textit{Politics, Technology, Development}, 223. The influence of belief systems and historical factors on policy decisions is seen in Szyliowicz’ treatment of the cognitive factors involved in international technology transfer cases. The viewpoints and beliefs of policy and decision-makers constrain and greatly affect the outcome of technology transfer cases and project outcomes, positively or negatively. Belief systems can blind decision-makers to reality, and failure to adjust their viewpoints and decisions to changing conditions can also greatly affect outcomes. Perceptions often “…diverge from the reality of the environment.” Because radical breaks in the historical chain of decision-making are usually rare, both history and decision-makers’ beliefs can affect their decisions for decades (Ibid., 8, 212, 223).
\end{footnote}
adaptation.” There were three primary possible responses—wholesale adoption of all things Western, selective adaptation of things that would prevent immediate invasion and strengthen the national polity, or redefinition of Japan’s national character according to the changing historical conditions of the nation, using the West as a model where helpful. Mori chose the third option. Here the “West” serves, historically, as both a point and counterpoint as I assess Japanese ideas of technology, development, and aid.

Other leaders studied here, including Ito Hirobumi and Fukuzawa Yukichi, went through a similar process as they encountered and considered the West. The particular response of each leader was based on his/her own particular education and upbringing, historical circumstances and context, individual beliefs, and the degree of involvement in policymaking. So responses vary. Several of the leaders had significant influences on policies enacted in Meiji Japan and later—Mori on education, Ito on politics and law, and Yamagata on the military and politics. Fukuzawa’s influence on Japanese policies was more indirect, since he was never a policymaker. But he had a huge impact on Japanese attitudes concerning Western culture, foreign relations, and Western business practices, through his best-selling books, the major university and influential enterprises he founded.

Studying the past and present images that Japanese leaders have held about technology, development and foreign relations/aid will help us to understand their overall

39 Ibid.
40 Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver.
41 To better understand the worldviews of each leader, before considering each leader’s beliefs about the major contexts of Japanese technology, development and international relations, where possible, I will examine his/her education and early upbringing, since these are important influences shaping each person’s later beliefs and actions.
worldviews about these subjects, and where possible, I will mention them. At least since World War II, Western scholarship about Japan has been afflicted with a duality of contrasting images, such as liberalism/militarism, tradition/modernity, state/society, and Japan as World War II villain/victim. The complexity of Japanese policymaking, and its general lack of transparency, sometimes contributes to the lack of depth in the study of Japanese politics (by Western scholars).\footnote{Dickinson, \textit{War and National Reinvention}, 239-241, 243-244.} Uncovering the underlying images and beliefs of Japanese policymakers can help us better understand the policy outcomes they have promoted.

Though religion\footnote{An anthropological definition of religion sees it as the “…lived significance of … ideas, experiences and institutions…” about the supernatural, and about the role of such things in human existence. Religion is a part of culture, and is “…integral to the common understandings, activities, and circumstances that shape a people’s way of life” (“Anthropology of Religion,” in \textit{The HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion}, eds. Jonathan Z. Smith et al. [San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1995], 891). See a more detailed treatment of Religion in the Glossary.} and spirituality\footnote{Spirituality has been called “…the concern of human beings with their appropriate relationships to the cosmos” (Mary N. MacDonald, “Spirituality” in \textit{Encyclopedia of Religion}, ed. Lindsay Jones [Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005], 8718), or the connections between “…the human and the sublime, …the concrete and the abstract, and between man and God” (Zehavit Gross, “Contemporary Approaches to Defining Spirituality,” in \textit{Encyclopedia of Religious and Spiritual Development}, eds., Elizabeth M. Dowling and W. George Scarlett [Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2006], 425). Spirituality suggests feeling, thought, and practice connected with the inner, subjective world related to religion, and the meanings of the deepest parts of human life and existence. It is the main motivating force of religion, on corporate (organized or unorganized) or individual levels. Spirituality flourishes within living religious traditions. Forms of spirituality vary according to social and personal conditions and tradition (Wade Clark Roof, “Spirituality,” in \textit{International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., ed. William A. Darity [Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008], 59-60).} have historically been challenging and difficult to define, they are commonly seen as a deep, enduring part of a people’s identity or worldview, and considered to be increasingly important factors in contemporary international relations. Therefore it makes sense to investigate the possible connections of spirituality, worldviews, and an international affairs topic like Japanese foreign aid.

Scholars of religion have important things to say about worldview. Anthropologist
Charles Kraft argues that our worldviews and beliefs of many things (i.e. the supernatural) affect our experience of and reactions to/actions about them. Both Kraft and Paul Hiebert identify conflicts between “spirituality” and “reality/science” in the common worldviews of Westerners that are usually not found in the worldviews of non-Westerners.\(^\text{45}\) Hiebert terms this common characteristic of Western worldviews the Flaw of the Excluded Middle. According to this concept, the worldviews of non-Westerners commonly allow for the existence of the spiritual realm, both beyond the present world, and in operation within it. Most Western worldviews, while possibly allowing for the existence of a spiritual realm after death, usually do not include the active presence of spiritual forces in everyday life.\(^\text{46}\) Possible conflicts between science and spirituality also occurred in the worldviews of Japan’s most influential political actor of the twentieth century, Emperor Hirohito.\(^\text{47}\) He was strongly affected by the government’s official views of Shinto, and his own great love of and belief in science. He was also modern Japan’s supreme political leader before 1945. These two aspects of Hirohito’s basic worldview (Shinto and science) had great impacts on his political actions and decisions, affecting millions of people in Asia, the Pacific, and the United States through 1945, and nearly destroying Japan, at least outwardly. What were the implications of that conflict for Hirohito’s policy actions and impacts?

What are the implications of these issues for current Japanese aid policy?

Spirituality is a highly important area of worldview issues, since it is one of the cultural


\(^{46}\) Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle” and *Anthropological Reflections*.

\(^{47}\) We will examine this issue further in Chapter 7.
systems and contexts to which worldviews are connected, which they also influence and by which they are influenced.\textsuperscript{48} Paul Hiebert defines worldview as “…the foundational cognitive, affective, and evaluative assumptions and frameworks a group of people makes about the nature of reality which they use to order their lives.”\textsuperscript{49} I view worldview as a cognitive framework, so in this case, we can call spirituality a highly significant cognitive framework that interacts with and influences the other such cultural systems in people’s lives. As such, on some levels it also influences a society’s view of other societies, foreign countries, and how to relate to them. Since spirituality is a key area of worldview issues, one of my key research questions asks, how has Japanese spirituality perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? What evidence do we see in the historical data presented here? Are there possible conflicts between leaders’ worldviews of spirituality and science that have affected their policy actions, and/or later Japanese aid policies? My working hypothesis is that Japan’s experience with technology, development and foreign relations, as seen in the beliefs of some of its important leaders about them, has affected its current aid policies. I argue that the perceptions and policies of key Japanese leaders, from the late Tokugawa era forward, help us to better comprehend how technology has influenced Japan’s view of itself, its view of “the Other,”\textsuperscript{50} and its view of how foreign policy (especially for development) should occur.\textsuperscript{51}

To better understand the ideologies of key Japanese thinkers and leaders about Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign affairs, it is also helpful to

\textsuperscript{48} According to Paul Hiebert, the other systems to which worldviews are connected include cultural, biological, physical, personal and social systems (Hiebert, \textit{Transforming}, 86-88).

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 25-26.

\textsuperscript{50} The “Other” means non-Japanese, mainly either Westerners or other Asians.

\textsuperscript{51} I am thankful to Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver, for this last insight.
place their beliefs within several broader contexts. Accordingly, within the historical period covered in Chapter 3, I include a brief survey of major domestic contexts of Japanese technology and economic development from 1850 to 1895: the roles of Japan’s technological development and domestic society. These two contexts are especially related to sociocultural issues. Technological development includes the state of the basic natural sciences in Japan, scientific knowledge imported from abroad, technologies and industrial applications (such as research and development), science and technology policies of different governments in Japan, and how social and cultural factors have influenced those processes. The section on domestic society contexts examines Japanese society and socio-cultural change, especially related to technology and development issues. In Chapter 4, my historical survey covers domestic political economy issues for the same period. The domestic state section covers Japan’s domestic politics and the nature of the state, and when data is available, how the state and political actors interacted with technological development. The section on the domestic market contexts looks at Japan’s domestic market, economic development and growth. I follow similar procedures in additional chapters.

What additional approaches from the social sciences can I use to link ideologies, history, and development policy outcomes? There are several strong theoretical and methodological approaches. Development policies are implemented through projects. Worldview is one contributing factor to project outcomes, but not a directly causal
factor. Project outcomes feedback to previous stages of the process in an iterative, circular fashion. Even if worldview is not a directly causal factor, it is an important one to examine.

All of this relates to the largest research question for the dissertation: how have Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations (and key leaders’ worldviews of those issues) from 1850 to 1945 affected its current foreign aid policies? In order to answer this question, I need to consider the meanings of Japanese development concepts like “modernization,” translative adaptation, and internationalization. I must do so since these concepts deeply embody Japanese notions and interpretations of what technology and development mean, and what they mean for the Japan case in particular. “Modernization” explores what happens to the internal cultural core of a developing, commonly non-Western country as it enters the global

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52 Political scientist and Japanologist Richard J. Samuels argues that ideologies interact with institutional factors over time to affect policy outcomes in powerful ways. See my discussion below of Samuels’ work, especially under the definition of ideology in the Glossary.

53 I learned these arguments about development policies implemented as projects and the circular pattern of feedback from project outcomes in an interview (March 2003) with a Denver area anthropologist who prefers to remain anonymous about this point.

54 In this project I define “modernization” as is the process where a rich country in the core (center) of the world’s economy forces weaker, poorer countries in the periphery to trade with it, so it can become richer and more developed. As a poor, non-Western country is absorbed into the world economy, on the surface, its culture will start to look more Western (like the cultures of the rich “core”). But the core of its culture will not change much, but stay mostly non-Western.

55 Translative adaptation is the process where a non-Western country adjusts to Western culture as it begins “modernization” and development. As this happens, the non-Western country must carefully match and adjust its own culture and values to the imported cultural items. If it does this well, it will have Western and non-Western items in its new culture, and it will develop well. If not, it may not develop well, and its culture may be destroyed. See also longer definition in the Glossary section.

56 Internationalization refers to the process where the “active” West absorbed the “passive” non-West, for the sake of its own development. The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Americas, and much exploitation and subjugation. Internationalization focuses on external, international processes: what happens as the powerful “core” West absorbs other peoples from the periphery into the global market. It looks at both economic and cultural factors: what occurs as the periphery countries are absorbed into the “cultural universe” of the West? Internationalization does not examine internal implications. It especially considers what happened on the international level through historic processes of colonialism. It can also study contemporary issues; i.e. what happens on the international level as Western development ideologies affect non-Western countries?
economic system, arguing that though on the surface its cultural form may change, in its core, it will remain non-Western and indigenous.

According to translative adaptation, as a non-Western country develops, it must carefully adjust its own cultural features and values to imported cultural items. What happens to a society’s culture as it is drawn into the development process in the global economic system? If it does so well, it will successfully develop, but if not, it may culturally implode. A closely related idea is that each nation must customize its recipe for development according to its own unique conditions. Japan is seen as a prime example of successful translative adaptation.57 Maegawa Keiji, a Japanese anthropologist, argues that if development is to truly succeed, the indigenous, core elements of a developing society’s identity must be respected, not destroyed.58 This raises profound questions about the viability of universalistic recipes for development and development ideologies that continue to be preached by major international development organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, which in turn are largely dominated by Western nations in North America and Europe. Japan and other Asian nations sometimes bristle at these notions, which they often find are contrary to their own cultures, histories, and their significant, state-led experiences of authoritarian development, some of which are still unfolding.59 The concept of translative adaptation, drawn from development economics

57 See the definition of translative adaptation earlier in the dissertation and in the Glossary. I also use the Japanese concept of “modernization” to assess development issues on the domestic level. Note that “modernization” is not the same as the outdated notion of modernization that was developed by leading Western social scientists such as W.W. Rostow in the early 1960s.
59 See the definition of authoritarian developmentalism in the Glossary. According to this concept, development, as it has occurred in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China, is an example of
and anthropology, more from the latter, bridges those fields, plus development and technology, very well.\textsuperscript{60}

Internationalization here refers to what happens on the international level, economically and culturally, as developing countries are absorbed into the global economy.\textsuperscript{61} According to this concept, they will be aggressively absorbed into the world system, in a damaging fashion. Key issues here include what happened to Japan as it developed, what happened to Japan’s colonies and neighboring states in Asia, and what happened and happens today through Japanese aid.

Historically, Japan has viewed technology as a key component in its economic development, improving imported technologies in many ways. Today the nation strives to pioneer original technologies and discoveries. In development, since ancient times, the Japanese state has usually had a primary role in directing the nation’s overall path, alternating between isolation from and interaction with foreign nations. More recently, Japan’s “developmental state” shepherded the private sector toward maximum international competitiveness. According to the “developmental state” concept, while market dynamism is the necessary engine of development, the state has important functions in managing the nation’s development and trade. Only an effective state and its such a process. Similar development is underway in many nations, including China and Vietnam. The cultural assumptions behind authoritarian developmentalism, and related concepts such as developmental state and developmentalism, are also reflected in Asian-oriented development ideologies such as \textit{fukoku kyōhei}, \textit{shokusan kōgyō}, and others (see the definitions of all of these concepts in the Glossary). Many of the cultural assumptions behind these concepts are different from those in the development ideologies stressed by Western-dominated international development groups such as the World Bank and other major Western donors of aid.

\textsuperscript{60} Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver.

\textsuperscript{61} I mean the concept of internationalization as developed in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, \textit{Japanese Views on Economic Development: Diverse Paths to the Market} (London: Routledge, 1998), not the concept of internationalization (\textit{kokusaika}) in common usage in Japan since the late 1970s. See Internationalization and \textit{Kokusaika} in the Glossary.
supportive institutions can do so. As Japan tailored its own approaches to technology and development in the 1800s, Japanese scholars argue that today’s developing countries must find “diverse paths to the market.” But how has Japan’s own experience with technology and development affected the aid it offers other countries? It is therefore essential to explore another key research question of this project, whether the ideas of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development. If so, how much are they seen in Japan’s aid policies of today? In this research, I also try to identify useful lessons from Japan’s development experience as a developing country. It must be stressed, however, that Japan is not, nor has it ever been, an LDC as they are defined today. In times of historical memory, Japan has never been impoverished in the same way as today’s LDCs. At the beginning of the period under study, the late Tokugawa period, Japan also had a strong state, a national education system, and cultural unity that few of today’s LDCs have ever matched. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw forth several valuable lessons for LDCs in the present research, and when I can, I will.

An additional history-related concept in this research, technonationalism as ideology, has long been important in Japanese thought. More specifically, Samuels uses technonationalism to signify the belief that technology is a basic part of national security, and that it must be carefully developed in a country to make it wealthy and powerful. He argues that the concept provides a helpful summation of Japanese beliefs about

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62 Discussion with Peter Van Arsdale, Sarah Hamilton and Haider Khan, University of Denver, October 30, 2008.
technology and security over several hundred years.\textsuperscript{63} One example of technonationalism as ideology is the slogan \textit{fukoku kyōhei}.\textsuperscript{64} While Richard J. Samuels has traced this notion at length through political science,\textsuperscript{65} it is also helpful to consider it through the lenses of cognition and cognitive anthropology.\textsuperscript{66}

To understand Japan’s contemporary foreign and aid policies, technology and development issues, a survey of relevant factors throughout Japanese history would be helpful.\textsuperscript{67} 1850, the beginning of modern Japan’s interaction with the West, is a logical starting point. This study’s consideration of historical influences and trends in the pre-aid era ends with the period encompassing the end of Japanese colonialism and World War II (in 1945). With the entry of American forces into Japan in 1945, significantly new influences enter the picture. It is thus logical to end this survey of pre-aid historical influences in 1945, to get the clearest picture of how Japanese forces in particular, in the pre-aid period, have shaped and contributed to today’s aid policies. Many scholars logically consider the history of Japan’s aid in the postwar period only, since that is when it began (1954), and 1945 was the beginning of significant American influence.\textsuperscript{68} Though American influence on Japan’s culture of aid has been profound, it has been relatively short-term (now about sixty years).

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\textsuperscript{63} Samuels, \textit{“Rich Nation, Strong Army,”} ix-x.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Fukoku kyōhei} (“rich nation, strong army”) was one of the most important development ideologies in Japan during the period 1868 to 1945. See \textit{fukoku kyōhei} in the Glossary.
\textsuperscript{65} Samuels, \textit{“Rich Nation, Strong Army.”}
\textsuperscript{66} I thank Peter Van Arsdale, University of Denver, for pointing out this last idea.
\textsuperscript{68} For example, see the historical treatments in Sukehiro Hasegawa, \textit{Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice} (New York: Praeger, 1975) and Dennis Yautomo, \textit{The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
\end{flushright}
But longer term, equally significant influences, particularly historical or cultural ones, were also present from the prewar period. To better comprehend the influence of those factors on Japan’s ODA, this project especially focuses on the pre-aid influences of Japan’s recent past on its aid system. A hint of Japan’s long-term influence on the region around it is seen in how many nations, including Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and even China, have copied elements of Japan’s economic model for their own development. Several, including South Korea and Thailand, are also adopting the Japanese aid “model” for their own emerging ODA donor systems. The one key element present in Japan’s own development and aid that has carried over to several other East Asian nations is Japan’s emphasis on economic infrastructure as the foundation of everything else. This, in turn, links to the attitudes of several key leaders examined here, especially Ito Hirobumi and Fukuzawa Yukichi, on the necessity of economic development as the foundation of national growth, survival and prosperity.

Literature Review

Anthropological Theory

Into what broader theoretical debates can we situate this project? Chiefly, this research straddles the main approaches to development anthropology: actor-oriented,

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69 Twenty years ago, the debate between cultural materialism and idealism would have been relevant (Robert Borofsky, Assessing Cultural Anthropology [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994], 27-28). According to cultural materialism, the material and physical concerns of human survival drive other aspects of culture. In idealism, the symbolic aspects are seen as more determinative. In the 1980s, this debate was seen as seminal in the analysis of worldviews (Kearney, World View, 9-40). Today’s anthropologists feel that both material and ideational aspects of culture are interrelated, so now this debate seems outmoded (conversations with Angelique Haugerud and Sarah Hamilton, University of Denver, late 1990s and Spring 2003).
postmodern and applied. Actor-oriented studies have studied how local peoples reconstitute the implementation of development plans and projects. Postmodern scholars have analyzed the effects of development discourse and actions, and question whether development has any value. The applied approach stresses the identification of ground-level effects in development. Few scholars have tried to bridge the gap between these schools. The actor-oriented and applied approaches seem most relevant for this project.

This research also strengthens the contribution of anthropological approaches to international studies. In general, the integration of anthropology and political science work in international studies has been weak, though there have been some outstanding

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70 Scholars are not in universal agreement about how to divide the literature on anthropology and development. Here I utilize the three-way division of the literature (actor-oriented, postmodern, and applied) used by Arce, Alberto, and Norman Long in Anthropology, Development, and Modernities: Exploring Discourses, Counter-Tendencies, and Violence (London: Routledge, 2000), 23-27. While various scholars sometimes divide the literature differently (i.e. two approaches), or use slightly different terminology, I find Arce and Long’s characterization the clearest and most helpful. Other scholars, including Gardner and Lewis, refer to a similar division (Katy Gardner and David J. Lewis, Anthropology, Development, and the Post-Modern Challenge (London: Pluto Press, 1996). It can be effectively argued that most of the literature historically has fallen within these three approaches. There is some work that crosses these boundaries. One example is recent work that seeks to combine postmodern and applied approaches.

71 Ibid.

72 Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine.


76 See my discussion below of this topic.
exceptions. Historically, anthropology, with its widespread emphasis on assessing local societies, and international relations, with its postwar, “top-down” focus on the Cold War, found few opportunities for integration. Some recent explorations of politics and culture in cultural anthropology and comparative politics have seemed more promising. This project integrates political science and anthropological research on perception, cognition, worldview and foreign policy for the first time. It also applies anthropological theory to a new topic not previously studied by many anthropologists (Japanese foreign aid), although political scientists and economists have examined various aspects of the subject.

**Work on Perception, Worldview, Ideology, and Policy**

A foundational scholar in this area was Karl Mannheim, who argued that people in different social groups often are blinded through their interests and cultural environments, from which they construct worldviews. Michael Kearney did much of

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78 George B. Thomas, “Is an Anthropology of International Relations Possible?” *Anthropology News* 42, no. 9 (2001), 7.


the seminal work on worldview, and argued that it is a vibrant theoretical field.\textsuperscript{81} Others argued that it had been replaced by ideology.\textsuperscript{82} More recent works looked at the connections of identity, worldview, transnationalism, and global political economy.\textsuperscript{83} My project builds on previous anthropological work on worldview and perception by applying cross-disciplinary perspectives on perception and cognition (from political science and anthropology) to historical perspectives on a highly significant case of non-Western globalization. In political science, Robert Jervis did much of the pioneering work on this area, including his studies of how states project desired images,\textsuperscript{84} and of how perception affects decision-making in international politics.\textsuperscript{85} Martha Cottam did important studies of how images in the worldviews of foreign policymakers affect their reactions to the foreign policies of other states,\textsuperscript{86} how images have influenced U.S. policymakers’ actions on Latin America,\textsuperscript{87} and how competing images and roles in decisions affect the behavior of actors in international organizations.\textsuperscript{88}

One of the most seminal studies of ideology examined the impacts of western colonialism and Christianity in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{89} Jean and John Comaroff’s anthropological study of colonialism in Southern Africa offers relevant insights on

\textsuperscript{82} Barfield, “Worldview,” 499.
\textsuperscript{86} Cottam, \textit{Foreign Policy Decision Making}.
\textsuperscript{87} Cottam, \textit{Images and Intervention}.
\textsuperscript{88} Cottam and Shih, \textit{Contending Dramas}.
worldview, history and ideology. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, British colonizers sought to impose two different worldviews on the Southern Tswana—one religious, and the other distinctly secular. The Comaroffs argued that dominant classes cannot determine directly the mental conceptions of those they would dominate. But the constellation of dominant ideas gradually sets limits, accumulates explanatory and symbolic power to organize the world, and becomes ingrained over time. Through a dialectical process of hegemony and ideology, consciousness and unconsciousness, a new, dominant worldview emerges.

The Comaroffs’ study raises many issues relevant for the present study—how the “‘savages’ of colonialism” were drawn into conversation with the global cultures of capitalism, ideology, and religion. How much did Japanese colonialism reflect patterns

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90 Ibid., 11-12. How do the Comaroffs handle history? Of Revelation and Revolution falls within the genre of historical anthropology, and seeks to delineate the “…making of a social and cultural world, both in time and at a particular time.” Rather than constructing a chronological history of events, it explores these events as a multidimensional process of increasing complexity and scale, with distinct phases and levels (Ibid., 38-39). For general details about how the disciplines of history and anthropology interact, see Shepard Krech III, “History and Anthropology,” in The Dictionary of Anthropology, ed. Thomas Barfield, (Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997), 237-240. Methodological challenges here include the integration of political economy, culture, ideology, and the relationship of structure and agency (Comaroff and Comaroff, Revelation and Revolution, 8-10). A fundamental question is how culture, power, ideology and consciousness affect historical processes (Ibid., 6). In this case, European colonizers sought to create “history,” order and rationality for peoples who supposedly had none. Ethnography, colonialism, social history and the social sciences are all the products of the nineteenth century Western “scientific worldview” of secular modernism (Ibid., 14-15).

91 Ibid., 18-19.

92 Here the Comaroffs build on work by Gramsci, Marx, Stuart Hall and others. The Comaroffs’ definition of ideology is similar to that of Marx in The German Ideology. For the Comaroffs’ definitions of hegemony and ideology, see the Glossary section (Hegemony; Colonialism and ideology). What is the relationship between hegemony and ideology? They are two extremes along a continuum (Ibid., 28-29). But in the uncertain spaces between them, people give voice to their evolving perceptions. As the Tswana people were drawn under European domination, they resisted in uneven ways. The Comaroffs assert that this is the common pattern in colonialism; the process is never one of simple domination and resistance (Ibid., 30-32).

93 Ibid., xi-xii. These issues include questions such the following: what happened in Japanese colonialism and imperialism in East Asia and the Pacific in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? How much did Japanese colonialism reflect patterns of hegemony and ideological resistance seen in Western colonialism? How did Japanese colonizers seek to impose their worldviews? Did this include Japanese visions of
of hegemony and ideological resistance seen in Western colonialism? It is also interesting to compare how Japanese anthropologist Maegawa Keiji and the Comaroffs analyzed the cultural impact of Western worldviews and processes on the non-Western world.\footnote{See the definitions of “modernization” and colonialism and ideology in the Glossary section.}

Maegawa’s conception of “modernization” is very similar to the Comaroffs’ concept of colonialism and ideology, except in the latter case, the Comaroffs argued that the ideologies (worldviews) of the receiving culture, despite providing content, would be subsumed under the overall form of the hegemonic worldview of the colonizer. Maegawa seems to suggest that if “modernization” is successful, the culture or worldviews of the receiving (non-Western) society will maintain their “persistent form,” and not be engulfed or subsumed under the adoption or entrance of the Western culture/worldview. The Comaroffs assumed that the Western (or colonizer’s) worldview will dominate those of the receptor society, at least in overall form, that the receiving culture’s ideologies (their indigenous worldviews) will be subsumed under those of the colonizers. Perhaps Maegawa and the Comaroffs were describing the same basic process with different words. Colonizers are not necessarily Western, as in the case of Japanese colonialism in Northeast and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific from 1895-1945.

In anthropology, poststructural (postmodern) scholars of development offer insights on connecting ideologies, institutions, and policy/project outcomes. To study the ideology of development organizations, James Ferguson analyzed the discourse embodied in agency reports, and then assesses ethnographically what happens on the

\footnote{In the postwar world, has increasing Japanese economic presence or cultural globalization in East Asia led to a re-colonization of the region, economic or cultural if not political? In particular, what has Japanese foreign aid contributed?}
ground level. This study incorporates more historical background, and more analysis of how historical experience/ideologies influence the present. Other anthropologists contend that we can also gain important insights about development ideology by examining the interactions of development actors and institutions. Gardner and Lewis argue that within planning and project ethnography,

...there is increasing recognition that the realities within which people act and make decisions are multiple and changing. This is closely related to actor-oriented research, in which the worldviews of individual actors (rather than passive target groups or beneficiaries) and the interfaces between them and bureaucratic institutions are the focus of study. Recognition of the need to understand (and then change) the workings of bureaucracy is also important.

Actor-oriented research, developed by mostly European scholars, emphasizes the assessment of the orientations of local actors, and of how development represents a series of conflicts between actors of the West and developing societies. Gardner and Lewis conclude that

...anthropologists need to examine the ways in which people and the discourses they produce interact according to their different cultural, economic and historical

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95 Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine*, argues that certain discourses support the work of particular development institutions. Only supportive statements are included in agency reports. So discourse affects actual development practice. Development discourse and practice occur within development planning, but do not determine it; planning is only a small part of the whole development process (p. 68, cited in Gardner and Lewis, *Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge*, 73).

96 Ferguson’s study incorporates little analysis of historical factors, and no analysis of how they influence the present. Through the incorporation of historical ideologies and factors, I will add further depth to this fascinating work by poststructuralist scholars.


99 Arce and Long, *Anthropology, Development, Modernities*, 23-24, 26-27. Common themes in actor-oriented works, relevant to this project, include the daily interactions and experiences of varied actors involved in the development process, how these social relations and development interventions/policies transform each other in uneven ways (Long and Long, *Battlefields of Knowledge*, ix-xi, 3-5, 8-9; Wedel, *Collision and Collusion*); gaps in perceptions and images projected by aid donors and recipients (Wedel ibid.); how local practices influence global ones and the reverse (Wedel ibid.); how people, in their (local) lives, reshape and contest modernity, development and its institutional arrangements, often imposed from the outside; and disconnections of state policy and people’s counter-tendencies (Arce and Long, *Anthropology, Development, Modernities*: 1-3, 9-11, 21-22).
Research must be actor-oriented, not only through those to be ‘developed,’ but [also] in terms of how individual and group agencies cross-cut, reproduce, or resist the power relations of state and international development interventions.\(^\text{101}\)

These interventions are policy or project outcomes/implementation. Actors, whether individual or organizational, can reproduce or subvert development policies/projects. Actor-oriented perspectives can help us to understand why, while ethnography can show us how. Actor-oriented approaches encourage us to tangibly examine how actors mediate and transform development. They are more relevant to this project than poststructural approaches. Actor-oriented research shows more effectively the connections of worldview/ideology, institutions/organizations and policy.\(^\text{102}\)

Another stream of literature, the applied approach, stresses practical responses to the problems of anthropology and development.\(^\text{103}\) Certain applied and ethnographic studies, especially of organizational culture, examine the connections of ideology, institutions/organizations and policy.\(^\text{104}\) Hoben’s ethnography of USAID uncovers important findings about the interactions of organizational culture, ideology, policy and

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\(^\text{100}\) I would also add that discourse is an outward, partial articulation of a worldview or ideology.

\(^\text{101}\) Gardner and Lewis, *Anthropology, Development, Post-Modern Challenge*, 74-75.

\(^\text{102}\) Comparing actor-oriented and postmodern approaches, Long and Long try to show how both can be integrated in studies of development (Long and Long, *Battlefields of Knowledge*, 6-8). The two streams differ in how they treat the usage of knowledge (Arce and Long, *Anthropology, Development, Modernities*, 24, 26). Awareness of how local actors and sites mediate development is basic to understanding how development can be practically engaged, and problems solved.

\(^\text{103}\) Ibid., 25-26. This work looks at a wide variety of themes, including consumption, land and energy use, property rights, resettlement, agricultural development, and various national and international linkages (Suzanne Hanchett, “Anthropology and Development: The 1998 ICAES Discussion,” Practicing Anthropology 21, no. 1 [Winter 1999], 47).

\(^\text{104}\) A fascinating essay by Carol MacLennan highlights the potential contributions of ethnographic research for helping us to better understand barriers to democratic participation in American political life. One of the policy areas in which this participation is the weakest is technology policy. See Carol MacLennan, “Democratic Participation: A View from Anthropology,” in *Diagnosing America: Anthropology and Public Engagement*, ed. Shepard Forman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 51-74.
institutional contexts in an aid organization. Additional studies highlight the value of ethnographic research methodologies for investigating bureaucratic organizations. The applied approach offers many significant lessons about institutional, organizational and bureaucratic cultures. Comparing applied and postmodern approaches, the former is more relevant to this project, since it is equally scientific, and more practical in the solutions it offers.


106 To really understand tensions in an aid agency’s organizational culture, policy and operating environments, we need to probe beneath the surface using ethnographic and similar methods (Judith Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975]). Ethnography helps us to better understand the inner workings of bureaucratic life by examining behavior in everyday contexts and events, uncovering hidden networks, insiders’ views, and details about the social frameworks of decision-making (Gerald M. Britan, Bureaucracy and Innovation: An Ethnography of Policy Change [Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1981], 20-21). As trained outsiders, anthropologists can uncover facts that policy makers or other organizational insiders are not trained/able to see themselves (Interview with Richard Clemmer-Smith, University of Denver, February 24, 2000). While ethnography offers valuable approaches for understanding policies, programs, and the wider dynamics in large bureaucracies (Britan, Bureaucracy and Innovation, 7, 10-12, 24-26), there are limits to its contributions. But they are fundamental and important. Ethnography can show how bureaucracies work at the crucial level of daily implementation, and therefore how such policies and bureaucracies can be improved. Ethnography also provides deep, multidimensional understandings of the social contexts within and surrounding bureaucracies. This can help us to understand why bureaucracies actually do what they do, not just what they say (Ibid., 142-144).

107 What are some of the lessons that the applied approach offers about organizational cultures? To understand the actions and decisions of aid policy makers, we must study the institutional contexts, organizational structures and cultures of aid agencies, including impacts of the external environment (Hoben, “Agricultural Decision Making”; Tendler, Inside Foreign Aid). Bureaucratic constraints on change are not simply due to organizational inertia, but often are more affected by the social, economic and political contexts and complexities in which organizations operate (Britan, Bureaucracy and Innovation, 137). The informal social organization of a bureaucracy can direct or hinder an agency’s attempt at rational policy improvement, especially in the context of everyday operations and decision-making (Ibid., 7, 10-12, 24-26). Organizational rationality is contextual and limited, since it is based on the unique contexts of each organization (Ibid., 139-141).

108 Emilio Moran argues that often, applied work is just as scientifically valid, ethnographically and theoretically rich as the work of postmodern academicians. A weakness of present abstract (postmodern) theory is its emphasis upon recent theory, rather than the history of theory, “texts” and beliefs, concrete, ground level realities and actual practice (Hanchett, “Anthropology and Development,” 47). Postmodern
Political scientist Richard J. Samuels’ *Rich Nation, Strong Army* is a key study on history, ideology, and Japanese technology development. How does he link the three? Samuels studies the evolution of Japan’s ideologies of technological development and national security over time, and how institutions and ideologies interact. He does not argue that ideas alone drive political outcomes or policies, that they are unchanging, or that they lead directly to national policies. But through interaction with institutions, ideology is a significant factor. This interaction is finalized in the political economy. As they interact with organizational, institutional and other factors over time, ideologies result in concrete influences and policy outcomes that should be visible in the actions and pronouncements of political actors.

Many policy studies handle the linkages between history and policy rather weakly, though there are exceptions. What are some other possible approaches to

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109 For details about how Samuels defines ideology and its interactions with history, see Ideology in the Glossary section.

110 Concerning Japan’s experience with ideologies, Samuels argues that Japan’s national security has been driven by several related themes since Tokugawa Ieyasu united the nation in the 1600s. The central theme is perhaps insecurity (*fuan*-anxiety) about Japan’s capacity, as a resource-vulnerable nation, to survive in a dangerous world. National slogans from the Meiji era onward that captured Japan’s task include Oitsuki, Oikose (catch up and surpass the West) and Fukoku Kyôhei (“Rich Nation, Strong Army”). Under the U.S. security treaty, Japan in the postwar era has pursued technology relentlessly, as seen in three predominant themes: *kokusanka* (maintaining independence through the indigenization of technology), *hakyu* (the diffusion of this knowledge throughout the nation’s economy), and *ikusei* (the efforts on multiple levels to nurture enterprises to which such technical knowledge can be given). Samuels argues that these three parts are the basis of Japan’s own “technonational ideology.” Japan’s ideologies of technology and security have endured because they renew their value continuously. They have evolved in the context of Japan’s late development in a turbulent world. And they have survived in a challenging [domestic] environment of political and economic institutions intended to strengthen Japan’s national security. In his book, Samuels explores how political protocols link ideologies and institutions of technonationalism (Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army,* x-xi).

111 Ibid., x-xi.

112 James P. Lester and Joseph Stewart, *Public Policy: An Evolutionary Approach* (Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Pub, 1996), xiii-xiv. Lester and Stewart argue that while many policy texts have handled the history of public policy poorly, an historical or evolutionary approach is more effective. An in-depth historical study of solar energy and technology policy in the United States is Laird 2001.
connect history and later policy outcomes? To identify connections between historical ideologies/worldviews and current and future aid policies, in this research, I conceptually analyze the possible relations of historical ideologies, their evolution over time, from 1850 to 1945, and later aid-related policies and ideas, especially in Chapters 9 and 10. It might be useful to use principles from systems analysis, a common analytical approach for technology, development and policy concerns.¹¹³

As an alternative, Rebecca Lynn Spyke offers the following figure to summarize how various influences and experiences of Japan have combined to form Japan’s contemporary aid policies:¹¹⁴

![Figure 1.1 The Path to Forming Aid Policy](image)

Spyke summarizes her approach as follows:

This study assumes that Japan’s historical experiences interacting internationally have combined with its domestic political and economic organization to form the Japanese view of the world. The experiences and conditions have also led to the motivations that have inspired particular foreign policy goals. In the contemporary context, aid has been used to attempt to attain these goals.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ For example, one could consider both “vertical links” (historical ideologies and the contemporary scene) and “horizontal links” (between current ideologies and contemporary policies), and analyze them through the use of systems analysis and systems diagrams (conversation with J. Szylowicz, March 2003). For examples of systems analysis and diagrams, see Szylowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 12, 15, 23, 31, 37, and the definition of systems analysis under systems theory/analysis in the Glossary section. But following such an approach is time consuming, and beyond the scope of the present project.


¹¹⁵ Ibid., 3.
The basic steps Spyke follows to analyze this complex process, and the equally complex Japanese aid system, are fairly clear and impressive. However, there are several weaknesses in her approach. As I argue in Chapter 2, the process is more complex and nuanced than Spyke shows, involving a multiplicity of domestic and international contexts, historical and contemporary actors, their views and actions, and additional forces, at both the micro- and macro-levels, and their evolution over time. Spyke’s study only examines the macro-level, and lacks the more sophisticated, nuanced conceptions of worldview and additional, relevant concepts, many drawing on anthropology, that the present study includes.

In this study, I conceptually analyze how factors from Japan’s historical experience, relevant contextual factors on the domestic and international levels, and key leader’s ideologies/worldviews and actions interact and evolve over time, especially from 1850 to 1945. In the final two chapters, I consider how the gradual development of these factors relates to policy concerns facing contemporary Japanese aid, and to important aid-related ideas and themes in Japan’s recent ODA policy. I primarily connect these issues on the conceptual and ideational levels.

**Work on Asian Development**

What works are especially relevant to the issues in this research? Few Western anthropologists and similar social scientists have studied the significance of Japanese development or foreign aid; my study is one of the first. In anthropology, this

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116 Ibid., 284-301. Spyke’s general findings and arguments about the outcomes of this process are interesting.

dissertation project contributes to the study of foreign aid and development, on the Japan
case in particular. And among Japanese anthropologists, the same has been generally
true, especially concerning Japanese aid. Maegawa argued that each nation must develop
according to its own conditions,\textsuperscript{118} while Kikuchi argued for the application of kinship
theory to Japanese development policy.\textsuperscript{119} Matsuzono briefly surveyed the history of
applied and development anthropology in the United States and Europe, recent work of
Japanese anthropologists studying development topics,\textsuperscript{120} and the general lack of
anthropological input in Japanese aid efforts.\textsuperscript{121} There has also been significant, relevant
work on other parts of East Asia, including Bray’s examination of the roles of
development and technology in the rice economies of East and Southeast Asia, since
ancient times,\textsuperscript{122} and Robertson’s study of state development planning in Southeast
Asia.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{118}Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures and Civilizations.”
\textsuperscript{119}Kikuchi, “Development Anthropology.”
\textsuperscript{120}Two examples of such work on development are: Eri Sugita, “Social Dimensions in the Organizational Culture of JICA and a Case Study of a Malaria Program in Tanzania” (M.A. Thesis, University of Florida, 1998); and “Domestic Water Use, Hygiene Behavior and Children’s Diarrhea in Rural Uganda” (Ph.D. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Florida, 2004). At: http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0004375/sugita_e.pdf.
\textsuperscript{121}Matsuzono (Matsuzono, “International Cooperation Activities”) finds that while there have been various spurts of anthropological involvement in development and aid work, especially in the United States, through the late 1990s, involvement by Japanese anthropologists in applied aid efforts from Japan was rare. While Japanese anthropologists working overseas have often encountered Japanese aid workers in the field, and the former have found analysis of development topics to be empirically rich, Japanese government aid agencies such as JICA and JBIC have rarely drawn on the skills of anthropologists for their analyses of aid projects (see JICA and JBIC in the Glossary section). This is also true of several graduate schools of international development across Japan. Through the late 1990s, few of these programs employed many anthropologists among their full-time staff. An exception is Waseda University’s Graduate School of Asia and Pacific Studies in Tokyo, where Kikuchi Yasushi leads graduate programs in international cooperation and development anthropology.
\textsuperscript{123}A.F. Robertson, People and the State: An Anthropology of Planned Development (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
Work on Japan’s Economic and Technological Development

Political scientists and economists have analyzed Japan’s economic and technological development and aid policy from several viewpoints. Johnson traced the history of Japanese industrial and technology policies from 1925 to 1975, and develops the influential concept of the developmental state, that the state has a primary role in directing the nation’s industrial policy. He concluded that limited elements of this concept should be institutionally transferable to other regions.\textsuperscript{124} Yet much Western and global development research and many financial institutions have supported the neoclassical, free market system. Their recent policy tools encouraged structural adjustment, rapid borrowing, and viable governments in developing countries,\textsuperscript{125} while many Japanese scholars argued that each country’s development path must be unique.\textsuperscript{126} Which are necessary, universal prescriptions or “diverse paths to the market?” Pempel argued that the problems of Japan’s recent economic decline are best understood in a comparative historical framework.\textsuperscript{127}

Concerning technology, Hayashi surveyed Japan’s experience in technology since the Meiji era, and offers specific lessons for other developing nations.\textsuperscript{128} Japan views technology as a key component in its development. Morris-Suzuki argued that Japan’s technological successes were largely due to social information networks that

rapidly spread innovation throughout the nation (Morris-Suzuki 1994). Samuels concluded that various national ideologies of technology, and successful postwar development of both civilian and military applications of technology, contributed greatly to Japan’s economic growth.  

**Work on Japanese Foreign Aid Policy**

Yasutomo assessed the strategic concerns of Japanese aid, and prominent Japanese aid trends in the 1990s, especially Japan’s role in multilateral development banks. Orr considered how Japan’s aid system reacts in response to pressure from the U.S., and its relationship with developing countries. Koppel and Orr assessed how Japanese aid is distributed to different world regions. Arase argued that an institutional approach is the most effective for assessing Japanese aid, and that the institutions that shape Japanese aid policy were influenced not merely by individuals, organizations, or rules, but also by international, domestic, crisis and ideological factors. Potter’s regional study examined in-depth the reaction of aid recipients Thailand and the Philippines) to Japanese aid. These are just a few examples of the broad literature in English and Japanese regarding Japan’s ODA policy. Works generally fall into these areas: strategic, institutional/bureaucratic politics, comparative, perceptual/cognitive,

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129 Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army."
132 Bruce Koppel and Robert M. Orr, Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). Koppel and Orr’s volume includes studies that focus on Japanese aid to several regions (Oceania, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East) and aid to different Asian nations (p. 15).
economic, cultural/historical, and human rights approaches. More examples of these areas of work are extensively surveyed in Chapter 2. My study adds a valuable historical and anthropological component to all of this important work.

**Work on Religion, International Affairs, and International Development Cooperation**

Scholarship on religion and international affairs is a relatively new, emerging field. Two of the pioneering works in this field were Douglas Johnston’s 1994 study on the contributions of various religions, including Christianity, to conflict resolution processes in conflicts involving religion in regions around the world, and Wade C. Roof’s 1991 study of the effects of global politics and economics on U.S. religion.\(^{135}\) There has recently been almost a torrent of books covering both general and specialized aspects of the subject. Texts introducing the field include works by Dark (2000),\(^{136}\) Hatzopoulos and Petito (2003),\(^{137}\) Carlson and Owens (2003),\(^{138}\) Fox and Sandler (2004),\(^{139}\) and Thomas (2005).\(^{140}\) More specialized studies examine religion and diplomacy (Johnston 2003),\(^{141}\) religion and globalization (Beyer 1994),\(^{142}\) religion and global terror (Tétreault and


Denemark 2004), U.S. diplomacy and religion (Albright and Woodward 2006), the effects of religion on the global order (Esposito and Watson 2000), religion and global governance (Falk 2001), religion and international law (Janis and Evans 2004), religion and global security (Seiple and Hoover 2004), and religion and human rights (Lerner 2000, 2006). One Japanese study explores the meanings of religion, war, and globalization for Japan (Hashizume and Shimada 2002). Religion and international affairs has become a hot affair for investigation in graduate programs for international affairs in the United States, and several major graduate schools have recently received funding for this purpose. There are fewer works on religion and international development cooperation. Recent intriguing studies include explorations of the humane contributions of world religions to development (Harper 2000), cross-regional assessment of major religions as a development aid (Haynes 2007), critical study of the ethical aspects of the roles of social science and religion in global development

150 Daisaburo Hashizume and Hiromi Shimada, Nihonjin wa shûkyô to sensô o dô kangaeru ka (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2002).
151 For example, there is the Luce Foundation’s Henry R. Luce Initiative on Religion and International Affairs, which issues such grants (Henry Luce Foundation, http://www.hluce.org/hrlucerelintaff.aspx, accessed November 8, 2008).
(Salemink et al 2004), of the broad role of religion in international development and international affairs (Goldewijt 2007), and of the religious aspects of economic development and poverty (Marshall and Van Saanen 2007).

Research Methodology and Analysis

Method of Choosing Leaders Studied

How and why did I choose the particular leaders, thinkers, and scholars I have? The criteria for my selection are practical, objective and subjective. I began broadly by reading about Japan and Japanese culture. After identifying influential leaders and thinkers in many areas of Japanese politics, economics, culture, society and international relations, I read more about them. Using a simple numerical scale, I ranked each potential leader/thinker according to his/her relevance to the themes of the project, his/her general importance and influence in Japanese society, and availability of sources by/about him or her. These leaders are important examples of how technology, development and culture were transmitted and perceived by the Japanese during their respective eras. Many are among the most important or interesting leaders of their respective periods.

Data Collection

Briefly, the main stages of research have included data gathering and analysis of mostly secondary data and some primary data, theoretical analysis and reflection. My


approach is qualitative, as are most studies of political cognition. The validity of qualitative research is strengthened through multiple methods (triangulation).

To get a broad picture of the main contexts related to Japan and its history since 1850, what happened inside and outside the country, I read broadly about Japan’s politics, economy, science, culture, and society. From that, I identified eighty to one hundred important Japanese leaders and thinkers involved with Japan’s technology, development, culture and politics, 1850 to the present. Third, I carefully assessed each of those persons, their lives, thought, the importance of their actions, relevance for this research, and the availability of sources written by or about them in English. Next, I rated all those factors on a series of simple numerical scales to measure and compare the importance and relevance of each leader for the project. Then I narrowed the list to about forty possible top leaders to research. Of those, seven are covered in this stage of the research, 1850-1945. Next, I read key sources by or about each leader (where possible, more contemporary ones) to gather data on each leader’s beliefs about the major issues of the dissertation.

**Relation of Data and Research Questions**

To answer my research questions, what types of research methods and evidence do I need? For the first stage of historical analysis, I have reviewed relevant literature in the United States. This primarily involved scanning secondary sources, mainly in English. My research and data collection approaches have seemed focused enough to

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157 One of the leading studies, by Martha Cottam, is qualitative (Appendix in Cottam, *Images and Intervention*, 187-191).
allow me to answer the central research questions well, partly through triangulation.\textsuperscript{159} But the key issue of perceptions of technology, development, and aid has remained my emphasis here.

**Data Analysis**

To analyze the data, I began writing on each leader’s beliefs about technology, development, and Japan’s foreign relations, comparing their beliefs, and analyzing them in terms of important concepts relevant for the project’s major questions. Then I explored how these beliefs and impacts have changed over time, 1850-1945. Finally, I considered the possible impacts of the leaders’ thoughts for the Japanese government’s aid policies, and for broader issues related to general policy issues, development policies, and relevant social sciences such as anthropology and international studies, both in Japan and abroad.

In order to answer the major research questions, I use concepts for data analysis that fall into three main areas: development, technology, and cognitive issues. My approach is holistic. I use concepts mostly drawn from political science and anthropology, and some from economics. For development, I take concepts of Japanese economists and anthropologists and apply them to Japan’s own experience. On the issue of how external engagement and internal adaptation to outside forces affected domestic society, Japanese scholars’ concepts of “modernization,” internationalization (in some cases) and translative adaptation are helpful.\textsuperscript{160} On technology, I use concepts from

\textsuperscript{159} Margaret Diane LeCompte and Jean J. Schensul, *Analyzing & Interpreting Ethnographic Data*. The ethnographer’s toolkit, 5 (Walnut Creek, Calif: AltaMira Press, 1999), 40-41; and *Designing & Conducting Ethnographic Research*. The ethnographer’s toolkit, 1 (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 1999), 130-134.

\textsuperscript{160} “Modernization” is helpful since it helps us to think both about Japan’s interaction with outside influences, and how they have affected its internal society. For domestic issues, “modernization” is more helpful than internationalization (see the definition of internationalization in the Glossary), and sometimes more useful than translative adaptation, since it integrates both internal and external components.
anthropology and political science to examine views of technology holistically: in daily life, and in economic and security policies. Thomas Glick’s articulation of technology is helpful for domestic society, since it can help us assess the effect of systemic issues on leaders’ views of society, politics, and their relation to technology, over time.\(^{161}\) I also use Richard J. Samuels’ concept of technonationalism as ideology, mentioned earlier.\(^{162}\) It is a key example of how technology and international relations have affected Japan’s domestic socio-political system. On cognition, I use concepts from political science and anthropology. Regarding how leaders’ perceptions affected domestic society, I use selected aspects of the concepts of image, worldview and cultural logics.\(^ {163}\)

Through this research, I gathered a lot of information about several important leaders, their thoughts and impacts on policies, and how these things changed and developed over time, to help me answer the research question and the working hypothesis that concern how Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations, and views of those, have affected its current foreign aid policies. I considered a second research question (whether “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation are an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations) by reflecting on my data and the relevance of the three concerned

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\(^{161}\) On domestic society, if I can see how leaders’ views of society are affected by technology, as part of a socio-technical system, then Glick’s approach is relevant. This is also true for other domestic aspects, if this approach helps me to think more systemically. Viewing the domestic state, market and society as part of a technology-related system across time (the historical aspect of Glick’s definition) is useful.

\(^{162}\) Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army." In this research and that of Samuels, technonationalism as ideology refers to technology as an important, basic part of protecting a country by making it rich and strong. The idea has been an important part of Japanese thought for several centuries.

\(^{163}\) See my discussion of the meanings of these concepts earlier in the dissertation.
analytic concepts to the former. The last part of that question\textsuperscript{164} concerns what Japanese aid policy is doing today: how much its aid reflects the ideas of “modernization,” internationalization, and translatively adaptation. For the last key research question, about the effects of religion and spirituality on Japan’s current ODA policies, I draw on my rich findings about religion and spirituality in the data already gathered.\textsuperscript{165} Using the concept of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle and several others, I consider how spirituality has interacted with politics in Japan over time, and what it means for Japan’s aid policies of the present. I note, among other things, that the current constitution requires official separation of religion and state, and Japanese claim they are not “religious.” Yet in their daily practice, most Japanese, aid staff and policymakers included, are profoundly “spiritual.” As today’s Japanese become increasingly disenchanted with Japan’s workaholic ideologies of authoritarian development, significant new avenues for expanding political pluralism, civil society, and active “spirituality” are emerging.

Several patterns of theoretical and data analysis here evolved as the research proceeded, and are dependent on the nature of the data I collected.\textsuperscript{166} In the course of qualitative research (and also participant observation), hunches frequently become hypotheses. They must be checked and rechecked against both data and the researcher’s

\textsuperscript{164} The last part of this research questions asks, if “modernization,” internationalization and translatively adaptation are an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations, how much are they seen in Japan’s current aid policies?

\textsuperscript{165} For example, this includes Yanagita Kunio’s prewar ethnographic research about rural Japanese spirituality, Hirohito’s possibly conflicting views of spirituality and science and their effects on Japan’s World War II policies, the rise of State Shinto as one of Japan’s prime motivating development ideologies from 1868 to 1945, and the effects of postmaterial values on current Japanese ODA.

biases. That was also the case here. The final stage of my data analysis was conclusion drawing and verification. This refers to “…the development of ideas about how things are patterned, how they fit together, what they mean, …what causes them… and then returning to the data to verify that those ideas are valid, given the data available.”

Conclusion: Contributions of the Research

This dissertation research is important on several levels. It improves our understanding of how ideational and historical factors affect policy, and Japanese foreign aid policy in particular. It strengthens the contribution of anthropological approaches to international studies issues, in areas where such application has not previously occurred: perception, cognition, and foreign policy. The project also adds a significant, anthropologically based component to the extensive scholarship in political science and economics on Japanese technology, foreign aid, and economic development. In sum, this project improves the study of the role of ideological, cultural and historical factors in foreign aid, and about the meaning of religion for international development cooperation policy, especially on the Japan case. It also helps to pioneer new ways to strengthen the contributions of anthropology to international studies. As we see from many contemporary examples in world affairs, from 9-11 to Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond, better comprehending the human, ground level components of international relations is one of the most pressing issues of our time.

In this research, I consider how various contexts and ideas have affected Japan’s aid policies of today by examining key leaders’ worldviews of social and cultural

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DeWalt and DeWalt, Participant Observation.
issues,\textsuperscript{168} domestic and international political economy, and imperialism.\textsuperscript{169} This project is not intended to prove the influence of particular leaders and their beliefs (worldviews) on the project’s themes or later aid policies. Rather, I focus on the change over time of the worldviews themselves, their ideas and content, and how they may have influenced later policies relevant to Japanese aid.

After a survey of the Japanese foreign aid policy system in Chapter 2, this project continues with a historical survey of the chief contexts of Japanese technology, economic development, and foreign policy/aid from 1850 to 1895: Japan’s technological development and domestic society in Chapter 3.\textsuperscript{170} Chapter 4 covers Japan’s domestic state and market, and Chapters 5 and 6, its relations with the outside world, all in the period 1850 to 1895. Chapter 7 examines domestic issues from 1895 to 1945, and Chapter 8, international issues for the same era. Final findings on the project’s key research questions and working hypothesis are in found in Chapter 9, and comments on possible policy implications will be offered in Chapter 10.

\textsuperscript{168} This includes the related theme of technological development, in which I also consider how technology relates to culture.
\textsuperscript{169} For domestic political economy, I will look at the contexts of the domestic state and the domestic market. For international political economy, I will consider the contexts of Japan’s foreign political and foreign economic relations.
\textsuperscript{170} These contexts include looking at decision makers’ general views of Japanese society and social/cultural change. Drawing upon both anthropology and political science, I define culture as all learned behavior and knowledge, as well as values and attitudes.
Chapter 2

Overview of Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy System

Introduction: Contexts, Concepts—Western, Japanese

Foreign aid (ODA, official development assistance) rose in the Western world after World War II, first in the United States, as a tool to rebuild damaged European nations, and to forestall the spread of communism.\(^{171}\) As Europe rebuilt, increasing amounts of aid went to other world regions, including Asia. In Asia, Japan and India in particular benefited from large amounts of aid, Japan through the 1960s. ODA has been used as a tool to cultivate allies, protect friends, discourage enemies, and to begin to attack other problems in international development, poverty, and security issues.\(^{172}\)

After the American occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952, Japan began giving aid (as war reparations) to other nations in non-communist Asia. As Japan grew as an economic superpower in the postwar period, attention grew to the fact that it did not make many contributions to global security beyond hosting American bases, mostly due to the limitations from the peace constitution imposed on it after World War II. To answer charges that it was a “free rider,” Japan began increasing the amounts of its ODA

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\(^{171}\) Here I am not considering aid from the communist world, including aid from such nations as the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba to other regions, such as Africa.

\(^{172}\) Koppel and Orr, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 364.
to support the foreign policy goals of its American and other Western allies. Japan also wished to use aid to improve its relations with its Asian neighbors who remained angry and doubtful about Japan after the suffering they experienced during World War II. Japan felt it could also gain support as a regional leader in Asia through these efforts. Japan also hoped to use ODA to build positive relations with far away developing countries with which it had no historic relations, so that they might support Japan’s efforts to gain leadership positions in international organizations such as the United Nations. Aid assumed a prominent position in Japanese foreign policy since Japan has had few diplomatic tools available to it in the postwar period. This is partly due to Japan’s painful history of militarism, dictatorship, and the bombings of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and other Japanese cities after World War II. There are also the limitations of the peace constitution, which limit, in principle, Japan’s capacity to build up a strong military beyond that needed for defense, and strict prohibitions, until recently, on dispatching Japanese troops to overseas conflicts. So Japan has had to use ODA to build its own international reputation and security, and to support its Western allies, among other issues.173

Stated simply, foreign aid is “…a transfer of resources and knowledge from industrialized to developing countries.”174 One important form of foreign aid is ODA (Official Development Assistance). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines ODA as:

1) given by official agencies, 2) provided with the enhancement of the welfare and economic development of developing countries as its primary goal, and 3) as recipient-friendly (concessional) and refraining from imposing extreme burdens on aid recipients. To avoid doing so, it must include at least 25 percent provided as grant aid. ODA differs from two other kinds of financing for international development. OOF refers to “other official flows,” which means aid given by donor nations that includes less than 25 percent given as a grant. Export-import banks of developed countries commonly provide OOF. PF (“private flows”) include commercial loans given by private banks.175

According to Okita Saburo, through the late 1970s, there were two prominent lines of [Western] thought regarding foreign aid. One, the efficiency principle of assistance, advocated aid to countries that could attain viable economic growth. The other, the basic needs approach, emphasized giving aid to meet the basic human needs of those in the poorest countries176. By the late 1980s, aid was also defined as having altruistic or commercial components. Altruistic aid is often for humanitarian purposes, and carries no expectation of repayment to the donor country.177

Japanese ODA (Official Development Assistance) refers to foreign aid that is coordinated by the Japanese government. Japan’s ODA program began in 1954, while Japan itself received aid from the World Bank to aid in the postwar reconstruction of its economy. From the late 1950s to the early 1980s, Japanese ODA policy mainly focused

175 Ibid., 2.
on augmenting Japan’s domestic development, not the needs of LDCs.\textsuperscript{178} Japan’s aid increased almost every year since 1954,\textsuperscript{179} until 1998, when Japan’s economic recession forced the first aid cuts in decades. The general downward trend in Japan’s aid budget has continued since the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{180} According to Hanabusa, through the 1980s, Japan’s ODA was genuinely oriented toward promoting economic and social development in the third world, and not merely commercial gain. He argues that Japan’s concept of economic cooperation is broader than “official development assistance,” as commonly defined by the DAC countries.\textsuperscript{181} In the Japanese concept of aid, there is also commercially-motivated aid, which “…entails the development of commercial relations between the donor and the recipient that are expected to bring economic gains to both parties, even though such gains may not be so evenly distributed.” Successful economic development involving industry includes technologies, managerial skills, business experience and access to markets. These are key areas in which the private, commercial sector excels.\textsuperscript{182}

Japan’s aid has gradually expanded to include recipients outside of Asia, and strategic, political goals, in addition to economic ones. Japan’s ODA is divided into two


\textsuperscript{180} Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 3.


\textsuperscript{182} Ozawa, \textit{Recycling Japan's Surpluses}, 96-97.
forms, multilateral ODA and bilateral ODA. Multilateral ODA consists of subscriptions and contributions to international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank. Bilateral ODA includes grants (grant aid and technical cooperation) and loans. Grants are provided by JICA, while loans are released by JBIC.\textsuperscript{183} Japan’s new aid policy will also require increased oversight (and monitoring) of the aid process on the part of Japan, the donor nation. Usually aid has been provided on the basis of requests from potential recipients. The majority of Japan’s ODA loans go to Asian countries. ODA loans from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations (OECO) of the JBIC accounted for 40 percent of Japan’s ODA in 2003, making them the “…cornerstone of Japanese ODA policy.” Japan’s budget for total ODA for fiscal year 1999 was $15.385 billion.\textsuperscript{184} Critics of Japanese aid have argued that its true commercial purposes are masked by humanitarian rhetoric. In practice, humanitarianism is not an insignificant portion of international ODA, from Western, Japanese or other donors. But, given global competition and the flexible nature of ODA, it really serves a wide variety of diplomatic and other interests.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{183} See JICA and JBIC in the Glossary section. In October 2008, the loan functions of JBIC were to be incorporated into a new aid agency, the “new” JICA. For more details, see later in this chapter.


\textsuperscript{185} Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 1, 3. This point is argued by several ODA scholars, including Ibid.; Peter J. Schraeder, Bruce Taylor, and Steven W. Hook, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows." World Politics 50(2) (1998), 294-23; and Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 14.
The forerunner of Japan’s system of official development assistance was post
World War II reparations, and came to gradually include diplomatic, political, and
humanitarian goals.\textsuperscript{186} Haider Khan has argued that

…the structure of Japanese aid has gone through several stages leading to
…[Japan’s] emergence as …[a] leading aid donor. …The motivation for giving aid
has changed from purely economic to both economic and diplomatic reasons; …
humanitarian concerns have also been given a voice. …The process of aid giving is
a complex one. Both domestic bureaucratic and interest group politics are
significant. International pressures play a major role as well.\textsuperscript{187}

It is possible to identify at least five major themes in the evolution of Japan’s foreign aid:
diversification (disbursement of aid for foreign policy purposes beyond development
alone, and beyond the Asian region), politicization (the use of aid for purposes beyond
national economic gain, for broader political and strategic goals), multilateralization
(increased aid coordination with other donors, and disbursement of aid through
international organizations and other multilateral channels, beyond bilateral ones), and
philosophizing (allowing Japan to contribute more broadly to aid and development: not
just funding, but ideas too).\textsuperscript{188} A fifth stage is retraction and accountability (pressure to
decrease aid disbursements, increase aid’s efficiency and public openness, streamline the
aid bureaucracy and bring it more in line with international norms).\textsuperscript{189}

Although narrow trade and economic interests drove earlier Japanese aid, by the
1990s, security became one of the most important components of Japanese foreign
policy. As Japan’s aid disbursements became increasingly globalized, they contributed to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{186} Mari Yamauchi, “Trends in Development Aid in Major Developed Countries,” In eds., Takamasa
Akiyama and Masanori Kondo \textit{Global ODA Since the Monterrey Conference} (Tokyo: FASID [Foundation
for Advanced Studies on International Development]), 2003, 83.
\textsuperscript{188} Yasutomo, \textit{New Multilateralism}, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{189} This theme has emerged due to the prolonged economic recession in Japan since the early 1990s.
\end{footnotesize}
a broader range of issues, including environmental protection, humanitarian and refugee assistance, peacekeeping, aid for Eastern Europe, and the dismantling of nuclear weapons and other threats in the former Soviet Union and North Korea. Aid could be Japan’s means to help counter global criticisms stemming from its war guilt, “closed” markets, difficult trade imbalances, and “free-riding” through defense help from the United States. Yasutomo concludes that the rise of Japan’s aid programs happened through “…necessity and accident, pragmatism and idealism, fortuitous timing and opportunism,” and pressures both abroad and at home.190

As noted in Chapter 1, I am applying largely cognitive, perceptual, and non-materialist models to the study of Japanese foreign aid. Is such an approach inherently superior to a materialist, more economic approach? I do not believe it is. Earlier we noted the now rather antiquated debate among anthropologists about whether ideas cause social conditions or the reverse (called the debate between cultural idealism and historical materialism). Anthropologists now choose to view this relationship in a more holistic fashion, realizing that material and mentalist phenomena interact with and influence each other. The influence does not go mainly one way or the other. In the anthropological study of Western and non-Western worldviews, a divide between material and spiritual forces is also often noted. As discussed in Chapter 1, Paul Hiebert called this distinction, most common in the worldviews of Westerners, the Flaw of the Excluded Middle.191 In this project, I discuss both material and spiritual aspects of Japanese worldviews about technology, development, foreign relations, and other important themes germane to the

190 Ibid.
research. My ideational approach is not meant to demean material arguments or approaches, which also have great value. Rather, in this project I have chosen to focus on the ideational background of Japanese aid. For the most effective understanding of Japanese aid, and foreign aid in general, certainly both materialist and ideational approaches are needed.

**History and Philosophy of Japanese Aid**

Next I present major themes and developments in the history of Japanese ODA, over several decades, in a series of tables. This is followed by a discussion of the major debates over the philosophies behind Japanese aid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1</th>
<th>History of Japanese Aid, 1950s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Time frame:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War reparations</td>
<td>Early 1950s to 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of aid interests</td>
<td>1950s to 1960s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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| Reconstructon, recovery from war damage | 1950s | Japan: aided by massive infusions of aid from the United States, much borrowing from the World Bank. |
| Key factors in Japan’s growth | 1950s to 1960s | Japan’s abundant human resources, national unity, good education system, wise governmental economic policies, vibrant business sector, open international economy. |
| Types of aid offered to other countries | 1950s | Japan’s first multilateral aid offered through its participation in the Colombo Plan. Japan’s first bilateral aid loan given (to India). Aid called “economic cooperation” (not ODA) to partly conceal the relatively small size of official aid as compared to huge private aid flows. |

Table 2.2 History of Japanese Aid, 1960s

| Theme: Aid goals, practices | Time frame: 1960s | Details: Along with export promotion, a main goal of Japanese ODA is kaihatsu yunyū (the “develop-and-import formula”), to encourage developing countries to produce primary products and raw materials, and to improve trade imbalances in Japan’s favor. In practice, Japanese technology and know-how migrates to nations with greater resources and energy supplies. |
| Yen loans | 1960s | Japan begins extending yen loans to promote purchase of Japanese products by LDCs. |
| Coordination with international donors | 1964 | Japan joins the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). The OECD encourages economic cooperation among its members, and attempts to coordinate the bilateral aid programs of its members. |
| Regional distribution of Japan’s aid | Through late 1960s | Asia receives almost 100 percent of Japanese aid. |

195 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 5-6.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2
200 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, v-viii.
202 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 3.
203 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8.
### Table 2.3  History of Japanese Aid, 1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme: Politicization and globalization of Japanese aid</th>
<th>Time: 1970s</th>
<th>Details: ODA offered to various communist Asian nations, including Mongolia, Vietnam, and China. Offers of aid to Vietnam and Afghanistan later withdrawn in line with policies of the U.S. and ASEAN.(^{204}) Resource diplomacy: aid offers shifted from Israel to Arab and Palestinian interests after 1973-74 oil shock.(^{205}) The oil crises of the 1970s lead Japan to seek to use ODA as a means to gain access to needed natural resources.(^{206}) Late 1970s to late 1980s: new emphasis in Japan’s aid on basic human needs, poorer countries, and on humanitarian needs of strategic countries. Late 1970s: aid policy is more politicized to include strategic and economic objectives.(^{207}) Economic pressures on Japan increase, due to close economic relations with the U.S., the large U.S.-Japan trade imbalance, and Japan’s worries about protectionism in the U.S. The U.S. and other Western nations put increasing pressure on Japan to participate in “burden sharing” and to contribute financially to global security and development. So Japanese policymakers evolve the new concept of “comprehensive security,”(^{208}) and political and strategic concerns continue to be manifested in Japan’s aid. The Ohira cabinet (1978-80) initiates aid to “countries bordering conflict,” “front-line states” of value to the U.S., such as Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey, and China. Aid becomes a prime foreign policy tool of Japan for both third and first world nations (late 1970s).(^{209})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s aid to Asia</td>
<td>1969-1978</td>
<td>Renewed emphasis on aid to Asia. Global influences on this trend: America’s defeat in Vietnam (1975), Sino-American thawing of relations (early 1970s), implications for Japan and Asia of the “Nixon Doctrine” (1969), and the shock of riots in Southeast Asia against Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit (1973).(^{210}) Then ODA terms to SE Asia are softened, amounts and recipients increased. Mid-1970s: Prime Minister Miki Takeo announces Japan’s new “Asian Marshall Plan,” to bring a doubling in rice production in Asia, partly through the Asian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\(^{204}\) Ibid., 7, 12.

\(^{205}\) Ibid., 6-8; and Hirata, *Civil Society*, 167-168.

\(^{206}\) Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, *Japan’s System*, Chapter 1. The oil shock, plus the “Nixon shock” (President Nixon’s 1972 surprise visit to China without consulting Japan in advance) showed Japan that the United States would do whatever was in its own interests first, and that Japan could not necessarily count on the latter to guarantee its access to vital resources. Japan saw the need to further globalize its international relations, especially with regions possessing abundant natural resources (Koppel and Orr, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 342-344).


\(^{208}\) Koppel and Orr, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 2.


\(^{210}\) Ibid.
Development Bank. Fukuda (Manila) Doctrine announced (1978): plan to offer $1 billion to various ASEAN projects.\(^{211}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid increases</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>Prime Minister Fukuda’s cabinet pledges to double the amount of Japanese aid within five (later changed to three) years.(^{212})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes in regional aid distribution</td>
<td>Late 1970s</td>
<td>Middle East, Latin America, Africa each receive about 10 percent of Japanese aid (together, about 30 percent), Asia: about 70 percent.(^{213})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.4 History of Japanese Aid, 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme:</th>
<th>Time frame:</th>
<th>Details:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s gigantic economic expansion</td>
<td>Mid- to late 1980s</td>
<td>Japan changes from the position of a debtor country to become the world’s largest creditor (1985). Its surpluses near $100 billion.(^ {214}) Japan’s aid budget rapidly increases after the appreciation of the yen (1985), resulting in extensive plans to recycle Japan’s economic surpluses as ODA.(^ {215}) Late 1980s: Japan has an annual trade surplus of $80 billion, the largest of any nation in history. It continues to face the unusual economic problem of having to recycle its enormous surplus funds, and responds with massive programs of domestic and international investment, and more proposals for gigantic increases in aid.(^ {216}) Japan creates new forms of “hybrid” aid (Minkatsu), which combine public and private sources to encourage “comprehensive development.”(^ {217}) Late 1980s: despite growth, major criticisms of Japan’s ODA emerge: that it lacks transparency, is corrupt, has fragmented organization, and no overarching policy framework.(^ {218})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing globalization of Japan’s aid</td>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>The U.S. puts more pressure Japan to increase its ODA. Japanese policymakers increasingly view aid as a foreign policy tool, not just one for international trade.(^ {219}) Economic emphasis of Japan’s ODA shifts from export promotion and gaining access to resources to promoting Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI), to encourage</td>
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\(^{211}\) Ibid. The Fukuda Doctrine was important because it showed Japan’s new willingness to use aid to its aid in Southeast Asia for political, not just economic, purposes. Fukuda’s pledge to increase aid to ASEAN also signaled Japan’s first effort to greatly increase the quantity of its aid (Hirata, Civil Society, 169).

\(^{212}\) Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8.

\(^{213}\) Ibid.

\(^{214}\) Ozawa, Recycling Japan's Surpluses; and Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 8-9.

\(^{215}\) Dilip K. Das, The Yen Appreciation and the International Economy [New York: New York University Press]), 1993. Das explores economic aspects and issues related to the Plaza Accord decision by leading industrialized nations (in 1985) to double the value of the yen in the international economy, and how Japanese ODA was influenced by the appreciation of the yen. The recycling schemes are explored in more depth in Ozawa, Recycling Japan's Surpluses.

\(^{216}\) Ibid.

\(^{217}\) Ibid., 7-12.

\(^{218}\) Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 123.

\(^{219}\) Koppel and Orr, Japan's Foreign Aid, 2-3.
Japanese firms to gradually shift production overseas. Mid-1980s: 4 areas selected for special attention: rural and agricultural development, new and renewable energies, technical assistance, promotion of small and medium-sized businesses in LDCs. Late 1980s: Japan’s aid agenda begins to adopt more global concerns.

Japanese aid becomes more multidimensional, global, political, generous, independent, and Japan becomes an “…international financial superpower.”

### Aid and international security

**1980s**

Strategic and political objectives intensify in Japan’s aid, which the government tends to deny. 1981: Prime Minister Suzuki pledges that Japan will “…strengthen its aid to areas which are important to the maintenance of peace and stability of the world.” His cabinet (1980-82) adopts “comprehensive national security” as official policy, but calls it “ODA” to “areas that are important for the maintenance of peace and stability in the world.” From 1982 to 1987, under Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan approves a $4 billion aid program for South Korea, and limited aid to the Soviet Union and the Philippines, to voice opposition to the policies of the latter two. In response to the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Japan joins other Western nations in economic sanctions against China, but soon restores aid with quiet Western approval.

### Aid disbursement patterns: big increases, continuing focus on Asia yet increasing regional diversification

**1980s**

Total Japanese aid flows, 1980: $3.3 billion, increasing to $50 billion in 1986. 1986-1989: Era of “capital recycling” Japan approves three debt relief programs for third world nations to recycle its enormous economic surpluses, to be disbursed through bilateral and international financial institutional means.

Late 1980s: Japan’s aid disbursements to Asia drop to around 60 percent of the total, yet the overall amount increases greatly, including to Asia. Japan surpasses the U.S. to become the world’s largest bilateral foreign aid donor, partly due to the size and growth of Japan’s economy, its position in the Western alliance as a leading industrialized nation, and its desire to contribute to world peace and security. Japan also needs stability in world affairs to assure a smooth supply of raw materials. Japan seeks to better coordinate its aid with other donors, and to diversify its aid recipients beyond Asia and through contributions to international and multilateral organizations.

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220 Brooks and Orr, “Japan’s Foreign Economic Assistance,” 323, 327.
221 Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, *Japan’s System*, Chapter 1.
223 Yasutomo, *Manner of Giving*.
225 Ibid., 11-12.
226 Ibid., 8.
227 Ibid., 8-9; Hirata, *Civil Society*, 170-171.
229 This means the world’s largest donor of bilateral foreign aid in dollar terms (Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 3); Yasutomo, *New Multilateralism*, 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.5</th>
<th>History of Japanese aid, 1990s</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Major trends, events | 1990s | Collapse of Japan’s huge bubble economy, the Gulf War, the aftereffects of the Tiananmen Square incident. Increasing emphasis on humanitarian (“soft”) aid and aid to LLDCs; continued emphasis on infrastructural, “hard” aid for capital projects. Collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the former Soviet Union; Japan’s offer of aid to many emerging states in those regions, for democratization and human rights. 1991-2001: Japan remains the world’s largest donor of bilateral foreign aid. Japan approves the 1992 ODA Charter, concretely expressing goals for ODA. Japanese aid flow increases to $70-$75 billion by 1993. By the mid-1990s, a new aid activism rises in Japan. Japan is forced to make aid cuts for the first time in decades, due to its continuing economic retraction. Other problems: more public criticisms of aid corruption, aid to China, and political scandals related to ODA. Late 1990s: Japan’s aid expands to a more global agenda, including environmental issues, conflict resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, humanitarian and refugee assistance, development projects, and efforts by international organizations.
| Japanese ODA’s international trends | Early 1990s | International factors, along with domestic ones, began to influence the development of Japan’s ODA system. Japan quietly avoids use of aid sanctions, contrary to American views, believing that aid is more effective as a positive political tool. Major aid is given for humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts in the Persian Gulf region and Africa. Japanese aid has a major role in contributing to peace and free elections in Cambodia. For this, ODA is combined with the

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232 Keiko Hirata, *Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid and Development Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 165, 174-176. Hirata describes the challenges for Japan of offering soft (humanitarian) aid, as opposed to hard aid (for capital projects). Japan is much better equipped to offer the latter, not the former.

233 Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 3.

234 For more details on the 1992 ODA Charter, see the discussion later in this chapter on Japan’s aid philosophy.


236 Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 122.


238 Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 3.

239 Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 129-130.

240 Beaudry-Somecnysky and Cook, *Japan’s System*, Chapter 1.


first dispatch of the Japanese military (Self Defense Forces) to the 
Asian mainland since World War II.\textsuperscript{243} New Japanese ODA to 
former communist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union further expands the global scope of Japan’s ODA.\textsuperscript{244} Despite 
Japan’s large aid budget, and globalization of aid, Western aid critics 
remain largely ignorant of the Japanese/East Asian development 
model’s possible usefulness for other regions.\textsuperscript{245}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More aid via multilateral avenues</td>
<td>Early 1990s</td>
<td>More aid given via United Nations, multilateral development banks, and Group of Seven nations. Spending for multilateral bank aid especially increases. Multilateral aid in particular shows excellent evidence of new activism in Japanese foreign policy at this time.\textsuperscript{246}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese ODA in Asia</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Japan maintains its priority of giving aid to Asia, arguing that most of the world’s poor still live there. Several of former aid recipients like South Korea and Taiwan now become donors themselves. Japan expands its aid to new Asian recipients, such as the former Soviet Central Asian republics.\textsuperscript{247} With the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, Japan receives many requests for aid from other Asian countries, briefly delays cuts in its own aid budget.\textsuperscript{248} 1995, 1998: Japan suspends some aid to China, India and Pakistan because of their nuclear tests.\textsuperscript{249}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{243} Yasutomo, \textit{New Multilateralism}, 11.  
\textsuperscript{244} Koppel and Orr, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 347-348.  
\textsuperscript{245} For example, although Japan funded the study and publication of efforts such as The East Asian Miracle by the World Bank in 1993 (World Bank, \textit{The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy} (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993), many Western aid experts largely failed to recognize lessons from Japan and East Asia for other regions.  
\textsuperscript{246} The last point is Yasutomo’s in \textit{The New Multilateralism}, 15-16.  
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., 12-13.  
\textsuperscript{248} Hirata, \textit{Civil Society}, 165, 171, 175.  
\textsuperscript{249} Japan’s White Paper, “Japan's International Cooperation.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.6</th>
<th>History of Japanese Aid, 2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Main aid goals, trends: increasing pressures for reform, ODA budget fall reversed | 2000s | Japan’s aid seeks to contribute to world peace and prosperity by aid for economic development and infrastructure. Japanese ODA continues to emphasize spirits of self-help, self-reliance with large emphases on ODA loans and request-based aid.  
250 2000: Japan Platform group founded to encourage cooperation among the government, business, and NGO sectors.  
251 Early 2000s: desire to base Japan’s ODA on the Japanese and Asian development model resurfaces.  
252 Decreases in Japan’s aid budget continue through 2003.  
253 Early 2000s: mounting domestic and public pressures (naiatsu) for ODA reform lead the government to create new ODA advisory boards and councils.  
254 Increased global focus of Japanese ODA continues.  
255 The 2003 ODA Charter stresses goals of aid efficiency and quality, Japan’s own security and prosperity, and global goals of poverty reduction and conflict management.  
256 2003: JICA to be turned into an “independent administrative institution.”  
257 2005: Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announces plan called “small government” to downsize Japan’s aid bureaucracy, increase efficiency and responsiveness to the Japanese public. Japan pledges to increase its ODA by $10 billion by 2010, and to double aid to Africa by 2008.  
258 Late 2008: JICA and JBIC’s ODA arm to merge into a new super aid agency, the “new” JICA.  |
| Aid as diplomatic, political goal continues | 2000s | Early 2000s: Japan announces the goal to use aid as a “diplomatic weapon.”  
259 2002: Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announces goal to use aid to promote conflict prevention and peace.  
259 Goals for political development and democracy continue.  
260 The 2003 ODA |

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250 Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 117-119.  
252 Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 268-269.  
253 Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 129.  
254 Ibid., 130-132. Critics like Lancaster charge that these attempts at reform will likely fail to change to fundamental nature of Japanese aid.  
256 Hirata, *Civil Society*, 175; and Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 131.  
Charter stresses goals of efficiency in Japan’s ODA and ensuring its contribution to pressing global issues. Two more major aid conferences on aid to Africa convene in Tokyo as a result of varied motives. Japan makes various contributions to global aid efforts, including aid to China, Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, and global issues such as debt relief, NGOs, global health, the environment, conflict, grassroots development, gender and disaster relief. Many Western and international aid experts from groups like the World Bank continue to offer significant critiques of Japan’s aid and development efforts and to discount their usefulness for other regions.

Does Japan have an aid philosophy? This has been a vigorous matter of debate for some time, involving scholars from both Japan and overseas. Official explanations of the main objectives in aid have greatly varied through the years, often according to the differing priorities of the various ministries that are involved.

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Footnotes:

261 See further comments later in this chapter in the section on Japan’s aid philosophy in the decade of the 2000s.
263 Ibid.
264 See the critiques presented by many Western scholars in Part I of Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid. In another example, Western aid expert Carol Lancaster calls Japan “…more a niche player in development aid rather than a world leader” (Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 110).
265 For example, Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid (1975) examines Japanese aid goals (including political and diplomatic ones), what its ODA does in practice (p. 144), its history and accomplishments from 1953 to 1973, Japan’s aid policies, types and distribution of aid, the aid bureaucracy for multilateral and technical assistance through the early 1970s, and aid policy administration and formulation. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japanese international economics expert Okita Saburo argued that aid from the developed countries should be coupled with efforts of the developing countries to meet their own basic needs, and that Asian developing countries, with their limited land and huge populations, face problems different from nations elsewhere. With much surplus labor, the creation of productive employment is a key need in both rural and urban areas (Okita, Developing Economies and Japan, 6-10, 12).
266 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 19-21. For example, aid goals for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) from the late 1950s through the early 1980s focused on international and foreign policy issues, such as the early 1970s oil crisis, and basic human needs, while the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) usually stayed with economic priorities, connected with development and humanitarian priorities (Ibid.).
contended in the mid-1990s that there is a “mainstream” view that argues that Japan does not have an aid philosophy. There are five basic versions of this argument. In the first, Japan cannot develop an aid philosophy, for several reasons. It has historically lacked a charitable tradition, especially toward foreign nations, and its complex aid bureaucracy and policymaking processes make the development of a holistic philosophy impossible.267 A second argument that Japan does not have an aid philosophy is because one is not necessary. The purpose of its aid is simply to help the Japanese economy and Japanese firms. A third argument against a Japanese aid argument is that it should not have one. The request-based approach is best, and Japan’s traditional policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations should be maintained. A fourth argument is that Japan has no aid philosophy because it borrows aid philosophy from the United States or from other international sources. A fifth argument acknowledges that Japan lacks an aid philosophy, but that it should, to defend Japanese aid policy to both the Japanese public and to international critics.268

Others contend that Japan does have an aid philosophy. Das argues that Japanese aid policy lacked a significant philosophy (beyond “pragmatism” and “opportunism”) until about 1980.269 There are several arguments supporting this position. According to the first, Japan has had an aid philosophy from the start of its aid, stressing

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267 An additional argument that Japan does not need an aid philosophy is that a specific philosophy would violate the Japanese principles of request-based aid and self-help, since recipients best know their own needs.

268 Yasutomo, *New Multilateralism*.

269 Das, *Yen Appreciation*, 157-158. Similar to Das, Yamauchi contends that before 1990, Japanese aid was criticized as an aid system without a philosophy, since it was largely based on the requests of recipient countries. But as the volume and diplomatic issues surrounding aid greatly increased after 1980, domestic debate about a philosophy for aid ensued. In the light of these pressures, the government finally prepared Japan’s first ODA Charter in 1992 (Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 101).
commercialism and self-help, at first, for Japan. During the Cold War, Japan’s aid philosophy incorporated Free World, anti-communist principles. After the Cold War, these ideals have at least partially developed into goals to support leading development ideologies touted by international financial institutions and Western donor nations, including democratization, free markets, and civil rights. But Japan’s aid philosophy has not been political, but development-oriented. In this view, political goals such as anti-communism, democracy, and diplomacy obstruct genuine economic development. So since the 1950s, Japan’s aid philosophy has stressed

...a belief in self-reliance and self-help on the part of the recipient; a request-based aid philosophy; separation of politics from economics; emphasis on infrastructure; attention to the social infrastructure and the welfare of the masses. All of these constituted a Japanese development philosophy that has guided [Japan’s] ODA all along [through the mid-1990s]. It was practical and results-oriented rather than political and ideological, which as a rule are obstacles to genuine and effective development.

A second pro-aid philosophy argument contends that Japan’s aid philosophy developed slowly. In one version, from the 1950s to the 1960s, Japan did not have an aid philosophy, but it has since the 1970s, when the concept of comprehensive national

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270 A variant on this argument is Hasegawa, *Japanese Foreign Aid*. He contends that from 1953 to 1973, the Japanese government claimed that the goals of its aid were promoting world peace and economic growth (needed for Japan’s security), through improving living conditions in the LDCs (Hasegawa, *Japanese Foreign Aid*, 144). But Hasegawa argues in reality, that the major goals of Japanese aid were to strengthen Japan’s national interest (kokueki) and two national goals: national development and international ascendancy. During the first ten years, aid goals focused on Japan’s commercial purposes and its internal material well-being. In the second ten years, aid connected with attempts to improve Japan’s social welfare, its role as a potential leader in Asia, and its assumption of a proper role in the global community (Ibid., v).


272 Ibid. Rix also discusses Japan’s “aid philosophy” from the 1950s through the early 1990s (Rix, *Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge*, Chapter 1). Similar to my arguments in this dissertation, Rix argues that closely related to the idea of aid philosophy are the historical and cultural antecedents of aid, including contexts, motives and rationales behind aid (Ibid., 15-19). See my discussion of these issues later in this chapter.
security came into being. The aid philosophy evolved through various stages until the early 1990s, when Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (1989-1991) expressed it as: “democracy, freedom and a market economy must be the framework for any country offered assistance.” With the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan’s first fully formed and articulated ODA philosophy emerged. According to Rix, official explanations of Japanese aid in the early 1990s were fairly clear about the basic rationale behind Japan’s aid, but left many questions unanswered, including the underlying, fundamental objectives of Japan’s government.

In a third argument, Japan’s aid philosophy finally emerged with the 1992 ODA Charter. It could not have been developed at earlier stages. Only the unique circumstances of the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War allowed such a philosophy to arise. According to the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan became committed to working with the least among the less developed countries (LLDCs) and other LDCs, to address

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273 Japanese politicians have evolved the concept of “comprehensive national security” since 1978. It stresses the use of foreign aid to maintain friendly international relations, to enhance national prestige, and to show Japan’s Western allies that Japan is loyal because it aids nations that are important to Western security interests (Yasutomo, Manner of Giving).
274 Information up to this point is from Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 29-30. Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, argues that Japan has had an aid philosophy since the 1950s, first clearly articulated in the 1992 ODA Charter and similar statements, such as Kaifu’s. By the 1990s, aid assumed a high profile in Japanese society, given the large amount of taxpayer expenditures it entails. According to Rix, in the early 1990s, the key elements of the philosophy continued to include emphases on resources (and their connection with security), Japan’s national image, and trade—a focus more Japan’s economic security than on the needs of LDCs. Some aspects of aid were new: goals to use aid pragmatically, for humanitarian purposes, for global issues such as the environment, and to connect aid with political and economic reform objectives in recipients (ibid. Rix, 13, 31, 34-35, 41-43). Inject goals for recipient reforms into ODA signaled a “new wave,” a willingness to offer aid in a more politicized, interventionist manner, in Rix’s view (ibid. Rix, 33). Igarashi adds that by the early 1990s, Japanese aid included seven key objectives: “…reparations, trade promotion, comprehensive security, strategic aid, LDC economic welfare, economic power responsibility, [and viewing] …Japan as an aid power with international status” (Igarashi, “Keizai taikoku no kadai” in Igarashi 1990, cited in Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 32 and 200, n43).
275 Ibid., 29-30.
276 Ibid., 14. This suggests that deeper ethnographic research of these issues would be helpful.
277 Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 30.
“...basic human needs (BHN), poverty, environment, human-resource development, social and economic infrastructure, emergency humanitarian aid, support for the private sector, and structural adjustment,” and to strengthen international peace and stability, democratization, and market-based economies. Soon the Charter was augmented with the Medium-Term Policy on ODA (1999), which stressed goals of self-help efforts in recipients, partnership, balanced with aid for economic infrastructure, more coordination with NGOs, local governments and other civil society governments, support for South-South cooperation, coordination of major ODA efforts through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and that Japan’s new ODA policies would be based on the DAC’s New Development Strategy (focused on social development and poverty alleviation). A significant question is how Japan’s 1992 ODA Charter, the related 1991 ODA guidelines and the 1999 Medium Term Policy Outline affected the evolution of Japan’s aid. The key question was: how much were these new guidelines used as key influences in aid decisions? By the early 2000s, there were doubts about how much the 1992 Charter


280 Ibid.

281 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 365, contended in 1993 that while there was little in the 1992 Charter that was new, how it was implemented might be novel, given newly emerging public pressures for accountability and clarity. The 1992 Charter was related to four new ODA guidelines announced in 1991, which expressed several principles to be considered before granting aid: trends in LDCs’ military spending, production of weapons of mass destruction, import and export of weapons, and efforts for promoting democracy, free markets, human rights and freedoms (Ibid., 360-363, 365).

282 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 36.
and the Medium Term Policy actually guided policy, since Japanese pronouncements have, under analysis, proven to not follow actual aid allocations by sector.\textsuperscript{283}

Table 2.7 Medium-term ODA Policy Outline 1999\textsuperscript{284}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Approaches:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adherence to the DAC Development Partnership Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promotion of good governance practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Priority given to individual recipient needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role coordination among developing countries, donor countries, international organizations, private sector, and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human-centered development, LLDC needs, and human security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More active domestic involvement in ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority issues:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for poverty alleviation and social development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for economic and social infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resources development and educational exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, health, population, food, energy, and narcotics issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict, disaster, and recovery assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another pro-aid philosophy argument contended in the mid-1990s that Japan did not yet have an aid philosophy, but would soon. During the 1990s, Japanese development economists and other policymakers focused on identifying common guidelines and principles based on the experiences of Japan and Asia, and arguing for them in multilateral banks and at other international venues. Japan’s aid philosophy, when it emerged, would be based on Japan’s development experience and the “Asian development model.” It would offer developing nations transferable lessons based on Japan’s and other Asian countries’ development, “…the common features of their

\textsuperscript{284} Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 120.
‘economic miracles’.” By the late 1990s, several analysts argued that such an aid philosophy, based on Japan’s development model, not the West’s, had emerged. In this argument, Japan advocated development based on actual economic growth, self-help, efforts, and initiative from the LDCs:

The Japanese government advocates the view that developing countries need to take responsibility for their own development, choose their own priorities, and mobilize their own efforts. Japanese economic cooperation changes the nature of the donor’s relations with developing countries from one based on humanitarian assistance to one based on a partnership for growth. Developing countries have been asking for years for trade, not aid. Japan has been successful in using public-sector financing under the OECD–DAC definition of ODA to leverage financing for, and investment in, developing countries from the Japanese private sector. Japan is very proud to point to its active involvement in bringing about the Southeast Asian miracle as a model for other donors to pursue with developing countries.

In the 1990s, there was also somewhat of a shift in aid policy to “results-oriented” and “client-centered” aid approaches, with an emphasis on “measurable” and “sustainable”

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286 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid (268) asserts that this development approach, based on the experiences of Japan and other East Asian countries with industrialization, emerged as early as the early 1990s, in reaction to Western economic neo-liberalism.

287 According to this view, the basic philosophy of Japanese aid is based on “economic cooperation” or “development cooperation” between Japan and developing countries, not just on “aid” or “assistance” being given by “donors” to poor “recipient” nations, the common aid philosophy of many Western donors (Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1).
From the mid-1990s, Japan has sought to incorporate more accountability, efficiency, transparency, and effectiveness into its aid, and to de-emphasize more conventional, large-scale, state-centric programs that neglect the needs of the poor.\textsuperscript{289}

By the late 1990s, several critics noted basic differences in Western and Japanese aid philosophies. For example, they argued that most Western industrialized nations prefer an aid approach that favors helping the poorest nations to eliminate poverty, not helping to finance development of financial infrastructure. Japan, on the other hand, prefers to help with the latter, providing most of its aid through yen loans, to encourage LDC’s efforts to build economic and social infrastructure.\textsuperscript{290}

Japan’s view is that many developing countries require capital to build infrastructure for continuous economic development and that the countries cannot build enduring democratic systems, with continuous improvements in living standards, unless economic growth backs their efforts. Sustainably improving the living standards of the poor through their own self-help efforts is possible only when the economy of the country is fundamentally sound. The general belief in Japan is that its support for development in Southeast Asia — through a combination of ODA, trade, and private investment — played an important role in the region’s economic development and increased standard of living.\textsuperscript{291}

This emphasis on “self help” is often emphasized in Japan’s aid philosophy.\textsuperscript{292}

How has Japan’s “aid philosophy” (or lack of one) evolved in the last decade?

According to official sources, the purpose of Japan’s ODA is to contribute to global peace and prosperity through helping to stabilize the international economy, by

\textsuperscript{288} Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 117-119.  
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., 119. For example, under the Hashimoto cabinet, in 1998, the ODA Reform Council released a report that called for improving aid reforms through “human-centered development” and relieving poverty, to be accomplished through improvements in areas including: partnerships with fellow donor nations, country-level coordination and planning, aid evaluation, field office presence, civil participation in recipient nations. These concerns are integrated with more conventional Japanese aid goals in the Medium Term Policy Outline (1999) (Ibid.).  
\textsuperscript{290} Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, Chapter 1.  
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid.
supporting “…economic infrastructures and social development in developing countries.”

Japan’s aid philosophy continues to emphasize self-help and self-reliance, often through the provision of ODA loans, a request-based system, and goals for political development, such as democratization and human rights. This system (of loans, aid requests, and political goals) is influenced by Japan’s own experience in international relations and development. Since 2000, to try to better customize aid programs for recipient nations, Japan also initiated the preparation of Country Assistance Programs, following principles in the 1992 ODA Charter and the 1999 Medium-Term Policy, the latter guiding overall aid policies for major recipient nations. In the early 2000s, Japan announced goals to use aid in diplomatically strategic, assertive ways. The 2003 ODA Charter stresses additional goals about the effects and efficiency of Japanese aid,

294 Japan’s aid continues to feature a request-based system, to respect the sovereignty of recipients, and to reduce wasteful requests. The stress on “self-help” is to encourage national pride in the minds of the recipients. In line with this thought on self-help and reduction of waste, most of Japan’s aid is offered as yen loans (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 268-269). A request-based system inherently gives more priority to recipient governments than to other civic participants in an LDC (Ibid., 117-119).
296 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 117-119. These influences include emphases on strong, state-led efforts, infrastructural development, the need to respect the sovereignty of other nations, and a desire to respect the wishes of Western and other international donors.
297 Some country evaluation reports of JICA’s technical aid to various countries can be found at http://jica.go.jp/english/publication/studyreport/country (Morrison, “World Bank,” 40, n46).
299 Ibid., 103-104. Yamauchi stresses the “unique” nature of Japan’s aid diplomacy, and the initiation, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, of special diplomatic goals for Japanese aid in four areas: infectious diseases, conflict and development, and aid in two regions: Africa and East Asia (Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 103-104).
especially on the international level.\textsuperscript{300} The stress on the “Japanese” or “Asian” development model, on development as a state-led process of trade and industrial growth driven by industrial projects that feature related technologies, seems to have resurfaced in Japan’s aid philosophy in the 2000s.\textsuperscript{301} It has both positive and negative aspects. Among the negative ones, critics argue that many developing countries do not have the institutional capacity to prepare applications for the complex Japanese system, and that the requirement for aid requests mainly from national governments shuts out other public and civil sector actors in LDCs.\textsuperscript{302} We also gain valuable perspectives on the philosophy of Japanese aid (in practice) by studying the perspectives of aid recipients about Japanese aid.\textsuperscript{303}

\textsuperscript{300} The 2003 Charter incorporates both national and international goals. According to the Charter, the effectiveness of Japanese aid must be improved. It defines the purpose of Japanese aid as “contributing to the peace and development of the international community and thereby ensuring the nation’s security and prosperity,” amid complex problems associated with globalization, including human rights, pollution, terrorism, religious and ethnic conflicts, and the gap between rich and poor. The revised Charter continues to affirm traditional Japanese goals of giving priority to aid to Asia, physical infrastructural problems. But it fails to mention the MDGs (Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 270, 272-273).

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., 268-269.

\textsuperscript{302} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{303} For example, according to Chinese scholar Feng, Japan’s ODA to Asia serves as an important policy tool for economic diplomacy. Its ODA to China serves in part to compensate China for its claims to war reparations (Shaokui Feng, “Japanese Aid to China,” in ed., David M. Arase, \textit{Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid} [Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995], 206). Fiji-based scholar Sandra Tarte finds that in its aid to Pacific Island states, in principle, Japan supports such international aid norms as poverty reduction, sustainability and self-reliance in development, human rights/security, and advancing its own national and foreign policy interests. In practice, however, Japan’s aid has a large presence in these nations in terms of amount, but not in political influence, due to Japan’s aid policy emphases on self-help and on non-interference in aid recipients’ political affairs (Sandra Tarte, “Japan’s ODA in the Pacific Island States,” in ed., David M. Arase, \textit{Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid} [Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995], 250-251). Thai scholar Anuman Leelasorn reports that technical Japanese aid to Thailand increasingly incorporates international, participatory norms (Anuman Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan and Other Donors in Thailand,” in ed. Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 258-259).
Approaches to Assessing Japan’s Aid

Overview

In Takamine Tsukasa’s analysis, there are five major approaches to analysis of the meaning of Japanese foreign aid: the commercial instrument approach, the approach of mercantile realism or strategic pragmatism, the reactive state approach, the proactive state approach, and the institutional analysis approach.

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304 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 7. For more details on Takamine’s categorization of analytical approaches to Japanese ODA, see the appropriate footnoted portions in this section.

305 The commercial instrument approach refers to analyzing Japanese aid regarding its connections to commercial interests in Japan. Historically, Japanese aid was well known for having a high percentage of officially tied aid (the requirement that Japanese business interests be used for the provision of services or infrastructure connected with the aid). Scholars associated with this approach include Margee Ensign (Margee M. Ensign, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Japan’s Foreign Aid Program (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); and David P. Wright-Neville, The Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 1950-1990: The Impact of Culture, Politics, and the International System on the Policy Formation Process (Clayton, Vic: Monash Development Studies Centre, 1991). Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid (7-8) criticizes the commercial instrument approach as inadequate to explain the complex factors, especially political and strategic elements, connected with Japanese ODA.

306 Mercantile realism, Samuel’s analysis of major Japanese foreign policy goals, is directly related to the concept of technonationalism as ideology. See the definition of technonationalism as ideology in the Glossary section.

307 The mercantile realism approach, developed by Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels (Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” International Security 22(4) [Spring 1998], 171-203) stresses how Japan’s diplomatic and international economic policies emphasize enhancing its economic and technological positions in the international system, rather than its military one. According to their explanation, Japan’s technological and economic security interests are more primary determinants than its military ones (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 9). Mercantile realism is based on the rational actor model, which assumes the dominance of a single, unified, rational actor in the process (Ibid., 16). It is a variant of structural realism, the international relations theory that mainly military interests, rather than other interests, drive the foreign policies of nations. Related to mercantile realism is the strategic pragmatism approach, which refers to Japan’s diplomatic and foreign economic policies focused on technology and economics. Schmiegelow and Schmiegelow argue that in the 1980s, Japan’s model of development inspired many developing countries in East Asia (including China and the Soviet Union) and Latin America in their own development efforts (Henrik Schmiegelow and Michèle Schmiegelow, “How Japan Affects the International System,” International Organization 44(4) [Autumn], 553-88). Takamine concludes that mercantile realism and structural pragmatism stress how well Japan uses its technological and economic capacities, including ODA, to enhance its global economic and political security interests (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 8-10).

308 The reactive state approach, advocated by scholars Kent E. Calder and Robert M. Orr, Jr., argues that Japan’s foreign policy has tended to follow the pattern of a reactive state, where its policy change most commonly results from outside pressure, and where “…reaction prevails over strategy…” (Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986 [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988]). While Calder concludes that Japanese ODA tends to react to U.S. pressure, Orr
These approaches do not address the same issues, but answer three main questions concerning Japanese ODA policy issues: 1) the mercantile realism and commercial instrument approaches ask what policy goals are pursued by Japan’s ODA and international economic policies. 2) The proactive and reactive state approaches ask whether mainly domestic or international interests drive Japan’s ODA actions. 3) The institutional analysis approach explores how institutional structures and forces formulate


In the proactive state approach, Dennis Yasutomo, a major proponent, stresses the independence and “proactiveness” of Japanese foreign policy, and the capacity of the Japanese state to formulate its own coherent foreign policy that operates in its own interests (Yasutomo, *Manner of Giving*, and *New Multilateralism*, 36-48, cited in Takamine, *Japan’s Development Aid*, 12, n58, n59). Like mercantile realism, the proactive state approach is also based on the rational actor model of decision-making (Ibid., 16). A major difference in the proactive and reactive state positions is disagreement on whether domestic or international factors are more influential in Japanese ODA policymaking. The proactive state approach also supports the concept of comprehensive security (sôgô anzen hoshô), a doctrine in Japanese foreign policy uniting various political, social and economic goals, first articulated under the Ohira administration in 1980 (Ibid., 12).

In the institutional analysis approach, similar to the bureaucratic politics model of Graham Allison, the issues of what institutional actors or procedures determine and shape policy are asked. In this approach, no single, rational policy actor or agency is assumed (Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* [Boston: Little, Brown Co., 1971], 10-36, 145-7; and Allison and Halperin in Takamine, *Japan’s Development Aid*, 13). Alan Rix and Robert M. Orr, Jr. use this model in their discussions of Japan’s ODA policymaking (Ibid.). Rix, *Japan's Economic Aid*, identifies the bureaucratic wrangling that occurs among the “Big Four” ministries in ODA policy (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA), also known as the yonshocho (the “four ministries”) (Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 10). Orr, *Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid*, confirms these findings but also adds the influence of policymaking from the United States. In the treatment of Rix and Orr, the model used stresses the influence of policymaking in smaller bureaucracies within the larger Japanese government. David Arase expands this analysis by examining the ODA policy system in the broader government structure (including the ruling political party, ministries and the Diet) and between the government and the private sector. Arase concludes that Japanese ODA allows Japan to pursue economic, political and security goals simultaneously (Arase, *Buying Power*, cited in Takamine, *Japan’s Development Aid*, 14-15). Takamine further argues that his own study goes beyond the “Big Four” explanation of Rix and Orr, and the expanded institutional argument of Arase (Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*) by stressing the importance of competition between MOFA bureaucrats and politicians in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (the ruling party for most of the postwar period) as a key determinant in Japan’s ODA policymaking, especially for aid for China in the late 1990s (Takamine, *Japan’s Development Aid*, 15, 158-159).
Japan’s ODA policies.\footnote{Ibid., 7.} David Arase lists five rather similar approaches to analyzing Japanese aid, including the conflict of “trade versus aid,”\footnote{“Trade versus aid” refers to the argument that Japan has been less able than other aid donors to meet the ODA standards and expectations of the international development community, due to the historically strong connection between its ODA and national trade interests (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 9). See also my discussion of Arase’s treatment of this issue later in this chapter, where I discuss economic approaches to the analysis of Japan’s ODA system.} bureaucratic politics explanations,\footnote{Arase’s discussion (Ibid., 10-11) of bureaucratic politics mentions the work of Rix and Arase, stressing that the huge bureaucratic involvement in Japan’s ODA has created an “…entrenched…” system that “…ensures that Japanese ODA, barring a radical structural reform, will continue in balkanized fashion to serve national economic and commercial interests and will stop short of meeting international ODA norms” (Arase, Buying Power, quoted in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11).} strategic explanations,\footnote{Arase notes how MOFA began coordinating Japanese ODA with U.S. strategic interests, in response to criticism in the 1980s that Japan was “free-riding” on U.S. security efforts to protect it. Arase puts the work of Orr, Yasutomo, Miyashita and others in this “strategic” group (Orr, Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid; Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid; Yasutomo, Manner of Giving; Shafiqul Islam, Yen for Development; Akitoshi Miyashita, Limits to Power: Asymmetric Dependence and Japanese Foreign Aid Policy [Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2003]; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11). Miyashita argues, after examining five historical cases of Japanese foreign aid, that Japanese aid policy is not merely reactive to the demands of U.S. pressure on Japanese, but also proactive and strategic, that it represents intentional action reflective of Japanese interests (Miyashita, Limits to Power).} ODA as “corrupt and unaccountable…”\footnote{On this point, see my discussion on the perceptions of the Japanese public/media/civil sector on Japan’s ODA, later in this chapter.} and gaps between Japan’s ODA system and the international, Western-dominated ODA system (Arase 2005a: 9-12).\footnote{On this item, please see the section later in this chapter where I discuss the perceptions of other donors on Japan’s aid.} In this study, I categorize the major approaches analyzing Japanese ODA as the following: strategic approaches, institutional/bureaucratic politics approaches, comparative approaches, perceptual/cognitive approaches, economic approaches (which focus on the effects of trade interests on ODA), cultural/historical approaches, and human rights approaches. More details of each approach follow. I also review some of the major findings of each.
Strategic Approaches

Japan’s ODA may be assessed through the lens of strategic analysis. Japan became more assertive in the implementation of its aid programs and foreign policy, and aid acquired an increasingly strategic nature since the 1980s. Japan now regularly rewards or denies aid according to whether the behavior of the potential recipient nation is in line with Japan’s economic and political strategic interests. While earlier motives for foreign aid included export promotion and insuring stable supplies of natural resources, in the 1980s, ODA became a strategic “…foreign policy tool for achieving political and security objectives as well as economic benefits.” The government reduced or withheld aid from Cuba, Angola and other nations for political reasons, and extended or denied economic aid for strategic reasons deemed important to international Japanese security.\(^{317}\) This reflected increasing activism in Japanese foreign policy since the 1980s. Japan was no longer willing to be “an economic giant and a political dwarf.” Because of Japan’s 1947 peace constitution, its contributions to international “burden-sharing” for most of the postwar period have necessarily and mainly been non-military. According to Yasutomo, no other nation so enthusiastically embraced foreign aid as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, or increased it so rapidly, as Japan did at this time.\(^{318}\)

But there have been several problems with “strategic aid.” Japanese prime ministers must carefully guide it through a myriad of difficulties involving the budget, the policy process, and the nature of Japanese aid itself. There have been problems with aid

disbursement, the aid application process, and other areas, though the government has been trying to address several of these areas since the 1990s. Because of the experience of World War II, and “...the sensitivity of other Asian nations to the notion of any kind of strategic Japanese concept for the region,” Japanese government officials in 1980s never openly used the term “strategic” aid. They also denied the existence of the concept to the Japanese public. Some scholars argue that there is no proof that foreign aid “...produces internationally pacific conduct.”

Historically it has often been argued that Japan’s aid policy forms in reaction to U.S. pressure. J. Robert Orr emphasizes the formulation of Japan’s aid policies as largely shaped by external pressure (gaiatsu) from the United States. Orr also treats the influence of the U.S. and its strategic interests on Japan’s ODA, including attempts at aid cooperation and joint projects between the two nations. Concerning ODA through the late 1980s, Orr’s argument sees Japan as largely a reactive, not proactive, state.

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319 Ibid., 59-61, 63-64, 67, 70-71. Since the 1990s, the Japanese government has adopted many administrative reforms to try address these problems. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2008, JBIC and JICA will merge into one super aid agency. But the main question is, how much have these reforms effectively addressed actual problems in aid disbursement, effectiveness, evaluation, and other areas?

320 Orr, *Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 6, 58.


322 Koppel and Orr, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 349.

323 Koppel and Orr agree somewhat, but also argue that realistically, it often formed because of diverse influences, as seen in their case studies of Japanese ODA to various Asian countries (Ibid.).

324 Orr, *Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid*, 144-145.
Institutional / Bureaucratic Political Approaches

A study by Alan Rix in 1980 aims to elucidate the foundations of Japan’s aid policy through a bureaucratic politics and organizational analysis approach. Rix argues that Japan’s ODA system, explained as part of its global economic policy, is largely driven by domestic factors: “…conditions, [bureaucratic] structures, and forces.” He stresses the complexities of Japan’s aid decision-making processes, and applies many classical arguments of political science studies of bureaucratic politics to the politics of Japanese aid. In Rix’s argument, aid processes are dominated by procedures in a policy environment in constant flux, in turn influenced by ideas of aid, aid processes and organization, the priority of aid in Japanese domestic politics, patterns of policymaking, and the competition of the interaction of agencies, officials and procedures versus the Japanese government’s aid policy options. Rix calls the bureaucratic politics of Japanese aid vigorous, and its organizational processes resilient.

Concerning studies in the 1990s, J Robert Orr’s The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power (1990) portrays Japan’s aid policies as greatly influenced by the

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325 Rix, *Japan’s Economic Aid* (270-271), draws on the pioneering work of Judith Tendler in analyzing organizational influences on the policy outcomes of the U.S. Agency for International Development (Tendler, *Inside Foreign Aid*). Rix found that a strong factor in aid policymaking in Japan was continuous coordination of goals, activities and perceptions at the level of the primary workgroup within a ministry or agency, rather than coordination of decisions across agency or ministerial lines. This is similar to the findings of Hugh Heclo and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *The Private Government of Public Money: Community and Policy Inside British Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) who found, in their study of British budgeting, that effective policy coordination can include “…personal ties characterized by personal trust and confidence, constant exchange of information and ideas, and the voluntary constraint of conflicts within reasonable bounds” (Ibid.).

326 Ibid., 9.

327 Ibid., 12, 16. For example, Rix argues that, like policies everywhere, Japan’s aid policies are affected by the push and pull of policymaking, standard operating procedures and incrementalism, among other forces.

328 Ibid., 12-13.

329 Ibid., 269.
complexity of Japan’s bureaucratic politics. 330 David Arase’s 1995 study investigated in-depth the influences of Japanese bureaucratic politics on Japan’s aid policies. He concluded that the latter are influenced by a multiplicity of factors, and that institutions that shape Japanese aid policy are influenced not merely by individuals, organizations, or rules, but also by international, domestic, crisis and ideological factors. 331

In the early to mid-2000s, Arase argued that there were various institutional factors in Japan’s ODA bureaucracy that limited its capacity to change. The “entrenched” bureaucratic structure dates back to the 1950s, the era of postwar war reparations to other Asian nations. Larger ministries and agencies related to aid are linked by horizontal ties, and implementing agencies, such as JBIC and JICA, by vertical connections. The political party ruling Japan for almost all of the postwar period, the Liberal Democratic Party, resisted attempts at major reform, and made it unlikely that effective reform legislation would be introduced in the Diet. 332 Yet Japan is continuing to attempt aggressive reform of its aid policy system (treated further below.

**Comparative Approaches**

There is great value in comparative studies and approaches. The broadest, most significant comparative study of Japanese ODA to date is Arase 2005a, though there are others. Objective, factual comparisons of Japanese aid have high value. In his 2005 study, 333 Arase notes that his contributors, from both donor and recipient nations, offer many significant critiques of Japanese aid, largely in the light of the latest international

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330 Orr, *Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 4, 6-14. The other major factor Orr identifies as influencing Japan’s ODA policy is outside pressure from the U.S. See also my discussion of Orr’s (*Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid*) treatment of strategic approaches earlier in this chapter.
331 Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*.
332 Ibid., 270.
333 Ibid.
standards for foreign aid, that to improve aid, aid policymakers must better engage and listen to aid recipients and the poor.\textsuperscript{334} Next I survey the landscape of major works offering comparative perspectives on Japan’s aid, including comparisons with Western and international donors, with Eastern (other Asian) donors, comparative studies of the effects of Japanese aid on aid recipients, and cross-regional studies of Japanese aid.\textsuperscript{335}

A significant group of studies comparing Japan’s aid with major Western and international donors, including the World Bank, Britain, Sweden, Australia, the United States, and Canada, appears in Arase’s \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions} (2005).\textsuperscript{336} They compare Japanese ODA with prevailing international norms of ODA in such areas as “…field presence, policy coordination, user-friendly aid procedures, priority of lowest income countries, partnership with other government donors [and] …civil society actors…; and priority accorded to human development.”\textsuperscript{337}

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid., 2-3.
\textsuperscript{335} Major cross-regional, comparative studies of Japanese aid include Koppel and Orr, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}; Douglas A. Van Belle, Jean-Sebastien Rioux, and David M. Potter, \textit{Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}. Van Belle et al explores the influence of media coverage on how foreign aid is allotted by five major donor nations, including Japan. They find that more media coverage of particular recipients correlates with increased aid offers. For more comments on the other two works, see the comments that follow.
\textsuperscript{337} Ibid., 14.
Among the findings are that Japan’s ODA focuses heavily on the construction of infrastructure, the need for Japan to develop a more effective structure for aid management and core competence, that it can learn valuable lessons from other donors, and that there are possibilities for cooperation between Japan and other major donors. The ways in which Japan’s ODA system differs from those of Western countries include the higher (yen) loan component in Japanese aid (to support “self-help” ideals in recipient nations), a higher emphasis on the development of economic infrastructure, a major regional emphasis on Asia, and its overall philosophy of aid.

Other notable studies comparing Japan’s ODA system with Western and international aid systems include studies of development cooperation policies in Japan, the United States and Germany, in Japan and Germany, of Japan’s ODA system within the international aid system and comparisons with major Western systems, and of major trends in Japan’s ODA policy compared to other national and international donors. King and McGrath study the role of knowledge in the aid policies of several major donors, including Japan. David Arase’s essay “Japan’s and the United States’ Bilateral ODA Programs” provides a valuable overall comparison of the bilateral aid systems in the United States and Japan, including their aid philosophies, schemes, and

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338 Ibid., 14-15; Alan Rix, “Japanese and Australian ODA,” 104-116; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 131-132.
administrations. Lancaster’s 2007 study *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* explores the impact of domestic politics in five nations, including Japan, on aid donor policy decisions.

A new, emerging area of comparative study is comparisons with “Eastern” (Non-Western, often Asian) donors, such as South Korea, the People’s Republic of China, India and Taiwan. In their comparative study of Japanese and South Korean aid, Kim and Seddon’s 2005 essay notes numerous similarities between the Japanese and South Korean aid programs. South Korea’s program was intentionally structured with Japan as its model. While there are several differences in the two systems, soon both may face similar struggles: demands of highly varied domestic bureaucratic interests and external pressures to meet international (largely Western) aid standards for partnership with donors and recipients, and for poverty reduction. To date, there have been few

345 Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*.
346 Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*.
347 Perhaps we should include additional, significant actors in this group, for example, Saudi Arabia. It depends on how we define “Eastern.”
348 Sang-Tae Kim and David Seddon, “ODA Policy and Practice: Japan and the Republic of Korea,” in *Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions*, ed. David M. Arase (London: Routledge, 2005, 152. In both countries, ODA was initially strongly connected to domestic economic development and trade. Both are poor in natural resources, and have undergone similar economic development processes (Ibid., 159-164). There are structural similarities in both countries’ ODA systems. Up to 2008, both have been decentralized, with aid decisions and implementation split among various ministries and agencies (Ibid., 166). The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), South Korea’s agency for technical aid and cooperation, was modeled after JICA. Both agencies have many similarities (Ibid., 170, 176-178). The bilateral loan programs in each country operate similarly, and make up a high proportion of each nation’s total ODA. The largest portion in each goes to Asia (Ibid., 171-175). Both nations have had systems without overt philosophies, lacked a leading development agency or ministry, had much aid tying, and been rather weak in development research and having adequately trained development specialists (Ibid., 183, 186-188; Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 16). Recently new programs for training specialists in international development and cooperation have increased in both nations.
349 For examples, see Kim and Seddon, “ODA Policy and Practice,”171.
350 Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 16.
comparative studies of the aid systems of Japan and other non-Western donors. There are many interesting possibilities. Beyond comparing the histories, structural features, philosophies, strategic functions or distribution and contribution patterns of these emerging systems, a rich field for investigation is comparative study of the impacts of non-Western aid systems on other regions, perhaps contrasted with Western and/or international-multilateral systems.


Major comparative studies of the effects of Japanese aid on aid recipients include Koppel and Orr’s 1993 study, one of the first studies to comparatively analyze Japanese aid policy by studying how it has unfolded in various countries and regions. Their unique contribution is to examine what Japan’s aid does through recipient country-focused analyses of Japan’s bilateral economic and political relations, in an attempt to explain variation in Japanese ODA policies. They conclude that in the late 1980s, a variety of bilateral relationships and influences, pressures from Japan’s obligations to the United States and the West, and Japan’s international “obligations” influenced Japan’s ODA policies. Japan’s ODA was not so hugely different from that of other countries, but its management of ODA was.

Marie Söderberg’s 1996 study examines the business aspects and effects of Japanese aid in several Asian countries. David Potter’s 1996 and 1997 studies compare two Southeast Asian recipients’ experiences. Schraeder, Hook and Taylor’s 1998 essay compares the effects of foreign aid flows from four major industrialized donor nations (France, Japan, Sweden, and the United States) on Africa in the 1980s. Arase 2005 study includes several brief studies of Japan’s aid to countries...
and regions in Asia, the Pacific, and beyond, including recipients\textsuperscript{361} and other donors\textsuperscript{362} viewpoints.

A key area of current interest among scholars is the comparison of Japan’s ODA system and its performance with international ODA norms and standards.\textsuperscript{363} Both Japanese and international norms have evolved over time.\textsuperscript{364} Prevailing international norms that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s include a new “results-oriented” emphasis on “development partnerships” for poverty alleviation through measurable progress and improved “stakeholder coordination.” In 2000, the United Nations’ Millennium Summit approved eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that seek to strengthen aid donor and recipient cooperation so that poverty alleviation may be

\textsuperscript{360} Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}.

\textsuperscript{361} These include Japan’s aid to Pakistan (Tahir Andrabi, “Japanese Aid to Pakistan,” in \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions}, ed. David M. Arase [London: Routledge, 2005], 193-202), to China (Feng, “Japanese Aid to China”), to South and Southeast Asia (Haider A. Khan, “Japanese Aid to South and Southeast Asia: a Comparative Analysis,” in \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions}, ed. David M. Arase [London; New York: Routledge, 2005], 224-234)), Pacific island states (Tarte, “Japan’s ODA”), and Thailand (Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan”). I will discuss several of these studies later in this chapter in the section on perceptual and cognitive approaches to analyzing Japan’s ODA.

\textsuperscript{362} Seddon, “Japanese and British Overseas Aid,” in \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions}, ed. David M. Arase (London: Routledge, 2005), 41-80, compares the British and Japanese aid systems, offering a comparative history and overview of trends in both. Among the interesting findings, Seddon notes that as precursors to today’s aid, Britain’s experience in imperialism goes back over 300 years, while Japan’s experience began about 100 years ago. This gave Britain long, extensive skills in interacting with and developing governance mechanisms to deal with its colonies and the now independent Commonwealth. But Japan has had to develop governance and foreign aid mechanisms for LDCs much more rapidly (Seddon, 41-46).

\textsuperscript{363} Koppel and Orr, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid} (354) question the eventual effects of new ODA goals incorporating humanitarianism, environmentalism and democratization, and Japan’s increasing multilateral contributions. David Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid} (131) finds that the bilateral ODA systems of the United States and Japan are gradually growing similar in their mutual recognition of the value of international aid goals encompassing areas such as aid partnerships, sustainability, gender, and NGOs.

\textsuperscript{364} Some of the international norms prevalent in the past included a stress on quantitatively measured inputs (such as aid quantity, regional, sectoral and income group-based allocations of aid, and concessionalities) in the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, knowledge of the success of industrial-led development in East Asia, and the debt crisis in Latin America, led to a neo-liberal Washington-based consensus that stressed aid as a reward for political and economic liberalization, and reliance on trade and the private sector as the main paths to economic development. In the 1990s, it became clearer that policy conditionality was hard to coordinate among donors, and economic liberalization alone would not succeed in the absence of adequate infrastructure, governance and stability (Ibid., 7-8).
improved. These new goals have resulted in new methods of aid delivery that stress “country-led strategies” (“poverty-reduction strategy papers,” PRSPs) in development jargon, aiming to encourage increased “ownership” over aid by recipients and partnerships between them and other actors (domestic and international civil society groups and others) on the local level. Donors are also expected to improve their partnerships and coordination of aid efforts with other so all these efforts can encourage more effective achievement of the MDGs in each nation. Meeting these goals is a challenge for all bilateral aid donors, but particularly for Japan, which Arase contends likely does not have the “…structures,” protocols, or staff to achieve the flexible coordination of interests demanded by this new participatory, on-the-ground method of aid delivery. Some of the major possible lessons emerging from Arase’s 2005 comparison of Japanese aid with new international aid standards are that the former is well intended, but largely incapable of responding to international pressures for new norms, due to the structural weaknesses of Japanese ODA administration. Several aid

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365 The Millennium Development Goals are: “1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) to achieve universal primary education; 3) to promote gender equality and empower women; 4) to reduce child mortality; 5) to improve maternal health; 6) to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 7) to ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) to develop a global partnership for development, which emphasizes close coordination involving donors, recipients, the private sector, and all levels of civil society in each endeavor.” These goals are further “…broken down into 18 policy targets with 48 progress indicators…” to allow donor to better focus, monitor and measure their progress (Ibid., 8-9).

366 Ibid., 7-9. Carol Lancaster asserts that in the 1970s, in its aid agencies, consulting firms and NGOs, Japan lacked adequately trained staff to implement aid to meet basic human needs on the local level (Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 119). Though challenging, given new priorities for social development at JICA since 2003, and new graduate programs in international development, this situation should gradually change.

367 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13-14, 267. According to Arase, scholars and aid experts praise Japanese aid projects’ overall quality and quantity, and Japan’s recent attempts to strengthen aid delivery methods, they note other limitations. These include poor clarity and a mismatch between ODA policy goals and implementation, due to administrative issues; poor overall policy coherence; rather inflexible policymaking and excessively complicated implementation; a struggle to meet recipient needs in technical cooperation programs; a generally poor capability in meeting diverse recipient needs; the need to increase policy
practitioners from JICA take issue with many of these criticisms, arguing that somehow Japanese aid has a big image problem.\(^{368}\)

**Perceptual, Cognitive Approaches**

These approaches, consisting of the study of the perceptions of Japanese foreign aid by Japanese, other aid donors, and aid recipients, can greatly enrich our understanding of foreign aid, how it is seen, and how it has developed. Some of this work is comparative. In his study of Japanese ODA to China, Takamine argues that multiple perceived national interests, commercial, strategic, political, and diplomatic (among others), drive Japanese ODA policy.\(^{369}\) Japanese aid can promote multiple interests and policy objectives at the same time. He also argues that Japanese ODA policy is driven more by domestic interests than by international pressures. These policies are not made by a central or unitary, rational authority, but more determined by

...bargaining (or politics) among different domestic actors with competing perceptions of national, organisational and personal interests. It is primarily the shift in the balance of aid policy-making power among these different actors [and their perceptions] that brings about changes in Japanese ODA policy and the goals of that policy.”\(^{370}\)

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\(^{368}\) Yamamoto Aiichiro and Kuwajima Kyoko, “Whither Japanese Aid?” Social Science Japan Journal, Vol. 9, no. 6 (2006), 276, 280. Yamamoto and Kuwajima defend aspects of Japan’s ODA policy, arguing that it is not excessively tied, or unconcerned for international norms of poverty alleviation. Rather, they argue it attempts to address poverty comprehensively, through infrastructural growth including social development. They defend JICA’s technical aid, countering that Japan has “long experience” in partnering with local peers, based on Japan’s cultural history of perseverance, hard work, and a corporate culture of effectively gathering knowledge of foreign markets on the ground level. They charge that Arase misses new efforts to reform Japan’s ODA administration, including changes at MOFA, JICA, increased local collaboration with foreign partners, field-based efforts, and movement toward more cooperative, unified aid administration (Ibid., 275, 277-278, 280-281).

\(^{369}\) All italics in this section are added.

\(^{370}\) Takamine, *Japan’s Development Aid*, 16-17.
Aid programs inevitably have certain effects on aid recipients, and perceptions of those influence future aid policies. Assessing perceptions of Japan’s ODA is vital in analyzing Japan’s aid policymaking.\textsuperscript{371}

My study aims to uncover some of the key historical perceptions and ideas that lay at the root of the Japanese aid system. Such a nuanced understanding is necessary, to better comprehend what is happening in Japanese aid policymaking, and why. For more breadth and richness of analysis, it is useful to study and compare the perceptions of four groups, to start: 1) the Japanese public, media and civil sector, 2) Japanese ODA experts, 3) other aid donors, and 4) aid recipients, their people and communities (the grassroots level affected by Japanese aid), both short- and long-term. Though such study is beyond the scope of this study, I will highlight several in the following paragraphs.

Concerning the perceptions of the Japanese public, media and the civil sector, until the late 1980s or so, Japan’s ODA did not receive too much public or press attention in Japan, but this changed as it gained a higher profile, both domestically and internationally, and took more funds from Japanese taxpayers.\textsuperscript{372} In this period, Japanese aid emerged as a key source of controversy and publicity in Japan’s popular media. Many scandals and other reports of aid problems resulted in much press coverage, in newspapers and books. The Japanese public also liked to hear about the achievements of Japan’s aid. This media attention reflected increased public attention to aid. The Japanese government could not ignore the emerging debate.\textsuperscript{373}

\textsuperscript{371} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{372} Rix, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge}, 13.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 45-46.
Non-academics in Japan’s popular media, opposition parties, civil society, and even within the government have leveled critiques of Japanese ODA system since the 1980s. They have criticized the policy system as wasteful, corrupt, unclear, unaccountable, and inconsiderate of recipients’ needs. This pressure has created more transparency and accountability, encouraging the 1992 ODA Charter, and limited NGO involvement in the aid policy process. As Japanese ODA goals have become more public and visible due to documents such as the 1992 ODA Charter and new movements for more public accountability, it has indeed faced increased public scrutiny.

In the early 1990s, Japan’s young non-governmental organization (NGO) community also reflected this rapidly emerging public concern. Overall, this increased public scrutiny has put more pressure on the government for public openness than it would have preferred. In general, aid officials and bureaucrats have borne more pressure to respond than politicians. Increased pressure on Japan’s ODA system emerged on three sides, from: expanded public awareness about aid, greater media coverage of aid problems, and greater public involvement in NGOs. Greater public pressure undoubtedly created more pressure for reform of the ODA system. Hirata Keiko argues that the economic decline of Japan in the early 1990s sped the weakening of the “iron triangle” of Japan’s postwar political establishment of the LDP, business, and the bureaucracy.

374 Prior to the release of the 1992 ODA Charter, various Japanese critics, including Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations), opposition parties, and several leading government agencies, such as some in the Economic Planning Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued for a more firmly articulated aid philosophy. Several of these arguments were based on rational choice economic theory, and Japanese aid’s stress on self-help (noted above in the aid philosophy section). Arguments for self-help and respect for the sovereignty of other nations potentially conflict with international calls for more humanitarian intervention and aid conditionality (Ibid., 38-41).
375 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 11.
376 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 363.
377 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge, 45-46.
378 Ibid., 70-71.
creating unprecedented space for the emergence of Japan’s civil society and increasingly assertive NGO community. Hirata sees Japan’s ODA policy as the key foreign policy arena where NGOs and the state interact and where the former press for ODA reform. She seeks a more nuanced understanding of state-society relations that may be a model for other East Asian nations imitating Japan’s development model. She concludes that today there are more opportunities for citizens’ involvement in Japan’s aid/development activities, that the developmental state has weakened, more are involved in civil society, political pluralism has increased, and that millions of Japanese support more NGO involvement in ODA.

Regarding the perceptions of Japanese aid experts, Rix’s 1980 study notes how several past studies of Japanese aid and policy attributed its patterns to primarily perceptual factors, and assumed that Japanese perceptions of aid were fairly uniform. Rix realistically disagrees, concluding that the process of Japan’s aid policymaking is much too complex and subject to too many influences for such an explanation to be effective. The cumulative effect of varied forces and relationships concerning aid, along with organizational influences, conflicting ideas and perceptions of aid of the relevant ministries and agencies, has produced different processes for varied types of

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379 Hirata, Civil Society, 1-3, 5-6.  
380 Hirata argues that while the developmental state successfully built the Japanese state from the 1950s to the 1970s, it created several “monsters” now out of control, including corruption, economic crises, weakened industries that can no longer be protected, and increasing demands for citizen participation. Other developing nations should be wary (Ibid., 162-163).  
381 Ibid., 154-155  
383 Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid, 14-15.
aid.\textsuperscript{384} Competition among ministries, ideologies, structures, and perceptions contributed to bureaucratic change regarding Japanese aid, but Rix argues that through the late 1970s, bureaucratic interests were the main force driving how Japanese economic cooperation and aid policies were expressed.\textsuperscript{385} Boundaries around policies are constantly in flux as they interact with changing structures, procedures, and bureaucratic power shifts. These shifts affect how policymaking happens and how it is perceived. Before the late 1970s, shifting policies and perceptions of Japan’s aid helped hide inter-ministerial conflicts, but this became harder as public goals for aid became more visible. Rix contends that this increased visibility would harden and narrow Japanese perceptions of aid,\textsuperscript{386} but has this been the case? How have perceptions of aid affected the aid policy process in Japan, whether within or outside the bureaucracy?

The first extensive treatment of Japanese ODA in mainstream literature in Japan occurred from 1973 to 1975, before and after the first oil shock. Its general findings pointed to economic concerns as a major factor in Japan’s ODA, the challenges of Japan’s complex aid bureaucracy, the regional focus on Asia, and Japan’s tough standards for granting aid. Many complained that Japan’s ODA was subservient to the United States. A second period of extensive treatment happened in the late 1980s to the 1990s, focusing on the conditions, politics, rationales, effectiveness, impacts, and policy processes of Japan’s ODA. Much of the second stream of literature was critical, alleging ODA policy’s high level of corruption, negative effects on the environment, over politicization and emphasis on infrastructural development, and selfish, consuming

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 13.  
\textsuperscript{385} Ibid., 267.  
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid., 272-273
nature. A pro-Japanese school of literature also arose in the early 1990s, arguing that Japan’s aid was the most liberal and untied of all major donors, more multidimensional than other donors’ aid, a motivator of change in LDCs, including democratic values, infrastructural development in Asia, a valuable diplomatic tool, an integral part in sharing Japan’s development expertise, and a foundation of its continuing global engagement.

A weakness of Japanese and foreign literatures on Japan’s ODA through the mid-1990s was their emphasis on bilateral aid, to the neglect of Japan’s multilateral efforts. In the early 1990s, most Japanese aid experts attributed the motives behind Japanese aid as “…economic welfare and security, self-aggrandisement, and political influence and leverage.” Rix also called motivations for aid a result of various gimu (duties) of Japan as a main regional and global economic power.

Among other subjects, Takamine studies Japanese aid experts’ perceptions of the political, social and economic effects of Japan’s massive aid to China on that country’s development. Japan’s aid to China began in 1979, with only brief interruptions following China’s Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and brief tensions in

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388 Ibid., 22-26.
389 Yasutomo lamented the general neglect of the analysis of Japan’s multilateral aid in the Japanese and foreign aid literatures on Japan’s ODA in the mid-1990s (Ibid., 31-32), and hoped to overcome it with his own work. See also the brief discussion of Japan’s regional and multilateral aid efforts later in this chapter.
390 Rix, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 29-30. Problems with these explanations included shifting priorities, unclear definitions, and diverse views of Japan’s ODA in the aid system.
391 The two questions Takamine investigates are 1) how Japan’s China ODA policymakers, specialists, and academics perceive the effects of Japan’s aid on China, and 2) the relationship between these perceived effects and the Japanese government’s policy goals, seen in its aid to China. Takamine acknowledges the impossibility of proving direct cause and effect between Japan’s ODA and China’s development in various sectors. The chapter on the effects of Japan’s ODA on China shows how Japan’s China aid policymakers assess those effects, and correlations between Japan’s ODA and development effects in China. Takamine notes the importance of the perceptions of Japan’s policymakers, since they had direct effects on future decisions on Japan’s aid to China (Takamine, *Japan’s Development Aid*, 136). From the Japanese side, he concludes that implementation of Japan’s ODA to China has not been totally based on rational plans, but rather on strong competition between MOFA bureaucrats and LDP politicians in aid policymaking, influenced by their perceptions of personal, national and organizational interests (Ibid., 159).
Japanese aid experts generally conclude that Japan’s aid to China has brought positive changes in China’s economic development, increased its market reforms, helped to better integrate it into the world economy, encouraged more pluralism in Chinese society, and opportunities for further political reforms. In the view of these experts, Japan’s aid to China has encouraged the latter’s transition from Communist totalitarianism to an authoritarian developmental state, and deepened Sino-Japanese economic relations to the point that neither state can afford serious conflict with the other.

On the perceptions of other aid donors, in the early 1990s, Rix noted the general international image problems Japan had to handle concerning its ODA. Canadian aid practitioners Beaudry-Somecynsky and Cook find that the Japanese aid system is highly complex and hard for outsiders to understand. This hampers its cooperation with other donors. In Marie Söderberg’s 2005 study of Swedish perceptions of Japanese foreign aid, Swedish aid and foreign policy experts characterize Japanese aid as lagging twenty years behind [Sweden’s system], complicated, bureaucratic, dictated by Tokyo, heavily

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393 This might include the eventual furtherance of democratization in China, although this is neither a direct goal nor outcome of Japan’s aid (Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 157). Japan’s China aid experts also note several negative aspects of China’s development, such as rising pollution, military spending, unemployment, gaps between development in rural and urban areas, East and West China, and in income (Ibid., 137).

394 Ibid., 136-137, 156-157.

395 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 1-2, argues that in the early 1990s, few citizens in countries receiving Japan’s aid knew very much about it, and foreign aid in general generates little public interest in most countries. Even if they were informed, in Rix’s opinion, most people would attribute Japan’s aid to further attempts to buy international influence.

396 Beaudry-Somecynsky and Cook, Japan’s System.
stressing infrastructure, and weak in transparency, human rights and democracy issues.\(^{397}\) Other critiques by international experts have recently stressed gaps in the effectiveness of Japan’s ODA system compared with international, Western-dominated norms. They commonly focus on how to improve the performance of Japanese aid by helping it to come more in line with those standards. Critiques often look at the “policy coherence” and “administrative organization” of Japan’s ODA (both criticized as fragmented).\(^{398}\) The most common suggestions are for the Japanese government to implement a more unified, national level aid strategy, to be carried out by a national, cabinet-level agency. Arase concludes that such critiques may be somewhat naïve, but serve to highlight for Japanese national policymakers key problems and possible answers for Japan’s ODA policy system.\(^{399}\)

In the eyes of some, despite huge amounts of Japanese ODA since the late 1980s, it has had big image problems in the West. These problems may stem from Japan’s emphasis on state-led development, seemingly contrary to free market preferences of the United States, the World Bank and other Western donors, poor mastery of English, timidity in asserting its ideas in international forums, and difficulties in realigning its ODA structures to better meet new global norms. Ultimately, Lancaster charges that Japan has become a “niche player,” not a global leader in aid.\(^{400}\) Western observers of Japanese aid have recently offered various lessons for Japan’s aid, based on


\(^{398}\) Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 12, Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System.

\(^{399}\) Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 12.

\(^{400}\) Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 110, 124-126, 128-129.
Western and multilateral systems, but fail to adequately recognize lessons that Japanese or other Eastern systems may offer their own systems, namely, how actual economic development can really happen. Is this ethnocentric?

Through the early 1990s, there were many studies of Japanese aid and of Japan as a donor, but few studies of Japanese aid recipients, especially of the impacts of Japan’s ODA at the grassroots level. Arase’s 2005 study includes several studies of Latin American, Chinese, South Asian, Southeast Asian and South Pacific recipients’ perceptions of Japanese aid. While these studies note recipients’ positive appraisals of several distinctive contributions of Japanese aid, such as its sectoral, infrastructural and regional strengths and high levels of funding, they mention weaknesses noted by other donors, including struggles with sustainability, adjusting to local needs, transfer of

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401 For example, Keith Morrison argues that Japan should decrease its economic infrastructural allocations, increase social allocations, decentralize aid staff and decisions to the country level, improve aid evaluations, and end the request-based system (Morrison, “World Bank,” 37). Rix, “Japanese and Australian ODA,” 114-115, argues that Australia may be a model for Japan to emulate, that dispensing technical aid might be best delegated to one agency, that Japan should intervene more in recipients’ aid decisions, give less attention to economic infrastructure and more to social issues. Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 132, concludes that USAID’s norms (focusing on aid results, evaluation, field-centered emphasis and community building) are closer to international norms, and thus provide possible lessons for the reform of Japan’s ODA. While applauding Japan’s reform efforts, and acknowledging the challenge of reforming a system much larger and more complex than Canada’s, Beaudry-Somcynsky, “Japanese ODA Compared to Canadian,” 142-151, offers several lessons for Japan from Canada, rather than the reverse, especially on technical aid.

403 This reminds one of the numerous critiques of postwar Western development policies by Western anthropologists that deem “development” as a total failure, such as Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine, and Escobar, Encountering Development. East Asian experts cannot help but notice how these critiques virtually ignore the significant development experiences of various East Asian nations. There is also great reluctance in Western dominated international financial institutions to admit the high degree of success, on some levels, of Eastern experiences of development, such as Japan’s (World Bank, East Asian Miracle). Many of these stress strongly state-led development schemes. All of this seems ethnocentric on some levels.

404 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 6.

technology, and appropriateness of project design. Among the findings are that Japanese aid needs increased flexibility, field presence, and soft aid/social analysis capabilities.\textsuperscript{406} Several commentators note the predominantly state-to-state nature of Japan’s ODA efforts, and its weaker capabilities on the ground.\textsuperscript{407}

David M. Potter’s work on Japanese aid to Southeast Asia, focusing on aid recipients, finds that recipients obtain funding for many desired projects as they learn to tailor their requests to the Japanese ODA system.\textsuperscript{408} Söderberg studies the implementation of Japanese aid to four Asian nations,\textsuperscript{409} from donor and recipient viewpoints.\textsuperscript{410} Recipients exercise considerable influence.\textsuperscript{411} Multiple actors in both donor and recipient nations, including opinion makers, politicians, bureaucrats, the business community, the media and the public, can influence the process, and do. What transpires depends on differentials in each case, project, and country.\textsuperscript{412} On aid to South and Southeast Asia, Haider Khan finds that while Japanese aid has contributed successfully to budget issues for some recipient governments, it is too donor oriented, and weak in addressing ground level recipient issues.\textsuperscript{413} Aid recipients in Bangladesh and

\textsuperscript{406} Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 16-18.
\textsuperscript{407} Khan, “Japanese Aid.” Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA” argues that historically, most Japanese aid to Latin America has stressed state-to-state development projects, with negotiations conducted at high levels, not grassroots development projects representing local needs. This emphasis in Japanese aid may have helped limit it from implementing more projects related to social and participatory development in Latin America (Ibid., 96-97).
\textsuperscript{408} Potter, “Accommodation and Recipient” and \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}.
\textsuperscript{409} The nations studied include China, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (Söderberg, \textit{Business of Japanese Foreign Aid}).
\textsuperscript{410} Ibid., 4-5.
\textsuperscript{411} Ibid., 277-279. Here, China was particularly strong.
\textsuperscript{412} Ibid., 286-289.
\textsuperscript{413} Khan, “Japanese Aid;” Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 17. For example, Khan finds that Japanese ODA has weak partnership with indigenous NGOs, has transferred technologies that are unsustainable, inadequate field presence, and poor progress in addressing social issues such as gender, education, and health.
Indonesia find Japanese aid to be chiefly geared toward economic and humanitarian purposes, and better than aid from the United States, but too bureaucratic, opaque, and donor-driven. Recipients in China and Thailand note positive contributions of Japanese ODA to their nations’ development, but regret having to deal with Japan’s overly complex technical aid schemes and bureaucracy.

Anthropologist Kay B. Warren’s research on Latin American perceptions finds that Japan’s economic motivations have been a primary factor behind its aid there. Latin Americans perceive business interests as the key motivation. Though much Japanese aid is now untied, Latin Americans continue to believe that it largely goes to Japanese firms, especially for technical projects. It was only in the early 2000s that many Latin Americans learned that Japan was Latin America’s number one foreign aid donor from 1985 through the early 2000s. Other cultural factors also shape Latin American perceptions of Japanese ODA.

**Economic Approaches (Effects of Trade Interests)**

Since the beginning of Japan’s postwar reparations to other Asian nations in the early 1950s, aid has been associated with Japan’s economic development and security. From the mid-1960s, analysts have noted the persistent connection of Japanese aid with

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414 Ibid., 230-232.
Japan’s own trade and economic interests.\textsuperscript{418} When Japan completed its postwar reconstruction and rose as a modern industrialized nation, it gained several strong reasons to recycle some of its capital account and structural trade surpluses to ODA, to diversify foreign direct investment away from the United States, to improve relations with developing countries, and to relieve trade friction with many countries. As a country for which imports of key commodities including food, energy and key industrial inputs are mandatory, ODA could help stabilize Japan’s economic security.\textsuperscript{419} In the 1970s, as Western aid standards moved toward better addressing recipient nations’ needs and interests, Japan came under increasing criticism for the strong trade component of its aid. Hasegawa argued in the 1970s that in its aid, Japan had to balance the extremes of internal \textit{kokueki} (national interests, including domestic development and trade) and external \textit{tsukiai} (pressures for humanitarian, untied aid and other obligations imposed by Japan’s membership in international organizations and agreements) factors.\textsuperscript{420} Although many conventional explanations of Japan’s ODA have correctly identified the strong connections between Japan’s economic and trade interests and its ODA, Koppel and Orr also note great variation in Japan’s ODA policies, and in the interests of various parties supporting the policies.\textsuperscript{421}

\textsuperscript{420} Hasegawa, \textit{Japanese Foreign Aid}, noted in Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 9-10.
\textsuperscript{421} Koppel and Orr, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 351-352.
There are additional studies of the “trade versus aid”\textsuperscript{422} conflict in Japanese from the 1980s to the present. Margee Ensign, Michael Hoffmann, Steven Hook, Guang Zhang and Marie Söderberg note the national-interest aspects of Japanese ODA, while not ignoring the “trade versus aid” dichotomy.\textsuperscript{423} Global trade pressures in the 1980s and 1990s forced Japanese corporations to move more production overseas to Southeast Asia and China. If ODA could encourage the development of economic infrastructure to support this, it might benefit Japan’s overall trade competitiveness.\textsuperscript{424} Yet Hanabusa Masamichi stresses how Japan’s ODA also benefits other donors and recipient nations.\textsuperscript{425} “Trade versus aid” evolved into the question of which agency is more influential in Japan aid policy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, formerly MITI), reflecting the economic/national interest side of aid, or MOFA, which leans more toward the international/Western norms for aid.\textsuperscript{426} This conflict is real, and representative of basic tensions in Japanese ODA policy, but Arase concludes that Japanese aid policy is much too complex for this model to serve as the sole explanatory model of its aid policymaking.\textsuperscript{427} Overall, the trade and economic motivations of Japanese aid can be

\textsuperscript{422} See the definition of “trade versus aid” in the footnotes in the introductory section on Japanese ODA earlier in this chapter. “Trade versus aid” refers to the debate over whether the presence of economic interests in Japanese aid limits Japan’s ability to meet international aid standards.


\textsuperscript{424} Okita, Jayawardena, and Sengupta, Potential Japanese Surplus, quoted in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13.

\textsuperscript{425} Hanabusa, “Japanese Perspective,” mentioned in Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 10.

\textsuperscript{426} Saori Katada, “Japan’s Two-Track Aid Approach: The Forces Behind Competing Triads,” Asian Survey 42, no. 2 (2002), 320-42; Hook and Zhang, “Japan’s Aid Policy.”

\textsuperscript{427} Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 10.
partly viewed as a policy tool to encourage Japanese economic competitiveness in this age of rapid economic globalization.\textsuperscript{428}

Several studies from the 1990s and 2000s examine and compare the economic effectiveness of Japanese aid to different world regions and nations, including Africa, South and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{429} Söderberg’s \textit{Business of Japanese Foreign Aid} (1996) does not examine aid effectiveness, but comparatively studies the methodologies, procedures and business factors connected with the implementation of Japanese ODA, as seen in OECF loan projects in five Asian nations.\textsuperscript{430} Söderberg concludes that receiving loans, rather than simply grant aid, complicates the process,\textsuperscript{431} but that aid processes in the mid-1990s, though rather complex, were fairly open. Numerous factors, including recipient country viewpoints, influence the process.\textsuperscript{432}

\textbf{Cultural and Historical Approaches}

The histories and cultures of donor countries affect the types of aid they dispense. Japan is just one example.\textsuperscript{433} Similar to my arguments, Alan Rix contends that

\textsuperscript{428} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{430} Söderberg, \textit{Business Japanese Foreign Aid}, 4-5. OECF was a forerunner of today’s JBIC. The five nations studied are China, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Söderberg’s study aims to gain a fuller comprehension of how the Japanese ODA system operates by studying it from multiple viewpoints (the Japanese government, the private sector in Japan, and those of other donors and recipient nations) (Ibid., 4-5).
\textsuperscript{431} Ibid., 277-279.
\textsuperscript{432} Ibid., 4-5, 286-289. Söderberg urges persons wishing to influence the Japanese ODA process to learn its policy basics and get involved (Ibid., 288-289).
\textsuperscript{433} Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 83; Söderberg, \textit{Business Japanese Foreign Aid}, 85-86, 90-96. Söderberg notes how the aid systems of different donor countries reflect the sociocultural systems of their nations. For example, Sweden’s ODA values are derived from long traditions of giving to religion (Christianity), sending missionaries abroad, and helping the poor in their midst. They also have a positive value of charity, that giving makes people feel good, especially when they expect nothing in return. On the other hand, Japan’s ODA seems to reflect its business culture, where businesses value reciprocal, loyal
the objectives and philosophy of any foreign aid program emerge out of sociocultural values, not just economic and political interests. According to Sato Seizaburo, five important attitudinal (psycho-cultural) factors have been important in Japanese foreign policy since 1890:

1) a strong sense of belonging to Japan and the Japanese race coupled with deep-rooted feelings of inferiority; 2) an intense concern with improving the country’s international status; 3) a deep anxiety over being isolated internationally; 4) a desire to conform to world trends; and 5) an emotional commitment to Asia, which has resulted in a policy that emphasizes the region.

Orr sees these same basic attitudes as influential in Japan’s foreign aid policymaking through the late 1980s. The first four factors created the “psychological climate” for America’s influence in Japanese aid, and Japan’s experience in World War II and the occupation only strengthened its general sense of weakness and inferiority since then. Culturally, Japan has sometimes seen itself as a “development bridge” or model between East and West, North and South, and/or the first and third worlds, given its recent development experience and influences from both Asia and the West.
The link between aid policy and cultural values is related to how predominant cultural norms influence the behavior of nation-states in foreign policy, and also how domestic influences and contexts do. How has Japan’s own cultural and historical experience influenced its modern aid program? Japan’s history of foreign aid shows influence from important trends in Japanese culture and history, including during the Meiji period. A second feature of the cultural influence on Japanese aid has been allegedly weak values of charity toward the weak in other countries, supposedly a reflection of “traditional” Japanese religious and social values. A third cultural

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440 Ibid., 15. In the Meiji era, these cultural features included intentional learning from the West, solid domestic leadership, policies promoting nationalism and education, and colonialism for the support of Japan’s domestic growth. These policies succeeded. Japan’s current stress on self-help and self-reliance in aid recipients is reflective of its own development experience. Japan’s need for economic development, overseas markets and scarce natural resources also led to the aggressive drive for imperialism and “mercantilist trading policies” (Ibid., 15-16).
441 David Wright-Neville, *Evolution of Japanese*, 34, n64, identifies several Japanese cultural concepts that he argues are related to Japanese aid: on (obligation), giri (duty), ninjo (empathy), and jizen (charity, philanthropy). Wright-Neville argues that jizen appears to apply the least (of these four terms). I comment further on Wright-Neville’s arguments later in this section.
442 Rix, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 16, notes this argument, that Japan has historically lacked a universal ethic of charity such as found in Christianity. Rather, in Japanese social and religious ethics, the spirit of charity traditionally has focused on one’s own family. Weakness in Japanese charitable values is noted in Gaimushô, *Wagakuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo* 1989, 2 volumes (Tokyo: Kokusai Kyôryoku Suishin Kyôkai, 1989), 19, as cited by Rix (Ibid.). Rix mentions a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that highlights Christian heritage and principles as one reason for Western European cultures’ commonly strong support for foreign aid (Gaimushô, keizai kyôryokukyoku keizai kyôryoku kenkyûkai, *Keizai kyôryoku no kaihatsu to nenjutsu* (Tokyo: Gaimushô, 1989), 198, n4).
influence on aid is Japan’s sense of cultural insularity and isolationism, reflected in Japan’s historic focus on aid to Asia, in pursuit of its own domestic self-interests.\textsuperscript{443}

Additional cultural factors influencing Japan’s ODA have included Japan’s own sense of cultural uniqueness and difference,\textsuperscript{444} its hierarchical view of nations,\textsuperscript{445} and

\textit{rinen: seifū kaihatsu enjo naze okonau no ka} [Tokyo: Kokusai kyōryoku suishin kyōkai, 1984], 75). Other Japanese authorities argue that nations with a Judeo-Christian heritage are more likely to give charitable donations than nations that lack it (Ibid.; and Chie Nakane, \textit{Tekiō no jōken: Nihonteki renzoku no shikō} [Tokyo: Kodansha, 1972], cited in Rix, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 18, 199, n15). Yet one should not discount the tremendous generosity reflected in Japan’s enormous aid flows during the 1990s, even if they originated in Japan’s own self-interests. Also related to the religious origins of charity, Orr, \textit{Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 139, notes that Japan lacks the “missionary” sending experience common to many Western nations with Christian traditions.

This sense of “uniqueness” is seen in MOFA reports on Japanese ODA that repeatedly stress cultural differences between Western donors and Japan as reasons behind the uniqueness of Japan’s aid (Ibid.). One report argues that Western European nations have historically been wealthy, had high incomes, and extensive experience with other races [and cultural groups], while Japan has not (Gaimushō, \textit{Keizai kyōryoku}, 75). Rix, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 24-27, notes important official aid documents from the late 1980s that contend that, along with common global concerns of humanitarianism and interdependence, Japan has “unique circumstances” as an aid donor: 1) a peace constitution and need for a stable trading environment and world peace, 2) the need for official aid to balance Japan’s huge private LDC investments, 3) generous ODA to counter Japan’s dependence on imported resources by encouraging economic stability and pro-Japanese attitudes in LDCs, and 4) lessons for LDCs from Japan’s “unique” experience as a recently-developed non-Western nation that can help Japan be a bridge between North and South, and West and East, “Japan’s world historical mission.” This is reminiscent of the 1930s ideology of \textit{hakkô ichiu} (Japan as a beacon of world peace and civilization) discussed in Chapter 8, and philosopher Nishida Kitarō’s prewar treatment of Japan’s “mission” (Khan, e-mail communication with Richard Shannon, 25 March 2008). MOFA has called Japan’s stress on “self-help” in recipients a unique aspect of Japan’s aid (Ibid., 33). Rix counters that these arguments fail to identify fully why Japan is truly “unique” compared to other resource-poor, industrialized donors like Germany and the Netherlands, and that they subsume concern for recipient development under overarching concern for Japan’s long-term economic health and prosperity (Ibid., 25, 28-29).

I comment on the related theme of the hierarchical view of foreign nations in the worldviews of several past Japanese leaders in coming chapters. An excellent example is Kato Hiroyuki. Herbert Passin noted in the 1950s that Japanese ranked developing countries as far down their perceived order of nations with influence and status (Herbert Passin, “Socio-cultural Factors in the Japanese Perception of International Order,” Japan Institute of International Affairs Review [1952], 51-75, cited in Ibid., 17). For much of the postwar period, Japan’s attentions in international relations have been primarily focused on attaining status and recognition from other advanced nations, not from impoverished nations receiving aid (Ibid., 17). This may be slowly changing, however, as Japan continues to recognize its need for resources from developing nations, and its competition with other nations for those resources. A current example is Japan’s “competition” with China in extending aid to Africa (King, “Aid Within”; Japan’s White Paper, “International Cooperation”; and “Japan Vows To Double Aid to Africa by 2012, International Herald
“exclusivity” in dealing with developing nations. Other cultural issues affecting current Japanese aid include the organizational cultures of Japanese aid organizations such as JICA, and how they handle such issues as democracy, gender, training and language issues in the aid they disperse. Interestingly, Japan has given some support for “strategic partnerships” where some Latin American nations do development projects in others. This is seen as innovative in Latin America, and helps solve some of the cultural and linguistic problems that Japan has faced in the region (Warren 2005: 97).
Culture can either be a boon or a barrier for aid cooperation. Compared with several European donors with longer experience with imperialism and colonialism than Japan’s, Japan has had more cultural isolation, and less extensive numbers of Japanese interacting with foreigners, especially in foreign countries. Cultural values have influenced Japan’s rationales for ODA, and Japanese aid officials often cite differences between Japan and other cultures as a partial justification for Japan’s ODA system. This leads to the important question of how cultural values and experiences like these interact with current Japanese aid policy, beyond the scope of the present study.

Studying the rationales and cultural logics underlying aid can help us uncover the motives of aid donors. The literature on aid through the early 1990s lists four main areas of donor motivation: 1) humanitarian motives to relieve third world poverty with development, 2) the political goal of “image-enhancement” for the donor, 3) the political goal of national security promotion for the donor, and 4) promoting the economic self-

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452 An example of cultural boon is Leelasorn’s argument that Japan has cultural compatibility with Thailand, another “Oriental” country, and that this helps the two countries to work together in ODA matters (Leelasorn, “ODA from Japan,” 261). An example of “barrier” is how Swedish aid professionals assert that Japan’s ODA work as less cooperative than other donors’ work, since the Japanese “tend to keep to themselves,” and sociolinguistic barriers separate them from other donors (Söderberg, “Swedish Perceptions,” 91). Tarte, “Japan’s ODA,” 243, argues that language is a barrier in the provision of Japanese aid to education in Pacific island states. Seddon, “Japanese and British,” 41. Britain is one such donor (Ibid.). Others include France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

453 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 17.

455 Rix argues that cultural values interact with and helps to shape Japan’s aid policy outcomes: “social and cultural values help set the parameters within which policies develop, and the speed at which they change. Aid policies therefore provide a vivid reflection of a donor’s social values and culture, despite the strength of political, economic or bureaucratic considerations” (Ibid.). To better uncover such details, ethnographic research is required.

456 According to Rix, this argument is commonly based on the dubious idea that aid will bring economic growth, political stability, and then benefits for the donor. The security argument has often been applied to Japan’s policies toward Southeast Asia 1945 (Ibid., 18).
interests of the donor. In a democratic society, a donor’s motives for aid must have some social basis or public legitimacy for aid programs to continue. The interpretation of aid objectives by aid practitioners will also influence the acceptance of aid in a donor society’s social and political contexts. Comparing cultural influences on the motives of Japanese and Western ODA systems, while some critics have called Japan’s ODA self-serving, and Western aid arising from a sense of noblesse oblige, more in-depth study sometimes reveals these assertions to be false.

A study that extensively investigates the cultural aspects of Japanese ODA is Wright-Neville’s 1991 study. His perspective on Japanese ODA is based largely on political science. His study aims to develop a more holistic, historical view of Japanese ODA. Many of his arguments are based on culture. Wright-Neville uses a “conventional” political science view of culture, arguing that culture is a problematic concept, to be handled with caution. I find his cultural arguments fascinating and

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457 These economic interests of a donor may include obtaining preferential treatment regarding to an LDC’s markets, its aid contracts, and its resources (Ibid., 18-19).
458 Ibid., 19.
459 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 2-3, cites cases of self-serving Western aid, for example, from France and the United States (Ibid.).
460 In his study, Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 7, examines Japan’s aid through three primary lenses: impacts of the government bureaucracy, Japanese culture, and the international environment, over time (from 1955 to 1990). He criticizes Japanese aid in the late 1980s and early 1990s as lacking coherent logic, having poor coordination in its delivery, and suffering from bureaucratic complexity.
461 Ibid., 1, 7, 28-30.
462 Wright-Neville (Ibid., 31) draws on rather “conventional,” static political science notions of culture, mentioning definitions of culture from Clifford Geertz and Max Weber, how humans are suspended like animals caught in webs of meaning. Wright-Neville assumes that culture is static and enduring. He also draws on Lucian Pye (Ibid., 42), a political scientist who draws on anthropological concepts of culture. Pye’s work emphasizes the “national character” approach to analyzing Asian political cultures, how “national” patterns of childrearing shape the later behavior of leaders. Anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict also worked in this genre. Some of Pye’s other work focused on the “national” political cultures of China and Japan (Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority [Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1985]; Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Cultures [Ann Arbor, Mich: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan,
creative, yet rather shallow. Some of Wright-Neville’s cultural arguments parallel my work here. He mentions similar concepts, including cognition and worldview, holism, and comparisons of Japanese and Western cultures. My cultural arguments are offered in greater depth. While Wright-Neville examines a segment of the postwar period (1955-1990), my project covers a longer time frame (nearly one hundred years), and focuses on precursor influences to the Japanese aid system. I disagree with Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, argues that the Japanese way of handling aid that is different from all other major donors. While this may have been largely true in 1991, above we noted the many similarities between Japan’s and South Korea’s current ODA systems; as do Kim and Seddon, “ODA Policy and Practice.” Other non-Western donors are likely copying at least some aspects of the Japanese system. Wright-Neville also contends that differences in the Japanese bureaucracy and Japanese customs regarding giving, the latter involving the Japanese concepts of on (favor, obligation), giri (duty, debt of gratitude), and ninjo (empathy, kindness) have been especially influential in making Japanese aid unique (Ibid, 8-9, 33-39). He applies the on argument to his treatment of Japanese aid from 1955-1972, and giri to the period 1973-1990. Many of his observations about Japan’s bureaucracy and its “unique” features, such as inter-ministerial competition over aid, are accurate (Ibid., 9-11, 42-54, and 62-74).

Wright-Neville, Evolution of Japanese Foreign Aid, 23-25, mentions the work of White (Japanese Aid, 6) and Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid. He asserts they both argued, at points, that Japanese aid is essentially based on unique aspects of Japan’s culture and national interests: according to Hasegawa’s findings, “Japan’s approach to aid was the product of a particular world view and an essentially Japanese interpretation of what was after all, an idea with its roots in the West” (Ibid.).

Wright-Neville (Ibid., 28-30) argues for the value of using a holistic yet historical perspective that integrates cultural and structural elements, including cultural logics, over time: “if we wish to understand those forces that shape Japan’s aid policies it is therefore necessary to examine not only those attitudinal (or cultural) and structural factors preeminent in Japanese decision-making, but how they interact; how the particular logics contained within them reinforce or contradict each other over time.”

I have already noted Wright-Neville’s characterizations of Japanese culture that he finds relevant to aid (on, giri and ninjo). Regarding Western cultures (primarily those of Western Europe and the United States), he argues that they have incorporated altruistic values of sacrifice and moral imperatives to help poorer nations, based on “Judeo-Christian culture,” and that the extensive presence of non-governmental organizations in those countries is evidence of this. While admitting that values of altruism are not totally absent in Japan, he argues that the “culture of giving” in Japan, based on values incorporating on, giri and ninjo, are very different from those in the West (Ibid., 32-40). I would counter that today there is absolutely a genuine spirit of altruism in Japan, despite shrinking aid budgets, and a growing presence of NGOs, even if the number is still proportionately smaller than in many Western nations. Wright-Neville (Ibid.) also notes that Japanese aid has been affected by conceptions of a “hierarchy” of nations, that the highly developed nations are superior to “backward” nations of the Global South, and by ethnocentric notions of racial and cultural superiority. Of course Western nations and their views of colonialism and aid have often been similarly affected.
Neville’s conclusions that Japanese aid system is like no other in the world, though historically, in many respects, it has differed from Western aid. 467

Another study with a somewhat similar historical approach to this study is Hasegawa 1975. One of its analytical lenses is the “historical national evolutionist view,” which attempts to uncover “…the objectives and nature of Japanese foreign aid…” [through an] historical perspective [of aid] as an instrument of Japan’s evolving national policy. 468 The approach stresses how aid is used by the Japanese state to promote national interests (kokueki). Kokueki and national goals vary over time. Hasegawa differentiates Japan’s kokueki from 1945 to 1972 469 from those in the prewar period in terms of “secularized postwar Japan” 470 He contends there was a fundamental break in the outlooks of prewar and postwar Japan. According to Hasegawa, kokutai (national essence or polity), an ideology strongly influenced by religion and spirituality, 471 and the colonial ideology of Daitowa Kyoeiken (the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) 472 dominated prewar Japanese worldviews and policies. The national interests of the

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467 I would counter that Japanese aid has certain similarities to the emerging aid systems of other Asian countries, which often find the Japanese aid system as a useful model. This is the case for South Korea’s aid system (Kim and Seddon, “ODA Policy and Practice”; Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid). As another example, it has been noted that Chinese aid to Africa, like Japanese aid in general, has a tendency to avoid analysis of cultural and internal factors such as human rights, and focuses more on technical and economic aspects. This is very different from recent Western patterns of foreign aid analysis.

468 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, 7-8.

469 Ibid. Hasegawa’s 1975 study stops in 1972 with the return of Okinawa to Japan and President Nixon’s historic visit to China.

470 Ibid.

471 See the brief discussion of kokutai in Chapters 4, 7, and 9.

472 This was a proposed policy designed to influence Japan’s colonial policies for China and the South Pacific during World War II, mentioned briefly in Chapter 8 (Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan [New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000], 397). Also see “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity,” in Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993), 475.
secularized kokutai and increasing influences of Japan’s regional and global communities (chiiki kyodotai and sekai kyodotai)\(^{473}\) have governed postwar Japan.\(^{474}\) While Hasegawa’s study examines the evolution of Japanese aid over twenty years,\(^{475}\) the present study focuses on a longer time frame, preceding the aid period: the evolution of ideas and contexts surrounding the birth of Japanese aid policy. Though legal formalities on the mixing of religion and state changed greatly between prewar and postwar Japan (it is now prohibited), in practice, how much have core spiritualities at the root of most Japanese worldviews changed? I would argue they have not changed that much. Hasegawa’s distinction, on the difference between the prewar “spiritual” Japan state and the postwar “secular” one, seems essentially false, true only on the surface, on institutional, formal and legal levels. This is an example of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle.

A more recent study incorporating cultural and historical approaches similar to this study is Spyke 1999. Spyke stresses the study of history and culture as fundamental to providing more grounded, in-depth knowledge of international relations and foreign

\(^{473}\) Hasegawa, *Japanese Foreign Aid*, 12-13, argues that as Japan’s global trade and interaction increased in the postwar period, it manifested an increasing desire to fit in with and get along with the international community, to preserve the collective interests of nations, and to contribute to them as it was able. Contemporary Japan also connects with these goals, evidenced by its desire to gain a permanent seat at the United Nations, to gain international prestige, and to influence the international system in ways that will contribute to the trade, peace, and prosperity of the world and for itself. In turn, these ideals have served as motives for Japan’s huge contributions to foreign aid and various multilateral programs.

\(^{474}\) Ibid., 9-10, 12-13. Despite these differences between the two periods, Hasegawa argues that security, development, and ascendancy among world powers were common Japanese goals for both eras, to varying degrees.

\(^{475}\) Ibid. Hasegawa’s study concludes that through 1972, aid was much more intended to enhance Japan’s growth than to aid developing nations in the areas of greatest need. He argues that there was a discrepancy between what Japanese aid claimed its goals were, and what it actually accomplished. In poststructuralist studies, Western anthropologists often explore this theme (differences between development rhetoric and reality) for Western aid and development programs (Ferguson, *Anti-Politics Machine*; and Escobar, “Anthropology and Development” and *Encountering Development*). Also see Teresa Hayter and Catharine Watson, *Aid: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Pluto Press, 1985).
policy. Her study explores various influences and motivations behind Japanese foreign aid policy:

the main emphasis… [is] on how the motivations for Japan’s aid policy have been formed through time. Historical factors … combine with psychocultural factors to help determine the lens through which Japanese actors view the world and also through which Japan perceives the world views them.476

Her approach integrates various factors and contexts, including selected historical and cultural elements since the 1500s, Japan’s economic development, U.S.-Japan relations, domestic factors, and a case study of how these factors play out in Japanese aid to Africa. While Spyke grounds her study in valuable fieldwork and a broad, historical lens, her treatments of worldview and culture lack the basic anthropological perspectives that the present study includes.477 While Spyke draws on similar ideas to this study,478 such as the importance of culture and history in shaping Japan’s aid policies, her study only examines the macro-level. She neglects the role of Japanese leaders and their views.

476 Spyke, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy, 10, argues that several cultural values, including Japan’s ambivalence of superiority toward some countries and inferiority toward others, its sense of isolation from Asia and the West, and its sense of “non-whiteness,” are important influences on Japan’s aid policy. She explores Sato Seizaburo’s five stage explanation of cultural factors in Japanese foreign policy throughout her study (Ibid. 12-15). See my discussion of Sato’s points earlier in this chapter.

477 At various points, Spyke mentions worldview, but never clearly defines it. Her concept of worldview often equates with Japan’s “view of the world” (her terminology) (Spyke, Japanese Foreign Aid Policy), not an anthropological or political science sense of worldview as defined in the Glossary section of the present project. It would be helpful if Spyke offered clear definitions of culture and worldview.

478 Other similar ideas that Spyke mentions include the West contrasted with the non-West, Japan’s hierarchical view of nations, the role of religion and charitable values, and of international and domestic forces in shaping Japanese aid policy. When mentioning the influence of religion, Spyke mentions Japan’s contentious interaction with Christianity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and argues that it is difficult to distinguish among Shinto, Buddhist and Confucian influences in Japan’s history (Ibid.). To a large extent, the last point is true, but in the period studied in the present project (1850 to 1945), it is possible to distinguish, to some degree, the influences of State Shinto from Buddhism and Confucianism on Japanese politics and society. The Japanese state carefully created and institutionalized the influence of State Shinto during this period, and it is particularly seen in the life and actions of Emperor Hirohito. For more on State Shinto, see Chapters 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9, in particular.

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Human Rights Approaches

Hoshino 1999 addresses the issue of human rights conditionality in foreign aid programs, especially Japan’s. Hoshino specifically studies the impact of the 1992 ODA Charter on Japan’s bilateral aid allocations (Hoshino 1999: 199). He concludes that Japanese aid is not allocated in any systematic way concerning human rights performance in recipient nations. Although the idea exists in the 1992 ODA Charter, the situation in recipient nations is too complex, and the general will in Japan is not strong enough for this to be effectively accomplished.

Japan’s Foreign Aid Bureaucracy and Policymaking

Key Domestic Aid Bureaucratic and Policymaking Actors

On the domestic level, in the 1980s, four main ministries and agencies (MOFA, MOF, MITI, and the EPA) considered each loan request in the aid policymaking process. As of 1988, Japan had no field aid missions, and no more than five or six aid officials in any recipient country at one time. Aid implementation was principally divided between JICA, which administered about half of all of Japan’s ODA grants, and the OECF, which dispersed loans. There was also pressure from the powerful private sector that lobbied “…the policy makers in…” particular directions, and from foreign interests, including the United States.

479 For example, some recipients have the human rights infrastructure but not the political will to support human rights, and for other nations, they have the will, but not the means (Eiichi Hoshino, “Human Rights and Development Aid: Japan after the ODA Charter,” Debating Human Rights: Critical Essays from the United States and Asia, ed. in Peter Van Ness [London and New York: Routledge, 1999], 225-226).
480 Ibid.
482 Khan, “Japanase Foreign Aid,” 6-7.
At present, the primary domestic actors and forces shaping Japan’s ODA policy include the national government (including the bureaucracy and the Diet), municipal governments, public opinion, NGOs, and the private sector. Each of these forces has varied in its influence in different time periods. Critics have called the Japanese government bureaucracy handling aid cumbersome. At present, the most important institutional actors in Japan’s national aid bureaucracy include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the “new” JICA, along with numerous other ministries and agencies. In recent decades, the three most important government agencies implementing aid have been the OECF (the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund), JBIC (the Japan Bank for International Cooperation), and JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency).

Figure 2.1 The Organization of Japanese Aid, 2004

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483 Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5-9; Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook, Japan’s System, chapters 3 to 6.
484 Orr, “Aid Factor,” 743.
485 The two major, contemporary aid implementation agencies, JBIC (its OECO division) and JICA, merged into one super aid agency, the “new” JICA, in October 2008.
486 For more details on these agencies, see the entries for JBIC, JICA, and OECF in the Glossary section of the appendices.
487 Lancaster, Foreign Aid, 114.
Aid Policymaking Process

Hasegawa’s analysis of Japan’s aid policymaking from the 1950s to the early 1970s examines inter-ministerial competition between several leading ministries and agencies involved in aid policy.\textsuperscript{488} Competing views and interests hampered the coordination of Japanese aid. Language and cultural struggles also somewhat limited success for technical aid programs.\textsuperscript{489} Significant, new conflicts in Japan’s aid policy goals have intensified since at least the early 1990s. Since the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan has promised to improve the quality of its ODA. Later in the 1990s, there was increasing pressure to reduce the ODA budget, which has occurred regularly since 1998. Along with the pressure to improve aid quality in the midst of budget decreases, Japan’s ODA policy has become more assertive in seeking to support Japan’s national interests in foreign security and economic policy.\textsuperscript{490} Pressures exerted by Japanese public opinion, the media, and other international donors are noted elsewhere in this chapter.

David Arase and other foreign experts identify several weaknesses in Japan’s current aid process, making it perhaps the most complex of any major donor in the world.\textsuperscript{491} The state of Japan’s ODA

\begin{quote}
…seems to suffer from a lack of policy coherence (i.e. a tight focus on poverty alleviation), an unwieldy and overly complex system of policymaking and implementation, and a limited ability to tailor aid to the specific needs of diverse recipients.\textsuperscript{492}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{488} Hasegawa, \textit{Japanese Foreign Aid}, v-viii. These ministries were MOFA, MITI, and MOF. The agencies were the Export-Import Bank of Japan, the OECF, and the OTCA (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{489} Ibid. 149.

\textsuperscript{490} Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 1.

\textsuperscript{491} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{492} Ibid., 267.
Recipients must request bilateral assistance. For them, the approval process is complex, opaque, and lacks uniform procedures or standards.\textsuperscript{493} In another example, grant aid administered by MOFA tends to focus on tertiary issues such as urban sanitation, urban hospitals and higher education, rather than on primary needs where the impact for the less-served poor would be larger. Critics find that Japan’s technical cooperation is complicated, varies in quality, and needs improved coordination. While the traditional part of Japan’s technical aid includes accepting trainees, sending experts and volunteers overseas, project aid, and development analysis, JICA implements only half of such aid. Nearly every ministry and agency in the Japanese government also has its own technical aid programs. JBIC implements loan aid usually used for production-oriented projects, large-scale physical infrastructure, and a limited amount of microlending.\textsuperscript{494}

Coordination of this system has been difficult since Japanese has lacked a central aid agency. Though this was assigned to MOFA in the early 2000s, MOFA still did not make policy for all of the agencies involved, but had to shepherd numerous bureaucratic actors toward policy consensus.\textsuperscript{495} In the mid-2000s, foreign critics further critiqued the ‘opaqueness’ of bilateral aid policy, due to Japan’s having no central aid agency, no Diet legislative authority over ODA, bilateral aid policy delegated to over a dozen ministerial agencies, according to a vaguely worded ODA Charter lacking Diet approval, and multiple forms of ODA (grant, loan, and technical aid) implemented by different agencies.\textsuperscript{496}

\textsuperscript{493} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{494} Ibid., 267. These functions of JBIC will only continue through September 2008, after which the OECO portion of JBIC will be absorbed into the new JICA agency.
\textsuperscript{495} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{496} Ibid., 6.
The top policymakers in this system are usually long-term bureaucrats who are skilled generalists but who lack in-depth training in development theory or work in the field. Aid experts are hired for only limited tasks, and most staff of JBIC and JICA are consumed with clerical tasks rather than significant research and analysis. Field personnel are largely hidden. The major aid actors such as MOFA, JICA, and JBIC have had separate field offices that seldom coordinate their efforts. Most field staff spend their time managing relations with and documents from Tokyo. NGO involvement has been weak, comprising less than three percent of the recent budget for NGO activities.\textsuperscript{497} Japan’s ODA has also lacked systematic program evaluation, which could encourage overall change. Though Japan’s aid bureaucracy, including MOFA, is attempting to tackle these challenges,\textsuperscript{498} they are great. All of this has created problems for ODA policy coordination and clarity, as might be expected.

\textbf{Reform of Recent Japanese ODA Policy}

Rix 1993 examines Japan’s capacity for institutional reform of its aid policy, in the face of various domestic and international pressures.\textsuperscript{499} At the foundation of Japanese ODA policy’s capacity for innovation are several ideas of aid: what Japan wants its aid to do, and how these ideas have changed. Rix considers the concept of aid philosophy

\textsuperscript{497} For more details on the involvement of NGOs in Japanese ODA policy, see Hirata, \textit{Civil Society}; Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 97-101; Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 11, 71, 92, 131, 139, 140, 268; and Akiko Nanami, “Showing Japan’s Face or Creating Powerful Challengers? Are NGOs Really Partners to the Government in Japan’s Foreign Aid?” A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the University of Canterbury. Thesis (Ph.D.) (University of Canterbury, 2007, 2007), \url{http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/etd/adt-NZCU20070420.101120}; accessed 9 August 2008. For example, Nanami studies the government’s interaction with three NGOs, and concludes that pressures favoring the bureaucracy have made genuine openness to NGOs difficult. NGOs also face a host of new challenges, in an era of economic retraction and high staff turnover.

\textsuperscript{498} Ibid., 267-268.

\textsuperscript{499} Rix, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 2-3.
Closely related are domestic pressures for aid reform, both bureaucratic and public. Rix concludes that in the early 1990s, Japan’s ODA system continued to suffer from over-centralization and ineffectual administrative reform.  

But since the early 1990s, Japanese aid has undergone highly significant administrative restructuring, a continuing process. Though some pressures for ODA reform existed earlier, they accelerated in 1991 with the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy and several scandals. The second cabinet of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (in office from 1996 to 1998) sponsored six major reforms in Japanese governance, some of which affected Japan’s ODA. Before certain reforms passed in 1997, nineteen different ministries had their own ODA operations budgets. Other major reforms of this period included the merger of the OECF and the Japan Export-Import Bank into JBIC, completed in October 1999, passage of the 1998 Basic Law for Central Government Reform, initiating certain reforms of Japan’s complex ODA administration system, and the reorganization of MOFA’s Economic Cooperation Bureau and of JICA, in the late 1990s to early 2000s. New reforms for cooperation with Japanese

500 Ibid., 7. See the discussion of Japan’s aid philosophy, and Rix’s treatment of it, earlier in this chapter.
501 Ibid., 7-8.
502 Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 91-92. For a more detailed discussion of the many reform initiatives for Japanese ODA in the 1990s, including cooperation with NGOs, see Ibid. 90-101.
503 Ibid.
504 Ibid.
505 Ibid.
506 Ibid. 95-97. Reforms affecting have JICA included, first, sweeping internal changes begun in 1999. These created a new country focus in JICA’s operations (Country Assistance Programs), such as regional departments along with sectoral departments at JICA headquarters. Regional departments are now in charge of both making country-specific plans and implementing them. A specific goal is to technical plan aid for entire countries and their various sectors in a more holistically. More authority has been delegated to JICA’s field offices. Second, JICA was reorganized in October 2003 as an “independent administrative institution,” to hopefully aid in separating policy planning from implementation, to improve the success of aid projects (Ibid.).
NGOs were also introduced. Since the early 1990s, other reform issues have included the need to delegate more authority to the field, increasing the number of ODA staff in various agencies such as JICA, overcoming challenges presented by Japan’s compartmentalized aid administrative system, addressing Africa’s special problems, reconciling differences between emerging global aid standards and Japan’s, and improving collaboration between JICA and JBIC. Both JBIC (its OECO division) and JICA attempted to move toward increased public openness and accountability since the early 2000s, and merged into one new super aid agency in October 2008. In practice, what will this merger mean for the effectiveness of Japanese aid delivery and results? Have the continuing administrative changes since the early 1990s improved Japanese ODA? These are paramount questions, beyond the scope of the present study.

507 From 1996, important ODA agencies including MOFA, JBIC and JICA began increasing their communication with Japanese NGOs. From 1999, JICA began assigning entire projects (of a small level) to NGOs and other actors such as universities and municipalities. The Japanese government is also moving to create more financial support for Japanese NGOs. It also created an initiative called “Japan Platform” in 2000, to coordinate aid Japanese aid efforts among the government, NGOs, and the business sector for humanitarian and refugee crises (Ibid.).

508 Ibid., 107-112.

509 The new combined agency, still to be called JICA, will have an annual budget of approximately $8.5 billion, and be one of the largest bilateral aid agencies in the world. It will allow Japan to provide technical, grant and loan assistance “all ‘under one roof’ for the first time,” so that hopefully aid can be delivered more “effectiveness, efficiency, and speed,” along with increased sensitivity to field conditions, grassroots initiatives, and public openness. In the words of Sadako Ogata, JICA’s current director, “when all of these changes are completed, it will mark the most important turning point in the history of Japan’s ODA” (JICA, http://www.jica.go.jp/English/about/pres.html; accessed 9 August 2008).
Types and Amounts of Aid

Types of Aid

Japan’s ODA is channeled through government channels, some in cooperation with the private sector. There are three primary elements—bilateral loans, mainly used for industrial and economic infrastructure, bilateral grant aid, and multilateral contributions and subscriptions. Bilateral aid made up the lion’s share of aid disbursements through the mid-1990s (since the early 1990s, 70 to 75 percent of Japan’s ODA budget). Bilateral loans are granted through a request-based system. How does the bilateral aid given by Japan compare with that from other DAC donors? Until the early 2000s, Japan was mainly known for the huge amounts of aid it gave, but still lagged behind other DAC countries in most measures of the quality of aid given. Loans

510 Bilateral loans were formerly disbursed and evaluated by JBIC’s OECO division, but since October 1, 2008, are disbursed and evaluated by the new JICA agency, which has absorbed the OECO.

511 Bilateral grant aid is provided by JICA. Grant aid includes general grant aid (aid for social and cultural projects dispensed directly by MOFA) and technical cooperation (knowledge transferred by human exchange and by equipment transfers, mainly handled by JICA (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5).

512 Taken from JICA, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/01.html; accessed 17 September 2003. Note that the OECO will be absorbed into the new JICA agency in October 2008.

513 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 5. For example, in 1989, bilateral flows ($6.779 billion) made up 75.6 percent of the total ODA disbursements ($8.956 billion) for that year. The remainder ($2.186 billion, 24.3 percent) was multilateral flows, which went to “…multilateral institutions such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank” (Ensign, Doing Good, 27-28).

514 Ibid.

515 For example, as of the early 2000s, though its total aid amount has been large, compared to its national income, Japan’s level of giving has been below the DAC median, far below the recommended DAC median amount of 0.7 of GDP. The general terms of the aid that Japan offers have slowly improved, but continue to be less generous than those of other DAC countries, due to the high amount of loans in aid it offers. The DAC also has developed measures comparing how its members are meeting the challenges of poverty and other humanitarian needs, by examining aid across geographic regions, recipient nations’ income levels, and sectors. Japan’s aid continues to be largely focused on Asia, continues to have a fairly high level of focus on industrial sectors (despite some sectoral change). While Japan’s aid to the poorest countries has increased over time, it still ranks near the bottom of all DAC members. From 1970 to 2000, while Japan slowly increased its aid generosity and focus on the poorest nations, overall, in quality its achievements are still below the median for DAC members in most areas (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 6-7).
continue to be a very important component in Japan’s total ODA. What seems obvious in Chart 2.1 (Japan’s ODA Allocation by Sector) is that aid for physical infrastructure was a very high percentage of Japan’s ODA from 1993 to 2005, and continues to be so. Aid for social infrastructure has consistently been lower than for the physical area. This is graphic evidence of the long-term emphasis of Japan’s ODA on economic infrastructure.

Graph 2.1 Japan’s ODA Allocation by Sector: 1993-2005.

Note: The figure above includes assistance to Social and Administrative Infrastructure, Economic Infrastructure, Production and Multi-Sector and does not include Commodity Aid and General Program Assistance, Debt Relief, Administrative Expenses and Others.

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516 Though loans were 67 percent of Japan’s total bilateral ODA in 1970, they decreased to 35 percent in 2002. Yet this figure for all DAC members, including Japan, drawn from aggregate data for 2002, was only 2.3 percent (Ibid., 5).
Multilateral aid has increased in importance. Since the early 1990s, up to 20 to 25 percent of the ODA budget has gone to multilateral programs and agencies (Arase 2005s: 5). Multilateral aid is generally less studied than bilateral aid. Yasutomo argues that the importance of Japan’s multilateral ODA channeled through multilateral institutions is increasing, and worthy of study, since it represents increased Japanese assertiveness in foreign policy. This new assertiveness through multilateral ODA is the result of a slow evolutionary policy. Yasutomo attempts to prove this through his study of Japanese behavior in three multilateral banks providing aid for post-Soviet Russia: the IBRD, the ADB, and the EDBRD.518

Historically, much of the aid that Japan offers has been “tied.” Japan’s ODA program has often been criticized for its tied nature.519 Critics have long charged that Japan’s ODA has a definite trade/commercial promotion link.520 There can be economic or political security reasons for tying aid. In Japan’s case, Ensign argues that in the 1980s, the reason was chiefly economic, coupled with “Japan’s regional aid biases toward the Asian countries….”521 In her study on the impacts of Japan’s tied aid to six Asian countries from 1982 to 1989, Ensign concludes that

519 This refers to its connection with promoting Japanese commercial interests and purchases from Japanese firms. The amount of Japanese aid that is tied has been steadily decreasing, however. By 1999, almost all ODA loans were untied (Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 4).
520 Ensign, *Doing Good*, 32-33.
521 Ibid., 83-84.
Japanese aid and trade are linked. Specifically, aid to infrastructure projects in [the six nations] …is positively correlated with trade in infrastructure. Tied aid benefits the Japanese economy and industries. Capital projects support the exports of Japanese goods.\(^{522}\)

Ensign notes that from the early 1980s, most Japanese aid to other Asian countries went to infrastructural development, and that there were potentially harmful impacts on each nation’s environment and local groups that might hamper a nation’s capacity for economic development.\(^{523}\) Tied aid has likely had mixed results, contributing to both economic development and environmental damage in some countries.

There are several types of aid flows that make up Japanese aid and economic cooperation. Budget-determined official flows consist of official development assistance (ODA) and “other official flows.” They are “…administered solely by the government.” Part of ODA consists of technical cooperation, such as the transfer of proprietary knowledge, the education of students and trainees from LDCs, the dispatching of experts and advisors, and help with feasibility studies in the LDCs.\(^{524}\)

Compared with Western aid systems, Japan’s aid system has been unique for its significant component of private sector involvement.\(^{525}\) Ozawa calls one type of this “public-private aid flow” hybrid aid, defined as

\[\ldots\text{joint financing arranged by the government in collaboration with the private sector. Examples are joint loans and syndicated equity investments that [were formerly] \ldots\text{arranged by [the] \ldots OECF [, later by JBIC] and private corporations for investment projects in the developing countries, and by co-operative loans organized by the Ex-Im Bank of Japan and Japanese commercial banks. [These organizations have served] \ldots\text{as risk-sharers for these financial arrangements. In}\]

\(^{522}\) Ibid., 84, 92-93.
\(^{523}\) Ibid., 92-93.
\(^{524}\) Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses, 99, 101.
\(^{525}\) Das, Yen Appreciation, 167-169. See Söderberg, Business of Japanese Foreign Aid; and Arase, “Public-Private Sector,” for more in-depth explorations of private aid to Asia and public-private aid coordination from Japan in the 1990s.
addition, the commercial banks’ subscription of the bonds issued by such international financial organizations as the World Bank, [and] the Asian Development Bank… can …be classified as hybrid flows.  

Another form of public-private aid flow is market-coordinated flows, “generated by market forces and include foreign direct investment, bank loans, and donations by private institutions.” In the late 1980s there was a rapid increase in this form of aid from Japan, due to the yen’s rapid appreciation. As production in Japan became more expensive, more financial capital (foreign securities, real estate, and other assets) and industrial production overseas were transferred overseas. In the 1980s, the transfer of these surplus industries, including managerial expertise and production technologies, was especially strong to the Asian NICS and China, but also to Europe and North America. Ozawa predicted that in the 1990s, Japanese aid would move toward increasing transfer of industrial activities to neighboring countries, especially China, which happened, and the development of new forms of “hybrid” aid packages, combining official aid with private sector transfers of capital, technology, know-how, and organizational skills.

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526 Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses, 99.
527 Ibid., 99, 106-107. Ozawa concludes that market-coordinated flows stood at the base of Japan’s economic cooperation with LDCs in the late 1980s, and that Japan’s government relied more upon “privatized aid” because of budget constraints, and “…its belief that foreign direct investment is the most effective conduit through which Japanese corporations can transfer the crucial development resources they possess.” The drawback of such aid is that it tends to flow mainly where profits lie (Ibid., 99, 108).
528 Ibid., 7, 9-12. Ozawa believed that other Asian nations, especially China, were uniquely positioned to benefit from this new form of aid, and that Japan was unique in pioneering such an approach. Dubbed “comprehensive development strategy,” or Minkatsu, it aimed to make “…optimal use of private sector vitality to enhance productivity and efficiency in the entire economy.” It seems likely that other Asian nations, such as China and South Korea, given their strong experiences of state-led development, will also offer similar hybrid types of aid packages (Ozawa, Recycling Japan’s Surpluses).
Amounts of Aid

In terms of total financial flows, Japan’s aid increased from about .5 percent of GNP in the early 1960s to almost one percent in the early 1970s. The rise and decrease in the amounts of Japanese ODA have roughly followed Japan’s growth as an advanced industrial nation (its GDP growth). After Japan joined the OECD in 1964, it increased its ODA in concert with its increase in GDP, becoming the fourth highest OECD donor in 1973. From the late 1970s to 1999, there was an unprecedented rise in Japan’s aid budget, followed by rapid declines from 2000 to the present. In 1978 Japan ranked as the third largest donor, and after several massive increases in ODA amounts, became number two in 1983, and in 1989, number one, cresting at $15.3 billion (net ODA) in 1999. Japan dropped to the number two spot again in 2001, at $9.8 billion. Though Japan will stay a fairly wealthy nation for the near future, it faces great competition from the meteoric rise of China, and pressure from the United States, the European Union, and new powers like Russia, India, and Brazil.

529 Hasegawa, Japanese Foreign Aid, 145.
530 From FY 1997 to FY 2004, Japan’s ODA budget decreased 30 percent (Arase, Japanese Foreign Aid, 4).
531 Ibid. 3.
It is interesting to compare the spending decreases in Japan’s ODA account from 1997 to 2007 (about 40 percent from 1997 levels) with the Japanese government’s public works related spending over the period, which also a somewhat similar decrease (19 percent) (see Chart 2.2). Clearly the spending levels of Japan’s ODA have paralleled the state of Japan’s overall economy. The chief reason behind Japan’s ODA reduction seems to be its general economic decline since the early 1990s, when Japan’s famous bubble economy “burst.” By 2002, various government economic stimulus packages ballooned the national government debt to 140 percent of Japan’s GDP. Another emerging socioeconomic crisis is the nation’s rapidly aging population. The loss of Japan’s reputation as a global superpower was humiliating, contributing to a rising sense that Japan was must do less for others and more for itself. There are also political motivations for the decrease in Japan’s ODA budget, especially MOFA’s loss of face.

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with the Japanese public. MOFA has been the chief public face for ODA. Its efforts to decrease loan tying of Japanese aid, to bring it up to current international standards, caused a large decrease in the number of loan contracts awarded to Japanese firms. This made many in the ruling LDP and the Japanese business community doubt that ODA was still crucial to their interests. Frosty relations between China and Japan from the late 1990s to 2008 increased domestic calls to end Japanese ODA to that nation, with charges that Japan’s aid contributed to China’s economic rise and military build-up, to Japan’s harm. MOFA was also tainted by a series of scandals from 2000 to 2002. All of this contributes to the likelihood that Japan’s ODA budget will not be significantly increased until the government carries out needed reforms to help renew the Japanese people’s confidence in ODA.\textsuperscript{533} While the Japanese government is indeed carrying out quite a number of reforms, the question remains whether they will maintain or increase the effectiveness of Japan’s aid, in the face of continuing economic challenges. Many foreign critics doubt they will.

Bilateral, Regional, Multilateral/International
Aid Policies and Contributions

**Bilateral, Regional Aid Policies, Contributions**

Please see Chart 2.3 for details on the major aspects of the distribution of Japan’s bilateral ODA to major world regions. One thing that is obvious here is that Asia has always occupied a high percentage of Japan’s regional giving, through 2006, yet that is changing. It is notable that giving to the Middle East and Africa greatly increased in

\textsuperscript{533} Ibid., 3-5.
2005 and 2006. In 2006, Japan’s bilateral ODA to Africa surpassed aid to Asia for the first time, a highly significant change.

Graph 2.3  Trends in Bilateral ODA by Region (Net Disbursement)\(^{534}\)

**Aid to Asia**

Sato Seizaburo has characterized an emphasis on Asia as one of the pillars of Japanese foreign policy since the 1880s.\(^{535}\) Traditionally Japan has maintained a very strong regional focus in its foreign aid programs, especially centered on Asia: the ASEAN states,\(^{536}\) Korea, and since 1978, China. Japan feels a certain commonality in heritage and history with its neighbors. Historically, they contained many natural

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\(^{535}\) Orr, *Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 4.

\(^{536}\) Concerning ASEAN, Indonesia has often been Japan’s top or second highest aid recipient.
resources, such as oil, natural gas, rubber, copper, and bauxite.\footnote{Yasutomo, \textit{Manner of Giving}, 91.} In the late 1980s, more Japanese aid was given to South and East Asia (65-70 percent of total aid in the 1980s) than to other regions. 30-35 percent of the total was reserved for ASEAN, more than the Japanese ODA given to Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America combined. The emphasis on one world region or group of countries is not unique to Japan. In the late 1980s, 70 percent of Britain’s aid went to Commonwealth countries.\footnote{Orr, “Rising Sun,” 42, 45.}

In the mid-1980s, China developed into ASEAN’s chief rival for Japanese aid …in terms of amounts and special treatment. ASEAN views of the growth of intimate Sino-Japanese ties uneasily. ASEAN governments sense that Japan considers China the real priority because of …[traditionally stronger] ties to the mainland. Their concern is understandable since the most outstanding development in Japanese aid policy in the 1980s …[was] the sudden rise of China as Japan’s …largest bilateral aid recipient…. [in] record time.\footnote{Ozawa, \textit{Recycling Japan’s Surpluses}, 96, 121-122.}

Through the early 1990s, Japan’s aid philosophy has continually stressed aid to Asia.\footnote{Rix, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 22-24.}

In 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro announced two major initiatives designed to enhance Japan’s economic cooperation with and aid to the ASEAN nations.\footnote{Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 105. The first initiative, announced in January 2002, called IDEA (Initiative for Development in East Asia), included efforts to “confirm the significance of East Asian development, to promote intra-ASEAN cooperation, and to share their experience with other countries and regions.” The Koizumi Initiative of late 2002, announced just before the Johannesburg Summit, stressed that Japan would push acknowledgement of IDEA and of East Asian development as a model for other nations, and promote growth-oriented development against the PRSP development approach supported by the World Bank and other Western donors, among several other goals (Ibid.).} Other studies that examine various aspects of Japan’s aid to Asia and ASEAN include studies by Orr,\footnote{Orr, “Rising Sun,” studies Japanese aid to ASEAN, the Pacific Rim and South Korea.} Potter,\footnote{Potter, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid} and “Accommodation and Recipient,” examine the viewpoints of two Japanese ODA recipients in Southeast Asia, Thailand and the Philippines.} Söderberg,\footnote{The Söderberg, \textit{Business of Japanese Foreign Aid}, study investigates Japanese aid to five different Asian nations from largely a business point of view.} and Khan,\footnote{many already mentioned above.}
Since the 1980s, China has often been the top recipient of Japanese ODA. Two recent studies of Japan’s aid to China are Takamine, which examines Japan’s aid to China in-depth from Japanese points of view (the donor’s), and Feng, which briefly looks at the subject from the recipient’s point of view. Takamine asserts that the case of Japanese aid to China reveals the capacity of a donor nation to pursue multiple foreign policy goals through its aid to a recipient country. In the past, Japan used aid to China to encourage positive economic and political developments, but since 1995, has used its aid as a “diplomatic weapon” to support Japan’s security interests there. For his study of Japanese aid to China, Takamine chooses the analytical approaches of mercantile realism, proactive state, and institutional analysis as the best for his case. Takamine argues that institutional analysis characterizes Japan’s foreign aid policymaking as

...intensive bargaining (or politics) among various Japanese policy-making actors, each of which engages in ODA policy-making on the basis of different perceptions of national, organisational and personal interests. In fact, the politics of foreign aid is a battle among competing ideas that all claim to represent the national interest [italics added].

546 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid.
547 Feng, “Japanese Aid to China.” See my comments about Feng earlier in this chapter.
548 Takamine, Japan’s Development Aid, 158.
549 Ibid., 15-16. These three approaches are discussed earlier in this chapter. The first approach helps address the complex connections between Japan’s attempts to further its strategic and diplomatic concerns in the international system on the one hand, and its international economic policy and ODA on the other. The proactive state approach correctly stresses the input of various domestic “indigenous” factors in influencing policy outcomes in Japan’s aid policies. So while the mercantile realism and proactive state approaches are useful for identifying the interests within and the objectives behind Japan’s ODA, they do not explain actual policymaking processes, and they assume the input of solitary, rational actors in the policy process, a naïve assumption for foreign aid in democratic societies (Ibid.).
550 Ibid. Takamine concludes that the institutional analysis approach sees Japanese politics as a battle among politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders, and well supplements the weaknesses of the mercantile realism and proactive state approaches (Ibid.). Hence, Takamine’s study goes slightly beyond all of the existing studies.
Thus, Takamine’s work on China concurs with some of the chief arguments of the present research, that perceptions, worldviews and ideas are paramount forces in shaping a donor’s aid policies (in this case, Japan’s), among other factors. Since 1978, the rise of China in Japan’s regional aid goals has been paramount.

**Globalization of Aid**

Japan has moved toward globalization of its aid beyond Asia since the early 1970s, resulting from a desire to contribute to stability in resource-rich areas, and second, from its status as a great economic power. Japanese aid to Latin America increased, and was influenced by U.S. policies.\(^{551}\) Japan aid to Africa increased over seventy fold from 1972 through the mid-1980s, and was humanitarian in nature. Aid to the Middle East in this period varied, but Egypt tended to receive a lot because of its strategic importance.\(^{552}\) Other regions receiving new infusions of Japanese aid since the early 1990s include Eastern Europe and former Soviet states in Europe and Asia.\(^{553}\) So Japan has used economic aid as a significant foreign policy tool. Although Japan tried to become a global player, regional concerns, focused on Asia, figured prominently in its foreign policy and economic aid programs. The first significant, major non-Japanese study of the

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\(^{551}\) For a more recent treatment of trends in Japanese aid to Latin America, especially on social development issues, see Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” and my comments on Warren’s work earlier in this chapter.


\(^{553}\) Note my brief comments on Japanese aid to Russia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet states in Central Asia in the early 1990s earlier in this chapter. Japan especially gave aid to encourage democratization, human rights, and free markets in these regions through the late 1990s (Hirata, *Civil Society*, 172-173). For the latest trends in JICA’s aid to these regions, see JICA, available from http://www.jica.go.jp/english/countries/index.html, Internet; accessed 30 June 2003, and click on the appropriate links (East Asia, Europe, or Central Asia and the Caucasus).
effects of the distribution of Japanese aid to major world regions was Koppel and Orr’s 1993 study.554

Earlier in this chapter I commented on aid trends from Eastern donors, including Japan, to Africa.555 In the 1990s, Japan announced significant new initiatives to address poverty and development problems in the region, in contrast to major Western donors who temporarily began to cut their aid to the region, due to “post-Cold War aid fatigue.” The Japanese government has also organized four major international conferences on aid to Africa, called the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD), in 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008.556 These efforts are laudable, but some Japanese have complained that much of sub-Saharan Africa is not yet capable of receiving investment.557 It is crucial that Japanese aid efforts to Africa continue to be realistic in approach.558 Care must be exercised in offering aid to Africa in areas such as infrastructural, agricultural and social development, transferring elements of the East Asian and Japanese development experiences, and partnering with European donors who have more experience in the region.559 In Africa, Japan also hopes to encourage South-
South partnerships, “self-motivated development,” and cooperation with other regional
development efforts, such as NEPAD.\textsuperscript{560}

The Japanese government also seeks to increase partnerships with other bilateral
donors. Cooperation among donors is also a key goal in the Western-led global
development agenda. Since Japan is one of the world’s most significant aid donors,
Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook 1999 was written to encourage that process, to help
introduce the Japanese aid system to Western audiences.\textsuperscript{561} Beaudry-Somcynsky and
Cook’s 1999 study attempts to offer an overall guide to the highly complex Japanese aid
system in the mid- to late 1990s, which foreigners find hard to understand.\textsuperscript{562} A better
understanding is necessary if foreign countries are to partner effectively with Japan. The
multiplicity of ministries and agencies involved, their relations with NGOs, relations
between the public and private sectors, and complex decision-making and approval
processes all contribute to the complexity.

\textsuperscript{560} Ibid., 110-111. NEPAD is a framework for the development of Africa that was approved by the
Organization for African Unity (now the African Union) in July 2001 (available from
\url{http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php}. Internet; accessed August 9, 2008.)

\textsuperscript{561} Alain Berranger, preface to \textit{Japan’s System for Overseas Development Assistance}, eds. Micheline
Beaudry-Somcynsky and Chris M. Cook (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999);
development are also a goal of Canada’s IDRC. Beaudry-Somcynsky and Cook 1999 was the fruit of
attempts at partnership between the IRDC and Japan’s RIDA, and between Canada’s CIDA, and JICA.

\textsuperscript{562} The two main goals of the book are to “to provide a better understanding of the full range of the
Japanese ODA system and to assist those involved in initiating joint cooperation activities with Japan in
development” (Ibid.).
Table 2.8  Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2006 (Calendar Year)\textsuperscript{563}

Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,631.61</td>
<td>21.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>780.81</td>
<td>10.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>569.40</td>
<td>7.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>562.91</td>
<td>7.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>263.63</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>225.03</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>202.73</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>201.92</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>138.02</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>107.42</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-country total 4,683.49 62.59

Table 2.9  Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2005 (Calendar Year)\textsuperscript{564}

Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country or region</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3,502.85</td>
<td>33.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1,223.13</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,064.27</td>
<td>10.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>602.66</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Democratic Republic</td>
<td>376.26</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.10  Top 10 Recipients of Japan’s Aid by Type in 2004 (Calendar Year)\textsuperscript{565}

Bilateral ODA Total (Net disbursement basis, unit: US$ million, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>964.69</td>
<td>16.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>662.07</td>
<td>11.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>615.33</td>
<td>10.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>256.50</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>211.38</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>179.53</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>172.52</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>134.11</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>130.76</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>115.42</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ten-country total</td>
<td>3,442.30</td>
<td>57.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 present data about the top ten national recipients of Japan’s bilateral ODA in 2004, 2005, and 2006. In 2004, Asian nations made up eight of the top ten recipients of bilateral aid from Japan. The Middle East and Africa were also present in the top ten (one nation each). The pattern of broader globalization of the distribution of Japan’s aid was significantly present in 2005 and 2006, but not in 2004. Along with the broader globalization of aid, there is also a strategic element, supporting the foreign policy goals of both Japan and the United States. In 2005, we see evidence of a pattern of emphasis on Asia with increasing globalization in the disbursement of Japan’s bilateral ODA. Though five Asian nations were among the top ten recipients, other major world regions are well represented: Africa (two nations), and the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Latin America (one nation each). In 2006, many of the nations were highly important to Japan for economic reasons, due to their geographic presence in Japan’s Asian market (China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Pakistan and Malaysia). Also in 2006, two of the top ten recipients were important (or potential) suppliers of oil (Nigeria, Iraq). Several of the top recipients in 2006 were of high strategic interest for the general foreign policy concerns of the United States (especially Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan). 2004 disbursements also reveal sensitivity to current strategic U.S. interests in several of the recipients (again, to the same three nations).

**Multilateral / International Aid Policies**

By the end of the period 1953-1973, Hasegawa argues in his study of Japanese aid that Japan had gained more influence in Asia, but not globally. Japan’s participation
in international bodies like the World Bank was relatively small.\(^{566}\) Today Japan is an active member and large supporter of many international institutions dealing with development, such as the United Nations, the IMF, the IDA, the ADB (in which Japan has been particularly active since its founding), the IADB, the AfDB and Fund, and the World Bank. Japan is also one of the top contributors to international relief and food aid organizations. It has actively joined many groups founded by other nations, yet maintained a low profile until the 1990s, with the rise of new “assertiveness” in its dealings in influencing multilateral banks and organizations.\(^{567}\) By the mid-1990s, a new Japanese theme for its involvement in multilateral development banks arose: “ideas, not just money.” The goal was now to contribute lessons from Japan’s own experience for the development of other regions, both the third and former second worlds.\(^{568}\) By this time, ODA became a very complex foreign policy tool; it could “…no longer be understood in one-dimensional terms. It [had become] …a diverse, multidimensional policy tool with multiple objectives.” But the question was why, and what the impacts on future Japanese foreign policy would be.\(^{569}\)

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\(^{566}\) Hasegawa, *Japanese Foreign Aid*, v-viii.


\(^{568}\) Yasutomo, *New Multilateralism*, 15.

\(^{569}\) Ibid., 16.
Current ODA Issues and Trends

Recent Domestic Trends, Issues in Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA)

A major issue in Alan Rix’s 1993 study Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge is what Japan’s capacity for ODA administrative reform means for Japan’s potential for future global leadership. Rix argues that Japanese ODA practice and policy on the international level can tell us much about this question. By studying Japan’s pattern of aid giving, we can uncover much about Japan’s relations with and roles in other Asian nations, other regions, its relations with other significant powers, and whether Japan can take over the “hegemonic” role of the United States in international relations. The continuing global presence of the United States, the recent rise of China, the increasing role of the European Union, and the return of Russian influence combine with other factors to make “Japanese hegemony” in global international relations or Asia alone doubtful at this time.

In the opinion of Alan Rix, in the early 1990s, the complexities of Japan’s aid bureaucracy meant that Japan was unable to effectively, completely respond to international calls for reforms in its aid and for increased global leadership. Some aid officials in Japan began to doubt the suitability of Japan’s “unique” approach to aid as suitable for other donors. Rix concluded that possibilities for a “convergence” of Western and Japanese aid models seemed doubtful. Increasingly assertive, active public relations...

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570 Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 2-3.
571 Ibid., 9-11. Rix notes that Japan’s significantly increased aid amounts and aid visibility in the 1990s (and later) do not necessarily mean that it will become a global leader. But its capacity to manage aid more effectively might be tangible signs of its ability to manage issues in specific sectors (such as development) or regions, i.e. Asia (Ibid.)
efforts from the Japanese government failed to dispel domestic or international criticisms, and reforms remained slow.\textsuperscript{572}

But much has changed in the new millennium. The September 11 terrorist attacks increased international support for ODA, even in Japan somewhat (for the short term). Support for the MDGs has also increased in Japan. Earlier in this chapter I noted the intense domestic pressures in Japan for ODA reform, including the reorganization of major elements of JICA, JBIC, and MOFA, the merging of parts of the first two agencies, and the increasing presence of social development and field/country-based initiatives.\textsuperscript{573}

The overall amount of Japan’s ODA general account decreased 38 percent from 11.687 trillion yen in 1997 to 7.293 trillion yen in 2007,\textsuperscript{574} though Japan has pledged to increase aid in certain areas, for example to Africa, in the next few years. Historically, Japan has shown a much greater preference for aid for economic infrastructure in its aid than for social infrastructure. This is basically the opposite of many major Western donors.\textsuperscript{575}

Another major trend is that Japan’s ODA has continued to include a significant proportion of yen loans.\textsuperscript{576}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[572] Ibid., 190-191.
\item[575] Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 84-87.
\item[576] Yamauchi describes Japan’s motive for the high dependence on loans as due to the fact that “Japan achieved miraculous economic development with self-help efforts and financial assistance from the World Bank and other donors, and made sure that all debts were paid on schedule. From this experience was born a belief that yen loans motivate recipient countries by imposing repayment obligations” (Ibid., 89).
\end{footnotes}
Recent International Trends, Effects on Japanese ODA Issues

Recent international (Western) trends in ODA are moving toward increased emphasis on human development and institutions, among others.\(^{577}\) Since the announcement of the MDGs in 2000 and the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, there is increased stress on recipient participation, institution-building, poverty reduction, preventing poverty-related phenomena that may breed terrorism, democratization, increased coordination of donor efforts, more comprehensive development, human security, analysis of social and political factors in development, and a greater results orientation.\(^{578}\) In Japan, there has been faltering public support for ODA, and increased stress on aid efficiency and effectiveness, even in the light of scarcer resources, resulting in significant administrative reforms of Japan’s ODA efforts and attempts at improved coordination among its ODA-related agencies.\(^{579}\) As noted earlier in this chapter, international critics charge that there are various gaps in how successfully Japan is meeting current international norms for ODA. Yet such gaps exist among other donors. David Arase notes that research has shown that even “altruistic” Sweden, noted for the highly transparent, humanitarian nature of its aid, has historically shown preference for socialist governments in its Africa aid. “Given the fact that bilateral ODA is influenced by a donor’s unique combination of values, ideologies, available resources, and interests, one might expect donors to have concerns in addition to simple poverty alleviation.”\(^{580}\) Japan is no exception, and neither are other donors.

\(^{577}\) Note that these trends are especially predominant in Western donors’ goals, and in the goals of the international financial institutions that Western countries tend to dominate, such as the World Bank.\(^{578}\) Akiyama and Kondo, *Global ODA*, 1-8.\(^{579}\) Ibid., 2-3.\(^{580}\) Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 12.
Japanese development scholars have offered several critiques of recent international trends, including the following. While there are significant efforts in Japan to integrate these trends, the basic thought in many of the MDG goals runs counter to many assumptions of Japan’s and East Asia’s own development experiences. Some Japanese scholars argue that the MDGs put too much stress on poverty reduction, and not enough on growth promotion. While the MDGs emphasize social development goals incorporating health, the environment, and education, they neglect goals of economic growth. In the development experiences of Japan and other nations in East and Southeast Asia, effective economic growth in itself reduces poverty. Denial or reduction of aid to countries with poor governance may leave those countries behind, resulting in even further poverty. The new stress on social and political goals and institutions will increasingly challenge the traditional loan delivery approaches of the regional and international development banks and of Japanese yen loans. Do the organizational structures and personnel of these institutions have the capacity to deal with the challenges that will result? In the experience of East Asian nations, trade has a paramount role in effective development. Many developing nations are begging for more trade, not more

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581 I devote slightly more space here to these Japanese critiques with the assumption that many of my Western readers will be less familiar with the Japanese arguments.


583 Akiyama and Kondo note that this is the experience of Japan’s as a result of aid it received from the World Bank, and of East and Southeast Asian countries receiving the largest proportion of Japanese aid (Ibid., 8).

584 Ibid., 8.

585 Ibid., 9-10. For example, project costs incorporating extensive political and social analysis will be greater and involve more complexity. It is also costly for these organizations to develop such expertise in-house, and it will likely have to be contracted out (Ibid.).
As the liberalization of world trade proceeds, developing countries will be allowed fewer options in protecting their emerging markets, and in other trade issues.\textsuperscript{587} Achieving the MDGs by 2015 will be very difficult; many developing countries lack the capacity to even measure their progress. Will questionable progress result in even more donor fatigue in the future? International pressure for increased donor coordination may bring more long-term aid sustainability and efficiency, but also greatly increased complexity and costs in development projects, reform of traditional aid methods and basic restructuring of aid agencies.\textsuperscript{588} Greater aid harmonization could also result in fewer aid options for recipients, and in aid less customized for the needs of particular regions, countries, and populations, a basic premise of the Japanese development concept of translative adaptation.\textsuperscript{589}

Conclusion

From our overview of Japan’s ODA system, we see that Japan has both benefited from Western aid (especially from the United States and the World Bank), and sought to become a highly active participant and player in the Western-dominated international development system. While Japan has participated very actively in this system for over fifty years, its aid has a huge image problem in the West. Though both Japanese and Western scholars of East Asia have extensively studied Japanese aid,

\textsuperscript{586} Many LLDCs have small markets, so some involvement with trade is unavoidable (Ibid., 10).
\textsuperscript{587} Ibid., 10-11.
\textsuperscript{588} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{589} See the definition of translative adaptation in the Glossary section.
Japan’s “unique” approaches to development and aid seem misunderstood and underappreciated by Western scholars at large, especially by non-Asia specialists.

Japan’s aid system is highly complex, and analysts have struggled to explain many aspects of this. Koppel and Orr conclude that variation is a big theme in Japanese ODA policy, in practice and policy, asking two key questions: 1) does the variation result from a central theme, or is the central policy a rational articulation of various policies and interests? 2) What mix of domestic and international forces strongly influences these differences? Differences revolve around the central objective of offering Japanese aid to countries of economic, strategic or humanitarian importance to Japan, to support Japan’s own comprehensive security, economic connections between these countries and Japan, and recipient nations’ capacities for self-help to economic growth and development. Reasons for variation include influences from Japan’s varied bilateral relations, bureaucratic competition in Japan, and pressures from the United States. Koppel and Orr conclude that there is enormous variation in what Japan’s aid does, why and how. Variation revolves around these central themes and others, but Koppel and Orr conclude that there is no comprehensive aid policy in Japan that can explain or account for all change.\(^{590}\)

Japan’s own beliefs about development and philosophy of aid are based on its experience, which is logical. In Japan, while many factors, including a rather unique set of postwar circumstances (i.e. an unusually open global trading system and a massive infusion of economic support from the United States) contributed to the nation’s redevelopment and growth, Japan’s own hard work in economic production, trade, and

\(^{590}\) Koppel and Orr, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 355-358.
the strong role played by the state were all paramount. Despite the seeming incoherence and complexity of Japan’s aid bureaucracy, domestic and international criticisms have forced the government to articulate the goals of aid more clearly than ever before.

In several areas there is essential conflict between many of the basic assumptions of the norms of the international, Western-dominated development agenda, and Japan’s (and much of Asia’s) own development experience. David Arase and other scholars find that Japan may be attempting to “harmonize” these conflicts by offering two tracks of aid, one stressing Japan’s own growth-oriented approach, and the other focusing on helping to meet the global agenda of poverty reduction and coordination of donor efforts. Scholars using economic approaches also note this “trade versus aid” dichotomy, seen in basic policy conflicts between MOFA and METI. Is it possible for such a two-track approach to work? What will be the effect of the merger of JICA and part of JBIC in late 2008? Is it realistic to expect Japan to abandon its own capital-intensive, infrastructural approach to aid, which, though based on its own experience, has proven effective in many other Asian nations, even while the aid and development efforts of many Western and international donors in the third world are often condemned as failures? This seems unlikely.

Above we noted the massive increases in Japanese aid and its huge decline since the late 1990s and early 2000s, due to Japan’s economic recession since the early 1990s. The ODA program enjoyed extremely high public support for decades, but came to be dogged by various scandals and accountability problems. The Japanese government has

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591 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid; Katada, “Two-Track Aid.”
592 For example, see Escobar, Encountering Development.
aggressively responded to domestic and international criticisms by resorting to great fiscal and administrative reforms of ODA. Leading Western scholars of Japanese aid still complain about many problems they observe in Japan’s system, and express doubts at reform attempts. We also noted how other countries’ aid programs are not free of problems and bias, not a surprise. But this is not to discount the many astute observations of foreign scholars about Japan’s ODA.

Among the approaches to analyzing Japan’s aid, many factors have been studied on the domestic and international levels, especially strategic and institutional/bureaucratic politics aspects. Several areas can benefit from more attention, including the comparative study of the aid systems of non-Western donors, and the effects of those systems on developing regions. More in-depth ethnographic study of Japan’s ODA system by Japanese and foreign anthropologists and other social scientists, both in Japan and overseas, is sorely needed. Japan’s own development and its significant aid system are too important for Western poststructuralist anthropologists to largely ignore, even if parts of Japan’s experience and its effects run counter to many of their long-held assumptions about development and its “universal” failures. Currently many non-Japanese aid scholars are interested in how well Japan’s ODA system meets global aid standards. Despite their doubts, given the rapid pace of current reform in Japan’s aid system, the answer to this question is far from settled.

593 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid.
To date, few studies have attempted to systematically examine how perception affects Japanese aid policymaking. David Arase’s 2005 study,\(^{595}\) building on Koppel and Orr’s 1993 work,\(^{596}\) goes a long way in some respects, noting the perceptions of numerous other donors and aid recipients. It is especially valuable in its contribution regarding recipient viewpoints, generally an understudied subject. As we saw in our survey, perceptions occur on many levels, international and domestic, public and private, expert and generalist. Unfortunately Arase’s study fails to incorporate historical factors, especially those from before Japanese aid began, which this present study does, from the donor/Japanese side.

Many Asian recipients praise the economic contributions of Japanese aid, but lament the challenges it finds in meeting and assessing differences in varied field conditions. This criticism agrees with the findings of Western donors and scholars. Above we noted the challenges that Japan faces in developing the cultural and linguistic expertise to properly assess ground level conditions that its ODA encounters, though some of its responses are quite creative.\(^{597}\) But at least efforts to meet these challenges have begun.\(^{598}\) Scholars investigating the business and economic aspects of Japan’s ODA also note this challenge. Given the past successes of Japanese marketing researchers in effectively analyzing highly complex business climates and consumer tastes in markets as

\(^{595}\) Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*.

\(^{596}\) Koppel and Orr, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*.

\(^{597}\) I am referring to Japan’s recent creative practice, noted above and in Warren, “Overview Japanese ODA,” of partnering different aid recipients in one region (Latin America) together in some projects, to help each other (and Japan) overcome problems affected by culture and language differences.

\(^{598}\) Remember the program in ethnographic training and development led by Kikuchi Yasushi at Waseda University, Tokyo, mentioned earlier. Also note graduate programs in international development and cooperation that have begun in Japan since the 1990s.
varied as the United States, Europe and China, I predict eventual success for Japan in these efforts.

Similar to perceptual and cognitive approaches, few past studies of Japan’s aid have effectively incorporated cultural and historical factors. While astute observations of Japanese cultural values and charitable/religious traditions have been uncovered, results have not been systematically surveyed or assessed. The present study exceeds past efforts by applying a more sophisticated, nuanced understanding of culture, and related factors such as worldview and cultural logics, to Japanese aid. The cultural concepts used here are developed from both anthropology, the social science that has investigated culture and related concepts the most extensively, and from political science. Past studies of Japanese aid in political science and international studies have failed to adequately integrate crucial cultural perspectives from anthropology with those of political science, which the present study does for the first time. More sophisticated, grounded knowledge of the aid systems of Western and non-Western countries, especially based on ethnography, can help free us from false stereotypes about international development and aid. They also greatly deepen our understanding of how aid has evolved, how it functions, what it does, and why, both on the levels of policymaking and implementation.

Previous studies of Japanese aid using cultural and historical approaches briefly allude to religious and spiritual influences, especially in terms of how Japanese spiritual values and traditions may have affected Japanese concepts of charity, both in Japan and for others living abroad. As we noted above, religion and spirituality are highly significant factors in worldview, one of the most significant components of culture. But

previous studies fail to assess how religious and spiritual factors have affected Japanese worldviews beyond charity, yet equally related to aid, i.e. worldview factors affecting concepts of technology, development, and policy. Past studies also fail to adequately assess how these religious factors have evolved over time, and important worldview factors on the micro level, namely views of significant Japanese political actors, in this case, historical ones. The present study overcomes these weaknesses by examining how significant leaders’ views of spirituality and religion from 1850 to 1945 relate to the aid-related themes of technology and development, among others. As noted in Chapter 1, general study of how religion contributes to foreign aid and international development cooperation is a fairly new field and generally understudied. The present project deepens findings on the case of Japan, in particular.

The bureaucratic and policymaking processes governing Japan’s ODA policies have been among the world’s most complex aid systems, the subject of much study and criticism. Due to various domestic and international pressures since the early 1990s, Japan has mounted significant efforts to introduce large-scale reforms. Foreign critics such as Alan Rix have long doubted the capacity of Japan’s government to introduce truly effective, long-term reforms. Future studies will undoubtedly investigate this current stage of Japan’s ODA development, one of the most significant in the history of the Japanese system. In reality, the system is under constant reform of some type.

Remember how the historical national evolutionist analytical approach used by Hasegawa, one of several in his study (Hasegawa, *Japanese Foreign Aid*), makes a flawed distinction between the basic spiritual character of prewar and postwar Japan, calling the earlier era essentially religious and the later one primarily secular. Above I call this distinction an example of Paul G. Hiebert’s concept of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle (Hiebert, “The Flaw of the Excluded Middle,” 35-47, and Hiebert, *Anthropological Reflections*).

Spyke, *Japanese Foreign Aid Policy.*
Another issue presently undergoing change is the disbursement of Japan’s bilateral and multilateral aid. As noted earlier, from October 2008, all three major forms of Japan’s bilateral aid (loans, grants, and technical cooperation) will be disbursed through one agency, the “new” JICA. Will this new centralization of Japan’s ODA result in improved, streamlined policy processes, as foreign critics have argued for some years? The new JFC will also assume responsibility for both domestic and international aspects of Japan’s policies for finance, including public policies for foreign direct investment and international economic cooperation activities of the private sector. In essence, this will separate the international financial operations (IFO) and OECO activities of JBIC, while uniting major ODA activities within the new JICA. What effects will this move have on the effectiveness of Japan’s overall ODA, both public and private?

Amounts of aid have logically always followed Japan’s own general economic fortunes. In the face of various economic and political pressures, though Japan’s current ODA budget has pledged slight increases in several areas, what effects will these pressures have on the long-term effectiveness of Japan’s aid, both its capacities to contribute to effective development and global poverty reduction, and to support Japan’s foreign policy and security aims? How significant a player is Japan in the global war on terror? Can aid quality be maintained or strengthened, and the public’s confidence restored?

Japan’s aid has made enormous contributions to the economic development of several regions, Southeast Asia and China in particular. The latter is the perspective of
both Japanese and Chinese aid experts, though public opinion in China likely varies. Japan has contributed massive amounts of money to other world regions, increased its efforts to contribute to the global development agenda and multilateral efforts, and to coordinate its bilateral aid with other donors. Yet many foreign aid experts continue to complain and critique Japan’s aid for its lack of quality and effective coordination with global standards. One of the best-informed publics in the world on ODA, the Swedish public, barely knows anything about Japan’s aid. Clearly Japan’s aid continues to have enormous international image problems, and it is hard to know what Japan can do to improve this, despite hiring a wonderful, well-known public diplomat like Ogata Sadako to lead JICA in 2003. JICA’s extensive public relations on the domestic level in Japan may bear better fruit.

Another essential conflict in Japan’s current ODA involves intense international pressure for reform of Japan’s current system to bring it more in line with the objectives of international, chiefly Western, donors. These goals, largely revolving around increased poverty reduction, grassroots development, and public accountability, also have much support from the Japanese public. Japan highly values face, and the government seems to be trying to meet as many global goals as possible. Yet enormous counter pressures flow from Japan’s economic challenges, and the resulting large budget austerity measures

602 Takamine, *Japan’s Development Aid*; and Feng, “Japanese Aid to China.”
603 This point was noted earlier in the chapter. See Söderberg, *Business Japanese Foreign Aid*.
604 Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*.
605 These efforts include hiring Sadako Ogata, huge administrative reforms, establishing an extensive network of domestic offices, libraries and centers open to the public across Japan, and maintaining the Global Plaza in Tokyo to communicate with the Japanese public. JICA also participates in the government’s annual “Global Festa Japan” festival, held by various public agencies and NGOs to better engage the public about Japan’s international cooperation activities. For more on JICA’s current public relations activities and national network, visit JICA, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/index.html. For more on Global Festa Japan, see http://www.gfjapan.com/2007/index.html, accessed 15 August 2008.
imposed on most public agencies. At present, this makes significant reform of Japan’s ODA system extremely challenging.

Despite the profound development experiences and accomplishments of Asian societies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China, there is a general failure of Western scholars, aid activists and development practitioners in many Western-dominated international development institutions and NGOs to fully absorb what that experience means, especially for other regions. Western scholars reflect on many aspects of East Asian development, and Western scholars of East Asia study them in depth. Japanese scholars have done much more study of what East Asia’s experiences may mean for other regions. Western anthropologists also need to study this issue more. Is it not obvious that we must learn from the experiences of non-Western countries where development has worked, at least in terms of economic growth, despite the enormous associated human costs? Similar costs have occurred in the West. To ignore these lessons is ethnocentric and even more costly. Reforms and learning in international development should not just be one way.

What can the West and Western-dominated IFIs learn from the development and aid experiences of Japan and other Asian countries, for themselves and their development work in other regions? This deserves serious, pragmatic consideration that does not merely repeat the West’s Japan-worshipping craze that happened during Japan’s 1980s economic boom. Western scholars should also not fall into the trap of writing off Japan as a second-rate power in the face of the recent spectacular growth of China, a much larger nation.
The criticisms of Japanese development scholars of recent trends in the global development agenda, such as the MDGs, are interesting, and worth serious consideration by Western development experts and institutions. Much more profound are the insights of Japanese development economists and other social scientists, based on Japan’s interaction with the West as the former developed, concepts such as “modernization,” internationalization and translative adaptation. These concepts offer crucial findings about how development can occur, and challenge many of the present universalistic development assumptions of the West and its development institutions.

In coming chapters, we will explore the views of some of Japan’s most important leaders on these subjects, and Japan’s historical experience with them, during the pre-aid period of 1850 to 1945. What Japan’s aid is today inevitably flows from what came before. To explore the key questions of this research, about how Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations affect its contemporary aid policies, how novel development concepts such as translative adaptation may reflect that experience, and how Japanese spirituality may affect its aid, we will now proceed to our study of historical subjects.
Part Two

1850 to 1895: The Pre-Colonial Period
Chapter 3

Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895)

Domestic Sociocultural Issues

Introduction

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to survey some of the ideologies of Japan’s most influential key decision-makers from 1850 to 1895 (the period of pre-colonialism) about important aspects of Japan’s experience with technology and development during that period, especially concerning sociocultural issues on the domestic level. These are the key themes relevant to this project’s overall goal of examining worldview impacts on Japan’s later foreign aid. Chapter 4 examines the period’s domestic political economy issues for the period, and Chapters 5 and 6 will cover Japan’s external relations in the era. It is necessary to examine these factors starting at the dawn of modern Japan’s opening to the outside world (about 1850), at the end of the Tokugawa period, ending approximately two hundred fifty years of national isolation. Doing so will also give us a flavor of some of the historical and ideological forces at work at the end of the last age of pre-modern Japanese society.

606 The historical periods mentioned in this chapter include the Tokugawa Period (1603-1867), the Meiji Period (1868-1912), and the Taishô Period (1912-1926).
What is the importance of the leaders/thinkers examined in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4? The key leaders/thinkers studied in these two chapters are: Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), Mori Arinori (1847-1889), Kato Hiroyuki (1836-1916), and Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922).

Fukuzawa Yukichi was a prominent educator, best-selling writer, proponent of Western knowledge, and influential in the formation of modern Japanese business. The height of his career was about 1854-1901. He became a great scholar of western learning, and accompanied some of the first missions from Japan to the West in the mid-1800s. His life mission was to educate Japanese in the principles of western civilization. Fukuzawa essentially believed that Japan lacked modern science and a spirit of independence, and therefore was backward. He sought to replace traditional Japanese ideas with concepts from Western positivism and liberalism. He both used and developed concepts of *keimô* (enlightening the Japanese) and *jitsugaku* (the practical use of foreign knowledge and sciences). Fukuzawa founded Keio University, a top university for many of modern Japan’s business leaders, and established several prominent businesses, including a major bank, a leading newspaper, and a future national bookstore chain.

Ito Hirobumi was one of the most prominent leaders of Meiji Japan. He had a highly distinguished career in public service, including the posts of foreign minister, four terms as prime minister, and many top leadership positions in the new Meiji government, starting in the 1860s. He was the major author of Japan’s first constitution (1889), and

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served as the first Japanese resident- (governor-) general of Korea from 1905-1909, before it became a Japanese colony in 1910. The height of Ito’s career was about 1863-1909.

Mori Arinori was an important educator, statesman, diplomat, national policymaker, and a leading proponent of Western thought and educational and social reform in the Meiji period. He introduced important educational principles for Japan’s national education system during that time. Perhaps his most controversial proposal was for Japan to adopt English as its national language. A controversial figure, he was assassinated in 1889. The height of his career was about 1868-1889. We can place both Mori and Fukuzawa, mentioned above, in the bunmei kaika (enlightenment) movement of 1870s Japan. Mori’s writings reflect the liberal idealism of most members of the Meirokusha debate society for intellectuals that he and Fukuzawa founded. Mori’s thought, at its most advanced stage, also reflects social evolutionism, which Swale calls social organicism.

Kato Hiroyuki was a leading educator and intellectual of the Meiji period, later a public official. As a youth, he studied briefly at a Dutch studies school. In 1860 he became an official at the Bansho Shirabesho, and began studying German. In the late 1800s, he was a leading intellectual who applied German Social Darwinism to Japanese

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609 Swale, Political Thought, 4, 181-183.
610 Dutch studies (or Dutch learning) is the term the Japanese used in the Tokugawa period to refer to knowledge and learning imported from the West during that period. The only Western country allowed to trade with Japan during that time, at Nagasaki, was the Netherlands, and Japan received most of its Western knowledge from the Dutch.
611 Winston Davis, The Moral and Political Naturalism of Baron Kato Hiroyuki (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Center for Japanese Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, 1996), 10-12. The Bansho Shirabesho was the Tokugawa Shogunate’s “Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books.” German was the language of the country considered to be most “advanced” nation in Europe.
thought. He helped to introduce German studies, Social Darwinism and evolutionary principles into Japan, and opposed movements for democracy. The major period of his career was from 1868 to the early 1900s. Winston Davis concludes that Kato was not a profound philosopher. Borrowing from many diverse sources, his writings are filled with various contradictions, but he took the ethnocentric theories of German Social Darwinism and transformed them “… into a theory of Japanese development.” He wrote almost until 1916, but his philosophical system was developed by 1893. Academics respected him, but his popularity decreased as more attractive, nationalistic philosophers appeared.

Yamagata Aritomo was a major Japanese political and military leader in the Meiji and Taishô eras. His career was at its height from about 1873-1905. He was prime minister twice, chief planner of the local governmental system, head of the Privy Council, and the main architect of the army. After Ito Hirobumi’s death in 1909, Yamagata’s faction was the most powerful in government. Yamagata was influential in many areas, including the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), international relations, and wars with China and Russia. Hackett calls Yamagata “an institutional innovator and a manipulator of men,” not a great thinker, but one of the fifteen-twenty most influential

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612 Hiroshi Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism: Hiroyuki Kato and the Reception of Darwin’s Theory in Modern Japan from the 1880s to the 1900s,” History and Anthropology 11, nos. 2-3 (1999), 235-236, 240; Davis, Moral and Political, vii-ix. Foreign instructors first introduced natural selection into Japan in the 1870s. Intellectuals in Europe, Asia, and other world regions attempted to apply Darwinian natural selection to support their intellectual agendas, especially on issues involving any form of competition (Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 235-236, 240). Unoura argues that Social Darwinism encompassed such a wide range of meanings and usages that it almost defies definition. However, he offers this attempt: Social Darwinism is “… a set of attitudes held by individuals or that are prevalent within a society, which purport to explain social phenomena through the application of Darwin’s theory.”

613 Ibid., 107-108.
decision-makers on Japan’s development in the early Meiji period, contributing much.\textsuperscript{614} Yamagata used certain “traditional” ideologies and values, and Western ideas and institutions, to strengthen Japan, reforming the military (conscription), local government and constitutional politics.\textsuperscript{615} By 1914, he was one of four surviving elder statesmen (genro) advising the government. Recently many historians view him as a force for moderation during World War I, but for much of postwar scholarship, he was called the “evil genius” of Japanese militarism.\textsuperscript{616}

Below I examine the views of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato on Japan’s domestic society. Toward the end of the Tokugawa period, they were in their years of early adulthood. The bulk of each man’s career occurred during the Meiji era. Each encountered the dangers facing Japan, including the need to rapidly develop economically and quickly handle the Western cultural influences and ideologies flooding the country. Two of them, Fukuzawa and Mori, had unusual chances to learn Western knowledge and travel abroad when very few Japanese were able. They eagerly embraced these opportunities and faced their uncertainties with courage. Internationally, Japan faced a variety of perceived “threats” from distant Western powers and from its regional neighbors. Technological systems on a very general level also affected these worldviews. Consider the powerful image of Commodore Perry’s black ships suddenly appearing in Edo Bay, and the amazement of Japanese when a small steam locomotive, imported from the West, was first demonstrated. I will note further examples as we proceed.

\textsuperscript{614} Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 243, 268-269; and Dickinson, \textit{War and National Reinvention}, 40-42. These key Meiji era leaders were not all unanimous in their beliefs and actions concerning Japan’s early development. Yet they often showed surprising uniformity, and Hackett believes that Yamagata is an excellent example of many of their common beliefs (Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 243).

\textsuperscript{615} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{616} Ibid.
On the third key question of the dissertation, the possible relationship of spirituality and Japanese foreign aid, religion and spirituality were believed to be an important part of Japanese identity and worldview by early Meiji policymakers. One interesting thing I find is the rather important role of religion and spirituality in some of the policies from the Meiji period onward to protect Japan’s culture. After studying the role of state churches in European society, politics and development, the Meiji government chose to make Shinto, a Japanese spiritual practice, into Japan’s national religion, to protect Japan’s core culture and identity, and to give the people more courage and strength during the difficult reform process. Thoughts about religion and spirituality played a somewhat important role in the thinking and actions of several of the five leaders studied for this period, and other leaders, through 1945. Some leaders wanted Japan to bring more Christianity, a religion they saw as “Western,” into Japan’s culture, since they thought it played an important role in helping people in the West to work hard and make the West stronger. Other leaders disagreed, and thought that only some form of religion that was truly “Japanese” (for example, Shinto) could be used for that purpose. An additional issue is the role of science and spirituality in the worldviews of significant Japanese leaders, and whether those elements conflicted. If so, how did these conflicts play out in the policy outcomes encouraged by such leaders throughout Japan’s modern period? I will briefly explore these issues for this period in the conclusion of this chapter.
Contexts of Domestic Sociocultural Issues (1850-1895): Major Trends

**Contexts of Technological Development**

From 1850 to 1895, important developments occurred in Japan’s natural sciences. During the Tokugawa period, both traditional science and Western (Dutch) learning from abroad followed what might be deemed an indigenous pattern up until about 1868, the year of the Meiji Restoration. After the opening of Japan to the full range of foreign influences at that time, science began to fully develop, freely and in a manner and level of quality similar to Western science. Dutch learning (Rangaku), later called Western learning (Yôgaku), refers to Western subjects learned by the Japanese during the Tokugawa period. The chief subjects studied included medicine, the physical sciences, art, foreign languages, and late in the Tokugawa period, military science and international affairs. Late in that period, western medicine, learning and science, especially military weaponry, were seen as very practical and useful.

Prior to the end of the Tokugawa period, the Shogunate sent six official missions to the West (the United States and Europe) in the 1860s. Several of the

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618 The term Dutch learning was used first, since most Western knowledge came via Dutch traders at the island of Dejima in Nagasaki harbor, the only Westerners legally allowed to trade with Japan during most of the Tokugawa period. See, *Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia*, “Western Learning,” 1697.
619 Carmen Blacker, *The Japanese Enlightenment: A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (Cambridge: University Press, 1964), 14-16. Also in the late Tokugawa period, a debate raged about which issue was most urgent—the threat of foreign invasion or the internal decline of Japanese society. There were two schools of thought. The first school, Jôi (“expel the barbarians”), favored the internal problem, and saw problems with reconciling the “spirit of the West” with the “Japanese spirit.” In the Jôi school, Westerners were seen as preoccupied with the external form of physical things, as opposed to their internal, moral essence (the Confucian view, inherited from China). Japan needed western techniques to defend the country, but must prevent certain western values (i.e. Christianity) from also seeping in. Hence the Jôi school gave the internal decline of the Japanese spirit the most attention. The second school, Kaikoku (“open the country”), argued that Japan should be opened to limited foreign intercourse to forestall a Western invasion. Renewing the internal Japanese spirit was of secondary importance. Only in science was the West seen as superior. According to Sakuma Shozan, only eastern ethics (for the internal problem) and western techniques could save Japan (Ibid., 16-22).
missions were sent to negotiate trade problems associated with the Ansei commercial
treaties with Western nations (signed in 1858), while the purpose of two of the missions
was to gather technological knowledge. Beyond these goals, the missions opened up
surprising perspectives for the delegates and students who journeyed to the West, causing
them to question the wisdom of Japan’s traditional sociopolitical order.\textsuperscript{620}

Japan began to develop industrial technologies later than most Western nations,
and the Japanese government invested heavily in the development of technology and
industry in order to build up the wealth and independence of the nation. Success in the
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and additional conflicts contributed to the rise of Japan’s
industries.\textsuperscript{621} The term research and development (\textit{kenkyû kaihatsu}) usually refers to the
development of both industrial and military technologies. The roots of Japan’s postwar
R&D system began with the establishment of significant scientific training capabilities in
higher education during the Meiji era (1868-1912).\textsuperscript{622}

In technological development in this era, the issue of Japanese response to
outside/Western influences quickly emerged, to collect, master and apply the world’s best
scientific and technical knowledge. This reaction inevitably affected Japan’s culture.
Encountering the West’s “superior” technologies and power made Japan feel weak, and
spurred it to aggressive action. In the late Tokugawa era, it also made emerging leaders
question many of their neo-Confucian assumptions. Japan’s reaction to Western

\textsuperscript{620} \textit{Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia}, “Shogunate Missions to the West,” 1406.
\textsuperscript{621} These additional conflicts were the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and World War I (1914-1918).
\textsuperscript{622} Ibid., “Research and Development,” 1255.
influences changed its politics, expanded its economy and wealth, and soon led to imperialism and wars.

**Domestic Society Contexts**

National identity signifies the “…sense of belonging that links individuals to the modern nation state.” Governments develop this sense in their citizens through rituals, symbols, ideas, education, and popular culture. Japan-leaning scholars in the late 1700s developed some images of Japanese national identity in the *Kokugaku* intellectual school by drawing on ancient myths and folk beliefs of the Shinto (“way of the gods”) spiritual tradition. For the new Meiji government after 1868, developing a sense of national unity and identity were paramount tasks, to defend the country against Western colonialism, since in the Tokugawa period, Japan was divided into a large number of feudal domains, and early Meiji Japan had much regional variation. The Japanese dialect of Tokyo’s educated class became the national standard, imposed on all of Japan, in new colonies in Hokkaido and Okinawa, and in additional colonies such as Taiwan and Korea after 1895. Important images of national identity during the early Meiji period included the emperor recast as a powerful royal figure, Confucian ideals applied to national life, including loyalty, the family and its hierarchical structure (the *ie* system), and the idea of *kazoku kokka* (the family-state). To create additional symbols, the government drew on both indigenous and foreign sources, such as the *hinomaru* (rising sun flag) and the Japanese love of nature. Debates about Japan’s racial origins followed.

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623 *Kokugaku* is briefly discussed in Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 9.
Two social groups important in early Meiji Japan were *shizoku* and women. *Shizoku* was the term for descendents of the former samurai class, five percent of Japan’s population in 1873. Their hereditary stipends were a difficult public burden until ending in the 1870s.  The history of women in Japan reveals how their status often connects with broader social forces. In the Tokugawa period, they were granted fewer legal rights than men, but in more prominent families, led lives not quite as severe as those of women in lower classes. In the early Meiji period, the spread of universal primary education increased female literacy, but their education still lagged behind males’. With industrialization, women began working in the textile and other industries, contributing to Japan’s rural productivity. Some women contributed to politics, struggles for the Meiji Restoration and democratic rights. Rural women in the Tokugawa era endured heavy burdens in agriculture and making clothing for their families. In early Meiji Japan, eighty percent of the population was rural. Changes brought by industrialization affected rural Japan and its women in many ways.

Important social movements and ideologies started or occurring in the Meiji era included feminism, pacifism, and *Nihonshugi*. Feminist thought and arguments for women’s rights began in the 1880s, part of the broader liberal movement for human rights in Meiji Japan. Western missionaries introduced pacifist concepts in the late 1800s, but they found little acceptance, since most of Japan had no recent experience

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625 The traditional classes of Tokugawa Japan (samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants) were replaced, in 1869, with the new social classes of peerage, shizoku, commoners, and the imperial family, Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia, “Shizoku,” 1399.
627 Ibid., “Rural Women,” 1708.
628 See the brief discussion about Nihonshugi in Chapter 4.
with war.\textsuperscript{630} The war with China (1894-1895) greatly affected Japanese society, furthering Japan’s national integration.\textsuperscript{631}

Important changes affecting Japanese society in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras occurred in several areas. Several elements of Tokugawa society gave Japan an excellent foundation for modern mass communications, including the nation’s relatively compact size, relative cultural homogeneity and political centralization through the Shogunate, and a fairly educated, increasingly urbanized citizenry.\textsuperscript{632} The newspaper business began in the 1870s, with two types of newspapers, focused on political debate or light entertainment.\textsuperscript{633}

In the Tokugawa period, the Shogunate and feudal domains established schools, and private schools were located at shrines and temples. Schools of “Dutch learning” for the study of Western knowledge were also founded. Nationalism and support for industrialization were strong forces in education in the early Meiji period. The government founded a national system of public education, based on imported models.\textsuperscript{634} The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) contained important principles for Japanese education such as loyalty and filial piety for the support of the throne, and became an essential tool for political indoctrination and nationalism.\textsuperscript{635} Military training in public schools was introduced in the 1880s, in support of the \textit{fukoku kyôhei} ideology.\textsuperscript{636}

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\textsuperscript{630} Japan had only had two minor civil wars in the previous two hundred years. Japan, “Pacifism,” 1180.

\textsuperscript{631} Bix, Hirohito, 33-34.

\textsuperscript{632} Ibid., “Mass Communications,” 931.


\textsuperscript{634} Japan, “History of Education,” 323-325.

\textsuperscript{635} Ibid., “Imperial Rescript on Education,” 596.

\textsuperscript{636} Ibid., “Military Education in the Schools,” 962.
Education included moral training, starting in 1872.\textsuperscript{637} Prestigious imperial universities were established in Tokyo and Kyoto during this period for the training of scholars and bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{638} Scientific learning focused on medicine from the mid-1700s, and on military technology from the mid-1800s. After 1868, national science education was institutionalized, and Western scientific experts brought to Japan to teach.\textsuperscript{639} Government policy established universal primary education for both genders, but there were more opportunities for males.\textsuperscript{640}

In the arts, literature in the late Tokugawa period was influenced by the prosperity of the national economy.\textsuperscript{641} Fiction on contemporary society was popular. Neo-Confucian scholars studied early literary texts, such as the Manyōshū and The Tale of Genji, to clarify the Japanese worldview as it existed before the influx of Chinese traditions. After 1868, the rapid importation of western technology and culture caused the decline of the Chinese tradition in Japanese literature.\textsuperscript{642} The novel was re-established as a serious genre. Colloquial Japanese language in prose, free verse in poetry, and romantic influences on literature occurred by the mid-1890s.\textsuperscript{643} Western influence in this period contributed to the rise of new forms of popular fiction, including science fiction.\textsuperscript{644} Since 1868, “traditional” forms of drama such as Kabuki have continued, but tend to stage pre-1868 productions. Modern theater was at first influenced

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{637} Ibid., “Shûshin,” 1427.
\item \textsuperscript{638} Ibid., “Imperial Universities,” 596.
\item \textsuperscript{639} Ibid., “Natural Sciences,” 1069.
\item \textsuperscript{640} Ibid., “Women’s Education,” 1708.
\item \textsuperscript{641} Lack of space limits this survey of Japanese arts to primarily literature.
\item \textsuperscript{642} While the Japanese language long contributed to Japanese literature, the influence of Chinese language and traditions dominated the Japanese literary tradition from the seventh century until the early Meiji period. Ibid., “Literature,” 895.
\item \textsuperscript{643} Ibid., 895-896.
\item \textsuperscript{644} Ibid., “Popular Fiction,” 1218; Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Science Fiction,” Sandra Buckley, ed., Japanese Culture, 443.
\end{itemize}
by somewhat of a rejection of traditional forms, seen as stagnant, along with acceptance of imported forms of western drama.\textsuperscript{645} The Meiji government used an imported western cultural institution, museums, to showcase nationalistic values and new areas of education, science and technology.\textsuperscript{646}

Regarding philosophy and religion, Tokugawa era Confucianism provided a useful tool for social and political thought that otherworldly Buddhism did not. Confucianism was granted official status in the 1600s, and began to achieve its highest creativity in Japan. Confucian ethics were spread in the samurai class by feudal domain schools, and at the popular level by terakoya (“village schools”). While the influence of Buddhism and Shinto on society was greater, the effect of Confucian ethics was important among intellectuals.\textsuperscript{647} In the mid-1800s, as Japan faced the threat of Western culture and ideas, the Mito School of Confucianism completed influential histories with pro-imperial, anti-foreign arguments. After 1868, the flood of Western ideas seemed to erase Confucian influence, but it continued in the expanded bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{648} After the Meiji Restoration, young scholars sent abroad brought back influence from Western movements and thinkers such as utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill), positivism (Comte), and democracy (i.e. Rousseau). An important early Meiji intellectual group was the

\textsuperscript{645} Japan, “Modern Drama,” 296.
\textsuperscript{646} The Meiji government opened the first museums. Imperial museums at Kyoto and Nara used ethnography and archaeology to weave portraits of history and culture that contributed to both Japan’s national and emerging colonial goals. Museums were an additional tool of the government using science, technology and culture for the construction of national identity in Japan (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Museums,” 335-336).
\textsuperscript{647} These ethics included filial piety, social hierarchy and harmony.
\textsuperscript{648} Japan, “Confucianism,” 223-224. An example of such influence is kôkoku shikan (emperor-centered historiography), an influential school of historiography in Meiji Japan that stressed the importance of the imperial line in shaping Japan’s history and national polity (kokutai) (Ibid., “Kôkoku Shikan,” 815).
Meirokusha society of the bunmei kaika movement. In religion, in the Tokugawa era, Buddhism and Shinto became more formalized, attracting broad popular participation. In the early to mid-1800s, the phenomenon of new religions began. One of the most significant developments in religion in this period was the initiation of State Shinto by the Meiji government. This form of nationalism was a powerful tool for the building of Japanese identity through the end of World War II.

Regarding the domestic society context, society’s contributions to Japanese national identity and nation-building, and important social and cultural changes in response to the West, are key themes in this era. Japan’s government sought to enhance its goal of nation-building by instilling new patriotic values through various symbols, rituals and social institutions. Key social changes included the start of the shift of labor, including women, from farming to the industrial sector, and the emergence of modern mass media and the national education system. Both of the latter had large influences on the nation-building process. In the area of culture, in literature, Japanese scholars attempted to identify authentic examples of “Japanese” tradition, in response to the rapid influx of Western influences. To stress its chosen examples, the Meiji state responded with new institutions such as national museums and State Shinto.

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649 Bunmei kaika stands for “civilization and enlightenment” (Ibid., “Modern Philosophy,” 994).
650 Ibid., “Religion,” 1252. “New religions” draw on elements of older spiritual traditions, including Buddhism, Shinto, Christianity, and folk religion. One of the most famous of the new religions founded in the 1800s is Tenrikyo, headquartered near Nara, but there are many others which are more recent (Ibid., “New Religions,” 1078; Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Japanese New Religions,” 350-352).
651 On the nature of State Shinto, see the brief discussion in the section on Domestic State Contexts in Chapter 4, and my general discussion at the end of Chapter 3.
Worldviews on Japan’s Technological Development

After noting each leader’s thoughts about and experience with technological development, I will compare their views of Japanese technology and culture, if known, their views of Western science, technology, culture and Japan, and each leader’s willingness to be exposed to Western technology and culture, evidenced by each one’s training in Japan or abroad.

**Fukuzawa Yukichi.** To Fukuzawa, the two parts of the slogan “eastern ethics, western techniques” seemed irreconcilable. Japan needed both western technology, and a new spirit. On his first trip to the United States in the early 1860s, while impressed by technologies like gas lights, Fukuzawa was keen to understand everyday political and cultural phenomena, such as couples dancing, life insurance, and the postal system. According to Fukuzawa, Japan was not blessed with the highest level of civilization. It had emphasized Chinese ethical knowledge, to the neglect of scientific knowledge. The new “queen bee” of knowledge should be science, not ethics. Yet Fukuzawa argued in his concept of *jitsugaku* (practical knowledge) that material values should not replace spiritual ones. Rather, a new spirit was needed. Fukuzawa also believed that Japan’s independence could only be maintained through strengthening it with science and

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technology. Otherwise, it would lose to the “formidable foreign enemy”—“the aggressive foreigners.”

*Ito Hirobumi.* As a youth, like many Japanese in the late Tokugawa period, Ito was wary of interacting with foreigners, but greatly admired Western science. At about age eighteen, he went to Nagasaki to study basic western military technology. In the United States in 1870, Ito studied transportation, mechanical, and electrical systems. Overall, Ito felt that Japan should advance to greater strength, respect and equality with advanced nations through absorbing their civilization and technologies. Japan’s domestic development and growth must take precedence over potentially costly wars of conquest, such as against Korea.

*Mori Arinori.* As a young man from the Satsuma feudal domain in the late Tokugawa period, Mori attended the domain academy of Western science and technology. He excelled, and was secretly sent along with eighteen other male Satsuma students in 1865 to spend three years in London, Russia and the United States. In the mid-late 1800s, evolutionary thinking that influenced the cultures of Western nations and Japan suggested human progress in society, morals, and other areas through industrial technologies. All of this thought influenced Mori.

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654 Tamaki, *Yukichi Fukuzawa*, 90.
656 Ibid., 20-21.
657 Ibid., 62.
658 Ibid., 64-68.
659 Van Sant, *Mori Arinori*, xviii, xx-xxi, xxv.
**Yamagata Aritomo.** Yamagata had a mixed attitude toward modernization.\(^{661}\) He was open to major innovations using Western science and technology, but he supported certain limits on the political system. In the military arena, both he and many other major Meiji leaders supported the use of Western science and technology, while in Japan’s political system, he supported a strong Emperor and imperial system.\(^{662}\)

**Kato Hiroyuki.** Kato believed that scientific principles affected all areas of life, and that soon mathematics and statistics would form the basis of all disciplines. Science yields eternal principles (*tensoku*). The same basic laws and factors of heredity and adaptation drive all forms of evolution, whether biological, social, or other.\(^{663}\)

**Comparison of Worldviews on Technological Development (1850-1895)**

Concerning their views of Japan’s own technology and culture, all five of the leaders studied for the period 1850-1895 highly valued Japanese culture. Each of them loved Japan, and none felt that it should forever be “inferior” to the West. They desired to protect and strengthen Japan for its survival. Implied in their views is that Japan was now weaker than the West, and that if Japan did not improve its capabilities in technology quickly, it would be subjugated to the latter. Because of the West’s “temporary” technological superiority to Japan, several of these leaders were tempted to feel that the culture of the West was now “superior” to Japan’s culture in certain areas.

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\(^{661}\) When modernization or forms of the term are not in quotation marks, I am referring to the conventional, now archaic definition of this concept in Western social science, of the specific stages through which a developing society must pass in order to become modern. When modernization appears in quotes ("modernization"), I refer to the concept of Japanese development economists of the 1990s, which is the process that occurs as a non-Western, undeveloped country is absorbed into the Western-dominated global economy, but where the cultural core of the developing society stays fundamentally non-Western (see "modernization" in the Glossary).


Kato and Fukuzawa felt that Japan was presently somewhat inferior to the West, especially in technology, but they still felt superior to other Asians.\(^{664}\)

The five leaders vary in their general views of Western science, technology and culture, and their relation to Japan. They all felt that Western science and technology were presently superior to Japan’s, and that Japan must import the former to survive. But they differ in how positively they viewed Western products and ideas and how much they should be absorbed into Japan. Mori and Fukuzawa felt the most positive about the value of importing Western technology and culture. They valued Western technology because they believed in many cases it was superior to Japanese technology. They also highly valued certain ideas and ideologies that they believed underlie the success of Western science and culture, concepts such as freedom, independence, human rights, and the emancipation of women. Mori was the most extreme in the degree to which he called Japan to westernize.\(^{665}\) He was strongly influenced by Western evolutionary thinking, as were other Japanese intellectuals and policymakers of Meiji Japan, including Kato Hiroyuki.\(^{666}\) Kato applied the ideologies of Social Darwinism to Japan’s situation itself. Both Ito and Yamagata were ambivalent regarding Western technology and knowledge. When young, Ito was very wary about its importation and its potential impact on Japan. Later he and Yamagata argued for selective adaptation of certain Western technologies.

\(^{664}\) See Sushila Narsimhan, *Japanese Perceptions of China in the Nineteenth Century: Influence of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (New Delhi: Phoenix Pub. House, 1999) for an in-depth treatment of Fukuzawa’s views of China. Superiority to other Asians is also seen in the willingness of Yamagata and Ito to participate in war or colonization in Korea, in order to accomplish Japan’s purposes in Asia.

\(^{665}\) For example, Mori called on Japan to abandon its use of the Japanese language, and to use the English language instead. If Japan had become a longstanding colony of the United States or Britain, such as the Philippines or Hong Kong, perhaps this could have happened somewhat.

\(^{666}\) For more in Mori Arinori’s evolutionary thought, and influence on him from Herbert Spencer and others, see Swale, *Political Thought*. 
and ideologies to certain sectors of political or military affairs, where they believed it would definitely strengthen Japan.

All five of the leaders (1850 to 1895) realize the superiority of Western technology in this period, and valued ideas and principles from the West to strengthen Japan. While all five studied Western technology, culture and philosophy in Japan, they varied in their direct exposure to the West. Fukuzawa, Mori, and Ito accompanied various tours to the West, some official, and spent periods abroad studying Western knowledge, culture, and technology. While neither Kato nor Yamagata had extended periods of study and residence abroad, both desired to use Western ideas and/or technologies to strengthen Japan.667

**Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Technological Development (1850-1895)**

**Development Issues:** To assess development-related aspects of these worldviews on technological development, I will use the concepts of “internationalization,” “modernization,” and “translative adaptation.” Internationalization concerns leaders’ views about Japan’s external engagement, “modernization,” the external and internal processes of Japan’s absorption into the Western-dominated global economy, and translative adaptation, Japan’s internal adaptation to external forces.668 On internationalization, each of these leaders desired to

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667 Given Kato’s enthusiastic embrace of German Social Darwinism, it seems that he felt more strongly about the West’s cultural and technological superiority than did Yamagata, whose acceptance of Western ideas for Japan was more limited and qualified.
668 Several Japanese development economists and cultural anthropologist Maegawa Keiji developed these concepts. See the definitions in the Glossary. To analyze development issues connected with technological development, I include internationalization, “modernization” and translative adaptation. But for development issues and the areas of domestic state, market, and society, I will only use the latter two concepts. Briefly, internationalization refers to the process where the “active” West absorbed the “passive” non-West, for the sake of its own development. The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the
use Western technology and culture to strengthen “passive” Japan, in various ways, so the “active” West would not invade Japan politically and economically. The period 1850-1895 was in some ways a high point of the West’s invasion of the non-West, especially of Africa, Asia, and Oceania, though not so much for Latin America, whose subjugation came earlier. All of these leaders realized the West’s technological superiority to Japan at this time, but varied in their views about the West’s cultural superiority. Japan’s external engagement with the West was unavoidable at this point; Japan was forced open both by external pressures (such as the arrival of Commodore Perry’s black ships in 1853), and internal ones (i.e. pressure on the Tokugawa Shogunate from the feudal domains to open Japan to foreign trade and knowledge). These five leaders also varied in their views about how much Japan should be externally engaged with the West and the world. They were unanimous in the conviction that Japan must use Western technology and knowledge to avoid Japan’s outright invasion and colonization. Exactly how much external engagement was necessary for Japan to

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669 We will examine this issue further in Chapters 5 and 6, as we consider Japan’s external relations with the outside world (1850-1895).
effectively absorb these areas of knowledge, and yet avoid cultural, if not political and economic, invasion? These leaders varied in their conclusions.

Examined through the lens of “modernization,” developed by Japanese anthropologists, what do these worldviews on technological development show about the West’s absorption of Japan into the global economic system, and how Japan imported Western cultural elements? On the external side, all of these leaders worried about the Western threat Japan faced. They recognized the powerful role of Western science and technology in the West’s power, and their potential to help Japan resist that threat. The leaders here who most overtly advocated Japan’s use of Western knowledge to repel Western invasion and colonization were Fukuzawa, Yamagata and Ito. Of the three, Yamagata most strongly supported the use of technology for this purpose. On the internal side, Fukuzawa and Ito varied slightly in their attitudes about the internal elements of “modernization.” Both supported the use of Western technology to strengthen Japan, and wanted Japan’s independence and cultural integrity maintained. But Fukuzawa seemed to support more adaptation of Western cultural elements. Mori was a more extreme Westernizer when young. Later he moderated, desiring Japan to

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670 These are profound questions with which many non-Western societies, such as China, India, Vietnam, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others, continue to struggle today. The answers that each society develops to these questions vary greatly.

671 The assumption in “modernization” is that through the process of interaction with external (Western) forces, both the overall form and society of the receiving (non-Western) nation/culture will remain essentially intact, though somewhat altered.

672 It seems we can conclude this, even though I did not find any specific quotes or writing from these five leaders concerning the issue of technological development and Japan’s absorption into the world economy.

673 Yamagata modernized Japan’s military technologies to counter the West, though not directly concerning economic issues. Fukuzawa heavily promoted the use of economic knowledge for this purpose. As a leading official in the national government in the 1870s, Ito promoted the development of some of Japan’s public infrastructure. But his major reforms occurred in the areas of constitutional law and foreign relations.
strenthen its national pride, though not through jingoistic means.\textsuperscript{674} This suggests he also wanted Japan to maintain its essential cultural core and identity. Yamagata was a strong advocate of modern technology for the nation’s military defense. Given his conservative politics, it seems he would abhor the destruction of Japanese culture in the Western ideological invasion. Kato tried to draw on “scientific” evidence in “indigenous” Japanese socio-cultural phenomena to protect Japan’s cultural core, while supporting Japan’s aggressive use of Western scientific thought to strengthen itself against the West, and to take advantage of the resources of nearby Asian countries.\textsuperscript{675} While varying in their convictions, all five leaders recognized the strong role of technology in the West’s power to invade Japan and other non-Western societies, its potential to help Japan defend itself against the West, and the dangers it presented to Japan’s own cultural integrity.

Our five leaders (1850-1895) varied concerning the issue of translative adaptation,\textsuperscript{676} or how Japan should handle its internal adaptation to Western technology and culture. None of them supported the wholesale invasion of Western technology and culture into Japan, to the point where Japan’s existing culture was erased. Even the most extreme pro-Westerner, Mori Arinori, was highly nationalistic in his support of

\textsuperscript{674} This is discussed below in the section on domestic society worldviews, and is seen in Mori’s policies for national education in the 1880s. In these policies, Mori advocated the promotion of patriotic values in education, in support of Japanese nationalism, but he did not support the use of the Shinto religion for this purpose, which the Meiji state and other pre-World War II governments later did.

\textsuperscript{675} These “indigenous” institutions included Shinto and the new emperor system. I use italics because although the Meiji government wanted Japanese to believe that these two institutions were indigenous in their current form, it tried to revitalize them into new forms more supportive of Japanese nationalism. For more details, see my comments on Kato later in this chapter in the section on domestic society worldviews.

\textsuperscript{676} In translative adaptation, the focus is on a non-Western society’s degree and quality of internal adaptation to external forces. Here the assumption is that the base society of the receiving culture will remain stable and primary, although a new dual (Western/non-Western) cultural identity in the society will emerge.
Western knowledge to strengthen Japan. These five leaders varied in the degree of their “wariness” toward Western culture and its impacts on Japan. Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato were highly supportive of “superior” elements of Western culture and ideas, and their ability to strengthen Japan. While Ito and Yamagata saw value in Western technology and culture to empower Japan, they clearly valued parts of Japan’s “indigenous” or “traditional” culture and society, and wanted to strengthen and maintain them.

**Technology Issues:** Regarding technology policy-related issues in these worldviews, a helpful analytical tool is Thomas Glick’s anthropological definition of technology, which emphasizes the social meanings and uses of technology in daily life and work, within a technology’s broader social, political and historical contexts. Through this lens, we see that all five of our leaders studied technology through a national scale of perspective—how Japan as a nation could use technology to repel Western invasion. Kato’s thought seems more universalistic and theoretical, although he applied Social Darwinism to a particular national context, Japan’s. Ito and Yamagata also emphasized the analysis of technology for the national level. Fukuzawa’s conception of technology seems the most anthropological. When he visited the United States, while intrigued by individual technologies, he was more interested in their social contexts, uses in daily life, and implications for American social institutions. But his overall emphasis was national, to discern how Japan should use these technologies for its

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677 In the sections where I refer an “anthropological” approach to technology, I will be referring to Thomas Glick’s definition. See my discussion of Glick’s definition in the Glossary. Many recent anthropology scholars of technology use systems theory to study technology as a socio-technical or techno-economic system, and how “people employ artifacts to accomplish social purposes in everyday life.” Technology is viewed as a socially-constructed phenomenon closely connected with the organization of work. Historical study of a technology’s cultural and cognitive aspects is also helpful (Thomas F. Glick, “Technology,” in *The Dictionary of Anthropology*, ed. Thomas Barfield [Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997], 466).
national defense and survival. His concept of *jitsugaku* (practical knowledge), that foreign knowledge must be applied for practical purposes emphasis, fits well the pragmatic spirit of applied anthropology. Fukuzawa’s concern for a technology’s social contexts is also seen in his conviction that the cultural context or “spirit” surrounding a technology’s application must be mastered for the technology to be successfully transferred. Mori was also very practical concerning technology, emphasizing its application for the national defense of Japan, and the effective mastery of the spirit and culture behind it.\(^{678}\) Most of these leaders directly examined technologies in other cultural contexts, to varying degrees. All five grappled with how to effectively transfer different technologies or technological principles into the Japanese cultural context.

On the issue of technonationalism as ideology,\(^{679}\) all five of the leaders here manifest the idea that Japan should defend itself through technology, especially against the West, by becoming wealthy and strong. The strongest direct support is seen in the views of Fukuzawa, Ito, and Yamagata. Yamagata presupposes strong, wealthy, productive industries in Japan in order to build the strong military forces he believes are needed to defend the country. Kato indirectly reveals support for technonationalism in his support for the evolutionistic concept of the survival of the strongest nations, which of

\(^{678}\) Mori’s practical emphasis was instilled from his education about Western science at the Satsuma domain academy. He utilized this approach in his diplomatic work in Washington to help a visiting Japanese delegation study American science and technology, and in his later work on Japan’s national education policy (see my discussions later in this chapter). All of these applications were intended for Japan’s national defense. Anthropologically, like Fukuzawa, Mori was greatly concerned about the cultural contexts and “spirit” behind the technologies and knowledge he studied. He directly observed ideals of freedom, entrepreneurship and the emancipation of women and slaves in the United States that he found quite astonishing. Mori’s firsthand observation of these phenomena overseas was more extensive than Fukuzawa’s, while the former reflected and wrote more deeply about them back in Japan. Like Fukuzawa, Mori believed that unless Japan mastered the chief contexts and factors behind the imported technologies, its national defense would fail.

\(^{679}\) See the definition of technonationalism as ideology in the Glossary section.
course must also be wealthy. Mori also communicates support in his extensive
documentation of America’s economic and technological resources for Japanese in his
*Life and Resources in America.*

**Cognition Issues. Image.** Concerning worldview and cognition issues in these
views of technological development, next I will assess aspects of image, worldview, and
cultural logics. These five leaders’ predominant images of technological development
can be organized into five major areas. On their general images of science and
technology, all five leaders see science and technology as powerful. Fukuzawa and Kato
stress science as the basis of all knowledge and life.

Regarding images on science, technology and the nature of the world, Mori
believes that through science and industrial technologies, the West has progressed. He
and Kato support science and evolution as the basis of all progress. Kato argues that
evolution is the primary force of change in all knowledge and life. Fukuzawa, Mori and
Kato identify potential conflicts between material and ethical/spiritual values. Fukuzawa
and some of the others worry that the material power of Western technology may
overwhelm Japan’s “spirit.” Fukuzawa and Mori argue that mastering material
techniques is not enough for Japan’s survival; it also needs new spirits of freedom and
individualism. To Mori and Kato, the material-spiritual dichotomy may be false;
progress in technological development may positively affect morality and social life.

On images of the role of science and technology in modern life, Fukuzawa and
Mori imply that Japanese must understand how technologies fit into and function in

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681 See the definitions of image, worldview, and cultural logics in the Glossary section.
Western societies. Kato stresses that science affects all of life. This holistic view is also seen in images of science as the foundation of all knowledge (Fukuzawa and Kato).

Concerning scientific and technological development in Japan, prevalent images in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras see its scientific development as grossly lagging the West’s. Japan greatly needs advanced knowledge to counter the West. It must place priority on quickly gaining it, and on its scientific and technological development in various sectors (all five leaders). Japanese must apply knowledge of Western technologies to help such technologies function better in Japan. Japan’s weaknesses in modern science and technology make it weaker than Western societies.

On images of Japan’s response to Western science and technology, all five leaders see Western science as admirable and superior to Japan’s, so Japan must study them. On reconciling perceived conflicts between Western technology and Japanese culture, they vary. On science, technology and international relations, Yamagata believes that much of the West’s power comes through modern science and technology. For Japan to defend itself, it must also master them. By effectively absorbing Western

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682 Each of these five leaders placed emphasis on gaining advanced scientific and technical knowledge in different sectors. Fukuzawa encouraged economics and business, education, and broad social acceptance of technology. Ito emphasized development of Japan’s public infrastructure, general science, politics and law. Ironically, though earlier he prioritized Japan’s domestic development above foreign adventures, he later went to Korea as governor-general, after Japan gained it as a sphere of influence following the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Mori stressed Japan’s general growth in technology, education, religion and morality, and Yamagata, applied technology, military sciences and technologies. Kato developed scientific theories for public policy and public morality, and tried to identify “scientific” bases of indigenous cultural institutions for application to modern issues.

683 Both of these last two points are from Fukuzawa.

684 While more conservative leaders like Yamagata supported Tokugawa era thinker Sakuma Shozan’s famous slogan “Eastern ethics, Western techniques,” (wakon yosai; see Wakon yosai in the Glossary section). Fukuzawa and Mori felt that both Western ethics and techniques were needed. In his philosophy of jitsugaku (practical knowledge), Fukuzawa argued that a new spirit integrating positive aspects of Western culture with Japan’s was needed.
science and technology, Japan will become stronger, gain more respect, equality, and protect itself against the West.\footnote{This point is from Ito.}

How do these images of technological development function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? The overwhelming power, progress and benefits that the West derived from scientific and technological development make these five leaders emphasize science and technology as major factors as they envision Japan’s development task. Material factors are stressed over non-material ones. Despite pressure to emphasize the material and scientific in all areas of reform, wise leaders, including Fukuzawa and Mori, realize that Japan cannot successfully develop, or counter the West, if it neglects its own soul. Proper spirit and values must undergird Japan’s technological development, both for development’s success, and so Japan’s identity will not be destroyed.\footnote{There is a huge literature on the role of religion, ethics, and spiritual values in development. One of the most pioneering works in this area is Max Weber’s \textit{The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism}.} All five leaders grapple with how to achieve this balance. In response, they reflected on the role of technology in Western societies, and on Japanese society in general, among other areas.\footnote{For example, Fukuzawa and Mori wrote on the role and state of technology in the West, while Kato reflected on how to incorporate Shinto and the emperor system into scientific and patriotic justifications for Japanese heritage and its emerging political system.} As I argue below, the power of the West’s technology, global military and economic achievements has caused the Japanese to overwhelmingly favor Western over East Asian models as the major source of their contemporary learning from the Meiji era to the present (2000s).\footnote{In spite of the emphases on Western knowledge and learning, Japanese indigenous sources of spirituality, such as Shinto, and sources generally considered indigenous, such as Buddhism, have remained important and enduring in Japanese life, up to the present.}
Worldview. In the primary worldview emerging from these images, science and technology are the most powerful force in the universe, regarding its origin, meaning, and very organization. All life, knowledge, change and growth flow from and around science and technological improvement. This new worldview, tending to de-emphasize spiritual values, contrasts greatly with previous Japanese worldviews, which tended to naturally assume that spiritual influences and forces are integrated with human existence.

Yet Japan as well as China became highly secularized states centuries before their counterparts in Europe, and in various periods, Japan’s national government struggled to contain or distance itself from religious influences. The fact that leaders and forces including Fukuzawa, Mori, and the Meiji government all believed that Japan’s successful technological (and other forms of) development must incorporate supportive “spiritual” and ethical” values suggests that in the mind of these leaders, this material-spiritual dichotomy was rather weak. While the leaders varied on how Japan should respond to the challenge of balancing scientific/”Western” values and ethical/”Eastern” ones, they

689 See the definitions of worldview in the Glossary, especially my own, which I use for analytical purposes in this project. Here are the steps I will follow as I construct worldviews (cognitive frameworks) for this research: after identifying the basic images about the selected topic, I will note aspects of images that identify beliefs about the nature of the world, how it works, its order (how it is organized), views of the self (the self’s actions, beliefs and roles) and views of the non-self/others (non-selves’ actions, beliefs, and roles). Next I will organize the images into a coherent framework or whole (perhaps a diagram), look at how the environment and worldviews affect each other, influences on the actors’ perceptions, uses of information and understandings of events and their causes, and any impacts from technological systems.

all agreed that Western technology was a key source of power for the West, and should be for Japan as well.

The environments surrounding these worldviews of technological development included Japanese perceptions of and influences regarding the natural sciences, modern technology and its applications, and Western knowledge and learning in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods. In the late Tokugawa era, many Japanese leaders, national and regional, recognized the power of Western technology, and its importance for Japan. Various feudal domains, especially in southwestern Japan, took steps to enhance their learning about Western knowledge, even in violation of the national isolation policy. Shortly after the nation opened to the West, the Tokugawa Shogunate’s official trade missions to the West reflected its belief in the urgency of importing Western knowledge. This was a period of tumultuous, unusual change and urgency for Japan, and wisdom in Japan’s leaders was crucial for the nation’s survival. The five leaders here (Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori, Yamagata and Kato) responded with urgency, much hard work and study to meet this challenge, but varied on how much they felt Japan should accept elements of Western culture. How did these environments affect these five leaders’ worldviews of technological development? The power of Western economic and military technology forced itself on Japan with the arrival of Commodore Perry’s ships in Edo Bay in 1853. Wise Japanese leaders and scholars realized the power of Western technology and knowledge, even earlier. When it was no longer possible for Japan to maintain national isolation, its leaders had to discern how to respond to the Western challenge. Japan’s historical legacy of importing knowledge from China and Korea from over a millennium earlier inevitably influenced its eager knowledge importation.
campaign at this point. The overarching factor in the late 1800s was the urgency of the task, and the need for a greatly accelerated, intensified response, in comparison with the earlier process.\footnote{The earlier formal process of importing knowledge from China and Korea, starting in about the sixth century A.D., continued for centuries, not decades, as in the contemporary case.}

How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence these leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes? Regarding perceptions, the actual and symbolic power of Western science and technology led these Japanese leaders to focus on science and technology as one of the most overwhelming forces behind the West’s military and economic strength, and as the leading possible “savior” for Japan in its quest to avoid colonization.\footnote{Ironically, not long after, science and technology would also become tools in Japan’s own quest to colonize and influence several nearby regions.} Science and technology were the crucial forces that explained the West’s superior military and economic achievements, and likely also the key tools that would enable Japan to development and resist the West. On information, the West’s superior science and technology led many contemporary Japanese scholars and leaders to prefer the West as the leading source for their ideas and information, not seemingly backward, undeveloped countries of East Asia, such as China. To understand events and their causes, “scientific” ideas and theories, including evolutionism and Western political liberalism, rapidly became influential in the Japanese intellectual landscape. As a part of their struggle to integrate new Western knowledge with Japanese culture, more ideologically conservative
scholars, such as Kato Hiroyuki, turned to Japanese sources of tradition to find “scientific” justifications for “Japanese” cultural phenomena and institutions.\(^{693}\)

How did technological systems affect these worldviews on technological development, and if so, which aspects? Some relevant technological systems in operation in this era (1850-1895) were Japanese government scientific and technological institutions, including educational ones, similar institutions in several feudal domains and in leading Western nations.\(^{694}\) There were also the technological systems in daily operation that several of the five leaders, namely Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori, observed in their travels in the West.\(^{695}\) These Western systems greatly impressed these future Japanese leaders. Of the leaders here, Fukuzawa devoted the most significant effort, in his popular writings, to educating the Japanese public regarding technological issues. The writings of leading scholars and thinkers, many from the West, can be called a part of this system. Elements of these institutions and leading writers had a great effect on the

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\(^{693}\) I will discuss what Kato did below in the section on domestic society worldviews (1850-1895). In brief, he sought to justify new Meiji policies for reforming Shinto and the emperor system with “scientific” explanations.

\(^{694}\) One famous national institution in late Tokugawa Japan was the government’s Bansho Shirabesho, the Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books. The Satsuma domain school of science and technology that trained young Mori Arinori is a good example of a feudal domain school. In the early Meiji era, several public universities important for research, such as Tokyo Imperial University, were organized. Leading scholars from many Western countries, including the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France, had an important role in training young Japanese leaders in science, scientific thought, and technological applications. Some Western scholars came from leading Western educational institutions. A good example is William S. Clark, a president of the forerunner of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, who (in 1876-1877) helped establish Hokkaido University, today one of Japan’s top universities.

\(^{695}\) In other parts of this chapter I discuss how technologies in San Francisco impressed Fukuzawa. Mori documents the overall state of technology and resources across the United States (Van Sant, *Mori Arinori*). Ito studied transportation, mechanical and electrical systems in the United States in 1870 (Hamada, *Prince Ito*, 62).
worldviews of several of these five leaders. These technological systems greatly affected the worldviews of technological development of the five.

The sheer economic and military power of the West impressed the pragmatic Japanese. The fact that these technologies worked so well, and brought the West so many tangible benefits, seemed obvious proof of the truth and strength of modern science in practice, and of modern scientific thought as the key explanatory guide to the universe. The conflicts of Western technology with Japanese values, including the material-spiritual dichotomy, seemed overwhelming at first, due to the high intensity and speed of entry of Western knowledge into Japan. It took great effort by Japanese leaders in the generations after the Meiji Restoration (1868) to devise answers to these issues. Their conclusions, and success in addressing them, varied.

Several leaders, such as Fukuzawa and Mori, wisely recognized that Japan must not only master techniques, but also understand the Western contexts and “spirits” behind technology, and Japan’s contexts, to successfully transfer this knowledge and not destroy Japan’s soul. This led to Japanese scholars to intensively study technologies and their cultural contexts in the West. That the West’s superior technological power caused Japanese to view Japan as a weaker nation reflects a long-standing sense of psychological weakness in many modern Japanese, that their nation is very resource-poor and

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696 Two examples of this influence are the writings of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. I discuss the influence of Herbert Spencer on Mori Arinori below, in the section on domestic society worldviews (1850-1895). It is also treated in depth in Swale, Political Thought.

697 Ultimately, how successful were Japanese leaders in balancing these conflicts? The answer must wait for the conclusion of this project.
overpopulated, so they must work harder than other nations for mere survival.\footnote{This “sense” of Japan’s weakness vis-à-vis the West, a common theme in Japanese society since 1868, perhaps lessoned in the 1980s, as Japan’s postwar bubble economy took off to unprecedented heights (for Japan) of development and wealth.} Despite this momentary sense of inferiority to the West, the Japanese government quickly began importing Western knowledge, industrializing, and building the military. Japan was not going to be passively invaded as other non-Western nations might be.\footnote{That Japan refused to “passively” respond to the actions of the “aggressive” West suggests that it is an exception to the characterization in the concept of internationalization of Japanese development economists that non-Western nations have usually “passively” responded to the aggressive attempts of the West to absorb them into the global economic system. See the definition of Internationalization in the Glossary section.}

*Cultural Logics.* Regarding the cultural logics behind these worldviews of technological development (1850-1895), the global phenomena to which they responded included Western science, Western technology, modern scientific research and development, Western scientific theories and ideas, military technologies, Western medicine, modern industrial technologies, Western science education, and Western technology in various other sectors, such as areas of public infrastructure.

The cultural logics behind the five leaders’ beliefs about technological development can be organized into perhaps four main areas. In the logics on science, the universe, life and human progress, observable things are more powerful than invisible ones. Through science, they are verifiable by processes that are logical, observable, and replicable. So science yields rules and regularity behind all natural phenomena. Science gives us powerful ideas help us to know the origin of the universe, how it works and is organized. Science is the foundation of everything in the universe, living and non-living, material and non-material, because it can be seen, measured and “proven.” Science explains everything we know; to be worthwhile, knowledge must be explainable through
Science. Science gives us the power to be in control of our lives, to be richer, wiser, to change the world. We do not have to be passive victims. Evolution is the key scientific explanation that explains processes of change, including that in humans and human societies, proven by scientific observation in nature. Weaker species, societies and characteristics do not survive.

Regarding logics on science, materialism, and spiritual values, science, the most important phenomenon in the universe, causes and explains everything, including spirituality and ethics. Neither people nor technology are merely material; without proper motivation and spirit, scientific and economic development cannot succeed. Scientific and Western values must complement Japan’s values and culture, not destroy them. Christianity has perhaps been a strong force contributing positive ethics and values for scientific and economic development in the West. Japan should learn from this, although wholesale adoption of Christianity is probably not possible.

On logics on science, Japan, the West, and the world, modern science and technology can make a country powerful, seen in the example of the West. To survive, Japan must learn about science and technology. To be rich, strong, and defend itself against the West, Japan needs modern military technologies, medicine, industrial technologies, and a strong public infrastructure. Japan doesn’t have these technologies, is weak, and needs them, so it can be strong and grow. If Japan is strong in technology, the West will respect and not attack it. It needs the West’s help to learn about technologies, but hopefully not for long. Japan must develop its own capacities in these areas. Japan must fit these new technologies smoothly into society, and develop itself and its own technological capabilities, before engaging in foreign adventures. Japan needs
these superior technologies to survive, but not destructive Western cultural influences, so it must be very selective in what it imports, and how.

Finally, concerning logics on “conflicts” between Japanese culture and Western science and technology, in “traditional” Chinese philosophy, normally all of life and nature exists in harmony and unity. This differs greatly with the common Western view, which sees essential conflict between the material and non-material worlds. Yet the West has become very strong in science and technology, partly due to supportive ethics and values. Japan may want to carefully import some of these values and balance them with its own, so its culture is not harmed. Identifying the “scientific” bases of Japanese culture will help. Balancing the conflicts between Western and Japanese cultures is hard, but Japan must do so, or it won’t develop and survive, which it must.

The five leaders’ responses to the global phenomena identified above were to learn relevant Western languages, study all they could through books and foreign teachers in Japan, travel abroad for observation or learning, if possible, and/or to read and write about the application of these technologies to Japan’s context, in terms of ideas and at times, policy applications. And what were the cultural logics under these responses? They included that the West has the best knowledge about science and technology. Japanese must study their languages, to absorb the knowledge and begin to translate it into Japanese. Without this knowledge, Japan cannot defend itself, will remain weak, and will not remain independent, but become a colony of the West. Japanese must learn this knowledge in the most efficient ways possible, by bringing in top foreign books and experts into Japan, and sending a few leaders and scholars abroad to study.
**Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Society Contexts**

**Fukuzawa Yukichi.** To change Japan and strengthen its capacity to compete with the West, Fukuzawa believed that it needed two things, a deep appreciation for scientific laws, and a spirit of independence. To achieve these, a fundamental shift in the people’s worldview, “…the whole people’s way of thinking from its very foundations,” was necessary. Fukuzawa believed that errors in Japanese society stemmed from its Confucian “rejection” of science and the scientific spirit. Most of Fukuzawa’s writings of the 1870s and 1880s were meant to help Japan in this task of worldview change.Overall, most Japanese remember Fukuzawa as Meiji Japan’s most influential enlightenment thinker, because of his prolific writings on the West and on the meaning of civilization.

**Mori Arinori.** Mori saw society as a growing, living organism, whose parts must all be in proper relation. This organic thinking (social organicism) influenced his concepts of the nation, administrative institutions, and the organization of knowledge. One of the leaders of this thought was Herbert Spencer, with whom Mori had direct contact. Spencer’s notions of historical gradualism and incremental social change fit Meiji Japan’s conditions very well. It is not surprising that they influenced Mori and other Meiji reformers.

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700 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 10-11. These writings started with Fukuzawa’s Gakumon no Susume (An Encouragement of Learning), and many of his serialized writings in the Jiji Shinpo newspaper.
701 Ibid., xxv, 168. Fukuzawa also contributed to the worlds of Japanese business, journalism, politics and education (Ibid.).
702 Swale, Political Thought, 4, 181-183. Meiji Japan faced the conflicting task of needing to quickly absorb outside knowledge and technologies, and maintain its domestic social cohesion. The principles of evolutionism fit this need well by allowing social change while prescribing particular social arrangements at different stages of historical development (Ibid., 13).
Concerning Japan’s domestic society, early in his career, Mori was critical of Japan’s “inferior ways,” and wished to raise the morality and intelligence of all Japanese, to build a modern, more advanced society. He called for Japan to abandon its language for English, since the latter was more “rational.”\(^{703}\) Returning to Japan in 1868 after his first study overseas, Mori became a Meiji government official. Soon he submitted a proposal calling for all non-government affiliated samurai to give up their swords.\(^{704}\) In early Meiji Japan, anti-Christian sentiment continued. Mori argued that freedom of religion and Christianity must be allowed, to gain the respect of Western nations.\(^{705}\) Mori viewed religion as the domain of the individual, ideally free from government promotion or interference.\(^{706}\)

In his proposed reforms for Japanese society, Mori took a very pragmatic, utilitarian approach that Swale calls Keizaishugi (“economism”).\(^{707}\) Mori stressed policies of duty and support for the nation and emperor in education and other areas.\(^{708}\) Some of Mori’s thought on educational reforms was influenced by Herbert Spencer’s social evolutionary thought.\(^{709}\) Education was one of the most important elements in the task of building a modern nation melded with the state. Mori understood that a proper, internal spirit stood at the center of this. Only a new, comprehensive worldview could

\(^{703}\) Van Sant, *Mori Arinori*, xxix; Swale, *Political Thought*, 179.

\(^{704}\) At first seen as outrageous, this became national policy three years after Mori’s original proposal (Van Sant, *Mori Arinori*, xix-xx).

\(^{705}\) Ibid., xxvi-xxvii. Soon this became official policy, but Mori’s proposal that Christianity be adopted as the official religion of Japan was never followed.

\(^{706}\) Ibid., xxviii, xxxi. Mori did not support the infusion of religion-based nationalistic philosophies from Shinto or neo-Confucianism into Japanese education, but this infusion did occur in the Imperial Rescript on Education (issued in 1890, after Mori’s death in 1889) (Ibid.).

\(^{707}\) Swale, *Political Thought*, 180-181. Later, Mori emphasized a “kuni no tame ni” (for the sake of the nation) spirit (Van Sant, xxix-xxx).

\(^{708}\) Ibid. In Japanese education, the strict system of physical and moral training that Mori initiated as Education Minister in 1885 continued its influence through 1945 (Ibid.).

supply this, and Spencerian evolutionism would be very useful.\textsuperscript{710} Mori believed that for Japan to develop into a modern state, the Japanese needed a sense of individuality before the nation’s institutions could operate effectively on a large scale. He was impressed by the ability of Westerners to regulate their behavior, at times, through internal principles.\textsuperscript{711} Yet his educational reforms included institutional, educational and cultural standardization, to create citizens capable of being integrated into a modern nation-state.\textsuperscript{712}

**Kato Hiroyuki.** Kato’s thought on Japan’s domestic society touches on morality and religion. In his mature theory of morality, there were two types of ethics, a priori theories founded on inborn moral knowledge (natural law), and a posteriori theories, where morals develop in particular situations or to aid society. Kato preferred the latter, and believed that morality evolved from natural sources, controlled by natural laws.\textsuperscript{713} Concerning religion, although Kato was atheistic, he participated in Shinto practices, including worship at the Grand Shrine of Ise. He defended this by arguing that worship at Ise was merely an expression of gratitude for the “great achievements” of the imperial ancestors. He later agreed with the government’s assertion that Shinto was not a religion, but a patriotic “cult” practice (*Shinto hishūkyō-setsu*), and that comparing Shinto gods with the Buddha or the Christian God would harm the former.\textsuperscript{714}

\textsuperscript{710} Ibid., 15-16.  
\textsuperscript{711} Ibid., 178.  
\textsuperscript{712} Ibid., 18-22.  
\textsuperscript{714} Ibid., 98.
Comparison of Worldviews on Domestic Society (1850-1895)

Concerning society, both Fukuzawa and Kato strongly believed that Japanese must develop an appreciation for the scientific basis of society (the former, for general scientific laws, and the latter, for science and nature as morality’s basis). Fukuzawa valued science as a key part of needed social change for Japan to effectively counter the threat of the West. Kato saw morality as controlled by natural laws. Mori’s view of society developed from a “scientific” source, Spencerian evolutionism. He saw society as an evolving, living organism. This organic thinking also influenced his concepts of politics, institutions, and knowledge. For Fukuzawa, weaknesses in Japanese society stemmed from Japan’s reliance on unscientific Confucian ethics. For Mori, they stemmed from most Japanese lacking a Westernized “scientific” education, which he believed gave them a lower level of morality and intelligence than most Westerners. For Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, Japanese society was weaker than Western societies, and needed strengthening to survive. For the last two, this view was evolutionary in origin. For all three, the strength and superiority of Western societies came from their higher level of scientific and technological advancement. For Mori, religion and Christianity seemed to play a significant role in the development of Western societies. Some values associated with Western religion might be helpful for Japan’s development. Kato rejected this view, preferring to strengthen Japanese spiritual traditions to support Japan’s nation-building. The religious practices and policies of the Meiji state supported his view.

Regarding social change and reform, Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato all supported the necessity of social change for Japan’s survival. The views of the first two developed more pragmatically, while Kato’s mature thought was more theoretical. While Fukuzawa
and Mori supported the adaptation of various Western attitudes and social phenomena in Japan, earlier in his career, Mori supported it to a more radical degree.\textsuperscript{715} Both Fukuzawa and Mori believed that Japan needed an entirely new worldview as the foundation for all social change, to survive. Both rejected the Confucian, “anti-scientific spirit” inherited from Chinese society and philosophy, which they saw as a cause of failures in Japanese society.\textsuperscript{716} Both supported a new “spirit” of independence for Japan, to undergird needed social change and scientific endeavors. Mori believed that a spirit of self-regulation and control must be practiced on an individual level.\textsuperscript{717} He observed this quality of self-regulation in Westerners, admired it, and thought it was a key reason for the West’s “success.” Without the “spirits” of independence and self-control, Japan could not successfully develop into a modern nation and defend itself. Fukuzawa also believed that without adequate scientific “spirit,” Japan would not modernize. Mori believed that Japanese must acquire the “spirit” of self-regulation first, to build national social institutions to support Japan’s development into a modern nation-state, and that education was a key tool in all these tasks.

Concerning their worldviews of morality and religion, Kato preferred a more evolved, “scientific” morality that could be applied and strengthened to aid the practical needs of society, which he felt “in-born” morality could not. Mori believed that the Japanese had a lower moral standard than Westerners. Kato and Mori both believed that

\textsuperscript{715} For more on the radical nature of Mori’s early reform recommendations for Japan, see the policy impacts section on domestic society in Chapter 10 (Conclusions, Part 2).

\textsuperscript{716} In Mori’s case, these two points are implied.

\textsuperscript{717} Mori’s belief about Western self-control, self-reliance and independence contrasts sharply with Japanese psychologist Takeo Doi’s famous ideal of \textit{amae}, or intense psychological dependence on others. Doi argues in The Anatomy of Dependence (Doi, \textit{Anatomy}) and other works that amae is a basic characteristic of the personality of most Japanese.
through a more scientific, educated approach to morality, (Japanese) society could evolve, be strengthened, and face the challenge from the West. Fukuzawa was not very religious. Mori respected religion and Christianity in the United States, and reflected a lot on it during his time there. It seems he felt that the “can-do” spirit of independence and entrepreneurship in the United States in part came from Christianity. Mori supported Western-style religious freedoms for Japanese. To him, freedom of religion closely paralleled other basic human rights. For Mori and Fukuzawa, unless Japan acquired the spirit of independence of the West (especially of Americans), it could not make the progress needed to survive. Mori saw freedom of religion and belief as an important foundation for Japan’s successful development as a society and nation, and admired the role of religion in American society.\(^{718}\) Kato was an atheist, distrusted Christianity, and rejected comparisons of “Japanese” and “Western” religious beliefs and traditions.\(^{719}\)

**Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Domestic Society (1850-1895)**

_Society, Culture, and Technology Issues._ Concerning society and culture, relevant questions emerge from the relationship of technology and culture that will help our analysis,\(^{720}\) including 1) what were the social conditions and contexts in Japan (1850-1895) affecting its receipt of technological and related social phenomena (or specific technologies) from abroad?\(^{721}\) 2) How well prepared was Japanese society to receive

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\(^{718}\) It seems that Mori also believed that freedom of religion, faith, belief and religious practice were important in America’s national development and growth [implied].

\(^{719}\) Yet Kato was generally negative in his descriptions of religious and ethical traditions he deemed “foreign,” meaning any tradition that did originate in Japan, including Confucianism, Buddhism, and especially Christianity. For treatment of this subject, see the section in Chapter 6 on Japan’s external cultural relations.

\(^{720}\) See the discussion and definition of Technology and culture in the Glossary section.

\(^{721}\) This question emerges from the arguments and evidence of several scholars that technology includes cultural values, that its acceptance into a new society (or organization) is constrained by the existing social
certain technologies? Did it have or develop the indigenous expertise to use them well? I cannot consider these issues in depth, but will discuss relevant points from the worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) considered here.

About the first question, the nation had a degree of openness to receiving Western knowledge perceived to be “scientific” or helpful for national survival, seen in the willingness of Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato to receive and draw on such knowledge. The perceived weaknesses they saw in Japanese society also helped increase their openness to importing scientific knowledge. Both they and Japan were open to receiving certain cultural values associated the West’s success in science and technology, such as democratic or religious values, to varying degrees. Some leaders and citizens were less open. Without adequate mastery of the proper knowledge and values, needed social change would not happen. All three of these leaders supported the social change that they believed was necessary for Japan’s survival. Despite the emphasis on group conformity in Japanese culture, the willingness of Fukuzawa and Mori to embrace very individualistic concepts is notable. They argued at several different points that Japan

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722 This question is considered in a little more depth in Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52-54, and in my discussion of Technology and culture in the Glossary. A third question that occurs is during this period, what were the cultures and structures of relevant organizations that affected Japan’s receipt of technologies or technological knowledge? For more on this issue, see Szylowicz, Politics, Technology, Development. There is not enough evidence in the worldviews of the three leaders to consider this third question here.

723 These perceived weaknesses included Japan’s reliance on “unscientific” Confucian philosophy, and its technological weakness compared to Western military and technological power.
needed a whole new worldview. Did they really realize what massive changes such a step would have meant for Japan?  It seems they did not. Japanese admired the “fruits” of science and Western religious and political values that the West had attained, and were eager to gain those fruits for themselves, especially to be able to resist the West. While the fruits were most tempting, most Japanese were highly resistant to many of their sources. We see these varying degrees of resistance in the worldviews of the three leaders examined here.

How well was Japan prepared (socially) to receive new forms of technology?

All three leaders (Fukuzawa, Kato and Mori) were correct in asserting that Japanese society must develop more appreciation for a scientific worldview, and that science was

\[724\] Consider the massive changes in Chinese society since the 1840s (the time of the Opium War with Britain), partly brought on by its encounters with the West and the ensuing changes in its predominant worldviews. At first the approach of the British “Southern Barbarians” was an annoyance to the Qing dynasty, which managed for a short period to keep them at the fringes of the empire, on the southern and eastern coasts. While a few Qing officials in the late 1800s believed that China needed to import Western knowledge in a manner similar to Meiji Japan, most did not. The Confucian worldview and sense of China’s superiority predominant at the time did not allow effective engagement with or importation of Western knowledge to a degree to enable China to reform enough to repel the West as Japan did. Perhaps China’s vast size, in comparison with Japan, made this impossible. Interestingly, the importation of a Western ideology, Marxism, was what finally helped to prepare China for the globally unprecedented, massive degree and scale of social and economic change it has experienced since 1978. I agree with Chalmers Johnson’s argument (Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China* [Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1962]), that without Japanese imperialism and Japan’s savage rampage in China in the 1930s and 1940s, it is unlikely that China’s peasants could have been effectively mobilized. Mao Zedong and Chinese Marxists were the one force with the adequate discipline to organize and channel the peasants’ rage. It is also interesting that Marxism, a Western, foreign ideology, is the philosophy that proved sufficient for this task. While the social, political and economic changes brought about in China after the Communist Revolution were huge, perhaps it was the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that perhaps finally dismantled remaining residual elements of Chinese “traditions.” But in the midst of today’s rapid economic development in China, we see a massive, rapid embrace of capitalism, the profit motive, a re-emergence of new and traditional Chinese religions, and explosive growth in Christianity. Perhaps “traditional” Chinese values have proven more enduring than was long believed. Nevertheless, today’s level and pace of change in the Chinese nation and society, based on its encounters with Western worldviews and ideologies, are perhaps on a scale unprecedented in human history.

\[725\] Conservative Japanese in this era were especially resistant to such sources as liberal, democratic political values and the Christian religion. The general resistance to the latter has generally proven enduring in Japanese society.

\[726\] It is beyond the scope of this study to consider Japanese society’s receptivity to specific technologies, although it is relevant to consider its overall receptivity to technology in general.
an important foundation for many of the social and technological changes it needed to counter the threat of the West. It is not true that all elements of Confucian philosophy or thought were “unscientific” or had to be jettisoned for Japan to reform,\(^{727}\) Nor is it true that all aspects of evolutionary theory were “scientific” or without flaw.\(^{728}\) The perceived need of the Japanese to obtain scientific knowledge, and to become “scientific” in their society and thought to resist the West, contributed greatly to the appeal of “scientific” knowledge and philosophies like evolution. Was the view of these three leaders correct, that Japan needed a high level of social or worldview change to become a technologically advanced nation? Since numerous societal structures, values and institutions are needed to support an industrial economy, they were correct. Kato and Mori in particular applied “scientific” ideals to their goals for morality and religion needed to support Japan’s economic and technological development to face the West. While Mori also found value in religious values and freedoms in American Christianity that seemed to support development, Kato resisted them, and sought such values from Japanese religious “traditions.” In general, Japanese society seemed highly receptive to developing the

\(^{727}\) As I commented above, there are many profound, deep insights in Confucian philosophy, and it served China extremely well in helping the nation to maintain social stability and growth for many centuries (with many interruptions), to the point where China developed into the most populous, wealthiest society on earth until about the late 1700s. Dr. Leonard Humphries, professor of East Asian history at University of the Pacific, made this claim in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I also believe there are positive aspects in Japanese society today resulting from its Confucian heritage. An example of a great Japanese philosopher who examined Japanese culture and philosophy, especially Buddhism, in the light of the modern world, was Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945). He was also a prominent philosopher in the Kyoto School, which has sought to meld important aspects of Eastern and Western philosophies. We do not have time to explore his work further.

\(^{728}\) The flaws in evolutionary thought in this period are seen in its social application in several areas. For example, Western anthropologists in this period contributed to “scientific” arguments for the racial superiority of certain human groups, based on their supposed evolutionary line of descent. This type of racist argument was later used in “scientific” support of the Nazi regime in Germany. As another example, some Victorian era anthropologists argued for the suitability of women for domestic tasks given the smaller average volume of female human skulls, and therefore female brain size, compared to that of male human skulls.
scientific infrastructure needed to resist the West. Evidence in the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato reflects that. Did Japanese society have the indigenous expertise to use and develop the imported technologies well? How supportive were these worldviews on domestic society for this task? In general, Japanese society in this era had this expertise, given Tokugawa society’s fairly high level of economic, capitalistic and educational development when it opened to the West, and the economic, industrial and technological progress that Japan made until several economic slumps in the 1920s.

A major question that must be answered is how Japan’s interaction with the West affected Japan’s domestic society. Did it maintain its relative distinctiveness at this time, as the West attempted to absorb Japan into the global economic system for its own benefit and development? Seen through the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato on domestic society, did the attempt to increase knowledge and appreciation of science in Meiji Japan help to crush the indigenous society, social organization and social values? And what about the impact of evolution upon Japanese society? To answer these and additional questions here, I will again use the “modernization” concept. The attempt to import scientific values led to the rise of new social institutions, such as public schools, universities, research laboratories, and state-affiliated Shinto shrines. Some of these institutions enhanced the spread of scientific values and philosophies into Japanese

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729 It is beyond the scope of the project to consider how supportive Japan’s social conditions were of indigenous expertise on specific technologies. These issues are discussed somewhat in Okawa, Kazushi, and Gustav Ranis, *Japan and the Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis* (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Hayashi, *Japanese Experience*; and Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *The Technological Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), among others.

730 For more details on these economic conditions from 1850 to the 1920s, see my discussions of the contexts of Japan’s domestic market from 1850 to 1895 (Chapter 4) and from 1895 to 1945 (Chapter 7).
society. How did these affect the indigenous society? The influx of science, technology, and scientific values gave average Japanese much more knowledge about the world and its conditions than during the Tokugawa period. Did this or evolutionary thought destroy “indigenous” social organization or values? According to the evidence I have studied, they did not. As more people moved to cities, worked in factories, went to school or served in the military, Japanese society was greatly affected by new scientific and technological values. But in this period, it does not seem that most elements of Japanese society were destroyed, though they were greatly altered. Did evolution make Japanese feel inferior? Perhaps it did somewhat. It also provided some justification for Japan’s actions in neighboring countries such as Korea.

Did the view of Fukuzawa and Mori, that Japan’s “unscientific” Confucian heritage made it weak, affect Japanese society negatively? And what effect did these scientific worldviews have on “traditional” Japanese religious systems? Rather than destroying Japanese ethical, moral, and religious traditions, it seems that the “threats” of the West, Christianity, and Western technologies and philosophies in this period partly enhanced Japanese religions and values. Kato’s commitment to Japanese spiritual values increased.

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731 As I note elsewhere, according to Kato’s evolutionary thought, while Japanese were evolutionarily inferior to Westerners, they were superior to other Asians.
732 We will consider this issue in chapter 5, in the sections on Japan’s external political relations and its imperialism from 1850-1895.
733 The threat of the West led Meiji officials to adopt “state” Shinto as Japan’s national spiritual tradition, similar to the role of state religions in European nations, for the purpose of promoting Japanese nationalism. All Japanese were expected to participate. This favoring of Shinto may have been somewhat to the detriment of Buddhism, however. So in the area of religion, harsh competition from the West, militarily, culturally, and philosophically, caused a large amount of “standardization” and institutionalization of Japanese religion, especially of Shinto, than had previously occurred.
734 This was noted above in the section on Kato’s views of domestic society (1850-1895). His evolutionary thought did not lessen these spiritual convictions.
Did the types of social and worldview change supported by these three leaders destroy indigenous Japanese society, values or institutions? Did the total degree of worldview change supported by Fukuzawa and Mori occur? It appears that most Japanese citizens were willing to embrace the new social values and changes supportive of science advocated by the Meiji state. They applied a similar degree of hard work, devotion to and respect for learning to the new system that their Confucian heritage encouraged. They generally did not totally embrace the “spirits” of independence or individual self-control that Fukuzawa and Mori supported. The social change in Japan caused by its engagement with the West from 1850-1895 was huge, painful, and costly. But it did not destroy fundamental, indigenous Japanese values, social structures, or the central worldviews of most Japanese. I will explore this further in the next section.

Development Issues. Through the concept of translative adaptation, the issue that emerges is whether domestic Japanese society successfully adjusted to the imported elements of Western culture and social values, and how that adjustment affected its response to science, technology and development issues. How compatible were Western values with Japanese social institutions and values? Did core elements of Japanese culture continue basically intact, though perhaps altered? What evidence do we see in the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato here? From our limited examination of these worldviews, we cannot reach any firm conclusions on overall social change in Japanese society. More specifically, to the degree that Japanese society imported the scientific

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735 One can certainly argue that many Japanese have exhibited a spirit of “self-control,” but given the small percentage of Japanese who subscribe to Christianity, the group-oriented nature of Japanese society, and the general rejection of “individualism” as a positive value in Japanese society, it is doubtful that the Japanese learned these values/traits from the “West.” In Japan, individualism has often been equated with “selfishness” or “egoism.”
institutions or embraced the social changes supported by these leaders, did its “base society” continue intact? The social changes that Japan underwent in support of industrialization were quite traumatic, affecting labor patterns, rural-urban relations and migration, the lives of women and families, and other areas of daily life. Did the total worldview changes supported by Fukuzawa and Mori happen? They did not. Japanese worldviews in many areas evolved and changed during this period (1850-1895), but it seems likely that certain core areas of Japanese worldviews and culture proved enduring, though perhaps articulated or institutionalized in some new ways.736

Technological Issues. To assess the technology-related aspects of these domestic society worldviews (1850-1895), I will use Glick’s definition of technology as a socially-constructed, sociotechnical system related to daily life to the issue of Japan’s domestic society. Several questions arise: 1) the effect of societal attitudes about technology upon Japan’s reception of it, 2) the effect of general societal attitudes on Japanese views of technology and technological change,737 3) how technology fit into the social system, daily life and work of the time, and 4) if technology was a socially-constructed phenomenon during this era. Do we find any answers in the worldviews on domestic society of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato? About the first issue, clearly societal attitudes toward science and technology could greatly affect Japan’s receipt and adaptation of them to resist the West. From the start of the Meiji period, these three leaders argued that Japan must have positive views of science, or its reform process would be doomed. The

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736 An example of this is the new forms of Shinto worship institutionalized through the establishment of State Shinto, as opposed to the many forms of informal, localized ujigami worship that were studied by Yanagita Kunio in the 1920s and 1930s. See discussion of this topic below in Chapter 7, and later in the section about policy impacts of worldviews on domestic society (1850-1895) in Chapter 10 (Conclusion, Part 2).
737 By general societal attitudes, I mean attitudes toward society, social change and morality/religion.
attitude of Japan’s leaders toward science and technology was extremely positive, and they tried to set the example for the rest of society.\textsuperscript{738}

What was the effect of general societal attitudes (and these leaders’ attitudes) about society, social change, morality and religion on Japan’s views of technology and technological change?\textsuperscript{739} It appears that the leaders’ highly supportive views of science and technology helped to encourage their spread more widely in Japanese society.\textsuperscript{740} Social change in Japan during this era, while great, did not change the basic conservative orientation of most members of the public. Some Western attitudes (“spirits”) believed to be behind technology, like individualism, were mostly rejected. The three leaders supported “foreign” or Japanese religions to the degree that they could help Japan adopt needed technologies and modernization,\textsuperscript{741} and rejected them when it seemed they would not. Despite the public’s generally conservative (though enthusiastic) responses to the influx of Western society and technology, Japan’s economy grew greatly, and the nation won victories in several foreign wars. The ideologically conservative response of Japanese society to Western technologies and knowledge in this era did not prevent Japan’s “successful” mastery of these forms of knowledge.

Through the three leaders’ views of domestic society, do we learn anything about how technology fit into Japan’s social system, daily life and work of the era? At

\textsuperscript{738} The attitudes of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato toward technology were all positive. I am not aware of any Meiji era leader whose attitude was negative. It is beyond the scope of this project to examine the attitudes of other levels of Japanese society toward technology.

\textsuperscript{739} I cannot respond directly to the second question about the effect of societal attitudes on technology. My data does not include such information, only about several leaders’ attitudes toward technology.

\textsuperscript{740} Given the huge popularity of Fukuzawa’s writings, Mori’s work as national minister of education, and state support for Kato’s mature theories, this seems like a fairly accurate reading.

\textsuperscript{741} Here I mean modernization in the common political science sense, not the Japanese definition we use throughout this project.
first, Fukuzawa and Mori saw quite a gap between how technology fit into the daily life of the West, and how it fit in Japan. They saw Western societies seemed “superior,” since they had more advanced scientific and technological products in daily life, which seemed to affect those societies’ advancement and standards of living. Japanese society was therefore backward, unscientific, “Confucian,” and weaker than the West. Japan’s rejection of science, and failure to develop technologies and science as powerful as the West’s, seemed glaring proof of its weakness. For Japanese society to become stronger, it must become like the West in technology, science and certain supportive value systems, though not necessarily in spirituality. To become strong and absorb these technologies, these three leaders believed that Japan must embrace a high degree of social and worldview change.

Do the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato suggest that technology was a socially-constructed phenomenon in Japan at this time? Their belief that Japan must become a more scientifically conscious society suggests that they would support the concept that technology is, to some degree, socially-constructed. All three saw science, technology and their supportive values as key to Japan’s future and survival. Implied is that Fukuzawa and Mori believed that the social conditions conducive to technology were partly found in certain values they saw as intrinsic to Western culture, including independence, democracy, individualism, Christianity, and freedom of belief and conscience. Kato believed that needed values could, to some extent, be found within

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742 While these worldviews suggest various possibilities about the nature of Japanese society during this period, without studying actual accounts of Japanese society at the time, we cannot be certain.
743 Fukuzawa and Kato expressly rejected the idea that Japan must adopt the main religion of the West, Christianity, to become strong, while Mori was more open to the possibility.
744 Also implied is the attitude that if Japan did not quickly develop the social conditions and attitudes conducive to rapid scientific and technological advancement, it would not remain independent.
indigenous Japanese society. But these worldviews do not concretely tell us much about the actual social conditions or construction of technology in Japan in this era.

The worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) on Japan’s domestic society reflect the concept of technonationalism as ideology rather strongly. On general society, note their views that the true nature of society itself reflects science (Mori), and that Japanese society must incorporate values supportive of science for Japan to survive. The implication is that without science and technology Japan will be weak and conquered by the West. With them, it can become modern, strong, and powerful. Science and technology are two of the key tools that will enable Japan to stand up and strengthen itself against the West. Here there is a strong connection between technology, society, and national security. Japan also needed vital reforms, social and worldview changes for it to master the knowledge and technologies needed for the nation’s defense. Japan must quickly adopt the Western, “scientific” worldview, and shed its Confucian, “anti-scientific” heritage (in the view of the three leaders). Japanese must also adopt daily habits of self-control and regulation, for the nation to survive and flourish. Through a more “scientific” approach to morality (Kato), and by adopting values connected with Western scientific success, even religious ones (Mori), Japanese society can support needed technological growth that will enable Japan to survive.746

Cognition Issues. Image. To analyze the cognition aspects of the domestic society worldviews of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato (1850-1895), I will first examine their

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745 As noted above, Mori supported Christian influence in Japan, while Fukuzawa did not. Kato supported values that he believed were found in indigenous Japanese spirituality, specifically Shinto, as did the Meiji state.
746 These views of society include such social features as education, religion, values, and morality that we identified above.
images of the basic nature of society, then of Western and Japanese societies. They all believed that society has a scientific basis, and evolves. The scientific nature of social issues must be fully grasped. All saw Western societies as more scientific, technological, positive, moral, advanced and stronger than Japanese society, which was weak and unscientific. Weak societies like Japan and China were poor in science. An unscientific society like Japan was weaker, negative, and therefore less moral.

Regarding social change, whatever made Japan stronger for its survival was positive. An unchanging society was negative. Social change was mainly based on science and new knowledge. Social stagnancy was based on (Confucian) ethics, and a lack of science and scientific investigation. For Japanese society to change, it needed the proper “spirits” (atmosphere and values) supporting science and social change, often based on individualism, self-control and independence. These “spirits” were abundant in the West. A totally new, more Western, scientific worldview would be positive for Japan, enabling it to survive (Fukuzawa and Mori). In the view of Kato and the Meiji government, a more scientific worldview would help Japan, but must not destroy the extant worldview and society. Rather, scientific foundations and justifications for Japan’s worldview and society must be highlighted. Only this would allow Japan to survive and flourish against the threat of the West.

Views on religion contrasted. Kato, the Meiji state, and the majority of Japanese people preferred to find spiritual and religious values supportive of science and change from Japan’s existing spiritual traditions, especially Shinto. To them, “Japanese”

747 For consideration of the overall frameworks into which these images and worldviews should be placed, see my discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in the section on the cultural logics behind these worldviews of Japan’s domestic society, 1850-1895.
spiritual traditions seemed more positive and natural for handling social change. A “foreign” religion like Christianity seemed unsuitable, since it did not “fit” Japanese culture. Images held by a minority saw Christianity as a positive force for change in the West, and capable of giving Japan positive values for change. To Mori, freedoms such as freedom of religion gave some Western societies, like the United States, a spirit of hard work, independence and entrepreneurship, all positive. Education was seen by him, the Meiji government and others as a key tool to help Japan become more scientific, moral, and strong to face the West.

How did these images function as perceptual filters for the three leaders, and affect Japan’s domestic society? The heavy emphasis of science and technology in these images caused Japan’s leaders to prefer to learn from and interact with (Western) societies that were more scientific and materialistic than with those that were more philosophical, ethical or spiritual. Societies with rapid technological and social change were preferred over those with more social stability or “stagnation.” Japan’s leaders would prefer interacting with non-Western societies that had successfully emulated the West and grown more scientific and powerful, but such a nation yet did not exist. Japan’s leaders tended to scorn or look down upon societies that refused to learn much from the West, change, or which isolated themselves, such as China and Korea. Most Japanese leaders, such as Kato, preferred to “filter out” features of Western culture that

748 This was the view of Mori, and leading Japanese Christian intellectuals including Uchimura Kanzo, Nitobe Inazo and others. Uchimura focused on the issues of pacifism, and the need to develop an indigenous form of Christianity in Japan. To Mori, freedoms such as freedom of religion gave some Western societies, such as the United States, a positive spirit of hard work, independence and entrepreneurship, all positive.
they found incongruent with Japanese culture, such as Christianity.\textsuperscript{749} While most leaders were not very accepting of the Christian faith, most were open to related “spirits” of independence, hard work, and thrift that might help Japan modernize. They hoped to identify and mobilize such values from Japan’s indigenous spiritual traditions.

What effect did these images have on Japan’s domestic society? The emphasis on learning from scientific, material societies caused some Japanese to scorn learning from China and other “stagnant” Asian cultures, both concerning the past and the present. For a time, the emphasis on Western values by extreme pro-Westernizers, such as the \textit{bunmei kaika} movement, tempted some Japanese like Mori Arinori to reject some values or ideologies seen as indigenous or “traditional,” such as Confucianism and Buddhism. But wise Japanese realized that the positive, noble elements of Japan’s Confucian and other heritages must be enhanced in order for Meiji Japan to withstand the almost unprecedented onslaught of Western values into the country.\textsuperscript{750} Even so, this desire to strengthen Japan’s indigenous cultural traditions for the nation’s survival sometimes took an imbalanced, extremist direction in later decades, where, for example, Shinto was manipulated as a nationalistic ideology that nearly destroyed the nation and much of East Asia and the Pacific. But this response to enhance “Japanese” values could not negate the power or attractiveness of many Western ideas and ideologies for leading intellectuals.\textsuperscript{751} The social changes that resulted from the influx of new Western ideas

\textsuperscript{749} This feeling was partly due to widespread prejudice against Christianity in late nineteenth century Japan. Christianity was proscribed 1637-1873, during the entire Tokugawa period, and into the early Meiji period.
\textsuperscript{750} The only other previous period that seems somewhat similar was when Christianity began to enter Japan in the sixteenth century. But in that time, the degree and speed of foreign influences and ideologies entering Japan were much slower and to a less intense degree than during the Meiji period.
\textsuperscript{751} These attractive new ideas included political liberalism, democracy, modern economics, Marxism, and evolutionary theory.
and Japan’s interaction with the West were tumultuous. Whether one looks at leaders and scholars who favored more “indigenous” responses to the West or more “Western” oriented ones, the impacts on Japan were enormous.

*Worldview.* Based on the above images, what are some of the main aspects of the worldviews of the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) about domestic society? About the nature of the world and how it works, domestic society is driven by science and material concerns. Social systems change and evolve over time. Weaker societies must improve and grow stronger (more scientific) to survive. If we want to understand, improve or change society, we must use science as the foundation. The world’s social organization can also only be understood through science. Japanese society is weak, but has noble aspects that should be strengthened to support Japan’s national survival (Kato, Fukuzawa). Western societies are more scientific, powerful, and advanced than Japan and other non-Western, philosophy- or ethics-based societies. Certain scientific aspects and values of society, many coming from the West, can strengthen Japanese society if carefully adapted and applied (Fukuzawa, Mori, Kato). Most leaders of Japan, including Kato, see positive aspects of indigenous Japanese spirituality that can be

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752 We will briefly discuss some of these changes in later sections and chapters. Some of them included increasing urbanization, the spread of mass education, costly wars, social and economic impacts from Japan’s rapid industrialization, several economic depressions, changes in women’s lives and roles, and so forth. Then there was the destruction of Japan during World War II, and the rapid social and economic changes resulting from the rebuilding and economic development of the nation in the postwar period. The fact that Japanese society and culture, although greatly altered, have survived as intact as they have, is a complement to their amazing durability and strength.

753 We have already commented on some of the impacts resulting from the Meiji state’s adoption of Shinto as a nationalist spiritual ideology for nation-building. Christianity has also had a large impact on education in Japan. Western missionaries and educators helped establish many leading public (national) and private universities in Japan, including Hokkaido University, Sophia University, Aoyama Gakuin University, Doshisha University, International Christian University and others. Japanese Christians have also been extremely active and influential in the intellectual life of the nation. One example is the leading twentieth century Catholic novelist Endo Shusaku.

754 In the Meiji era, such societies included China, the Indian subcontinent, and Korea.
mobilized to strengthen the nation. They tend to reject the direct application of
“Western” spirituality (Christianity) for this purpose (Kato, Fukuzawa), even though they
recognize it offers some positive values for economic development. A few leaders
supported such application, at times, to help the nation grow (Mori and others).

The environments surrounding the three leaders’ views of domestic society
included domestic and international aspects. Domestically, these leaders faced a time of
rapid social change and an uncertain future. I noted above how all three men (Fukuzawa,
Kato, and Mori) tended to view Western nations with respect and a degree of admiration,
yet fear, about the threat of domination by the West. They tended to look down upon
Japan’s Eastern neighbors, which were less “scientific” and more “philosophical” in
nature. These environments made the three leaders’ views on domestic society more
open to input from Western scientific worldviews than from Confucian societies like
China. How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions
influence the three leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, understanding of events and
their causes? They caused the three leaders to prefer “scientific” explanations of society
and social phenomena like social change and values, and to mostly favor “scientific”
solutions and applications of “Western” values and knowledge over “Eastern” or
Confucian ones. The latter form of explanation dominated Japanese society for nearly all
of its written history, but now seemed greatly discredited. Some Japanese thinkers like

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755 One example of this is Mori’s extensive exchanges with Herbert Spencer on sociological issues. This
had a deep influence on Mori’s “scientific” views of society and its evolution.
Kato worked to develop creative new “scientific” explanations for Japan’s own social features.\(^\text{756}\)

Technological systems on a broad level affected these worldviews of these three leaders. Remember the wonder of Fukuzawa felt at various technological marvels and their supportive social systems in San Francisco? And there is the impressive record of Mori’s reflections on the advanced social and technological features of post-Civil War American society.\(^\text{757}\) Whether military or civilian technologies, the West’s technologies, power and wealth that these Meiji leaders saw in their travels to the West and its colonies strongly impressed them. These were powerful, symbolic evidences of the power of science and technology in the modern world, and of the wealth and power that came to those who mastered them.\(^\text{758}\) The sheer power of these technologies was a strong motivator to these leaders, and helped lead them to believe that Japan must master them to survive. Since the West had produced these impressive technologies, Japanese observers were tempted to assume that Western societies and culture were in some ways superior, and that Japan must copy elements of Western social and cultural features to develop similar technologies. To become a modern, technological society, Japan must become like the West, in the view of some. Eventually most leaders, even extreme pro-Westernizers like Mori, realized that Japan must not jettison its entire heritage. Rather, valuable aspects of that heritage must be enhanced to support the acquisition of new (scientific) knowledge and technologies from abroad. Some of the social values seen to

\(^\text{756}\) While Kato preferred Western, evolutionary explanations for social phenomena, he carefully crafted those explanations to defend some Japanese indigenous institutions, including the emperor system and Shinto worship (however, as each was newly defined by the emerging Meiji state).

\(^\text{757}\) See Van Sant, *Mori Arinori*, which is a new, edited edition of Mori Arinori’s work *Life and Resources in America*.

\(^\text{758}\) These technologies were powerful both in a literal, physical sense, as well as symbolically.
be supportive of this knowledge, such as Western individualism and the Christian religion, seemed to clash greatly with Japanese culture. A chief problem Meiji leaders wrestled with was how to instill (Western) social values and institutions supportive of science and technology in Japanese society without destroying the latter in the process. Their answers varied, but tended to be ideologically conservative, in support of existing or renewed indigenous institutions.

*Cultural Logics.* Concerning the cultural logics related to these worldviews about domestic society (1850-1895), the global phenomena to which the three leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) responded included Western science and knowledge, Western technology and technological systems, new ideas about the nature of society (including Social Darwinism and Spencerian evolutionism), social values, social change, morality, social institutions (such as education), the nation-state, the individual’s role in society, human freedom, and “Western” religion (Christianity). All societies were assumed to include certain common features. Yet these leaders believed there were unique aspects of Japan’s culture that made it challenging to adjust to the flood of Western ideas.

The cultural logics under the worldviews about domestic society included the assumption that material, physical and measurable forces govern the universe, the world,

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559 I use the term Western here to signify that most of these specific scientific and technological ideas originated in the West (the geographic region commonly called the West), which here refers to Europe (including European Russia and Siberia), and North America (the United States and Canada). This is not to suggest that technologies or science that Japan imported or observed in this era had any inherently “Western” cultural qualities about them.

760 Here I put “Western” in quotes because while most Japanese have always conceived of Christianity as primarily a foreign religion originating in the “West,” it originated in a Semitic culture in the Near/Middle East (Southwestern Asia) in Israel. Today the majority of the world’s Christians live not in the West, but in the non-West (Africa, Asia, and Latin America). For more on the demographic shift of global Christianity to the non-West and its possible long-term implications, see Phillip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2002).
and human and social affairs, and must be understood through science. Material and scientific forces affect non-material aspects of human society, such as ideologies, morality and religion. Society grows and changes similarly to a biological organism. Any social or biological organism that is weak will not survive. For Japan to grow strong, it must become materially and technologically rich. Japanese society must be more supportive of science and technology in its social values and institutions, or Japan will not grow strong, socially or as a nation. To survive, Japan must change socially and increase its support of science. Scientifically and technologically strong societies are superior to those that are weak in those fields. Societies that emphasize spiritual, ethical or philosophical values are inferior. Western societies are positive models for Japan, because they are scientifically strong, while China and other “Eastern” cultures are not, since they are too “philosophical.” Western cultures and Eastern ones like Japan clash on many levels. Japan must very carefully import and apply Western knowledge, or its society and culture will be destroyed. Science and Western knowledge must be used to strengthen Japan’s existing social institutions and values, where the latter are positive. One reason that Western societies grew strong is that they support notions of hard work, self-control, initiative, and innovation on the individual level. The underlying spirits of independence and freedom, so strong in the West, seem to be the foundation of the scientific “spirit.” Japan must also support these spirits to the degree possible, without destroying its own society, to become a more scientific, technological society.

Japan’s response to the global phenomena just mentioned was to seek to master the new areas of scientific and technological knowledge believed necessary for the nation’s survival, including reflection on new thought about society and social issues.
Some scholars studied emerging approaches overseas. Many more studied them in Japan. Some leaders were more pro-Western, while others were more cautious about reform, and sought to strengthen Japan’s indigenous social institutions and values. The overall desire of Fukuzawa, Mori, Kato and other Meiji era leaders was to carefully balance Japan’s internal social and cultural features with the imported ones, so that Japan might be strengthened, not conquered. Among the cultural logics under the responses were that without new areas of social knowledge, Japan would remain weak, and be colonized. Science drives society, underlies it and other social phenomena. Without understanding this, we cannot solve social problems. Like other areas of Western knowledge, Western social theories are superior to “traditional” Japanese or Confucian ones. Like other areas of modern knowledge, Japanese scholars now believed that the West had the world’s best knowledge on social and human issues, best absorbed by study abroad. More pro-Western leaders also often enthusiastically adopted the idea that Western society was superior to Japan’s. The more cautious thinkers believed there were noble aspects of Japanese culture that must be preserved. They agreed that Western social thought should be studied, but only carefully applied to Japan. Behind the desire of Fukuzawa, Mori, Kato and other Meiji leaders to balance Japan’s internal social features with imported ones was the assumption that if they were not balanced, Japan’s culture would be erased or destabilized.

If we compare the cultural logics under these worldviews on domestic society, a (potential) conflict between material and non-material phenomena emerges. The three leaders here prefer materialistic, “scientific” Western approaches. Social change and development are viewed through “scientific” lenses influenced by evolutionary thinking.
More “assertive,” supposedly “scientific” values, such as independence and freedom, are preferred to the thought of “philosophical” societies like China.

Conclusion

From our broad survey of domestic contexts from 1850-1895, we saw that Japan faced sudden, multiple challenges to its political, economic and social integrity. The first key question of this project concerns the impact of Japan’s experiences (and leaders’ views of) technology, development and foreign relations on Japan’s current ODA policy. Here I will treat these possible connections on a general level, while in the first concluding chapter (9), I will draw them out more clearly. On sociocultural issues, one lesson from 1850 to 1895 that emerges is the need for LDCs to be willing to learn relevant, practical knowledge and institutions from more advanced countries, and to apply them in contextualized fashion to their societies. Japan did this in this period, and it is obvious that Japan seeks to encourage this goal in its current aid. The idea is also consonant with translative adaptation. Despite Japan’s rhetoric that it wishes to apply more localized aid, most critics note that it is weak in this area. A related sociocultural issue from 1850 to 1895 was the role of nationalism and related ideologies in Japan’s social change and economic development. Japan’s state was heavily involved in Japan’s development during this time, including the promotion of several development ideologies.

On the issue of culture and development, Japan’s leaders thought deeply about how policies could protect the nation’s culture, and about what technologies and products should be imported or rejected. But government policy placed more priority on economic
development and international security issues. Understandably, today’s LDCs often do the same, and historically, Japan’s ODA policies have also placed a greater priority on economic issues than cultural ones.

On religion, spirituality and development, from 1850 to 1895, Japan’s government studied the issue, and considered how religion and spirituality could be mobilized to aid Japan’s development. It chose to modify a version of indigenous spirituality, Shinto, for that task. But the government made some mistakes. It suspended freedom of religion and conscience, and infused State Shinto with a high level of nationalistic propaganda. This trampled on human and religious rights in Japan, damaged Shinto itself, strangled civic sources of accountability that could have helped limit state excesses, and helped to nearly destroy Japan in World War II. It is wise for future LDCs to consider religion and spirituality’s role in development and aid, but coercion, propaganda and mixing of religion and state must be discouraged.

Regarding the second key question of this dissertation, from 1850 to 1895, do the concepts of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation, as reflected in these worldviews of technological development and domestic society, present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development? While I cannot yet answer this question for the whole period under study (1850 to 1945), if I examine views for each period, eventually an answer should emerge.

What are the leaders’ basic views of the concepts of internationalization, “modernization,” and translative adaptation in this chapter? In their worldviews of technological development, all five leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori, Kato, and Yamagata) reveal basic concordance with the development related concepts of internationalization,
“modernization,” and translative adaptation, but vary in the details. All five leaders support internationalization, that Japan must use technology to externally engage the West, but vary on how much engagement is necessary to avoid political, economic, or cultural invasion. On “modernization,” all five leaders agree that technology has a strong role in the West’s power to invade Japan, in Japan resisting that threat, and that it presents potential threats to Japan’s own culture, but vary on many points. On translative adaptation, the leaders differ on how Japan should handle its internal adaptation to Western technology and culture, though none wants Japan’s culture destroyed. Regarding development issues connected with leaders’ domestic society worldviews, viewed through “modernization,” importing scientific values led to new social institutions, partly enhancing the former.761 “Threats” such as Christianity and Western technological ideas ultimately strengthened Japanese religions and values. For example, Meiji officials adopted “state” Shinto as the national spiritual tradition. Social change in Japan was great, but did not destroy basic social structures or values. Seen through translative adaptation, Japanese worldviews often changed, and yet many of their core areas proved enduring, though articulated in new ways.

How well do these views reflect Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1895? In Chapter 3, which covers sociocultural contexts, the primary meanings of technology here include those connected with technological development.762 In the context section on technological development in this chapter, the

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761 These new social institutions included universities, public education, publicly-funded scientific laboratories, and State Shinto.
762 My own definition of technology, based mostly on anthropological sources, is: tools, knowledge, learning and information that people use to live and survive. See also Technology (several definitions) in the Glossary.
main sense of technology that emerges is that of the practical and industrial application of Western scientific knowledge in Japan for mainly industrial and military purposes. In domestic society contexts, the primary sense of technology is the use of various forms of social knowledge, institutions and ideas, some of it incorporating scientific theories from the West, to encourage broad support for the new sense of national identity that the Meiji state sought to instill in its subjects. The primary senses of development relate either to the context of technological development, or social development. In the context of technological development, the main meaning of development relates to Japan’s change and growth in scientific and technological knowledge. In the late Tokugawa period, this knowledge, called Rangaku and later, Yōgaku, was limited due to Japan’s national isolation policy. Japan’s development of scientific and technological knowledge greatly accelerated after 1868, due to many intentional government policies in both the industrial and military sectors. Social development in this period includes the Meiji state attempting to instill a sense of national identity in the Japanese people, change affecting important social groups, such as women, social change and support for nationalistic values encouraged by such social institutions as the new national education system and State Shinto network.

How well do the above views of internationalization, “modernization,” and translative adaptation reflect these experiences? The sense of internationalization related to technological development supports the idea that technology must be used by Japan to build up the country through science and technology, so it can counter its external threats. On “modernization,” the main views of technology are that it can both bring Japan’s political and/or cultural invasion, or help to prevent it (the former), and that new
scientific and technological ideas helped to strengthen several Japanese social institutions. Technology seen through the lens of translatively adaptation reveals that although these leaders varied on how Japan should internally adjust to the impacts of Western technology, technology did change Japan. Yet many of its core values proved enduring in this period. Regarding Japan’s experiences with development in this period, viewed through “modernization,” the application of new scientific values strengthened some social institutions, such as schools. Development seen through translatively adaptation reveals that even though technological development was huge, and changes in social development also were great, in my analysis, many core values of Japanese society remained fairly stable. These three concepts well reflect Japan’s experiences in this period.

To answer the third key question of the dissertation, whether Japanese spirituality, as an important part of worldview issues, has affected Japanese foreign aid policies, I must consider how views of spirituality may have affected general policies in each period, the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and science and similar conflicts, and the impacts of these issues for foreign aid over the long run.

The views of spirituality and religion fall into four general categories here. The first is views of general spirituality. Above, I commented on the view of Fukuzawa and Mori of the need for proper “spirits” (atmosphere and values) such as freedom, individuality, and independence to accompany successful science and technology development. They observed and admired elements of these spirits in locations in the West, including the United States. Fukuzawa and Kato wisely conclude that it is not
necessary for Japan to blindly copy all elements of Western culture or religion. The threat of the West and its seeming cultural clash with Japanese culture increased the resistance of Kato and others to use Western spirituality (Christianity) and certain “un-Japanese” “spirits” (such as individualism and selfishness) as motivators for scientific development. In the above general worldview (cognitive framework) of domestic society I generated, it seems that most of the leaders studied here were open to “spirits” that were positive but not overtly Christian, for example, hard work and independence. Most Japanese were open to such spirits. In the long run, Kato Hiroyuki, the Japanese government, and most Japanese preferred to use Japanese spiritual traditions, such as Shinto, as sources of inspiration for Japan’s techno-social change and nation-building, where possible.

Second, in their worldviews of spirituality, these leaders presume that science underlies spirituality and all other phenomena, material or non-material, in the universe. There are varied views about possible conflicts between material and spiritual forces. Although both were seen as integrated in “traditional” Japanese worldviews, in the new scientific worldviews of these Meiji leaders, spirituality seemed to be de-emphasized. While several of the leaders believed that there might be conflicts between the material and the spiritual, in the long run they might be false, since the material side of life can positively influence the moral and spiritual, or the reverse. In these worldviews, there is the view that Japan needs proper “spirits” for Japanese society to embrace the social and technological change needed to properly support science. In the cultural logics under domestic society here, these spirits and values seem closely connected to the successful

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763 Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato.
764 Mori and Kato later reached this second conclusion.
practice of science. In the main worldview I constructed for domestic society, these leaders preferred learning from scientific Western societies rather than from “spiritual,” scientifically inferior Asian ones. Yet, at first, the “clashes” between Western and Japanese values seemed overwhelming.

Regarding the views of these leaders toward religion, I noted that although in the “traditional” Japanese worldview there was not much separation of the material and spiritual worlds, there has long been a separation of religion and the state in Japan. In the cultural logics I identified underlying Japanese domestic society, material forces govern both the spiritual and religious realms. While a clash between Western religion and Japanese culture is generally assumed in the worldview of domestic Japanese society I constructed for this period, threats from the West strengthened Japanese religion in some cases in this era.

Fourth, regarding the role of spirituality and economic development, Japanese leaders were not opposed to the use of spirituality and morality to encourage positive social change in Japan, as long as they would contribute positively to Japanese adopting science and technology. Some leaders were willing to use spirituality to support economic development. While Mori was willing to look to Christianity as a source of moral support for development, Kato was not. The young Meiji state observed the use of Christianity as most European nations’ state churches, how it often provided their

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765 What happened in the 1930s and the 1940s, where spiritual and religious ideology mixed closely with the state, was an aberration, not a typical pattern in Japanese history.
766 I noted above how Kato disliked Christianity and preferred Shinto, and how Mori looked favorably on what Christianity did for the West, and what it might do for Japan.
767 This was the case for State Shinto.
768 Mori believed that Christianity had contributed much to Western economic and social development, and might help Japan, too.
people courage and motivation to work hard, fight wars, and even save money. These ideologies also served as justification for state coercion, at times. They concluded that Japan needed a similar tool to build the nation, one that was uniquely Japanese, and decided to create State Shinto, a nationalistic reinvigoration of Japan’s indigenous spiritual practices, for that purpose.

What impacts did these views possibly have on policies in this period? For a brief summary of these views, and their possible policy implications, see Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 on the next few pages. Regarding views of spirituality and possible impacts, the spiritual views listed generally encouraged policy impacts that strengthened Japan’s knowledge and embrace of science and technology, in the midst of navigating challenging issues on how to respond to Western culture and influences. The views of religion listed in Table 3.2 all list the tendency to mix religion/spirituality and politics in this period, to a degree that is unusual in Japanese history since medieval times. According to Table 3.3, the generally pragmatic attitudes of Japanese people and their leaders encouraged a willingness to embrace spirituality for building of the nation’s scientific, technological, and defense capabilities, where it could help, as long as the spirituality was not perceived to be too incongruent with Japanese culture.

Table 3.1. Selected Views of Spirituality and Possible Policy Impacts, 1850 to 1895

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View:</th>
<th>Possible impacts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan needs proper “spirits” to support science and technology</td>
<td>Fukuzawa, Mori had much impact on Japanese society through culture, education, writing. Possible impacts: great. Encouraged broad support throughout Japanese society for science.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan mustn’t blindly copy all of Western culture or spirituality</td>
<td>This is common sense. Japan has followed this, in principle, if not always in practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western culture clashes with Japanese culture. Japan mustn’t import Western</td>
<td>Common sense, view of many Japanese. They likely followed this (except for the euphoria of extreme pro-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View</td>
<td>Possible impacts:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no separation of the material and the spiritual in the “traditional” Japanese worldview, but there is a long tradition of separation of religion and state.</td>
<td>The movement to create imperial ideologies, State Shinto encouraged fusion of religion and state. Laid the foundation for later dangers for the Japanese nation (1895 to 1945); led to extremist political and military actions, using technological weapons, through religious/patriotic justifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western religion and Japanese culture don’t fit</td>
<td>Led the Japanese government to resist allowing Christianity into Japan until forced to by Western nations. General resistance to Christianity continued (i.e., seen in opposition to Mori’s proposal that Japan should adopt Christianity as the national religion). Though much Christian influence entered Japan (e.g. founding of universities, hospitals…), more might have possibly slowed the creation of State Shinto and later militarist/nationalist tendencies of the state (1895 to 1945).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western threats strengthened Japanese religion</td>
<td>Threats of the West on Japanese identity, culture led the Japanese to look for spiritual sources of their own identity, greatness. Formation of State Shinto may have partly been a reaction to this, and encouraged some leaders’ (i.e. Kato’s) embrace of it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3. Selected Views of Spirituality and Economic Development, Plus Possible Policy Impacts, 1850 to 1895

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View</th>
<th>Possible impacts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It’s okay to use spirituality and religion to encourage development if it supports science and technology too.</td>
<td>Most Japanese and the government are pragmatic. Science/technology: one of the strongest things to build Japan against the West. If spirituality/religion does this too, then fine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity should be used to help Japan develop economically</td>
<td>Mori: it has helped the West, can help Japan too. Kato: no, it doesn’t fit Japan. Mori’s view did not prevail.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Europe has state churches to motivate the people for development. Highly influential view in Meiji government. Led to the formation of State Shinto.

Japanese culture and spiritual traditions are better sources for Japan’s growth and change than Western culture. Much support from Japanese government, Kato, and most Japanese. Likely impact: high.

Common sense values (hard work, thrift…) are fine, even if from the West. Support from the government, common sense from the pragmatic spirit of most Japanese. Likely high policy impact.

What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and science and similar issues for policy issues in this period? The major potential conflicts we have identified are: 1) those between the material and spiritual worlds, 2) conflicts between Western religion and spiritual values and those of the Japanese, 3) conflicts between Western countries’ “scientific” knowledge and Asian countries’ ethical, “unscientific” knowledge, and 4) conflicts between Western religion and culture and Japanese religion and cultural values. In Western worldviews, there had not always been such a strict separation between religion and the state, as we see by the power of religion in the political affairs of many European nations, such as Russia, up through the early twentieth century. According to the Flaw of the Excluded Middle, and the some of the work of anthropologists Paul Hiebert and Charles Kraft, the strict separation of spiritual and physical worlds in most Western worldviews really began with the French Enlightenment. Yet I noted earlier that Japan and China have had a tradition of the separation of religion from the state for many more centuries. It is the politico-religious views of some mid- to late-nineteenth century European states that had more traditional

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769 The second category refers to specifically to religion and spirituality alone, while the fourth includes the intersection of religion and cultural values.

770 Kraft, Christianity with Power; Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle” and Anthropological Reflections. Their work was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1.
mixing of religion with the state (such as Tsarist Russia) that the government of Meiji Japan copied, rather than the progressive, secularist views of a state like nineteenth century France.

As such, although the leaders we studied may have been momentarily disturbed by the seeming conflicts between the material and the spiritual in the Western accounts of science, evolution, and other studies that they read, these conflicts and the Flaw of the Excluded Middle were not really present in the models that the Meiji state copied when it chose to found State Shinto and incorporate both pro-religious and pro-science ideologies of nationalism into the educational and patriotic ideals of the new Meiji state. Western nations have never had trouble drawing on images of God and country (nor the Marxists drawing on Mother-/Fatherland and country) to wage war and drop bombs on other nations, and from 1895 to 1945, Japan did not either. In all cases, this has also involved the use of technology.

While Japan in this era did not have trouble knowing that it needed Western technology, and useful ideologies, even spiritual ones, to defend itself against the West, it could not accept cultural values or ways of life that were too disruptive to its own. Some of the chief cultural values that most Japanese simply could not accept included Christianity, and the “extreme” Western concepts of individualism (equated with selfishness and egotism in Japanese minds) and excessive freedoms, a concept with which Japan had virtually no background. While a few Japanese eagerly embraced these new, novel ideals, to most Japanese they remained quite strange and unfamiliar.

771 Much of the resistance to Christianity was due to the residue of anti-Christian propaganda and repression in the Tokugawa period, which was just ending at the start of this period.
The preference for Western, “scientific” knowledge, against the antiquated knowledge of Japan’s Confucian neighbors and heritage, had huge impacts on the future course of Japan’s international relations in Asia and the Pacific, starting in this era. The new military technologies and thought provided both the tools and justification for attacking weaker, unscientific neighbors like China or Korea, or a more powerful one like Russia, who stood as impediments to Japan’s “progress.” The influence of evolutionistic thought here is not overwhelming, but present nevertheless.

Where were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid, over the long run? These will be revealed in leaders’ attitudes toward spirituality, technology, development, and Japan’s international relations, and how they developed over time. At this stage, I can say that the practical, pragmatic attitudes we see in Fukuzawa’s, Mori’s, and Kato’s attitudes both toward spirituality, development, science and the acquisition of Western technology and knowledge are manifested in several basic attitudes of contemporary Japanese foreign aid: i.e., the prevalence of loans in Japan’s ODA program and encouraging a spirit of “self-help” in aid recipients. We will trace these attitudes in various areas as we survey the worldviews of key Japanese leaders in multiple areas in the coming chapters, up through 1945. I posit that these attitudes have evolved over time in ways that are not disconnected, and which provide key foundations

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772 This hints at my working hypothesis, but I cannot answer it yet, not until the last chapters of the dissertation (9 and 10).

773 Examples of this include Mori’s view that Christianity could provide Japan practical, pragmatic attitudes for development and reform as it had for the United States and other places in the West, his pragmatic suggestions for social reform which Swale calls Keizaishugi (“economism”) (Swale, Political Thought, 180-181), and Fukuzawa’s philosophy of jitsugaku, knowledge put to practical use. On morality, Kato focuses on “scientific” ethics and morality to help Japan reform. On religion, he supports the Meiji state’s nationalization of Shinto as the national patriotic and spiritual (not religious) practice. In both these areas, pragmatism, in both science and spirituality, is to be used for Japan’s nation-building process.
for what Japan’s foreign aid policies are today, and for what they may become in the future.
Chapter 4

Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895)

Domestic Political Economy Issues

Introduction

In Chapter 4, we will explore important views of several key Japanese leaders on Japan’s domestic political economy, on Japan’s domestic state and political issues, and its domestic market and economy, in order to understand political and economic forces in this era (1850 to 1895) that have contributed to shaping Japan’s later foreign aid policies in the 1950s. Before examining their views in depth, I will present the major contexts and events in Japan’s domestic politics and market for the period. On the domestic state, we will study the views of Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, Mori Arinori, Yamagata Aritomo and Kato Hiroyuki, and on the domestic market, the views of Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato. After studying the views of these leaders, to assess development issues of domestic state and market worldviews, I will use the concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation. Also for both the domestic state and market worldviews, on technology-related issues, I will use Glick’s concept of technology, Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, and technonationalism as ideology, and for cognition issues, the concepts of image, worldview, and cultural logics.
Domestic State Contexts

After the transition from the Tokugawa period into the early Meiji period, a small group of elite oligarchs (hambatsu, or domain cliques) from Japan’s feudal domains dominated the political system. From about 1889, parliamentary models from Britain and Germany, and Japan’s Meiji constitution, passed the same year, in particular influenced the early Meiji political system. The Meiji constitution placed primary power in the hands of the emperor and purposely limited the power of both houses of the Diet. The genro, retired elder chief counselors for the emperor, influenced real power. The Meiji constitution sought to balance competing principles: gradual political change versus rapid democratic reform, and imperial sovereignty against constitutionally limited government. The constitution finally left the latter issue’s resolution to the political system. Additional forces important in early Meiji politics included the military, and Japan’s early political parties. The government viewed the development of a strong

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774 Japan, “Hambatsu,” 495.
775 Japan, “Political System,” 1216.
777 The military exercised an important influence in Japan’s political affairs after the founding of Japan’s modern military shortly after the Meiji restoration (1868), since many of Japan’s leaders at this time were members of the military and often former samurai (Japan, “Gumbatsu,” 479). The ideology of militarism (gunkokushugi), the concept that military values should dominate all areas of national life, was also influential during this period (Japan, “Militarism,” 961). Japan’s complex system of political parties emerged after 1868, exercising increasing impact after the Meiji constitution went into force (1890) (Japan, “Political Parties,” 1212).
bureaucracy during the Meiji period, modeled on Prussia’s, as important for national unity and industrialization.\(^{778}\)

A complex set of ideologies from both Japan and abroad influenced Japan’s domestic politics in this period. Within Japan, ideas of nationalism (kokkashugi and minzokushugi) were perhaps the most foundational ideological base.\(^{779}\) Many similar Japan-focused ideologies emerged, including kokutai,\(^{780}\) patriotism,\(^{781}\) kazoku kokka,\(^{782}\) Nihonshugi,\(^{783}\) and State Shinto.\(^{784}\) Influential political ideologies originating abroad

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\(^{778}\) The government viewed democratic movements as impediments to these national goals (Japan, “Bureaucracy,” 147).

\(^{779}\) A clear sense of nationalism only began to emerge in Japan in the late 1700s, through the influence of Shinto-influenced scholars of Kokugaku (national learning), which sought, starting in the 1600s, to identify uniquely Japanese sources of tradition through the study of Japanese classical literature and other ancient writings (Japan, “Kokugaku,” 816-817). External pressures from the West encouraged forces within Japan unsatisfied with the Tokugawa Shogunate’s passive treatment of the throne, including the ideology of sonnō jōi (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians), and patriotic movements after the Meiji Restoration such as fukoku kyōhei (“rich nation, strong army”). After the restoration, the government developed a strong sense of national unity through its strong influence in encouraging a national level media, economy and education system. At this time, the two forms of nationalism that became the most influential were statist nationalism (kokkashugi), which stressed the state as the highest target of political allegiance, and popular or ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi), which stressed the ethnic, historical and cultural unity of the Japanese people (Japan, “Nationalism,” 1059).

\(^{780}\) Kokutai (national essence or polity), a scholarly line of inquiry in the Tokugawa era, stressed the uniqueness of the Japanese polity, through such ideas as the rule of Japan through the unbroken imperial rule, and Japan as a “family-state” (kazoku kokka) (Japan, “Kokutai,” 819).

\(^{781}\) A true sense of patriotism (aikokushin) did not emerge in Japan until the Meiji era, when the nation’s political leaders skillfully manipulated education and pre-Meiji notions of feudal loyalty to require dedication to the emperor, state, and the newly established order (Japan, “Patriotism,” 1189).

\(^{782}\) According to kazoku kokka (“family-state”), developed in the Meiji era, the national structure of Japan is similar to an extended family’s, where all the citizens (the children) are descended from the emperor (the father). This idea was used to support the emperor’s absolute powers (Japan, “Kazoku Kokka,” 767).

\(^{783}\) Nihonshugi (Japanism) was a conservative ideology influential from the late 1880s through about 1912, formed in response to the pro-Western policies of the Meiji government. Advocates of Nihonshugi sought to preserve “traditional” Japanese institutions and values against the onslaught of Western ideas into Japan (Japan, “Nihon shugi,” 1087).

\(^{784}\) State Shinto refers to the mandatory religious system developed by Japan’s government, starting in the Meiji era (1868-1912), which organized Japan’s indigenous system of nature worship into a national hierarchy of religious shrines dedicated to worship of the emperor and patriotic support for the state. State Shinto was meant to strengthen the national identity of all Japanese people against the invasion of Western culture (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “State Shinto,” 478).
included democracy, liberalism, and anarchism.

Important domestic political movements, acts and events from 1850 to 1895 included the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement of the early Meiji period. In it, former samurai (shizoku) and commoners pressed for their rights in the new political system. The new Meiji constitution spelled the end of this movement. The Land Tax Reform of 1873-1881 (Chiso Kaisei), a total revision of the land tax system by the Meiji government that sought to standardize land values and tax burdens, provided an essential foundation for industrialization. The Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1882) helped to inculcate nationalistic values of absolute commitment to the emperor and the nation that were transferred from the military to local regions as servicemen went home. The first famous citizens’ protest began in the 1890s, when farmers and fishermen in Tochigi prefecture protested against river pollution from the Ashio Copper Mine.

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785 Japan’s experience with democracy began in the 1870s, shortly after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when upset former samurai and landowners began a political movement for popular rights and representative democracy (the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement). Political parties, influenced by ideas from French radicalism and English liberalism, followed in the 1870s and 1880s, but only slowly gained some acceptance in politics from 1898 (Japan, “Democracy,” 278).

786 Liberalism was introduced to Japan from the West shortly after the Meiji Restoration. Fukuzawa Yukichi used jiyū, a term that originally connoted “as one pleases,” to translate the concept of liberty, and so it was disparaged by some critics as selfish. The Meiji constitution (1889) limited individual liberties, since it viewed the state as more important than the individual. Only members of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement tried to use liberalism in the early 1880s to oppose the authoritarian Meiji government. In this period, it never became very important, since forces both on the right and left opposed it (Japan, “Liberalism,” 889).

787 While some precursors similar to anarchy existed in earlier Chinese and Japanese thought, the modern concept was introduced to Japan in the Meiji period, based on the thought of Russian anarchists, and the philosophies of communism and socialism. One Japanese thinker, Kotoku Shusui, argued in 1906 that Japanese workers should overthrow the existing political system. For the most part, anarchism lost most of its influence in Japan by about 1923 (Japan, “Anarchism,” 36).


790 Japan, “Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors,” 596.

791 Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Residents’ Movements,” 420.)

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In the domestic political context, the Meiji government sought to import relevant knowledge and institutions that would strengthen Japan against the West, for national survival. Its response was ideologically conservative, though it adopted some institutions that seemed quite radical at the time. The political ideologies that emerged, especially those supported by the state, were mostly conservative. While the Western value of democracy was fairly influential, the government limited its application. Ideologies based upon nationalism were more prevalent.

**Domestic Market Contexts**

Regarding the state of Japan’s overall economy, by the mid-1800s, the mainly agricultural Tokugawa economy had evolved into a national system of commodities and handicrafts, with well developed commercial, monetary and transportation sectors. By 1868, Japan had several positive attributes for economic growth: a fairly well educated, hardworking, disciplined, cooperative population, a monetized economy, a prosperous merchant class, and talented former samurai to help administrate. The new Meiji government initiated reforms for rapid growth. Emerging entrepreneurs and maturing factors of production aided this. Particular industries given public encouragement included textiles, iron and steel, and banking. The primary ideologies of economic development of Meiji Japan were *fukoku kyôhei* and *shokusan kôgyô*. Regarding

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792 Areas of reform included the class system, communication, transportation, agriculture, land, and currency systems (*Japan*, “Economic History,” 306-307).  
793 The government of the Meiji period used the slogan *fukoku kyôhei* (rich nation, strong army) to encourage the development of key industries to strengthen Japan against the encroachment of Western powers (*Japan*, “Fukoku Kyôhei,” 425). *Shokusan kôgyô* (“increase production and encourage management”) signifies government policy in the early Meiji period, and was intended to encourage Japanese industries to pursue the goal of *fukoku kyôhei*. The Ministry of Public Works and the Home Ministry, largely successful, were charged with introducing foreign technologies, railroads, and managing public enterprises (*Japan*, “Shokusan Kôgyô,” 1409).
problem areas, the late Tokugawa economy was plagued by low support for samurai and daimyo, inadequate taxes, and foreign pressures for trade. And Japan’s opening in 1859 exposed the economy to potential problems of colonialism and invading Western technologies, politics and economics. Problems in the early Meiji economy included its dual structure of rapid industrial and slow agricultural growth. Japan’s natural resource base was and remains weak, even today.794

In the industrial and private sectors, the foundations of early Meiji Japan’s industries were based on Tokugawa Japan’s industrial and economic development.795 In the private sector, Tokugawa merchants united the economy through money, with Osaka as the economic capital. The Confucian concept of ie (‘household’) was central to the organization of Tokugawa commerce.796 From 1868 to 1882, the government strongly promoted the development of the textile industry to decrease imports. The state-led industrial revolution began in the late 1880s. After 1884, the private sector began to acquire state-promoted basic industries and light manufacturing.797 The structure of industry in the early Meiji period followed patterns typical of early national economic development.798 In the early Meiji period, leaders brought huge changes to the economy

794 Japan lacks most energy resources and resources necessary for industry, although their variety is surprising (Japan, “Natural Resources,” 1065).
795 This development benefited from the Confucian work ethic inspired by the samurai, widespread primary education, a national distribution system, and large amounts of capital held by landowners and merchants (Japan, “Industrial History,” 601).
796 According to the ie concept in commerce, owner-families promised all employees lifelong employment, in return for their absolute dedication. The system encouraged a strict positional hierarchy for those within it (Japan, “Corporate History,” 247).
798 According to this thought, primary industries such as mining dominate the earlier stages. In Japan, the shift of labor from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector was fairly slow, until the early 1900s (Japan, “Industrial Structure,” 603).
and military, superimposing Western institutions on them. Business went through a “pioneering” period (1868-1884) of pursuing financial stability and founding banks, and a growth period (from 1884), stimulated by Japan’s pursuit of imperial expansion, especially after the wars with China and Russia. Government favors encouraged huge financial and industrial combines to develop. Foreign instructors and prominent businessmen traveling abroad influenced early Meiji corporate culture. More important was the heritage of Tokugawa Japan. These factors supported Confucian and indigenous Japanese values that formed the basis of modern Japan’s corporate ideologies.

The employment system of the Tokugawa period divided employees into three groups: nenki (indentured servants), fudai (hereditary vassals), and hiyô (day laborers). Japan’s labor movement, unions, and working class started emerging in the late 1800s. In the Tokugawa period, most women worked in agriculture, but after the Meiji Restoration, some began to work in the textile industry. Management in the early Meiji period emphasized the samurai spirit, service for the nation, and public support for businessmen.

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799 These changes included the abolition of samurai privileges, new freedom of movement, and the importation of foreign experts (Japan, “Corporate History,” 247).
800 These wars occurred in 1894-1895 and 1904-1905, respectively. Japan, “Corporate History,” 247, 250.
801 These combines were called zaibatsu (Japan, “Zaibatsu,” 1768). Important zaibatsu included Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo (Japan, “Mitsubishi,” 980; “Mitsui,” 982; and “Sumitomo,” 1471).
802 This heritage included influences from the feudal and Tokugawa bureaucracies and important merchant trading houses (shôka) (Japan, “Corporate Culture,” 246).
803 These ideologies included allegiance to authority, hierarchy, social stability, and patron-client relations (Japan, “Corporate Culture,” 246).
807 Japan, “Managerial Ideology,” 914.
Concerning the domestic market context, despite the many challenges Japan faced, especially foreign pressure to trade and open its economy, its many strengths enabled it to emerge from national isolation and quickly begin economic reforms. Strong state involvement was key in marshalling resources, knowledge and goals for this purpose. State involvement in this period stressed large-scale industries and businesses, and recognized the importance of the emerging private sector in the nation’s growth. Neo-Confucian values from the late Tokugawa era contributed key ideologies for Japan’s new industries and businesses. The conservatism of Japanese politics and society encouraged government wariness concerning Japan’s new labor movement in the late 1800s. Changes brought by Japan’s industrial revolution (from the late 1880s) and shifts in labor patterns (from agriculture to industry) were often painful and costly.

Views of Domestic Political Economy Issues (1850-1895)

**Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic State Contexts**

*Fukuzawa Yukichi.* Around 1862, after a trip to Europe, Fukuzawa Yukichi quietly criticized the corruption and backwardness of the Bakufu. In 1868, the time of the Meiji Restoration, Fukuzawa favored neither the Bakufu nor the imperial

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808 Bakufu refers to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Fukuzawa criticized the regime to his friends. He could not do so openly, for fear of execution. In his early writings, like *Seiyō Jijō* (*Conditions in the West*, 1866, 1870), Fukuzawa did not criticize the Bakufu, although he did so in his later writings (Blacker, *Japanese Enlightenment*, 8-9).

809 This refers to the “restoration” of the Japanese emperor to a position of important prominence in the Japanese political system. For many centuries, the emperor had not occupied a very powerful position in national Japanese politics, but this was about to change. The restoration was partly symbolized by the relocation of the imperial court from Kyoto to the new national capital in Tokyo, and the enthronement of the Emperor Meiji in 1867.
After the Restoration, Fukuzawa and other kemp (enlightenment) thinkers were delighted to discover that the new government included reformers eager to build “...a new Japan in a very western fashion,” not simply an imperialist anti-foreign policy. But Fukuzawa believed that the Meiji government was ineffective in limiting its sphere of power, and in exercising “unified” action in that sphere.

Fukuzawa argued that no form of government is superior to others; this varies with each era’s need. Government tends to evolve from more autocratic to democratic forms. In a future time, government will be unnecessary. Japan should never again revert to autocracy. The main duties of government are guaranteeing people’s rights, and making laws. It should focus on limiting negative hindrances to the people’s welfare—through the military, war and peace, and enacting laws. All other duties belong to the private sphere, separate from the public arena. The balance between these is key to civilization’s progress. The average Japanese had a very poor understanding of the proper balance between these spheres, their rights, and the true meaning of independence. Fukuzawa preferred to be independent of politics, yet remain their critic and analyst.

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811 Ibid., 28.
812 Ibid., 113. Generally Fukuzawa maintained a position of neutrality toward the Bakufu and new Meiji regimes. Earlier, he served as an official translator, but usually he worked independently at home, so that he could continue his intellectual [and entrepreneurial] activities (Tamaki, *Yukichi Fukuzawa*, xxiv-xxv, 76, 78-79). He also argued that scholars should remain independent of the government (Ibid., 141-142). Several times the Meiji government offered Fukuzawa positions, but he usually declined them, avoiding close contact with politicians (Ibid., 142-143, 175-176). Fukuzawa started a national newspaper, the *Jiji Shimpo*, generally pro-government. On national security grounds, the paper was banned five times (Ibid., 156-158).
814 Ibid., 106-109.
815 Ibid., 110-111.
816 Ibid., 120-121.
Concerning government institutions, until 1879, Fukuzawa thought that Japan was not ready for a parliament; neither the government nor the people understood its basic nature or functions. In 1879 he argued for a parliamentary system that would give the Diet sufficient power, within limits, and public approval, following the constitutional English parliamentary/cabinet model. The Emperor should be kept above politics.

On human rights, in 1876 Fukuzawa argued that “people’s rights” must not compromise state power. He believed that the state has two kinds of rights, rights of political power and human rights. Human rights should not be neglected—eventually Japanese would be interested in their rights and freedom to discuss political ideas. All men are equal, as opposed to the traditional Japanese Confucian view, which said that society is naturally hierarchical. Fukuzawa struggled to translate the concept of equal rights in terms understandable to the average Japanese. If government became tyrannical, citizens should appeal to proper reason, even to the point of death.

**Ito Hirobumi.** As a youth, like many from Choshu, Ito felt contempt for the Shogunate. At eighteen, he chose to fight for the restoration of the Emperor. Ito contributed to many political reforms, including the legal system. By 1871, the national government adopted his doctrine of “feudal renunciation/civil hegemony,” where powers of the feudal fiefdoms were slowly reduced, and authority concentrated in the central government. Ito believed that concentrating political power in national

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817 Ibid., 118.
818 Ibid., 119.
821 Choshu was a leading feudal domain in the Tokugawa era, located in southwestern Japan.
823 Ibid., 55-56, 75.
governments contributes to their success. In the mid-1870s, Ito proposed basic changes to alter the central government’s structure.

By the late 1870s, as Japan’s top Councilor, Ito balanced hard political pressures for popular rights and a parliament versus the need for political stability. He felt that the Japanese were not yet ready for full self-government, but advised the Emperor to grant a parliament soon. After his second premiership, Ito formally renounced “bureaucratic principles” that emphasized oligarchic dominance and limited public participation. This was the first partial opening of the political system to the masses. Soon the first political party system was allowed.

In the 1870s and 1880s, Ito investigated the political systems of the U.S. and Germany. In 1884, he began crafting a constitution. To “protect” the nation from drifting toward liberalism, he sought to set up a bureaucracy and institutions following the German model. Ito proposed to modernize the government structure with a prime

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824 Ibid., 57-58, 61.
825 Ibid., 71-72, 74. The reforms were delayed because of a foreign policy crisis with Korea. These included creating a Senate, an assembly of prefectural governors, a Supreme Court, and the separation of the National Council from the administrative ministries. This was the first attempt to apply the lessons of Western political institutions to the conditions of Japan (Ibid.).
826 Ibid., 81-83. The emperor agreed to grant a parliament by 1890.
827 Ibid., 122-123. In 1900, Ito wrote the platform of the Seiyukai, one of Japan’s earliest political parties, which argued for the support of the constitution, the principles of the Meiji Restoration, the electoral system, industries and commerce, friendly international relations, the national interest, education, and the public welfare (Hamada, Prince Ito, 126).
828 Ibid., 62, 84.
829 Ibid., 85-86. These included the Ministry of the Imperial Household, and the Peerage Ordinance that established a system of nobility. The 505 peers were the basis for the Diet’s Upper Chamber. In the mid-1880s, Ito was not an opponent of liberalism, but differed from some of his contemporaries about how it should be applied in Japan. He preferred a moderate, gradual approach.
minister and cabinet of nine ministers.\textsuperscript{830} The first constitution (1889) was neither purely Japanese nor Western.\textsuperscript{831}

Ito believed that many political and legal reforms were necessary. He had evolving, mixed feelings about the West. Like technology, regarding political systems, he was willing to borrow from the West, to craft a government that would earn their respect, and enable the country to be governed effectively for modernization. The challenge was to work this out in practice. Hamada calls Ito a “cautious realist” who sought to craft moderate policies—midway between the powerful Emperor and the masses eager for rights.\textsuperscript{832} Finding the right balance was extremely challenging.

\textit{Mori Arinori.} There is a close structural parallel between the political and educational thought of Mori and Herbert Spencer.\textsuperscript{833} Mori did not blindly copy Spencer, but later developed his own distinctive patterns of political thought.\textsuperscript{834} Concerning his political philosophy, while scholars have struggled to accurately categorize his thought overall, Swale calls Mori a progressive, not static, conservative.\textsuperscript{835} Mori believed that government was meant to serve citizens, who should be allowed life, liberty, and freedom of belief without the state’s interference, except in cases of threats to political stability.

\textsuperscript{830} Ibid., 90-91. Ito became the first prime minister in late 1885.
\textsuperscript{831} Ibid., 95-97. It divided the government into several branches, executive, legislative, judicial, and the Privy (advisory) Council for the Emperor, and allowed for the creation of ministries. It defined mainly the fundamentals of various rights and duties of the Emperor and the citizens.
\textsuperscript{832} Ibid., 94-95.
\textsuperscript{833} Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was a prominent British sociologist, philosopher, and advocate of evolutionary theory.
\textsuperscript{834} Swale, \textit{Political Thought}, 17, 21. For Mori’s thought on education, see my discussion on Mori’s views of Japan’s domestic society.
\textsuperscript{835} Ibid., 4-7. According to Swale, scholars have struggled to categorize Mori according to conventional political categories. The two forms of conservatism mentioned here were both present among the Meirokusha members. Progressive conservatives were willing to allow adaptation of the polity to current circumstances, while static conservatives emphasized maintenance of the national polity according to transcendent principles (Ibid., 1-2, 6). For more on how progressive conservatism developed, (Ibid., 8-11).
He did not believe that the people and other political “outsiders” could handle much direct influence in politics. Liberties were fine, but the “people” seemed unqualified for public office. Mori supported the constitutional monarchies of Germany and Britain, and the ideals of Japan’s first constitution (1889). A significant political task in Meiji Japan was building Japan into a modern nation-state. Mori viewed the state in a non-ultra-nationalistic fashion, as simply the government, one institution among many that had limitations of function. The state “…evolved from a past and was subject to principles of development alike with all other institutions.”

Yamagata Aritomo. Yamagata argued in 1868 that national unity under the new Meiji government was the first priority. He convinced the troops from some strong fiefdoms, including Satsuma and Choshu, to join the Imperial Bodyguard in 1871. If the military was strengthened for external threats, there need be no anxiety over internal ones. Its modernization went beyond technology to national discipline. From 1880-1900, Yamagata argued that members of the military should be kept strictly separate from politics, but universal military conscription should be the first basis for increasing state power. Domestic reforms, based on Western models, were meant to win respect from and equality with outside powers. Yamagata’s approach to political development was gradual, cautious, and sought to strengthen national unity. To accomplish the last task, he

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836 Mori did not support the democratic Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (started in the late 1870s by dissatisfied ex-samurai) (Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xxix-xxx).
837 Ibid. According to Ernest Gellner, to build a modern nation-state, one must build a state that is coexistensive with a certain territory, and that has a fairly homogeneous culture for the people within that territory. Technological innovation alone is not enough; political and cultural integration are also needed (Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1-38, summarized in Swale, Political Thought, 11-12).
838 Ibid., 184, 187.
840 Ibid., 260-261, 268.
841 Ibid., 244, 246.
supported Western-type political institutions (where useful), limits on popular freedoms and dissidence, and in the 1880s, closer connections between local and central governments. His model was Imperial Germany. A constitution, popular rights and political parties were needed for Japan to win Western respect, but must be limited, and the power of the emperor protected from popular encroachment.  

**Kato Hiroyuki.** In his early political writings, before the late 1870s, Kato showed interest in progressive political ideas. In 1868, he became an official in the new Meiji government, and his thinking largely followed government preferences. In some writings of the late 1860s, he respects both incremental political change and Confucian virtues. Kato was heavily influenced by German ideas, and by 1879, “converted” to German-influenced Social Darwinism, which argued that nations and races, not just individuals, compete for survival. The choice of German was crucial for the development of Kato’s worldview. Kato’s later thinking was rather dogmatic, and yet he developed his own system of evolutionary thought to analyze government,

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842 Ibid., 261-268.
843 For example, in some of his earliest writings in the 1860s, Kato advocated the Shogunate’s policy of open-door policy of trade with the West (this was long after Japan’s encounter with Commodore Perry), as well as an independent judicial system, various civil and private rights, and the separation of government powers (Davis, Moral and Political, 11-12).
844 Kato served in several ministries, including Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Education. According to Davis, his greatest impact was in the last (Ibid.). In the 1870s and 1880s, the Meiji government found his writings an embarrassment, so in the 1870s, he “converted” to more conservative thought. At this point, writers such as Thomas Buckle and Montesquieu influenced Kato intellectually. Both argued that social phenomena developed through natural, material forces (Ibid., vii-ix, 14-17, 38, 40-43).
845 Ibid., 10-14.
846 This exposed Kato to conservative German thinkers, who advocated specific limits and contexts for human rights, different from more liberal British and French scholars (Ibid., 14-16).
morality and society, arguing that politics and ethics should be grounded in natural, knowable ideas.\textsuperscript{847}

On national sovereignty, Kato saw the nation as a “macromulticelled organism” (the “body”) and individual citizens as “cells.” What is right for the nation is determined by the greatest welfare for the most people (kôan). Nations result from the struggle for power over time. Our struggle to survive has two forms, internal (within nations, between individuals, families and other groups) and external (among nations). Individualism and nationalism are closely connected—the state should not ignore the individual, but individuals may be sacrificed for the nation.\textsuperscript{848} Kato sees Japan’s state as both a legal entity (hôjin) and as a natural, organic nation (shizen kokka). Where does the ultimate power and sovereignty of the state lie? Japan’s “patriarchal sovereignty” lies not with public opinion or the people, but in the “natural, filial relationship between the

\textsuperscript{847} Ibid., vii-ix, 14-17, 38, 40-43. For a discussion of Kato’s concept of morality, see the section on Kato’s views of domestic Japanese society. His theory of evolution supported the ideas of empiricism, positivism, utilitarianism, nationalism, strict concepts of monism (the denial of many forms of dualism, such as matter vs. mind, nature vs. culture) and universal determinism (the law of causation applied to everything). Matter and energy form all phenomena as the “world-substance” (German: \textit{Weltsubstanz}). The material “law of substance” (\textit{Substanzgesetz}) drives nature, and laws of physical nature drive culture (Ibid., 35-36, 38-39). Regarding politics and morality, Kato argued that laws of nature (shizenhô) drive inequality and the struggle for existence. The evolutionary struggle between human groups is more primary than that between individuals. Power in the primitive stage is based on physical ability, and in the civilized stage, on knowledge, wealth, and cultural ability. Primitive society was fairly egalitarian, but roles become more specialized over time. Gender roles are an example. Scientifically, Kato saw women as inferior to men. But he did not see this as an excuse for their mistreatment (Ibid., 38, 40-43). Kato further argued that the behavior of all life forms is controlled by egoism, the natural instincts that drive the fight for survival. In that fight, individual cells or organisms sometimes turn to cooperation with others (altruism). Egoism and altruism are not static, but evolve along with society (Ibid., 43-45, 48, 52). Also related to politics, Kato’s concept of progress is closely connected to his idea of development, expressed as evolution and development (shinka hattatsu) or progress and development (shinpo hattatsu). Progress and political development result from competition, the struggle for survival, conflict, and war. The strong in a society have the right to punish and discipline the weak (Ibid., 103-106).

\textsuperscript{848} Ibid., 68-70.
emperor and his subjects.” The people form the “branch families” of the imperial “stem” family. The emperor is the nation.\(^{849}\)

The Jiyû Minken Undô in the 1880s met the Meiji government move to authoritarian government to mobilize the nation for modernization.\(^{850}\) In response, the government sought a “scientific” theory to limit demands for human rights. Kato wrote *Jinken Shinsetsu (A New Treatise on the Origin of Human Rights)* in 1882, the first articulation of his mature thought.\(^{851}\) He was the first Japanese to apply Social Darwinism in support of an anti-democratic theory, and used it to argue that the emperor was the fittest leader for Japan.\(^{852}\) Kato developed his “mature” theory of human rights over several years, after public reaction to *Jinken Shinsetsu*. To him the idea of natural rights, endowed by God or gods, was ridiculous. Animals do not have rights, so why would only one species (humans)? Kato also felt that natural rights are based solely on

\(^{849}\) Ibid., 71-72, 111.

\(^{850}\) Jiyû Minken Undô, the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, was founded in the 1870s by political liberals and radicals who claimed they had a natural right to political freedoms. They demanded the formation of a national congress and universal suffrage for men. Natural rights and natural law were under attack in the West, and Kato applied similar arguments in Japan (Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 237, 240; Davis, *Moral and Political*, 3, 9).

\(^{851}\) In this work, Kato argues that the Jiyû Minken Undô is scientifically incorrect, because variation naturally exists in all human and animal populations, and national equality is impossible (Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 240-242). Kato also argues that the concept of naturally endowed human rights violates the principles of cause and effect, and the “universal law of nature” (evolution), that affect all living beings on the earth. Superiors win, inferiors lose. Families gradually came together to form tribes, and then nations. The “seeds of rights” were planted. As humans and their societies evolved, morality, customs and intellectual ability raised the level of various societies. Natural selection gradually raised the position of upper-class commoners, and later the middle classes, in several societies. Not all will have the same rights. Rights are not natural, but are given by stronger classes to the weak as social evolution continues. Natural selection can produce both good and evil people. The evolution of rights should be gradual. Rights granted prematurely hamper the development of progress (Davis, *Moral and Political*, 25-33, 106).

\(^{852}\) Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 240-242. The emperor was the fittest to lead since he had descended from the long imperial line of rulers who were all the fittest to lead. Other critics contested Kato’s claims. Supporters of democratic rights attacked his arguments in the 1880s. Another scholar, Toyama Masakazu, in order to bolster his own support for Herbert Spencer, attacked Kato’s claim that the emperor was the fittest leader for the Japanese people. Kato changed in his thinking from political liberalism to Social Darwinism, and some Japanese historians have attacked him for this “conversion” (Ibid.).
observation of civilized societies. Rights result from power and violence. The rights of the strong are the ultimate origin of development, civilization and progress. Kato identifies four stages in the evolution of human rights. But there are problems with his arguments. Social Darwinism conflicted with the Japanese creation myth chronicled in the ancient writings of Kojiki and Nihonshoki. Kato also argued that the emperor system was perfect and beyond scientific analysis. His concept of the Japanese national polity (kokutai) depended on the unbroken continuance of the imperial family line. Most conservative Japanese intellectuals eventually rejected Social Darwinism because of inconsistencies such as these. But Kato did not.

Comparison of Worldviews on the Domestic State (1850-1895)

How do the domestic-related political views of our five leaders (1850-1895) compare, especially related to science, technology, and foreign relations and influences?

Concerning their general views of politics and government, all five supported various

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853 According to Kato, if we examine primitive societies, we may see savages have little knowledge of counting, farming or morality. If human rights are natural, we should see wisdom and knowledge in savages (Davis, Moral and Political, 60-68, 111). But in fact we do see their wisdom. Scholars such as anthropologists now recognize that indigenous peoples have long had complex systems of indigenous knowledge of fields such as the environment, agriculture, ecology, mathematics, and complex cosmologies about the nature of life and the supernatural. Today we realize that Kato’s arguments here are ridiculous.

854 The strong have a right to “use” the weak, and the weak may resist. All can act according to their own desires and intuitions. Demands for equality occur when the weak are able to challenge the rights of the strong, but still, ultimate power is held by the strong (Ibid.).

855 The four evolutionary stages of human rights are: 1) “the violent acquisition of rights by the strong,” 2) “the creation of new rights by the voluntary self-restraint of the strong,” 3) “the transformation of power into genuine rights” (which emerge when the strong gain the “tacit consent” of the weak”), and 4) “the emergence of equal rights” (Ibid.). For a treatment of weaknesses in Kato’s mature theory of rights, see Davis, Moral and Political, 119-122.

856 Kato claimed that all Japanese were descended from their tribal father emperor, related to him and each other in the “family-state” (kokka). This conflicted with his arguments about the emperor as infallible, because the struggle for existence was weaker among the members of the same kinship group. To overcome these conflicts, Kato argued that individual competition for survival in Japan was manifested as competition for the most devotion to the Emperor and the kokka. This “moral evolution by self-selection” enabled the state to request unconditional obedience from citizens, to the point of death (Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 245-246).

857 Ibid.
forms of political development and evolution, but varied in how fast they thought it should occur in Japan. Evolutionary principles were especially strong in Kato’s thought, and fairly so in Mori’s. Concerning government’s responsibilities and duties, while Fukuzawa felt they should be strictly limited, Yamagata argued for limits on personal freedoms. Fukuzawa and Ito argued for the need to balance various governmental functions (the former for balance between the public and private spheres, and the latter for balance between democratic rights and oligarchic control). Mori and Fukuzawa had more liberal leaning political values. Both were highly supportive of Western values to help Japan, and very nationalistic regarding the latter. Ito, Yamagata, and Kato were more authoritarian leaning, and nationalistic. In their nationalism, Mori and Fukuzawa supported liberal values to strengthen Japan. Fukuzawa especially supported the liberal and scientific values (and “spirit”) behind technology, in terms of their ability to strengthen and defend the nation. Ito, Kato and Yamagata were more conservative in their nationalism. For Yamagata, the focal point of Japan’s domestic politics was strengthening the military and national unity. To him, the “spirits” of Japan-focused unity and discipline seemed more important for its defense than the Western technologies he used to modernize the military.

Regarding Japan’s government and its institutions, Fukuzawa and Ito were critical of the Tokugawa Shogunate; none of the five leaders supported it. Fukuzawa was also critical of late Tokugawa imperial restorationists and the new Meiji government, while the other four leaders supported both. Fukuzawa, Kato and Yamagata supported the emperor system in varied ways. In his mature thought, Kato offers the most detailed arguments about the relationship of the emperor to the Japanese people and the national
polity, somewhat based on evolutionary principles. Mori, Ito, and Yamagata were supportive of the Meiji constitution, though the latter two were conservative and cautious in their approach. The former two also supported a conservative constitutional monarchy system for Japan. Concerning political reform, Ito and Yamagata supported a more gradual approach, while Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato tended to support a more rapid one.

Regarding the Japanese nation and state, all five leaders supported it strongly. Kato had the most complex view of the state, and again, his mature views were influenced by evolutionary thought. Concerning the state’s power and authority, Mori, Fukuzawa and Yamagata believed that the government should have limited functions or be limited in certain ways. Ito, Yamagata and Kato highly supported the concentration of power at the national level. For Yamagata, increased national level power would strengthen national unity. For Kato, state power flowed from the emperor and his relationship with the people. On the issue of democratic rights and freedoms versus political stability and authoritarian control, Fukuzawa and Mori supported the former, while Ito, Yamagata and Kato supported the latter (Kato called freedoms “unscientific”).

On political and human rights, Fukuzawa strongly supported individual rights, but felt they must be carefully balanced with the state’s rights and stability. Kato preferred state rights above the individual’s. He and Yamagata supported limits on popular freedoms, rights and dissidence. Kato based his arguments against human rights on evolutionary and “scientific” arguments. Fukuzawa argued in favor of human equality, while Kato declared it scientifically impossible, based on evolutionary reasoning.
Concerning Western political influences, more of the thought of Fukuzawa, Mori, Kato and Ito leaned toward Western sources and models. Of the four, the first two were more liberal in their political values, leaning toward the “Anglo-American” system for their ideas, and the latter two, plus Yamagata, were more conservative, gravitating toward Germany/Prussia as the source for their political ideas. Of these five leaders (1850-1895), only Yamagata leaned more toward Eastern (Japanese and Chinese) sources than Western ones.

**Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on the Domestic State (1850-1895)**

*General Approaches.* To comparatively analyze the thinking of the five scholars (1850-1895) on domestic politics, I will use several conceptual approaches. On the issue of how external engagement and internal adaptation to outside forces affected domestic politics, Japanese scholars’ concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation, both related to development, seem helpful. On technology and policy aspects, Thomas Glick’s approach to technology is helpful for domestic politics, since it can help us assess the effect of systemic issues on leaders’ views of politics over time. It may also be helpful to consider the issue of industrial policy over time. I will also use Richard J. Samuels’ concept of technonationalism as ideology, a key example of how

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858 See the definitions of these two concepts in the Glossary. “Modernization” will be helpful since it helps us to think both about Japan’s interaction with outside influences, and how they have affected its internal politics. “Modernization” seems more helpful than internationalization and translative adaptation, since it integrates both internal and external components.

859 See the definition of technology in the Glossary, and my discussion of Glick’s treatment of technology in the section on technological development earlier in this chapter. On domestic politics, if I can see how leaders’ views of politics are affected by technology, as part of a politico-technical system, then Glick’s approach is relevant. This is also true for domestic economic and sociocultural aspects, if this approach helps me to think more systemically. Finally, viewing the domestic state, market and society as part of a technology-related system across time (the historical aspect of Glick’s definition) is also useful.

860 See Murakami’s definition of industrial policy in the Glossary. According to Murakami, industrial policy includes all forms of (policy for) government intervention in the economy, and often involves technology issues. Industrial policy will be relevant to domestic political issues in most time periods.
Technology and international relations have affected Japan’s domestic politics. On the issue of how leaders’ worldviews and cognition affected Japan’s domestic politics, I will use again specified aspects of the concepts of image, worldview and cultural logics.

**Development Issues.** Regarding the issue of the political worldviews of our five leaders (1850-1895) and Japan’s external engagement and internal adaptation to that engagement, if we examine it through the concept of “modernization,” we see that on general politics and government, while the five varied in their political values (some were liberal, some more conservative), all five were nationalistic in their political values and goals. All wanted Japan to strengthen its internal political system to effectively repel the threat of Western invasion. Thus all five leaders supported the concept of “modernization.” [All five varied on what types and degrees of Western political reforms should be imported, the pace of reform, and what degree of rights should be granted, but all wanted the core and overall form of Japanese society to continue intact.]

What do we learn if we examine the domestic political views of the five leaders through the lens of translative adaptation? From 1850 to 1895, how were the political structures and values in Japan affected by the worldviews of these five, as they mediated

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861 See the definition of technonationalism as ideology in the Glossary. Samuels uses technonationalism to signify the belief that technology is a basic part of national security, and that it must be carefully developed in a country to make it wealthy and powerful. He argues that the concept provides a helpful summation of Japanese beliefs about technology and security over several hundred years. (Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” ix-x). One example of technonationalism as ideology is the slogan *fukoku kyōhei* (see Glossary and discussion of *fukoku kyōhei* earlier in this chapter).

862 See the definitions of image, worldview, and cultural logics in the Glossary section.

863 Remember the assumption in “modernization” that through the process of interaction with external (Western) forces, both the overall form and society of the receiving (non-Western) nation/culture will remain essentially intact, though somewhat altered.

864 In translative adaptation, the focus is on a non-Western society’s degree and quality of internal adaptation to external forces. Here the assumption is that the base society of the receiving culture will remain stable and primary, although a new dual (Western/non-Western) cultural identity in the society will emerge.
the importation of Western political ideas and institutions into the nation? Did Japan’s institutions and values continue intact? What effects did Western-derived scientific and technological values have on Japan’s internal political system? The impact of Western scientific values on the political views and values of these five leaders was fairly deep. All five supported political change and development in Japan as necessary for Japan’s survival. The basis of many of these ideas was Western-derived theories of evolution. Many of the five (Yamagata, Ito, Kato) argued for more state control and fewer freedoms for the people, to generate the rapid political and technological development believed necessary for Japan to compete with the West. In this early stage of modern Japan’s political development, the five were cautious, to varying degrees, about how quickly the people could handle political freedoms. All five supported the reform of Japan’s government and political institutions through the adaptation of Western type political reforms and institutions that they felt were best suited to the Japanese context. All five leaders supported the concept of translative adaptation in their commitment to the strengthening and survival of the Japanese state and nation. They planned to use Western type reforms to strengthen some of Japan’s own political institutions (i.e. the emperor), add some new ones (a parliament and a constitution), and replace others, if necessary (e.g. the replacement of the Tokugawa regime with the Meiji government). But at the base of these reforms was the presumption that outsiders should not rule Japan, and that the core of its society and worldviews must be maintained, not destroyed. On human

While Western scholars might argue that more political freedoms could bring more scientific and technological advancement, most of the five leaders here would disagree. Even Fukuzawa, who strongly supported liberal Western values that he believed underlay Western scientific and technological successes, was generally cautious about how quickly they should be applied to Japan. In the view of these five leaders, too many freedoms granted too quickly invited political instability and national disunity.
rights, all of these leaders’ views were based on varied interpretations of Western concepts, but again, with support for Japan’s national survival and independence at the foundation. The underlying goal of Japan’s national survival was the continuance of its core society and values. Most of the five leaders (except Yamagata) leaned heavily toward Western sources for their political values. Yet the goal in all these areas of political reform was Japan’s survival as a nation, a people, and a culture. Surface appearances (of culture, technology, clothing, or the adoption of Western institutions) were usually considered less important.\textsuperscript{866}

\textit{Technology Issues.} Using frameworks emphasizing technology, from Glick’s definition of technology, I will investigate how technology affected these leaders’ views of politics over time, as part of a politico-technical system. The five leaders’ views of politics and government were highly influenced by Western sources and models, as were their views of science and technology. The influence of scientific and technological ideas on Japanese politics was great, both conceptually and in practice. Whether political or technological in nature, most ideas or innovations for reform in this period originated in

\textsuperscript{866} One example of this was the urging of zealous early Meiji reformers that Japanese quickly adopt Western dress, speak English, eat beef, or attend Western operas. It is interesting to compare the general Japanese attitude toward cultural and technological reforms (of caring more about a reform’s impact on core cultural values than about surface appearance) to the attitude of radical reformers in other regions. Some recent societies with conservative Islamic tendencies (post-1979 Iran, and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan), at times prohibited Western dress or outward cultural influences, in the view that such things corrupt a society’s cultural core. The attitude in Meiji Japan and later was more pragmatic. Japan was largely willing to learn western knowledge, technology and adopt Western institutions and attitudes in the hope that its core cultural and national identities could be maintained. Perhaps Japan’s long experience with importing overseas knowledge while maintaining its own distinct identity and traditions contributed to this belief. The Meiji government policy to import foreign experts, quickly absorb their knowledge, and quickly send them home is an example. If foreigners were kept at arm’s length and only allowed brief stays, their knowledge could be better absorbed without corrupting Japan’s core identity. This attitude may also be a reflection of the Japanese concepts of tatemae (surface expression of emotion and belief) and honne (true, heartfelt conviction). But the reform process was not easy for Japan. Consider how the Meiji government sought a Japanese version of Social Darwinism (in the work of Kato Hiroyuki), to limit the impact of Western reforms to mainly science and technology sectors.
the West. Science-based ideas such as evolution affected political thought in both the West and Japan, here especially Kato’s and Mori’s. The fact that these political ideas seemed to have the backing of Western technology and science surely gave them more appeal in Meiji Japan. In both the nineteenth century West and Japan, ideas of democratic politics, political philosophy, and science and technology underwent change, some rapid, some gradual. Leading Japanese, including Fukuzawa and Mori, admired Western democratic values assumed to be behind the West’s technological successes. The dilemma was how to apply these ideas to Japan’s context in a way that strengthened the country against Western colonialism and invasion, but did not destroy Japan’s core culture and identity. To protect Japan, the Meiji government and many leaders such as Yamagata and Ito insisted that these foreign political ideas only be very carefully applied to Japan, if at all. Concerning Japan’s government and its institutions, the most overt example of science influencing the five leaders’ worldviews on the domestic state here is how Kato used evolutionary arguments to support of the emperor system. On the Japanese state and nation, Kato’s somewhat complex views also had their origin in evolutionary thought. The philosophical support that the three more conservative leaders (Ito, Yamagata, and Kato) offered for power at the national level would also contribute to the build-up of the state’s scientific and technological research capacity through the early- to mid-1940s. The last two argued for limits against human rights and freedoms, and Kato used evolutionary arguments to support his position. Most of the five leaders gravitated toward Western, not Chinese, models to provide political guidance for Japan, based partly in their belief in the superiority of Western science and technology to strengthen Japan against Western invasion.
Viewed through Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, the main impact of the five leaders’ worldviews on the domestic state is seen in their desire to strengthen the Japanese state at the national level, which would soon enable the state to strongly support scientific, technological and economic development to a high degree. This large level of state involvement was generally contrary to British and American political concepts of free trade, but closer to the autocratic ideals of the late nineteenth century Prussian state. The latter provided much inspiration for Yamagata’s military reforms, and Ito’s Meiji constitution.

Samuel’s concept of technonationalism as ideology stresses the use of technology to make a country rich and powerful for its own defense. Examining the thought of our five leaders on domestic politics through this concept, we see that in their thought on political change, the overarching goal was to make Japan powerful enough to avoid colonization by the West. Any change in the political system in Japan, whether in its political values, institutions, or the state, must support that end. All five leaders were nationalistic and uniform in their support for strengthening Japan for that purpose, but varied on what degrees and types of change were needed to accomplish it. Yamagata most strongly supported the related ideology fukoku kyōhei (rich nation, strong army).867

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867 See footnotes earlier this chapter on fukoku kyōhei. Yamagata desired to strengthen the military so that Japan could be effectively defended against Western encroachment. We may assume that he also supported strengthening industries in Japan for that goal.
**Cognition Issues. Image.** Next I will examine domestic political worldviews (1850-1895) through analytical frameworks of cognition. Here images of Western governments as modern, superior, strong and forceful/invasive, and of Japan’s government as inferior, weak, stagnant and passive, predominate. The image of Western governments’ strength in modern science and technology, and Japan’s weakness in those areas, is related. The Tokugawa Shogunate is seen as weak and stagnant. The varied images of the Meiji government generally support that regime. As it became more powerful and achieved more foreign policy victories (i.e. the Sino-Japanese War, 1895), its image in the minds of these leaders (1850-1895) improved. Despite areas of stagnancy, honorable parts of Japan’s domestic political system (i.e. the emperor) may be “saved,” if relevant political institutions and values from abroad (i.e., constitutions, freedoms, and constitutional monarchy) can be carefully adapted and applied to Japan’s context. The Japanese state is weak, in need of strengthening. On human rights, these leaders’ images varied. More “liberal” leaders (Mori and Fukuzawa) saw them as helpful for strengthening Japan, while more “conservative” leaders (Kato, Ito, and Yamagata)

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868 For a discussion of the overall frameworks into which these images and worldviews fit, see my discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in the section on the cultural logics behind these worldviews.

869 Throughout the dissertation, here are the questions I will ask as I consider what the leaders’ images of the topic under study are: what kind of images do leaders have of the basic variables under study? Into what larger frameworks do they fit? How do they function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? I will examine images as both basic perception and perceptual filter, and seek to understand their larger frameworks.

870 On the foreign policy point, an exception is Mori, who died in 1889.

871 The main question in the minds of the five leaders (1850-1895) was what could be done to strengthen the Japanese state. They varied in their answers, both in the particular elements to be strengthened, and in the values needed for the purpose.
saw them as a threat to its unity. All believed they must be carefully and gradually applied to Japan’s context.\textsuperscript{872}

How did these images function as perceptual filters for the five leaders, and affect Japan’s domestic politics? Images of Japan as weak and the West as strong foreign threat must have blinded Japan’s leaders in certain ways, and led them to make certain policy choices. In the view of Japan’s leaders, if Japan did not respond rapidly and aggressively, it would not survive. Their chosen images in this period led the nation toward increased political centralization, rapid growth in the economic and technological sectors to support the military, and soon, Japan’s own involvement in foreign wars and colonization.\textsuperscript{873}

*Worldview.* Based on my own definition of worldview and the above images, I will now construct the predominant worldview(s) about domestic politics of our five leaders.\textsuperscript{874} About the nature of the world and how it works, our five leaders believe that the most powerful countries, presently the West, drive the world. Strength in science and technology will enable military power, which will make a country strong, wealthy and successful. Countries that are weak in science, technology and military power will be

\textsuperscript{872} The more conservative they were, the more cautious these leaders were about the direct application of Western political reforms to Japan. Virtually all of the five, Mori to the least degree, shared this caution.

\textsuperscript{873} Consider Gandhi in India, and how powerfully he helped India to resist British imperialism. What if a “Gandhi” like figure who emphasized peace and non-aggression had risen in Japan at this time? What if Japan’s leaders had emphasized images of non-violence, non-aggression, peace, or strict neutrality, which they often stressed in the late twentieth century? How would Japan’s political path and development have changed?

\textsuperscript{874} Here are the steps I will follow as I construct worldviews (cognitive frameworks) for this research: after identifying the basic images about the selected topic, I will note aspects of images that identify beliefs about the nature of the world, how it works, its order (how it is organized), views of the self (the self’s actions, beliefs and roles) and views of the non-self/others (non-selves’ actions, beliefs, and roles). Next I will organize the images into a coherent framework or whole (perhaps a diagram), look at how the environment and worldviews affect each other, influences on the actors’ perceptions, uses of information and understandings of events and their causes, and any impacts from technological systems.
weak, poor and conquered by stronger ones. Our leaders do not agree on which political values will make a country strong (liberal or authoritarian ones). The militarily and technologically powerful countries, now the West, drive the world’s political order, and decide the rules of international trade, war and diplomacy. Japan, its government and other Asian nations (the “East” or “non-West”) are stagnant, weak, and poor in science. Japan is capable of learning knowledge from the powerful West, and growing strong. Non-self (others, including the West and other Eastern countries) is strong, scientific and modern in the West, and stagnant, unscientific, and too philosophical in the East.875

Our five viewers/actors see Japan’s surrounding environment as hostile and unfavorable. If action is not taken, Japan will be conquered. This environment, dominated by the scientifically powerful West, threatens to engulf and dominate Japan’s politics and culture. This environment causes our leaders to see Japan as inferior in some ways, though they love it, believe in it, and will fight for it. This environment makes them rely on scientific information and technologies from the West, and doubt aspects of Eastern knowledge and traditions.

This worldview supports the evolutionary thought predominant in the nineteenth century Western world, and in the cultural universe beyond which is under its influence. In this worldview, our five leaders tend to explain political events through evolutionary, “scientific” explanations of military and technological power. Political values that support that strength, whether liberal or authoritarian, are superior. Western technologies, both military and consumer-oriented, powerfully impress these leaders.

875 Non-self means relevant worldviews Japanese hold of others besides themselves, in this case Western and other Eastern (East, South, and Southeast Asian) countries.
Militarily stronger nations will stay independent. Consumer technologies and conveniences will bring health, wealth, and comfort to a nation’s citizens.

*Cultural Logics.* Regarding cultural logics behind these worldviews of the domestic state and politics, the relevant global phenomena about which our five leaders held worldviews and to which they reacted were political ideas, values and institutions from the West, including ideas about politics and government, governmental institutions, nations, states, human rights, what the West was, how these ideas applied to Japan, and how Japan’s political conditions compared with the West’s. Related issues included scientific and technological ideas, military issues, and ideas behind Western politics, such as democracy, authoritarianism, and Christianity. At the beginning of this era, when Commodore Perry’s “black ships” arrived to open Japan in 1853, a strong, overt manifestation of Western power appeared on Japan’s doorstep. Assumptions of Confucian harmony and the superiority of Eastern and Chinese ethics and philosophy, long questioned by some, defended by others, faced a challenge long anticipated by leading Japanese thinkers. The cultural logics behind the powerful nineteenth century Western system, including ideas of evolution, scientific rationalism, political liberalism, constitutional monarchy, and political authoritarianism, suddenly had great appeal among Japan’s leaders.

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876 Here are the steps I will use to identify cultural logics in this and other chapters: 1) What are the global phenomena relevant to the topic under consideration, about which the Japanese leaders hold a worldview, and to which they are reacting? 2) Try to identify the underlying cultural logics under the particular worldviews about the relevant global phenomena and under their responses to the relevant global phenomena (mention what the general responses were). 3) Compare the cultural logics under the worldviews and under their responses to the global phenomena.

877 This is what Japanese called the ships of the U.S. Navy, sent by the U.S. government and led by Commodore Matthew Perry, when they arrived off the coast of Japan to force open the country in 1853.

878 In the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, in the thought of Fukuzawa, Japan’s weaknesses in politics, science and technology were due to its reliance on “passive,” “stagnant” Chinese ethics and Confucian philosophy, which he saw as weak and unscientific [quotation marks added].
The cultural logics under these worldviews on domestic politics (identified above) in Japan (1850-1895) were more materialistic, and less spiritual. It was assumed that the powerful rule and control the world, and that wealth, power, technology, military capability and knowledge make a country or people strong and successful. Without these, a nation was weak. Underlying the desire for power was the desire for Japan to continue its independence, not as a colony controlled by outsiders. Fukuzawa and Mori were not just concerned with overt manifestations of politics and power, but with the supportive culture or spirit surrounding them. Mere blind copying of Western institutions and technologies would fail. In their considerations about the “spirit” behind Western technology and wealth, they identified democratic freedoms, scientific inquiry, and in the case of Mori, religious/Christian values. But the overall emphasis of the five leaders was more on the material side.

Countries and cultures like China or India that placed more emphasis on ethics and philosophy were weak, antiquated, unable to respond to modernity, and became colonies of aggressor nations. If Japan did not want to be a colony, it must learn from the powerful West, carefully import and apply its political systems, and become strong. Practical, “scientific” political knowledge and ideas (democratic or authoritarian) that could make a country more powerful were better than “impractical” ideas that could not (i.e. Confucian philosophy or Buddhism). The value of ideas was their practicality and power, not simply their truth or philosophical strength.

Despite Japan’s present weakness, there was a pride and love for the country, its culture, and beauty. While it might be necessary to import political and other phenomena to “save” Japan from outside control, it must be done so carefully, or the heart of Japan
might be destroyed. Despite Japan’s weakness, there was a belief that it could rise to this challenge. Its people could learn from the West, as they learned from China for centuries, and make Japan stronger.

Japan was now the only Asian nation that could do this effectively. It must help other Asian countries do this. Because other Asian countries were weak, they were inferior. The assumption of power applied to general international relations saw them as hostile. If Japan did not strengthen its internal political and other systems, it would be conquered, even by other hostile Asian powers. This was the supreme motivator driving the intense push for domestic reforms in politics and similar areas in this period in Japan.

Japan’s responses to the global phenomena mentioned a few paragraphs above were to seek to import relevant areas of knowledge about political values and institutions from the West to strengthen itself against invasion and colonization. By the end of this period, Japan embarked on huge political reforms within its society, including the importation of many Western political values and institutions. In this importation, Japan was highly selective in what it brought in, and sought to strengthen certain “indigenous” political institutions, such as the emperor system. The cultural logics behind these responses were that if Japan did not import the needed areas of knowledge, it would remain weak, be invaded and conquered. Actual political reforms must follow; imported knowledge was not enough. If Japan was not careful, the imported knowledge could destroy it. Internal reforms to strengthen indigenous values and institutions were also necessary.

If we compare the cultural logics under the worldviews about the relevant global phenomena identified above, the most obvious comparison is between the ideas
underlying Western power and aggression against Japan and other Eastern countries, and
the Confucian ideas so long influential in East Asia’s cultural universe. Beyond their
power as ideas, these Western ideologies seemed overtly powerful in the real world. The
fact that the Western powers were able to defeat China and other Eastern powers hinted
at their ideas’ “superiority,” despite the fact that Confucian ideas had created the most
populous, stable, and wealthiest society on earth (China) through the late eighteenth
century. While there was obviously power and philosophical depth in Confucian ideas,
despite their influence and success throughout East Asia for several millennia, Qing
China was in serious decline. In the eyes of many Japanese reformers, “Eastern”
worldviews and their supportive systems seemed incapable of matching the powerful
West. At the very least, new Western ideas must somehow be combined with the
Confucian traditions of the East.

Probably the emphasis of material values over non-material ones in these
cultural logics was unavoidable, given the West’s aggressive behavior and the powerful
success of Western military technologies against China and other Asian countries. In
these worldviews about domestic politics (1850-1895) and their underlying cultural
logics, we see a pragmatic, utilitarian emphasis on whatever would prove useful for
“saving” Japan from being controlled by others. Fukuzawa and Mori wisely understood
that the “spirit” behind these ideas, institutions and technologies must also be
comprehended and “mastered.” If not, reforms could fail, and Japanese society be

879 This claim was made by Leonard Humphreys, professor of East Asian history at the University of the
Pacific in the 1970s and 1980s.
880 This refers to China under the rule of the Qing Dynasty (usually dated 1644-1911), the last dynasty of
imperial China.
engulfed, externally and internally. The reform drive to match and repel the West would greatly alter “surface elements” of domestic Japanese political institutions and other societal features. But it appears that many core elements and values proved extremely enduring.

The preference of the five Japanese leaders (1850-1895) was also for countries that could make Japan powerful and wealthy. Because China, Korea and other Asian cultures were now weak, they were “inferior.” If Japan could successfully modernize and repel the West, it would be “superior” to the other weak Eastern cultures. It is interesting to compare the varied reactions of various East Asian cultures to the encroachment of the West, and how quickly Japan turned on its Eastern neighbors to make itself strong.\(^881\) As we will see later, from the very beginning of the Meiji era, Japan turned its eyes to its “weak” Eastern neighbors. Certain leaders and forces in Japan soon expressed an interest in Japan’s involvement in those places. A natural love for their own country and culture soon evolved into a perverse sense of “superiority” over other East Asian regions that would justify Japan’s involvement in their affairs.\(^882\) This sense of “superiority” partly came from Japan’s victories over China at the end of this era (1895), and additional victories (over Russia, 1905, and Korea, formally colonized in 1910), which followed.

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\(^881\) The reactions of such nations as Japan, Korea, China, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam and others were quite varied. Most of these nations, except Japan and Thailand, became colonies of the West, to varying degrees.

\(^882\) Most cultures possess a sense of ethnocentric pride over all other cultures, since any culture’s members will tend to naturally prefer their own worldviews and ways of life, which seem most natural to the culture’s members. But we must also not forget that Japan was not the only country to respond aggressively to other world regions in this period. Virtually every Western country that was able to also did so. Were these reactions due to the influence of powerful evolutionary thought, or more due to human greed? It seems doubtful that Japanese ethnocentrism, which may have helped to inspire Japanese aggression in Asia to some extent, was any more perverse than Western ethnocentrism and racisms that inspired similar adventures in other regions.
If Japan did not import the political knowledge it needed, it was assumed that it would remain weak, and could be destroyed. If it did not do the reform process well, or if key elements of existing institutions were damaged in the process, it might also be destroyed. Internal, appropriate reform was very important. The nation faced dangers from both within and without.

**Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Market Contexts**

*Fukuzawa Yukichi.* In the 1840s and 1850s, Fukuzawa observed the rise of increasing trade and manufacturing among the townsmen (chônin) and members of his lower samurai class. On his journeys to the West, Fukuzawa bought back many English language books, and used many to write best-selling books, some on economics, which introduced a wide Japanese audience to modern economic and business practices and thought. His books and his translation works earned him a very large income, and his economic accomplishments were many. Fukuzawa Yukichi came to believe that economics was the highest subject every Japanese student should learn, since it explained the necessities of daily life (production, exchange, and distribution), applicable to a state

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884 Fukuzawa’s first two books on economics were *Minkan keizai roku* (*People’s Economics*, 1877) and *Tsuka ron* (*A Theory of Currency*, 1878). In the first book, he explained the basic functions of a modern (Western) economy in simple terms that even literate school children could understand (Ibid., 110). His *Bookkeeping* (1873) introduced modern business practice, bookkeeping and statements of finance in modern joint stock companies to Japan (Ibid., 92).
885 Ibid., xxiii-xxv. Fukuzawa became one of Japan’s wealthiest businessmen. Among his accomplishments were the founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank (1880), to attract gold and silver to Japan (Fukuzawa supported paper currency, backed by gold and silver). This aided the government in establishing the central bank, the Bank of Japan (1882), and achieving a stable currency. Fukuzawa started his own businesses, including a publishing firm that became the Maruzen bookstore chain, and the *Jiji Shimpo*, a major, national newspaper for fifty years. Maruzen used methods of western accountancy and modern management far ahead of other Japanese economic organizations. Fukuzawa advised two of Japan’s future great zaibatsu (financial and corporate combines), Mitsubishi and Mitsui. He founded Keio University, which educated most of Japan’s early business elite, contributing much to Japan’s economic development (Ibid., xxiii, 103, 111-112). Keio graduates became top leaders in many of Japan’s leading private firms (Ibid., 135-136, 170). Finally, Fukuzawa introduced the idea of life insurance in *Guided Tour of the West* (*Seiyô Tabi Annaï*, 1868), also a pioneering work on money and banking (Ibid., 62, 128).
or household. If effectively mastered, Japan could become rich. He believed his Keio College would play a role, and it did. He also believed that modern businessmen were a necessity for Japan. They needed to receive a proper education, learn English, read the news, and have broad knowledge and good character. His motto “Learn and earn, earn and learn” freed both himself and his students from the Confucian scorn for business, to be productive, and initiated Japan’s modern business elite.

**Ito Hirobumi.** While Ito’s major areas of action were Japan’s domestic politics and foreign relations, he was briefly involved in national economic policy. Like politics, it seems Ito believed economic lessons from the West must also be carefully applied. His birth in southwestern Japan and his study in London in the 1860s exposed him to the power of Western politics, economics, and culture. These events influenced his willingness to learn from the West in those areas. On domestic economic issues, he was happy to glean lessons from the West deemed relevant for and applicable to Japan’s situation. He saw Japan as economically and technologically inferior to the West, and acknowledged Japan’s need to learn as much as possible. Since he worked in the public sector throughout his career, likely most of his economic thought emphasized the public, rather than the private, sector. Based on his national policy actions that affected the economy, it seems he believed that government intervention in the economy was

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886 Ibid., 83.
887 Ibid., xxv-xxvi, 171-172.
888 Many of these comments are implied, because I did not find much explicit commentary on Ito’s views of economics.
889 Ito was born in the feudaldomain of Choshu (present-day Yamaguchi prefecture) at the western end of the island of Honshu.
890 I do not have enough data to surmise Ito’s thoughts about the private sector and business.
important for national prosperity and survival.\textsuperscript{891} Given his generally conservative political views, which permitted only gradual democratic rights for citizens, it is likely that he took a cautious view of labor rights. Due to his support of the autocratic Prussian system as the best governmental model for Japan, Ito supported principles of strong state economic intervention, rather than laissez-faire capitalism with minimal intervention. On the major economic ideologies of the Meiji period, from this analysis, it seems Ito’s economic thought strongly supported the ideology of \textit{fukoku kyôhei}, and was generally supportive of \textit{shokusan kôgyô}.\textsuperscript{892} His conservative political views suggest that he viewed the economy as one of the main pillars of Japan’s modernization process, though not the only one. On the economy’s social role, clearly Japanese society also needed to be connected to and supportive of important, more frontline political and economic changes. In the Constitution of 1889, Ito’s use of patriotic, emotive expressions and images was meant to shore up popular and political support, throughout society, for the state’s political and economic reform efforts.\textsuperscript{893} Ideologically, Ito’s approach in the Constitution is conservative, appealing to “traditional” images drawn from important Shinto legends and Japanese folklore about the people’s relationship to and descent from the imperial line.

What do the language and expressions used in the Constitution of 1889 (the Meiji Constitution) and related documents reveal about Ito’s attitudes about economic

\textsuperscript{891} For more details on Ito’s policy actions affecting Japan’s economy in this period, see the later discussion (in Chapter 10) on the policy effects of leaders’ worldviews on Japan’s domestic market (1850-1895).
\textsuperscript{892} The point about Ito’s view of \textit{shokusan kôgyô} is implied.
\textsuperscript{893} For more on the Constitution of 1889, see the next paragraph. Remember that Ito was the Constitution’s primary author.
matters in the public arena? What economic principles are revealed? In the Constitution, Ito employed very emotional, patriotic language and principles designed to promote political and economic strengthening of the state. Through the Constitution, he allowed the Emperor and the Imperial Government, not just the Diet, to have great power over decisions on public finance. The content of the Constitution does not reveal Ito’s thought about specific economic doctrines or policies affecting the private sector, but it shows that his general thought on economic matters in the public sphere was fairly conservative, given the great power of the Emperor and closely related political


895 From documents related to the Constitution of 1889 and the Constitution itself, there are official views supporting the prosperity of the throne, Japan’s “…ancient form of government,” and the stability, prosperity and welfare of the country, through the promulgation of the Constitution, and the Imperial House Law. The Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of the Constitution expresses the conservative, patriotic desire that the nation’s subjects, descended from their “Imperial Ancestors,” will desire to “secure forever” the glory of Japan, “both at home and abroad,” and the “stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our Imperial Ancestors.” The Preamble (Joyu) of the Constitution states the desire that Japan’s constitution and laws should promote the “welfare,” moral and intellectual development, and “security of the rights and of the property of Our people,” using quite emotive, patriotic language, even in English translation. Such expressions include “having, by virtue of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal…” and “…Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favored with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors….” (Japanese Constitution; Ito and Ito, Commentaries on Constitution).

896 Issues of public finance, including taxation, expenditures, revenue, and the national budget, were covered in Chapter VI of the Constitution. The Diet had primary responsibility for approving the budget and major expenditures. The Imperial Government and the Emperor had extraordinary power over the budget and other financial matters. All the Diet’s decisions also required the Government’s concurrence. The former two actors could also enact imperial ordinances on financial matters when the Diet was not in session. The Government also was to submit the annual accounting of the state’s expenditures and revenues.

897 The thinking of most of Japan’s top-level national policymakers during this period could also be called conservative, so Ito was not abnormal in this quality.
groups to issue various economic decisions and to intervene in economic matters of the state. 898

**Kato Hiroyuki.** Kato’s views of economics were influenced by evolutionary ideologies, including German Social Darwinism, which greatly affected his mature thought on all aspects of science. 899 His economic thought was slightly affected by racist overtones from evolution, common in this era. Globally, Social Darwinism was strongly connected with certain forms of racist ideology, and had some effect on thinkers in Japan. One controversy was how soon Japan should allow “mixed residence” (foreigners of different races to live in its cities). In 1893, Kato worried that implementing mixed residence too quickly in Japan might overwhelm the “inferior” Japanese by economic competition with “superior” Caucasians, and Chinese working for lower wages. 900 We can likely surmise that Kato’s views of economics were generally conservative, like his

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898 The Constitution calls the Emperor the sovereign head of the Empire. He exercised certain legislative powers in concert with the Imperial Diet and the Constitution, such as promoting laws (their passage and execution). He could issue emergency ordinances when the Diet was not in session (subject to later Diet approval), and regular ordinances to aid the execution of existing laws, for “...the welfare of the subjects,” on economic and other matters. The power to issue laws gave the Imperial government and the Emperor enormous power over policies governing the economy and other areas. Additional political groups closely connected to the Emperor had a significant role in lawmaking on economic and other policies. Ministers of State were constitutionally required to advise the Emperor, and one of them had to countersign all laws, imperial ordinances and rescripts. The Emperor could also involve his Privy Council, or group of senior state advisors, whenever he wished (this happened frequently, at least during Hirohito’s reign before 1945). The close ties of both of these groups with the Emperor increased his influence over economic and other policy areas even more. Other political actors could also play an economic role. The emperor’s subjects were legally required to pay taxes, but protected from arbitrary, extra-legal household searches or entry. Their right to hold private property was inviolable. The Diet had to approve all laws, including those on economic matters, submitted by the Imperial government or the Emperor, and could pass its own laws. The Judiciary could also become involved in economic matters. Among other possibilities, according to Article 60, a special court dealing with economic or other issues might be convened, if needed.

899 From my major sources on Kato, I did not obtain much data on his thought on economic matters, even though he served for a time in the Ministry of Finance.

900 Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 244.
political views.\textsuperscript{901} He saw Japan’s economy as inferior to the West’s, and believed that Japan needed to learn from it. There were racist overtones here also. He saw Caucasians as economically superior to Japanese, and the Chinese as economic inferiors. Due to Kato’s in-depth study of German language and thought, and his mature conservative politics, it is likely he supported strong state intervention in the economy.\textsuperscript{902} Given his evolutionary views, he supported the ideologies of \textit{fukoku kyōhei} and \textit{shokusan kōgyō}, which both argued that Japan must be rich and strong to survive. Likely in Kato’s mind, Japanese society must support these goals too.

\textbf{Comparison of Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1850-1895)}

I found varying amounts of data on the economic thought of the three leaders considered here.\textsuperscript{903} Both Fukuzawa and Ito were born in southwestern Japan, which increased their early exposure to Western ideas. All three leaders had extensive exposure to, and influence from, Western knowledge.\textsuperscript{904} All seemingly believed that Japan could learn valuable economic lessons from the West, like lessons in politics. Different from Fukuzawa, the impact of Ito’s views on the domestic economy occurred early in his career (in the 1870s), mainly in the public sector.\textsuperscript{905} Given Ito’s lifelong involvement in the public sector, it seems his economic thought emphasized government policy’s role in

\textsuperscript{901} Given the conservative nature of his political thought, we might assume that his economic beliefs were also conservative, but I am uncertain.
\textsuperscript{902} This point is implied. I found no data on Kato’s views of industry, the private sector, business, employment, labor or management issues.
\textsuperscript{903} I found the most data on Fukuzawa. Data on Ito is quite a bit less, as was the case with Kato.
\textsuperscript{904} Kato also had exposure to Western knowledge through brief study at a Dutch studies school, but did not began studying the German language until early in his adult career.
\textsuperscript{905} In Fukuzawa’s case, his involvement and reflection on economic matters occurred throughout his career, primarily concerning the private sector.
the economy, not the private sector’s role in it. Similarly, Kato’s lifelong career remained in the public sector. All three leaders believed that Japan must learn much from the technologically and economically superior West. Their economic views saw Japan’s economic development as inferior to the West’s. They believed that Japan must learn and grow from that superior model, somewhat as it had learned from its “more advanced” Chinese model throughout its earlier history. The economic thought of all three was affected somewhat by evolutionary principles, Kato’s the most strongly.

Above I noted the evolutionary, racist overtones that emerged in Kato’s brief comments on economics. Ito and Kato drew many lessons from Germany, and were more politically conservative than Fukuzawa. Ito was also aware of more liberal political and economic systems in the United States and Great Britain. Perhaps both his and Kato’s thought supported state economic intervention more than Fukuzawa’s.

Fukuzawa’s views of economics and Japanese nationalism highly supported the ideologies of *fukoku kyōhei* (rich nation, strong army), and likely *shokusan kōgyō* (“increase production and encourage management”). The Meiji government used the latter to encourage Japanese industries to pursue the former ideological goal. It seems both Ito’s and Kato’s thought also supported these ideologies. The three leaders’ views of the role of economics in society varied slightly. Fukuzawa emphasized the role of

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906 Given his views supportive of a strong state modeled on the Prussian system, it seems Ito would also have supported the state’s encouragement of public industries before the private sector was able to develop them. This became actual Meiji government policy. See my earlier comments on Ito’s likely views on government economic policy in the section on worldviews of the domestic market (1850-1895).

907 I found no evidence that Kato’s economic views had any impact in either the public or private sectors.

908 In Ito’s case, the main lessons emerged from Prussia’s authoritarian political system. In Kato’s case, the lessons came from studying the thought of leading German intellectuals, the arguments of German Social Darwinism, and the generally conservative worldview of German leaders at the time.

909 *Japan,* “Shokusan Kōgyō,” 1409.
economics in the private sector, while Ito and Kato focused more on the public sector. While not acknowledged by most Japanese, the impact of Fukuzawa’s thought on the economy, especially the private sector, was large.  

**Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1850-1895)**

**Development Issues.** To assess the development aspects of these domestic market worldviews, I will again use the analytical concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation. As with other domestic features of Japan (1850-1895), the concept of “modernization” is highly relevant to the domestic economy, since it assesses how a “peripheral” economy like Japan’s was absorbed by “core” Western economies into the global system, and how that process affected core Japanese cultural features and values. Did core features of the domestic economy remain intact during this period? In their domestic market worldviews, Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato supported the ideas of “modernization.” All three saw Japan’s economy as inferior, admitted Japan’s need to learn from the West in multiple areas, including economics, to prevent invasion, and

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910 Ito clearly believed that to survive, Japanese society must support economic reforms. His patriotic language in the Constitution encouraged social and political support for these efforts. Given Kato’s evolutionary views, it is likely that he thought that Japan must become strong and rich to survive, and that economics was key to make this happen.

911 As I note elsewhere, most Japanese remember Fukuzawa for his extensive writings on Western civilization. Yet he believed that economic development, growth and business had a vital role in the well-being of the nation. His efforts in his writings, private business and economic education helped strengthen the role of economics and business in Japan’s daily and national life.

912 As noted elsewhere, the assumption in the “modernization” concept of Japanese scholars is that the “core” cultural features of the receiving society will remain intact, although its overall, outward form may become very Westernized.

913 While the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato supported the ideas of “modernization,” they do not answer the question of whether core features of the economy remained intact at the end of this period. The changes in Japan’s economy during this period and subsequent decades were enormous, and it was virtually totally destroyed at the end of World War II, but the question of what core features of the economy endured is not answered here.

914 Ito’s conservative views in the Constitution of 1889 all advocated the building up of the Japanese polity, economy, and society to prevent invasion.
none of them wanted its cultural core destroyed. In Kato’s case as well,\textsuperscript{915} we see advocacy for empowering Japan on multiple levels, so it could evolve into a strong state that could not be invaded.\textsuperscript{916} While Japan might develop some of the outward trappings of the Western economies, clearly to Kato its cultural “core” and “indigenous ‘traditions’” must not be destroyed. While Japan might change greatly on the surface by importing Western business practices, a modern constitution, and conservative policies for public finance and government involvement in the economy, these leaders did not want to see their society destroyed. All their work meant to assure its survival.

In their domestic market worldviews, all three of these leaders supported the ideals of translative adaptation, that in Japan’s economic development, there must be compatibility between its indigenous institutions and values, and the imported organizational structures and technologies. In the process of economic development in Japan (1850-1895), was its base society destroyed, or did it continue intact, though altered? While I cannot examine this issue in detail, as I argue earlier in this chapter, while many features of Japanese society underwent traumatic alterations in this era, many deep “traditions” and values were not destroyed, but proved essentially enduring. Did the worldviews of Fukuzawa, Ito, or Kato on the domestic economy help destroy core elements of Japanese culture? I do not believe that they did, but that of these three

\textsuperscript{915} In addition to the evolutionary, racist overtones of Kato’s economic thought (noted above), in Chapter 3 I also noted Kato’s support for nationalistic spiritual values, associated with Shinto, as patriotic and useful for strengthening Japan.

\textsuperscript{916} This is most strongly expressed in Kato’s thought, but also in Fukuzawa’s and Ito’s, who both implicitly argued for evolutionary, progressive development for Japan. I am tempted to assert that these evolutionary views hint at the economic development principles of W.W. Rostow in the early 1960s. He wrote that there are necessary, specific, sequential steps in path of economic development for every developing society. The three Japanese leaders here did not specify what the steps are, but their thought supported the general idea of evolutionary progress in economic development, as did Rostow’s.
leaders, the deepest, broadest, and most direct impacts on Japan’s economy area occurred through the actions of Fukuzawa. They changed the attitudes of everyday Japanese about business and how it should be done. Fukuzawa’s powerful, positive portrayals of the West encouraged Japanese to engage the economic and technological challenges it presented with thrift, hard work, and eager learning, rather than fear and xenophobic defensiveness. These are the same basic values Japan positively engaged in its reaction to cultural input from the Asian mainland at many points in its earlier history. Fukuzawa’s contribution to modern Japan’s business culture has had a very positive, long-term impact on the development of Japanese business and economics, up to the present, consonant with many positive values long associated with business and hard work in Japan. In Meiji Japan, Fukuzawa also helped to weaken the widespread Confucian scorn for merchants and entrepreneurialism long influential in Tokugawa Japan.

**Technology Issues.** To analyze the technological aspects of the three leaders’ worldviews on the domestic market, I will use the concepts of industrial policy, technology as defined by Glick, and technonationalism as ideology. Thomas Glick’s

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917 These actions included Fukuzawa’s writings, his founding of Keio University, and his entrepreneurial activities.
918 Fukuzawa’s ideas about Western business practices were not necessarily contrary to many of the previous ideas about business practice commonly used by merchants in Tokugawa Japan. But the Western ideas included many practical insights about how to do business even more efficiently, and about how to do it in a modern world economy dominated by the West.
919 These last two values were certainly strong in the reaction of the Tokugawa government to the outside world during the period of national isolation.
920 An interesting question is to what degree these “positive” economic values may have also affected Japan’s later policies for ODA (Official Development Assistance) and technical aid for developing countries.
921 Since industrial policy is chiefly policy-oriented issue, I include my comments on how these leaders’ domestic market worldviews reflect industrial policy later in Chapter 10, which treats the policy implications of the leaders’ worldviews on the various domestic and international issues.
definition of technology is relevant. How does his thinking relate to the worldviews of the leaders here? On his journeys to the West, Fukuzawa observed interaction with technology and Western knowledge in daily life in his hometown, in the United States, Britain and elsewhere. In these contexts, he saw the power of modern economics to improve the lives of average citizens, and to empower entire societies. These observations had a powerful impact on his worldviews. He wrote about economics in many of his writings, and economics was one of his chief inspirations for founding Keio University. Through his writings and professional efforts related to economics, Fukuzawa had a large influence on the business culture of Japan, and on the use of modern business practices in daily Japanese life. Ito’s involvement with economics was at the national level, and mostly indirect, in his encouragement of popular support for public reform efforts in economics and politics, through language he used in the Constitution of 1889. The economic thought of neither Ito nor Kato, the latter with evolutionary overtones, had much connection to economics or technology as systems operating in daily Japanese life. But this was not the case with Fukuzawa.

Murakami’s concept of industrial policy means any form of government action or intervention in the economy, often involving technology. Fukuzawa is mainly concerned with how economics affects the private sector, while Ito and Kato’s concern is mainly for the public sector. Fukuzawa’s views are very nationalistic, supportive of enriching Japan, to help it resist the West. I am not sure if Fukuzawa would support much government action in the economy; he personally chose not to be so involved himself. Ito

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922 Glick notes how recent anthropologists study technology as a techno-economic or socio-technical system, through systems theory, looking at how human groups utilize tools to achieve social goals in daily living, often related to the organization of work (Glick, “Technology,” 466).
supported government intervention in the economy, in his brief involvement in national economic policy, and in what he wrote in the Constitution of 1889. Kato admired many things about Germany and Prussia. It is likely that he also supported their ideals of strong state economic intervention, but I am not positive. Of these three leaders, Ito’s support for some form of government economic intervention seems the most likely.

The concept of technonationalism as ideology is relevant if these domestic economy worldviews supported a strong role for technology in Japan’s national security, and the idea that technology had a key role in making Japan rich and strong. Is this the case? Fukuzawa strongly supported Japan’s successful mastery of modern economics as a chief tool, with technology, to make Japan rich and strong, to forestall Western invasion. It seems Ito understood that both economics and technology had a key role to play in strengthening Japan against the West. Given his support for a strong state role in the economy, he also seems supportive of technonationalism as ideology. There is no direct evidence that Kato supported technonationalism as ideology in his economic thought, although he clearly desired Japan’s survival, and was conservative in outlook. Of the three leaders here, Fukuzawa emerges as the leader most strongly supporting technonationalism as ideology.

*Cognitive Issues. Image.* To assess cognition aspects of these domestic market worldviews, I will again use aspects of the concepts of image, worldview, and cultural

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923 Earlier I noted Ito’s conviction that Japan could improve its international stature by absorbing the technologies of more advanced countries, and how he viewed Japan’s domestic development as taking precedence over foreign wars and adventures (Hamada, *Prince Ito*, 64-68). In Ito’s thought, domestic well-being must come first before international issues and entanglements.
logics. Regarding images of overall economics, Fukuzawa saw economic and entrepreneurial activities as helpful for the lives of local people. He saw economics as the most preeminent science, the foundation of daily and national life, and beneficial for the whole nation. To Ito, economics was one of the main pillars of Japan’s reform process, along with politics and law. Kato’s mature views of economics were influenced by German Social Darwinism and evolution, had racist overtones, and were likely generally conservative. The images of all three scholars of Japan’s economy saw it as inferior to the West’s. Fukuzawa saw economic activity as important for Japan, and believed that without improved economic and technical knowledge, Japan would not survive. This knowledge must be imported; both he and Ito believed Japan must learn appropriate economic lessons from the West. In the racist overtones of Kato’s thought, Japanese emerged as economically and racially inferior to Westerners, and the Chinese as similarly inferior to Japanese. To Fukuzawa and Ito, the Western economies were superior to Japan’s; the West was more economically dynamic. Their early positive exposure to Western economic activities, in their hometowns, early educations, and through travel and study abroad, shaped their views of Western economies, making them willing to learn from the West in this area. A hierarchical view of national economies suggests the influence of evolutionary thought on all three leaders, especially strong in Kato’s mature work. Concerning their images of leading economic ideologies of that era,

924 I will use the same basic aspects of these concepts that I use elsewhere in in Chapter 3 for worldviews of domestic society (1850-1895) and in Chapter 4 for worldviews of the domestic state (1850-1895). The images of economics used include those of economic history, economics overall, of the Japanese economy, Western economies, government economic policy, private industry/the industrial sector; the private sector/business, of employment, labor, and management, of leading economic ideologies of the era, and the role of economics in society. For a discussion of the overall frameworks to which these images and worldviews belong, see my discussion below of the global phenomena connected with these worldviews, in the section on the cultural logics behind worldviews of the domestic market, 1850-1895.
all three leaders were politically conservative, and likely supported the ideals of *fukoku kyōhei* (rich nation, strong army) and *shokusan kōgyō* (“increase production and encourage management”). Fukuzawa was especially strong in his support for economics and Japanese nationalism.

Concerning their images of the roles of economics in society, all three leaders saw economics as fundamental to Japan’s survival and flourishing. Fukuzawa believed that economic development, growth and business activity had a vital role in the nation’s well-being. His own efforts in his writings, private business and economic education contributed to strengthening the role of economics and business in Japan’s daily and national life. Ito believed that Japanese society must support economic reforms needed for its survival. Kato believed that Japan must become strong and rich to survive; economics was one of the key ways for this to happen.

On their images of the public and private sectors, on government economic policy, it seems all three leaders supported strong government intervention in the economy. Fukuzawa supported appropriate government intervention in the economy, meaning positive encouragement, not over-involvement, in the private sector. Sometimes the private sector could lead the public sector in encouraging economic development and growth. Ito positively emphasized public sector involvement in the economy, not the private sector’s, and saw public economic intervention as important. Ito and Kato were strongly influenced by German and Prussian thought, suggesting they likely supported...

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925 His use of patriotic language in the Constitution of 1889 was meant to encourage social support for needed political and economic reforms.
926 These conclusions about Kato’s views are implied.
strong state intervention in the economy. Fukuzawa had the strongest images of the private sector. He saw private sector business and industry as the prime engine of national economic growth and development. He believed, due to his personal experience, that through business, individuals could become successful, prosperous, and wealthy. This could promote the same for Japan. Fukuzawa was not afraid of monopolies (zaibatsu) or big business. He believed both could contribute much to the growth of the nation.

Fukuzawa offers the most extensive images on employment, management and labor. He saw modern management principles as important for economic and business prosperity, and business education as paramount for creating and strengthening a modern business elite for Japan. Efficient, hard-working, knowledgeable managers would be a key factor in the nation’s economic success. Fukuzawa supported human rights, but was concerned that their rapid application could destabilize the nation. His support for state rights and concern about emerging democratic movements likely made him wary of labor, that it might be disruptive to the nation’s economic health. Ito likely took a dim view of labor rights, given his rather low view of democratic rights, which he supported granting only gradually, and his conservative political views. Also given Kato’s conservative political views, it seems likely that all three of these leaders were conservative and not too supportive of labor rights in this era.

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927 In the Constitution of 1889, Ito allowed the Emperor and related political groups to have a high degree of involvement in many areas of public policy, including economic issues.
928 This point, about national prosperity emerging from that of individual entrepreneurs, is implied.
929 This last point is also implied from Fukuzawa’s actions.
How did these images of the domestic economy (1850-1895) function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? Economics is seen in these images as one of the most basic sciences and tools to enable Japan to survive in the modern world. If properly mastered, it can enrich Japan, and improve the daily lives of its subjects. These economic images reinforce Meiji Japan’s sense of temporary inferiority to the West; economics is an additional arena of weakness. Economic knowledge must be imported from the West, increasing Japan’s short-term dependency on the West. In their views of economics’ role in society and in the public and private sectors, all three leaders support economics’ centrality for Japan’s survival and prosperity. Their conservative political views led them to generally favor top-down solutions to economic issues. While Fukuzawa argued for the importance of well-trained management and big conglomerates in the private sector, Ito and Kato seemingly favored strong public intervention in the marketplace. This suggests that all three were wary of the potential of the labor movement to create political or economic instability.

These economic emphases also encouraged these leaders to reject “traditional” areas of knowledge not seen as crucial for Japan’s survival, including ethics, philosophy, religion, and Chinese studies. Areas like culture, religion and education seemed very “uneconomic,” and were only valued insofar as they could be harnessed to enhance the nation’s survival. These economic emphases also caused Japan to gravitate toward the Western world in its political and economic relations, and away from its “traditional” sources of such knowledge, namely China, Korea, and other “traditional” Eastern regions.

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930 Additional tools of this sort, in the mind of these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato) include modernized systems of politics, science and technology.
and societies. Did the new focus of many of Japan’s leaders on Western-oriented politics, technology, economics, and military systems cause large-scale cultural upheaval or disorientation in Japanese society? I do not believe they did at this stage in modern Japan’s development. In sum, I posit that the emphasis on economics in these images underlying these three leaders’ worldviews inevitably caused them to favor certain economic approaches to some degree in their thinking and policy actions, and to reject other possible approaches based more on “traditional” areas of knowledge.

Worldview. Based on the above images, what are primary elements of the worldviews of the domestic market for these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato)? The nature of the world emerges as mainly economically driven—the international system, the national one, and daily life. Without the proper goods, people cannot survive. With efficient economics, they can prosper greatly. Economics are the lifeblood of any nation. National economic systems compete, and must continually grow and evolve for their nations to survive. Individual entrepreneurs compete within a nation’s economy. Whoever controls the world’s economic system controls the world. Presently, that is the West, which sets the economic rules of the game. If non-Western nations wish to survive, they must master economics and prosper. Many of these views seem highly influenced by evolutionism. This econocentric worldview tended to deemphasize elements of the universe that are generally more non-material and non-economic, such as religion and spiritual values.\(^\text{931}\)

\[^{931}\text{But I do not mean to deny the economic aspects of religious and spiritual practice, of which there are many. Consider the sale of trinkets and amulets for the annual visits of millions of Japanese to local shrines and temples on New Year’s Eve, as they pray to welcome the new year. Another example is the publication of religious books, literature and music in the United States.}\]

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Western economic knowledge is crucial for Japan’s survival.\footnote{Similar to this thought, Fukuzawa would argue that efficient Japanese managers must learn valuable lessons from efficient managers in the West (implied).} Japan must strengthen economics on both the public and private levels; both are important for growth. Japanese society must strongly support economic reforms. As an autocratic, “traditional” society, to succeed economically, Japan must copy lessons from similar societies overseas (i.e. Germany).\footnote{This is the thought of Ito and Kato.} Economic lessons must be carefully applied for Japan to succeed. If not, its stability may be destroyed. Economics is central to most “productive” activity in Japan and the world, and to Japan’s reform efforts. For Japan, economic inferiority also means national weakness and dishonor. Japan must grow strong and rich to survive (Kato). Economics has a crucial role in the nation’s health. For Japan to be strong, business and management must also be. As individual entrepreneurs prosper, their success can be transferred to the national level.\footnote{These last two points are Fukuzawa’s thought.} Japan must rise up and fight for itself economically, or it will be controlled or colonized by outsiders. Both the public and private sectors in Japan have important roles in the economic growth process. While the emerging business world will provide much of the energy for growth, government has a prime role in facilitating the process, in discerning the best lessons from abroad, focusing the nation’s attention on economic reforms, encouraging society’s support, and identifying the best policies to support major goals. Popular support throughout society is important. Without it, public efforts may fail. Individuals must also prosper, for the benefit of the nation.
The West is superior to Japan in many areas, including economics and race. Germany has superior knowledge in various sectors; its model seems most suitable for Japan in politics and economics.\textsuperscript{935} Economies of “traditional” Asian powers, including China’s, are inferior to the West’s and to Japan’s, since Japan has a better capacity for reform. The West’s superior economic knowledge must be imported for this purpose. Economics is central to explaining the West’s wealth, growth and superior evolution.\textsuperscript{936} The Tokugawa and Meiji governments played a crucial role in the reform process and the importation of the West’s economic knowledge. They were key mediators of how Japan’s domestic economy responded to foreign economies in this era, to a large degree, since they established overall policies for trade, currency exchange, and foreign investment overseas and domestically. This is seen in the trade missions and the students sent abroad by several Japanese governments, both national and domainal, to learn business and economics, and in the foreign instructors imported to teach the same fields. Their policies favored economic knowledge from the West, not from Japan’s “traditional” Asian sources. Earlier in this period, the government’s role was especially primary, as the private sector had not yet fully emerged in Japan.

The environments affecting these leaders’ (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato’s) domestic market worldviews included domestic and international elements. Fukuzawa and Ito grew up in southwestern Japan, the region most open to trade with the West, and receiving the most direct Western economic influence in the late Tokugawa and early

\textsuperscript{935} Both Ito and Kato support the points about Germany. Kato also supports the idea of Western racial superiority. In the late nineteenth century, Germany was perhaps Europe’s most advanced society, in terms of wealth, industrial development, level of literacy, education, cultural development and standard of living. These factors may have also strengthened its image as a powerful model for Japan.

\textsuperscript{936} This point is implied from the thought of Fukuzawa.
Meiji eras. It also received the most direct economic influence from Japan’s closest Asian neighbors, China and Korea. Later in life, Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato moved to Tokyo, experiencing the growth and frenzy of entrepreneurialism there. The major focus of the last two was on the public arena, more on politics than economics. The international arena of these worldviews was also intense, including Japan’s need to improve its economy, compete with the West, and end unequal treaties imposed on Japan after reopening in 1859. Another major issue was intellectual currents affecting global trade, such as economic liberalism and pressure for open markets. Pressures for improved labor rights and factory conditions in major industrialized countries in this era soon hit Japan.

How did these environments interact with and affect the actors’ worldviews on Japan’s domestic market? The dynamism of Western economies, trade, and technology impressed all three leaders, making them feel that Japan must learn from the West, and that Japan was economically inferior. Trade with other Asian nations was deemphasized. Economic growth was one of the main forces affecting Japan’s survival; so all sectors of society must focus on encouraging its success in this arena. The “superior” nature of the West made Japan import its knowledge, not the East’s.

How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence these actors’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes? The overwhelming perception of the world as economically driven tended to make these

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937 For most of his career, Ito’s focus was on international and domestic politics and diplomacy, not economics.
938 Marxism did not begin to emerge as an intellectual force in Japan or in the labor rights movement until the late 1890s, shortly after the end of this period (1850-1895).
leaders deemphasize non-material and non-economic knowledge, such as religion.\textsuperscript{939} It made them favor knowledge from the West, rather than knowledge from “traditional” Asian sources such as China. “Practical” knowledge (Fukuzawa’s concept of jitsugaku) was the most preferred. Societies that were judged the most successful economically became the most favored in the overall eyes of most Japanese leaders. These three leaders tended to support Western knowledge and sources of information. Western societies judged to be the most successful in particular sectors, such as economics, were also considered to be the best sources of knowledge in those areas. Science, hard work, and material forces became major determinants for understanding events and their causes.

How did technological systems affect these worldviews? Much of what impressed the leaders of Meiji and late Tokugawa Japan about the West and its power flowed from the West’s economic, technological and scientific achievements. In these leaders’ eyes, the West’s wealth was a large part of what enabled it to prosper, exercise influence in international affairs, gain colonies, and maintain independence. Japan’s leaders experienced the power of the West when Commodore Perry’s black ships appeared in Edo Bay. When leaders like Fukuzawa and Ito traveled to the West, they

\textsuperscript{939} We noted above how Fukuzawa argued that the “spirits” behind technology and advanced Western knowledge must be mastered, in addition to mastering the knowledge itself. Yet he was not very religious. In the section on domestic society in Chapter 3, I noted how Kato favored the use of “traditional” Japanese spiritual values, especially from Shinto, believing that they would best strengthen Japanese nationalism. This meant Shinto as the new nationalistic spiritual ideology, as defined by the Meiji state. We will discuss the profound influence of Shinto on Emperor Hirohito’s worldviews and on Japan’s foreign policies during his reign through 1945 in Chapters 7 and 8. Westerners are sometimes amazed at how spiritual practices and beliefs like Shinto continue to influence major events and aspects of life in “secular,” non-religious Japan. Spiritual influence on modern life is seen in the ritual prayers offered by Shinto priests at the dedication ceremonies for new buildings, and in household worship and prayers offered at the Shinto and Buddhist family altars still kept in many Japanese homes. Yet in most surveys about religion, most Japanese commonly define themselves as “non-religious.” This may be because the Japanese word for religion, \textit{shukyo}, has the sense of “sect teaching.” Since many Japanese do not practice just one sect, they do not consider themselves to be “religious.”
directly observed its economic power, manifested in its technologies, military prowess, wealth, economic productivity and citizens’ daily lives, and in its colonies that they visited en-route. All of this provided very concrete inspiration for Japan’s leaders that the path to “success” for the West was trod in economics, science, technology, and military power, and would be for Japan too.

*Cultural Logics.* Concerning the cultural logics under these worldviews of Japan’s domestic market (1850-1895), the global (international) phenomena and actors to which these leaders responded included the Western trading system, the global economic system dominated by the West, the unequal treaty system, commodities Japan traded with other countries,\(^{940}\) the global monetary (currency) system, foreign investments in Japan, Japanese investments overseas, foreign technologies,\(^{941}\) the economic and trade policies of foreign governments and the Japanese government, international companies and players from overseas and Japan, Western economic knowledge, modern (Western)
business practice(s), international segments of the labor force, colonialism, and imperialism. Some of the powerful ideas behind the Western and global economic systems included classical economics (represented by Adam Smith), theories of free trade, international trade, industrialization, evolutionism and Social Darwinism, imperialism, colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, Western theories of business, Western and international business practices, theories of economic growth, wealth and prosperity, and values of wealth and individual entrepreneurialism. Some of the important thought underneath domestic market worldviews in Japan included Japanese thinking on economics and business in this period, concepts of importing needed knowledge that Japan lacked, theories of individual entrepreneurialism and hard work, ideological support for sending trade missions abroad, and concepts of political

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942 These international segments of the labor force included foreign instructors and businessmen, traders, and migrant workers in Japan who came from countries like China.

943 Several streams of economic thought, important in the West (1850-1895), affected Japan’s economic system, directly and indirectly. Two of these streams were the classical economics of Adam Smith, and the Malthusian principle of political economy and the doctrine of comparative advantage on international trade, developed and applied by David Ricardo. Adam Smith’s thought, formerly called the “English classical school of political economy,” is developed in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776). In this work, Smith studies how a private enterprise-based economic system works. He sees it as driven by the self-interest of individual consumers, which ultimately determines prices, in a framework of supportive laws and institutions. His work offered simplistic theories of value, distribution, international trade and money, and enabled the development of classical and modern economics. In the early 1800s, David Ricardo developed the concepts of the economic model, the doctrine of comparative advantage, and applied the Malthusian principle to economics. Essentially, he argued, based on the work of Thomas Malthus, that economic expansion would finally stop due to the rising expense of growing food on shrinking plots of available land. To handle this, countries should import needed foodstuffs from other countries able to produce them more productively. Countries should specialize in agricultural or manufactured goods that they are most advantaged to produce. The benefits of international trade are shown by comparing the costs within each individual nation, rather than by comparing costs between nations. This thought became the primary basis for nineteenth century arguments for free trade. Ricardo’s thought was powerfully re-argued by John Stuart Mill in 1848 in *Principles of Political Economy*. Also in the late 1800s, Western economists began to try to explain why goods trade at particular prices, and how resources are apportioned in situations of perfect competition (“Economics,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2007. *Encyclopaedia Britannica* Online, [http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-236756](http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-236756); accessed 21 June 2007).

944 One example of this is Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856), a Japanese agricultural reformer whose own hard work and common sense principles helped improve his own family’s welfare and that of the farming
authoritarianism allowing strong state economic involvement, protectionism, and import substitution.\footnote{What were the cultural logics (unspoken, shared assumptions and patterns) underlying these leaders’ worldviews of the major global phenomena affecting Japan’s domestic market (1850-1895)? On theoretical issues connected with these global phenomena, the key beliefs and underlying logics concern Western social science theories and knowledge related to Japan’s domestic economy, including economics, evolutionism, colonialism and imperialism. Cultural logics beneath these theoretical beliefs (about economics) included the idea that money and material things drive the world. For global influence, independence and development, Japan needs those things. As a proud nation, Japan must survive by fighting hard and developing itself first, internally, economically and in other areas, before it can successfully face the West. Trade with nearby regions and perhaps gaining colonies can help Japan’s economy grow stronger. Developing empires made Western countries rich, and will enrich Japan too.}

\footnote{Some protectionist thoughts may have been based on concepts of economic nationalism (mercantilism), developed in Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Mercantilism argued in support of trade protectionism (Ibid., “Economics”).}

\footnote{The global phenomena related to Japan’s domestic market in this period are many and complex. To make better sense of these phenomena and their related cultural logics, I have organized them into several categories: theoretical issues, broader issues, and more focused issues. Within the category of broader issues, related to Japan’s domestic market, I have also organized them as follows: mainly domestic issues, public sector issues, and private sector issues. Predominantly international issues are included later in my discussion of worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations, 1850-1895.}

\footnote{Economic theories included classical economics, theories on free trade, international trade, industrialization, economic growth, wealth and prosperity.}

\footnote{What were some of the major theoretically influenced beliefs to which I refer? A major phenomenon strengthening the West is economics. To be strong, Japan must also master economics, and fight hard for survival. To compete with the West, Japan must develop its own house first. Helping nearby regions and nations like Hokkaido and Korea can also strengthen Japan’s economy. While Hokkaido, now Japan’s northernmost island, had long been a major sphere of Japanese influence, it did not formally enter the nation until the late 1800s.}
Beliefs about broader market issues on the domestic level included those on economics and business. Cultural logics underneath these beliefs saw economics as a major controlling force of the world. For Japan to become wealthy, it must become economically powerful, but first its people must prosper. Internal prosperity precedes external prosperity. In rich nations like the West, many people know business well, work hard, and are smart. Japanese are also smart, so they can learn the business ways of the West. Doing so, as Japan learned from China before, will make Japan strong.

Beliefs on broader domestic market issues included those about general business practice, entrepreneurialism and labor. The cultural logics supporting these beliefs included the conviction that business and hard work are honorable. Through them, people and nations prosper. Confucianism, in condemning commerce, has become a bankrupt philosophy that has failed Eastern nations. While Confucianism long worked well for social relations, Eastern nations are now weaker than the West. Successful business generates wealth that strengthens all of society. For example, Ninomiya Sontoku showed much practical wisdom, courage and hard work that strengthened his own family, and the regions he helped to develop. So thrift, hard work, and perseverance will make Japan and its people strong. Strong business at the grassroots is really what

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949 Most of the beliefs and supporting cultural logics that concern Japan’s international economic relations I will discuss later in Chapter 5, and some in Chapter 8. Beliefs about international economic phenomena that primarily affected Japan’s domestic market are included here. Beliefs on basic economics and business related to Japan’s domestic market include the conviction that economics drives every nation and the world. Japan too must be wealthy to survive, both its people and the nation. Creative, aggressive ways of doing business have helped strengthen the West, so Japan must study those ways. Japanese are clever, and their ingenuity can help Japan to grow as well.

950 According to these beliefs, hard work is seen as especially honorable. Business is not shameful, and the ethical norms of Confucianism that condemned commerce are wrong. Business can strengthen individuals, their families, communities, and the whole nation. Ninomiya Sontoku is a hero and model for all Japanese. Individual entrepreneurs and companies that succeed are necessary to help the nation become rich.
invigorates a nation. The government’s role is important for setting the stage for what the market can do, but the market is central around the world, and will be in Japan.

Broader beliefs and their underlying logics on how the public sector affects Japan’s domestic market included those on relevant economic policies of the governments of foreign countries and Japan, and on public policies on Japan’s internal economic reforms. In the cultural logics behind these beliefs, Japan is a great country that must be saved. It will learn best from economically successful countries with experiences most like its own. If Japan copies from countries too different, it risks its social stability. Japan can learn valuable lessons from such countries (i.e. the United States), but must do so carefully. The governments of economically successful Western countries should be emulated, as culturally appropriate. The governments of economic failures should not be. Japan will succeed and learn best through hard work, using the best information from the world’s economic successes. The government, the people, and the private sector must learn these lessons, working together to help Japan grow.

951 Government economic policy includes ideas about the state’s economic role, protectionism, and import substitution. The broader beliefs on how governments and their economic policies affected Japan’s domestic market included the idea that for the soundest path to economic development, Japan must learn economic lessons fitting its own culture, history, and context from countries with similar experiences. Since Japan was seen as a highly traditional, authoritarian country, leaders such as Ito and Kato believed it would learn the best from countries with similar systems, such as Germany. Some countries’ cultures were very different from Japan’s, including extremely successful economies (i.e. the United States). Japan might learn and apply lessons from such countries, but must do so very carefully. The Japanese best understand their own society, so they can best apply these lessons. Japanese, not foreigners, must control their country. Japanese must reform their government to gain more qualities of the governments of economically successful Western countries, or Japan will not be able to apply their lessons well. Both Japan’s government and people must work hard to learn the world’s best lessons in every sector, including economics, and wisely apply them in both the public and private spheres (Ito and Kato stressed the former, and Fukuzawa the latter).
Japanese know their country best, and can best define how it should develop. Foreigners can assist, but they cannot have ultimate control.\textsuperscript{952} Beliefs on broader market issues affecting Japan’s domestic private sector included those about Western business, international firms (Japanese and foreign), and international segments of the labor force.\textsuperscript{953} According to the cultural logics under these beliefs, economics and wealth are the foundation of prosperity and well-being, seen in examples from the West, their economies and rich people. If it works for the West, it can work for Japan.\textsuperscript{954} Through modern business and hard work, if Japanese prosper, then Japan (as a nation) will.\textsuperscript{955} For modern business to truly succeed in Japan, Japanese must master its techniques, technologies, social and ethical factors, and encourage them in society. While Japan must change in this process, if it destroys its heart and soul, or it will not survive. Western firms are the key practitioners of Western business. Japan must study their practices and ideas, overseas and in Japan. Foreign experts in Japan are vital for quicker mastery of Western economic knowledge. But they must not stay too

\textsuperscript{952} It is implied that this would be the case for any country seeking to develop.
\textsuperscript{953} According to these beliefs, by learning Western business, Japan can become powerful and rich. Western-type business can make nations and individuals very rich. Japan must master the techniques of Western business and economics, the “spirit” behind them, and create a society supportive of business and entrepreneurship (Fukuzawa). But in doing so, it must not give up its own soul. The purpose of mastering Western (economic) knowledge is so that Japan can survive. Business is the new lifeblood of Japan, the foundation to increase its power, internally and externally. Foreign firms have a key role to play in economic reform, bringing in vitally needed knowledge and technologies. They must be carefully managed, and not allowed to get too much of a foothold in Japan. Foreign experts can be a key source of modern economic knowledge; Japan must find the best experts to teach its brightest students. This can enable Japan to leapfrog certain stages in the development process. Foreigners must not stay long. Japanese must quickly master their knowledge and send them home.
\textsuperscript{954} Through Western business and “scientific” economics the West became rich, and through them, Japan can too. Wildly successful Westerners, such as Andrew Carnegie and the Rothschilds, became rich through business.
\textsuperscript{955} There are also examples of hard work and prosperity in Japan, including Ninomiya Sontoku and the founders of Japan’s zaibatsu. 
long. Japan must be for the Japanese, and “cultural contamination” from outsiders is a danger. Japan is not Western.

More focused issues affecting these three leaders’ worldviews on the domestic market and their related cultural logics include their views of foreign technologies and knowledge and their roles in the domestic economy. The cultural logics supporting these beliefs include the conviction that strong public involvement in major areas of the economy is needed to accomplish major goals, such as importing knowledge. At this early stage, the weak private sector will do better if the government helps. But the private sector also has key roles. It will be the key engine of growth, and can often respond more quickly and flexibly than the government.

The basic response of these three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato) to the global phenomena identified above was to study and learn from the powerful economic example of the West, to seek to understand the principles and social contexts of the West’s economic achievements, and to reflect upon how to apply those lessons to Japan. This necessitated study and reflection on two levels, on the contexts, ideas and accomplishments of modern economics and business internationally, and on Japan’s

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956 For example, foreigners, their cultures and beliefs, such as Christianity, may pollute and corrupt Japan and its people. So while Japanese absorbs their knowledge, foreigners should be kept at arms’ length, staying as briefly as possible. Recall the “mixed residence” controversy over how soon to allow foreigners to reside in Japanese cities, and Kato’s comments on the issue (see Kato’s comments in this chapter in the section on domestic market worldviews).

957 According to these beliefs, the government plays a key role in importing and setting policies for foreign knowledge and technologies, and mediating the process. The major purpose for these policies is to strengthen Japan and its economy domestically so it will not be invaded. The government must set major policies on training through foreign experts and choosing the best foreign models. It helped set the tone for importing knowledge through trade missions. The government must play these roles now since the private sector is still weak. But that sector also has key roles. It is more dynamic, can better generate wealth and real growth, and affects the daily lives of Japanese more directly. Private business training, through schools like Keio, can help spread knowledge of modern economics and business. Sometimes business can set the lead for the public sector. These points about the private sector are implied from Fukuzawa.
current economic capabilities, available resources, and social conditions. Second, these leaders sought to apply these lessons in their own writings and policy recommendations for what Japan should do. Applications included developing economics education programs for the nation, and devising successful policies to encourage Japanese trade, industrialization, and business development, including development of the relevant public infrastructure. Generally, on the domestic level, the response of Japan to the Western economic challenge in this era paralleled the response of these three leaders, along with supporting the application of modern economic and business principles to daily business practice, and the huge growth of private sector business and industry that began in the Meiji era.

The cultural logics under these responses included assumptions that the West was more economically successful than Japan, that economic and business success was key to the West’s power (and power in general), that it would be for Japan, and that similar success for Japan was needed for it to remain free. For Japan to achieve this, it must learn from the already “successful.” The learning process involved absorbing relevant technical and social knowledge on economics and business from abroad,

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958 As noted before, on economic matters, Fukuzawa developed his main recommendations for the private sector, by writing widely for popular consumption and education in Japan, founding a university highly influential on Japanese business (Keio), and several successful businesses. Ito and Kato’s main work concerned the public sector, and their involvement in economic issues was less than in political affairs. Kato also wrote extensively on social issues (morality and ethics).

959 While modern accounting principles and others were widely applied throughout Japan, the application of these principles occurred within the overall context of Japanese business culture. While modern Japanese corporate and business cultures adopted many modern business practices and techniques from the West, Japan’s business culture did not disappear. Rather, it incorporated these techniques into the overall framework of relevant Japanese values, which have continued to evolve over time. Evidence of this adaptation process includes the fierce loyalty to the company (their lifelong employer) required of “salarymen” in the corporate culture of late twentieth century Japan. This was highly reminiscent of the loyalty expected of Tokugawa era samurai for their lords. Today, the expectation of lifelong employment in major corporations has lessened, due to Japan’s economic slowdown of the 1990s and early 2000s. This is also affecting the loyalty of contemporary young Japanese to their employers.
gathering data on Japan’s relevant conditions, and reflecting on how to best apply the foreign knowledge to Japan. Japanese also assumed that Japan could learn from foreign cultures, apply their knowledge, improve it, and “catch up,” as it had done for centuries. In the cultural logics behind their response to foreign phenomena, Japanese reacted partly on the basis of their previous experience with and response to similar phenomena, knowledge and technology from China and other Asian regions. There was pride that Japan, a great nation, should, could and must survive. Foreign economic knowledge must be applied in culturally appropriate ways. If not, it would not function well in Japan, whose society, culture and national identity would be threatened. Japanese leaders assumed that it was appropriate and useful to have strong public intervention in the private sector that would enable and enhance the social environment the private sector needs to flourish. Judging from the spread of modern business practices and Japan’s economic growth in the Meiji era, it seems they were correct.

Comparing the cultural logics under Japan’s response to the global phenomena affecting its domestic market, the new theory-related logics focus on assessing the meaning of economics for the West, and their application to Japan. Modern economics made the West more powerful and wealthier than Eastern nations. While economics were influential in late Tokugawa society, and the state of its economy was fairly advanced, due to the influence of Confucian ethics, economics and commerce did not enjoy the prestige they gained in the new Meiji world. Commerce was somewhat scorned in the Confucian and Buddhist worldviews, and merchants did not have a place

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960 I discuss the general state of the late Tokugawa economy in the domestic markets contexts section earlier in this chapter.
in the official social hierarchy of the late Tokugawa period. There is also the more material focus of these new cultural logics, as opposed to the more ethical and spiritual focus of late Tokugawa Neo-Confucian logics. In the Neo-Confucian logics, proper social hierarchy, harmony, honor, and duty drove society, but in the new Meiji world, entrepreneurialism, wealth and power did. Earlier in Japan’s history, the overwhelming wealth, power, beauty and wisdom of China and its cultural universe impressed the ancient Japanese. From the sixth century A.D., they began actively importing and absorbing these treasures from Korea and China. Somewhat similarly, the wealth, power and technology of the West impressed modern Japanese, and led them to embark on a new but greatly accelerated learning program in the late 1800s. The earlier experience with China influenced modern Japan’s response to the West, and somehow prepared it to embark on its new knowledge importation campaign. Hard work, necessary for the survival of each generation, has always been valued in Japan. Peasant farmers had always grown the rice that fed the nation, but were not given a position of honor in the social hierarchy of the late Tokugawa era.

In the Meiji era, business, commerce and the “science” behind them received unprecedented honor throughout society. Belief in a strong state is one assumption of pre-Meiji worldviews that carried into the new cultural universe of the Meiji era. The logic that Japan should learn from the “most successful” and powerful foreign models is another carry-over from Japan’s experience in the China-dominated universe to the Western one. The cultural leap the Japanese had to make in adjusting to the Western-dominated universe seems greater than that they made in adapting ancient Chinese influences. The receipt of the latter was the active choice of Japanese, and happened over
centuries, as opposed to Japan’s accelerated learning from the West in the late 1800s. Japanese took pride that they had imported, saved and/or improved key cultural and political features from China, many of which had long died out in China.\textsuperscript{961}

Japanese had a deep confidence, from their China experience, that they could also indigenize and improve Western imports. So prolonged involvement of foreigners was viewed as strange, obstructive, and unnecessary. In its experiences with ancient China and the modern West, Japan valued what appeared most powerful at the time. In the ancient world, it was the military and economic power and gigantic size of China, the depth and practicality of Confucianism and other Chinese philosophies, and the esoteric beauty and power of Buddhism and its artistic influences. In the late 1800s, Japanese were impressed with the military power, economic and technological strength of the West, from which they had isolated, by choice, for so long. The new Western-dominated cultural universe was largely “forced” on Japan, requiring a more accelerated, focused response from Japan’s leaders. Japan had less luxury of choice and time in the modern case. The new case placed almost exclusive emphasis on the material world, and comparatively little on the ethical or spiritual world.\textsuperscript{962} Foreign knowledge of the material realm, including technologies, science, and business techniques, gained an unprecedented place of honor in Japan. The “private sector” did as well.

In comparing the cultural logics under these domestic market worldviews identified above, on theoretical economic issues, the new Meiji assumption that money

\textsuperscript{961} One example of this is the national cultural treasures from ancient China and Japan stored and maintained at the Shōsō-in national treasure storehouse at Todaiji Temple in Nara, from the eighth century A.D. up to the modern age.

\textsuperscript{962} In spite of this, I have noted above the belief of Fukuzawa and Mori that Japan must master the “spirits” or cultural components surrounding Western political, economic and cultural achievements, and not mere techniques.
and material things drive the world contrasts with the older Confucian view, prevalent in the Tokugawa period, that proper harmony, social order, attention to ritual, duty and ethical behavior would save the nation. In the New Meiji view, Japan must work very hard and develop itself, but in the more traditional view, honor, order and proper ethical behavior were the primary characteristics of advanced societies. The new Meiji world focused on trade and external engagement, where the Confucian world focused on attaining the highest level of proper harmony and order within each society, believing, from the powerful example of China, that societies which did so would honor the proper ritual order of the universe, and prosper greatly. Societies that did not honor nature’s proper harmony and order, and those farthest from the greatest nation that did (China), were the most primitive and barbaric. A new logic emerging in late Tokugawa Japan began to doubt the benefits of Confucianism, since it now failed China, which was becoming a colony of the West. Though the Westerners were generally barbaric, they were very clever and powerful; therefore Japan must learn from them, so as not to suffer China’s fate.

Comparing the cultural logics on economics and business in Japan’s domestic market, we see in the new Meiji view, a nation’s power in the world is driven by material and economic productivity in society, based on the people’s hard work. In the Confucian cultural universe, national well-being is based on proper order, ritual and harmony in a nation. Hard work is the basis of survival, but the life of a scholar or bureaucrat who uses his mind, not just his muscles, is more honored.

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963 In Japan’s case, this wisdom was absorbed from a much more powerful external force, China, though in China’s case, it was not.
In the new Meiji cultural logics on business practice, entrepreneurialism and labor, business and hard work are highly honored. Confucianism, which has failed East Asia, is seen as backward and corrupt. Most fundamentally, hard work and solid business build a nation, not just ethics and philosophy. The market drives the prosperity of the nation and its people. In the Confucian universe of the late Tokugawa era, hard work is necessary for survival, but people of honor should be more than hard working, ignorant peasants. The universe has overall laws governing its operation and balance, for which we need careful study by scholars, or we will not understand the lessons of history and ourselves. To flourish, a society needs proper order, ethics, rituals and social relations on all levels, orderly government and wise rulers. If not, it will perish. Commerce is necessary for the functioning of society, but is cruder than ethical reflection. Japan is no exception. It needs all these things, and the hard work of its people. But they are unwise. They need the guidance and protection of wise leaders, their father the Emperor, and a harmonious society. Out of deep love, affection and thanks for their country and ancestors, Japanese must work hard, and maintain their families’ and nation’s honor.964

On the public sector, governments and their economic policies, the cultural logics of the Meiji period stress that Japan is a great country, currently weaker than the West, from which it faces a great threat. For successful development policy, Japan’s government must be strong and reform itself, learning best from governments of economic powerhouses most like Japan. Hard work, outstanding knowledge and

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964 The new Meiji state emphasized new patriotic values of devotion to the emperor and nation. They built on the Confucian-influenced bushido (samurai ethic) values of commitment and duty that were predominant in the Tokugawa period.
cooperation between sectors (public, private, and popular) will help Japan grow. Much knowledge can be gained from foreign experts, but Japanese know Japan best, and can best help it grow. In conservative Confucian views in the late Tokugawa era, those geographically furthest from the Confucian world are seen as most barbaric. Yet many Westerners are very smart, have impressive technology, and are gaining increasing power that threatens the East. Japan will soon have to face them, change, and grow. The Tokugawa regime is increasingly weak and corrupt. Japan must figure out how to open itself to Western knowledge, improve itself and grow, without being destroyed. How can Japan receive foreign knowledge, improve it, and make it its own? Does Japan need Western techniques yet Eastern spirit (wakon yosai), or both Western techniques and Western spirit?

In the Meiji era’s cultural logics of the international segments of business, firms, labor and their roles in the domestic market, economics and wealth are the basis of well-being of nations and their people, as seen in the West, and will be for Japan too. Japan must learn from the West’s economies, technologies, and societies. Japan must change, but not destroy its soul. Since foreign firms are the chief experts in business practice, Japan must learn from them. Their knowledge is crucial to help Japan grow and survive. The temporarily superior culture of the West has allowed its superior economic and scientific success. To succeed economically and technologically, Japan must change and become more like the West, culturally, or master certain (Western) social features.

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965 Wakon yosai (Japanese/Eastern ethics, Western techniques) is an important ideological slogan of the late Tokugawa period coined by Sakuma Shosan (1811-1864), a leading scholar of Western learning at the time. Sakuma used the phrase to signify that Japan urgently needed to learn Western science and technology, while maintaining its own Japanese spirit (“Sakuma Zosan,” in New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 10 [Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1993], 345).
that support such success.\footnote{966} In the more “traditional” and Confucian-influenced cultural logics of the late Tokugawa period, while Japan desperately needs foreign knowledge to survive, it does not desire many cultural aspects. Foreigners must not stay in Japan too long; their prolonged presence is a danger to Japan’s political, economic, and cultural survival. In China, India, and other parts of Asia, foreigners dictate to local governments, control and exploit their economies, and trample their cultures and religions. Westerners are culturally inferior to Japanese. They are smelly, hairier, “stinking of butter,” much cruder, and their religion (Christianity) believes in an intolerant god who cannot respect or allow Japan’s gods to coexist. Christianity is an imperialist tool that the Westerners tried to use before to invade, control and conquer Japan. Westerners have often nearly destroyed societies they have invaded. This must not be permitted in Japan. They must not overly contaminate the culture of Japan.\footnote{967}

On the roles of foreign technologies and knowledge in the domestic economy, the Meiji era’s new cultural logics see Western technology and science as superior to Japan’s, as what made the West so powerful. Japan needs them to survive. It is the government’s duty to help Japan to import them.\footnote{968} Business will become the most powerful tool to help Japan grow, the key factor behind economic growth and wealth, often more flexible and dynamic than government. Now Japan’s business sector is weaker than the West’s, but will grow stronger. The government must help business at

\footnote{966} The points about the West’s cultural superiority and mastering some of its social features are from Fukuzawa and Mori. 
\footnote{967} Some of the points about the cultural logics behind “traditional” and Confucian logics here sound stereotypical and extreme. To a degree, they may be, but many Japanese held such views during this period. 
\footnote{968} This flows from the government’s most basic duties to effectively rule the nation and guarantee its survival in the face of extensive (foreign) threats and other national emergencies.
this stage of Japan’s development. In more “traditional” and Confucian logics in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, Japan needs the West’s powerful technologies and knowledge to survive. Japan cannot stay isolated now. It must learn from these “clever barbarians,” without importing many of their ways. Hopefully Japan can keep them at arms’ length. The state must be strong, to stand up against foreigners and internal divisions. Without a strong state, Japan will not survive. Business was seen as ignoble in traditional Confucianism, but Japan must now use it to compete with the West.

For a brief summary comparing selected findings generated from this discussion of likely cultural logics underlying these domestic worldviews, see Table 4.1 below, which compares cultural logics of the knowledge importation campaign from mainland Asia (starting about the sixth century A.D. onward) with logics in the early Meiji era, and Table 4.2, which compares important cultural logics on the domestic market from the late Tokugawa era with those from the early Meiji era. From Table 4.1, we see that the earlier campaign placed more emphasis on spiritual, ethical and artistic items than the Meiji campaign did. The former campaign also took much, much longer than the latter campaign. The latter campaign was considered a matter of national survival. In Table 4.2, we observe a higher emphasis on ethical, philosophical-based knowledge, legal prohibition on interaction with foreigners, and an official scorn for business during the late Tokugawa period. In contrast, in the early Meiji era, there is a much greater focus on material and economic knowledge, learning and importing foreign knowledge, and encouragement of business.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Cultural Logics, China/Korea Importation Campaigns (6th Century A.D. onward) and Meiji Knowledge Importation Campaign (late 1800s-early 1900s).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China, Korea Campaigns</th>
<th>Early Meiji Era Campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wealth, power, technology, religion, arts from Asia mainland greatly impresses Japan</td>
<td>Wealth, power, technology, arts from the West greatly impresses Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importation campaign took centuries</td>
<td>Importation campaign took decades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan must learn from the most powerful, successful foreign model(s)</td>
<td>Japan must learn from the most powerful, successful foreign model(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Moderate,” less drastic cultural leap to adjust to Asian sources</td>
<td>“Drastic” cultural leap to adjust to Western sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whatever is most powerful, beautiful, and/or philosophically appealing is worth copying</td>
<td>Whatever is most powerful is worth copying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan chose to learn and copy from Asian sources, models</td>
<td>Japan forced to copy and learn Western sources, models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on importing many ideas and “spiritual” items, also many techniques</td>
<td>Heavy emphasis on importing technological items, little interest in Western spiritual ones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Comparison of Important Cultural Logics on the Domestic Market: Late Tokugawa Era and Early Meiji Era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Late Tokugawa (Neo-Confucian) Logics</th>
<th>Early Meiji Logics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More ethical focus</td>
<td>More materialist, economic focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business scorned, merely tolerated by the Tokugawa state; ethics/morality preferred by state</td>
<td>Business, economics, science behind them highly honored in Japan; needed for Japan’s survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in a strong state</td>
<td>Belief in a strong state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong emphasis on ethical, moral issues of Japanese origin, lesser interest in material issues</td>
<td>Heavy emphasis on material knowledge, items, little on spiritual items, issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger emphasis on ethical, moral world</td>
<td>Stronger emphasis on material world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Japanese,” indigenous knowledge of ethics, philosophy highly valued, Confucian, Buddhist knowledge less valued, Western knowledge least valued</td>
<td>Western materialist, scientific, economic, other knowledge highly valued; Mainland Asian knowledge often devalued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, commerce has low social status</td>
<td>Private sector honored, nurtured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper harmony, order, ritual, duty, ethics, behavior save a nation</td>
<td>Money, material things, power, hard work empower a nation, drive the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability, political and social order are the basis of Japan’s prosperity; wealth: not unimportant</td>
<td>Economics, wealth are the basis of a nation’s well-being, international status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign knowledge helpful for Japan, somewhat desired (especially military, medical knowledge)</td>
<td>Foreign knowledge mandatory for Japan’s national survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign cultural knowledge restricted by Japan’s state, highly desired in certain cases and by some individuals</td>
<td>Foreign knowledge highly desired by the state, which embarks on aggressive importation campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of foreigners is legally banned, except for limited trade in limited locations in Southwest</td>
<td>Presence of foreign experts is highly encouraged, but only for short periods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Japan

Continuing fear of “cultural contamination” by the West

Overseas travel by Japanese is banned; a small number slip abroad anyway

Overseas travel and study by Japanese highly encouraged, though few can go

The West’s science, technology: highly desired, imported as Japan is able. Yet protecting Japan’s national isolation cannot be compromised.

West’s science, technology are highly desired, have made it strong; aggressive imports encouraged by the state.

Conclusion

Regarding the first main question of this research, the influence of Japan’s experience in technology, development and foreign relations (and key leaders’ views about them) from 1850 to 1945, here I will trace general connections, while I will attempt to identify more specific linkages in Chapters 9 and 10, the concluding chapters. On sociocultural issues, in this era, Japan was definitely willing to look abroad to absorb foreign knowledge (during the late Meiji and Taisho eras), but as it got closer to World War II, it was less willing and able. Today’s aid follows this lesson well. Japan’s aid encourages openness and foreign learning by LDCs. Another key issue, not considered in Japan in this era, was what the state of an LDC can do to try to relieve the social costs of development, if anything.

On domestic political economy issues, in facing political development and reforms, in this era, Japan resorted to repression somewhat, and sought to limit democracy and other possible forms of dissention. Unfortunately most leaders did not really worry about what kinds of economic development might be the most appropriate for Japanese society at the time. Japan did maintain its overall goals for independence and national unity. Despite the destruction brought by the nation’s authoritarian system by 1945, Japan’s national unity served it very well.
On economic policy and development, from 1850 to 1895, Japan did not pursue a balanced approach to industrialization, but focused on heavy industrialization and encouraging large parts of the private sector, such as the zaibatsu. On the role of development ideologies, during this era, Japan was willing to aggressively borrow foreign ideas and ideologies to help with its economic growth. Japan also used several indigenous ideologies to encourage growth and management, influenced by samurai and Confucian values.

Next, on the second key question of the dissertation, I will consider if the ideas of “modernization” and translative adaptation, as seen in the worldviews of the domestic state and market in Chapter 4, present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1895. All five leaders support the concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation in their views of the state, and the three leaders studied on the domestic market also support the two concepts. Regarding “modernization” in worldviews of the domestic state, all five leaders studied (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Kato, and Yamagata) supported it. All were nationalistic in their political goals, wanting Japan to strengthen its internal politics so that it could repel the West. While they varied in their views of the exact form political reforms should take, none wanted Japanese society destroyed. On “modernization” and the domestic market, Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato all supported the concept. All knew that Japan’s economy was weak, that Japan needed to learn from the West in economics to prevent invasion, and none wanted to lose Japan’s identity. On translative adaptation and the domestic state, all five leaders studied supported political change and development for Japan’s survival. So all five supported

969 The concept of internationalization is not considered in Chapter 4.
translative adaptation in their goal to strengthen Japan through political reforms, and assure its survival as a people, a nation, and a culture. And the three leaders studied on the domestic market also supported translative adaptation, that imported Western economic practices and technologies must enhance, not destroy, deeper features of Japanese culture.

Regarding technology issues and the domestic state, rapid political reforms allowed Japan to quickly rebuild the Japanese government after the Meiji Restoration. The rapid development of an effective bureaucracy, and the strong emphasis on the military, meant that Japan marshaled its forces fairly rapidly to build up the nation’s capacities in military, economic, industrial, scientific and technological capacities. The Meiji state also used these capacities to limit movements and protests pressing for more political rights. Technology also played a very major role in the growth of Japan’s domestic market in this period. Faced with the possibility of intense competition from abroad, certain industries such as textiles and iron received key input from the state, and Japan’s industrial revolution started in the late 1880s.

Concerning development, in domestic political development, Japan adopted several political institutions that were mainly modeled on authoritarian, monarchical systems in late nineteenth century Europe, especially from Germany, including a constitution, a limited parliament, extensive bureaucracy, autocratic emperor, and a large, powerful military. Political development encouraged by the state included a set of nationalistic ideologies that were conservative in nature. More liberal ideologies were not yet allowed to take root. On economic development, by the mid-1800s, the late Tokugawa economy had developed to a very sophisticated pre-industrial level. After the
Meiji restoration (1868), the Meiji government aggressively targeted particular heavy industries for initial emphasis and growth, promoting development ideologies such as fukoku kyôhei for this purpose. The private sector slowly began to emerge. Government emphasis in this period especially targeted large-scale industries and businesses for development.

While international contexts of politics and economics (1850 to 1895) will mostly be discussed in Chapter 5, regarding Japan’s experiences in the domestic state, there are many examples of foreign models for Japan’s parliament, constitution, bureaucracy, the military, and of political ideas and ideologies. The most influential ideas and models in this period came from Europe, while some came from the United States. In the domestic market, influential economic forces included various industrial technologies, principles, theories, and practices of economics, finance, business and banking. Ideas regarding the labor movement and workers’ rights also entered Japan, though they were heavily suppressed by the state during this period.

All of the leaders studied in Chapter 4, five on domestic state issues, and three on domestic market issues, support the basic concepts of “modernization” and translatable adaptation in the worldviews we have studied. In the domestic contexts surveyed here, do the ideas of “modernization” and translatable adaptation in these worldviews well represent Japan’s experiences in technology, development and foreign relations? On “modernization, while all of the leaders studied in the chapter agree that Japan must import needed political and economic ideas and technologies, all want Japan’s essential cultural integrity in these areas to remain intact. From the items imported, what happened in practice? The military and industrial technologies inevitably began to greatly alter
Japan’s rural and urban landscapes. The creation of a new extensive, national bureaucracy did as well. The spread of various new values, including nationalism, patriotism, and market-oriented production norms could not help but change many aspects of Japanese life, since in Tokugawa Japan, culture, politics and much of daily life operated on a highly regionalized level, given the division of the nation into numerous, rather isolated feudal domains. Economics was more integrated on a national level than were politics or culture. There is little evidence that many aspects of Japan’s core culture were fundamentally changed, though. For example, most of the new corporate ideologies that emerged for Japan’s new private sector were based on neo-Confucian values of the ie system and the bushido code. In development, the imported political items were carefully designed to match Japan’s conservative culture of politics, and liberal political and economic ideologies were discouraged by the state. However, the state, in its major emphasis on promoting large-scale industries, did not seem very cognizant of the need to protect small-scale and localized agriculture, cottage industries or merchants. For the most part, practices seem sensitive to the issues of “modernization,” except on the need to protect local industries.

Though all of the leaders also supported the theory of translatable adaptation, what happened in practice? As Japan imported various new political and economic technologies and items, did its culture adapt well? Though review of grounded, ethnographic data would be needed to authoritatively answer this question, from my study here, it appears that Japan’s basic culture adapted fairly well to the huge influx of foreign technologies, institutions and ideologies promoted for development. Though inevitably altered, I wish to argue that the deepest aspects of Japanese culture remained
mostly intact through this period of tumultuous change. This is also the conclusion of many Japanese scholars. The foreign items that were imported were particularly chosen on the basis of helping Japan to quickly modernize, but also to not clash too greatly with Japan’s conservative politics and culture. The latter, in particular, had been extremely isolated from foreign, especially Western, input for so long. In general, the economic imports seem less sensitive than the political ones on the need to protect Japan’s cultural core. The primary emphasis there is on quickly enriching the country so it can defend itself economically and militarily, to simply survive.

In the data in the historical worldviews of the domestic state and market presented here, is there evidence of how Japanese views of spirituality may have affected policies in general? On the issue of spirit and spirituality, in my discussion about domestic politics, I note Fukuzawa’s and Mori’s concern for mastery of the supportive “spirits” (values) surrounding technology, and how the cultural logics behind worldviews of the domestic state seem more materialistic than spiritual in tone. In my treatment of spiritual values and domestic market worldviews, I noted how there seemed to be a general de-emphasis of spiritual values in the economic worldviews, and a more ethical focus in late Tokugawa cultural logics contrasted with a greater emphasis on the material world in Meiji logics. There was also a need for Japanese to master the spirit behind Western political, economic, business and cultural achievements.

Regarding the contrasting theme of the role of material phenomena in these worldviews, in the cultural logics on domestic politics (1850 to 1895), material values are emphasized more than spiritual ones, likely partly because of the strong images of the sheer power of the West’s technologies displayed in conflicts with China and other
countries, and Western technology’s power to conquer and control many of them as colonies and areas of influence. The domestic market worldview here de-emphasizes non-material phenomena, sees the world as primarily economically driven, and offers material causes as the major explanation for world events. Money and material things drive the world in the cultural logics under these domestic market worldviews. These cultural logics had a mostly material focus, while the domestic market cultural logics of the late Tokugawa era were mainly ethical and neo-Confucian in orientation. The foreign, Western items favored for importation in the Meiji era were generally more material in emphasis than items imported from Asia since the sixth century A.D. Foreign knowledge of material things was more valued in the Meiji era. In the new Meiji world and worldview, money and material things drove the world (and determine a nation’s power), but in the late Tokugawa era, harmony and proper ritual did.

In the brief comments on religion in this chapter, I note while a few of the Meiji leaders identified Western religious values and Christianity as having a major role associated with the “spirits” behind Western scientific and technological success, the economy-focused worldview of the domestic market tended to de-emphasize non-material phenomena and knowledge, such as religion. The economic images in the domestic market data would also tend to encourage Japanese leaders to reject traditional fields not seen as crucial for practical Japanese knowledge acquisition, such as religion. These were only valued if they seemed to contribute to Japanese survival. In their observations of Westerners, Japanese saw that the former tended to trample the cultures and religions of those they invaded, and Christianity seemed highly intolerant. In spite of

970 Here I am referring to Mori and Fukuzawa.
all these factors, I noted how in contemporary Japan [and actually in late Tokugawa and Meiji era Japan as well], the Japanese practice of spirituality, even if often not defined as “religion,” is quite pervasive.\textsuperscript{971}

What possible impacts did these views have on policies from 1850 to 1895? There seemed to be pressure against spirituality in the worldviews and cultural logics in this period, in domestic state and market views. The material-oriented worldviews and logics on politics and economics of the early Meiji era seemed to dominate the more ethical/philosophical ones that were predominant in the late Tokugawa period. The general discouragement of spirituality seen in these worldviews would also tend to discourage religion. Religion was only valued where it was seen as practical, i.e. where it might contribute to the construction of the nation. The policies likely to result from these views would focus on practical economic and political concerns centered on building Japan as a nation. Religion and spirituality would not be much of a concern unless they would contribute to that cause. Compared with the views of spirituality that I mentioned in Chapter 3, these views seem less encouraging of them. But in both cases in Chapters 3 and 4, we see a willingness to use spirituality and religion if they will contribute to the supreme national goal of building the nation to avoid colonization by the West. This indeed happened when the state chose to create State Shinto as the national religion and patriotic practice. This is the most direct policy application in this period seen here.

The major conflicts identified here are between the emphasis material and economic concerns over spiritual and ethical ones, noted in the major worldviews and cultural logics on the domestic state and politics. There is also the conflict between the

\textsuperscript{971} See my brief discussion earlier in this chapter on the general religiosity of contemporary Japanese.
more ethical/philosophical/spiritual orientation in late Tokugawa worldviews and logics here, and the more material concerns that were predominant in the early Meiji era. Japan’s urgent need for survival helped to generate this shift. But I also noted above that in actual practice, in everyday life, it is highly likely that the daily practice of religion and spirituality did not diminish. So while there was a much more overt emphasis on political and economic concerns in the policy actions of most Japanese leaders, the knowledge that Japan must not abandon its own heritage, culture or spiritual identity was assumed, though not overtly.

What were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid, over the long run? What we see here is that pressures to separate consideration of spiritual factors from the nation’s daily activities in political and economic affairs may have entered along with the Western, materialist, scientific worldviews and assumptions behind Japan’s political and economic reform programs in this era. Although the political and economic policies that Japan attempted to copy from the West may have included some policies of Western, especially European, countries that assumed the integration of church and state (several authoritarian political models), the Flaw of the Excluded Middle was also present, the secularizing influence of the French Enlightenment. In the actual policies for politics and economics that Japan enacted, there is little overt consideration of religion and spirituality, especially in the economic areas. Where secularizing tendencies may have occurred, it is hard to say whether they resulted from the Western-generated “Flaw,” and Japan’s own secularizing political tendencies.

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972 See the definition of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle in the Glossary, and the brief discussion of the issues it entails in Chapter 1.
In contrast, though, in the early Meiji period, the state instituted State Shinto to help build and motivate the nation. If anything, this seems to have represented somewhat of a reversal, from whatever secularizing source. There is no indication that the integration of spirituality with everyday life, even in things that could be called “political” or “economic,” disappeared. Given the presence of such practices in Japan today (noted above), I would argue that such practices remained during this era.

All of this suggests that although the postwar Japanese state and bureaucracy have been required to de-link all formal connections between religion and the state, some subtle connections might still remain. There is the famous case of Yasukuni Shrine, where the spirits of Japan’s war dead are enshrined. Many other Asian countries have complained that the visit of many prime ministers to the shrine to pray to the spirits of the war dead amounts to glorification of war crimes, mixing of religion and state, and ignorance of the feelings of the peoples of many of Japan’s Asian neighbors. Does this mean that some subtle signs of spirituality might be present in Japanese aid, or shape how the contemporary aid policymaking process occurs? Or are there subtle hints about spirituality in the aid policies, programs, loans and grants that are offered, or the aid outcomes that are generated? Although I cannot this question fully in the present project, it is interesting to ponder. We will see what insights emerge in Chapters 5 and 6, where I consider leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external politico-economic and cultural relations, 1850 to 1895.

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973 To answer this question, it would be necessary to do ethnographic fieldwork on the Japanese aid policymaking process.
Chapter 5

Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895)

International Political Economy Issues

Introduction

This chapter, on Japan’s external relations (1850-1895), examines decision makers’ notions of how Japan interacts with influences from outside Japan in its political and economic relations, and in its emerging imperialism. As we begin our examination of influences and contexts that are specifically international, and of views about them, a major point is that most of the change that occurred in Japan came because of its increasing contact and interaction with foreign influences, cultures and technologies. The massive influx of these forces into Japan began in this era. What major changes occurred as a result of Japan’s interactions with these forces? In Chapter 5 we will study the influence of Japan’s external relations in politics and economics, and of Japanese imperialism, while Chapter 6 examines issues connected with Japan’s external cultural relations in this period. What connection might these changes have with Japan’s contemporary aid policies? Several possible significant lessons for development and aid policies emerge, which I offer in the conclusion. Below I also argue that although several of these leaders were strongly convinced that spiritual factors were potentially important
contributors to aiding Japan’s reform process in this era, several forces fought against these contributions. But those forces could not prevent the significant emergence of State Shinto during this period, nor did they limit the powerful influence spirituality exercised on various policies from 1895-1945. Exploring these issues for this period will help us further lay the foundation for their implications for current Japanese aid.

After briefly surveying the contexts of Japan’s external political and economic relations (1850-1895), we will examine the views of selected leaders. On worldviews of external political relations, I discuss the views of all five leaders studied for this era (Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, Mori Arinori, Yamagata Aritomo and Kato Hiroyuki). On external economic relations, we will briefly examine the views of Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato. Leaders’ views of imperialism emerge more fully in 1895-1945, so I will consider them in Chapter 8, which covers that period.

Here imperialism includes the general thought of Japanese thinkers and leaders about colonialism and imperialism, Japanese government policies for building colonialism and empire, important imperialist doctrines and ideologies, and the state of Japanese-controlled or heavily influenced colonies, territories and possessions. In Chapter 5, I include two territories that were eventually incorporated into Japan proper: Hokkaido island and Okinawa/the Ryukyu Islands. 974 Briefly, colonialism refers to “control by one power over a dependent area or people,” or “a policy advocating or based

on such control."帝国主义 may be defined as “the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation [,] especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; broadly: the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence….”

Japanese overseas imperialism did not fully emerge until after the close of the period covered in the present chapter (1850-1895), after Japan’s victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, when Japan was awarded its first overseas colony in Taiwan. Nevertheless, relevant antecedents of overseas imperialism occurred when the Japanese government chose to colonize first Hokkaido, and then Okinawa/the Ryukyu Islands, both of which were soon fully incorporated into the main part of Japan. I will examine the issue of imperialism more fully in Chapter 8, which covers the period of major Japanese colonialism and imperialism (1895-1945), including analysis of the worldviews of relevant leaders. I did not gather much data on the views of the five leaders studied for this chapter on imperialism and colonialism for the period 1850-1895, so I will not discuss and analyze leaders’ views of imperialism until Chapter 8. However, contexts related to imperialism are included here in Chapter 5.

For consistency of analysis, when possible, I will use the same analytical concepts to assess leaders’ worldviews of international issues and contexts as I used for domestic ones. In Chapter 5, I use the same three concepts for analysis of cognitive issues: image, worldview (my definition), and cultural logics. But using the same analytical concepts for international issues is not always possible. To analyze

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975 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 1983), 261. Also see the more detailed definitions of colonialism and imperialism in the Glossary section.

976 Ibid., 604.
development-related aspects of the leaders’ worldviews of international issues, I will
draw mainly on the concept of internationalization, and on “modernization,” where
appropriate. The two concepts are very similar. Translative adaptation is not so relevant
for external issues, so it will not be used. In this chapter, I will not really look at domestic
issues, including those of the regions and countries that came under the influence of
Japanese imperialism and colonialism. “Modernization” tends to focus more on global
economic processes, on the global economic system dominated by Western countries,
and their effect on the internal cultural evolution of non-Western countries, as they are
absorbed into the economic system.977 “Modernization” stresses the cultural effects of
global economic processes, of the West upon the non-West, integrates both global and
local (external and internal, international and domestic) factors, and concepts from
development economics and anthropology.

Internationalization focuses more on external, international processes, on what
happens as the more powerful West in the “core” absorbs other peoples from the
periphery into the global economic system. As this happens, the West, assumed to be
more “active,” dominates the weaker, more passive “periphery” countries. This concept
not only looks at economic factors, but also considers cultural issues, to a degree. What
happens as the peripheral countries, from non-Western regions such as Asia, Africa, the
South Pacific and Latin America, are absorbed into the “cultural universe” of the West?
While “modernization” considers the cultural effects of the global economy on the

977 The key question with “modernization” is what happens to the (internal) cultures of non-Western
countries as they are absorbed into the Western-dominated global economic system. “Modernization”
answers that the cultures of the non-Western countries will be “Western” on the surface, but not in their
core areas, if development succeeds. If their core areas are destroyed, then development can be called a
“failure.”
domestic cultures of peripheral nations, internationalization does not really consider the internal implications at all. It especially examines what has happened on the international level through historic processes of colonialism. “Modernization” does not really look at issues of colonialism. And internationalization’s focus is not exclusively on historical issues. It also looks at contemporary issues, of what happens on the international level as Western/international development ideologies such as free markets, democracy, good governance, sustainability, participatory development, human rights, and WID (women in development) impinge on non-Western countries. Internationalization is also relevant for examining imperialism, though on a historic level, not on a contemporary one. Can these contemporary processes (such as the imposition of Western/international development ideologies on peripheral countries) be called “imperialism”? That seems rather a strong charge. Perhaps the term global hegemony (or domination) might be more appropriate.

After reflecting on technology concepts in several different disciplines, I came up with basic questions in six categories to consider the technological implications of these worldviews on the international level: 1) General concepts of technology: what are the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with each international worldview studied here? 2) Technology in the international system: what

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978 See the definition of development ideology in the Glossary. I use the terms Western and international together here, because at present, Western countries from North America and Western Europe largely dominate the global enterprise of international development, in such organizations as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many of the multinational development banks. A non-Western power, Japan, is highly influential in the operations of the Asian Development Bank. But as we saw in the discussion of the place of Japanese aid in the global aid system in Chapter 2, Japan does not occupy a central place in the global aid system. It is likely that the system will become more diversified with the gradual rise of possible new economic powers in this century, such as China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and others.

979 See the definitions of colonialism and ideology, and of hegemony in the Glossary. These concepts have hegemony and domination have been developed by anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff, and also by Antonio Gramsci. See Comaroff and Comaroff, Revelation and Revolution.

980 For more details, see the various technology-related concepts in the Glossary.
are the most significant political (economic, social, other) factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in the international worldview studied here? And did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or negatively? Why? 3) Technology transfer: what were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in the worldviews under consideration? Who were the main international actors in the external environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they have on the transfer outcomes? What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn? 4) Technology, culture, and the international system: what are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these international worldviews? In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level? How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? 5) Technology, cognition, and international relations: do the belief systems of any of these leaders (on technology issues on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing

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981 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
982 Ibid.
983 This could be called the “international cultural ecology approach” to technology. This question is drawn from this anthropological definition of technology: “the means and agencies by which human societies cope with and transform their material environment” (Glick, “Technology,” 464). This definition is based on the theory of cultural ecology in anthropology, the study of how human societies adapt to surrounding environments, through technology and other means (Richard O. Clemmer, Daniel Myers, and Mary Elizabeth Rudden, Julian Steward and the Great Basin: The Making of an Anthropologist (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999); Yehudi A. Cohen, Man in Adaptation: The Cultural Present (Chicago: Aldine, 1974). Here I apply that idea to the study of international relations, how a particular nation-state or national actor uses technology and related phenomena to adapt to and transform its surrounding environment in the international system.
984 Again, this is the cultural ecology approach to technology, applied to international relations. See Clemmer, Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward, and Cohen, Man in Adaptation for some explorations of the concept of cultural ecology.
conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes?

And 6) Technonationalism as ideology: in these worldviews on external relations, is the concept of technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how?

Above I noted that I will use the same analytical concepts for cognition issues on the international level as I used on the domestic level. Also in this chapter I introduce an additional analytical framework related to globalization. Key aspects identified in my anthropological treatment of globalization include speeded up and intensified global connections, including economic, social, cultural, and political linkages. Globalization can be ethnographically and comparatively assessed on the micro-level (how it is perceived by individual, human actors) or the macro-level (public, shared perceptions). It does not spread from one center or cultural tradition, but from several.985 From this definition, we see that globalization applies to our contemporary age, but what about Japan in the period 1850-1895? The period of 1850 to 1895 represented unprecedented globalization for Japan, as evidenced by its return into the global system in 1868, and the spread of global communications (i.e. the telegraph) and transport (rail, ships) in this era, among other things. Here are the key questions I will explore to uncover the globalization aspects of international worldviews in this chapter, Chapter 6 and Chapter 8: 1) How do some of the most important worldviews here reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? And how does globalization affect the worldviews? 2) If we consider these

global processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? 3) Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance?

Contexts of Japan’s Foreign Relations (1850-1895): Major Trends

**Contexts: Japan’s External Political Relations**

To enhance its authority in Japan and East Asia, the Tokugawa Shogunate adopted a policy of national seclusion (*sakoku*) from 1639 to 1854. The policy banned Christianity and its missionaries from Japan, most Japanese travel overseas, and limited foreign trade to four countries (with China, Holland, Korea and the Ryukyus), through just a few ports. In 1853, “black ships” from the United States helped to force open Japan. Japan officially opened in 1854, signing treaties of diplomatic relations with the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and others. In 1858, Japan signed several unequal trade and friendship treaties that granted foreign powers extraterritorial rights, and limited Japan’s capacity to tax foreign trade. Through these, Japan was absorbed into an unequal system of foreign relations dominated by Western nations. This led to an outflow of gold from Japan, raising commodity prices, internal unrest, and anti-foreign feelings. The Shogunate was overthrown in 1867.

After 1868, the new Meiji government began a program of aggressive internal westernization, to strengthen the nation and prevent its colonization by the West. Soon Japan began negotiations to end the unequal treaties, not achieved until 1911. Japan was

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also involved in significant events on the Asian mainland. In 1876, Japan forced Korea to sign a treaty granting the former unequal rights of trade, ahead of all other foreign powers. Korea was a significant sphere of Chinese influence. Various events led to war with China over Korea (1894-1895), which Japan finally won, gaining colonies in Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands. Reparations from China contributed significantly to Japan’s industrialization, and gave greater access to the Chinese market for Japanese business.  

Japan also sent several significant official missions to tour the United States and Europe in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, including six Shogunate missions in the 1860s, and the famous Iwakura mission (1871-1873). The missions provided the government the opportunity to attempt to renegotiate the unfair commercial treaties (to no avail), and to obtain technological knowledge. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, founded in 1869, stood at the height of the bureaucratic pyramid in the early Meiji period, and was the only bureaucracy with the foreign expertise to translate and negotiate treaties and other external matters.

Japan’s closest foreign relations in this period were with the United States. The United States is the country that has perhaps most influenced Japan for the last one hundred fifty years. The two societies were very different at their first contact in the 1853, and their subsequent relations might be called, for the most part, “distant but harmonious.” In the 1870s, both possessed modernizing militaries, industries, and political systems. At first, Japan learned much more from the United States than the

988 Ibid., “History of International Relations,” 616-617.
reverse; many American teachers and other foreign visitors helped Japanese to gain their first (direct) exposure to Western knowledge, science and culture.\textsuperscript{991}

In Asia, until the late 1800s, Japan was continually influenced by Chinese traditions that it reshaped into a distinctive civilization. With China’s loss of the Opium War (1840-1842), many Japanese saw China as increasingly backward. Meiji Japan and Qing China signed a treaty of friendship in 1871, but tensions erupted over Japan’s interests and actions in the Ryukyus (Okinawa), Taiwan, and finally in Korea, significant areas of Chinese influence. Events in Korea resulted in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) that Japan won. By 1895, Japan gained colonies in all three areas.\textsuperscript{992} Japan had had distant relations with Korea during the Tokugawa period, but after the Meiji Restoration, the latter maintained its seclusion policy.\textsuperscript{993} Japanese pressure for influence there led to conflict with China.\textsuperscript{994} Japan’s relations with Russia were also important. After 1868, both nations competed and occasionally cooperated regarding influence in Northeast Asia, especially in China, Manchuria and Korea. After Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War, the Russians became increasingly concerned.\textsuperscript{995} Toyotomi Hideyoshi, an important Japanese leader, attempted unsuccessfully to invade Taiwan in 1593. After 1868, Japanese interest in Taiwan increased as Japan contemplated resisting

\textsuperscript{991} Japan, “The United States and Japan,” 1656.
\textsuperscript{992} Ibid., “China and Japan,” 188-189.
\textsuperscript{993} Before the Tokugawa period, in 1592 and 1597, Japan invaded Korea, but was repelled by the Koreans and the Chinese. This inflicted great damage on Korea (Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827). This signature case seems to have contributed greatly to tensions and ill feeling on both sides of the Korea Strait for a long period.
\textsuperscript{994} Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827-828.
\textsuperscript{995} Ibid., “Russia and Japan,” 1277-1278.
Western colonialism and acquiring its own colonies.\textsuperscript{996} Japan also began to restore trade and diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian regions. These relations had ended with the national isolation period (1639-1854).\textsuperscript{997}

Regarding Europe, Japan’s relations with Great Britain were the most important. Britain was an important model for Japanese industrialization. Important Japanese scholars studied in Britain, and British teachers in Japan made significant contributions to Meiji Japan’s development.\textsuperscript{998} Germany and France both had a significant influence on early Meiji Japan, in the areas of medicine, law, politics, economics, education, and the military.\textsuperscript{999}

Concerning intellectual trends in international relations from 1850 to 1895, the ideology of sonnō jōi (“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians,”) expressed the goal of national unity under imperial rule and shunning contact with foreigners. This political doctrine was used to encourage the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate, to support the Meiji Restoration, and to contribute to the building of the modern Japanese state.\textsuperscript{1000} In 1873, a major debate (Seikanron) broke out over whether Japan should punish Korea for refusing its overtures for improved relations. Pro-attack supporters lost the debate.\textsuperscript{1001}

After 1868, former samurai organized the imperial army and navy on Western principles into one of the world’s most formidable armed forces. In line with fukoku kyōhei and the importation of advanced technologies to prevent Western invasion, the

\textsuperscript{996} Ibid., “Taiwan,” 1504. For more on Japan and Taiwan, see my discussion below (in Chapters 8 and 10) on Japan’s imperialistic interests in Taiwan from 1895 to 1945.
\textsuperscript{997} Ibid., “Southeast Asia and Japan,” 1449.
\textsuperscript{998} Ibid., “United Kingdom and Japan,” 1504.
\textsuperscript{999} German advisors influenced the Meiji constitution, and the Japanese army was modeled after Prussia’s. Ibid., “Germany and Japan,” 452; Ibid., “France and Japan,” 407.
\textsuperscript{1000} Ibid., “Sonnō Jōi,” 1445.
\textsuperscript{1001} Ibid., “Seikanron,” 1336.
government founded a modern army drawing on all classes of society in 1869. The army was modeled on Prussia’s, and the navy on Great Britain’s. Before 1870, the military focused on internal security, but soon began preparing for foreign wars. National conscription began in 1873, and large-scale build-up in 1884. “The independence of the supreme command” concept and active military leaders in the cabinet would have profound effects on Japan’s politics. In the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan totally defeated China, and became the Far East’s superior power. For Japan, the war meant the point when the military began decisive influence in politics, when power politics came to influence foreign policy, with empire building in China as a primary target, and intensified industrialization. These trends greatly affected Japanese society and Asian international relations for the next half-century.

**Contexts: Japan’s External Economic Relations**

During the Tokugawa period, the Dutch were the only Europeans allowed to trade with Japan. During national seclusion, the Dutch became the main source of Western knowledge for Japan. Japan opened to more extensive foreign trade in 1858, with the signing of the Harris Treaty with the United States. At first, Japan’s largest exports were raw silk, raw material goods and foodstuffs, and semi-manufactures. Key imports included textiles, ironware, ships, and guns. Major trading partners were Great

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1002 *Fukoku kyôhei* means “rich nation, strong army.” See the discussion in Chapter 4 and in the Glossary section.
1003 Ibid., “Imperial Japanese Armed Forces.”
1005 Ibid., “Dutch Trade,” 299.
Britain (which received eighty percent of Japan’s trade), the United States and Holland.  

After 1868, the first major goal of Meiji Japan’s trade policies was to achieve equality with the West. Unequal treaties signed with major Western powers limited Japan’s negotiating power. Japan did not attain tariff independence until 1911. After 1868, Japan’s foreign trade, including exports and imports, grew every year. The government’s first promotion of trade occurred in 1873. The Meiji government supported Japan’s modernization with loans, subsidies and technical help. Japan had to import commodities, equipment and other materials that it did possess, paid for through exports. From 1868 to 1912, there were only twelve years when Japan had a surplus balance of trade. In the early Meiji era, both the Japanese government and private firms viewed foreign investment in Japan as a means for Japan to acquire access to foreign markets, technology, capital, and management experience, so they actively sought foreign technical assistance. Many foreign instructors and engineers came to Japan, and brought a great deal of industrial expertise, but Japan was wary of foreign domination, so most foreign instructors did not stay long. The first Japanese businesses to operate overseas were trading companies that opened branches in China, Europe and the United States, from 1876. Early businesses also included those related to silk and textiles, banking and insurance.

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1008 Ibid., “Foreign Investment in Japan,” 398.
In the Meiji era, Japan gained much of its knowledge of foreign technological and economic systems through American teachers visiting Japan, and young Japanese going abroad. Very soon this economic relationship would become important for Japan, the United States, and the security of the whole Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{1010} Limited trade between Japan and Korea continued during the Tokugawa period. After 1868, Japan pressured Korea to open itself to diplomatic and trade relations, which Korea resisted. Eventually the two countries signed an unequal treaty in 1876 that granted Japan dominant trading power. Competition with China over Korea led to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1894), and formal Japanese colonization in Korea from 1910.\textsuperscript{1011} Limited trade between Japan and Taiwan (via the Dutch) earlier in the Tokugawa period greatly decreased after 1683. Taiwan became a Japanese colony after the Sino-Japanese War, so its economic importance for Japan would soon increase. Britain dominated Japan’s foreign trade in the early Meiji period, and British instructors and engineers aided Japan’s industrialization and railroad development.\textsuperscript{1012} Instructors from Germany and France also had significant input in Japan’s technological and economic growth in this period.\textsuperscript{1013}

\textsuperscript{1010}Economic factors such as immigration, trade, and pressures for resource-poor Japan to colonize Asia are among the issues that would soon emerge. See my discussion of economic connections between the United States and Japan from 1895 to 1945 below in Chapter 8. Ibid., “United States and Japan,” 1656-1657.
\textsuperscript{1011}Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827-828.
\textsuperscript{1012}Ibid., “Foreign Trade,” 399; Ibid., “United Kingdom and Japan,” 1655.
\textsuperscript{1013}Instructors from Germany advised Japan on such areas as chemistry, mining, agriculture, and French teachers helped with economics and industrialization, in particular. Ibid., “Germany and Japan,” 452; Ibid., “France and Japan,” 407.
Contexts: Japan’s External Relations: Imperialism

Japan’s first attempts at colonialism began soon after the Meiji Restoration (1868). The Meiji government realized the strategic importance of Hokkaido and other northern islands (including Sakhalin and the Kuriles), and established the Kaitakushi (Hokkaido Colonization Office) in 1869. In a treaty signed with Russia in 1875, Russia gained control of Sakhalin, while the Kaitakushi controlled Hokkaido and the Kuriles. The Kaitakushi hired many foreign advisors who helped to found the forerunner of Hokkaido University. The Kaitakushi aggressively advocated the development of Hokkaido, but in doing so, systematically denied the indigenous Ainu population their hunting, fishing and land rights. A political scandal erupted in 1881, and the Kaitakushi was disbanded in 1882. By 1886, all of Hokkaido became a modern Japanese prefecture. To help develop Hokkaido, in 1873 the national government established the Tondenhei (Colonist Militia), composed of former samurai from various northern prefectures, to settle in Hokkaido. By 1882, over 2,400 settlers had moved to Hokkaido under the program. By 1890, as Russia’s interests in the Far East became much more visible, Japan ramped up efforts to increase the number of settlers and its military presence in the region. Over 40,000 people, both former samurai and commoners, were

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1014 Hokkaido is the northernmost island of contemporary Japan. Before the Meiji era, Japanese settlement primarily extended up through the northern end of Honshu Island and the southern tip of Hokkaido, around the region of the city of Hakodate. Sakhalin is a long, narrow island located just north of Hokkaido, and separated from the Siberian mainland by a narrow strait.

1015 According to an 1855 treaty, Sakhalin was to be jointly occupied by both Russia and Japan, but tensions increased in the 1860s and 1870s. Japan’s presence formally ended with the treaty signed in 1875, but this was not the end of Russo-Japanese conflict over the island (Ibid., “Sakhalin,” 1301).

recruited. By 1904, with an adequate increase in population and the presence of an army division in the territory, the *Tondenhei* system ended.\textsuperscript{1017}

The Ryukyu Islands had paid regular tribute to China since the fourteenth century. Although Japan exercised much influence in the Ryukyu Islands since 1609, the year of an invasion by the Satsuma domain, it was not until 1872 that the Meiji government designated the islands as a daimyo domain and announced to Western governments that it would take responsibility for diplomatic affairs. In 1879, the government declared the Ryukyus to be Okinawa prefecture under the new prefectural system, and China’s Qing dynasty complained. It was not until the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1895) that China agreed to Japan’s acquisition of the Ryukyus.\textsuperscript{1018}

One of the doctrines guiding Japanese expansion starting about this time was the *Nanshinron* (“Southern Expansion”) school of thought. It argued that Japan should extend its influence into Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, “legitimate” spheres of Japanese influence.\textsuperscript{1019} The *Nanshinron* doctrine became influential in thought about Japan’s overseas influence from the Meiji era through 1945, and was eventually used to justify political and territorial influence into Southeast Asia and the Pacific, including concepts that free trade, immigration, and sea routes to the region were important for Japan. *Nanshinron* was also used to justify the expansion of the Imperial Navy.\textsuperscript{1020} The

\textsuperscript{1017} Ibid., “*Tondenhei*,” 1604.
\textsuperscript{1018} Ibid., “Ryûkyû kizoku mondai,” 1285.
\textsuperscript{1019} Originally the *Nanshinron* doctrine stressed the value of Japanese influence in the “Southern Seas” (islands of the Southwest Pacific above the equator), but was later expanded to include Southeast Asia as well (Ibid., “Southern Expansion Doctrine,” 1450).
\textsuperscript{1020} Ibid., “Imperial Japanese Armed Forces,” 54; Ibid., “Southern Expansion Doctrine,” 1450.
*Hokushinron* (or Northern Expansion, Advance-to-The-North) doctrine advocated Japanese expansion into Korea and Manchuria.\(^{1021}\)

Views about Japan’s Foreign Relations, 1850-1895

**Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations**

*Fukuzawa Yukichi.* Fukuzawa Yukichi believed that it was wrong for Japanese to think of foreigners as an inferior species, only intent on invasion and “exploitation.”\(^{1022}\) This thinking was supported by the Kaikoku school of thought, according to which Japan should peaceably open her doors to foreign contact and trade, and absorb Western knowledge, technology and science to defend itself.\(^{1023}\) In this view, China was defeated in the Opium War and in other confrontations with the West because it ignored Western techniques.\(^{1024}\) According to Fukuzawa, both duty and self-interest required Japan to renounce its isolation and to restart its international relations.\(^{1025}\) Fukuzawa’s top priorities for Japan’s foreign relations were its interests and independence.\(^{1026}\) In the early Meiji period, some Japanese scholars argued that international relations was based on a universal moral principle, that countries never intentionally harmed other countries, and would not suffer harm unless they behaved dishonestly. In 1876, Fukuzawa criticized this view, arguing it might apply to

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\(^{1021}\) Ibid.


\(^{1023}\) See my comments about the Kaikoku School in Chapter 3.


\(^{1026}\) Tamaki, *Yukichi Fukuzawa*, 161.
individuals, but not to nations. Rather, strong ethnic sentiments (jôjitsu) and an “irrational bias” (hempashin) bound people together in clans and nations.1027

In his writings before 1876, Fukuzawa believed that as reason deemed that all men should have equal rights, so should all nations. A “law of nations” governed the behavior among Western nations, in principle and practice.1028 The first school of Western international law introduced to Japan (in 1865) stressed that international relations are based on international law, derived from immutable human reason.1029 This idea was likened to the Confucian doctrine of human good nature, similar to the Confucian ethical path.1030 In order for Japan to attain adequate “country rights” (kokken), her people must have adequate minken (people’s rights). Only then would Japan be strong enough to defend itself.1031 By 1876, Fukuzawa concluded that the rational law of nations had no correspondence with reality, and that international relations were entirely different from interpersonal relations. Rather, the former were based on “quarrels over power and profit.”1032 International relations in practice have no relation

1027 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 128. Fukuzawa’s views of the West, and Japan’s international relations, were also shaped by his personal experience. At twenty-five, Fukuzawa joined the first official voyage of a Japanese ship, the Kanrin Maru, to a foreign port (San Francisco) (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 37). Fukuzawa also saw Europe. Under internal and external pressure (the latter from the British and the Russians), in 1861 the Bakufu (Shogunate government) renegotiated the opening of four major ports. From early 1862 to 1863, it sent an embassy to six European countries, including Britain, France, Prussia and Russia. Fukuzawa was allowed to join, since he worked in the government’s translation office. His accounts became two books, one of which was Diary of the West (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 45-47).
1028 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 123-125.
1029 This work was based on the thought of the Western scholars Grotius, Pufendorf and Wolf, from a Chinese translation of Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (Japanese: Bankoku Kôhô) (Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 126).
1030 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 126-128.
1031 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 133.
1032 Blacker, Japanese Enlightenment, 130. In his Jiji Shogen (Current Affairs) (1881), Fukuzawa reviews the history of Europe’s international conflicts, concluding that people’s rights have no weight in international conflict, and are not based on Christian values. Power, money and Machiavellianism are important. “The way of power” drives international conflicts, and Japan must strengthen itself militarily and economically (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 151).
with theory. If necessary, a nation must use violence or trickery to gain victory.\textsuperscript{1033} In 1878, Fukuzawa argued that international relations were governed by \textit{jakuniku-kyōshoku} (the strong devouring the weak). Only by adopting Western civilization could Japan become strong enough to defend itself.\textsuperscript{1034}

From 1882 until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Fukuzawa’s writings changed, stressing the primary importance of strengthening Japan in international relations. Internal government issues like people’s rights took on a secondary importance.\textsuperscript{1035} After 1895, Fukuzawa’s worries about Japan’s independence disappeared, since it had proved its strength. Now it could concentrate on building an ideal civilization.\textsuperscript{1036}

Fukuzawa’s generally pro-government \textit{Jiji Shinpo} newspaper took an aggressive stance about Japanese foreign policy in Asia.\textsuperscript{1037} He claimed that Japan was “major and … civilized” while Korea was “minor and … uncivilized.” Japan should “leave Asia” and join the West, treating China and Korea as the West treated them. Fukuzawa was angry at both countries.\textsuperscript{1038} He believed that Japan had taken off an “old coat” and put on a new one—Western civilization. After the start of the Sino-Japanese War, he called the Japanese those who tried to “advance civilization,” and the Chinese

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\textsuperscript{1033} Blacker, \textit{Japanese Enlightenment}, 129-130.
\textsuperscript{1034} Blacker, \textit{Japanese Enlightenment}, 132-133.
\textsuperscript{1035} Blacker, \textit{Japanese Enlightenment}, 133-134.
\textsuperscript{1036} Blacker, \textit{Japanese Enlightenment}, 137.
\textsuperscript{1037} The \textit{Jiji Shinpo} newspaper was notable for its anti-Chinese, anti-Korean tone (Tamaki, \textit{Yukichi Fukuzawa}, 177).
\textsuperscript{1038} This is also known as the “\textit{Datsua-nyūō}” (leave Asia, enter the West) doctrine. See \textit{Datsua-nyūō} in the Glossary. Fukuzawa was angry because the Chinese army had defeated an attempted Korean coup supported by the Japanese army (Tamaki, \textit{Yukichi Fukuzawa}, 159).
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those who tried to “hinder” it. Here he seems to have lost the rationality seen in his writings on Western civilization.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, xxv, 158-160. Fukuzawa’s views of China are treated much more extensively in Narsimhan, \textit{Japanese Perceptions}.}

\textit{Ito Hirobumi}. Shortly before the Meiji Restoration, Ito supported the Shogunate’s overthrow and strengthening foreign relations.\footnote{Hamada, \textit{Prince Ito}, 47.} Early in the 1870s, there were two main competing viewpoints among Japan’s leaders about foreign policy. Ito’s group wished to solve the problem of unequal treaties quickly. The other group called for a punitive expedition to Korea, for perceived insults to Japan.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, 64-65. The latter group was part of the Seikanron debate, mentioned earlier in this chapter.} In 1884, China and Japan clashed over Korea, which the former saw as its “vassal state.” Ito showed what Hamada calls a protective, paternal attitude toward “impotent” Korea, reserving Japan’s right to intervene.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, 87-90, 110-111.}

\textit{Mori Arinori}. In 1871, the Japanese government sent Mori to the United States as its first resident diplomat in Washington, to help prepare for the arrival of the Iwakura Mission.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, xx. This embassy was in the United States for five months in 1872 (Van Sant, \textit{Mori Arinori}, xx).} At twenty-three, Mori was fluent in English, already had experience with the United States, and was a high status samurai. With no diplomatic experience, he had to rely on several older prominent Americans for advice about diplomatic issues.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, xx. The people he relied on included Hamilton Fish, U.S. Secretary of State, Mori’s secretary Charles Lanman, and Joseph Henry, scientist and director of the Smithsonian Institution (\textit{Ibid.}, xx).}

\textit{Yamagata Aritomo}. To protect Japan externally, in Meiji Japan, it was quickly accepted that a national, modernized military must be developed. Yamagata saw the abolition of feudalism and restored national unity as prerequisites.\footnote{Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 250-251.} Fear of external
invasion drove his thought about the buildup of the national power infrastructure, reflecting his goal to strengthen the military. Yamagata supported universal conscription, the model of European nations. To defend the nation, Japan’s military must compare well with those of other nations.

On foreign affairs, in 1890 he argued that Japan must possess a line of sovereignty (territorial integrity—*shukensen*) and a line of advantage (*riekiesen*) beyond Japan, for the protection of its national interests. By 1895 he viewed the growing power of Russia and other Western nations in East Asia with concern. Therefore he supported large military budget increases, and throughout his career, the strengthening of the military due to the external threat by Western nations in general, later by Russia.

For much of the Meiji period, Yamagata viewed Russia as a threat, and supported an alliance with Britain.

**Kato Hiroyuki.** Kato’s mature thought on Japan’s international relations was based on German Social Darwinism. His thought is steeped in political realism and power issues. International law results from the international battle for survival, and is essentially unstable. Kato’s understanding of international relations involves several levels of morality: 1) between civilized and uncivilized peoples, 2) among civilized nations (*Volkermoral*), and 3) that of one nation or people (*Volksmoral*). About the first

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1046 Ibid., 270-271.
1047 Ibid., 254-255.
1048 Later Yamagata viewed Tsushima Island as the western line of sovereignty, and Korea as the line of advantage (Ibid., 248-249).
1049 Ibid., 248-250.
1050 Ibid., 250, 270-271.
1051 German Social Darwinism focused on the competition between countries and between racial groups, different from Anglo-American Social Darwinism, which emphasized the struggle for existence between individuals in a capitalist society (Davis, *Moral and Political*, 60).
1052 Ibid., 60, 74.
level, concerning race, although the exploitation of weaker peoples by the strong is good for progress, the strong should not totally dominate “savages.” Since we are all the same species, eventually “natural sympathy” (shizenteki dōjō) will govern race relations. Relations between civilized states are characterized by immorality; there is no “superstate” to control them. Their interactions are as “natural” as those in the physical environment. Nations also operate in terms of self-interest, cooperating only when they wish. Self-interest allows attacking others, yet a new spirit of international cosmopolitanism sometimes replaces it. On the last level, citizens fulfill their highest duty by commitment to the welfare and happiness of their country. Seeking a citizen’s highest dignity and rights also usually benefits the nation, since whatever benefits an individual without harming the nation or other individuals is good (Davis 1966: 73-74). In Japan, willingness to die for the Emperor is the highest form of evolved devotion to the state. Kato combines this interpretation of Social Darwinism with the samurai ethical code of bushido, and applies it to international affairs.

Non-Western Social Darwinists like Kato often saw Europeans as the most advanced peoples. Kato argued that Asia was more submissive, “feminine,” and backward than Europe. China achieved a high level of civilization in the past, but had stagnated. Only Japan had an assertive, sufficiently “masculine” culture to break from

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1053 Ibid., 73, 76.
1054 Because of the inequality of power relations, nations are often motivated to pursue their own self-interest, and only cooperate or seek peace when their powers are nearly equal (Ibid., 75).
1055 Ibid., 74-76.
1056 Bushido stressed Confucian virtues of propriety, sincerity, benevolence, wisdom, righteousness, and the honor of death as the highest expression of loyalty. At the time of the wars with China and Russia (1894-1895 and 1904-1905), the Japanese government reinvigorated bushido to encourage the sacrifice of citizens for the nation. According to Kato, the state could engage in aggressive wars to enhance its survival in the international “jungle.” Social Darwinism and bushido justified gross militarism (Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 246-247).
the bonds of tradition, modernize, escape Asia, meld with the West, and join the modern world. This was “proven” in the transformation of Japan since the Meiji Restoration, and victories in wars against China and Russia (1895 and 1905). Eventually Japan and China will join the coming world-state (Weltreich), dominated by Europe. Due to enhanced economic relations and international development, by the late 1800s, the nations of Europe showed the first signs of the world-state, seen in increasing international ties in many fields. Eventually each state in the international system will become the cells or organs of the “single great organism” (ichi daiyūkibutsu), international rights will progress, and morality will experience a tremendous change.

Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations (1850-1895)

In their views of international relations, all five leaders wish to strengthen Japan so it can survive and flourish in the international system. To do so, all five realize that Japan must borrow needed political ideas, institutions, and military technologies. Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato are political realists, Yamagata the most conservative. Fukuzawa and Yamagata view the international system as driven primarily by the hunger of various state actors for power. Yamagata is the most overtly supportive of a strong military. He sees military reform as Japan’s top priority, international or domestic, to be preceded by ending feudalism and uniting the country. In their language

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1057 The idea of Japan “escaping” from Asia to join the West was captured in the slogan of Datsua-rön (the “discourse of leaving Asia” (also called “Datsua-nyūō;” see “Datsua-nyūō” in the Glossary). According to this slogan, Japan could fully modernize only by exiting Asia and becoming a part of the West. This happened when Japan became the strongest Asian ally of the United States during the Cold War. The dispute over whether Japan should remain an integral part of Asia or “leave” has continued through modern Japanese history. Today Japan struggles on various levels to reintegrate into the rest of Asia.

1058 Davis, Moral and Political, 78-82.

1059 The views of Weltreich and ichi daiyūkibutsu are examples of globalization. Globalization issues are discussed toward the end of this chapter.

1060 Ibid., 76-77, 82.
and images here, Fukuzawa and Kato in particular show evolutionistic influence. Regarding Japan’s reforming itself to better function in the international system, Fukuzawa, Mori and Ito were highly supportive of borrowing Western political ideas, institutions, and innovations. The first two were highly influenced by Western, liberal-leaning political values. Early in his career, American influence on Mori’s diplomatic thought and practice was strong. Fukuzawa and especially Ito show more caution regarding reforms than Mori.\footnote{Later in his career, Mori’s policy efforts were more focused on the domestic front (education), to strengthen Japan internally, so it might become a robust player in the international system. At this point, his thought seems less liberal, but more nationalistic and pragmatic.}

Kato is the leader with the most complex views of international relations. While his views were often racist and sexist, current trends of globalization seem to be somewhat imitating his estimation of how the international system would evolve into a world “super-state” controlled by the West. Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato were also realists in how they viewed international law. Ito had the most practical view. He knew that the West dominated the current system of international law, and believed that for Japan to survive, it must become strong, fit in, and earn a high place of honor in that system.\footnote{These points on Ito’s views of international law are implied.}

On the philosophical and cultural foundations of their views of international relations, all five leaders except Mori show a high degree of political realism.\footnote{Mori shows more political realism toward the end of his career.} The influence of Western political thought is great upon each leader, except Yamagata. In his case, Western military thought was more influential. Fukuzawa and Mori show more liberal political influence, Mori from the United States. German thought especially influenced Ito and Kato. Fukuzawa and Mori were more liberal leaning, while the other
three leaders were more conservative. Mori, Fukuzawa, and Kato were influenced by evolutionary thought in their views of international relations, Kato the most profoundly and directly. Of the five leaders, Kato combined Western political ideologies with Asian ones to the highest degree.1064

Regarding their views of the Japanese nation, Japanese nationalism, and of Japan in the international system, all five leaders desire to support and build up the Japanese nation and assure its survival, yet vary in how much they are willing to borrow Western ideologies or institutions to do so. To strengthen Japan as a nation, Fukuzawa, Mori and Ito are more willing to borrow Western ideas, while Ito, Yamagata, and Kato are willing to borrow Western institutions and some ideas, more cautiously. Fukuzawa’s definition of Japanese nationalism as driven by strong ethnic and “irrational” emotional ties seems conventional. Earlier, Mori showed a more liberal view of the nation, and later became more conservative.1065 Concerning Japan’s place in the international system, all five leaders wish to build up Japan as a nation so that it can successfully compete and survive. For its survival, both Fukuzawa and Yamagata stressed Japan’s international relations and external defense as more primary than domestic issues.1066 To survive in the international system, Japan must open itself to foreign knowledge, and study the West’s appropriate political systems and constitutions, applying them carefully (Fukuzawa and Ito). Without adequate reform and modernization, Japan cannot defend itself or survive.

1064 As noted above, Kato combined evolutionary views of international relations with the Confucian ethics of the bushido code, and supported the patriotic practices of State Shinto, essentially as developed by the Meiji state.
1065 In his earlier views, Mori argued that Japan should take the radical steps of adopting English and Christianity as the national language and religion, while later in his career, there was a strong connection between nationalism and his mature view of education policy. He wished to use education as a tool to promote Japanese nationalism.
1066 This was Fukuzawa’s view from 1882-1895.
Earlier in his career, Mori suggests the most radical degrees of reform for Japan, but later, his approach moderates. Kato’s extensive arguments, marrying evolutionary ideas, biological terminology and Confucian ideology, seem the most creative here.1067

All five leaders vary in how they view the West, and acknowledge that it dominates the international system (1850-1895). Fukuzawa and Mori are the most positive of the five. Yamagata is the most wary, viewing Russia and the West as Japan’s greatest security threat. For international relations, all five are willing to enthusiastically borrow from the West: general knowledge and technology (Fukuzawa), diplomatic thought and practice (Mori), political theory, ideas and institutions (Ito), military strategy and technologies for defense (Yamagata), and evolutionary theory to explain Japan’s place in the international system (Kato).1068

Four of the five leaders see Japan’s neighbors as inferior to Japan, even China (Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata and Kato). Kato again applies his evolutionary, gendered ideas of international relations in his image of Asia as the passive, feminine East. Yamagata and Ito suggest that Japan has a right (or duty) to intervene in the affairs of other Asian states.1069

Four of the five leaders draw heavily on modern science and technology at various points in their thought on international relations. Fukuzawa sees the West’s

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1067 To explain Japan and international relations, Kato takes evolutionary ideas and combines them with the samurai bushido code of Confucian ethics. His use of biological terminology in referring to nation-states as “cells” or “organs” in the “single great organism” (the coming “world-state”) that dominates the international system is also very interesting. Ideas like these would later be used by the Japanese state to encourage patriotism, war, militarism, and Japanese nationalism.

1068 Kato also uses concepts of gender to explain the behavior of various actors, including that of the aggressive, masculine West. He sees Europeans are the most advanced, the ones who will control the international system and the coming “world-state.”

1069 This is seen in Yamagata’s argument for Japan’s need for nearby spheres of influence in Asia, and in Ito’s support for Japanese intervention in Korea, even before 1895.
currently superior knowledge and technology as crucial for Japan’s survival in the international system. Mori greatly admires the West’s/America’s superior science and technology, cataloguing it in Life and Resources in America. While Yamagata acknowledges the superiority of Western military and scientific technologies and wants Japan to master them for survival, Kato draws concepts from Western “scientific” thought to explain the international system, Japan’s place in it, and the system’s future.

Concepts of morality and religion somewhat affect three of the leaders’ views of international relations. Fukuzawa has no specific ideas relating spirituality or religion to international relations, though he feels Japan must develop proper “spirits” of freedom and individual initiative to master technology, key to guarantee Japan’s independence. Mori admires Christianity and what he perceives to be its role in making the West great, so earlier, he urged Japan to adopt it as the national religion. Kato has a complex, multilevel concept of morality underlying his explanation of international relations, incorporating ideas about race, civilization, survival, nature, and instinct. He also wants to use State Shinto to build up Japan, for it to gain a stronger place internationally.

**Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations (1850-1895)**

**Development Issues.** To analyze the development-related issues of these leaders’ views of Japan’s external political relations, as noted above, I will use the concept of internationalization here, supplemented by “modernization,” if relevant. What do we uncover in the views of these five leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata and Kato) on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895), in light of internationalization? In their view, is it true that the West was attempting to subjugate Japan into its own
cultural universe as it drew Japan into the global trading system, to put Japan in an inferior position, dominate and exploit it? In this process, would Japan be colonized?

It is obvious that these five leaders accept the premises of internationalization: the West wishes to dominate and control Japan, economically and politically. This belief motivated these leaders to work and study hard, and take many urgent actions. They are generally pragmatic in their political realism, and in their assessments of how Japan should respond to the challenge. Since Western nations were the most successful and powerful in international politics, these leaders were eager to borrow from Western political thought and institutions, presumed to be part of the West’s success in international relations. Some of the leaders (Fukuzawa and Mori) are attracted to liberal-leaning “Anglo-American” thought, given the huge success of the United States economically and technologically, and of Britain in technology and empire building. Others (Kato, Ito, and Yamagata) are attracted to German political thought and military technologies, due to Germany’s military and technological successes, and the greater “suitability” of its systems for Japanese culture. None of the five leaders wanted the pressure of the Western-dominated global economic system or cultural universe to crush Japan and its culture. Their reflection on cultural issues focused more on protecting Japan’s domestic culture, not really on international aspects. The exceptions were their view that Western culture must not destroy Japan’s culture, and the earlier view of pro-Westernizers in the *bunmei kaika* movement, that Western culture was vastly superior, and must be rapidly acquired to make Japan modern. In the tension of whether internal development or external defense should take precedence, several of the leaders wavered
in priority at various stages (Fukuzawa, Mori), while Ito and Yamagata put more emphasis on the external throughout their careers.

In his complex views of the global system, including its moral underpinnings and future development, Kato accepts that in the long run, the process of internationalization, of the West absorbing and dominating the passive, peripheral East, will continue until the West totally dominates the future world-state.\textsuperscript{1070} The five leaders admit the present superiority of the West over Japan and the rest of Asia in various international arenas and issues, including the international system (economically and politically), colonialism, science and technology, and the presumed religious and moral underpinnings of international strength.\textsuperscript{1071} In their hierarchical views of the international system, several of the leaders held racist views about the West’s superiority over Japan, and Japan’s superiority over the rest of Asia.\textsuperscript{1072} It is ironic that as these leaders were wary of the threats that internationalization and possible Western colonialism presented to Japan and the rest of Asia, Japan in some ways repeated a similar pattern with many of its neighboring regions and states, some before 1895, and some after.\textsuperscript{1073}

Is it relevant to use the concept of “modernization” to examine what happened in the worldviews of Japan’s external political relations, 1850-1895? The key question would be: in the international relations processes connected with the absorption of Japan

\textsuperscript{1070} With the rise of China and other non-Western powers, this belief should not go unquestioned.\textsuperscript{1071} Fukuzawa and Mori viewed many of the strengths of the West as partly stemming from “spiritual” factors: strength of spirit, independence, morality and initiative. They also attributed some of the international strengths of the West as flowing from these internal factors. Other leaders here (Yamagata and Kato) admired the strengths of Japanese morality and spirit, and believed them to be superior to the West’s. They likely also hoped that these qualities would be a source of international strength for Japan.\textsuperscript{1072} Regarding Asia, the views of Fukuzawa and Kato in particular were racist. For Fukuzawa’s views, see Narsimhan, \textit{Japanese Perceptions}.\textsuperscript{1073} Is this true, that Japan repeated the pattern of Western colonialism in East Asia and the Pacific? This is an interesting question, but one that seems beyond the scope of the present study, though I reflect on it briefly in Part 4 of the dissertation.
into the global economic system, what happened to Japan culturally, especially in the international arena? Did it become more “Western” on the surface? Did the core of these cultural features stay Japanese? It seems hard to apply very much “modernization” here.

On external political relations, I cannot really examine domestic political or cultural features, the main feature that “modernization” covers. In their views of international relations, these leaders wanted to enthusiastically adopt Western political ideas and military technologies. Japan quickly learned to function effectively in Western diplomacy and especially in the use of Western military technologies (consider its victory in the Sino-Japanese war and other wars soon to follow). There are several cultural elements and angles connected with other aspects of the leaders’ views of Japan’s external political relations that we have examined here (such as the philosophical foundations of their views of Western diplomacy, and their views of nationalism), but the connections to “modernization” seem rather indirect.

In their thought about science, technology, and international relations, all of the leaders drew on modern scientific and technological principles from the West in various ways. In this area, it is implicit in their thought that Japan will be able to master and draw on these principles and technologies without culturally disintegrating and losing its soul. In these external political issues, what happens to Japan’s internal culture does not seem to really seem to be an issue of concern. Rather, in science and technology used for Japan’s international relations, the focus is more on using them to strengthen Japan’s external defense capabilities. This does not mean that these leaders did not have concerns about how Japan’s interaction with the West could affect the identity, integrity, and culture of Japan. As we noted in Chapter 3, they were highly concerned about these
issues, but when considering Japan’s culture, their focus seems to have been more on internal issues rather than external ones.

What about applying “modernization” to the spiritual and moral underpinnings of Japan’s international relations? Three of the leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato) wish to use elements of religion or “spirit” to motivate the Japanese people for the arders of the development task. Fukuzawa and Mori are more willing to draw on “Western” sources, and Kato on “Japanese” ones. With a properly strengthened cultural core, Japan would have the fortitude to develop economically, compete successfully in international trade, and maintain its political independence. It seems the priority of these three leaders is to strengthen Japan’s internal cultural fortitude first, to withstand the onslaught of Western culture. Fukuzawa, Mori, and Kato imply that the internal cultural side is important. But placing priority on first strengthening Japan externally, in its diplomatic and trade capabilities, rather than internally, might go further in protecting its identity and cultural core. Yamagata and Ito placed priority on addressing the external factors first, since foreign political or economic invasion and control threatened Japan’s very existence as a nation. A balance of external and internal processes may have been optimum. It seems that none of these leaders explicitly contemplated these issues, because they were in the “thick” of the battle, and many of these concepts had not yet been well formulated.

**Technology Issues.** To analyze the technology-related aspects of these leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895), I will ask several questions in six major categories: 1) general concepts of technology, 2) technology in the
international system, technology transfer, 4) technology, culture, and the international system, 5) technology, cognition, and international relations, and 6) technonationalism as ideology.

On general concepts of technology, what are the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with the worldviews of external political relations studied here? In general, each of these leaders recognized the importance of Japan becoming a modern, scientifically and technologically advanced nation in order to win a position of respect in the international system, especially Fukuzawa, Kato, Yamagata, and Mori. Above we noted how four of the five leaders draw quite a bit on modern science and technology in their ideas on foreign affairs. In most of their minds, especially Yamagata’s, military ideas and technologies were one of the key forces that Japan must master and use to strengthen its position in the international system. Fukuzawa, Kato, and Mori show the influence of “scientific” thinking in their evolutionistic ideas about political development and international relations. In his arguments about the Japanese nation, Kato again draws on evolutionary theory. Fukuzawa also greatly values the mastery of modern technology as key in helping Japan to defend itself and grow in the international system. Three of the leaders stress “spiritual” values (from the West, Fukuzawa, Mori, or the East, Kato), to help Japan

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1074 According to Szyliowicz, technology inherently operates as a part of various systems. It is also a system of inputs, throughputs, and outputs. Inputs include raw materials, parts, and knowledge, throughputs the organization and control of the manufacturing process, and outputs the completed product (Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 8).

1075 The main emphasis here, in the concept of technology and cognitive factors articulated by Szyliowicz, is that the viewpoints and beliefs of policy and decision-makers constrain and greatly affect the outcome of technology transfer cases and projects, positively or negatively. Belief systems can blind decision-makers to reality, and failure to adjust their viewpoints and decisions to changing conditions can greatly affect outcomes (Ibid., 8, 212, 223).
strengthen itself for development and the mastery of technology, so that it can survive in the international system.

Second, concerning technology in the international system, what are the most significant political factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in the international worldview studied here? In the five leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external political relations, there are many connections between political and technological issues. To survive and strengthen its position in the international system, Japan needs both advanced political knowledge and development relevant for its society, and strong technological advancement. The pragmatism of most of these leaders makes them political realists, and exceedingly practical in their approach to technological decisions and importation. They also show much influence from scientific and evolutionary thought as they formulated their political convictions, and their views of the West. They saw technology as a major source of the West’s political power, and believed that it would be for Japan as well. I noted earlier in this chapter how heavily several of the leaders draw on scientific and technological principles in their thought on international relations. Two of them, Fukuzawa and Mori, also attributed superior spiritual values or beliefs as partial sources for the West’s scientific and technological capabilities.

Also regarding technology in the international system, how did the international system affect the technology-related issues in the worldviews of external political

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1076 Ibid., 11; Hayashi, *Japanese Experience*, 52.
relations studied here. The effect of technology in the international system affected these worldviews in two primary ways. The first way concerns the sheer physical power of technology in the international system. The capability of the United States to send a small fleet of ships to Japan and “force” it open in 1853 did not depend on the power of technology alone. Internal corruption in the Tokugawa regime, the dynamism of Tokugawa society, and pressure from restless feudal domains such as Satsuma and Choshu also played huge roles. But the 1853 event was a powerful, ominous warning of future dangers that forward-thinking Japanese had long anticipated—Japan must open up and engage the world. Isolation could only last for so long. They knew that eventually Japan must end sakoku. Foreign knowledge and technology, and the ability to import, learn, and apply them, would also be key in defending Japan and maintaining its independence. If Japan did not modernize many aspects of its society quickly, maintaining independence would be impossible in the face of the West’s superior military and economic power. Events in China, India, the Philippines and Southeast Asia made that very clear. Technology was one of the key tools Japan must quickly master to stay free. To develop the modern economy and military defenses required, technology was also required. Indeed, Japan quickly mastered the technical and physical aspects of this science and technology very well.

In my answer to the question above on the general concepts of technology in these worldviews on external political relations, I identified several significant themes: 1) the importance of Japan becoming a modern, scientifically and technologically-advanced nation, to win a position of respect in the international system; 2) the importance of modern military technologies and principles; 3) the importance of technology in Japan’s defense systems; 4) the influence of evolutionistic thought on leaders’ ideas about political development and international relations; and 5) a belief in the role of strong “spiritual” and moral values to strengthen Japan in its scientific and technological growth, which would in turn enhance and maintain its position in the international system.
A second major way that technology in the international system affected these worldviews was in the mental or attitudinal arena. The physical power of technology encouraged Japanese scholars and leaders to presume that the scientific laws and principles behind modern science and technology, as developed in the West, made them superior to the “ethical” and “philosophical” emphases of Asian philosophies.\textsuperscript{1078} This encouraged Kato, Mori, Fukuzawa and others to investigate Western knowledge and scholarship, to discover just what drove the West, and what had allowed it to leap so far ahead of the East in many areas. We explored a few details about their exploration of Western thought in earlier chapters. Top Japanese leaders and thinkers eagerly embraced many elements of Western culture and “scientific” thought, including, at times, Christianity, Western dress, diet and mannerisms, and evolutionary theory.\textsuperscript{1079} Early in the Meiji period, some leaders, such as those in the bunmei kaika movement, tended toward extreme Westernization. Soon, in the battle to confront modernity, many of these thinkers and others would turn back toward a search for Japanese and Asian sources of scientific and philosophical greatness.

Were these “physical” and “mental” effects of the international system on the technological aspects of these external political worldviews positive or negative? They were both. Positively, on physical effects, these events forced Japan’s leaders to face the reality of the West’s power, and the international conditions that Japan faced and encouraged political realism. They also encouraged the commencement of vitally needed political, social and economic changes in Japanese society, necessary for Japan to

\textsuperscript{1078} Recall my reflections in Chapter 3 on how Fukuzawa in particular rejected Confucian thought as backward.
\textsuperscript{1079} We explore many of the details of these cultural phenomena in Chapter 6 and elsewhere.
maintain its independence. And they laid the foundations for contemporary Japan and its many strengths, but they came only after many trials, costly losses, and the near destruction of the nation in World War II. The physical effects of the international system on the technology-related features of these worldviews on Japan’s international politics also included negative effects. The process of realistically confronting the West caused massive social and political changes in Japanese society that were extremely costly and traumatic. The human costs were huge. This also forced the West to further engage Japan and Asia as they “awoke,” and the rest of Asia to further confront the West, Japan, and modernity. Again, the costs were gigantic. And the growth in Japan’s power seemed huge confirmation of the wisdom of the nation’s chosen political and reform paths, which led to aggressive actions on the part of Japan’s military and government (similar to actions of the West) in nearby Asia. The positive mental effects of the international system on the technology-related issues of these external political worldviews included the need to confront the West. This caused many more Japanese to become knowledgeable about the West and global conditions. Also, many more Japanese became aware of modern science and technology, so industrial, scientific and health standards in Japan were raised.

Negatively, the sheer power of the West and its technology caused nearly idolatrous “West-worshipping” by some of Japan’s leaders, at first, and caused some to briefly reject their Asian and Confucian heritages. These attitudes, coupled with evolutionary thought, brought increased feelings of nationalistic ethnocentrism, which eventually led to colonial and imperial actions in nearby regions. In the coming decades and World War II, the costs of these actions would be huge.
How did these technological issues affect Japan’s external political relations? The conviction (Yamagata’s, in particular) that military ideas and technologies were key for Japan to master for its survival, and to strengthen its position in the international system, caused Japan to place priority on its military build-up in the domestic economy. The build-up was effective. Japan grew enough in military technology and prowess that it was able to defeat China in the Sino-Japanese War. This victory hugely increased respect for Japan among the Western powers and in the international system, though of course it angered and perplexed China. The influence of scientific and evolutionistic ideas in the thinking of Japanese leaders caused some of them like Fukuzawa and Kato to artificially, racially elevate Westerners to a higher position of honor and power than they deserved, and to downgrade the honor of Chinese and other Asians. In the early Meiji period, Japan gave much more preference to interaction with the West than with China and other Asian nations. This type of thinking helped pave the way for Japanese imperialism and colonialism. The stress on the importance of science and technology in the nation’s defense led to the modernization of Japan’s military, and contributed to Japan’s military victories over China (1894-1895) and later over Russia (1904-1905). These victories also helped further validate the militaristic policy preferences of the state, and contributed to respect for Japan in the international system and in the West, though they did not improve Japan’s position in the

Recall that the four main effects of technology-related issues identified above (associated with worldviews of external political relations) are that: 1) military ideas and technologies are one of the key forces that Japan must master survive, and to strengthen its position in the international system; 2) the influence of scientific and evolutionistic thought in several of these leaders about political development, international relations, and the nation/Japanese nationalism; 3) the importance of modern science and technology in Japan’s defense; and 4) spiritual and moral values are needed to help Japan strengthen itself for development and mastery of technology, for its survival in the international system.
eyes of its Asian neighbors. The idea that spiritual and moral strength could enhance Japan’s development and position in the international system on some levels seemed to suggest to some Japanese that in battle, Japanese soldiers had more discipline and fortitude than the less well-organized, lumbering forces of its larger neighbors (China and Russia). 1081

On technology transfer, what were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in these worldviews of external political relations? There were many technologies transferred from the West and the international system to Japan, more than from Japan to the international system or its colonies in this period. 1082 Major political and military technologies and ideas related to external politics transferred into Japan in this period included military technologies (ships and armaments), military theory, strategy, training and organizational principles, industrial technologies supporting militarism, Western political ideas, institutions, innovations, and philosophy, 1083 evolutionistic theory/Social Darwinism, racist views of international relations, and modern concepts of diplomacy. The major technology-related items and ideas on international relations transferred from Japan to other nearby regions and the international system (1850 to 1895) were fewer.

1081 One also thinks of Japan’s surprise attack on and victory over Russian forces at Port Arthur (Lüshun) in southern Manchuria, China (February 1904) that later served as a model for the Japanese attack on Americans at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in 1941. Japanese, including Hirohito, were also tempted to believe in their own moral and spiritual superiority over Americans, though those qualities did not lead to final victory in World War II.

1082 Remember that this period (of pre-colonialism) goes through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, just before Japan acquired Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands, its first two major foreign colonies.

1083 These Western political ideas and concepts included democracy, political liberalism, political authoritarianism, authoritarian rule by royalty, the concepts of European-style aristocracy, a constitution, national parliament, principles of local governance, German political theory and philosophy and institutions, British and American political and diplomatic thought, and modern concepts of nationalism, the study of contemporary diplomacy and international law, and the building of diplomatic bodies and institutions for Japan’s foreign relations. For more on the nature of the Western political ideas and institutions that were imported into Japan, see Chapter 4.
Specifically, Japan used many modern military technologies and areas of knowledge in the Sino-Japanese War in Korea, China, Manchuria and Taiwan.\footnote{1084}

Who were the main international or domestic actors in the external environment involved in these transfer cases? For military technologies, theories, strategies, and training, on the international level, the main individual actors were foreign engineering instructors, military experts, and teachers who taught briefly in Japan, Japanese military officials who briefly studied or traveled abroad, and government officials who arranged to import these technologies. On the domestic level, the main individual actors included Japanese engineers and scientists who taught in colleges or did research in public and military institutions, and Japanese military officials and thinkers in Japan who studied foreign military writings. On the industrial technologies supporting militarism, the key individual actors on the international level included foreign scientists and teachers in Japan, and Japanese students, experts, and government officials who studied abroad and returned to Japan. On the domestic level, the key individual actors connected with these industrial transfers were Japanese teachers, engineers, scientists, and public/military officials in Japan.

Regarding Western political ideas, institutions, innovations, and philosophy, evolutionary and diplomatic theory, the primary individual actors on the international level were foreign teachers in Japan, and Japanese teachers/scholars who studied abroad.

\footnote{1084 There are additional significant items of knowledge and technologies that Japan transferred to its new overseas colonies and the international system after the period of overseas colonialism started. For more on that period, see Chapters 8 and 10. I am not really aware of very significant political ideas or military technologies exported out of Japan until about 1895, though Japan did send some political ideas to Korea after its influence there began in the 1870s.}
On the domestic level, the primary actors included Japanese teachers and scholars who studied foreign writings in Japan.

State or institutional actors involved with military technologies, strategy, theory and training and their industrial applications at the international level chiefly involved Japanese government ministries related to the military and defense, foreign governments and armament sellers. On the domestic level, state and institutional actors involved with military technologies and issues again included the Japanese military and defense ministries, imperial colleges and government military research institutions. State and institutional actors promoting military industrial technologies on the domestic level were the Japanese government, several of its ministries, and largely public-related industries.

The institutional actors supporting the transfer of Western political ideas, evolutionary thought, and diplomacy at the international level included foreign educational institutions sending foreign instructors to Japan, the Japanese government and relevant ministries (education, foreign affairs, and others), and foreign governments and entities supporting Japanese scholars studying abroad. The state/institutional actors connected with the transfer of these areas of knowledge at the domestic level were mainly the Japanese government, colleges and schools, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

What impacts did the actors involved in these transfer cases have on the transfer outcomes? Based on the worldviews of the five leaders studied here, concerning the transfer of military technologies and theories by individual actors on the international
level, all of the actors\textsuperscript{1085} had a profound impact on the Japanese importation of military technology and knowledge. Judged by what Japan did in the Sino-Japanese War, it mastered them extremely well. On the transfer of industrial military technologies by individual actors on the international and domestic levels, by the time of the war, Japan imported significant military technologies, and developed the capacities to build them, seen in the impressive fleet sent to attack China. The efforts of individual actors on the international and domestic levels\textsuperscript{1086} were very successful. And on the transfer of Western political ideas and innovations at the international level by individual actors, both the foreign scholars in Japan and Japanese scholar returnees were highly successful, given the many innovative political institutions that Japan adopted, such as the Constitution and the Diet. Japan soon developed the capacity to function diplomatically.\textsuperscript{1087} The ideological nature of all these developments was conservative.

What were the impacts of individual actors on these transfers at the domestic level? For military technologies and theories, Japan-based scientists, engineers, teachers and military officials also worked extremely hard, and again judged by what Japan accomplished in the Sino-Japanese War, did an amazing job in mastering and applying these areas of knowledge.\textsuperscript{1088} In the transfer of Western political ideas and innovations, at the domestic level, individual actors helped Japan to absorb these ideas. Some of them,}

\textsuperscript{1085} These actors included foreign instructors, Japanese military officials and scholars who studied abroad.
\textsuperscript{1086} As a reminder, the actors on the international level were mainly foreign instructors and Japanese scholars returned from abroad, and on the domestic level, Japanese teachers and engineers.
\textsuperscript{1087} While Japan developed these diplomatic capacities, it is interesting to remember how young Mori Arinori, the first Japanese diplomat posted to reside in the United States, relied upon leading Americans for guidance in learning the nuts and bolts of diplomacy.
\textsuperscript{1088} Regarding the transfer of Industrial military technologies at the domestic level by individual actors, see the comments in the immediately preceding paragraph.
like Mori and Kato, developed fairly sophisticated applications. The conservative nature of Japanese society in this period limited the application of more liberal ideas.

Concerning the impacts of actors on the transfers by state or institutional actors at the international level, regarding military technologies, theories, and their industrial applications, in general, the Japanese government actors did an outstanding job in acquiring and transferring the technologies they judged needed for Japan’s military. The foreign suppliers of this knowledge were usually willing to supply them. On Western political ideas, evolutionary thought, and diplomacy, the foreign entities sending foreign instructors to Japan, the relevant Japanese government ministries, and foreign entities supporting Japanese scholars abroad also did a generally effective job in transferring these political and social ideologies. Some officials, like Kato, were very creative in how they applied them to the Japanese context, which was not easy.

On the impacts of state and institutional actors on the transfers at the domestic level, regarding military industrial applications, the main actors (Japanese government ministries, educational and military research institutions) were again generally successful in transferring these technologies. The Japanese government agencies and education-related institutions transferring concepts of Western political ideas, evolutionary thought, and diplomacy to the Japanese context also did fairly well, though the task was certainly not simple.

What major lessons or improvements can we learn from these transfer cases? These political and military “transfers” went mainly to, not from, Japan. Items imported were of a highly pragmatic and utilitarian, not esoteric nature, to strengthen Japan’s internal political system and military defenses for survival and respect in the international
system. The military skills were used well in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895. Foreign teachers and engineers also contributed greatly to Japan’s transfer of political and military knowledge for its international relations, and yet Japanese scholars, teachers, and scientists also made crucial contributions. The Meiji state was the key driver in the process. Japan’s success in the war, and its rapid adoption of innovative political institutions, point to its overall success in this endeavor to import technologies to allow Japan’s survival in the international system. Both state and individual actors were highly successful in transferring these areas of knowledge.

Fourth, on technology, culture, and the international system, what are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these international worldviews? The primary cultural factors affecting these worldviews fall into several main areas. Views of politics include Japanese ideas and concepts of Western politics, the cultures of international law and diplomacy, the Japanese culture of politics in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras, and linguistic and cultural contexts and their influences on the translation of these political concepts from other languages into Japanese. Another important cultural factor was views of

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1090 These include views of democracy, political liberalism, and authoritarianism.
1091 The Japanese culture of politics in this era included new notions of national identity drawing on new and ancient sources, including State Shinto, the new emperor ideology of the unbroken imperial line and of the emperor descended from the gods, ancient chronicles of Japan’s creation, and notions of Japanese ethnicity (such as Japan’s divine creation by the gods, and Japan as a family-state descended from the imperial family). Japan’s culture of politics also included the concept held by Japanese of Japan compared with other nations, and their self-concept of Japan as a nation. In that view, Japan was currently weak, technologically poor, and must build itself up quickly to compete with the West. Many of these aspects of Japan’s culture of politics are noted in the domestic political contexts section of Chapter 4. See Culture of politics in the Glossary section.
militarism, including the Japanese cultures of militarism,\textsuperscript{1092} and the influence of the military cultures of various countries, such as Britain, the United States, and Germany. Views of science, technology, and politics and international relations were another notable cultural feature here: the cultures of modern science and technology, Japanese views of evolutionism and Social Darwinism, and their influence on Japan’s views of politics, race, international relations, and the “hierarchy” of peoples and nations in the international system. A final area of relevant cultural factors is general views of other countries and regions.\textsuperscript{1093}

In these worldviews, how did these leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata, Kato) concerned use these technologies/ideas\textsuperscript{1094} as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level?\textsuperscript{1095} Fukuzawa contributed most to spreading Western, liberal political ideas in his popular writings. This in turn had a meaningful impact had what Japanese needed to do to build their country

\textsuperscript{1092} The Japanese cultures of militarism in this era included post-samurai culture, the bushido ethical code, and neo-Confucian thought.

\textsuperscript{1093} Views of other countries included Japanese views of the West and specific Western countries, of Western religion and its role in Western political and scientific development, of Asia, China, and Korea, of Confucian thought and political philosophy, and Western countries’ views of Japan and of Asia.

\textsuperscript{1094} The major transferred ideas and technologies were 1) military technologies (ships and armaments); 2) military theory, strategy, training, and organizational principles; 3) industrial technologies supporting Japan’s militarism; 4) Western political ideas and philosophy (democracy, political liberalism, political authoritarianism, German political theory and philosophy, British and American political thought, evolutionistic theory/Social Darwinism); 5) Western political institutions, innovations, systems (such authoritarian rule by royalty, European-style aristocracy, a constitution, national parliament, principles of local governance, German political institutions); and 6) Western diplomacy and international relations (i.e. British and American diplomatic thought, modern concepts of nationalism, the study of contemporary diplomacy, international law, building diplomatic bodies and institutions for Japan’s foreign relations, racist views of international relations, and modern concepts of diplomacy).

\textsuperscript{1095} As noted earlier, this can be called the “international cultural ecology approach” to technology. This question is drawn from this anthropological definition of technology: “the means and agencies by which human societies cope with and transform their material environment” (Glick, “Technology,” 464). This definition is based on the theory of cultural ecology in anthropology, which I apply that idea to the study of international relations, how a particular nation-state or national actor uses technology and related phenomena to adapt to and transform its surrounding environment in the international system.
internally so it could face external challenges on the international level. In this period, Ito contributed to Japan’s external political relations in his service as a foreign minister and diplomat, and his work on strengthening Japan’s internal political system through his work on the Meiji (1889) constitution. Mori did not have a large impact on strengthening Japan’s capacity to function in its external political relations, beyond functioning as a diplomat in Washington, DC in the early 1870s, and helping the Iwakura Mission when it arrived in the United States. Yamagata had a huge impact on Japan’s external political relations, in his efforts to lead Japan’s military build-up, and its massive importation of military technologies in the early Meiji era. I did not find any direct evidence that Kato’s complex thought on international relations had any direct influence on Japan’s diplomacy. So of the five leaders, Yamagata contributed the most strongly, in the technological arena, to strengthening Japan’s external political relations.

How did the technological issues or features in these worldviews of external political relations affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? Military technologies, theories, training, and military-related industrial technologies enabled Japan to attack and intervene in the affairs of neighboring countries and regions including Korea, China and Taiwan near the end of 1850-1895. This enhanced Japan’s relations with Western countries (won their respect, to some degree), but it greatly increased hostility with Japan’s Asian neighbors, including China and Korea, who were both highly wary of Japan. Western political ideas, institutions, and

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1096 Although Mori prepared his Life and Resources in America to educate Japanese about the advanced conditions in the United States, it was written in English, and was never translated into Japanese (Van Sant, Mori Arinori).

1097 Again, this is the cultural ecology approach to technology, applied to international relations. See Clemmer, Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward, and Cohen, Man in Adaptation, for some explorations of the concept of cultural ecology.
diplomatic innovations helped to modernize Japan’s own domestic political system somewhat, brought greater recognition from the West, and enabled Japan to basically function in the system of Western-dominated international diplomacy. In sum, these technologies paved the way for greatly increased warfare and imperialism by Japan in Asia and the Pacific in the next period examined in this project (1895-1945), improved Japan’s capacity to relate diplomatically to the West, and increased Japan’s presence in the international system, especially in the East Asian region.

On the issue of technology, cognition, and international relations, do the belief systems of any of these leaders (on technology issues on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? While Fukuzawa had a fairly balanced view of the West, his negative views of Asia blinded him to the dignity of those cultures. In his era, China and Korea went through periods of relative stagnation or decline. Both struggled, as Japan did, to adjust to the onslaught of the West. This bias toward mainland Asia, seen in several of the other leaders’ writings, affected Japan’s actions toward mainland Asia in very powerful ways, most specifically in this era, in the Sino-Japanese War. The politically conservative attitudes of Ito, Yamagata, and Kato predisposed them to copying a more authoritarian model like Germany or Prussia, not toward a more liberal model, such as Britain. Somewhat similarly, Mori’s extensive experience traveling to and living

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1098 For a discussion of technology, cognition, and international relations, see Chapter 5.
1099 Belief systems include a decision-maker’s beliefs about another actor’s strategies, tactics, motivations, and goals (Keith Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration [Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1991], 45). They are a part of an actor’s worldview, but not the same thing (Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10). See also Belief Systems in the Glossary section.
in the United States and Britain, and Kato’s long-term study of German language and thought, predisposed them to the models each chose to copy, and inevitably influenced, to some degree, the policy outcomes each finally encouraged. I do not see any overt evidence that these leaders’ blind spots caused them to fail to adjust to rapidly changing international conditions. Rather, I would argue that while their backgrounds and beliefs caused them to move in certain directions in their policy decisions, they did not lack a capacity to move fairly rapidly, when conditions warranted it.1100

Finally, in these worldviews on external relations, is the concept of technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how?1101 Implicit in the concept of technonationalism as ideology is the idea that a nation must strengthen itself internally, in terms of its economy and technologies, so that it can be strong and secure in the international system. How much did the external politics worldviews of these five leaders reflect the international aspect of technonationalism as ideology, and how much did they reflect domestic factors? For Japan to strengthen itself in the international system in this era, it must first import needed areas of technology and knowledge from the international system (from the West, in particular). Second, it must learn, master and apply the technologies in its own context. Finally, it must use the relevant technologies to improve

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1100 For example, while Mori’s exposure to the liberal the United States and Britain caused him to propose radical social policies when he was young (i.e. that Japan should adopt English as its national language), he moderated his proposals later in his career (for example, his conservative educational policies in favor of Japanese nationalism). The general rapidity of Meiji Japan’s response to the onslaught of the West, reflected in the actions of all five leaders studied here, is impressive, compared to the slower responses of China and Korea.

1101 Technonationalism as ideology is the idea that technology is an important, basic part of protecting a country by making it wealthy and strong. See also the definitions of technonationalism as ideology in the Glossary section.
its own position and interaction in the international system. While Yamagata and Ito emphasize this last point the most, all five of the leaders strongly acknowledged Japan’s vital need to import needed technologies to strengthen itself internally, for national survival in the international system. Similarly, in their views on nationalism, all five of the leaders support building up the Japanese nation so it can be strong in the international system. For that process, they all recognize that Japan must import the world’s best knowledge, science and technology, now possessed by the West, no longer by Asia. In sum, in examining the leaders’ external political worldviews through the lens of technonationalism as ideology, the possibility of Japan gaining strength and surviving in the international system is strongly connected with its own internal strength and reforms. Most of these five leaders care most about the domestic aspects, for the basic reason that if internal reforms are insufficient, external strength will never follow.

**Cognition Issues. Images.** The primary images about general international relations that emerge here reflect strong political realism and instrumentalism (Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, Kato). International relations are seen as driven by the powerful (Fukuzawa, Kato), by economics (Ito), with nations fighting for their own interests and their own survival (Fukuzawa, Kato), cooperating only when they wish (Kato). The international system is chaotic (Kato; Yamagata (implied)). Japan’s capacity to conduct international relations and diplomacy must be strengthened (Ito, Mori). Regarding nations and nationalism, Japan must modernize and restore its national unity in order to survive

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1102 This could include using the technologies to project into the international arena, as the West did. Yamagata in particular agreed with this point.
1103 See also my discussion (earlier in this chapter) of the five leaders’ views of international relations, at the beginning of the section, Comparison of worldviews on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895).
Fukuzawa believes that strong feelings and emotions, even irrational ones, connect people with nations, while Kato argues that the bonds of the Japanese people are both emotional and due to blood.\textsuperscript{1104} The nation is more important than individuals; people have a duty to sacrifice their lives for the state (Kato, Mori (implied), and Yamagata). Similarly, the rights of the nation are more important than those of individuals (Fukuzawa). Images of international relations also reflect, to a large degree, the influence of scientific, technological, and evolutionary thinking. Biological imagery permeates Kato’s arguments about international relations. He sees the international system as a “jungle” where civilized and uncivilized peoples, nations and races compete for survival. International relations represents a competition between stronger and weaker nations, and like nature, only the strong will survive (Fukuzawa, Yamagata). There are also a few images of morality and international relations. To Kato, international relations often involve moral components which, though complex, are mostly driven by the survival instinct. Fukuzawa sees idealistic, moralistic or Confucian images of international relations, presuming human goodness, as unrealistic and flawed.

Another group of images relates to military and defense issues. In the early Meiji era, Japan’s military is seen as backward, in need of modernizing, while Europe’s military is strong and superior to Japan’s (Yamagata). Modernizing and strengthening the military for the nation’s survival is the government’s supreme task (Yamagata, Fukuzawa: 1882-1895). Japan must also adopt and develop modern military technologies from the West to survive (Yamagata, implied). Fukuzawa also argues that only through

\textsuperscript{1104} Recall Kato’s argument that all Japanese are descended from the emperor, and connected with each other in a “family-state.”
acquiring Western civilization can Japan defend itself. Yamagata implies that Japan must exercise influence in nearby countries to defend itself against the West. There are generally no negative images of war here, especially regarding Japan and Asia, only the certainty that Japan does not want the West to invade it or Asia. To Kato, aggressive wars and attacking other nations, to enhance survival in the international “jungle,” are acceptable.

A final category of images on Japan’s external political relations (1850-1895) concerns foreigners, foreign countries and regions. One gets the impression that Japanese in the late Tokugawa period were highly wary of foreigners, especially Westerners, and interaction with them. Contrary to many others, Fukuzawa concludes that foreigners are not inferior to Japanese, and not solely bent on invading other countries. Images of the West are both positive and negative. In some images, the West is seen as admirable, and these Japanese leaders admit that Japan can learn much from it (Mori, Fukuzawa, Yamagata). Fukuzawa calls the West a desirable “new coat,” from which Japan can learn. On the other hand, the West is a huge threat that may invade Japan (Yamagata). In the future, the world will become a world-state, dominated by Europe (Kato). Images of Asia are also somewhat conflicting, though mostly negative. Asian civilization is now an “old coat” (Fukuzawa). Asia and China are uncivilized and backwards, though China used to be civilized (Fukuzawa, Kato). Japan is now superior to both Asia and China (Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, Kato). It is now acceptable for Japan to intervene in and influence mainland Asia (Yamagata, Ito).

How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? These images of international relations show a preference for pragmatic, power-oriented images
that would tend to provoke materialist, realist, power-oriented policy responses: massive study of Western knowledge and importation of useful technologies, and the rapid buildup of Japan’s military. This happened. In line with this realism, the leaders here mostly prefer “scientific” and “technological” explanations for everything, including social and political phenomena. As we observed earlier, this helped encourage a rejection of Japan’s philosophical, ethical Asian/Confucian heritage by these leaders. These types of images would make state leaders prefer more strong state, autocratic solutions to diplomatic dilemmas, rather than diplomatic, carefully negotiated ones, and make them have less preference for individual human rights. All of the images regarding the military and war support a rapid increase in Japan’s military and defense capabilities, and aggressive actions regarding both the West and Asia. They do not suggest a pacifist response. The images on the West suggest the ambivalent response that Meiji Japan gave: great admiration for much of Western technology and culture, but a fierce determination to protect Japan’s political integrity and cultural autonomy, at all cost. There is also near anger or disgust expressed toward Asia and China (Fukuzawa), and paternalistic sympathy for its “inferior” state (Ito). These attitudes suggest Japanese intervention, which soon occurred. The concept of non-interference in other state’s affairs does not apply here.

**Worldview.** What do these images of Japan’s external political relations suggest about the nature of the world, and how it is driven? The world is chaotic, driven by power, and only the strong survive. It resembles a biological system, a “wild jungle.” Only through unity as a nation can people survive. To be strong, a nation must have power: money, resources, military, and so forth. The West controls the world. The world
outside Japan is strange and dangerous. The lifeways of the strongest, the West, are best; the lifeways of the weak (Asians) are inferior. Japan needs to fight hard to grow strong and make its way in this world. How does this world work? Wealthy, militarily strong countries drive the world. The weak are devoured by the strong. Unified nations are strong, and can fight. Through success in war, victors become stronger. The temporarily weak, such as the Japanese, must study the strong (the West) to get stronger. In this view, it is allowable for the strong to invade the weak, though Japan does not want to be, or intend, to stay weak. The world is politically controlled by the politically, economically and militarily strong: the West. In these worldviews in the early Meiji era, the self (Japan) is weak in international and military affairs. Japan must become strong, is capable of doing so, and by 1895, has done so. Japan can learn, has a noble culture, and can teach the rest of Asia. Regarding non-self (other countries and regions), the West is strong in all these areas, threatens Japan, Asia, and other weak nations. It wants to invade and control Japan like the rest of Asia and many other countries.

What are the relevant environments surrounding the leaders who hold these worldviews? How have these environments interacted with or affected the their worldviews? The surrounding environment includes Western countries (such as the United States, Britain, France, Russia), East Asian countries and regions (China, Korea, the Ryukyus, Southeast Asia), Western views of international relations, and international relations and political theories that seep into Japan at the time. Those theories were highly influential on the views of Japan’s leaders working in politics and diplomacy. These outside philosophies interacted with existing Japanese views inherited from the
Tokugawa era\textsuperscript{1105} and Dutch studies for over two hundred years. The power and threat of the West made these leaders know they must learn and master Western diplomatic and military knowledge, or Japan could become colony like India or China.

How these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes? Regarding perceptions, the power of the West made Japanese leaders favor Western views of politics, international relations, diplomacy, military technology, science, and related areas. They tended to reject the Confucian and Asian foundations of previous Japanese knowledge. They highly favored knowledge from the West.

Concerning information, most of these leaders and the Japanese government drew on the best, latest Western knowledge that could be obtained abroad or brought to Japan. They often ignored Asian sources. They used power-, scientific, biological, evolution-leaning and economic-oriented explanations of international events.

How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? The power of Western military technology greatly influenced the Japanese military, and both its and the Japanese government’s actions in international relations in mainland Asia in this era. Western political knowledge transformed Japanese domestic politics to encourage the rapid industrial and military buildup that supported military actions against Asia, indirectly against the West.

\textit{Cultural Logics:} The global phenomena to which these leaders responded included foreign governments (Western and Asian), Western political ideas (including those on international relations) and institutions, Western military technologies and

\textsuperscript{1105} The Tokugawa era worldviews included neo-Confucianism, and on the official level, supported \textit{sakoku}.
forces, Asian military forces (China and Korea), Western diplomatic institutions and structures, Western writings on politics, diplomacy and military affairs, and Confucian ideas about politics and political relations that had influenced Tokugawa Japan and still influenced Qing China and Korea.

The cultural logics under the worldviews of these global phenomena suggest that governments that have more military power are superior. Those that lose battles or do not have such power are weaker and thus inferior; those with power are superior. Asian governments are weak, passive, and therefore inferior. Western political ideas support these Western victories and power, and therefore are superior. Western political ideas are based on logic and science, and therefore better. The West and the strong rule the world and “call the tune.” Thus Japanese must adopt their systems of international politics and diplomacy to fit into that system. The West’s main culture of politics and ideas mostly conflicts with Japanese culture, so Japan must only very carefully adapt Western political ideas and institutions, or its culture may be damaged. The West is stronger. Therefore if Japan wants to survive politically as a nation and in the international system, it must have the West’s military technologies and Western-type military forces to survive. Hard work brings rewards. Those who are weak, passive (ie. Asia countries and their militaries) are inferior. Political ideas based on science are better than ones that are not. Therefore Western political ideas are better than Asian or Confucian ones. Western cultural and political ideas conflict with Japanese politics and culture. Only ideas closest to Japanese culture can work at this time, despite their intellectual appeal. This reflects an attitude of cultural relativism. Political ideas and
philosophies that do not stress action, power, bring more power, or wealth are passive, weak, and inferior. Confucian ideas and societies are therefore weak and inferior.

What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? As quickly as possible, Japan must learn these new political and military ideas, institutions, and systems, quickly industrialize, and build up its own military, political and diplomatic systems. Japan must quickly use these to its own advantage, for its own interests in the international system. That is what these leaders believed, and what they did. Japan then imitated the West, and used these new ideas and technologies it had mastered to attack China, Korea and Taiwan before the end of this period (1895).

In the cultural logics under these responses, if Japan is not strong and does not modernize quickly, those who are stronger, the West, will conquer it. It may become an inferior colony or vassal state, such as India or China. Japan must learn the best knowledge and technologies to survive. Only the powerful, learned, and technologically strong survive and flourish. To survive, it is permitted for Japan to import knowledge that it needs. Japan can take these imported ideas and technologies, and improve them, based on its past experience with Chinese and Korean knowledge. To survive, Japan must become a strong, aggressive power like the West. A strong country is allowed to be involved in the internal political and economic affairs of inferior powers. Japan knows it does not want this itself. But it is the right of a strong country. The strong can exploit the weak and do. Japan will be great and strong. It also has this right.

What do we learn by comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to them? The cultural logics under the worldviews stress evolutionary ideas, power and
strength, especially military ones. Science and technology are preferred. We should assume that science, materialism and technological strength bring tangible, true benefits. Japan must have these to survive. There is also the assumption that though Japan is also technologically weak, it is more assertive than other Asian countries. It can learn, work hard, and improve. Additional assumptions include those of Western superiority over Japan, Japan’s superiority over other Asian countries, and that imported technologies and ideas must be compatible with the receiving society’s culture, or they will not work. The cultural logics under the responses are very similar to the cultural logics under the worldviews themselves. Many of the same assumptions about the superiority of power, strength, materialism, and knowledge are also here, and that Japan is superior to other Asian countries, that it can import these technologies and ideas, learn, master, and improve them. The former cultural logics under the worldviews seem of a more general nature, while the cultural logics under the responses are more specific to Japan’s actual current conditions.

**Globalization Issues.** How do these important worldviews on external political relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? The intensified speed of global communication and transportation in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period meant that Japan and its leaders now could have knowledge of the world’s greatest political and military ideas and technologies, and possibly learn them, if it wished. This had never before been possible for a nation as geographically isolated as Japan, on such a scale, and so quickly. While Japan had very interesting, intense encounters with the West in the period just preceding the Tokugawa period, this period was much more intense and
urgent compared with the former. Decisions had to be made quickly, or the nation could be invaded. Absorbing the political theories and ideas was not as urgent as building up the country’s military defenses, in the thought of Yamagata. The leaders’ attitudes on nationalism do not reflect the input of these global processes at such an intense rate. Both the intense threat that Japan now faced in its international relations, and its ability to respond so rapidly, were a result of these global processes. In the minds of these leaders, the power of the West, and the speed at which it and its forces now threatened Japan, helped to emphasize the threat of the West, and de-emphasize threats from Asia. Science and technology were a primary reason for this intensified globalization. Morality and religion did not really affect these globalization factors. And how did globalization affect the worldviews? The unprecedented speed of communication and transport links in this age intensified the speed at which Japan must respond to the Western threat of invasion, and even the speed at which Japan’s worldviews were hit. Like China and Britain during the Opium War, Japan now faced war with global powers like Britain on an unprecedented scale, in just a matter of months, where not long before, encounters with such a distant power at such a scale were unknown.

If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro-(personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? The global processes I refer to here are the intensified speed at which Japan and other non-Western nations like China, India and Korea had to respond to political and military ideas, forces, and technologies. Individually, all of these five leaders responded with hard work and study,

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1106 I refer to the period from about 1550 to 1650, when Japan encountered Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and British traders, and the entry of Christianity into the country.
to try to understand aspects of the Western threat, and to determine how Japan should best respond. Fukuzawa focused on understanding the meaning of international relations on a general level, and international law. Kato attempted to understand these issues on a “scientific” level, and some of his writings were used by the Meiji state to support its own policies. His own estimation that the world would eventually evolve into a single world-state dominated by Europe actually predicts the process of political globalization. Several of the leaders took personal action on Japan’s diplomatic and military policies. Ito concentrated on learning European political and legal systems, so they might be applied effectively in Japan, and participated in direct negotiation in foreign diplomacy with other nations in several occasions. Mori also briefly served as a diplomat. Yamagata took aggressive action on building up Japan’s military. Several traveled overseas to observe the West directly (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori). On a public level, the actions of these leaders represent an urgent, collective response in the face of a huge threat almost unprecedented for Japan. The Japanese people at large did not seem to have the capacity to picture the complexity and exact nature of this threat, but their wise leaders did so rapidly, and very well.

Do these important global processes of external political relations represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? These Japanese responses only represented a Japanese form of globalization at the end of this period, with the start of the Sino-Japanese War, when Japan battled Chinese and Korean forces in Korea, China, and Taiwan. At this point, the Japanese response to the forces of Western globalization boiled over, resulting in Japanese invasion of several neighboring

1107 Davis, Moral and Political, 76-77, 82.
regions. The significance of these events was the start of unprecedented Japanese involvement in the world, strongly manifested from 1895 on, up to our present age. Negative aspects of this Japanese globalization were first felt by its Asian neighbors, not really by the United States or Britain until World War II, and not much by Europe until the postwar period.

Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations

Fukuzawa Yukichi. The foreign books that Fukuzawa collected on his overseas trips provided many of his ideas for Japan’s domestic and international economic activities, as did the trips themselves. From his trip to Europe (1862), Fukuzawa developed a deeper knowledge of Western business practices. Seeing the results of post-Civil War hyperinflation on his second trip to the United States (1867), Fukuzawa understood the causes of inflation. This helped motivate him to later start the Yokohama Specie Bank, which became Japan’s first international bank.\textsuperscript{1108}

Ito Hirobumi. Ito understood the importance of foreign economic institutions. In 1870, he studied American financial institutions in the United States, later applying similar knowledge to Japan’s Far Eastern empire. In the mid-1870s, he helped negotiate a commercial treaty between Japan and Korea, a first for modern Korea.\textsuperscript{1109} After Japan gleaned political and economic lessons from the West, in the early 1900s, and after he became Japan’s resident-(governor-) general in Korea, Ito supported the importation of Japan’s political and economic lessons into Korea, which he saw as inferior to Japan in

\textsuperscript{1108} Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 108, 110. The roles of the Yokohama Specie Bank were to balance the amount of gold and silver in Japan, and to provide funds to Japanese international traders (Ibid.). The U.S. occupation forces closed the bank in 1946, since it had become the bank of Japan’s military forces and overseas colonies (Ibid.,119).
\textsuperscript{1109} Hamada, Prince Ito, 62, 75.
its development. This is a clear, early example of Japan projecting itself and its own development experience on another country, soon to be a colony.

**Kato Hiroyuki.** In late nineteenth century Social Darwinism, and to Kato, Caucasians were seen as racially superior to non-Caucasians. Kato would have been shocked to see the global economic successes of Japan in the late twentieth century, when some experts declared, “Japan is number one.”

Kato also had a somewhat racist view of economic competition between nations. It seems he attributed the superior economic performance of the West and Europeans, in part, to their “superior” race and civilization. As noted above in Chapter 4, he worried that the superior economic abilities of Caucasians might overwhelm Japanese in economic competition within Japan, and that the racially inferior Chinese might do the same, through their presumed willingness to work for lower wages. If this was true for Japan’s domestic marketplace, it seems Kato would apply the same thought to competition in global markets.

**Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations (1850-1895)**

Both Fukuzawa and Ito traveled to the West to observe Western economics in action, and had early exposure to the power and presence of Western trade in their childhoods in southwest Japan. Both observed the practical operation of Western economics in childhood, and overseas, especially Fukuzawa. Fukuzawa was highly effected by what he observed *long-term*, both by the impressive knowledge of Western trading and Dutch studies when he was young, and then by the powerful effects of Western economics when he traveled overseas (he was especially impressed by the

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1111 Ibid., 244.
latter). He was moved to write about these in his many popular books, several devoted to economics and business. Fukuzawa applied what he wrote in his private life and career, and in the many financial and business institutions he helped found. Ito also very impressed by what he observed in Western economics when he traveled overseas. He also applied these lessons to another country: Korea. Fukuzawa founded the highly influential Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan’s first international bank. Thus he also had a large influence on Japan’s international financial dealings with the world. Ito was directly involved in international economic negotiations, though his greatest impacts were on international politics, not international economics. This was not the case for Fukuzawa and Kato. Ito studied economic issues in his travels to the West, and later applied them to one of Japan’s greatest colonies, Korea. This is a clear example of Japan “learning” from the West, and then projecting that onto its own empire. It is an example of Japan projecting the West’s mistakes onto others, of repeating the West’s “mistakes.” It is also an example of Japan projecting itself, its own development experience, on another country. In general, we see suggestions of evolutionistic thought in the thought of Fukuzawa, regarding intense economic competition between nations, but it is strongest in Kato. In Kato’s racist views and explanations of economic competition, of winners and losers, among the races and nations, it is assumed Westerners/Caucasians are economically superior, next Japan, and last, other Asians.

\[\text{1112} \text{ I refer to the commercial treaty between Japan and Korea that Ito negotiated.}\]
\[\text{1113} \text{ This is a straightforward observation of Kato’s views, but it is based on only a small amount of data. I did not find that much evidence about Kato’s views of international economics in the writings and studies I reviewed.}\]
Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations (1850-1895)

**Development Issues.** Is it more relevant to use internationalization, “modernization,” or both concepts here? Internationalization seems more relevant, since it considers external, international processes involving the global economic system, including colonialism and imperialism, of how peripheral, non-Western countries are absorbed into the global economy, and the cultural effects of that process on the international level, not the domestic one. This chapter does not really consider domestic issues, so internationalization is more relevant here than “modernization,” which considers the global economy and its effects on the internal cultural features of peripheral countries, as they are absorbed into the world market.

In terms of internationalization, as we examine these worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations (1850-1895), the key question is what do we learn about Japan’s economy and its culture on the international level as it began to be absorbed into the global economic system? As Japan was about to be drawn, or “forced,” into the world economy, by both external and internal pressures, of necessity its cultural interaction with the outside world increased. With pressures to trade came the signing of the unequal trade treaties with several Western nations in the late 1850s, which in turn brought pressures for more negotiations from the Japanese side, in order to replace the treaties and their unfair requirements. Increased economic interaction brought foreign teachers of economics and business to Japan, as well as some foreign businessmen and migrant workers from China. Japanese government officials and young scholars were also sent abroad to master the fields of economics, business, accounting, and related fields. These
interactions greatly updated and transformed the technical practice of business in early Meiji Japan, even if many of the ideologies guiding Japanese management continued to be influenced by neo-Confucian values that prevailed in the late Tokugawa period.\footnote{See the discussion of the influence of Confucian values from the late Tokugawa period on Japanese management culture in early Meiji Japan in the section on domestic market contexts in Chapter 4.}

Additional social changes hit Japan that were brought through increased economic interaction with the outside world, including rapid industrialization, increased urbanization, women entering the workforce, and so forth. These economic changes also enabled Japan to begin to build its huge export businesses, build up its military, and to “export” its own culture to neighboring regions, in a manner of speaking, with the Sino-Japanese War.\footnote{The “export” of Japanese culture that started in the next period (1895-1945) was probably greatest in Taiwan, to start, since it came under direct Japanese administration shortly after the end of the Sino-Japanese War.} In coming decades, Japan’s economic relations with the world would have increasingly large economic and social effects on Japan, its Asian neighbors (especially its colonies), and other nations.

**Technology Issues.** What are the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with these worldviews of external economic relations? Among the major technological issues connected with these worldviews of external economic relations are that these actors received direct exposure to the power and “wonder” of Western technological and economic “marvels.” As youths in southwestern Japan, even under national isolation (sakoku), Fukuzawa and Ito were exposed to the influence and powerful presence of Western trade and economies. Ito stole away on a steamship to learn how to pilot one. Both Fukuzawa and Ito were greatly impressed with these marvels when they traveled overseas to the West, and were also exposed to Western economic
ideas. While Fukuzawa’s knowledge tended toward the basic functions of modern economies, banking, and daily business practices in the West, Ito’s knowledge focused more on international economic diplomacy and treaties. Technology is also closely connected with industrialization, which would further promote Japanese economic growth. In Kato, we see an evolutionistic emphasis on economic competition between nations, another key determinant to which nations become strong, influential, and survive. Economically successful nations develop great technologies, are strong, more admirable and receive the spoils of the international system.

What are the most significant economic factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in these worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations? And did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or negatively? Why? Many of these technologies were physically powerful. Their most significant economic factors included the power of military technologies to conquer and control foreign markets by force. Technologies of global transport and communication enabled Western traders to trade globally, spread their economic influence, gain more wealth, control more colonies, and more spheres of influence. They would do the same for Japan. Managerial technologies of business, economics and economics education would strengthen Japan’s economy domestically, build it up, and prepare Japan to better function in the global economy. Mastering the know-how of international economic diplomacy would enable Japan to function in the world economy. The technologies connected with industrialization would greatly enlarge Japan’s production capacity, contribute to domestic growth, and permit Japan to produce various products.

1116 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
domestically, export to foreign markets, and increase its wealth. An “evolutionary” mentality that stressed that Japan must work hard or it would not survive encouraged hard efforts to ensure Japanese survival. The international system affected many of these technologies very powerfully and positively. It is the international system that brought Japan many of these technologies in the first place. While the international economic system threatened to impoverish or control peripheral nations like Japan, Japan is one of the very few cases that showed that if nations worked hard, smartly and in a disciplined manner, independence from foreign economic and political control might be achieved.

What were the important ideas and technologies transferred in these worldviews of external economics? Technologies transferred included transportation and communication equipment (ships, trains, the telegraph), industrial technologies (manufacturing, steel, textiles, shipbuilding), managerial and business technologies (modern management, accounting, training), agricultural imports(exports), and military technologies (ships, armaments, battle strategies). Among the ideas that were transferred were Western economic theories of trade, finance, commerce, business, evolutionary theory, management, business and accounting principles and theories, late Tokugawa Dutch studies (which inevitably included some economic ideas), ideas, and theories of imperialism.1117

Who were the main actors involved, whether international or domestic, individual or state, and what impacts did they have on the transfer outcomes? Main individual actors on the international level included Western international leaders, traders, military officials, foreign economists, and business leaders. Japanese actors in the

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1117 See Chapter 4 where many of these economic ideas are briefly outlined and discussed in more detail.
international level included many of the same. There were also migrant laborers present, especially from China, in this era. State and institutional actors on the international level from the West included foreign governments, economic ministries, international shipping and commercial firms, and from Japan, the Japanese government, economic and industrial ministries, commercial and shipping firms. On the domestic level, individual actors from Japan were mainly government leaders, economic thinkers, businessmen, and traders. Western actors present in Japan included foreign businessmen, traders, and teachers doing business with or living in Japan. State and institutional actors on the domestic level included the Japanese government, ministries and agencies connected with the economy, industry, trade or business, small or large business firms, and the zaibatsu.

What were the impacts of the transfers? They were both positive and negative. Western government actors forced negative treaties on Japan. Western businessmen and teachers brought a great deal of know-how and shared this with the Japanese. The Japanese government had huge impacts on the progress of business in Japan. The government’s hand in the market was heavy in this era, mostly leaning toward large business. The public sector mostly took the lead in deciding trends and policy directions. While the influence of individuals like Fukuzawa, Shibusawa Eiichi\footnote{Shibusawa (1840-1931) was one of the greatest and most influential businessmen in Meiji era Japan.} and others was very significant in Japan’s business and private sector, the lead of the public sector in this era was stronger.

What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn in these transfer cases related to Japan’s external economic relations? These technologies and economic systems indeed were powerful. Hard efforts to study and master them paid off in many ways.
Japan grew, and its efforts to grow and industrialize were highly effective. This is not to say that there were not many difficulties or pain; there were. Japan grew to the point that not long after this period it was able to negotiate an end to the unequal treaties with the West, and become involved economically in the affairs of its neighbors such as Korea and Taiwan, and beat huge countries such as China and Russia in military confrontations. Yet even though Japan developed the capacity to do all of these actions did not mean all of them were justified or right; many were not. The damage inflicted on neighboring countries, especially through the wars, was huge. Yet economic infrastructure eventually resulted in some places where there had been almost none (i.e., Taiwan).

What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these economic worldviews? The most important cultural factors included greatly enhanced, speeded up connections in transportation and communications with the outside world, a greatly improved ability to communicate, travel to, and connect with it, and an enhanced capability to receive economic ideas from overseas and discuss them. There were huge impacts from industrial technologies: the ability to vastly increase the productivity and output of the Japanese economy and then the huge accompanying social impacts. This inserted a greater Japanese presence into the world marketplace. The impacts of this presence were likely the most significant in Asia in this period. Managerial and business technologies brought new and enhanced principles of scale, efficiency, finance, time-keeping, speed, exporting, importing, and trading. Interacting with the outside world had huge cultural impacts on how Japanese worked and conducted business in the early Meiji era, compared with the late Tokugawa

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1119 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
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era. Agricultural production of silk and textiles enhanced employment in rural areas. Increasing employment of rural men and women in new factories and industries affected their lives, farms, village, and families in many ways. Military technologies brought increasing discipline throughout society, and increased the economic scale of production and industry. Western ideas of business greatly increased the scale of production of Japanese business, connected it with world markets, greatly changed daily life in Japan, and vastly increased the nation’s wealth. The culture of science and technology associated with industrial and military technologies gradually spread throughout the nation through the education system, improving research, health, and military applications. The most important cultural values included the value of efficiency in time and work, increased values of communication, travel, freedom, Western cultural values of freedom, independence, freedom of communication, expression, values of free trade, entrepreneurialism, experimentation, hard work, wealth, European ideas of class, wealth, desires to increase efficiency in agriculture and industry, values associated with mechanization in many areas, values of speed, evolutionism, survival of the strongest/fittest, and the right of strong nations to invest in and influence other regions, to gain wealth and help developing regions improve as well.

In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level? Fukuzawa observed, studied, and read about these economic and business technologies, wrote popular books to educate other Japanese in economic principles, founded several businesses and educational institutes, and became very wealthy and successful. In other words, he practiced what he preached. He believed that
through his writings and efforts, Japan would improve economically on the grassroots level, and that this would strengthen the nation internally, and enable it to flourish on the international level. Fukuzawa had some direct influence through the founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Ito used ideas of international economic diplomacy to negotiate several international treaties, including Japan’s commercial treaty with Korea in the mid-1870s. This helped to begin to project Japan’s influence overseas, which eventually had huge impacts on Japan’s Asian neighbors, and on Japan as well. Economic efforts that supported Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War also enhanced Japan’s position in the international system through the increased prestige Japan gained in the eyes of the Western powers after its victory over China. Subtle, evolutionistic ideas of racism and the hierarchy of nations, peoples, and countries, like Kato’s, also helped to support Japan’s military and economic interventions on the mainland.

How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? The rapid influx of various technologies (transportation, communication, industry, management, and agriculture) greatly increased Japan’s wealth, and its capacity to communicate with, interact with, and influence the international environment. This interaction and influences most greatly affected Japan itself, and its Asian neighbors. Influences on the West were more gradual and subtle, i.e. the export of porcelains, teas, silk, and Japanese art from Japan, increasing Western knowledge of and interest in Japan. For Japan, its increasing involvement in Asia and the buildup of its military greatly increased the nation’s wealth, industrialization, and economic power, and brought it out of near total isolation. It also increased its respect in the international system and to the West. To other Asian countries (China, Korea), this
would soon bring much pain, anger, and hatred of the Japanese that continues to manifest itself to some degree in Japan’s contemporary international relations today.

Do the belief systems\textsuperscript{1120} of any of these leaders (on technology issues in these economic worldviews, on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? If so, how do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? The belief systems of the leaders here do blind them to certain realities, and likely bias their actions and (where relevant) policy decisions in certain directs. The pro-materialist-leaning, pro-scientific bent of these leaders, plus the great wealth and impressive technologies of the West they have observed, makes them favor big-scale “scientific” technologies and knowledge systems on economics from the West, then the world’s dominant center of power. These leaders tend to favor heavy industrialization, rapid adoption of modern business and accounting practices, large-scale development of military armaments, assertive economic diplomacy and trade to end Japan’s unequal trade treaties with the West, and aggressive Japanese involvement in the economic and political affairs of nearby regions, wherever possible. Their economic belief systems therefore make them favor economic practices or assertions of the West, and generally blind them to non-material conditions in mainland Asia and nearby regions, such as China, Korea, and Taiwan. Evolutionary thought also influences their focus on the “strong” West, as opposed to Japan’s “weak” neighbors. Ironically, the economic and

\textsuperscript{1120} See the definition of belief systems in the Glossary. Briefly, belief systems include a decision-maker’s beliefs about another actor’s strategies, tactics, motivations, and goals (Shimko, \textit{Images and Arms}, 45). They are a part of an actor’s worldview, but not the same thing as worldview (Cottam, \textit{Images and Intervention}, 10).
technological strength of the West, and the weakness of Japan’s Asian neighbors, seems to motivate Japan to “copy” the West so Japan can grow strong, and then “share” its knowledge and fruits with its weaker Asian brothers. Hopefully Japan would also gain more wealth in the process too.

In these worldviews on external economic relations, is the concept of technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? The ideas of technonationalism as ideology are implicit in these views, especially in Fukuzawa’s. Most of his writing on economics stresses helping Japanese to understand modern economics and business practice, so that they will be adopted, to strengthen Japan internally, so that it will grow wealthy and strong, to defend itself against the West. The views of Ito and Kato also suggest that a stronger Japan also has the right to help its weaker Asian neighbors grow stronger, which theoretically also increases Japan’s wealth, and therefore its own security.

**Cognition Issues. Image.** The primary images of Japan’s external economic relations here can be organized into three main groups. In the first, images of foreign economic relations, economic treaties are seen as both good and bad. They should be fair to Japan, and in Japan’s national interests, but when they are not, they are bad (Ito, implied). Yet economic treaties and stable economic relations between countries are good, when they are fair (Ito). The superior economic performance of Westerners over Japanese and other Asians is sometimes attributed to their “superior” race and civilization (Kato). Other Asian countries are seen as economically inferior to Japan and the West, and less developed than Japan, so exporting Western or Japanese economic lessons to

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1121 Kato is also worried that premature competition with Westerners in Japan could ruin Japan’s economy.
them is good, and helpful for those countries (Ito). In the main images of Western
economies, Western economics and business are seen as superior to Japan’s (Fukuzawa
and Kato), and it is assumed that Japan can learn much from Western economies
(Fukuzawa). They are both seen as good models for the Japanese economy and business
world (Fukuzawa). Learning about Western business is good, whether in the West or in
Japan, but the former is even better (Fukuzawa). Western economic knowledge is useful
and can be applied in Japan (Fukuzawa), or soon, in Japan’s new empire (Ito). The third
group of images here are of Western economic institutions. They are seen as important,
and worthwhile for Japanese to study (Ito).

How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? The
economic images here reflect pragmatism and realism, similar to the images above on
external political relations. These images would encourage Japanese policymakers to
favor close economic relations with the West, and not as much with other Asian nations.
These images favor the West, its economic systems and knowledge. These images also
encourage Japan to intervene economically in the affairs of other Asian countries, if it is
strong enough and able to do so. These images do not encourage Japan to learn about
business or economics from other Asian countries.

*Worldview.* Based on the above image, in the cognitive framework that
emerges, the world is controlled by the strong, including the economically strong (the
West). Because the West is economically stronger than Japan and other Asian countries,
it is superior to them. Any country that does not want to be weak and inferior must learn
from the strong, the West. For the weak to become strong, they must learn and change.
Japan can learn and change by adopting Western economics. The world is also driven by
the strong, especially the econ strong. That is now the West. That strength gives the strong the right to control and exploit the economically weak. Japan does not want to remain that way, so it must learn and grow economically, and become strong like the West as soon as it can. The strong, even Japan, have the right to control the weak, i.e. rest of Asia. Regarding the world’s order, an existing system of international trade and economic treaties controls trade and financial relations between countries. Japan is shut out of this system due to sakoku (national isolation) and because the powerful West has both developed and now controls the global economic system. The economically powerful West now controls this system. If Japan can gain military or economic power, it can change the unequal treaties foisted on it by the West. In Japan’s views of the self, Japan is rather poor and weak, but enterprising, well-disciplined and hard-working. It can work hard, learn, and overcome its present weaknesses. Japan is in the best posit of the Asian countries to do this. Japan can then help the other weak Asian countries fight the West. In Japan’s views of the non-self (others), the West is economically strong, aggressive, greedy, individualistic, selfish, ready to conquer others and the weak, and to control them. The rest of Asia appears superstitious, weak, slow, lumbering, primitive, isolated, and incapable of defending itself without Japan’s “help.”

What are the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold these worldviews? The relevant environments contain Western powers and other Asian countries/regions nearby. There are also Western governments, Asian governments, trade treaties, the diplomatic world influencing and controlling the treaties, and emerging Japanese trading companies and entrepreneurs. How have these environments interacted

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1122 These are main images of China and Korea.
with or affected the leaders’ worldviews? Western treaties have put a “vice” around Japan, an unfair burden that Japan seeks to overcome as rapidly as possible. Weak Asian countries, their “offensive” behaviors, potential resources, and potential invasion by the West tempt Japan’s business leaders and entrepreneurs.

How may these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions have influenced the leaders’ perceptions? The unequal treaties angered and worried Japan’s leaders. They made them more determined to modernize Japan, and help it grow as quickly as possible, to overcome these unfair conditions. Actions of Asian countries such as China and Korea angered some leaders (Fukuzawa, Yamagata), made them feel pity for them (Ito), and desire to punish, discipline, guide them like children, and so forth. Regarding their uses of information, Japan’s leaders favored Western economic knowledge, not from Asia. Concerning the leaders’ understanding of events and their causes, they encouraged them to explain economic events through Western scientific and economic theories and explanations. They also applied Japanese entrepreneurial common sense to many of these issues, and used very worldly, material points-of-view, pragmatic explanations, according to which, the economically powerful control and drive the world. It was the West.

How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? If so, which aspects may have been affected? The huge evidence of power of economics was evident in the power of industrial technology to build up the West, in its enormous wealth, and in the amazing lifestyles in the United States and Europe that these leaders observed. These systems also gave Japanese the power to travel the world, the British the power to conquer the greatest known power (China), and so forth.
**Cultural Logics:** The global phenomena to which these leaders responded included the Western trading system, the global economic system dominated by the West, the unequal treaty system, commodities traded with other countries, the global monetary system, foreign investments in Japan, Japanese investments overseas, foreign technologies (including industrial and manufacturing technologies), foreign governments and the Japanese government, their economic and trade policies and economic-related ministries, international companies and players from overseas and Japan, Western economic knowledge, modern (Western) business practice(s), international segments of the labor force, colonialism, and imperialism. Some of the powerful ideas behind the Western and global economic systems included classical economics, theories of free trade, international trade, industrialization, evolutionism and Social Darwinism, imperialism, colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, thought about business, industry, production, factories, management, labor, Western theories of economics and business, Western and international business practices, theories of economic growth, wealth and prosperity, and values of wealth and individual entrepreneurialism.  

What are the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena? In their view, the West controls the global economic system, and has forced treaties favor to itself on Japan. All that the West wants to do in and with Japan is designed to be in its interest, not Japan’s. Foreign technologies must be imported and mastered by Japan, and can be. Foreign governments favor their own economic interests, are greedy, and do not care

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1123 Much of this list is similar to the global phenomena I listed for the cultural logics of the domestic market worldviews in Chapter 4.
about Japan. Japan’s government must act in Japan’s natural interests. All governments should fight for their national interests, as should their economic ministries. Strong state involvement in international economic diplomacy is necessary for Japan’s economic interests to be protected in the world market. Japanese international business should definitely be encouraged, but in this period, the state must take the biggest lead. Strong government in the marketplace for a country like Japan at this stage of economic development is good, internationally or domestically. Western economic knowledge works, is practical, has brought the West’s great wealth and power. Western business practices are efficient; they work too. Western colonialism and imperialism are dangers for Japan, and must be resisted. The international labor force must be carefully controlled, or it could overwhelm Japan’s economy (Kato). All Western economic thoughts are “scientific.” They prove that they are better because they work. The economically strong will control and dominate those who are weak. Modern Western theories about business and economics must be learned and well applied by Japan, because they work. If Japan does this successfully, it will survive and flourish in the international system. Domestic wealth in Japan will be affected by what happens internationally. Values of entrepreneurialism, industrialization, and business in the private sector have been the true engine of growth in such countries as the United States, Britain, and will be for Japan, as soon as its private sector can be strengthened enough to emerge. Until then, a strong state role is okay and necessary. Learning these international economic and business practices will make Japan wealthy.  

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1124 This last point is from Fukuzawa.
What are the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena? The strong control all forms of power, even economic, in the world. Brute force and power controls and determines that happens in the world. Greed drives the world. Economic actors, even states and their governments, act in their own, national interests. Each country and government cares most for itself. Each country and government, including Japan, must act in its own interests, including economic ones, and defense. This is also true in international economic diplomacy, and in the world market. Japan’s government must act on behalf of, and defend, Japan. Private business, including Japan’s, cannot compete in the global market until it reaches a certain maturity or level of quality and competitiveness. Until that time, strong state action in international economic diplomacy to protect its own national markets and businesses is allowed. Strong state economic action and intervention is necessary at this stage. Western and modern economic and business knowledge work, are practical and scientific. Japan must learn them. It will not be good for Japan to econ controlled or dominated by the West, so Japan must build itself up so it will not be. The economically strong will survive and flourish in the world, and control the economically weak. Learning Western economics and business practices will make Japan successful, wealthy. Countries that are wealthy and successful will survive. What happens internationally affects what happens domestically. The private sector is what really brings growth, but if it is too weak, or just emerging, it must have the help of the state. The public and private sectors must cooperate; they are not natural enemies.

What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? They studied hard, learned about Western economic and business theories and theories of international
trade, to answer these questions: why is the West so wealthy and strong? What made it so? What are the basic principles behind these phenomena? What must Japan do to learn these principles, and grow? What can Japan do to grow strong and wealthy so the West will not control it? Japan’s leaders studied all of the economic areas listed. The specific leaders studied here focused on the overall economy, modern business and accounting practices, the meaning of modern finance, Western business culture, international economic diplomacy, basic theories of economics, understanding entrepreneurial values and culture, and how they might be encouraged in Japan.

And what were the cultural logics under these responses? Japan has the capacity to learn from other countries, and then grow. Japan has often done it before in its history. Through hard work, a people and country will be rewarded. Japan must work hard in its present situation. It must survive. It has no choice. If Japanese apply themselves to learning these economic and business ideas, they can master them, and improve Japan’s situation. Japan’s leaders need a basic understanding of overall economic and business knowledge; certain leaders need specialized knowledge of particular areas. Economic knowledge is the most fundamental for Japan’s national survival. Japan’s leaders have the responsibility for setting the pace for the rest of Japanese society concerning the adoption of these modern economic business practices and culture, in helping set goals, providing overall guidance, and encouraging everyday people throughout Japan to learn

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1125 Fukuzawa.
1126 Fukuzawa.
1127 Fukuzawa.
1128 Fukuzawa.
1129 Hirobumi Ito and Miyoji Ito, *Commentaries on the Constitution*.
1130 Fukuzawa and Ito.
1131 Fukuzawa.
1132 Fukuzawa.
about them. The state especially has the responsibility to take the lead concerning Japan’s international economic and business dealings, since it is beyond the realm of almost all Japanese. But the effects of the international econ system and competition can determine the fate of the whole nation, so the state must definitely be involved.

If we compare the cultural logics under the worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena, we see that the former logics stress very realist, materialist forces and issues: power, wealth, greed, and economic and political actors acting in their own, national interests. If actors do not act in their own interest, they will lose in international economic competition. Strong state action is assumed to be necessary until Japan’s private sector has reached enough maturity to face international competition. Western business and economic knowledge is admired and desired because of practicality: what it has done for the West, and because it is “scientific.” These views are highly materialist and pragmatic. Cooperation between the public and private sectors is presumed to be positive and necessary. Though the private sector will ultimately determine most of Japan’s growth, it is currently too small, and needs the protection and nurturance of the state. The cultural logics under the leaders’ responses to the global economic phenomena stress action on the part of Japan’s leaders, and the Japanese people themselves: hard work, study, and more hard work. Hard work, cooperation and learning have built Japan in the past, from the village level up. This time, the national government must take the lead in determining the best courses of action for Japan’s overall economy. Cooperation of various domestic and private sector actors will be strongly encouraged, and if necessary, coerced, since this cooperation is a matter of national survival.
**Globalization Issues.** How do these important worldviews on external economic relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? Even in the late Tokugawa period, under the national isolation policy, in remote Japan, these leaders experienced the impacts of Japan’s limited economic relations with the West in southwestern Japan. Of Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato, Fukuzawa in particular sensed the power of economics to greatly uplift Japan, from what he saw in the West. On a global level, Ito knew that Japan must quickly undo the damage of the unequal trade treaties with the West, or it would be colonized and econ-dominated by the latter.

If we consider these global economic processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Impressions from Fukuzawa’s childhood of the power of Western economics, and what he later observed as he traveled in the West, affected his lifelong work, in which he stressed the import of economics as the foundation for Japan’s modern life. It is also seen in the various economy-related institutions he helped found. Ito was the individual here who was most directly involved in the processes of international economic diplomacy, helping to negotiate treaties with several other countries, such as Korea.

Do these important global processes of external economic relations represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Western economic globalization and pressures on Japan to open for trade helped force Japan to open and begin modernizing. Eventually Japan was determined to begin its own

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[1133] Japan was geographically remote from the Western world, and in ancient/medieval times, fairly isolated even from the rest of East Asia.
involvement in Asia, largely for economic reasons, partly in response to what the West was already attempting to do there. Besides the economic damages resulting from the Sino-Japanese War, the economic effects of this Japanese “globalization” did not really start to emerge until slightly later, when Japanese colonization began in Taiwan in 1895, and in Korea in 1910. The economic effects were much more fully seen in the next period (1895-1945).

Conclusion

From our study of leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external political and economic relations (1850 to 1895), what can we conclude about how those views, and Japan’s experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations at this time, may have contributed to Japan’s current foreign aid policies? In this conclusion, I will note general trends, but will explore more concrete linkages in the final chapters (9 and 10). On learning from foreign societies, we see that a developing nation needs strong relations with more advanced countries so it can import practical, high level knowledge, from many sources, to help it develop the nation. Nation-building, for the nation’s survival, must be a top priority. Japan needed such knowledge in politics, economics, science, technology, military affairs, and so forth. For this purpose, Japan sent bright scholars overseas, and brought foreign experts into the country. Japan did all these things in this period, and set a good example for LDCs today. These should also be priorities in today’s aid programs, but I am not sure how much they currently are in Japanese ODA. On cultural issues and development, Japan’s leaders (1850-1895) did not do very much to protect the nation’s culture. On religion and development, coercion and mixing of
religion and state were highly destructive in Japan. On the role of development and security ideologies in domestic Japanese affairs, toward the end of the era 1850 to 1895, Japan used several ideologies to encourage imperialistic control of nearby regions and extremist nationalistic ideologies to cement its control of Japan’s domestic politics, economy and society. In ODA and development policy, aggressive or extremist ideologies should be discouraged.

On external political relations, from 1850 to 1895, there were many negative events that can provide fruitful guidelines for ODA and development policies. For example, in this period, Japan generally had hostile relations with its neighbors in Asia. Though Japan was uncomfortable with being forced to open itself to foreign relations with the West, a few years later, it forced Korea to do the same. Though Japan did not like the unequal treaties that were forced on it, it forced similar treaties on Korea and others. Though Japan did not want to be attacked or invaded by the West, it attacked China over the issue of Korea, partly on Korean soil. Japan built up its military without adequate controls on its power, which would have disastrous consequences for the nation in a few decades. Sadly, in this situation, we have a developing country quickly repeating the mistakes of the West in its relations with other developing countries. It seems that Japan recognizes these mistakes on some levels. Its present ODA policy seeks friendly relations with LDCs, not to attack or coerce them. Japan also limits its ODA for countries that have excessive arms trade or build-up.

On external economic issues, Japan took various wise, pragmatic steps in its international economic relations in this era (1850-1895). It sought to trade with a broad range of nations on an equal basis, including bilateral trade, though unequal treaties
hindered these goals, somewhat. The government encouraged Japan to seek independence and strength in trade, and to identify the nation’s areas of economic strength, as quickly as possible. Japan also sought positive economic and cultural relations to help it rapidly gain needed technical knowledge. Since positive trade has been a key part of Japan’s development and growth, Japan’s ODA policies have always sought to encourage LDCs to develop strong economic infrastructure so that they can engage in their own positive economic development and growth.

The second key question of the dissertation asks whether the ideas of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development, and how much are they seen in Japan’s current aid policies. The concept of translative adaptation does not really apply here, since the main focus of this chapter is on international, not domestic issues. In their worldviews of Japan’s external political relations (1850 to 1895), all five leaders studied accept the basic assumptions of internationalization, that the West should not dominate Japan as it is absorbed into the global economy, politically or economically. While it is also implied that they do not want Japan to be culturally invaded, their cultural emphasis is more on the domestic level. In their views of external economic relations (1850 to 1895), all three leaders studied (Fukuzawa, Ito, and Kato) support internationalization. None wants Japan to be economically dominated by the West, nor its internal culture destroyed. There are few comments about cultural issues on the international level here. I found it challenging to apply “modernization” to the worldviews of external political relations, but in the end, concluded that in the case of Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, they suggest that while maintaining Japan’s internal cultural fortitude is important, placing
priority on external defense first is more important (a matter of national survival). External defense is also more important to Yamagata and Ito. I also concluded that the concept of “modernization” does not apply to the worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations (1850-1895).

What are some chief insights from Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations during this period? Regarding technology, during the Tokugawa period, Japan imported most of its Western technology through its trade with the Dutch, the only Western country with which it was allowed to trade. A significant technology, a fleet of American navy ships, helped force open Japan in 1853. Japan significantly built up its military technology and industrialization, contributing to its victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). This led to further industrialization in Japan after the war. Japan gained significant exposure to and training in technology through several different sources in this period: through the various government missions sent to the West in the 1860s and 1870s, foreign direct investment, and from trade with and foreign instructors from the United States, Britain, Germany and France.

Concerning development, national isolation (sakoku) from 1639 to 1854 turned much of Japan’s development inward, though not totally. It limited, but did not totally extinguish, foreign input entering Japan. During sakoku, the Dutch were the main source of Western knowledge for Japan. Even though Japan was cut off from most sources of foreign knowledge in the Tokugawa period, it had a remarkably dynamic, economically

1134 These comments are based on comments in the context sections on Japan’s external political and economic relations, earlier in this chapter, and draw on various sources footnoted there.
and culturally active society, based on its own internal dynamics, trade, hard work, high educational levels, and large population. Though the signing of unequal trade treaties with various Western nations in 1858 initially created various pressures for Japan, such as higher commodity prices and internal unrest, ultimately the opening of the country provided a huge stimulus for the nation’s development in all areas. Though Japan’s development had historically been profoundly influenced by China and also Korea, with China’s defeat by Britain in the Opium War (1840-1842), Western models became much more appealing. After 1868, the Meiji government’s aggressive Westernization program had large effects on Japan’s development. Examples of foreign stimulation of Japan’s development included the large input by foreign scientists and instructors from leading Western nations, especially the United States and Britain, and aggressive negotiations by Japan with Russia in 1875, which enabled Japan to actively colonize the northern island of Hokkaido, while Russia gained Sakhalin. Though the Meiji government supported development efforts with loans and other subsidies, there was also heavy reliance upon foreign investments, markets, technical assistance, and instructors.

What do we learn about Japan’s experience with foreign relations from our survey of the contexts above? The national seclusion policy cut off almost all political and economic relations between Japan and other countries in the Tokugawa era. Though Japan reopened its political and economic relations starting in 1854, it was burdened with the system of unequal treaties with major Western powers that did not end until 1911. Early in the Meiji era, Japan quickly began assertively engaging China and Korea, politically and economically. Through war and other actions, Japan gained several colonies and significant economic footholds on the mainland, but the consequences for
the other Asian powers were largely painful. Relations with the United States and Britain were the most significant for Japan, politically, economically, and culturally. Military knowledge imported from Prussia, in particular, would have important effects on Japan and other Asian nations, through the Sino-Japanese War (1904-1905) and later conflicts. Economically, Japan had relatively limited exchange with foreign powers during the Tokugawa era, especially with Western powers. Despite the burden of the unequal treaties from 1858-1911, Japan was able to export mainly agricultural and semi-finished and manufactured goods in the Meiji period, though it usually had a negative trade balance. Foreign trade, interchange, and knowledge were especially key in the Meiji era for enhancing Japan’s economic and technical knowledge in this period.

What evidence emerges by comparing both the leaders’ worldviews and Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations in this era? Regarding “modernization” and internationalization, while these five leaders are not unconcerned about the cultural impacts of Western influence, they are most concerned about Japan’s external defense and security, since that was the most obvious, overt threat. In reviewing the nation’s primary experiences with technology, development and foreign relations from 1850 to 1895, what emerges is the great contrast between the late Tokugawa and the Meiji eras. In the former, Japan had extremely limited access to Western technologies and stimulation. It was greatly isolated, economically, politically, and culturally. After the opening of the country, however, enormous growth in the nation’s technological capabilities, development, industrial capacity, and foreign relations/connections occurred.

Another key difference is that in the older era, Japan gladly received influence from other Asian nations, while now, those sources were nearly totally rejected, and
Western sources overwhelmingly favored. The contrast between such intense isolation followed by feverish importation of everything Western could not be starker. After emerging from the late Tokugawa period, young Meiji leaders realized how much Japan had missed, and wasted no time beginning to educate themselves and Japan in what they believed they country needed to know, since its very freedom and independence depended on it.

The intense nature of what Japan faced, and its need to progress as rapidly as possible, tended to make these leaders neglect “softer” issues like culture, in the face of more pressing political, economic and strategic issues. Internationalization’s emphasis on comprehending the political and economic threats Japan faced as it was increasingly absorbed into the world market is well reflected in both the worldviews and development experiences seen in this chapter, and the urgent nature of reforms makes the leaders’ “neglect” of culture make sense. It has been argued by some aid critics that today’s Japanese aid policy also tends to focus more on economic and technical issues, rather than softer human issues such as those mentioned here.

What evidence do we have here of how views of spirituality and religion associated with these worldviews of external political and economic relations (1850-1895) may have affected policies in Japan in this era? On spirituality, above I note how three leaders in particular (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) support the use of spiritual values to strengthen Japan and its cultural core so that Japan can better succeed in technological and economic development, and enhance its chances for survival in the international system. Several of the leaders also argue that positive values and spirituality, whether Western or Eastern, can contribute to a society’s positive economic growth and
development. Above I also noted a significant theme that emerges on in the views of several of the leaders on the role of technology in Japan’s external political relations: the importance of strong spiritual values to strengthen Japan’s scientific and technological growth, to help enhance its position in the international system.

In my above discussion of the worldviews and cultural logics of Japan’s external political relations, I note that there is a heavy emphasis on material power, values, and the presumed strength and benefits that science and technology may bring. The superiority of material values and science is assumed. In my examination of leaders’ views of external economic relations in this era, I observe how their pro-materialist bent makes them favor large-scale technologies and industrial development for Japan, and encourages them to discount the ethical and philosophical values of Japan’s East Asian and Confucian heritage. The cultural logics under these worldviews are highly materialist, pragmatic, and stress the power of science, technology and economics to control and change the world.

In my brief comments on religion in this chapter, I note how concepts of religion and morality affect three of the leaders’ views of international relations to a degree. These three feel that morality and religion have a role in strengthening Japan. In their worldviews of Japan’s external political relations, all five leaders studied admit the West’s current superiority over Japan and Asia in most international issues, including the presumed religious and moral underpinnings of international strength. In the lessons

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1135 These leaders are Fukuzawa, Mori, Yamagata, and Kato. The first two are highly positive about the potential role of Western values in the West’s.
1136 Here I am referring to Fukuzawa, Kato and Mori.
offered for other developing countries here, a positive role for religion in contributing to a nation’s economic development is acknowledged.\textsuperscript{1137}

What impacts might these views on spirituality, religion, and materialism have had on policies in this era? Views that strong, positive spiritual values can help build Japan and its stature in its external political and economic relations would encourage more humility in Japan’s approach toward its Asian neighbors, and more confidence and less anxious perplexity at rash, insensitive actions of Western powers. These did not occur. The heavy material emphasis in views of technology would tend to cause Japan to support large-scale industrialization, and to largely reject its Confucian heritage, and indeed occurred. It is possible that religion could contribute positively to Japan’s own development and international stature, though the leaders had mixed feelings on whether Western spirituality could. Finally State Shinto emerged as the Meiji government’s response, especially for the purpose of offering the nation moral strength for development. I found no intentional applications of State Shinto for international relations in this era.\textsuperscript{1138}

From the evidence presented here, what are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and science and similar issues for policy in this period? What are the possible value conflicts between spirituality and science revealed in the views discussed in this chapter? While several of the leaders wisely observed that positive spiritual values could likely enhance Japan’s technological and economic

\textsuperscript{1137} For example, religious values can contribute positively to the building of a society, so a society should not neglect its religious heritage in order to develop. If it does, it may suffer. 
\textsuperscript{1138} This was not the case in the next period (1895 to 1945), when Japan imposed the practice and ideologies of State Shinto and emperor worship on its long-term colonies in Taiwan and Korea. Part of the purpose of this was to build a sense of imperial identity, commitment and patriotism in these colonized populations.
development, and therefore also its international stature, the question was which values. While some of these leaders leaned toward Western values or Christianity, others and the Meiji state preferred Japanese values. While the state officially chose to build a new national spiritual infrastructure in State Shinto, other individuals such as Fukuzawa did their best to promote Western type values in their own personal spheres of influence. We noted earlier, especially in Chapter 4, the profound though indirect influence felt through Fukuzawa’s writings, his work at Keio College, and his other economic activities.

However, these efforts did not negate the general pressure against spiritual values and ethical knowledge that pervaded the period, in the face of the overwhelming power of technology, science, economics, and other material forces in this era that Japan especially encountered from the outside world as it opened itself to increasing foreign intercourse. Part of the pressure was caused by the “power” of science and materialism, part of it came from the cultural conflicts that most Japanese felt as they considered Christianity, and some came from rejecting Japan’s Confucian ethical and philosophical heritage. So there was strong pressure against much consideration of spiritual factors as various development and security policies were implemented by the Meiji state. Was any of the pressure against the use of spiritual perspectives in policies due to the Flaw of the Excluded Middle that was perhaps inherent in the scientific and technological worldviews and ideologies that Japan absorbed from the West? Perhaps there was some influence, though not in the case of several of the leaders we studied here.\footnote{This was not the case for Kato, Fukuzawa, or Mori.} The fact that State Shinto could even emerge in the face of such pressures likely resulted from
Japan studying the presumed positive role of state churches and religion in the economic development of Europe.

Where are possible future implications of these issues for Japanese foreign aid, over the long run? The theme of pressure against considering spiritual issues and values as one approaches “real world,” materialist policies in politics, economics, and diplomacy emerged in this chapter. In postwar Japan, Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution of 1947, imposed on Japan by the American Occupation, prohibits the influence of religion in the political affairs of the state, and state interference in the religious life of the people. What has been the effect of this stance on Japanese diplomacy or foreign aid? It likely created additional pressure against any insertion or consideration of these issues as aid is offered to developing countries. Has that likelihood created “blindness” on the part of Japanese policymakers of this significant cultural area, and how it might affect the acceptance, appropriateness, or delivery of aid programs, loans and packages for countries with different religious and spiritual conditions? If such a form of “blindness” exists, could it be attributed to some form of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle? In contrast, from 1895 to 1945, spiritual issues had profound effects on the course of Japan’s future, both domestic and international, as we will see in

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1140 I must wait until the first part of the conclusion, Chapter 9, to include definitive comments about my working hypothesis, how Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations, and leaders’ views of those areas, may have affected Japan’s current aid policies. Right now, I can say that Japan’s experience in this period offers many potentially highly valuable lessons for other LDCs in the areas of technology, development and foreign relations. Another key point here is that in this era, various material, secularizing forces attempted to divorce the input of values and “spiritual” forces from Japanese reforms and policies in multiple areas. Similar secularizing tendencies also seem to be present in contemporary aid policy. What is the cause of these forces, and what are their current effects? I cannot yet say.

Chapters 7 and 8. But first we will consider the issues connected with Japan’s external cultural relations from 1850 to 1895, in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6

Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1850-1895)

External Cultural Relations

Introduction

This chapter, a continuation of the discussion of Japan’s external relations (1850-1895), examines decision makers’ notions of how Japan interacts with international influences on its cultural relations with the outside world. In this chapter, I primarily consider the views of Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori and Kato. In Chapter 6, like Chapter 5, I again use the concept of internationalization to analyze development issues in the worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations, six major issues to assess worldviews in the area of technology, and the same concepts for analysis of cognitive issues: image, worldview (my definition), and cultural logics. For globalization issues in Chapter 6, I use the same questions that were used in Chapter 5: how some of the most important worldviews here reflect or affect processes of globalization, how globalization affects worldviews, how global processes affected people and these leaders on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, and whether these global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization. In the conclusion of this chapter, I argue that it was very hard for the Japanese government to balance the material aspects of foreign learning and knowledge importation with the ethical/spiritual/philosophical aspects. Why was this so,
and what implications might this have for later Japanese aid? In this chapter, I explore partly how this issue and others related to Japan’s external cultural relations unfolded.

**Contexts of Japan’s External Cultural Relations, 1850-1895: Major Trends**

In the late Tokugawa period, until the 1860s, foreigners were generally viewed by Japan according to China’s *Ka-I* (“Flower-Barbarian”) view. All foreigners outside the middle kingdom were barbarians; the further away they were, the greater their barbarity (Blacker 1964:125). Japanese study of and exposure to foreign cultures from 1850 to 1895 consisted mainly of academic study and cultural exchanges of several types. During the Tokugawa era, Western learning in Japan included study of Western languages, medicine, the physical sciences, the arts, and late in the period, military science and foreign affairs. Japan’s sustained effort to acquire advanced Western knowledge during the Tokugawa and Meiji eras was a decisive factor in its rise to great power status in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The Shogunate established the Bansho Shirabesho (the Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books), a forerunner of Tokyo University, in 1855, as Japan’s first centralized educational facility for the study, translation, and teaching of Western languages, science and technology. In the early Meiji period, English replaced the Dutch language as the most important Western language studied in Japan, and was considered essential for the mastery of Western technologies important for modernization. Study of English stressed reading skills to

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1142 For most of the Tokugawa period, Western learning was called Dutch learning, since Japan acquired most of its knowledge from the Dutch during this period, because the Dutch were the only Europeans with whom they were allowed to trade (Japan, “Western Learning,” 1697-1698).

1143 Ibid., “Bansho Shirabesho,” 100.
master such knowledge, not oral skills. Another area of western learning important for Japan’s modernization was the study of foreign law, the concepts of which required careful adaptation for the Japanese context. Foreign law would have important impacts on Japan’s constitutions (1889 and 1947), its politics, and the lives of all Japanese persons.

Japan is famous for its important cultural exchanges and embassies sent abroad to acquire foreign knowledge, some of which occurred in ancient times. In the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras, the Shogunate missions to the West (1860s) and the Iwakura mission (1871-1873) provided unexpected perspectives on Western societies for embassy members and a systematic way for the government to learn about the West, helping to motivate some of the travelers to question the traditional social and political systems in Japan. After Japan opened to foreign exchange in the late 1800s, its

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1144 Ibid., “English Language Training,” 342-343. Such an approach to English instruction was highly pragmatic and utilitarian, geared toward training all Japanese to master English for the building of the nation. The stress on reading skills made sense, since in Meiji Japan, very few Japanese would ever meet foreigners or travel abroad. But this choice affected generations of Japanese and their ability to relate well to foreigners in intercultural interaction. Today Japan’s huge, national JET (Japan English Teaching) program, where several thousand young foreigners are brought to Japan to teach English and other foreign languages every year, is an attempt to overcome these difficulties. Anthropological explorations of the JET program are found in David L. McConnell, Importing Diversity: Inside Japan’s JET Program (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) and David L. McConnell, “JET Lag: Studying a Multilevel Program Over Time,” in Doing Fieldwork in Japan, ed. T.C. Bestor et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2003), 124-38.

1145 Ibid., “Study of Foreign Law,” 399.

1146 From the seventh through the tenth centuries A.D., during China’s Sui and Tang dynasties, Japan sent (or scheduled) twenty-four different diplomatic missions to China, in order to promote diplomatic relations, trade and cultural exchanges. Several embassies from China also visited Japan, and a few of the Japanese missions stopped in Korea on the way. Embassies often included scholars and Buddhist monks. In addition to enhancing economic, political, and cultural relations, some of these exchanges promoted great changes in Japanese culture and politics, based on Chinese models, such as the administrative reforms of Japan’s Taika Reform of 645 A.D. (Ibid., “Embassies to Sui and Tang China,” 1467).

1147 Fukuzawa Yukichi accompanied the 1862 mission. His bestselling book Conditions in the West was very influential in the bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment) movement in the Meiji era. Several important national leaders in the Meiji government accompanied the Iwakura mission. Through their observation of life in the West, some of them better understood the social conditions necessary to support a modern economy (Ibid., “Shogunate Missions to the West,” 1406 and “Iwakura Mission,” 641).
international cultural exchange policy stressed the importation of foreign knowledge from abroad into Japan, rather than the promotion of Japanese culture abroad, in order that Japan might quickly be built into a strong, modern nation based on Western models.\textsuperscript{1148}

Japan was affected by its contact with ideologies and movements gleaned from foreign cultures. Underlying this has been the Japanese concept of the West, which is rather problematic in its imprecision, but tends to emphasize geographic aspects and racial identity.\textsuperscript{1149} Among the important ideologies and intellectual trends in this period was the \textit{bunmei kaika} (“civilization and enlightenment”) movement, initiated by the Meiji government to instill Western thought and cultural practices in the populace at large.\textsuperscript{1150}

In the private sector, intellectuals like Fukuzawa Yukichi, Mori Arinori, Kato Hiroyuki and their \textit{Meirokusha} society attempted to introduce Western culture, social institutions, and “enlightenment thought” across the fields of culture, economics and politics through their writings and debates. These intellectuals greatly influenced the \textit{bunmei kaika} movement, and served as its leaders. Increased exposure to the West led to greater acceptance of Western ideas such as political liberty, seen in the rise of democratic

\textsuperscript{1148} Ibid., “International Cultural Exchange,” 615. While this is basically true, as soon as Japan began the process of colonizing outlying regions such as Hokkaido, Okinawa, and Taiwan, the attempt to systematically transfer Japanese culture to those areas, and develop them economically, also began. For Taiwan, the process began in 1895.

\textsuperscript{1149} The Japanese have used the word \textit{Seiyō} for the West since the mid-1800s. It literally means “the western seas” as related to China, historically viewed as the center of Japan’s known universe. The concept of the West has changed greatly over the years, even recently (\textit{Encyclopedia of Contemporary}, “The West,” 563-564).

\textsuperscript{1150} The government encouraged people to adopt Western diets, hairstyles, and clothing. It also initiated cultural and technological innovations such as the telegraph, postal services, railroads, a national public education system, and the West’s Gregorian calendar (\textit{Japan}, “Meiji Enlightenment,” 946).
movements.\textsuperscript{1151} Two other important Western-related intellectual influences beginning in
this period were Social Darwinism and feminism.\textsuperscript{1152}

Concerning Japan’s interaction with foreign cultures in overseas locales from
1850 to 1895, the impact of many Japanese who studied abroad in the United States and
Europe and then returned home was great.\textsuperscript{1153} Japan has been aware of its cultural debt to
China throughout history, but from the late Tokugawa period, Japanese began to doubt
the Chinese tradition’s relevance for modernity for various reasons.\textsuperscript{1154} Japan’s cultural
debt to Korea is also deep, since it received many elements of its pre-modern culture
from Korea, or from China via Korea.\textsuperscript{1155} But problems from two attempted Japanese
invasions since the late 1500s, and Japanese pressures for influence in Korea in the late
1800s and early 1900s, contributed greatly to tensions between Japan and Korea from the
late 1800s to the present.\textsuperscript{1156} Japan’s cultural interaction with Southeast Asia, renewed in

\textsuperscript{1151} The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement was one such democratic movement. By 1880 the broad
acceptance of things Western led the Meiji government to counter the influence of Western culture by
attempting a revival of conservative Confucian thought (Ibid.; Encyclopedia of Contemporary,
\textsuperscript{1152} For more on Social Darwinism in Japan, see my discussion of Mori Arinori and Kato Hiroyuki in
Chapter 3. For a brief overview of feminism in Japan, see Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Feminism,”
141-142.
\textsuperscript{1153} Japan, “United States and Japan,” 1656.
\textsuperscript{1154} These reasons included the weak response of China to both the West and to Japan throughout the
nineteenth century, revealed in China’s defeat in several conflicts, including the Opium War with Britain
(1840-1842), and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). To intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi,
contemporary China seemed technologically and scientifically weak and philosophically stagnant,
compared with the West (Ibid., “China and Japan,” 188-189). See also Narsimhan, Japanese Perceptions.
\textsuperscript{1155} For example, many aspects of Japanese culture in the Jōmon and Yayoi periods (10,000 B.C.-300 B.C.
and 300 B.C.-300 A.D.) are very similar to Korean culture of the same periods. Japan received Buddhism,
Confucianism and Chinese characters directly from the Korean kingdom of Paekche in the sixth century
\textsuperscript{1156} The tensions between China and Japan for influence in Korea led to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895), discussed above in this chapter. The Japanese victory in that war and the war with Russia (1904-
1905) led to Japan’s formal colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945 (Ibid., “Korea and Japan,” 827-828).
During the early 1900s, Japan had many inaccurate cultural images of China and Korea, reflected in
discrimination inflicted on Chinese and Korean residents in Japan. Japan devoted more cultural attention
toward learning from the West from 1868 to the 1920s. Though Japan’s cultural gaze again shifted to Asia
from the 1930s to 1945, at that time its imagery of China and Korea was clouded by militaristic and
1868, included Japanese female prostitutes who worked chiefly on the Malay Peninsula.\textsuperscript{1157} Immigration was never a major social trend in Japan.\textsuperscript{1158} While the eventual impact of Japanese emigrants on the lands where they went is certainly significant, the impact of emigration on Japan itself has been comparatively much smaller.\textsuperscript{1159}

Regarding Japanese interaction with foreign cultures within Japan (1850-1895), relations with the United States had profound cultural influences on Japan. Foreign teachers and visitors from the United States introduced many scientific, social, and humanistic philosophies, as well as arts and religion, to young Japanese through schools and universities.\textsuperscript{1160} Through foreign experts and teachers in Japan, German influence on Japanese medicine and law and French influence on its economic thought and other areas of culture were deep.\textsuperscript{1161} Several thousand foreign teachers and experts came to Japan to both public and private sector education, helping Japan modernize in areas such as engineering, agriculture, medicine, foreign affairs, and military science, where foreign colonial ideologies. It is likely that accurate images of China and Korea have only recently emerged, in the case of China, since the 1980s.

\textsuperscript{1157} These women were referred to as Karayuki-san (Ibid., “Southeast Asia and Japan,” 1449; Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Japayuki-san,” 233).

\textsuperscript{1158} Much larger percentages of the populations in nations such as Ireland, England and Italy have emigrated overseas than from Japan. The major overseas destinations of Japanese emigrants in the early Meiji period were Hawaii and the United States. Even if we consider the percentage of Japanese who emigrated to Japan’s overseas colonies during Japan’s period of active overseas colonization, it still seems small compared to Japan’s total population. (Japan, “Emigration,” 334).

\textsuperscript{1159} Ibid., 334-335. A significant example of the impact of Japanese emigrants on foreign lands is their huge impact on agriculture in Hawaii, California, and Brazil, lands where they emigrated in fairly large numbers. In California, the most productive agricultural state in the United States, Japanese emigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helped to pioneer the state’s enormously productive fruit and vegetable growing industries. For more, see Ronald Takaki, \emph{A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America} (Boston: Little Brown Co, 1993).

\textsuperscript{1160} Japan, “United States and Japan,” 1656.

\textsuperscript{1161} Ibid., “Germany and Japan,” 452; Ibid., “France and Japan,” 407.
knowledge was deemed useful. Their impact on helping transform Japan from a feudal society into a modern, great power in slightly more than a generation was huge. Chinese immigrated to Japan after the nation opened to Western trade in 1853. Many Westerners also brought Chinese employees, and by 1875, half of the foreign residents in Japan (5,000) were Chinese. Most were merchants and professionals who settled in port cities like Yokohama and Kobe.

Views of Japan’s External Cultural Relations, 1850-1895

Leaders’ Worldviews

Fukuzawa Yukichi. A key factor in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s view of foreign culture is that he grew up in Kyushu near Nagasaki. In the late 1850s, the thought of traveling to a distant “barbarian” country was frightening to most Japanese. After two hundred years of seclusion, they were “nervous,” “unadventurous,” and easily frightened by Western things. Yet they felt (morally) “superior” to Western barbarians. But Fukuzawa was somewhat different. In San Francisco, he was impressed by various

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1162 Most of the foreign instructors came from four countries: the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France (Ibid., “Foreign Employees of the Meiji Period,” 396-397).
1163 It is true that foreign instructors had a huge impact. They taught subjects requested by Japanese authorities, and implemented policy decisions already made by Japan itself. In most cases, their salaries were totally paid by Japan (at least for the public sector foreign employees) (Ibid.).
1165 This exposed Fukuzawa to Western ideas flowing in via the Dutch at Deshima, an island outpost in Nagasaki harbor. During the Tokugawa period, all trade with the Netherlands was relegated there, and the Netherlands was the only Western nation allowed to trade with Japan. There was a tradition of Dutch learning at Nakatsu, Fukuzawa’s home feudal domain, from the late 1700s. His love of Western knowledge began when he was made curator of a large collection of Western books in Nagasaki at age nineteen. A year later (1855), he was invited to attend a school of Dutch studies in Osaka. In 1858, Fukuzawa transferred to teach Dutch studies in Edo. Soon he began to study English. By 1863 Japan’s major diplomatic language had switched to English from Dutch, reflecting the increasing importance of Britain in Japan’s diplomatic relations (Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 4, 14-16, 20, 22-27, 30, 33, 67).
1166 Ibid., 39. As an example of Japanese discomfort, some ignorant samurai attacked foreigners for perceived insults. These could have caused foreign intervention. Fukuzawa believed that Chinese ignorance of the West caused foreign intervention there (Ibid., 53-54).
technologies, yet found Western male-female relationships shocking.\textsuperscript{1167} In Europe and the United States, Fukuzawa treasured seeing things with his own eyes, but spent much money on books, many for use in his school in Edo, to establish a foundation for modern education in Japan. He believed that education through Western books was necessary for Japan to achieve \textit{fukoku kyōhei} (rich nation, strong army). He saw that in numerous areas, Japan was weaker than the West, so \textit{fukoku kyōhei} made sense.\textsuperscript{1168}

Fukuzawa was very successful as a translator, but anxious to address a wider Japanese audience.\textsuperscript{1169} Soon he began \textit{Conditions in the West} (\textit{Seiyō Jijô}) (first part published in 1867). The first volume includes accounts of common western institutions, technology, and essays on the history, politics, military, and public finance in the United States, Britain, and Holland.\textsuperscript{1170}

According to Fukuzawa, only through a spirit of freedom and independence could people and nations improve themselves, and can Japan defend itself against the “aggressive” West.\textsuperscript{1171} Individual duties are the foundation of Western civilized society and the “well-being of states.”\textsuperscript{1172} Yet the key factor in whether societies succeed is education. In the beginning, all people are created equal, but education makes the long-

\textsuperscript{1167} Ibid., 41. Among the technologies he found interesting were gaslights, tall stone buildings, factories and steamships (Ibid., 41).
\textsuperscript{1168} Ibid., 49-50, 54, 56, 58. Japan’s areas of weakness included science, industry, politics, commerce, and military strength (Ibid., 54).
\textsuperscript{1169} For this purpose, Fukuzawa privately distributed the unpublished \textit{Tojin Orai} (\textit{How to Deal with Foreigners}) (1865) in simple Japanese, where he contended that the presence of foreigners in Japan and interaction with them were unavoidable (Ibid., 70).
\textsuperscript{1170} Ibid., 69-71. The institutions treated include politics, taxes, currency, trading companies, schools, the military, newspapers, and libraries. Areas of technology discussed include steam engines, steamships, steam locomotives, and the telegraph. Fukuzawa argues that he has focused on the most pragmatic areas, to help Japan decide whether each country is to be treated as friend or enemy, and the appropriate strategy, military or other (Ibid.).
\textsuperscript{1171} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{1172} Ibid., 72.
term difference. Fukuzawa founded Keio Gijuku (College), the first Japanese institution that he opened, based on a Western model. Building such institutions was his way of helping to modernize Japan. Fukuzawa also pioneered public debate in Japan.

From 1866-1875, Fukuzawa published seventeen books on current global issues such as western science, military affairs, British politics and diplomacy. During this period, his greatest books were *An Encouragement of Learning* (1872/1876) and *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (1875). Both were bestsellers, and the former became a national textbook for children. By the mid-1870s, Fukuzawa no longer viewed the West so positively. He lost patience with the pressures, “violence,” arrogance and scandals of the Westerners in their interpersonal and international behavior, calling them “inhumane white devils” and “aggressive foreigners.” Fukuzawa’s role as a key interpreter of Western civilization waned after this time.

*Ito Hirobumi*. Ito had mixed feelings about Western culture. As a young man, prior to his first journey abroad, Ito harbored anger against foreign residents in Japan.

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1173 Ibid., 89-90.
1174 For the school, he adapted various Western customs, including standards of cleanliness, student behavior, and time-keeping (Ibid., 82).
1175 Ibid., 80-82.
1176 Ibid., 139-140, 144-146. Fukuzawa built two famous debating halls in Tokyo in the 1870s and early 1880s, and started Japan’s first elite debating society, Kojunsha (Ibid., 139-141).
1177 Ibid., 87. In the second book, Fukuzawa claims he means to write an outline of western civilization for the public, especially for older “Confucianist” readers. He begins by implying that all things, even the West, must be seen and learned in relative terms (Ibid., 90-91).
1178 Ibid., 91.
1179 Ibid., 150-151. The terms in quotation marks here are direct quotes from Fukuzawa and from Tamaki, *Yukichi Fukuzawa*.
1180 Ibid., 92-93. Fukuzawa’s role waned because he lost interest in translation work. Also the huge, government-sponsored Iwakura mission returned to Japan in late 1873, and the large account of the mission by Kume Kunitake (*Tokumei zenkan-taiishi Beiou Kairan jikki*) was published in 1878 (Ibid., 92-93).
1181 Hamada, *Prince Ito*. Ito helped several others burn down the British legation house in Edo.
In 1863, to learn how to operate a steamship, Ito and five others snuck aboard a foreign freighter bound for Shanghai. Ito made it to London four months later, and was totally enthralled by its technologies, wealth and power. To learn western culture, he lived in the home of a London college professor for six months. He grew to respect much of the strength and wisdom of Western civilization. To strengthen Japan, he traveled abroad several times throughout his life for extended research about Western societies.

*Mori Arinori.* After Mori’s first trip to Europe, he and five other Japanese students traveled with an American to a Christian utopian religious colony in upstate New York. This was Mori’s ticket to explore the United States. Similar to Japan in the late 1800s, the United States was a new kind of society that borrowed technology, politics and culture from older societies, but was remaking itself and expanding in a utilitarian fashion. Mori hoped that Japan would learn and borrow from the United States as well.

One of the main purposes of Mori’s *Life and Resources in America* (1871), the first comprehensive account of the United States written by a Japanese, was to inform the members of the government’s Iwakura Mission about conditions in the United States. Mori assumes that events in the U.S. are a foretaste of what will come to other

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1182 Ibid., 33-34, 36-37.
1183 Van Sant, *Mori Arinori’s Life*, xviii-xix. The colony was called the Brotherhood of the New Life. Mori was impressionable, and clearly affected by the utopian view of Christianity he experienced in New York (Ibid., xix).
1184 Ibid., xxv.
1185 Van Sant, *Mori Arinori*. The book is also meant to appeal to the interests of his Japanese audience. It is one of the few works available in English on a nineteenth or twentieth century non-Westerner’s view of the United States (Ibid., xxiii). Mori wrote the book with the assistance of others, including Charles Lanman, his secretary. Curiously, the book was never translated into Japanese, perhaps because of sensitive political conditions in Japan, or Mori’s own busyness (Akira Iriye in *Mori Arinori’s Life and Resources in America*, ed. John E. Van Sant [Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004], x-xi. x, xxii-xxiv).
nations.\(^{1186}\) The range of subjects covered in the book is quite comprehensive, covering many areas of American life, politics, economics, infrastructure, society, and culture.\(^{1187}\) Mori is also struck by the difference between American ideals and actual reality, and by the importance of religious, philanthropic and educational organizations in American life.\(^{1188}\)

**Kato Hiroyuki.** A key area of Kato Hiroyuki’s thought about intercultural interaction concerns religion.\(^{1189}\) He attacks it as “the enemy of all learning,” and mistakenly believed that all religions and related ethical systems are based upon theistic supernaturalism.\(^{1190}\) He views religion through the lens of evolution. Religion has had powerful impacts on progress, more the result of social evolution.\(^{1191}\) Ethical systems evolve over time, and the struggle for power provides the basis for moral evolution. Religious ethics provide great “motivating power,” but hinder civilization.\(^{1192}\) Kato asks important questions about religion, and yet Winston Davis concludes that his attack on

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\(^{1186}\) Van Sant, *Mori Arinori*, xxiii. This assumption is also found in similar books, such as Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (Ibid., xxiii)

\(^{1187}\) Areas covered include America’s government and politics, agriculture, amusements, transportation, commerce and trade, banking and finance, manufacturing, industries, religion, education, culture and science, natural resources, the military, cities, and frontier life.

\(^{1188}\) Akira Iriye in Van Sant, *Mori Arinori*, x-xi. Examples of these ironic aspects of American society for Mori include racial prejudice, political corruption, and failure of American Christians to always follow their faith (Ibid., x-xi). Mori strongly suggests that Christianity is a “leading element” in the search for civilization, and later argued that it should be adopted by Japan as the national religion. He seems to accept the prevalent nineteenth century Western notion that there was a “connection to Christianity, ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’” (Ibid., xxvii).

\(^{1189}\) Here I consider Kato’s thought on Japan’s religious systems that originated outside Japan in this section—namely Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity. Kato’s views of Japan’s primary indigenous religion, Shinto, are considered in Chapter 3 in the section on leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s domestic society.

\(^{1190}\) An exception is Buddhism in its original form, which included no belief in a god or gods.


\(^{1192}\) Ibid., 122.
religion was rather dogmatic and primitive. Concerning major world religions, Kato’s childhood was steeped in neo-Confucianism, the main support for the Shogunate, and he based his personal philosophy of utilitarianism on conventional Confucian virtues. He admired the Confucian model of relationships, and condemned the ethics of more universal religions. Yet Confucianism provided an inadequate foundation for modern ethics. He was generally critical of Buddhism, an “otherworldly” religion that he charged hypnotizes people against their natural mental capacities. It adapted well to the Japanese context, and seemed harmless, but was unscientific. Kato was most critical of Christianity, what he called a great “insult” to Japan’s national essence (kokutai).

A second area of intercultural interaction in Kato’s time was the issue of Japan’s unequal treaties with the West. Japan had to prove it was modern and civilized. The Western nations pressured it to allow their traders, diplomats and missionaries to dwell there. Various conservative scholars in Japan, including Kato, argued that allowing

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1193 His questions include the relationship of the “is” of science and the “oughts” of religion and ethics, the claims of faith versus the state, and whether gods are real (Ibid.).
1194 The various assertions here about the nature of non-Japanese religions here are Kato’s, not my own.
1195 These include filial piety, loyalty, righteousness, and benevolence (Ibid., 85).
1196 According to Kato, these religions failed to recognize the particularism in all moral relationships (how moral obligations determine the particular relationship one has with another person) (Ibid., 86).
1197 Ibid., 85-88. For example, in China, some Confucian rituals were still observed, but often altered, and included many lapses. Confucianism in China failed to protest against many social evils, such as the criminal code (Ibid., 87).
1198 This is a direct quote.
1199 Ibid., 95-96.
1200 Ibid., 90-94. Kato published a series of three books attacking Christianity from 1907-1909. These were republished in 1911 as The Perniciousness of Christianity. Like many Japanese nationalists, he resented the criticisms of Christians of Japan’s emperor-worship, and its treatment of women. While modern science rose in the Christian West, he condemned Christianity as unscientific. And while it claimed to be the great faith of love, Christian nations were nationalistic and imperialistic. Yet early Christianity made great contributions to human progress (Ibid., 90-94).
“mixed residence” too soon would threaten the Japanese with extinction.\footnote{Also see the discussion on the issue of mixed residence in Chapter 3, in the section on Japan’s domestic society.} Meiji Japanese thinkers saw Japanese as racially inferior to Caucasians.\footnote{Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 243-244. Unlike the Germans, however, Unoura argues that the Japanese did not overtly apply Social Darwinism to developing a sense of racial superiority to their Asian neighbors, including the Chinese and the Koreans (Ibid., 248). But they did apply an evolutionistic-influenced concept of hierarchy to their images of nations and peoples, to determine which were stronger or weaker, more superior or inferior.} Kato also saw the West as superior in science. The main area where the Japanese could show their superiority was in moral superiority and evolution.\footnote{Ibid., 247-248. This moral superiority was seen in bushido and the devotion of Japanese to the emperor and the state.}

**Comparison of Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations (1850-1895)**

To compare the worldviews of these leaders on Japan’s external cultural relations (1850-1895), we can organize their views into several primary categories: views of and attitudes toward culture, views of (foreign) religions, attitudes toward foreigners and interactions with them, views of foreign learning and books, of foreign technology, and of overseas travel and study. Regarding culture, Fukuzawa believes that while all peoples are created equal, education is the key factor in determining how far different societies progress. Books are also a key way to learn about foreign cultures. Individual duty and responsibility are also fundamental bases for any “civilized” or highly developed country. Yet cultures, even the West, must be judged in relative terms. On Japanese culture, only by a spirit of independence and freedom in various cultural realms can help Japan or any society grow. Education and educational institutions are a key way of accomplishing this. Adopting some Western customs and styles of communication and thought may also help...
Japan to modernize. Yet Japan must defend itself, culturally and otherwise, against the West. Compared with the West, Japan presently has many weaknesses, and yet Japan has moral superiority. These leaders recognize many positive aspects of Western culture. According to Ito, Western civilization has much wisdom, power, and Western technology and wealth are amazing. Westerners are racially and scientifically superior to Japanese, and show much individual responsibility. The general progress in the United States, despite its many struggles, offers a foretaste of coming global trends. But there are negative aspects of Western culture. Westerners are perceived as “aggressive,” violent, arrogant, and “inhumane” on multiple levels. Japan must overcome inequalities in its relations with the West.

Among these leaders, most of their attitudes about foreign religions, especially Western religions, are negative. While foreign religions provide great inspiration, they limit civilization’s development. Foreign religion has affected progress only indirectly, as

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1204 Here I am referring to Fukuzawa’s advocacy of Western-style public debate.
1205 All of these points are Fukuzawa’s opinions.
1206 This is Fukuzawa’s point.
1207 This is Kato’s argument.
1208 Kato.
1209 Fukuzawa.
1210 Mori. He also finds that there are conflicts between American ideals and actual practice (Van Sant, Mori Arinori).
1211 Fukuzawa. The terms in quotes are direct quotations from Fukuzawa.
1212 Kato. According to him, Japan’s unequal economic treaties with the West are one example of what must be overcome.
1213 The strong exception to this is Mori, who takes a very positive view of Christianity (noted above, especially in Chapter 3). Positively, Mori finds that religion and charity make many positive contributions to American life (Van Sant, Mori Arinori). For the most part, these leaders do not consider Shinto to be a “religion,” but more a deep, heartfelt, indigenous spiritual practice that at times is highly connected with patriotism and a love for Japan. The term “religion” in Japanese, shukyo, literally translates into English as “sect-teaching.” Before the Meiji era, before Buddhism and Shinto were formally and legally organized into strict sects, in informal practice, they often intermixed, even at the same temples and shrines. This may help explain why even today, many Japanese do not view Shinto (“the way of the gods”) as a “sect-teaching,” or religion, while they more easily see Buddhism (Bukkyo, “Buddha’s teaching”) or Christianity (Kirisutokyo, “Christ’s teaching”) as such.
a product of social evolution. To Kato, foreign religions seem superstitious. Kato finds foreign religions contrary to learning, unscientific in general and in their ethics, as opposed to science, which stresses actual reality. Kato also faults universal ethical systems, which fail to consider relational differences. Kato reserves the most scathing criticisms for Christianity, which he finds totally contrary to Japanese culture.

Regarding foreigners and interacting with them, these leaders, besides Mori, are mostly negative. Above I noted the ethnocentric attitude held by most Japanese in the late Tokugawa period that Japanese were morally superior to foreigners and Westerners, and their fear about interacting with foreigners or traveling abroad. Yet interaction with the West and with foreigners was unavoidable for Japan; Japanese must learn how. Japan must prove to the West that it was civilized and modern. Despite these wise conclusions, even these leaders struggled with these interactions, practically and intellectually.

1214 Kato implies this. As noted above, he falsely believes that all non-Japanese religions are based on theistic supernaturalism. Kato argues that foreign religion focuses on “oughts” and “shoulds” (i.e. ethical issues) while science focuses on the “is’s” or actual facts of reality. Recall the discussion in Chapter 6, where I noted that Kato essentially argues that Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity all fail in their handling of ethics, in their unscientific approaches. In Chapter 5, I noted Kato’s argument that a new scientific morality will eventually guide international relations. This new morality is largely based on evolutionistic thinking. There are flaws in this thought. What then becomes of issues of justice involving the weak, minorities, and the poor?

1216 Thus Kato prefers Confucian social ethics and its values such as filial piety and loyalty, although he also finds that they fail to handle modernity adequately. Recall Kato’s arguments mentioned above, that Christianity is imperialistic, nationalistic, and intolerant of Japanese spirituality and the kokutai. All of the negative points about foreign religions in this paragraph are Kato’s.

1218 This is Fukuzawa’s essential argument, and partly why he devoted so much effort to writing many books about the West for popular Japanese audiences, even though after the mid-1870s, his attitude toward interacting with Westerners turned sour, when he called them aggressive and violent.

1219 Kato.

1220 Recall how when young, Ito was angry about the presence of foreigners in Japan, and helped to burn down the British legation house, how Fukuzawa felt overwhelmed when he saw male-female interactions in
While interacting with foreigners seemed a huge challenge, these leaders show a much more eager attitude about Japan’s need to master the “superior” fruits and knowledge of Western civilization. Japan should learn and borrow from the West, especially from the United States, according to Mori. Japanese must also understand global affairs and Western civilization.\textsuperscript{1221} These leaders also supported foreign learning in their own lives, seen in their study of foreign languages and numerous trips abroad for observation and research.\textsuperscript{1222} If possible, it is worthwhile to travel overseas to research the West, and to obtain foreign knowledge.\textsuperscript{1223} Observing things firsthand is valuable.\textsuperscript{1224} Yet not all can travel or go abroad. It is important for Japanese to learn about Western culture and institutions through books or any other means possible.\textsuperscript{1225} These attitudes about absorbing foreign knowledge through books or overseas learning are also seen in the leaders’ attitudes about learning Western technologies.\textsuperscript{1226}

**Conceptual Analysis of Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations (1850-1895)**

*Development Issues.* In terms of the concept of internationalization, if we examine these worldviews on Japan’s external cultural relations, how did the absorption of Japan into the Western-dominated global economy affect the various cultural features identified in these worldviews? The positive attitude toward education seen in

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\textsuperscript{1221} Fukuzawa.

\textsuperscript{1222} Fukuzawa especially focused on English (after Dutch), Mori on English, and Kato on German. Fukuzawa, Mori, and Ito often traveled and studied abroad.

\textsuperscript{1223} Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori.

\textsuperscript{1224} Fukuzawa.

\textsuperscript{1225} Fukuzawa, Ito.

\textsuperscript{1226} Ito believed that Western technology was great, and should be learned by Japanese. That is why he stole aboard a ship (to learn to pilot it), and first traveled to London. Fukuzawa found Western technologies in daily life in the West highly impressive.
Fukuzawa’s view of culture was nothing new, but a reflection of the Confucian respect for learning that was several millennia old. But his emphasis, and Mori’s, on the importance of “individual” duty and responsibility does seem a reflection of Western cultural influence. As leaders such as Fukuzawa and Mori reflected on the West’s technological and economic successes, and Western culture, they could not help but notice the strong emphasis on individual duty and morality common to Western cultures. Education would expedite the technical transference of knowledge and expertise, but independence, freedom, and creativity were more “spiritual,” and could not be so easily copied. Fukuzawa thought that actually adopting Western customs to some degree would help, but the process seems rather tricky. To what degree did Japan master the transference of not only the technical aspects of various areas of knowledge and technology, but also the value- and “spirit”-related components? Technically, it seems that Japan mastered many of these technologies very impeccably, evidenced most clearly in its rapid industrialization, economic growth, and the victory in the Sino-Japanese War. But mastering the spirits of individual freedom, independence and creativity seemed more much more elusive, given the conservative, authoritarian tendencies of Japanese culture and politics in this era and after. What was the effect of the generally negative view of Western religion and Christianity that prevailed in late Tokugawa and Meiji Japan on Japan’s mastery of individualism and freedom? Though creativity in the arts and literature has never been lacking in Japan, and a brief era of increased liberalism occurred in the Taisho era (1912-1926), this influence seems rather small.\footnote{1227 I say this because, although Christianity has exercised a relatively large cultural influence in Japan, in the establishment of social institutions, hospitals, and universities, the number of Christians in the society} So while
Japan’s full entry into the world economy greatly increased its economic and even cultural interactions with the outside world, I wish to argue that key elements of Japan’s core cultural identity did not really change as a result of this interaction.

But what did these processes mean for Japan’s external cultural relations? Perceptive leaders and thinkers such as Fukuzawa and Mori identified important cultural factors behind Western science and technology that they hoped Japan could absorb. It seems that although Japan was superb at mastering the technical aspects of many techniques, it did not master the accompanying “spirits” and values of freedom and individualism nearly as well. Did Japan project these cultural “spirits” of freedom, individualism and creativity abroad, in its foreign relations and interactions? This is the key question relevant to Chapter 6 that internationalization asks. Theoretically, if these spirits and values are key to technological success, and Japan wished to help its Asian neighbors, it should have also desired to share these values. I must respond that no, Japan did not project these spirits of creativity, individualism and freedom abroad in this era. If it did not master them internally, how could they have been projected externally? Rather, in the Sino-Japanese War and pressures projected in its relations with places such as Korea and Taiwan, I would argue that Japan basically projected a negative “Western” (and Eastern) value: aggression.

**Technology issues.** What were the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with these worldviews of external cultural relations? They included education, education-related knowledge, methods of communication and

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has never been large, never more than one percent of the total population. It does not seem that Christianity has changed the fundamental core of Japanese culture, which tends to be highly oriented toward conformity and harmony within groups.
education that brought foreign cultures and technologies to Japan, including ships, the telegraph, the modern postal system, universities, schools, Western education, educators and styles of teaching, foreign language pedagogy and pedagogies (Western or Japanese) for teaching of these areas of foreign cultural knowledge. Scientific and technological areas of knowledge included science education and pedagogy, experimentation, the culture of Western science and education transferred into the Japanese environment, scientific and evolutionary theories. Western cultural products included music, literature, religion, and art. How did foreign religions relate to the transference of this knowledge? Some foreign teachers who came to Japan were religious, often Christian. A good example is William S. Clark, a professor from Massachusetts who taught agriculture and Christianity as ethics at the forerunner of Hokkaido University. He converted many of his students to Christ and famously urged them, “Boys, be ambitious!” Many foreign instructors, some of whom were foreign language and English teachers, and others who were Christian missionaries, helped establish universities, schools and hospitals. Their general teaching had a great impact on the transference of Western cultural knowledge into Japan, especially in the teaching of English, a primary gateway for learning many other forms of Western knowledge. They collectively had a huge impact, sometimes intangible, on Japan’s quest for foreign knowledge and culture, in providing the first and only interaction of many Japanese with foreigners.

\(^{1228}\) Some of these “scientific” and evolutionary theories also offered support for a reemerging Japanese sense of moral superiority over the West and other Asian nations, too (thanks to Peter Van Arsdale for this insight).
What are the most significant cultural factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in these worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations? While Western education models exposed Japanese to more rhetorical styles of teaching and examples of creativity, Japanese education tended to stress more rote learning styles. Some universities may have been organized on Western lines, but functionally and socially, remained very Japanese. Japanese easily mastered experimentation and observation in Western-inspired science education. They were excellent learners of English reading and writing, but due to differences in language study and emphasis, their mastery of spoken English was often of a lower level. The geographic isolation of Japan did not affect their mastery of the technical aspects of this cultural knowledge, but language challenges and cultural differences did hamper the general mastery by Japanese of English and other languages for face-to-face interactions with foreigners. This latter struggle reflects the general awkwardness of interaction with foreigners with which many Japanese in this era struggled.

Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or negatively? Japan was able to import virtually all the areas of foreign knowledge it desired, and master them. The system of knowledge importation and learning mainly emphasized technical mastery of information for contribution to the growth of Japan, technologically and economically, not the gaining of intercultural skills for interaction with foreigners and foreign cultures. This difference was not an effect of the international system, but likely an after-effect of the extreme cultural isolation of Japan during the


\[1230\] The English language education system of Meiji Japan focused on the mastery of books and written knowledge, not on oral English for communication.
Tokugawa period, and continuing geographic isolation in the Meiji era. And the practical purpose of this knowledge was to contribute to the building of the nation, usually not to prepare Japanese for study or travel abroad.

Who were the main international actors in the external environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved? On the international level, the main individual actors who were Westerners included foreign teachers, scientists, researchers, and engineers working in Japan. International individual actors who were Japanese included teachers, scholars, government officials and business people who had traveled or studied abroad. On the domestic level, individual actors who were Japanese included teachers, scholars, scientists, and engineers who remained in Japan. State and institutional actors on the international level included foreign governments and ministries (both of which had rather limited influence), Western religious institutions (churches and missionary societies), educational institutions and universities. State and institutional actors who were Japanese on the international level included the Japanese government, the Ministry of Education, other ministries (such as Foreign Affairs) which sent Japanese scholars abroad or brought foreign teachers to Japan, and private educational institutions (such as Keio and Waseda Universities) which brought foreign teachers to Japan. State or institutional actors on the domestic level included the Japanese government, the Ministry of Education, private educational institutions and universities, public and private schools, museums, and religious institutions.

What was the impact of these actors on transfers of knowledge and ideas related to external cultural relations? Western teachers, scientists, and Japanese teachers and scholars who traveled abroad had huge impacts, in what they taught and transferred to
Japanese students. Of the latter, one example is Fukuzawa, although most Japanese instructors did not travel abroad. Western religious institutions, schools and universities also had a fairly large influence on spreading knowledge of Western culture and English language. Foreign governments had limited impact, though foreign educational organizations also had some influence. The Japanese government, private educational institutions, and public and private schools and universities also had a large influence in spreading knowledge of Western culture, language, and technologies to the Japanese mainstream population at large, and on whether they were favored or rejected by the public.

From these cases of cultural and technological transfers, what lessons do we learn, and how could these transfers have been improved? It seems easier to transfer the actual technical hardware of a technology or cultural item, rather than the culture, context or “spirit” that surrounds it, uses it, or causes it to flourish. Various individual and institutional actors here made huge contributions to the spread of Western culture and related technologies and ideas in this period. It is not possible to say here which actors had the most influence. The encounter with Western ideas, creativity and influence had a huge, stimulating influence on Japanese arts, literature, and many other areas of culture. To repeat, various surface features of Japan’s culture changed, but most of its core cultural features did not change that much.

What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these worldviews? The most important cultural factors that

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1231 More in-depth case studies would be necessary to answer that.
were present included targeted learning, debate, argument, Western logic, scientific experimentation and rationality, foreign knowledge, diversity of opinion, new political and cultural ideas, knowledge of the world, foreign conditions, their cultures, and creativity. The most important cultural values included freedom, individuality, independence, choice, and values connected with Western art, diversity, democracy, liberalism, and several philosophies that mainstream Japanese considered highly radical, such as anarchy and feminism.

In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level? Of the individual actors we have considered, Ito negotiated with foreign governments to improve Japan’s economic and political standing on the international stage and helped import some important Western political concepts and institutions into Japan, including the Diet and the Constitution. Fukuzawa had more domestic than international cultural impact. Mori guided Japanese overseas (in Washington DC, on the Iwakura Mission) to learn more about the West.

How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? Western nations were more impressed with Japan after observing its political development (i.e. the Diet and the Constitution), and seeing its victory in Sino-Japanese War, so they granted Japan more autonomy and diplomatic recognition. Though their attitudes toward Japan were still highly racist, and they did not necessarily agree with Japan’s conduct in the Sino-Japanese War, soon Western powers
were more willing to sign treaties with Japan, for example, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902.

Did the belief systems of any of these leaders (on technology-related issues in these cultural worldviews, on the international level) blind them to certain realities? All these leaders prefer to absorb cultural knowledge from foreign cultures that they believe have superior knowledge (from the West). They favor knowledge from cultures that appear scientific, modern, more powerful, wealthy and advanced. This bias makes most of the leaders here (except Yamagata, not considering in this chapter) favor Western sources of knowledge over Asian and Confucian ones. But while these leaders desire advanced Western knowledge and cultural products to help modernize Japan and defend it against the West, they struggle with what will happen to Japanese identity and culture as this occurs. They know that there are many positive aspects of Japanese culture that must be preserved. While the West has superior technology, they do not believe that its culture is superior (except perhaps Mori). Their general rejection of Western religion and Christianity, except for Mori, suggests that they realize deep down that while Japan may be very successful in acquiring Western technology and knowledge, it cannot and must not jettison its core identity, its soul. The eagerness to learn and accept Western knowledge and technology was great, but willingness to accept Western culture only went as far as necessary to facilitate acceptance of the first two. They also expressed extreme awkwardness expressed at having to learn to interact with Westerners. This also reflects the great ambivalence present in Japan: a desire to accept foreign technologies and knowledge without having to accept the presence of foreigners, or to keep their presence as minimal as possible.
To which realities are the leaders blinded, and how? The leaders here are biased toward the West and against Asia. This blinds them to the fact that mainland Asian countries and peoples did not feel the need or want much of any foreign presence in their midst, including a Japanese one. It also temporarily blinded several of these leaders to the wisdom of many aspects of Asian and Japanese heritage (especially Fukuzawa and Mori, on Confucian and Chinese influences).

Do the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? These leaders adjusted their viewpoints to changing conditions very rapidly, especially regarding both the West and events in nearby Asia. Yet I would argue that their general pro-Western, anti-Asian bias tended to blind them toward realistic conditions in Asia outside Japan, and the true desires of those regions’ peoples.

How do these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? The general blindness and bias seen in these regarding the rest of Asia definitely affected policy outcomes in this era and shortly after. Fukuzawa, as we noted earlier in this chapter, was angry against China, and his Jiji Shinpo newspaper reflected this. Ito took a paternalistic attitude toward Korea, and Kato saw other Asians as racially inferior to Japanese. Did these attitudes reflect those of more Japanese leaders? While we cannot be certain, given the actions of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War, this seems a strong possibility.

In these worldviews on external cultural relations, is the concept of technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? Technonationalism as ideology is manifested in a very basic way here, in the goal of several of these leaders (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, and Kato) to strengthen Japan for its own security and survival, through its mastery of Western technology and appropriate cultural products that are helpful for
those ends. While they admire many of the advanced features of Western culture, they are not blind to Western aggression. Their primary goal in helping Japan attain knowledge of various areas of Western culture is not sheer intellectual fascination, but rather Japan’s national survival. Their generally negative attitude toward Western religion reflects their concern with protecting Japan’s cultural identity and core. Even Mori only wished to use Christianity because he believed that it could help Japan become great. Interacting with foreigners, Westerners or Asians, was very challenging for most Japanese, seen in the attitudes of the leaders here. Yet despite these challenges, the great efforts of these leaders in various cultural areas to strengthen Japan’s interactions with the outside world, in their writings, research, work in various areas of policy advocacy, their travel abroad, and study of Western culture, economics, politics, and science, all reflect one supreme goal: to strengthen Japan so its own security is assured.

**Cognition Issues.** The main images about Japan’s external cultural relations include issues of culture, the West, social relations and intercultural interaction, social development, and religion. Fukuzawa suggests that while all humans are created equal, not all cultures are equal. A key factor in the different levels of cultural development of different societies is varying levels of educational achievement. He also suggests that all cultures, even the West’s, must be judged in relative, not absolute, terms. On Western culture, early exposure to it created favorable impressions and lessened the fear of it in Fukuzawa and Mori. These leaders call Western culture impressive.

1233 Remember that Fukuzawa and Mori both grew up in southwestern Japan (Kyushu), the region that had the most contact with Western culture during national isolation in the Tokugawa period.
(Fukuzawa, Mori), possessing much strength and wisdom (Ito), and Westerners racially superior to Japanese (Kato).

Western books, and the knowledge that comes from them, are highly valuable for Japanese, a potential foundation for Japanese cultural reformation, so they should be used in education. They will help make Japan strong and wealthy.\(^{1234}\) Fukuzawa observes that individual duties are the foundation of Western civilized society and the “well-being of states.” It is worthwhile to study and learn Western culture, abroad if possible.\(^{1235}\) Regarding Western technology and culture, the West’s technology, wealth and power are all impressive (Fukuzawa and Ito), and the West is superior to Japan in science (Kato), so Japanese should learn Western technology and culture (Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori). And yet the West is “aggressive” (Fukuzawa). There is sometimes a dissonance between Western values and actual sociocultural conditions (Mori). So there is some ambivalence in these images of Western culture and society.

There are extensive images on “foreign” religions, especially from Kato.\(^{1236}\) Kato calls religion evil.\(^{1237}\) Religious ethics give great “motivating power,” but hinder civilization (Kato). His images and thought on religion are colored by evolutionism. Religion has strongly affected human progress, but because of social evolution, not because of religion’s intrinsic nature. According to Kato, morality and ethics evolve over time, and are based on the struggle for power. Kato sees conflicts between foreign

\(^{1234}\) All of these points about Western books and knowledge are images of Fukuzawa’s.
\(^{1235}\) This is seen in the life examples of Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori, who all studied and traveled abroad at many points in their lives.
\(^{1236}\) Remember that Kato does not see Shinto as a “religion.” He sees all religious and ethical systems that did not originate in Japan as foreign, even if they have adapted to Japan and flourished there for centuries, as in the case of Buddhism and Confucianism. All Kato’s comments here, on religion, morality, and ethics, are generally directed at religious and ethical systems he considered foreign.
\(^{1237}\) Kato called religion the “enemy of all learning.”
religions and reality, foreign religions and science, for example, between the “is” of science and the “oughts” of religion and ethics, faith versus the state, and whether the gods are real.\textsuperscript{1238} To Kato, neo-Confucian values and the Confucian model of social relations are more admirable than the ethics of more universal religions. But Confucianism provides an inadequate basis for modern ethics, since it fails to handle many modern social evils.\textsuperscript{1239} Buddhism is negative since it hypnotizes people against their “natural mental capacities,” and Christianity is ethnocentric, anti-Japanese, unscientific, hypocritical, and imperialistic, although it has made many contributions to human progress. Kato’s images of Christianity greatly contrast with Mori’s, who sees it as very positive, and believes that it has made many contributions to America and the West. Its spirit of independence and individualism are very important, and likely part of the reason for the West’s success in science. So Japan needs Christianity or least Christian-inspired scientific values.

These leaders offer extensive images about the challenge for Japanese to relate to Westerners. While Fukuzawa soon argued, after traveling abroad, that Japanese must learn how to interact with foreigners, and that doing so in Japan would be unavoidable, Kato and Ito worried about the presence of Westerners in Japan and the effect it could

\textsuperscript{1238} It is interesting to realize that though Kato saw conflicts between “foreign” religions and science/reality, he drew on ideologies based on Japanese spirituality, Shinto, to support Japanese nationalism, patriotism, and evolutionary arguments for descent of the Japanese people from the divine emperor, into one “family-state.”

\textsuperscript{1239} Neo-Confucian values reflect such qualities as filial piety, benevolence, and loyalty. In the Confucian model of social relations, morality exercised is based on relational particulars. In Kato’s mind, universal religions ignore these relational aspects of morality. But Confucianism, in its stress on proper ritual, fails to address many modern social evils.
have on Japan’s culture.\textsuperscript{1240} Fukuzawa himself struggled with these interactions.\textsuperscript{1241} Despite this, Fukuzawa argues that for Japan to improve, it desperately needs knowledge of Western culture and the adoption of certain Western cultural practices.\textsuperscript{1242}

A final type of images regarding Japan’s external cultural relations concerns how social change and development are affected by international factors. Fukuzawa argues that building social institutions based on Western models and incorporating Western customs is a key way to help Japan modernize.\textsuperscript{1243} Several further factors are identified as key: education, “spirits” of freedom and independence, and vitality in religion.\textsuperscript{1244}

How do these images function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? These images stress cultural relativism and a hierarchical view of different cultures. The culture and knowledge of the West is seen as positive, though its behavior is not. These images would cause policymakers to fear the West yet admire it, and to reject Asian models for cultural change. The negative bias of Kato’s images of “foreign” religions is notable. He finds nothing positive about Christianity, though he quietly acknowledges that science

\textsuperscript{1240} Ito worried about the presence of Westerners in Japan, and remember that Kato worried about the threat of “mixed residence” if Westerners were allowed to live in Japan too soon. These fears reflect the inexperience and fears of most Japanese in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods concerning interaction with Westerners.

\textsuperscript{1241} Recall how Fukuzawa was shocked at male-female interactions when he visited San Francisco, and how in the mid-1870s he called Westerners arrogant, scandalous, and violent in their interpersonal (and international) behavior.

\textsuperscript{1242} Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori all contend that learning about the West will strengthen Japan. Mori believes that Japan can learn much from America, and that it should study its conditions in depth to do so (Van Sant, \textit{Mori Arinori}). According to Fukuzawa, practical knowledge of Western culture is important for Japan to understand how to respond to each foreign society. He further argues that Japan needs “spirits” of freedom and independence to defend itself against the West, and that adopting Western cultural customs and habits such as cleanliness, time-keeping, public debate, and schooling practices will help Japan to modernize.

\textsuperscript{1243} Here modernize is not given in quotes, so I mean the conventional sense of modernization, not the specialized Japanese definition (“modernization”) that is used as an analytical concept in the development issue sections throughout this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{1244} Fukuzawa concludes that the key factor in whether societies succeed is education. Mori notices that religious, philanthropic and educational organizations are important contributors to American life (Van Sant, \textit{Mori Arinori}), and believes that they can be for Japan too. Also recall the stress of Fukuzawa and Mori about the importance of freedom, independence and individual initiative.
emerged within Christendom. This crucial point, the power of Christianity and its “spirits” of freedom and scientific investigation, is what Mori seizes upon as key to help Japan become scientific. The ill feelings of Kato toward Christianity reminds one of anti-Christian bias prevalent in the Tokugawa period, also present in the early Meiji period, though the government made the religion legal, due to pressure from Western countries. Pro-Christian leaders like Mori were influential, but small in number. Japan eventually acquired science, despite anti-Christian feelings. National survival encouraged Japanese to study English and Western knowledge, even if most in this era would never interact directly with foreigners. The insight that Japan needed education and positive values for growth and change certainly took hold, and has influenced Japan up to the present.

Worldview. Based on those images, in the worldview/cognitive framework that emerges, the world is divided into many cultures, many of which are unequal. Cultures with more knowledge and education are better. In the view of these leaders, those cultures, such as the West, have more power and control the world. Countries with poor cultural development are weak. To Kato, many peoples are “religious.” Religion is simply a feature of social evolution, not important by itself. Western religion is negative, greedy, nationalistic, and does not fit Japan. Foreign religion conflicts with science and reality. To Mori, Western religion (Christianity) made the West great, partly through its values, and also encourages science. Japan needs science, so perhaps it needs Christianity

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1245 Remember that many of the great early European scientists, such as Newton, Galileo and Copernicus, were Christians.
1246 Under the Tokugawa period’s Sakoku (national isolation) policy, the practice of Christianity was banned in Japan.
1247 Note that the views listed here are the views of the leaders under study.
as well. The West drives the world. Japanese must interact with both. Mori also believes
that through education, a people can improve their culture and their condition.

In this worldview/cognitive framework, countries with superior culture are
powerful and strong in other areas too, such as politics and economics. To Kato, science
drives the world; religion does not. Religion is a lie, unreal, and cannot handle modernity.
Mori believes that positive religion (i.e. Christianity) and its values can make a people
great (for example, the United States). Not just greed drives the world, also charity,
philanthropy, science, and inventions (inspired by religion and creative, inspired values).
Education enables a people to grow, improve. In this worldview, the West now culturally
dominates the world, as China once dominated Japan’s known world. Japan must
therefore learn from the West, not just from China and Asia.

In this cognitive framework, Japan is seen as presently weak, but having a great
culture, morality, and a capacity to learn, grow, work hard, and change. Views of the
non-self see the West as strong, “superior” in culture and technology to Japan, but not
necessarily in morality. To Mori, the West has superior morality, and its religion (mainly
Christianity) is superior to Japan’s. It has made the West stronger in science and
technology to Japan and Asia. Japanese must unavoidably interact with Westerners to
learn from them. Westerners are greedy. Asia is weak, culturally inferior, and stagnant.
While it was once great, it is now isolated (China, Korea), and now has trouble learning
modern knowledge, such as from the West.

The relevant environment(s) surrounding those who hold these worldviews
include Western ideas, arts, books, education, and from Asia, Confucian culture, Chinese
ideas, studies, arts, literature, and philosophy. How have these environments interacted
with/affected these leaders’ worldviews? The effects include a view of Western learnings as fascinating, amazing, cutting-edge, superior, and more “scientific” than Japanese and Asian learnings. This causes most Japanese thinkers in this period to highly favor Western knowledge and culture. Others struggle with how to merge Western culture with Japanese culture and Asian heritage.

How have these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influenced the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understandings of events and their causes? In these perceptions, in the most extreme version, Western culture is far superior to Japan’s. Japan needs it, must learn, master, and support it. Eastern culture is stagnant, slow, and backward. Japanese feel very awkward in interacting with Westerners. Regarding information, there is a new preference for Western art, culture, dress, and customs. Asian and Japanese arts are briefly ignored, and deemphasized by certain leaders. A high value is placed on Western culture and knowledge as key for Japan’s survival. On understandings of events and their causes, Western arts, architecture, science, and culture are great and more “modern.” Science dominates and drives the world. Now the West and its culture are conquering the world. Therefore the West can conquer Japan and Asia. Japan needs this culture, or at least knowledge of it, to be more strong and modern. Change happens through learning. Through education, a people can better themselves and their country.

How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? The West’s superior technology makes Japanese assume that the culture and science of the former are better. This makes most Japanese leaders in this period temporarily prefer Western culture and learning from the West, rather than Asian culture and learning. Yet most
Japanese know there is much honorable in Asian and Japanese cultures. Japanese and Asian cultures cannot be totally abandoned, and certain things about the West seem funny, strange, bizarre, and/or incomprehensible.

*Cultural Logics.* What are the global phenomena relevant to external cultural relations about which these leaders hold a worldview, and to which they are reacting? These include Western cultural influences entering Japan: ideas from politics, science, literature, the arts, medicine, technology, food, new products, materials, clothing, books, English, German and other foreign languages, and people (Western teachers, scholars, traders, diplomats, missionaries, and religion coming to Japan). This includes knowledge brought back to Japan from Japanese who have studied and traveled abroad. Asian students, traders, and migrants who come to Japan, especially from China, also brought their cultural artifacts and knowledge.

What are the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena? Western culture, knowledge, and science are powerful, great, and superior to Eastern and Japanese knowledge in a material, technical sense, but not necessarily in a moral sense (Kato, Yamagata, and Ito). Perhaps in a moral sense, Western culture is superior to Japanese culture. The superiority of Western culture is proven in the power it manifests in economics, politics, the military and technology.

In the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena, the powerful and the strong are great and superior. The West is superior to Japan and Asia. The strong are better than the weak, who are inferior. Japan and Asia are both weak and inferior. Weak countries should copy and learn from the cultures of strong countries.

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1248 This was the view of Fukuzawa earlier, not later, and of Mori.
What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? At first, there was a mad craze to learn and copy anything Western (opera, beef, and dress) and strongly manifested in the *bunmei kaika* movement. Soon after, there was anger and fear at the West, its greed, and concern about how to protect Japanese culture and identity against the Western onslaught. There was also a strong desire to strengthen Japan, its culture, nationhood, and identity, and to earn a strong place for Japan on the international scene. This would include respect for Japan’s military, and Japan’s place in international relations. Japan should become a strong power in Asia. Japan should earn a position of respect, while still being Japanese.

What were the cultural logics under these responses? At first there was almost idolatrous worship of the West and its power, and then realistic appraisal and concern over the West, its power and intentions. This was followed by much pondering and effort to discern how to keep Japan great, protect, and maintain its culture. Some of these leaders showed anger toward the West and/or toward Asia. Later came the desire of some to aggressively counter the West and “help” Asia, even if war must be waged. If we compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics under the responses to the phenomena, the former logics seem logical, but also more philosophical/mental than the latter ones. The latter logics are more pragmatic and realistic, and yet more reactive to actual conditions.

**Globalization Issues.** How do these important worldviews on external cultural relations reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? These worldviews reflect the processes of greatly intensified cultural globalization for Japan that especially occurred in the early
Meiji era. The increased cultural flows especially involved ideas and new technologies, but also a relatively small number of influential people, both foreigners who came to Japan, and Japanese who went overseas. In the arena of external cultural relations, the influence on Japan of these leaders who went overseas, Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori, was huge, especially from the first two. The impact of Fukuzawa on overall Japanese society, through his translation of Western cultural ideas in ways that were comprehensible for millions of Japanese in his popular writings, and his less acknowledged work in economics, looms large. Ito also had indirect, but great, effects on daily Japanese life through his translation of Western political concepts in the Constitution of 1889.

If we consider these global cultural processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Fukuzawa, Ito and Mori experienced the effects of cultural interchange with the West in their personal lives from their youth, due to growing up in Kyushu, the region with the most connection with the West in the late Tokugawa period. These three also experienced these effects as they traveled overseas on various occasions for study or work. All of these men, including Kato, were highly impressed with the quality of knowledge they learned from the West. But each struggled with relating to Westerners in person. Only Mori did not seem to struggle as intensely. In spite of his intensive study of foreigners, later Fukuzawa became bitter after the mid-1870s. Mori also noted that there were conflicts in the United States, between its high ideals and its actual accomplishments. 1249 And Kato struggled

1249 The specific conflict to which I refer is that between the high moral ideals of Christianity, the predominant religion in the United States, and the nation’s struggle with slavery, which helped provoke the Civil War. Mori arrived in the United States in the early 1870s, when he wrote his Life and Resources in America (see Van Sant, Mori Arinori). Given this environment, shortly after the end of the Civil War, this
with what he viewed as elements of Western culture, like religion, that seemed highly incongruent with Japanese culture. Did everyday Japanese struggle in these ways as they encountered Western culture and ideas? It does not seem that they did, as these deep-thinking leaders especially struggled on a philosophical level. This “clash” of Japanese and Western values was not fully manifested until the anti-Western backlash of the pro-military governments of the 1930s, when Japan’s government came under intensified military influence. On a public level, over time, the impacts of Western cultural artifacts and technologies would greatly transform the daily lives of most Japanese, especially during the twentieth century.

Do these important global processes of external cultural relations represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? These relations do not represent a very strong case of Japanese globalization in this period, since other countries did not begin to come under much Japanese cultural influence until shortly later in the early twentieth century. This process was especially intense in Korea, which became a Japanese colony in 1910. The cases of cultural influence were greatest in those regions that became Japanese colonies (also including Taiwan and Okinawa).

Conclusion

From our study in Chapter 6 of leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations (1850 to 1895), what can we conclude about how those views, and Japan’s

\footnote{Conflict could not have been more vivid for Mori. Yet despite America’s struggles, Mori was still hugely impressed with what he observed.}

\footnote{The chief exception to this time line was Taiwan, which became a colony of Japan’s in 1895, shortly after the Sino-Japanese War.}
experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations at this time, may have contributed to Japan’s current foreign aid policies? Here I will list general trends, while more concrete linkages with the actual ideas of current Japanese ODA will be explored in Chapters 9 and 10. First, gaining key areas of foreign knowledge is a key priority for any developing country, and must be in ODA policies. These areas include science, foreign languages, politics, economics, foreign law, and so forth. The government should take a key role in encouraging policies in this area, including sponsoring study abroad, scientific/cultural exchanges, importing foreign teachers and books, and society-wide discussion of what values and institutions should be imported and/or rejected. Japan excelled in much of this in the period 1850 to 1895. On cultural issues and development, ODA policies should encourage an LDC’s government to initiate policies to protect the nation’s positive cultural values and institutions, but the policies should not be coercive, and must allow for freedom and opposition. Japan’s policies on culture were often coercive and repressive.

Regarding external cultural relations, to learn from foreign countries, an LDC must have accurate views of those cultures, and the capability of interacting effectively with foreigners. In ODA, this issue relates to the effective transfer of technology and knowledge, and how culture affects the process. Japan had numerous cultural barriers to cross: the need to overcome great geographic and cultural isolation that had lasted hundreds of years, linguistic difficulties, inaccurate views of foreigners influenced by ancient Chinese and Confucian stereotypes, and broad inexperience in interacting with any foreigners at all. All of these factors suggested that it would be quite challenging for Japanese to interact with foreigners and their cultures. Indeed it was, even for bright
young leaders who eagerly desired to do so. But Japan benefited from its long tradition of importing, learning and improving knowledge from foreign countries, and its historic eagerness over many centuries to do so. Perseverance and hard work in this area also paid off, despite setbacks such as World War II. The historical legacies of Japan’s geographic and linguistic isolation have created significant barriers that continue to somewhat “isolate” its people from the outside world, even today. At the very least, while Japan does an amazing job of importing and translating foreign knowledge from abroad, knowledge from Japan is much less accessible to foreigners, because of the difficulties of the Japanese language.

These cultural difficulties have affected Japan’s ODA and its overall effectiveness. Japanese aid agencies have been hampered in their ability to adequately assess ground level issues and interact with local populations because of language challenges. Cultural barriers, to some degree, also affect the international image of Japanese ODA, and the success of Japan’s government in communicating about it to the world at large. Whatever cultural barriers other LDCs face in development and aid, no doubt Japan has faced many of similar gravity.

Regarding the second key research question of the dissertation, is the idea of internationalization an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development?\textsuperscript{1251} In my discussion above of how internationalization meshes with the worldviews of external cultural relations in this chapter, I argued that a chief factor in the views of Fukuzawa and Mori, the West’s values of individual duty and responsibility,
seemed important for Japan to adequately master science and technology. I also noted
that while Japan was very successful in importing much hardware of Western science and
technology during this era, importing the accompanying cultural values was more
challenging. Despite the great cultural impacts and changes in Japan that resulted from
this interchange, I argued that most of the deepest parts of Japan’s culture did not change.
Also, Japan’s overseas actions in this era, primarily the Sino-Japanese War, did not
project these spirits of freedom and individualism, but rather aggression.

From the contexts examined in this chapter, what do we learn about Japan’s
experiences with technology, development, and foreign relations? Regarding technology,
various cultural institutions and policy actions were important in encouraging Japan’s
mastery of foreign technology. Three identified above included the public Bansho
Shirabesho for the study of Western languages, science and technology, the study of
English to facilitate the mastery of foreign knowledge and technology for the building of
the country, and government missions and embassies sent abroad so that leading Japanese
could learn about Western culture and technology, among other purposes. And
concerning development, above we learned that Japan’s policy on international cultural
exchange in the Meiji period emphasized the massive importation of Western knowledge
to contribute to the building of the nation, in huge contrast to the strict national isolation
policy of a few years before, under the Tokugawa Shogunate. Various intellectual trends
and ideologies, some publicly sanctioned, attempted to favorably introduce Western
culture and thought to the nation.\footnote{Two of these movements were the \textit{bunmei kaika} (civilization and enlightenment) movement, and the Meirokusha debating society.} Foreign instructors from various nations, especially
from the United States, had a huge impact on Japan through the foreign knowledge they helped to share, greatly facilitating the rise of Japan from feudalism to a modern power in only a few decades.

Regarding foreign (cultural) relations, before the end of the Tokugawa period, most Japanese subscribed to the Chinese view that Westerners were highly barbaric, given their great distance from China, though they possessed great technical knowledge. Yet Japanese also began to doubt the modern greatness of China, after its defeats before Western powers. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan’s massive national campaign to absorb international knowledge contributed greatly to building of the nation. Despite Japanese tensions with China and Korea, Japan’s intellectual debts to those nations, and to the United States (in the Meiji era) were huge.

What evidence emerges by comparing both the leaders’ worldviews of external cultural relations and Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations in this era, from the evidence presented in this chapter? From internationalization, I concluded that while Japan did an amazing job in importing the technical hardware of many technologies into Japan during this period (1850 to 1895), it had a more challenging time importing some of the associated “spiritual” factors, such as values of freedom, individualism, and creativity, believed by leaders such as Fukuzawa and Mori to be important for Japan’s mastery of Western science and technology. In our examination of Japan’s experience with technology, development and foreign relations, seen in the contexts of Japan’s external cultural relations, I concluded that several social institutions and policy efforts, such as the Bansho Shirabesho and encouragement of English study, were important in encouraging Japan’s mastery of foreign technology. The
Meiji government’s policy that was extremely supportive of importing Western knowledge contrasted sharply with that of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which sharply limited it. The Meiji government efforts, and the contributions of many foreign instructors, were especially key in Japan’s successful mastery of technological hardware. A few foreign instructors also shared religion. While influential on a few individuals, it did not take hold widely. Despite Japan’s great cultural debt to the Chinese and Korean civilizations, they fell into some disfavor in contrast to Western civilization and technologies as sources for Japanese learning. What again seems clear is that while Japan was impeccable at mastering the technical aspects of these technologies, the accompanying cultural values were much harder to absorb. In this era, in practice, technological hardware (items of a more material nature) was more favored than the esoteric, ethical, and spiritual values behind them.

I give a more definitive answer in Part 4 (the concluding section), but what is the likely pattern seen in Japan’s aid policies of today, regarding the issue of internationalization? They do not seem overtly or politically “aggressive,” as just noted. I cannot say whether values of freedom and individualism are also transferred. Somewhat of a degree of “dependence” on Japan may be encouraged, in that historically, much Japanese aid has been “tied.” But its aid cannot be called aggressive, as the Sino-Japanese War was.

Concerning the third key research question of the dissertation, to what extent has Japanese spirituality perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? What evidence do we see in the historical data in this chapter? In my discussion of “spirit” and spirituality in this and several other chapters, I note how Fukuzawa and other leaders, especially Mori,
argue that any nation wishing to develop, including Japan, must master “spirits” and values of freedom, independence, individual duty, and creativity. In Chapter 6, I comment that transferring intangible values like these is more challenging than transferring technical hardware, in general and also for Japan. Hence I argue that in this era (1850-1895), Japan did not substantively transfer “soft” spirits such as independence and creativity in its cultural interactions with other nearby regions, but rather an aggressive use of technology, as seen in the Sino-Japanese War. Mori also argued that since Western Christianity seemed to encourage values of individual duty and inspired values that encouraged science and freedom, perhaps Japan also needed Christianity. I further identify several key lessons on spirituality and development from Japan’s experience, including the importance of balancing material and ethical/contextual elements of knowledge as a nation develops, the valuable contributions that religious input from other countries can offer (though not without some cultural risk), and how many of the leaders considered here identified both helpful values and contributions that religion provided for the development of Western nations.

On the conflict between the material and spiritual worlds identified in previous chapters, there are few overt references in Chapter 6. Earlier in this chapter, I commented on how Ito is the strongest case here of a leader who took several technologies and ideas on the international level and used them the most profoundly to transform Japan on the domestic level. I also noted how several of the leaders (Kato, Yamagata, and Ito) found Western culture and technology superior to East Asian knowledge, though not the

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1253 I am referring to his support for ideas on political issues such as a parliament/Diet, and for a constitution. Fukuzawa also had a huge impact, though his impacts were more centered on the private sector, not on public policy.
West’s morality and spirituality. The only exception was Mori, who saw both Western technology and spirituality as superior. Finally, there is the lesson here that for wise development, a nation should seek to pursue a balance between material/scientific and cultural/spiritual development. Perhaps this last comment is the most notable, that in approaching development, and the technical and ethical/cultural dilemmas it presents, Japan (and any LDC) must seek a balance. However, the overpowering “superiority” of Western technology and culture, manifested in its military and economic strengths, Japan’s consequent rejection of “ethical” East Asian models in this era, and perhaps an “in-built’ Flaw of the Excluded Middle” weakness inherent in the Western technologies Japan imported, may have challenged Japan’s ability to do this.

Regarding religion, the main insights that stand out in this chapter are that, through interaction with foreign instructors, reading Western literature, and travel overseas, several of these leaders (Fukuzawa and Mori) gained positive impressions of what Western religion, Christianity in particular, had accomplished in the West. They valued both its moral strengthening of individuals and the contemporary scientific and technological advances they observed which were pioneered in the West, not in East Asia or other regions. On the other hand, many Japanese leaders, here especially Kato, disliked Christianity for various reasons, and felt it was highly incongruent with Japanese culture, though it had contributed positive things to the development of the West. What contributed to Kato’s extremely negative view of Western religion? Perhaps it was the fact that he did not observe its accomplishments in the West firsthand,1254 and likely he

1254 To my knowledge, Kato Hiroyuki never had the chance to travel or study abroad. If he did, it was only very briefly.
was also exposed to the Protestant theological school of German rationalism in the late
nineteenth century, which caused many to question the historicity of Christianity. Perhaps
the negative attitude of these leaders reflected residue of prejudice against Christianity
left from the Tokugawa period, and their concern with protecting the identity of Japan. I
also noted above in this chapter that Western religion (thus Christianity) was one of the
most important global cultural products to be transferred to Japan at this time. Both
foreign instructors and Western religious institutions were among the main actors
facilitating this transfer. There are also very valuable lessons that Western spirituality and
religion offered for Japanese development, and for any LDC, so developing countries
should carefully reflect on what degree of openness to foreign religion they wish to
allow, and why.

What impacts may these views on spirituality have had on policies in this period?
The reflections of several of these leaders were very wise, especially their insight about
how values and “spirits” accompanying the technologies to be mastered must also be
studied and perhaps adopted to some degree. Fukuzawa and Mori both attempted to
encourage this as much as they could, Fukuzawa in the private sector, and Mori largely in
his work on education policy. Despite this wisdom, there was enormous pressure against
allowing many Western cultural values, including religion, into Japan. Part of the
pressure was based on the sakoku policy of the Tokugawa period, and part of it was
based on the prejudice against Christianity that prevailed even before the Tokugawa
period. It is also harder to transfer intangible values than technical hardware. Achieving
appropriate balance between material and ethical/spiritual/philosophical factors in
Japan’s development was thus extremely challenging. Did Japan find an appropriate
balance in this area, or between hyper-Westernization and pro-Japanese nationalism, the latter that especially took hold in the 1930s? Shifts between these various extremes occurred at various times, and it seems that the ideal balance was never found in the pre-1945 period.1255

The major conflicts between spirituality and science that were present in this era include the conflict between leaders who were pro-Western religion (because they felt it had contributed much to Western science) and leaders who were pro-Shinto (because they thought Japan must have its own indigenous source to inspire development efforts).1256 Could Christianity or Shinto contribute more to Japan’s development efforts? Whatever the answer might have been, Shinto was chosen as the national spiritual ideology to support Japanese nation-building. There was also the potential conflict between material and spiritual values that, though mentioned infrequently in Chapter 6, continued nevertheless.

Where are the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign and development? As discussed above, in this era, there were great pressures against considering the contributions of religious and other spiritual values to development, what they might be, and pressures against Japan adopting Christianity as its official ideology for this purpose. To achieve a balance between the extremes of considering material issues in development, or only examining spiritual ones, I argued that in this period (1850 to 1895), Japan mainly leaned toward the material side, though it did adopt State Shinto

1255 I do not necessarily believe that the appropriate balance for post-1945 Japan has been found either, though it is not pertinent to reflect on this issue here.
1256 There was also consideration of what Buddhism might contribute to Japanese development by various thinkers, notably by philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870 to 1945).
as its official spiritual ideology for development. In subsequent periods of Japanese history, it appears that Japan has alternately leaned toward either the material extreme or the spiritual one on the issue of whether to acknowledge the influence of spirituality in its development efforts (both on the domestic and international levels). In my opinion, from 1895 to 1945, Japan leaned more toward the spiritual side in its development efforts.\footnote{1257}

In the postwar period, I would argue that Japan has again returned to overtly pro-material extremes in its policies for development and aid, though the Western/global aid agenda is currently pressuring Japan to consider social and cultural issues to a greater extent.\footnote{1258}

This is seen in Japan’s long-running preference for economic infrastructure in both its domestic development and foreign aid, rather than aid for social infrastructure.

\footnote{1257 For more on this, see the arguments I present in Chapters 7 and 8.}

\footnote{1258 Though we are not able to explore these issues in this dissertation, I surmise that partly due to the strict legal pressures in Japan’s 1947 Constitution for the separation of religion and state, there is little or no consideration of religion in the development ideologies currently supported by the Japanese government, and in its aid policies. However, recent arguments about the clash of civilizations, Islamic politics, and religious terrorism may be increasing pressure on Japan to reconsider how religion and spirituality affect its diplomatic and aid policies. I suspect that any attention that religion is given likely fails to consider domestic factors in Japan. There is presently much pressure for such consideration in American diplomacy.}
Part Three

1895 to 1945: The Period of Colonialism
Chapter 7

Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1895-1945)

Domestic Issues

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the pre-aid period of 1895 to 1945, the age of major overseas Japanese colonialism. Colonies included Taiwan (from 1895), Korea (from 1910) and parts of mainland China (from 1931). On domestic issues, worldviews discussed here include views of technological development, the domestic state, market, and society. In each case, I consider the views of Yanagita Kunio and Emperor Hirohito. What is the significance of Yanagita Kunio and Emperor Hirohito for this project, and why did I choose each of them?

Yanagita Kunio was the founder of Japanese folklore studies, a scholar, poet, government bureaucrat, a pioneer of ethnography in Japan, and one of the first Japanese leaders to critically assess Japan’s mass importation of Western culture and technology, examining this process in grassroots Japanese society. The unifying theme of his work was the search for elements of tradition that explain Japan’s distinctive national

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1259 I will discuss the choice of these two leaders momentarily.
1260 Yanagita served as a national bureaucrat, in the Diet (1914-1919), as a journalist, and at the League of Nations (the early 1920s). After 1930, he devoted himself to ethnography across Japan (Kawada 1993). Our consideration here is primarily of Yanagita’s thought from about 1900 to 1930. We are not able to consider his other writings during the World War II or postwar periods, which space and time do not allow.
character. Many of these he identified in rural society. He worried that the uncritical, wholesale adaptation and invasion of Western technology and culture was rapidly destroying Japan’s heart and soul. His career lasted from the early to mid-1900s. Japanese scholars view his work as relevant to Japan from the Meiji era onward. Some argue that he attempted to offer Japan models for “alternative modernization.”

Emperor Hirohito (posthumous name, the Emperor Showa) was a pivotal figure in the life of the nation, as a symbol and more. His thought, as an individual, was of questionable impact. But through the symbolism of his position as emperor, the images he projected, and his policy actions and inactions, his influence on the nation was profound. Although the historical “height” of his reign was from the early 1920s to 1945, his influence continued until the late 1980s. Even after his death, he continues to be incredibly controversial, both in Japan and abroad. In his study of Hirohito, Herbert Bix examines the contexts of his life, his interaction with politics, and how the emperor transformed Japan’s monarchy. Hirohito is the one Japanese figure, more than any other, who reveals the nature of “…Japanese politics and government-military relations,” and the political views of the Japanese in the twentieth century. Hirohito was a “fallible” person with common human weaknesses and desires, but at the center of

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1261 Minoru Kawada, *The Origin of Ethnography in Japan: Yanagita Kunio and His Times* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), 1-3, 81, 110-111. Kawada argues that while Japanese scholars acknowledge the importance of Yanagita’s work, their overall conclusions about his work are highly varied (Ibid., 2).

1262 Herbert P. Bix’s seminal study of Hirohito’s life, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, is groundbreaking in its analysis of Hirohito’s life, political actions, and the broader implications of these for Japanese society and its place in the twentieth century world (Bix, *Hirohito*). In Japan, the book has received both positive and negative critical response from scholarly and popular critics. For details on the Japanese critiques of Bix’s book and his response to them, see Herbert P. Bix, “Emperor Hirohito in 20th Century History: The Debate Rekindles,” JPRI working paper, no. 92 (Cardiff, Calif: Japan Policy Research Institute, 2003), http://www.jpri.org, accessed 9 August 2008.

1263 Ibid., 5-7.
power, politics, and political conflict in Japan longer than anyone else.\textsuperscript{1264} In Hirohito, we have a strong case where images greatly affected policy outcomes. Below and in the concluding chapter, I examine Hirohito’s worldviews and his personal and projected images, each of which highly influenced his policies and political engagements. Especially with Hirohito, connections between worldviews and policy actions should become clearer.

In this chapter, for consistency and ease of analysis, where possible, I will use the same analytic concepts that I used for domestic issues in Chapters 3 and 4. In the case of technology issues, for worldview of technological development, I use Glick’s anthropological definition of technology. For domestic state and domestic market worldviews, I will again use the concepts of Glick’s definition of technology, technonationalism as ideology, and Murakami’s concept of industrial policy. For the domestic society worldviews, I will use the first two concepts, and not the third, in addition to several questions about the relationship of technology and society, where relevant.\textsuperscript{1265}

An item of particular interest in this chapter is the importance that views of spirituality exercised on policy, and the impact these policies eventually had on Japan and its empire. A major tension arises between the views of spirituality of Yanagita, who stressed strengthening local manifestations of spirituality to build Japan, and Hirohito,  

\textsuperscript{1264} Ibid., 17-18.  
\textsuperscript{1265} The questions (from Chapter 3) to be asked here about the technology aspects of domestic society, if relevant, are: 1) what was the effect of societal attitudes about technology upon Japan’s reception of it? 2) What was the effect of general societal attitudes (and these leaders’ attitudes) about society, social change, morality and religion on Japan’s views of technology and technological change? 3) Through these leaders’ views of domestic society, do we learn anything about how technology fit into Japan’s social system, daily life and work of the era? 4) Do the worldviews of these leaders suggest that technology was a socially-constructed phenomenon in Japan at this time?
who exercised great influence as the supreme spiritual and political leader of Japan, but who focused more on the national and international levels. During this era (1895 to 1945), as time went on, spirituality exercised an increasing influence on Japanese politics and national life. It clouded, to some degree, Hirohito’s policy actions and decisions. Sadly, before 1945, the Japanese government largely ignored the wise observations of Yanagita on preserving Japan’s local cultures and spirituality. The heavy mixing of religion and politics in this era ultimately had disastrous consequences for the nation. Based on my own reflections on these issues, later in this chapter I offer several significant policy lessons on how religion and spirituality can positively affect a developing country’s development processes. I also ask important questions about the consideration of religion in Japan’s current foreign policymaking and aid policy processes. As Japan remains the second largest economic power in the world, one of the most significant players in the Asia and Pacific region, and one of the world’s largest donors of foreign aid, these questions are potentially of great significance for global development and security.

Contexts of Domestic Issues (1895-1945): Major Trends

**Contexts of Technological Development**

For Meiji policymakers, Western science became one of the chief means for making Japan into a modern nation, to prevent its colonization. From the era of World War I through World War II, while three main sectors did scientific research (the public sector, universities, and the private sector), only the research of the national laboratories
had much prestige. During World War II, Japanese research suffered from isolation from most foreign sources of data. The public sector, both the military and the government at large, had used many foreign sources, but now they had to rely on Japanese ones. Funding increased, and for the first time, Japan’s science and technology researchers cohered their own unique identity. But as World War II worsened for Japan, scientific research almost halted.

Throughout the pre-World War II era, Japan’s government played a key role in the promotion of technological development. Most engineers entered government service, serving in public agencies, schools, laboratories, and as advisors to private industry. The need to build both Japan’s military and industrial strengths was deemed proper motivation for the government’s involvement in pre-war R&D. Globally, the degree of public involvement in technological development seen in Japan’s pre-World War II scientific research community was rare in that era. Much of Japan’s basic and applied research in the 1930s and 1940s was done at the prestigious Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (Rikagaku Kenkyūjo, or Riken).

After 1895, Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and Japan’s economic boom during World War I were a further boon for Japan’s industrial and technological development. Before World War II, Japan’s military escalation was

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1266 All three of these sectors cooperated in funding pre-World War II research and development (Japan, “Research and Development,” 1255).
1267 Ibid., “Natural Science,” 1069.
1268 Perhaps the most important public research-related effort before 1945 was the establishment of the Gakujutsu Shinkōkai (or Gakushin), the prewar predecessor of today’s Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Gakushin was mainly a research funding organization, and its work provided an important foundation for much of Japan’s postwar industrial base, including the fields of chemicals, electronics, and medicine (Ibid., “Research and Development,” 1255).
1269 Ibid.
the motivation for much of the nation’s industrial and technological growth, especially in the heavy and chemical industries. Although most of Japan’s technologies in this era were imported, Japanese researchers developed several new important technological innovations in the pre-World War II era.\textsuperscript{1270}

**Domestic State Contexts**

In the late 1890s, the aftermath of the war with China (1894-1895) greatly affected Japanese politics, and the throne as a tool for authoritarian control and rule. Ironically, the strength of political parties in the Diet also increased. Economic development picked up speed, and Japan’s politics became increasingly competitive, as the interests of Japan’s elites in big business, the Diet, the military and the bureaucracy often clashed. After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), political party activities grew, as well as increased military spending to support Japan’s new colonies on the continent.\textsuperscript{1271} Intense political factionalism continued until the end of the Meiji period (1912), and slightly beyond.\textsuperscript{1272} From then until the early 1930s, political liberalism and participation, a trend called Taisho democracy, spread as men over twenty-five received

\textsuperscript{1270} Ibid, “Modern Technology,” 1540. Among the notable innovations by Japanese researchers before World War II were the development of monosodium glutamate (MSG, an important food additive) (1908), a high performance steel alloy, KS Magnetic Steel (1917), and the Yagi Antenna, the most common television and radio antenna configuration (1926) (Ibid.). One sector in which Japan is a pioneer is the area of environmental technologies. Japan’s development of advanced environmental technologies has run in tandem with its industrial development. From 1868 to 1945, mining pollution in particular stimulated technological innovation in this sector (*Encyclopedia of Contemporary*, “Environmental Technologies,” 129).

\textsuperscript{1271} Bix, *Hirohito*, 33-34.

\textsuperscript{1272} *Genro* (elder statesmen) from the *hambastu* (pre-1868 domain clique) factions, especially from the former domains of Satsuma and Choshu, served as prime minister, influenced important government posts, and controlled the army and navy through about 1918 (*Japan*, “Hambatsu,” 495, and “Political System,” 1216).
voting rights in 1925. Yet the authoritarian tendencies of the government continued.\textsuperscript{1273} Gradually the power of the military in politics increased in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{1274} Government and bureaucracy were very closely connected, and most bureaucrats served long-term.\textsuperscript{1275} Through 1945, the emperor had supreme authority over his ministers and the military, creating two bureaucracies, one civil, and one military. The military exercised extraordinary power over the political system. Laws were drafted by bureaucrats, and approved in the Diet; the emperor also issued imperial decrees.\textsuperscript{1276} The state manipulated both religion and images of the emperor for political purposes.\textsuperscript{1277} The power of political parties grew after World War I, but they declined due to political pressure from the military in the 1930s, and were absorbed into a new national body by 1940.\textsuperscript{1278}

Nationalism continued as an even more powerful ideology from 1895 to 1945. Through about 1912, Meiji leaders skillfully used the concept of \textit{kuni} in the education system to translate the people’s allegiance from their feudal domains into devotion to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1273} Many of these authoritarian tendencies resulted from the Meiji constitution, in force through 1945. The constitution was a compromise between the two principles of imperial sovereignty and parliamentary government, and left unclear exactly how policy was to be made. Much of Japanese political history through 1945 was driven by the conflict between these two issues (Ibid., “Political System,” 1216; “Constitution of the Empire of Japan,” 232).
\item \textsuperscript{1274} Ibid., “Political System,” 1216. Competing factions from the army and navy competed over the government’s domestic and foreign policymaking in the 1920s and 1930s. Their power was strongest from 1937-1945, when the military dominated the entire national government (Ibid., “Gumbatsu,” 479).
\item \textsuperscript{1275} Most bureaucrats served long-term since they were chosen mainly by competitive examination, rather through political appointment (Ibid., “Bureaucracy,” 147).
\item \textsuperscript{1276} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1277} I explore the issue of the emperor’s image in Chapter 9. Regarding religion and politics, after Hirohito ascended the throne in 1926, two ideological movements influenced by religion emerged. One took off again in the late 1920s, a debate about the true nature of the national polity (\textit{kokutai}), Japan’s state and society, and how it might be renewed. It was argued that this could best be accomplished through the emperor’s authority. The second ideology, \textit{kōdō} (“the imperial way”) argued that the emperor provided the morally superior model for all Japanese. \textit{Kōdō} was influential in Japanese politics in the late 1920s and 1930s. Only morally superior Japan and its \textit{kōdō} could purify Asia from corrupting Western influences, such as liberalism, communism, and individualism. While the \textit{kokutai} debate was particularly associated with Shinto, the \textit{kōdō} ideology was associated both with Shinto and several Buddhist sects, especially the Nichiren sect (Bix, Hirohito, 10-11).
\item \textsuperscript{1278} Japan, “Political Parties,” 1212.
\end{itemize}
Japan and the emperor. During the period of Taisho democracy (about 1905-1932), the nationalistic ideology of Nihonshugi (Japanism) receded, but resurfaced in the 1930s. Forms of statist nationalism took hold through the education system, Shinto festivals and rituals for the emperor, and new doctrines stressing harmony and Japanese uniqueness. In the 1930s, these forces solidified into powerful political influences. Popular nationalists attacked the government for its “weakness” against the West, often stressing the spiritual role of the emperor as Japan’s high priest and intercessor, and seeking to connect all Japanese in ethno-psychic bonds. From the debate on Japan’s national polity (kokutai), the kazoku kokka (“Japan-as-a-family-state”) concept was official dogma in Japan’s schools through 1945, with persecution of dissenters.

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Kuni is the basic Japanese word for “country,” in the sense of a national state or land. This feeling was an example of “patriotism” (aikokushin) (Ibid., “Patriotism,” 1189).

Ibid., “Nihon Shugi,” 1087. An example of a theory supportive of liberal Taisho era values, opposed to the official interpretation of the kokutai was tennô kikan setsu (“emperor-as-organ-of-the-state” theory), influential from 1920-1935. It argued that the emperor as mainly an organ of the state, in which primary sovereignty was vested (Ibid., “Tennô Kikan Setsu,” 1552). Another political theory supportive of liberal Taisho values was mimponshugi (“people-as-the-basism”), developed by political scientist Yoshino Sakuzo, which argued for government by and for the people, in the name of the emperor. The movement used mimponshugi as the translation for democracy, since the more common term for democracy, minshushugi, suggested popular sovereignty against the emperor, and would have drawn condemnation from the government in the 1920s (Ibid., “Mimpon shugi,” 962).

The state did not consider State Shinto to be a religion, but a government institution that fostered moral instruction. State Shinto influenced Japan’s education system to encourage popular support for the state, by stressing the Emperor as divine and Japan as sacred (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “State Shinto,” 478-479; Japan, “Nationalism,” 1059). The use of symbols to promote nationalism also intensified. For example, the rising-sun flag, while a modern invention, was increasingly used in public places and schools, although it did not legally become Japan’s national flag until 1999 (Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Rising-Sun Flag,” 422-423).

The debate over the meaning of the kokutai goes back to the nineteenth century, and was, at its start, heavily influenced by different schools of Shinto. Central to the concept of kokutai is the idea that the Japanese polity is unique, since the Japanese imperial line is descended in an unbroken line from the gods, and the concept of the family state, that all Japanese are related to the emperor as their “father.” The debate reemerged in 1935, and the concept was important through the end of World War II as nationalist ideology promoted by Japan’s government (Japan, “Kokutai,” “Kokutai debate,” and “Kokutai no hongi,” 819-820). An example of official dogma related to the kokutai issue was a two volume political tract, Kokutai no Hongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan), in use from 1937 to 1945. It was intended as mass propaganda for all Japanese and school children. It stressed the unique, divine mission of Japan, and used arguments drawn from nationalistic treatments of Japanese culture (Ibid., “Kokutai no Hongi,” 820).
Democratic ideals reached their zenith in the Taisho democracy movement through the early 1930s. In 1918, the victories of democracy after the world war and Marxism in Russia led to similar demands from students, intellectuals and workers in Japan. The government responded by granting some demands, and repressing others. In the 1930s and the 1940s, as the military gained more power over Japan’s politics, liberal influence waned.\textsuperscript{1284}

Political movements, acts, and incidents in Japan from 1895 to 1945 had a range of ideological leanings. On the conservative side, notable political movements included the Peace Preservation Law\textsuperscript{1285} and the February 26\textsuperscript{th} Incident.\textsuperscript{1286} Liberal movements included the Taisho democracy movement,\textsuperscript{1287} the Universal Manhood Suffrage Movement,\textsuperscript{1288} the movement for women’s suffrage,\textsuperscript{1289} and the student movement.\textsuperscript{1290} A major political scandal of this period was the Siemens affair of 1914.\textsuperscript{1291}

\textsuperscript{1284} Ibid., “Democracy,” 278. The values of liberalism had a hard time taking hold before 1945. The Meiji constitution gave top power and position to the emperor, assuming that the state was always more important than the individual. Important players on both the right and the left resisted liberalism. A few activists resisted the rise of militarism from the 1920s to the 1940s, but with little effect (Ibid., “Liberalism,” 889).
\textsuperscript{1285} This law (in use 1925-1945) was used to control communists, anarchists, and other political radicals, and was the main foundation of ideological control in Japan (Ibid., “Peace Preservation Law of 1925,” 1192-1193).
\textsuperscript{1286} Ibid., “February 26\textsuperscript{th} Incident,” 359-360.
\textsuperscript{1287} This movement (1905-1932) encouraged liberal values in Japanese politics, culture, education and the media (Ibid., “Taisho Democracy,” 1500-1501).
\textsuperscript{1288} This was a movement to grant the vote to all Japanese males over the age of 25 in elections to choose members of the House of Representatives in the Diet. It was passed in 1925 (Ibid., “Universal Suffrage Manhood Movement,” 1662).
\textsuperscript{1289} The women’s suffrage movement in Japan began not long after 1868, as some activists in the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement pressed for women’s rights. The women’s suffrage movement became active in the 1920s, but was disbanded in 1940 (Ibid., “Women’s Suffrage,” 1709).
\textsuperscript{1290} The student movement in Japan was at its height from the 1920 to the 1970s. While there are student groups of every political leaning, Marxist-leaning groups have been the most influential. In the 1920s, the leading student group was the Marxist Gakuren, but in the 1930s, nationalistic student groups were the most active (Ibid., “Student Movement,” 1460-1461).
\textsuperscript{1291} Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Scandals,” 439. In the Siemens affair, a German company paid kickbacks to Japanese navy officials in exchange for contracts. Scandals have been a major feature of
Domestic Market Contexts

Concerning Japan’s economic history, through 1919, several major industries grew greatly, but rapid industrial growth caused problems in several sectors, including textiles, iron and steel, shipbuilding, and banking. Agricultural growth was slow. Alongside industrial growth, small scale and cottage industries continued, resulting in a dual structure economy, with most people’s incomes staying low. The government and the police largely suppressed the socialist and labor movements at this time. During the 1920s, several economic crises struck Japan, and the worldwide economic depression (from the 1929 U.S. stock market crash) hit the nation in 1930-1931, causing the Showa Depression (1930-1935). Many small- and medium-sized firms went bankrupt. The agricultural sector suffered, increasing poverty for tenant farmers, and exacerbating rural social unrest. Yet in the 1920s, Japan’s productivity increased in technological growth and industrial rationalization. Pressure for the concentration of capital enabled the growth of older financial and industrial conglomerates (zaibatsu), and the birth of new ones. By 1931, after the Manchurian Incident in China, the government increased military spending, prompting growth in key industries, employment, and agriculture. This also began Japan’s ultimately disastrous march into World War II. The government slowly increased military spending, public control over labor, the economy, and key industries. Toward the war’s end, by 1944 and 1945, manufacturing halted with allied

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*modern Japan’s political landscape since the 1880s, when the government sold public-related industries to Meiji officials’ friends at bargain prices.*

*1292 The financial crises that hit Japan in the 1920s included the post-World War I slump (1920), short recovery followed by the economic crisis from the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923, and bank failures causing the financial crisis of 1927 (Japan, “Industrial History,” 307; Ibid., “Showa Depression,” 1414).*

*1293 For more details on the Manchurian Incident, see the section on the contexts of Japan’s external political relations, 1895-1945 in Chapter 8.*
The wartime economy totally crumbled with Japan’s surrender in August 1945.\textsuperscript{1294} The wartime economy totally crumbled with Japan’s surrender in August 1945.\textsuperscript{1295}

In government economic policy, from 1868 to 1945 there was no antimonopoly policy in Japan, and little support for individual entrepreneurs. The chief economic goal was to strengthen the national economy rapidly, to prevent Japan’s colonization. The rise of large zaibatsu was encouraged, and seen as supportive of the economy’s nationalistic goals. Many new industries and their related corporations emerged in the interwar years. Government policies promoted the growth of specific industries.\textsuperscript{1296} Japan’s industrial revolution continued until about 1910, with the government taking the lead in developing certain heavy industries.\textsuperscript{1297}

The private industrial sector in Japan was stimulated by Japan’s victories in the wars with China (1895) and Russia (1905), and the opening of new colonies. Japan’s industrial capital increased greatly during World War I, with the Far East left to mainly Japan’s input.\textsuperscript{1298} Through 1931, the private sector endured several waves of unemployment, bankruptcies, and increasing capital concentration by the zaibatsu. After 1931, the economy “re-inflated” through war preparations, more exports, and achieved greater employment. A weakness of Japanese banks was the large number of small banks

\textsuperscript{1294} Production in late 1945 was one-sixth of prewar (1935-1937) amounts (Ibid., “Industrial History 307; and “Showa Depression,” 1414).
\textsuperscript{1295} Ibid., “Industrial History,” 307; and “Showa Depression,” 1414.
\textsuperscript{1296} Emerging industries included aircraft, consumer electronics, and automobiles (Ibid., “Industrial History,” 601).
\textsuperscript{1297} One of the heavy industries getting public promotion was iron and steel, from the late 1880s (Ibid., “Industrial Revolution,” 603). Until 1900, light industry dominated up to 85 percent of industrial production in Japan. The textile industry was the most important light industry in Japan through World War II, and the greatest energizing factor in Japan’s industrialization (Ibid., “Industrial Structure,” 603).
\textsuperscript{1298} During World War I, the Far East was left mainly to Japan’s input since the other major powers, including Russia, the United States, Britain, Germany, and others in Europe, were all occupied with hostilities in Europe.
connected to particular firms. The government strongly supported the formation of joint-stock companies (kabushiki kaisha) from 1901, and the zaibatsu networks of interrelated industrial and financial holding companies, which grew greatly. Families maintained intense control of the top zaibatsu until just before World War II. In the 1930s, Japan’s economic activity on the Asian mainland expanded, and several new zaibatsu emerged. Through tight control, zaibatsu limited imported technology to their related firms.

The first continuous labor unions began in the late 1890s, but disbanded by 1901. Through the 1920s, awareness of worker’s rights increased, and labor linked up with democracy movements. More lasting labor federations started in 1912 and 1919. The productivity of industry grew in the 1920s, partly due to partial suppression of trade unions, and the growth of managerial principles that encouraged loyal workers. By the 1930s, ideological differences split the labor movement into moderate and more radical branches. The latter was basically eliminated by government repression before World War II. In the late 1930s government militarists suppressed labor by starting Sampō (Sangyō Hōkoku Kai, the Industrial Patriotic Association), which stressed loyalty

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1299 Following numerous bank failures from 1926-1929. By 1935, the five largest private banks held 40 percent of deposits (Ibid., “Corporate History,” 250).
1300 Reasons for the growth of the zaibatsu included their large capital bases upon founding, their ready access to funding, raw materials and lines of foreign trade through their networks, their excellent entrepreneurial leaders, and their application of the Confucian ie (household) concept to the business environment, which inspired consensus decision-making and intense corporate loyalty (Ibid.).
1301 From the start of World War II, outside ownership grew (Ibid., “Zaibatsu,” 1768).
1302 One of the newer zaibatsu was automobile manufacturer Nissan (Ibid.). Important, older zaibatsu in this period included Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo (Ibid., “Mitsubishi,” 980; “Mitsui,” 982; and “Sumitomo,” 1471).
1303 Ibid., “Zaibatsu,” 1768.
1304 Their disbanding was due to financial and police problems (Ibid., “Labor,” 869).
1305 Ibid.
1306 Ibid., “Industrial History,” 601.
and ultranationalist values. All unions disbanded or went underground. Both Sampô and managers’ encouragement of family-like loyalty (1890s-1930s) provided the basis for Japan’s postwar enterprise unions.\textsuperscript{1307} Working conditions for women in industry were poor and wages low, and first received notice in the late 1890s.\textsuperscript{1308} Women remained concentrated in the textile industry, but with militarization in the 1930s, moved into other sectors as men joined the military.\textsuperscript{1309}

Important ideological currents about domestic economic development from 1895-1945 included the concept of \textit{fukoku kyôhei}.\textsuperscript{1310} From the early 1900s, management ideologies were affected by principles about paternalism and the uniqueness of Japanese culture. Business faced public intervention in labor issues, so managers argued that foreign-type labor laws would drive up costs, and that they, unlike Westerners, cared for employees.\textsuperscript{1311} Among intellectuals, the pre-World War II \textit{Nihon shihonshugi ronsô} (debate on Japanese capitalism) was important.\textsuperscript{1312}

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\textsuperscript{1307} Ibid., “Labor,” 870; and “Labor Unions,” 873.
\textsuperscript{1308} The first law to improve women’s working conditions passed in 1911 (Ibid., “Women in the Labor Force,” 1707).
\textsuperscript{1309} Women outnumbered males in the total labor force through about 1930. In the 1930s, the other areas women moved into included the chemical industry, manufacturing and skilled jobs (Ibid., “Women in the Labor Force,” 1707).
\textsuperscript{1310} Through about 1912, \textit{fukoku kyôhei} continued its influence in building up strategic, publicly supported industries (Ibid., “Fukoku Kyôhei,” 425).
\textsuperscript{1311} Ibid., “Managerial Ideology,” 915. The argument about managers’ concern for workers’ welfare was based on the Confucian ideal of \textit{ie} (household) family-like relationships in the workplace. It could be argued that this ideal had only limited effect in the prewar system, since working conditions for many lower level laborers in the prewar system were perhaps as bad as those in any Western country undergoing industrialization.
\textsuperscript{1312} This debate of Marxist economists, at its height from about 1927-1937, considered whether the most important factors of Japanese capitalism were its residual “feudal” or “semi-feudal” aspects from the Meiji area (argued by the Kôzoha “Lectures” faction, connected with the Japan Communist Party) or the aspects it shared with other advanced capitalist countries (the position of the Rônôha “Labor-Farmer” faction). Members of the latter faction argued that Japan’s coming revolution would be socialist (Ibid., “Nihon shihon shugi ronsô,” 1086; “Rônôha,” 1275; “Nihon shihon shugi hattatsu shi kôza,” 1086). See also Japan, “Kôzoha,” 836.
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Domestic Society Contexts

Regarding social and national identity (1895 to 1945), we noted in Chapter 3 how a government commonly instills a sense of national identity through symbols, rituals, education, and ideas. Popular culture also contributes. The Meiji state also encouraged nationalist images based partly on the Kokugaku School of learning,\textsuperscript{1313} stressing such sources as Shinto and its creation myths, and Confucian values of loyalty, duty, and patrimonial descent. The Emperor ideology related closely to the concept that all Japanese were divinely descended from the imperial family in a “family-state,”\textsuperscript{1314} with the emperor as father and head of the nation. The state also drew on non-Japanese sources, including Western concepts of royalty,\textsuperscript{1315} ethics education, and heroic figures like Benjamin Franklin. Leading public intellectuals and mass media also contributed to a sense of national identity. In Japan, intellectuals like Watsuji Tetsuro (1889-1960), Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962, already mentioned) investigated elements of Japanese identity, including connections with nature, cultural practices, and Buddhist philosophy.\textsuperscript{1316}

In this period intense debates over the racial origins of the Japanese also emerged. While some scholars, including Kato Hiroyuki, stressed the racial purity and homogeneity of the Japanese, descended from the imperial family, others, such as anthropologists Torii Ryuzo (1870-1953) and Kita Sadakichi (1871-1939), emphasized

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1313} See the brief discussions of Kokugaku in Chapter 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{1314} See the brief discussion of kazoku kokka (“family-state”) in Chapter 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{1315} This was to help support the new Emperor ideology, which also drew on Shinto images of imperial divinity. Previously the emperor had long been a mysterious, largely hidden figure of ritual (\textit{Encyclopedia of Contemporary}, “National Identities and Minorities,” 344).
  \item \textsuperscript{1316} Information in this paragraph is from \textit{Encyclopedia of Contemporary}, “National Identities and Minorities,” 344-345.
\end{itemize}
the descent of the Japanese *minzoku* (ethnic group) from peoples who entered Japan from Northeast and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, prior to the Japanese state’s formation in the seventh or eighth century A.D.\textsuperscript{1317} As the nation entered World War II in the 1930s and 1940s, issues of identity and race were increasingly affected by politics. From 1937-1940, the Kokumin Seishin Sôdôin Undô (National Spiritual Mobilization Movement) encouraged pride in Japanese culture and values of patriotism and thrift through radio and celebrity lecture tours.\textsuperscript{1318}

Despite legal restrictions against women in the 1898 Meiji Civil Code, women made huge contributions to the nation and its economy. In addition to their participation in agricultural labor and cottage industries in rural areas, women contributed greatly to the industrialization of Japan in the textile industry. Gradually women entered new jobs in such places as telephone exchanges, department stores, and entertainment venues. Some even entered the new occupations of journalism, secretarial work, teaching, and medicine. At the turn of the nineteenth century, a few women became leaders in the labor movement, and in political movements in nationalism, socialism and anarchism.\textsuperscript{1319} The feminist group Seitôsha (Bluestocking Society) emerged in 1911, followed by politically active groups in the 1920s and 1930s, some of which pressed for female suffrage. In the 1930s, conservative militarist forces impelled Japanese women to quiet these demands. During World War II, women worked in government-sponsored neighborhood and

\textsuperscript{1317} This is still the most commonly accepted view of the racial origins of the majority of the Yamato (majority) Japanese racial group (Ibid.). This does not include the origins of the Ainu people of Hokkaido.

\textsuperscript{1318} Ibid., “National Identities Minorities,” 345-346.

\textsuperscript{1319} An early pioneer in the field of women’s history was the former anarchist Takamura Itsue (*Encyclopedia of Contemporary*, “Women’s History,” 567).
patriotic associations, but work in industry was limited to single women during most of the war.\textsuperscript{1320}

From 1895 to 1945, important social movements, ideologies and events included the social effects of several wars, \textit{Nihonshugi} (Japanism),\textsuperscript{1321} feminism,\textsuperscript{1322} pacifism,\textsuperscript{1323} Taisho democracy,\textsuperscript{1324} the Tokyo Earthquake of 1923,\textsuperscript{1325} \textit{Yamato-damashii},\textsuperscript{1326} and the cultural effects of the \textit{Kokutai} (national polity) movement from the late 1930s through 1945. During World War I, the war, centered in Europe, meant that Western and other foreign suppliers could not meet demand for various products in Asian markets. This, plus the demand of Japan’s Western allies for munitions, increased the value of Japanese exports three fold from 1913 to 1918. Japan had an industrial boom and a rapid entry of capital, causing steep inflation for Japan’s quickly urbanizing regions, leading to widespread rice riots in 1918. But overall, the large growth of Japanese society during World War I, including industry, the economy, military, and empire, brought an

\textsuperscript{1320} \textit{Japan}, “Women of Japan, History,” 1706.
\textsuperscript{1321} This conservative reaction to the rapid Westernization of Japanese society in the Meiji era, seeking to preserve “traditional” elements of Japanese institutions and values, reemerged during the increase of ultranationalism in the 1930s (Ibid., “Nihon shugi,” 1087).
\textsuperscript{1322} For more brief details on Japanese feminism in this period, already mentioned in the previous paragraph, see \textit{Encyclopedia of Contemporary}, “Feminism,” 141.
\textsuperscript{1323} Japanese pacifism was strongly influenced by Christianity. Christian pacifists denounced various military events, including the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905, Kinoshita Naoe), World War II (Kagawa Toyohiko) and colonialism and war in China (1931-1945, Yanaihara Tadao). Additional important pacifists in this era, often influenced by Christian thought, included Kotoku Shusui, Uchimura Kanzo, and Abe Iso (\textit{Japan}, “Pacifism,” 1180).
\textsuperscript{1324} See my discussion of Taisho democracy in other sections of the dissertation.
\textsuperscript{1325} The Tokyo Earthquake of 1923, one of the most devastating natural disasters in history, struck on September 1, devastating a large area surrounding Tokyo and Yokohama. It affected an area populated by nearly 12 million people. The earthquake and the resulting fires killed an estimated 142,000 and injured over 103,000. It caused massive destruction of the capitol metropolitan region, and widespread social chaos (\textit{Japan}, “Tokyo Earthquake of 1923,” 1596).
\textsuperscript{1326} \textit{Yamato-damashii} was a slogan used through the end of World War II regarding spiritual qualities allegedly uniquely possessed by the Japanese people, including moral and physical strength, endurance, devotion, sincerity, and bravery. The meaning of the phrase, used since the Heian period (794-1185), has changed over time. By the early 1930s to 1945, it signified unwavering devotion to the nation and emperor (\textit{Japan}, “Yamato-damashii,” 1735-1736).
increased sense of pride for most Japanese.\textsuperscript{1327} For Japan, World War II, occurring at the end of this period, represented a total national effort on the part of all citizens. The war, commencing with Japanese military intervention in China in 1937, profoundly affected the lives of all Japanese persons. Yet many Japanese experts have claimed that even utter defeat in August 1945 failed to rock the basic stability supporting the Japanese social system.\textsuperscript{1328}

In this period, both local and national newspapers became very popular. By the 1920s, expanding democracy, urbanization, education, industrialization and capitalism allowed the rise of mass magazines, including many for women. Magazines attracted an increasingly diversified readership, and often included selections of fiction to attract readers. In the 1920s, as radio broadcasting began to emerge, newspaper and magazine publishers attempted to open radio stations, but the government chose to establish NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) as the national broadcasting service. Radio broadcasting commenced in 1925.\textsuperscript{1329}

Advertisements in magazines and newspapers took off by the early twentieth century, with the rise of national mass media. As the country moved more toward imperialism and World War II, the volume of advertising decreased, and people working in advertising leaned more toward the national propaganda machine.\textsuperscript{1330}

\textsuperscript{1327} Ibid., “World War I,” 1711.


\textsuperscript{1329} Ibid., “Mass Communications,” 931; \textit{Encyclopedia of Contemporary}, “Newspapers and Magazines,” 353.

\textsuperscript{1330} Ibid., “Advertising,” 3.
Another influential force in Japanese mass culture in this period was the Iwanami Publishing House (Iwanami Shoten), founded in 1913, which dominated prewar Japanese academic publishing through the 1970s. Iwanami first established its reputation by publishing the works of the famous Japanese novelist Natsume Soseki, and gained particular strength in philosophical works. Iwanami is one example of the rise of the Taisho democracy movement, and has contributed many influential trends to the Japanese publishing industry.\footnote{Ibid., “Iwanami Publishing House,” 222-223.}

In Japanese education, ideological factors were increasingly influential during this era (1895-1945). The push for education to encourage nationalism and modernization were powerful forces in the late nineteenth century. Nationalism reemerged as an important influence under state militarism in the 1930s. Part of the purpose of the comprehensive national system of schooling was to contribute to the nation’s modernization, and to encourage the people’s “spiritual unification.” In the early twentieth century, new, complex forces influenced Japanese education, including the Russo-Japanese War, World I, the Russian Revolution, and global demands for democracy. New or renewed ideologies such as democracy, liberalism, socialism and communism entered Japan, spawning such movements in Japanese education as the New Education Movement, child-centered teaching, student movements, and the first teacher’s union, all in opposition to nationalistic education. By the mid-1930s, the government reacted with repression and promotion of the Japanese spirit (Yamato-damashii), to try to counter the effects of leftist ideologies. Schools began to emphasize ultranationalism after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, and outright militarism with the start of the war in
China in 1937. After war with the United States began in late 1941, military education and indoctrination in the schools increased, using such textbooks as the *Kokutai no Hongi* (*Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan*).\(^{1332}\) After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), military training courses (*gunji kyôren*) were required for all students, male and female, at the primary and secondary levels. The height of *gunji kyôren* was during World War II, when it was required even for university students. After the war, it was banned from education.\(^{1333}\) Moral training and education (*shûshin*) was instituted in Japan’s public schools from 1872, and increasingly incorporated principles of Confucianism, nationalism, and militarism, until it was ended after World War II.\(^{1334}\)

Regarding more general trends in education, additional imperial universities besides Tokyo Imperial University, the first, were established starting in 1897.\(^{1335}\) During the two world wars, three main actors in Japan, including universities, did scientific research.\(^{1336}\) During the Meiji period, although universal education was the goal, opportunities for females after primary school were few. Therefore a large private sector of educational providers for girls and women began opening schools for them. Christian missionaries were prominent in helping to provide these opportunities, and several private colleges for women were also established.\(^{1337}\)

\(^{1333}\) Ibid., “Military Education in the Schools,” 962.
\(^{1334}\) Ibid., “Shûshin,” 1427.
\(^{1335}\) Ibid., “Education, History,” 325.
\(^{1336}\) The other two major sponsors of research were companies and the government (Ibid., “Natural Sciences,” 1069).
\(^{1337}\) Ibid., “Women’s Education,” 1708.
In the arts in this era, Western literature continued to exercise a heavy influence on Japan, another arena where the struggle to come to terms with modernity and Westernization occurred. Novelist Shimazaki Toson published *Wakanashū* (1897, a volume of free verse poetry), initiating a new style of free verse in Japanese poetry.

Additional significant influences from the West included romanticism (introduced in the 1890s), symbolism (introduced in 1905), and naturalism (highly influential from 1905 to 1910, the source of the “confessional” novel, also known as the I-novel or *watakushi shōsetsu*). An additional significant trend in the early twentieth century was the publication of coterie magazines by writers of similar mind, and the serial publication of novels by famous writers in newspapers. Many novelists such as Natsume Soseki, Mori Ogai, Nagai Kafu and Tanizaki Junichiro struggled with integrating elements of Western culture with Japanese literature. In the late 1920s and 1930s, Nagai and Tanizaki managed to draw on a vague sense of Japanese “tradition,” quickly obliterated after the war. Drawing on Western concepts of literary criticism, modern Japanese literary critics attempted to apply Western critical standards to a variety of Japanese works, with varying success. They struggled to find a common position from which both Western and Japanese literature could be critiqued. 

In spite of the venerable tradition of classical literature by Japanese women, the category of “women’s literature” (*joryū bungaku*) arose as a distinct genre in the early 1900s, when collections and histories of women’s

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1338 Remember that our consideration of the arts must be mainly limited to just literature.
1339 Ibid., “Literary Criticism, Modern,” 893.
1340 Ibid., “Literature,” 896.
1342 Ibid., “Literary Criticism, Modern,” 893.
1343 This tradition includes outstanding works of fiction, novels, diaries, and journals such as *The Tale of Genji* (by Murasaki Shikibu), and *The Pillow Book* (by Sei Shonagon), starting as early as the Heian period (794 to 1185 A.D.).
writings began to be published. This categorization has been criticized as isolating women’s writing from the Japanese literary mainstream of “pure literature” (junbungaku), despite saving it from being classed with popular literature (taishū bungaku).1344

Regarding mass popular culture, in the Meiji period, younger writers attempted to create a new form of popular literature (called taishū bungaku) that fused elements of both Western and Japanese literature.1345 Western literary influence can also be seen in the emergence of genuine science fiction in Japan starting in the Meiji era from 1890-1900, based on translations of works by Jules Verne and H.G. Wells, and reappearing in the 1920s.1346 The state was also involved in attempting to shape national popular culture through the imperial museums. New imperial museums in Kyoto and Nara, started in the 1890s, used displays, archives and archaeology to help inculcate the state’s concepts of “nation” and “empire” to visitors. It was no accident that these museums were called “imperial,” not national, museums, since even in the 1890s, the state used the imperial throne as a symbol of nationalism. Displays also connected with Japan’s colonial ambitions.1347 A movement of aesthetic modernism that influenced mass culture in the 1920s and 1930s was ero guro, an abbreviation of the Japanese term for “erotic-grotesque nonsense” (ero-guro-nansensu). This movement touched such areas as magazines, horror and detective novels, commercial design, soft-core pornography, and academic fields like urban anthropology and psychology.1348

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Concerning philosophy, in the 1890s, the Japanese government attempted to encourage emperor-centered nationalism through the national education system. At the same time, certain Japanese intellectuals such as Nishimura Shigeki introduced the use of Western philosophy to reinterpret Confucian and Buddhist thinking. In public universities, study of British and French enlightenment thought was gradually replaced by German-influenced idealism (i.e. Hegel) through the work of Inoue Tetsujiro. Another scholar, Onishi Hajime, used the work of Kant to counter Inoue’s anti-Enlightenment, pro-statist positions, combining Eastern and Western thought in the process. In the early 1900s, researchers in Japan’s state universities used German philosophy to deepen Japan’s understanding of modern philosophy, generating a new understanding of the self and awareness of the search for the meaning of human existence. From the late Meiji period to the end of the Taisho era (1926), Japanese scholars focused on Neo-Kantianism, producing work of increasing technical focus. In 1911 Nishida Kitaro published Zen no Kenkyūjo (A Study of the Good), which was the first study by a Japanese philosopher to try to develop a universal philosophical system by applying Western philosophy in a logical, rational fashion to “traditional” Japanese thought. Under the influence of the Taisho democracy movement, philosophers such as Kuwaki Gen’yoku and Watsuji Tetsuro attempted to use intellectual rationalism, traditional Japanese and East Asian ethics, and new liberal, democratic ideals influential in the Taisho period, to encourage a move beyond strict state nationalism to a spirit of individualism and values supportive of the new middle class.¹³⁴⁹

Marxism, first in the form of socialism, did not become influential until after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and its ensuing social and political problems in Japan. Early socialists such as Abe Iso and Katayama Sen were inspired by Christian humanism. Another socialist, Kotoku Shusui, shifted from anarchism to support for socialism and workers’ rights after a visit to the United States, but was executed by the Japanese government in 1910. Though the Marxist movement revived slightly following World War I, it did not receive much philosophical consideration until after about 1926, encouraged by scholars such as Kawakami Hajime, Fukumoto Kazuo, and Miki Kiyoshi. Japan became increasingly fascist and militaristic after war with China started in 1937, and many Japanese intellectuals were increasingly influenced by nationalistic philosophies such as Japanism. Thinkers such as Tosaka Jun and Saigusa Hirota tried to encourage consideration by intellectuals of the accomplishments of Marxism in the Soviet Union, but their movement was disbanded by state repression. Along with the rise of interest in Marxism, there was growing Japanese philosophical concern with historical and social issues, especially through the lenses of Hegelian philosophy and dialectical thought.

The rise of militaristic nationalism in Japan in the late 1920s and 1930s encouraged work on nationalistic ideologies such as Nihonshugi (Japanism) and kōdōshugi (imperial supremacy) by scholars like Kihira Tadayoshi. Confucian ideals were preserved in the Imperial Rescript on Education of the late 1800s, and by the early 1930s, increasing international and domestic pressures on Japan created an atmosphere where the fusing of Confucian values with nationalism was encouraged. Through tools

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1350 Nihonshugi is discussed in Chapter 4, while kōdōshugi (kōdō) is briefly considered in Chapters 8 and 9.
such as the nationalistic document *Kokutai no Hongi*, Confucian ideals became a powerful tool for the promotion of Japanese nationalism within Japan and throughout the empire.\(^{1351}\) In the years shortly before World War II, conservative Japanese scholars also attempted to use the ideology of Kokugaku to provide ideological backing for the imperial state of Japan.\(^{1352}\) The historical tool of *kōkoku shikan* was also used in the late 1930s and 1940s as a primary ideological tool to encourage Japan’s wartime activities.\(^{1353}\)

Regarding religion, by the end of the nineteenth century, Shinto and Buddhism had become more institutionalized and formalized, and Japanese folk religions highly popularized.\(^{1354}\) State Shinto, founded in the Meiji period, exercised an even higher degree of influence on Japanese spirituality and politics from 1895-1945. It was formed partly to provide a clear cultural and national sense of identity for Japanese in the face of Western religions, ideologies and influences that were rapidly entering Japan. In the twentieth century, State Shinto exercised influence on Japanese education, encouraging ideas of the divinity of the emperor and sacred nature of Japan. The government claimed that State Shinto was not a religion, and organized separate branches of Shinto that were considered religious (called Kyōha Shinto). Thus the government could attempt to coerce all Japanese to participate in worship at State Shinto shrines without breaking the Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of religion. Another controversial part of State Shinto was the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, dedicated to enshrining Japan’s war dead. The

\(^{1351}\) Ibid., “Confucianism,” 224.

\(^{1352}\) Ibid., “Kokugaku,” 817. See also the discussion of Kokugaku in Chapter 3, 4, 7, and 9.

\(^{1353}\) Ibid., “Kōkoku shikan,” 815. *Kōkoku shikan* (emperor-centered historiography) refers to a nationalistic type of historiography in the late 1930s and 1940s that emphasized the permanence and importance of the imperial throne in Japan’s national polity and in influencing Japanese history.

\(^{1354}\) Ibid., “Religion,” 1252.
emperor performed ceremonies at the shrine that turned the war dead into kami; over one million were so deified during World War II. The formal state functions of Yasukuni Shrine as a primary center of State Shinto were legally prohibited in late 1945. Nevertheless, it continues to be a source of controversy within Japan and between Japan and its Asian neighbors, even up to the present.\footnote{Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “State Shinto,” 478-479.}

Some folk religious groups organized around charismatic leaders or pilgrimage groups, eventually becoming “new religions.”\footnote{For a brief discussion on new religions, see the section on religion under domestic social contexts (1850-1895), Chapter 3.} Many new religions were founded in the nineteenth century.\footnote{Japan, “New Religions,” 1078.} Many have been characterized by offering close camaraderie and warm fellowship in small groups,\footnote{Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Japanese New Religions,” 351.} also true before 1945. Government control of religion was especially intense during the years shortly before 1945.\footnote{Japan, “Religion,” 1252.} Despite this, membership in many new religions grew greatly in the twentieth century. Perhaps the most famous new religion founded in the twentieth century is Sōka Gakkai, currently the largest new religion in Japan. Sōka Gakkai bases its doctrines on the teachings of the Nichiren Shōshū sect of Buddhism that focus on the Lotus Sutra. Before 1945, Sōka Gakkai members experienced some persecution from the government for refusing to participate in Shinto efforts in support of World War II.\footnote{Ibid., “New Religions,” 1078.}
Worldviews on Japan’s Technological Development

Yanagita Kunio. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Yanagita Kunio believed that two forces threatened Japan’s indigenous stability—family changes, and lifestyle alterations through the rapid influx of Western culture and technology. Uncritically received through urban gateways, they especially affected rural people’s daily lives, worldviews, lifestyles and finances. Yanagita believed that farmers must evolve standards of acceptability for Western products and their imitations, which spread to the remotest areas by 1912. Their response to foreign technology also affected the agricultural economy, since the class system of rural life sometimes stifled creativity, talent, and innovation. Failure to conform to expectations could result in banishment or ostracism. Rural Japan needed a new balance of “traditional solidarity” and individual will.

Hirohito, Emperor. Concerning science, from 1914, Hirohito developed a love for marine biology. In school he learned natural history, physics, marine biology, and Darwin’s theory of evolution. In his worldview, he reconciled modern science and

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1361 For a brief discussion on changes in family life, see my discussion on Yanagita’s views of Japan’s domestic society in that section in this chapter. The types of Western products affecting rural Japan included “… new kinds of art, religion, manufactured goods, and an entirely new kind of knowledge….” (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 147).
1362 Since Japan’s prewar population was predominantly rural, these issues affected the lives of the majority of Japanese in profound ways.
1363 Increasing materialism and consumption undermined the budgets of many rural families (Ibid., 147-148).
1364 These included expectations in the areas of behavior, tradition, and communal labor. The system of social ostracism was called (mura) hachibu—village ostracism (Ibid., 154).
1365 Ibid., 145, 147-149, 154-155.
accounts of Japan’s national polity (kokutai).\textsuperscript{1366} Science strengthened the rational side of Hirohito’s character, making him capable of weighing arguments, reason, and evidence. He also felt a great duty to his imperial, divine ancestry.\textsuperscript{1367}

**Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on Technological Development (1895-1945)**

How do Yanagita and Hirohito’s views of Japanese technological development and culture compare?\textsuperscript{1368} Both Yanagita and Hirohito highly valued Japanese culture and society, desiring to preserve it. Yanagita wanted to protect the “soul” of Japan and its cultural core from the uncritical importation of Western culture and technology. Preserving certain elements of Japan’s true identity, seen in the religious practices of many of Japan’s rural villages, seemed necessary. Hirohito was especially concerned with protecting and continuing the imperial throne and his position on it, no matter the cost. It seems that no matter the perils and destruction that Japan faced during World War II, this was his strong desire.\textsuperscript{1369} Perhaps he believed that if the imperial throne ceased to exist, so would Japan. While Hirohito strongly supported the official emperor religious ideology that was imposed on Japan during his reign and before, Yanagita rejected it as the core of Japan’s cultural identity. Rather, Yanagita argued that the

\textsuperscript{1366} Bix, *Hirohito*, 199-200.
\textsuperscript{1367} Ibid., 60-62.
\textsuperscript{1368} I am not certain how Yanagita or Hirohito viewed Japanese-derived technology; my data does not touch on that subject.
\textsuperscript{1369} If Hirohito had ordered Japan to surrender earlier in World War II, hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives could have been saved. Bix argues that he waited until he was reasonably sure that the throne would be preserved before he was willing to press for surrender. This suggests that he may have valued the safety of the throne more than that of his own people (Bix, *Hirohito*).
“heartfelt” expressions of grassroots folk worship found in rural Japanese villages were closer to the true heart of Japanese culture.  

What about Yanagita and Hirohito’s general views of Western science, technology and culture, and their relation to Japan? Yanagita viewed Western technology and culture in a negative manner. He believed that Japan’s massive importation of Western technology and culture was a threat to Japan’s survival, and its cultural soul. To forestall this destruction, new critical standards of what to reject and what to accept must be developed. Hirohito viewed Western science and technology positively, with great fascination and respect. Beyond his personal avocation with Western-derived scientific study of marine life, he supported the positive Meiji view of Western science and technology, that it was superior to Japan’s, and a powerful tool to help strengthen Japan militarily, economically, and politically. Through modern science and technology and its applications, Japan could lead and protect itself, and perhaps the rest of Asia, from Western invasion and colonialism.

What about Yanagita and Hirohito’s willingness to be exposed to Western technology and culture, through the training they received in Japan or abroad? Both Yanagita and Hirohito were trained in some of the most advanced Western knowledge in their respective areas of study in their era, Yanagita at Tokyo Imperial University, and Hirohito at the imperial schools expressly created for his training. But while both men received such exposure to Western knowledge in Japan, neither one studied or lived

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1370 For more details, see my discussion below of Yanagita’s and Hirohito’s views of domestic Japanese society, 1895-1945.
1371 Yanagita’s field of academic study was “agricultural politics,” while Hirohito’s training exposed him to many areas of knowledge, including military science, politics, the natural sciences, history, religion and philosophy. About Hirohito, see my discussion of his education below in the section on Japan’s domestic society, 1895-1945.
abroad for very long.\textsuperscript{1372} Like the leaders of 1850 to 1895 discussed above, both desired to use Western science and culture to strengthen Japan.\textsuperscript{1373}

**Conceptual analysis of leaders’ worldviews of technological development (1895-1945)**

Seen through the lenses of internationalization, translative adaptation, and Glick’s anthropological definition of technology, Yanagita’s thought about technology was mostly concerned with its effects on domestic Japanese culture and society, the effects of the aggressive internationalization of Japan by the West that he observed. To him, the internationalization was underway; the question was how to mitigate its impacts. Hirohito’s worldview emphasized basic scientific principles of rationality and empirical investigation more than technology. During World War II, his scientific worldview also influenced his policy actions concerning the military’s use of technology, chiefly for what he and the Japanese government saw as the defense of Japan and its Asian neighbors against the “iron ring” of “ABCD” encirclement by other powers, especially by the aggressive West.\textsuperscript{1374} So inspired by the West’s aggressive internationalization, Yanagita’s technological concerns focused more on the issues of Japan’s effective, domestically focused translative adaptation. Before 1945, Hirohito, was more externally focused in his view of technology. At this time, he was profoundly influenced on a

\textsuperscript{1372} Both Yanagita and Hirohito traveled abroad, Yanagita as a representative to the League of Nations in the early 1920s, and Hirohito on goodwill tours to Europe and the United States in the 1920s and 1970s. Yanagita lived abroad during his service in Europe, and later established contact with several leading Western scholars of ethnography and anthropology.

\textsuperscript{1373} Yanagita, while wary of Western influence, used a western-derived social science research method, ethnography, for this purpose. Hirohito utilized training in Western politics and military principles and technologies to try to strengthen Japan in Asia against the West. Scientific rationality also influenced his policy decisions and actions.

\textsuperscript{1374} In the 1930s, “ABCD” signified American, British, Chinese and Dutch influence around Japan in East, Northeast, and Southeast Asia and the North and South Pacific regions. The Soviet Union was also viewed as a very significant threat. In the overall Japanese worldview, it appears that the Soviet Union was seen more as a “Western,” not “Eastern” power.
personal level by Western science, seen in his usually rational policies using technology to “defend” Japan and Asia against the West. His view of technology mostly emphasized the external threat of Japan’s internationalization by the West. Through an anthropological lens, Yanagita’s view of technology seems fundamentally anthropological, especially in an applied sense, regarding his concern about the impacts of Western technology on the daily lives of Japanese, rural society, and the cultural core of Japan as a whole. Hirohito, however, did not seem to have any real comprehension or concern about the impacts of science or technology on the daily lives of his subjects.¹³⁷⁵

Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic State Contexts

Yanagita Kunio. Domestically, Yanagita Kunio supported universal male suffrage in the 1920s, the parliamentary system, and political parties (the last two if they truly reflected “the people’s will”). Though espousing no ideology, he supported proletarian parties, but it was hard for them to unite against the two most powerful conservative parties of the dominant elites, the Seiyûkai and the Minseitô. The nation’s diverse interests were more important than those of any class or group, but even with universal male suffrage, all of them were not represented. Yanagita’s concept of nationalism stressed the nation’s long-term interests. Representative government should control all aspects of national policy and the military.¹³⁷⁶ The emperor should be the nation’s supreme spiritual symbol, without much political power. Yanagita also cared about regional political development, but saw little interest in it. The weakening of

¹³⁷⁵ Perhaps this was related to Hirohito’s overall isolation from and lack of understanding of his subjects, a point explored by Bix (Bix, Hirohito).
¹³⁷⁶ Elements of the political system that Yanagita criticized included the House of Peers, the Privy Council, the political power of the military, and the power of the genrô (elder statesmen) to influence national policy. All of these forces tended to limit the “people’s will” in various ways (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 88–91).
“communal consciousness” seemed a source of political problems, and national administrative consolidation in rural Japan damaged “traditional” solidarity. Perhaps the enduring sense of communality limited this, yet it also might stifle political freedom. Yanagita gave unique importance to the role of agriculture in Japanese politics, culture, and national life. As the basis of national solidarity, it contributes to the people’s sense of communal belonging. He also emphasized Japan’s ie (extended family) system, which connected individuals to extended family, ancestors, descendants, and the nation. Yanagita criticized many national trends in pre-World War I politics since they ignored citizens’ everyday concerns, and long-term implications. By the late 1920s, he took an independent stance toward many political questions.

**Hirohito, Emperor.** Hirohito’s education affected his worldviews about the Japanese state and domestic politics. The goals of his lifelong education were to enable him to judge policy viewpoints and options, yet stay above the process, and effectively serve through the Meiji system of checks, balances, factions, and bureaucracies. Until nineteen, Hirohito attended his own schools, learning military and non-military affairs, important for his future work on domestic and international affairs. From 1914-1921, Hirohito received formal military training, the daily routine of which greatly influenced

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1377 Ibid., 86-107, 151.
1378 Yanagita’s academic background was in the field of “agro-politics” (Ibid., 2-3).
1379 Yanagita saw agriculture as the key link between “… the land and its people,” the nation’s “anchor” (Ibid., 38-39).
1380 Ibid., 39-40.
1381 Ibid., 107.
1382 Bix, Hirohito, 81.
1383 Ibid., 36-41, 43-47, 51, 57-59. These non-military subjects were called teiógaku (“instruction for the emperor”). They included mathematics, science, economics, foreign languages, calligraphy, ethics, and law (Bix, Hirohito, 58-59). His instructors included top military leaders and university professors. Many of his instructors were conservative. Because top instructors were usually chosen as his teachers, they were not “fanatical emperor worshippers.” Later in life, Hirohito was uncomfortable with such people (Ibid., 44).
his whole life. Hirohito’s education affected his worldview of the military and politics in important ways. A conflict emerged in Hirohito’s training, due to the image of his autocratic grandfather, the Emperor Meiji, whom he was to emulate. The Confucian ideal of gentle, benevolent monarch contrasted with the autocratic ruler image imported from Europe. The last image conflicted with Hirohito’s natural personality. On Japanese history, he learned the same ideology of divine descent, racial homogeneity and superiority that all Japanese children did. These became essential elements in his worldview. Hirohito also received instruction on current Japanese theories of constitutional law. He believed in the sacred nature of his authority, and was taught to perform Shinto rituals for the imperial ancestors, representing the ideology of kōso kōsō

1384 His military training was also affected by the military culture of the time. Japan’s military culture in the 1910s and 1920s was influenced by the values of bushido (the samurai ethic), Yamato damashii (“Japan spirit,” which stressed feelings of “racial superiority” and “invincibility”), and strengthening Japan’s national polity (kokutai). The military also had the conflicting roles of protecting Japan’s colonies, defending the nation, and maintaining internal stability in the midst of the most intense strikes and labor unrest in Japan’s history. There were also conflicts in the military concerning general morale and support for the monarchy (Ibid., 51-52, 152-156). There were conflicts in his roles and interests in this area. From an early age, he believed that as emperor, he would exercise leadership in political and military matters. As he entered adulthood, his interests tended toward politics, but also history and the natural sciences. How would Hirohito balance his conflicting roles of supreme military commander and constitutional monarch? His education failed to teach him how to handle these conflicts, but his tendencies unfolded in the crucible of policy making in the late 1920s and 1930s (Ibid., 51-56, 89-91). For example, Hirohito and his aides continued to allow the superior power of the military over civilian forces in the “mixed” cabinets that ruled Japan from 1888-1945. And against the opposition of educators, from 1925, Hirohito allowed the military to send officers to middle schools and universities to provide military training for students (Ibid., 150, 156-157).

1385 Ibid., 133. Hirohito’s character affected him throughout his life—his reticence, high-pitched voice, weak demeanor, and “unmartial” appearance. Hirohito came to often mask his emotions during public appearances. The theme of masks and hiding one’s emotions is important in Japanese culture. Hidden meanings have been highly valued. Despite appearances, Hirohito was fairly intelligent, strong-willed, frugal, and knowledgeable about the military, though not very creative. Top experts were brought in to help him through daily lectures, and they often succeeded (Ibid., 84, 87-91, 129-130).

1386 Bix, Hirohito, 70-74. His instruction also stressed that activist emperors were important throughout Japanese history, even during periods of military domination of politics (i.e. the Kamakura period, 1193-1336) (Ibid., 73-74).

1387 One theory, advocated by Hozumi Yatsuka and Uesugi Shinkichi, advocated imperial absolutism. The other major theory, of Minobe Tatsu, argued that the emperor was an organ of the state, and that his power was therefore constrained at times. In his exposure to constitutional law, Hirohito learned that the center of sovereignty (tōchiken) is located in both the emperor and the state, but that the emperor is the brain (central force) of the state (Ibid., 77, 79).
that connected the imperial family to the myth of Japan’s divine creation, forming part of his worldview about morals and the state. In the mid-late 1920s, Hirohito supported nationalism and traditional political values over the liberalism and openness connected with the Taisho democratic movement.

Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on the Domestic State (1895-1945)

Yanagita and Hirohito’s views of the domestic state can be broken into three broad categories, views of politics and policymaking, of political institutions, and of political ideologies. On politics, Yanagita worried that Japan’s political system ignored the people’s daily concerns, that the loss of “communal consciousness” would cause political problems. This consciousness was deeply rooted in rural agriculture. The latter he saw of central importance in Japan’s culture of politics, and worried that national political consolidation occurring in Japan would damage “traditional” solidarity. Hirohito had very different concerns. In general politics, in the competition between military and oligarchic political involvement and civilian political involvement, he definitely preferred the former. So on politics, Yanagita manifests more concern for popular political involvement, while Hirohito preferred elite control with limited, carefully regulated democracy.

On political institutions, Yanagita worried that elite controlled institutions such as the Genro and the Privy Council limited popular democratic involvement. He supported such institutions as the Diet, broadly populist political parties, universal male

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1389 Ibid., 77-80, 38-39. Kōso kōsō means “the imperial founders of our house and our other imperial ancestors” (Bix, Hirohito, 38).
1390 Ibid., 146. See the brief discussion of the Taisho democracy movement in Chapter 7.
1391 The Genro refers to the Elder Statesmen who advised the emperor in the pre-World War II political system.
suffrage, and representative and civilian control of the national government and the military. In contrast, Hirohito disliked democracy, and believed that Japan needed a supreme leader, the emperor. Yanagita believed that the nation’s emperor should be the nation’s supreme spiritual leader, but not have much political power. Hirohito saw the emperor’s authority as sacred, that the emperor must perform sacred rituals for the imperial ancestors. In the conflict between the images of the emperor as benevolent, Confucian ruler or as autocratic, European-style emperor, Hirohito personally preferred the former. Yet he also desired that the emperor should have much power, as he indeed had in the prewar political system.\textsuperscript{1392} In his actions, he shows that he desired to be able to judge policy options, and yet stay above the complexities of national political entanglements. In Hirohito’s prewar view, the emperor should exercise influence in the nation’s political and military affairs. In his own training, military knowledge and discipline were heavily stressed, so he could not help but be strongly influenced by them. To Hirohito, the military was vital in the political life of the nation.

Regarding political ideologies, according to Kawada, Yanagita had no particular ideology, although he leaned toward proletarian, populist political parties, against the conservative parties of Japan’s ruling elites. As of the late 1920s, Yanagita usually took an independent political stance. In contrast, Hirohito’s basic political ideology was very conservative, as seen in the ideology of kōso kōsō, that Japan was divinely created and closely related to the imperial family. Elements of this ideology included the views that

\textsuperscript{1392} This view was stressed in his education, which stressed the “activism” of many emperors in Japanese history. His training also emphasized the conservative values of Japan’s military culture, including bushido, Yamato damashii (“Japan-spirit”), and strengthening the kokutai (national polity or essence). Understanding military issues and affairs was highly important to Hirohito in the prewar political system.
Japanese are divinely descended from the gods, racially homogeneous, and superior to others. On nationalism, Yanagita saw the nation’s long-term interests as more important than short-term ones, but also believed that representing the diversity of those interests was more important than those of any single group. Regarding views of the nation and Japanese history, Yanagita believed that the Confucian *ie* system connected all Japanese to each other and the state. To him, “communal consciousness” and communality were important in Japan’s culture of politics. Agriculture played a central role in both Japan’s national solidarity and the sense of “communal belonging” of all Japanese. The weakening of Japan’s communality in the 1920s seemed to be a source of political problems, but he worried that excessive communality might stifle political freedom.

Hirohito, as just noted, viewed Japanese as divinely descended and racially superior, and saw national sovereignty as centered in both the emperor and the state. On religion and the state, Yanagita was not opposed to some mixing of religion and public life, in that he believed that the emperor should be the nation’s supreme spiritual symbol. And yet, he wanted the political power of the emperor to be limited. Though we have already noted Hirohito’s mixing of religious and political authority (his zealous participation in Shinto rituals), later in life, he was uncomfortable with “fanatical” emperor worshippers. So on political ideologies, while both Yanagita and Hirohito have conservative elements, Yanagita is much more populist in his outlook.

**Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews of the Domestic State (1895-1945)**

**Development Issues.** Regarding “modernization,” the basic question, from 1895-1945, is, as Japan was increasingly absorbed into the world economy, and

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139 In the 1920s, Yanagita believed that not all national interests were yet represented.
interacted with it, from the evidence in the domestic state worldviews here, what happened to Japan’s domestic culture of politics? Did its “core” become more “Western,” or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On general politics, Yanagita was more concerned for grassroots, populist political involvement and genuine democracy (similar to the consensus, village-level politics of traditional Japan): a focus more on the domestic level. Hirohito was more concerned with oligarchic control of the political process, with limited democratic input, and a focus more on national level. On the local level, despite the heavy input and huge changes brought by Japan’s heavy involvement in the international economy in this period, the basics of Japanese political culture in rural areas, especially decision-making by consensus and local communalism, did not change. At the national level, the oligarchic, authoritarian tendencies of Japanese politics, seen since ancient and Tokugawa times, also did not change.

On political institutions, Yanagita favors strong, democratic, populist input and institutions. Hirohito favors supreme power exercised by an all-powerful emperor, and oligarchic- and militarily-controlled political institutions with limited popular input. He seemed “afraid” of the people, somewhat unsure of how to personally relate to them. In national political institutions, Hirohito’s view prevailed in the pre-war system; its core seemed more similar to “traditional Japanese political culture. “Modernization” basically prevailed in Japan’s general politics and political institutions in this period.

Concerning political ideologies, Yanagita supported a populist, independent form of Japanese nationalism, but was rather conservative in his support for “traditional” elements of Confucian social connection and rural, agriculturally based solidarity. Hirohito was highly conservative ideologically, supporting the political aspects of
emperor ideology, State Shinto and nationalist thought. He also had a highly conservative view of the state and of Japanese ethnicity. Both Yanagita and Hirohito were fairly conservative, but Yanagita, more populist. In their political ideologies, both seem reflective of “modernization”—Yanagita in his support for Japanese communality and Confucian values, and Hirohito, less so. Though Hirohito supported Shinto values, they were the redefined, nationalized values of State Shinto, not necessarily those of “traditional,” local Shinto across different regions.

On translative adaptation, the main question here is, in the evidence in the political worldviews here, as Japan attempted to adapt to the global market, in spite of its importation of Western political and cultural items, did the “core” of its domestic culture of politics stay mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On general politics, Yanagita was concerned that national politics were destroying “traditional” Japanese communality. He was also concerned for local and regional political life. Hirohito cared about oligarchic and military control of politics, with limited democrat input. In both of these worldviews, on general politics, translative adaptation seems validated; Japan’s basic politics stayed mostly non-Western and Japanese. On political institutions, Yanagita favored democratic, popular input in political institutions, and was wary of too much elite input. Hirohito supported a strong emperor, and elite/military-controlled institutions. In these worldviews, did the core of its domestic culture of politics stay mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese”? Again, translative adaptation generally prevailed.

On political ideology, Yanagita was populist and proletarian leaning, without espousing a specific ideology, but supported communality and Japan’s local culture of politics. Hirohito was ultraconservative, supported the state’s main ideologies, including
State Shinto, the emperor ideology, and nationalism, and had conservative views of the nation. In these worldviews, did the core of Japan’s domestic culture of politics stay mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese”? Yanagita’s support for communality prevailed, but his democratic populism did not. Hirohito’s conservative political ideologies also prevailed, although the highly state-manipulated ideologies of emperor worship and ultranationalism were not very characteristic of the historic Japanese culture of politics. Here, Yanagita basically supported the ideals of translative adaptation. Hirohito’s “new” ultranationalistic political values seem more like Western ideologies of ultranationalism than “traditional” Japanese ones, and do not seem supportive of translative adaptation.

**Technology Issues.** Examining these leaders’ views on general politics through the lens of Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita was more supportive of popular political involvement in national politics, while Hirohito favored elite control. Yanagita was more concerned about how politics affected peoples’ daily lives. Yanagita disliked elite institutions that limited people’s opportunities for democratic involvement. Hirohito was concerned about maintaining elite control of institutions. Yanagita manifested a concern for how politics affected peoples’ daily lives much more than Hirohito did.

There was not much concern in either Yanagita or Hirohito for the issues of technonationalism as ideology, to make Japan wealthier. Yanagita’s main concern for economics is that the state should focus more on agriculture and the regional economy, not heavy industrialization and exports. He believes that this is the major way to make

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1394 Yanagita’s views here reflect the basic continuance of communality that continued in rural Japanese politics, but here we cannot judge what happened in urban politics.
Japan stronger and therefore wealthier. His main concern was protecting Japan’s culture and identity, enabling Japan to survive. Making Japan abundantly wealthy was not his major concern. Hirohito’s main concern, however, was effectively ruling Japan, and maintaining the viability of the imperial throne, not economic, industrial or wealth issues.

Concerning Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, in their views of politics, neither Yanagita nor Hirohito shows much concern for Japanese government intervention in Japan’s economy. Yanagita is a strong supporter of government intervention, but not in support of heavy industrialization. He desires that intervention be positive, especially focused on rural, regional, and agricultural issues. His main motivation is the protection of Japanese culture, not the promotion of (heavy) industrial growth. Hirohito shows absolutely no concern for this issue. So while Yanagita is a mixed, perhaps moderate example of Murakami’s concept, Hirohito shows no connection to it at all.

Cognition Issues. Image. The main images of Japan’s domestic state here concern politics, political institutions, political ideologies, the nation and politics, Japanese society and politics, and religion and politics. There is a large dichotomy in many of the images because of huge differences in many of the basic views of the two leaders studied here, Yanagita and Emperor Hirohito. Regarding basic politics, Yanagita paints positive images of regional and local politics and takes an independent stance on many issues. Hirohito, however, supports the conservative authoritarian apparatus of prewar Japanese politics. On Japan’s culture of politics, Yanagita’s images stress the importance of agriculture and local culture in Japan, while Hirohito’s stress the roles of the nation’s elite-dominated political institutions and the military in politics, and the need to create stability.
Main images on political institutions from Yanagita question elite domination as negative, while those from Hirohito imply that elite control of politics is both good and necessary, since the people are not able to govern themselves. While Yanagita’s images of the emperor’s role in politics stress that it should be limited, those of Hirohito emphasize that the emperor, the “brain” of the state,\footnote{Brain” of the state was Kato Hiroyuki’s biology-influenced term for the leadership role of the emperor in relation to the Japanese nation. I use the term here again to signify the central, guiding role the emperor had in Japanese national politics in the prewar era.} has a primary role in providing leadership and guidance for the state and the military, without getting mixed up in political complexities and factional disputes. On the role of the military in national politics, while Yanagita’s images stress that representative government should limit the military, Hirohito’s suggest the importance of the military in national life and politics. On democracy, Yanagita’s images stress that all of the interests in Japan must achieve some level of representation,\footnote{For example, Yanagita strongly supports universal male suffrage. Female suffrage was perhaps too radical even for a progressive like Yanagita in this period. Yanagita also supports the Diet, Japan’s national parliament, and political parties, if they effectively represent all national interests.} and that representative government should reign in political actors such as the military. Hirohito’s images hint that democracy is dangerous, and therefore it should be limited. Yanagita supports political parties if they support workers’ rights and broad national interests; he distrusts the elite-dominated parties in control in the 1920s.\footnote{I found no evidence concerning Hirohito’s opinion of or image concerning political parties, but given his conservative political beliefs and experience in working with elite political actors and bodies, it is likely that he distrusted and disliked them.}

On ideologies of politics and the nation, Yanagita’s images are progressive and liberal leaning, while Hirohito’s support imperial and nationalistic ideologies of divine descent and Japanese heritage such as kôso kôsô. On Japanese history and national
origins, there is slight similarity in their images. In the imagery of Hirohito’s beliefs, we see strong connection between the imperial family and the history and creation of Japan. Yanagita also sees Japan and its people as founded on the imperial family, but, in addition, closely connected to the land and heartfelt worship of local spirits.

In imagery on Japanese society and politics, we see strong support in Yanagita for democratic politics and populist movements, while Hirohito’s suggest fear of democracy and too much popular involvement. Yanagita supports more such involvement, while Hirohito’s images suggest a preference for elite control. Yanagita’s images also reveal a strong concern for the daily concerns of peoples’ lives, and a stress on the importance of protecting indigenous solidarity and communality. If this communality is damaged, politics will suffer. We also find strong images supporting religion, spirituality and politics, from both Hirohito and Yanagita. Though Hirohito supports a stronger, more active role for the emperor than Yanagita does, the latter still sees the emperor as the nation’s greatest spiritual symbol. Both Hirohito and Yanagita suggest images which draw on Japanese spirituality and ethics very strongly, including Hirohito’s fervent, faithful performance of Shinto rituals, and Yanagita’s conviction that the Confucian-based ie\textsuperscript{1398} system connects people to their ancestors and the nation.

How did the above images function as possible perceptual filters or as cognitive organizing devices? In the images of general politics, Yanagita shows preferences for local and regional politics, agriculture, and local culture. Hirohito’s images stress strong roles for elites, the emperor and the military in politics, and limited democratic input. These could result in Yanagita failing to deal realistically with national or international

\textsuperscript{1398} ie means household.
level forces, interests or groups. Hirohito shows almost a total lack of touch with his subjects and their desires, and no comprehension of grassroots and local issues. On ideologies, Yanagita is basically independent, but shows a preference for liberalism, while Hirohito prefers nationalistic and imperialistic thought, and both see the nation’s founding through the lenses of imperialist ideology. In these ideological biases, Yanagita shows potential anger or a lack of in-depth understanding of the intricacies of elite ideologies and forces, and their powerful lock on national politics from the late 1920s through 1945. Again, Hirohito shows little knowledge of, and no experience with, local beliefs and issues, though he was trained in the same nationalist ideologies as other Japanese. On society and politics, in his images, Yanagita shows a strong concern for rural areas, solidarity, communality, and support for populist, democratic movements. Hirohito suggests a fear of democratic political involvement from his subjects. Yanagita’s images suggest few blind spots on society and politics issues, though his rural preference may have biased him slightly against urban needs and issues. Again, Hirohito has almost no connection with average Japanese or awareness of their true needs and issues. Finally, on religion and politics, in their images, while both leaders support Shinto-related beliefs, Hirohito’s have more connection with State Shinto and state-defined spirituality in service of politics, and Yanagita’s have more connection with grassroots society and popular belief and spiritual practice. Here Yanagita’s bias suggests a potential lack of relevance to the reality of State Shinto, what it is doing to the country, and an inability to

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1399 Here I mean ideologies that stress the role of the imperial throne and family in the nation’s heritage and founding.
resist or change it. Hirohito failed to see the devastating impacts of State Shinto and emperor ideology near the end of World War II, which nearly destroyed Japan.

*Worldview.* In these worldviews about the nature of the domestic state, about the nature of the world, Yanagita is concerned about micro-level political matters, not just the macro-level. In his views, the most fundamental things that happen in Japan occur at the local level, related to agriculture and rural areas; the local drives the most basic things that happen in a society. Yanagita believes that progressive political thought will do more for the world. On the other hand, in Hirohito’s view, elites and leaders run the politics in all normal countries and in Japan. Without them, politics cannot function. To Yanagita, the world is driven by politics on both the macro- and micro-levels. To really understand it, we need to study both levels. He believes that the people have a right to be involved in politics; their voice must be heard. For politics to work effectively, the people’s interests must be heard, and their voices known. Hirohito, however, believes that leaders who are conservative, experienced and wise must lead politics. Leadership by those who are too young, inexperienced or radical will fail. Hirohito believes that the world needs stability and leadership by experienced leaders in order to function well.

Regarding the world’s forms of political organization, for Yanagita, political order on the local and regional levels is important, not just the national or international levels. While Hirohito believes that elite-dominated political institutions run the nations of the world, Yanagita sees elite domination of politics as negative. To Hirohito, elite control of politics and leadership is both needed and good. Yanagita believes that to prevent abuses, leaders must be account to the people. Hirohito believes that democracy is dangerous, and should be limited, while Yanagita views populist, democratic political parties as
positive, and dislikes elitist political parties. He supports the representation of workers’ and peoples’ rights.

Regarding their views of the self (Japanese politics), to Yanagita, local and regional politics are more important in Japan than national politics. He sees the heart of politics in Japan as located in agriculture and local communality. Agriculture is a basic part of Japan’s political culture and how it works. On the other hand, to Hirohito, elites and the military must lead Japanese politics, and the emperor has a key role in Japan’s politics. Above all, stability is needed in Japan’s politics, and the people cannot govern themselves. Yanagita believes that the emperor’s role in Japan should be limited, while in Hirohito’s view, the emperor has a primary role in guiding the Japanese state and military. To him, the emperor should not get mixed up in ground-level political complexities. Yanagita argues that all political interests in Japan should be represent at the national level, and that Japan needs democratic and representative government to control potential abuses by its leaders. In Hirohito’s view, democracy is dangerous for Japan, and should be limited. Again, Yanagita supports populist politics, and the rights of the workers and the people. To both Hirohito and Yanagita, Japan must be ruled by divine forces, the imperial family and order. Japanese are descended from the imperial family. To Yanagita, Japan and its people are closely related to the land and local spirituality. The needs of the people matter, and Japan’s indigenous solidarity and communality must be protected. If Japan’s communality is damaged, its politics will suffer. He views the emperor is Japan’s greatest spirit symbol. To Hirohito, Shinto rituals, honoring the kami, and ancestors are important for the success and functioning of

1400 Both of these points are implied.
the nation. For Yanagita, the Confucian-based ie system connect all Japanese to their ancestors and to the nation.

What are the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who held these worldviews? How have these environments interacted with/affected the viewers’/actors’ worldviews? Yanagita’s views were shaped by his experiences in urban Japan, in rural Japan-regions and small villages, towns across the nation, by his own education in agro-politics at Tokyo Imperial University, and by his own experiences as a politician in the Diet and as a diplomat in the League of Nations. These experiences and environments have given Yanagita views that are quite broad and practical, but biased toward the rural, populist sector. Hirohito’s elite, isolated environment stressed militaristic training and the best learning and knowledge available at the time. He was isolated in the imperial court and in his interactions with only the highest leaders and aristocrats of the nation. This environment totally oriented Hirohito toward elitist views of the world, and the nationalist ideologies he was taught as a child. It totally isolated him from a capacity to relate to his subjects. How these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence the viewers’/actors’ perceptions, uses of information, and their understanding of events? Yanagita’s education in agro-politics and his own personal interests heavily biased him in the direction of focusing his own research on rural and agricultural Japan, also influenced his findings. These also strongly affected his interpretations of rural and indigenous spirituality. Hirohito’s isolated, heavily guarded, regulated upbringing and environment isolated him from understanding the concerns of average Japanese, to a large extent, and biased him exclusively toward elitist politics and conservative views of the military, what their roles in politics should
be, and against popular, democratic input. These also strongly biased his spiritual interpretations toward State Shinto and its ideologies and practices/rituals. In uses of information here, Yanagita was biased toward rural, popular, ethnographic, local level, bottom up sources, and Hirohito was biased toward top down, elitist, state/official views and sources of information regarding politics. Regarding their understanding of political events and their causes, Yanagita interprets events as influenced by organic causes, and by Japan’s indigenous spirituality and culture, to a large extent. Neglect of these, and over-reliance on foreign or urban sources and models will likely cause problems in Japan. Hirohito interprets the causes of political events through the evolutionary and also spiritual training he has received. Underneath all his education is the influence of evolutionary views on the behavior of foreign actors and of Japan in the international system (the strongest will survive). Regarding the blessing and survival of Japan, it seems his spiritual training (and his performance of proper Shinto rituals and prayers) is the most important part. Here we see the conflict between science and religion, “material reality” and spirituality, at a very basic level in the life of Japan’s most important Japanese political leader of recent times. What were the implications of this conflict for policy outcomes related to Hirohito’s life and actions? I will discuss this more in Chapter 10.

How did technological systems affect these worldviews? Because Yanagita preferred local level processes in nearly everything, he also preferred technology on a smaller scale, and other solutions on a smaller, more humane scale. He preferred localized politics and solutions better than national scale politics. Hirohito was oriented toward an elitist, large scale, national/international, militarist, and conservative
orientation in almost everything. Clearly he believed that solutions to political and military problems must come from strong, powerful, and technologically great solutions.

In sum, if we compare these worldviews, regarding the nature of the world, Yanagita focuses on the micro-, local level, rural areas, and progressive politics. Hirohito focuses on an elitist, narrow, statist view of politics and the world. On how the world functions, Yanagita sees the world operating on the micro- and macro-levels, and on additional levels too: local, national, international, and so forth. In his mind, we need an appropriate balance between these for effective politics and economics. Hirohito believes that experienced, elite leaders must lead the world. Concerning the world’s political order, order, to Yanagita, agriculture is a basic part of Japan’s culture. Democratic accountability and involvement are essential for effective politics. For Hirohito, elite control of politics is basic to the world and Japan; democracy is dangerous. To Yanagita, local and regional politics are more important than national level politics. Democracy and representative politics are important for Japan, which needs limits on possible abuses by elites and leaders. Popular needs must be recognized. Japan’s indigenous solidarity and communality are essential. Spirituality and the imperial tradition are important parts of Japan’s identity, but the state must respect local differences. In Hirohito’s view, elites, the military and the imperial throne have key roles in Japan’s politics. The people cannot govern themselves; democracy is negative for Japan. The emperor should have a strong role. Finally, he sees the Japanese as descended from the imperial family. On these two leaders’ views of Japanese politics, Yanagita sees local and national politics as more important than national level politics. Democracy and

\[1401\] This point is implied.
representative politics are important for Japan, which needs limits on possible abuses of power by elites and leaders. Popular needs must be recognized. Japan’s indigenous solidarity and communality are essential. Spirituality and the imperial tradition are important parts of Japan’s identity, but the state must respect local differences. For Hirohito, elites, the military, and the imperial throne have a key role in Japan’s politics. People cannot govern themselves; democracy is negative for Japan. The emperor should have a strong role, and all Japanese are descended from the imperial family. All of the people must be committed to the national honor and honoring the ancient (spiritual) ways of the ancestors and the imperial line.

*Cultural Logics.* The global phenomena to which these leaders responded included international ideas and ideologies about politics, such as democracy, political liberalism, Marxism, autocratic theories of European politics, monarchism, theories on warfare and the military, ideas about political institutions, such as a national parliament, role of a king or monarch, theories of nationalism, principles of absolute leadership, and East Asian-derived theories of politics (such as Confucianism). What are the leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? Yanagita leaned toward democratic and liberal-leaning beliefs, including support for voting and democratic institutions. He believed that politics must be based on the needs, convictions, and daily lives of the people and the indigenous ways of life of Japan, best seen in rural areas. Democratic ideas from the West would support the effective representation of these ideas in the Japanese political system, so that is why Yanagita supported them to a degree. The new social science methods of ethnography, also gleaned from abroad, would enable Japan to study and know its own self, its own culture. Hirohito embraced ideas of nearly
absolute rule by the monarchy, little democratic representation, and authoritarian
government with a strong military influence. While some of his political ideology drew
on symbols and ideas from Japanese or East Asian origin, many of them also drew on
ideas from other nations, especially Germany and other authoritarian systems in
Europe. Both Yanagita and Hirohito have a strong Confucian and imperial (family
and throne) ideological foundation to their political views. Their beliefs are in many ways
the opposite of each other.

The cultural logics emerging under Yanagita’s views are that the job of
government is to create better conditions for the people, the average citizens, people and
workers who make up the heart of society. This is a populist orientation; he really loved
the average people and ways of Japan, and the country. He wants Japan to survive.
Though he generally feels that Western ideologies and culture are totally unsuited for
Japan, he is willing to draw on ideas and techniques from the West (certain political ideas
and ideologies) when he feels they can be used to help Japan survive culturally and
politically. The assumptions here are that the heart of the nation are the people, and rural
people/farmers. These elements must be preserved and adapted by reasonable means for
the people to survive. If they are not, the country will be destroyed. Additional
assumptions are that it is worthwhile for Japan to survive, and that if intentional steps are
not taken, Western culture will destroy Japan. Western culture is not compatible with
Japanese culture. By flexibly adapting certain (political) ideas or research methods
(ethnography) from abroad, Japan can survive. Hirohito’s cultural logics include the basic
cultural logics under the Meiji political system, since his education stressed them. The

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1402 Bix, Hirohito.
basic logics under the Meiji system were that political ideas from countries with politics and culture most like Japan’s were the countries that were the best from which could Japan learn. In politics in Meiji Japan, that country was mostly Germany/Prussia, which had an authoritarian system. His logics also emphasized tradition, honor, state-defined rituals and spirituality. They also stressed that Japan would not survive if it did not have a strong military, that the country must be defended, and strong. There are many evolutionistic assumptions here also. The common people are like “children,” and cannot be trusted to handle complex political decisions. Those who are wealthy, wise, proven, well educated, and the elite members of society must provide guidance. There is the assumption that for Japan to be strong and survive, it needs to draw on the best ideas in the world, from the most powerful countries. Through World War I, the best, most appropriate political ideas were believed to come from Europe. After the failure of many states in Europe in World War I, and their authoritarian, monarchist systems, Japan lost some of its most admired models. Hirohito and his conservative court did not like the liberal leanings of Taisho democracy. They were happy that the military was rising (it was conservative, and it supported the throne). Hirohito did not like Marxism, and greatly feared the Soviet Union, remembering what they did to their monarchy.

What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? Yanagita disliked and philosophically resisted all of the conservative, authoritarian political movements. His main response was do research and much writing, to try to intellectually devise solutions to the problems Japan faced. Hirohito disliked and feared democratic and liberal movements, and wanted them to be as limited and impotent as possible. He got involved

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1403 In my research, I uncovered no evidence that Yanagita actively resisted conservative politics in Japan.
extensively in Japan’s politics at the top level, though “behind the scenes,” usually, especially its international political issues. He also prayed often for the nation through Shinto rituals, especially during World War II.

What were the cultural logics under these responses to these global phenomena?

Yanagita’s views were deeply rooted in an emphasis on grassroots level society, people, and populist viewpoints, based on his ethnographic studies of Japanese society. Therefore he resisted conservative, elitist ideas. Hirohito was steeped in and trained in political ideas that emphasized the importance of authority, ritual, power, and tradition. Democratic, liberal ideas were not in his political vocabulary, training very much, nor in his worldviews and experience. What if we compare the cultural logics of these worldviews about the global phenomena, and the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena? On the cultural logics of the global phenomena, Yanagita’s are that Japan’s survival depends on knowing and protecting the true, indigenous culture and “traditions” of Japan. To do that, he is willing to use tools from the West (some democratic ideas and institutions, and ethnography). He feels that elitist politics do not listen to or comprehend Japan’s grassroots level needs and politics, and therefore cannot help the country. Hirohito’s cultural logics here are based on assumptions that emphasize leadership and control of politics by elites and prominent, educated, wealthy members and forces of society, such as wealthy aristocrats, landowners and the military, not the masses. He is also willing to borrow or support political ideas from abroad that seem suitable for Japan. What he is willing to use is not democratic, but authoritarian or monarchical in nature. The cultural logics under the responses to the global phenomena are also extremely similar to the first cultural logics I identified.
Again, Yanagita shows a preference for grassroots, populist, democratic and liberal-leaning ideas, and Hirohito prefers elite, authoritarian ones. There is no basic change in the logics here.

**Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Market Contexts**

*Yanagita Kunio.* Yanagita Kunio opposed the Japanese government’s economic policies of the early 1900s and its plans for Japan’s development on largely Western lines.\(^{1404}\) His criticisms were based partly on his thoughts about cultural effects on the process. He saw weaknesses in Western patterns of modernization, and had serious concerns about whether Japan should follow them.\(^{1405}\) Yanagita concluded that Japan should take its own path to development, based on its own conditions.\(^{1406}\) He supported a re-orientation of the government’s plan by developing and improving Japan’s domestic economy, without totally altering its structure. He developed his theories of agro-politics and regional development during a period that helped set the course for Japanese capitalism. He believed that capital should be broadly distributed throughout Japan. National domestic economic policy must involve a balance among agriculture, industry, and commerce, with the first two sectors as pillars, and the third a bridge between them. Yanagita opposed protectionist policies in these sectors. He wished to lessen conflict among various sectors, partly by strengthening the communal solidarity

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\(^{1404}\) The government’s plans stressed increasing industrialization and concentration of capital to finance Japan’s economic expansion overseas (*Kawada, Origin Ethnography*, 32).

\(^{1405}\) Some of these weaknesses were revealed in the massive self-destruction of Europe in World War I (*Ibid.*, 79).

\(^{1406}\) Yanagita questioned whether there was only one path to modernization, and argued that there would likely be multiple paths for the varied cultures of the world to follow, based on the pattern of cultural variation in global cultures which he saw present in the early 1900s (*Ibid.*, 79-80). This thinking is similar to the recent thought of Japanese anthropologist Maegawa Keiji and Japanese development economists Hara Yonosuke and Ohno Kenichi. For more, see the definition of translative adaptation in the Glossary section (*Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,”* and K. Ohno, “Overview”).
that he believed had pervaded rural Japan. Yanagita saw the importance of heavy industries for Japan’s international trade, but over-reliance on them could cause problems. Instead, he supported the development of regional industries. While Yanagita’s economic vision differed from that of national policymakers, Kawada concludes that it could have contributed to long-term economic stability.\footnote{1407}

Second, the nation’s agriculture must gradually change to small-scale independent farming. Yanagita opposed the “semi-feudal” landowners’ dominance of agriculture.\footnote{1408} Tenant farmers must change to small-scale, independent status.

Yanagita’s objectives differed from those of leading Japanese agricultural theorists.\footnote{1409} In the 1920s, he believed Japan’s agricultural population suffered from the extreme attention given to military and industrial buildup after the wars with China and Russia. To help, he wished to increase the productivity of agricultural labor, and offered many practical suggestions.\footnote{1410} Also, industrial unions, legalized in 1901, should reflect the interests of small-scale farmers and the “traditional” rural sense of communality.\footnote{1411} But Yanagita believed what unions could accomplish in rural regions was limited.\footnote{1412}

\footnote{1407} Kawada, *Origin Ethnography*, 3-4, 11, 32-33, 40-42, 77-79, 141. Yet his economic thought had several weaknesses, including vagueness on how small- and medium-sized enterprises and traditional communal values could strengthen regional development, and the plausibility of his theories in the international context of the era. (For more details, see Ibid., 78-79).

\footnote{1408} Yanagita wished to aid independent and tenant farmers, not the landowners. He rejected the idea of land expropriation. It would be interesting to compare Yanagita’s prewar proposals for agricultural and land reform with those of the postwar American occupation of Japan, which were quite radical. This is beyond the scope of this chapter.

\footnote{1409} Ibid., 19, 22-25.

\footnote{1410} Ibid., 10-11, 13-23. Among his suggestions were the improvement of agricultural production and technology, encouraging farmers to focus on agriculture, and decreasing the number of farmers to standardize landholdings (Kawada, *Origin Ethnography*, 10-11, 13-23).

\footnote{1411} For more on Yanagita’s concept of communality in rural Japan, see the section on domestic Japanese society.

\footnote{1412} Ibid., 34-38, 143-144, 149-150. In his earlier writings, Yanagita was hopeful that unions in rural areas could help bring regional unity among farmers and landowners, but later he grew pessimistic (Ibid., 76). And he came to believe that labor unions could not successfully help to establish a renewed rural spirit of
From the early 1900s, Yanagita offered detailed plans for regional development. He was especially concerned about increasing economic divisions between urban and rural areas. During and after World I, Yanagita attributed Japan’s weakening economic condition to domestic factors. To Yanagita, the central purpose of industrial policy was to improve people’s daily lives. This influenced his theory of regional development.

**Hirohito, Emperor.** In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Prime Minister Hara Kei faced pressure over the huge wealth of the monarchy becoming a source of conflict for the people. As Japan’s largest landowner, the imperial house had to be careful not to engage in economic activities that might cause hardship or raise resentment. For this purpose, Hara and other leaders, including Yamagata Aritomo, understood that the monarchy must use its wealth to “purchase” the people’s goodwill, such as selling some

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1413 Yanagita also supported unions in urban areas and unionization for all workers, including women. Without more cooperation and help for workers, he feared that the urban-rural divide would increase (Ibid., 158-159).
1414 Yanagita’s plan was to handle surplus agricultural labor, promote regional stability, communality and growth (Ibid., 27-33, 61).
1415 For example, his vision for the domestic economy included a large industrial urban sector, and smaller regional industries, and the creation of regional small- and medium-sized markets. The purpose of small and medium markets was to help eliminate intermediary exploitation, or urban industries would devastate local areas (for details, see Ibid., 29-30). For local markets, many new administrative arrangements should be eliminated, and traditional political subdivisions renewed (Ibid., 30). Within regions, he hoped to divide labor between industrial and agricultural sectors, including semi-independent units in each area (Ibid., 32). Yanagita was also concerned about the increasing centralization of the economy into urban industries. This centralization also occurred through zaibatsu, large industrial combines of interlocking companies in various industries. These included such famous groupings as the Houses of Sumitomo, Mitsu and Mitsubishi. They especially increased in strength in the period from 1905 to the late 1910s, following the Russo-Japanese War and during World War I (Ibid., 70-71).
1416 During this period, urban products continued to flood rural areas, and capital increasingly returned to cities. According to Kawada, government promotion of urban versus rural growth caused general economic decline. Earlier, Meiji rural industry policy on caused the decline of rural industries, lifestyles, and economy, increasing dependence on urban products. Government policy favored rice, decreasing agricultural diversity, and affecting rural stability (Ibid., 64-65, 67-69).
1417 For example, I have noted elsewhere the rice riots over food prices that occurred in many towns, cities and rural areas across Japan, involving over 1 million protesters (Bix, Hirohito, 94).
stocks and land holdings. The imperial family’s wealth was as great as that of Japan’s largest zaibatsu, and it increased the ability of the imperial house to relate to and influence the nation.\textsuperscript{1418} Although Hirohito received lectures on economics in his education, evidence suggests that neither he nor his court group understood economics very well. By the late 1920s, it seems his interest in economics arose mainly from a concern for domestic and international order, stability, and peace, perhaps for the well-being of the throne itself.\textsuperscript{1419}

\textbf{Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on the Domestic Market (1895-1945)}

Yanagita Kunio’s and Emperor Hirohito’s views of Japan’s domestic market can be organized into three primary groups: general views of the economy and economics, views of economic development, and views of the rural and urban economies.\textsuperscript{1420} I found very little about Hirohito’s views, so I will explore Yanagita’s views in more depth. In Yanagita, we see a strong desire to promote balanced development that does not squelch Japan’s indigenous culture. He disliked development that was too large-scale, which he saw as inhumane. He was especially concerned about economic development across Japan’s various regions, and in its rural areas, which he saw as the heart of Japan’s culture and identity. A significant insight here is that Yanagita supports the recent argument of some of Japan’s leading development economists that there are multiple paths to development, to the market. Like them, he also supports

\textsuperscript{1418} Ibid., 94-95. For example, among the monarchy’s land holdings were “… palaces, mansions, schools, mausoleums and museums in Kyoto, Nara and Tokyo,” income from investment in corporate stocks and bonds, profits from stocks in colonial banks and enterprises, including the Bank of Korea and the South Manchurian Railway, an annual government allotment of 3 million yen, and income from domestic mines and other enterprises. In 1919 the imperial house had an income of 6-8 million yen from forest management activities alone (Ibid., 95).

\textsuperscript{1419} Ibid., 130-131.

\textsuperscript{1420} I will not repeat all of these ideas here, however, since they are found above.
capitalism, but insists it be humane. In contrast to Hirohito’s economic views (which, as with political views, also seem conservative), Yanagita’s views are economically progressive. He desires to modernize Japanese agriculture, support farmers’ and workers’ rights, and he opposes large-scale, centralizing economic forces such as the over-concentration of heavy industry in urban areas and of financial power in the zaibatsu. Yanagita’s significant reflections on economic issues flow out of his concern to protect Japanese culture and identity from the onslaught of Western technology and cultural influence coming into Japan. Yet it seems his overall impact on economics in this era was small, given the generally conservative political atmosphere in Japan from the late 1920s through 1945.

**Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Domestic Market Worldviews (1895-1945)**

*Development Issues.* The main question here (on “modernization” from 1895-1945) is: as Japan was absorbed more and more into the world economy, and interacted with it, from the evidence in the domestic market worldviews here, what happened to Japan’s domestic economy and its effects on Japan’s “core” culture? Did its “core” become more “Western,” or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On their general views of the economy and economics, Yanagita opposed the Japanese government policy for the domestic economy. His plan stressed regional development throughout Japan and communalism, not just large-scale industrial development in urban areas. He also supported balanced development among major sectors, labor unions, and workers’ rights. Hirohito had a poor understand of economics, was mainly concerned for the maintenance of peace and survival of the throne. Regarding the main question, the government did not really follow Yanagita’s recommends on regional development until
after 1945. It followed its goal of large-scale industrial development. It also supported the basic conservative political and emperor ideologies that Hirohito did. It does not seem that these things made the Japanese culture’s core less western. "Modernization” prevailed, though it was not intentional.

On their views of economic development, to Yanagita, there are multiple paths to development. Japan must follow its own path, based on its own conditions, and the basic structure of the existing economy should not be altered. There are weaknesses in Western development models that will have negative effects on Japanese culture. Yanagita supports the broad application of capitalism across Japan’s regions, and the importance of smaller, regional industries, not just large scale ones. On the main question, the pattern of Japan’s economic development did not follow the pattern of small-scale, regional and localized development that was recommended by Yanagita. Rather, it followed the large-scale, heavy industry preferences of the national state. What were the cultural effects of this process before 1945? Even though the country did not follow Yanagita’s economic dev goals, the agricultural roots of Japan’s culture remained very strong and abiding through 1945. Again, Japan’s cultural core, especially in rural areas, stayed basically Japanese, though this was not intentional. Japan’s development followed its own path, however. For the most part, its path was not the same as that trod by the economies of the United States and Great Britain. Japan did not have totally free trade, but much heavier state involvement and guidance.

On the rural and urban economy, Yanagita’s vision was to help independent and tenant farmers, to encourage small-scale independent farming, to support land reforms,

1421 I had no data on Hirohito’s views of economic development.
and improve agricultural production and technologies. He was concerned about the increasing economic divide between urban and rural Japan, and the rising centralization of the economy. Yanagita supported urban unions and urban industries balanced with regional industries throughout Japan. On the main question of “modernization,” Yanagita’s overall concern here, and especially his vision for rural Japan’s economy, became concerns of the postwar Japanese government, an era of rapid urban growth and population decline in rural areas. The problems that Yanagita predicted, such as over-concentration of population and industries in urban conurbations, came to pass. In the prewar period, the process had of rapid urbanization had not yet accelerated too much. Japan’s population was still predominantly rural through 1945 [is this true? Try to confirm]. It seems likely that Japan’s cultural core in rural areas, Yanagita’s key concern, remained essentially “Japanese.” My data here does not concern what happened in the urban areas, so I cannot judge that. So it seems that on this level again, “modernization” prevailed, though it was not intentional.

Concerning domestic market worldviews and translative adaptation, in Yanagita’s vision for economic development, the core of Japan’s culture would definitely have been respected and likely protected, assuming that Japan could have developed effectively under this vision, enough to compete successfully in the global market. Economic success would buy the right to more cultural autonomy. But the government did not have this vision, and did not follow this scheme. Under the government’s existing scheme, a pattern of massive industrialization and militarization was followed in the pre-

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1422 I also had no data on Hirohito’s views of the rural and urban economies.
1945 period. Even so, the core of Japan’s rural culture was not destroyed before 1945, but this was not because of public intentionality.

Also regarding translative adaptation, Yanagita’s vision for the rural and urban economy was not shared or followed by the Japanese government. In this period, their main concern was dealing effectively with the numerous international challenges and wars that Japan faced, through good and bad economic times. The heavy emphasis of the government in the 1930s and early 1940s was on militarization and maintaining domestic political stability. Their concern was not Japan’s internal cultural preservation, though domestic order was. But the social, indigenous glue that held rural Japan together was centuries old. Through 1945, it basically held. But again, on the urban scene, I cannot judge. After the war, with the nearly total destruction of cities, and rapid migration to urban areas, there was great change in both rural and urban areas. So translative adaptation, at least in rural areas, seemed to hold through 1945, though it was not the government’s intentional policy.

Technology Issues. Assessing these domestic market worldviews through Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita had a very holistic view of economics, and concerned about how they affected peoples’ daily lives and work. Hirohito had no concern for how the economy affects peoples’ daily lives and work. Here, Yanagita’s views fit Glick’s concept well, but Hirohito’s do not. Concerning technonationalism as ideology and the domestic market worldviews (1895 to 1945), Yanagita was not opposed to the idea that Japan needed to be wealthy to protect its security, but this is not his main concern. Rather, he would argue that Japan must be aware of, and protect, its own

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\text{However, investigating this is beyond the scope of the present research.}
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identity, or it will lose its heart, its culture. The real danger was that as Japan became rich, this might happen. Hirohito would also, in theory, support this concept, but he expressed no interest or awareness of this idea. Neither Yanagita nor Hirohito is a good exponent of technonationalism as ideology. On Murakami’s concept of industrial policy, Yanagita’s views were already explored under the worldviews of the domestic state. Yanagita did value government intervention in the economy, but not very much in favor of heavy industry, more in support of rural and agricultural industries. He desired some industrial input in urban areas, but insisted it be balanced with regional and rural efforts. To a limited degree, Yanagita supported Murakami’s concept of industrial policy. Hirohito had no concern for this.

_Cognition Issues._¹⁴²⁴ Image. Yanagita’s and Hirohito’s images on the domestic market fall into about four main categories, images on: 1) the economy, economics, and the Japanese economy, 2) economic development, 3) industry and industrialization, and 4) the rural and urban economies. On the general economy, Hirohito’s likely images imply that it is good to be concerned about economics, to encourage international and domestic peace and stability.¹⁴²⁵ Yanagita’s images condemn almost all aspects of the government’s current economic policies for Japan, including its plans to encourage a strong emphasis on heavy industry, trade, and concentration of capital, to develop Japan on mostly Western lines, and its strong promotion of protectionism and urban growth. To Yanagita, all of these damage the rural heart of Japan’s culture. Behind all of his images

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¹⁴²⁴ Remember that on cognitive issues of Japan’s domestic market, almost all of the views I study are Yanagita’s.
¹⁴²⁵ See my comment on this point above at the end of my discussion of Hirohito’s worldview of Japan’s domestic market, based on Bix, Hirohito, 130-131.
on economics is the conviction that economics strongly affects culture, and that the
cultural effects of the government’s current economic plans are negative. In his images of
several economic sectors, Yanagita urges a balance and lessening of tension among them,
with human-scale agriculture and industry of primary importance. His images of labor
and labor unions are highly positive. Yanagita’s imagery portrays government policies as
the source for many potential problems in Japan’s economy. To improve the economy,
both greater sensitivity to Japan’s cultural realities and broader distribution of capital and
industries throughout Japan are needed.1426

On economic development, Yanagita’s images focus on issues of culture, scale
and distribution. Development will be good if it is based on Japan’s own culture, and
follows models appropriate to it. Western models are not. Economic development should
be of a smaller scale, suitable for the rural heartland of Japan’s culture, and it should be
broadly distributed, not overly centralized. Yanagita’s images of Japanese development
stress domestic development before external activities, and following paths suitable to
Japan’s own conditions. His images of Western development find it inappropriate for
Japan.

A large group of images concern industry and industrialization. In his basic
images of industrialization, while Yanagita calls heavy industries beneficial for Japan’s
trade, most of the images are negative. He finds that heavy industrialization for several
wars has damaged Japan’s agriculture. Over-reliance on or over-concentration of heavy
industry is bad for Japan’s economy. Rather, Yanagita prefers industrialization of a much

1426 Looking back, we can see the wisdom of many of Yanagita’s insights. Over-concentration of industries
and population has long been recognized as a major problem in postwar Japan. The government has
attempted to encourage broader regional development for the last few decades.
more human scale. Development of a broad range of regional industries is good, and it is good for the government to place more emphasis on balanced, smaller scale rural development. Industrial policies should improve people’s daily lives.

The final group of images covers the rural and industrial economies and their relationship. These images reveal Yanagita’s concern over increasing gaps between rural and urban Japan, and over government policies for urban growth he finds inappropriate for rural areas. In his images of farming, Yanagita’s concern for human scale again emerges, as it does in his interest in improving the conditions for rural labor. Yanagita’s foundational concern for maintaining and restoring Japan’s commonality underlies many of these images.

How did these images possibly function as perceptual filters or organizing devices for Yanagita? Yanagita disliked many current Japanese government economic policies, felt that economic development must fit Japan’s conditions, and that Western economic schemes did not. In his images, he also shows a general dislike for heavy industry and feels it is often too over-concentrated and large scale for Japan. He also was concerned about economic policies more oriented for urban needs than for rural ones. Possibly these biases may have blinded Yanagita to the good that government economic policies did, to the possible benefits of Western development models, of large scale development, or of heavy industry. He also may have been lacking awareness concerning urban economic conditions and needs.

*Worldview.* The nature of the world revealed in these worldviews (mostly Yanagita’s) stresses the need for balance, between culture and the economy, rural and urban regions, various sectors, and so forth. Development at the expense of a country’s
culture, people, ways of life would not work. Balanced, human scale economic development was needed for economic success. To be effective, farming must be done at a scale appropriate for farmers. Regarding the world’s order, Hirohito believed that economics was vital for peace and order in the world. In Yanagita’s view, the Western economies were encroaching on Japan and other developing economies. Regarding Japan’s economy, Yanagita saw the Japanese government’s economic policies as negative and causing many problems. The heavy policy emphasis on industrialization, trade, over-concentration of heavy industry and urban growth, excessive protectionism and capitalism would all damage Japan’s agriculture. Developing Japan on Western lines was negative as well. Yanagita was concerned about the cultural effects of the government’s economic plans. Development with appropriate balance among Japan’s various sectors was needed. To improve the economy, greater sensitivity to Japan’s cultural realities and broader distribution of capital and industries throughout Japan were needed. A more human-scale economy, suitable for Japan’s present agriculture and labor conditions, was as well. Economic development and growth must enhance Japan’s solidarity and communality. Regarding the economies of the West, Yanagita saw the West’s development model as not useful for Japan.

What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who held these worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect their worldviews? Yanagita had some exposure to urban areas and the wider world, but much study and focus on rural Japan: its society, economy, politics, and ways of life. His long-term exposure to rural Japan and his study in college (on agro-politics) influenced these

1427 Yet, in Yanagita’s view, heavy industry has potential benefits for trade.
perspectives. How did these worldviews and their environmental interactions influence these actors’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes? On perception, Yanagita’s in-depth exposure to rural Japan and its needs caused him to focus mostly on the economic needs of rural areas. He believed they were the center of Japan’s culture, so it made sense to center his analysis of Japan’s economy there. On uses of information, Yanagita made primary use of ethnographic data. He also made general observations and reflections about economic phenomena and processes. A focus on the local level influenced his conclusions and explains his emphasis on the local, rural economy, the main site of his research. Concerning events and their causes, Yanagita’s use of ethnography, his study of Western anthropology and its attempts at holistic methods, and his emphasis on rural areas as his primary study site(s) all influenced his view that culture and the economy were vitally interconnected in rural Japan. He saw culture as both fundamentally underlying the economy and affected by it.

How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? To Yanagita, Western technologies and cultural products were in the process of invading Japan. Western technology brought these cultural products and influences to Japan in the first place; in part, that was what had enabled the West to “open” and culturally invade Japan. In Yanagita’s mind, Western technology was massive scale and inappropriate for Japan, its land, and culture. It must be adjusted and adapted to Japanese conditions.

In sum, Yanagita’s views of Japan’s domestic market (1895 to 1945) stress the need for balance and appropriate scale in many areas of Japan’s economy and its economic development. Though Yanagita had international experience of the wider world and traveled abroad for short periods, he chose to focus on rural Japan, what he
saw as the heart of Japan’s culture. As his academic training and research emphasized rural Japan, so did his views of economics. In Yanagita’s worldview of Japan’s domestic market, culture and economy were vitally connected. Technology provided both the means for Western culture to enter Japan, and was itself part of the cultural threat Japan faced.

*Cultural Logics.* The global phenomena to which these leaders responded included Western products, imports, economic and trade theories, heavy industry, Japanese government economic, trade and agricultural policies, private sector forces, zaibatsu, smaller and medium sized businesses, economic and trade policies of Western countries, forces, actors, and items from the urban Japanese economy such as products, firms, and local and regional economic policies. What were the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena? Yanagita believed that these forces were destructive and insensitive to the needs of base Japanese society and heartland: rural Japan and its social solidarity. Western prods and imports did not fit Japanese culture and society; Japanese government trade policies focused on large-scale, heavy industries, the urban economy, and producing for export. They ignored Japan’s rural heartland, its needs, and the impacts of economic policies on the heart of Japan and its culture. Of course the Western technologies and forces gave no thought to or knowledge of Japanese conditions.

What are the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena? Modern economics clashes Western culture. It has little consideration of scale or humanity. The modern economy places more emphasis on the material, wealth and getting money. It ignores Japanese needs, culture and issues of the soul heart, and spirit. Of course Western economics clashes with Japanese culture. Sadly, most Japanese
economic efforts do too. What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? Yanagita responded with intense study, writing, research of local and rural Japanese conditions, and various ideas and proposals about how to solve the problems he saw.

What were the cultural logics under these responses? Yanagita felt that Japan must know its true self. Knowing itself, it must enact wise policies in various areas, including economy, to protect itself. If not, its heart and who it truly was would be lost, and Japan destroyed, at least in its identity. If we compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena, what do we learn? For Yanagita, the former logics focused on the problems of modern economics, both Western and Japanese, and how they both ignored the heart of cult, especially Japanese culture. The latter logics focused more on what Japan must do to protect its culture, and what might happen if it did not.

**Worldviews on Japan’s Domestic Society Contexts**

*Yanagita Kunio.* In the 1910s, Yanagita Kunio began developing his understanding of Japan’s domestic social development. To reform Japan’s economic, agro-political and cultural systems (all intertwined), it was necessary to understand their contexts, all of Japanese life and worldviews, more holistically. Yanagita was concerned with increasing gaps in the economic, social and psychological worldviews of urban and rural Japan, and the unmitigated penetration and export of urban products and culture into rural areas. These heightened people’s thirst for luxury, without improving their lives.¹⁴²⁸ A new rural consciousness of culture was needed, new standards, self-awareness, and

renewed identities, to strengthen “regional cultural autonomy.” So Yanagita developed his ethnographic approach in the 1920s, stating, “we must endeavor to know ourselves.”

To help Japan endure the rapid changes of modernization, in writings from 1900 to 1930, Yanagita stresses restoring “communality” to rural areas. To develop successfully, Japan’s values, worldviews and indigenous ways of life must be seriously considered. Japan needs a new communality to help it function in the contemporary world, based on the past “traditional” communal spirit of generosity and cooperation, the most important, unifying rural feature relevant to successful modernization. The rapid social changes hitting Japan required that the people adopt greatly refined worldviews. Customized, local education was important for renewing communality. Yanagita identifies three different levels of communality: national, family, and village levels. Confusion over national identity clouds modernization. The breakdown in family communality threatens connections of family, land and nation, including the spiritual thread behind family unity. The Meiji rise of nuclear families threatened traditional

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1429 Yanagita defines culture as everything from everyday life, including “social systems, manners and customs, everyday consciousness and life patterns,” and “high culture” (fine arts, academic fields, ethics and religion). On the national level, culture includes all lifestyles with elements new and old, internal and external to a nation, during a particular time period (Ibid., 66-67).

1430 Ibid., 65-66, 74-75. Yanagita was the pioneer of the ethnographic method in Japan, where his approach came to be called “Yanagita Ethnography” (Ibid., 108). For more on his approach to ethnography and how it developed, see Kawada, Origin Ethnography, Chapter 5.

1431 Nevertheless, according to Yanagita, certain “age-old traditions” of rural villages must be preserved and other elements of their worldviews acknowledged. Unless the people understood the foundations of their worldviews driving their behaviors and thoughts, they faced social destruction (Ibid., 151).

1432 Some of examples of this “traditional communality” Yanagita includes are yui, a system of labor exchange, and two systems related to spirituality and village leadership, kô and moyai (Ibid., 152).

1433 Ibid., 141, 145, 151-153, 155-156. Examples of localized education included “local community education” for children and youths, preserving local knowledge, common sense, and new “cultural standards.” Yanagita preferred this education model to the Meiji national educational system (Ibid., 155-156).
village communality. They isolated their members from extended families and support networks, leaving them lonely, suicidal, and often poor.\textsuperscript{1434} Problems with traditional communality included the “closed nature” of rural society, its class-based social structure, and pressures for social conformity.\textsuperscript{1435} Problems in renewing communality in rural and urban Japan included morality.\textsuperscript{1436} The government’s national education campaign weakened the spontaneous evolution of popular language and worldviews in villages, threatening communality.\textsuperscript{1437} “Traditional” values were destroyed by bureaucratic rationalization and modern capitalism. Only ethnography could uncover the indigenous “glue” of values to strengthen Japan in the modern world.\textsuperscript{1438}

Using ethnography, Yanagita studied Japanese folk religion.\textsuperscript{1439} He argues that there is a common faith for each people and nation, and in Japan throughout history. This \textit{ujigami} tradition, connected to Japanese “blood,” helps give Japan its identity.\textsuperscript{1440} \textit{Ujigami}, present throughout Japan, are the spirits protecting a locality, above the \textit{kami} (ancestors or deities) protecting one’s family. How \textit{ujigami} are worshipped varies; most Japanese feel a deep affection for them. Yanagita believed they could provide a foundation for national spiritual unity and modernization.\textsuperscript{1441} Rather than constructing a national, hierarchical pattern of worship for Japan’s “family-state,” or a national “mish-
mash” of customs, Yanagita supported a national, horizontal network of *ujigami* awareness, to respect the spontaneous, heartfelt practices of each region. He also argues that the imperial family and its worship of the sun goddess Amaterasu Ômikami are at the center of *ujigami* worship, but he opposed the system of State Shinto established by the government from the Meiji period through 1945. Only *ujigami* worship could play a crucial role in guarding the nation’s social morals, as opposed to other religious or philosophical systems present in Japan. From 1914, Yanagita promoted *kyôdo kenkyû* (local community studies), to better understand *ujigami* worship. He believed that traditional belief in the *kakureyo* (the unseen spiritual world of the kami) influenced and constrained human behavior in the *utsushiyo* (the physical world of living humans). Under modernization, without state support, *ujigami* worship could disappear as the nation’s best anchor of communality.

**Hirohito, Emperor.** The Meiji state developed a new spiritual ideology to unify the nation under the emperor, drawing on ancient Shinto, arguing that the Japanese are descended from the gods. Under State Shinto, a national hierarchy of Shinto shrines was

1442 Ibid., 45-46, 49.
1443 Ibid., 46-52. Yanagita views the imperial family as the nation’s spiritual symbol, not a “source” of political power. His views differ from the Japanese government’s from the Meiji period onward. It sought to develop a new national faith for Japan, State Shinto, to spiritually unify all citizens for modernization. Under State Shinto, the emperor was the supreme symbol of national unity. Shinto shrines across the nation were forced under state control and rankings. Yanagita condemned State Shinto as “fabricated,” disconnected with the “people’s faith” of *ujigami* worship. It showed no concern for preserving *ujigami*, crucial for uniting the nation during rapid social change, and could destroy all Japanese cultural traditions (Ibid., 46-52).
1444 Among the problems with others systems were Confucianism’s stress on hierarchical relationships, Buddhism’s focus on individual level spirituality, and the neglect of the Imperial Rescript on Education (1889) to consider the people’s love of village or region (Ibid., 56-57).
1445 Ibid., 52-59. Yanagita worried about the increasing alienation and materialism caused by the rapid rise of urbanization and capitalism in Japan from the Meiji period onward, threatening to destroy the indigenous and cultural values of *ujigami* worship. But he fails to prove whether rural villages were still the foundation of Japanese life, and if *ujigami* worship could also function as a spiritual anchor for urban areas, in a time of great urban growth and social change (Ibid., 57-60).
established. All families in Japan had to join a shrine. The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) taught generations of Japanese about their supreme duty to the state and the emperor, the source of all morality. By about 1910, the Rescript instilled intense paternalism, with all Japanese seen as descended from the imperial family, in the “family-state” of Japan.\(^{1446}\) Hirohito was affected by this ideology. As emperor, he was Japan’s highest religious authority, and one of its top military, educational and political leaders.\(^{1447}\) He faithfully performed complex Shinto rituals, accepting the notions of State Shinto.\(^{1448}\) Hirohito’s early education included several paradoxes. He was trained in the national myths and versions of Japanese history and supporting State Shinto, expected to honor Confucian ideals of benevolent rule, and the samurai bushido code of honor. He was also exposed to the worldview of modern science. Bix argues that the conflict between these worldviews formed an important basis for all of Hirohito’s actions.\(^{1449}\)

**Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews on Domestic Society (1895-1945)**

As with the domestic market, most of my data here concern the worldviews of Yanagita, not Hirohito. Their views fall into about three main categories: views of social development, of rural and urban social development, and of spirituality, religion and the state. For effective social development, in Yanagita, there is a great concern for understanding the various elements of society and social change, such as the economy, politics, agriculture, and culture, in a holistic manner, contextually, since he sees all parts

\(^{1446}\) Bix, *Hirohito*, 30-32.
\(^{1447}\) According to Bix, this multiple identity complicates the study of Hirohito (Ibid., 16, 31).
\(^{1448}\) Ibid. During World War II, Hirohito performed his required religious ceremonies with zealously, since routine and fixed order suited his personality, and provided relief for his frustrations (Ibid., 442-443).
\(^{1449}\) Ibid., 49, 59. For details on Hirohito’s training in science, see my discussion on his views of science in the section on technology development.
of life as interconnected. He also stresses worldview’s crucial role in social development, that Japan’s indigenous worldviews, values and ways of life must be considered. To handle rapid social change, Japanese must adopt greatly refined worldviews. These views together suggest the need for worldview flexibility coupled with durability. In addition to the threats posed by Western culture and technology, Yanagita is concerned about increasing gaps in the economic, social and psychological worldviews of rural and urban Japan, and the cultural effects of the government’s national education campaign, which he sees as stifling the spontaneous development of popular culture, language and worldviews in rural villages, thus threatening communality, the heart of Japanese culture. To Yanagita, culture has a key role in social and economic development. He believes the core of Japanese culture is found in rural areas, so these areas need a new critical cultural consciousness of standards, identity, and awareness, to protect each region’s “cultural autonomy.” Yanagita’s view of culture is holistic and comprehensive, integrating daily life and the arts on the local, national, and international levels.\footnote{See earlier in this chapter where I discuss Yanagita’s conceptions of culture.}

Another major theme in Yanagita’s thought on social development is the need to protect Japanese social identity during the economic development process, for which he stresses renewing “communality” across Japan, starting with rural areas. Threats to communality included the rise of the urban nuclear family and the destruction of “traditional” values by increasing bureaucratization and capitalism, thus threatening family and village communalities, their extended social support networks, rural and urban morality, social, spiritual and national unity, development itself, and Japan’s capacity to function in the modern world. To protect its communality, Yanagita argues that it must be
renewed through ethnographic research (so the Japanese become aware of their true identities and values), customized, local education, “traditional” spirits of generosity and cooperation (common in rural areas), and invigorated *ujigami* worship. To Yanagita, the renewal and strengthening of local, indigenous forms of education, social cooperation, communality, and spirituality were particularly key in assuring Japan’s cultural survival during development.

On rural and urban social development, Yanagita is concerned about the corruption of rural values through the increasing materialism and uncritical import of urban products and culture into rural regions across Japan. Shoring up rural communality, cooperation, critical judgment and consensus regarding rural cultural standards is needed. Yanagita also cares about rural-urban social relations, including increasing gaps in basic outlook, the squelching of rural culture by new products, and the collapse of morality.

Regarding religion, spirituality, and social development, Yanagita believes that each country or people have had a common faith; Japan has had one throughout its history. He views the breakdown in communality as threatening the spiritual unity of families, which in turn threatens unity at every level across the country. In his general view of spirituality, there is a strong stress on the *local*. *Ujigami* are worshipped and loved on the local level, and Yanagita studied them on the local, community level. Another theme is the issue of how the spiritual world intersects with the material one. We noted above how Yanagita accepted the notion that the unseen spiritual world affects the seen, physical world on earth. His view that the collapse of communality threatens both spiritual and national unity reflects this viewpoint. So a breakdown in spirituality and communality may also threaten social development. How spirituality intersects with
physical reality also played out in Hirohito’s worldviews. The conflict between his spiritual training in State Shinto, Confucian ethics and bushido-type values and his training in scientific rationality and observation influenced many of his actions. We will explore this more shortly.

Concerning spirituality, the state, and the Japanese nation, Yanagita sees *ujigami* worship as connected to Japanese “blood,” something that gives Japanese their basic identity. He believed that effective *ujigami* worship could provide a basis for national spiritual unity and development, but he opposed the strict, standardizing effect of hierarchical State Shinto upon spontaneous, heart-felt *ujigami* worship, which varied slightly in different locales. Rather he preferred regional, localized forms of worship, connected in a loose, horizontal, national network. Because he believed that *ujigami* worship played an essential role in protecting social morality, he saw it as the most essential part of guarding Japan’s communality. So he was willing to allow state involvement in protecting *ujigami*, though he generally opposed State Shinto. In contrast, Hirohito supported the basic ideals of State Shinto, that all Japanese were descended from the gods, and that both the people’s and his supreme duty was to the state and to maintaining the throne. While Yanagita accepted some Shinto-esque notions, that the imperial family and Amaterasu Ômikami were the center of *ujigami* worship, he did not to the degree Hirohito did. Hirohito believed that he had a great duty to perform sacred rituals for the imperial ancestors and for the country, and he did so zealously, especially during World War II.
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Domestic Society Worldviews (1895-1945)

Development Issues. On “modernization,” the key question here is: from 1895-1945, as Japan was absorbed more and more into the world economy, and interacted with it, from the evidence in the domestic society worldviews here, what happened to Japan’s domestic society and to Japan’s “core” culture? Did the “core” become more “Western,” or did it stay basically “non-Western” and “Japanese”? On views of social development, Yanagita saw the need to understand Japanese society, indigenous culture and worldviews holistically (the need for Japanese to understand themselves), plus the need for worldview flexibility and durability. Yanagita was concerned about threats of increasing cultural standardization brought by Western culture and technology, urban-rural gaps and the national education system. To him, culture had a key role in social and economic development; its core was found in rural areas. To protect Japan, critical awareness and standards for rural culture were needed. Yanagita also recognized the need to protect Japanese communality however possible. In his view, attacks on communality were occurring through increasing urbanization, bureaucratic complexities, changes in family structures, and politics. Yanagita desired to protect it through localized, accurate knowledge of the Japanese self/identity, indigenous social values and spirituality. These very wise insights by Yanagita, widely known in Japan today, were not applied until the postwar period, for the most part. It does not seem that these wise insights had any impact on policies in the prewar period. Rather, the state attempted spiritual mobilization and motivation for the citizens during World War II through ideologies connected with Japanese nationalism and State Shinto. These were standardizing forces with which even
Christians were forced to comply. They were not respectful of local differences as Yanagita’s insights were. “Modernization” was not respected in these worldviews; indigenous rural spirituality was negatively affected.

In his views of rural and urban social development, Yanagita was concerned about increasing rural-urban gaps and the destruction of rural culture through increasing materialism and penetration of urban, Western products into rural areas. He believed that strengthening traditional Japanese values of communality and new critical standards for cultural awareness would help protect the rural heart of Japanese culture. Surely Yanagita’s observations on rural social change processes here transpired. The prewar Japanese government did not really apply any of these insights to protecting Japan’s “indigenous” cult before the war’s end, but only in the postwar period.

Regarding views of religion, spirituality and social development, Yanagita believed that all Japanese have a common spiritual faith. Japan’s national and spiritual unity and communality are based in that. This faith was first experienced, and must be renewed, on the local level. He believed that the spiritual world influences the physical one; a breakdown in spirituality and communality may harm social development. In Hirohito’s worldviews, there was seemingly a conflict between his spiritual values (of State Shinto, Japanese nationalism and emperor ideology) and of scientific observation and rationality. Did these actually conflict? If so, how? They especially conflicted in his policy decisions during World War II. While he was most often a highly shrewd, rational political actor in daily decisions, details and interactions, when it came to his decisions on

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1451 I say “even Christians” since Christians were a very tiny percentage of Japan’s total population during World War II. That even Christians were expected to comply indicates the wide reach that State Shinto and similar nationalistic propaganda had on Japanese society.
really major issues, such as whether to go to war with the United States and Britain, or how soon to declare Japan’s surrender, Hirohito’s spirituality and devotion to religious ritual seem to have clouded his rational capacity and judgment. He made several unwise decisions that cost many thousands of lives. In Hirohito’s case, spirituality definitely influenced the physical world reality of his policy decisions and actions.

In Yanagita’s case, the implementation of his insights would have, in theory, protected or enhanced local spirituality, but it was not applied in the pre-1945 period by the state. If so, would this strengthening of Japanese spirituality also have inoculated Japanese culture against excessive Western influences? Likely it would not have. The notion that the spiritual world has connections with and influences the physical one is very interesting, and a very common notion in the worldviews of many non-Western peoples throughout the world. Regarding Hirohito’s worldviews, it does seem that his spirituality somewhat clouded his policy judgments, especially on really major issues. His embrace of State Shinto, and the standardizing effect it likely had on Shinto worship across Japan was likely great. As a result of their views, in Yanagita’s case, it seems that on this issue, before 1945 his views had very little impact on the protection of Japan’s core culture. In Hirohito’s case, his embrace of State Shinto likely had a standardizing effect on Shinto worship across Japan, but it is hard to say exactly how

1452 Note the arguments of anthropologists Charles Kraft and Paul Hiebert that are cited in Chapter 1.  
1453 Perhaps another case of this is Tsar Nicholas II, his wife the Empress Alexandra of Russia, and their interactions with the monk Rasputin. See Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra (New York: Atheneum, 1967).  
1454 More concrete study of this issue would be needed to confirm the exact effects of State Shinto on local worship practices in Japan from the 1930s to 1945.
much. Despite the devastation of World War II, I wish to argue that the core of rural Japanese culture and society survived basically intact.\footnote{I cannot say anything about urban issues, since they are beyond this present data.}

On their views of spirituality, the state and the Japanese nation, Yanagita stressed the central role of local, ujigami worship in Japanese identity, communality, and national unity. The standardizing effect of State Shinto destroyed this. Yanagita was willing to allow some state involvement in religion, though, to protect ujigami worship, what he saw as the heart of Japanese culture. Hirohito accepted the basic notions of State Shinto more than Yanagita did. As noted in just above, Yanagita’s views had little or no impact before World War II, perhaps they did after (on Japanese cultural preservation). Hirohito survived the war. I cannot judge the impact of his support of State Shinto on Japanese culture in rural areas (protecting it from Western influence). But on a basic level, the whole State Shinto system, including emperor ideology, proved disastrous for Japan in how it encouraged the Japanese to devote themselves to destructive actions in the war that finally nearly destroyed the nation, at least physically. But this was not the result of Shinto itself, but rather of its nationalist perversion as State Shinto. Japan’s defeat subjected it to an unprecedented onslaught of American cultural and political influence after the war. At this level, ironically Hirohito’s embrace of State Shinto indirectly contributed to the postwar deluge of Western and American cultural influences into Japan in the postwar period. In this sense, Hirohito’s support of State Shinto had huge political and cultural impacts on Japan, especially after the war. Yet it does not seem that the core of Japanese culture or spirituality was destroyed before the war.
On translative adaptation, in the evidence in the domestic society worldviews seen here, as Japan attempted to adapt to the global market, in spite of its importation of Western social and cultural items, did the “core” of its domestic society and culture stay mostly “non-Western” and “Japanese?” On views of social development, despite Yanagita’s wise conclusions, I have seen no evidence that Japanese policy makers intentionally heeded his sage advice. Nevertheless, it seems that in the pre-1945 period, rural Japanese culture (its core) remained durable, despite the huge changes brought during the war, and the damage in urban areas.  

On rural and urban social development, Yanagita expressed wise concerns about increasing gaps between rural and urban areas and the destruction of rural culture. There is no evidence that his concerns were listened to in the prewar era. Yet it again appears that the core elements of rural Japanese culture, especially values, continued, though likely somewhat altered.

Concerning translative adaptation and these leaders’ views of religion, spirituality and soc development, again, I do not believe that Yanagita’s very wise conclusions had significant impacts on policies in Japan before 1945. Hirohito had gigantic impacts. Changes surely did result in rural Japan’s spirituality through the creation of State Shinto and its elaborate hierarchy of Shinto shrines—perhaps there was a standardizing and squelching of heart-felt regional worship, as Yanagita had feared. And the impacts on Japan at large because of Hirohito’s delay in ending the war were even larger. Did essential values continue, though? In rural Japan I wish to say yes. Though I am not sure for urban Japan, I postulate that changes were even greater there.

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1456 Again, I cannot comment on what happened in urban areas.
So translative adaptation seems basically valid in rural Japan on the issue of spirituality and society development.

On translative adaptation and leaders’ views of spirituality, the state and the Japanese nation, the state did not intervene as Yanagita wished in order to protect *ujigami* worship. But it did create various patriotic and neighborhood associations across Japan to mobilize all Japanese into sacrifice and hard work on behalf of the war effort. The ideologies that Hirohito supported (of nationalism, emperor worship, and State Shinto) were part of this mobilization. Despite the massive invasion of American presence into Japan that the failure of these ideologies permitted, Japanese culture’s “core” stayed durable, certainly through 1945. The process of translative adaptation seems affirmed here.

**Technology Issues.** If we view these leaders’ domestic society worldviews through Glick’s concept of technology, Yanagita’s basic view of culture and society is very holistic, multi-level, and includes concern for the effect of larger events on daily life and work. His view of social and economic development also manifests this; the idea that without careful judgment and standards, the very processes connected with development and commodities pouring into rural Japan will destroy its identity and soul (the global destroying the local). Yanagita fits Glick’s concept of technology very well here. Hirohito shows no concern for this, other than that both he and the Japanese people should faithfully worship and follow the dictates of Japan’s (imperial) ancestors, the kami, and State Shinto ideology and practices. If either they or he did not, in theory the nation would not be protected and blessed.
In his views of domestic society, Yanagita supports the ideas of technonationalism as ideology, but only indirectly. Through his holistic concept of culture, where society and economy are closely connected, we see the view that if the nation wisely protects its communality, the unity and spiritual center of indigenous worship, the anchor of its identity, it will also be blessed economically, as a by-product. Hirohito is an even less a direct proponent of technonationalism as ideology. Similarly, he also seems to express the conviction that if both he and the Japanese people are faithful in their moral and ritual duties (i.e. faithful worship of the nation’s ancestors and the kami through State Shinto worship), then the nation will be protected and blessed economically and militarily. Although both Hirohito and many Japanese faithfully worshipped as they were taught, in World War II, this view proved false.

**Cognition Issues. Image.** Images on Japan’s domestic society (1895 to 1945) cover those on 1) society, culture, social change and development; 2) rural and urban societies; and 3) religion and spirituality. Most of these images are Yanagita’s; only a few are from Hirohito. Yanagita’s images of culture portray it as holistic. In his images of Japanese society and its problems, a lack of self-knowledge and the breakdown of indigenous Japanese communality, partly driven by national, standardizing forces of bureaucracy, education, and similar phenomena, threaten Japanese society and culture. Yanagita’s images of how to protect Japanese culture stress the issues of how to guard communality, and increase cultural awareness. On social change and development, Yanagita stresses worldview issues. Increasing worldview gaps between rural and urban Japan threaten society. Without increased, balanced flexibility in their worldviews and
consideration of indigenous factors, Japanese cannot develop their nation successfully.  

Concerning Yanagita’s images of rural and urban societies, those on rural social development emphasize the danger of increasing materialism, and Western and urban cultures destroying Japan’s indigenous, rural culture. Images on social solidarity and communality stress the challenges of renewing communality. One of the challenges is morality. Another is the multiple levels on which communality increasingly occurs, including family, village/local, and national levels.

There are many images on religion and spirituality. Yanagita’s images on religion and spirituality in general stress local spirits (ujigami or kami) protecting local areas or families. Though styles of worship vary across regions, Yanagita sees the imperial family and the sun goddess as their foundation. If family and other levels of communality are nurtured and renewed, the communality of the whole nation will be also. The spiritual world affects the physically visible world. Regarding spirituality and the nation, Yanagita’s images stress the common bonds of faith, blood, descent and history that all Japanese possess through ujigami worship and the imperial family. Hirohito’s images also stress the imperial family as the foundation of the people’s lineage and identity, and the importance of Shinto rituals for the life of the nation. In his images on State Shinto, Yanagita opposes its imposition of a strict hierarchy on the nation’s localized patterns of worship, though he personally does not disagree with many of State Shinto’s doctrines. Yanagita’s images of rural and local spirituality stress the localized,  

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1457 Yanagita would define successful development as that which both encourages economic growth and respect for Japan’s indigenous culture and identity.
1458 All of these images are Yanagita’s.
regional nature of Japanese (ujigami) spirituality, the necessity to understand it on the local level, and how ujigami worship can provide a basis for renewing national communality, which in turn can renew the whole nation’s social development.

How did these images possibly function as perceptual filters or organizing devices? While the images on society of Yanagita show that he was an astute, brilliant observer, there are various potential weaknesses in his findings. His bias toward rural society shows he had a potential ignorance of both urban and international issues, needs, and realities. He also ignores potential positive contributions from Western culture that may strengthen Japan: improvements in education, technology, health, and human rights, among other areas. In his views of religion and spirituality, Yanagita fails to recognize the values of Japanese nationalism, of uniting the nation for more effective defense, trade, and survival in the modern world. He has not fully proven that the “heart” of Japanese culture is indeed in rural Japan. Though he accurately describes rural worship and spirituality, and criticizes negative aspects of State Shinto, he fails to offer practical alternatives to counter its influence. Regarding Hirohito’s images and potential blind spots, they are many. He failed to recognize that State Shinto and his embrace of it failed the nation. The distorted views that resulted helped contribute to Japan’s near destruction. Hirohito also failed to see his own personal responsibility in this and, according to Bix, seemed more interested in his and the throne’s survival after the war (Bix 2000). This perpetuated his lack of accountability, and perhaps the nation’s.

Worldview: The main views about the nature of the world that emerges from the worldviews constructed from the above images about domestic society, especially from Yanagita, are that human life and culture are holistic, and that we need to understand the
world, including society and spirituality, on the local level as well. Regarding how the world functions, to handle social change, flexibility to change and awareness of one’s own self (culture, worldviews) are needed. On the world’s order, Yanagita saw worldview issues as an important part of social change and development. Regarding Japan, Yanagita believed that standardizing forces, such as bureaucratization and national education, were destroying Japanese culture and societal features like social solidarity and communality. The lack of self-knowledge of the Japanese threatened their culture. New awareness and cultural standards could help protect Japanese culture and communality. Yanagita believed that flexible but durable worldviews were necessary for Japan to successfully adjust to rapid social change. Increasing worldview gaps between rural and urban Japan, materialism and Western and urban cultures were destroying Japan’s indigenous, rural culture and threatening society. Yanagita saw Japan’s communality occurring on multiple levels, including the local; local spirits protect areas and families in Japan. To both Yanagita and Hirohito, a foundation for all Japanese was their spirituality and the imperial family. Yanagita believed it was bad to standardize much of Japanese worship into standardized forms (State Shinto), as that destroyed Japanese spirituality and culture, but renewing local indigenous worship could help renew national communality and social development. Regarding the West, both Yanagita and Hirohito believed that Western culture was ill-suited for Japan, especially its traditional culture.

What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold these worldviews, and how did the environments interacted with or affected these leaders’ worldviews? Immersion in rural Japanese society through research and
university studies greatly affected Yanagita. Although he had exposure to urban Japanese and international environments as well, the rural focus affected Yanagita’s findings, images and worldviews on domestic society. Hirohito was immersed in elite, imperial, state, and militarist subcultures. These biased him toward elite responses, and he seems to have had almost zero comprehension of local Japanese culture.\(^{1459}\)

How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understandings of events and their causes? On perception, Yanagita’s immersion in rural areas strongly affected his findings and conclusions. Hirohito’s isolation and exposure to nationalist ideologies greatly shaped his views and beliefs. Concerning uses of information, Yanagita relied on ethnographic research, local observations, personal study, and new theories of ethnographic research from leading scholars in the West. Hirohito relied on his own education, isolated upbringing, advice from court officials and other leading aristocrats in Japan. He had no exposure to local Japanese and their lives. Regarding events and their causes, Yanagita had a holistic view of Japanese society and life. He saw nothing seen in isolation, but assumed that all Japanese social life flowed out of what he determined to be “indigenous”—the heartfelt worship and communality in rural areas. Hirohito accepted all his training and ideological notions of emperor and imperial ideologies, nationalistic ideologies, and State Shinto.

How have technological systems affected these worldviews? If so, which aspects? The main effect of technology on Yanagita’s worldviews of society was his

\(^{1459}\) The same basic environmental effects on Hirohito’s domestic society worldviews were also noted earlier under my findings for the environmental effects on his domestic state and market worldviews.
concern over whether the flood of Western products and culture into rural Japan would destroy rural culture. Hirohito’s chief concern was that the technological power and military successes of Japan in various wars, including World War II at certain points, seemed to confirm to conservative Japanese and others, including himself, the rightness of their worldview and system. This also reinforced his belief in Shinto and nationalist ideologies through the war’s end.

In comparing the domestic society worldviews of these two leaders, I am struck by Yanagita’s in-depth observations of rural society, and Hirohito’s few observations and images of society, due to his lack of exposure to it. The two leaders are similar in a few of their convictions of spirituality (on imperial origins and the descent of the nation). Yanagita supports spontaneous rural worship; Hirohito supports State Shinto as the true practice of the land.

*Cultural Logics.* The global phenomena behind domestic society worldviews to which these leaders responded included Western theories about society and culture, ideas from politics and economics that affected society, evolutionistic thought, thought about social institutions, health and education, overseas wars in Asia and elsewhere and their effects on Japanese society, new ideas about social change, morality, workers’ and human rights, freedom, democracy and how those affected Japanese society, Western cultural and social influences on literature, music and the arts, new media influences (radio, broader circulation of newspapers), and technological innovations (i.e. telephones and increased mobility through the spread of railroads). As Japanese society turned more inward in the 1930s and 1940, several domestic features became increasingly influential on Japanese society, including State Shinto, nationalistic and militaristic ideologies.
What were the leaders’ worldviews/basic beliefs about these phenomena?

While Yanagita felt that Western culture in general was incompatible with Japanese culture and society, and was somewhat wary of Western culture and science, he accepted that some Western theories about society might be used to protect Japanese culture from the onslaught of Western influences, his first concern, and give voice to the Japanese people. In Yanagita’s mind, the people were wise; they had more common sense than foolish, selfish leaders. The people should be heard, not crushed. He also believed that the heart of Japanese culture was in the lives and beliefs of people in “traditional,” rural, agricultural Japan. Yanagita supported several progressive ideas about democracy, workers’ and farmers’ rights. He worried about the influences of elites, the military, Western culture and technology, and thought they should be controlled by careful judgment, increased awareness and self-knowledge by all Japanese. Hirohito saw Western culture as relatively unfamiliar, strange, foreign, and generally not compatible with Japanese culture. He believed that the heart of Japan, the deepest part of its identity, was found in the Meiji state-manufactured State Shinto. Though I have not read exactly what he believed about Japanese society, Hirohito’s actions suggest that he deeply honored and valued Japan’s “traditions” as he learned them, and was concerned that they be preserved against corrupting Western influences. Some of what Hirohito learned about State Shinto was corrupted and a distorted version of Japanese spirituality, as Yanagita

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1460 This reminds one of Lawrence F. Salmen’s *Listen to the People: Participant-Observer Observation of Development Projects* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), which stresses the wisdom of learning from local people in development projects through the ethnographic research method of participant observation.
argued. Hirohito was not seem opposed to technology, per se, but did not like democratic movements.

What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena, and what were the leaders’ responses to the phenomena? To both Yanagita and Hirohito, Western culture was generally not seen as compatible with ideologies of State Shinto, the emperor and imperial throne ideologies. What were their responses to these phenomena? Yanagita used Western theories about society and culture to study Japan and its culture, so it might be protected. He attempted in his writings to inform and train other Japanese about who they were (identity) and to get them to incorporate new critical standards for judging culture, so they could protect themselves. Hirohito was informed about various Western phenomena and ideas, including politics, science, economics and culture, though his education was highly oriented toward conservative, militaristic and nationalist ideologies. His unique, isolated environment meant that he could not respond very flexibly to these issues. His responses were cautious, guarded, and ideologically conservative. Though he loved pure scientific investigation, he did not concern himself very much with direct Western cultural and social influences, but more with Western political issues and threats.

What were the cultural logics under these responses? To Yanagita, Western culture was basically incompatible with Japanese culture, though it did have some useful ideas and methods that were practical and ironically could help Japan strengthen itself against the West. To Hirohito, Japan was a divine and unique nation, unlike all others. The West did not understand Japan, and never could. The emperor’s sacred,
unchangeable duty was to guard, protect and lead the nation, the people and their sacred heritage.

In comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena, it emerges that Yanagita’s logics in both cases stress that Western culture was incompatible with Japan, though it could provide tools to help protect Japanese culture. The former logics stressed the inherent wisdom of the Japanese people more than the latter ones, which focused more on the West. Hirohito’s first logics accepted the common Japanese view that Western culture is highly different from Japanese culture. He also accepted the general, official ideological views of the state; there is no indication he did not.

Hirohito’s latter cultural logics were basically the same as the first in their assumptions.

Conclusion

First, I will offer some preliminary reflections from this chapter on the first key research question of the dissertation, how Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations from 1850 to 1945 (here, focusing on 1895 to 1945), and key leaders’ worldviews of those issues, may have affected its current foreign aid policies. General trends will be noted here, while more concrete linkages between ideas and experiences in this era and Japan’s current ODA policies will be noted in Chapters 9 and 10, the concluding chapters. On sociocultural issues (technological development and domestic society), both the Japanese military and state played a huge role in Japan’s R&D from 1895-1945. There was also a repressive environment toward the end of the era. Today, while the government plays a large role in encouraging Japanese R&D, the
private sector also has a huge role. In its aid, Japan most certainly does not encourage heavy development of military R&D for the growth of LDCs. It also heavily involves the private sector. Developing a high quality education system was a top priority for Japan, with a proper balance of foreign and imported elements. It should be one of the top priorities for successful development. For that, education must be free from ideological or propagandistic influences. It was not in Japan before 1945. Related to social change and economic development, there are other issues in this period (1895 to 1945) that were decisive, including women’s participation in the economy, development’s effects on them, media freedoms, social and worldview flexibility/durability, and the need for policies to encourage social solidarity through localized approaches to education, social cooperation, and morality.\textsuperscript{1461} Japan’s policies in these areas fell far short. They focused on national goals, to the detriment of local identities, and generally ignored women’s needs (actually seeking to discourage the participation of most women in the economy during World War II). They also limited media freedoms from the 1930s to 1945, and sought to impose ultra-conservative worldviews from the top down. Today’s Japanese ODA seeks to be increasingly sensitive to these social goals and needs, and to incorporate them into its agenda.\textsuperscript{1462}

On cultural issues and development, in Japan in this period, there was a varied, vibrant response to economic development and international forces, especially seen in

\textsuperscript{1461} Remember that the policies to encourage social solidarity and communality were the recommendation of Yanagita Kunio.
\textsuperscript{1462} Evidence of this is seen on JICA’s website (Japan International Cooperation Agency, www.jica.go.jp/english, accessed September 26, 2008). Several global issues of priority for JICA listed on the website, and involving social change and development, include education, health, governance, peace-building, gender and development, and poverty reduction. But how effectively is consideration of these issues actually being incorporated?
Japan’s popular culture, and in its intellectual life. The focus of many of Japan’s top political leaders at this time, such as Hirohito, was external, not very internal. A balance between internal and external focus is needed for successful development. A government should initiate policies to protect social solidarity and identity at all levels, not just the national, including encouraging critical cultural standards, but not censorship. Japan failed in many of these areas; today’s LDCs might learn from its mistakes. A key question is: what is Japan’s aid doing now?

On religion and development, for effective development, separation of religion and state are paramount. The state should not endorse any religion or (indigenous) ideology, even for development. In Japan, the state endorsed Shinto, and reformulated it. This negatively affected other religious groups, and deceived Japanese into waging a disastrous war that nearly destroyed the country. It has continued to sour Japan’s relations with nearby countries over controversies such as the Yasukuni Shrine. How can a developing nation’s government help religion can to encourage development, even indirectly, without coercion or endorsement of one faith over another?

A concept that prevailed in Japan at this time, still influential, is that Japanese identity, even kinship, is strongly connected to particular forms of religion and spirituality. In a sense, a conviction of the strong connections between the spiritual and physical worlds seems predominant throughout much of the developing world, unlike in the West and its Flaw of the Excluded Middle. For development and aid plans to succeed, they need to consider the religion and spirituality factor among others, since it is such an important part of a people’s core identity and worldviews. The strong connection between presumed identity and spirituality in so much of the non-Western world may
make separation of religion and state a very difficult thing to achieve in policy. Yet if this is not respectfully achieved, the state may coercively endorse one religion over another, and the nation risks some of the mistakes Japan and other authoritarian societies have made on the issue of religion.

On domestic political economy issues, in prewar Japanese politics, there was a continuing battle between those who supported more liberal, democratic politics, and the repressive, oligarchic tendencies of the state. The repressive side won. In Japan, from the 1920s to 1945, authoritarianism and the military grew too strong, and nearly destroyed Japan as a result. Conversely, Japan has prospered much more greatly under a democratic type system than was ever imaginable under the repressive system. Ideologically, two key leaders we studied in this period (Yanagita and Hirohito) had rather conservative political ideologies, though Yanagita preferred more populist, democratic political approaches. In several postwar developing countries in East Asia, conservative politics have often guided economic development (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). Though authoritarianism is not desirable, conservative political approaches may be best, at first. For general ODA policy and Japan’s, it seems that aid for LDC should encourage the development of democracy, while allowing for the presence of more conservative ideologies, since these have worked so well in many East Asian LDCs. A strong state is also a common factor in all of these cases.

On domestic economic policy and development, one of the most important economic issues in Japan (1895-1945) was the issue of balance. While Japan experienced great growth until the 1920s, and later decline the Showa depression and World II, it struggled to balance large-scale industrialization with small-scale industries, urban with
rural growth, and military domination of the economy and economic growth in the 1930s and early 1940s. Two additional significant points here include the strong state presence in Japan’s economy, and Yanagita’s idea that there are multiple paths to development, and that they must be customized by each nation’s conditions. Yanagita’s idea of customized development also seems evident in current Japanese development scholars’ support for translative adaptation. Ironically, in much its current aid, and throughout the postwar period, Japan has argued for a rather universalizing approach to aid that emphasizes economic infrastructure. And ironically, the Western/global development agenda now argues that more ground-level, customized approaches. Concerning the impact of Japan’s military on its domestic economy, while several military conflicts in this era built up Japan’s economy (i.e. the Russo-Japanese War and World War I), World War II totally destroyed it. Given the destructive impacts of warfare on society, ODA policies must encourage limits on conflict, military force and its growth. Japan’s aid policies now do.

On the role of development and security ideologies in Japan’s domestic issues, in the era 1895 to 1945, the Japanese state did not hesitate to draw on propagandistic ideologies incorporating race and religion to promote to promote development and war. ODA policy should never promote such ideas for the pursuit of development, and Japan’s ODA policy does not. These ideologies violate the idea of separation of religion and state, among many other problems, and caused many difficulties for Japan before World War II.

On culture and the arts, the arts in Japan were largely unfettered before the late 1920s. Especially from the 1930s to 1945, more government control and censorship
occurred. ODA policies from Japan and other nations should seek to enhance cultural freedom where they can.

On the second key research question of the dissertation, are the ideas of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation, as reflected in the domestic worldviews studied here, an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development in this period? Concerning views of Japan’s technological development, Yanagita was concerned about the effects of aggressive internationalization of Japan by the West, seen in the affects of Western technology and cultural products on Japanese society. Hirohito’s views focused on the external challenges brought by Japan’s internationalization. On technology and translative adaptation, Yanagita focuses most on how Japan’s domestic core culture could remain intact during the flood of Western input entering Japan. Hirohito’s views do not show concern for translative adaptation.

In views of the domestic state, on “modernization,” as the domestic state was increasingly absorbed into the global economy, did its “core” culture of politics become more Western, or stay “Japanese”? I conclude that the core of Japan’s politics in this era did not change much. Popular input remained limited, and authoritarianism on the national level and decision-making by consensus in rural areas both continued. In domestic politics worldviews of Yanagita and Hirohito, “modernization” basically prevails. Yanagita is more concerned for local, grassroots politics, and is democratic populist in orientation. Hirohito more focused on oligarchic control of the political system, and on national and international issues. In their support for varying degrees of emperor-centered Shinto nationalism, both leaders again support “modernization.” I also argued above that in Japan’s core culture of politics, the worldviews of Yanagita also
support the concept of translative adaptation, though Hirohito’s did not. Yanagita in particular was concerned for the preservation of Japan’s local political life.

On worldviews of the domestic market, in Japan’s general economy, I concluded above that “modernization” basically prevailed, though this was not intentional. In views of Japan’s economic development, I also argue that Japan’s core culture, especially in rural areas, stayed basically Japanese. I argued this also seemed true on the issues of the rural and urban economy. In the prewar period, Japan’s cultural core, Yanagita’s main concern, essentially stayed the same. Regarding translative adaptation, before 1945, though the government did not follow Yanagita’s vision for localized and regional economic development on the rural level, Japan’s rural social structure and stability remained basically intact, so the concept seems validated here, though I cannot comment on urban culture. On economic development, though the government followed policies supporting massive industrialization and militarization, it seems Japan’s rural cultural core remained stable, so again, translative adaptation seems validated. The government’s focus during this period was not on the rural and urban divide, or on protecting Japan’s indigenous culture, but on strengthening Japan against external threats and maintaining internal stability and security. Through the evidence studied here, it seems that translative adaptation held true through 1945, at least for rural areas.

On views of domestic society, despite Yanagita’s wise insights about how to better protect Japan’s cultural heritage and its rural spirituality in the midst of rapid changes in Japan’s rural and urban social development, the government paid no attention. Hirohito supported the ideologies of nationalistic State Shinto, and his views had somewhat of a standardizing effect on Shinto worship across the nation, since they
concurred with official government policies. Despite the damage of World War II, I concluded above that the core of rural Japanese culture remained basically stable through 1945, and that Hirohito’s support of State Shinto before the war contributed somewhat to the defeat of Japan, and so ironically opened the door to massive American cultural penetration into Japan after 1945. In all of these processes, it seems that the ideals of “modernization” were not really respected by Hirohito or by the government, though they were by Yanagita. Yet in practice, since the “core” of rural Japan stayed basically stable through 1945, the ideals of “modernization” prevailed here. Concerning translative adaptation, in various areas of the worldviews of the domestic society studied here, including views of social development, rural and urban society, religion, spirituality and social development, and spirituality and the state, although Yanagita offered advice that seemed very wise, few of his policy suggestions were adopted by the state before 1945. On spirituality and social development, Hirohito had a large policy impact, through his support for the emperor ideology and the standardizing effect of State Shinto. In all of these areas, in rural Japan, the ideals of translative adaptation were affirmed through 1945.

From the domestic contexts presented in Chapter 7, what lessons emerge about Japan’s experiences with technology and development? As noted above, enhancing Japan’s capacity in science and technology was perceived by Meiji policymakers as one of the key ways to strengthen the nation against Western invasion. The state had a degree

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1463 I make this argument since Hirohito supported State Shinto and its nationalistic efforts that encouraged large popular support for Japan’s war efforts, which nearly destroyed the nation.

1464 Here I will not consider contextual aspects related to foreign relations, since this chapter is mainly focused on domestic issues. I did the same in two previous chapters, 3 and 4, which were similarly mainly focused on domestic issues.
of involvement in research and development that was, for the time, high by global standards. Industrial and research activities generally received a boon during periods of military escalation, although they were isolated from key foreign sources during World War II. Though Japan pioneered several significant developments before the war, most of its technological achievements in that era were based on technological imports from abroad.

Development contexts fall into three main areas, political, economic and social. From 1895 to 1945, authoritarianism dominated the Japanese political landscape, except for brief cultural trends (called Taisho democracy) supporting democratic tendencies from about 1912 to the early 1930s. Meiji politicians purposely limited democratic input, since they felt Japan was not yet prepared for it. Militarism was ascendant in political influence from the late 1920s through 1945. Political and religious nationalism were heavily promoted by the state during the 1930s through 1945, to enhance patriotism and the national war effort. State involvement in the Japanese economy was heavy throughout this period, and promoted heavy industry, large-scale business, including zaibatsu, and national security through economic and technological strength. Though an economic boom occurred in Japan due to several wars from 1894 through World War I and new colonization, Japan was hit by several economic depressions and slowdowns during the 1920s and 1930s. From 1931, the government increased military spending, which helped prompt some growth in key industries. On social development, we noted how state-promoted nationalism, begun in the early Meiji period, accelerated through 1945, through the promotion of religious nationalism, neo-Confucian values, emperor ideology, the

1465 In other words, this last point refers to the ideology of fukoku kyôhei.
national education system, and various rituals. Other significant social trends included increased involvement by women in the economy, the expansion of national media, and continuing vitality in Japanese religion, despite government manipulation of spirituality through State Shinto.

How did the worldviews of Yanagita and Hirohito compare with Japan’s experiences in this period? Though Yanagita showed more concern for maintaining the cultural identity and integrity of the rural Japanese heartland, both Hirohito and the Japanese state placed more priority on Japan’s international security, especially economic and political.\[1466\] Japan’s basic culture of politics, emphasizing oligarchic control of political institutions and decision-making at the national level, and consensual decision-making at the local level, remained fairly stable in overall tendencies, so the concepts of “modernization” and translative adaptation were generally affirmed. In Yanagita’s views of the domestic market, concern for preservation of local rural cultural integrity also seemed affirmed, though this was not government policy. Hence, “modernization” and translative adaptation were again supported. On social development, though Yanagita offered many wise observations about how to preserve rural Japan’s cultural integrity, the government did not pay attention. Hirohito was not explicitly concerned about the cultural integrity of rural Japan (though no doubt he would have desired it). Rather, his concern was mainly for Japan’s international security and the stability of the throne. The government also ignored Yanagita’s many suggestions about protecting Japan’s rural spirituality. Hirohito’s support for State Shinto likely had a standardizing effect on

\[1466\] This is not to suggest that they did not also feel that internal security did not matter.
elements of Japanese spirituality. I concluded that through 1945, in social development, the goals of “modernization” and transitive adaptation were basically supported.

Japan’s general experience with technological development (1895-1945) essentially agrees with the external security focus of Hirohito and the Japanese government, not the internal concerns of Yanagita. The focus of technological development was mainly external, on building up Japan’s technological capabilities internally so they could contribute to Japan’s national security, and on what foreign technological innovations needed to be copied and mastered. The contexts of Japan’s domestic politics also leaned more in the direction of Hirohito’s and the Japanese government’s authoritarian tendencies, not toward Yanagita’s democratic populism. In the economy, as with technological development, the emphasis tended toward strengthening Japan’s internal infrastructure for the purpose of national (external) security, again, more in line with Hirohito’s and the state’s concerns, not Yanagita’s. On the social front, the state exercised increasingly nationalistic manipulation of education, spirituality and education, in support of national security, especially from the 1930s to 1945. This was the general policy tendency from 1895 to 1945, increasingly so as time went on. Yanagita’s domestic cultural concerns do not seem to have become a major policy concern until Japan became more affluent in the postwar period. In all of these policy areas, both the prevalent worldviews and contexts emphasize domestic strength and stability in support of Japan’s national security, or technonationalism as ideology.

Regarding the third key question of the dissertation, how Japanese spirituality has perhaps affected Japan’s foreign aid policies, what evidence do we see in the historical data in Chapter 7 of how views of spirituality and religion may have affected
policies in this period? Yanagita’s views stress spirituality in the local level, and its role in protecting communality and social solidarity. Hirohito’s emphasize his role on the national level. Each leader’s view of the role of spirituality in the life of the nation was influenced by each one’s respective upbringing and professional experience. While Yanagita emphasized spirituality as a vital part of Japanese identity, and the role of the state in protecting Japan’s culture, Hirohito saw it as an important pillar of the nation-state, its politics, and the throne. Hirohito accepted the notions of State Shinto more than Yanagita. Hirohito also wished to use spirituality (State Shinto) to promote the nation. Both share a view of the importance of spirituality in promoting the health and life of the nation, though differ in how that will happen. In a few of their observations of spirituality, of the imperial origins and descent of the nation, there are also similarities. There are weaknesses in their views. Yanagita is not able to offer a counter to the influences of State Shinto. Hirohito is blind to the damage done to Japan by the same, and his participation in that process.

On religion in Chapter 7, it is clear that Yanagita is especially concerned about the preservation of Japan’s identity by preserving local religious and spiritual practices throughout rural Japan. He believes that the government, including elements of State Shinto, does not respect them. Though both Hirohito and Yanagita support elements of Shinto ideology, such as the emperor as the supreme spiritual authority, Hirohito does more so. Hirohito desires to use religion more as a tool to promote the state and throne on the national level, while Yanagita’s primary concern is the survival of rural Japanese spirituality, culture and identity, on the local level.
What impacts might these views of spirituality and religion have had on policy issues in this era? The further into the period (1895 to 1945) we proceed, the more advanced becomes the role of spirituality in promoting state aims. Spirituality had a big role in Japanese nationalism, seen in such images and phenomena as the emperor as the nation’s intercessor and high priest, the use of State Shinto to encourage nationalism, and the presence of spiritual symbols in the national education system for the same purpose. State Shinto was also a prime government tool to influence patriotism and support for the state, the emperor system, and World War II, through education. Both Yanagita and Hirohito have images and beliefs supporting the important role of the emperor as the nation’s spiritual leader, Hirohito to a more extreme degree. Both use images suggesting the strong connections among Japanese religion, spirituality, and politics. Hirohito’s views on spirituality had a much greater policy impact than Yanagita’s did, especially before 1945. Both Yanagita and Hirohito suggest the attitude that if the people practice proper Shinto rituals and spirituality, that the nation will be protected from aggressive foreign invasion, either politically or culturally. Though Hirohito was very faithful to his spiritual duties, this was not the case. Despite Yanagita’s wise recommendations for what Japan should do to protect its local and indigenous cultures and spirituality, the government ignored his advice. The State Shinto supported by the government and Hirohito ultimately seemed to have a rather negative standardizing effect on indigenous spirituality, and almost destroyed the nation.

At the beginning of this conclusion of this chapter I offer policy lessons on the issues of economic development, religion, spirituality, politics, and religious freedom. One is that leaders of LDCs should be aware of the positive roles that spirituality and
religion can possibly play in economic development. Religion, if properly free and encouraged, yet kept separate from the state, can be an extremely vital encourager of development. An LDC’s state should not trample on religious freedom, a vital sector of civil society. Freedom of religion must be guaranteed. Religious leaders should not seek to invade the domain of the state and politics, though their limited ethical input should be allowed. In the challenging area of religion and politics, careful balance and wisdom should be sought. LDC leaders must also receive broad training in the diverse social and ethnic issues they will confront, including religion and spirituality, to positively engage them for the nation’s benefit, in development and security. An LDC’s leaders must learn how to include religion as a positive part of their development and security tool kit. Another major policy lesson here is that an LDC’s government should seek to protect itself from the impact of negative cultural values of forces such as hyper-materialism (or hyper-secularism), which ignores the important contributions of religion and spirituality, by enacting proactive policies. It should seek to encourage opportunities to enhance the nation’s both material and cultural/spiritual lives, without overt interference in the religious sphere.

In pre-1945 Japan (since 1868), the state drew heavily on religious and spiritual ideologies and images to support patriotism, nationalism, and national development. It did not hesitate to mix these images and symbols with the political system. In the 1930s and 1940s, it was also happy to attempt to control, suppress or marshal religious bodies such as Shinto, Buddhist and Christian groups, and new religions such as Sôka Gakkai, in
service of the national interest. In spite of these efforts by the state, religion and spirituality remained very active and vital in Japan, even more so after the war. The state’s strict withdrawal from active involvement in religion, prompted by the separation of religion and the state as mandated in the American-imposed Constitution of 1947, contrasts sharply with the state’s gradual increasing use of spirituality as a pragmatic policy tool from 1868 to 1945. If anything, this modern behavior seems more in line with much of Japanese history, where political officials have often been wary of over-involvement by different sects in the affairs of the state. So the willingness of the state to create State Shinto seems almost a reflection of attitudes toward spirituality in popular Japanese culture, namely a rejection of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle, and a pragmatic willingness to draw on any form of spirituality that meets one’s current particular need.

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1467 We noted above how Sōka Gakkai resisted the government’s attempts at state control. During World War II, the government forced Protestant churches into one grouping, and encouraged both Protestants and Catholics to include honoring the emperor as part of their worship services. Marshalling religion in the service of the state is also a feature of several postwar Communist systems in East Asia. In China, the government organized all legal Protestant churches into the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and Catholics into the Catholic Patriotic Association. Unregistered groups are illegal, but currently tolerated. After the enormous earthquake near Chengdu, Sichuan, China in May 2008, the Chinese government showed more willingness to allow volunteer groups from outside China, even religious ones, to assist with relief efforts. In North Korea, religion has been strictly banned and controlled for state purposes.

1468 I noted an example of this wariness in an earlier chapter, when the Japanese state relocated the capital to Kyoto to avoid excessive influence of Buddhist clergy in state affairs.

1469 The attitudes toward spirituality and religion mentioned in this paragraph and in the footnote immediately preceding show a pragmatic attitude toward religion that is common throughout East Asia, including in China, Japan, and Korea. This is a willingness to participate in any spiritual activity or site that will aid one’s current needs. In the examples just cited, the governments of China, North Korea and Japan have been happy to either ban religion, restrict it, or promote it, depending on what would serve state purposes. The Tokugawa government in Japan did the same thing when it banned Christianity in the seventeenth century. Despite the normally highly secularized nature of the states of China and Japan since ancient times (mentioned earlier in this research), this attitude shows a rejection of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle. Most of the time, rather than totally ignoring or banning spiritual reality, these East Asian states, like their citizens, are happy to acknowledge religion and utilize it when it serves their material, pragmatic purposes.
What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and science and similar issues for policy issues in this period? There is a strong connection between the spiritual and material worlds in the views of both Yanagita and Hirohito; in neither one is a conflict between these two realms seen to be inherent. In Chapter 6, there are not as many mentions and occurrences of materialism as there are of spirituality and religion. The most prominent occur in the views of Yanagita. For example, he is concerned that modern economics places too much emphasis on the material world and on wealth, and ignores the needs of the heart and soul. He also cares about the corrupting influence on rural life by increasing materialism and the penetration of urban and Western products. The “conflict” in Hirohito’s views between scientific rationality and spiritual ritual/practice does not seem to be as present in the views of Yanagita. He used a Western scientific methodology, ethnography, to uncover the nature of rural Japanese spirituality, so the cultural life of the nation might be protected.

Where were the possible future impacts of these issues for Japanese foreign aid? Here we observed Yanagita’s stress on local level impacts, and Hirohito’s stress on the national level. In contemporary Japanese aid, there is likely little consideration of spiritual issues and impacts of aid on any level. Yanagita stressed how protecting and respecting the indigenous spirituality of local and rural regions across Japan in must be the foundation of all policies to guard Japan’s essential culture and identity. Hirohito offered no consideration of these issues at all; he only desired to help impose a national level spirituality to strengthen the overall state. Contemporary Japanese aid has a basic attitude not to intervene in the religious and internal political/cultural matters of aid recipients. This ignores issues of how spirituality/religion in a given aid recipient affects
its receipt of aid, and the effectiveness of the recipient’s development programs. How could such a consideration enhance aid’s effectiveness?\footnote{Recall the observation of many foreign observers that Japan’s aid agencies have historically been weak in their skills in analyzing the “soft,” social aspects of aid (Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid). Religion and spirituality are two of those components. Yet since JICA and the OECO division of JBIC have just completed their new merger (on October 1, 2008) as I write this on October 11, 2008, things may slowly change. In a luncheon speech in Tokyo on October 1, 2008, New JICA president Ogata Sadako reported that the New JICA intends to establish a new research institute that will conduct research by first rate researchers on various soft components of aid, including economic, political and social issues, both in Japan and abroad. Reportedly, a big area of focus in the research will be aid to Africa, to which Japan has recently given increased priority (“Luncheon Speech at FCCJ,” http://glocom.blog59.fc2.com/blog-entry-832.html; accessed 11 October 2008). Hopefully consideration of religion and spirituality factors in Japan’s ODA by Japanese aid agencies may gradually improve. To comment definitively on this issue, ethnographic research would be necessary.}

Some states desire to use religion to help promote the state’s development, or at least they do not want development to conflict with the state’s national religious ideology.\footnote{Two such states are contemporary Saudi Arabia and Iran.} Could the failure of an aid donor to consider how religion affects the delivery or receipt of aid have a “secularizing” effect on the society of the aid recipient that might negatively affect its social stability or durability? This would be interesting to consider.

I noted above the very heavy role of spirituality in some areas of Japanese policy from 1868 to 1945, contrasted with its intentional absence in the postwar period, due to legal restrictions. But is there some sort of subtle influence anyway, even in aid? In some of my policy lessons, I argue that religion, in its proper sphere (separate from the state) can possibly enhance or complement economic development efforts, even those promoted by the state. Is contemporary Japanese aid cognizant of this fact? If so, is the Japanese government’s avoidance of the spiritual implications of its aid hampering, rather than enhancing, Japan’s aid efforts? If so, how could this situation be improved?
Increasing numbers of foreign policy policymakers acknowledge the importance of the “religion” factor in foreign policy and international politics, and the need of foreign policymakers and diplomats to understand it. Given the most obvious example of this issue since the 9-11 terrorist attack, Islamic terrorism, what is the Japanese state doing to better prepare its future diplomats and aid workers to better understand and handle the “religion” factor? What about in the issue of aid? Though Japan is not paying much attention to religion questions in its aid policies, is there a way that they might bring the religion factor into consideration? Despite the “messiness” of religious and similar cultural issues, if Japanese policymakers can be shown that such integration would be in their pragmatic interest, would they not be willing to embrace it? I will explore some of these questions further in Chapter 9.

See Albright and Woodward, Mighty and Almighty.

If they can be shown that doing so is in the best interests of Japan, its ODA programs, and aid recipients, given the pragmatic attitudes in Japan toward policy, foreign aid, and spirituality, I believe agencies like the New JICA will research these issues, especially if they can be practically shown how to do so without violating legal restrictions or interfering in an aid recipient’s internal affairs.
Chapter 8

Worldviews of Selected Key Leaders (1895-1945)

International Issues

Introduction

In Chapter 8, regarding international issues (1895-1945), on external political relations, I examine the worldviews of Ito Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Yanagita Kunio, and Emperor Hirohito, on external economic relations, those of Yanagita, on external cultural relations, Yanagita and Hirohito, and on imperialism, the views of Ito, Yamagata, Kato Hiroyuki, Yanagita, and Hirohito.

Chapter 8, like Chapters 5 and 6, considers primarily international issues, not domestic ones. Therefore here, as in Chapters 5 and 6, for the conceptual analysis of the technology aspects of the various worldviews about external matters, I will again ask questions on these six major themes related to technological issues on the international level, but not the domestic one: 1) general concepts of technology, 2) technology in the international system, 3) technology transfer, 4) technology, culture, and the

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See the insights about technology as a system offered by Szyliowicz in Politics, Technology, Development, 8 and mentioned in this dissertation.
international system, 5) technology, cognition, and international relations, and 6) technonationalism as ideology.

Contexts of Japan’s Foreign Relations (1895-1945): Major Trends

Contexts: Japan’s External Political Relations

Regarding Japan’s general international relations, earlier in this period, major themes included Japan’s attempt to renegotiate the unequal treaties imposed on it by the West (not achieved until 1911), increasing Japanese expansion on the mainland, conflicts with China, Korea, and Russia, increasing Japanese influence in Southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in the 1900s and 1910s, and several conflicts with the United States. During and shortly after World War I, Japan moved to consolidate its hold over territories in China and the South Pacific, including several formerly held by Germany. Japan put increasing pressure on China to allow more Japanese input into Chinese government affairs. From 1917 to 1922, Japan, along with several other allied nations, stationed up to 70,000 troops in eastern Siberia during the Russian Revolution. The Washington Conference of 1921 resulted in the “Washington System,” to encourage more cooperation in East Asia. Japan began to come under pressure to curb some of its actions in China, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia.

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1475 Note the discussion on technology and cognitive factors above in Chapter 5, based on Ibid., 8, 212, 223.
1476 Conflicts with the United States included disputes over trade and railway issues in China, U.S. restrictions over Japanese immigration in the United States, and increasing rivalry between the U.S. and Japanese navies in the Pacific (Japan, “History of International Relations,” 618).
1477 The territories over which Japan moved to strengthen its control included southern Manchuria, eastern Inner Mongolia, the Shandong peninsula in Shandong province, China, and Pacific islands formerly controlled by Germany (Ibid.).
1478 Ibid.
Further Japanese incursions on the mainland in the 1930s, including the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the founding of the Manchukuo puppet state in 1932, increased tensions between the United States and Japan. Both the United States and the League of Nations responded negatively. By early 1933, Japan withdrew from the League. Facing less trade with the United States and Britain, Japan turned to more intervention in Manchuria and northern China, which increased tension with the Soviet Union. Japan’s second war with China broke out in mid-1937. In 1938 and 1940 Japan issued two declarations of intention to create a new Pan-Asian, non-Western political order throughout Asia. After rapid German victories in Europe with the start of World War II there in September 1939, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940. By April 1941, Japan invaded all of French Indochina, and the United States stiffened economic sanctions against Japan by declaring an oil embargo and freezing Japanese assets. After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, war with the United States began in late 1941. Early, sweeping victories across the Pacific enabled Japan to occupy all of Southeast Asia, including French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. A turning point in the war was Japan’s defeat in the Battle of Midway in June 1942, and from that incident, Japan grew steadily weaker. The empire became more challenging to maintain.

On late July 1945, the United States, China and Britain issued the Potsdam Declaration, informing Japan that it must immediately surrender or face “prompt and

\[1479\] Ibid., 618-619. These were the Tôa Shinchitsujo (New Order in East Asia, declared in 1938), and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, announced in 1940.
\[1481\] Japan, “History of International Relations,” 619. For more details on World War II, see my discussion below on Hirohito’s views of Japan’s external political relations, later in this chapter, and in Chapter 9, in the section on the policy implications of external political relations worldviews.
utter destruction.” The Japanese government was divided on the issue. Delay resulted in the dropping of two atomic bombs and Soviet invasion of territories held on the mainland.\textsuperscript{1482} Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender by radio on August 15, 1945, and the Instrument of Surrender was signed on September 2, 1945.\textsuperscript{1483}

Regarding Japan’s foreign relations (1895 to 1945), throughout this era, the military increasingly challenged MOFA’s monopoly on the conduct of Japan’s foreign affairs, especially during conflicts such as the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I. From 1931, MOFA was increasingly forced to share foreign policy functions with various military representatives.\textsuperscript{1484}

In Northeast Asia, Japan’s victory against China in the Sino-Japanese War (1895) forced China to recognize Korea’s independence, cede Taiwan and the Liaodong peninsula, pay a large indemnity, and grant Japan broad trading privileges. Tumultuous events in China in the early 1900s included the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and its aftermath. Japan gave sanctuary to Sun Yat-sen’s political party and movement when they fled there. After World War I began, European powers fled Asia, and Japan rushed into China, claiming formerly German-held concessions. In 1915, Japan forced China to accept various demands.\textsuperscript{1485} Affronts such as these to China’s integrity led to the eruption of the May Fourth Movement, in which 4,000 Beijing university students protested in May 1919, causing widespread protests and strikes in China throughout the 1920s against foreign imperialist actions. After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1905),

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1482} Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Potsdam Declaration,” 404-405.
\item \textsuperscript{1483} Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Surrender,” 487. For more details on Japan’s surrender, see my discussion in Chapter 9.
\item \textsuperscript{1484} Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 317.
\item \textsuperscript{1485} These are known as the Twenty One Demands, which Japan made to China at this time.
\end{itemize}
Japan again won the right to the Liaodong peninsula, and extended its influence in Manchuria through the South Manchuria Railway. In the early 1930s, China’s Nationalist government and the Soviet Union increasingly threatened Japan’s interests in Manchuria. To solidify their hold on Manchuria, Japan’s Guandong Army blew up a section of the South Manchuria Railway north of Shenyang, and blamed the Chinese. After setting up the puppet state of Manchukuo in Manchuria in early 1932, Japan invaded Hebei province, near Beijing, in 1933. The second Sino-Japanese War began in late 1937 over fire exchanged near Beijing in July. Japanese hostilities in China continued through 1945, killing many millions.

Concerning Korea, after victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1905), Japan gained the legal right to exercise increasing influence in Korea. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea as a colony, controlling it through 1945.

Japan established consulates in Southeast Asia from the 1880s. During World War I, Japan occupied several South Pacific islands previously controlled by Germany, (considered by Japan to be in Southeast Asia). By 1936, Nanshinron (the “Southern Expansion Doctrine”) became official policy, implemented in 1940 in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. By late 1941, Japan occupied many areas in the region, including French Indochina, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and Burma. In late 1942 Japan formed the Greater East Asia Ministry,

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1486 This is known as the Manchurian Incident.
1487 Japan, “China and Japan,” 189-190.
1488 Japan, “Korea and Japan,” 828.
1489 The Greater East Co-prosperity Sphere was a slogan used by the Japanese government (1940 to 1945) to represent the idea of an economically and politically united Asia, led by Japan, to successfully resist Western imperialism and hegemony. The government also used the slogan to justify its imperialist plans for expansion on the mainland and elsewhere. The sphere included Japan, Manchukuo (Japan’s puppet state in Manchuria), additional areas of China under Japan’s control, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina. Before long, all of Southeast Asia and Japanese-controlled Pacific islands were added (Japan, “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere,” 475).
which did not exercise much decisive control. During World War II, most of Japan’s diplomatic efforts focused on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, not China.¹⁴⁹⁰

Russia aided China during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894 to 1895), obtaining a leasehold in the Liaodong peninsula. After 1900, as Russia constructed the China Eastern Railway, it sent troops into Manchuria. Japan was increasingly nervous, and attacked the Russian military at Port Arthur (Lüshun), Manchuria in early 1904. After a war fought mainly in Korea and Manchuria, Japan received the Liaodong peninsula, the South Manchuria Railway, south Sakhalin, and recognition of its interests in Korea. Shortly after, Russia and Japan signed various agreements that were rejected by the Soviet Union after 1917.¹⁴⁹¹ Through 1945, Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union were affected by Soviet ideologies, various foreign policies, and colonial competition in north Asia. Japan’s dispatch of troops to Siberia from 1917 to 1922 to fight against the Bolsheviks raised tensions. Yet the two nations shared mutual economic interests and needs. Japan recognized the Soviet Union in exchange for economic and trading rights, but the rise of militarism in Japan from the late 1920s increased chances for hostility. The Soviets allowed Japan to take the China Eastern Railway, but grew nervous in the late 1930s over Japanese actions in China. In April 1941 the Soviets and Japan signed a treaty of neutrality, but in early August 1945, the Soviet Union initiated huge attacks on Japanese forces in Manchuria, the Kuriles, south Sakhalin, and Korea. Japan effectively surrendered by August 14.¹⁴⁹²

¹⁴⁹⁰ Japan, “Southeast Asia and Japan,” 1449.
¹⁴⁹¹ Japan, “Russia and Japan,” 1278.
Though the United States and Japan had stable relations in the early Meiji era, after Japan’s victory over China in 1895 and U.S. victory over Spain in 1898, both nations emerged as “great powers.” They then had to deal with each other on military, balance of power and colonial issues, not simply trade and education. After Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, both Japan and the United States drew up hypothetical war plans concerning each other. Tensions increased over American restrictions on Japanese immigration. Japanese and Americans competed economically in China. Though some leaders attempted to strengthen mutual ties and understanding between the U.S. and Japan, the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s hampered this. The United States reacted negatively to Japanese actions in East and Southeast Asia, and Japan increasingly saw the United States as the chief obstacle to its Asian goals. After Japan joined the Axis and the United States increased economic sanctions, to many in Japan, conflict was inevitable.\textsuperscript{1493}

In Europe, Japan had close relations with Great Britain through the early 1900s. Britain was a model for Japan on modernization, Western culture, and a key contributor of technology and foreign knowledge.\textsuperscript{1494} The Anglo-Japanese military alliance, Japan’s first military treaty with a foreign nation (1902 to 1923),\textsuperscript{1495} was one sign of Japan’s emergence as a major power. Both Britain and Japan were concerned with protecting their Asian interests in the face of an increasing Russian presence. One faction led by Ito Hirobumi favored accommodation with Russia, while another led by Yamagata favored Britain. The second prevailed. In the 1930s, Japanese interventions in China increasingly

\textsuperscript{1493} Japan, “The United States and Japan,” 1656-1657.
\textsuperscript{1494} Japan, “United Kingdom and Japan,” 1655.
\textsuperscript{1495} Japan, “History of International Relations,” 617.
strained relations with Britain, including their economic competition in third countries. After Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in the late 1930s and moved to attack Indochina and Southeast Asia, tensions boiled over. Japan declared war on the U.S. and Britain after Pearl Harbor, and seized British possessions in Asia. Britain participated in the American occupation of Japan after World War II. Though Germany influenced Japanese politics through advising Ito as he wrote the Constitution of 1889, and Yamagata modeled the Japanese army after Prussia’s, World War I interrupted German-Japanese relations, and Japan seized German possessions in China and the South Pacific. In the late 1930s, both countries had fascist systems, and signed treaties to increase cooperation against the Soviet Union and the West, but with little effect. France assisted the Meiji government as it sought to modernize Japan. After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, France and Japan signed a treaty in 1907, agreeing to recognize their respective Asian possessions. Diplomatic and economic cooperation followed. But in the 1920s and 1930s, both nations experienced tension over events in Asia. In the early 1940s, Japan invaded French Indochina, and the Free French government declared war in late 1941. Japan formally annexed Indochina in 1945. Japan’s relations with other world regions such as Latin America and the Middle East increased in significance after 1945.

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1497 Japan, “Germany and Japan,” 452.
1499 While Japan’s postwar relations with other regions such as Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Latin America are more significant than in the prewar period, the most important feature of the prewar period was the emigration of Japanese to Latin America. From 1897 to 1941, nearly 250,000 Japanese emigrated there. Nearly seventy-five percent of that total went to Brazil, where they made significant contributions to Brazilian agriculture (Japan, “Africa and Japan,” 12-13; “Eastern European Nations and Japan,” 303; “Middle East and Japan,” 957; “Latin America and Japan,” 880).
Of several intellectual currents affecting Japan’s international relations (1895 to 1945), one of the most important was Pan-Asianism (*Han-Ajia-shugi*). This intellectual movement stressed the uniqueness of Asia contrasted with the West. Pan-Asianists in Japan argued that Japan should pay more attention to commonalities that Japan had with Asia, that Japan’s future lay in Asia. Other proponents stressed that Japan’s future lay with China, while in the early 1900s, Okakura Kakuzo stressed that “Asia is one,” and East-West distinctions. Pan-Asianism was revived in the 1930s to justify Japan’s actions in Asia, arguing that wars in China and the Pacific were basically cultural warfare, the East versus the West, necessary to awaken Asia to its true destiny.\(^{1501}\)

On military and defense issues, as the leaders of Meiji Japan created Japan’s modern military, modeled on leading Western examples, they instituted special privileges for them that would decisively influence the course of the nation. After the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars (1894-1895 and 1904-1905), the military’s “right of supreme command” was increasingly applied over the civil authority in the national government. After war with Russia, a debate between the *Nanshinron* and *Hokushinron* doctrines erupted among Japan’s military leaders.\(^{1502}\) Ultimately, a compromise was reached, where the army focused on preparing for a Russian threat, and the Navy a U.S. one. After World War I, there was international pressure against militarism. But with the onset of the Great Depression in the late 1920s and 1930s, militarism rose in Japan, increasingly

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\(^{1500}\) Those who argued this included Tarui Tokichi, Miyazaki Toten, and Sun Yat-sen (*Japan, “Pan-Asianism,”* 1187).

\(^{1501}\) Ibid.

\(^{1502}\) See my discussion of the *Nanshinron* and *Hokushinron* doctrines in Chapter 5, in the section on the contexts of imperialism.
influencing society. Militarism’s grip on Japanese society was not broken until Japan’s defeat in 1945.\textsuperscript{1503}

Significant conflicts during this era included the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), World War I (1914-1918), the war in China (1937-1945), and the Pacific War (World War II) with the United States (1941-1945). In the Russo-Japanese conflict, Japan attacked Russia in southern Manchuria over Russia’s increasing presence in Korea, to firmly establish Japan’s interests there. The war was costly, especially for Japan, but afterward, Japan won the right to exercise exclusive influence over Korea, control of south Sakhalin and the Liaodong peninsula. Significantly, Japan achieved the status of an imperialist state in the Far East, in direct competition with the West, and in the minds of many Meiji Japanese, finally achieved its independence and security against the West.\textsuperscript{1504}

In World War I, after conflict began in Europe, Japan declared war against Germany in support of Britain, Japan’s ally. Japan quickly took control of German possessions in China and several German–controlled islands in the South Pacific. Soon after, Japan pressured China to accept its “Twenty-One Demands.” In the face of British and American protests, Japan dropped several of the demands while forcing China to accept the remainder, which granted Japan greater influence in China. In 1917 and 1918 Japan attempted to consolidate its gains in China, somewhat in competition with the United States, though the U.S. finally agreed to respect Japan’s interests, in exchange for equal opportunities in commerce and recognition of China’s integrity. By the end of the

\textsuperscript{1503} Japan, “Imperial Japanese Armed Forces,” 54.
\textsuperscript{1504} Japan, “Russo-Japanese War,” 1279-1280.
war, Japan held former German territories in Shandong province and the South Pacific, more sections of mainland China, northern Manchuria, and some of eastern Siberia.1505

In the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 to 1945, the Japanese military fought against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Army and the Communist Army led by Mao Zedong. The conflict included numerous battles, war atrocities, and cost millions of lives. Japan’s attack on China essentially enabled the rise of peasant nationalism by the Communists,1506 eventually leading to the rise of communist China a few years after 1945.1507 Starting in the 1930s through 1945, an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 women (comfort women—jūgun ianfu) were forced to serve in military brothels in areas such as China, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and New Guinea.1508

World War II was complex for Japan, on multiple levels. From 1930 to 1936, an increasing number of political assassinations in Japan slowly increased the political power of the military. Both the Imperial Army and Navy competed for attention for their respective agendas, military adventurism in China and Northeast Asia, and invasion of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific islands. Later in the decade, as Japan’s military increased its power in the nation’s politics, there was more emphasis on heavy industrialization, militarization, and mobilizing the people for war. The role of the Diet and the political parties slowly decreased, and the nation plunged haphazardly toward possible conflict with the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, and Western powers in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Though the war in China from 1937 may be viewed as

1506 Johnson, Peasant Nationalism.
1507 Japan, “Sino-Japanese War of 1937 to 1945,” 1432-1434. For more details on the events of this war, and Hirohito’s war in it, see Chapter 9.
part of World War II, many Japanese see it as a separate but related conflict. The China war drained Japan’s resources and risked war with the West, not to mention the damage inflicted on China. Though Japan and Germany shared several possible enemies (the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States), they lacked a common strategy. As Germany attacked various nations in Europe, it became more tempting for Japan to attack their possessions in Southeast Asia. That angered the United States, and risked war with the Americans and European powers. The nation pursued a desperate, risky gamble by attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor, hoping that along with immobilizing American naval power, it could quickly establish a wide network of naval and air bases to discourage American response. Japanese progress for the first months of the war was rapid, but Japan met increasingly decisive resistance from the United States, including the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway (in May and June 1942). From then on, Japan was on the defensive. In additional, costly battles across the South and Central Pacific and Southeast Asia, Japan’s resources gradually waned, though its determination to fiercely resist American victory did not. In the final stages of the war, the devastating costs to both the U.S. and Japan included painful, bloody battles in locations such as Iwo Jima and Okinawa, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. There were also devastating fire bombings of most major Japanese cities, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing many more hundreds of thousands, and leaving over 13 million or more homeless. After the atomic bombings, Japan finally surrendered.

1509 Japan, “World War II,” 1716. See additional details on the events of World War II in my discussions of Hirohito in Chapters 8 and 10.
**Contexts: Japan’s External Economic Relations**

In policies for foreign trade from 1895 to 1945, Japan’s government traded with foreign nations to help Japan achieve economic parity with the West. Until the end of the unequal treaties with the West (1911), Japan paid for needed imports (things it did not produce itself, such as ships, steel, and equipment) with exports. To promote industrialization and development through technical assistance, subsidies and loans, Japan also imported needed items. Exporting to import has remained a basic part of Japan’s trade policy for decades. From 1899, tariff protection was granted to particular industries. Tariffs on raw materials were kept low, to help stimulate manufacturing. Policies for the protection of Japan’s domestic market were also extended to Japan’s colonies and occupied territories.\(^{1510}\) During World War I, Japan experienced a large economic boom as its exports to the rest of Asia greatly increased in the European absence during the war, leading to great inflation in Japan.\(^{1511}\) In the 1920s and 1930s, Japan exported heavy industrial products to the colonies, and imported mostly raw materials and food. Japan’s need to import and export in such a manner in the hostile international environment of the 1930s was one factor contributing to efforts to establish something akin to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.\(^{1512}\)

Concerning Japan’s foreign economic relations with Asia (1895 to 1945), a large motivator of Japanese colonial and military intervention in China was economic in nature. From the late nineteenth century through 1945, Japan viewed various markets and


\(^{1511}\) Japan, “World War I,” 1711.

resources in China as vital for Japan’s survival. Japan’s intervention in China in various regions, was motivated, in large part, by economic factors, and Japan’s desire for survival in the harsh international system.\textsuperscript{1513} After gaining Taiwan as a colony in 1895, Japan developed the island’s economy mainly for Japan’s economic benefit. The same policy was followed in Korea. In the Korean case, resentment against the Japanese presence and economic policies was more overt than in Taiwan, but in both, resistance was often harshly suppressed.\textsuperscript{1514} Around 1900, Japanese shipping companies opened trade routes between Japan and major ports in Southeast Asia. Communities of Japanese traders opened in all parts of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (the latter also considered by Japan to be a part of Southeast Asia). From 1914 to 1920, Japanese trade with the region increased dramatically, especially in cotton textiles, and Japanese investment in rubber and coconut plantations. Expanded trade brought an increased Japanese presence in the region.\textsuperscript{1515}

Japan’s foreign economic relations with Europe (1895 to 1945) included significant connections with Great Britain, Germany and France. Great Britain had a great impact on Japan’s development, providing the model for its railway system, and many foreign instructors who helped teach subjects related to economic and technological growth. Japan and Britain signed the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty in 1894, partly ending their unequal trade relations and Britain’s extraterritoriality. But by the 1930s, trade friction over British and Japanese competition in third markets such as

\textsuperscript{1513} These regions in China included the Liaodong peninsula, Manchuria, parts of Inner Mongolia, Northeast China, the Shandong peninsula, and eventually across most of eastern China,\textsuperscript{1514} For more on Japan’s economic activities in Taiwan and Korea, see the section on the contexts of Japan’s imperialism later in this chapter.\textsuperscript{1515} Japan, “Southeast Asia and Japan,” 1449.
China, and Britain granting its own colonies preferential trading status from 1932, contributed to tension between the two nations. From the Meiji period forward, German and Japanese economic relations also quickly increased through growing trade. France provided crucial assistance to the Meiji government as it began Japan’s efforts to industrialize, helping with advice and technical assistance. After the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 1907 was signed, both nations agreed to respect each other’s possessions in Asia. Economic and diplomatic cooperation followed. Economic and financial cooperation continued after World War I. In the 1920s and 1930s, increasing tension during negotiations over economic issues between French Indochina and Japan was further heightened during aggressive Japanese actions in Indochina in the early 1940s.

Japan also had significant economic relations with the United States from 1895 to 1945. American teachers had significant impact on Meiji Japan’s mastery of various forms of economic and technical knowledge. By 1907, more than 125,000 Japanese had settled on the U.S. West Coast in addition to Hawaii. Japanese laborers made important contributions to the economies of Hawaii and California, especially to agriculture. In the early 1900s, there were various military, economic and cultural tensions brewing in the U.S.-Japan relationship, however indirect. The U.S. passage of the 1924 immigration law excluding Japanese immigration was a serious blow to the countries’ relations. Increased Japanese intervention in Southeast Asia, China and other

1516 Japan, “United Kingdom and Japan,” 1655.
1517 Japan, “Germany and Japan,” 1655.
1519 Japan, “United States and Japan,” 1656.
1520 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa.
parts of Asia, in the name of Japan’s economic survival, caused relations to further decline.\textsuperscript{1521}

Concerning foreign trade, around 1900, Japan’s primary imports shifted to raw cotton from cotton thread, to iron, and to machinery instead of ships. From 1868 to 1915, Japan had a positive balance of trade in only twelve years. From the late 1800s, there was a boom in the construction of large textile mills. During World War I, Japan replaced European and American exports to many Asian nations, especially to Southeast Asia and Russia. The percentage of finished goods in Japan’s total exports increased. By 1918, the last year of the war, the volume of exports was three times the prewar level. After World War I, although conditions were again favorable for exports to Europe and the U.S., domestic demand in Japan created a foreign trade deficit. In the 1920 and 1930s, general trading companies, especially those connected with the \textit{zaibatsu}, played a large role in increasing Japan’s foreign trade. Large shipyards produced heavy machinery, railway equipment, and other heavy steel and iron products. Several major shipping firms emerged. From 1929, the Great Depression had a drastic effect on Japan’s economy. The volume of imports, exports, and Japan’s currency fell dramatically. After 1931, Japan adopted controls over foreign exchange and trade to organize a war type economy.

During the 1930s, global trading blocs and Japan’s trade with its colonies both increased in importance. After the start of the war with China in 1937, Japan’s trade became more war-oriented, focusing on imports of war-related materials, items for basic living, and exports devoted to earning foreign currency for needed imports. Trade controls were imposed in 1937, and from 1941, general mobilization for war began. Trade became

\textsuperscript{1521} \textit{Japan}, “United States and Japan,” 1657.
heavily focused on Japan’s “yen bloc,” especially its colonies, and trade outside the yen bloc was reduced. Japan had a trade surplus with the yen bloc, but deficit with countries outside the bloc. Before 1930, Japan had no widespread foreign exchange controls, but during the 1930s, an extensive system of production, distribution, and foreign trade ensued, characteristic of an economy on wartime footing.

Regarding foreign investments (1895 to 1945), after the Sino-Japanese War (1894 to 1895) to World War I, Japanese firms in the chemical and heavy manufacturing sectors sought connections with Western firms in the U.S. and Europe for access to proprietary knowledge and technologies, sometimes through technical licensing agreements. Several leading American firms such as General Electric and International Telephone and Telegraph played a significant role in Japanese firms. In the 1890s, after trade-related companies, including insurance and trading firms and banks, established overseas offices, several major spinning firms established branches in Tianjin and Shanghai. In the 1930s, Japan’s heavy industries actively invested in Manchuria, but Japan lost all of these in World War II. Two of the major assets that aided Japan’s control of Manchuria were the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, both of which Japan obtained from Russia and the Soviet Union by 1935.

1523 Japan, “Foreign Exchange Controls,” 397.
1524 Japan, “Foreign Investment in Japan,” 398.
Contexts: Japan’s External Cultural Relations

Regarding international cultural exchange and the study of foreign cultures in Japan from 1895 to 1945, in the Meiji and Taisho periods (1868 to 1926), English language training focused on the mastery of written English for learning Western knowledge and technology, though there were unsuccessful efforts to introduce the oral method of language teaching.\textsuperscript{1527} From the 1880s to 1945, the study of German law was especially important, forming the major influence on Japan’s first Constitution (of 1889), which in turn affected all of Japanese society throughout this period. In the Meiji era, prominent foreign legal scholars from countries such as France and Germany advised Japan on many legal reforms, and outstanding Japanese experts in the fields of English, German and French law emerged.\textsuperscript{1528} From the late nineteenth century through World War I, Japan’s external cultural relations focused on the introduction of Western culture in Japan, rather than the promotion of Japanese culture abroad, which was motivated by the national goal to build Japan into a modern state based on Western models. After World War 1, the importance of promoting international understanding was more widely recognized. In 1934, Japan’s Society for International Cultural Relations (KBS, Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai) was formed.\textsuperscript{1529} From the late 1890s to the 1920s, principles of progressive Western education influenced a movement in Japanese education called the New Education Movement. It encouraged initiative and individuality in children, but its

\textsuperscript{1527} Japan, “English Language Training,” 342-343.
\textsuperscript{1528} Japan, “Study of Foreign Law,” 399.
\textsuperscript{1529} Japan, “International Cultural Relations,” 615.
influence decreased with the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{1530} The first foreign students came from China after the Sino-Japanese War (1894 to 1895).\textsuperscript{1531}

In this period, there were many Japanese intellectual trends influenced by foreign cultural influences, including Marxism, liberalism and democracy, but I will limit my comments to two fields. The Meiji enlightenment intellectuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Mori Arinori, explored in earlier chapters, worked broadly at introducing Western social institutions, customs, and thought into Meiji Japan, and served as leaders in the movement. They helped to introduce Western ideals of reason and enlightenment, and other important principles to be followed for Japan’s modernization.\textsuperscript{1532} Feminist thought and movements, inevitably influenced by their Western counterparts, began in the late nineteenth century. They included arguments in favor of women’s rights (\textit{joken}) (1880s), the emergence of women’s literary journals (1910s), socialist debates over the “woman question” (\textit{fujin mondaï}) (early 1900s), and unsuccessful campaigns for women’s suffrage (1920s and 1930s). The militarist governments of the 1930s suppressed autonomous women’s movements through 1945.\textsuperscript{1533}

Concerning Japanese interaction with foreign cultures overseas, Japan had major interactions with China in this period, through the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (1894 to 1895), continuing disputes over the right to influence and control Korea, Japanese investments in Manchuria and other parts of China, Japan’s demands for more influence in China in the 1920s, Japanese incursions and attacks on China in the 1930s,
and the war with China from 1937 to 1945. These interactions were highly painful and costly for both Japan and China, and have had long-term effects on Asia and the world, up to the present. Japan also had extensive interactions with Korea, which it absorbed as a major colony in 1910. This included Japanese intervention in Korea during the wars with China and Russia (1894 to 1895 and 1904 to 1905), and major influence in Korea after 1905. Japan’s rule and exploitation of Korea was harsh and painful on multiple levels, economically, politically, and culturally. Up to the early twenty-first century, these interactions have also had major influences on other world powers, including on China, Russia, and the United States. In this period, the United States continued to have major cultural impacts on Japan through sending many instructors, experts and missionaries, and some prominent young Japanese also studied in the U.S. Yet cultural misunderstandings between the two nations increased in the early twentieth century through the 1930s as the United States moved to limit Japanese emigration through several laws, through racist fears of a “Yellow Peril.” The two nations also felt tension due to their economic competition in China, and Japan’s increasing sense that the United States stood in the path of its pursuit of “Asia for Asians.”

On Japanese interaction with foreign cultures in Japan (1895 to 1945), earlier in the period, Western nations including the United States, Britain and others had a major cultural influence on Japan through foreign instructors at Japanese universities. The two other major groups of foreigners present in Japan at this time were Chinese and Koreans.

1534 Japan, “China and Japan,” 189-190.
1535 This was noted elsewhere in this project, and below in the section on the contexts of Japanese imperialism in this period (Japan, “Korea and Japan,” 828).
1536 Japan, “The United States and Japan,” 1656-1657.
In the Meiji era, many Japanese accepted Western notions that Chinese were unhygienic. Though foreign concessions were abolished in Japan in 1899, Japan passed laws that forced Chinese to continue to live in those areas. The two major Chinese areas in Japan slowly emerged as “Chinatowns” in Yokohama and Kobe, composed of mostly professionals and merchants. By 1930 the number of Chinese in Japan had decreased to 30,000, but the number from Taiwan increased greatly. By 1943 150,000 Taiwanese were in Japan, mostly conscripted soldiers.1537 While Korea was a Japanese colony (1910 to 1945), some Koreans migrated to Japan, looking for jobs and better economic welfare. After the Pacific War started in 1941, hundreds of thousands were brought to Japan as wartime laborers, many by force. In 1945, over 2 million Koreans were present in Japan.1538

**Contexts: Japan’s External Relations-Imperialism**

About ten years after deciding to compete with the West for Asian colonies, Japan declared war on China in 1894 to gain control of Korea, but instead gained Taiwan, the Liaodong peninsula of southern Manchuria, the Pescadore islands, and trade benefits in China. Japan’s victory over China in 1895 stirred “xenophobic nationalism” and a sense of racial superiority over the Koreans and the Chinese in many Japanese. From the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Japan gained influence in Korea, control of the South Manchurian Railway, southern Sakhalin, and the Liaodong peninsula (this last location, for a second time), but at great financial and human cost.1539 The empire eventually

1538 *Encyclopedia of Contemporary*, “Koreans in Japan,” 266.
occupied all or portions of Korea, Taiwan, China, the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, islands in the North and South Pacific, and threatened additional regions such as India and Australia. Ultimately Japan’s imperial expansion cost about 23 million lives in World War II alone.\textsuperscript{1540}

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a new mood emerged in Japan, in praise of imperialism. During the Taisho period (1912-1926) and Taisho democracy, there was little praise of Japan’s victories in the late Meiji wars in China and Russia. But in the 1930s, the Japanese army celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the victory in the Russo-Japanese War, and there was a large literary, artistic and dramatic output of books and plays lauding the victory, in patriotic, jingoistic, emotional terms. Through this, Japan experienced a large cultural affirmation of the glories of empire, its “war god” military heroes, and its “virtuous” young emperor, Hirohito.\textsuperscript{1541}

New colonial ideologies arose in connection with the formation of Japan’s colonial puppet state of Manchukuo (1932). Japan crossed a threshold in “self-defense,” gaining new victories over “Western decadence” and Chinese “warlordism” on the path to modernity. For Japan’s politically active military leaders, the tropes of “crisis” and “Anglo-Saxon encirclement” became useful political tools to strengthen the army’s involvement in politics and Emperor Hirohito’s image. As “virtuous” Japan fought morally inferior foreign “devilish” states, people were encouraged to support the “holy mission” to spread “the emperor’s benevolence” to other regions, and to overtake the

\textsuperscript{1540} Ibid., 3-4. This included nearly 20 millions Asian lives, over 3.1 million Japanese lives, and more than 60,000 Western allied lives, according to official government estimates released after 1945 (Ibid., 4). But there was also great cost in earlier wars with China and Russia. For example, the Russo-Japanese War cost the Japanese side 110,000 lives (Ibid., 9).

\textsuperscript{1541} Ibid., 209-210.
West in every field. During the Meiji era Japan adopted the concept of “Datsu-A,” the sense of escaping from inferior Asia, to assimilate the superior cultural features and technologies of the West. Now an independent Japan emerged as the rightful leader of Asia, to resist Western aggression, and spread morally superior, harmonious living to the continent. Though Japan never developed the systematic racism of Nazi Germany, from the start of Japanese colonialism in 1895, many Japanese manifested a strong racism toward other Asians. 1542 These new ideologies were supported by Japanese views of Manchuria and its potential. In the early 1930s, speeches by military officials emphasized Japan’s need for raw materials, national security, land, increasing population, racial competition for empire, and the coming necessity for war. Manchuria would help Japan through its vast resources, and as a buffer between the latter, Russia and China. Japanese diplomat Matsuoka Yosuke called Manchuria-Mongolia Japan’s “economic, strategic, and moral ‘lifeline,’” stirring patriotic feelings in Japan. 1543 In 1938, the Japanese government introduced the slogan Tôa Shinchitsujo (New Order in East Asia) in justification of its China policy. It supported the expansion of Japan’s presence in China as a stepping-stone to build increased economic, cultural and political ties among Japan, China, and Manchukuo (Japan’s Manchurian puppet state). 1544 Additional ideologies that provided support for Japan’s imperialistic expansion in this period included hakkô ichiu (“eight corners of the world under one roof”), Nanshinron (“advanced to the south”),

1542 Ibid., 279-280.
1543 Ibid., 265-269.
Hokushinron ("advance to the north"), and Hokushu nanshin (hold the north, advance to the south).

The most important colony for Japan was Korea, in terms of size, nearness to Japan, and historical connections. Korean resistance became fierce. Taiwan served as a training ground for Japanese colonial officials, and economically, was the most profitable colony in the empire. The southern half of Sakhalin, known as Karafuto, was occupied in Japanese in a manner similar to Hokkaido, and became a genuine “settlement colony.” Japan’s Pacific Island colonies stretched across Micronesia, and included 84,000 Japanese settlers by 1942. Japan also received the southern tip of Manchuria, the Guandong territory, from Russia in 1905, and used the South Manchuria Railway to eventually influence the rest of Manchuria. Though Japan hoped to use the colonies to absorb excess population from Japan, this had only mixed success, since several areas were highly populated, and generous subsidies for settlers had limited impact. Japan also desired to use the colonies to create an integrated economy in which it exported technology and capital in exchange for raw materials, foodstuffs, and investment opportunities. Though it did largely integrate its economy with the five colonies (Korea, Taiwan, Karafuto, Guandong Territory and the Pacific Islands), it did so mainly for its own benefit, not theirs. Japan also used these colonies and territories as a springboard to expand into China, the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

What were the effects of Japanese national identity on the colonies? From 1895, the Japanese state also imposed the Tokyo dialect of educated Japanese beyond Japan

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\(^{1545}\) Many of these ideologies were discussed in earlier chapters. Also see Japan, “Imperial Japanese Armed Forces,” 54.
\(^{1546}\) Japan, “Colonialism,” 214.
proper, on newly acquired territories of Hokkaido, Okinawa, colonies in Taiwan, in Korea from 1910, and beyond. Debates on race and Japanese identity affected colonial policies, in that while Koreans and Taiwanese came to be called “Japanese subjects,” they were not given the same political rights as other Japanese. Policymakers argued over whether there should be strict separation between Japanese colonizers and the colonized, or whether the colonized should be fully absorbed.\textsuperscript{1547}

After Japan annexed Korea as a colony in late 1910, it took control of the government, military, education system, major enterprises, ended the Joseon dynasty, and suppressed all political parties, meetings, and the press. Since Koreans were subjected to harsher punishment than Japanese in Korea, and forced to use Japanese in schools, resentment increased, leading to the Samil Independence Movement that began with a declaration of independence read in Seoul in March 1919, resulting in widespread riots that were violently suppressed by Japan. In the 1920s economic conditions became harder in Korea as the nation was forced to produce increasing amounts of rice for Japan. The number of tenant farmers increased, and by the early 1930s, hundreds of thousands sought better employment conditions in Manchuria or Japan. Feeling in Japan against Korean immigrants was high; more than 6,000 Koreans were killed in anti-Korean violence following the massive 1923 Tokyo earthquake. Conditions in Korea became more repressive as State Shinto, emperor worship, and Japanese names were forced on all Koreans after the war in China started in 1937. From 1939 to 1945, about 1.2 million

\textsuperscript{1547} Encyclopedia of Contemporary, “National Identity and Minorities,” 344-345.
Koreans were forcibly transported to Japan as laborers, and drafted into the military near the end of World War II.\textsuperscript{1548}

Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. Taiwanese resistance to Japan’s takeover was suppressed. Japan’s colonial control of the island was modeled after Western imperialism. A Japanese governor-general controlled Taiwan’s government, and its economy was developed for the benefit of Japan. Japan introduced modern economic infrastructure and technology to the island, primarily benefiting resident Japanese. These actions stimulated agricultural and commercial development, and the island became a major supplier to Japan of sugar, rice, and other agricultural products and raw materials. In the 1920s, light industry began to develop. Despite occasional resistance from the indigenous and educated Taiwanese, general peace, stability and economic growth prevailed. From 1937 to 1945, Japan used the island as a base from which to conduct war operations in China and Southeast Asia. Taiwan contributed heavily to the war effort, both economically and in terms of military recruits. Taiwan was attacked in 1944, and severe economic shortages and inflation soon followed.\textsuperscript{1549}

Views About Japan’s Foreign Relations (1895-1945)

**Worldviews on Japan’s External Political Relations**

*Ito Hirobumi.* In the late 1890s, Ito declared that the real object of the Japanese government was friendship, assistance, and ultimate independence for Korea, since the two countries’ interests were so close. By the early 1900s, Ito feared that conflict with

\textsuperscript{1548} *Japan,* “Korea and Japan,” 828.

\textsuperscript{1549} *Japan,* “Taiwan,” 1504.
Russia in Korea was inevitable. In the new century, Japan felt threatened by Russia’s increasing influence in Manchuria and Korea. In response, Prime Minister Katsura’s government favored signing an Anglo-Japanese alliance (done in 1902). Ito agreed, but feared it could lead to war with Russia. Japan sent Ito to Russia to informally negotiate over Korea and Manchuria. When Russia moved too slowly, in Japan’s eyes, the latter attacked Russian forces in Port Arthur, Manchuria in February 1904. Ito went to Korea as an envoy. Hayashi asserts that his intention was never the absorption of Korea, but to offer Japan’s aid and protection, until Korea could stand independently. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s interests in Korea were internationally recognized in 1905. While the Katsura government sought to tighten its control over Korea, Ito’s goal was to slowly strengthen Korea’s capacity for self-government and development. In late 1905, under duress, the Korean king agreed to Japan’s control of Korea’s foreign affairs. Next, Ito was appointed resident-general of Korea. By mid-1907, the King abdicated. In 1906, Ito called the Japanese military government on the Liaodong peninsula in Manchuria a great insult to Imperial China. By 1909, he stressed the promotion of peace and cooperation among the Far Eastern powers (China, Japan, and Russia) without interference from outside powers, and equal opportunity for commerce for all nations in the region.

Hamada calls Ito a realist and moderate on foreign policy issues. As a young man, Ito recognized the West’s power, and the threat it presented to Japan’s security and

1553 Ibid., 138, 211, 222.
independence. He wanted to quickly strengthen Japan’s global standing by ending unequal treaties, and responding to security threats. Was he an imperialist? We will consider this further. Ito believed that Japan needed to stand up to other regional powers to protect its own interests. Hamada also calls Ito a man of peace.

_Yamagata Aritomo._ After 1914, Yamagata’s fear of worldwide racial war of whites against non-whites made him support closer ties with China. In 1916 he supported an agreement with Russia to counter a possible “all-white alliance.” After 1905, to counter increasing American interest in South Manchuria, he supported stronger ties with Russia. From 1907-1912, Japan and Russia signed three conventions.

Through World War I, Yamagata increasingly saw improved Russo-Japanese relations as key to countering an increasing American presence in East Asia. By 1914, many other members of the military-bureaucratic elite shared Yamagata’s view about the low value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japanese imperial expansion to counter the coming race

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1554 On imperialism, perhaps compared to military hardliners in Tokyo, Ito was moderate. They waited until 1910 to formally annex Korea into the Japanese empire, one year after Ito’s assassination in 1909. A Korean nationalist assassinated him in Harbin.

1555 Ibid., 139, 162. “Man of Peace” is the title of Chapter 14 of Hamada’s biography about Ito. Throughout his life, Ito negotiated for peace between Japan and other nations on several occasions. The first time was before 1868, when several Western powers prepared to bombard Shimonoseki after Chôshu forces stationed there had attacked several passing foreign ships. Ito negotiated with both Chôshu and British leaders.

1556 In his very racist picture of international relations, Yamagata believed that only an alliance with China could protect Asia from Western and American encroachment. For the Yamagata faction, China had an almost “religious” significance, as the former center of East Asian civilization. Faction members saw dangers in Japan’s over-reliance on the Western powers. To counter the threat of increasing Western imperialism, and an impending race war, close relations with China were seen as mandatory (Dickinson, _War and National_, 44, 250).


1558 Yamagata believed that a clash between the United States and Japan in East Asia was unavoidable, although he had no idea when it might happen (Dickinson, _War and National_, 142-143).

1559 Ibid., 42-48, 81. Yamagata supported the Russo-Japanese Convention of 1916 in which Russia replaced Britain as the focus of Japanese foreign affairs, to obtain Russian acknowledgement of expanded Japanese interests on the continent, and potential Russian help against the United States. During World War I, the Yamagata faction saw the United States and Britain as the two chief threats to Japan’s interests in East Asia (Ibid., 120, 141, 251). For more about Yamagata’s views of Russo-Japanese relations at this time, see Ibid., 138-152.
war, and the United States as the biggest threat to Japanese power in Asia. Concerning the United States, as early as 1916, prominent publications and top intellectuals began pondering how Japan should deal with rising American power in East Asia.

**Hirohito, Emperor.** Here we will consider Hirohito’s prewar views of Japan’s foreign relations at some length, given his huge importance in twentieth century Japanese politics. Concerning Japan’s foreign relations, Hirohito was taught a rather social Darwinian and racialist philosophy, stressing competition between races for global dominance, Japan’s superiority and a disdain for democratic principles. The only absolute was the state. On international history, he learned that during the wars with China and Russia, Japan always acted justly, for “peace.” He devoured books about Western history that saw revolution and war as monarchy’s greatest threats. His instruction in history was at times rational and rich in examples, yet reflected official ideologies of Japan’s racial origins and the emperor as the center of its power and empire. When young, he viewed modern history in terms of Emperor Meiji and his court, and the world in light of the Meiji empire. The Meiji wars with China and Russia reshaped the situation of Japan’s national life, and its international environment.

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1560 Ibid., 48.
1561 Ibid., 155. Yamagata and other members of his faction grew increasingly worried about the threat of “radical” ideas of representative government and Wilsonian international egalitarianism presented at the postwar Versailles peace conference, both emanating from the United States (Ibid., 227, 234-237).
1563 Though his history instructor acknowledged Chinese resistance to Japan’s colonization of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese war, he was silent about Japanese injustices committed against Korea (Ibid., 74).
1564 Ibid., 74-76.
1565 Ibid., 33. Related to Hirohito’s views, during World War I, Japan’s leaders supported a foreign policy of “Asian Monroeism,” the right of Japan to protect Asia from the West, and to use war to oust Western powers from China. Japan’s leaders viewed the world as locked in endless racial conflict. Hinting at Japanese military goals in the 1930s, they secretly formulated plans to make China a Japanese protectorate, dominate Manchuria and Mongolia, control resource-rich Indonesia, and declare Asia for Asian (Japanese) control (Ibid., 146-148, 264).
During Hirohito’s regency (1921-1926), Japan signed several treaties that changed its foreign relations, shifting the emphasis on multilateral treaties, the League of Nations and its “peace code.” Hirohito and the court supported this reorientation.\textsuperscript{1566} The new order recognized Japan as a great power, but had weaknesses, not allowing racial equality. Japan’s leaders and Hirohito continued to view international relations as competition between the races, and that each nation must have adequate arms. Treaties signed by Japan in 1921-1922\textsuperscript{1567} limited its naval power, and committed it to “open door” and “equal opportunity” policies for China’s development. Realizing that the new system would not support Japan’s true goals, Hirohito and the court finally withdrew their support, supporting actions in violation of the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{1568}

In the early-mid 1920s, Hirohito was proud of Japan’s victories in World War I and its wars with China and Russia, yet he was somewhat open to the international peace perspectives, given the dangers of rapid military buildup and engagement in China.\textsuperscript{1569} In 1921, court officials urged Hirohito to go to Europe and see the world and its leaders, to prepare Japan for its new international relations. They wanted to project an image of

\textsuperscript{1566} Hirohito and the court supported this reorientation to goals also supported by the United States since they hoped to limit Japan’s military spending increases (Bix, Hirohito).

\textsuperscript{1567} These are referred to as the treaties of the Washington Conference (Ibid., 147).

\textsuperscript{1568} Ibid., 146-150. Japan’s leaders’ support of these treaties was based on certain assumptions, that peace would guarantee Japan’s gains in Mongolia and Manchuria, allow its future plans for China and Asia, and that Japan could separate foreign policy from domestic repression (Ibid., 149-150). In 1922, some of Japan’s leaders supported the Washington treaties, since they believed that agreement with the United States was necessary for Japan to flourish economically, but many in the right wing and the military disagreed (Ibid., 128). In 1923 Japan’s military leaders defined the Soviet Union as Japan’s number one potential enemy, number two as the United States, and number three as China (Ibid., 151).

\textsuperscript{1569} Ibid., 146. He praised the principles of the League of Nations, but out of youthful zeal. He believed he must support peace as the context where the Japanese empire could develop to the level of the “Great Powers.” He also denounced “extremist” thought and “luxury,” in line with Japan’s conservative elites and military (Ibid., 91-93).
Hirohito as Japan’s worldly-wise, confident, great regent, to strengthen the monarchy’s “declining” image.\footnote{Ibid., 103-105. For the trip, the Imperial Household ministry carefully trained him, and prepared the press to cover it extensively, since this was the Taisho government’s first major effort to groom Hirohito’s image. He visited six European nations, including the Vatican, but not the United States (Ibid., 106-108). He was especially impressed with England and France. Court officials decided not to send him to the United States, since they thought that he might be too shocked by the different “national sentiment” of that nation, and the rough behavior of its reporters and citizens (Ibid., 106). In England, Hirohito especially desired to learn from King George V, who survived the storms that destroyed many of Europe’s monarchies. The king eagerly welcomed Hirohito, in front of cheering crowds. Some of the chief lessons that Hirohito took from George V were that a monarch could be both a political activist who approved prime ministers, and exercise great influence behind the scenes. Also, he observed how the king used large ceremonies and court rituals to strengthen the appeal of the throne and nationalism. Yet, Japanese politics were very different from Britain’s (Ibid., 115-118).}

In the late 1920s, Hirohito evolved a view of diplomacy and international law stressing that leaders must sometimes use force in support of their national interests.\footnote{Ibid., 133-135. Hirohito received regular lectures by academic experts on these topics. One of his lecturers was Prof. Tachi Sakutaro, Japan’s leading international lawyer. His view of international law was that war was always legal, that international law existed to serve state interests, and that self-defense included war to extend territory or protect a nation’s citizens or property located abroad. These views were contrary to the views of international law of leading American experts, who argued that aggressive war was a crime, and aggressors must be punished. Hirohito also heard from additional lecturers on the conditions in other important locations, such as the Soviet Union and Japan’s colonies (Ibid., 133-135).}

In August 1928, Japan signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which stressed pacifist principles.\footnote{In Japan, the Kellogg-Briand Pact is referred to as the No-War Treaty. According to the Pact, signatories agreed to recognize aggressive war as an international crime, condemn war as a solution for international disputes, and seek to use “pacific means” for such conflicts (Ibid., 220-221).} The Pact enjoyed broad support in the United States, but not in Japan, where leading scholars denounced it.\footnote{Among those who denounced it were Tachi Sakutaro, Japan’s top international law expert and Hirohito’s personal lecturer on the subject. In the minds of Japan’s intellectuals, the No-War Treaty was another example of the Western liberal democracies, such as Britain and the United States, forcing their pacifist interpretations of international law on the post-World War I world order, for their own advantage (Ibid., 222-223).} Hirohito and his court group never encouraged it. The signing of the Pact occurred amidst a developing crisis over Japan’s presence in Manchuria, and new efforts of the government and court to unite the Japanese with their emperor, and to renew national spirit.\footnote{Hirohito did not see the Pact as a barrier to resolving any potential crisis over Japan’s presence in Manchuria through force. Japan’s leasehold, centered on Dalian, southern Manchuria, had been acquired
up nationalist spirit through the enthronement events. Like many Japanese bureaucrats of the late 1930s, he likely viewed international law as a Western invention, useful for Western, but not Japanese, interests.

In the early 1930s, the worldview of the Japanese of themselves and the world changed. The military, not the elites, seemed to have more awareness of the people’s suffering in the depression, so the people supported the former. Overall, Japan accepted “anti-Chinese, anti-Western xenophobia,” supporting the Manchurian incident in 1931. Hirohito and the court could have reversed this, but they saw international relations in racial terms, disagreed over the proper path, and allowed the military’s view to prevail. In the predominant Japanese worldview of international relations, the United States and Britain seemed very hypocritical for proclaiming democracy at home while supporting imperialism abroad. The Soviet Union seemed a huge threat, with its potential might and communist ideology. The breakdown of global capitalism,

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1575 Ibid., 221-224.
1576 Ibid., 359-360. In the late 1930s, Hirohito did not support complying with international laws governing the treatment of prisoners of war. He could have issued orders to prevent the mass murder and torture of numerous Chinese prisoners, but did not (Ibid., 360).
1577 The Manchurian Incident refers to the situation where Japan’s Guandong Army faked an explosion on a railway bridge near Shenyang, Manchuria in order to falsely blame China and provoke an excuse to further invade Manchuria.
1578 Ibid., 263-264.
1579 Many Japanese became willing to confront Britain and the United States for Japan’s honor. Prince and multi-term Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe argued that the white race had violated international law by dominating the yellow race. Konoe’s views were highly influential for the emperor and the court (Ibid., 265-269).
emerging monetary and trade blocs, and domestic disagreement over politics and ideology were used to justify Japan’s actions in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{1580}

Also in the early 1930s, Hirohito knew that only superior arms would permit Japan to achieve victory in war with the United States or Britain, and hesitated to break relations with them.\textsuperscript{1581} Rapid mobilization would threaten the stability of the throne.\textsuperscript{1582}

In July 1940, Japan contemplated invading Southeast Asia, and strengthening its axis ties. Hirohito worried about the response of Britain and the United States, but hoped for their continued cooperation, and that invading would help end the China war. The Americans saw it as a direct provocation.\textsuperscript{1583} Japan signed the axis Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which the Japanese government contemplated for three years. Hirohito could have halted it, but did not.\textsuperscript{1584} He broke with Meiji Japan’s heritage of friendship with Britain and the United States. He hesitated, knowing it might cause war.\textsuperscript{1585}

Hirohito did nothing to counter the views of military officers suggesting that China was merely a geographical designation, not a distinct people or nation, and that Japan should be allowed to seize all desired regions.\textsuperscript{1586} Many university professors supported official, ideological defense of the attack on China—Japan offered China the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{1580} Ibid., 265-269. For the specifics on the views of many Japanese, Hirohito, the court and other leading officials on Manchuria and empire in the 1930s, see my discussion later in this chapter in the section on Japanese views of imperialism in the 1930s.
\item\textsuperscript{1581} For example, Hirohito did not accept all of the nationalist propaganda put forth by the government in some well-known patriotic films released in 1933 to 1934 that portrayed the West as Japan’s insidious enemy. I discuss a couple of these films later in this chapter in the section on Hirohito’s view of outside cultural influences on Japan (1895-1945).
\item\textsuperscript{1582} Ibid., 278.
\item\textsuperscript{1583} Ibid., 375-379.
\item\textsuperscript{1584} The axis states Japan eventually allied with were Germany, Italy, Romania, and Hungary (Ibid., 380).
\item\textsuperscript{1585} Ibid., 380-382.
\item\textsuperscript{1586} For example, he allowed the military to increase the size of its China garrison in 1936, and approved the construction of a new military base at Fengtai outside Beijing. He also believed that resource-rich provinces in North China should be available for seizure (Ibid., 306-307).
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emperor’s benevolent “imperial way” (kôdô). Hirohito supported the war. Behind Japanese support was the throne, and his powerful image as benevolent emperor, the virtuous embodiment of morality, aristocratic and national values. Hirohito symbolically clouded “principles of peace” that later emerged as “policies of violence,” serving as supreme war commander, and shaping policy and strategy. By the late 1930s, he did not view China as a modern state, likely viewed the invasion as correct, and supported a policy of undeclared war.

Policy documents from July 1941 mention the possibility of wars with the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain. Hirohito most feared war with the Soviet Union. Soon he believed that war with the latter two must be risked but avoided if possible. When Japan’s military hastened their advance into Southeast Asia, the United States responded with harsh economic sanctions, but only light military reaction. The sanctions greatly shocked Hirohito and Japan’s top leaders. Different factions in the court group debated whether or how soon to declare war on the United States and Britain. Hirohito and many leaders assumed that the axis would be victorious over Britain and the Soviet Union, so they plunged ahead. Indecision risked internal stability and the throne’s strength. Hirohito had several options, to favor diplomacy, focus on China, or keep Japan neutral. In fall 1941, he assented to war.

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1587 This is related to the ideology of hakkô ichiu (Ibid., 326-327).
1588 One document called for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, ending the war in China, and invading southward, to ensure Japan’s “self-existence and self-defense” (Ibid., 397).
1589 Hirohito worried about the possibility of Japan’s “ABCD encirclement,” Japan being surrounded by America, Britain, China, and the Dutch (Ibid., 559). He also blamed Japan’s situation on the U.S. oil embargo on Japan, and stalemated U.S.-Japan negotiations. He had no realization that Japan’s situation was due to the cabinet’s aggressive policies against China and Southeast Asia (Ibid., 407).
1590 Ibid., 397-405, 408-410, 419, 426-427, 429-439. While preparations for war with the U.S., Britain, and Holland continued in fall 1941, Hirohito stalled and quietly urged officials to seek other options. He was
Yanagita Kunio. Yanagita’s thought on Japan’s social and economic policies of the early 1900s suggests that he supported a non-assertive, non-expansionary pattern for Japan’s international relations. His primary political writings from 1924 to 1930 show important clues about his overall political thought. He laments the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, and Japan’s imposition of the Twenty-One Demands on China during World War I. Although he felt Japan had no alternative but war in the Sino-Japanese War, he was uncertain if it was justified. His comments about the Japanese immigration exclusion law passed in the United States in 1924 reveal his general attitude about international relations. He felt the law was symptomatic of Japan’s general international isolation since the late 1800s. Overall, national interests were still more primary in the international system than the cooperative spirit of international humanitarianism. But power imbalances and conflicts between nations are likely temporary phenomena in world history. Yanagita also distrusted oligarchic dominance of politics and international relations.

Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 77-78.
Kawada Minoru studied Yanagita’s political writings from this period that appeared as political editorials in the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (Ibid., 81).

Ibid., 81-82, 84-87. For example, Yanagita doubted if Japan could learn anything from fascist Italy, and he thoroughly opposed elite dominance of decision-making in Japan’s international relations, such as going to war. Such important matters should be decided with input from the people (Ibid., 86-87).
Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Political Relations (1895-1945)

These leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external relations can be classified in three main groups: their general views of foreign relations and the world, their views of relations with specific regions (Asia and the West), and their views of international conflicts, peace and diplomacy. On foreign relations and the world, Hamada concludes that Ito was a moderate on foreign policy, a realist, and a general supporter of peace.1594 Yanagita supported a populist, more democratic approach to international relations, similar to his approach to domestic politics. He opposed elite domination of foreign policy decision-making, and instead advocated a non-aggressive, non-imperialist approach to Japan’s foreign relations. Temporarily, he believed that realist, national interests and power struggles dominated foreign policy, but that international cooperation would eventually prevail. Perhaps we could call Yanagita a progressive idealist. Hirohito’s views of international relations stress social Darwinism, competition between the races for global domination, Japanese superiority, a disdain for democracy, and preference for absolute state power. In the late 1930s, he viewed international law as useful for Western, but not Japanese, interests. The ideological tendencies of Ito and Hirohito were more conservative, while Yanagita’s were more liberal. Concerning their views of the world and world history, Hirohito was an avid reader of world and Western history who received (in his education) fairly accurate yet racist views that supported state ideologies, empire (via the lens of the Meiji era, the Emperor Meiji and the Meiji empire), and the empire as absolute. After 1914, Yamagata was preoccupied with fear of

1594 Hamada, Prince Ito. Ito negotiated with foreign powers for peace on several occasions.
an impending race war the West, centered in Asia, which he believed the United States and Britain would wage.

Regarding relations with other Asian powers, by 1909, Ito stressed peace and cooperation among major East Asia powers, non-interference from outsiders, and fair trade. Similarly, it is likely that Hirohito supported the doctrine of “Asian Monroëism,” that Asia should be free from intervention from outsiders, but open to Japanese input. Views of China varied, from Ito and Yamagata who desired cooperation with China against Western encroachment, to Hirohito, who, in addition to that view, was proud of Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War, and who supported, by his actions, the right of Japan to invade, exploit, and control China as a protectorate in the 1930s. In contrast, Yanagita was ashamed of the Sino-Japanese War. Views of Manchuria also varied. Ito was nervous about both Russia’s and Japan’s presence there in the early twentieth century, and negotiated with Russia over its future. But in the 1930s, Hirohito saw Manchuria as part of a “sacred legacy” inherited from the Emperor Meiji, and did not oppose Japanese intervention in Manchuria in 1931. Ito desired close relations and friendship with Korea in the late 1890s, feared conflict with Russia over it, and wanted to help Korea maintain its independence. Ironically he became the first Japanese governor-general there, and demonstrated a patronizing attitude that the Koreans resented; it resulted in Ito’s death. Tensions over Korea and Manchuria led him to negotiate with Russia before the Russo-Japanese War, with whom he desired peace. Somewhat similarly, in the early 1900s and 1910s, Yamagata sought stronger ties with Russia to counter increasing American influence and an impending “race war.” In contrast, though Hirohito seemed proud of Japan’s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, he
feared the Soviet Union as Japan’s greatest potential enemy. Hirohito supported invasion of Southeast Asia in 1940, and hoped it would not provoke a harsh Western response, but it resulted in sharp U.S. economic sanctions. Hirohito was shocked, worried about Japan’s need for resources from the region, and the possibility of Japan’s “ABCD” encirclement. He hoped that conflict with the U.S., partly over Southeast Asia, could be avoided, but finally consented to it with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Some common themes that emerge here among these leaders are a common desire for Japan to help its Asian neighbors defend themselves against the West. However, later in the period, by the 1920s and 1930s, more than two decades into the era of overseas Japanese imperialism, Hirohito shows more support for Japanese intervention in Asia, China, Manchuria, Taiwan[^1595] and Southeast Asia than other leader we have studied.

In their views of relations with the West, commonly there was caution and fear. When young, Ito was worried about the West’s power. During and after World War I, Yamagata saw increasing American interest in China, Manchuria, spreading democracy and international Wilsonian egalitarianism, along with Britain, as Japan’s greatest security threats, and sought Russian help to counter them. By the early 1930s, it seems likely that Hirohito and his court group supported the main view of the military elite, that the United States and Britain were very hypocritical for supporting democracy at home and imperialism abroad. Japanese leaders slowly became willing to confront the U.S. on its racism, but Hirohito knew the danger of conflict with the Americans, and hesitated to cut ties. By 1940, despite hoping for cooperation, he finally, hesitantly broke Japan’s

[^1595]: See comments on Hirohito’s tour of Taiwan below in the section on leaders’ views of imperialism, later in this chapter.
long Meiji tradition of friendship with the U.S. and Britain. In 1941, frustrated over U.S. economic sanctions because of Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia, Hirohito proceeded to war, without realizing that the U.S. reaction was mainly due to Japan’s aggressive military actions in China and Southeast Asia. Regarding Britain, Ito disliked it as a youth, and was wary of signing a treaty with it in the early 1900s, for fear of angering Russia. Similarly, Yamagata’s racist view of coming conflicts caused him to value peace with Russia more than with Britain, and since he saw the United States and Britain as the chief threats to Japan’s interests in East Asia, he preferred relations with Russia more than with Britain. Despite Hirohito’s highly positive impressions of Britain garnered during his imperial tour there in the early 1920s, he also noticed the hypocrisy of British imperialism. As with the United States, he also desired peace with Britain, and worried about Britain’s response to Japanese intervention in Southeast Asia. But by the time he signed the Tripartite treaty with the Axis in September 1940, he was willing to bet on Britain’s losing the war, and to risk it. Britain was also the “B” in the “ABCD” threat of Japan’s encirclement. At the beginning of this period (1895 to 1945), these leaders generally viewed both the United States and Britain as threats, and feared them. Leaders throughout the period expressed frustration over the hypocrisy and racist nature of Anglo-American imperialism. These events resulted in Japanese war with both of these powers by the end of this era. At the beginning of the period, these leaders seemed more willing, at times, to cooperate with Russia, but Hirohito greatly feared the Soviet Union, and seemed generally more pro-Asian than pro-Western in his view of international relations before 1945.

1596 Remember that as a youth, Ito participated in the burning of the British legation house.
In their views of international conflict, peace and diplomacy, three of these leaders saw international conflicts in racial terms, to a large extent. In the early 1900s, Yamagata feared worldwide racial wars, and sought ties with both China and Russia to counter the possibility. In the early 1930s, Hirohito largely envisioned international relations in racial terms, though he saw revolution and war as the monarchy’s greatest threats, and was proud of Japan’s victories in wars with China, Russia, and in World War I. While he hoped to avoid war with the United States and Britain, he was willing to risk it for Japan’s national interests. While he supported Japan’s invasions of China and Southeast Asia, and finally assented to war with the United States, as we noted above, he most feared war with the Soviet Union. Yanagita’s view of international relations was seemingly partly colored by the issue of race. He saw Japan’s international relations as characterized by the twin issues of isolation and exclusion on the basis of race.\footnote{I say this based on Yanagita’s view of the 1924 Japanese immigration exclusion act in the United States that we noted earlier in this chapter.}

Regarding specific conflicts, while two of the leaders regretted some of them, Hirohito took a more positive view before 1945.\footnote{Yanagita regretted Japan’s actions in the Sino-Japanese War, and Ito tried to discourage war with Russia. In the 1920s, Hirohito felt that each nation had a right to adequate arms, and that war was sometimes necessary, for a nation to pursue its national interests. We already noted his pride in Japan’s victories in earlier modern wars.}

The power of Hirohito’s supreme authority and position meant that his actions, inactions, and decisions gave extremely influential input into the events in China and World War II in the 1930s and 1940s. For example, in the late 1930s, in the military’s “Imperial Headquarters” and the “imperial conferences” (gozen kaigi), Hirohito influenced and approved major decisions affecting Japan, its colonies, and other
These basic facts, argued at length by Herbert Bix (Bix 2000), stand in stark contrast to Hirohito’s postwar image long cultivated by the Japanese government, that of Hirohito as a passive, pacifist ruler controlled and manipulated by aggressive militarists and ultraconservative bureaucrats he was powerless to stop. Hirohito was highly concerned about his image, an effort he continued after the war, and which, with American cooperation, enabled his survival. Bix charges that Hirohito’s concern for the image of the emperor, the throne and their survival even delayed the surrender of Japan at the war’s end.

Ito and Yanagita stand out as the strongest supporters of peace here. Interestingly, Hirohito believed that Japan waged the earlier wars with China and Russia for the sake of peace. In the early 1920s, at first Hirohito and his court somewhat supported the prevailing international atmosphere of peace-building, multilateral treaties, and the activation of the League of Nations. But shortly later they dropped their support, since these various instruments seemed to limit what Hirohito and other conservative political and military leaders viewed as Japan’s legitimate interests in Asia. These leaders also displayed mixed attitudes concerning various treaties.

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1599 Bix, Hirohito, 327-332.
1600 Starting in the 1920s, the Japanese government used, created, and projected many select images of Hirohito and the imperial throne to encourage Japanese nationalism, patriotism, and support for the throne, stressed at various places in Bix, Hirohito. This concern for image is also seen in Hirohito’s imperial tours of colonies as regent (Ibid., 137-139, 156), and in the Imperial Household Ministry’s excessive attention to detail in promoting and maintaining Hirohito’s image in such events as his enthronement ceremony (Bix, Hirohito).
1601 For more on Bix’s discussion of how Hirohito hesitated to end the war, see Ibid., 16-17, 487-493, 499-505, 519-521, 523-524.
1602 We noted above how Hamada called Ito a “man of peace,” given his opposition to the Russo-Japanese War, support for and negotiations for peace with various powers.
1603 For example, Ito desired to quickly end the unequal trade treaties that the West had forced on Japan in the late nineteenth century. He also reluctantly agreed to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902, fearing it would provoke war with Russia. In the early 1920s, Hirohito and his court briefly expressed support for
Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Political Relations (1895-1945)

*Development Issues.* Internationalization asks, as Japan engaged in increasing trade in the global economy from 1895 to 1945, what happened culturally on the international level? What, if any evidence, do we see from these worldviews of Japan’s external political relations? Most of the leaders here, except for Yanagita, were conservative in their politics, and expected Japan to soon get sucked into various race wars. Most of these leaders have very realist views of international relations, somewhat affected by evolutionistic thought. All of this is especially true for Hirohito. All these leaders support Japan’s leadership of the Asian region against Western imperialism. During World War II, Hirohito expressed increasing support for Japanese imperialism in several regions. He was fearful of the West, but finally willing to sacrifice war with the United States and Britain for the pursuit of Japan’s interests. He showed a more favorable attitude toward conflict than any other leader here. While the leaders had varied attitudes toward treaties, Hirohito only supported them when, again, they were judged to be in Japan’s interests. The generally conservative, assertive attitudes toward external political relations and conflict seen in these leaders tended to encourage assertive Japanese political and diplomatic action as Japan’s domestic politics became increasingly conservative and militaristic in the 1930s. The assertion of Japanese power in the East Asian region could not help but affect the cultures of other countries there as Japan exercised increasing political and economic influence. Whether through trade during various multilateral treaties, but soon opposed most of them. They also never supported the Kellogg-Briand Pact of the late 1920s, since its pacifist nature seemed contrary to Japan’s overseas interests.
World War I, later conflict, or direct imperialism, the projection of these attitudes on other nations in the region surely had profound effects.

**Technology Issues.** On general concepts of technology, what are the most important technology-related ideas associated with these worldviews of external political relations? The main technological phenomena connected with these worldviews were the technologies of heavy industrialization, militarism, and military arms. While Japan imported some of the weapons it used in its various conflicts, without this industrialization, Japan could not have mastered or built the military arms it needed to support the military actions in which it engaged in this period, from the Russo-Japanese War through World War II. If Japan had not produced and used these technologies in all of these conflicts, perhaps the future of East Asia would have been very different.

What are some the most significant political factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in the worldviews of external political relations studied here? Some of the main imported technologies related to these worldviews were industrial and military technologies, military arms, and political ideas of authoritarian government, monarchy, military theories, and theories of evolutionistic political development. Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or negatively? Why? Though more liberal thought from Great Britain and the United States was influential in Japan during the Taisho democracy movement (about 1905 to 1932), especially in academic circles and popular culture, conservative thought from

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1605 For a more detailed list of the types of ideas and technologies that were imported, see the discussion later in this chapter, under cognition issues, on the cultural logics of these worldviews of external political relations, specifically on the global phenomena to which these leaders reacted. Evolutionistic ideas seemed more relevant earlier in the period (seen here especially in the thought of Kato), but touched even the thinking of Hirohito, due to his education early in the twentieth century.
Europe was more predominant in the government, the military and the imperial court. This conservative influence constrained the actions of the Japanese government and its top decision makers. It also had a decisive impact on the overall direction Japan’s politics, international and military relations took.

What were the important ideas and technologies transferred in these worldviews of external political relations? These ideas and technologies were mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. Who were the main international actors in the external environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they have on the transfer outcomes? Some of the main international actors included foreign governments and leaders, foreign diplomatic bodies and actors, such as the League of Nations, and foreign military bodies who advised Japan. Important domestic actors included ministries and agencies of the Japanese government related to heavy industry, foreign affairs and relations, the various emperors and their courts, branches of the Japanese armed forces, and military leaders. The main impacts of the foreign actors on these transfers included allowing the Japanese government, military, and heavy industries, both public and private, to import these technologies and develop them further. The primary impacts of the domestic actors, beyond importing and further developing the technologies and ideas, included deploying and spreading them throughout areas under Japanese influence in East Asia and the South Pacific.

What are the significant lessons here, or could these outcomes have been improved? A possible lesson is that Western exporters should perhaps have been more selective in what they allowed Japan to import, by asking for what purposes the imported items would be used. This was perhaps too advanced a concept for the time. Did the
international system affect the technologies and ideas Japan imported positively or negatively? Japan imported some ideas and technologies that became very destructive to the peoples of East Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. Most of the time, foreign governments did not consider very much what Japan was importing, or what the effects might be. When Japan attacked Southeast Asia in 1941, the United States enacted strict economic sanctions. This was one case of a foreign government reflecting seriously on what Japan was doing, and taking action as a result.

What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these worldviews?\textsuperscript{1606} Some of the most important cultural factors were conservative political ideologies that stressed the virtue of power and military victory, that the strong would be victorious and rule the weak. The state, military, and imperial court especially embraced ideas that were conservative, as Japan’s own predominant culture of politics was. Some of these ideas partly had their basis in evolutionistic thought, while some were accentuated by the nationalist, imperialist propaganda that became influential in Japan in the late 1920s through the 1930s. This combination of ideas helped Japan’s conservative political and military leaders come to the conclusion that Japan had a duty, or right, to help defend both itself and other Asian nations against the West. Astute Japanese leaders quickly observed the hypocrisy of how the West handled the issue of race. There was no strong culture of peace in Japan at this

\textsuperscript{1606} Szyliowicz, \textit{Politics, Technology, Development}, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
time, neither in the main political ideas the state imported, nor in Japan’s own “traditions.”

In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies and ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level? Japan’s leaders often used ideas of strong military action, aggression, and military intervention in the affairs of other nations to pursue Japan’s national interests, and what they interpreted to be the interests of neighboring regions, including Korea, Taiwan and others. Japan used the most advanced military technologies it could obtain to seek to obtain access to or control territories and resources that they believed were necessary to defend Japan and the rest of Asia against the West.

How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? These technologies, especially military ones, enabled Japan to invade and attack Russia, Korea, Taiwan, China, the United States (Hawaii), and other areas. Earlier attacks brought wealth and honor to the nation’s military, and new areas came under Japan’s predominant influence for the first time. But the long-term costs were devastating; ultimately Japan was virtually destroyed at the end of World War II, and damage to other areas was also huge, in many cases.

Do the belief systems of any of these leaders (on technology issues on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Yamagata, Hirohito and Kato were more conservative and militarist leaning, Ito was conservative

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1607 Note my previous comments on pacifism in Japan. When pacifist ideologies were first imported from the West in the 1800s, Japan had no recent, significant experience of war, so many Japanese had a hard connecting with these ideas.

1608 Again, this is what I call the “international cultural ecology approach” to technology, drawn from anthropology, based on Clemmer, Myers, and Rudden, Julian Steward, and Glick, “Technology,” 464.
but less militarist, and Yanagita was more of a progressive pacifist. Several of the leaders’ belief systems definitely blinded them to certain realities. The clearest example here is Hirohito. His unusual, tightly controlled environment, steeped in imperialist, nationalist, and spiritual ideologies, could not help but constrain his viewpoints and actions. Did the leaders fail to adjust their decisions or viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? If so, how did these factors affect transfer or policy outcomes? In Hirohito we have a very strong case of a leader who failed to adequately adjust his decisions to rapidly changing conditions, especially during World War II.\footnote{1609} The results for Japan and East Asia were devastating. Through the war, Japan experienced the ultimate technological nightmare to date: two atomic bombings. And ironically, this supreme loss eventually resulted in Japan’s postwar technological renaissance with open export access to the world’s largest consumer market, the United States.

Finally, in these worldviews on external relations, is the concept of technonationalism as ideology manifested? If so, how? Views of technonationalism were very strongly present in the views of Yamagata and Hirohito. Yamagata strongly relied on military power and technology to create the strong military forces needed to defend Japan and allow it to pursue its national interests in Asia. Though his overt use of military technologies for this purpose was more evident in the previous period (1850 to 1895), these factors were still present in his thought early in this period (1895 to 1945). In his thought on international relations in this era, Hirohito shows implicit support for the ideas of technonationalism as ideology. Though his thinking and actions were more driven by

\footnote{1609} I will mention only two examples discussed in Bix, \textit{Hirohito}. One example was Hirohito’s minute attention to detail in many policy areas, which caused him on occasion to lose sight of the “big picture,” and also his hesitancy to allow Japan to surrender until the last possible moment (Bix, \textit{Hirohito}).
ideas of power politics and evolutionistic images of survival of the strongest nations, and less by overt economics, he surely realized that economics and resources had connection to political power.  

**Cognition Issues. Image.** The basic images in these leaders’ minds (1895 to 1945) about Japan’s international relations may be organized into about four major groups. In the first group, images of international relations and general foreign policy, concerning their primary images of foreign policy and international relations, most of the images lean toward realism and competition between nation states for power. Images of intense competition between nations, based on their own interests, battles for power, and competition between the races suggest the influence of evolutionary thought. Of the leaders who commented on external political relations in this period (Ito, Hirohito, Yanagita, and Yamagata), only Yanagita’s images suggest non-aggression or distrust of oligarchic dominance of leadership in diplomacy. Some of Hirohito’s images reveal the opposite: a dislike for democratic input in international relations. In all of the images on basic international relations, there is a desire for equality between Japan and other nations. Images of the place of Japan in international relations mention competing images: Japan’s superiority to other nations, the danger of its encirclement by other powers, and its general isolation. The images of several leaders include

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1610 He demonstrates this idea in his support for Japan’s attack on Southeast Asia, to obtain needed resources, in the early 1940s (Bix, Hirohito).
1611 Ito, Hirohito.
1612 Hirohito, Yanagita.
1613 Hirohito.
1614 Hirohito.
1615 Ito, Hirohito.
1616 Hirohito.
1617 Hirohito.
1618 Hirohito.
references to competition between races and impending race-based conflict between Japan and Western powers.¹⁶¹⁹ In these leaders’ images of Western and international history, we see a stress on conflict, power, and competition between nations.¹⁶²⁰ In Hirohito’s images of international law, the stress is on nations acting in their own interests, and the assumption is that through international law, Western nations do just that.

A second major group of international relations images are those of Japan’s relations with Asian powers. In his images of general relations with Far Eastern countries, Ito expresses support for peace, cooperation, commerce, and for Japan defending its interests against other regional powers if necessary. He also offers images of friendly relations with Korea. On images of China and Manchuria, in the 1930s, Hirohito is supportive of invasion and inferior status for both regions, and earlier, fearful of China helping to “encircle” Japan. In contrast, Yanagita regrets Japanese aggressive action in China. Images on relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, from Ito, Yamagata, and Hirohito, are contrasting. While Hirohito and Ito greatly fear conflict with Russia or the Soviet Union, Yamagata is eager for treaties with Russia to counter threats he sees from the United States. Finally, in his images of relations with Southeast Asia, Hirohito reveals he is willing to go to war with the United States and Britain in order to gain the resources of Southeast Asia for Japan.

¹⁶¹⁸ Yanagita.
¹⁶¹⁹ These various images are offered by Hirohito, Yamagata and suggested by Yanagita.
¹⁶²⁰ This is true of all of Hirohito’s images. Yanagita is an exception. He views power imbalances and conflicts between nations as most likely a temporary phenomenon.
The third group of images concerns Japan’s relations with Western powers. In their images of relations with the West and Europe at large, while Ito recognizes the West’s power, and the potential of conflict with it, Hirohito was highly impressed with Europe, especially Britain, when he traveled there as regent. In the images of U.S.-Japanese relations, we see negative images. While Yamagata viewed the United States as Japan’s greatest threat in East Asia, in Hirohito’s images, we see caution and fear about possible ruptures in the relationship. On relations with Britain, there are similar images—fears about conflict with Britain, or that signing a treaty could bring conflict.\textsuperscript{1621}

The final group features images of war, peace and diplomacy. In his images of many conflicts, Hirohito reveals a belief that Japan acted justly, for peace, or that he was proud of what was accomplished.\textsuperscript{1622} He also voices support for each nation possessing adequate arms. In contrast, Ito and Yanagita both express doubts about several wars. On peace and diplomacy, several images from Ito show that he was often supportive of peace and ending unequal relationships in international relations. In Hirohito’s images on peace and diplomacy, we see a mixed record, of support for peace early in the 1920s, and later, general opposition.

How may these images functioned as perceptual filters or organizing devices? On international relations and foreign policy, several blind spots existed in the views of these leaders, including blindness on paths to peace, non-aggression, idealism, cooperation, the dangers of Japan toward other regions, and what Japan could learn from Asia. Yanagita was less blind in these areas. Perhaps a balance of influence in foreign

\textsuperscript{1621} These are the images of Ito, Yamagata or Hirohito.
\textsuperscript{1622} This was the case in Hirohito’s views of the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I.
policy, both democratic and elite, would have been best for Japan at this time. On relations with Asia, the leaders’ blindspots included a general ignorance of the possibilities of peace through trade and cooperation, not aggression. In their minds, how could cooperation with Asia be possible if not through colonialism and imperialism? On relations with the West, these leaders seemed blind to the benefits and possibilities of cooperation with the West, the United States, and Britain. What might have been gained? Ito and Yanagita often supported peace and diplomacy, but Hirohito had a mixed record and generally did not, except when it seemed they would benefit Japan. On war, if Japan’s leaders, in practice, had been more cautious about war, perhaps the government and Hirohito would have been less aggressive toward Asia, and Japan’s postwar relations with the continent smoother.

Worldview. From the above images, the predominant worldview that emerges sees the world as made up of power hungry groups and actors, competing for position and strength in the international system. These groups and actors include different countries and races. Western nations are seen as more of a threat to Japan than Asian nations, and the latter seem weaker than Japan. The international system is mostly driven by competition for power, and nations, by their own interests. Powerful countries control the world, and want to dominate weaker ones. The West wants to dominate the countries of Asia and other non-Western regions, and usually does. Non-Asians want to dominate Asians. In the world’s political order, stronger countries dominate weaker ones. The West dominates the non-West. Elites and powerful groups in different countries dominate the leadership of their nations’ diplomacy. Japan should be equal with the nations of the West.
In this worldview, Japan should be equal with Western nations, but is not. Japan must grow stronger to fight for its interests in the international system. It is in danger of being invaded, controlled or encircled by aggressive foreign (especially Western) nations. In Hirohito’s mind, Japan has acted justly in its wars with other countries (Hirohito). Regarding views of peace, to Yanagita and Ito, conflict is negative, and should be avoided whenever possible. Yanagita alone felt Japan should not compete with other nations, but should seek cooperative non-aggression.

Regarding the non-self, on Asia, these leaders express a desire for Japan to cooperate with them. There is a common belief that Japan is superior to other Asian nations, and that Japan is best able to lead them against the West. Later, in Hirohito, we see the view that Japan has the right to dominate other countries. Yanagita believed that Japan should seek to set an example for other Asian countries, try to lead them toward development, and cooperate with them against the West. On the West, images show fear in the minds of other leaders, that the West threatens Japan, wants to control and encircle it. In general, most of these leaders desired, if possible, to avoid conflict with major Western powers. Among the most threatening Western states were the United States, Russia/the Soviet Union, and Britain. Hirohito is the leader who finally took Japan to war against all three.

What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the viewers/actors who hold these worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’ worldviews? The environment was the system of international relations in Asia, largely dominated or influenced by major Western powers: the United States, Britain, Russia, and several lesser Western powers, including France, Germany, and Holland (the latter,
through World War II). Earlier in this period, there were several non-Western powers who are important actors in connection with Japan, especially China and Korea. There was also the system of international diplomacy and international bodies such as the League of Nations. This system and bodies were absolutely dominated by the West, and not open to much input from those outside the West. The international diplomatic system and the Western powers did not respect Japan or non-Western powers, expect or want them to have a voice in the international system. But Japan’s military victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars won it a small amount of respect. In the international system, Japan had almost no voice. The Western nations assumed that they knew best, had the right to dominate international diplomacy, and expected Japan to cooperate. When Japan did not, the West found it incomprehensible, and was willing to resort to force in the Russo-Japanese war or World War II if Japan actually attacked Western interests, especially in Asia. Otherwise, the West was not interested in listening to Japan or other non-Western powers and their interests.

How these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions may have influenced the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes? The perception that strong, aggressive countries dominate international diplomacy made Japanese leaders very open to realist, military-oriented interpretations of international relations. They generally were not open to perceptions that hinted at cooperation. These power-oriented views also encouraged Japan to take a more aggressive stance toward its Asian neighbors. On uses of information, the power-oriented views of international relations likely encouraged Japan’s leaders to read views of international relations and military theory that stressed realist views and building Japan’s
defenses. These views downplayed and persecuted individuals, groups and scholars who hinted at pacifist views. The leaders’ understanding of events and their causes made most of these actors view international events as reflective of the power-hungry drive of nations for survival. These events were caused by countries’ pursuit of their national interests and the desire to survive. How did technological systems affect these worldviews? The stress on power and the military throughout this period made Japanese leaders prefer powerful, technological solutions to the problems of international relations. These solutions had to be supported by the industrial, military complex in Japan. These worldviews leaned overwhelmingly in the direction of realism, conservatism, and militarism. The only exceptions were the views of Ito and Yanagita on peace and cooperation.

*Cultural Logics.* The global phenomena to which these leaders responded included foreign governments (Western and Asian), Western ideas and theories about politics and international relations, military forces, theories and technologies, Asian military forces (China and Korea), international conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War and World War II, Western powers, East Asian powers, Western diplomatic institutions and structures, Western writings on politics, diplomacy and military affairs, international treaties, and international bodies such as the League of Nations. What were the leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? Of the leaders here (Ito, Yamagata, Hirohito, Yanagita), most saw international relations as competition between different nations and/or races.\(^\text{1623}\) Regarding conflict, while all of the leaders were fearful of war to varying degrees, some saw the use of arms as acceptable to defend Japan’s national

\(^{1623}\) Yamagata and Hirohito agree with the racial factor.
interests, worth risking if it would strengthen Japan.\textsuperscript{1624} Others saw it as dangerous, to be avoided if possible.\textsuperscript{1625} Regarding Japan and international relations, Yamagata was determined to defend Japan through foreign alliances and a strong military, and Ito desired to strengthen Japan so it could stand independently on the international stage. On Asia, all of these leaders saw other Asian countries besides Japan as weaker and more inferior, and believed that Japan could help lead and strengthen them to successfully resist the West. They seemed to accept the view of some Japanese leaders during World War I, “Asian Monroism”—that Asia should be for Asians, not just for the West’s domination. Some of these leaders thought it was acceptable for Japan to invade or control other Asian countries,\textsuperscript{1626} while others implied that Japan should help them, but not invade.\textsuperscript{1627} On the West, all of the leaders were cautious about or fearful of the power and potential actions of such nations as the United States, Britain and Russia/the Soviet Union. On peace and diplomacy, some of the leaders supported treaties and diplomacy as long as Japan’s national interests were furthered,\textsuperscript{1628} while others were more generally supportive.\textsuperscript{1629}

The cultural logics under these worldviews saw international relations as driven by power and competition between different nations and groups. Nations that are stronger militarily will have more power, and be able to conquer and lead other nations. If Japan became strong, it would have the right to lead other Asian countries, and to guide them in

\textsuperscript{1624} Yamagata and Hirohito.
\textsuperscript{1625} Ito and Yanagita.
\textsuperscript{1626} Yamagata and Hirohito.
\textsuperscript{1627} Ito and Yanagita.
\textsuperscript{1628} Yamagata and Hirohito.
\textsuperscript{1629} Ito and Yanagita.
resisting the West. It was not merely Japan’s power that gave it the right to lead other Asians, but also its superior character.

The response of these leaders to these global phenomena was to personally be involved however each one was able in areas of action or reflection relevant to these issues. Ito was personally involved in diplomacy and in becoming the first Japanese resident governor-general in Korea. Yamagata founded and led one of the most powerful political factions in early twentieth century Japan, advocating for policies that would maintain Japan’s modern military. Later, Hirohito was personally involved as the leader and emperor of Japan. He continued his policy efforts behind the scenes at the imperial court. Yanagita most actively opposed the various wars and elitist tendencies of Japanese diplomacy in his writings in Japan’s press, and in personal reflections.

The cultural logics under these responses are that as the West overtly threatened Japan up through the period of 1850 to 1895, it continues to threaten the rest of Asia in a somewhat similar manner in the current period (1895 to 1945). Japan needs to help these other countries strengthen themselves, unite and rise up against Western domination. In all of these leaders, except Yanagita, there is also the assumption that if Japan is strong, it has the right to use some of the other countries’ resources. We see the assumption that the strong will rule those who are weaker. It is ironic that most of these leaders assume that other Asian nations will welcome Japanese leadership, just because Japan is also Asian, and stronger. They fail to realize that most other Asians do not want any foreign domination or influence, even from a fellow Asian country, especially one that invades.

-Compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena, and then compare the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena.
In both of these sets of cultural logics, there is the assumption that the strong have the right to rule the weak. The first set assumes simply that those who have the most power have the right to, and will, rule the weak. In the second case, the cultural logics under the responses, Japan also has the right. There is little realization, except by Yanagita, that Japan’s Asian neighbors do not want its intervention, leadership, or control.

**Globalization Issues.** To consider globalization issues, as in Chapters 5 and 6, the first question I ask here is, how do some of the most important worldviews here reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? In the momentous events that take place in Japan’s external political relations during this period, ranging from Japan’s surprise attack on Port Arthur in China in 1904 to its large-scale production supporting the allies in World War I to the events in World War II, this period represents greatly intensified processes of globalization in external political relations. For these various conflicts, Japan produced an impressive range of technologies and armaments. Each successive conflict represents an increased degree of technological sophistication and global connection. By the time of World War II, Japan launched transpacific attacks on Hawaii and Alaska, controlled a vast area of the South Pacific, and soon faced massive bombing from American planes and the atomic bomb before the end of the war. Not only in these technologies, but also in the thinking of the leaders on Japan’s external political relations, we see intensified consideration of global issues, including concerns over the actions of various Western powers, and important Asian powers such as China and Russia. As the single most influential leader in Japan in this period, Hirohito had access to frequent reports and briefings of the best available information about various political and military
issues and events. His reactions had global and regional consequences for thousands, indeed millions of lives.

And how does globalization affect the worldviews? The intensification of political and military information and technologies helped Japan to continue modernizing its military forces during this period, enabling it to attack such major powers as Russia, China, the United States, and Britain, either directly and/or their colonies. Japan’s access to excellent military know-how and technologies greatly complicated its political, diplomatic, and military interactions during this period, across an increasingly broad geographic range. While these actors often showed great skill and astuteness in these interactions, the broadened scope necessitated an increasingly larger range of experience and skills. Some mistakes were inevitable.

If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? As these leaders interacted with important political and military forces and ideas, they worked very hard, and were often very deeply affected. For example, Ito was assassinated in Korea in 1909. Hirohito nearly lost the imperial throne at the end of World War II, and contributed to greater destruction in the nation by surrendering so late. On a macro-level, many Japanese were affected by the various wars and changes in Japanese society that took place as millions of lives were lost, as the nation increasingly industrialized and transformed itself to supply the conflicts, and as it suffered terrible attacks and deprivation during the war. The scale of shared suffering increased exponentially by the end of World War II. These processes of global politics and conflicts affected millions of Japanese, and millions more in foreign lands and Japan’s colonies.
Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Based on the above definition of globalization, the events from 1895 to 1945 do represent a new form of globalization, of intensified, regional connections, unprecedented in their intensity, coming from Japan. As Japan drew in other regions and nations into its colonial orbit, its political, economic, and cultural influence on them grew. Regarding politics, colonial areas were forced to come under Japanese administration and submit to Japan’s political and nationalistic ideologies, including State Shinto and emperor worship. This was the first period of global Japanese influence in history, but it was relatively short-lived. The region with the most extended influence was Taiwan, where it lasted from 1895 to 1945 (fifty years). Japan’s influence on certain regions, such as Taiwan and Korea, was great, and minimal on others, such as the Philippines and Burma. The prewar case of Japanese globalization in some ways prepared the way for vastly increased, new forms of global influence after 1945, when Japanese globalization truly became global in its scope, through trade, exported economic and cultural products, aid, and other means.

Worldviews on Japan’s External Economic Relations

Yanagita Kunio. In 1925, Yanagita Kunio wrote that national-focused economics had ended, that the age of international economics had begun. Yet countries still regarded their national interests as primary. Because of social evolution, the stronger nations would devour the weaker ones. Japan still needed a system of national

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1630 It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the long-term impacts of this influence. I will note that the intense cult of leader worship in North Korea, focused mainly on its former leader Kim Il Sung, is perhaps a manifestation of emperor worship imposed on Korea before 1945.

1631 We do not have time to discuss details of postwar Japanese globalization at this stage in the research.

economic planning, and excessive economic liberalism was not advisable. The Meiji’s government’s basic economic policy favored development of commerce and industry focused on exports, and top-down capitalism. The contributions of agriculture were seen as secondary.\textsuperscript{1633} The government and some other scholars advocated protectionism in the early 1900s. Yanagita, aware that Japan was a developing nation, disagreed with some of their ideas, but agreed that Japan needed limited protectionism. Some officials and scholars like Ito Hirobumi supported primary protection of commerce and industry, and agriculture as secondary. Yanagita felt that over-dependence on manufactured exports would place Japan at the mercy of international economics. Less-developed nations that received Japan’s products would build up their own industries, reject imports, and attempt to export their own products.\textsuperscript{1634} In the late 1920s, the government’s economic policies focused on exports and the rationalization of industry. Yanagita disagreed, arguing that the economy should focus on reforming agriculture, and domestic-oriented production.\textsuperscript{1635}

**Conceptual Analysis of Yanagita’s Worldviews About Japan’s External Economic Relations (1895-1945)**

**General Issues.** Yanagita’s views about the structure of Japan’s external economic relations differed greatly from official Japanese government policy from the

\textsuperscript{1633} From our discussion of Yanagita’s view of agriculture in the section on Japan’s domestic economy, it is clear that he viewed the role of agriculture as foundational in Japan’s economy and culture. In global competition, the “loser nations” will be those who over-consume the commercial products of other countries, and forget how to produce their own (i.e., agricultural and other basic products) (Ibid., 62-63).

\textsuperscript{1634} Ibid., 4-9. Interestingly, one could argue that this is essentially what has happened in the late 1900s and early 2000s as countries like Taiwan, South Korea and China have developed their own economies, and begun to export their goods to Japan and other countries that were formerly Japanese colonies or less developed markets for its exports.

\textsuperscript{1635} Ibid., 106-107. I do not include comparative assessment of Japan’s external economic relations here, since I focus mainly on the views of only one leader, Yanagita.
early 1900s through the 1920s. While the government placed emphasis on heavy and large-scale industries geared for exports, Yanagita favored smaller-scale production, regional industries, a focus on agriculture and the domestic market. In the mid-1920s, though he felt the age of international economics had truly arrived, he still felt that most nations focused on their own economic interests, with the strong devouring the weak. Since Japan was still a developing country, he favored national economic planning, and distrusted too much economic liberalism. Overall, Yanagita’s international economic views seem somewhat progressive, supportive of heavy state involvement in promotion of human scale industries, and cautious about economic plans that turned Japan’s productivity away from basic commodities like agricultural products and increased its dependence on the uncertainties of international markets through over-reliance on industrial products. There is also a slight influence of evolutionary views here.

**Development Issues.** If we examine Yanagita’s views of Japan’s external economic relations in the 1920s through the lens of internationalization, we see that his entire concern was the protection of Japan’s domestic culture from the ravages of the impacts of international economic and cultural forces on Japan as it engaged the global marketplace. He favored the revitalization of regional industry and agriculture so that Japan could be strengthened internally on both the economic and cultural levels, and so be able to better withstand the impacts of foreign influences. However, internationalization considers the economic and cultural impacts of a developing country’s absorption into the global market on the international, not domestic level. But Yanagita does not consider the issue of the impacts of Japan’s external economic
relations on the international level, so the concept of internationalization is not very relevant here.

**Technology Issues.** What are the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with Yanagita’s worldview of external economic relations? The most notable concept related to technology here is Yanagita, in general, opposes a heavy emphasis on large-scale industries and technologies mainly geared for generating exports. He acknowledges that some large-scale industries should be present, but for Japan, he favors industries and technologies that are more human scale, suited for broad distribution across the nation.

What are the most significant economic factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in the worldview studied here?\(^{1636}\) In his emphasis on regional, human scale industries, Yanagita also places more emphasis on Japan’s domestic market, rather than on international trade. While Japanese government policy in the early twentieth century favored heavy industries geared for exports, Yanagita takes the opposite track. If Japan does care for its own house first, the house may collapse. Yet the government’s policy on heavy promotion of exports, coupled with fierce competition within Japan’s domestic market, is the basic policy that finally prevailed through the postwar period. Did the international system affect these technologies/issues positively or negatively? Why? There is no evidence here that international forces influenced Yanagita’s views of external economic relations, though he was surely aware of the major economic theories through his training in agro-politics in college.

What were the important ideas/technologies transferred in this worldview?

Among the most important ideas in Yanagita’s worldview are that economic activities should fit the scale of life and level of the people whom it affects, and that they should be broadly distributed (geographically) across a society, not just centered in one or a few locales. He also believed that though international trade had reached unprecedented levels, that the national interests of various nation-states still drove the system, and that production, in Japan’s case, should focus on primary products, such as agricultural ones. I have no idea what the sources for these economic ideas are, whether they are Japanese or foreign. The main international actors in the external environment, and domestic actors, individual or state, involved here included foreign governments and their trade and economics-related ministries, trading companies, international firms, zaibatsu, the Japanese government and its economic ministries. Their impacts on the transfer outcomes here were important, especially in the case of the Japanese government. The government’s policies on economics and trade directly affected what Japan’s economy did on the international level. It is interesting that the Japanese government’s concerns for protecting regional and rural economies took off in the 1960s and 1970s, in an era of extremely rapid urbanization. It seems that Yanagita’s economic vision, while not embraced in the prewar period, may have been somewhat prophetic.

What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in this worldview?1637 The most significant cultural idea here, imported or not, is that economics must be human scale, and sensitive to human needs. It must not engulf ways of life in local areas, but strengthen and complement them. Another

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1637 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
cultural value is that it is moral for the state to intervene in the economy for the common good. Yanagita does not trust in the automatic good or morality of the marketplace. There is no evidence here that Yanagita used these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level. Rather, his concern was for Japan’s survival on the domestic level. He assumes that if Japan prospers on the domestic level, that its international prosperity, or survival at a minimum, will follow. His first concern is for Japan’s mere cultural survival (economic survival is seen as a means for achieving that end). Did these technology-related ideas affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? Since Yanagita’s cultural ideas here found no application in the prewar system, they had no opportunity to enhance its survival on the international level. It is interesting to contemplate what they might have done if they had had the chance.

Does Yanagita’s belief system here, on technology issues on the international level, blind him to certain realities? Yanagita seems convinced that Japan’s priorities must be on building its economy and technologies for the human scale. What did he believe about technology on the international level? He likely would have argued that although the economy (and presumably technologies, too) is now internationally driven, individual developing nations, such as Japan, must not allow themselves to be engulfed or coerced by international forces to determine what their economies and technologies do. Rather, these decisions and policies should be determined by each nation, by each one’s own peoples and government, according to the unique conditions and situation of each. If this was Yanagita’s conviction, did it blind him to certain realities? Yanagita was certainly aware of international realities, but he was biased toward the domestic level.
Does Yanagita fail to adjust his viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? Perhaps he does. While he argued against the Japanese government’s policies, that it was too biased toward heavy industry and exports, he was biased toward the domestic side. It seems that a balanced policy, integrating both extremes, might have been more advisable.

In this worldview of external economic relations, is the concept of technonationalism as ideology manifested? Technonationalism as ideology is not central to Yanagita’s thought. Rather, the idea of “cultural nationalism as ideology” can be called one of its central emphases. Yanagita is not concerned about economics as the most important aspect of Japan’s survival. Japanese must not lose their sense of self, who they are. If they do, all the money in the world will not matter. To Yanagita, economics is a by-product of culture, but not the item of most fundamental concern.

**Cognition Issues. Image.** Most of the images of Japan’s external economic relations are Yanagita’s, and fall into three groups: images of international economics, of Japan’s economy within the international economic system, and of Japan’s trade and international economic policies. In Yanagita’s images of international economics, we see a stress on the irony that although the age of international economics has truly begun as of the late 1920s, nations will still act primarily in their own national economic self-interests. Perhaps because of this, stronger nations will continue to devour weaker ones in the global marketplace. Regarding images of Japan’s place in the international economy, Yanagita sees Japan as a developing country, and expresses concern that over-dependence on exporting manufactured goods, rather than primary products such as agriculture, will make Japan vulnerable. Yanagita’s images of Japan’s trade and international economic policies show disagreement with most Japanese government
policies. Yanagita disagrees with the emphases of these policies on heavy industries, commerce, and exports of manufactured goods, and argues that there should be more emphasis on agriculture. His images also reveal his support for national economic planning, some protection of the Japanese market, emphasis on domestic reforms and issues first, and opposition to unfettered economic liberalism [by implication, free trade].

How might these images have served as perceptual filters or organizing devices? On the international economy, these leaders failed to see where there were any opportunities for economic cooperation, or cases where positive trade with other nations would result in greater growth and prosperity for Japan and others. On the Japanese economy in the international economic system, perhaps it would have been best to include a balance of industry, commerce and agriculture, not one more than the other. Both Yanagita and the government had differing views of this subject. Regarding Japan’s trade and international economic policies, Yanagita’s emphasis on mainly agriculture might have depleted Japan’s food resources, and left it vulnerable to boycotts from other nations such as the United States. What difference would seeking a policy of balanced trade, with some free trade and some sectors with limits have made? What if the government had been encouraged to consider trade’s impacts on local areas?

**Worldview.** In the worldview framework that emerges from the above images, concerning the nature of the world, the world is affected by fierce econ competition. A developing country like Japan would do better to depend more on primary products, not manufactured ones. Concerning how the world works, though the world is now an international economic system, nations still act in their own international economic interests. The economically stronger nations devour weaker ones. Free trade is not good;
LDCs need more protectionism, not less. More state intervention in the economies of LDCs would probably be positive. On the world’s order, in these worldviews, the world is truly an international economic system for the first time, but in practicality, national economic interests still largely drive the system.

Concerning views of the self (Japan and the self’s actions, beliefs, and roles), Japan is still seen as an LDC. If it depends on exporting manufactured goods too much, it will be vulnerable to what other nations want to do. The Japanese government’s economic policies are wrong. They overemphasize heavy industries, exports, and commerce. There should more emphasis on exporting agriculture. More state intervention in Japan’s economy would also be good. On views of the non-self (non-Japanese nations), nations that are stronger than Japan or other Asian nations (namely, the West) will devour Japan and Asia economically if given the chance. Therefore they cannot and should not be totally trusted in the economic system. Japan and similar nations need some level of protectionism and strong state economic intervention to prevent being devoured.

What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding these leaders and these worldviews? How have these environments interacted with and/or affected the leaders’ worldviews? The international trading system, dominated by Western countries, was also a highly aggressive environment. Countries, even large ones, that could not organize themselves would be invaded, economically dominated and perhaps colonized by the West.

How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interaction influence the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes? Regarding perception, harsh economic environment and evolution-
influenced economic views made Yanagita oppose free trade and liberal economic policies. If “weak” Japan was too open, it would simply be devoured. Yanagita preferred more state intervention to protect Japan’s agriculture and domestic economy, since he generally was more concerned about domestic issues, and feared that too open an economic environment would destroy the heart of Japan, the rural economy, agriculture and its culture. Foreign nations did not care about rural Japan’s culture, and nor did Japan’s government. On information use, Yanagita’s views on international economics were limited, since he was greatly concerned about there domestic economy. Therefore my data on this section, based on only Yanagita, is short. On understanding of events and their causes Yanagita believed that the unlimited international market was driven by greed and lack of concern for an individual country’s needs or cultures. Therefore these countries must protect themselves. It also seems that evolutionary thought affected his basic thoughts on the international economy.

How did technological systems affect these worldviews on the international economy? Yanagita saw large, heavy industries, a major emphasis of Japan’s trade policies, as totally disconnected with the cultural realities of Japan, and what needed to be done to protect it. Therefore he opposed many basic aspects of Japan’s trade and economic policies.

*Cultural Logics.* In their worldviews, the global phenomena to which these leaders responded the Western trading system, the global economic system dominated by the West, commodities traded with other countries, the global monetary system, foreign investments in Japan, Japanese investments overseas and in the colonies, foreign technologies, foreign governments and the Japanese government, their economic and
trade policies and economic-related ministries, international companies and players from overseas and Japan, Western economic knowledge, modern business practices and technologies, theories of international trade, industrialization, evolutionism, imperialism, colonialism, governmental trade and economic policies, thought about business, industry, production, factories, management, labor, Western theories of economics and business, theories of economic growth, wealth and prosperity, commodities traded with Japan’s colonies.

What were the leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? Yanagita believed that the Japanese economy should be domestically focused, especially on agriculture and the production of primary products. The export of mainly manufactured goods was unhealthy. Strong state intervention in the market and in trade was needed by the state in the face of intense economic competition between nations still acting in their self-interests. Some protectionism was needed; totally free trade was ill advised for a developing country like Japan. If free trade prevailed, Japan would be devoured.

What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena? They see economics as one of the most powerful forces in the world. It could destroy vulnerable countries. A state must intervene in the affairs of a country and their people, to protect them from economic or cultural exploitation from other countries. If Japan’s government did not take decisive action to protect Japan, Japan could be controlled or destroyed by other countries’ economies.

What were Yanagita’s responses to these global phenomena? He reflected deeply about a broad range of issues that he observed affecting Japan, one of which was
its economic interactions and trade with foreign countries. His main area of concern was protecting the heart of Japan’s indigenous culture and identity, found in rural Japan. He saw that Japan’s trade with foreign countries could overwhelm the country economically, and that unguided importation of too many products would damage Japan’s culture. He desires that Japan’s government consider and take decisive action regarding its foreign trade, as he argues in the writings studied here.

What were the cultural logics under these responses? An uncontrolled flood of foreign money and influence could overwhelm the culture of a weaker nation. Japan’s culture and economy were in a weaker state than those of the Western countries. Japan had a valuable culture and country, and they had the right to exist. A weaker country and its government must take defensive steps to protect the country. If they did not, they might lose.

What do we learn by comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena? In both cases the logics stressed the weaker state of Japan’s economy and culture. Without intervention by the state, either one or both might be destroyed or controlled by foreign forces.

**Globalization Issues.** Again, to assess globalization issues connected with Yanagita’s worldviews of Japan’s external economic relations (1895-1945), the first question I will ask is, how do these worldviews reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? And how does globalization affect the worldviews? Yanagita’s views here focus on the effects of Western economic globalization on Japan’s indigenous culture.
Large-scale industries and the massive import of Western products into rural Japan threatened to engulf local ways of life.

Regarding how globalization affected Yanagita’s worldviews here, while he saw Western globalization, in the form of the cultural effects of the reach of Western trade and its economic products, as a huge threat to Japan’s indigenous culture and identity, he expresses no direct concern about how Japanese global influences would affect the cultures of other regions in Asia. Given his sensitivities, while he expressed a desire for Japan to offer positive guidance for other Asian countries, likely he would not have wanted Japan to impose its ways on them. I do not see evidence that Yanagita’s culturally sensitive insights had much impact on the actions of the Japanese government toward other Asian regions.

If we consider these economic processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? As Yanagita observed and studied the impacts of Western economic globalization on rural Japan, he became concerned about the disappearance of its culture. His ethnographic observations were made on the local, micro level, though over the years, he studied several locations across Japan. His conclusions are made on the basis of observations and interviews with multiple actors in several locations across several regions in Japan. So these are micro-level observations of the local impacts of macro-level, global, economic phenomena.

Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Yanagita’s observations here focus on the impacts of Western globalization on a non-Western region (Japan). They do
not examine Japanese or another form of non-Western globalization affecting another region.

**Worldviews on Japan’s External Cultural Relations**

*Hirohito, Emperor.* In Hirohito’s youth and early adulthood, the Taisho democracy movement (influential from about 1905 to 1932) heavily influenced Japan’s political life and culture.\(^{1638}\) Regarding culture, according to Bix, Taisho democracy includes “…the transmission to Japan of American [and other Western] cultural and political products, lifestyles, and such ideologies as individualism.” It also challenged the assumption of Meiji Japan that the government, rather than the individual, should be the main factor in regulating correct morality.\(^{1639}\) As noted above, the values of Meiji Japan heavily influenced the education and worldviews of Hirohito in many areas, likely contributing to his resistance to Western democratic values before World War II.

In 1928, connected with enthronement events, a theme emerged in the Japanese press that Japan was about to begin a new global mission as the center of world culture, sharing superior values of peace, filial piety and loyalty with the world. This thought emerged as a variant of the ideology of *hakkô ichiu.*\(^{1640}\) *Hakkô ichiu* revived about 1928 in support of Hirohito’s reign, contributing new energy to Japanese nationalism.\(^{1641}\)

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\(^{1638}\) Taisho democracy movement refers to public efforts, often by politicians, journalists, and leading thinkers, to press for a more democratic political system, based on political party action in the Diet, rather than political cliques outside it, universal male suffrage, and cabinet governments led by the strongest political party’s chief (Bix, *Hirohito*). See Japan, “Taisho Democracy Movement,” 1500-1501.

\(^{1639}\) Ibid., 200-201.

\(^{1640}\) This 1928 version of *hakkô ichiu,* “eight corners of the world under one roof,” was related to the concept of *hakkô ichiu* in Tokugawa era writings that eventually each nation would recognize its proper place in the world hierarchy of nations, and follow the leadership of Japan in bringing world peace. In the 1850s and 1860s the concept re-emerged with the argument that Japan’s emperor should always be a dynamic leader who furthers the cause of enlightenment and civilization (Bix, *Hirohito*).

\(^{1641}\) Ibid., 200-201.
In 1933 and 1934, the military began producing propaganda films and books to mobilize the public for war. Some of them attempted to make the Japanese reject decadent Western culture, evoking images of the honor of sacrifice, Shinto worship, patriotic images of emperor and shrine worship, and village life. These films connected emperor and military ideologies by suggesting that through imperialism, the military embodied “national virtue” and the “sacred spirit” of Hirohito. “Spiritual mobilization” would allow Japan to break the “iron ring” of foreign powers starting to surround it.1642

Yanagita Kunio. Yanagita Kunio argued that only by helping the peoples of Japan’s different regions to strengthen their cultural identities and autonomy would they be able to pick what was beneficial from the onslaught of Western culture. Unless they understood their own indigenous cultures at the grassroots, they could not defend them.1643 Without understanding how modernization1644 interacted with Japan’s existing cultural values, its imposition on top of Japanese culture would be disastrous.1645 The source of confusion in Japan, seen in crises in the rural economy and urban morality, was the failure of the government to examine the effects of imported Western culture on indigenous lifestyles. This blindness of policymakers resulted from policies focused on short-term economic gains and losses.1646

1642 Ibid., 273-278. One book issued by the army, Hijôji kokumin zenshû (Essays on the Time of Emergency confronting the Nation) (1934), argued for government control and mobilization of all areas of the economy, politics, and society for war (Ibid., 277).
1643 Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 66. Yanagita felt this understanding was necessary at several levels, including those of the government and of the citizens themselves (Ibid., 76).
1644 Note that this is the conventional, Western meaning of modernization, not the Japanese version that I list in quotation marks.
1645 Ibid., 77.
1646 Ibid., 75.
and indigenous values, adequate policies for international politics and economics would be impossible.\textsuperscript{1647}

**Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Cultural Relations (1895-1945)**

In brief, there are four main themes that emerge here regarding Japan’s external cultural relations in this period: 1) views of the clash of Japanese culture with Western culture, and how to protect the former, 2) views of Western cultural influences in Japan, 3) views of the place of Japan in international culture, and 4) images of Western culture in comparison with Japanese culture. Regarding the clash of Japanese and Western cultures, Yanagita stressed these major factors: 1) Japanese must understand their own cultures and ways of life at the public, private and personal levels in order to effectively protect them during the onslaught of Western culture and values. 2) This cultural understanding must be encouraged in local and regional areas across Japan, to protect each area’s cultural autonomy and identity. 3) The Japanese government needed to be involved in the process of studying and protecting Japanese culture, but unfortunately its policy emphases on short-term economic gain blinded it to this reality.\textsuperscript{1648} 4) Without effective cultural self-awareness, not only will Japanese not be able to protect their own culture, their policies in international politics and economics will be handicapped.

Concerning views of Western cultural influence, we noted above how Hirohito was heavily influenced in his personal values by the cultural values of Meiji Japan and

\textsuperscript{1647} Ibid., 107. The use of ethnography to develop this sense of self-understanding is implied here, as well as the need for long-term historical perspective and reflection (Ibid., 77).

\textsuperscript{1648} Eventually the Japanese government seemed to catch on to Yanagita’s point here. The government has had, for some decades in the postwar period, extensive programs to recognize, protect and nurture rare cultural treasures and knowledge in danger of disappearing. One example is the government’s policy of recognizing “living national treasures,” people who have knowledge of rare and unique cultural practices and arts that few others possess.
the Emperor Meiji, which were heavily stressed in his education. His highly conservative education discouraged the liberal type of Western democratic values that the Taisho democracy movement promoted: individualism, personal choice in morality, democracy, and Western, particularly American, cultural products and values. Hirohito was generally very conservative in both his political and cultural values. It is likely that in the pre-1945 period, he also distrusted the kinds of liberal values that the Taisho democracy movement promoted.

On views regarding the place of Japan’s culture in international culture, in the late 1920s, Hirohito supported, to some degree, the thinking of the hakkô ichiu ideology, that Japan would now help bring world peace, culture, and virtuous Confucian values to the world, especially to Asia. His strict thought about the proper place of Japanese colonies in the hierarchy of nations also shows he supported hakkô ichiu.\(^{1649}\)

On images of Western culture compared with Japanese culture, in the late 1930s, how much did Hirohito support government propaganda showing Japanese virtuous images of Shinto, farm life, emperor worship, and the decadence of Western culture? Remember that as a child, he was trained in the same basic ideas of nationalism, State Shinto and emperor ideology as his subjects. This propaganda also showed the virtuous Japanese spirit breaking the “iron ring” of foreign nations trying to surround and strangle Japan. While we cannot be absolutely certain of Hirohito’s beliefs about Western culture, he zealously participated in Shinto rituals, and accepted the ideas of the “iron ring” and Western threats against Japan in his foreign policy decisions and actions through 1945. He was also likely wary of Western culture to some degree.

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\(^{1649}\) On this point, see my discussion later in this chapter on Hirohito’s views of Japanese imperialism.
Yanagita was more progressive in his beliefs, especially on politics, while Hirohito was highly conservative. Like Yanagita, Hirohito also disliked Western cultural values, but for different reasons. Yanagita was concerned about Japan’s cultural integrity from the bottom up. Hirohito was most concerned about protecting Japan from the top down, i.e. from potential military invaders. In the ideology of *hakkó ichiu*, Hirohito also displays a top down view of the place of Japanese culture in the world. Yanagita is most concerned about protecting the integrity of Japan’s own culture and identity amidst the cultural onslaught of Western values flooding into Japan: Japanese culture must hold its own in the midst of world cultures. Like Yanagita, Hirohito seems wary of Western cultural influences in Japan, and also accepted that the government had a role in protecting Japan’s culture. In sum, Yanagita had a much more populist, grassroots concern for Japanese culture, while Hirohito had more top-down, elitist perspectives. Both felt the government had a role in protecting Japan’s cultural and political integrity against the West.

**Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japan’s External Cultural Relations (1895-1945)**

*Development Issues.* In applying the concept of internationalization to these worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations (1895-1945), we see that Yanagita and Hirohito mainly had a concern for what international forces might do to Japan’s domestic culture, which is not the concern of internationalization, which mainly focuses on what happens to developing countries on the international level. Internationalization is relevant if we note the ideology of *hakkó ichiu*, the idea that Japan would become a beacon of peace and Confucian civilization for the world, including East Asia. In the pre-World
War II international community, Japan never had such an influence in East Asia or globally. It is beyond the scope of this brief section to investigate the impacts of Japan’s external cultural relations with other nations in this period, but it is safe to say that its deepest impacts were likely upon the regions it ruled as colonies, especially Korea and Taiwan. Were these impacts those symbolized by the *hakkô ichiu* ideology? While Japan laid very valuable economic and infrastructural foundations in Korea and Taiwan, its cultural exports were deeply resented and resisted, especially in Korea.\(^\text{1650}\) From this brief examination, it seems the ideals of *hakkô ichiu* were not effectively shared during Japanese colonialism in this period. The concept of internationalization applies in only a limited fashion for these worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations.

**Technology Issues.** What are the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with the worldviews of Japan’s external cultural relations studied here? As noted in the discussion of technology and culture in the Glossary, technology includes cultural values, even intrinsically.\(^\text{1651}\) Technology is influenced by the social structures and cultural values of the societies where it is created, by the structures and values of the societies that export it, and those of the societies that receive it. Technology also affects the structures and values of receiving societies.\(^\text{1652}\) In addition, technology that is transferred across cultural or international boundaries is deeply affected by the structures and cultures of both the sending and receiving organizations.\(^\text{1653}\) Obviously, cross-cultural technology transfer is a very complex process.

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\(^{1650}\) For example, in Korea, children were required to learn Japanese in school.  
\(^{1653}\) Szyliowicz, *Politics, Technology, Development*, 10.
Yanagita reflected deeply on the effects of the transfer of Western technology and cultural products, mediated by urban Japanese environments, where they were usually first received, on the life and social structures of rural Japan. He was disturbed by what he observed through his ethnographic research, and spent much effort trying to devise practical solutions to relieve what he believed were very devastating impacts. Hirohito and the Japanese government observed what the impacts of Western culture and technology on Japan were at a much more general, less grounded level. As reflected in propaganda films of the late 1930s (already noted), the government argued that Western values were corrupting the discipline and sincere cultural/spiritual purity of Japanese. Through these propaganda tools, they hoped to alert Japanese to this danger, and encourage them to return to “purer” “Japanese” ways, such as filial piety and emperor worship. These films were also designed to raise patriotic, nationalistic pride.

What are the most significant social factors present in the imported technologies and related ideas in the worldviews studied here? The imported cultural and technological items and ideas in this period included a huge range of things, such as new inventions (the radio, the automobile, telephones), consumer products and gadgets, art, Western novels, films, and the “Western” values of individualism, personal freedoms, and broader morality connected with the Taisho democracy movement. These inevitably had massive effects across Japanese society. It is impossible to say in this brief consideration whether the international system affected these technologies and issues

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1654 Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
positively or negatively. But Yanagita, the conservative Japanese government of this era, and likely Hirohito all viewed and interpreted these effects negatively, as they surveyed their impacts on Japan’s domestic scene. They did not consider what effects Japanese imperialism or cultural influences might be having on the rest of East Asia and the Pacific. As reflected in the hakkô ichiu ideology, it seems that the government and Hirohito wanted to believe that Japan’s cultural influence across the region was positive.

What were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in the worldviews under consideration? We noted in them in the paragraph immediately preceding this one. They include various items drawn from international science, business, the arts, and cultural ideas and values. Who were the main international actors in the external environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they have on the transfer outcomes? Individual entrepreneurs, world travelers, artists, writers, intellectuals, teachers, and scholars, some foreign and many Japanese, and international firms and trading companies were among the chief actors driving these exchanges, but the Japanese government and its relevant ministries and agencies also played a role. While it is impossible for governments in relatively open societies to dictate or control the cultural directions its citizens take, certainly government policies have some effect. The more open atmosphere in the Taisho period (1912-1926) generally allowed a more open embrace of foreign and Western influences. The restrictive, ultraconservative policies of Japan’s militaristic government in the 1930s and 1940s also narrowed the flow. What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn here? It would have been

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1655 To comment more decisively on this would require the review of more grounded, definitive studies, some of them ethnographic, which is beyond the scope of the present research.
good if the governments of the late 1920s through 1945 had been more constructive, intentional, and intentionally listened to the critiques of leaders like Yanagita, without the outright censorship and propaganda it did, but this was not the case.

What are the most significant cultural factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these worldviews?\(^{1656}\) The most important cultural items and values in these worldviews included more cosmopolitan, international values connected to science, communication, increased mobility, comfort, convenience, and individual tastes, preferences, and freedoms. In these worldviews, how did the leaders concerned use these technologies/ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level, if at all? While Yanagita was not involved in seeking to transform Japan’s international environment in the cultural sense, the Japanese government used Hirohito and his carefully cultivated image to shore up support for the Japanese state, both in Japan and in the overseas colonies. Ironically, in the 1930s and 1940s, the state attempted to use fear of these Western values to encourage support for “Japanese” values, as evidenced in the propaganda films already noted. How did these technological issues affect or enhance Japan’s survival in the international system or environment? I see very little connection between what the Japanese militarist state and Hirohito did here, and what happened on the international level. The military actions of Japan in World War II cost it whatever goodwill and cultural capital it possessed before the war.

Do the belief systems of these leaders (on technology issues on the international level) blind them to certain realities? If yes, which, and how? Yanagita’s beliefs about

Western culture and technology were highly oriented toward “traditional” and “indigenous” items in Japanese culture on the domestic, rural level from what he believed were the highly negative effects of the former on the latter. But there is no evidence in his beliefs of what positive effects of Western culture and technology might be. I will mention just two from the postwar period: increased mechanization of Japanese agriculture in the postwar period greatly raised its productivity, and land reforms induced by the American occupation also aided the numerous tenant farmers for whom Yanagita expressed much concern. Hirohito encouraged the use of military technologies (many originally imported) for use in spreading Japanese influence, trade and imperialism in the 1930s and 1940s. His own nationalistic and spiritual biases blinded him to the negative impacts of these efforts and the terrible damage inflicted on China and additional regions. The costs for Japanese international relations and foreign policy are still felt today. Did the leaders fail to adjust their viewpoints to changing conditions and reality? As noted earlier, the biases and blindness of Hirohito on the effects of various technological phenomena on the world around him (i.e. Japanese attacks on millions of civilians in China, and American bombing of cities across Japan) led to very costly suffering and the difficult surrender of Japan at the end of World War II. On a sixth issue, technonationalism as ideology, neither Yanagita nor Hirohito manifested a strong concern or awareness for the ideology in their worldviews of external cultural relations here.

**Cognition Issues. Image.** There are six main groups into which we can organize these leaders’ images of Japan’s external cultural relations (1895 to 1945). In the first, images of Japanese culture compared with other cultures, Hirohito implicitly stresses the
honor of Japanese culture, its values of sacrifice and others, seen in the ideas and practices found in emperor worship, State Shinto, nationalist and imperialist ideologies.

In his images, Yanagita stresses that Western culture will destroy Japanese culture unless Japanese know themselves, their culture, and strengthen their own cultural autonomy. In the second group of images, on Western culture, both Yanagita and Hirohito show fear and concern over the impacts of Western culture as it enters Japan. It is likely that Hirohito viewed Western culture as decadent and that he resisted American cultural values such as individualism. Yanagita fears that Western culture flooding into Japan may destroy Japan’s culture if Japanese do not grow in cultural self-awareness and independence. A third group of images concern cultural values associated with democratic ideas (the Taisho democracy movement in particular). It seems likely that Hirohito personally resisted these and similar values. In the fourth group of images, those of Japanese cultural interaction with other cultures, we have already noted Yanagita’s concern about the impacts of Western culture flooding into Japan. His images also reflect awareness of the need for careful reflection, study and understanding of these issues, by Japanese and the government. Without these efforts, their culture will be destroyed. The fifth group of images focuses on images of the Japanese government’s policies on cultural issues. Yanagita laments the government’s general lack of input on a coherent

1657 I say that it is likely because many of Hirohito’s views must be determined indirectly by contextual clues, diaries by court officials, and from reports of his actual behavior, the general methods Bix used in Bix, Hirohito. This is because the Imperial Household Agency in Japan maintains a very tight grip on the image, writings and possessions of Hirohito and of other members of the imperial family.

1658 Remember that these values stressed individualism, liberalism, personal freedoms, and various other cultural values associated with American culture, in particular.

1659 Yanagita’s images suggest that understanding is needed of the effect of modernization on Japanese culture, and understanding of Japanese culture and identity themselves. Yanagita is further concerned that Japan’s government is not studying these issues, which he sees as a major source of social and moral confusion.
policy or study of the effect of imported Western cultural products on indigenous
Japanese culture and values. In Yanagita’s images, ignorance on these issues, partly due
to a focus on short-term economic gain by policymakers, and lack of reflection and
knowledge by Japanese themselves, threatens all of Japan’s other international policies.
And sixth, on images of the place of Japan in world culture, evidence suggests that
Hirohito supported the images of the *hakkō ichiu* ideology, that Japan would become a
center of world culture, and share noble values of loyalty, peace, and devotion to family
and parents with the world. His enthronement in 1928 was steeped in these images.
According to Yanagita’s images, unless Japanese understood their own culture at the
grassroots, they could not protect it in its relations with other world societies.

How did these images serve as perceptual organizing devices or filters?
Regarding Japan compared with other cultures, Hirohito was blind to Japan’s weaknesses
of culture and character, and about what Japan could continue to learn from overseas.
Yanagita failed to see good aspects of Western culture, and presumed that Japan must
totally be on the cultural defensive. He also seemed blind to external issues, with his
nearly total focus on the domestic level. For example, he failed to consider what was
valuable for Japan to import from the West. What cultural products should Japan export,
and what might it gain? On Western culture, both Yanagita and Hirohito missed the good
things that Western culture had done and was doing in Japan. What positive Western
values fit Japan well? How could Japan build on and improve those (i.e. Western
education, technologies, hospitals, health care, democracy, and human rights), as it had
“improved” Chinese culture over the centuries? On culture and democracy, Hirohito
failed to see how empowering the people could empower both the nation and its cultures.
Postwar Japan has learned this. Yanagita did not have this problem, but supported popular democratic and workers’ rights. On Japan’s interaction with other cultures, these images show that these leaders misunderstood, on some levels, the benefit of interaction with Western culture, how Japan could grow, improve, and improve Western cultural items. This was seen very clearly in the postwar Japanese experience. I agree with Yanagita’s basic argument on Japan’s policy on culture, but I believe that the main thing that destroyed Japanese culture at this time was not ignorance of Western culture’s effects on Japan, but the government’s twisted policies of manipulating State Shinto, patriotism and other nationalistic values. This caused Japan to invade other countries, and destroy most of its infrastructure in World War II. That literally nearly destroyed the country, and subjected it to defeat and foreign invasion. How fortunate Japan was that the United States invaded it, and not the Soviet Union.\footnote{After Japan’s defeat by the United States, the Soviet Union demanded the right to invade and occupy Hokkaido, but General McArthur absolutely refused. To imagine what might have happened to Japan in this case, just picture the case of Korea, and what happened to North Korea.} On Japan’s place in world cultures, consider briefly the place of Japan in Asia during this era. Did other East Asian countries, including Japan’s colonies and the territories it invaded, desire the values that Japan offered? In general, they did not, since imperialist invaders forced these values on them. Japan, in reality, did not offer the noble values of hakkô ichiu in the various wars and its imperialism. Rather it offered the foreign values\footnote{I mean foreign in the sense that these values were foreign to the regions that Japan colonized or invaded.} of State Shinto, the emperor ideology, and other nationalistic ideologies, in a largely brutal and coercive manner. Yet Yanagita’s basic viewpoint about the place of Japan in world culture was true. Without
the Japanese achieving a better understanding of their self-identity, Japan’s culture faced potential destruction.

*Worldview.* In the cognitive framework of worldviews that emerges from the above, what is the view of the nature of the world? In this view, different countries have different cultures. The cultures of stronger societies threaten those of weaker societies. Though some societies like Japan are currently weaker, their cultures still have honor and positive points. It is good if weaker countries with honorable cultures can protect and preserve the good parts of their cultures. They should make efforts to do so. They can do so by knowing and studying themselves, and taking time to honor their “traditions.” In this cognitive framework, how does the world work? Implicit in even these worldviews is a degree of evolutionary thought, in which the cultures of dominant, stronger societies will flood and wipe out those of weaker societies. Here we also see a stress on economics driving the world. The drive to survive, economically and otherwise, will make a country or government forget what really matters, its heart, its deeply latent culture. If weaker countries are not more careful and self-aware, they will lose the core of who they are. In Hirohito and the state’s *hakkō ichiu* ideology, we see the wish that Japan will become a virtuous center for world culture and peace. In the world’s order in this cognitive framework, the economies and cultures of stronger nations control the world, and dominate those of weaker countries. The economies and cultures of the West now dominate those of Japan and other non-Western cultures.

Regarding views of the self (Japan and its actions, beliefs, and roles in the world’s culture), even though is presently a weaker country economically, its culture has huge importance and honor in its values of sacrifice, duty, and love of nature and family.
Its culture is worth saving and protecting from the onslaught of Western values. Japanese must know themselves, and the government must make efforts to help save Japan’s culture.

On the views of non-self (others) in this cognitive framework, Western countries are stronger than Japan. Their cultural values are flooding into Japan and other non-Western countries. Western culture and values do not fit them. Western culture seems decadent, individualistic, selfish, and inferior to Japan’s.

What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the leaders who held these worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’ worldviews? These views arose in a hostile international environment of harsh political and economic international competition and trade. Accompanying these interactions was intense cultural interchange of the cultural products and ideas of stronger societies flooding into weaker societies like Japan. The West might engulf or greatly weaken Japan politically, economically and culturally unless Japan was active and defended itself. In addition, we must not forget the rural environment that surrounded Yanagita in his research, and the isolated imperial environment in which Hirohito was immersed. These colored each man’s views. Regarding environmental interactions, the “hostile” international environment gave Yanagita and Hirohito’s views here a negative tone regarding potential cultural impacts of the West on Japan. Part of this was due to the negative effects of economic shocks in Japan in the 1920s and the 1930s, from the worldwide depression. Each actor’s predominant environment in this era (Yanagita in rural Japan, and Hirohito in the imperial court and government) influenced each one’s emphasis here (Yanagita on the value of rural Japanese culture, and Hirohito on the virtue of “traditional” Japanese
values, due to its unique nature and divine descent). Each actor here seems blind to potential positive aspects of Japan’s interaction with the world, to provide much greater wealth and comfort for more Japanese, which happened during the 1910s and the 1960s to the 1990s.

How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence these leaders’ perceptions, utilization of information and interpretation of events and their causes? On perception, each actor had a mainly negative worldview regarding the interaction of Western culture with Japanese culture in Japan, and wished to defend the latter. They were concerned about Japan’s political and cultural survival. Yanagita seemed more concerned than Hirohito. What Yanagita observed happening to the cultures of rural Japan, as more Western and urban Japanese cultural influence came in, greatly colored his thinking. Hirohito’s isolated imperial environment and his lack of practical exposure to the West also colored his views and reactions. But in the postwar period, in his interactions with General Douglas MacArthur and other important American actors, with the aid of many of his top officials, he proved very adept at surviving and transforming his image in the greatly transformed postwar cultural universe (Bix 2000). In his uses of information, Yanagita used ethnographic information from his personal research, and reflection based on his own research and readings, to form his opinions. Hirohito received daily in-depth briefings of the best available information. Each man’s environment (Yanagita, rural Japan and Hirohito, the imperial court) colored sources of information and final interpretations of each. It seems it was more difficult for Hirohito, because he could not humanly break out of his imperial cocoon. On events and their causes, Yanagita was rather biased toward his views of rural Japan as the foundation
of all Japanese culture and identity. Despite his perpectivity, he largely ignored the many important events and influences in urban Japan. It seems impossible for Hirohito to have escaped the intense training and cultural universe in which he lived, which was steeped in imperial and nationalistic influences in the prewar period. If he had been of exceptional intelligence or leadership ability, like Peter the Great or Abraham Lincoln, perhaps he could have, but he was not.

How did technological systems affect these worldviews? The technological major factors here were the increased manufacture and transport of urban and foreign products into rural regions across the nation in the case of Yanagita). For Hirohito, it was the increasing rise of heavy industry partly related to Japan’s military in the 1920s and 1930s, and partly connected to Japan’s imperialism.

What do we learn by comparing these worldviews? Yanagita emphasized protecting rural Japanese culture from the flood of Western and urban cultural influences. In contrast, Hirohito seemed to show concern about protecting his image of traditional Japanese culture embodied in imperial and nationalistic ideologies of what Japan supposedly was.

_Cultural Logics._ Under these worldviews on Japan’s external cultural relations (1895 to 1945), the global phenomena to which these leaders responded included Western cultural influences entering Japan, such as ideas from politics, science, literature, and the arts, including movies, science, technology, new products, materials, books, information, and from people, including Western diplomats, teachers, and others coming to Japan. What are these leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? In their mind, Western culture and values were not suitable for Japan, and did not fit its
culture and identity. Western culture was highly individualistic and selfish. Japanese culture, as defined by the state, or as indigenously practiced by the people, was worth saving. Japanese moral character was superior to Western values, which were decadent and selfish. Japanese must critically assess their indigenous culture and identity, and the government had the duty to help them in this. If Japanese did not know who they were, they could not protect themselves from the flood of Western culture, and their culture would be lost.

What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena? Western culture did not fit Japan. Japan’s culture and identity should be saved, since they had value. The state was a strong actor, and could help in this task. It seemed that Western culture might overwhelm Japanese culture. There is no assumption that the two cultures could mix, and a new one result, only that the old Japanese culture might be destroyed.

What were the leaders’ responses to these global phenomena? Hirohito supported the state’s cultural campaign of nationalistic and spiritual ideologies, such as State Shinto and hakkō ichiu, from the late 1920s to 1945. To warn Japan about the dangers of losing its identity and heritage it faced if it did not take careful, critical action, Yanagita researched rural Japanese culture extensively and wrote much about it.

What were the cultural logics under these responses? For Hirohito, the assumptions were likely that the state-defined culture of Japanese identity and spirituality was who Japanese really were. For Yanagita, Western values were not true Japanese identity. Western values were often negative, and did not fit Japan. Western values and culture were aggressive, appealing, and might seductively destroy Japan’s real culture
and identity if allowed to enter unchecked. Japan’s state was strong, and positive action by the state in the affairs of the nation, such as culture, would normally help the situation.

In comparing the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena, and the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena, in the former logics, there is an emphasis on what will happen to Japanese culture as it and Western culture interact. In the second set of logics, there is more of an emphasis on what both Japanese and Western culture and values actually were. In both cases, strong action by the state was desired, to prevent a negative outcome.

**Globalization Issues.** How do the most important worldviews here reflect and/or affect processes of cultural globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? How does globalization affect these worldviews? Western globalization affected Yanagita’s worldviews to a great degree. His worldviews here reflect concerns over the long-term impact of Western culture on Japan’s regional, indigenous cultures. His perception of the intensification of Western globalization’s impacts, and their long-term effects, based on his own ethnographic research in rural Japan, is what has spurred his concerns. His concern also reflects the impacts of Western culture mediated through the urban gateways of Japan, where usually the Western cultural products first enter Japan and are then distributed across the nation. The spread of newspapers and radio also contributes to these effects. Hirohito also mediated certain cultural values, of official nationalism, State Shinto, and the imperial throne, to the nation. His actions show support for these official ideologies that opposed Western cultural influences and values, sought to minimize their influence, and to maximize the impact of official ideologies. What was the actual impact of these ideologies on the daily
lives of persons in rural Japan? Perhaps it was not that much. But the overall costs, revealed in the loss of lives and Japan’s defeat in the war, were huge.

If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Yanagita’s ethnographic study of the effects of Western globalization on rural Japanese culture spurred many of his writings, and they are well known and respected in Japan, even today. What kind of policy impacts did they have? Their policy impact through 1945 seems to have been minimal. On the other hand, the macro-level impact of Hirohito’s worldviews here was much larger, since his views reflected the official policies of the state, and he was the most influential political actor in the nation in prewar twentieth century Japan. The social costs of the state’s nationalistic policies during World War II, reflected in millions of deaths and the defeat of the nation, were tremendous.

Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? Over the fifty years of this period, the impact of Western cultural forces on Japan was certainly great. Huge changes in Japan’s economy, industrialization and urban-rural balance could not help but result from its increasing engagement in the global economy, in several wars, and greater connections with the outside world. The whole period seems, overall, to represent a conservative counter-reaction to Western cultural influences, contrary to their generally

1662 John Dower notes this in his Embracing Defeat, which investigates the overall cultural conditions of Japan during its early postwar recovery in the American occupation period, 1945 to 1952. He mentions the research of a social scientist who found that in prewar Japan, few villagers studied manifested much impact from emperor ideology in their daily lives (John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1999).
enthusiastic reception from 1850 to 1895. Also in this period, we see the initial spread of Japanese cultural globalization through its empire and increased global connections.

Worldviews on Japan’s External Relations: Imperialism

**Kato Hiroyuki.** According to Kato Hiroyuki, imperialism and colonialism are related to evolutionary progress. If the imperialist European powers had not ventured overseas, they would have progressed less, and colonial regions benefited less. Even slavery is a form of progress. International law is unsuccessful since the Europeans use their power to exploit, destroy and colonize weaker peoples. Yet while Kato observed the nationalism and imperialism of the western “Christian” nations, because of progress, he could not totally condemn them. As the strongest, they had a right to control the world. But he found Western imperialism to be hypocritical, against Christianity. Yet Kato remained almost silent about Japanese imperialism, arguing that parts of the empire, such as Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia, were merely satellites of Japan.

“Patriarchal sovereignty” and Japan would always remain the center of the empire, and the imperial family would always be the “quintessence” of the race. According to evolution, the ruler will always be the *Denkcentrum* (thought-center) or *tôchi kikan* (Denkorgan—controlling organ) of the state [and empire].

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1663 This is despite the brief period of Western influence in the Taisho democracy movement from about 1912 through the late 1920s.
1664 Davis, *Moral and Political*, 103-106. In Kato’s view, without slavery, the achievements of ancient civilizations such as Egypt would have been impossible. Africans enslaved in America escaped the barbarism of Africa, and some even received education and enlightenment (Ibid., 105-106).
1665 Ibid., 76.
1666 This is the concept that all Japanese are ultimately descended from and connected to the imperial family, the foundation of the kokka, the “family-state” (Ibid., 71-72).
1667 Ibid., 37, 71-72, 91-92, 113, 124-125.
**Ito Hirobumi.** Ito supported large colonization schemes for Taiwan and Hokkaido.\(^{1668}\) Before 1895, Ito showed a somewhat paternalistic attitude toward Korea.\(^{1669}\) Later, in the early 1900s, in his role as governor-general for Korea, this attitude about Korean development surely had a major impact, encouraging the eventual transfer of technologies and other areas of know-how to the peninsula. He had extensive plans for Korea’s development.\(^{1670}\) Hamada argues that in the face of a second conflict over the Korea issue, Ito stood as a force of moderation, against pressures for war from Russian and Japanese militarists.\(^{1671}\) After Japan won that war, Ito brought in Japanese experts to improve Korea’s infrastructure in transportation, health, education, economy, and government.\(^{1672}\) After the Korean king abdicated in 1907, Ito issued a plan for the resident general’s control of Korea’s internal and foreign affairs, resisting pressure from Tokyo to annex Korea.\(^{1673}\) In August 1907 he returned pessimistically to Japan to secure loans and experts for Korea’s development.\(^{1674}\) To improve relations, Ito and the new king went on a failed national tour. Ito resigned, returning to Japan.\(^{1675}\) In some ways, perhaps Ito was attempting to steer Korea’s reforms in the image of Japan’s. There was much similarity between his vision for Korea’s development and the Meiji approach to

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\(^{1668}\) Hamada, *Prince Ito*, 113-114, 116-118, 120. After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan claimed China’s Liaodong peninsula. Under pressure from Russia, France and Germany, Japan renounced it, but won Taiwan (Ibid., 113-114, 116-118, 120).

\(^{1669}\) See discussion of this in Chapter 5, where I discuss Ito’s worldviews of external political relations from 1850 to 1895 (Ibid., 87-90, 110-111).

\(^{1670}\) The Japanese annexation of Korea did not occur until 1910. Ito declared his plan about 1907.

\(^{1671}\) Ibid., 168-169. The first conflict was the Sino-Japanese War, and the second potential conflict was between Japan and Russia.

\(^{1672}\) Ibid., 188-191. Ito planned to reform Korea’s bureaucratic structure and government ministries. The ministries would be subject to the advice of the resident-general (Ibid.).

\(^{1673}\) Ibid., 199-201. In announcing his plan, Ito declared that Korea had finally been freed from China, and that Japan had merely suspended Korea’s independence, not violated it (Ibid.).

\(^{1674}\) Ibid., 202-203. Ito was pessimistic since he felt that Koreans could not initiate reforms, that they resisted his own, and that they might rebel (Ibid., 202-203).

\(^{1675}\) Ibid., 205-206, 208.
Japan’s development. His desire was to strengthen the Korean nation and render constructive advice, yet most Koreans resented against his efforts.\textsuperscript{1676} It is tempting to call Ito an imperialist, since he felt that Japan must be the power to restore Korea’s strength and independence.\textsuperscript{1677}

\textit{Yanagita Kunio}. According to Kawada Minoru, in the early 1900s, as Western nations sought more colonies, a shift occurred in the world economy, from capitalism to imperialistic militarism. As Japan’s economy developed, it laid the groundwork for imperialism through wars with China and Russia. Japan evolved into a “semi-feudal,” militaristic, capitalistic state in the first half of the twentieth century. Yanagita wished to strengthen Japan so it could stand independently and in prosperity against possible Western imperialism.\textsuperscript{1678} He strongly opposed nationalist forces that favored use of the military for overseas imperialism.\textsuperscript{1679} He believed that Japan must not blindly copy Western imperialism, but seek to lead other Asian nations by example, encouraging their development and unity against the West.\textsuperscript{1680} Yet Yanagita does not explain how to do this. How realistic was his theory of agro-politics in the context of expanding imperialism in the early 1900s?\textsuperscript{1681} And how would increasing the sense of national unity

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1676} Ibid., 192-193.
  \item \textsuperscript{1677} It is hard to imagine any contemporary scholar today who would not call Ito an imperialist. In spite of his doubts about Korea and China, both have become global economic powers, although it has taken them longer than Japan.
  \item \textsuperscript{1678} Kawada, \textit{Origin Ethnography}, 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{1679} Ibid., 107.
  \item \textsuperscript{1680} Ibid., 82-86. Yanagita especially was concerned with Sino-Japanese relations and regretted Japan’s copying of Western imperialism and racism toward its Asian neighbors (Ibid.).
  \item \textsuperscript{1681} Ibid., 27, 32. On a related issue, Yanagita later criticized the government’s policy of diverting rural capital for investment in overseas colonies, although he thought that colonization might reduce the surplus of agricultural labor (Ibid.).
\end{itemize}
and communality in Japan affect its expansive tendencies?\textsuperscript{1682} Yanagita was much more concerned with Japan’s internal development, and very little with its overseas expansion.

\textit{Yamagata Aritomo}. In 1918, in the face of Russia’s Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Yamagata enthusiastically supported dispatching Japanese troops to Siberia, a wonderful opportunity for Japan to expand from “small house” to “grand master” status, and for his faction to strengthen its position at home. Official approval followed, but soon huge riots over rice price increases broke out across Japan. The Siberian Intervention failed to arouse nationalistic sentiment as the wars with China and Russia had.\textsuperscript{1683}

\textit{Hirohito, Emperor}. As one of the most complex political figures in twentieth century Japanese life, from 1926 to 1945 Hirohito had a huge influence over Japan and its short-lived empire, exercising authority in a manner that was ultimately calamitous. Under Hirohito, the empire occupied various parts of Northeast and Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union, and the North and South Pacific.\textsuperscript{1684} He inherited the origins of this empire from Emperor Meiji.\textsuperscript{1685} Even before becoming emperor, Hirohito exercised influence over the empire. As regent, in April 1923, he traveled to Japan’s Taiwan colony.\textsuperscript{1686} Hirohito especially wanted to visit schools, to impress Taiwan’s youth. His tour had many purposes, in terms of the imperial image, to remind all Japanese that the throne was

\textsuperscript{1682} Ibid., 42. Kawada poses these significant questions, but fails to answer them.
\textsuperscript{1683} Dickinson, War and National, 188-190, 200-203. Similarly, Dickinson argues that Japanese imperialism in the late 1800s was driven not so much by fear of Western invasion as by incredible euphoria at Japan’s unprecedented “opportunities” (i.e., Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, 1894-1895 and 1904-1905) (Ibid., 256-257).
\textsuperscript{1684} Bix, Hirohito, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{1685} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{1686} The Taiwan colony’s people, weather and culture were distinct from Japan, although a small number of Japanese had settled there. About four years before, control of Taiwan’s government passed from Japan’s military to a civilian governor-general, though in reality, the military continued to rule (Bix, Hirohito).
the moral source of their wealth, affirm Japan’s possession of Taiwan, and strengthen the peoples’ belief in the monarchy as the source of all morality. Hirohito’s official visits always had a great deal of pomp and formality, extensive press coverage, and the Taiwan tour was no different. In 1925, he took a similar tour of the southern Sakhalin colony.  

Military considerations made Hirohito support the military in its invasion of Manchuria in 1931. After the invasion, he felt the most important issue was to stabilize Japan’s internal politics, which he thought the invasion would aid. In the late 1930s, as Hirohito pressed for more “unity” among his perpetually divided government and high command, these differences were wallpapered over in policy statements bringing increasing pressure for imperialist expansion. Both Japan’s aggressive military and its “religiously charged” throne impelled expansion in China in the mid- to late 1930s. While a few military leaders argued for “rationality” in Japan’s imperialist policies, soon the nation was carried away, and conflicts with China, the United States, and Britain were unavoidable.  

In 1942, Hirohito and Prime Minister Tojo planned to establish a new Greater East Asia Ministry to control the conquered territories in mainland China and Southeast Asia. In late 1943 and early 1944, they encouraged a new approach to China, treating it as a co-equal, which they hoped would allow a reduction in Japanese forces there. 

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1687 Ibid., 137-139, 156. There are further comments about how in the late 1920s and 1930s the Japanese government manipulated images of imperialism to encourage support of the emperor and the throne above in the contexts of imperialism sector.  
1688 Ibid., 265-269.  
1689 Ibid., 310-312.  
1690 Ibid., 457. The ministry was not going to control colonies in Korea, Taiwan, and Sakhalin (Ibid.).  
1691 In January 1944, Japan and the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei in Nanjing signed a treaty in which Japan agreed to end its treaty-port settlements and extraterritorial rights in China, treat Wang’s regime as a
But Hirohito did not support the concept of “national self-determination,” nor any change in the relationships of Korea and Taiwan with Japan. Rather, he supported a hierarchical notion of each “race” in the empire assuming its proper place, with Japan guaranteed its proper lead-position and privileges.\textsuperscript{1692}

**Comparison of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japanese Imperialism (1895-1945)**

Here I will evaluate four categories of these leaders’ views: 1) their general views of imperialism and colonialism, 2) views of Western imperialism, 3) views of Japanese imperialism, and 4) views of Japanese colonies and colonialism. On the general nature of colonialism and imperialism, Kato Hiroyuki had mixed views. While he sees them as positive signs of evolutionary progress, he laments the exploitation and damage that European colonialism has wreaked on weaker peoples. Nevertheless, the strong have that right. Yamagata and Hirohito see imperialism by Japan as positive; Yanagita does not. In 1918, Yamagata believed that successful Japanese colonization in Siberia would enhance Japan’s international status, and his faction’s own domestic political power. Similarly, in the 1930s, Hirohito hoped that Japanese achievements in Manchuria and the colonies would calm the domestic political scene. This suggests an attitude that external adventures will alleviate challenging domestic situations. Yanagita had a more domestic focus, preferring Japan’s internal development more than overseas expansion. Bix charges that domestic forces, including religion, created additional pressure on the throne to increase imperial expansion in China in the mid- to late 1930s.\textsuperscript{1693} Similar to Kato, we

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\textsuperscript{1692} Ibid., 473-474.
\textsuperscript{1693} Ibid., 310-312. What were these religious pressures? Perhaps they came from the nationalistic pressures inherent in the emperor ideology and State Shinto, both taken to extremes.
see evolutionistic influence in Hirohito’s preference for each “race” in the empire to take its proper place in the hierarchy, with Japan in the lead. In their views of colonialism and imperialism, these leaders have both negative and positive impressions.

On Western imperialism, Kato argues that although Western imperialism has done damage, it has also benefited European powers and their colonies. To Kato, this “progress” means that Western colonialists cannot be totally condemned; they have the right to rule the world, and eventually will. But the damage they have done is at odds with the values of Christianity, and Kato finds this troubling. Yanagita felt that imitating Western imperialism would be negative for Japan. Yamagata believed that weakness in a Western power, i.e. Russia, could create positive opportunities for Japan overseas. These leaders (Kato, Ito, Yamagata, Hirohito, and Yanagita) universally condemn the idea that Japan should be subject to the West. All of them want Japan to repel Western imperialism, and to remain free.

On Japanese imperialism, Kato saw the emperor, imperial descent and the throne as the center of Japan, the “satellite” colonies, the “race,” and the empire. So biological, evolutionary thought, mixed with Confucian and Shinto influences, also colors his thought on Japanese imperialism. While Yanagita hoped that Japan would develop and lead other Asian nations against Western exploitation, he strongly opposed use of the military for Japanese imperialism. The evidence from Kato, Yamagata and Hirohito suggests that they viewed Japanese imperialism as positive. Kato and Hirohito also believed that the emperor had a central role in Japan’s imperialism.\textsuperscript{1694} In Hirohito

\textsuperscript{1694} Kato saw him as the “brain” of the nation and empire, and Hirohito was delighted to use his early colonial tours of places like Taiwan and south Sakhalin to strengthen the imperial image.
we see tacit or direct approval of various imperialistic ventures in areas such as China, Manchuria, and Southeast Asia. Despite rhetoric suggesting equality, colonial self-determination, and the proposed creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry in 1942, in reality, Hirohito seemed to most highly value imperialism for how it might help domestic concerns, including empowering the throne.

Concerning their views of Japanese colonies and colonialism, though Kato called Taiwan and Korea mere “satellites” of Japan, Ito and Hirohito both felt highly supportive of the colony in Taiwan, Hirohito for propaganda purposes. Ito had particularly strong, paternalistic feelings for Korea, and tried to offer it guidance for its internal and external affairs without making it a colony, as most in Tokyo desired. But near the end of World War II, Hirohito failed to support much self-determination for either Taiwan or Korea, or any change in their current status. Rather, he supported a rigid international, racist hierarchy of regions, with Japan at the front. Regarding development, Ito’s vision for Korea here was the most significant. As governor-general of Korea, he requested that Tokyo dispatch experts in numerous fields to Korea to help it begin to modernize, even before it became a colony. But he was shot before much happened.

In sum, all of these leaders saw Western imperialism and colonialism as negative, and most of them regarded Japanese imperialism as positive, protecting

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1695 I am referring to his tour of Taiwan as the imperial regent in the early 1920s.
1696 This reminds one of the famous Japanese vision of economic development for Asia, the flying geese pattern, where Japan supposedly takes the lead for all of the nations in Asia, in its position as first developer.
Most see negative effects of Western imperialism, and all universally want Japan to stay free. Most focus most on what colonialism and imperialism will do for Japan’s domestic affairs. We noted biological, evolutionistic, Shinto, and Confucian influences in the thought of Kato and Hirohito here, where there is also a strong connection of imperialism with the emperor ideology. Ito and Yanagita have the most sincere vision, genuinely desiring to help colonial regions grow, and defend themselves against the West. Hirohito had the greatest influence here; most of it was negative.

**Conceptual Analysis of Leaders’ Worldviews About Japanese Imperialism (1895-1945)**

**Development Issues.** The concept of internationalization is highly relevant to the issue of imperialism. What do we learn from these leaders’ worldviews on imperialism if we examine them through the lens of the concept of internationalization? Again, the key question of internationalization is, what happened on the international level, especially culturally, as Japan was drawn into the global trading system? It is especially relevant to consider this in terms of Japanese colonialism and Japan’s actions across Asia during World War II. Three of the leaders here paint a positive picture of the impacts of Japanese imperialism, while Ito and Yanagita are somewhat doubtful. Several of the leaders think about Japan’s imperialism in terms of the benefits it may bring Japan’s domestic situation or picture it as something that Japan inherently deserves,

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1697 While Yanagita condemned Japanese imperialism, he supported Japanese strengthening and defense of Asia against the West.
1698 Kato, Yamagata, and Hirohito.
1699 Yamagata and Hirohito.
if it becomes strong. They also imagine the benefits colonies or areas under Japanese influence will gain.

While each of the leaders acknowledged negative things that Western imperialism did to peripheral countries, only Yanagita expressed active concern about what aggressive Japanese imperialism might do. Yet even he was hopeful Japan could exercise positive leadership to help East Asia and the Pacific resist the West. Ito hoped Japanese intervention might aid Korea and Taiwan. While it is beyond the scope of this research to examine what Japan’s impacts on the colonies actually were, it seems in the short term that they brought some economic benefit to the regions under colonial rule. Examples include the development of railroads and transportation networks in Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan, heavy industries in Manchuria, and the expansion of education in Taiwan and Korea. But it was at a heavy toll. As I noted earlier, resistance, especially in Korea, was fierce. If we consider the impacts and destruction on other nearby regions during the war, such as China proper, they were devastating. Of these leaders, only Yanagita hints at a slightly realistic appraisal of what Japanese imperialism actually did.

**Technology Issues.** What are the most important technology-related ideas and phenomena associated with these worldviews of imperialism? Military technologies and power are partly what enabled Japan to fight and achieve victory in the conflicts that won it its colonies and empire. Additional technologies of communication and transportation

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1700 Kato.
1701 Hirohito, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato.
1702 It is also fascinating to think about what the legacy of Japan’s prewar cultural impact has been in the postwar period and even today, but beyond our present study.
also provided Japan with the technical means to develop and exploit various resources in
areas such as Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan. And technology provided much of the
sheer power helped allow Japan to maintain control of these areas for as long as it did.
The pro-imperialism viewpoints of all these leaders, except Yanagita, no doubt approved
of these coercive and exploitive uses of technology.

What are the most significant factors related to imperialism present in the
imported technologies and related ideas in the worldviews of imperialism studied here?
The main imported technologies and related ideas connected with these worldviews
included military technologies, heavy industrial, mining and agricultural technologies,
new transportation and communication technologies, management principles, certain
political ideas and theories, and evolutionistic ideas, to a degree. The key imperialism
related factors included the ideas that strong nations had a right to have colonies, that the
strong rule the weak, that Japan and the rest of Asia must not be colonies of the West,
that Japan was weaker than some of the Western countries, but stronger and more
disciplined than the other Asian countries, and therefore entitled to colonies itself. The
international system affected these issues both positively and negatively, at multiple
levels. Japan imported Western military technologies and products to enable it to attack
China (1894-1895), and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Technological
expertise, imported and enhanced in Japan, allowed Japan to provide commodities for
many Asian markets and its allies during World War I. Relevant technologies helped
enable Japan to maintain control of its colonies through 1945, to attack and wage warfare
against the United States, and then suffer huge defeat in the war, which also meant the
loss of its colonies.
What were the important ideas/technologies transferred here, in these worldviews of imperialism? Who were the main international actors in the external environment, or domestic actors, individual or state, involved, and what impacts did they have on the transfer outcomes? What lessons or chances for improvement do we learn? The main ideas and technologies related to imperialism here, revolving around military strength, technological power, and the right of the strong to exploit the weak, were mentioned in the previous paragraph. The chief international and domestic actors included the foreign governments of the countries and regions Japan attacked and/or gained as colonies or areas of influence, the Japanese government and its relevant ministries related to the military, colonies, and international economic issues, Japan’s military and the military forces of the foreign countries concerned, new governments installed in colonial or occupied territories, multinational and trading companies, and various leaders and important individual actors involved in the above groups. The impacts of these various groups and actors on the transfer of empire-related technologies and ideas were complex, and many. Japan’s industrial actors imported and then produced the military technologies that enabled Japan’s military to attack, influence, and/or control other regions. The Japanese government set major policies influencing what technologies were produced, and how they were used, whether for military or industrial purposes in the colonies. Some of the main lessons from this complex situation we learn are that the predominant beliefs of many of the top leaders in the country (in this case, on imperialism) eventually prevailed, resulting in horrific consequences for Japan and other nations. This argues in favor of the perspectives of Yanagita, for more popular and democratic oversight of governing and military elites, to help prevent abuses of power.
What are the most significant factors and values present in the imported technologies and ideas in these worldviews of imperialism? There is a mixture of many contrasting values. In addition to the images and ideas connected with military power, here we see ideas of evolutionistic influence, that the strong have the right to rule and exploit the weak, and yet discomfort with the hypocrisy of that, with the realization that no weaker nation, including Japan, wishes to be exploited. There are racial values, and a Confucian influenced sense of the hierarchy of nations in East Asia, with Japan in the lead. This is related to ethnocentric values of Japanese superiority. There is admiration for Western power and “progress,” coupled with resentment of Western racism, cruelty, and bigotry toward non-Westerners. There are values of greed and power contrasted with altruistic desires to liberate, protect, and defend neighboring Asian regions from Western influence or control. There is also the desire to strengthen Japan domestically (politically and economically) through the colonies.

In their worldviews, most of these leaders, except Yanagita, used these technologies and ideas as means or agencies to cope with and transform Japan’s (material) environments on the international level by justifying Japan’s intervention in neighboring countries in terms of the overall benefit that both Japan and the colonies would gain if the West were repelled, and the colonies were given the benefits of Japanese protection and development expertise. The supposed economic benefits for Japan were also added bonuses. The outcome of these technological issues finally threatened Japan’s survival in the international system, since it bankrupted and nearly destroyed Japan by the end of World War II.

\[1703\] Szyliowicz, Politics, Technology, Development, 11; Hayashi, Japanese Experience, 52.
The belief systems of many of these leaders, on technology issues on the international level, blinded them to the reality that Japan’s neighboring regions did not want to be colonies of Japan just as Japan did not wish to be a colony of the West. Though Japan was, in many ways, more developed than the others, and almost the lone Asian actor to not become a Western colony, did not mean that Japan should control its neighbors. But an alternative view was almost unknown. In the mind of most of Japan’s leaders, Japan had no choice but to engage in assertive interventions in its neighbors, because if Japan did not, the Western countries would, to the peril of all East Asia. Toward the end of this era, even though it became impossible for Japan to maintain control of its colonies, Hirohito in particular stubbornly refused to admit the need for flexibility in colonial policies, and to surrender as soon as was needed. It is hard to believe that the nationalistic ideologies of hakkô ichiu, imperial descent and Japanese superiority did not cloud his actions on the empire at least a little.

In these worldviews on imperialism, technonationalism as ideology is strongly manifested. Kato, Yamagata and Hirohito all implicitly, yet definitely, support the idea that Japan’s colonies and imperial ventures must benefit Japan, economically and politically, to enable it to resist Western encroachment. Only Yanagita resists this ideal. His view, like Fukuzawa’s in an earlier era, was that Japan’s internal development must precede foreign adventures. But Yanagita’s vision did not prevail; that of the other leaders did. Ultimately aggressive intervention in other nations nearly destroyed Japan and its neighbors in World War II.
Cognition Issues. Image. These leaders’ images of imperialism may be organized into four groups. In the first group, basic images of colonialism and imperialism, the images are generally positive. Kato calls imperialism and colonialism evidence of evolutionary progress, and argues that the strongest have the right to rule the world. Yamagata hints that imperialism can enhance a nation’s power and prestige in the international system. The images of European and Western imperialism are mixed. European and Western colonialism are called positive in that they have contributed to global progress. In Kato’s eyes early in the twentieth century, as the strongest nations, they have a right to power and control of the world. Negatively, Western colonialism has exploited weaker peoples and destroyed many of their cultures, is hypocritical, and contrary to Christianity. Western imperialism can be positive for Japan if it serves as a motivator for the nation to grow to resist the West. Images of Japanese imperialism, offered by Kato, Yamagata, Yanagita, and Hirohito, are generally supportive and positive. Hirohito offers the most positive images, while Yamagata strongly supported the unsuccessful Siberian Intervention in 1918. Other images, of Kato and Yanagita, suggest that Japan is superior, more powerful, central, and important than its colonial satellites. Yanagita offers the only negative images of Japanese imperialism here.

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1704 Kato.
1705 Kato.
1706 Yanagita.
1707 In his images, Hirohito shows support for the general idea of Japanese imperialism in his imperial tours and elsewhere, for the invasion of Manchuria in the 1930s, and for Japan’s additional imperial expansion in the late 1930s. He also believed that Japanese imperialism could aid politics and the throne at home.
1708 For example, Kato declared that “patriarchal sovereignty” and Japan would always be the center of the empire, that the emperor was the “brain” of the empire, and that the imperial family would be the “quintessence” of the Japanese race at the empire’s center. Even Yanagita, who opposed Japanese imperialism, suggested that Japan must lead other Asian nations by example, and that Japan must encourage the development and unity of other Asian nations against the West.
Regarding images of Japanese colonies, although Ito opposed colonialism in Korea, he calls colonialism in Taiwan and Hokkaido good. Hirohito’s images suggest that each colony should take its proper place in the imperial hierarchy, and that each is naturally inferior to Japan. Images of how Japan should relate to the colonies stress that Japan should take the lead position in the empire, and that some colonies need Japan’s guidance, protection, and help with development. Rhetoric near the end of World War II, suggesting that certain regions in the empire should have some autonomy or equality with Japan, proved not to be genuine.

How may these images have served as perceptual filters or organizing devices?

On colonialism and imperialism, these images ignore the negative impacts of colonialism, including exploitation, moral and human rights problems, economic injustices, oppression, and so forth. On European and Western colonialism, Kato’s images were overly positive. Negative aspects of Western colonialism were true. Western colonialism was really a mixed case. It would have been good if Japan had not copied so much Western colonialism. From the social and political points of view, there seemed to be many negative impacts on other Asian countries from Western imperialism. From the standpoint of technology and economics, in the long run there were some positive impacts. In images on Japanese imperialism, there were several blind spots. Hirohito in particular failed to recognize that Japanese imperialism was often brutal, despite economic benefits and infrastructural development it brought some areas, including

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1708 For example, Yanagita argued that Japan’s internal development was more important than its colonialism or imperialism, that using Japan’s military for overseas imperialism was bad, and that Japan must not blindly copy Western imperialism.
1710 Hirohito.
1711 These are suggested by Ito’s images of Korea.
1712 These were some of Hirohito’s statements about China, Taiwan and Korea, noted earlier in the chapter.
Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan. Since it was forced on these areas, it was often resented. This has caused many foreign policy headaches for Japan that often continue until now. The images on Japanese colonies included false ideas that Japan was inherently better than all of its colonies. It is true that the colonies benefited somewhat from Japan’s input and its higher level of development. This help should have been given without force, not as a result of invasion. Perhaps some nations would have welcomed Japanese help that was not forced, perhaps not. 1713 There was a failure to recognize the ultimate failure this forced policy would have, and the baggage it would create for Japan’s future international relations.

**Worldview.** What worldviews of Japan’s imperialism emerge from the above images? In the nature of the world, the strong have the right to rule the world. Imperialism is good if it contributes to progress, though weak nations may suffer. Imperialism can be hypocritical, and this also is not good. The strongest nations will rule and control the weak ones. If Japan or any other nation does not want to be ruled or controlled by others, it must become strong. If Japan becomes strong, it has the right to have an empire too. On views of the world’s order, the strong rule the weak. If a nation has an empire or colonies, it can build its power and prestige. It is good for nations to submit themselves to the proper international hierarchy of nations. Hirohito believed that those in Asia should willingly let Japan lead, since it was the most advanced nation in the region.

In views of Japan, imperialism could help Japan grow, domestic politics and other domestic issues. Japan was superior and therefore fit to lead other Asian countries.

1713 In the case of Korea, the answer was definitely no in either case.
Japan could help these other countries with development, and to resist the West. In the views of non-self (non-Japanese) here, Western countries were seen as superior to Japan. Their imperialism had helped bring progress to Asia and elsewhere, but they exploited and harmed the cultures of weaker countries, which was not good. Weaker peoples, namely other Asian countries, were not as strong as Japan or the West. Japan should help lead them. Colonialism in Taiwan and Korea and similar regions was good. Hirohito especially believed that each Asian country should take its proper position in the empire so Japan could lead.

What were the relevant environment(s) surrounding the leaders who held these worldviews? How did these environments interact with or affect the leaders’ worldviews? The environment included Western imperialism and colonialism threatening other Asian countries. Though not a current threat to Japan, it was in the recent past. Several of the leaders, including Hirohito, were afraid of the threat of war with or invasion (of Japan) by the Soviet Union. There was great competition between Japan and the Western powers on the Asian mainland for resources and influence. Concerning environmental interactions, to many except Yanagita, Japan’s rapid military victories in the late 1800s and early 1900s, its gain of colonies in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, and rapid economic growth through the mid-1920s, seemed to confirm Japanese power and the rightness of Japanese imperialism and its cause. However, the collapse of Japan’s empire in World War II, the huge suffering and defeat of the nation caused many to feel betrayed after the war. How did these worldviews and their associated environmental interactions influence the leaders’ perceptions, uses of information, and understanding of events and their causes?

On the issue of perception, for Hirohito, Japan’s victories in the earlier wars since 1895,
and tours to several colonies, seemed outstanding proof of the rightness of Japanese militarism and imperialism. Others, such as Kato and Yamagata, were generally supportive of Japanese imperialism. But Ito and Yanagita expressed doubts. On uses of information, information for several of these leaders was limited, due to various circumstances. Difficulties in travel and tight control on information later in the period meant that they sometimes had a hard time having an accurate picture of what was really happening abroad. This was not the case for Hirohito, who usually had access to the best possible information.\textsuperscript{1714} Power politics, realism, and evolutionary thinking, to some degree, influence many of these views of imperialism and colonialism. Imperialist and nationalist ideologies, some from Meiji Japan, influenced the thought of Hirohito, Kato and others. The main exception was Yanagita.

How may have technological systems affected these worldviews? Heavy industry, powerful military technologies, and successful industrialization and trade all enabled Japan to buy or produce the technologies it used in its warfare and imperialism. Railroad, port and mining technologies allowed economic exploitation in several colonies, such as Manchuria. To these leaders, except Yanagita, these successes, especially before the full breakout of World War II, suggested that imperialism was the right path for Japan.

\textit{Cultural Logics.} Under their worldviews of imperialism, what were the global phenomena to which these leaders responded? These included Western imperialism, colonialism, theories and ideas about colonialism, evolutionistic theories, economic pressures for colonies and more wealth, the idea that Japan was threatened with invasion

\textsuperscript{1714} Bix, \textit{Hirohito}. 659
or foreign control if it did not obtain more wealth, colonies, and pressure for natural resources. What were the leaders’ worldviews and basic beliefs about these phenomena? Some believed that Western imperialism had contributed much to evolutionary progress. The strong have the right to rule the weak. All believed that Western imperialism should be repelled, Japan should not be a colony of the West; it must remain free. Kato and Hirohito believed that superior races have the right to control weaker countries and races. Some saw Japanese imperialism as positive. They believed it could strengthen Japanese politics and economics, and help various domestic issues. Japanese imperialism could help Asia defend itself against the West. Kato saw Japan as superior to its colonies, as the necessary the center of the empire. Colonies were mere “satellites” of Japan. Japan should help the colonies to develop and be strengthened. Only Yanagita believed that Japan should be more focused on home, not overseas adventures.

What were the cultural logics under the worldviews about these global phenomena? These included evolutionary assumptions that the strong and superior races usually win, seen as positive. Because the West had many colonies, it had contributed to “progress.” There were assumptions that progress and imperialism were good, because they would strengthen the controlling country, and often the colonies. Japan should not become a colony; it should stay free. Freedom for one’s self was seen as good. It was permissible for Japan to have colonies although Japan did not want to be controlled by

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1715 The previous two beliefs were Kato’s.
1716 Kato, Yamagata and Hirohito.
1717 Yamagata and Hirohito.
1718 This was the belief of all the leaders studied in this section.
1719 Kato.
1720 Ito.
others. That was a right of stronger countries, and Japan was such a country. Japan was superior to other Asian countries, so it could and should help them.

What were these responses to these global phenomena? They responded with hard work, study, writing, and much effort in policymaking (in some cases) to help build up Japan and help it grow so it could resist the West. Ito was personally involved in helping to administer a region under Japanese control (Korea). Hirohito had the biggest impacts on imperialism, due to his position as emperor, and the huge macro-level policies during World War II that he either allowed or did not stop.

What were the cultural logics under these responses? They included hard work to help Japan fend off Western imperialism. This was seen as a matter of survival. Actions regarding Japanese imperialism, colonies were seen as contributing to Japanese survival. They were also as a means of helping Japan’s Asian neighbors to develop, grow, progress and resist the West.

What do we learn if we compare the cultural logics of the worldviews about the global phenomena with the cultural logics of the worldviews under the responses to the phenomena? The former logics were more basic, such as what the meaning and motivations for imperialism were, and whether imperialism was good. The latter logics examined more specialized issues, such as the value of Japanese imperialism and colonialism.

**Globalization Issues.** How do the most important worldviews of imperialism and colonialism here reflect and/or affect processes of globalization (intensified or speeded up flows of ideas, peoples, money, media, or technology)? How does globalization affect these worldviews? Intensified global connections of technology and
communication enabled Japan to be both threatened by Western imperialism, and then to threaten its Asian neighbors. The spread of political ideas and military technology from the West enabled Japan to study and make sense of the actions of the West, and the new threats that Japan and other Asian nations faced. The chief understanding that emerged is that the world is now driven by wealth and power, and that if Japan is to repel the West and become strong itself, it must grow strong enough to resist the West, but then influence other Asian countries near it so it too can become great. The worldviews of these leaders reflect their own understanding of, and reactions to, the Western imperialism that had threatened Japan, and then their interpretations of how the enterprise and concept of imperialism should be acted upon by Japan and nearby regions. In this sense, these leaders received the concept of Western imperialism and mediated it in somewhat different forms to the rest of East and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. While all these leaders condemned Western imperialism, not all supported the Japanese form. Yanagita is the exception.

If we consider these global processes as people experienced them, on micro- (personal) and/or macro- (shared, public) levels, what do we learn? Ito, Hirohito\footnote{1721 Hirohito did brief colonial tours to nearby regions when he was regent in the early 1920s (Bix, Hirohito).} and Yamagata had limited experiences of living in and/or traveling to nearby regions. Yanagita served briefly in Europe in the League of Nations.\footnote{1722 To my knowledge, Kato Hiroyuki never had a chance to live and travel overseas much.} The thought of all of these leaders on imperialism and colonialism is fundamentally based on what they read and were taught in their conservative educations, public service, and limited travel overseas. Their conservative training colored and influenced their reactions, especially in
the case of Hirohito. The exception is Yanagita. Why was Yanagita different? How were his progressive-leaning political beliefs acquired, and why did they make him oppose harsh, militaristic Japanese imperialism?\textsuperscript{1723} This is beyond the present project’s scope to answer, but perhaps because he so opposed the destructive effects of Western globalization on Japan, he did not want Japan repeating similar mistakes on its neighbors.

Do these important global processes represent a form of Japanese or non-Western globalization? If yes, what is their significance? These processes are an example of a non-Western power, Japan, receiving the impacts of Western globalization, in the form of imperialism, and then mediating them in similar, though altered forms, as Japanese forms of global impact (Japanese imperialism and colonialism). They are significant as the first forms of non-Western globalization in the modern world, though certainly earlier forms of non-Western globalization, such as China’s, were highly significant.

Conclusion

From the above study of several key leaders’ worldviews of Japan’s external relations (1895 to 1945), and of Japan’s experiences with technology, development, and external relations in this period, what are some of the main lessons and conclusions that may be possible for Japan’s current foreign aid and development policies? Here I will explore general tendencies, but will save the exploration of more concrete linkages for the concluding chapters (9 and 10). Regarding sociocultural issues, on the role of

\textsuperscript{1723} Remember that Yanagita supported positive Japanese leadership of nearby regions, but not harsh control forced on them.
ideology on social change, development and security in this era, various imperialist
doctrines, such as hakkô ichiu, were used by Japan’s government and military to
convince Japan’s citizens that Japan’s actions in other countries were practically,
intellectually, and divinely justifiable. Thankfully, this is not the case in Japan’s current
ODA policy. In addition, images of biology, evolution and indigenous ideologies (i.e.
Shinto) colored the visions of imperialism and colonialism of some of these leaders
(Hirohito, Kato). Certainly some particular images, even if not imperialistic ones,
influence the views of current Japanese aid workers, images such as globalization, free
trade, self-help, and others.

In this period, Japan had close relations with a wide variety of nations and world
regions, including its Asian neighbors, the West, and geoculturally distant places such as
Africa and Latin America. Though Japan enjoyed peace with many of these nations
during much of this era, it also had horrifically painful conflicts, such as World War II.
Japan’s overall foreign relations in this era seem painful, and filled with many
misunderstandings. Japan’s leaders had various misunderstandings about other nations
that influenced the policies they enacted. Hirohito’s views of other nations were highly
colored by racist, biological notions. On the policy level, his problem was not one of
inaccurate information or a lack of it—it was a worldview problem. How could this have
been corrected? The political worldviews of most of Japan’s leaders in this period stress
conservative ideologies and various forms of competition between nations. Their views
have various racial overtones, hint of evolutionism, Japan’s superiority, and the desire for
empire (the exception is Yanagita). All of the views have a degree of realism. Some
conservative ideologies emerging in this era suggested that Japan had the right to control
certain resources in neighboring regions, or a duty to unite Asia and lead it against Western domination. This thought influenced some of Japan’s leaders. Another major issue here, again, is the further rise of Japan’s military and its powerful grip on Japan’s economy, society, politics, and its international relations. Mistakes in these two areas—misreadings of international conditions by Japan’s top leaders, based partly on (in my opinion) faulty worldviews, and the unhampered power of Japan’s military, had disastrous consequences for Japan, Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, costing tens of millions of lives, and partially enabling the victory of communism in China and elsewhere in Asia, which would cost tens of millions of more lives after the war.

There are at least two important, basic lessons for ODA and development policies here. First, the worldviews of leaders will influence the kinds of foreign policy they support and enact. This was the case in prewar Japan, and also is for contemporary LDCs. Japan’s current aid policies inevitably reflect a complex mix of the worldviews of Japan’s current policymakers, bureaucrats, and aid staff, and competing political and economic forces, pressures and interests, domestic and foreign. Similar forces will shape the development and aid policies of LDCs, though in different ways from Japan. A key question is, where leaders of an LDC have inaccurate worldviews which misread domestic or foreign conditions, how might they be corrected? Access to accurate information is obvious, but how can leaders be helped when they are influenced by faulty worldviews, as Japan’s leaders were before World War II? Frequent change of leadership, as in a democracy, seems the simplest answer. The second issue concerns controlling a nation’s military so that it does not abuse its power. It seems that encouraging democratic governance and controls on abuse of power and militarism are
fundamental for ODA and development policies, to prevent help prevent problems like these in today’s LDCs.

In its external economic relations in this period, for the first thirty years, Japan had extensive trade with the outside world, Western and Asian nations and others, and benefited immensely. Earlier wars such as the Russo-Japanese War and World War I expanded Japan’s economy, though World War II destroyed it. Trade built up the Japanese nation and the wealth and prosperity of its people, to a very widespread degree. Yet because of its new global connections, when the Great Depression hit in the late 1920s, Japan also suffered. The expansion of the power of Japan’s military in domestic society, and its aggressive actions caused great damage to it and other nations. International isolation for Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s greatly harmed its economy. The strong state emphasis on heavy industrialization and trade failed to deal with the issues of small and medium enterprises. The views of the only leader studied here, Yanagita, also emphasized the issues of local and more regional business, and more on the domestic side. Today Japanese economic policy has more balanced emphases and examines both domestic and international issues. The more advanced an LDC’s economy becomes, likely the greater its engagement with international trade. Aid and development plans for a particular country should be geared around this fact. LLDCs should therefore have a lesser degree of openness to the international economy than more advanced LDCs. So economic openness to international trade should be geared to an LDC’s actual economic conditions. This idea seems based on Japan’s actual experience, and fits well the Japanese concept of customized development for LDCs. It also fits Japan’s actual
ODA policy, which has sought to encourage bilateral trade and investment based on LDCs’ actual conditions.

In the period 1895 to 1945, the study of foreign and Western cultures seemed to have somewhat of a liberalizing effect on Japan through the early 1930s (the period of Taisho democracy), both in popular culture and in some intellectual trends. In the late 1920s to 1945, due to conservative pressure from the Japanese government, there was much censorship and oppression against these “decadent” Western influences, but they could not be totally eliminated. Interactions with foreigners in this era had big impacts on Japan’s relations with other countries, some lasting until today. Japan’s anger against the United States was provoked when the latter passed the racist anti-Japanese immigration exclusion act in 1924, and Japanese cruelty against the Chinese in China in World War II and Koreans in Japan during and after the war have had long-lasting effects on Japan’s international relations. Foreign employees and experts who brought Western knowledge to Japan, starting in the Meiji period, had huge impacts on Japan’s knowledge. Rather than contaminating Japan, ultimately this contact with foreigners greatly enriched it.

The wise policy ideas of Yanagita Kunio, designed to protect Japanese identity and culture against the onslaught of Western influences, did not affect Japan’s cultural preservation policies until later in the postwar period. Yanagita’s policies stressed understanding and protecting Japan’s culture from the bottom–up, while Hirohito’s and official views supported more of a top-down approach. Both leaders supported the role of government in this process. Japan’s aid has also demonstrated more of a top-down approach in many issues, even toward cultural issues. The global aid agenda has also historically supported a top-down approach when it has paid any attention to cultural
issues, but lately it is beginning to emphasize a bottom-up approach, at least in its discourse. Japan is now also attempting to incorporate more such bottom-up approaches, in line with the global agenda. But can it really do so?

Leaders who were most influential for most of this period supported more conservative cultural values, though some supported more liberal ideas during the period of Taisho democracy. We also see rather conservative approaches in Japan’s general aid philosophy—conservative economic approaches, loans, the emphasis on self-help/reliance, and so forth. As noted in Chapter 2, other countries’ development approaches also reflect their own beliefs and experiences. Hirohito and the Japanese government also supported the conservative, imperialist ideology of hakkô ichiu, the idea that Japan could bring peace and Confucian virtue to the world. This ideology was somewhat implicit in official Japanese propaganda in the 1930s and 1940s. This may be seen in current Japanese ideas about Japan’s role as a cultural and development bridge between East and West, and North and South. True, Japan’s aid approach has been rather distinctive. But is it really such a bridge?  

What are the possible implications of Japan’s experiences and its leaders’ views of colonialism and imperialism for Japan’s aid policies? By 1895, Japan incorporated Hokkaido and Okinawa as integral parts of the nation. Japanese colonialism went into full swing in Taiwan in 1895, soon followed by parts of Southern Manchuria, Sakhalin and

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1724 The idea of serving as a cultural bridge between East and West is shared by other East Asian societies, including South Korea and China. For example, consider the new Back to Jerusalem missionary movement of China’s persecuted underground Protestant church, which aims to take the Christian gospel to the largely Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist cultures of South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Brother Yun and Paul Hattaway, The Heavenly Man: The Remarkable True Story of Chinese Christian Brother Yun (London: Monarch Books, 2002); Back to Jerusalem, “God’s call to the Chinese Church to Complete the Great Mission”; http://www.backtojerusalem.com; Internet; accessed 15 October 2008).
Korea (the last in 1910). Japan began massive infrastructural investment in each of these regions. Later, Japan acquired many new territories in mainland China and Southeast Asia. In some places, its rule was quite brutal; in others, it was barely present. From the early 1940s, Japan created new policies for both its older colonies and newly conquered territories. They were designed in principle to grant more autonomy to some colonies, and to strengthen the empire, but most of the policies had little impact. Japan’s impacts on its colonies and territories were sometimes positive (in terms of economic infrastructural development), but often harsh or negative. As noted already, many millions of lives were affected, both foreign and Japanese.

What were the cultural impacts and implications of Japanese imperialism? Japanese colonialism often created widespread resentment in indigenous populations, including from the Okinawans and the Ainu in Hokkaido. Koreans felt even greater resentment toward Japan’s long, harsh colonial rule. Japan’s cruel behavior in mainland China helped to unite China’s peasants under Chinese communists for nationalist resistance. In many of these places, the Japanese imposed the use of the Japanese language, State Shinto, the Japanese education system, and other imperialistic/nationalistic ideologies. Current international ODA policies, including Japan’s, prohibit imperialistic, hegemonic influences such as these.

In Japan proper, from the late 1920s to 1945, Japan’s government heavily promoted the glories of imperialism and its past military victories in Japanese society, and ideologies supporting such ideas. This eventually had a large impact in generating much popular Japanese support for World War II and Japanese imperialism. In Japanese

\[1725\] Johnson, Peasant Nationalism.
thought, Western imperialism and colonialism were negative, and should not be permitted. Japan felt that it was a stronger non-Western country, so it should help other Asians defend themselves against Western outsiders/invaders. Supposed economic and political benefit for Japan was an added bonus.

Most Japanese felt that indigenous peoples in the colonies were racially inferior, and debates over colonial identity and the role of colonists in the empire followed. Colonies were seen as “inferior” (mere “satellites”) to more developed/advanced nations such as Japan (Kato). In the view of Japan’s leaders, including Hirohito, there should be a “hierarchy” of Asian nations and colonies, with Japan at the front, like the “flying geese” pattern mentioned in an earlier chapter. Contemporary aid suggests that LDCs are inferior to donor countries, and that donor countries like Japan have a right to continue to lead them. Donor countries support this position. It is doubtful that aid from Japan or elsewhere can challenge this.

What are the (economic) implications of Japan’s imperialism (1895-1945) for Japan’s current ODA? Japan’s pattern of offering mainly infrastructural help in its ODA follows not only Japan’s own pattern of development, but also the development pattern it followed in the colonial regions it held for a fairly long time. Japanese could not tolerate a foreign or colonial presence in their midst, and Japan’s colonies generally felt the same about Japan’s presence. This is especially true among young people in most other Asian countries that were Japanese colonies. While Japanese infrastructural investments laid the foundation for later development of colonies such as South Korea and Taiwan, many of these populations deeply resented former Japanese control, and the tremendous damage
of World War II. This anti-imperialism attitude common in the postwar world has made imperialism deeply resented, and prohibited in international law.

But while today imperialism is illegal and condemned by global public opinion, are the attitudes of more advanced countries, including Japan, still “imperialistic” in their development and aid policies? The idea of more advanced countries “helping” LDCs to develop is very much a part of the global development agenda, common in Japan and other advanced OECD nations, and hints at colonial and evolutionistic ideas of a hierarchy of nations. Various “non-Western” countries, such as China, Japan, and the Soviet Union/Russia have shown a desire to help LDCs in other parts of Asia, Africa and elsewhere to develop. Japan desires to help them come into the global trading system. Japan and China display the attitude that aid to these LDCs will benefit the domestic economies of the former (i.e. their aid to Africa). The ideal of helping LDCs to resist Western “imperialism” (or the “West”) was also strong in Chinese and Soviet aid in the late twentieth century.

Non-intervention in the internal affairs and sovereignty of other nations is also a strong principle in contemporary international relations and law. Advanced nations such as Japan hope to set a “positive” example for LDCs, and through aid and development plans, hope they do so. Ito Hirobumi hoped to “help” Korea develop in the early twentieth century, and tried to arrange for many Japanese experts to be dispatched there. Today, Japan and other advanced nations show a similar attitude through their dispatching of technical assistance and volunteers in programs like the Peace Corps, and JICA’s JOCV. Do these programs perpetuate ethnocentric attitudes of national superiority? “Advanced” nations like Japan still feel “superior” to LDCs, economically
and culturally, perhaps even racially. How much cultural and economic control over LDCs is still generated by contemporary aid, even from non-Western donors like Japan and China?

On the second key question of the dissertation, the development related concept of internationalization an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development? Regarding internationalization and Japan’s external political relations, most of the leaders discussed in this chapter were politically conservative, and expected Japan to get involved in race wars with the West. Their thought is mostly realist, and influenced by evolutionism. All wanted Japan to lead Asia against the West. As Japan’s domestic politics turned increasingly militaristic in the 1930s and 1940s, more assertive attitudes in its foreign relations emerged, having great effects on the countries with which it interacted. Internationalization does not really apply to Yanagita’s views on external economic relations (the only leader studied on that topic for this period). His major concern was protecting Japan’s domestic, especially rural, culture from destructive cultural and economic influences from abroad. His policies emphasized strengthening local and regional industries, such as agriculture, so local regions could be empowered. Internationalization only has limited relevance for external cultural relations. Yanagita and Hirohito, the two leaders studied, were mainly concerned about how international cultural forces would affect Japan’s domestic culture. But on internationalization, since Hirohito accepted most of the nationalistic and emperor ideologies, it is likely that he

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1726 The concepts of “modernization” and translatable adaptation are not considered here, so I do mention them.
1727 The exception is Yanagita, who was politically liberal.
accepted the *hakkô ichiu* ideology too.\textsuperscript{1728} But there is no strong evidence that *hakkô ichiu* affected other countries in Asia, or that Hirohito strongly believed it could.

Internationalization is extremely relevant to Japanese imperialism. Three leaders see Japanese imperialism as positive,\textsuperscript{1729} and two see it as doubtful.\textsuperscript{1730} Several think of it in terms of the benefits it may bring Japan or to other countries/colonies.\textsuperscript{1731} Only Yanagita showed concern for negative effects it might have on other regions. As we considered what the effects were, there were several that were positive, but we also noted the overwhelmingly devastating consequences of World War II.

From my earlier survey of Japan’s external political, economic, cultural relations, and relations with its empire (1895 to 1945), what contextual factors relevant to Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations emerge that are important for the issue of internationalization? There are many issues covered in these contexts relevant to the concept, since internationalization concerns the economic and cultural effects occurring as weaker regions are absorbed into the world market. What happened here as both Japan and its empire entered the global economy?

In this era, Japan exercised increasing political, economic and cultural influence on surrounding regions, including Korea, Taiwan, southern Manchuria, and others. Aggression occurred at many points, especially during conflicts. Earlier in the period, major Western powers tolerated Japan’s actions against its neighbors. But from the 1920s to 1940s, as Japan faced increasing opposition from Western powers for hostilities in

\textsuperscript{1728} According to the *hakkô ichiu* ideology, Japan would become a beacon of world peace and Confucian wisdom.

\textsuperscript{1729} Kato, Yamagata, and Hirohito.

\textsuperscript{1730} Ito and Yanagita.

\textsuperscript{1731} Hirohito, Ito, Yamagata, and Kato.
Asia, it gradually decreased its political, economic and cultural ties with the West and increased them with its Asian sphere of influence. Japan slowly became more aggressive toward its neighbors. Though the West was the international provider of the knowledge that Japan craved for its survival in the early to mid-Meiji period, as well as Japan’s chief threat, now the Western powers were seen as Japan’s chief obstacle to wealth, power and survival in Asia. While Japan’s military exercised influence over Japan’s politics, especially during war, this influence greatly increased in the 1930s, with devastating impacts on Japan’s international relations, even on the economic and cultural levels, with its empire and Asian neighbors.

Economically, Japan’s trade and economic ties with the empire and Asia greatly increased during this period. Economic factors and survival were among the main factors contributing to Japan’s involvement in Asia. Most of the trade, development and economic activity with the colonies were carried out mainly for the benefit of Japan. Though Japan had significant trade relations with several Western nations, increasing political tensions toward the end of the period strained these ties. The withdrawal of the Western powers from East Asia during World War I helped increase Japan’s ties with the mainland as it strove to supply the needs of Asian markets. Through the 1920s, Japan quickly mastered large-scale industrial production and trade with the rise of the zaibatsu and major trading companies. Increasing trade with the colonies further cemented its ties with Asia. In the 1930s, the increasingly militarized nature of Japan’s economy and its colonial ties meant that the colonies would also be leashed to Japan’s wartime fate.

Japan’s cultural ties with the West continued to be great, though direct ties decreased in the 1930s and 1940s. Intellectual influences in many areas were strong,
though the totalitarianism of the Japanese government in the 1930s reduced their impact. Cultural tensions with the United States over immigration increased general hostility between the two nations, reinforcing to some Japanese that the United States and other Western nations were fundamentally racist. This was one more factor encouraging Japan to cast its gaze to the East, not the West, for the future. Japan’s cultural relations with neighbors like China and Korea were extensive during the period, and filled with tension. Though teachers from the West exercised decisive influence in Japan until the 1930s, two other groups of foreigners in Japan, the Chinese and the Koreans, experienced intense discrimination.

Through its expanding empire, Japan exercised increasing influence on the lives of other Asians, economically, culturally and politically. The influence of jingoistic, imperialistic ideologies in Japan also increased. The Japanese government heavily promoted these ideologies, which were economically motivated but culturally tinged by racism. They reinforced the worldviews promoted by the state, encouraging the Japanese public to support its extremist actions. As Japan’s economic and political ties with its colonies increased, it attempted to impose Japanese identity on them, through language, education, citizenship, State Shinto, and the military draft, but the colonized were not given full political rights. Examining the cultural conditions in colonies such as Korea and Taiwan under Japanese imperialism, we see that Japanese rule was often oppressive, in Korea, to the extreme. The ultimate irony was that Japan’s non-Western colonialism was just as exploitive and violent as the West’s was.

In sum, in Chapter 8, Japan represents both an example of and an exception to internationalization. It is a good example in that it actively, aggressively exercised
domination and control over its weaker neighbors, with broad cultural, economic and political impacts upon them. Japan is somewhat an exception in that it was not a Western power, and the definition assumes that acts of aggression that occur as non-Western regions enter the global economy will be committed by Western nations. This is not always the case, as seen in Japan’s actions in Asia at this time, and in contemporary China’s powerful economic interventions in Africa and Latin America in the 2000s. Also, Japan did not passively react to the threat of the West, but aggressively and assertively responded on many levels. In these ways, Japan does not fit the conventional definition of internationalization.

What, if anything, do we see in the historical and worldview evidence presented here about how Japanese spirituality and religion may have affected policies during this period? While this chapter has fewer references than some previous chapters, above I noted how spirituality and nationalism mixed in the views of both Hirohito and Yanagita.\textsuperscript{1732} Hirohito’s mixing of spirituality and politics blinded him on the effects of Japanese actions in China and other overseas regions in the 1930s,\textsuperscript{1733} and he supported nationalistic, spiritual ideologies such as State Shinto and \textit{hakkō ichiu} in reaction to the external cultural influences that he felt threatened Japan. The government used spirituality and spiritual values in national education and State Shinto to increase citizen

\textsuperscript{1732} Remember how Hirohito and his court emphasized the connections of nationalism and spirituality in the enthronement ceremonies (in 1928) (Bix, \textit{Hirohito}), and how Yanagita connected ujigami spirituality and the emperor with true Japanese (national) identity. Hirohito also assumed that state-defined ideologies such as State Shinto represented who Japanese really were. In addition, he was surrounded by nationalistic and spiritual input in his education and upbringing, greatly affecting his future policy stances and outcomes.

\textsuperscript{1733} See my comments in Chapter 9 on Hirohito’s attitude toward Japan’s actions in China in the late 1930s.
support for militaristic policies, and to minimize resistance to them.\textsuperscript{1734} In the policy lessons offered above, I argued that based on the Japanese experience in this period, while the state of a developing country should not endorse any religion, positive spiritual values, apart from the state, can sometimes encourage a nation to seek humble paths of service in the international arena. This is not what happened in Japan in this era.

Japan’s leaders also used material means (military technologies, industries, and aggression) to try to transform Japan’s external environment—to expand Japan’s overseas influence, control, wealth, and to help “defend” Asia against Western encroachment. Japan also used these material means to gain access to additional territories and natural resources for “defense” purposes. These actions were also justified in terms of the benefits that Japanese influence would bring these newly conquered regions. Yanagita did not concur with these actions. Instead, he argued that Japan must use material means (regional industries and agriculture) to defend its indigenous rural culture and spirituality, what he saw as the foundation of Japanese culture, identity, and survival, against the flood of Western material and spiritual products (technology and culture). In reality, the aggressive material actions of the Japanese state, undergirded by forced acceptance of State Shinto in conquered territories and Japan itself, greatly alienated foreign populations against Japan, and nearly destroyed both.

What are the implications of possible conflicts between views of spirituality and science and similar issues for policy matters in this period? What emerges is that the main leaders studied here, including Hirohito and Yanagita, and the Japanese

\textsuperscript{1734} Earlier in this chapter I also noted how Bix argues that Japan’s aggressive military and the “religiously charged” throne helped fuel its invasive actions in China and elsewhere in the 1930s (Bix, \textit{Hirohito}, 310-312).
government, did not see essential conflicts between spiritual and material concerns, including nationalism, patriotism, and encouraging citizen support for state goals. These leaders and the Japanese state saw no essential conflict in drawing on either material or spiritual tools to accomplish their purposes. Again these seem to be manifestations of the practical Japanese attitude toward spirituality, to use any means necessary, spiritual or material, to accomplish important, pragmatic goals. In actuality, the Flaw of the Excluded Middle does not seem to be at work here. The conflict between Western and Japanese values is of much greater concern for these leaders than any conflict between the spiritual and material realms.

What are the possible effects of these issues for Japanese aid? Though leaders of this era were not afraid to consider spiritual and material issues in tandem, according the constitutionally mandated separation of religion and state in contemporary Japan, the state does not routinely consider religious issues, unless they explicitly affect policy matters, as in the case of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, and the continuing controversy over the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{1735} But as I noted in the previous chapter’s conclusion, religion and spirituality are increasingly important features in contemporary international relations. More scholars are beginning to investigate the implications of these issues, and how they can be handled.\textsuperscript{1736} How the issue of religion and spirituality may affect contemporary Japanese aid policy, and what might be done to equip Japanese policymakers to better handle this aspect of Japanese aid, will be addressed in Chapter 9.

\textsuperscript{1735} I have referred to both of these cases elsewhere in the dissertation.
\textsuperscript{1736} For example, see the discussion on books on religion and international affairs in Chapter 1.
Part Four

Conclusions
Chapter 9

Conclusions, Part I: Key Findings

Introduction

In this chapter, I offer final comments on several important subjects and questions explored at length in earlier chapters. I will consider key findings on the three key research questions of the dissertation and the working hypothesis. As a reminder, these questions concern lessons from Japan’s historical experiences and leaders’ worldviews of technology, development and foreign relations for contemporary Japanese aid policy (1850 to 1945), whether the concepts of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development, and the possible effects of spirituality and religion on Japan’s contemporary aid policies. In the conclusion of the chapter, I review and explore primary implications of these key findings for contemporary aid policy and international affairs in Japan and beyond, including lessons from the Japanese case on religion and international development cooperation.
Lessons from Worldviews and Experiences with Technology, Development, and Foreign Relations (1850 to 1945) for Current Japanese Foreign Aid Policies

The first key question of the dissertation is: how have Japan’s experiences with technology, development and foreign relations (and key leaders’ worldviews of those issues) from 1850 to 1945 affected its current foreign aid policies? What conclusions about these impacts can we draw from the research in this dissertation? Is the working hypothesis of this dissertation true, that Japan’s experience (seen in the beliefs of several key leaders) somehow has affected its current aid policies? Third, what lessons for current aid can be drawn from those views and experience? Of course the effect of prewar trends on today’s aid policies has been greatly mediated by what happened after 1945, but in-depth consideration of postwar factors must be saved for another study.

Concerning the impacts of Japan’s experiences and leaders’ views (1850 to 1945) on current Japanese ODA policies, I will divide my comments into three broad categories: cultural/social issues; politics, foreign policy and political relations; and economic policy issues. On each issue, I will begin by commenting on lessons emerging from Japan’s historical experiences. General remarks about the influence of leaders’ views and later ODA will be found at the end of each issue section.

On historical experiences, I will comment on general trends, and then on possible sources for key concepts in contemporary Japanese aid policy. On a general level, on many issues that emerge in Japan’s historical experiences, what Japan’s ODA policy is today often seems related to what it should not be, based on negative experiences of Japan in the prewar period. In some cases, positive prewar experiences seem to have influenced, to some degree, what Japan’s aid does or seeks to do today. But
negative lessons seem common, especially in the cultural and political areas. On economic issues, historical influences seem more positive.

**Sociocultural Issues**

On cultural/social issues, policies based on negative results from prewar experiences include the negative role of nationalist, propagandistic development ideologies and their impact on Japanese education from the 1880s through 1945, and the failure of the Japanese government to concretely consider and enact policies to effectively protect Japanese culture from negative Western influences in the prewar period. Regarding nationalistic propaganda, from 1850 to 1895, the Japanese government developed and then imposed State Shinto on the nation as a mandatory spiritual/patriotic practice, starting in the education system. This damaged human rights and freedoms, and helped justify extremist military policies and civilian sacrifices on behalf of the nation in World War II. Though the government studied and considered the important role of religion and spirituality in economic development, this resulted in repressive, coercive policies. It also utilized several other ideologies, such as the emperor ideology, for similar purposes.

On protecting Japanese culture, several leading leaders and thinkers, such as Fukuzawa, Mori, and Yanagita, reflected deeply on Western technology and culture, and how they should be adopted by Japan. But in the prewar period, from the early Meiji period through the 1920s, the state first placed priority on national economic development and trade promotion, and through 1945, on industrialization and mobilization to support Japan’s increasing militarization. In these pressures for national
survival and expansion in the hostile global environment, serious government policy for protecting Japan’s heart and soul got lost.

The government also failed to enact effective policies that proactively enhanced the nation’s adjustment to the massive social and economic changes resulting from the rapid economic development and reform processes. As the nation moved closer to World War II in the 1930s and 1940s, government repression against culture got worse. The massive mobilization of society in support of militarization and the war effort at various times, during the Russo-Japanese War and especially World War II, had grave costs, both economic and social, though the nation enjoyed a huge economic and cultural boom during and right after World War I.1737

While Japan developed important economic infrastructure in long-term colonies such as Korea and Taiwan, it also imposed elements of Japanese identity, including language, State Shinto, and education on those colonies, so its presence was often resented. The idea of more “advanced” countries “helping” weaker ones was strong in Japan’s imperialistic ideologies, and remains so in today’s global foreign aid policies, even from Japan. “Helping” and “aid” may sometimes hint at national ethnocentrism and “superiority,” even from non-Western donors such as Japan and China, toward other (non-Western) nations.

On the positive side, regarding cultural/social issues, from the late Tokugawa period forward, the Japanese state took numerous efforts to help Japan import many crucial areas of technology and other areas of knowledge needed for the nation’s survival,

1737 I discussed the positive economic effects of World War I in Japan, from acting as chief industrial supplier to the Asian markets and colonies that the West had fled, and also the cultural stimulation during the Taisho democracy movement, in earlier chapters.
including sending scholars and missions abroad, and importing foreign experts, books and technology into Japan. As noted earlier, Japan had tremendous cultural and geographic barriers to overcome to master this knowledge, and what it accomplished as an LDC in the late 1800s and early 1900s was truly amazing. Cultural barriers greatly affected the effective transfer of foreign knowledge into Japan in the Meiji era and later, creating a great chasm between what Japan was and what it needed to access foreign knowledge in order to effectively change and develop. These barriers are equally great, if not greater, for today’s developing societies. This is a major issue in ODA and development policy, and there are certainly valuable lessons for other LDCs to be gained from Japan’s transfer experience.

While interaction with foreign cultures and technologies greatly stimulated Japanese politics, economy, and society through the 1920s, the isolationist turn of Japanese society from the 1930s to 1945 had a highly negative effect on these processes.

Regarding possible sources for specific concepts in contemporary Japanese aid policy, on sociocultural issues, main concepts can be organized into four main themes: 1) how aid reflects Japan’s own experience and culture; 2) how aid should be customized for each aid recipient, and local conditions respected; 3) using aid to enhance Japan’s face or (global) image; and 4) possible conflicts between Japan’s development/aid goals and the West’s.

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1738 Many of these lessons are explored further in Hayashi, *Japanese Experience*.

1739 As noted earlier, these ideas are a variant on the concept of translative adaptation.

1740 When I say the West’s, I mean the goals of the currently Western-dominated global aid and development agenda.
Table 9.1 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Sociocultural Issues

Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources and influences are likely present here. PTW: post-World War II sources and influences are likely present.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Idea/Concept</th>
<th>Thematic area(s)</th>
<th>Possible source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offer aid based on lessons from the Japanese and Asian development models</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>Japan’s prewar, postwar dev. experiences, Asia’s recent experiences. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term regional emphasis on Asia</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>Japan’s historical, cultural, geographic linkages to Asia. Historically, Japan had the closest economic links with these countries. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s aid stresses goals of self-help, reliance through mostly giving loans, request-based aid</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>Japan’s work culture of self-help, perseverance and hard work; their role in its own development. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many goals(^1) for Japan’s aid reflect Japan’s political culture, development and IR experience</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>PC: strong state involvement; dev: 1st non-Western country to industrialize; IR: Japan has grown most through peaceful trade, not aggression. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Japan’s aid budget usually parallels its overall economy</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>For most countries, size of ODA budget is partly determined by state of overall economy. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of “pragmatism” and “opportunism” in Japan’s aid</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>Likely reflects the strong business sense and spirit of hard work in Japanese culture since pre-World War II times. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term goals: commercialism and self-help, first for Japan</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>Likely reflects the strong business sense and spirit of hard work in Japanese culture since pre-World War II times, putting Japan’s national interests and survival first. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals from Japan’s private sector: influential in ODA policy</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>Japan’s political and corporate cultures that often mix public, private sectors; tremendous wealth of Japan’s private sector. Mainly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s ODA often reflects competing goals of different public ministries, agencies</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>Inevitability of bureaucratic politics shaping aid’s outcomes. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global(^1) poverty reduction goals may conflict with Japan</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s own development experience (since Meiji)</td>
<td>Economic infrastructure goals reflect Japan’s own development experience (since Meiji</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) These goals include the presence of ODA loans, request-based aid, and various political and economic goals in Japan’s aid program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA’s economic infrastructure/growth promotion goals</th>
<th>culture, experience; Conflicts: Japan’s, global aid agendas</th>
<th>era); tradition of charity (beyond one’s family) has no long historical or cultural background in Japan. Especially PRW.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implicit goal: to not mix religion with Japan’s aid, especially not overseas</td>
<td>How aid reflects Japan’s culture, experience</td>
<td>Long tradition of separation of religion and state in Japan (except for 1868-1945), 1947 Constitution that mandates this separation, postwar desire not to intervene in the internal affairs of other states (based on negative experience of prewar imperialism). PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific goal to customize aid for each country (emerged since 2000)</td>
<td>Customizing aid for local conditions</td>
<td>Goal in line with global aid agenda, and concept of translative adaptation, based on Japan’s own unique dev. experience. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal for Japan’s aid to be more aware of ground level conditions</td>
<td>Customizing aid for local conditions</td>
<td>In line with current global aid agenda goals for improved social development and recipient participative aid approaches; somewhat in line with translative adaptation concept. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal for Japan’s aid to not interfere in recipients’ internal affairs (i.e. politics, religion)</td>
<td>Customizing aid for local conditions</td>
<td>Based on Japan’s negative experiences in pre-1945 imperialism, negative reactions of other states, postwar global standard in int’l law. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal to increase aid to Africa (1970s, 1990s, 2000s)</td>
<td>Enhancing Japan’s face, image through aid</td>
<td>In line with global aid humanitarian agenda; desire to impress the West and to compete with China for African resources. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal for Japan and its aid to be development “bridge” between different global regions</td>
<td>Enhancing Japan’s face, image through aid</td>
<td>Desire to impress other nations by serving as global leader in aid, belief that Japan’s unique experience as 1st non-Western nation to develop can help other LDCs. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/international image problems: Japan no longer an econ. superpower, scandals, less support from business, LDP, pressure by Western aid agenda</td>
<td>Enhancing Japan’s face, image through aid</td>
<td>Strong sense of face, reputation and honor and honor in Japanese culture. Shame: a major theme in the culture. Desire for honor of the nation. Mainly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal to greatly increase Japan’s aid budget</td>
<td>Enhancing Japan’s face, image through aid</td>
<td>Desire for Japan’s national honor, strong national concept of face, recycle huge budget surpluses, win LDC support for Japan’s foreign policy goals. Mostly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs seem to conflict with many of Japan’s ODA aid philosophies</td>
<td>Conflicts: Japan’s, global aid agendas</td>
<td>Difference in aid philosophies and experience. Japan’s experience: successful economic development preceded its capacity to address</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1742 Here I mean the poverty reduction and alleviation goals of the global, Western-dominated development and aid agendas.
From the above table comparing sociocultural issues of Japanese ODA with their possible sources, several possible trends emerge. In the main ideas from contemporary Japanese ODA identified here, possible causes in both the prewar and postwar periods often occur. It is likely because this category emphasizes cultural and historical connections. In the largest subcategory (“how aid reflects Japan’s culture and experience”), possible prewar and postwar causation also appears often. In the third largest subcategory, “customizing aid for local conditions,” a highly cultural one, all of the ideas have likely occurrences in both the prewar and postwar periods. In the sociocultural area, there are only a few key ideas whose source(s) mainly or exclusively occurred in the postwar period, and only one idea I identified whose source mainly happened in the prewar era. On key ideas on sociocultural issues in Japanese ODA in the early 2000s, it appears that there may be a fairly high degree of historical continuity of influence or similarity of occurrence between the prewar and postwar periods.

Concerning the relationship of leaders’ views/ideas on sociocultural issues and later ODA policies, an important theme in sociocultural concepts in current Japanese aid policy identified above is how Japan’s aid reflects its own culture and historical experiences. Key current ideas in the sociocultural area on Japan’s aid reflecting this theme include the fact that some aspects of Japan’s aid are based on lessons from the Japanese development model, Japan’s long-term emphasis on aid to Asia, encouraging
values of self-help and self-reliance in recipients, and an emphasis on economic infrastructure. Japan’s development model stresses, in part, a primary emphasis on economic growth and the development of industrial infrastructure. Among the leaders studied, Fukuzawa in particular stressed this emphasis. Ito, Yanagita, and Hirohito stressed close relations with Asia. Fukuzawa and Mori stressed the necessity of importing superior Western technology and knowledge so that Japan might once again become self-reliant economically and politically, and remain independent.

On the theme of customizing aid, key ideas include the goal to customize Japan’s aid for each recipient’s unique conditions. The one leader here whose thought represents this genre is Yanagita. I am not sure if Maegawa Keiji drew directly on Yanagita in developing the concept of translative adaptation, but since Yanagita is a leading pioneer of Japanese ethnography, it is quite possible.

On the “enhancing Japan’s (international) image through aid” theme, important ideas include the desire for Japan to be a development “bridge” between different regions, and the desire for Japan to be perceived as great. Ito, Yanagita and Hirohito all embody, to some extent, the desire for Japan to encourage and/or lead fellow Asian countries, in Yanagita’s case, quite positively. The first two leaders also embodied the idea, in some respects, that Japan, as the superior Asian power at the time, could serve as a model and example of development and modernization for the other Asian countries, and help them to develop. All seven leaders studied in this project felt a pride and belief in Japan’s greatness, even if the West had temporarily overshadowed it.

Concerning the theme of conflicts between the Japanese and global agendas for aid, above I noted that many of the MDGs seem to conflict with Japan’s own aid
philosophies, especially with Japan’s historic stress that economic growth must come before concern over social and cultural issues. Fukuzawa was greatly concerned about cultural issues, and about how to translate Western technology into Japan’s context. But overall, he emphasized the importance of economics as the single most important area of knowledge that Japan must master to survive.

In general, on sociocultural issues, all the leaders from 1850 to 1895 struggled with how Japan could effectively import Western technology and knowledge needed for development without compromising Japanese culture and identity. Many of their views of society and social change were colored by “scientific,” evolutionary thought. Similar notions of change and “progress” have also been embodied, historically, in most concepts of development. Science also colored some, not all, of these leaders’ views of religion and spirituality related to development. Several of them identified important spiritual and cultural values they believed to be important for encouraging successful development in Japanese society.

Although current Japanese (and international) law tends to mandate the separation of religion and state, more international development bodies and international organizations are considering possible contributions religion and religious values can make to international affairs, conflict resolution, and international development cooperation. Yet the global/Western international affairs and international development establishments tend to suffer from the Flaw of the Excluded Middle in their worldviews, without knowing it. In their formalized legal and political structures, to a great extent, Japan’s leaders do too, though in their daily lives and practice, most everyday Japanese (and many other non-Westerners) do not. Though spirituality may naturally connect with
daily life, practice, and worldviews for most non-Westerners, separation of religion and the state at formal, legal, and institutional levels seems important. If not, an LDC may make mistakes similar to those Japan made with State Shinto before World War II, a case where one of the state’s chosen development ideologies, based on spirituality, became a weapon of coercion that damaged the religion, the nation overall, its empire, and Japan’s future international relations.

A rather unique, important idea that these Meiji era leaders supported was the conviction that Japan must import, study and master selected items of foreign technology and knowledge in order to survive. In practice, they and many other Japanese struggled with how they could successfully interact with the foreign carriers of this knowledge, interpersonally and intellectually. This was a huge struggle for Japanese in this era, and today, many other LDCs also struggle with overcoming cultural barriers to successful technology and knowledge transfers for development.

Sociocultural struggles similar to those seen in the views of the leaders studied for 1850 to 1895 emerge in the views of leaders studied for 1895 to 1945. The leaders for the latter period, Yanagita and Hirohito, strongly embodied spiritual concepts in their general and sociocultural worldviews, Yanagita on the levels of daily and local life, and Hirohito on the levels of imperial duty, personal practice, and the role of spirituality in national life. While Yanagita saw foreign technology as a threat to Japanese cultural integrity and survival, Hirohito viewed it as a means to secure Japan’s survival in the hostile global environment, through military and industrial strength. Yanagita, through his years of ethnographic study, developed sophisticated concepts about the nature of Japanese identity and culture that exceeded the understandings of most other Japanese
scholars and policymakers of his era. He believed both were based on local spiritual practices, rural culture, and social and kin-related bonds.

In contrast, similar to the practices of other nations like France, the United States, Great Britain and others, from 1895 to 1945, the Japanese government’s process of encouraging nationalism and national unity for Japan’s development and national security presumed that local and regional differences must be minimized, and the entire “nation” united around common bonds of such things as language, ethnicity, identity, geography/particular places, patriotism, ideology, and in some cases, spirituality. Hirohito and most of Japan’s leaders supported this top-down approach to nationalism and social change that generally failed to appreciate or nurture local differences, as Yanagita wished. At the national level, the Japanese state attempted to create a national identity for all Japanese that made them unique from all other countries, incorporating tools as State Shinto and the emperor ideology. Hirohito was thoroughly trained in, supported and participated in these efforts.

On Japan’s external cultural relations (1895 to 1945), Yanagita stressed that Japanese must know themselves, and that the Japanese government must support policies for local cultural self-awareness and protection as the basis for Japan’s success in other international policy arenas. The government did not acknowledge these proposals, but advocated nationalistic, conservative views similar to those of Hirohito and of many other conservative leaders. Hirohito and the government were wary of the influence of Western decadence on Japanese culture. While Yanagita stressed strengthening Japanese cultural integrity from the bottom up, Hirohito and the government focused on protecting it from the top down.
Among the valuable lessons here for LDCs are that, as they seek to develop, the threats to their cultural integrity and survival will be great, as they were for Japan. LDCs need basic skills in ethnographic study and knowledge, so that they may know themselves and their own societies. If they do not, how can they proactively protect their own social integrity during development? Top down approaches did not work for Japan, nor will they work for other LDCs. LDCs have also struggled profoundly with constructing their own national identities, especially many nations in Africa, where their borders are more arbitrary and artificial than Japan’s. Adopting coercive or propagandistic ideologies of nationalism, such as State Shinto and hakkô ichiu, ultimately damaged Japan, and will damage other LDCs too. Today, Japan’s and global ODA policies should seek to incorporate cultural knowledge, awareness and ethnographic research skills into their ODA and development policies. While the global aid agenda is now generally encouraging this (using ground level research skills for development), Japan’s long-term aid emphasis on economic infrastructure seems to contradict it. While developing these capabilities is not easy or cost-free, their use is more consonant with customized approaches to development and the principles of translative adaptation that many Japanese development experts advocate.\textsuperscript{1743} Their application, however valuable, does not seem easy.\textsuperscript{1744}

\textsuperscript{1743}Ohno and Ohno, \textit{Japanese Views}; Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures.”
Political Issues

Regarding general trends in Japan’s political issues from 1850 to 1945, most of the lessons and impacts emerging here for ODA come from negative experiences. On the domestic front, the Japanese state tended to turn toward repression and nationalistic ideologies to shore up support for the state, to unify the nation politically and socially for development, and to build the nation. Reliance on repression and negative ideologies intensified as the nation moved closer to World War II. In promoting political reform in LDCs, ODA policies should encourage political diversity, along with the goals of building national unity and freedom. To help LDCs evolve a civil society that can help put a check on repressive tendencies of the state, it is good if ODA policies for political development encourage the growth of democracy. Democracy was too weak in Japan from the 1920s to 1945, and the end result was disastrous. Concerning positive lessons from Japanese politics (1850 to 1945) for today’s ODA policies, conservative political and strong state approaches allowed Japan to develop rapidly. This has often been true in other East Asian states from the twentieth century until today. ODA policies should allow conservative (non-repressive) politics in LDCs, and acknowledge that they may be positive for encouraging development.

In its political relations with Asia, Japan was generally hostile. It repeated many mistakes of Western imperialists. In its ODA policies today, Japan seeks to not repeat past mistakes of hostility and aggression. It also often refuses to offer aid to states that have large arms build-ups (China is a notable exception). From 1895 to 1945, two major dangers emerged concerning Japan’s international relations. In my opinion, leaders’ faulty worldviews damaged their policy decisions, resulting in faulty policy outcomes.
Second, unhampered military power damaged both Japanese society and Japan’s international relations. To try to control these problems in other LDCs, ODA policies should encourage the development of democratic accountability in LDC political systems; at a minimum, frequent change in political administrations, and limits on military power in society.

Japan also had mixed success in policies for it colonies and conquered territories, some positive results, and many negative ones. One positive result was the economic infrastructure Japan developed and left in many longer-term colonies, such as Taiwan and Korea. Negatively, Japan often turned to political repression in the colonies and, during wartime, gross oppression and violence in conquered territories. This generated angry reaction in most of the territories, and continues to often hamper Japan’s international relations with them today. Imperialism is universally condemned in international law today. In both imperialism and foreign aid, “advanced” countries have tended to view colonies or developing countries as inferior, believing they have a duty to lead and teach them. It is very hard to break this pattern. ODA policies should seek to discourage such relations that hint at dependency. Rather, advanced countries, such as Japan, should seek to serve and learn from LDCs, not just teach them.

On possible sources for specific concepts in contemporary Japanese aid policy for issues in politics, main concepts may be organized into four main groups: 1) aid for strategic goals, both political and economic; 2) Japan’s external political relations; 3) the desire to cooperate with global aid agenda goals; and 4) goals to reform Japan’s government and its ODA programs.
Table 9.2 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Political Issues

Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources, influences present here. PTW: post-World War II sources, influences present here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Idea/Concept</th>
<th>Thematic area(s)</th>
<th>Possible source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan becomes assertive, denying/giving aid based on its goals, behavior of other states.</td>
<td>Aid for strategic (political, economic) goals</td>
<td>Similar to prewar Japanese assertiveness in foreign policy and acting in its national interests, Japan now wishes to pursue its own security goals, not be a “political dwarf.” PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase global distribution of Japan’s ODA</td>
<td>Aid for strategic (political, economic) goals</td>
<td>New Japanese foreign policy assertiveness is similar to its prewar assertiveness, desire for peaceful trade, enhance Japan’s global image, honor, obtain resources. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political goals emerge in Japan’s ODA: promoting democracy, human rights, etc (early 1990s)</td>
<td>Aid for strategic (political, economic) goals</td>
<td>Increased assertiveness in Japan’s foreign policy (like prewar behavior), enhance Japan’s global image. Some PRW, mainly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to world peace and peacekeeping through contributing to global economic infrastructure (1980s, 1990s and after)</td>
<td>Aid for strategic (political, economic) goals</td>
<td>Peaceful global environment is key for Japan’s trade and prosperity, goal for Japan’s national survival (like prewar survival goals). Some PRW, mainly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use aid to help other countries, build Japan’s global reputation, and solve economic problems at home (1980s)</td>
<td>Aid for strategic (political, economic) goals</td>
<td>By helping other countries, Japan also helps itself: global prestige, recycle surpluses, win support for its foreign policy goals. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA: strongly connected with Japan’s economic interests, security and development (since early 1950s)</td>
<td>Aid for strategic (political, economic) goals</td>
<td>These postwar goals: like Japan’s primary prewar national goals (national survival, based first on economics). PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal of Japan’s ODA: to support Japan’s national interests</td>
<td>Aid for strategic (political, economic) goals</td>
<td>Japan: not ashamed to put national interests first, both prewar and postwar eras. Postwar era: much concern about what other nations think. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal to vastly increase Japan’s aid budget</td>
<td>Aid for strategic (political, economic) goals</td>
<td>Increase Japan’s international prestige, influence, markets, resources, support for its foreign policy goals. Mostly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal to use aid to improve Japan’s image/relations with the US/other Western allies, partly by partially supporting their aid agendas</td>
<td>Japan’s external political relations</td>
<td>Increase Japan’s international prestige with Western allies, Asian countries; decrease foreign hostility against Japan’s trade, investment. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use aid to build positive relations with other Asian and distant nations, to emerge</td>
<td>Japan’s external political relations</td>
<td>Through aid, gain better relations with Asian, distant nations, gain better access to trade, resources, win more support for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as regional/global leader, join UN Security Council</td>
<td>Japan’s foreign policy goals. Mainly PTW.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use aid to build Japan’s general int’l reputation, security</td>
<td>Japan’s external political relations</td>
<td>Use aid to enhance Japan’s int’l image, support for Japan’s foreign policy goals, create more options for trade, getting resources. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support global aid agenda’s political goals: promote democracy, human rights, peace, etc</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>Increased assertiveness in Japan’s foreign policy (like prewar behavior), enhance Japan’s global image. Increased public pressure for accountability, desire to use aid to actually solve world issues, do global good. Mainly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevate additional global aid agenda goals in Japan’s ODA: humanitarian, environment, famine goals (1990s)</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>Enhance Japan’s international prestige, Japanese public’s desire to contribute to global good, int’l stability. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan seeks some degree of aid coordination with other aid donors (from 1980s)</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>Enhance Japan’s int’l image, increase aid’s efficiency, please Japan’s allies, fellow donors. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal for increased aid cooperation, assertiveness through multilateral and IFI channels: “ideas, not just money” since the 1990s</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>Desire of Japan to increase its int’l prestige, influence, image; desire to contribute more to success of int’l development by contributing from its own development successes/experience. Somewhat PRW, mostly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal for Japanese aid to become more aware of ground level conditions</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>Desire of Japan to comply with int’l aid agenda, enhance its int’l prestige; somewhat in line with translative adaptation concept. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal for Japan to better coordinate aid with other bilateral (especially Western) donors</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>Desire to partially comply with demands of Western allies/global aid community, enhance Japan’s int’l image, improve global aid to the degree possible. PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal to increase aid to Africa (late 1970s, 1990s, 2000s)</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>In line with global aid humanitarian agenda; desire to impress the West and to compete with China for African resources. Mainly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal for Japan’s aid to serve as a development “bridge” between world regions</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>Desire to impress other nations by serving as global leader in aid, belief that Japan’s unique experience as 1st non-Western nation to develop can help other LDCs. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global poverty reduction goals may conflict with Japan ODA’s economic infrastructure/growth promotion goals</td>
<td>Cooperate with global aid agenda goals</td>
<td>Economic infrastructure goals reflect Japan’s own development experience (since Meiji era); tradition of charity (beyond one’s family) has no long historical or cultural background in Japan. Especially PRW.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Goals to increase efficiency, accountability, openness and accomplishments of Japan’s aid, from early 1990s | Governmental, aid reforms | Domestic and int’l pressures for reform of Japan’s aid; aid policymakers’ fight for aid programs’ prestige, budget, public support, survival. PTW.

Goal to cooperate more with Japanese public, civil society, NGOs, from early 1990s | Governmental, aid reforms | Domestic public pressure, need to make Japan’s aid more flexible, open, reform pressures. PTW.

The ideas in Japan’s aid, and underlying its aid philosophies, are an integral factor in determining its capacity for innovation and reform, among other things (Rix 1993) | Governmental, aid reforms | Ideas: one important source for Japan ODA’s policy decisions, goals, outcomes, and its ability to change. PRW, PTW.

From this table comparing political issues in Japanese ODA with their possible sources, we see that with most of the ideas, joint possible pre-World War II and post-World War II causation occurs only a few times. This joint causation occurs the most often in the “aid for strategic goals” subcategory. The ideas here are divided between possible joint prewar and postwar sources, and mainly/only postwar sources. In the “cooperation with the global aid agenda” subcategory, mainly/only post-World War II causation occurs only a few times, while joint pre-, post- World War II causation and mainly/only prewar causation occurs even less. The sole case of mainly/solely prewar causation occurring within political issues happens in the “cooperation with the global aid agenda” subcategory. So in political issues that concern primarily external politics, it appears that postwar influences may predominate. Given the enormous political influence of the United States on the Japanese political system in the postwar period, this should be no surprise. Joint prewar/postwar influences occur most often in a subcategory (“aid for strategic goals”) that tends to be heavily influenced by Japan’s domestic interests, which seek to ensure Japan’s survival and to enhance its political interests in the international system. While external influences such as the United States influence the issues of
Japan’s aid system and its overall strategic goals to some degree, given the huge overall American influence on Japan’s postwar political system, and the great changes that occurred in the postwar structure of Japanese politics compared with the prewar system (1868 to 1945), it is no surprise that occurrences of joint prewar/postwar causation and mainly/solely prewar causation seem so low in the political issues area.

Regarding the relationship of leaders’ views/ideas on political issues (1850 to 1945) and later ODA policies, on a general level, in the first period (1850 to 1895), the overall political climate, both internationally and in Japan, was conservative. Japan was also conservative in its ideological climate. All five of the leaders studied for this period (Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Yamagata and Kato) were highly supportive of Japanese nationalism, a strong, effective state, and national unity. The need for a strong, effective state, so important in Japan, is also crucial for LDCs, to help aid succeed. For all, Japan’s national survival was the overarching goal. For that, Japan’s leaders scoured the globe to determine the most culturally relevant political institutions and effective military technologies needed to unify Japan and make it strong. There was also a need for the best possible, most appropriate political knowledge to help both Japan grow. The need remains for today’s LDCs. The leaders varied on their views of various issues, including the appropriate pace for political reform, on how much the state should exercise its power, how many freedoms should be allowed, and on the best type of foreign sources, almost universally Western, for Japan’s political reforms (more liberal or more autocratic sources). In Japan in this era, there were disagreements on many political issues and sometimes on ideologies. There is a need, at some point, for agreement among a developing society’s leaders about the most effective path for development. Even if there
is agreement, the chosen approach must be appropriate for the society’s current conditions. It must actually work, and be effective. Japan’s economic approaches worked very well, though its political path went astray, and nearly destroyed the nation.

Japan’s political reforms (1850 to 1895) reflected its political and ideological climate, as much of its aid does today. Japan’s overarching goal in the Meiji era was national survival, and ultimately, it is today too (seemingly related to Japan’s perpetual view of itself as a small, resource-poor nation). It is no surprise that aid should be affected by this “do-or-die” mentality. As we have already observed, benefiting Japan economically, politically (and enhancing its economic and political survival) has been one of the key aspects of its aid. National survival is also often one of the key goals for LDCs.

One also notices the strong influence of evolutionistic thought in some of these leaders’ views of politics and the international system. At various points, evolutionistic thought colors their thinking about political development and reforms, especially Kato’s. This thought is similar to some bias present in the ODA and development programs of Japan and other advanced countries, which often see themselves as superior. The bias here toward political knowledge that incorporates scientific and technological knowledge also reminds one the bias of today’s LDCs toward the same. But this latter bias is logical. Science and technology formed an important basis for Japan’s survival, over the long-term, and also seem important for LDCs.

For these leaders (1850 to 1895), realism and Western thought commonly influenced their views of international relations, and in several cases, evolutionism was influential. Kato in particular was quite creative in how he combined political ideas of
German Social Darwinism and evolutionism with Confucian thought to form new concepts about the future of Japan’s international relations and global politics. All five leaders acknowledged that Japan needed to borrow Western knowledge to survive in the international system. All five borrowed various aspects of Western thought, science and technology to explain and address what Japan should do politically and militarily to survive in the Western-dominated international system. For Japan and today’s LDCs, there is need to effectively import appropriate, expert, practical foreign knowledge, and to effectively combine it with indigenous ideologies. This should strengthen the LDC’s development process. It is also important not to distort indigenous ideologies as they are remade for this new purpose, which is what happened with State Shinto, that they not become too ethnocentric, violent, or ultranationalistic.

Three of the leaders’ views were influenced by concepts of religion and morality, Kato’s in the most complex fashion. All of these leaders looked down on the rest of Asia, and saw Japan and the West as its superior. It is inevitable that a developing society’s culture, including religion and spirituality, should at some level affect its leaders’ views of everything, including international relations. Awareness of these issues would be helpful in ODA policy, including Japan’s. The religion factor should be

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1745 These comments relate to Meiji era leaders’ views of morality and religion, including the thought of Kato that Japan needed more “scientific” morality. The Meiji state also desired to have more scientific bases from which to intellectually promote Japan’s development. Perhaps these issues connect with the desire of modern Japanese, from 1868 onward, to have “scientific” approaches for everything, including development. This affects contemporary Japanese, who have “scientific” educations, use the latest technologies, and who often practice Shinto and other spiritual rituals on a daily or regular basis. This may be an interesting dichotomy. Does this relate to the Flaw of the Excluded Middle? Do we have a similar dichotomy in the United States? Realistically, it is very possible to be both “scientific” and “spiritual” or “religious” in one’s daily practices and worldview(s). It must also be possible for aid policy staff, including those in Japan.
included. If the overall effect of the indigenous spirituality is leaders’ emerging views of international relations is negative, means should be determined in ODA policies to try to counteract it.

Regarding the political thought of the leaders studied for 1895 to 1945 (Yanagita Kunio and Emperor Hirohito),\textsuperscript{1746} in a broad, though imperfect manner, each may perhaps represent two major streams of political thought influential in early twentieth century Japan, first, demands for democratic change and liberal political values (Yanagita), and second, pressure for oligarchic, autocratic political control (Hirohito).\textsuperscript{1747} Yanagita worried that national political consolidation was trampling the rural solidarity that he saw as the foundation of Japanese identity and unity, while Hirohito preferred only limited democratic and popular input in politics. This contrast in views (between democratic versus oligarchic control of politics) is also seen in the two leaders’ views of political institutions, where they again supported similar positions to those they held on overall domestic politics. This broad contrast is also seen between postwar Japanese politics (more democratic), and prewar politics (more autocratic). This is also a major theme in today’s ODA programs, both Japanese and global. Both seek to actively encourage democratic development in LDCs, and to discourage autocratic trends.

On political ideologies, both Yanagita and Hirohito had generally conservative viewpoints (especially Hirohito), often connected to Japanese identity, spirituality and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}

\item[\textsuperscript{1746}] I originally chose Yanagita because he deeply engaged several of the major themes of this project, among others: how Japan should handle the massive influx of Western technology and culture, and how it might develop without destroying itself. Hirohito was chosen because he was the most influential political leader of the twentieth century, and is an excellent representative of the autocratic, oligarchic stream of Japanese politics from the 1920s to 1945. Hirohito in particular was hugely influential on many developments in Japanese politics toward the end of this era, both domestic and international.

\item[\textsuperscript{1747}] This does not include a third important stream of thought that was particularly influential among intellectuals and in academia: Marxism, the trends of which I briefly discussed in earlier chapters.

\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
kinship, though in different ways. But Yanagita remained more populist and concerned for local identities and solidarity. Hirohito also strongly embodied the heavily state-sanctioned, highly influential ideologies of nationalism of this era, including State Shinto. Though nationalism may be a natural trend in any LDC as it develops politically, the propagandistic nationalism seen in prewar Japan (1930s and 1940s) should not be. ODA policy should discourage this. Japanese ODA seeks to encourage democracy and human rights, but also strives to not intervene in the internal affairs of LDCs.

While both Yanagita and Hirohito were willing to permit some mixing of religion and politics (Hirohito, to an extreme degree), Yanagita was more cautious, and did not support the unlimited influence of the emperor or State Shinto over Japanese society and politics. His stance was much wiser. Japanese aid tries to not mix religion with aid at all. This is safe, but some cognizance of the role of religion in the overall development of LDCs would be wise, and could only help improve the quality of Japanese aid.

On Japan’s external political relations and imperialism (1895 to 1945), views are more complex, since I studied a slightly larger number of leaders on these issues. Regarding Japan’s external politics, on foreign relations and the world, all the leaders’ views were mostly conservative, except Yanagita’s. Conservative political beliefs and ideologies have also been dominant in postwar Japanese political culture and Japan’s ODA culture.

\textsuperscript{1748} To repeat, on external political relations (1895 to 1945), I studied the views of Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita, and Hirohito, and on imperialism issues (1895 to 1945), the views of Ito, Yamagata, Kato, Yanagita, and Hirohito.
All of the leaders supported Japan’s leadership in Asia to help other Asian powers resist Western imperialism. Hirohito held the most hardened views of several neighboring regions, including China, Russia, Manchuria and Southeast Asia. The idea of Japan leading and helping Asia hints at a vision of “mission.” This reminds one of postwar Japan’s desire to exercise its leadership and influence in Asia for the benefit of both. Other Asian nations resist it, part of the residue of World War II. What is the reaction of other regions, such as Africa, to Japan’s aid today? Perhaps they can encourage aid competition between the West, China, Japan and India, for their own benefit.

These leaders were generally fearful and cautious in their views of major Western powers in this period, including the United States, Britain, and Russia. The fears, attitudes, and beliefs of Japanese leaders toward the West, especially of Hirohito, led to horrific war. While relations were friendly with different Western powers at various points, and some treaties signed, terribly damaging, costly wars with the West were fought, including the Russo-Japanese War and World War II. So today Japan is totally committed to encouraging peace through its ODA policies, among other means. On international conflict, three of these leaders, including Hirohito, saw war in largely racial terms. Practically speaking, Hirohito took a more positive view of these conflicts than the other leaders studied, and only supported peace when he strongly felt it was in Japan’s own interests. In particular, Hirohito’s attitudes matter, since as an autocratic emperor, he had such an enormous influence over the nation and its politics. How should Japan’s aid work to discourage or correct faulty perceptions in LDCs and their leaders that may help lead to conflict? As Japan was fearful of the West, today’s LDCs often are fearful and
angry toward it. In aid and other areas, what lessons can Japan offer the LDCs about learning to work successfully with the West?

Concerning imperialism and colonialism, images about Western imperialism are mostly negative, and images of Japanese imperialism positive. All of the leaders studied wanted Japan to remain free. Most of them focus on what imperialism and colonialism can do for Japan’s domestic affairs. Ito and especially Yanagita want Japan to genuinely help other Asian regions develop and resist the West. Kato and Hirohito’s thought about imperialism contains ideology with evolutionary, biological, and Shintoistic overtones. For both, there was a strong connection of the emperor with imperialist ideologies. The effects of Japan’s imperialistic ideologies were extremely negative. These ideologies included racist distortions of both science and religion. In postwar Japanese aid, these negative effects encourage Japan to seek to use technology and science in positive, non-ideological ways to help the growth and development of LDCs. Today Japan’s aid does not really consider religion or spirituality, since it is too controversial an issue. But it would be positive for Japanese aid policymakers to consider the role of religion and spirituality in general ODA and development, in Japan’s aid, and in how they affect other countries. To not do so ignores the ground level issues now important in the Japanese and global aid agendas.

Hirohito’s views became highly influential for policies that affected millions of people in China, Northeast and Southeast Asia and beyond. Most of his influence was negative. These leaders had varied views of Japan’s colonies, as “mere satellites” of Japan, places with genuine, valuable resources, or as regions that Japan could really help to develop, defend and protect. Throughout the postwar period, Japan has desired and
needed to improve its relations with the rest of Asia. The prewar legacies have made this very hard. Yet Japan has learned some very valuable lessons, about how, as a non-Western country, to work positively with the West and the U.S. How can Japan do so now, through its international relations and aid with LDCs, and help them also learn how to successfully work with the West?

Great fear about competition between nations and races, influenced by evolutionistic thought, colors the thought of Yamagata and Hirohito, while Ito and Yanagita offer more support for peace and international cooperation. One senses the influence of evolutionism in the hierarchical view of international relations present in the views of Hirohito, Kato, and others. This view also influences the views of nations as developed/undeveloped, weak/strong, advanced/not advanced, as seen in aid relations today. What steps could be taken to encourage increased mutual respect between aid donors and recipients, and two way learning? How can Japan learn to view LDCs more positively, not as mere satellites, resource depositories or needy, inferior aid recipients? How can Japan genuinely help them, and how can it learn from and be helped by them?

**Economic Issues and Impacts**

On general trends in Japan’s economic issues from 1850 to 1945, there are mostly positive and a few negative impacts and lessons for ODA. From 1850 to 1895, Japan was willing to borrow foreign economic ideologies and ideas to aid its economic growth. It also used indigenous ideologies to aid its growth and management. This is a very positive lesson that all LDCs should learn, and which should be encouraged in ODA policies. Also positive, on international trade, Japan has many wise lessons (1850-1895) for LDCs: seeking equal trade opportunities, to identify and focus on areas of economic
strength, developing a strong economic infrastructure, and placing priority on positive international relations and trade. Japan has always emphasized these lessons, based on its experience, to LDCs in its aid policies. Since they worked for Japan, and have worked for many other Asian nations, it seems wise that Japan continue to do so, though these policies must be modified for the varied conditions of other regions and economies.

Also positive, from 1895 to 1945, is the issue of balance in domestic economic growth: the need to balance large-scale industrialization with promotion of smaller-scale business and regional economic development. Related to aid and development, Yanagita’s two ideas that there are multiple paths to development and that each nation’s path should be customized according to its own conditions, plus the concept (not his) of the appropriateness of strong state intervention at early stages, are all important. Though Japan did not balance its economic development very well in this period, on many of these issues, it presents a strong example and important, positive lessons for LDCs and ODA policies. There is also the irony that both Japanese and Western/global aid agendas have argued, in practice, for universalizing approaches to development for most of their history. Yet lately, in its rhetoric, the global agenda seems to support customized, local approaches more than the Japanese one does. The latter still strongly supports the economic infrastructural approach in practice, though in rhetoric, it also advocates local, grassroots involvement.

On the negative side, Japan did not pursue balanced economic growth from 1850 to 1895, but focused on large-scale infrastructure. Growth in an LDC needs to be more balanced, tailored to its local and regional conditions. It should also not open its economy to international competition too soon. Aid should learn from these lessons.
Another positive lesson, based on Japan’s experience in international economics from 1895 to 1945, is that an LDC should place a high priority on trade as soon as it can. Economic openness to international trade should be geared to an LDC’s actual economic conditions. This idea is based on Japan’s actual experience, and fits the Japanese concept of customized development very well, as well as Japan’s actual ODA policy, which has sought to encourage bilateral trade and investment based on LDCs’ actual conditions.

On the negative side, ODA policies should limit the promotion of arms and military build-up, based on Japan’s negative experience in this area from 1895 to 1945, and its near destruction in World War II. Today Japan’s aid complies well with this lesson. In addition, based on Japan’s negative experiences before World War II, ODA policy should not use negative, propagandistic ideologies to promote development.

From Japan’s experience with imperialism, a key lesson on development and ODA policy is that aid that focuses at least partly on the promotion of economic infrastructure, that will promote actual economic growth, is positive, but it must be welcome in the LDC, and not violate the wishes of its people. On the negative side, Japan used various coercive ideologies, especially from 1895 to 1945, to impose its development and security goals on the Japanese people and many others in the empire.

Concerning likely sources for concepts in current Japanese aid policy for economic issues, I have organized key ideas four main areas: 1) concepts related to Japan’s domestic economic growth, development, and (war) recovery; 2) Japan’s external economic relations; 3) general ideas related to economic development; and 4) Japan’s ODA budget.
Table 9.3 Sources for Contemporary Japanese Aid Concepts: Economic Issues

Note on sources: PRW: pre-World War II sources, influences present here. PTW: post-World War II sources, influences present here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Idea/Concept</th>
<th>Thematic area(s)</th>
<th>Possible source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid from US, World Bank used by Japan to rebuild the nation after World War II</td>
<td>Domestic economic growth, development, recovery</td>
<td>US desire to quickly rebuild Japan as its key anti-communist ally in Asia. Japan’s desire to recover and rebuild after the horrible war destruction; desire for national survival, to rise from despair of the war. Almost totally PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal to use Japan’s aid to build Japan’s economy, late 1950s to early 1980s</td>
<td>Domestic economic growth, development, recovery</td>
<td>Intense global economic competition and exports to the US: seen as Japan’s only path to survival. Early postwar era: most other goals subsumed to Japan’s need to rebuild and survive. Somewhat similar to the hard work and sacrifices of Japanese for national survival during Meiji era. Also, the tendency to relate everything (even aid) to Japan’s overarching goal of recovery and survival. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Japan’s aid, goal for participation of private sector also</td>
<td>Domestic economic growth, development, recovery</td>
<td>Economic pragmatism: the private sector, in Japan’s and int’l experience, has much greater capacity to grow and generate wealth than the public sector. The latter can shepherd the process; the former empowers, makes the economy grow. Belief that int’l scene will parallel Japan’s experience. Somewhat PRW, mostly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals from Japan’s private sector have been influential in Japan’s ODA policy</td>
<td>Domestic economic growth, development, recovery</td>
<td>Pragmatism: public sector cannot effectively fund ODA without private participation. Great wealth, success of the private sector. Desire of business to benefit from gaining access to and exposure to foreign markets. Japan’s heritage: blurring of public-private boundaries in government, business. Somewhat PRW, mainly PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid used to promote Japan’s exports, and potential imports for Japan from resource rich countries</td>
<td>Japan’s external economic relations</td>
<td>Pragmatism, desire for economic survival: subsuming nearly everything to the national goal to survive, recover from war. Japan’s prewar economic heritage: importance of trade in prewar economic growth, success. PRW, PTW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal to connect ODA with</td>
<td>Japan’s</td>
<td>Economic pragmatism, Japan’s desire to survive,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Japan’s international trade (since 1950s) | external economic relations | grow, excel; important role of trade in Japan’s economy (1868 to 1945), centrality of economics in most Japanese worldviews of the nature of the world and the global system. PRW, PTW.

Goal to help LDCs too, not just Japan | Int’l economic development | Desire to enhance Japan’s int’l prestige and to “fit in,” to be a productive, important, contributing member of the int’l system. New desire to “help” the global poor, especially by helping them transition into the global econ., trade, and to help Japan economically too. Somewhat PRW, mainly PTW.

Major long-term goal of Japan’s ODA: help LDCs develop economic, financial infrastructure | Int’l economic development | From Japan’s own dev. experience, and other Asian countries’: view that econ. infrastructure is the heart, basis for development. PRW, PTW.

Global poverty reduction goals may conflict with Japan ODA’s economic infrastructure/growth promotion goals | Int’l economic development | Economic infrastructure goals reflect Japan’s own development experience (since Meiji era); tradition of charity (beyond one’s family) has no long historical or cultural background in Japan. Especially PRW.

Goal to vastly increase Japan’s aid budget | Japan’s ODA budget | Increase Japan’s international prestige, influence, markets, resources, support for its foreign policy goals. Mostly PTW.

From the preceding table comparing economic issues in Japanese aid with their possible sources, there is only a small number of ideas/concepts. I cannot really judge what is happening in terms of the period of causation. Joint pre-World War II and post-World War II causation and mainly/only postwar causation appear to occur only a few times here. In the mainly postwar occurrences, there seems to be a strong, but not dominant, presence of prewar causes in several occurrences. Among economic issues, there appears to be only a single occurrence with predominant prewar causation. In the largest subcategory here, “domestic economic growth and development,” most of the occurrences have mainly or only postwar causes. The main comment that I can make is that from the analysis here, for economic issues in Japanese aid, postwar causes seem to be slightly more dominant than prewar causes.
On the connections between leaders’ views and ideas about economic issues (1850 to 1945) and later Japanese aid policies, on Japan’s domestic economy, in Chapter 4, I studied three leaders (Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato). They were all highly impressed about the successes of Western economics and believed Japan could learn valuable economic lessons from the West. They observed that the West’s economic development was currently superior to Japan’s, and that Japan must learn from this superior model, as it had learned from China for centuries. The thought of all three was affected by evolutionary principles, especially Kato’s. Both Fukuzawa and the government strongly supported the development ideologies of fukoku kyôhei and shokusan kôgyô. Fukuzawa emphasized the role of economics in the private sector, while Ito and Kato focused more on the public sector. The impact of Fukuzawa’s thought on the economy, especially the private sector, was large.

Evolutionistic thought, which presumes that some nations are more highly developed, more advanced, and therefore better than others, has also been influential in the worldviews underlying some of the economic aspects of Japan’s aid. In contemporary Japanese aid, a similar thought, on Japan’s domestic economic growth and development, is seen in the goal that aid should be used to help Japan’s economic growth. In the early postwar period, somewhat similar to the hard work and sacrifices of Japanese for national survival during Meiji era, intense global economic competition and exports to the U.S. were seen as Japan’s only path to survival. Like the Meiji era, in the early postwar period, most other goals subsumed to Japan’s need to rebuild and survive. While several of the five leaders studied for the period 1850 to 1895 embody this type of thought, that economics must be the nation’s top priority for its survival, Fukuzawa did so the most.
Concerning Japan’s external economic relations (1850-1895), Fukuzawa and Ito observed the power of Western economics in Japan and abroad. Early education and overseas exposure to Western economics impressed these leaders, and motivated them to work hard, study Western economics, and begin to apply these lessons to Japan. ODA policies for economics must also consider what will motivate LDCs to learn economics. Early exposure through education and study abroad are optimal. Japan seeks to encourage this by bringing thousands of young trainees to Japan for technical training each year through JICA and other aid programs. Such an approach, of hard study and work in applying basic economics, reflects the actions of several of the leaders studied here, including Fukuzawa and Ito. Fukuzawa shared what he learned through his many writings, and applied many of the principles in the institutions and businesses he founded, including the Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan’s first international bank, which greatly influenced Japan’s international financial dealings. Ito tried to apply some lessons about Western economics and development to Korea. In this case, Japan took what it learned from the West and tried to apply it in another country. In doing so, it repeated some of the West’s mistakes. Japan should be careful not to repeat some of the mistakes of the West in its aid programs. Here we again see evolutionistic influence, in the economic thought of Fukuzawa and Kato, especially the latter. The evolutionistic influence in Japan’s current ODA and foreign economic relations is also seen in Japan’s pragmatic goal, for most of the postwar period, to connect ODA to international trade, to subsume nearly everything to the national goal to first survive, and then grow and excel. It also reflects the core conviction in the worldviews of many Japanese, since the late Tokugawa

1750 The goals to grow and excel are also connected to Japan’s overarching goal to survive economically.
and early Meiji eras, of the importance of economics in the nature of the world and the global system.

On leaders’ views of Japan’s domestic market (1895 to 1945), I mainly focus on Yanagita.\textsuperscript{1751} His views stress the effects of the international economy (Western technology and culture) on indigenous Japanese culture and its domestic economy. He desired balanced development across rural and urban regions, so that the heart of Japan’s culture, the countryside, would not be destroyed. Yanagita also asserted that there were multiple paths to development and the market, and insisted they be humane. As mentioned earlier, this has likely formed part of the basis for anthropologist Maegawa Keiji’s work on the concept of translative adaptation. Given the importance that this concept and similar ones such as “modernization” and internationalization receive, at times, in the thought of contemporary Japanese development economists,\textsuperscript{1752} it seems ironic that their principles have not been more systematically applied in Japanese ODA policy before now, though Japan has recently expressed the desire to support the participatory, customized aid goals inherent in the MDGs and the current global aid agenda.\textsuperscript{1753} Yanagita also highly supported workers’ and human rights, and opposed

\textsuperscript{1751} I found the most data on Yanagita’s views of Japan’s external economic relations during this period.  
\textsuperscript{1752} For example, see Ohno and Ohno, \textit{Japanese Views}, and several additional essays in that volume.  
\textsuperscript{1753} Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}. It is interesting to note that the basic goals of customized development and translative adaptation, while noble, do not really appear among the key economic goals and ideas behind Japanese ODA that have been noted by David Arase (Arase, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}) and many other scholars, and which I outline in Table 9.3 in this chapter. This brings up an interesting question: although Japanese aid scholars, activists or policymakers may express support for elements of the concepts of customized aid and translative adaptation, in practice, how much are they really applied in Japanese aid?
economic development that was too large-scale. His overall impact on Japan’s domestic economy was small.  

On Japan’s external economic relations (1895 to 1945), Yanagita opposed Japanese government policies in place from about 1900 through the 1920s. They placed heavy emphasis on heavy, large-scale industries for export. Yanagita favored smaller-scale industries, agriculture, and the domestic market. Yanagita felt that despite the arrival of an era of true international trade, nations still mostly pursued their own self-interests, with the strongest countries devouring the weakest. So evolutionism also influenced his views on international economics, somewhat. Yanagita also supported strong state economic involvement through national economic planning. Only limited elements of Yanagita’s views have been embodied in Japanese economic policy and its external economic relations, namely the stress on strong state involvement in helping to shepherd Japan’s overall economy and trade. Yanagita chafed at the government’s emphasis on large-scale industrialization and heavy trade for Japan’s economic development. Yet some of the evolutionistic assumptions in his overall economic thought, and additional ones, are reflected in both Japan’s long-term economic policies, and in its ODA programs. Beyond this, almost no element of Yanagita’s thought is present in the key ideas of current Japanese ODA policy as summarized in Table 9.3

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1754 Given its extreme ideological conservatism from the late 1920s to 1945, the chances that the Japanese government would pay attention to or apply the insights of a scholar like Yanagita in the prewar era were small. But, as noted earlier, in the postwar period, the government has applied aspects of his general thought about preserving rural elements of Japanese cultural traditions.

1755 I am referring to the idea that only the strongest nations survive, and that stronger countries will devour weaker nations. Other evolutionary assumptions present in the thought of developed countries and their ODA programs, noted earlier, are that developed nations are “advanced” and “superior” to LDCs.
earlier.\textsuperscript{1756} However, the aid ideas in Table 9.3 reflect economic infrastructural goals, historically very strong in prewar Japanese economic policies and its postwar ODA programs, very well.

Yanagita had the heart of an engaged, activist scholar, one who cared deeply about applying his knowledge for the well-being of his nation and its people. In this vein, he well fits the traditions of several socially engaged disciplines, such as applied anthropology and social work. It is interesting that while his thoughts about balancing Japan’s economic development and its external economic relations with its cultural integrity were not applied much by the government in the prewar period, thus far, neither have the insights of anthropologists been very well applied to Japanese ODA policy as a whole.\textsuperscript{1757}

**Working Hypothesis**

What conclusions may be reached about this project’s working hypothesis, that Japan’s experience with technology, development, and foreign relations (1850 to 1945), as seen in the beliefs of several of its key leaders, has affected its current aid policies? I wish to argue, in a qualified sense, that it is true that the beliefs of several of the leaders studied here, and reflected in Japan’s experiences, have affected Japan’s current aid policies. In reflecting on these leaders’ ideas, it seems apparent that in many cases, rather than a particular leader’s thought contributing directly to later trends in Japan’s current ODA, leaders’ thoughts more often likely reflect particular intellectual currents that have

\textsuperscript{1756} The only principle present in this table that reflects Yanagita’s thought is the idea that Japanese aid should help other countries (LDCs) too, not just itself.

\textsuperscript{1757} For more on the challenges of applying anthropology to Japan’s contemporary ODA policy, see Matsuzono, “International Cooperation Activities,” (discussed earlier). Earlier I also noted the program in development anthropology at Tokyo’s Waseda University, presently led by Kikuchi Yasushi, which hopefully can help to encourage more anthropological input in Japanese ODA policy.
evolved over time, and that, in some contemporary form, have influenced current ODA. We have identified several possible streams of influence, though they are usually not direct. I also argued earlier in this chapter that it is challenging to identify absolutely direct lines of influence since the project’s current stream of historical research only extends through 1945, leaving an historical gap of over sixty years between the past and the present.

Despite this gap, what are some of the most important lines of influence we may be identify here? Of the seven leaders studied, which offer evidence of the strongest lines of influence of contemporary Japanese ODA policy, and on which areas of policy? The four leaders who appear to have had the strongest influence on ideas in Japan’s current ODA policy are Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Hirohito. I can identify two possible levels of influence, on both the general and more specific levels (ideas that seem more closely related to those in current Japanese aid policy).

On the general level, Fukuzawa’s most significant possible connections to ODA policy occur in two main areas, sociocultural issues and economics. His most important, significant connection occurs on the theme of learning and absorbing general knowledge from foreign cultures: encouraging Japanese to do so on a broad, popular level, and to effectively translate foreign concepts and ideas that were often highly alien, in ways that average Japanese could understand. Second, he contributed greatly to the common understanding and practice of modern business and economics in modern Japan. These emphases on the necessity of learning useful knowledge from foreign cultures, and of mastering pragmatic economic and technological skills, have deeply affected both
Japan’s own development process, and the approach to aid that it seeks to encourage in its aid recipients.

Ito’s general connections with later Japanese ODA policy flow from his work on the Meiji Constitution of 1889, which exercised great influence on the everyday lives of millions of Japanese in prewar Japan through the laws and policies it encouraged. This influence extended to many areas of politics and culture, including education. It allowed the creation of an authoritarian, conservative political system that eventually became heavily militaristic, nearly destroying the nation in World War II. On a second level, Ito’s connection emerges through his involvement in Japan’s international relations, as a diplomat, foreign minister, and major actor involved in crucial political and economic negotiations on multiple occasions.

Yamagata’s connections with Japanese ODA policy stem from his role as the architect of the Japanese military, his direction of the military’s modernization and build-up in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, his role in directing Japan’s involvement in several wars, especially the Russo-Japanese War, and the long-term impact he had on Japan’s culture of politics through his service as a genro\textsuperscript{1758} in the early 1900s. Through 1945, all of these encouraged to Japan to move toward a more authoritarian, aggressive political system. The aggressive military moves that Yamagata encouraged against Japan’s neighboring states, including Russia and Korea, also had long-term effects on Japan’s foreign relations with its neighbors, and on future conflicts. These excesses resulted in Japan’s defeat in World War II, the American invasion and

\textsuperscript{1758} Genro refers the elder statesmen who served as long-term advisors to the emperor in the prewar Japanese political system, from the Meiji period through 1945.
occupation, and the creation of a new culture of politics in Japan that has historically strongly rejected the militarism and imperialism of the prewar era. All of these developments have strongly affected the domestic culture of politics from which Japan’s aid emerged and in which it continues to operate.

As noted earlier, there is no other Japanese actor who had a greater influence on Japan’s domestic and international affairs in the twentieth century than Hirohito. Though Hirohito did not cause the authoritarian, militarized culture of politics in which he served before 1945, he did nothing to contest or change it. Deeply affected by the spiritual and scientific dynamics in his worldviews, he served as a shrewd, all-powerful and usually rational policy actor in the prewar political system, promoting policies and decisions that affected the lives of hundreds of millions of people across Asia, the Pacific, North America, Europe and beyond. Given his unique, unmatched power in prewar Japan as its autocratic, influential ruler, it seems likely that his policies did more to destroy Japan and East Asia in World War II than anyone other single individual’s. His postwar survival and reemergence as a strong symbol of peace and constitutional monarchy, still deeply loved and revered by many Japanese, is a supreme irony, but also a compliment to his (and the Japanese government’s) extreme political shrewdness and highly skillful image management abilities. His strong prewar support for such ideologies as Japanese nationalism, State Shinto, *hakkō ichiu*, and the emperor ideology, and his overwhelming desire to assure Japan’s (and the throne’s) survival in a hostile international environment, contributed to the seeming necessity for Japan’s continuing colonial involvements in Asia and the Pacific. As one example of Japan’s strong, unavoidable connections to Asia,

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This is not to imply that postwar Japan has a totally new culture of politics. It certainly does not.
these reemerged in postwar Japan’s aid policies in both negative and positive fashion. For all of the postwar period, the necessity of Japan’s economic involvement with Asia, and a peaceful environment so that all in the region may flourish, has been countered with general Asian resistance to Japanese influence on multiple levels, partly due to past Japanese political and cultural aggression with which Hirohito had much connection. These challenges have unavoidably affected the progress of Japan’s aid to, and economic relations with, Asia in the postwar period.

Lessons Learned

What are some of the main lessons learned for aid and development policy that can be drawn from this exploration of Japan’s experience with, and key leaders’ worldviews of, technology, development and international relations from 1850 to 1945? I organize my insights into three main areas: sociocultural lessons, political lessons, and economic lessons, especially focusing on lessons for Japan. It is more challenging to relate these lessons to today’s LDCs, since Japan was never an LDC. Yet a few of these lessons may relate to them, on an institutional, though likely not a cultural, level. There are many historical strengths in Japan’s economic approaches to its development and current aid strategies. In terms of economic infrastructure, both Japan’s internal development efforts and its external aid schemes can be called highly successful.

1760 Of course this situation was also greatly affected in the past by Cold War politics.
1761 One example is riots in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and in China in the 2000s over potential or actual Japanese economic involvement in those regions.
1762 I mentioned this point in Chapter 1.
However, consideration of the political and especially the social factors related to Japan’s aid remains weak, in comparison with the economic ones.

Regarding sociocultural issues/lessons, science and technology policy for Japan’s development was largely tackled on the national level, and the government had a key role. It sought the most advanced technologies that it believed were appropriate, since they were viewed as key for Japan to maintain its freedom and survival. On society, culture, and development, Japan’s leaders pondered how entering the global economy would affect its politics and society. Yet there was overwhelming emphasis on increasing Japan’s economic wealth and technological strength, so practical consideration of how to protect Japan’s culture was lacking. The Meiji state chose to manipulate a particular indigenous spiritual tradition, Shinto, into a national ideology to motivate Japanese in their development and modernization efforts. The state’s coercive methods trampled many freedoms, including freedom of religion. The perversion of Shinto into State Shinto helped plunge Japan into World War II, which nearly destroyed the nation. A lesson for LDCs is that though there may be positive values in religion that can help promote development, the state must not trample on religious freedom to encourage them, or some type of painful destruction may result.

On political issues, national survival was Japan’s supreme goal, for which it made aggressive efforts. Japan’s leaders considered Japan’s political and economic independence as even more important is its domestic development. Without that, all else would fail. High priority was also given to Japan’s political and military development. For that, learning from more advanced systems was essential. Among its first priorities,
Japan also emphasized building its own governmental and institutional capacities, on which security and all else depended.

For Japan’s economic development, practical ideas, material and spiritual, were important. Japan’s government sought to learn the most advanced technologies it could. The government placed a high priority on education as a primary sector to encourage development. To aid in this, foreign experts and scholars were brought to teach in Japan. Students studied both technical and cultural/linguistic knowledge. Japan was highly successful in this education effort. Building Japan’s wealth and economic development were seen as important for its security and national survival. Encouraging wealth, business and economics was also crucial for Japan’s growth and security. The Japanese state also did all it could to encourage the growth of the private sector. It sought to carefully intervene in the economy, to encourage cooperation among sectors, and to provide overall guidance and key economic knowledge it helped import. It made mistakes, but overall, its efforts were successful. Strong state involvement in development seems appropriate in the early stages of an LDC’s development, where a strong state exists. In Japan’s case, it did.

Japan placed first priority on its own internal development, before trade. It sought growth it believed to be focused and strategic. Yet Japan now knew it could no longer be mostly economically isolated. Yet Japan’s leaders knew they should not open the country to excessive free trade until it reached an adequate level of maturity from which to compete. Perhaps more, rather than less, state guidance in the economies of LDCs may be appropriate, especially at earlier stages. Japan’s government also sought to
protect the nation from excessive economic and cultural exploitation from abroad; its success varied, especially in the cultural arena.

“Modernization,” Internationalization, and Translative Adaptation: An Accurate Picture of Japan’s Experience with Technology and Development?

Regarding the second key question of the dissertation, do the concepts of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation present an accurate portrayal of Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945? If so, how much are they seen in Japan’s aid policies of today? On “modernization,” did what happened with the West cause Japan to be increasingly absorbed into the global economy during this period? On the issues of technology and development, did Japan’s culture become “Western,” on the surface and/or in its core, or did it remain essentially “Japanese?” It is challenging to draw absolute conclusions here, since even the concepts of “the West” and “Japanese” can be problematic. It is best, of course, to avoid cultural stereotyping.

Concerning technology, development, and “modernization,” Japan imported a great deal of Western technology into its society to rapidly industrialize, for the purpose of national survival. The purpose of the massive importation and intense study of these technologies was to quickly build up the nation, to help it become wealthy enough to afford the huge arms build up and military reform that Japan’s top leaders and oligarchy, typified by Yamagata Aritomo, believed was necessary for the nation’s defense. These events follow the ideology of *fukoku kyôhei* (“rich nation, strong army”) fairly well. In the first period, 1850 to 1895, Japan embarked on the massive project of learning and
importing foreign technology and knowledge. The first period represents Japan’s accelerating absorption of foreign technology and knowledge, their application to Japanese industries, economy and society, and then to the build-up of Japan’s new, modernizing military.

At the start of the second period, 1895 to 1945, this intensive, domestic absorption of foreign knowledge began to be externally applied. Japan defeated its two greatest neighboring powers, China and Russia, and the rest of the world took shocking notice. On many levels, the basic goals of **fukoku kyōhei** succeeded. The process of economic growth based on Japan’s expanding industrialization continued into the early twentieth century, and was accelerated by Japan’s industrial boom during World War I. Japan continued importing much foreign knowledge, though not as frenetically as during the first period. The economic expansion brought in part by the wars with China, Russia, and World War I continued into the 1920s. This boom accompanied the cultural flowering and relative openness of the vibrant Taisho democracy period.

After World War I, Japan’s leaders began to feel more tension with the world, especially the West, when they discovered that the West continued to view Japan through ethnocentric, racist eyes. Japan encountered a world dominated by the West, a region that was not very prepared or willing to open up and share the world stage with a virtually unknown, mysterious, isolated non-Western power. As Japan’s leaders applied their new worldviews influenced by modern science and evolutionism, they determined that for Japan to continue to survive and flourish, it must not stop applying the fruits of its new power against the hostile West. As Japan’s leaders observed the West’s actions in Asia and China, it seemed that aggression must be met by aggression. For its survival and
independence, Japan determined that it must increase its presence and intervention in Asia, to help weaker nations seemingly unable to defend themselves against the West. Unfortunately these worldviews, and Japan’s rising military power and actions, led to increasing repression in Japan, more aggression and atrocities by Japan across East Asia and the Pacific, and great destruction and death in World War II. “Modernization” asks, through all of these events, did Japan become more “Western”?

What if we consider events in Japan (1850 to 1945) through the lenses of development and “modernization?” In the anthropologically-based definition of “development” offered in the Glossary, development has three major components: 1) increasing a society’s capacity for industrial production, capitalism and its products, and the society’s movement toward “modern life;” 2) improving a society’s quality of life, standard of living, and reducing/eliminating the presence of poverty within it; and 3) building a society’s capacity for local participation in these decisions. The first part of the definition largely encompasses an increase in industrialization and industrial capacity, the second part the improvement of a society’s social and quality-of-life components during processes of economic change, and the third, improving a people’s capacity to decisively participate in these changes on the local level. What happened in Japan from 1850 to 1945, and through these events, again, did Japan become more “Western,” or stay mostly Japanese?

If we reexamine events in Japan from 1850 to 1945 in the light of development and “modernization,” it is clear that Japan went through massive economic and social changes as it moved through and toward “development.” In this period, the Japanese state defined development in terms of the first part of the above definition: large-scale
industrial production supported by increasing international trade. By this standard, from 1850 to 1895, economic development was a great success. The economy experienced great industrial expansion, the development of many new industries, expanded trade, employment, and the increase of capitalism and industrial products. Ironically, in the second period, 1895 to 1945, these industrial successes were virtually obliterated by Japan’s actions and the foreign responses in World War II.

Yanagita’s conceptions of holistic development, discussed earlier, while acknowledging the presence and importance of industrialization in development, stress the second and third components: enhancing quality of life (in Japan, social solidarity and communality in rural areas), and increasing/maintaining local capacity for participation in these important decisions. From the evidence presented here, in the prewar period, Japan failed greatly in these last two aspects of development. In this midst of its rapid industrialization from 1850 to 1895 and into the early 1900s, social change issues were largely ignored, except when violent protest, extremist or democratic movements erupted. Japan’s conservative culture of politics usually brought this response from the state. From 1895 to 1945, the situation did not improve. Continuing rapid industrialization and growth into the 1920s and wars with China, Russia and World War I brought further social change and disruption. Yet these changes cannot compare with the socioeconomic, political and material destruction hitting Japan from the late 1920s to 1945, as it went through depression, increased militarization, war in China, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, with the United States, Great Britain and finally, the Soviet Union. The damage and social disruption hitting Japan also affected other regions such as China, most of East Asia, and the United States. Japan’s industrial achievements from 1850 through the 1920s
were destroyed by late 1945, and its society, rural and especially urban regions, were
greatly damaged.\footnote{For a treatment of the social conditions in Japan at the time of its surrender in 1945 and through the period of the American occupation, see Dower, \textit{War Without Mercy}.}

Though Japanese society changed in multiple, painful ways through the huge, traumatic events from 1850 to 1945, adopted many Western technologies and cultural phenomena during this period, and experienced massive social changes over the century, it did not change in the core of its identity or worldviews, in the essence of what makes it truly “Japanese.” Though Japanese adopted numerous forms of Western technology, dress, economic structures, communication, transportation, fought in huge wars that nearly destroyed the country, and brought massive changes to their daily lives through rapid economic growth and industrialization, the basic, core social structures of their society did not change that much. Neither did many core elements of the Japanese worldview and one of its most important aspects, the most essential views and practices of religion and spirituality, change in their basic nature.\footnote{I say this while acknowledging the vibrancy and incredible variety of religious and spiritual activity in Japan’s spiritual landscape, seen in the amazing diversity of its new religious movements. For studies on these, see H. Neill McFarland, \textit{The Rush Hour of the Gods; A Study of New Religious Movements in Japan} (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Mark Mullins, Susumu Shimazono, and Paul L. Swanson, \textit{Religion and Society in Modern Japan: Selected Readings} (Berkeley, Calif: Asian Humanities Press, 1993); and Susumu Shimazono, \textit{From Salvation to Spirituality: Popular Religious Movements in Modern Japan} (Melbourne, Vic: Trans Pacific, 2004).} Though elements of Japanese identity and worldview were influenced and altered by Japan’s interactions with the West, I wish to argue that its cultural core and base society remained mostly intact, both through 1945 and in the many traumatic changes to follow, in the American occupation and years of rapid economic growth and today’s economic recession. In terms of
technology and development issues, the concept of “modernization” represents Japan’s experiences from 1850 to 1945 very well.

Does the concept of internationalization well portray Japan’s experiences with technology and development from 1850 to 1945? Remember that internationalization focuses on what happened economically and culturally on the international level, as the West absorbed peripheral countries like Japan and others into the global economy. To apply this concept here, I will focus on Japanese colonialism and on Japan’s international reaction to the West’s actions, as both Japan and Asia were brought into world trade from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s.\footnote{Readers in the United States are more familiar with how the West “forced” Japan and other non-Western regions into the global system. It is more interesting to address what Japanese colonialism did, partly in response to the West, since that approach to internationalization is more relevant to what Japanese aid is doing today.}

On the issue of technology, from 1850 to 1895, as Japan imported and mastered more Western technology and industrial products, it was increasingly enabled to turn its gaze to nearby Asian regions. More Japanese wealth and military strength empowered Japanese assertiveness as Japan began to increase its presence in both northern and southern regions, including Hokkaido, Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and the Ryukyu Islands. As these regions were incorporated, in varying degrees, into Japan proper, Japan

\footnote{This does represent a slight variant of the definition of internationalization that is in the Glossary and in K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11-12, since according to that definition, internationalization involves what the active West does to passive non-Western nations as it forces them into the world economy. Here I apply the concept to what Japan, a non-Western country, has done in its colonial processes involving other non-Western nations. Usually Japan is not considered to be part of the West, geographically or culturally, although it is often allied with western Europe and North America in various political and economic dealings.}
extended its gaze beyond, to Korea, China, and Taiwan. Soon Japan’s rising industrial prowess enabled the growth of its military and technological capabilities, which it used to attack China, Russia and Korea. Technological and industrial capabilities and extreme discipline enabled Japan to achieve costly victories over these nations, and to acquire colonies in Taiwan, Southern Manchuria (China), and Korea from 1895 to 1910. Japan also used its techno-industrial prowess to begin to assess and build industrial capabilities in each of these regions. Its economic investments in Hokkaido, Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria were great. Japan’s rule in different regions varied, but sometimes grew harsh when it encountered much resentment or resistance. Japan also imposed its language, education system, and State Shinto on Taiwan and Korea. Japan’s military and technological capabilities also enabled it to conquer additional regions through 1945, including eastern China, Southeast Asia, and regions in the South Pacific. But it did not have the capacity to consolidate these holdings for very long.

Based on the definition of development, Japan invested the most heavily in developing key segments of industrial production and transportation in Manchuria, Taiwan, and Korea, and some agricultural production. Japan did not show much concern about improving the living standards of indigenous populations in its colonies, and it did not do much to increase the local capacity of these populations to be involved in Japan’s development decisions for their regions. As the conditions of Japan in World War II grew worse, conditions for the colonies were often more repressive and difficult, especially for newly conquered territories.

In terms of technology, development and internationalization, as Japan resisted the West’s attempt to coercively and exploitatively absorb it into the global economy, it
ironically did a similar thing to many of its neighbors in attempting to conquer them.
Japan’s economic and cultural impact on its colonies in the short term was not as huge as the impact of European empires on their colonies. This is likely because the period of Japan’s major colonization was shorter than Western colonization. But in the postwar period, the legacy of Japan’s industrial investment in these regions has gradually become massive, as has the example of Japan’s economic growth and development for other East Asian nations. Many of them, including South Korea, Taiwan, and China, have had among the fastest rates of economic growth in history, and some are entering the ranks of the world’s wealthy nations. Compared to the legacy and long-term impacts of Western and European colonialism on their former colonies, this is a stark difference indeed. Even so, this is not to minimize the pain or suffering these regions suffered because of Japanese imperialism. It was often huge. I conclude that internationalization does represent well what Japanese colonialism did to its colonies as it absorbed them into its economic and cultural universe in the period 1850 to 1945. Japan most certainly “actively” engaged and conquered these territories, though their reactions were not so passive, and the process certainly did involve a great deal of subjugation and exploitation of these regions by Japan. In these senses, Japanese imperialism and colonialism seem similar to their Western counterparts.

Does translative adaptation present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945? Was Japan able to properly match and adjust its own culture to imported Western items? With the presence of the new

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1767 I am referring to colonies besides those that were absorbed into Japan proper, the latter being Hokkaido and the Ryukyus/Okinawa. Japan held Taiwan, the longest held colony, for fifty years.
Western technologies, did Japanese cultural items continue, or were many of them destroyed? Did Japan develop “well”?

On technology and translative adaptation, one of the major issues with which various Japanese leaders struggled (here, Fukuzawa, Mori, Ito, Kato and Yanagita) was how Japan could import needed Western cultural items and not destroy its social and cultural integrity. On technology issues, the work of Fukuzawa and Yanagita is the most significant. Though Yanagita articulated the basic concept of translative adaptation decades ago, the work of Fukuzawa on this issue had the most long-term, widespread impact on Japan. What happened in Japan from 1850 to 1895 and from 1895 to 1945 in terms of translative adaptation? Many surface cultural features of Japanese life changed, for example, clothing, technologies used in daily life, modes of communication and transportation, and large-scale public architecture. Many social institutions changed and evolved as well: the postal system, education, health, agriculture, transportation, communication and governmental institutions all encountered massive change.

But what happened to the most enduring parts of Japanese culture, its core or base cultural features, including social organization, family structure, interpersonal behavior, gender roles, worldviews, and views of religion and spirituality? Many of these have changed to varying extents. But as even a brief review of many areas of Japanese social life will reveal, they have proven extremely enduring within the generally conservative base of Japanese society. Various ideologies and features of Japanese society follow this trend, such as the influence of the Confucian *ie* system and bushido.

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1768 Here I mean worldview in the more conventional anthropological, holistic sense, not my own narrower definition of worldview as a cognitive framework. See Worldview (anthropology) in the Glossary section.
values on prewar (1850 to 1945) and postwar Japanese corporate life, the presence of
Confucian-influenced, hierarchical social roles in Japanese life, the use of hierarchical
and honorific terms in the Japanese language, the heavy influence of group-based
behavior on individuals, and so forth.\footnote{For a well-known treatment of this hierarchical, Confucian aspect of Japanese culture, see Nakane, \textit{Tekiô no jôken}. It is true that some of these patterns in Japanese corporate life are now changing, due to the influence of the economic recession that started in the early 1990s.} This is not to deny the highly fluid, rapidly changing nature of Japanese society, as complex and dynamic as any society on earth,\footnote{For an excellent overview and treatment of contemporary Japanese culture, see Sandra Buckley’s \textit{Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japan} (Buckley, \textit{Encyclopedia of Contemporary}). Examples of the rapidly changing nature of Japanese society include the current gradual elimination of the life-time employment system in large Japanese corporations, due to the economic recession of the 1990s and early 2000s, Japan’s shrinking population and demographic crisis that may lead to a significant presence of immigrants in Japan, and the nation’s continuing innovations in high technology that amaze the world.} nor the contested, fragmented nature of culture as commonly conceived by contemporary social and cultural anthropologists. But in sum, from 1850 to 1945, I wish to argue that in general, most of the deepest core features of Japanese culture proved enduring.

Technology greatly affected them, but it did not change or eliminate them at the most fundamental levels.

Is translative adaptation an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with development from 1850 to 1945? Despite traumatic social changes in that century brought by Japan’s economic development and subsequent destruction in World War II, did core “Japanese” cultural features, amid “Western” influences, continue intact? Did Japan develop “well?” Considering the three main aspects of development defined above,\footnote{These aspects are industrial production, quality of life, and increasing local capacities for civic participation.} the first level of development, industrial production, had large impacts on Japanese society at many levels, as outlined earlier. Quality of life in Japan suffered, especially during World War II. Local capacities for civic participation were not
encouraged by the top-down development approaches that the government supported. In the 1930s through 1945, repression became more common. The base societal elements of Japanese life continued intact, despite the great changes brought by development and by technology. Though Japan’s economy developed and grew greatly through the 1920s, it did not develop very “well,” not in terms of how anthropologists and Yanagita Kunio would define well: improved quality of life for most people and chances for local participation in development decisions. In the 1930s to 1945, with the onset of militarism and World War II, everything related to quality of life and local participation declined even further.

Above I argued that the Japanese development concepts of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation all, on a basic level, accurately describe Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945. How do they relate to contemporary Japanese aid policies? Is “modernization” also valid for Japanese aid? That would mean that as LDCs are drawn into trade with Japan, they hopefully develop, but also retain their unique, indigenous features, and do not become Western or Japanese clones at the core level. To seriously answer this question, we would need to do ethnographic fieldwork on the cultures of various recipients of Japan’s ODA. Barring this, I can reflect briefly on a few cases. One of the most interesting is Malaysia. Former leader of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad (prime minister from 1981 to 2003) strongly advocated the nation’s adoption of a Japanese style development model, and Malaysia has also received much aid from Japan. Under Mahathir’s efforts and policies,

1772 Here I mean internationalization modified to refer to the impacts of Japanese, not so much Western, colonialism.
Malaysia enjoyed mostly high levels of economic development and growth. This growth did not cause Malaysia to become Western or Japanese in its core cultural identity. While it is impossible, without ethnography, to definitively judge whether most Japanese aid recipients effectively retain their core identities despite receiving Japanese aid or investment, my suspicion is that they do. Two other significant recipients of Japanese aid, China and Indonesia, have also retained their core cultural features.

“Modernization” is likely a valid concept for what happens to the core cultures of many Japanese aid recipients, at least Asian ones. The principles of “modernization” are also embodied in Japan’s aid goals to customize aid for local conditions, not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, to enhance Japan’s image, to build positive relations with other countries, and to benefit LDCs, not just Japan.

What is the relevance of internationalization for Japanese aid? Here the question becomes what has happened to recipients of Japanese ODA, economically and culturally, as they have been drawn into the global economy? This is an important, complex question that could be studied on a general level, or for individual countries. Considering one example in Chapter 2, most Japanese aid experts who know China well conclude that Japanese aid to China has greatly helped China to develop economically by helping lay a


1774 These three points are from Table 9.1.

1775 This point is from Table 9.2.

1776 This point is taken from Table 9.3.
strong infrastructural foundation, and that Japan’s ODA has increased China’s diversity and possible openness to later political change.\textsuperscript{1777} The perspectives of Chinese experts concur on the significance of Japan’s ODA as helping lay a basis for China’s development, though they disagree on some other points.\textsuperscript{1778} In studying the issue of internationalization for Japanese ODA, both donor and recipient perspectives should be considered. In terms of ideas in current Japanese ODA policy, those which support the study of recipients’ economic and cultural conditions, during or after they received Japanese aid, are relevant to internationalization: goals to customize aid for local countries’ conditions,\textsuperscript{1779} goals to use aid for Japan’s strategic interests,\textsuperscript{1780} Japan’s goals to use aid to support its external political relations and the global aid agenda,\textsuperscript{1781} and Japan’s economic goals for its ODA related to international economic development.\textsuperscript{1782} From this brief review, internationalization seems relevant for analyzing contemporary Japanese aid.

Is translatable adaptation useful for Japan’s ODA policy? Leading Japanese development economists believe it is.\textsuperscript{1783} In general, it must be applied to single country case studies. To apply the concept to Japanese aid, one must ask, as a particular LDC receives Japan’s aid, how well is it adjusting culturally to the process? Is its core culture

\textsuperscript{1777} See Chapter 2 above, also Takamine, \textit{Japan's Development Aid}.
\textsuperscript{1778} Feng, “Japanese Aid to China.”
\textsuperscript{1779} Table 9.1.
\textsuperscript{1780} See Table 9.2. These goals require Japan to study the conditions of recipients, their compliance with its ODA norms, and Japanese ODA’s effects on them.
\textsuperscript{1781} See Table 9.2. These goals necessitate Japan’s awareness of how other countries (donors and recipients) perceive its aid.
\textsuperscript{1782} See Table 9.3. For these economic development goals, of course Japan must study the economic conditions of aid recipients.

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being destroyed, or are its indigenous cultural features able to survive alongside imported items? If the recipient’s base society is still intact, is development working? In the case of larger countries, Japanese aid, in many cases, as only a small part of a nation’s entire economy, has likely not fundamentally altered or eliminated the core cultural features of the recipient society. As noted above, in Malaysia and China, Japanese aid has not altered most of the core cultural features of these two societies. For these two cases, Japanese aid has decisively contributed to each nation’s development. Clarifying the situation is likely more complex if one seeks to study cases in regions beyond Asia. Again, to confirm what has happened for other countries, ethnographic research is a must. If we compare the principles of translativa adaptation to key ideas in current Japanese ODA, the ideas and themes that most naturally support translativa adaptation include: customizing aid for local conditions, enhancing Japan’s image/face, improving Japan’s relations with other countries, and Japan’s recently articulated goals to genuinely help LDCs with their infrastructural and additional aspects of development. Japan has often seemed to put its own interests first in its aid, but this may be changing. New pressures and goals from both domestic and international sources require Japan to be more sensitive to the genuine, ground level needs of its aid recipients.

Possible Effects of Spirituality and Religion on Japan’s Foreign Aid Policies

How has Japanese spirituality affected Japan’s foreign aid policies? In Chapters 1 and 2, I presented several arguments for how worldviews are one important factor,
among several, in determining what a country’s aid policy outcomes will be. Religion and spirituality are one of the most fundamental parts of worldview, so it is logical that they must be influential, to some extent, in helping shape aid policy outcomes. There are also other cultural, religious and historical factors mentioned in earlier chapters that relate to Japan’s aid.

What evidence do we see in the historical data presented here? From 1868 to 1945, religion and spirituality played somewhat important roles in policies to “protect” Japanese culture from foreign, Western influences. In this period, as the Meiji state created State Shinto, there was an atypical (for Japan) fusing of politics and religion to promote national development and Japanese nationalism. The state made State Shinto a national ideology for that purpose. Most leaders supported it; a few preferred Christianity. State Shinto was also used to strengthen the Japanese national sense of identity. This also connected with the highly kin- and locality-based traditions of folk (“traditional”) Shinto. How can the negative experiences that Japan experienced in mixing religion and the state in this period, seen in how State Shinto as nationalistic

Perhaps the strongest argument is Carol Lancaster’s. She argues that a country’s worldviews (in her view, widely shared beliefs about what is right or wrong) shape its collective beliefs about what kind of behavior should happen in different situations, based on varied basic values that can lead to different policy outcomes in aid policy and expenditures (Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, 18-19).

Ibid., 18.

As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, these include how a nation conceives of charity and giving, which often rises out of a society’s religious and spiritual mindset. There are also issues specific to Japan, including its historically “weak” values of charity toward other countries, perhaps based on traditional religious values (Rix, *Japan’s Economic Aid*, 15-16), its lack of a strong Judeo-Christian heritage (Orr, *Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 139), and an alleged fundamental rupture in worldviews between prewar religious and postwar secular values (Hasegawa, *Japanese Foreign Aid*, 7, 8). Cultural factors specific to Japan include its concepts of *on* (obligation), *giri* (duty) and *ninjo* (empathy) (Wright-Neville, *Evolution Japanese Foreign Aid*, 8-9, 33-39) and Japan’s *uchi-soto* (insider-outsider) tradition, an emphasis on helping those inside one’s own group, not outsiders (Hirata, *Civil Society*, 25).

Here I discuss general, relevant trends from Japanese experiences with these issues as revealed in the contexts we examined in many of the chapters.
propaganda and as a tool for state coercion, serve as positive lessons for development and ODA policies today? This is a key task for Japanese aid policymakers and scholars of development to consider. Part of the value of Japan’s experience is the lesson of how dangerous it is for religion to mix too closely with politics for development.

In the late Tokugawa period, Japan’s leaders and government valued certain areas of Western knowledge (Dutch learning) and science as helpful for Japan, such as medicine and military weaponry. They also rejected a leading non-material ideology, Christianity. Japan sent trade missions abroad to obtain desired technical knowledge, but at first rejected religious (Christian) missions and missionaries the West sent to Japan, until forced to accept them early in the Meiji period. A leading motivator for national isolation during this period was the desire of the Tokugawa regime to prevent Western imperialism and takeover of Japan. Christianity and European trade were seen as two of the chief Western means to achieve this end; therefore the first was totally banned and the second severely curtailed. Confucianism and its ideals played an important role in the ethics of late Tokugawa Japan, and continued to be influential in helping to motivate the nation for development through Confucian-influenced, bushido-type work values in the Meiji period and beyond. Neo-Confucian ideologies also contributed ideologies and thought helpful for Japanese business and industries. And in 1855, the state founded the Bansho Shirabasho, the first public facility in Japan for the study of Western languages and sciences. From this point in early modern Japan, the state’s involvement in the importation of foreign knowledge, both cultural and technical, became more important and decisive. In today’s aid, the Japanese state continues to play an important role, but unlike in the late Tokugawa period, the state’s role is increasingly dependent on the
private sector. Also different from the late Tokugawa era, the state’s legally mandated separation of religion and state policy now discourages Japan from considering the role of spirituality in ODA and development very deeply.

In the late Tokugawa period, religion played an important role in Japan’s education system, in the form of shrine and temple-based schools (terakoya). Somewhat similarly, in the Meiji era, State Shinto was placed into the national consciousness through the new national education system. Through 1945, Japan’s national system of education supported state-sanctioned nationalistic propaganda drawing on elements from Shinto and Confucianism. In education for women and private education, Christianity made important contributions from 1895 to 1945. Education is one of the most important components in an LDC’s development, as it was in Japan’s, but it can be used either positively or negatively. Japan’s ODA, especially JICA, continues to place a strong emphasis on technical training for Japan’s aid recipients. What lessons can be drawn from the manipulation of State Shinto in Japanese education, as a tool for promoting nationalistic development, for other LDCs? One of the most important lessons is that here the state abused its power, damaged religion, education, and the nation in the process. How can ODA policy discourage such abuses of power in other LDCs? Can it or should it? If we support Japanese and global aid goals for the promotion of democracy, human rights, and freedom, we can say that ODA policy should discourage manipulation of education and other cultural features for state ends.

In the Meiji era, in general, Japan rejected its “ethical,” Confucian heritage, seen as inferior, and Christianity, and coveted “scientific” Western knowledge. Japan accepted technology and knowledge it deemed useful, but sought to reject what it
considered harmful. Contrary to Tokugawa policy, to avert Western imperialism, Japan began aggressively importing Western knowledge and technology, as rapidly as possible.

For the same purposes, some leaders (here, Fukuzawa and Mori) strongly supported Japan’s adaptation of Western values, and even Christianity (Mori). Most Japanese strongly resisted the temptation to adopt Christianity as the new national religion or development ideology. Like Japan, today other LDCs struggle with how to integrate development and aid with their own spiritual heritage. Japan’s painful lessons here may serve them well. This should also be an encouragement for Japan to consider more deeply the impact of religious forces on its aid.

The United States had profound influence on Japan from 1868 onward, more than any other foreign power. Interestingly, two of the greatest areas of American influence on Japan, were educational: the sharing of science and technology, and Western religion (Christianity), both often through the vehicle of English. When English was chosen as the most important Western language for study, it became the seminal linguistic vehicle for the transference of both Western scientific and cultural knowledge, including religion, into Japan. Like the U.S., Europe brought much influence, including science, technology, and Christian-influenced ideologies, religious and secular, cultural and political features, which were significant in the Meiji period. Foreign experts, scientists, teachers and businesspeople who came to Japan brought much-coveted foreign knowledge, but they also brought Western cultural values, and often, Christianity. The impact of foreign teachers on Japan in many areas of knowledge, including science, technology, and religion and philosophy, was great. Through Japan’s attempts to develop in this era, it had to interact with foreign nations and foreigners. In the process, it
received science, technology, and foreign religious influence, though most Japanese would have preferred only the first two. No matter how hard an LDC desires to limit certain cultural influences from abroad, doing so is extremely hard, as these lessons from Japan show. Rather than resorting to repression, the LDC should more fruitfully direct its efforts at deciding how it can positively benefit from religious input, even from foreign countries. This would be a positive question for Japanese aid officials to concretely ponder as they deepen their consideration of how religion affects Japan’s ODA projects, not to merely focus on negative questions such as religion and the promotion of terrorism.

From 1895 to 1945, the Meiji state continued to use the Kokugaku School of learning, and influences from Shinto and Confucianism, to heavily promote nationalism. The influence of various nationalistic ideologies, often fused with religious and spiritual overtones, was huge in this period, especially from the 1930s to 1945. Most of these drew on Shinto or Confucian values to some degree, not so much on Buddhism. The emperor exercised huge power and influence in the political system. The state encouraged the mixing of religion and politics through several ideologies involving the emperor, including State Shinto, kokutai and kódó. State Shinto exercised a higher influence on Japanese politics, education, and society during this period. It was established to provide Japanese with a powerful, alternative form of identity to counter Western influences, and to promote Japanese nationalism. The effects of this continue to haunt Japan’s relations with other Asian nations. These negative experiences in Japan have made it harder for the religion factor to be easily considered in Japan’s ODA assessments today. But this issue deserves more concrete attention.
Christianity had a broad, if diffuse, influence on several areas of Japanese culture in this period, such as ideologies of pacifism, socialism, and philosophy. It had larger impacts on other areas like education, women’s rights, democratic thought, human rights, and various liberal areas of cultural influence, through the Taisho democracy period. But as Japan moved closer to the 1930s and World War II, repression against all religion besides State Shinto increased, and these liberalizing influences in Japanese culture decreased. During the period of national cultural and scientific isolation in World War II, Japanese R&D also suffered. In national isolation, an LDC’s cultural and scientific development will suffer, as Japan’s did in such periods. This is strong support for the Japanese argument that openness to cultural exchange and training are paramount for successful aid and development.

Externally, from 1895 to 1945, Japanese spirituality was imposed on long-term colonies (such as Taiwan and Korea) as emperor ideology and forced participation in State Shinto. This created a great deal of resentment among these colonized populations, especially in Korea. State Shinto contributed to the nationalistic ideologies that were used to justify Japan’s aggressive actions in various conflicts and wars in Asia and the Pacific. This was a state-sponsored corruption of an indigenous form of spirituality that historically had no connection to such practices or ideologies. Extreme spiritual ideologies clouded the beliefs and policy actions of some of Japan’s top leaders, especially Hirohito’s. These had horrific consequences both for Japan and other nations, as he delayed surrender in World War II. The connections of State Shinto and Japan’s external economic relations are only indirect, and relate to the fact that politically, State Shinto helped provide ideological justification for Japan’s aggressive political actions.
against other Asian nations. From these actions, some economic benefits, especially for Japan and somewhat for the colonies (economic infrastructure), resulted. The main lesson for ODA here is that extremist ideologies, including religious ones, can cause a nation’s politics to go asunder. One more factor for donors and recipients to consider, as they assess the religion factor in aid, is how ODA can be used to discourage political extremism in LDCs.

What possible evidence is there from my study of leaders’ views of religion, spirituality, economic development, science, technology, and international relations on how spirituality may be affecting Japan’s current ODA? In the leaders’ general views of religion and spirituality, especially from 1850 to 1895, science is generally assumed to underlie everything in the universe. These leaders believed that they must learn advanced technology from the West (not from “unscientific,” philosophical Asia), and that they need supportive “spirits” to help them do so. If possible, they preferred to get these “spirits” (or spiritual sources) of inspiration and hard work from indigenous sources. The general views of spirituality in the late Tokugawa era leaned more toward emphasizing ethical issues, while those of the Meiji period emphasized more material concerns. This was especially true of the views of economic issues. Though in the “traditional” Japanese worldview there was little separation of the material and spiritual realms, in Japan there has long been a separation of religion and the state, except for 1868-1945, which was an historical aberration.

One sees this emphasis on the material in the leaders’ worldviews and cultural logics (1850 to 1895 and beyond) of the domestic state and market, international political economy, and on the issue of technology transfers. Concepts and images emphasize
material power and values, and include the power of Western technology to conquer China, other Asian countries, and the strength of science, technology and economics to help save Japan. Money and material things drive the world. A basic lesson here is that it is much harder to transfer the soft, value-laden, “spiritual” aspects of technology. Transferring the “hard,” material aspects of technology is easier in many respects. LDCs can learn how Japan attempted to balance the material and ethical/contextual aspects of imported knowledge. Religion can make various valuable contributions to an LDC’s development, but these entail some cultural risk. Some of Japan’s Meiji leaders, such as Mori and Fukuzawa, were good students of development. They effectively identified positive things that Western religion gave the West for development, but this does not mean that everything was successfully or uniformly applied in Japan.

A third important area is the leaders’ view of the role of religion and spirituality in economic development. The leaders in the first period (1850 to 1895) did not mind using religion and spirituality to encourage social change in support of Japanese nationalism and development, though many did not want to use Christianity. Most of them, and the Meiji state, preferred to use Shinto. Religious and moral underpinnings were recognized as influencing the West’s strength over Japan and Asia, so these leaders admitted the possible contributions of spirituality to economic development. Though many Meiji leaders connected some values of Christianity with Western economic development, the domestic market worldviews and logics identified in this study seem to deemphasize non-material knowledge like religion. Most Japanese in this era disliked Christianity. Some of these leaders were impressed by what Christianity had done in the West (i.e. its moral strengthening of individuals, and historic role in promoting the
scientific and technological discoveries). But they were perplexed by the seeming
conflicts of Christianity with Japanese culture. Even so Christianity was among the most
important global cultural products to be brought (back) into Japan at this time. An
implication is that today’s LDCs should reflect carefully on whether they wish to restrict
foreign religion, since its contributions can be great, but risky.

From 1895 to 1945, on spirituality’s role in development, Yanagita stressed the
impacts of spirituality on the nation’s politics and society on the local level, and Hirohito,
on the national level. Both thought spirituality was important, but neither was capable of
changing the damage state coercion through State Shinto ultimately inflicted on the
Japanese polity and society. For ODA policy, LDC leaders need a clear idea of how
religion affects the state and development. Without that, potentially great damage can
result. Based on Japan’s negative example here, LDCs should be aware of religion and
spirituality’s potential positive effects for economic development, as long as freedom of
religion is maintained. Donor and recipient aid staff and LDCs’ leaders should include
religion as a potentially positive tool in their development arsenal.

From 1895 to 1945, some leaders’ actions in international relations were
affected both by religion and by science. Hirohito’s foreign and military policy actions
were at times colored by his devotion to maintaining Japan’s sacred spiritual traditions
and the throne (the delay of the decision to surrender in World War II), and by rational
policy decisions about progress in battle (his guidance of battle plans in various South
Pacific locations) (Bix 2000). Earlier, from 1850 to 1895, while the influence of
evolutionistic, scientific thought on Japan’s international relations helped provide leaders
such as Yamagata with justification for Japan to prepare to attack “backward” neighbors
seen as blocking Japan’s progress, other leaders (Kato in particular) worked hard to
device scientific, evolutionistic and spiritual arguments to justify the Meiji state’s plans
for Japan’s development and international relations.

There were several potentially significant conflicts in the leaders’ views of
spirituality and science. Despite the ethical emphasis of many late Tokugawa leaders’
views and the more material leanings of Meiji leaders (already noted), daily spiritual
practice continued in Japan, both among leaders and the general population. There were
several potential conflicts affecting the use of spirituality and science for Japan’s national
policy goals in this era: conflicts between Western “scientific” knowledge and Asian
“ethical” knowledge, Western religious values and Japanese ones, and Western and
Japanese cultures. Though the separation of religion and state is a much longer tradition
in Japan than in Europe, in the Meiji state’s pro-religion and pro-science ideologies of
nationalism, the Flaw of the Excluded Middle and “conflicts” between the material and
the spiritual are not really seen. From 1850 to 1895, another conflict emerged concerning
which spiritual source might provide the best inspiration for Japan’s development. While
most leaders preferred Shinto or Confucian sources, a few like Mori chose Christianity.
Japan was totally open to accepting “useful” Western technologies, but generally not
willing to accept foreign ideologies that seemed too conflicting with Japanese culture,
such as Christianity. Another potentially important conflict (1850 to 1895) concerned the
spiritual and material realms. Several leaders (Kato, Yamagata, and Ito) found Western
culture and technology superior to East Asia’s, though not the West’s spirituality. In
approaching the technical and ethical/cultural dilemmas of development, any LDC must
seek a balance between the spiritual and material aspects of the process. In this era, the
power of the West’s technologies and Japan’s rejection of “weaker” East Asian models may have made it harder for Japan to do this.

From 1895 to 1945, conflicts between the spiritual and material realms in the leaders’ worldviews can be seen, first, in some of their policy implications. The leaders here, and the state, saw no essential conflict between spiritual and material concerns, or in drawing on either for policy needs. This, again, is an example of pragmatic Japanese spirituality. The conflict between Western and Eastern cultures was of much greater concern to these leaders. While essential dichotomies between the material and spiritual realms are likely assumed in the worldviews of most Western aid workers, what about Japanese aid staff? Perhaps at their conscious, operational level of policy such a dichotomy may be assumed, but likely not at the level of their personal spiritual practice (this would need to be confirmed ethnographically). Integration of the material and spiritual is seems to be a likely reality in the lives of many non-Western aid recipients. How do presumptions about the spiritual and material in aid workers’ worldviews affect the delivery of aid and its effectiveness? Aid staff should know their own operational presumptions, because they will surely affect their decisions, policies, and interactions with recipients. Knowing the worldviews of recipients, in general and regarding these issues, would also help in improving aid effectiveness.

From 1895 to 1945, conflicts also occurred in the leaders’ material and spiritual interventions in policy. Japan’s leaders used material means to transform Japan’s external environment, and to obtain access to territories and natural resources they perceived to be needed for Japan’s “defense.” Yanagita argued that Japan must use material means to defend its indigenous culture and spirituality, the foundation of its culture, identity, and
survival. But the aggressive material actions of the Japanese state, supported by forced spirituality, greatly alienated foreign populations against Japan, and nearly destroyed Japan and its empire. Coerced development is never the answer. Successful ODA policy must draw on both hard (material) and soft (spiritual) aspects of development to be effective.

What are the possible impacts of these leaders’ views of spirituality and/or science on their general policy actions and impacts? From 1850 to 1895, many of their views supported policies that would encourage science. Many Japanese and the state were willing to use religion and spirituality to support science and defense if the clash with Japanese culture was not too great; there was a definite tendency to mix religion and spirituality with politics in this era. In the leaders’ worldviews of the domestic political economy (1850 to 1895), there was more of an emphasis on the material realm, and less on the ethical/philosophical side. Religion was only seen as useful if it could be used to resist the West. The heavy material emphasis in Japan’s views of technology in this era caused Japan to emphasize large-scale industrial development, to chose State Shinto as the state spiritual ideology, and to partly reject its Confucian heritage. But the state did not apply State Shinto to international relations until the next era (1895 to 1945). Leaders here (from 1850 to 1895) stress how positive spiritual values might strengthen Japan’s cultural core, its development process, its scientific and technological growth, and its position in the international system. Yet despite the wise insights of Fukuzawa and others about the great things appropriate scientific “spirits” and values could give Japan, there were great pressures against importing Western religion into Japan. Japan’s leaders struggled to balance various extremes here, including transferring intangible cultural
values versus technical hardware, material and spiritual aspects of technology, values of hyper-Westernization and pro-Japanese nationalism. Perhaps the proper balance between all these extremes was never found before 1945.

Regarding the general policy impacts of leaders’ views of religion and spirituality from 1895 to 1945, the later in the period one examines, the greater was the role of spirituality in Japanese politics and nationalism. Since Hirohito was emperor, of course his views had a larger impact than Yanagita’s. The government’s choice of State Shinto as the state religion likely standardized local spirituality. For ODA policy, from this we learn that religion should be separate from the state, but the state cannot ignore consideration of the social effects of religion. As they affect policy, they inevitably affect aid, especially in highly religious societies. Spirituality and nationalism both mixed in the worldviews of Hirohito and Yanagita. Hirohito supported ideologies such as State Shinto and hakkô ichiu in reaction to foreign influences threatening Japan. The government used spiritual values in education, such as State Shinto, to increase citizen support for militarism. LDCs should learn from Japan’s negative example here. While there were seemingly not many conflicts in the worldviews of Hirohito and Yanagita between spirituality and the material, they seem slightly stronger in Hirohito’s case.1791 The worldviews of LDC aid recipients, their leaders and other relevant actors, including their views of spiritual and material phenomena, will affect how the LDC receives a technology or development intervention, and it succeeds. Knowledge of these issues by aid donors should help an ODA program or policy succeed.

1791 Here I am referring to the conflict between Hirohito’s scientific rationality and his personal spiritual ritual/practice concerning his policy actions.
From 1868 to 1945, Japan was happy to use spirituality to support nationalism and national goals, including control of all religious groups in the 1930s and 1940s. State policy (from 1895-1945) to use religion as needed resembles popular Japanese spirituality: a willingness to use religion for whatever practical needs one has. It may seem crass, but ODA policy should be willing to do the same—to call on religion whenever it can help development, and is willing.

What about the possible later policy impacts of these worldviews on religion and spirituality, related to science and development, on later ODA policies? In the period 1850 to 1895, both the European ideal of integrated church and state and the Flaw of the Excluded Middle seem somewhat present in the worldviews of domestic state and market. Given the Meiji state’s choice of State Shinto as the national spiritual practice and development ideology, it does not seem that this was a secularizing force. Daily spiritual practice continued, though regional forms may have been squelched. Since ground-level spirituality continued underneath Meiji State Shinto, such a practice may underlie today’s ODA policy, too. What do Japan’s leaders do, not just say? Consider what most recent Japanese prime ministers and other top leaders have done at Yasukuni Shrine.¹⁷⁹² The presence of spirituality in daily practice is likely present in their lives, but must be confirmed ethnographically. What would this mean for ODA policy today? It would mean that there are spiritual influences, at some level, in their ODA policy actions, however subtle.

¹⁷⁹² Most recent Japanese prime ministers have gone on a regular basis to worship at Yasukuni Shrine, to the great consternation of other East Asian nations such as China and South Korea.
In this era, there were also many pressures in Japan against considering the contributions of religion and spirituality for development, and against using Christianity for this purpose. There was great pressure to overemphasize the material and de-emphasize the spiritual in policies. Does the Constitution of 1947 bring similar pressure to today’s ODA in Japan? Are there “secularizing” forces today attempting to pressure policymakers from considering “spiritual” features in today’s aid? If so, how?

From 1850 to 1895, it seems Japan leaned more toward the material side, while choosing State Shinto as the national ideology for development, but from 1895 to 1945, it became more “spiritual” in its leanings, I would argue. Today, I suggest that Japan is more “material” in its approaches to ODA, but that it needs to become more knowledgeable of the “spiritual,” given the rise of Islam, global terrorism, and so forth. There are some signs it may do so. Attitudes similar to the practical attitudes of several leaders here toward spirituality, development, technology and knowledge\footnote{1793 Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato.} are also seen in Japan’s contemporary aid, i.e. the emphases on self-help and self-reliance in recipients. These attitudes evolved in ways that are connected over time, and which relate to what Japan aid is today and will ultimately become. Though the leaders of 1895 to 1945 were not necessarily afraid to marshal spirituality in support of the state’s material goals, today Japan’s constitution prohibits such a practice. The Japanese state does not routinely intervene in religious affairs unless there is a pressing policy reason to do so (i.e. terrorism). It is time to bring consideration of religion and spirituality into Japan’s aid, for many of the reasons recognized by more international relations scholars today in
the West. To not do so ignores a significant piece of the puzzle of international relations and development.

Hirata Keiko offers additional, valuable insights concerning the relevance of cultural, historical and spiritual values in Japan for today’s Japanese ODA policies.\textsuperscript{1794} The first set of insights concerns NGOs in Japan and how they relate to the Japanese government and the ODA system.\textsuperscript{1795} Though Japan’s ODA community is younger and less well funded than NGOs in the West, its connections with the global NGO community are helping to bring an expansion of Japan’s civil society. The Internet has enabled a huge increase in transnational communication and networking between NGOs in different countries, and enabled NGO staff to increase their knowledge and skill levels about global and development issues. Both of these factors have combined to create attitudes among NGO activists that are less deferential to authority (a Confucian-based norm, strongly encouraged in Japan’s developmental state era), and more willing to question or protest against corruption or abuse.\textsuperscript{1796} Globalization has also brought more knowledge to Japanese society and to NGOs. It has empowered both citizens and NGOs so they do not have to be as easily deceived by state propaganda. They are more willing to organize themselves collectively and demand accountability from the government and its ODA.\textsuperscript{1797}

Additional insights are seen in how NGOs cooperate with the Japanese government in current ODA policy. Despite the noble goals of NGOs to increase their

\textsuperscript{1794} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1795} For a complete overview of the nature of NGOs in Japan and their relationship to Japan’s civil society, the government, and ODA, see Hirata, \textit{Civil Society}.
\textsuperscript{1796} Ibid., 62-63.
\textsuperscript{1797} Ibid., 73.
cooperation with the Japanese government in ODA, these NGOs, including religious ones, often struggle with the increased bureaucratic and financial accounting requirements associated with seeking more cooperation with MOFA, to the point where even some of the NGOs’ own goals are hampered. According to Hirata, these partnerships can nevertheless be beneficial, but must be carefully managed by both sides. NGOs tend to support grassroots development efforts, and the global aid agenda goal of poverty reduction, more than MOFA does. MOFA supports the use of aid for Japan’s kokueki (its national and diplomatic interests, i.e. its security and economic needs and status in the international community). 1798

Second, Hirata also offers insights on the issue of religion and spirituality in Japanese ODA in her examination of NGOs, both secular and religious, and how they relate to aid. According to Larry Diamond, religious, ethnic and communal groups that promote collective rights, values, faith, and beliefs are legitimate NGOs, while religious or racist hate groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, are not. 1799 Virtually all NGOs are non-religious, with only a few exceptions. 1800 There are a limited number of Buddhist or Christian groups. Of these, virtually none do proselytizing along with their charitable work in Japan, so these NGOs have a very high reputation. 1801 According to Hirata, historically, Japan has no deep Christian tradition, and little regarding volunteerism or

1798 Ibid., 158. In the post-Cold War era, the increasing priority of LLDCs in Japan’s ODA, especially to Africa and Indochina, is also of great political and economic importance, strategically, to Japan (Ibid., 174-175). However, an increased Japanese spirit of generosity, likely resulting from Japan’s rising postmaterial values, is also significant.


1800 Of the twenty development-related NGOs in Japan with the largest budgets in 1996, only five were clearly religious in affiliation (according to their names). Of these, one was Buddhist, and the rest were Christian in orientation (Ibid., 41).

1801 Ibid., 39.
charity. Before World War II, many NGOs in Japan were Christian-affiliated. Various Christian groups from abroad entered Japan after the war to assist with rebuilding the country, and many remained after the American occupation ended. The largest Christian-related NGO that does development work, World Vision Japan, was established in 1987.\footnote{Ibid., 25, 30-31, 33.}

Third, Hirata offers additional valuable insights about how historical cultural values relate to contemporary Japanese aid policy. Historically, Confucian ideological influence in Japanese society has encouraged three primary cultural values: “… 1) respect for hierarchy and authority, 2) emphasis on conformity to group interests rather than individual needs, and 3) emphasis on order and stability.” These values have encouraged citizen deference to state authority, and helped the state to subordinate Japan’s civil society when it has desired, as in the national goals for economic development that were pursued in late twentieth century Japan.\footnote{Ibid., 23-24.} Today more Japanese are less willing to subscribe to Confucian values of sacrifice, hierarchical deference to authority, and conformity, but prefer independence and freedom.\footnote{Ibid., 28.} Therefore they are more willing to participate in volunteer activities with NGOs. A significant non-Confucian value, the \textit{uchi-soto} (inside-outside) tradition, relates to the group-oriented nature of Japanese society.\footnote{Ibid., 28.} People usually see a great difference between those who are within their group, and those who are not. This has encouraged them to only give charity to those who are in their family or neighborhood, and not to support those who are outsiders. This was

\footnote{Ibid., 25, 30-31, 33.}
\footnote{Ibid., 23-24.}
\footnote{Ibid., 28.}
\footnote{This was briefly mentioned earlier in the present chapter.}
also encouraged by the values of filial piety and *ie* (Confucian family-like connections) influential from 1868 to 1945. Japan’s developmental state discouraged citizens from exercising civil activism, and their dependence on the state.\(^{1806}\)

Fourth, Hirata briefly explores the influence of contemporary cultural and spiritual values on Japanese aid. With modern Japan’s affluence, “catching up with the West” is no longer one of the national goals. Young Japanese have begun looking for more meaning in life, even from spiritual and religious sources. Hirata argues that the postmaterial values that political scientist Ronald Inglehart identified in Western societies are also developing in Japan.\(^{1807}\) While older Japanese were willing to sacrifice, work hard and save, young Japanese value “social equality, self-expression, personal freedom and the quality of life.” Hirata calls this the “crumbling” of developmentalism and the developmental state. This makes Japanese more willing to volunteer or explore religion.\(^{1808}\)

Hirata argues perceptively that many Japanese have undergone a spiritual crisis since the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Several of the development ideologies that drove Japan since the Meiji era, including the goals of catching up with the West, achieving a higher GNP, called “GNPism,” and rapid

\footnotesize{\(^{1806}\) Ibid., 25.  
\(^{1808}\) Ibid., 28-29. In Japan’s economic recession of the 1990s and 2000s, the strong alliance between Japanese business and government has weakened. People are looking for more meaning and fulfillment beyond sacrifice and single-minded commitment to Japan’s ideology of national development. People want to find meaning and personal happiness beyond corporate Japan, so they are more willing to participate in NGOs and volunteerism (Ibid., 74).}
economic development, no longer hold sway. The state ideology of “GNPism” generated a postwar corporate culture in Japan that encouraged the ultimate of samurai-like devotion, creating such terms and phenomena as karōshi (death from overwork), môretsu shain (fierce company employees), kigyō senshi (the enterprise warrior), kaisha-shijō-shugi (company-firstism), and chichioya-fuzai (children growing up “with father absent”). As Japan has become more affluent, younger Japanese have been less willing to make such sacrifices of their health and families. The economic recession has not allowed material concerns to disappear, but economic issues no longer consume most people’s lives as in the late twentieth century. Fewer people are willing to sacrifice their lives for authoritarian developmentalism.

The “spiritual crisis” generated by Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s and early 2000s has had two principle social effects. First, “traditional” norms in Japanese society have been weakened, including the weakening of patriarchal families and closeknit neighborhood and community connections, bringing unprecedented social problems. New problems include increasing youth violence, rebellion, juvenile delinquency, and with a minority of people, destructive spiritual cults such as Aum Shinrikyo. Effects on youth are largely the result of their maturing in a materially affluent society that has generally lacked a solid moral or spiritual mooring. Second, as Japan has achieved its affluence, many more Japanese are looking to new postmaterial

\[1809\] “Catching up with the West” and “GNPism” are discussed in Gerald L. Curtis, Japan at the Crossroads: Asia Pacific Issues Analysis (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1999), 3; and Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

\[1810\] Hirata, Civil Society, 91-93.

\[1811\] As noted earlier, this is the destructive cult that carried out sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway in 1995.
values beyond economic survival, including democracy, freedom, and life significance, and willing to give themselves to serving others in citizen volunteering. Many young and even older Japanese are embracing these values, and more willing to engage in citizen and grassroots activism, including helping people in other countries, or traveling and serving abroad. As the sacrificial values encouraged by Confucian ethics have weakened, fewer Japanese are willing to submit their personal well-being to the goals of the developmental state.\footnote{Ibid., 93-95.}

Hirata concludes that the onset of postmaterial values in Japan and increasing globalization, since Japan’s economic recession in the 1990s and 2000s, has contributed to the rise of several new values in Japan. More Japanese see themselves as chikyūjin (global persons), concerned for the welfare of people around the world, able to transcend the past limits of uchi-soto (inside-outside) mentality. Fewer people trust the effectiveness and ethics of Japan’s developmental state. Hirata argues that all of this has weakened the state, increased space in civil society for citizen activism, even on a global scale, and political pluralism in Japanese politics.\footnote{Ibid., 154-155.} There has been a postmodern crisis of spiritual and material values. Once Japan achieved its goals of economic development and affluence on a par with the West, many Japanese realized that they had little life outside of corporations and work; “…they lacked meaning in their lives.” Japanese now demand more freedoms and are no longer willing for Japan to be dominated by the iron alliance of state and business. With continuing political and business scandals, and
prolonged, endless recession, Japanese are less willing to recognize the validity of the developmental state.\textsuperscript{1814}

Conclusion

For the first research question,\textsuperscript{1815} I argued that much of what Japan’s aid is today is based on Japan’s negative prewar experiences, a few positive, because of the great destruction Japan and East Asia experienced in World War II, the desire not to repeat past mistakes, and postwar policies imposed by the American occupation. Yet Japan has had much choice in how its postwar system has been implemented. In Japan’s own choices, of course, cultural and historical influences from the prewar period remain.

In the sociocultural area, I explored how Japan’s government placed overwhelming priority on Japan’s need to survive in the hostile international system. This need was driven by politics and economics, not by society and culture. As a result, the state continually placed top priority on political and economic issues, not social ones, despite wise observations by leaders like Fukuzawa and Yanagita who wrestled with the social meanings of Japan’s interactions with the West, and preserving the essence of what Japan was. The leaders studied struggled with significant social issues: how Japan could develop without culturally imploding, and the role of intangible values and spirituality in development and technology transfer. Sadly, in the prewar period, the state’s adaptation

\textsuperscript{1814} Hirata also argues that although Asian countries like Malaysia and its former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad have widely praised and emulated the Japanese development model and the developmental state, the current weaknesses in Japan’s economic and political system should raise doubts about aspects of the developmental state concept for other Asian nations. Rather, Hirata concludes that LDCs need “…another model, one that promotes short-term economic growth while also nurturing the conditions for sustainable economic, social and human development” (Hirata, \textit{Civil Society}, 162-163).

\textsuperscript{1815} This concerns the influence of Japan’s experiences and leaders’ views of technology, development and foreign relations on Japan’s contemporary ODA.
of State Shinto as a coercive development ideology contributed to the destruction of Japan and East Asia in World War II. These experiences offer rich lessons for LDCs on development, aid, and spirituality.

In comparing ideas in current Japanese aid policy with possible sources, there is much continuity between the prewar and postwar periods. Many ideas are based on Japan’s development experience. The experiences of Japan and other East Asian nations are distinct from the experiences of many Western nations. This may be a source of tensions between the Japanese and global aid agendas. A related theme is Japan’s continuing sense of international image. Despite how Japan has used aid to help its image, and massive aid budget increases through the late 1990s, aid has not met these expectations.

If Japan had had a stronger civil society and religious institutions in the prewar period, there may have been some checks on the destructive policies of the prewar political system. Since civil society was weak, much damage occurred. Tension between oligarchic rule and democratic desires was a main theme in prewar Japanese politics. In the prewar system, the oligarchs won. The wartime destruction of the prewar political system enabled the development of postwar democracy that now guides Japan’s aid. Now the aid bureaucracy must be accountable to public demands. On democratic accountability, Japan’s postwar political system is totally different from the prewar one. Japan’s weak prewar civil society enabled the state to manipulate State Shinto as a nationalistic ideology, to the nation’s peril. Although Japan’s contemporary culture of politics is more liberal than the prewar system’s, it is still heavily conservative. Yet the character of the recent institutional reforms of its ODA system can be called quite
progressive, in terms of various administrative moves, including the creation of the “new” JICA agency in October 2008, under the leadership of Ogata Sadako. These reforms have resulted from both internal and external pressures. Japan’s small NGO community and the public also exercise increasing influence over Japan’s aid.

Strategic and foreign policy interests are important in contemporary Japanese aid, and were also in Japan’s prewar politics. Some of the key features of that system were its authoritarian nature, political and ideological conservatism, the strong nature of the state, the powerful influence of the military in politics and government (especially from 1895 to 1945), and the overarching goal of the state to assure Japan’s survival. A major theme in Japan’s prewar politics was national survival. Though Japan is much stronger and more stable today, national survival remains an important undercurrent in the national psyche. It is no surprise that even postwar aid has always been strongly connected to Japan’s political and economic *kokueki* (national interests).

In the prewar system, ultimately its economic policies were more successful than its political ones. I found that Japan’s economic system and economic development experience has many wise lessons for LDCs, including how to borrow foreign economic knowledge and mix it with indigenous ideologies. Other lessons include the importance of hard work, education, a strong state, and how to learn and improve valuable economic knowledge from foreign powers. Early in its development, Japan had a strong state, which purposely took a strong role in national development and trade. Limiting an LDC’s openness to international trade near the beginning of its development, until different sectors and industries are mature enough to face international competition, is one of the most important lessons. Trade was imperative for Japan’s growth, and likely is for other
LDCs. Japan’s growth in the prewar system was heavily imbalanced toward large industries and urban areas. Postwar Japan continues to pay the price of congestion and other problems because of these mistakes. As Yanagita wisely argued, more balanced, cross-regional development is needed.

Japan, as the first non-Western nation to develop economically, offers valuable insights for other non-Western nations, though most Western aid and development experts fail to recognize it. The challenge is to apply these lessons wisely in different regional environments and cultural conditions. Although many Western aid experts seem to have trouble believing that this can be done, Asian nations do not. This crucial issue deserves much more attention by the global aid and development communities. It should be possible to transfer, on some level, elements of what Japanese has done, to the development experiences of other developing nations today. As mentioned earlier, this must usually be done on an institutional level; it cannot be done on a cultural level. It must also be done very carefully, following the ideas of translatable adaptation. Lessons from any foreign development model or experience, including Japan’s, must be carefully applied and offered according to the unique conditions of each recipient nation. Each LDC’s own people are the best experts in helping an aid donor to offer effective aid that matches their nation’s actual needs and conditions. Local peoples and experts, perhaps

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1816 Johnson, MITI and Evans, Embedded. A similar argument is made in Haider A. Khan, “Aid and Development: What Can Africa Learn from the Macroeconomics of Foreign Aid in Some Southeast Asian Economies?” in Asia and Africa in the Global Economy, eds. Ernest Aryeetey, Julius Court, Machiko Nissanke and Beatrice Weder, (Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, 2003, 346-368). Khan argues that the effective application of institutional and policy inducements to support the best use of aid possible, such as has occurred in three Southeast Asian nations, will go a long way in promoting successful development and aid to Africa.

1817 A similar argument in found in Michael M. Cernea, Putting People First and Salmen, Listen to the People.
aided by applied social scientists who know how to effectively listen and facilitate, seem the most capable of determining the local particularisms of applying Japanese or other foreign development and aid models to their local situations.

There were strong currents of evolutionistic thought in many of the prewar worldviews we have studied. Evolutionistic thought was influential at various levels in most of the leaders’ thought on social, political and economic issues, and is present in many assumptions of technological progress and notions of “development” that remain influential in the postmodern world, including in foreign aid. Such thought was partly used to justify imperialism and aggression by the West against non-Western nations, and by Japan against its temporarily weaker neighbors. These values often run counter to much less influential religious and ethical thought in Japan’s development and aid programs. The influence of evolutionism in current views of aid remains, though it is less overt and less racist than in the prewar period. Some degree of ethnocentrism, based partly on evolutionistic thought, continues in Japan’s aid. But overall, Japan now manifests a much healthier desire in seeking to help LDCs at multiple levels. Over the long-term, a science-based type of morality, such as desired by various Meiji leaders including Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato, emerged in Japan, albeit in modified form. The influence of evolutionism on various aspects of Japanese leaders’ thought is also seen here. One hopes that it is less racist than past Japanese thought was.

One of the most profound insights emerging from Japan’s development experience is the concept of translative adaptation, that each nation’s development plans must match its actual, unique conditions. It seems so simple and obvious. “Modernization” and internationalization are similar. It seems logical that such insights
would emerge from Japan’s rather unique development experience. Translative adaptation offers many significant lessons for LDCs, so it is unfortunate that it has not been more carefully or systematically applied in Japan’s ODA policies to date.

I conclude that my working hypothesis is basically true. Japan’s experience with technology, development and foreign relations, seen in the beliefs of several important leaders, has affected its current aid policies, despite the fact that linkages between historical experiences and ideas usually seem indirect. Rather they are evidenced through the gradual evolution of several different streams of thought over time. Of the seven leaders I studied, I concluded that the ideas of Fukuzawa, Ito, Yamagata, and Hirohito seem to be the most influential on the thought in current ODA policy. These leaders each exercised different, important influences over Japanese society and politics, domestically and internationally, that affected the postwar environments in which Japanese ODA emerged and in which it continues to function. Based on Japan’s positive and negative development experiences from 1850 to 1945, there are also many valuable applications in politics, economics, and culture for LDCs. Japan’s experiences, even on this general level, offer many valuable insights for LDCs.

On the second key question of the research, whether the ideas of “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation present an accurate picture of Japan’s experience with technology and development from 1850 to 1945, I concluded that in all three cases, they do. On “modernization,” although Japan adopted numerous forms of Western culture and technology, and encountered tumultuous social

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1818 Japan’s development experience is unique compared to the West’s, but not unique compared to the experiences of other East Asian nations.
1819 See my discussion earlier in this chapter.
change on many levels, the true core of its identity and most basic social structures did not fundamentally change. Japan’s imperialism in East Asia well represents the concept of internationalization, since Japan actively conquered, absorbed, exploited and brought other Asian nations into its economic and cultural universe, as it was able. On translative adaptation, although imported technologies and ideologies greatly changed many surface (infrastructural and cultural) features in Japan, they did not fundamentally alter the deepest parts of Japan’s core culture, including its social organization, family structures, and core spiritual convictions. How do these concepts apply to Japan’s aid? Barring in-depth ethnographic research, at present, “modernization,” internationalization, and translative adaptation all can be used to better understand the conditions of various recipients of Japanese aid.

On the third research question, the effects of spirituality on Japan’s contemporary aid policies, I argued that religion and spirituality, important components of worldview, have likely played an important though indirect role in shaping Japan’s ODA. But the question is how. Religion provides valuable lessons for today’s aid policies, but in Japan’s case, many of its applications flow from negative experiences in the prewar period. We find valuable lessons for LDCs in how Japanese leaders attempted to balance the “soft” (philosophical, spiritual) and “hard” (material) components of technology as they transferred many forms of foreign knowledge into Japan.

The Meiji state coercively mobilized a new spiritual ideology, State Shinto, to encourage support for nationalism and development in Japan. This indirectly encourages contemporary Japanese aid to steer clear of religion and spirituality, given Japan’s past interference in the affairs of other Asian states, partly by the Japanese government’s
imposition of State Shinto on them and on Japan. The danger here for Japan and today’s LDCs is mixing religion and state too closely for the purpose of development. Second, Japan’s government manipulated the education system with State Shinto and similar forms of nationalistic propaganda for state ends. This should be discouraged by ODA policies. Japan sought to import technologies believed to be useful for development, but discouraged the importation of ideologies believed to be harmful for Japanese culture, such as Christianity. But accepting certain desired technologies and filtering out accompanying cultural features is hard. LDCs should not resort to repression. In Japan’s case, an “indigenous” ideology, State Shinto, not a foreign religion, became the true tool of state repression and damage for the nation. LDCs should consider the dangers of foreign and indigenous extremist ideologies, whether secular or religious. This is an additional argument for promoting democracy, pluralism and freedom in aid and development policies, including freedom of religion.

An irony in Japan’s culture of spirituality is that while Japanese politics has discouraged mixing religion and state for centuries, most Japanese, including politicians, engage in spiritual practices on a regular or daily basis, even in public life.\footnote{Here I am referring to the periodic visits of national politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Some prime ministers visit that shrine on an annual basis. While many Japanese pray at household Shinto shrines and/or Buddhist family altars on a daily basis, they visit public Shinto shrines or Buddhist temples on regular occasions too. Shinto shrines are typically visited on New Year’s Eve or New Year’s Day, December 31 and January 1. Thus the concept of “public” or “private” religion and spirituality seems rather murky in contemporary Japanese consciousness.} Is this an interesting twist on the Flaw of the Excluded Middle? It is not. There is a difference in how the Japanese language defines religion and spirituality that I described in an earlier chapter. The Japanese state has long legally discouraged the manipulation of and involvement in politics by various religions (“shukyo,” sect-teachings such as different
branches of Buddhism), but it did not formally proscribe the involvement of *spirituality* (*seishin*, spirit) or *spiritual practices* such as Shinto until after World War II. Politically, these were not viewed as “sect-teachings” until Japan’s postwar American occupiers forced that interpretation on the nation. Most Japanese still do not view Shinto as a “religion,” any more than most Americans view stopping at a Starbucks for coffee or putting up a Christmas tree as religion. Most Japanese see Shinto, the “way of the gods,” as it has been viewed in Japan for millennia, as a daily, regular ritual or custom of heartfelt gratitude to the *kami*, a natural part of everyday life. The prewar Japanese state refused to call State Shinto a religion.\(^{1821}\) It called it a patriotic (*aikoku*)\(^{1822}\) practice that Japanese should see as their natural duty of devotion and love for the nation. These examples reveal the diverse concepts of religion, spirituality and politics in different cultures, and how sensitively they must be handled in effective ODA and development policies.\(^{1823}\)

Japan’s leaders struggled with deciding which spiritual ideology could best help motivate Japan for development. Because of perceived cultural conflicts, most chose Shinto over Christianity as the preferred aid.\(^{1824}\) States may use spirituality as a useful

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\(^{1821}\) The term for State Shinto is *Kokka Shinto*, which may be directly translated as “National Shinto” or “Shinto of the National House.”

\(^{1822}\) The literal meaning of *aikoku*, a common word for patriotism, is “love the nation” (country). Today the term has a negative connotation of prewar propaganda and jingoism that it did not have before World War II.

\(^{1823}\) Other examples of this spiritual complexity are seen in the research of Yanagita Kunio on Japanese spirituality that we explored earlier. Consider the “traditional” Japanese connections of spirituality with local identity, place, and kinship, very different from contemporary American views that often connect religion with beliefs or doctrine. Another example is the close non-Western connection of the spiritual realm with the material realm, as explained in the Flaw of the Excluded Middle concept (Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle,” and *Anthropological Reflections*).

\(^{1824}\) The Meiji state also did not choose Buddhism as the preferred spiritual practice to motivate Japan’s development. In the Tokugawa period, Buddhism was often seen as a less indigenous source of tradition than Shinto (Buddhism originally entered Japan from overseas). This occurred as Tokugawa scholars
tool to promote cultural cohesion during development at either the national or local levels, but freedom of religion must be maintained. A few conflicts emerged in these leaders’ views of spirituality and science, especially over alleged conflicts between Japanese and Western cultures, but not really about spiritual and material aspects. To assess spiritual and religious issues in aid and development, aid workers need training in how to be sensitive to the spiritual (and secular) aspects of the worldviews of both aid donors and recipients.

From 1895 to 1945, the role of spirituality in Japan’s politics increased. The state drew more on State Shinto to promote nationalism, through education and other vehicles. The state’s willingness to use spirituality for its own purposes is similar to the pragmatic Japanese attitude of drawing on religion whenever it can help with practical needs. When the state chose State Shinto as the national spiritual practice, it likely had a somewhat homogenizing effect on local spirituality, as Yanagita feared, though daily spiritual practice remained alive throughout Japan. The same is likely true for Japan’s political actors, prewar and contemporary. Regardless of public statements about religion and spirituality, personal practices continue. The Flaw of the Excluded Middle does not seem to be in operation here. Likely the spiritual practices and convictions of even aid staff, at some level, play out in their views of aid and in their aid policymaking, though exactly how needs to be determined through ethnographic research.

On the relationship of religion and spirituality with Japan’s contemporary aid policies, we learned that in various respects, especially regarding “postmaterial” values, struggled to identify indigenous, genuine sources of tradition for the nation. Shinto was seen as such a tradition, while Buddhism was not.
Japanese are not so different from persons in other advanced nations. “Traditional” values, many from Confucianism, are being changed through the rise of new values that encourage people to seek freedom, purpose, and self-fulfillment. Many Japanese, especially the young, have lost their drive to achieve economic development at all costs. This has created a spiritual vacuum in increasing numbers of Japanese, making them more open to seeking personal meaning through human service or religion. Although Japan’s NGO community is small compared to those in most Western nations, it is a vibrant example of the expansion of Japan’s civil society, of how Japan is becoming more diverse, pluralistic, and how Japanese citizens are demanding greater public accountability on ODA and other issues. Increasing globalization and connections of these NGOs with their overseas counterparts have also strengthened their ability to pressure the government and its ODA programs, and provided further avenues for service and fulfillment for postmaterial Japanese.  

Though there may be formal, legal or cultural pressures in Japan that discourage aid policymakers from considering spiritual factors in aid, they need to, given the rise in the importance of religion in international affairs since the 1990s, including terrorist attacks in Tokyo in 1995 and the 9-11 incident in New York in 2001. The question is how this can be practically done. Training development and aid workers and policymakers in practical research skills and approaches such as applied ethnography and holistic

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1825 A good example is a recent graduate of the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Kimura Hiroshi. Before graduating, Kimura did a development-related internship in Bosnia with World Vision International. Returning to Japan, he served with both secular and religious NGOs in the Osaka area. Kimura now works as the international coordinator for a Tokyo area research institution.
anthropology is one way. Like every major aid donor and advanced industrial nation, Japan needs to improve its consideration of the human, ground level factors and conditions that affect aid, diplomacy, security, and numerous other issues in international affairs. Let us hope that various efforts underway, both in Japan and globally, including new graduate programs in international development, organizational reforms and research improvements in aid agencies such as the “new” JICA, and cross-disciplinary efforts to bridge the social sciences in training for international affairs can help encourage this.

Yanagita Kunio’s ethnographic research of Japanese religious life and the resulting policy implications is one concrete example. Aid workers need training in practical, rapid ethnographic methods so that they can do this in overseas development research. Possible examples of such training include W. Penn Handwerker, *Quick Ethnography* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001); and James Beebe, *Rapid Assessment Process: An Introduction* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2001). On a general level, giving aid policymakers and decision-makers basic training in applied cultural anthropology, which is commonly holistic in approach, can encourage awareness of these issues in development policy.
Chapter 10

Conclusions, Part II: Policy Implications

Introduction

Chapter 10 explores this study’s possible policy implications for domestic and international issues.\(^{1827}\) I will often discuss worldview policy implications for both historical time periods studied\(^{1828}\) consecutively, though sometimes they will be considered together. Next, I will briefly examine possible future trends for Japan’s ODA policy. Finally, the chapter considers policy applications from this project for the social sciences (applied anthropology, political science and international studies) and development policy. What has Japan’s ODA accomplished in practice? Koppel and Orr argue that while the amount of actual ODA may seem “small” compared with value of private sector flows flowing from Japan, ODA is the main instrument through which postwar Japanese foreign policy has developed the capacity, via bilateral and multilateral channels, to broaden its goals and activities beyond mere trade and economic issues.\(^{1829}\)

In the conclusion, among several key insights, I stress the importance of applying improved social research methods to the Japanese aid system, and the urgency for the

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\(^{1827}\) Note that these policy implications and lessons are largely conjectural, offered from my own reflection on these issues.

\(^{1828}\) The time periods studied are 1850 to 1895 and 1895 to 1945.

\(^{1829}\) Koppel and Orr, _Japan’s Foreign Aid_, 365.
Western-controlled, global aid system to acknowledge and better understand the significance of the East Asian development experience, in general and for other regions.

Worldview Policy Implications for Domestic Issues

Policy Implications of Technological Development Worldviews

For the time period 1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa Yukichi helped other Japanese to absorb knowledge about Western science, technology, and culture through his university, writings, and business ventures. Fukuzawa, along with Mori Arinori, was one of the leaders of the bunmei kaika movement, which stressed the need for Japan’s pragmatic, liberal adaptation of Western science and knowledge. Mori Arinori later went to Washington as Japan’s first diplomat in the U.S. from 1871-1873 to prepare for the Iwakura mission, a high level delegation of Japanese officials and students sent to study U.S. and European “intellectual technologies” in science, business, education and government. It soon had a big influence on Japan’s industrialization.1830 In the early 1870s, during his service in public works, Ito Hirobumi helped initiate various infrastructural improvements.1831 As a major political and military leader in Meiji and Taisho Japan, Yamagata Aritomo used certain “traditional” ideologies and values, coupled with Western ideas and institutions, to reform and strengthen Japan. He was particularly influential in contributing to reforms in the military, local government,

1830 Van Sant, Mori Arinori, xviii, xx-xxi, xxv.
1831 Hamada, Prince Ito, 62-63. These improvements included Japan’s first railway and additional lines, telegraph lines, docks, lighthouses, mining, postal, and printing systems (Ibid.).
constitutional politics, and in Japan’s international relations, including Japan’s adoption of the most advanced military technologies then available.

In the process of modernizing to repel Western invasion, Japan imported numerous forms of Western culture, science, politics, and technology. The government, suspicious of Western influence, attempted to limit it almost exclusively to the areas of science and technology, to maintain the distinctiveness of Japanese culture. Along with these goals, the government and some intellectuals sought a “scientific” theory that could allow rapid modernization and social change. Social Darwinism met that need. Kato Hiroyuki was one of the chief intellectuals who helped to develop and apply the theory for that aim.1833

The five leaders examined during 1850-1895 vary in their direct involvement in policymaking and in how their views of science and technological development affected policy. Four of the five leaders served as policymakers during at least a part of their careers, in education, local government, the military, and foreign policy. Only Fukuzawa never had direct policy involvement, though he worked briefly as a government translator. Concerning policy impacts for technological development, many of these leaders’ impacts were direct: Mori on education, Ito on public works (in the 1870s), and Yamagata on Japan’s military and local governments. Kato’s influence was broad, since he helped to apply Social Darwinism to Japan’s general context. Through that, the government hoped to limit Western impacts to mainly the science and technology sectors. The influence of Fukuzawa and Mori, members of the Meirokusha debate society, was

1833 Unoura, “Samurai Darwinism,” 236-240. Yet as they received Darwin’s theory, many Japanese felt racially inferior to Caucasian Europeans (Ibid.).
also broad. Fukuzawa had great impact on Japan’s perception of the West through his popular writings and work in education and business.

In the time period 1895 to 1945, early in his career, Yanagita Kunio had broad exposure to domestic and international policymaking, leading him to later study how interaction with Western technology and culture affected Japan’s core identity and culture, through the relatively new methodology of ethnography. This was unlike many Meiji leaders, whose concern for Japan’s defense preceded their policy involvements. Yanagita proposed many kinds of policy applications designed to preserve elements of Japanese “traditional” culture that he identified through his research across rural Japan. But they seem to have had limited impact on actual government policies in Yanagita’s era. The second major leader studied, Hirohito, was inspired by his love of science, by 1928, to establish two personal biological research facilities, and to pursue a scholarly scientific career as an avocation. Both government propaganda (at times) and his personal worldview reconciled modern science with divine accounts of the national polity. While Hirohito’s scientific bent was modulated by his obligations as emperor, scientific rationality also influenced his significant policy actions.

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1834 As noted above, early in his career, Yanagita served as a bureaucrat in several ministries, in the Diet (1914-1919), as a journalist for a major newspaper, and then as one of Japan’s delegates at the League of Nations in the early 1920s. His use of ethnography began about 1930 (Kawada, Origin Ethnography, 1-3, 81, 110-111).

1835 While beyond the present study, it seems Yanagita’s policy impacts were greater in the postwar period, when the Japanese government began actual campaigns to preserve many unique aspects of Japan’s cultural heritage, and in the 1970s, when rural Japanese culture was widely promoted by the Japanese travel industry.

1836 Hirohito became a naturalist and student of marine biology, collecting marine samples his whole life (Bix, Hirohito, 199-200).

1837 Government propaganda connected with Hirohito’s enthronement celebrations in 1928 claimed that modern science and the kokutai (Japan’s national polity) were compatible (Ibid.).

1838 Ibid., 60-62.
surrounding World War II. He was a shrewd, rational political actor, and yet his stubborn commitment to divine ideals nearly destroyed the nation.\footnote{The influence of elements of Japanese religious tradition and the emperor ideology clearly also had a great influence on Hirohito’s actions, and are better known.}

While Yanagita was critically aware of the implications of Western technology and culture for Japan, and devoted much of his career to researching related phenomena, and offered policy applications, before 1945, their impact is questionable. Though Hirohito’s reflections on these issues were less overt, his policy implications were massive. He experienced conflicts in his worldviews and policy actions based on his scientific rationality and his commitment to divine, imperialistic ideologies. Both of these elements of his worldview influenced each other. Given his position as the top political and military leader in the nation, his decisions and actions had huge effects on Japan. His divine obligations nearly destroyed the nation, but his scientific-based rationality enabled both him and the throne to survive the turbulent politics of postwar Japan. On their views of technology and policy, Yanagita’s focus tended toward the domestic effects of technology on Japanese society (translative adaptation), while Hirohito’s approach leaned toward the threat of Western internationalization. Yanagita’s policy applications were weaker than Hirohito’s. Given Yanagita’s concern with limiting the effects of Western technology on Japanese society, his views were more anthropological than Hirohito’s. Hirohito’s wartime militaristic technology policies were unsustainable. The use of destructive Western technologies, including the atomic bomb, nearly destroyed Japan.\footnote{The effects of this destruction continued after World War II, in the number of people wounded by the atomic bombs who finally died, the utter devastation of the Japanese economy at the war’s end, and the widespread suffering, poverty, and starvation of many Japanese in the early postwar period. For more} While pragmatic concerns and tones of scientific rationality
guided many of Hirohito’s policy responses to war with the United States, the conflict between his religious and scientific worldviews, and his spiritual duties as high priest of the nation, prolonged the war and contributed to Japan’s near destruction.\textsuperscript{1841}

**Policy Implications of Domestic State Worldviews**

Examining the period 1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa’s comments on politics were extensive.\textsuperscript{1842} He stayed largely independent of direct political involvement. His popular writings had a broad, indirect impact on Japanese politics and public opinion. But his belief in liberal political values, supported by the *bunmei kaika* movement, likely increased their appeal in society. Ito’s policy impacts were also broad and more direct than Fukuzawa’s. Ito had extensive involvement in domestic Japanese politics, and many impacts upon them.\textsuperscript{1843} He affected areas of politics that broadly influenced people’s daily lives, not specific policy issues so much.\textsuperscript{1844} He also researched Western political systems, their implications for Japan, and was the major author of Japan’s first constitution. Mori Arinori was a broad thinker, heavily involved in national policy. He thought and wrote about the nature of politics, Western politics, and their applications for Japan.\textsuperscript{1845} Yet his life was cut short. Ultimately his major policy impact, only short-term, was on national education policy, examined below. Yamagata Aritomo stressed national...
unity as the nation’s first political goal, and accompanying military and political reforms. He judged Japan’s national survival, in the face of huge external threats, as the supreme task for Japan’s leaders. He also introduced several important reforms for Japan’s domestic politics. Ultimately, he did not hesitate to get involved in policy, fighting strongly for what seemed best for Japan. Yamagata had some of the most assertive policy involvements of the five leaders. While his impacts on Japan’s domestic politics are not insignificant, they were eclipsed by his actions affecting Japan’s external relations. Kato Hiroyuki served in several national ministries and as the president of Tokyo Imperial University. Relevant to this study, his most significant impact stemmed from his mature political thought in writings such as Jinken Shinsetsu, which, in the 1880s, gave the Japanese government an intellectual, “scientific” justification for its extensive reform programs for Japan’s domestic affairs. Kato applied Social Darwinism to support official arguments against popular democratic movements. He provided mainly intellectual arguments in support of the national state’s reform policies.

How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic political worldview with the surrounding environment affect each one’s policy judgments, actions, and outcomes? The environment of all five leaders was at first rather closed, because of national isolation. To Fukuzawa, the forbidden West seemed the source of true power and

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1846 Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 243, 268-269; Dickinson, War and National, 40-42. Yamagata’s impacts on domestic politics included major reforms and innovations in local government, the military and constitutional politics (Hackett, “Meiji Leaders,” 243, 268-269; Dickinson, War and National, 40-42). In domestic politics, he strongly supported strengthening the central government’s authority over local affairs to support national unity.
1847 Davis argues that his greatest concrete policy impact, as a public servant, was in the national Ministry of Education (Davis, Moral and Political, 12).
1848 For a time, Kato’s thought was fairly influential, until he was eclipsed by more appealing writers.
practical wisdom. This, plus his observances in journeys to the West, led him to favor Western-oriented solutions in his policy reflections. The Tokugawa period was a conservative age. Fukuzawa, Ito, and Mori sensed the corruption of the Tokugawa regime. Ito supported imperial restoration. The outlook of the Meiji government was conservative, despite rapid reforms. At first Ito was wary of Western influence, but soon recognized the West’s power, and that Japan must reform quickly. The conservative environment, domestically and internationally, encouraged Ito’s conservative policy responses, as he modeled the Meiji constitution on the conservative Prussian model, and sought to limit popular political participation. Mori’s journeys to the West and training in Western science and technology powerfully exposed him to the dynamism of Western knowledge, and led him to advocate strongly for Western-oriented reforms, at first, radical ones. Gradual policy experience tempered this, later leading him to offer more conservative, pragmatic policy responses. Similar to Mori, at first Kato preferred more liberal, Western-oriented policies. But in a few years, he underwent a conservative transformation, and developed conservative yet evolutionary based arguments for the Meiji government’s policies. Like Ito, he adapted Western models of thought as conservative policy responses. Yamagata responded to the hostile external policy environment pragmatically, by seeking to use the West’s knowledge and technology against it, to build and unify Japan so it could resist Western imperialism. While perhaps radical in terms of the pace of change and the degree of state intervention, ideologically,

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1849 Remember that both Fukuzawa and Mori received early exposure to Western knowledge due to their upbringing in southwestern Japan, the region most open to Western influence during the Tokugawa period.
the outcome of these worldviews and policies on the domestic state was generally conservative.

In the time period 1895 to 1945, Emperor Hirohito emerged as Japan’s single most influential leader. Yanagita’s views of domestic politics (briefly explored in Chapter 7) stressed the need for strong local, grassroots political involvement and democracy. But they had little impact on how domestic Japanese politics unfolded through 1945. On the other hand, Hirohito’s views about domestic politics, his own policy actions, inactions, and decisions, and how the government chose to represent him to the nation (his public images) all deeply affected Japan’s domestic politics. Long before he became emperor, the state engaged in careful image management on his behalf. As emperor, he used divine myths to justify his actions and to strengthen his political position. At times, he utilized religion as a tool of power. One important example of the state’s image management of the emperor occurred in Hirohito’s enthronement. In 1928, the government spent huge sums for the event, reviving emperor ideology. Enthronement

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1850 For example, in the Meiji era, Japanese citizens were taught that they must work hard, and give full allegiance to the emperor (Bix, Hirohito). From 1918 to the early 1920s, public indifference to the throne increased, and the status of monarchies declined abroad. Examples of this included the collapse of dynasties in Russia, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere, and pressures from the United States to spread democratic ideals abroad through the League of Nations and other institutions. As regent, Hirohito completed a tour of European countries (1921) to strengthen the public image of the throne. The public saw a vigorous crown prince, meeting with leaders in Europe. When Hirohito became regent in 1921, the press portrayed him as an energetic prince on military maneuvers and meeting with foreign dignitaries. To strengthen his image, aides urged him to study and work harder. Aides urged Hirohito to do this since they were concerned about his ability to perform. The government experimented with bringing the throne a bit closer to the people by allowing his photo in newspapers. Hirohito privately expressed his doubts about the divinity of emperors, but finally followed the official ideology in his future rule (Ibid., 84, 110, 112-114, 119-122, 127-128, 135-136).

1851 Bix, Hirohito discusses these issues at some length.

1852 Ibid., 186-191. The rituals and intense media coverage of the Enthronement showed Japan as divine, and Hirohito as closely connected with his subjects. In the climax, events across Japan and its colonies reinvigorated people’s support for the emperor and the state (Ibid.). In the events, Hirohito was “deified,” united with the sun goddess, and watched massive military displays, uniting his images as the national
activities greatly influenced Japan’s political culture, strengthening the indoctrination of leaders and the people into the national morality, the fusion of religion with politics and the end of Taisho democracy. The enthronement helped close Japan to Western influence, strengthened the expansionary slogan of hakkô ichiu, and encouraged the emergence of emperor worship through 1945. But Hirohito’s image was not always uncontested. By 1940, the emperor image and ideology were used to justify other ideologies of militarism, war, Japanese fascism, and colonialism. Through the state’s prewar national image work regarding the emperor, Hirohito and the Japanese people evolved a symbiotic relationship of shared emotions, ideology, and experiences with war. Before the postwar period, he looked down on them as their exalted, benevolent father, with whom they were not to disagree, though some always did. Yet in reality, Hirohito was terribly isolated from them.

How Hirohito’s prewar worldviews and images influenced policy is seen the most strongly after he became emperor. In a setting like Japan, with a “divine” ruler, the

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religious leader and supreme military commander. His weak personal image, national unity, and his symbolic connection with the people were strengthened (Ibid., 191-195).

Hakkô ichiu, eight corners of the world under one roof, based on a quotation in the seventh century chronicle of Nihon shoki, emerged as a philosophy during the Tokugawa era. It reemerged from 1850 and in Meiji Japan, and became an important government slogan during World War II. According to this ideology, all corners of the world would eventually unite under the rule of Japan’s benevolent emperor (Ibid., 200-201; Japan, “Hakkô ichiu,” 491).

In 1933, Hirohito’s image was attacked from several domestic quarters. Those attacking his image included some in the military, the Privy Council, the Seiyûkai (a leading political party), and civilian right-wing groups. Some criticized him as limiting the military, as manipulated by his advisors, or overly interested in his recreational pursuits (Bix, Hirohito, 283).

For example, within official emperor theory there had long existed two competing images of the emperor: the pragmatic image of the emperor as a “jewel” to be manipulated to provide political legitimacy, and an ideal image that supported the idea of actualized, “direct imperial rule.” By the 2,600th anniversary of the Japanese state, November 10, 1940, the emperor also emerged as the colonial symbol of the “New Order for East Asia” (Ibid.).

In another example of image management, to counter this isolation, the court had Hirohito initiate a rice planting ceremony, to improve his popular image (Ibid., 182-183).
nation viewing itself as a superior race, and supreme authority vested in the state.

Hirohito and his court were free to directly influence politics in decisive ways. In domestic politics in the mid- to late-1920s, conflicts emerged over the nature of Japan’s national polity, and oligarchic versus popular control of Japan’s politics. Amid fierce Diet debate, Hirohito and the court found it hard to remain aloof. The small, sophisticated, elite court group, operating beyond constitutional limits, assisted him. The court policymaking process was complex. The elaborate politics forced the court group to develop methods for Hirohito to influence policies before their formal presentation to him by ministers. The court group also tried to prevent his involvement in partisan debates.

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1858 Ibid., 11-12. For example, early in his reign, from a distance, Hirohito enthusiastically influenced the behavior of his first three prime ministers, hastened the downfall of political party cabinets, and resisted mechanisms for peace at the League of Nations (Ibid.).

1859 Briefly, in the 1920s, Japanese at every level of society, including military, religious and academic leaders, debated the meaning of Japan’s kokutai (national polity or essence). Leaders in the government, court, and Hirohito clung to slowly eroding, Meiji era images of the national polity, while political liberals and reformers in every sector hoped to make kokutai compatible with modern scientific thought and bureaucratic politics. Conservatives resisted democracy and Japan’s subjugation to the West, arguing that “sacred” notions of the kokutai and the emperor were eternal. Concerning pressures from liberals for increased democratic representation, in 1925 the Diet’s lower house passed the Peace Preservation Law, making anarchist, communist or republican movements almost inconceivable (Ibid., 159, 161-163).

1860 Ibid., 157-163.

1861 Ibid. Court group members were representatives of the most wealthy, powerful classes in Japan. According to Bix, they must be studied in conjunction with, not in contrast to, the military and the imperial family. Their views, characteristics, strategies, and actual members shifted over time. Hirohito directed their actions; they had little opportunity to operate outside his will (Ibid., 178-179). From 1927, the court group sought to erect a new ideological framework where he could exercise true supervision over politics, prime minister appointments, and the cabinet (Ibid.).

1862 The court policymaking process included naisō (informal reports from the prime minister, cabinet members and the military), gokamon (questions and responses from the emperor), and behind-the-scenes maneuvering for Hirohito’s approval. He influenced policymaking, high-level military appointments and promotions. While Hirohito was interested in the military, the court group preferred he focus on domestic issues, hopefully his greatest legacy. They assumed that he must both reign and rule, and hoped to revive his strength and image as authoritative, like the Emperor Meiji (Ibid.).

1863 To limit party influence, Hirohito and the court group strongly affected prime ministers’ policies, including Tanaka Giichi. Hirohito and the court group fired him, and promoted his successor, Hamaguchi Yuko, in 1929. The court group privately praised Hirohito’s desire to resist parties and to assume stronger oversight over politics. Yet he hesitated to exercise the strong control over the military required by law. Such interventions caused resentment by the right wing and the military from 1929 on (Ibid.).
Hirohito was interested in political action, often indirect, influencing cabinet decisions, political party and Diet disputes. Policy Implications of Domestic Market Worldviews

For 1850 to 1895, what were the major policy impacts and implications of the three leaders whose domestic market worldviews I studied? Fukuzawa initiated influential ideas for both private and public sectors, but his stronger impacts were on the private sector and Japanese culture at large. In the 1870s, Ito initiated several policies important for the foundation of Japan’s modern economy. They were designed to modernize Japan’s national economic system, and help it better function in the global economy. Both Ito’s political and economic views were conservative. In the Meiji Constitution, he believed that Japanese society must be broadly supportive of needed economic reforms. I saw no evidence that Kato’s economic policy impacts were great.

In their overall impacts on policy affecting the domestic economy, Fukuzawa’s seem the broadest and deepest, on the place of economics and business in the general culture, and on the private sector. The economic policy impacts of Ito and Kato both fell

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1864 Ibid., 178-181, 184-185, 206-208, 218-219. In the late 1920s, two additional important events affected domestic politics. Conflict between Japan and China over the status of Manchuria began, and the Showa financial panic occurred. Reports about the conflict over Manchuria emerged in Japan’s press in 1927 (Ibid., 205). The Showa financial panic occurred in 1927 in the context of economic growth that seemed to mainly benefit the zaibatsu and urban areas, to the detriment of rural areas and smaller businesses. Both the financial panic and the Showa economic depression (the latter caused by the 1929 New York stock market crash) brought confusion and decreasing public confidence in Japan’s economy (Japan, “Showa Period,” 1417-1418).

1865 The three leaders were Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ito Hirobumi, and Kato Hiroyuki.

1866 Fukuzawa had broad cultural impact through his writings on economics and business, his establishment of several important businesses and Keio University, and his advocacy of modern principles on currency, banking, and other business issues. His strong impacts on the private sector were demonstrated in his advising of two important zaibatsu, and his founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank, which laid the foundation for the Bank of Japan, Japan’s central bank.

1867 Hamada, Prince Ito, 62. These policies, modeled after Western economies, included revising the coinage system, adopting the gold standard, initiating the national mint and the Bureau of Taxation (Ibid.,).

1868 The Constitution gave the Emperor and other political actors wide encouragement to intervene in public finance and (indirectly) in the marketplace.
mainly in the public sector. But evolutionary economic views provided a quiet undercurrent for the thought of all three leaders, in how they placed more economically developed countries in a higher position of respect, more worthy of emulation. Such views affected what economic policies were adopted and how the economy developed. They influenced decisions of what systems would be imitated, and which would not.\textsuperscript{1869}

How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic market worldview with the surrounding environment perhaps affect each leader’s policy judgments, actions, and outcomes? Fukuzawa and Ito were raised in southwestern Japan. They grew up in the presence of Western cultural influence and trade, helping them to see the dynamism of the West and its economic influence.\textsuperscript{1870} This led them to later prefer Western models as the strongest and best for Japan. Kato’s choice of German as his main foreign language greatly influenced his later worldviews and politics. For all three, their early exposure to Western culture and knowledge had profound impacts on their later thought and policy-related recommendations. Through his writings and the founding of Keio University, Fukuzawa’s domestic economic legacy for Japan seems the greatest of these three leaders.

For 1895 to 1945, we also briefly studied the domestic economy worldviews of Yanagita Kunio and Hirohito. Yanagita’s views, which stressed the importance of regional development and agriculture as a foundation of Japan’s national life, were contrary to the general economic development policies pursued by the Japanese government through 1945, which mostly stressed large-scale industrialization and foreign

\textsuperscript{1869} Western countries, with authoritarian systems most similar to Japan (i.e. Prussia), emerged as the preferred model for Ito and Kato.
\textsuperscript{1870} Although the region also traded with Asia, the West seemed more powerful.
trade. Yanagita’s wisdom in this area was not well recognized until later in the twentieth century, when rapid urbanization began to threaten the economic viability of rural regions across Japan. In contrast, I found no evidence that Hirohito’s economic thought was either intrinsically significant or important in application to the domestic economy.

**Policy Implications of Domestic Society Worldviews**

In the period 1850 to 1895, most of Fukuzawa’s writings of the 1870s and 1880s were meant to help Japan in the task of worldview change that he identified as crucial for Japan’s reform. He also contributed greatly to the worlds of Japanese business, journalism, politics and education. Mori had extensive involvement in national education policy. He rejected state attempts to infuse religious nationalism into the education system, and the state’s use of indigenous religious ideologies for the purpose of nation-building. His educational reforms included institutional, educational and cultural standardization to create citizens who could be easily absorbed into the state. His overall approach was pragmatic and utilitarian. In addition to his service in several national ministries, at their mature stage, Kato’s evolutionary based views of morality were in line with the general government policy of supporting evolutionary arguments for various imperial political institutions, the state, and for Japan’s origins. He supported the government policy that Shinto was not a religion, but a patriotic practice, as

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1871 Tamaki, Yukichi Fukuzawa, 10-11.
1872 Ibid., 168.
1873 This happened when Mori served as the national minister of education.
1874 This religious nationalism was based on “traditional” Japanese religious values drawn from Shinto and Neo-Confucianism.
1875 His earlier calls for social reform included several “radical” proposals. Earlier in his public service, Mori proposed that Japan adopt English as the official language, Christianity as the state religion, and that non-government samurai give up their swords.
well as the state’s general religious policies and views at the time. Kato also affirmed the state’s use of nationalistic Shinto in his personal beliefs and practices.

As with domestic politics, Fukuzawa’s impacts on domestic Japanese society were broad, through his writings, educational institutions and businesses he started. He offered numerous suggestions for other areas of Japanese society, including institutions of daily life, such as post offices, schools, business and banking. One of his long-term impacts was to encourage Japan to adopt more attitudes supportive of science. It does not seem that Mori’s views of society had significant policy impacts, but his beliefs about social change evolved into specific education policies. His efforts at developing national educational standards had some effect. These policies encouraged the development of discipline and respect for the nation in students, and were not as nationalistic as those adopted after his death in 1889, which cut short his long-term impact on education. Kato’s policy impacts on domestic society were less direct than Fukuzawa’s or Mori’s, more those of strengthening ideological support for state policies on nationalism, political institutions, and religious nationalism. His views of religion were supportive of the nation’s general religious policies. Did these leaders’ views and actions on society, social change and morality/religion help Japan become more “scientific?” Through his popular writings, Fukuzawa had the deepest impact on Japanese society, helping it to adopt various technological, institutional, educational and economic innovations that affected daily life for generations to come. His writings encouraged a very practical view of science and technology.

We learn more if we compare the policy issues surrounding spirituality, social change, and the attitudes of the three leaders on these matters. I wish to argue that
generally the social institution of religion (specifically Shinto) was strengthened through 1945. \textsuperscript{1876} State Shinto received much public funding, support, and organization as it was embraced as the state religion and became a chief ideological pillar of state nationalism. The high level of support continued until the war’s end. Although Fukuzawa and Mori argued for the adoption of some “Western” social values,\textsuperscript{1877} the Meiji state preferred to reinterpret elements of Western culture and apply them in a selective manner.\textsuperscript{1878} Kato supported this. The radical degree of social change that Mori supported in his earlier recommendations for policy reforms was rejected outright by the state.\textsuperscript{1879} Interaction with the West caused the Meiji state to attempt to formalize, institutionalize and/or nationalize areas of social life that were previously conducted less formally, such as education and Shinto. While social change resulting from the state’s reforms was often rather sweeping, ideologically the state’s approach to social change seems conservative.

How did the interaction of each leader’s domestic society worldviews with the surrounding environment affect each one’s policy judgments, actions, and outcomes? Fukuzawa’s mindset and worldviews were deeply affected by his early journeys to the West, and by his continued writings about Western ideas. As a leading public

\textsuperscript{1876} This depends on how one defines strength. Folklorist and ethnographer Yanagita Kunio would disagree with my argument that Shinto was strengthened. He believed that the government’s formal institutionalization policy of Shinto into a highly organized, hierarchical, state-supported spiritual institution threatened to crush the genuine spirit of spontaneous, heartfelt worship that held Japan together as a nation and people. See more detailed arguments earlier in Chapter 7.
\textsuperscript{1877} Fukuzawa and Mori supported the adoption of such values as individualistic “spirits” of independence and religious freedom.
\textsuperscript{1878} For example, the Meiji state translated the European tradition of state religions or churches into the adoption of Shinto as one of the state’s chief official ideological foundations to encourage nationalism and patriotism.
\textsuperscript{1879} These recommendations included Mori’s suggestion that Japan adopt English as the official language, and Christianity as the national religion. In the sixth century A.D., traditionally either 538 or 552, the Japanese state and imperial court officially embraced Buddhism from mainland Asia as a positive force for the country, and encouraged its spread.
intellectual, aristocrat, educator and entrepreneur, Fukuzawa was thoroughly enmeshed in domestic Meiji society. His reflections about the West did not diminish his “Japaneseness.” His long-term impact on Japanese society was profound. He helped familiarize Japanese with the thought and logic of many Western technological and social innovations. As Japan adapted more of these innovations, it seems its “Japaneseness” failed to diminish, and remained strong. Like Fukuzawa, Mori was deeply affected by his many travels and lengthy stays abroad. Mori seemed, at first, more Westernized than Fukuzawa in his basic outlook, and in his earlier policy responses. Later both of these moderated. He became more pragmatic, conservative and nationalistic in his educational policies. Their impacts were cut short when he was killed in 1889. Kato’s study of German greatly affected his future worldviews, policy recommendations, and ideological thought. While earlier he was attracted to liberal ideas from Anglo-American sources, in the long run, concepts of Prussian conservatism, autocracy, and German evolutionism prevailed in his writings. He adapted cutting edge principles of German Social Darwinism into patriotic, conservative arguments for nationalistic political and social innovations in Meiji Japan. His creative adaptation of foreign ideological currents for Japanese society remained ideologically conservative when translated into the Japanese environment. Ultimately he became more ideologically conservative, keeping his “Japaneseness.”

In Chapter 3, when I assessed the implications of the three leader’s worldviews of domestic society (1850-1895), I used two key questions regarding the relationship of
technology and culture in Japan in that era.\footnote{1880} Modified for policy, the first question becomes how the social conditions and contexts in Japan affecting its receipt of technological and related social phenomena influenced its policies for those issues. The willingness of the three leaders and the Japanese public to receive Western technological and cultural input varied. They exhibited degrees of ambivalence. While desiring the “fruits” of Western technology and knowledge,\footnote{1881} they did not always wish to receive influence from institutions, values, and effects associated with the technologies.\footnote{1882} Both policymakers and leading thinkers struggled to develop effective policies that would allow Japan to import needed areas of knowledge, while enabling it to filter out ideologies and cultural influences believed to be socially negative.\footnote{1883} The second question becomes how the degree of preparedness of Japanese society to receive certain technologies from abroad affected its policies for those issues. Most policymakers and the Japanese people displayed a receptive attitude to science and technology, since they seemed necessary for Japan’s survival. Near the end of the Tokugawa era, forward thinking intellectuals, feudal domains and the Tokugawa regime attempted to learn about Western technologies through Dutch learning, schools for the study of Western knowledge, and overseas missions.\footnote{1884} The new Meiji state invested heavily in scientific and technological research, education, and infrastructure, so that Japan might quickly

\footnote{1880} The first question regarded how Japan’s social conditions (1850-1895) affected its receipt of technological input from abroad. The second question concerned how socially prepared Japan was to receive new forms of technology from abroad.\footnote{1881} These fruits included military power, increased comfort and safety in daily life, and wealth.\footnote{1882} I mean cultural influences such as democratic values, labor and women’s rights, increased urbanization, pollution, and Christianity.\footnote{1883} The government’s policies for temporarily importing foreign instructors, its prohibition against Christianity and foreign missionaries through 1873, and its attempt to use Kato’s theories to limit Western influence to science and technology sectors are examples of such policies.\footnote{1884} See the section in Chapter 3 about the contexts of technological development (1850-1895).
gain the means and wealth to defend itself against the West. So general social support for scientific knowledge in Tokugawa and Meiji Japan eventually translated into strong policies for the development of Japan’s scientific and technological capabilities.

On the period 1895 to 1945, Yanagita’s holistic views of the interconnections of various facets of Japan’s domestic society are impressive, as are his observations of what should be done to protect Japan’s cultural, rural heartland. In his views, there is a heavy emphasis on the need to protect local, indigenous Shinto worship, what he saw as one of the central cores of Japanese identity, and on the connections between the spiritual and physical worlds, between which there is no essential conflict, and which can greatly affect Japan’s development. Sadly, in this period, Japan’s government was very not prepared to act on Yanagita’s recommendations, which seem so wise. Earlier in the period, the government placed overall emphasis on Japan’s rapid economic growth, military and industrial strength, and political independence, all of which seemed the most necessary for Japan’s survival. Later, the dramatic events of the war crowded out quieter concerns like these.

In contrast, Hirohito’s worldview of domestic society, which heavily supported the state ideology of Shinto, was also affected by his scientific training in the natural, policy, and military sciences. These created a subtle, under-the-surface conflict in Hirohito that, while not impairing his rational ability to function as a policymaker, had profound effects on Japan as his worldview “tension” played out in World War II. His overarching commitment to the Shinto gods, imperial ancestors and throne led him to take several destructive, less than rational actions that delayed Japan’s surrender. But he
did not lose his overall shrewdness and rationality, as seen in the postwar actions he took as Japan’s emperor who survived.\footnote{Bix, \textit{Hirohito} traces these events.}

Hirohito also enacted several nationalistic cultural policies in the 1920s that affected domestic society. Several events in Japanese society in the early to mid-1920s also affected Hirohito.\footnote{Two more important events affecting Hirohito occurred in 1923, the founding of the Japan Communist Party and the great Kanto earthquake (Bix, \textit{Hirohito}, 139-145). The Communist Party was the first modern group to press for the throne’s end. The Kanto earthquake was one of the worst natural disasters of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (91,000 deaths and 104,000 wounded). Afterwards, Hirohito increased his charitable contributions, partly to strengthen his image as a benevolent regent (Ibid., 140).} His policies, while often not directly concerned with social issues, affected society greatly. In the early 1920s, to Japan’s elites, the continuing \textit{kokutai} debate threatened national unity.\footnote{The Kokutai debate is mentioned in Chapter 7.} Responding to pressures for democratization, and to strengthen the imperial throne, in 1923 the government formulated a cultural policy, and in 1924, Hirohito established a “central association of culture” that religious groups were encouraged to join. Nichiren Buddhism sought government recognition of its campaign for “national spirit,” which it partially received.\footnote{Nichiren Buddhism, the nationalistic ideology of \textit{hakkô ichiu} (“benevolent” rule or “the eight corners of the world under one roof”), and racist ideologies in Japan in the 1930s all contained universalistic notions of the superiority of the Japanese nation and culture, and its ability to “purify” and “unify” the rest of Asia and the world (Ibid., 168-169, 196, 200-201, 372).} The campaign affected public opinion and the views of many military leaders during the Taisho era (1912-1926), contributing to the rise of ultranationalism in the 1930s.\footnote{Ibid., 163-165, 167-169. Other extra-governmental organizations, such as right-wing groups, nationalist “study organizations,” and the military, also attempted to influence public opinion. Some in the military attacked the myths of Japan’s founding. Recent research by Japanese scholars suggests that there was declining support among the public and the military for the foundation myths of Japan at that time (Ibid., 164-166).}

From the late 1920s to the early 1940s, Hirohito’s nationalistic images from various sources, including the enthronement ceremonies, also had important effects on
Japanese society and politics. First, they released huge popular patriotism and enthusiasm, drawing people closer to the state and throne, as did supportive civic groups. Second, the state unleashed important campaigns and symbols that shored up nationalism and the image of the throne, national “spirit” and education campaigns, designed to encourage support for the kokutai, “Japanese spirit” (Yamato damashii), and national worship of the emperor, and to discourage mass political movements. Also in this period, partly inspired by the enthronement, the Japanese government developed a new racist construction of Japanese identity, based on race—people—nation, not class. This simplifying, divine ideology of race helped fill Japanese nationalism with new universalistic tendencies. The racist ideology of the 1920s hinted at later ideologies of the 1930s and 1940s, where Japan faced the world as a racially pure country waging holy wars to build “new orders” in Asia.

The nationalistic use of images and ideology (Shinto mythology and emperor ideology) by Hirohito and the government in 1930s also affected society. Before conflict broke out with China in 1931, Shinto mythology was taught as fact in Japan’s schools,
and emperor ideology took a tone opposed to anti-Western imperialism.\textsuperscript{1894} In 1937, after the February 26 incident,\textsuperscript{1895} the emperor and his court group directed the Ministry of Education to develop the first of several educational tracts for schools. These tracts emphasized the superior nature and immutable connection of the Japanese people and their emperor, and their mutual duty to liberate the rest of Asia from Western colonialism.\textsuperscript{1896} So, as Japan’s autocratic ruler, Hirohito’s own beliefs and actions on domestic social issues had profound influences on Japan, Asia, and beyond.

**Worldview Policy Implications for International Issues**

**Policy Implications of External Political Relations Worldviews**

Most of the five leaders whose views of external political relations we studied (1850 to 1895, Fukuzawa, Kato, Yamagata, Ito and Mori) were realists, and stressed borrowing Western political ideas. Their views were driven by Japan’s pressing need to survive in the international system. On the Japanese nation and its place in the international system, all five supported Japan’s task of nation-building for its survival, and the necessity of borrowing Western political and military knowledge for that

\textsuperscript{1894} Ibid., 283. A conflict in this ideology was slowly emerging, between the uniqueness of Japan, and a pan-Asia identity uniting Japan with the rest of the continent (Ibid.). The conflict erupted with Japan’s intentional provocation of China in the Manchurian incident. See Japan, “The Manchurian Incident,” 916.

\textsuperscript{1895} Ibid., 283.

\textsuperscript{1896} Bix, *Hirohito*, 313-315. The first tract, *Kokutai no hongi* (The Fundamentals of the National Polity, 1937), stressed the superiority, purity, and selflessness of the Japanese people and nation over all others, the “centrality of the family-state, home and ancestors,” and the image of the emperor as military leader and living god. It also embodied the philosophy *kōdō* (the “imperial way”) that allowed Japan to justify its aggressions, and harassment of internal opposition by the military and the right wing. This tract also offered Hirohito the opportunity to encourage massive public support, which might strengthen his relations with the military. A second tract, *Shimmin no michi* (The Way of the Subject, 1941), was written in the context of absolute fascism in Japan’s wartime society. It called for absolute sacrifice and devotion to the emperor, in order to throw off Western individualism, to build a new order in East Asia (Ibid., 314-315).
purpose. Kato’s views were the most creative, connecting evolutionary and Confucian thought, and the government used elements of his thought for policy purposes. All five leaders agreed that the West presently dominated the international system. Most saw Asia as inferior to the West, and Asia beyond Japan as weaker than Japan. Most drew on scientific and technological-influenced thought in their thinking about international relations. Three of the five (Fukuzawa, Mori and Kato) drew somewhat on religion and morality, Western or Asian, in their thought on international relations. Their key desire was to find values to strengthen Japan’s development and survival. In this era, Ito and Yamagata had the greatest policy impacts on Japan’s external political relations.

The four leaders studied for 1895 to 1945 (Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita and Hirohito) had varied views of foreign policy, ranging from realism to pacifism to international conflict between races. Most, except Yanagita, were politically conservative. The greater each leader’s role in actual policymaking and foreign policy, the greater his policy implications here became. Though all of these leaders believed that Japan should help the rest of Asia combat Western imperialism, not all supported Japanese aggression for that end. All of the leaders were cautious and fearful about the West: what it might do to Japan and Asia. Hirohito in particular had a more positive view of conflict compared with the other three leaders. Not surprisingly, Hirohito, through his position as Japan’s emperor, had a greater policy impact on Japan’s external political relations than any other leader studied here; Yamagata was second.

We can get a more in-depth handle on the policy implications of Hirohito’s worldviews of Japan’s external political relations by briefly examining some of the main contexts for his foreign policy actions from the late 1920s through 1945. In 1928, there
were four key events involving Hirohito with lasting effects on both Japan’s domestic politics and Sino-Japanese relations until the late 1930s, including the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (in August). Hirohito was directly involved in various aspects of these events. In the late 1920s, he received a large amount of foreign policy information, often secret, from various sources. In the 1930s and 1940s, he played an active role in planning and guiding the China and Pacific wars. A 1941 alliance between Hirohito, his court group and hard-line militarist supporters of war against the United States and Britain enabled the Pacific War to occur. Through the war, Hirohito exercised direct, often controlling influence on the Pacific battlefronts. He gave the military continual feedback, an optimistic stress on offensive tactics, and careful

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1897 See Chapter 8 for more details on the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
1898 Ibid., 214-217. The other three events were the Jinan Incident (May), the assassination of Chinese warlord Chang Tso-lin (June), and the first infusion of emperor ideology into Japanese society under Hirohito through his enthronement and deification (second half of the year). The Jinan Incident involved a reign of terror launched by 17,000 Japanese troops who surrounded the city of Jinan, Shandong, China, sent there to protect Japanese residents in the city. In June 1928, officers of Japan’s Kwantung army assassinated the warlord leader of Shandong, Chang Tso-lin (Ibid., 214-215). After Chang Tso-lin’s assassination, some members of Japan’s military began uniting themselves with civilian right wing groups, laying the groundwork for the Manchurian Incident in 1931 (Ibid., 219-220).
1899 Ibid., 178-179. For example, members of Hirohito’s court group gathered, analyzed and delivered solely to him information on foreign affairs from many places, including the embassies of the United States and Britain. Hirohito also received huge amounts of data from government and military officers. He was like a “silent spider” receiving and remembering information from every government and military branch. This was possible because the advisory organs of the state reported directly to him, yet were separate from each other. These organs included the cabinet, the Diet, the Privy Council, the general staffs of the military, and the bureaucracy (Ibid.).
1900 Concerning his relations with the military, around 1930, when their morale problems increased, Hirohito avoided confronting the problem directly, passing it to his court entourage. During World War II, he often had strained relations with military leaders, yet overlooked their acts of defiance when they achieved victory (Ibid., 224-226, 15-16). Members of the military were angry with him for the signing of the London Naval Treaty, which Japan signed in April 1930, along with Britain and the United States. It limited the number of primary and secondary warships that each signatory could build and possess. Many top leaders in Japan opposed this treaty, but especially the entire Washington treaty system, which they viewed as erecting an Anglo-Saxon “iron ring” around Japan, so that it could not expand abroad. The enthronement and exaltation of Hirohito had enhanced state power and its policies. Those who disagreed had to somehow reverse those policies. The London Naval Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (signed in August 1928) were Japan’s two top diplomatic ventures in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Ibid., 206, 210, 224-226).
oversight for theater operations. He often visited war-related sites in Japan, though no
war front, encouraging production and sacrifice for the state. He developed a certain
charisma and determination that helped him to survive the war. But his leadership style
had problems. He was overly detailed, slow in decisions, not good with bureaucratic
rivalries, and cautious. In early 1945, his hesitation to continue fighting, and yet not break
with military supporters of fighting to the finish, delayed the war’s end.\footnote{Ibid., 15-16, 423, 439, 441-442.}

Evidence of Hirohito’s policy impact on Japan’s external political relations is
seen in his role in actions on foreign and war policy in China, Manchuria, Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific from the 1930s to 1945. On September 18, 1931, the Manchurian
Incident began.\footnote{Ibid., 15-16, 423, 439, 441-442.} This set off a succession of international and internal events that
changed the course of the Japanese state. Hirohito could have intervened and stopped it,
but offered his “tacit” support.\footnote{Ibid., 235-236, 239-240, 245-247, 249.} On March 1, 1932, Japan proclaimed Manchukuo’s
independence.\footnote{Ibid., 235-236, 239-240, 245-247, 249.} In January 1932, the Shanghai incident occurred.\footnote{Ibid., 15-16, 423, 439, 441-442.} In this case,
Hirohito directed events, while on Manchukuo, he watched passively.\footnote{Ibid., 250-251.} In March 1933,
Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. From late 1937 Hirohito influenced many aspects of the planning for the war in China, including promotion of the top military leaders. By late 1940, when decision-making processes were more efficient, he was involved in every stage of policy review. July 1937 marked the beginning of the long China conflict. Hirohito exercised influence on various aspects of these events. Nanjing fell on December 13, 1937. The undeclared, difficult China war lasted eight years. Japan got bogged down. It declared the “New Order in East Asia” in late 1938, and established a puppet Chinese regime in Nanjing in early 1940.

1907 Ibid., 261-262. At this same time, Hirohito issued a “bland and blind” imperial rescript wallpapering over internal conflicts in Japan over the Manchuria and Jehol invasions (Ibid.). In April 1933, Hirohito greatly opposed the invasion by Japanese troops of provinces south of the Great Wall. Manchukuo was not an effective “buffer peace zone.” Japan’s presence there allowed its Kwantung army to attack and pressure the five provinces in north China. But existence of the zone, plus the Soviet sale of China Eastern Railway to Japan, helped Hirohito to believe that it was an effective “peace zone” (Ibid., 271-272). In addition to withdrawing from the League of Nations, in 1936, two key foreign policy documents set forth radical goals that would tax the empire if implemented concurrently. These documents, “Criteria for National Policy,” and “Foreign Policy of the Empire,” projected an unrealistic combination of goals that would be impossible to achieve, including Japanese control or influence in Manchukuo, North China, the western Pacific and Southeast Asia, war with the Soviet Union, and naval competition with the United States. The influence of the great Western powers was to be limited, and the influence of Japan’s benevolent emperor expanded (Ibid., 308-309).

1908 Ibid., 12. Hirohito’s involvement extended up to the point of war with the U.S. and Britain, with him finally getting carried away with the excitement of imperial expansion and conflict (Ibid.).

1909 Chinese and Japanese troops stationed near the Marco Polo Bridge southeast of Beijing exchanged rifle fire. After a three-day skirmish, a local armistice was signed. A split occurred in the Japanese military’s China policy that Hirohito had to resolve. At first, he was more concerned about the possible threat from the Soviet Union against Manchukuo (Ibid.). Finally, Prime Minister Konoe’s cabinet decided to expand the conflict. Hirohito quietly but actively approved. Chiang Kai-shek expanded the conflict south to Shanghai to force a showdown with the Japanese there. Konoe and Hirohito approved attacking Chinese forces strongly there, and across North China, to make the Chinese “reflect” on their mistakes. Hirohito felt that the Chinese misunderstood Japan’s true intentions for “peace.” Japan, for fear of angering the United States, a chief supplier of needed natural resources, could not declare war. Japan called these events “the China incident,” a sacred struggle (Ibid.).

1910 Ibid., 333. Members of the Konoe government knew about the Nanjing massacre and the collapse of Japanese military discipline there. Likely Hirohito knew too. As Japan’s commander-in-chief and spiritual head, he failed to project concern about the collapse of moral or military discipline. Rather, he urged the military to greater victories in China. While figures are disputed, over the next six weeks, approximately 200,000 to 300,000 people were executed in the Nanjing area. At least 1,000, and likely many more, Chinese women were also raped until late March 1938 (Ibid., 334-338).

1911 Ibid., 342.
Hirohito’s involvement in war policymaking from the late 1930s and 1940s occurred as follows. In late 1937, an “Imperial Headquarters” was established, to improve the command structure for the China war. More frequent were “imperial conferences” (gozen kaigi), where Hirohito had input on and approved major decisions affecting Japan, its colonies and other countries. He had final command over the armed services, and exercised influence on the Headquarters through questions, repeated instructions, and lectures. Hirohito sometimes involved himself in daily decisions on campaigns and operations. At cabinet briefings, the Headquarters supported him as supreme commander. Consensus decisions were often predetermined, reflecting his thinking. In reality, Japan had “a powerless cabinet, an emasculated constitution, and a dynamic emperor participating in the planning of aggression and guiding the process, by a variety of interventions that were often indirect but in every instance determining.” By summer 1941, Hirohito’s main court and military advisors began working at court to support him as commander-in-chief in more frequent liaison

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1912 Although Hirohito had several opportunities to press for a cease-fire or an early peace, he did not. Early in 1938 the Konoe cabinet offered difficult terms for peace to China. When the Chinese delayed their response, Konoe stopped negotiations. Hirohito’s silence at the imperial conference held on January 11, 1938 betrayed his support of a harsher China policy than the army’s General Staff supported. Although Japan managed to gain control of most major cities and railways in northern, central and southern China in 1938, it could not control the vast countryside (Ibid., 342, 344-345, 347).

1913 Ibid., 347-348. At the end of 1938 Japan also initiated a new offensive in China, but resistance strengthened, and the Nationalists withdrew their government to Chongqing (Ibid.).

1914 Soon after, an “imperial palace-government liaison conference” was created to better integrate the army and navy branches (Ibid.).

1915 Neither law nor Japan’s constitution mandated the conferences, designed for Hirohito to offer his input as a constitutional monarch, and to receive advice from his ministers of state. Hirohito received advice, but only his chiefs of staff transmitted his orders (Ibid.).

1916 Ibid., 327-332.

1917 Ibid., 329.
conferences, which became more important than the cabinet. Basic military policy was still made by competing bureaucratic organs.  

Hirohito supported the war and the “Southern expansion” of Japan’s forces into the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, but worried about American and British reaction. He also worried that potential Japanese attacks on French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies would harm his “benevolent” image. Yet the China war was the most important background factor influencing policy decisions in 1941, and enabled Japan to mobilize forces to attack the U.S. and Britain. As the Pacific war commenced, both Hirohito and Japan’s top military leaders had many mistaken assumptions. Herbert Bix argues that Hirohito’s reactions to Japan’s losses against the Americans in such battles as Guadalcanal, Saipan, Coral Sea, Midway and Okinawa are key for understanding his role in World War II. He seemed to not comprehend their  

\[1918\] Ibid.  
\[1919\] Ibid., 353, 357. Regarding Hirohito’s war responsibility over China, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, he was directly responsible for allowing the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons in the China war. According to Bix, Hirohito also shares responsibility for the indiscriminate bombing of Chongqing and other large Chinese cities from 1938-1945. Worst of all, he approved of massive “annihilation” campaigns throughout China, starting in 1938, which killed many more people (approximately 2.7 million) than the unplanned massacre in Nanjing (Ibid., 361-362, 364). The Chinese Communist Party called these the “three alls policy” (burn all, kill all, steal all). In Japanese, they are known as sankō sakusen. Japanese historian Himeta Mitsuyoshi estimates that more than 2.7 million Chinese noncombatants died in the annihilation campaigns (Ibid., 365-367).  
\[1920\] Ibid., 367-368, 371-372. Bix notes the irony that although Hirohito approved gassing Chinese and other atrocities, he worried about his image as benevolent emperor if Southeast Asia was invaded. Such actions by leaders were not limited to the Japanese context, but have also occurred in the West (Ibid., 371-372).  
\[1921\] Ibid., 387-390, 392, 396. When presented with conflicting options, Hirohito rejected the findings, being thoroughly familiar with the procedures that generated them. From 1941, the high command became more complex, and the emperor received detailed reports daily. He was very well aware about the war, and the deception of his subjects. He often viewed domestic and foreign press reports (Ibid.).  
\[1922\] They focused on naval battles in the central Pacific Ocean, and the Soviet Union as the primary enemy, while the main naval battles unfolded in the south and southwestern Pacific, with the United States as the chief threat (Ibid., 444, 447).
gravity.\textsuperscript{1923} In monitoring many fronts, Hirohito directly intervened several times.\textsuperscript{1924} His rigidity and attention to detail lengthened the war.

Hirohito’s surrender rescript is a significant example of image maintenance, the first to reshape his national image as a peaceful, non-military, totally uninvolved ruler—all false images.\textsuperscript{1925} He showed a lot of stubbornness in the face of criticism, including a refusal to surrender.\textsuperscript{1926} From February 1945, Hirohito and his top advisors chose to continue the war, despite terrible bombings of Tokyo soon after, and the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August.\textsuperscript{1927} After hints from the allies on August 11 that his status might be maintained, Hirohito agreed to unconditional surrender on August 14, which he announced to the nation on August 15.\textsuperscript{1928} His reluctance to accept defeat, and his failure to act with certainty to end the conflict, “plus certain official acts

\textsuperscript{1923} For more details on Hirohito’s reactions in these battles, see Ibid., 444, 446-452, 456-464, 466-467, 470-471. For example, after hearing about Japan’s defeats at Coral Sea and Midway, Hirohito persisted in various customary public duties and leisure activities. Later in the battle for Okinawa (spring 1945), he stubbornly insisted that troops fight on, despite huge losses (Ibid., 451-452, 484-485).

\textsuperscript{1924} Bix, *Hirohito*.

\textsuperscript{1925} Ibid., 485-486, 525-529. Hirohito did not consider himself or the court group responsible for the final defeat. In their worldview, acting in one’s own self-interest or according to one’s conscience was selfish. One must sacrifice for and obey one’s leaders, for the good of the nation. This ideal was placed on citizens since beginning of the Showa era (1926). Hirohito and the court expected this could continue in postwar period. They could not connect the causes of defeat and the building of a new Japan (Ibid., 535-536). In the surrender radio broadcast on August 15, 1945, he desired to confuse the issue of accountability, prevent internal conflict and rage in Japan, and empower its unification around himself. On August 17, media and new Prime Minister Prince Higashikuni showed Hirohito as a benevolent, wise, non-political king. Hirohito blamed the bomb, the Soviet entry in the war, and preserving the national polity as the main reasons for surrender. According to Bix, likely the last two reasons were true (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{1926} Ibid., 475-480, 483-484. Some of the criticism came from some members of the imperial family, and especially from leading members of Japan’s elites (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{1927} Ibid., 487-496, 499-505.

\textsuperscript{1928} Ibid., 501-504. The Suzuki cabinet and Hirohito failed to come up with a strategy to save the Japanese from the destruction of the war. They waited until the “face-saving” incidents of the atomic bombings, Soviet invasion, and partial clarification of the emperor’s future status to surrender. They viewed the clarification of the status as the absolute minimum condition. But the atomic bomb, the Soviet invasion, and fear of popular uprising if the war was prolonged also prompted Hirohito and his aids to finally accept the Potsdam Declaration (Ibid., 509-511).
and policies of his government,” continued the war for so long.\textsuperscript{1929} He continually pushed for victory and offense rather than peace and negotiation. When the surrender option came, he delayed while the atomic bombs were dropped and the Soviets invaded Manchuria and Korea. Ignoring the suffering they caused the Japanese and others, the emperor and Japan’s leaders hoped for a means to “lose without losing,” to minimize postwar criticisms and permit their political structure to be maintained. They missed several opportunities to end the war since they were most concerned with the fate of the throne and dynasty.\textsuperscript{1930} Hirohito failed to acknowledge his own war responsibility, since he believed he ruled by divine right, as the center of the state. He also lacked any sense of personal war guilt. After the war, this legacy continued. According to Bix, as long as no one considered Hirohito’s responsibility, the Japanese people did not have to consider their own. Serious inquiry in Japan of these issues did not begin until the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{1931}

**Policy Implications of External Economic Relations Worldviews**

Two of the three leaders (Fukuzawa and Ito) studied in the era 1850 to 1895 were greatly impressed by what they observed Western economics doing long-term.\textsuperscript{1932} Their internationally-inspired economic actions were important and influential in several ways. In his popular writings about economics and his founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Fukuzawa had broad influence on Japan’s economic system, on both the domestic and international levels. Second, Ito’s role in international economic negotiations, and his attempt to import Japanese economic concepts during his brief service as Japan’s first

\textsuperscript{1929} But these actions do not account for the dropping of the bomb. That was due to the overwhelming influence of the throne, the “power, authority and stubborn personality” of Hirohito, plus “the power, determination, and truculence of Harry Truman” (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{1930} Ibid., 519-521, 523-524.

\textsuperscript{1931} Ibid., 16-17.

\textsuperscript{1932} Remember they made these observations in as youths in Southwest Japan and in their overseas travels.
governor-general in Korea, soon to become an important colony, are an example of Japan’s projection of its own economic goals on another country, similar to what the West had tried to do to Japan. But this is not to presume that Fukuzawa and Ito were among the most important leaders in Japan’s external economic relations in this era. The international economic thought of the third leader, Kato, was highly reflective of evolutionary currents present in the thought of many Meiji intellectuals, but had no notable policy impact.

Yanagita, the only leader whose views of Japan’s external economic relations we studied for 1895 to 1945, believed that the first truly global age of international economics had begun. Yet nation-states still acted in their own self-interest, seeking to devour others in cutthroat competition. Yanagita believed in heavy state economic involvement on the domestic and international levels, some protectionism, and a policy emphasis on primary production, agriculture, and the domestic market. The Japanese government, in its emphasis on heavy industrialization and trade, did not support his arguments, however, beyond heavy state involvement and protection of Japan’s market.

Policy Implications of External Cultural Relations Worldviews

There are many wise observations about Western and Japanese cultures one learns by studying the four leaders’ attitudes of and interactions with foreign cultures for the period 1850 to 1895. Fukuzawa in particular seems extremely wise in many of his observations of Western culture and life, and their lessons for Japan. He was especially strong in highlighting positive aspects of Western culture that might be important for Japan’s reforms, including education, individual duty, and freedom. The four leaders here

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1933 The leaders studied here are Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori and Kato.
observed and noted many aspects of Western life, positive and negative. Ethnocentrism colors some of their observations, especially Kato’s remarks about Western and foreign religions (Christianity). These leaders struggled intellectually and practically, as all Japanese did, with their interactions with foreigners, Westerners, and Western ideas. Given Japan’s general geographic isolation, and its extreme cultural isolation in the Tokugawa period, how could this not have been the case in this period? These leaders and the Meiji government wisely encouraged Japan to embark on an aggressive international learning campaign during this era, in the most practical ways possible, largely through learning foreign knowledge through foreign languages, technologies, and ideas, especially through books. The single most influential leader here seems to be Fukuzawa, especially through his popular writings, in helping numerous Japanese to come to practical terms with their interactions with the world beyond Japan. Ito is second most important, due to his long-term influence in writing the Constitution of 1889. Its policies in many areas affected the lives of millions of Japanese through 1945.

For 1895 to 1945, the two leaders studied on Japan’s external cultural relations were Yanagita and Hirohito. Both saw Western culture as a major threat against Japan, and believed that the government must take systematic steps to protect Japan’s culture. Yanagita’s thought on this issue was highly developed, perceptive, and pragmatic, on what Japanese and their government should do to protect Japan’s cultural autonomy and integrity. While Yanagita and Hirohito shared some common concerns, Yanagita’s was more to protect Japan’s culture at the grassroots, from the bottom up, while Hirohito’s concern was to protect it from the elite level, the top down. This was inevitable, given Hirohito’s position and training. There is no evidence that the government heeded
Yanagita’s wise suggestions before World War II. Rather, along with the government’s intentions to spread State Shinto and other cultural influences throughout Japan and the empire, Hirohito’s policy impacts on external cultural relations were ultimately deep. The government’s standardization of rural spirituality through state Shinto likely meant that, as Yanagita feared, local, indigenous, spontaneous spirituality was squelched before the war. Second, the defeat of Japan in the war, to which Hirohito contributed greatly, opened up Japan to an unprecedented flow of foreign ideas and cultural products in the postwar period. Thus, Hirohito had a much greater impact on Japan’s external cultural relations in this era than Yanagita.

**Policy Implications of Worldviews on Japanese Imperialism**

The leaders studied on imperialism (1895 to 1945) were Kato, Ito, Yanagita, Yamagata, and Hirohito. Regarding the policy implications of their views of imperialism, most viewed it as positive (for the colonizers); only Yanagita saw it as negative. All saw certain negative effects of Western imperialism on colonies, though Kato saw some positive effects for both the West and colonies. These leaders universally felt Japan should stay free. The views of several, notably Kato and Hirohito, are colored with evolutionary images and additional influences from Japanese (Shinto and Confucianist) ideologies. Racial overtones in the views of Kato and Hirohito are that each nation and colony must take its proper place in the global hierarchy of nations. All the leaders focused on what imperialism and colonialism might do for Japan and its domestic affairs. Only two leaders, Ito and Yanagita, expressed much genuine desire for the well-

\[1934\] Note that policy implications of leaders’ views of imperialism from 1850 to 1895 are not mentioned here since they were not studied earlier. I did not find enough data to warrant coverage of their views in this earlier period.
being of the colonies, beyond helping them resist the West. Most of the leaders (Kato, Yamagata, and Hirohito) regarded Japanese imperialism as positive, protecting Asia.\textsuperscript{1935} All of them also viewed the colonies as inferior to Japan, needing Japan’s protection. Hirohito approved imperialistic adventures in several regions. Despite rhetoric suggesting a desire for colonial self-determination and equality, Hirohito’s real concern seemed to be for how imperialism could strengthen Japan internally, and the throne. Overall, Hirohito had the most policy influence of any leader studied here; most of his impact was negative.

Japanese Aid: Policy Implications, Possible Future Trends

Some key issues for the future of Japanese aid include its capacity to address diverse needs and issues. How much can it encourage stability in the global system and in Asia? Can Japan’s ODA contribute substantively and creatively to vital new goals in North-South relations and international development? Or will it remain (in the eyes of critics) crassly “mercantilist” or become more “globally responsible?”\textsuperscript{1936}

What is the possible influence of long-term trends from Japan’s cultural and historical legacies, as uncovered in the present study? How have these past views shaped present views on a policy level? Are future trends likely to be a continuation or disruption of those of the past and present? Until now, Japanese aid has been strongly influenced by ideologies of its historic leaders.\textsuperscript{1937} I treat this issue (the evidence for the historical influence of Japan’s past experience and aspects of key leaders’ views on today’s ODA)

\textsuperscript{1935} While Yanagita condemned Japanese imperialism, he supported Japanese strengthening and defense of Asia against the West.  
\textsuperscript{1936} Koppel and Orr, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Aid}, 366.  
\textsuperscript{1937} I thank Joseph Szylowicz, University of Denver for his insights on these themes and general issues.
at length in Chapter 9. I argue there that it is challenging to trace the direct influence of specific leaders from the period 1850 to 1945 on present aid policies, partly because I could not include the period 1945 to the early 2000s in the present research, so there is a gap of some sixty years. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several significant streams of thought within which the views of the key leaders studied fall, and which seem highly influential on present aid approaches.

One of those streams is seen in Japanese aid’s continuous emphasis on economic infrastructure. Related to this, from 1868 to 1945 in particular, the Japanese government placed a heavy emphasis on developing the Japanese economy through heavy industry and international trade. A second influential stream is evolutionism, which was influential in the development- or security-oriented thought of almost all these leaders, especially those of Kato and Hirohito. The assumptions of Japan’s superiority are strong in prewar notions that Japan must lead Asia to counter the West, and in today’s ODA, that Japan must help Asian nations to develop. Additional examples include Japan’s prewar emphasis on economic relations with Asia, and its postwar regional aid focus on the same. The concept of self-help and self-reliance in Japan’s aid is based on Japanese values of hard work and self-reliance that are centuries old, and which were also heavily stressed in the writings of Fukuzawa. The concept of translative adaptation is also based on Japan’s development experiences that are fairly unique compared to those of the West. This basic concept is seen in the thought of Yanagita Kunio, though

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1938 See Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 and the associated discussions in Chapter 9 for an in-depth treatment of how specific ideas in the prewar and postwar eras relate to key ideas in contemporary Japanese aid policy, in the areas of sociocultural, political, and economic issues.

1939 Both the Cold War and Tokugawa Japan’s national isolation policy caused unnatural disruptions in Japan’s connections with Asia, but for most of history, its connections with continental Asia were stronger than with any other global region.
technically its reemergence in the work of anthropologist Maegawa Keiji is only since the
1990s. The image Japan of serving as a development “bridge” or model between or for
different world regions is also seen in the prewar hakkō ichiu ideology, where Japan
would serve as a Confucian beacon of peace and civilization for other Asian nations, and
in the early postwar “flying geese” paradigm of Japan leading Asia in development,
influential in the thinking of Japan development experts over much of the postwar era.
From my study in Chapter 10, I conclude that of the three major issues areas I explore,
sociocultural, political and economic, the sociocultural area shows the most influence
from prewar thoughts on important, contemporary Japanese aid ideas.

Some critics have continued to view Japanese aid in the light of Japan’s colonial
and possibly neocolonial intentions of economic hegemony, but Koppel and Orr argue
that it has meant much more. In their view, if one fails to consider broader themes, such
as the emergence of Japan’s concept of comprehensive security, one does not really
understand Japan’s ODA. This concept sees economic development and political stability
in developing nations as foundational to needed natural resources and international trade,
key for Japan’s health and survival. The concept is closer to the broadened concept of
development and national security that has emerged in American foreign affairs since the
9-11 terrorist attack, the idea that raising the level of development and well-being of
various regions can enhance national and international security by defeating poverty, one
of the possible root causes of terrorism.

1940 I would add the important issues of domestic reform pressures and the influences of culture and history
on Japanese aid, among many others.
1941 Ibid., 364-365.
1942 A former predominant American concept of foreign aid and security viewed ODA in narrower terms, as
contributing mainly to military security. Comprehensive security is also broader than the concept of
An additional, significant, global yet historical force affecting the future of Japan’s ODA is Japan’s interactions with the United States throughout the period studied (1850 to 1945) and then especially in the postwar period. Relations with the United States have had enormous effects on Japan at large, especially in the postwar period. This project has mostly focused on prewar influences.

Religion and spirituality also exercised a strong, direct influence on Japanese society and politics from 1868 to 1945 in the form of state-imposed Shinto. In the postwar period, direct political effects of spirituality and religion on government in Japan have been prohibited by the Constitution of 1947. The influence of spirituality on ODA is likely indirect, though present. Today there is a distinction between the formal, legal separation of religion from politics and policy and the spiritual practices of many Japanese, including aid staff and policymakers, in their daily lives. This is not, as I argue in Chapter 9, an example of the Flaw of the Excluded Middle.\footnote{The issue of how spirituality and religion affect Japan’s ODA is discussed at much greater length in Chapter 9.}

The future of Japanese aid in the early twenty-first century is also related to various reform proposals that have emerged since the late 1990s.\footnote{Reform proposals for the early 1990s and earlier are studied in Chapter 2.} In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the concept of “human security” was introduced into Japan’s diplomacy. Several official reports centered on the interconnectedness of security and development/poverty, plus the need for a broad approach to tackle the issues. Ogata Sadako, JICA’s current director, argued that Japan’s ODA should be more human-
oriented, but that the goal was difficult under the request-based system for aid. In order to begin to accomplish this, more aid must be developed for targets below the state level.\textsuperscript{1945}

In late 2003, the LDP released a report that recommended several key reforms in Japan’s ODA policy. These recommendations relate closely to several important, current policy options for the future of Japanese aid, and reveal the significant influence of the LDP on Japan’s aid. The first goal, beyond aid requests, was to increase the opportunity for partnerships and policy consultations with aid recipients. The second recommended reform was to consider goals beyond those expressed in Japan’s 1992 ODA Charter, including poverty reduction, peace building and human security. The third objective was to improve policy coordination between aid implementation agencies (i.e. JBIC, JICA) and the Japanese government, and among aid agencies themselves. A fourth main goal was to upgrade the organization and roles of Japan’s ODA representatives in the field (agency field offices and governmental diplomatic missions).\textsuperscript{1946}

In the early 2000s, several pressing issues emerged in Japan’s ODA system.\textsuperscript{1947} These major challenges will help determine the future course of Japanese aid policy. In addition to continuing administrative and budget reforms, Akiyama and Kondo identify several of these issues as the need of Japan’s ODA for better coordination with the Western-dominated global ODA system, the need to “put a human face” on Japan’s ODA, securing Japan’s continuing national interests, and the need for better applied and

\textsuperscript{1945} Yamauchi, “Trends in Development,” 105-106.
\textsuperscript{1946} Ibid., 106-107.
\textsuperscript{1947} These issues included contributing to global peace building, reforming the request-based principle for obtaining aid, improving partnerships with other donors and international organizations, achieving better balance in aid for economic infrastructure and social infrastructure, improving aid for governance, the utilization of yen loans, preparing country assistance plans, and introducing new aid forms like budget support and Sector Wide Approaches (Akiyama and Kondo, \textit{Global ODA}, 154).
coordinated development research. In the likelihood of continuing aid budget reductions for the near-term foreseeable future, these challenges seem great. On aid coordination with other donors, earlier in Chapter 2 we noted several of the challenges at length. Japan desires, on some levels, to respond to the global, Western critiques of problems in its aid system, and also recognizes much of the value of the global aid agenda. There are no doubt various opportunities for increased partnership between Japan’s ODA and agencies from other countries. Yet Japan desires to do more than just donate funds and “…give away all other presence enhancing ‘juicy’ parts to other donors.” Here Japan’s continuing concern for its international image again merges. Coordination of Japan’s system is extremely challenging, for reasons identified above, including Japan’s cumbersome aid bureaucracy, and the system’s basic goals that often conflict with other donors’. Another challenge for Japan is to better coordinate the loan and grant aspects of its ODA. Since both of these functions are to be incorporated, to a large degree, in the “new “JICA from October 2008, it would helpful to examine how this merger affects this issue.

The “human face” issue relates to Japan’s concern for its international image and “face.” Akiyama and Kondo comment that in the history of postwar Japanese aid and economic relations, there are a small number of talented individuals whose faces have largely come to represent Japanese development and aid to the outside world, including

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1948 Ibid., 154-163.
1949 In earlier chapters I mentioned examples of Japan’s partnerships with aid agencies from Canada and the United States. Akiyama and Kondo mention the United Kingdom as another excellent possibility (Ibid., 155).
1950 Perhaps administrative reforms in Japan’s aid system, such as the start of the “new” JICA, can help improve coordination with other donors somewhat.
1951 Ibid., 156-157.
the late Foreign Minister Okita Saburo and Ogata Sadako. In addition, there is the positive representation of Japan by numerous, vibrant young Japanese who have served with (or applied to) JBIC, JICA, JOCV, and the UN Junior Program Officer program. In recent years, Akiyama and Kondo charge that Japanese aid agencies have become somewhat more assertive in “flag raising,” making sure that Japanese contributions are visible and acknowledged in various aid projects. But ultimately, effective aid, not image, is what really counts.

Akiyama and Kondo further lament the relatively small recognition of Japanese aid and its contributions in the general world literatures on international development. While acknowledging the problems of Japan’s aid often cited by its global critics, they defend its valuable contributions to economic infrastructure and practical technical help given by Japanese experts, “…never poorly valued by developing countries.” Overall, they emphasize the importance of serious, national effort by Japan to assure that Japan’s ODA is recognized for its actual contributions, not just its amounts:

The challenge for us lies in how to improve Japanese aid while accepting these problems as real constraints, how to showcase the merits of our aid, and how to demonstrate to the world our intention to work on development assistance as a member of the international community.

The concern for image and face, a perennial feature of Japanese culture, continues.

From the donor’s viewpoint, Akiyama and Kondo also stress that Japan must better secure its national interests (kokueki) through aid. They argue that it is

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1952 As noted earlier, Ogata is the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the current director of the “new” JICA aid agency in Japan.
1953 Ibid., 157-159. Concerning human resources issues, signs that Japan’s aid may be somewhat improving its effectiveness include attempts to better train Japanese staff, hiring more local area staff overseas, and increasing South-South aid cooperation in developing areas (Ibid., 158-159).
1954 Ibid., 163.
1955 Ibid.
understandable that to gain public and business support for ODA, the Japanese
government must highlight how ODA contributes to Japan’s kokueki. There may be value
in the comparative study of different aid recipients, asking how each one perceives
Japanese aid, how the country and aid for it may contribute to Japan’s kokueki, how
aiding the country helps Japan, the productivity of investing in the country’s economic
infrastructure and how much the public in that country appreciates the aid.\textsuperscript{1956} Again we
see pragmatism and the concern for face and image.

There is also a great need for better study of the large-scale issues and policy
centers that Japanese aid seeks to address. Continual, comprehensive analysis of these
issues at the national government level is needed, yet that analysis has been lacking.
Though a fair number of Japanese universities and think tanks study such issues, there
should be better coordination and communication of their efforts. National level study
groups that include experts with expertise in different regions, sectors, and themes should
be pursued. Another problem in Japan’s development research capacity is a common
mismatch between the research conducted and actual field needs. Research grants,
researcher interests and findings are not well coordinated with field conditions on the
ground. These problems partly result from the organizational culture of Japan’s ODA
system and agencies, which are commonly understaffed with overworked generalists who
lack adequate training in the increasing technicalities of the international development
field. Positively, while the World Bank has tended to heavily stress economics and
econometric analyses, Japan realizes the value of interdisciplinary research for

\textsuperscript{1956} Ibid., 159-161.
development. Though different agencies and committees in the Japanese aid bureaucracy prepared study reports and plans to address these issues, Akiyama and Kondo argue that greatly improved research, characterized by “…clear, coherent and holistic ideas,” was needed to help improve the situation. Among the key research tools that could help to improve this situation, the holistic, clear suggestions of applied anthropology seem particularly relevant.

Japan’s ODA system has continued to be characterized by competing goals from its domestic side (economically driven goals, calls for reform, and conventional foreign policy concerns), contrasted with the demands of the global aid community and agenda. In the recent past, many of the economic-related goals of Japan’s aid have been pursued through JBIC, while JICA has addressed many international norms. With the appointment of Ogata Sadako as head of JICA in late 2003, many dynamic reforms have occurred, including increasing the field presence of staff, poverty alleviation and conflict resolution goals, cooperation with NGOs, African aid, and local capacity building goals, in addition to the merging of JICA and the OECO functions of JBIC into the “new” JICA in October 2008. It remains to be seen how the new merger will affect the actual operations and effectiveness of Japan’s aid.

By the early 2000s, both MOFA and JICA prepared recommendations for improving the reaction of Japanese ODA to global poverty reduction goals, but this was

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1957 Ibid., 161-163.
1958 Ibid., 154-155.
1960 Arase, *Japan’s Foreign Aid*, 273-274.
only one of multiple goals for Japan’s overall ODA. Part of the difficulty in reconciling conflicts between Japan’s ODA and the global aid agenda has been that many of the strengths of Japanese aid have not really matched the BHN focus of the global agenda and the MDGs. Ohno Kenichi has argued that Japan should seek to cooperate with the global aid agenda goals of poverty reduction, “…without losing its unique perspective.” Some of these unique perspectives include the capacity to encourage actual economic growth, and to customize aid for the unique needs of each country. Ishikawa Shigeru argues that these are something World Bank development methods such as the PRSP have lacked. Yet the economic and trade motivations for Japanese aid, while possibly overlapping with its foreign policy functions, may somewhat hinder goals that lean toward the international norms for poverty alleviation. In reality, it is likely that the unique combination of factors in Japan’s domestic politics combine to prevent any full harmonization of Japan’s aid with the global aid agenda. Yet in addition to South Korea, several Asian nations, including Taiwan, Thailand, and even China seem to be imitating Japan in various aspects of their own emerging aid programs. Perhaps an

1961 Foreign, especially Western, aid experts have also actively critiqued many elements of Japan’s aid system, and offered many suggestions for reform. Among these is Alan Rix. For more on the suggestions of foreign critics through the early 1990s, see Chapter 2. In his 2005 comparison of ODA from Australia and Japan, Rix argues that Japan should seriously consider merging grants, technical cooperation and project planning into one agency like JICA, expand its aid beyond a request-based only system, give less emphasis to economic infrastructure, and put more on social needs (Alan Rix, “Japanese and Australian ODA,” in Japan’s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions, ed., David M. Arase [London and New York: Routledge, 2005], 104-116). No doubt some of these foreign critiques are having an influence on Japanese ODA’s reform process.


1964 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 13.
unusual, hybrid system of aid, borrowing from both Western and Japanese elements, will emerge in Asia.\textsuperscript{1965}

David Arase has both lauded past Japanese efforts to take a lead in promoting global development, and lamented the fact that economic difficulties in the 1990s and early 2000s led Japan to scale back many elements of its massive aid program. Yet evidence suggests that a modest, more focused effort by wealthy nations could go far in aiding the developing world.\textsuperscript{1966} But major shifts in the world economy can affect both the aid of major donors and the socioeconomic conditions in the LDCs.\textsuperscript{1967}

What are several likely scenarios for the future of Japanese aid? Arase argues that while it is likely that Japan will not return to the position of the world’s top donor, it can be among the top donors, if not number two, for the foreseeable future. If Japan wants to improve the international image of its aid, it will have to do a better job of addressing the goals and concerns of the global aid agenda, such as the MDGs. Since the late 1990s, Japan has expressed a desire to do just that, to contribute more to poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, and conflict prevention resolution/prevention, amid conditions of increasing economic austerity.\textsuperscript{1968} When Kawaguchi Yoriko, a former METI official, took over as Foreign Minister in 2002, she pushed revision of the 1992 ODA Charter to not only include Japan’s commitment to pressing global and humanitarian issues, but to expressly address its \textit{kokueki} as well: “the objectives of

\textsuperscript{1965} Ibid., 275.
\textsuperscript{1966} Ibid., 1-2.
\textsuperscript{1967} Ibid. This was seen in the major global economic downturn in late 2008, initially precipitated by the collapse of the mortgage loan industry in the United States, followed by severe downturns in major stock markets around the world. This crisis threatened not only the economies of major aid donors, but also their capacity to offer foreign aid, in turn affecting the ability of major global aid organizations to address a world food crisis.
\textsuperscript{1968} Ibid., 271.
Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity.” The 2003 ODA Charter also expresses goals for Japan to obtain access to needed resources, partner closely with Asia, and the traditional aid goals of self-help, economic and physical infrastructure and similar issues. While the 2003 Charter fails to even mention the MDGs, the 2005 Medium Term ODA Policy Outline does, while also emphasizing aid incorporating the East Asian development experience and Japan’s desire to cultivate economic relations.\textsuperscript{1969}

Koppel and Orr argue that ODA is a thread in Japanese international relations that will likely remain important for some time into the future. However, it will also likely continue to be a “burden,” not only economically, but also perhaps politically and culturally. They conclude ODA is a tie that further binds Japan to the complexities of the international system, with ever shifting issues and interests.\textsuperscript{1970}

One thing we can say with fair certainty is globalization and other foreign forces will increasingly influence the future of Japanese aid, more than ever before. These international forces include such actors and phenomena as the United States, other Asian countries and aid donors like China and Korea, and the effects of globalization on domestic Japanese society. As I discussed in Chapter 9, globalization is having important, gradual affects on Japan’s internal politics and civil society, including ODA policy. The entry of diverse, global values into Japan, through many venues such as the Internet, is strengthening Japanese civil society, increasing its pluralism and the capability of Japan’s

\textsuperscript{1969} Ibid., 272-273.
\textsuperscript{1970} Koppel and Orr, Japan’s Foreign Aid, 366.
small NGO community and the public to influence the government’s ODA policies. More
Japanese, especially young but also old, are turning to volunteering with such NGOs.
Young Japanese are more open to spirituality, due to new postmaterial values affecting
Japan, similarly to how they have affected other advanced, industrialized nations. These
forces sometimes lead young Japanese to seek international work or volunteer
opportunities with NGOs or public avenues such as JICA and JOCV in different areas,
including development and aid work. Some of these NGOs are religious.

Policy Applications for the Social Sciences and Development Policy

**Applied Anthropology**

In this section, I offer study and policy suggestions for the overall field of
applied anthropology. Recommendations for anthropologists in Japan are found in Table 10.1, while recommendations for anthropologists outside of Japan, Westerners and
others, are in Table 10.2.

Table 10.1 Policy and Research Recommendations for Applied Anthropology: Japan-based Researchers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes/ Policy Areas</th>
<th>Research or Policy Recommendation(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills promotion, historical study.</td>
<td>Yanagita Kunio is a wonderful example of an engaged scholar who conducted significant studies and made many insightful policy recommendations in the prewar period, though many were not applied then (why was this so?). Lives of such scholars should be studied, highlighted, and emulated. Mentoring programs and networks for applied scholars in Japan should be developed and strengthened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve policy through ethnographic research, study of aid recipient views, study of aid’s effects.</td>
<td>Japanese and foreign anthropologists should ethnographically study the effects of Japanese ODA on foreign societies and populations, and how to better incorporate their viewpoints in Japan’s aid policymaking, to improve the overall quality of Japan’s aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved study of anthropology and dev. anthropology.</td>
<td>More study of applied anthropology and its relationship to international development globally.</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved application of anthro to public policy issues.</td>
<td>Increased consideration of how to make anthropology more useful for broad policy issues of the Japanese government, including development and ODA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved application of anthro to public policy issues.</td>
<td>Specific consideration of how anthropology applies to the specific issues of Japan’s international relations, diplomacy, conflict resolutions, and international trade, and development of ideas for increasing the application of anthropological methods for such concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve policy through ethnographic research, study of aid recipient views, study of aid’s effects.</td>
<td>Study of the actual social and grassroots effects of Japanese aid policies in Japanese aid projects and policies around the world, including Asia, and how to improve them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve policy through ethnographic research, organizational ethnography.</td>
<td>Ethnographic study of how to improve Japanese aid’s partnerships with other donors, Western and non-Western, bilateral and multilateral, and policy priorities of the global aid agenda, such as the MDGs. This would likely include ethnographic study of the organizational cultures of aid-related groups or agencies in Japan, to identify policymaking and decisional bottlenecks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve policy through ethnographic research, organizational ethnography.</td>
<td>Conduct organizational ethnographies of public aid-related groups in Japan to identify structural weaknesses and recommend opportunities for administrative and policymaking improvements. Such study can be intra-organizational, or inter-organizational, to better understand Japan’s complex ODA policy networks, how they function, and how they may be improved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network analysis, organizational ethnography.</td>
<td>Study the relations between Japan’s NGO and public ODA/development groups, in order to improve their relations, cooperation and mutual effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study of aid recipient views.</td>
<td>Study of the perceptions of Japanese ODA and development in recipient countries, and how they can be improved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study of aid’s effects, improve policy through ethnographic research.</td>
<td>Study of the social effects of Japanese aid for economic infrastructure in Japanese aid recipients, and development of concrete policy recommendations for the government, so these impacts can be improved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical study, study of historical impacts on aid, study of aid’s effects, improve policy through historical research.</td>
<td>More holistic study of the history of Japan’s development and development ideologies, and their impacts on Japan’s former colonies and the rest of Asia today. Based on these lessons, what concrete policy lessons can be developed concerning the impacts of state development policies and ideologies on human populations, both domestic and foreign? How can other nations avoid Japan’s mistakes? What positive applications from the legacies of Japanese economic investment in former colonies and their successful development today can be drawn for other regions and cases of colonialism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical study, improve</td>
<td>Based on Japan’s development experience, what can LDCs do to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Area</td>
<td>Research Area</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Better protect their own cultures and identities during economic development?</td>
<td>Ethnographic study of field conditions, rapid social change, improve policy through ethnographic research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographic study of Japan’s aid policymakers’ worldviews and their decision-making processes. Use these findings to develop recommendations for policymaking improvements.</td>
<td>Improve policy through ethnographic research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographic study of how Japan does aid policymaking for the issue of social infrastructure and for economic infrastructure. How can these two areas be balanced and improved more?</td>
<td>Improve policy through ethnographic research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographic study of the “spiritual” aspects and views of Japanese aid policymaking and staff, the spiritual and religious conditions of aid recipients, and consideration of how spiritual factors both affect and are affected by the receipt of Japan’s aid. What are the impacts of these issues for the effectiveness of Japan’s aid, and how can they be improved? What about for Japan’s general diplomacy?</td>
<td>Improve policy through ethnographic research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study the cross-cultural adjustment challenges of Japanese aid workers, based on lessons from Japan and similar aid systems such as South Korea. A similar situation is the cross-cultural adjustment challenges of Christian missionaries from both those countries. Develop recommendations to improve the cross-cultural training for Japan’s aid workers.</td>
<td>Professional skills promotion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct research on whether Japan is projecting itself and its development experiences on aid recipients. If it is, is this bad? If so, how can it be changed?</td>
<td>Study of aid’s effects, improve policy through ethnographic research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study this issue ethnographically: does translatve adaptation work? Does it help Japanese aid and LDCs? Are the goals of customized development achievable? Can they be balanced with universal goals often preached by the World Bank and similar groups? Develop concrete policy recommendations for Japanese aid from these insights.</td>
<td>Improve policy through ethnographic research, study of aid’s effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the legacies of Japan’s views of its colonies? How do these views affect Japan’s aid and its relations with developing countries?</td>
<td>Historical study, study of historical impacts on aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How have the evolutionistic views behind Japan’s imperial legacy affected Japan’s aid of today? If the results are negative, how can they be improved?</td>
<td>Historical study, study of historical impacts on aid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the above policy and research recommendations for researchers in Japan, key themes that emerge relate to improving ODA policy and development research through ethnographic research and increased understanding and use of anthropological approaches, including organizational ethnography, network analysis, and similar methods, in research on Japan’s ODA policies and programs. I suggest that these methods to be applied to such issues as better understanding the viewpoints of aid recipients, the social and political effects of Japan’s aid, cultural preservation issues, LDC field conditions, rapid social change, and improving the social research skills of aid agency staff and policymakers in Japan. A final area of application relates to historical issues: the improvement of Japanese aid policy through study of relevant historical issues, historical-oriented research for policy concerns, and study of the historical impacts of Japanese aid. Key insights that emerge for Japan’s ODA policies and programs include the possibility of further improving the delivery and effectiveness of ODA policy through the use of applied social science methods. These research methods should be applied to study of both Japan’s aid recipients, and to aid policy and implementation bodies in Japan. Their use will further strengthen the large reform efforts of Japan’s aid policy system currently underway.
### Table 10.2 Policy and Research Recommendations for Applied Anthropology: Researchers based outside Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes/Policy Areas</th>
<th>Research or Policy Recommendation(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expand anthro study of dev of non-Western cases, comparative study, cross-regional application of insights</td>
<td>Increased study of and consideration of non-Western cases of development, including Japan, China, and Southeast Asia. Effective incorporation of these insights into mainstream anthropological theories of development, both in academic anthropology and applied/professional anthropology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand anthro study of dev of non-Western cases, organizational ethnography, improve ethnog research for policy, comparative study</td>
<td>Ethnographic and applied study of non-Western aid donors and aid agencies, including their organizational cultures and policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand anthro study of dev of non-Western cases, study of aid’s effects, improve ethnog research for policy, comparative study, cross-regional application of insights, study of aid’s effects.</td>
<td>Ethnographic study of the effects of non-Western aid on developing countries and regions, such as Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand anthro study of dev of non-Western cases, improve ethnog research for policy, comparative study, study of aid effectiveness, cross-regional application of insights, study of aid’s effects, policy applications.</td>
<td>Comparative ethnographic studies of Western and non-Western aid donor systems, incorporating such issues as the aid effectiveness of these systems, their impacts on recipient populations and countries, lessons for Western systems from non-Western systems (and the reverse).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study of aid effectiveness, study of non-Western dev concepts, cross-regional application of insights</td>
<td>Study and analysis of the Japanese development concepts of “modernization,” translative adaptation, internationalization, and consideration of how these concepts may apply to international development and aid issues worldwide, especially in new cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study of aid effectiveness, study of non-Western dev concepts, cross-regional application of insights, policy applications.</td>
<td>Ethnographic investigation of the validity of “modernization,” translative adaptation and internationalization. Development of policy recommendations from these findings for global ODA organizations and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative study, policy applications, cross-regional study and application of insights.</td>
<td>Cooperative study with Japanese anthropologists of the Japanese aid policymaking system. Development of concrete, practical recommendations for policymaking improvements and reforms, on Japan’s domestic level and for Japan’s improved cooperation with global aid groups and other donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study of aid policymaking and processes, policy applications.</td>
<td>Analysis and study of how development research is done in Japan, by anthropologists and others, in order to offer concrete recommendations for how it may be improved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Policy applications, improved study of anthro, training/professional issues.

Develop specific policy recommendations for how anthropological training and scholarship on spirituality and religion can be fruitfully applied to the training of American foreign policy makers and diplomats, so that our consideration of religion and international affairs can be improved. This may include incorporating insights from missiology and mission anthropology, despite present or past biases for or against such fields.

Policy applications.

Study how views of “spirituality” and “science” affect policies for foreign aid and development.

The key policy and research recommendations themes for non-Japan based researchers include expanding anthropological and other social science study of non-Western cases of development and aid, studying non-Western development concepts, comparative study of Western and non-Western development models and aid systems, and careful cross-regional application of insights that are generated. While many non-Japanese aid experts, many based in the West, have extensively studied and commented on many aspects of Japan’s ODA, there needs to be more study of other non-Western aid systems in countries like China, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is important that Western aid experts seriously consider the meaning of the Japanese and Asian development models and experiences, and what they mean for other regions. This must include reflection on the meaning and application of important non-Western development concepts, such as internationalization and translative adaptation that I explored in this project. Other key issues here are standard to the consideration by social scientists of development and aid issues everywhere: the study of aid’s effects, aid effectiveness, aid policymaking, the use ethnographic and other social methods in development research, policy applications, and training/professional issues.
Political Science and International Studies

In Table 10.3 I present policy and research recommendations for the fields of political science and international studies, mostly outside Japan. For research and policy outside Japan, these recommendations focus on improving international studies, diplomatic, development and aid policies and practices through further incorporation of anthropological research methods and approaches, including the use of ethnography to examine decision-making, local and global issues, and the effects of foreign and aid policies. On a third level, I again recommend comparative and cross-regional study and application of insights. For political science and international studies research in Japan, I recommend the improvement of international studies and foreign policy through the use of anthropological and ethnographic methods.

Table 10.3 Policy and Research Recommendations for Political Science and International Studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes/Policy Areas</th>
<th>Researcher Location(s)</th>
<th>Research or Policy Recommendation(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improving international studies, improving diplomatic practice, improve policy through ethnographic research, policy application of anthropological approaches, study of aid’s effects.</td>
<td>Outside Japan</td>
<td>Increased incorporation of anthropological methods and approaches in the study of foreign aid and foreign policy, to understand how foreign policies affect human populations on the ground level, and how those impacts may be improved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving dev policy, cross-regional study and application of insights.</td>
<td>Outside Japan</td>
<td>Increased study of East Asian and Japanese development models and experiences, especially consideration of how their significant lessons and experiences may be applied to other regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving diplomatic and aid practices, organizational ethnography. Improve policy through ethnographic research, policy application of anthropological approaches, improve decision-making through anthropological approaches.</td>
<td>Outside Japan</td>
<td>Increased consideration of how anthropological studies of organizational culture and organizational ethnographies can help improve the transparency, ethics and decision-making processes of Western foreign policy, diplomacy, aid policy and aid implementing bodies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

819
Improving diplomatic practice.
Improve policy through ethnographic research, policy application of anthro approaches, improve decision-making through anthro approaches.

Outside Japan
Increased incorporation of cognitive approaches from anthropology in research on foreign policy, especially contemporary policy, to enrich findings and understandings of how foreign policy and similar decision-making processes happen and can be improved.

Improving diplomatic practice, improve policy through ethnographic research, policy application of anthro approaches, improve decision-making through anthro approaches.

Outside Japan
Improvement of studies of decision-making and foreign policy decision-making through the incorporation of ethnographic methods for the study of the worldviews and decision-making processes of individual political actors and decision-makers.

Imporve study of local and global issues in international studies, improve decision-making through anthro approaches, improving diplomatic practice, study of aid’s effects, comparative study, policy applications, cross-regional study and application of insights.

Outside Japan
Improved understanding of globalization and its effects by including the study of local level effects and their impacts on foreign aid policymaking bodies and their decisions, and the impacts of policies of foreign policy policymaking bodies on local sites and populations throughout the world. Comparative study of these findings.

Improve decision-making through anthro approaches, improving diplomatic practice.

Outside Japan
Improvement of the consideration of foreign policy decision-making through incorporating expanded, improved analytical concepts of perception and cognition, based on cognitive anthropological concepts such as worldview, cultural logics, and image.

Cross-regional study and application of insights, comparative study, improving international studies.

Outside Japan
Better understanding of what colonialism, imperialism and globalization mean through improved consideration of these issues in the Japanese and other Asian cases.

Improving international studies, improve policy through ethnographic research, policy application of anthro approaches.

Japan
More incorporation of cross-disciplinary approaches in policy studies and analysis, including anthropological approaches.

Development Policy

In Table 10.4 I give policy recommendations for Japanese and Western development policymakers, mostly those in Japan. For development policymakers in Japan, I recommend the improvement of development policy practice and professional skills through the application of anthropological approaches in such areas as social
research skills, ethnography and organizational ethnography, and improved consideration of local issues in development. Increased public accountability is also a possible dividend from these efforts. My recommendations for development policymakers outside Japan stress improving development policies through cross-regional and comparative studies of Western and Asian development. I especially emphasize the consideration of Asian and non-Western development concepts, such as translative adaptation, namely their viability for development and beyond Japan.

Table 10.4 Policy and Research Recommendations for Development Policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes/Policy Areas</th>
<th>Policymaker/Researcher Location(s)</th>
<th>Research, Policy Recommendation(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills issues, policy application of anthro approaches, improving dev policy.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Incorporate more training in applied anthropology, rapid ethnographic assessment methods for Japanese aid staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills issues, policy application of anthro approaches, improving study of local issues in dev policy.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Include training in basic cultural anthropology and applied anthropology for Japanese government policymakers, to increase their sensitivity toward and capacity to better incorporate consideration of human and grassroots factors of development in their policymaking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills issues, policy application of anthro approaches, improving dev policy and practice.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Offer such training in JICA’s and other Japanese government aid technical training programs for overseas personnel or Japanese volunteers preparing to serve overseas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills issues, policy application of anthro approaches, improving dev policy and practice.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Offer brief training seminars in applied anthropology and rapid research methods for NGO staff and volunteers across Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional skills issues, policy application of anthro approaches, improving dev policy and practice through anthro and ethnographic approaches, study of aid’s effects.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Improve the inclusion of the analysis of social and cultural factors in Japanese aid policymaking and aid analysis programs. Incorporate such training in such venues as the new JICA’s research and training institute. This will help Japan to improve its consideration of the grassroots aspects of its aid policy in very tangible, practical ways, improve the quality of its aid delivery and to improve the impacts of aid on target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy application of anthro approaches, improving dev policy and practice through anthro and ethnographic approaches, organizational ethnography.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Hire expert organizational anthropologists such as Hamada Tomoko to study the organizational cultures of Japanese aid agencies and policymaking bodies, to offer policy recommendations for further organizational reforms to help improve the quality and delivery of Japanese aid.</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy application of anthro approaches, improving dev policy and practice through anthro and ethnographic approaches, improving public accountability and ethics of dev and aid policy.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Employ social scientists to further study Japanese public opinion of ODA through surveys, focus groups, and other avenues, in order to better understand public perceptions of ODA, how Japan’s aid can be improved by incorporating their suggestions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy application of anthro approaches, improving dev policy and practice through anthro and ethnographic approaches, improving public accountability and ethics of dev and aid policy.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Make Japan’s aid policy more democratic and ethical by using more public participation and insights for aid policy decision-making and goal setting. Use recommendations from social scientists for this purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving dev policy, cross-regional study and application of insights, comparative study.</td>
<td>Outside Japan</td>
<td>Increased study of East Asian and Japanese development models and experiences, especially consideration of how their significant lessons and experiences may be applied to other regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving dev policy, cross-regional study and application of insights, comparative study.</td>
<td>Outside Japan</td>
<td>Study and in-depth consideration of the concept of translative adaptation. Is this concept valid? Should it be applied to aid policymaking at the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and at other leading international and bilateral donors? If so, how?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving dev policy, cross-regional study and application of insights, comparative study.</td>
<td>Outside Japan</td>
<td>What are lessons from Japan’s and East Asian development experiences for Western countries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving dev policy, cross-regional study and application of insights, comparative study.</td>
<td>Outside Japan</td>
<td>What do the Western/global aid groups, agencies and their policy agendas need to learn from Japanese and other non-Western aid agencies and donors?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

Here I will briefly review some of my key findings about the policy implications for Japanese ODA policy generated from the study of historical leaders’ worldviews and Japan’s experiences related to technology, development, and foreign policy (1850 to 1945). What are some of the advantages of such a cognitive approach to policy analysis? What valuable insights does the consideration of “worldviews” bring to the issue of policy application? Here worldview generates especially significant insights into the behavior and motivations of Japan’s top political actor of the twentieth century, Hirohito, among others. Use of the anthropologically-enhanced concepts of image, worldview, and cultural logics, augmented beyond conventional political science approaches, enabled me to uncover newer, deeper insights on the possible motivations and understanding beneath these political actors’ actions. This approach seems richer and more nuanced than many conventional forms of decision-making analysis in political science. Applied to policy issues, it helps us to generate many additional insights about what these actors did, why, and within what contexts. The approach used in this study also draws extensively on historical and cultural insights that policy studies typically lack. This further enriches and deepens our findings about policy at many fundamental levels.

On policy issues in Japan’s domestic arena, I found that on technological development, the key leaders studied (1850 to 1895) were generally successful in applying their keen insights and study on various issues of transferring technology and culture to Japan. Both the government and these leaders sought “scientific” approaches
that would help support their efforts. That ideology was largely evolutionism. Most of the leaders in this period had direct policy applications in various significant sectors. From 1895 to 1945, the seeming conflicts in Hirohito’s training and worldviews, both spiritual and scientific, flowed from his immersion in State Shinto, his love of and training in marine biology, and his duties as supreme autocrat, military commander, and high priest of the nation. Despite these seeming conflicts, he was a highly shrewd, rational political actor who helped to nearly destroy Japan in World War II, and yet personally survived the war intact.

In their domestic state worldviews, most of the leaders studied in the first era (1850 to 1895) were significant policy actors. Because of his authorship of the Constitution of 1889, Ito Hirobumi was most important here. The range of policy actions and influence of these leaders is impressive, within the conservative policy environments of late Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan. In the second period (1895 to 1945), as emperor, Hirohito emerged as Japan’s most significant political actor in the twentieth century, and his influence on domestic politics, starting with the Japanese state’s careful cultivation of his image, was huge. Once he became emperor, his actions and inactions, always behind the scenes, had enormous impacts on the nation.

Examining the three leaders’ domestic market worldviews in the first period (1850 to 1895), the policy impacts of Fukuzawa, through his writings, enterprises, and founding of several schools, are the greatest of the three. Both ideological and environmental factors were highly significant in formulating the domestic market

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1971 The three leaders studied here were Fukuzawa, Ito and Kato.
worldviews of these three men. In the second period (1895 to 1945), the significant thought of Yanagita on domestic economic policy, on the development of regional industries across Japan, did not find application in the prewar period.

Concerning leaders’ worldviews of domestic society (1850 to 1895), I found that as with economics, Fukuzawa’s writings had the longest, broadest impact of the three leaders studied, in encouraging wide popular support for science, technology and economics throughout society. The ideological conservatism of Japan in this era was consistent with the choice of State Shinto as the nation’s spiritual ideology for development. The Meiji state also wanted Japan to eagerly embrace Western science and technology, though not much of the cultural “baggage” that accompanied them. These leaders generally supported that attitude. In the second period (1895 to 1945), as Japan’s supreme leader, Hirohito’s actions and projected images yielded huge impacts on Japanese society and education, especially through the encouragement of patriotism, nationalism, and State Shinto.

Concerning international issues, on Japan’s external political relations (1850 to 1895), most of the leaders studied were political realists, borrowed political ideas from the Western controllers of the international system, and urgently sought ideas for Japan’s survival. The four leaders studied from 1895 to 1945 had varied views of international relations, and most were ideologically conservative. Hirohito had the largest impact on Japan’s external political relations by far. On his involvement in Japan’s international

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1972 Environmental factors here included the childhoods of Fukuzawa and Ito in southwestern Japan, where the presence and influence of trade with the West was highly influential. Among important ideological factors was Kato’s choice to study the German language and German studies, which led him to be heavily influenced by German Social Darwinism and evolutionistic thought.

1973 The other two leaders studied on domestic society (1850 to 1895) were Mori and Kato.

1974 These leaders studied for 1895 to 1945 were Ito, Yamagata, Yanagita and Hirohito.
relations before and during World War II, a key observation is his indecisiveness in many crises. Though he had key power and influence in major and minor decisions, Hirohito was conflicted, often failing to realize the gravity of significant defeats, and dangerously delaying Japan’s surrender, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. Here Hirohito’s scientifically-based policy rationality wavered amid many pressures and conflicting roles, not the least of which was his daily devotion to military duties, his personal schedule, and faithful attention to Shinto prayers and ministrations as the nation’s high priest. Through all of this, the state’s management of his image continued unabated. And on Japan’s external economic relations, though Ito Hirobumi emerges as the most influential policy actor (1850 to 1945), from my study, I gained no highly significant, additional insights on this policy area.\textsuperscript{1975}

On external cultural relations (1850 to 1895), the leaders studied\textsuperscript{1976} reveal many of the same intercultural struggles with foreigners that all Japanese in that era did. Impacts of Fukuzawa and Ito emerge as the greatest, through Fukuzawa’s writings on Western cultures, and Ito’s work on the Constitution of 1889. On international and domestic issues, both had broad influence on the cultural attitudes, lives, and practices of millions of Japanese. The policy implications of Hirohito (1895 to 1945) on Japan’s external cultural relations were also enormous, through his impacts generated through World War II (the damage Japan received from abroad), and the massive influx of American influence through Japan’s defeat in 1945. The policy conflict in Hirohito’s top-

\textsuperscript{1975} On external economic relations (1850 to 1895, 1895 to 1945), the policy implications of Ito Hirobumi’s views are the most significant. This is seen in his participation in negotiations on international economic and trade relations, and his brief role as governor-general in Korea in the early 1900s. But I draw no notable conceptual observations on policy beyond these points.

\textsuperscript{1976} Fukuzawa, Ito, Mori and Kato.
down and Yanagita’s bottom-up approaches to protecting Japan’s culture seems vaguely symptomatic of the struggles of Japan’s aid to address policy issues today: a strong emphasis on the national, state-to-state level, but not as much on ground level concerns. This emphasis is gradually shifting, a good development.

On leader’s views of imperialism, the leader with the greatest policy impact (1895 to 1945) was again Hirohito. All of the leaders\textsuperscript{1977} condemned Western imperialism and yet wanted Japan to “help” its weaker Asian neighbors. Unfortunately, this “help” repeated many of the West’s mistakes. Most of the leaders focused on what the colonies could for Japan, though not all.\textsuperscript{1978} Though Hirohito could have done much to improve conditions in colonies and conquered territories during the war, he did not. Evolutionary influences heavily colored these leaders’ views of the colonies, of Japan’s role as their “leader,” and of the position of all in the global hierarchy of nations. Though evolutionistic views color some assumptions behind both prewar Japanese imperialism and postwar ODA, in ODA policy, the negative, prewar aggressive tendencies seem to be mostly gone, though perceptions of that likely vary, depending on who one asks.\textsuperscript{1979}

On the future policy implications of Japanese aid, I noted trends in several significant areas, such as the influences of Japan’s historical and cultural legacies in development, including spirituality, and important reform issues and pressures, both domestic and international. One of the greatest conflicts facing Japanese aid is between its largely internal, economic and strategic needs and the pressures and goals of the

\textsuperscript{1977} Kato, Ito, Yanagita, Yamagata, and Hirohito.
\textsuperscript{1978} Yanagita was the main exception.
\textsuperscript{1979} Likely the view of Japanese aid as aggressive or as a hidden tool of imperialism remains at the popular level in nations such as China, though I am not sure.
global aid community. Due to the deep legacies of Japan’s experience as the first of many Asian nations to successfully develop, and its own cultural background, Japan’s long-term emphasis on economic infrastructure likely will not change. The goal of the global aid agenda for poverty alleviation and sensitivity toward grassroots needs also has domestic support in the Japanese public, since it has many valid points. These facts, plus the high value placed on image and face in Japanese culture, and the increasing diversity of global influences hitting Japan, suggest that Japan will continue to evolve some type of “hybrid” aid system incorporating both economic infrastructure and social/grassroots goals, as David Arase argues. I agree, though with continuous, sometimes rapid administrative changes, one cannot say what final structure this hybrid system may ever take. But it will likely be highly influential on the emerging donor systems of other countries throughout East Asia.

For the social sciences and development policy, both in Japan and abroad, it is imperative that more effective application of the practical research skills and findings of applied anthropology be applied to the study of Japan’s aid and its effects on recipient nations, their populations, how Japan’s aid is perceived, and how it can be improved. It is even more urgent that foreign scholars and anthropologists outside Japan increase their understanding of Japanese and East Asian development, Asian aid donor experiences and their relevance for international development and international relations at large, for the basic improvement of the human condition of millions in the developing world. Many of the assumptions of Westerners regarding development, including those of Western anthropologists, tend to be culturally bound, biased, and inaccurate at several

1980 Arase, Japan’s Foreign Aid.
fundamental levels. The experiences of many nations in Northeast and Southeast Asia, some of the most important, on-going cases of development in history, prove this. One size does not fit all, in life or in development.
GLOSSARY

Note: definitions marked with an asterisk (*) are simplified versions of the central analytical concepts used for the dissertation, or they are a concept of central importance for the research. Where several meanings of a concept from different fields are listed, the streamlined version used for this project will be listed first.

Attitude(s): “predispositions to respond in a particular way toward a class of specified objects [which] consist of both cognitive (beliefs) and affective (feelings) components.”∗1981 Attitudes “…are a result of cognition, and include ‘knowledge.’”∗1982

Authoritarian developmentalism: “…a politico-economic system designed to formulate and implement state-led development. It emphasizes institutions, organizational structures, and policies that promote industrialization. It uses capitalism to promote economic development, and state intervention in the economy. Once rapid growth has been achieved, an authoritarian developmentalist regime should be replaced with an open system. Examples of this system include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China.∗1983 The system has been paramount that region’s rapid economic growth, and it offers a useful regional model for catching up with the West. More concrete study of this issue is needed.∗1984

Belief systems include a decision-maker’s beliefs about another actor’s strategies, tactics, motivations, and goals.∗1985 Some political scientists in the 1960s argued that belief systems are the same as worldview. They defined belief systems as the views that states and citizens hold concerning the outside world and themselves, including conscious and unconscious beliefs that are held to be true (the belief system) or false (the disbelief system).∗1986 Martha Cottam draws a helpful distinction between belief systems and worldview, arguing that worldview consists of belief systems, but that they are not identical phenomena∗1987 (see Worldview—political science). Research on individual belief systems has been driven by two presumptions, that “…reasoning consists of an awareness of particular phenomena and determination of the relations that exist among them…” and that all individuals process and perceive information similarly. Research by Jean Piaget, 20th century developmental psychologist, argued that since cognitive

1982 Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 7.
1985 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 45.
1986 Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 19, 22, 29.
1987 Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10.
development for each individual is unique, the assumption that all individuals reason in the same way is faulty.\textsuperscript{1988}

\textit{Bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment)}: In Japan, the slogan attached to the process of adopting Western technology during the Meiji period (1868-1912). After Japan was forced to open to the outside world, the Japanese were amazed at the superior technologies of the West.\textsuperscript{1989}

*Cognition (simplified version, used for this project):* how we become aware, how our brains get knowledge, organize and use it, or how we perceive (sense and think about certain things in the world around us). It includes things like remembering, solving problems, talking, thinking, and making pictures in our minds.

\textbf{Cognition} is the process through which we become aware, closely connected with language.\textsuperscript{1990} More technically, it is “…a collective term for the psychological processes involved in the acquisition, organization, and use of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{1991} In cognitive psychology, cognition refers to “…all the information processing activities of the brain, ranging from the analysis of immediate stimuli to the organization of subjective experience. In contemporary terminology, cognition includes such processes and phenomena as perception, memory, attention, problem solving, language, thinking, and imagery.”\textsuperscript{1992}

Political science work on cognition has produced an abundance of empirical studies and a shortage of general theory. Rather than studying worldviews, some research focuses on how information is processed. Other areas of study include cognition in elite decision-making and mass public opinion, image and self-image in policy, roles in international relations, perceptions of power and control, and affective (feeling) responses to cognitive images.\textsuperscript{1993}

\textbf{Cognitive anthropology} is “…the study of the relation between human society and human thought, …how people in social groups conceive of and think about the objects and events which make up their world.” Cognitive anthropology is also the investigation of cultural knowledge, seen in stories, artifacts, and words, which humans share and learn. One of the field’s main achievements is its detailed, accurate description of cultural representations.\textsuperscript{1994} Cognitive representations of various properties or objects

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1989} Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 169.
\item \textsuperscript{1991} Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{1992} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1993} Cottam, “Recent Development,” 1-18.
\item \textsuperscript{1994} Roy G. D’Andrade, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), xiv, 1, 251.
\end{itemize}
provide mental maps of the world. Both culture and psychology mutually affect each other.\textsuperscript{1995}

**Cognitive categories** are “a number of objects that are considered equivalent;” “…a class of events, objects, [or] ideas…. A given category invokes those attributes necessary for the identification of each member of the class to which the category refers.”\textsuperscript{1996} They form the foundation of our normal prejudgments and daily adjustments, and help us to “organize and simplify the environment.”\textsuperscript{1997} Categories provide the basis of how people organize their worldviews, information about “…what a part of the environment looks like, the identity of the [category’s] typical member, how it behaves, and how… [the perceiver] can respond.”\textsuperscript{1998}

The internal characteristics of cognitive categories include an object’s perceived attributes, images of events or movements, and “…patterns of behavior associated with the object, and response alternatives.”\textsuperscript{1999} The judgment process of cognitive categories includes two types of decisions, nominal judgments, where an individual makes a decision about which category in which to place an object, and ordinal judgments, where one positions objects relative to others in the category.\textsuperscript{2000} There are three levels of abstraction in categories. At the highest level are less abstract categories, where the objects may have only a few attributes in common, for example, pieces of furniture. The second level is the basic level, the most commonly used in forming categories. The shape, movements, attributes and functions of objects in the category define basic level objects. Third is the subordinate level, whose objects share many fairly concrete attributes with objects in other categories. Another kind of cognitive category, psychological scripts, is recordings of events in the memory that assist the individual with predictions and judgments of future events and outcomes. Political categories divide the political environment from other phenomena in the decision-maker’s world, and “identify basic level categories.”\textsuperscript{2001}

**Cognitive maps** in international relations are a visual attempt to show how belief systems of decision-makers relate to specific foreign policy issues, and to simulate their thought processes concerning actions in possible future scenarios. They are one of two major cognitive models for the study of decision-making in international relations (See also Operational Code).\textsuperscript{2002} The purpose is to “…build models of policy-makers’ political worldviews and to use these models to explain decisions.”\textsuperscript{2003} The assumption here is that thought processes are important in politics, and that beliefs and “interpretive frameworks” of decision-makers influence and constrain their decisions. Cognitive maps

\textsuperscript{1995} Ibid., 179-180,182.
\textsuperscript{1996} Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, 36, 23.
\textsuperscript{1997} Ibid., 24, 36.
\textsuperscript{1998} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{1999} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{2000} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{2001} Ibid., 37-40.
\textsuperscript{2002} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{2003} Ibid., 17, 8.
resemble diagrams used in systems analysis, and represent concepts (variables) and causal beliefs (definitions of variable relationships) connected by arrows. Policymakers’ beliefs are analyzed through documents, interviews, and questionnaires. Several problems with cognitive maps include their “…simplistic view of causality,” sole reliance on written and/or oral data, and their inability to predict future events due to their focus on past decisions.  

**Cognitive psychology** is the branch of psychology that focuses on the study of individual perception and decision-making. This field has generally not examined social or aggregate level decisions. Its main assumption is “…that any interaction between an organism and its environment changes not only its overt behavior or physiological condition but also its knowledge of or information about the environment, and that this latter change may affect not only present response but also future orientation to the environment.” See also Political cognition.

**Cognitive style:** how individuals conceptually organize the environment, how a person organizes his/her beliefs and handles information, especially when they are contrary to the person’s preexisting beliefs. Cognitive styles are based on information processing and the organization of beliefs, so they influence a person’s images and behavior.

**Colonialism:** in political science, has been called “the policy and practice of a stronger power extending its control territorially over a weaker people or nation.” The term was developed from the Latin word *colonia*, for country estate. One common meaning of colonialism in political science refers to colonialism that has happened in the recent historic past, where settlers feel as much a part of the territory where they now live as those their ancestors displaced felt (for example, South Africa). Second, colonialism refers to a sense of racial superiority and beliefs, practices and attitudes that result from a feeling of ethnocentrism. It can also connote xenophobia and racism in domestic society, not just overseas.

Anthropologists have studied colonialism extensively. Michael Watts calls it “…the establishment and maintenance of rule, for an extended period of time, by a sovereign power over a subordinate and alien people that is separate from the ruling power.” Colonialism is distinct from colonization, which refers to “…the physical settlement of people …from the imperial center in the colonial periphery.” Most colonial situations involve legal and political domination over an alien people, economic dependence, and regularized cultural and racial inequities. Colonialism is a variant of

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2008 Ibid.
imperialism (See Imperialism). Anthropologists studying colonialism have produced a huge literature. Common bodies of theory contributing to this work include dependency theory, neo-Marxism, and world systems theory. Western anthropology in particular has focused on the study of non-European “Others” in local places, and the institutions, practices, and peoples connected with those structures of Western domination. In some senses, anthropology is inseparable from colonialism, since colonial states used anthropology to help them understand and rule their colonies. Anthropology also pioneered the study of race. Today anthropologists also study postcolonialism, the broader contemporary situation of former colonies in the global system.  

Colonialism and ideology: In global processes of colonialism, ideology is the subordinate worldview of a people being colonized. While the new hegemonic worldview of the colonizer(s) provides overall form, ideology gives specific content. See also Hegemony.

*Cultural logics (simplified version, used for this research): unspoken, shared assumptions and cultural patterns under a people’s worldview about something global (something that affects people across the world in many places). We can learn about cultural logics by studying a people’s actions, stories, and religious beliefs, among other things.

Cultural logics: the underlying rationalities of meaning (political, economic, and cultural) that shape human and political responses to the processes of globalization and transnationalism. Different cultures contain varying logics of internal organization. These “…logics are not hard-and-fast rules, but dynamic, shared predispositions that inform behavior and thought. Cultural logics cannot predict particular behaviors, but they …lend a sense of regularity and continuity to behavior….” They are based on a shared comprehension of acceptability, and are “…received [and redefined] by individuals through …socialization and …social interaction.” Patterns of cultural logics are revealed in religious beliefs, observed behavior, metaphors, historical narratives, and other forms. Cultural logics change very slowly since they are cognitively deep, but they are shaped and changed through interaction, catastrophic events, and on differing geographic levels—local and global—which connect with global economic processes.

Cultural theory: Political scientists and anthropologists have attempted to strengthen the impact of the culture and political culture concepts in political science, policy studies and other social sciences by developing cultural theory. In a historical framework, cultural theorists attempt to apply culture to a broad range of policy issues and political

2011 Comaroff and Comaroff, Revelation and Revolution, 24-25.  
2012 Ibid., 28-29.  
2013 Ong, Flexible Citizenship, 4-6.  
2015 Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory.
theories, based on the recognition that political and policy decisions are made in a context of social values.\textsuperscript{2016} Cultural theory was also inspired by Wildavsky and Douglas’ pioneering work in the early 1980s on the influences of social context on risk perceptions of environmental and technological dangers.\textsuperscript{2017} According to cultural theorists, culture must be more clearly defined and measured.\textsuperscript{2018}

*Culture* (my definition, used for this project): is all learned behavior, knowledge, values and attitudes, “… is a shared worldview held by a group or organization,” is distinctive, and has three main parts: 1) technology, 2) behavior, and 3) knowledge.

Culture is all learned behavior and knowledge, as well as values and attitudes.\textsuperscript{2019} In applied anthropology, “culture is a shared worldview held by a group or organization. Cultures are distinctive, and have three main components: artifacts [technology]…; behavior…; and knowledge…”\textsuperscript{2020}

**Culture of politics**, a holistic analytical approach for the study of political life and culture, was developed by political scientists and anthropologists in the 1990s. In her work on regime change and democratization in Africa, Pearl T. Robinson argues that we need to examine political phenomena more holistically, by looking beyond government structures, to the contexts in which political life occurs.\textsuperscript{2021} Rather than focusing on political attitudes of citizens alone, as the political culture approach does (see Political culture), we need to use a wide variety of sources, materials and methods, including surveys and analyses of contemporary cultural phenomena such as street protests, political cartoons, rhetoric, dramas, and music. Angelique Haugerud's *The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya* (1995) fruitfully uses the “culture of politics” approach to analyze how Kenya constructs its national political culture. Haugerud seamlessly and creatively integrates multiple scales of analysis (local, national, regional and global) and methods (from anthropology, politics, and economics).\textsuperscript{2022}

**Datsua-nyûô (leave Asia, join the West):** In the Meiji period (1868-1912), Japan’s leaders idolized the West. According to the *Datsua-nyûô* doctrine, to promote development, some argued that Japan must follow the same path as the West, and that it must divorce itself from its Asian foundations.\textsuperscript{2023}

**Decision-making and perception** include rational and irrational factors, influenced by perception. The basic steps include: “1) definition of the situation, 2) calculation and evaluation of alternatives, 3) choice or selection of alternatives, and 4) implementation.”

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\textsuperscript{2016} Wildavsky, Ellis, and Thompson, *Culture Matters*, xiii-xvii.
\textsuperscript{2018} Wildavsky, Ellis, and Thompson, *Culture Matters*.
\textsuperscript{2019} This is my own definition, drawn from both political science and anthropology.
\textsuperscript{2020} Nolan, *Development Anthropology*, 309.
\textsuperscript{2021} Robinson, “Democratization.”
\textsuperscript{2022} Haugerud, *Culture of Politics*.
\textsuperscript{2023} Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 169-170.
Each stage is influenced by three considerations: desires, possibility, and obligation. Decision-makers are influenced and constrained by their own perceptions, and sometimes label their opponents as enemies.\footnote{Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, \textit{Enemies}, 13-16.}

*Development* has several primary meanings—first, an increase in a society’s capacity for industrial production and the products of capitalism, and movement toward being a “modern” society. Second, it means improving quality of life, the standard of living, and eliminating or relieving poverty.\footnote{Ferguson, \textit{Anti-Politics Machine}, 15, 55.} In applied anthropology, it includes “attempts to [build] …local capacity, and [encourage] …local participation and decision-making. Development almost always involves multiple groups, and therefore, multiple cultural perspectives.”\footnote{Nolan, \textit{Development Anthropology}, 309.}

**Development ideology:** In the task of development, ideology is a “…means of establishing symbolic relations between people and the state.”\footnote{Robertson, \textit{People and the State}, 41.} It has also been called “…a set of doctrines about the proper methods to attain economic progress.” While ideology is often associated with state power, and seems to take a directive role in state development planning, it is also contingent and malleable.\footnote{Ibid., 98-99.} Contemporary anthropologists working in all three major theoretical approaches to anthropology and development (applied, postmodern, and actor-oriented) are making valuable contributions to the analysis of ideological factors in development.\footnote{See my overall discussion above of how the three major approaches to anthropology and development handle ideology and development in Chapter 1. For applied approaches, also see Hoben, “Agricultural Decision Making;” and Gardner and Lewis, \textit{Anthropology, Development, and Post-Modern}. For a postmodern treatment, see Ferguson, \textit{Anti-Politics Machine}. For actor-oriented studies, see Long and Long, \textit{Battlefields of Knowledge}; and Arce and Long, \textit{Anthropology, Development, and Modernities}.}

Historically, ideologies have played an important role in the development of East Asia. Nationalistic ideologies used in promoting development in Meiji Japan included \textit{fukoku kyōhei} and \textit{shokusan kōgyō}. In South Korea, “defeat communism and achieve unification” and in Taiwan, “retake the mainland” were important ideologies that initially motivated those nations’ postwar economic growth.\footnote{Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 202.} Since the rise of the West, modern history has been a process of the gradual domination of the West (the core) over the rest of the world (the periphery).\footnote{K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11.} The ideologies of capitalism and communism, both of which originated in the West, are examples of powerful development ideologies that have had global significance.

Some of the recent slogans used by third world governments to promote development include marketization, industrialization, and modernization. “Market” and “democracy” are two of the most prized development ideologies today, and are aggressively promoted by the West and many international organizations. These values have great appeal—“…the market mechanism is genuinely attractive because it [often]
promotes economic growth.” International organizations encourage developing nations to “convert” through programs like structural adjustment, peacekeeping, and election monitoring.\textsuperscript{2032} See also Internationalization; “Modernization;” Translative adaptation.

**Developmental state:** a form of political economy that emphasizes state-led industrial policy through strategic approaches. The government stresses “plan rational” development in collaboration with the private sector, and structures that guide domestic industry and enhance international competitiveness. Four key features of a developmental state are: 1) a small, elite bureaucracy, 2) a political system where the bureaucracy is given adequate space to intervene effectively in the economy, 3) perfection of methods of state intervention which still respect the market, and 4) overall guidance through a pilot agency like Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).\textsuperscript{2033} Limited elements of this concept should be institutionally transferable to other regions.\textsuperscript{2034}

**Developmentalism** is “…the ideology which places highest priority on economic development.”\textsuperscript{2035} It is “…a conscious attempt to exploit the tendency toward dynamic increasing returns regardless of who pursues it, whether a firm, a government, or any other organization.” Developmentalism at the state level involves industrial policy.\textsuperscript{2036} It is “…an economic system based on private property and the market economy….where the government is permitted to intervene in the market from the long-term perspective….Clearly, the state …is the founding unit of developmentalism as a political and economic system.”\textsuperscript{2037}

**Ethnography:** a description of a single contemporary culture or a piece of culture, the collection of data that describe a culture;\textsuperscript{2038} or “…the study of a community or ethnic group at close quarters and the text (usually a monograph) which results.”\textsuperscript{2039}

**Flaw of the Excluded Middle:** According to this concept developed by anthropologist Paul Hiebert, in their worldviews, Westerners often have a two-tiered view of the universe that excludes a middle realm commonly seen by non-Westerners. Many Westerners see two “worlds” or domains: the “seen world” of material, visible phenomena in this world, and the transempirical world (supernatural worlds beyond this present world, such as heavens and hells). Between the seen and transempirical worlds, Westerners miss the “unseen” domain of this present world; invisible things such as unseen powers (i.e. magical forces, the evil eye) and spirit forces in everyday life.

\textsuperscript{2032} Ibid., 11-12.
\textsuperscript{2033} Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 205-206.
\textsuperscript{2034} Johnson, MITI.
\textsuperscript{2035} Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 204.
\textsuperscript{2036} Murakami, “Theory of Developmentalism,” 180-184,188.
\textsuperscript{2037} Ibid., 203.
(demons, spirits) that are commonly recognized by non-Westerners. Anthropologist Charles Kraft makes a similar argument. Secular bias in common Western worldviews, based on the influence of the French Enlightenment, often blinds Westerners to the reality of the supernatural in everyday life. We fail to “see” or experience what we do not believe exists. Yet many non-Western cultures recognize and experience the operation of supernatural forces in this present world.

**Foreign aid/assistance:** “…a transfer of real resources or immediate claims on resources (such as foreign exchange) from one country to another, which would not have taken place as a result of market forces or in the absence of specific official action… by the donor country….” The OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) definition of 1973 includes grants, official loans, and credits with maturities over one year. It excludes private export credits and private foreign investment. One important form of foreign aid is ODA (Official Development Assistance) (see ODA, Japanese).

*Fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong army):* a powerful national slogan used in Japan during the Meiji period (1868 to 1912) to promote the adaptation of economic capitalism (*fukoku*) and a modernized military (*kyôhei*). Richard J. Samuels traces the meaning of this and similar ideologies in *Rich Nation, Strong Army* (1994).

*Globalization* (simplified version used for this research) is speeded up and intensified global connections, including economic, social, cultural, and political linkages. It can be ethnographically and comparatively assessed on the micro-level (how it is perceived by individual, human actors) or the macro-level (public, shared perceptions). It does not spread from one center or cultural tradition, but from several.

**Globalization** is the process of speeded up and intensified global connections, especially in economics, but also social, cultural, and political linkages. In anthropology, a well-known portrayal of global cultural flows is Appadurai’s notion of “scapes:” *ideoscapes, ethnoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes*, and *technoscapes*. Analysis of the experience of specific actors, and the meanings they apply to globalization, is needed (microglobalization). Or globalization can be experienced on a more public level (macroglobalization). Grounded, empirical, ethnographic studies of globalization’s effects will allow a comparative theory of globalization to emerge. Globalization does not spread from one center or cultural tradition. Rather, there are “multiple globalizations.” Globalization emanating from Japan is just as powerful as those of the West.

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2040 Hiebert, “Flaw of Excluded Middle,” and *Anthropological Reflections*.
2041 Kraft, *Christianity with Power*.
2043 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 169.
**Hegemony:** the dominant, finally naturalized worldview of a people in the process of being colonized.\(^{2047}\) Usually this corresponds in some degree with the predominant worldviews of the colonizer(s). Hegemony provides overall form for the new worldviews in the colonized region.\(^{2048}\) See also Colonialism and ideology.

**Ideology:** Political sociologist Karl Mannheim’s concept of ideology has been influential on later scholarship on ideology and worldview in both political science and anthropology. He calls ideology “….the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of [an] …epoch or [a] …group.” Ideology combines concepts of both individual interests and the “….the whole outlook of a social group.”\(^{2049}\)

Ideology has many varied definitions in political science.\(^{2050}\) A common one derives from *Weltanschauung*, or world-view, meaning one’s overall perception of the social world and how it works. An ideology is a consistent set of beliefs, morals, and attitudes.\(^{2051}\) Scholars of foreign policy argue that ideology can be viewed as a cognitive map, worldview, or guide to action. It is often systematic, connects action and policy, and helps to frame situations, establish goals, and legitimate authority.\(^{2052}\) This project draws heavily on political scientist Richard Samuels’ notion of ideology, “…the ways in which history and political structure conspire to constrain the strategic choices of nations.” Ideas/ideologies alone do not drive political outcomes. Rather, ideas and institutions interact extensively, and this interaction is finalized in the political economy. Ideologies are malleable and contested, and are embodied “…in a concrete and particular social history that has not only dates, but also names and faces.”\(^{2053}\)

Anthropologist Michael Kearney argues that in their nature, content and function, worldviews are influenced by ideological biases, and can also function as ideologies. Kearney identifies two primary ideological orientations that have influenced worldviews, cultural idealism and historical materialism. In the former view, ideas drive social conditions, and in the latter view, social conditions cause ideas.\(^{2054}\) This debate is now outmoded in cultural anthropology.\(^{2055}\) According to Ernest Gellner, ideologies claim

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\(^{2048}\) Ibid., 28-29.

\(^{2049}\) Ibid., 28-29.


\(^{2051}\) John B. Thompson argues that the most common sense of ideology in contemporary political science is rather neutral, and refers to fairly coherent, discrete systems of thought, many of which are “isms,” such as communism, fascism or Catholicism (John B. Thompson, “Ideology,” in *Oxford Companion to World Politics* [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001], 381). Charles Jones calls ideology “any comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world” (*Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, 1996:233). Marx did some of the most important work on the nature of ideology, and inspired a large amount of later work on the topic in political science and other social sciences. I do not find Marx’s work relevant here, however. For a brief summary of Marx’s contribution, see Ibid. 381 and Naugle, *Worldview*, 235-38.

\(^{2052}\) Robertson, *Dictionary Modern Politics*, 232.

\(^{2053}\) Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, *Enemies*, 99-100, 19.


\(^{2055}\) Naugle, *Worldview*, 240-242, 244.

\(^{2056}\) Conversation with Sarah Hamilton, University of Denver, May 2003.
ultimacy, but are “…formed and perpetuated within a broader framework of language, values and discourse, from which they extract their meaning.” Ideologies must accept the norms of the worlds within which they function, and seek to draw adherents. For the state, ideologies create official aspirations and help to structure them.

*Image (simplified version, used for this project): the basic ideas and pictures in our minds about reality; how we organize these ideas and pictures in our minds about reality and the world around us. A set of images can form a worldview.

Image (anthropology) has two general meanings, according to Kearney. One is “…a visual representation in the mind.” The second is fundamental, general perceptions and concepts of reality or schemata that together form a worldview. Images of an object are constructed through a selective process of memory, of remembering and forgetting. The same is true of images of Japan constructed by Japanese expatriates and non-Japanese local peoples in foreign countries. Some tend to idealize Japan, others minimize negative memories, and some focus on their bad experiences with Japan. Historical experiences with Japan are sometimes not exploited, unless they are found to be useful. Foreign governments may invoke either negative images of Japan (the case of China) or positive ones (Prime Minister Tony Blair’s campaign in the mid-1990s to promote state welfare in Britain) to suit their purposes.

Image (political science) refers to “…perceptual filters that organize our environment and enable us to predict and respond to that environment.” Like stereotypes, images include both facts and emotional responses. They are also called “…cognitive organizing devices, …information filters, …schema, …and …perceptual patterns. They are frequently treated as synonymous with beliefs, … although … [they are not]. Images are cognitive organizing devices, while beliefs incorporate cognition and affect…. Psychology indicates that environments tend to be organized into seven, plus or minus two, images.

There are several important types of images. The enemy image is a range or collection of perceptions about an opponent. In an international conflict, images of the enemy influence a nation’s internal and external images of itself. An enemy will polarize our images of good and evil. Self-images “…serve the same function as images of others: they facilitate information processing and environmental management, [and they] …tend to hold more positive attributes than negative ones.” A national image is “…the totality of attributes that a person recognizes …when he contemplates [a]

2056 Gellner quoted in Robertson, People and the State, 99.
2057 Geertz in Robertson, People and the State, 98.
2058 Michael Kearney, World View (Novato, Calif: Chandler & Sharp, 1984), 47.
2060 Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10.
2061 Cottam, “Recent Development,” 3.
2062 Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 24.
2063 Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 19-21.
2064 Cottam, “Recent Development,” 7.
Images are a valuable tool through which states can achieve their international goals without the use of costly resources. As rational actors, states attempt to project desired, even deceptive, images at low cost. A state’s images are one major determinant among several of the policies of other states toward it. We can study state images on the decision-making level. They are often hard to change, since they include immutable factors like geography.

Images have been studied generally as information screens and specifically as the image of the enemy. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the concept of image was also investigated in terms of stereotyping. Eventually “the analytical utility of the concept expanded as efforts were made to explore the totality of images in the cognitive worldview of foreign policy makers.”

Theoretical issues in the study of image are complex. Investigators have tended to focus on smaller concepts rather than larger theoretical frameworks.

**Imperialism:** in political science, has been defined as “…domination or control by one country or group over others.” The exact nature, causes, clearest examples and other aspects of the term are debated by social scientists. In political science, there are varied arguments and positions on many of these issues. For example, some analysts contend that equating imperialism with global capitalism is too inexact, that a wider variety of politico-economic conditions are present. Anthropologists have defined imperialism as “…unequal territorial relationships among states based on subordination and domination, associated with particular expressions of industrial capitalism such as financial monopolies and transnational capital flows.” The anthropological treatment shows more Marxist influence.

**Industrial policy** (simplified version, based on Murakami Yasusuke’s concept, used for this project): everything a government does in a country’s economy. It often includes technology.

**Industrial policy** consists of all forms of government intervention into the economy, such as protection of failing industries, trade policies that protect infant industries, and promotion of high-tech industries. The policy tools of industrial policy include: basic policies (identification of industries), indicative, long-term or educative planning, promotion and diffusion of technical innovation, broad policies of protection (trade protection and subsidies), policies for the preservation of polipoly (through the

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2066 Jervis, *Logic of Images*, 3, 6, 8, 10-14.
2067 Cottam, “Recent Development,” 3.
2068 Ibid., 17-18.
2072 *Polipoly* refers to competition within a group of highly innovative firms. In this case, the uncertainty of technical innovation “…causes a large number of firms to endlessly compete for a leading position, without any lasting monopoly.” See Murakami, “Theory of Developmentalism,” 186-187.
regulation of prices, investments and production), indirect financial controls, and entry and exit policies for foreign firms.\footnote{Ibid., 186, 189-190.}

**Institutions** are “organizational mechanisms that ‘remain relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals.’” Three important types of institutions are governmental institutions, economic institutions, and those that connect society, economy and politics, such as electoral systems and parties.\footnote{March and Olsen quoted in Pempel, *Regime Shift*, 1998.} Institutions include rules, sanctions, legalistic aspects, and means of enforcement.\footnote{Margaret Levi, “A Model, A Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,” in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, eds. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 25.} According to the World Bank, they signify the government’s ability to design and implement appropriate policies.\footnote{Ohno and Ohno, *Japanese Views*, 307.}

*Internationalization* (simplified version, used for this project): refers to the process where the “active” West absorbed the “passive” non-West, for the sake of its own development. The non-West has included Asia, Africa, Oceania, and the Americas, and much exploitation and subjugation.\footnote{K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11-12.} Internationalization focuses on external, international processes: what happens as the powerful “core” West absorbs other peoples from the periphery into the global market. It looks at both economic and cultural factors: what occurs as the periphery countries are absorbed into the “cultural universe” of the West? Internationalization does not examine internal implications. It especially considers what happened on the international level through historic processes of colonialism. It can also study contemporary issues; i.e. what happens on the international level as Western development ideologies affect non-Western countries?

**Internationalization:** as defined by some Japanese scholars, is essentially the same as the process of “modernization” (see “modernization”). Specifically, it is “…the process by which the militarily and economically superior West has subjugated other peoples in the periphery, absorbing them into its own cultural universe, positioning them as inferior, and exploiting them, if necessary, to the benefit of its own development.” The “active” West dominates the “passive” non-West. The zenith of this movement was the colonization of Asia, Africa and Oceania in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,\footnote{K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11.} though the earlier colonization of the Americas by Western powers is similar. Internationalization continues today through the promotion of Western values like free markets and democracy in international development (see development ideology).\footnote{Ibid.,12.} A second meaning of internationalization (*kokusaika*) is specific to Japan. See *Kokusaika*. 

\textsuperscript{2073} Ibid., 186, 189-190. 
\textsuperscript{2074} March and Olsen quoted in Pempel, *Regime Shift*, 1998. 
\textsuperscript{2077} K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11-12. 
\textsuperscript{2078} K. Ohno, “Overview,” 11. 
\textsuperscript{2079} Ibid.,12.
JBIC (Japan Bank of International Cooperation): a Japanese government agency established in the late 1990s. Its purpose is to “…contribute to the sound development of Japan and the international economy and community through undertaking lending and other financial operations: for the promotion of Japanese exports, imports or Japanese economic activities overseas; for the stability of international financial order, and for economic and social development or economic stability in developing areas; in accordance with the principle that it shall not compete with commercial financial institutions.” Through September 2008, the two main components of the bank’s operations were International Financial Operations (IFO) and Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations (OECO), plus several supportive and administrative programs. IFO programs primarily consist of “…export loans, import loans, overseas investment loans, untied loans, [bridge loans, refinancing,] …and equity participation in overseas projects of Japanese corporations.” OECO programs provided long-term, low interest ODA (official development assistance) loans for the “…self-help efforts of developing countries, including social infrastructure development and economic stabilization” (see also ODA, Japanese). OECO used to exist as an important Japanese government agency, the OEFC (see OECF). The primary areas OECO loans funded included socioeconomic infrastructure such as telecommunications, gas, power, agriculture and transportation. Additional areas include social development, human resource development, economic stabilization, and environmental conservation. OECO also provided “Private Sector Investment Finance” (PSIF) which “…supports the activities of private companies in developing countries.” On October 1, 2008, IFOs will be taken over by a new Japanese organization, the Japan Finance Corporation, within its international finance area, and JBIC’s OECOs will be absorbed into a new JICA organization. JBIC had a total budget of 1,777 billion yen for FY 2007 and outstanding loans worth 19,351.7

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2084 This budget was down from 1, 910 billion yen for fiscal year 2002. The 2007 budget figure includes 1,007.0 billion yen for IFO, and 770 billion yen for OECO. Information (2007 data) about JBIC was taken from the following website: JBIC, http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/profile/organize/index.php; accessed 12 August 2008.
billion yen on March 31, 2007.\textsuperscript{2085} JBIC’s staff numbers about 865.\textsuperscript{2086} There are also 29 branch offices outside Tokyo, both in Japan and overseas.\textsuperscript{2088} JBIC has 29 primary departments, sections and divisions in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{2087} Its staff numbers about 865.\textsuperscript{2086} There are also 29 branch offices outside Tokyo, both in Japan and overseas.\textsuperscript{2088}

**JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency):** a Japanese government-related, independent agency established in 1974.\textsuperscript{2089} With JBIC, it has been one of the most important Japanese agencies responsible for Japanese ODA policy (see also JBIC and ODA, Japanese).\textsuperscript{2090} JICA handles the technical cooperation programs of Japan’s ODA. Its aim is the transfer of technologies and knowledge to aid the socioeconomic development and nation-building capacity of LDCs. JICA’s chief programs include technical training of overseas trainees in Japan, a youth invitation program, dispatching technical cooperation experts from Japan overseas, project-type technical cooperation, development studies, provision of equipment, grant aid, the JOCV program (similar to the U.S. Peace Corps), disaster relief, limited support for Japanese emigrants and ethnic Japanese (mostly in Latin American locations), addressing aid effectiveness and global issues, and a community empowerment program.\textsuperscript{2091} JICA has more than 1,300 full-time


\textsuperscript{2086} The staff figure was current on March 31, 2007 JBIC, available from \url{http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/bse/profile/organize/index.php}. Internet; accessed 12 August 2008), and is a slight decrease from 886 staff in the early 2000s. The staff figure includes the JBIC Institute, JBIC’s economic research center and think tank in Tokyo (JBIC, available from \url{http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/about/develop/index.php}. Internet; accessed 12 August 2008). There were about 27 primary departments in the early 2000s in JBIC in Tokyo. This refers to the number of offices outside Tokyo, both domestic and international, on August 12, 2008 (JBIC, \url{http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/base/network/index.php}; accessed 12 August 2008).

\textsuperscript{2089} In late 2003, as part of the Japanese government’s reform plans, JICA was transformed into an “independent administrative institution,” to promote more accountable and efficient ODA, strengthened public participation, peace building assistance, efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Now JICA manages and operates itself fairly autonomously, but presents plans, goals and performance evaluations to MOFA twice a year. While third parties increasingly scrutinize its work, JICA has more freedom to select aid recipients. Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, became director in late 2003. Many hoped that she would bring a fresh touch to JICA, given her broad experience. Indeed she has encouraged more public participation and cooperation between governments and NGOs in Japan’s aid policy and JICA. Critics charge that bureaucrats have long dominated JICA. In the past, its top chief has usually been a retired bureaucrat from MOFA. Information about JICA is from these websites (all accessed 17 September 2003): JICA, available from \url{http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/02.html}; \url{http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/index.html}; \url{http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/newjica.html}; \url{http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm}.

\textsuperscript{2086} This is in addition to several major ministries, one of which is MOFA.\textsuperscript{2090} Information about JICA is from these websites (all accessed 17 September 2003): \url{http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/02.html}; \url{http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/index.html}; \url{http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/newjica.html}; \url{http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getcd.p15?ed20030917al.htm}. 2091

844
staff members. They serve at varied locations, including the Tokyo headquarters, an additional 18 domestic offices including the Institute for International Cooperation, and 99 overseas offices. JICA’s budget (end of FY 2006) was 155.6 billion yen. In October 2008, the ODA activities of JBIC merged with JICA into a “new” JICA, creating a larger bilateral aid agency with an estimated budget of $8.5 billion, offering technical cooperation, grant and loan assistance within one agency.

**Kokusaika (internationalization):** an informal movement and way of thinking that was strongly advocated by the public and private sectors in Japan starting in the late 1970s. *Kokusaika* promoted international values in Japan through improved foreign language education, international conferences and scientific exchanges, the media, and international trade shows. It was promoted outside Japan through exhibitions of Japanese culture in major world cities, the global spread of Japanese pop culture, Japanese foreign aid, and public and private trade organizations. Examples of public vehicles that promote internationalization are the JET program inside Japan, and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) abroad. Some critics condemn *kokusaika* as a sham.

**Kokutai:** (national essence or polity), a scholarly line of inquiry in Japan in the Tokugawa era, stressed the uniqueness of the Japanese polity, through such ideas as the rule of Japan through the unbroken imperial rule, and Japan as a “family-state” (*kazoku kokka*). The debate over the meaning of the *kokutai* goes back to the nineteenth century, and was, at its start, heavily influenced by different schools of Shinto. Central to the concept of *kokutai* is the idea that the Japanese polity is unique, since the Japanese

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**Footnotes:**


2095 While numerous Japanese organizations and institutions have promoted *kokusaika*, critics charge that Japan maintains the highest degree of discriminatory barriers against participation by foreigners in their society of any major industrialized nation. Ivan P. Hall provides numerous examples of how Japanese institutions regularly discriminate against foreign participants in sectors such as law, academia, journalism, and scientific exchanges. Hall charges that while Japan has eagerly embraced foreign things and ideologies since the Meiji era, it purposely limits in-depth participation by foreign people in Japan to a token minimum. A good example is the refusal of most Japanese universities to grant tenure to foreign instructors. Hall concludes that this sort of discriminatory parochialism threatens Japan’s future contributions to and ability to meaningfully function in the modern world. See Ivan P. Hall, *Cartels of the Mind: Japan's Intellectual Closed Shop* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1998), 172-185.

2096 *Japan*, “Kokutai,” 819.
imperial line is descended in an unbroken line from the gods, and the concept of the family state, that all Japanese are related to the emperor as their “father.” The debate reemerged in 1935, and the concept was important through the end of World War II as nationalist ideology promoted by Japan’s government.

*“Modernization”* (my definition, used for this project) is the process where a rich country in the core (center) of the world’s economy forces weaker, poorer countries in the periphery to trade with it, so it can become richer and more developed. As a poor, non-Western country is absorbed into the world economy, on the surface, its culture will start to look more Western (like the cultures of the rich “core”). But the core of its culture will not change much, but stay mostly non-Western.

“*Modernization,*” according to certain Japanese scholars, is the process through which the core West, which is economically and militarily superior, forces weaker peripheral peoples into the global economic system, in order to exploit them for its own development. Anthropologically, “modernization” can be called “…the adaptive acceptance of Western civilization [culture] under the persistent form of the existing culture [of a non-Western society]….” “Modernization” presupposes that non-Western societies will evolve and eventually become like Western ones. A non-Western society may adapt to Western civilization and the market principle, but core areas of non-Western societies, such their social organization, will never become Western. “Modernization” is not unilinear. Japan’s “modernization” began with the arrival of Commodore Perry’s “Black Ships” (armed steamships) in Japan in 1853, which helped to force open the nation to trade. This process has continued through the Meiji Restoration.

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2097 *Japan,* “Kokutai,” “Kokutai debate,” and “Kokutai no hongi,” 819-820.
2098 I put quotation marks around the term “modernization” to distinguish this unique Japanese version of the concept from the more widely known definition of modernization used by Western social scientists such as W.W. Rostow in the 1960s and after. This concept was developed in the attempt to provide an acceptable, non-Marxist definition of how the newly independent countries in Asia, Africa and elsewhere could “develop.” In the more conventional definition, economic development is presumed to include a set of definitive stages any developing country must pass through to “develop.” This concept of modernization was also applied to other issues, including politics and society.
2100 Maegawa’s conception of modernization is very similar to Comaroff and Comaroff’s concept of colonialism and ideology, except in the latter case, they argue that the ideologies of the receiving culture, despite providing content, will be subsumed under the overall form of the hegemonic worldview of the colonizer. Maegawa seems to be suggesting that if the “modernization” is “successful,” the culture or worldviews of the receiving (non-Western) society will maintain their “persistent form,” and not be engulfed or subsumed under the adoption or entrance of the Western culture/worldview. Comaroff and Comaroff assumed that the Western (or colonizer’s) worldview will dominate that of the receptor society, at least in overall form. We must also note that “colonizers” are not necessarily Western, as in the case of Japanese colonialism in East and Southeast Asia and the South Pacific from 1895-1945, and the contemporary “colonialism” (perhaps an exaggerated accusation) of Chinese investment in Africa, a greatly increasing trend at present (2006).
2101 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 175.
(1868) up to the present. It was a process of adaptation to the global economic system led by the modern Western nations. See also Translative adaptation.

**ODA, Japanese (Official Development Assistance):** foreign aid that is coordinated by the Japanese government. Japan’s ODA program began in 1954, while Japan itself received aid from the World Bank to aid in the postwar reconstruction of its economy. Japan’s aid has increased almost every year since that time. Japan’s aid has gradually expanded to include recipients outside of Asia, and strategic, political goals, in addition to economic ones. Japan’s ODA is divided into two forms, multilateral ODA and bilateral ODA. Multilateral ODA consists of subscriptions and contributions to international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank. Bilateral ODA includes grants (grant aid and technical cooperation) and loans. Grants are provided by JICA, while loans are released by JBIC (see JICA and JBIC). The purpose of Japan’s ODA is to contribute to global peace and prosperity through helping to stabilize the international economy, by supporting “…economic infrastructures and social development in developing countries.” In its aid philosophy, Japan emphasizes self-help and self-reliance, often through the provision of ODA loans, as well as values of democratization and human rights. Japan’s first ODA Charter was adopted in 1992. Its goals included environmental conservation and development in tandem, the avoidance of using ODA for military purposes or sending it to countries with increasing militarization or arms trade, the strengthening of international peace and stability, democratization, market-based economies, human rights and freedom. The second ODA Charter was approved in 2003. According to the new charter, the effectiveness of Japanese aid must be improved. The new charter defines the purpose of Japanese aid as “contributing to the peace and development of the international community and thereby ensuring the nation’s security and prosperity,” amid complex problems associated with globalization, including human rights, pollution, terrorism, religious and ethnic conflicts, and the gap between rich and poor. Japan’s new aid policy will also require increased oversight (and monitoring) of the aid process on the part of Japan, the donor nation. Formerly aid was provided on the basis of requests from potential recipients. The majority of Japan’s ODA loans go to Asian countries. ODA loans from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations of the JBIC account for 40 percent of Japan’s ODA, making them the “…cornerstone of Japanese ODA policy.” Japan’s budget for total ODA for fiscal year 1999 was $15.385 billion. Since then it has decreased significantly.

**OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund):** the Japanese government agency that implemented Japan’s huge ODA (official development assistance) program from the 1950s through the late 1990s (Ohno 1998: 1). OECF provided “…so-called ‘two-step’ loans at concessional interest rates with long maturities to governments or public

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2102 Ibid., 167.
financial institutions in developing countries. Loan funds [were] …on-lent by borrower governments or public financial institutions in developing countries…. Two-step loans [were] …one of the main vehicles for Japan’s ODA loans…. In the late 1990s, the OECF was absorbed into the newly created Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). See also JBIC.

Operational code is one of two major cognitive models for the study of decision-making in international relations (See also Cognitive maps). It is “a guideline for describing some of the political beliefs of policymakers; …a descriptive set of analytical categories.” When combined with theories of cognition, these beliefs suggest a connection between beliefs and behavior. An operational code attempts to provide a “…general, non-situation-specific, framework of fundamental beliefs about politics and the political world.” Beliefs are organized hierarchically, and scholars attempt to identify those that are central (unchangeable). Two kinds of beliefs are seminal. Philosophical beliefs are “fundamental assumptions” about politics, and instrumental beliefs are assumptions of “…how politics should be approached, [and] what kinds of behavior are appropriate.” The code has several problems, such as connecting beliefs and behavior, and generating testable hypotheses. Several scholars, including Holsti, have developed code typologies.

Organizational culture(s): “Organizations, like societies, have cultures of their own. Although an organization’s culture may incorporate major elements from the society in which it exists, it will differ in other ways. Organizations that contain members from different cultures will reflect these differences to some extent.” Also, organizational culture is a subject studied by several different disciplines, including anthropology, management sciences, policy sciences, sociology, linguistics, social philosophy, and psychology. Anthropological studies of organizational culture fall within a wider framework of comparative (ethnological) and single culture studies of work and human relations in societies since human prehistory. Today’s organizational anthropologists also apply the culture concept holistically to the study of formal organizations in complex societies. The first anthropological studies were done in the 1930s.

Organization(s) are “…groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives,” “…collective actors who might be subject to institutional
constraint,” or “...a body of procedures by which participating members pursue together a set of agreed goals through control of uncertainty.” Anthropologically, an organization can be defined as “...a socio-cultural system embedded in larger socio-cultural environments.” Management is perhaps only one subculture among several of an organization’s cultures. Organizational life is rather fluid, not linear, in the midst of changing decisions, plans, actors, meanings, and statuses. Perception of organizational values often occurs subconsciously. These values influence the reactions, behaviors, and decision-making of persons in the organization. Many occurrences are ambiguous and unpredictable. So we must examine not only events, but also their meanings. Because of differences in perception, information processing, and interpretation, organizational members vary in how they interpret events. Alliances formed by members do not necessarily correspond with their ideational worlds.

Paradigm refers to “a pattern or model that guides thinking and action.”

Perception: Through the senses, we perceive certain elements of the world around us. How we perceive the total environment around us is affected by the nature of that environment. Perceptions are gradually and systematically organized into a worldview. This worldview becomes the basis for how we interact physically and socially with the environment, helps us to alter the environment, and is affected by changes in the environment as well. However, “perception alone does not explain behavior or set the range of options available to the actor.” It is often a function of external stimuli and political drama. Perception is not a concept commonly used in political science.

Policy: Political scientists have defined policy as a government’s or organization’s broad statement of intention, goals or objectives, implying theories, or “...a hypothesis [by a public or private organization or group] containing initial conditions and predicted consequences.” Anthropologists characterize policy as “an overall plan or course of action, usually based on clearly-stated values or beliefs, intended as a guide for decisions and plans” or “...deliberate action in any sphere of human activity,” including public and private realms. Some policies are “...institutionally sanctioned and have the

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2117 Cottam, *Images and Intervention*, viii-ix. Political drama is defined as “...a collective sense-making mechanism that leads actors to fulfill certain roles” (Ibid.).
2119 Ibid., xiii.
potential for affecting large numbers of people." In general, the study of policy is more systematic in political science than in anthropology.

Policy cycle/stages: Lester and Stewart identify six stages in a policy cycle: agenda setting, policy formation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, policy change, and policy termination. According to anthropologist Erve Chambers, there are generally thought to be four basic stages in policy decision-making: policy formulation, planning, program implementation, and review.

Policy implementation means to complete, carry out, produce or accomplish a policy. It is “...a process of interaction between the setting of [policy or program] goals and actions geared to achieving them; ...the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain [of policies and programs] so as to obtain the desired results." Policy implementation is the second of the three traditional stages of policy identified by public policy studies, the first being policy formulation/design, and the third policy evaluation. The process of implementation begins after new policy adoption, provision of funding, and program agreement. The process is inter-organizational, entailing complex, joint actions.

Public policy theorists largely ignored implementation until Pressman and Wildavsky’s Implementation (1973). There is no certain model for successful policy implementation, although a large number of approaches have been attempted. The “top-bottom” approach argues that policy is formulated at the top, and translated into instructions for staff that implement the policy at the bottom. According to the “bottom-top” approach, “street level bureaucrats” determine success in implementation through prioritizing and rationing policy as they serve their clienteles. Or implementation is seen as an evolutionary, interactive, negotiative process, where it is difficult to determine the boundaries between policy and implementation, which are viewed “...as a policy/action continuum...”

2122 Lester and Stewart, Public Policy, 6-9.
2123 Chambers, Applied Anthropology, 41-45.
2124 Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, xiii.
2125 Ibid., xxiii.
2128 Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation, xv.
2130 Ibid.
2131 Ibid., 5, 8-9.
2132 Ibid., 10.
Political cognition: a field of study that evolved in the 1970s and 1980s that applies the methods and theories of cognitive psychology to the study of political behavior. Specific literatures examined from psychology include cognition, decision-making and social cognition. Psychologists conduct some studies, but political scientists also do many. Scholarship is political cognition has suffered from several problems. According to Martha Cottam, problems in political science work include a failure to adequately draw on previous works or psychology itself, inadequate linkage of psychology and behavior, problems in connecting social psychology and individual cognition, and confusion of basic concepts such as belief, cognitive system, and worldview. The first application of cognitive psychology to political science examined the beliefs of foreign policy makers about why certain events happened. Other areas of investigation are information processing, selective memory and selective perception. Scholars believe that information-processing theories can be usefully applied to important political questions, such as understanding political attitudes, ideologies, and reasoning processes of elites.

Political culture in political science refers to political attitudes and values. Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture* (1963) surveys political beliefs of individuals in five nations in order to predict political orientations and values conducive to democracy. Almond and Verba conclude that there is one predominant political culture for each nation. While many political scientists discount political culture, since in the late 1980s, it has been gradually strengthened. In 1990, Wildavsky, Thompson and Ellis developed their political culture typology of social relations and shared values, called cultural theory (see Cultural theory). They apply this typology to numerous past studies. Wildavsky et al argue that it allows improved analysis, and that it can be universally applied. They argue that there are multiple political cultures within each nation, a significant advance over *The Civic Culture*. Putnam et al’s *Making Democracy Work* (1993) examines political cultures and democracy in Italy, through significant triangulation of methods (contemporary and historical statistics, and multi-sited ethnography). They find that there are multiple political cultures in Italy, and that culture is a significant predictor of potential for democratization and successful economic development. In *Culture Matters*

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2134 Lau and Sears, *Political Cognition*, ix-x.
2135 For more details on Martha Cottam’s work on these issues, see Cottam, *Foreign Policy Decision Making*, “Recent Development,” *Images and Intervention*; and Cottam and Shi, *Contending Dramas*.
2139 Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, *Cultural Theory*.
2140 Daniel J. Elazar’s work on the different political cultures in the United States, as seen in the different state governments, and at different levels of government, local, state and federal, confirms the existence of multiple political cultures in the United States. For examples, see *American Federalism: A View from the States* (1972), *Building Cities in America: Urbanization and Suburbanization in a Frontier Society* (1987), *Cities of the Prairie Revisited: The Closing of the Metropolitan Frontier* (1986), and *Minnesota Politics and Government* (1999).
(1997), Wildavsky, Ellis and Thompson apply cultural theory to a wide variety of policy areas, and argue powerfully for the need to better operationalize culture. To improve political culture, we need to better integrate interpretive and predictive approaches, quantitative and qualitative methods, and multiple scales of analysis. See also Culture of politics.

Alternatively, some scholars of political cognition define political culture (“cultural system”) as “…all publicly common ways of relating in… [a] collectivity.” A political culture/cultural system includes relationships among individuals, patterned systems of relating, and ways of relating that are commonly known to all participants in the culture. These ways of relating are the public norm for a society.

**Positivism**, a paradigm or group of philosophies with an extremely positive view of science and the scientific method, stresses “…objectivity, hypothetico-deductive theory, external law-like relations, exact and formal language, and separation of facts from meaning.” Positivism stresses the use of hypotheses, postulates, explanation and prediction.

**Postpositivism** is a paradigm that attempts to address weaknesses in the positivistic paradigm by following a critical realism that stresses that reality and truth exists, but can only be imperfectly comprehended. It encompasses several theoretical approaches. There are perhaps four main paradigmatic approaches in the social sciences today: positivism, critical theory, postpositivism, and constructivism. Objectivity is an important goal, but can only be partly achieved, through the use of external aids, such as critical theory and noting one’s biases. Methodologically, imbalances are addressed through multiple methods, researching in more natural settings, and using more grounded theory and qualitative methods. In postpositivism, knowledge is built cumulatively. The paradigm attempts to develop generalizable theoretical propositions built on empirical research, but holds that such generalizations are only tentative. Human phenomena can be best explained by causal relationships. Postpositivism values

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2141 Wildavsky, Ellis, and Thompson, *Culture Matters*.
2142 Two studies that integrate multiple scales of analysis are Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Haugerud, *Culture of Politics*, but they are only single-nation studies. We need multination studies like Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder, Colo.: L. Reinner Publishers, 1990), which include the integration of statistics, historical data, and long-term, multi-sited ethnography.
2145 Van Arsdale, “Ethnographic Field.”
2146 Ibid.
explanation, prediction, control, and rigorous inquiry through quantitative and qualitative methods.

**Program(s)** in development “… [are] distinct from either a policy or a project. [They] …operationalize broad (and sometimes vague) policy directives by collecting resources or various kinds, outlining sets of goals and objectives, and setting out timetables.” These plans are refined and then applied to the grass-roots level by projects. More broadly, programs are “…governmental action initiated in order to secure objectives whose attainment is problematical…. Considered as a whole, a program can be conceived of as a system in which each element is dependent on the other[s]…. Programs make… [policy theories] operational by forging the first link in the causal chain connecting actions to objectives.”

**Project(s)** in development are “…a planned series of activities, bound in space and time, designed to achieve a stated set of objectives, using specific resources and employing stated strategies or rationales. Projects are the predominant way in which development assistance is delivered.”

**Project stages:** There is no universal consensus on the stages involved in development and technology project decision-making. The World Bank identifies six stages: identification, preparation, appraisal, negotiations, implementation and evaluation. According to the United Nations, there are eight (conception, formulation, analysis and evaluation, approval, implementation, reporting and feedback, transition to normal administration, evaluation). Szyliowicz collapses them into five: initiation, appraisal, approval, implementation and completion.

**Reasoning** is “…a structured pragmatic activity [which] …explains the nature and development of structures of thought with reference to the general progress of intellectual development” (Jean Piaget, 20th century developmental psychologist). Rosenberg et al argue that a general structure underlies each individual’s understanding of political and physical events, and that the nature of this cognitive structure varies among people.

**Religion** is a complex social and spiritual phenomenon, challenging to define, that incorporates behavior, symbols, beliefs, and organizational structures. Any of these four primary features may be relatively simple or highly complex in different cultures. Across cultures the variance is so great, it is challenging to generalize. Religion is also closely
connected with the cognitive: religion is “...a symbolic and linguistic system that by its nature is powerfully evocative—it triggers experiences and emotions and at the cognitive level defines a meaningful universe including proper strategies for action.”

Social scientists argue that religion serves various social roles, including strengthening individuals in the face of limitations that nature or society imposes on them, and supporting and giving validity to other features of society, such as economic and political issues. Religion can provide an integrative function, highlighting values and norms in cultural identity that enable an individual to fit in well in society. Religion can give answers and solace for many challenges of human existence, including illness, death, stress, greed, and the afterlife. Other forms of human activity, such as business, also involve behavior, symbols, beliefs, and organizational structures. Though one can identify elements and terms common to religion that differentiate it from other such activities, such as ultimate, transcendent, spiritual, sacred, and supernatural, these terms are also challenging to define cross-culturally. Exactly what sets “religion” apart from other human endeavors that may be more “secular” or “profane?” Though religion appears to be a universal human endeavor in nearly all cultures, the West tends to draw a harder distinction between “religious” and “non-religious” social systems than other societies.

Many languages, such as Japanese, have no exact equivalent for the term “religion,” though many peoples, again including the Japanese, do activities that can be called “religious,” as defined in the West. Monotheistic religions predominant in the West (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) tend to stress God as an all powerful, male king, judge and lawgiver, with the human problem defined as one of sinning against divine law. Eastern religions (i.e. Hinduism, Buddhism) often include numerous gods, or none, and stress meditation or devotion in pursuit of joy, freedom, inner peace, material prosperity or health.

Religion is studied by different fields in multiple ways, which also makes it challenging to define. Anthropologists tend to take a holistic approach, studying any or all of the four key components of religion identified above. Sociology focuses on the social behavior patterns and organizational structures of religion. Theology, philosophy and comparative religion tend to stress belief. Literature and art history look at religious symbolism and art. Social scientists concentrate on how religion functions in different cultural contexts. One issue that all disciplines examine is origins. This addresses how religion became of concern in the human mind, individually and collectively. Scholars in different fields have offered different answers, including arguments that religion originated in dreams (anthropology), from feelings of guilt and fear (psychology), from the human tendency to personify difficult natural forces (philosophy), for the purpose of exercising elite control (philosophy), or from divine revelation (religion and religious

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2158 An example of this is the Flaw of the Excluded Middle discussed in Chapter 1 and earlier in the Glossary.
practitioners). Sociologist Emile Durkheim focused on how religion operates in society as a social institution. Anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown studied how religion supports other social institutions, while Bronislaw Malinowski focused on how religion assists people with daily issues that transcend scientific knowledge. Scholars such as Robert Bellah have identified forms of civil religion, such as patriotism, which incorporate beliefs, behaviors, organizational structures, and symbolism. Civil religion is present in the United States, and Japan’s State Shinto was a form of civil religion. Also related to religion and politics, many scholars have been interested in how religion interacts with ideologies. One example is the work of Max Weber on the role of Protestantism in promoting capitalism, and on how other world religions relate to economic activity. Contemporary questions include how religious fundamentalism affects national and international politics, war, and global terrorism. Social scientists are also interested in issues of religious participation, religion and ethnicity, and religion and gender. While formerly social scientists attempted to approach the study of religion in a scientifically detached manner, today there is more tendency for reflexivity, to admit one’s own religious biases and to consider how these may color one’s work.

New technological tools such as computers are expanding how religion is studied, and how religions extend their reach globally. There are many thousands of different religious systems today, and the impact of technology upon them is great. Some religions have almost always transcended geography (Christianity, Islam and Buddhism), while others have been more geographically tied (Hinduism, Shinto, and Jainism). Increased globalization through technology and world travel only increases the complexities of religion, including opportunities for expansion, interreligioius dialogue, conflict, and syncretism.

Schema/schemata: preexisting knowledge structures used by individuals to process information. A schema is “…a hierarchical organization of knowledge in a particular domain, which includes a category label, generic descriptions of the stimulus domain, particular instances of it, and interconnections among these. For example, a politician schema could include general information about all politicians, …higher level organizing categories, …more specific …examples of politicians, and a specification of the relationships of the various attributes of the schema.” Two classes of schemata important for politics are role schemata, which focus on broad social groups, and person schemata, which systematize knowledge about individuals. Schemata direct the storage and processing of new information, and assist the recall and interpretation of information in the memory. Researchers have used many different methods to measure political schemata. An important issue is determining when particular schemata will be utilized.

2161 Clements, “Religion,” 159.
2162 Ibid., 160.
2163 Ibid., 161.
2164 Ibid.
2165 Lau and Sears, Political Cognition, 349-351, 360, 362.
Seiryoku tozen (the encroachment of Western powers in the East): an ideological slogan that encouraged Japan to embark on the path of industrialization during the Meiji period, in order to avoid colonization by the West. At that time, western capitalism was the only model of economic development available to Japan. Yet also motivating Japan’s development were indigenous ideologies of spiritualism and nationalism, not Western individualism or utilitarianism.2166

Shokusan kōgyō (increase industrial production): One of two primary ideologies influential in Meiji Japan (1868-1912) that promoted nationalistic industrialization. The other primary ideology was fukoku kyōhei.2167

Social cognition and political behavior: while all actions pass through a cognitive process, cognition is not a powerful independent variable. The connections between cognition and political behavior must be assessed on different levels of analysis—social (international and domestic), and individual (political decision-makers). There are several problems with the “social cognition” approach. Sometimes people assess problems rationally, other times rashly. This approach asks interesting questions, such as how beliefs are related to each other, how beliefs and images form, and how they change. A cognitive approach looks at an individual’s beliefs, values, and how s/he processes information. Previous beliefs affect behavior and perceptions strongly. A very important predictor of how a foreign policy decision-maker will view a situation is his/her beliefs and expectations.2168

Spirituality is often considered hard to distinguish from religion, and hard to define.2169 It has been called “...the concern of human beings with their appropriate relationships to the cosmos.”2170 A simple dictionary definition renders it as an “attitude or principle that inspires, animates, or pervades thought, feeling, or action,”2171 or the connections between “...the human and the sublime, ... the concrete and the abstract, and between man and God.”2172 Spirituality suggests feeling, thought, and practice connected with the inner, subjective world related to religion, and the meanings of the deepest parts of human life and existence. It is the main motivating force of religion, on corporate (organized or unorganized) or individual levels. Spirituality flourishes within living religious traditions, which often involve text, story, myth, doctrine, ritual and/or symbols.2168

2166 Watanabe, “Designing Asia,” 205.
2167 Ibid., 202.
2169 For more on the distinctions between religion and spirituality, see Gross, “Contemporary,” 424. Part of the debate entails differences between religiosity and spirituality. Religiosity usually refers to religious behavior, “...the way people and communities are influenced by religious ideas and shape social reality accordingly” (Tony Tain-Ren Lin, “Religiosity,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. William A. Durity Jr. Vol. 7. 2nd Ed. [Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008], 162).
Forms of spirituality vary according to social and personal conditions and tradition.\textsuperscript{2173} Although religious community or participation can generate spiritual power, social contexts shape what form it will ultimately take.\textsuperscript{2174} In advanced industrial societies, there increasingly seems to be a distinction between spirituality and religion. Many people in the United States claim to be spiritual, but not religious.\textsuperscript{2175} Similarly, a distinction between religion and spirituality exists in Japan also. For example, the Japanese word for religion (\textit{shukyo}) connotes ‘sect teaching,’ while the general word for spirituality (\textit{seishin}) suggests a more general form of “spirit.” Therefore many Japanese claim to not be “religious,” though they regularly participate in “spiritual” activities or rituals, on a daily or periodic basis.

In the social sciences, most academic research on spirituality is done in the fields of psychology and sociology of religion, based on empirical studies. According to Zehavit Gross, current research on spirituality in the West should be done in the context of postmodernity, since contemporary spirituality in the West [and in Japan] suggests increasing disenchantment with conventional religion. Increasingly, Western research seems connected with “…the secularization process in the postmodern era, accompanied by the revival of privatization and individualization of religiosity…. [Spirituality] is connected to the affective, the rational, the cognitive, and the unconscious symbolic domains.”\textsuperscript{2176}

\textbf{Systems theory/analysis:} a form of scientific analysis influential in technical/applied sciences, such as engineering and space science, and in the social sciences, including political science, policy analysis, and anthropology, starting in the 1950s and early 1960s. Pioneers in the field include Maruyama Maguroh and Kenneth Boulding. Systems analysis attempts to picture the dynamics and interrelationships of the parts of any technical or social system through the use of systems diagrams, which graphically portray the relationships within systems through various forms of inputs, throughputs, outputs, and feedback loops. In political science, David Easton pioneered the concept of political systems in the early 1960s, which attempted systemic analysis of politics in a dynamic, rather than static, way. This form of analysis quickly became outmoded, due to its inability to handle the complexities of real politics. The use of systems analysis for policy analysis has been more influential, including the analysis of foreign policy decisions. In anthropology, systems analysis has been used to analyze policy issues, and uses of technology in contemporary societies, including agricultural and international development issues. Somewhat related to systems analysis is world system theory, developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in the early 1970s. Based upon dependency theory, Marxist-influenced world system theory argues that the nations of the world are interconnected in a worldwide system of trade in which powerful core countries dominate and impoverish the developing countries of the periphery and semi-

\textsuperscript{2173} Roof, “Spirituality,” 59-60.
\textsuperscript{2174} Max Weber, cited in Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{2175} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{2176} Gross, “Contemporary,” 425.
periphery. While influential in political science in the 1970s and 1980s, world system theory continues its importance in anthropology up to the present.

**Technological development:** Japanese scholars have identified five basic stages in technology development (not necessarily chronological): 1) acquisition of operational techniques (operations); 2) maintenance of new machines and equipment (maintenance); 3) repairs and minor modifications of foreign technologies and equipment, both in the system and in operations (repairs and modifications); 4) designing and planning (original design and creation of a system); and 5) domestic manufacturing (self-reliance in technology). Information and manufacturing capabilities are important throughout these stages.  

*Technology* (my definition, used for this research): Tools, knowledge, learning and information that people use to live and survive.

*Technology* (Glick’s anthropological definition, simplified version, used for this project): an interconnected system of tools and knowledge used in a society or economy to accomplish purposes in daily life and work.

**Technology** is “…ideas and practices which people use to maintain and enrich their material existence,” or “the means and agencies by which human societies cope with and transform their material environment.” More specifically, most western scholars of technology define it as “…any kind of practical know-how” and “…any set of standardized operations that yields predetermined results.” It includes routines, procedures, methods, machines and tools, knowledge, skills, and forms of administration and organization. Technology is also a system of inputs, throughputs, and outputs. Inputs include raw materials, parts, and knowledge, throughputs the organization and control of the manufacturing process, and outputs the completed product. Political factors and cultural values are inherent in technological processes.

Japanese scholars of technology argue that while science tries to discover universal principles and build on them, “…technology comprises all scientific knowledge deliberately and purposefully used for production, distribution, consumption, and utilization of goods, services, and information, especially that which concerns mechanical apparatus and systems.” “Traditional” technologies also include (scientific) rationality. Contemporary technology consists of five main elements (the five “Ms”), in addition to money and information: 1) raw materials, resources, and energy; 2) machines and equipment; 3) manpower (engineers and skilled workers); 4) management (technology

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2181 Ibid., 8.
2182 Ibid., 11; Hayashi, *Japanese Experience*, 52.
management and management technology); and 5) markets for technology and its products.  

Technology was traditionally seen in sociocultural anthropology as tools, simply a subset of cultural artifacts. It has been under-theorized. One example of theory is cultural ecology, the study of how human societies adapt to surrounding environments, through technology and other means. “Traditional” techniques were stressed, rather than “modern” industrial technology. Using systems theory, many recent scholars view technology as a sociotechnical or technoeconomic system, examining how “people employ artifacts to accomplish social purposes in everyday life.” Technology is seen as a socially-constructed phenomenon closely connected with the organization of work. To identify broader linkages, it may be better to include historical study of a technology’s cultural and cognitive aspects. See also Technology and culture.

Technology and cognitive factors: Since decision-makers often possess inaccurate conceptions of technology, many errors are committed in technology transfer. Disregarding complexities, they see technology as machines that can be easily transferred. Cognitive factors in technology projects are also important. Sometimes the viewpoints of decision-makers limit optimality factors; one project is considered better than none. Belief systems of actors influence choice through project stages, and project outcomes. Decision-makers’ beliefs can affect their decisions for decades. But we must not minimize constraints imposed by actual situations. Mental maps become useless if policymakers do not adjust them to changing conditions. Belief systems can be so strong as to blind decision-makers to reality; “…perceptions tend to diverge from the reality of the environment.”

Technology and culture: Technology shapes economics and history, but is itself a product of culture. Technology includes cultural values. In the early postwar period, some international organizations employed anthropologists to study how the “traditional” social structures and cultures of developing societies constrained their adoption of modern technologies, which were seen as a boon for development. Studies in the 1970s examined how the adoption of new technologies affects social change in developing and “traditional” societies.

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2185 Clemmer, Myers, and Rudden, *Julian Steward*; Cohen, *Man in Adaptation*. In Clemmer et al., especially see Introduction and Chapters 10, 12, and 14.
2187 Ibid., 466.
2188 Szyliowicz, *Politics, Technology, Development*, 8, 212, 223.
Science and technology are not neutral commodities, but inevitably influence the social structures of societies where they go.\textsuperscript{2193} Even though applied according to scientific principles, technology faces different natural and social conditions in each society. The achievement of the same technological goal must be customized for each society. The five Ms concept (see Technology) can help us to determine challenges in the technological development process. The five Ms will differ in every society, firm and factory. First, each society must select strategic areas and sectors for development, and then nurture its own indigenous engineers and technologists, without over-reliance on foreign experts for too long. For “…in spite of the diachronic, trans-cultural nature of technology, it cannot function independently of the society and culture in which it is expected to function.” Whenever a technology is transferred, the culture of the technology, surrounding it, is not transferred with it. Indigenous technologists are best suited to adapt a foreign technology to their society’s conditions.\textsuperscript{2194} The cultures and structures of organizations are an important factor in technology transfer. These factors influence technological choices and mastery by organizations.\textsuperscript{2195}

**Technology and development:** The role of science and technology in development is complex, difficult to measure, and not automatically determined. Development represents a complicated journey between “tradition” and “modernity.” Only less developed countries (LDCs) can answer how each can “…modernize without sacrificing tradition, …or preserve tradition without compromising modernization.”\textsuperscript{2196} Truly development has become an uncertain quest, involving many questions about costs, benefits, and sacrifices that may be required. Science and technology is no “magic pill” for solving development problems or value conflicts.\textsuperscript{2197} We are still a long way from achieving a complete account of how science and technology interact with development, especially given new social and environmental complexities\textsuperscript{2198}

Science and technology resources are crucial for a nation’s social and economic development. Improving economic growth is central to improving the quality of life. A wide variety of situations prevail in the LDCs concerning their science and technology resources, and no single strategy will be effective for all. Social conditions and political institutions determine how a nation is able to develop and absorb science and technology.\textsuperscript{2199} Supportive conditions are important to encourage science and technology activities in the third world. The effective flourishing of science and technology requires nations with stable, democratic, open environments supportive of innovation.\textsuperscript{2200}

Specific sectoral and development issues are also important. Both LDCs and advanced nations face great challenges because of information technologies and rapid technological change. Technical change and growth are not predetermined or

\textsuperscript{2193} Salomon, Sagasti, and Sachs-Jeantet, *Uncertain Quest*, 6-8.
\textsuperscript{2194} Hayashi, *Japanese Experience*, 52-54.
\textsuperscript{2195} Salomon, Sagasti, and Sachs-Jeantet, *Uncertain Quest*, 1-6.
\textsuperscript{2196} Ibid., 9-11.
\textsuperscript{2197} Ibid., 22-24.
\textsuperscript{2198} Ibid., 511-518.
\textsuperscript{2199} Ibid., 1-6, 9-11.
\textsuperscript{2200} Ibid., 511-518.

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inevitable. LDCs need help in determining how new technologies can help them to address crucial development issues, including social and environmental issues. Information technology solutions may help to provide low cost solutions. While we have unprecedented power to overcome poverty, technological and other gaps between advanced nations and LDCs are increasing. For these gaps to be overcome rapidly, science and technology issues must be thoroughly integrated into development strategies. Customized strategies and new frameworks are needed.

**Technology transfer:** Although the term implies an automatic, painless system, it is a costly, “...conflictual process involving many interactive dimensions—actors, mode (joint venture, licensing, etc.), content (the technology itself), channel (manpower training, plant construction, etc.), and impact.” This process moves through several stages, and problems can occur at any point. If decision-makers do not perceive the complexities, failure is more likely. Success demands much time, effort and funding from both senders and receivers.

To avoid problems in technology transfer, we should choose a technology with strong potential for enhancing and upgrading the links among a nation’s technological sectors. We should also examine and adjust the quality and quantity of the transferred technology, to make sure that it meets the needs of the region it enters. There are different levels of development (the end), and also different levels of technology (the means). Some Japanese scholars argue that in order to determine how to best make technology transfer succeed, we need to determine the general patterns of successful cases, and minimize our consideration of political and value-laden factors. On the other hand, technology transfer is full of political and ethical dilemmas, and these issues often lead to failure. International actors in the external environment and domestic political actors and states themselves have a large impact on the outcomes of technology transfers and large technology projects. Successful transfers require the necessary pre-conditions and supporting systems, including management and workers’ skills. In Japan, these factors were present.

*Technonationalism as ideology* (my version, simplified, used in this project): Technology is an important, basic part of protecting a country by making it rich and strong. This idea has been an important part of Japanese thought for several centuries.

**Technonationalism as ideology (Japan):** According to Samuels, many Japanese feel discomfort with the terms “technonationalism” and “ideology.” Technonationalism in
Japanese suggests “technoprotectionism,” while ideology connotes nationalism, militarism, the emperor, and fascism. Samuels uses the term technonationalism to signify the belief that “…technology is a fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, diffused, and nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong.” He also believes that it is an appropriate summation of useful Japanese beliefs that have influenced Japan through several centuries.209

*Translative adaptation* (my definition, used for this project): the process where a non-Western country adjusts to Western culture as it begins “modernization” and development. As this happens, the non-Western country must carefully match and adjust its own culture and values to the imported cultural items. If it does this well, it will have Western and non-Western items in its new culture, and it will develop well. If not, it may not develop well, and its culture may be destroyed.

**Translative adaptation**, a concept developed from economic anthropology and development economics, is the process where actors in a non-Western culture adjust to new elements of Western civilization by “…reinterpreting each element of Western culture” according to their own values, altering yet continuing their indigenous institutions.210 Japan is a prime example of a society that has done this. In order for a non-Western society to develop, there must be compatibility between its indigenous aspects (social institutions and values) and foreign aspects (imported organizational structures, technology). If the two aspects are successfully merged, economic development can occur. If they are not, the base society of the developing country may be destroyed.211 If the non-Western society develops successfully, it will continue with a new dual identity. Three important conclusions follow: 1) a market economy is closely connected with and embedded in the social structure of the surrounding society; 2) each society’s social structure is unique, and some societies may not be compatible with the imported market system; and 3) each society’s government must ensure that the path to economic development is customized according to each society’s unique conditions.212 This concept forms part of the ideological basis of the opposition of Japanese development economists to the universalistic, neoclassical, free market approaches to development advocated by the World Bank and other international development groups.

*Wakon yosai* (“Japanese/Eastern ethics, Western techniques) is an important ideological slogan of the late Tokugawa period coined by Sakuma Shosan (1811-1864), a leading scholar of Western learning at the time. Sakuma used the phrase to signify that Japan urgently needed to learn Western science and technology, while maintaining its own Japanese spirit.213

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210 Maegawa, “Continuity of Cultures,” 174-175.
*Weltanschauung* is “...a particular philosophy or view of life; a concept of the world held by an individual or a group.” It is often rendered “worldview” in English, from the German *Welt* (world) and *Anschauung* (perception). Most scholars agree that Immanuel Kant coined the term in 1790, essentially meaning “the sense world of perception.” Many of Kant’s successors used the term, including Hegel and Goethe. *Weltanschauung* stood beside philosophy as a companion concept, and was extremely influential in German intellectual life through the early twentieth century. German scholars of word history and the history of ideas have documented *Weltanschauung*’s history. Soon *Weltanschauung* was adopted by scholars into the Romance, Slavic and Germanic language families, and was first used in English in 1858 as “world-view.” Since then, *Weltanschauung* and worldview have become seminal concepts in the intellectual life of the Anglophone world, where they have received little attention in philosophy, unlike in the social sciences and theology. As one of the central concepts in contemporary culture and thought, this is surprising.\(^{2214}\)

The concepts of worldview in anthropology and ideology in political science are both related to *Weltanschauung*.\(^{2215}\)

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*Worldview (cognitive framework)* (my definition, used for this project): a set of pictures and ideas about the world, or a certain part of or thing in the world, that mostly makes sense, but which may not be totally correct. It includes complicated pictures about the world and how it works, based on deep, previously held beliefs. *What people and political actors see and believe affects what they do.*

*Worldview (anthropology)* is defined as the set of psychological and cultural beliefs held by members of a cultural group.\(^{2216}\)

According to Michael Kearney, worldview is “...a set of images and assumptions about the world, [a people’s] ...way of looking at reality,” the way in which the world is seen. *Worldview* provides “...a mostly coherent, though not always accurate way of thinking about the world.” It includes views of Self and Not-Self, and the relationships between them.\(^{2217}\)

Thomas Barfield argues that as anthropologists came to realize that since not all members of a society share the same views, and because cultural belief systems are constantly reshaped, the term worldview has been largely replaced with the term ideology.\(^{2218}\)

Michael Kearney disagrees. He argues that the concept of worldview is not totally outmoded, but a vibrant area of theoretical investigation.\(^{2219}\)

Anthropologists often


\(^{2216}\) Barfield, “Worldview,” 499. This evolved from the work of linguists like Edward Sapir, and the concept of the Whorfian hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, habitual patterns of language structure thought patterns.

\(^{2217}\) Kearney, *World View*, 242, and *Winds of Ixtepeji*, 43.

\(^{2218}\) Barfield, “Worldview,” 499.

\(^{2219}\) Kearney argues that the anthropological concept of worldview is similar to that of cosmology (the nature of the earth, its place in the universe, the nature of humans and our fate after death). But worldview goes beyond cosmology, and includes ideas that underlie it, such as conceptions of time, space, self, other, relationship, causality, and classification. Many of these concepts are tacit, and indirectly expressed (Kearney, “Worldview,” in *Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology*).
study the particular worldviews of different peoples.\textsuperscript{2220} Contemporary worldview theory is concerned with identifying universal structures that underlie all worldviews, so that they may be studied comparatively.\textsuperscript{2221} While earlier scholarship focused on identifying the worldviews of local communities and social groups, contemporary worldview theory looks at the worldviews of peoples in unbounded communities, of migrants, diasporas, and peoples influenced by the forces of transnationalism, global communication and cyberspace. These profoundly challenge conventional anthropological notions of “tradition” and “modernity.”\textsuperscript{2222}

**Worldview (political science):** Applied to politics and foreign policy, general worldviews/perceptions are “…not sets of beliefs so much as complicated bundles of cognition organized as images of types of states.”\textsuperscript{2223} Worldview is formed by our belief systems, “…a series of assumptions by which we explain the nature of man, our environment, and the universe.” A formalized worldview consists of usually logically related beliefs and ideas that are institutionalized and communicated authoritatively.\textsuperscript{2224} Michael Spicer defines worldview as “…pre-analytic cognitions or visions of how the world works; …they provide a frame of reference for interpreting human action on the basis of an almost instructive set of prior assumptions regarding why people act the way they do.” Worldviews do not flow from reasoning or logic; but they shape the premises and objects of our reasoning.\textsuperscript{2225} Interaction between a perceiver’s worldview and his environment affects his final judgments. Political worldviews form a basis for policy judgments, and consist of cognitive categories (see Cognitive categories).\textsuperscript{2226} Cottam identifies seven primary categories in the political worldviews of foreign policy decision-makers, images of foreign states: “…enemy, hegemonist, dependent ally of the enemy, neutral, ally, dependent of the perceiver’s state, and puppet of the perceiver’s state.”\textsuperscript{2227} She argues that these state images form the natural basis of a foreign policymaker’s worldview, and that how the policymaker categorizes a state will affect his/her assumptions for that state’s characteristics and for predicting the state’s behavior.\textsuperscript{2228}

Political scientists studying foreign policy argue that in order to know how to behave, individuals must have a certain worldview that shows them the correct order of the world, how people behave, and the role of the self. People act according to what they believe to be true about themselves. Worldviews direct their perceptions, uses of information, and role expectations, and reinforce actors’ understandings of events, their causes and correct order. As cognitive structures begin to share a “…meaningful,

\textsuperscript{2220} Anthropologists also study factors that influence worldviews, including geographic environments, social organization, and technological systems. Much of the work on the latter two areas is by Marxist-influenced scholars (Kearney, “Worldview,” 1381-1382).
\textsuperscript{2221} While certain universals may be identified, worldviews about phenomena such as self, time, and space differ significantly between and also within societies (Ibid.).
\textsuperscript{2222} Ibid., 1380-1383.
\textsuperscript{2223} Cottam, Images and Intervention, 10.
\textsuperscript{2224} Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, Enemies, 19.
\textsuperscript{2225} Hayes, Limits of Policy Change, 8.
\textsuperscript{2226} Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making, 26, 23.
\textsuperscript{2227} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{2228} Ibid., 55-56.
cognitive whole,” they become the central deciding factor of the intrastate and supranational system of [political] organization. Worldview serves the psychological function of organization.…”

Recent American public policy scholars identify two predominant worldviews of political order, rationalist and anti-rationalist. The former worldview sees humankind as perfectible, altruistic, and supports the capacity of science and government to solve human problems. The anti-rationalists argue that humans are fallible and self-interested. Social problems cannot best be resolved through unlimited government, but rather through the spread of knowledge through economic systems, such as the free market. Both of these worldviews evolve very different visions of equality, freedom, and justice.


**APPENDIX**

**Timeline of Japanese History**

*(List of Historical Periods)*

Jōmon………………………………………………………c. 10,000 BC to c. 300 BC

Yayoi………………………………………………………..c. 300 BC to c. AD 300

Kofun………………………………………………………..c. AD 300 TO 710

Nara, capital: Heijo (Nara) .................................710 to 794

Heian, capital: Heian (Kyoto) .................................794 to 1185

Kamakura, capital: Kamakura ......................1185 to 1333

Muromachi, capital: Muromachi (Kyoto) ........1336 to 1568

Azuchi-Momoyama, capital: Azuchi, Momoyama (Kyoto). 1568 to 1600

Tokugawa (Edo), capital: Edo .........................1600 to 1868

Meiji, capital: Tokyo ........................................1868 to 1912

Taisho, capital: Tokyo .......................................1912 to 1926

Showa, capital: Tokyo ......................................1926 to 1989

Heisei, capital: Tokyo .................................1989 to present
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